Pakistan army Green book 2019

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Green Book 2019 PAKISTAN ARMY

Changing Global Scenario and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Sardar Masood Khan

The Hybrid Challenge: Whose Problem is it anyway? Dr Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

Re-appraisal of the Principles of War and their Relationship with Tenets of Military Strategy Lieutenant General Raza Muhammad Khan, HI (M) (Retired)

Tackling Terrorism: Pernicious Implications of Poor Policing Dr Muhammad Shoaib Suddle

Lawfare as an Instrument of Foreign Policy Barrister Ahmer Bilal Soofi

An Analysis of Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Potentials against Non-State Actors: Case Study of ISIS Ms Sidra Jamil Bajwa

Administration of Swat Handed Back to Civil Authorities after 11 Years

PAKISTAN ARMY General Headquarters Rawalpindi

Pakistan Army Green Book

A Research Journal of Pakistan Army, recognised by the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan

DISCLAIMER The contents of this book are writers’ personal views. The statements, facts and opinions by the authors in the Green Book do not imply the official policy of the institution, editors or the publisher.

ISSN 2303-9973 Copyrights General Headquarters, Rawalpindi All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Doctrine and Evaluation Directorate, Inspector General Training and Evaluation Branch, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi.

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Note from the Patron-in-Chief

GENERAL QAMAR JAVED BAJWA, NI (M) Chief of Army Staff

The current stream of geo politics is extremely volatile and the strategic environment is changing at a pace, not witnessed hither-to-fore. Challenges oscillate along a wide spectrum ranging from conventional to the Hybrid /Grey Hybrid Zones, warranting well considered and adroit responses at each level of the strategic paradigm. Notwithstanding the upward trajectory, Pakistan still has some very peculiar challenges to confront. The 5th Generation Warfare that we are currently subjected to, demands a ‘Whole of the Nation’ approach with inputs from all Elements of National Power. In the current edition of Pakistan Army Green Book, some of our leading scholars and strategic practitioners have touched upon most of the critical issues faced by the country and have proffered their insightful analysis, opinions and viable recommendations, worth reading. Pakistan Army Green Book has evolved at fast pace in the last few years and has improved substantially in the quality of contents and relevance. The credit goes to its contributing authors, the editorial team and the advisory board. I wish them well in their future endeavours. Green Book 2019

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PATRON

Note from the Editor-in-Chief Green Book, the flagship publication of Pakistan Army, offers intellectual discourse on diverse range of subjects of significance by eminent research scholars, think tanks and practitioners. The current edition sheds light on Hybrid, Cyber and Lawfare Challenges besides other contemporary issues. We are highly indebted to our esteemed authors for their quality contributions. Please feel free to exchange your ideas and opinion.

Lieutenant General Sher Afgun, HI (M)

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sardar Masood Khan

Salman Bashir

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50 The Hybrid Challenge: Whose Problem is it anyway?

Major General Fida Hussain Malik, HI (M)

EDITORS

Dr Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi & Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

Brigadier Muhammad Farooq Colonel Saif Ullah Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Bilal Usmani

ADVISORY BOARD Lieutenant General Naeem Khalid Lodhi, Hl (M) (Retired) Brigadier Dr Naeem Haider, SI (M) Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema President and Executive Director of Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema Dean FCS, National Defence University Islamabad, Pakistan Dr Zulfqar Khan Head of Department, Strategic Studies National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan Dr Rizwana Karim Abbasi National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan Dr Zafar Khan National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan Dr Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi Cranfield University, UK Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe University of Loughborough, UK Dr Peter Caddick Adams Cranfield University, UK

Pakistan and the Shifting Configuration of Geo-Politics

Changing Global Scenario and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

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Re-appraisal of the Principles of War & their Relationship with Tenets of Military Strategy

Impact of CPEC on Pakistan in Social, Demographic, Economic and Legal Domains

Lieutenant General Raza Muhammad Khan, HI (M) (Retired)

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Brigadier Kamal Azfar & Lieutenant Colonel Wasif Mahmood

Lawfare as an Instrument of Foreign Policy Barrister Ahmer Bilal Soofi

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Strategic Transformation of the Pakistan Economy through Special Economic Zones: A Pragmatic Approach Dr Zafar Mahmood

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Cybersecurity: An Essential Element of National Security

China: Economic Bulwark Against Terrorism? Lesson for others

Brigadier Dr Abdul Rauf, Brigadier Dr Ashraf Masood (Retired), Ms Narmeen Shafqat

Imtiaz Gul

91 An Analysis of Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Potentials against Non-State Actors: Case Study of ISIS

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150 National Response to Cyber Threats

Brigadier Dr Tughral Yamin (Retired)

Ms Sidra Jamil Bajwa

168 Tackling Terrorism: Pernicious Implications of Poor Policing

Mineral Wealth of Pakistan Dr Samar Mubarakmand, NI, HI, SI

Dr Muhammad Shoaib Suddle

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Growing Strategic Coercion Against Pakistan: Challenges & Response Brigadier Sheikh Ghulam Jilani

129 Climate Change as a National Security Imperative for Pakistan

Shafqat Kakakhel

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The Last Post: Major General Sana Ullah Khan, T Bt (Shaheed) - A Soldiers’ General, Loving Father & an Affectionate Husband

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CHANGING GLOBAL SCENARIO AND

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Honourable President Azad Jammu & Kashmir Sardar Masood Khan is an established diplomat and has served on several important assignments during his esteemed career. He is an ardent campaigner for the rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir

Abstract The regional and international challenges resulted in Pakistan’s alliance and reliance on the US and the Western World. Consequently, Pakistan joined the US sponsored pacts i.e. SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955 respectively. In 1960s. Pakistan’s relations with China were developed border agreement was signed between the two countries in 1963 and during Indo-Pak War of 1965 China supported Pakistan on all stages. In 1970s. Pakistan’s foreign policy saw the new dimensions in wake of separation of East Pakistan and the Afghan war in 1979. These developments influenced Pakistan greatly and brought Pakistan towards US and the Western World. On the other hand, cordial and friendly relations were also developed with the Muslim World, especially the Arabs and China. With present rapidly changing global scenario where power is diffusing, there is a need to craft Pakistan’s foreign policy intelligently and diligently. Keywords: Foreign Policy, Multi Polarity, BRI, New World Order, Changing Global Scenario

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Changing Global Scenario The United States will continue to remain a pre-eminent power or, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, an ‘indispensable nation’ in the World Order because it remains a global leader in innovation, intellect, science and technology, communications, and industry. But other nations are emulating and catching up and narrowing the gap with the US.

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America’s exceptionalism is being challenged by the emergent powers and by champions of global connectivity who advocate propagation and adherence to the rule of law at the international level

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he world’s geopolitics is passing through a period of historical transformation. The World Order led by the West since the end of the Cold War is under severe stress because of a number of factors. Questions are being raised about the United States’ overall moral and political leadership of the globe. America’s exceptionalism is being challenged by the emerging powers and by champions of global connectivity who advocate propagation and adherence to the rule of law at the international level. The rise of ethnic nationalism and centrifugal forces in West (Europe) are seen as indications of a period of uncertainty. Russia is assertive vis-a-vis the West; and a Cold War between the US and China, driven by perceived bipolarity, is unfolding. The Arab Spring has paused but not died down. The Middle East and many regions of Africa are being consumed by civil wars and intra-regional warfare. Latin America seems to be relatively calm. The Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region, though prospering economically, are being primed as a platform for great power contest.

every country for themselves”) have been pedalled. One theory has been expounded by the Chinese leadership advocating cooperation rather than confrontation between the existing power, the US, and the emerging power, China, by avoiding the so-called Thucydides Trap.2 China asserts the transnational Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is an essential part, is designed to connect nations, not divide them. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (commonly known as the Quad) comprising the US, Japan, Australia and India do not agree; they contend that the BRI process is disruptive. Disruptive to the existing World Order? The Former US Defence Secretary James Mattis has questioned the monopoly of one country – China – over trade routes.

James Norman Mattis - United States’ Former Secretary of Defence

China is, cumulatively, planning to invest US $ 1 trillion in energy, infrastructure and industrial projects, under the framework of the

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Today, the World Order does not have a singular doctrine. Broadly speaking, theories about G-2 (the world to be co-managed by the US and China), multipolarity, and G-Zero (a world of every country for themselves) have been pedalled

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From Washington, the world will continue to get contradictory signals of America First implying isolation and withdrawal; and assertion of American leadership in regard to global decisionmaking. In the meantime, China’s meteoric rise will continue and will keep on altering the global and regional power relations. Today, the World Order does not have a singular doctrine. Broadly speaking, theories about G-2 (the world to be co-managed by the US and China), multi polarity and G-Zero1 (“a world of

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MSCI ACWI & FRONTIER MARKETS INDEX MSCI EMERGING & FRONTIER MARKETS INDEX

MSCI ACWI INDEX MSCI WORLD INDEX

MSCI EMERGING MARKETS INDEX

MSCI FRONTIER MARKETS INDEX

DEVELOPED MARKETS

EMERGING MARKETS

FRONTIER MARKETS

Americas

Europe & Middle East

Pacific

Americas

Europe, Middle Asia East & Africa

Americas

Europe & CIS

Africa

Middle East

Asia

Canada United States

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Israel Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom

Australia Hong Kong Japan New Zealand Singapore

Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru

Czech Republic Egypt Greece Hungary Poland Qatar Russia South Africa Turkey United Arab Emirates

Argentina

Croatia Estonia Lithuania Kazakhstan Romania Serbia Slovenia

Kenya Mauritius Morocco Nigeria Tunisia WAEMU2

Bahrain Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Oman

Bangladesh Sri Lanka Vietnam

China India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Pakistan Philippines Taiwan Thailand

MSCI STANDALONE MARKET INDEX Saudi Arabia

https://www.msci.com/market-classification

BRI, supported by some 68 countries in three continents – Asia, Africa and Europe. Despite all the complementarities between the US and China, their relationship is now rocked by mutually damaging tariff wars. In this emerging confrontation between the architects of the post-World War II World Order and its challengers, the next five to ten years are crucial. There are broadly three possibilities of what may happen. First, the West and its allies try to maintain the status quo by bolstering the dominance of capitalism and liberal democracies around the globe through internal reforms, better economic performance, enhancement in global military capabilities and overcoming their family feuds. Second, China, Russia and other major powers succeed in altering the global strategic, military and economic order in which the existing and emerging nations coexist under a new code of conduct and new terms of reference, thus creating a genuinely multipolar world. Third, the first two scenarios do not materialise and the world, like in the first half of the twentieth century, is engulfed by wars, conflicts and violence on the regional and global scales. The third scenario seems most improbable because global citizens and even national governments will be averse to world wars and global strife because of their devastating effects on lifestyles, economic growth and prospects for human development. Equipped with nuclear weapons, countries would know that conflict beyond a certain limit will be suicidal. The currency for survival, security and deterrence, will be hard power, while soft power would be used to gain influence and

Jamaica Panama3 Trinidad & Tobago

Bosnia Herzegovina Bulgaria Ukraine

Botswana Ghana Zimbabwe

Palestine

project a positive image among nations. Military competition, in both strategic and conventional realms, will sharpen and accelerate. An arms’ race between China and the US has already started. The maintenance of continued equilibrium in state relations will depend on the viability and success of economic models of the leading nations. In this new phase, there would be massive redistribution of wealth within and among nations, with billions of people climbing up the prosperity ladder; and there would be demand and acceptance of more responsive and accountable governance, while democracy, in various forms, will sweep the globe. One common threat to the global community, besides wars and development of weapons of mass destruction, will be climate change, which will require a universal approach.

The UN will struggle with regards to hard core strategic, political and economic issues, because of real politik and the interests of existing and emerging powers. However, it would be allowed to play a leading role on sustainable economic development and human rights, though with certain limitations imposed by major powers. As far as peace and security are concerned, powerful Green Book 2019

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Thirty seven countries, including Pakistan, have been listed amongst emerging economies which will compete for wealth and markets and will claim a major chunk of global wealth

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nations will continue to exert their diplomatic authority and use military instruments in their spheres of influence and areas of strategic interest. Matters of peace and security of lesser importance for global players, such as in Africa, will be left to the UN in regard to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. Economics will play a key role in shaping the future World Order, generating and redistributing wealth, and determining power configurations. In 2018, the size of the nominal global GDP is roughly $ 87.6 trillion (or $ 135 trillion by power purchasing parity) and is poised to grow rapidly in the years to come. Thirty seven countries, including Pakistan,3 have been listed amongst emerging economies which will compete for wealth and markets and will claim a major chunk of global wealth. The performance of these economies will hinge on development and goods and services’ sectors, strong domestic economies, demand for products and services from the developed countries, stable currency, growth and availability of commodities and agricultural produce, growing per capita income, domestic and foreign capital investment, and mechanisms to lower governments’ debts. An interface of new technologies and the ongoing economic revolution will transform our individual and collective lives, and relations among nations. Nations, even those inimical to each other, will become interdependent in many spheres. New technologies, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, 3D and 4D printing, biotechnology, lethal autonomous weapons’ systems, and compact, miniaturised batteries, will redefine the ways in which we will transact, run enterprises, get education, provide health facilities, drive, work, make war and peace, and sustain a postmodern civilisation. Those who will lag behind in acquiring these new technologies and incorporating them in their education systems and economies will be left behind. It goes without saying that nations, that have internal stability and political continuity, will show more promise and resilience in fighting off volatilities in the global strategic and economic environment. High levels of tolerance, respect for pluralism and diversity and harmony will contribute to peace and economic development within and among nations. 4

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If one looks at the history of the past 150 years, the world has moved from the Concert of Europe to the League of Nations to the United Nations to bipolarity to multi-polarity. The next phase could be one of genuine multilateralism, though still dominated by big power interests, with the UN entrusted to play a larger role on global commons, environment, non-proliferation and human security.

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Foreign policy, in practice, is a product of a Whole-of-Government, or to be even more precise, a Whole of State endeavour. All ministries and divisions dealing with financial, economic and trade matters, defence and security, intelligence, energy, industry, agriculture, environment and culture must participate in the formulation of foreign policy and its execution. For this kind of policy making, elaborate mechanisms should be in place in order to respond to emerging and complex challenges collectively and inclusively. The silo mentality spells disaster; while synergy amongst all actors and stakeholders produces better results in both pushing the national agenda and course correction. Above all, there should be strong political leadership by the Prime Minister keeping in view the global trends and national interests.

The initial contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy were defined during the Cold War period. Some of our statements and strategies still date back to that era. The world has moved on and is moving on. Pakistan’s foreign policy makers continue to make the necessary adjustments to the changing times. While adhering to our national postulates, pragmatism and realism should be injected into the system for economic gains and transactions for the nation. The US is not happy with Pakistan’s strong partnership with China, especially in the context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and certain quarters within may present it as a zero-sum game,

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reminiscent of George W. Bush’ “You’re either with us, or against us”. But Pakistan and the US have been longstanding allies. The periodic rupture or volatility in Pak-US relations need not be hyped and considered a permanent feature. There are many ways to repair strained relations. One must remember that China and the US, despite their sharp rivalry, maintain channels and forums open for bilateral strategic and economic dialogue, because isolationism is not a possibility in this connected world. Doors must remain open for Pakistan in the US to benefit from modern technologies, education, commerce, and entrepreneurship, while Pakistan further cements its ties with China. The process of exploring new avenues of cooperation with Russia is important for both countries, as well as the region. Growing ties with Russia will add on regional security environment and strengthen Pakistan’s manufacturing and trading sectors; whereas the primary purpose of engagement with the European Union, the Gulf Region and East Asia should be investment and trade.

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, “Hide your strength, bide your time”, is also good advice for Pakistan too; but a prerequisite for the application of this adage is that Pakistan, while building its strength, and avoiding strategic entanglements that dissipate and squander its energies, also does not allow any encroachment on its sovereignty.

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India, in contravention to universally recognised principles, is adamant that it would have no such conversation on Kashmir because it has already declared Jammu and Kashmir its integral part

A full rapprochement with India will not be possible without a lasting resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the principles of selfdetermination and wishes of the Kashmiri people. India, in contravention to universally recognised principles, is adamant that it would have no such conversation on Kashmir because it has already declared Jammu and Kashmir its integral part. Intermittent cycles of bilateral talks in the past have yielded no results.

Human Rights’ violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir

Bilateral engagement with India, even though cosmetic in effect, shrinks space for Kashmir advocacy in the international community and to the international human rights’ movement, because during the talks they believe that India and Pakistan themselves are sorting out the issues relating to Kashmir and human rights. Meanwhile Kashmiris continue to be killed, maimed, incarceratedW and tortured on a massive scale by Indian armed forces. Pakistan’s bilateral dialogue with India on Kashmir and other matters, cannot be in isolation and cannot obviate Pakistan and the Kashmiris to credibly raise the issues of self-determination and human rights in the UN forums and various parliaments – The European Parliament, The British Parliament, The US Congress, for instance, – and global civil society that influence policy making.

Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi during his meeting with United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres stressed on the need for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute. (September 2018)

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Pakistan is on the right track by continuing to invest in the efforts for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan and enlisting regional stakeholders. It, obviously, cannot do it alone, as it needs the support of Afghan Government, Taliban, US and China. Courtney Cooper and Samir Kumar, in a blog post4on the Council on Foreign Relations website, talk about the need for, what they call, overcoming the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. They write: “The prisoner’s dilemma is a fundamental example in game theory where rational actors (in this case, the United States, the Afghan government and polity, the Taliban, Pakistan, and regional actors) fail to cooperate even if they would benefit from doing so. In this example, each actor would benefit from a peaceful outcome in Afghanistan but may perceive unacceptable short-term costs associated with that outcome.” What is little appreciated is that Pakistan has borne the brunt of the war in Afghanistan and its spillover but its initiatives to jumpstart an Afghan peace process have been repeatedly thwarted for various reasons. This vicious cycle should be broken by developing a strategy that would address the concerns of other players, while protecting Pakistan’s vital interests. It is evident that against the backdrop of the changing global scenarios, as outlined above, Pakistani foreign policy’s two main priorities are national security and economic development. National security entails a stable political system, national unity and conditions for the entire population to move ahead. In addition, Pakistan needs to work for pursuit of peace through preparedness for war. It is here that the best tools of foreign policy will be used to enhance national power. Technologically, Pakistan has done well in developing conventional and strategic deterrence. The diplomatic pincer of foreign policy has successfully ensured that Pakistan, as a nuclear weapon state, is part of the international discourse on nuclear diplomacy. However, in 2008, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), with the active backing of the US, gave a waiver to India, a nonNPT nuclear state like Pakistan, from its rules regulating civilian and nuclear trade, thus creating

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It is evident that against the backdrop of the changing global scenarios, Pakistani foreign policy’s two main priorities are national security and economic development

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a discriminatory hierarchy. Despite this waiver and resolute efforts by US’ diplomats, India could not enter into the NSG as a member. Ten years later, in 2018, the US announced another waiver for India in the form of the Strategic Trade Authorisation Tier-I License Exemption, which enables India to acquire sensitive technology, without Congressional oversight or approval, and paves the way for the establishment of the US’ high-tech industry in India (followed by the French and Russian enterprises).

The irony is that such waivers by powerful NSG members, which do not strictly conform to the NSG rules, are not in line with international obligations. While Pakistan must have all rights to legitimate nuclear trade, there is a large coalition of NSG members, all NPT states, who want a just, criteria-based formula for entry of new members into the NSG. Since 1947, Pakistani diplomats have been traditionally focusing on narrowly defined political issues, though in relatively bigger missions, economic and commercial counsellors and attachés are appointed. There is a need to focus on economic diplomacy with more energy. While the external economic relations are entrusted to the Economic Affairs Division and international financial matters to the Finance Ministry, Ambassadors and diplomatic missions are expected to achieve goals on investment and trade. Besides, traders, investors and entrepreneurs are not fully involved or integrated into the exercise. Despite these systemic handicaps, Pakistani mission do adopt a proactive approach and try to expand investment opportunities for Pakistan and promote Pakistani exports. To get best results, continuous review and empowerment is supported for leading economic diplomacy and producing tangible results.

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Pakistan’s youth bulge and broad demographic trends bode well for fast GDP growth, but woefully low investment in human capital remains a weakness which must be redressed to realise Pakistan’s full economic potential

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There is also the fact that in order to promote exports there should be exportable surpluses in sufficient quantities; and that requires development of robust manufacturing, services and commodities’ sectors. Pakistan needs to be optimally represented at the global financial, economic and trade forums and conferences. Sure, Pakistan should be selective in choosing where to show up, but it must be present where decisions are being made which impact Pakistan’s economy and integrate Pakistan into regional and global economies. In the new phase, Pakistan should go global and think big. Pakistan’s youth bulge and broad demographic trends bode well for fast GDP growth, but woefully low investment in human capital remains a weakness which must be redressed to realise Pakistan’s full economic potential.

For economic diplomacy to succeed, Pakistan should diversify its export base, reduce reliance on textiles and raw materials, and develop highend manufacturing, digital industry and services’ sectors.

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The CPEC is under fire from friend and foe alike. This is partly because of a failure in communication. The CPEC is being painted by vested interests as part of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. Pakistan should confidently and authoritatively convey to all interested interlocutors all over the world that the credit extended to it for the mega-project is on favourable rates and conditions and that Pakistan would be able to pay it back. Besides, the CPEC is a catalyst for making Pakistan a regional trade and investment hub; it is not an end itself. One should also rightly exude confidence that Pakistan would remain solvent in the transitional period and is fast becoming a success story. This, in turn, will build confidence of foreign investors to enter into Pakistani market and supply chains. To make Pakistan’s foreign policy effective, a further effective strategy must be developed to tap the full potential of approximately 9 million strong Diaspora Communities. Government should conceive modules for win-win partnerships, whereby resourceful community members make profitable investments in Pakistan and project Pakistan’s interests in their adopted countries. This is the model that has been followed by China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and many other emerging nations. The trend has started in Pakistan but it is at an incipient level; it needs to be expanded to a critical scale. Pakistan’s foreign policy will produce better results if it is supported by positive and supportive narratives churned out by the media, think tanks, and academic institutions. This has been a weak area so far but with the growing educated middle class, presence of talented Pakistanis all around the world, who understand the dynamics of effective communication, Pakistan should be able to bridge this gap. Allocation of resources and institutional support are a must for energising the Diaspora community and sharpening communication skill sets. Mere aspirational hectoring will not lure these communities. Water diplomacy is now recognised as a distinct discipline and is practiced to prevent and resolve water conflicts. It requires that water diplomats and negotiators have special skills and technical expertise while acting as representatives of upper or lower riparian states, as well as of

To make Pakistan’s foreign policy effective, a further effective strategy must be developed to tap the full potential of approximately 9 million strong Diaspora Communities. Government should conceive modules for win-win partnerships, whereby resourceful community members make profitable investments in Pakistan and project Pakistan’s interests in their adopted countries

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other stakeholders who speak for the interests of agricultural, industrial, energy, health and environmental constituencies.

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For economic diplomacy to succeed, Pakistan should diversify its export base, reduce reliance on textiles and raw materials, and develop high-end manufacturing, digital industry and services’ sectors

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effective by taking all stakeholders on board. This is imperative because India, in coming years, is aggressively working on a series of dams that include Sawalkote (1856 MW), Kirthai I (390 MW), Kirthi II (930 MW), Pakal Dul (1000 MW), Kwar (540 MW), Kiru (624 MW), and Bursar (800 MW), all in contravention to internal principles and commitments. Pakistan’s water diplomacy has been conducted traditionally in isolation, without looking at the big picture and without closely consulting all stakeholders in the state apparatus. Pakistani Indus Water Commissioners, who have led talks with their Indian counterparts, though had good technical knowledge, lacked sufficient diplomatic or negotiating skills and full interministerial support. India very deftly and speedily built dams, such as the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams, during periods of high tension between India and Pakistan, when there was nearly complete breakdown in communication between the two countries. Pakistan’s approach towards water diplomacy must be revisited and revamped to make it more Notes 1.

2.

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Jones, Bruce, The New Geopolitics, November 17, 2017, Brookings Institution website War becomes inevitable when a rising power causes fear in an established power.

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Conclusion In the rapidly changing global environment, Pakistan needs a dynamic, proactive and forwardlooking foreign policy. While firefighting will remain part of day to day conduct of foreign policy, a long-term vision of our foreign policy, anchored in Pakistan’s national security paradigm, extending to year 2050, should be developed and pursued. This would not be a unilinear tunnel vision but a flexible framework that would adjust and respond to future developments and vicissitudes. The core of this vision should be that, by 2050, Pakistan will rise holistically to become one of the top twenty developed and strong nations of the world, economically and militarily, with levels of human development reaching those prevalent in West Europe today. 3. 4.

In August 2017, Pakistan was upgraded from a ‘frontier market’ to an ‘emerging market’ by the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) Index. Courtney Cooper and Samir Kumar: from Strength Through Peace and Center for Preventive Action: Overcoming the Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reach Peace in Afghanistan, cfr.org

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THE HYBRID CHALLENGE: WHOSE PROBLEM IS IT ANYWAY? Abstract Hybrid warfare blends conventional and unconventional means to achieve policy ends. Combining means and approaches in such ways is not entirely new. Lineage of such combinations can be traced back to the ancient world. What we witness today, is a potent mix of old and new forms of warfare enabled by technologies around the internet offering nuances and permutations the likes and gravity of which were simply not possible before. We will discuss three distinct arenas in which this adaptive form of warfare creates effects, namely: the conventional battlefield; the social sphere; and last but not least, the diplomatic, political and economic stage of international politics. We observe the complexity of defence against this tripartite warfare on the part of any state or alliance and the inherent challenges and deficiency in systems thinking to provide a determined counter strategy over all three arenas over a sustained period. A significant component of hybrid war is insurgency. We find a particularly dangerous post-structural evolution in insurgency that we describe as 3rd Generation Insurgency (3GI) that particularly renders military power ineffective. The breadth and scope of hybrid threats create issues in response ownership and strategies that are difficult to articulate unless we fundamentally alter how threats are perceived and analysed. In short we need to start thinking outside of familiar systems. We posit an ‘adaptive’ approach to deal with adaptive threats and the complex challenges of hybrid war. Keywords: Hybrid War, Adaptive War, Adaptive Threat, Indirect Warfare, Insurgency Paradigm Shift, 3rd Generation Insurgency

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Dr Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi is a retired Brigadier from Pakistan Army. He is currently a Senior Lecturer of Leadership and Strategy at Cranfield University, UK

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe is currently Professor of International Security and International Relations at the University of Loughborough, UK. She is also a Visiting Fellow at the Rothermere Institute at the University of Oxford

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H

ybrid warfare is currently a organisations to act in concert against a threat or, fashionable term used to describe alternatively, may take the form of disruption and the state of contemporary war. physical revision of international norms as we saw Hybrid war is a type of military and in Russian actions over Ukraine and Crimea. political conduct which is widely Diplomacy and winning a battle of persuasion understood to blend conventional is no mean feat in an era where truth is elusive and and unconventional means with features of contested and propaganda eminently powerful. To regular and irregular war, and supported or led defend against such tripartite warfare/insurgency by the application of other elements of national is to say the least difficult and requires on the part powers.1 While that of any state or alliance combination is not a determined counterentirely new, we now strategy over all the Hybrid war is a type of military witness the potent three arenas, enacted addition of cyber-attacks, over a sustained period. and political conduct which is widely fake news, electoral In this article we understood to blend conventional and intervention in the affairs examine the recent of other states and a unconventional tactics with features of history of hybrid warfare wide spread utilisation arguing that after the regular and irregular war, and supported of local groups, some of end of the Cold War, the or led by the application of other elements which may be terrorist, collapse of the bi-polar to inspire disharmony world permitted shifts of national power and confusion in the and changes in war target country or warzone. Insurgency, in its evolved enabling a wide range of actors to take advantage form, is now a potent mix of old and new means. of ideological voids and political instability. We Some commentators have traced the lineage of identify some crucial and new elements in the such hybrid/mixed behaviour back to the ancient character of hybrid wars and the nature of hybrid world.2 One of the key enablers of this form of warfare is new technologies developing around the internet. Foremost among these are communication strategies, to rapidly promote a political agenda and incite public disruption. In short, the ‘people’ are targeted not just in a conventional sense by warfare, but emotional and personal messages are directed to individuals and constantly reinforced; perhaps, even via their mobile phones. A hybrid war, therefore, has three distinct arenas: first utilisation or posturing for a conventional battlefield; second provoking unrest and dissension among communities through careful use of information and events, and third; a variety of actions on the diplomatic, political and economic stage of international politics. This An analyst looks at codes in the malwares section third arena is one in which states might engage of a cybersecurity defence laboratory, Russia with allies to persuade international and regional

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threats, in particular the evolution of insurgency towards a form, particularly, suited as strategic line within a hybrid war strategy. We argue that while the breadth and scope of hybrid threats ought to make it a cross government and societal concern, ownership and response are difficult to articulate unless we fundamentally alter how threats are perceived and analysed and unless we think outside of familiar systems. Finally, we allude, in our sum-up to ‘adaptive’ approach to deal with the complex challenge of hybrid war and a particularly dangerous paradigm creating a new generation of insurgent movements.

BACKGROUND History and Evolution After the end of the Cold War, contradictory trends in warfare were apparent. For many scholars during the 1990s, the end of the Soviet Union had brought about a new ‘world order’ in which international politics had taken on a more optimistic shape. Some scholars even expressed the sentiment that war itself had been unlearnt and had been consigned to historical memory alongwith other arcane practises such as duelling and slavery.3 In some versions of this theory, hard military power had been replaced by ‘soft’ power.4 However, any idea that war had, or has, gone away was simply incorrect. Throughout the 1990s, civil wars and proxy wars as well as terrorist threats proliferated across the globe. But where Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were prescient was in their prediction over how important ‘soft’ power would become. It certainly features in hybrid warfare thus leading us to the rather simplistic but accurate claim that hybrid war is a mix of hard power

Hybrid war is a mix of hard power and soft power

and soft power. Cultural power too is important allowing many or indeed all sides to claim to be the custodians not just of religious sentiment, ethnic and historical traditions, but keepers of sacred sites and artefacts.5 At the time much of this complexity was not recognised. At the turn of the century and perhaps in the glow of ‘winning’ the Cold War, Western 12

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military dominance seemed assured. The Bosnian War had been eventually resolved and NATO prided itself on the defeat of Serbia and the liberation of Kosovo. The Kosovo War did not lead to a single combat fatality on the Western side. This and the mode of winning the war from the air with so-called precision bombing, led to the idea of a ‘Virtual War’6 and the belief that future wars would follow the same pattern. Indeed, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) seemed to have brought about an age of accurate targeting and fewer civilian casualties. Liberal states could, it seemed, wage war at a distance with few sacrifices for their troops and little disruption for domestic politics. There were of course, despite the rhetoric, unintended casualties on the other side with some caused directly by the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. Future war, it seemed, was to be short, sharp and distant – at least for Western states. The events of 9/11 transformed the context of war. Rather than forgetting war, states such as the US and the UK proved enthusiastic for military action against not just those who had perpetrated the terrorist attacks on the US homeland but those deemed unsettling to international order and Western interests. Hence, with the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), a traditional type of warfare returned – that of conventional ‘boots on the ground’.

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We saw, too, the emergence of multiple militias some of which were controlled and sustained by external actors and the operation of a variety of criminal gangs which fed off the human and

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Founder of ISIS

material resources of the area for political and economic gain. Refugees and those fleeing the war zones of the region came to be utilised for political as well as financial capital. The so-called ‘weaponisation’ of the migrant issue in politicised hybrid warfare is a subject of considerable importance as the homeless and dispossessed provide vulnerable terrain for predatory groups and states. What we also witnessed was the refinement of an older idea, the IED (Improvised Explosive Device) and its wide spread use by the insurgents. IEDs along with suicide bombers operating among hostile populations pressured coalition forces to shift their mode of operations both in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in the subsequent conflict in Libya.

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After more than a decade of bloody wars and increasing casualties on all sides the US and its allies abandoned the fight in Iraq and attempted an exit from Afghanistan. The hope was to keep ‘boots off the ground’ and utilise new technologies to counter and kill opponents: Counter-insurgency without regular soldiering

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Even so, the opening episodes in these wars appeared to confirm earlier trends; the initial Afghan campaign reflected in many ways the Kosovo war, fought initially by the West largely from the air with the added involvement of special operations’ teams to hunt down Al-Qaeda. Iraq involved a larger military deployment, but airpower remained crucial in that arena too. Planners expected a short, decisive campaign with relatively little resistance. However, the ‘9/11 wars’ did not prove easy.7 Victory is not complete till the enemy’s will to continue fighting is sufficiently eroded. In a conventional war, this usually occurs when the counter-offensive is defeated. In both these conflicts, however, the counter-offensive came in a different mode from that of the offensive and through enemies that had morphed within civil society. Opposition, therefore, came in the shape of a complex and multifaceted insurgency.8 The insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq transformed these wars into the type of quagmire where Western troops encountered the brutality of not just insurgency, but endemic violence, waged by a variety of sub-state actors, some of which were proxy forces, some of which were fighting civil wars and all of which had their own local or regional agenda. The eventual chaos in Iraq, after a series of blunders by invading troops provided the breeding ground for not just Al-Qaeda to evolve and adapt but for the beginning of ISIS.

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It is perhaps worth noting that contemporary hybrid warfare of which drones are a part raises any number of important questions about the limits of sovereignty and the legality of interference/subversion/assassination of the citizens of other states

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After more than a decade of bloody wars and increasing casualties on all sides the US and its allies abandoned the fight in Iraq and attempted an exit from Afghanistan. The hope was to keep ‘boots off the ground’ and utilise new technologies to counter and kill opponents: Counter-insurgency without regular soldiering. This trend was exemplified by the widespread use of armed drones to eradicate opponents in Afghanistan, in Pakistan and in Yemen. This use of armed drones by both (the US Military and the CIA) to execute enemies became characteristic of the first term of the Obama Administration inspiring considerable debate about the legality of killing/assassinating individuals both inside and outside of zones of conflict.9 Drone surveillance also caused unmeasured and possibly immeasurable psychological and physiological stress on the affected population that heard the mosquito like buzz of armed drones above and lived in the fear of the next strike. It is perhaps worth noting that contemporary hybrid warfare of which drones are a part raises any number of important questions about the limits of sovereignty and the legality of interference/ subversion/assassination of the citizens of other states. The desire on the part of some states, but most noticeably the United States not to commit manpower into theatres of war, was reinforced during the ‘Arab Spring’. The uprisings across the Arab world against brutal rulers such as the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 were characterised in Western circles by a desire to ‘encourage’ the overthrow of unsavoury regimes that it could no longer work with and to do so without the committal of significant troop numbers other than small special operations’ teams and intelligence units. In the Libyan action there were, therefore, few casualties for the European powers. The conflict in Syria since 2011 has also been characterised by an American reluctance to commit ‘ordinary’ troops, but the utilisation of massive strategic and tactical bombing. This is coupled with an overt encouragement of rebel and militia groups and the use of military contractors. The deployment too of private military personnel is a feature of most modern conflicts in which Western powers are involved. The way of war is now, as it was in Kosovo, military action at a distance. The continued and increasing use of armed drones, as well as the reliance on local forces and private security contractors, demonstrates a preference for technology and surrogate forces. One important consequence of this is that ‘opponents’, whether they be terrorists or other types of criminals, adapt their behaviour refusing to stay ‘in theatre’ to be hunted down and potentially killed. Insurgents/

terrorists are increasingly mobile, crossing borders into complex urban environments and sometimes staging terrorist atrocities to provoke and unsettle. APS Peshawar (2014),10 Paris (2015)11 and the numerous attacks in London are examples of this agility and adaptability. Individuals or groups may take up such acts to serve a personal agenda, at the same time, consciously or unconsciously double tap by supporting or exploiting the designs of external powers. A counter hybrid war strategy may thus engage such groups as an auxiliary line of action. Mercenaries, groups with no obvious political or criminal agenda become an instrument of the third arena of hybrid warfare, working for a state or indeed under the control of a non-state actor. Malign states engaging such groups keep their hands clean without threat of attribution and yet retain the potential for a high degree of control. In this sense, as we witnessed during the 1970s, terrorist or what we identify as terrorist groups or cells, may be part of a broader agenda, motivated and funded if not always totally controlled by an external power. Terrorist Attack on Army Public School Peshawar, Pakistan, killing 132 innocent students (16 December 2014)

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New Wars/Hybrid Wars/Insurgency? Contemporary conflicts continue to display a disturbing mix of characteristics. They are seemingly inconclusive and intractable. Most noticeably there are no official declarations of war and there is no clear mode of surrender or indeed of what may constitute a ‘victory’. Mary Kaldor, in

The Iraq war was beset by the bewildering spectre of sectarian strife, death squads, beheadings, suicide attacks and whole sale human rights abuses.15 The important point is that whatever gains had been achieved by the US-led coalition in terms of elections and new governance structures were ultimately offset by the political decision to withdraw foreign troops completely in 2011. This, coupled with sectarian politics, provided the fertile ground for the emergence and rise of the Islamic State group and a generational shift in the nature and character of insurgent organisations. We will come back to this later.

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her conceptualisation of New Wars, talks about the ‘grey zone’ between war and peace; conflicts that are often identity-based a mixture of old and new (primitive and modern with more guerrilla raids and massacres than set-piece confrontations between clearly identifiable armed groups).12 Battle lines are blurred, with high-levels of collusion between supposed protagonists.13 Violence is directed at civilians in the form of massacre, mutilations and rape, often with the sole purpose of creating sensation. Conflicts such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and Nepal were characteristic of these so-called new wars, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya can be added into this

Contemporary conflicts continue to display a disturbing mix of characteristics. They are seemingly inconclusive and intractable. Most noticeably there are no official declarations of war and there is no clear mode of surrender or indeed of what may constitute a ‘victory’

Islamic State was, and is, in many ways a more agile and resilient reincarnation of Al-Qaeda, though remnants of the latter still surface, it seems to have subsumed its precursor organisations. One of the reasons for this was its operating model and the other its success. Islamic State rapidly re-established a grip on parts of Iraq and Syria as well as footholds in Afghanistan, Yemen, and beyond. In most instances, this reinforced already incubating ideological polarisations with more virtual one is reinforced through the internet, targeting youthful population perhaps alienated from their own societies. The delinking of insurgency and geography by creating pathways into the global human terrain obviated the need for physical sanctuary and created the lone wolf or mini-cells. Control of a physical refuge with a sympathetic population is still considered by many an essential requirement for insurgent organisations but that may change as insurgents utilise the battle space of cyber-attacks. Structures are the product of strategy and while large formal organisation inverse this relationship, insurgent organisations have generally remain true to this principle.16 In the UK, the outbreak of terrorist attacks starting but not ending with the London suicide bombings of 2005 has been widely linked to the influence of websites highlighting the Western abuse of Muslim populations in war zones. Radicalised men and some women have left the UK to fight in Iraq or Syria or have perpetuated terrorist attacks on UK soil. All the post 9/11 battle spaces have witnessed opponents utilising a wide range Green Book 2019

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of tactics to disrupt superior state forces embroiled in clearly asymmetric but difficult struggles both at home as well as in conflicts abroad. It has also given rise to random and apparently isolated individual or small team acts (not sufficiently organised to be called ‘cells’) that do not seem connected to, or commanded by, other entities, but rather self-motivated, even when facilitated and abetted by external entities.17 ‘Selfstarting’ terrorists are also observable as in the case of the attack on the Finsbury Mosque in London.18 Finsbury Mosque – London

There is another nuance. Adaptive war, as we may term it, also provides opportunities for covert organisations of a state to cultivate, motivate and even create radicalised cells and/or individuals and use them to undertake sensational acts. Such individuals or groups never clearly know the identity of those helping and facilitating them in their motivation. The hand that ‘wields’ the sword may never know the motivations and intentions of the hand that ‘forged’ the blade. In short what is now labelled hybrid warfare, and we describe as adaptive war, has been utilised by a range of groups, proxies and terrorists in insurgencies and counter-insurgencies over many years. Most obviously, the label hybrid war was used to describe the strategy used by Hezbollah (alleged to be backed by Iran) in the 2006 Lebanon War. However, it was the Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria which have inspired much of the contemporary debate about the meaning of, as well as the use and effectiveness of so called hybrid warfare.

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The hand that ‘wields’ the sword may never know the motivations and intentions of the hand that ‘forged’ the blade

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By way of an example of the nuances discussed above, we take a brief look at the Ukraine Conflict which is considered by many analysts in the West to be a model Hybrid War. From a Western perspective, Russia since the turn of the century, has behaved like a Revisionist power. This has been provoked arguably by the expansion of NATO to the East and the incorporation of states such the Baltic Republics into the organisation. The ambition of Ukraine and countries such as Georgia to acquire membership of Western organisations has been widely cited as antagonistic by Russian analysts and spokespersons. So too has the extension of the influence and association agreements by the European Union with for example Ukraine. Russia found itself threatened by an eastward tide of EU and NATO influence. In this sense, Ukraine became a critical testing ground for Moscow. The geostrategic and historic importance of Crimea to Russia and its Black Sea Fleet arguably left Moscow with little or no choice but to act in its longer-term strategic interest. The intervention in Georgia in 2008 made by Russia in part but not only to protect

ethnic Russians, was also about securing territory and influence. It was this intervention which has given rise to renewed interest in the character of hybrid warfare. Military action in eastern Ukraine and the Crimea was preceded by disruption of Russian speaking people in the region, a potent propaganda campaign utilising historical examples and grievances and the appearance of the ‘little green men’ unbadged and technically unrecognised in the growing conflict. But, as Andrew Monaghan has pointed out, there was a powerful conventional element in all of this.19 Some 40,000 Russian troops were massed on the border. The battles at

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Donbas Airport all involved high intensity conflict including the extensive use of armour, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems as well as drones and electronic warfare. Keir Giles from Chatham House in London has added a critical voice to the speculation over Russian operations in eastern Ukraine as somehow constituting simply irregular warfare.20 As he has pointed out the Russian incursion into Ukraine was ultimately a large-scale conventional military cross-border intervention

undertaken in August 2014. Russian troops and transport although badged by the Russian authorities as primarily present for the delivery and organisation of humanitarian aid, proved militarily decisive.21 Most analysis of the current mode of Russian hybrid war has centred on an understanding of the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine as developed by the Russian Chief of the General Staff – Valery Gerasimov.22 In 2013, in a now much read essay, Gerasimov wrote of a blurring of the lines between states of war and peace. He went on to describe ‘long distance’ and ‘contactless’ actions against the enemy as the primary means of achieving combat and operational goals. That essay has been taken by some Western scholarly and military communities as evidence of an innovative, far sighted and novel approach to war; essentially a new Russian military doctrine. In turn, this ‘new’ approach is perceived as facilitating and underpinning an expansive and aggressive foreign policy agenda. This ‘doctrine’ in addition to the modernisation of the Russian Armed Forces, energy ‘blackmail’, the annexation of Crimea, as well as a ‘successful’ Russian policy in Syria (neutralising Western action to remove the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad) has caused a fair degree of consternation and controversy. Western policy has

failed to either remove the government, control territory or stem human rights abuses. The retaking by Russian backed forces of the ancient city of Palmyra from ISIS which was both widely reported and applauded in the Russian press highlighted the ability of the Kremlin to celebrate and promote the prowess of Russian military muscle even though reports of Russian complicity with members of the Islamic State group were openly circulating.23 Russia and its official media outlets deny that a ‘hybrid’ doctrine, as described in the West, is applied by the Russian Armed Forces. Some sources deny any existence of such a doctrine. Indeed, in the case of Ukraine the unique nature of that example, the weakness of the Ukrainian Army, the presence and embrace of the ‘polite people’ in the East note not the more sinister ‘little green men’ as described in the West and the overwhelming support of the Russian people (and Parliament in March 2014) for the Crimea intervention have all been stressed. This was a one-off event and it would be impossible according to some analysts to replicate any similar action in say the mid-west of the United States or in Poland.24 Perhaps but can the same, however, be said for the Baltic States? There are after all historical/cultural/ethnic claims by Russia on these states and the Russian speaking population in for example Estonia are widely ‘targeted’ by Moscow inspired propaganda. In addition, the propaganda campaign waged across a variety of arenas has highlighted the claim that it is Russia which is under imminent threat from powerful external forces. However, many of Moscow’s ‘near’ neighbours believe that they are under attack from Moscow. Hence Finland which occupies a particularly vulnerable position in comparison to its large neighbour has taken robust measures to fend off ‘hybrid’ or mixed activities. Valery Gerasimov

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The Finns have been recently flooded with fake news and the use of troll farms as well as suffering a variety of over-flights of its air space by Russian aircraft. Propaganda hostile to the Finnish Government has taken a variety of forms but not least have been claim from Moscow that Russian speakers in Finland are discriminated against on a routine basis in terms of property rights. In response, Helsinki has put in place a public diplomacy programme to train government officials about disinformation but also increased its emphasis in schools on media ‘literacy’. It is not just Finland that is wary of hybrid warfare from the east but Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden and Norway. Russia has also seemingly taken the opportunity along its shared border with Norway to ‘mischief make’ in terms of allegedly allowing refugees fleeing the Middle East to make their way across the border on bicycles! Hence the idea that as part of a hybrid war strategy the Russians are seeking to ‘weaponise’ migrants and generally exploit the migrant crisis to further divide the politicians and peoples throughout Europe who disagree (sometimes violently) about migrant/ refugee policy. The concentration on Russia as pursuing hybridity in warfare is contested. A contrary thesis is presented by Andrew Korybko, who, in his 2015 study of Hybrid Wars, claims that the US, is the only country currently engaged in Hybrid War. He argues that the nature of Hybrid War is such that it is ‘counter-productive for any of the Eurasian Powers to attempt it in their region’ due to proximity issues and the unintended consequences/spillover of what he calls the resulting ‘black holes’ on their own borders. He predicts that the ‘US will exercise a full monopoly on Hybrid War for at least the next decade, if not in perpetuity owing to the unique

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Andrew Korybko, in his 2015 study of Hybrid Wars, claims that the US, is the only country currently engaged in Hybrid War. He predicts that the ‘US will exercise a full monopoly on Hybrid War for at least the next decade, if not in perpetuity owing to the unique international circumstances in which it is waged.’ He has argued that actually ‘Hybrid War is the new horizon for US regime change strategy.’ This mixture of irregular and regular warfare will be the future strategy for US interventions in pursuit of its foreign policy interests particularly in an era of fake news

international circumstances in which it is waged.’ He has argued that actually ‘Hybrid War is the new horizon for US regime change strategy.’25 This mixture of irregular and regular warfare will be the future strategy for US interventions in pursuit of its foreign policy interests particularly in an era of fake news. Whatever the debates about the essence of Russian military doctrine and whatever claims may be about future US warfare now the success of this adaptive form of warfare is clear. Western responses to Russian provocations—or for that matter, Russian responses to US Hybrid warfare, if we take the Korybko thesis is predicated upon avoiding direct military conflict. In this sense the Russian ‘gains’ in Ukraine and Crimea have extended Moscow’s grip on the region. Despite sanctions, diplomacy and some military posturing, (the latter limited to NATO reinforcing its strategic presence in, both, Norway and in Estonia) Russian ‘gains’ in the tactical and strategic planes remain intact. Although the legacy of irregular methods in the region remains unknown at this point in time. New power brokers, dissidents and guns for hire may yet threaten Russia in the longer term.

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Hybrid Strategies The historical perspective and the Ukraine case study presented here provided a prism enabling us to demonstrate and extract some of the nuances that hybrid war presents. We can now turn to an inductive conceptual analysis of the nature of the threat and develop ideas that underpin responses to state or sub state threats at the strategic plane. A cleverly articulated hybrid war strategy by a revisionist and ambitious power(s) produces confusion, discord and disharmony in the targeted state or region. There may be confusion as to the overall objectives (even the existence of any design) and the means, and the ways, contributing towards attainment of the design or ends. Even more elusive and difficult to define are the linkages between what appear to be disparate actions spread over a long period. How does communal disruption in one village link to the appearance of protestors in another city or the circulation of rumours on the internet? How can these different events be put together? Because of uncertainty, dissonant views, often reinforced by elite political or financial interests, emerge. The nature of the threat, its aim and in turn, its ownership, are variously disputed and what often results is a disjointed and ambiguous counter strategy.

Threat Perception in the First Arena Of the three arenas of hybrid war discussed earlier, the relatively easier to decipher is the first arena, that is the utilisation of or posturing for a conventional battlefield. Even the best guarded strategy or strategic intent may be discerned from an analysis of hostile power interests, force and infrastructural development, training and alliances. In short a military equivalent of what Henry Mintzberg describes as a ‘pattern in a stream of actions’.26 (In light of an extensive body of literature and practice, we will not discuss this arena further here). The second and the third arenas, however, require a more critical analysis as it is here that strategic lines are often blurred. Furthermore, the experiential lens27 for strategic analysis — the bedrock of conventional military planning and systems thinking — is not terribly useful if there is a mix conventional/insurgent scenario. Unless the targeted state processes national security as a broad interrelated and mutually informing system, it is unlikely that it could make the necessary connection predicating a comprehensive response. This creative leap notwithstanding, biases like ‘anchoring’ and ‘availability’ creep in. This is the classic adage of every problem looking like a nail to a person with only a hammer.

Threat Spectrum in the Second Arena Provoking, exploiting, supporting unrest and dissension among people through careful use of information and other forms of national power, as we have demonstrated in above paragraphs, is nothing new. In fact, Sun Tzu28 talks about hollowing out one’s enemy from the inside absorbing the whole without fighting in his famous treatise on war. War among people or violent social movements are wicked problems or what Heifitz describes as adaptive problems.29 Such problems don’t follow the rules of systems and as such have never been easy to deal with. And while such conflicts may be deeply rooted in history, ideology, religion, culture, or general deprivation, solutions that are unsympathetic to perspectives and deal in the present or the near future, treat the problem not for what it is but what it is constructed to be, a tame30 or a critical31 problem, in fact a problem that follows rules. Prescriptions for fighting insurgencies and hybrid threats abound. There is an extensive literature that looks at categorising and classifying social movements and conflicts. This is important. Our interpretation of a problem points us towards its solution, misinterpret the problem and the solution will invariably not work, or worse, exacerbate the problem. As was seen in the Iraq War after 2003 the widespread misunderstanding of the ‘people’ by invading forces and the politicians at home meant that inevitably there was a failure to understand complex local tribal politics. Western failure meant that other external actors could fill the voids created by poor security planning and policing and the misunderstanding of Sunni-Shia relations plus a fateful ignorance of the motivations of external actors.

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A cleverly articulated hybrid war strategy by a revisionist and ambitious power(s) produces confusion, discord and disharmony in the targeted state or region. There may be confusion as to the overall objectives (even the existence of any design) and the means, and the ways, contributing towards attainment of the design or ends. Even more elusive and difficult to define are the linkages between what appear to be disparate actions spread over a long period

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COUNTER STRATEGIES: TO MANAGE OR DEFEAT?

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This arena involves a variety of actions on the diplomatic, political and economic stage of international politics. Sun Tzu recognised the power of indirect warfare. Taking the enemy, without fighting and in the process conserving vital resources mandates’ avoidance of direct confrontation. Attacking an enemy in different planes in a sustained manner while pacing the scale and tempo of the ‘offensive’ within limits of hope and tolerance of the political elite and threshold of survivability for the masses creates long term parallel effects. The dilution of economic, social and human capital in disparate directions germinates a defensive mind-set, making the target state further vulnerable and opens to other forms of attack. This form of warfare circumvents constraints such as alliances, military parity and again avoids direct conflict.32 Hybrid war displays a non-kinetic extension of Ludendorff’s conception of a total war with a covert twist. The utilisation of diplomatic, economic, informational and cultural power directly and indirectly—through alliances and political networks, pressure groups and the media are adopted over a sustained period. This, we can argue, is a situation which has relevance to contemporary Pakistan. This third arena essentially contains the main thrust lines and is the one where the long-term objectives are sought by hostile powers to undermine, disrupt and fragment the opposing state. The aim is to stir up politics, class, clan, tribe and gender relations, perhaps even to make parts of the country

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Unless the targeted state processes national security as a broad interrelated and mutually informing system, it is unlikely that it could make the necessary connection predicating a comprehensive response. This creative leap notwithstanding, biases like ‘anchoring’ and ‘availability’ creep in. This is the classic adage of every problem looking like a nail to a person with only a hammer

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The Third Arena

ungovernable and easy to penetrate by a host of actors. The question now is what is new in all of this for our understanding of countering hybrid war and insurgency? The first novel feature is motivation. Groups in a micro sense and social movements in the macro context are motivated by their personal or parochial interest. A hybrid strategy utilises these parochial motivations to facilitate the objectives of such movements and groups through means that create secondary effects towards serving or facilitating other lines of operation that tie into the hostile power’s interests. The social movement may remain oblivious to the fact that in pursuing its own narrow interest it is also servicing someone else’s wider agenda. Ironically, perhaps the wider agenda may be detrimental in the longer term to that group or movement.

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receptive segments of population across the globe, it is not geographically confined and can occur in the open media. Additionally, the action groups— the people that do the tactical damage—mobilise independently of the leadership and the visible organisations. The action groups are thus difficult to detect in the conventional system approach to threat perception and analysis. The need for sanctuary and a sympathetic population base with a geographical contiguity, as we have described earlier, is no longer a necessity; both are pre-requisites for 1GI and 2GI. Cells of all sizes hide in the mercy corners of cyber space. Another significant feature is that all tactical actions are effects-based not objective-based. It does not matter who did the act and for what

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The point is that in contemporary war and conflict we do not know for sure who the insurgents are, who funds them and whether they are connected to, or operated by, states or other actors in the international system. It is now relatively rare to see a purely nationalist insurgency at work

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The second feature is that the ideological or motivational base is disaggregated from recruitment. We see a glimpse of this in Islamic State recruitment, which has a strong global dimension to it, even for actions in a specific area, say for example Syria. Who is doing the recruiting, who one signs up to serve or even if an individual decides to act alone, the purpose being served is disaggregated from the source of the motivation, the thought leaders. This feature in turn provides two further differentiating qualities that set apart 3rd Generation Insurgency (3GI) from 1st Generation Insurgency (1GI), these are reach and mobilisation. The insurgent message finds instant credibility with

purpose. The long-term lingering impact is key. The impact, for example, of the Taliban attack on APS Peshawar is hard to measure. Different political groups, as we witnessed constructed the impact of the event from their own point of view creating multiple narratives. Finally, we need to consider distance and dehumanisation. The utilitarian argument that the ends justify the means, takes on a whole new dimension. Those at a distance but indirectly supporting the group have clean hands. They do not suffer and may even be disinterested in the human costs effects of the violence and disruption they have funded or directed. They are interested in the ends and not necessarily the means. Although sometimes the means – implemented by terrorists, or criminals or states can also be an end – to unsettle a society. In this sense the recent attack with a chemical nerve agent in Salisbury in the UK was striking in terms of its means and its ends: disturbing and illegal ‘means’ led to widespread political disruption surely an end in itself for those who had directed the attack? The point is that in contemporary war and conflict we do not know for sure who the insurgents are, who funds them and whether they are connected to, or operated by, states or other actors in the international system. It is now relatively rare to see a purely nationalist insurgency at work. Most groups even those who would badge themselves as ‘nationalist’ are actually complex and hybrid organisations working across borders and utilising technology for spreading ideas and fund raising.

A Post - Structural Construct of Insurgencies Language and terms of reference notwithstanding, scholarship generally agrees on the political and nonpolitical classification of insurgent movements. In both these forms, the underlying assumptions are, nonetheless, consistent and form what we might call the first paradigm . These Green Book 2019

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basic assumptions use physical space, sanctuary, leadership, external support, diffusion in mass and human capital as the metrics for analysis and classification underpinned with a geocentric context. Operationally, each of these types of insurgencies may employ a variety of means, methods and tactics for creating effects. Some scholars have used this modal differentiation as a metric for classification.33 Bunker identifies five forms of insurgency as under:

This implies that there is considerable synergy in approaches to manage political, non-political and networked insurgencies. The Information Age has transformed society and the military; it has also created new opportunities for the insurgent. Opportunities that expand the scope of activities, the insurgent’s battlefield and their idea of battle space. Large insurgent organisations tend towards intelligent, adaptive detached minimalistic subsystems.

Insurgency Form (Onset)

Group Examples

Theorists’ Form (Year)

Radical Islamist (1979)

Iranian Revolutionaries Hezbollah Shia Militias (Iraq) Mujahedeen Taliban Al-Qaeda Islamic State

Metz; Reactionary (1995) Rapoport; Religious Extremism (2001) Kilcullen; Globalised Islamist (2004)— Sunni focus O’Neill; Reactionary-Traditionalist (2005) Schnabel & Gunartna; Religious (2006; 2015)

Liberal Democratic (1989)

Contras (Precursor) African National Congress (ANC) Free Syrian Army (FSA) National Council of Resistance Iran (NCRI)

Beckett; Superpower Based (2001)— United States proxy component O’Neill; Pluralist (2005)

Criminal (Early-2000s)

African Warlords Colombian and Mexican Cartels Latin American Gangs Ndrangheta (Italy)

Metz; Commercial (1993) Clapham; Warlord (1998) Sloan; Apolitical (1999) Thom; Economic (1999) Cilliers; Resource-Based (2000) O’Neill; Commercial (2005) Sullivan; Criminal (2008) Tarr; Resource Control (2011) Metz; Non-Political (2012)

Plutocratic (2008)

Global Elites (.001% to 1%) Multinational Corporations

Metz; Commercial (1993) Bunker; Plutocratic (2011)

Table 1: Contemporary Insurgency Forms34 Metz observes the influence of modern technology on how insurgent organisations function and operate and a networked variant to proto-state and non-political insurgencies.35 Modern insurgencies are driven by a political particularism, profit or grand politics. The penultimate objective is usually a combination of destabilisation, weakening or disintegration of the targeted state. Seen from the other side of the prism, we find that effects sought also overlap and include a mix of paralysis, dislocation, division and disruption. Insurgent tactics, such as terrorism, aims at achieving transient effects like distraction, dispersion or fixation and is directed at the elements of national power and society.

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And while we may have answers to some of today’s conflicts, the character of insurgency has transformed and is still transforming. It is this evolution that places what the US military refer to as the fifth domain36 of warfare at the focus of response. One of the limitations in using structural and functional elements and indeed paradigms for classification is that post-structural and innovative methods can elude observation. We, therefore, propose a post-structural approach to placing different forms of insurgencies into categories. There is comparatively marginal impact on threat perception and response in legacy type insurgent movements and their place within an overall

The Information Age has transformed society and the military; it has also created new opportunities for the insurgent. Opportunities that expand the scope of activities, the insurgent’s battlefield and their idea of battle space

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Internet enables communications such as social media coupled with the so called ‘dark net’ to provide global reach and networking, the exchange of everything from radical ideologies to blue prints for IEDs

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hybrid strategy, however, a paradigm shift leading to a newer generation of insurgencies, is apparent and this reclassification of our fundamental assumptions needs consideration. We argue that within a hybrid war scenario, the insurgencies reflect the state of relationship between insurgent and wider society as well as a relationship between insurgent leadership and insurgent followership. Communication, a metric that has not featured as significantly in earlier classifications, is the key. The internet enables communications such as social media coupled with the so called ‘dark net’ to provide global reach and networking, the exchange of everything from radical ideologies to blue prints for IEDs. Communication predicates the degree of localisation or geographic dependency of the insurgent group or more appropriately insurgent ideas and influence as organisation and structure, in the classic sense, is becoming increasingly irrelevant. As communications and other influencing factors have evolved, we observe a further paradigm shifts in our conception of insurgent movements and groups; while a second shift is emerging.37

essentially a new contiguous population base—the human domain—where recruitment can take place and where influence is ultimately exerted. Such insurgencies are geographically contained, require physical sanctuary, a sympathetic population for the dual purpose of recruitment and dissipation. External support is critical and such insurgencies generally have focal leadership that acts as the hub of power and movement. Examples of such insurgent movements are: Maoists movements, the Taliban 2001 to 2003, the Afghan Mujahedeen; Organised Crime cartels in Colombia and warlords in various post-colonial uprisings in Africa. Maoists Movement – 1GI

The Classical Paradigm (1st Generation Insurgency: 1GI) Without going into lengthy topologies or taxonomies, we classify first generation insurgencies (1GI) as a combination of protostate and apolitical insurgencies that depend on space, sanctuary, external support, discernable leadership, ideology or clear criminal motives, and Cyber is the FIFTH DOMAIN of conflict after land, sea, air and space

The First Paradigm Shift (2nd Generation Insurgency: 2GI) This form of insurgency is network enabled and exploits new media in its use of information and communication. A slight variation of this was the Arab Spring as these essentially began as leaderless mass public response. Apart from transient mass public movements, 2nd Generation Insurgent movements exhibit many of the limitations and constraints of 1st Generation movements. Due to the use of communication and networking, 2GI network and coordinate their activities across the globe relying on physical sanctuary and support in each of the physical spaces. ISIS and its presence in many parts of the world as highlighted in earlier paragraphs is an example. Some of the nuances that challenge the classical paradigm however, are a global recruitment base, for example European jihadists joining ISIS in Syria. The main limitation is the need for physical sanctuary through control Green Book 2019

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In some ways, 2GI appears as a cross over between insurgency and revolution, but are not revolutions per se as perpetrators, leadership and organisation are dislocated and initially lacking in the principle roles they perform in 1GI

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of territory and some level of ability to merge back into local population in each of the global theatres. Leadership, particularly within regional contexts remains the centre of gravity together with the central idea or unifying factor. Such insurgencies may be dealt with by using approaches similar to the 1GI but with due cognisance of the distributed nature and network dimension. Such insurgencies do not seem to have a long incubation phase, as they are often derivatives of earlier less successful social movements. They may also have a varied life span, from protracted to short term. In the short term, variants, space, recruitment, sanctuary, insurgent leadership or external support play a less significant role than in 1GI. In some ways, 2GI appears as a cross over between insurgency and revolution, but are not revolutions per se as perpetrators, leadership and organisation are dislocated and initially lacking in the principle roles they perform in 1GI. The Arab Spring provided a brief glimpse of this transitional form where, essentially ‘bottom up’, peoples’ movement centred on swarming created conditions for state collapse. Here ‘leadership’ climbed the bandwagon once the mobilisation had already begun and subsequently exploited the opportunities presented. Islamic State provides a useful example of the protracted variant. Islamic State and its affiliate groups differ from other contemporary non-state groups such as Boko Haram, the Taliban and AlShabab in many ways. From an organisational perspective, Islamic State demonstrated several unique structural characteristics in the working of insurgent organisations. The most significant being its global recruitment base, ability to instigate widely dispersed operations if not formally control or manage these and yet, aligned also to the classical insurgent model with the control of physical space and some harmony with disaffected regions and populations.

Boko Haram – 2GI

The Second Paradigm Shift (3rd Generation Insurgencies: 3GI) Cyberspace and modern communication technologies provide both the means and an extension of the traditional insurgent activity. Zaidi in 2012, observed the paradigm shifting and introduced the concept of 3GI, centred on post-structural nature of global insurgencies, the idea, for example, of the lone wolf and minicells self-motivated, self-funded, self-trained, the minimalist with random and innovative approaches to creat fear through terror. The idea sounded so far-fetched and even incredible to the community of practitioners and academics alike that without evidence (none existed at the time) it remained in the realm of fiction. The events of 22 May 2013, when a British Soldier was murdered in violent attack on the streets of London at the hands of two self-radicalised individuals changed all that.38 We now had evidence, was this a one off or a new trend? Subsequent such events point to the latter. The post-structural and geographically unconstrained nature of these insurgencies was at the time considered indefinable and nonattributable. While the character of insurgencies transformed to an extent that the paradigm, our fundamental, assumptions, of what constituted an insurgency was challenged. The transition from hard, structural assumptions to soft ones such as ideas, beliefs, distributed leadership and networks of thought as opposed to networks of practice warranted a new frame of reference. At the same time, the obvious potential 3GI presented for mercenaries and criminal networks to tap into, what we now call hybrid wars, was clear. The difference between 2GI and 3GI is fundamental, it is a paradigm shift. There is no need for sanctuary, leadership does not play any significant role, there is no ownership of a strategic level only strategic effects filtering up from seemingly unrelated tactical actions. In the tactical or technical levels there is no formal organisation. While 2GI demonstrates a dislocation of leadership, insurgent structures, activities and activists, in other words a leadership remains one of the centres of gravity, 3GI requires no focal leadership, formal structure or elaborate organisation. Ideas and motivations emanating from, what could be a virtual leader, combined with a mechanism of selfmotivation and training (as provided by the dark net) form the basic ingredients for effects in the physical space. Properly resourced and with precursors such as real or perceived prejudices, dissent and division along ethnic, religious, linguistic or class lines, 3GI could canvas a modern state comprehensively. The more developed and modern in infrastructure the state, the more vulnerable it is

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likely to be to 3GI. People, governments, networks, banking, communications, trade, finance, industry, resources, all are included in the physical manifestation of earlier generations. 3GI can effectively tailor methods and effects to the target’s vulnerabilities as is not confined by linear thinking; ramming automobiles into a crowd on the street is an example whether it is in a street in London, Paris or Kabul. It is also not just about the ‘radical Islamism’ stereotype as we witnessed in the Finsbury Park Attack in London.39

world… whether one opts to trail, track, bait or bust a network, node or an individual, how do the police or other specialist units’ evidence what would eventually become legal matters. The tremendous success of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Army in combating terrorists in the frontier regions is indeed laudable, however while the battle is won, the war continues. Hybrid war will seek to push such terrorist movements into the new domain. In crafting a coherent movement, insurgents no longer need a sanctuary; cyberspace is their battle-

Metric

2GI

3GI

Leadership

Critical

Virtual

Organisation

Operate and exist in physical space

Sanctuary

Physical

Cyberspace

Population base

Local and Global

Global

Recruitment

Formalised Local and Global

Not required in most instances

External support

Yes

Irrelevant

Funding

Yes, routed through the organisation structures

Depends on resourcefulness of cell/ individual. When needed is likely to channel through anonymous sympathisers (through internet) or those who stand to benefit from the actions politically or materially.

Material Support

Significant reliance

Limited reliance

Impact

Localised (local political or criminal agendas)

Localised/global (global dimension of the motivation is more apparent)

Techniques

Guerrilla action Terrorism Open conflict (IS in Syria) Swarming and mass opinion mobilisations (Arab Spring) Cyber Terrorism

Terrorism Innovative small group or lone-wolf action

Table 3: Comparison of 2GI and 3GI ground. For insurgents, this is a world far more forgiving than the physical one, and promises rapid impact, and effects at a wider scale.

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The difference between 2GI and 3GI is fundamental; it is a paradigm shift. There is no need for sanctuary, leadership does not play any significant role, there is no ownership of a strategic level only strategic effects filtering up from seemingly unrelated tactical actions. In the tactical or technical levels there is no formal organisation

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3GI can at best be managed and mitigated. From threat perception to response, 3GI places a heavy reliance of a strong cyber component to detect and intercept the broad spectrum of actions and modes of operation the perpetrators can engage in. Relational diagraphs connecting threats is a simple and useful tool for perceiving interconnected threats that more structured tools often fail to detect. Either way, our conventional approach to understanding threats needs to evolve to understanding threat systems. Countering 3GI would require greater access to people use of the electromagnetic spectrum which throws up legal, moral and ethical arguments. As insurgents attempt to take the military out of the game, effectively negating military power disparity, there is the issue of responding in the physical

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3GI is but one component of a Hybrid War. We have demonstrated how 3GI attempts to make military power insignificant. Nonetheless, we have focused on this idea as it is the one closest to the military dimension of the response. The security dimension is much broader. Korybko argues that hybrid war permits individuals to become swarms that can then be used in creative ways to overwhelm authority and lead to what he calls a ‘soft coup’. It is the tactical manifestation of the weaponisation of ideas and unleashing chaos. The only prerequisite, he suggests, is ‘‘an effective information outreach campaigns and the construction of social networks over a period of time”.40 A monster composed of ‘a hive mind of anti-government activists’ is created. ‘War’ moves forward, not at the high intensity that technology permits it to but at pace far below it. Operational tempos are slowed down, the connection between actions and effect obscured and extended over time. The insurgents and indeed the hybrid war antagonist, own time, while the protagonists are locked in their own ‘efficient’ decision loops. The antagonist moves outside these decision loops, and all this while, the pieces of the puzzle come together waiting for the last push. Hybrid war is everyone’s problem. It is a whole of government and whole of society problem. While it can’t be effectively fought — because the enemy remains elusive — it can be effectively managed because we can know what we are managing and can strive to get it right, it becomes, therefore, a ‘tame’ and not a ‘wicked’ problem. Threat perception is of course particularly difficult. The operational tempo in a hybrid strategy does the opposite of what we strive for in high tempo operations. Instead of trying to get inside the target state’s OODA loop, the object is to operate well outside it; what Sun Tzu described as operating above the seven heavens and below the seven earths.41

Conclusion Change often needs something dramatic to break existing inertia. In this sense the current debate over Russia and its supposed embrace of a hybrid war strategy has been helpful in terms of thinking about the ‘enemy’. It has also opened debate about insurgency as a tool of great states as well as the province of new and shadowy sub state actors. This is important as despite a remarkable affinity to absorb technology, militaries the world over demonstrate an aversion to shedding intellectual and structural baggage which has become embedded in the bureaucracy and the mind-set of officials. Doctrine thrives on the hope that a compliant enemy will repeat history. In reality, reading emerging threats can be a bit like 26

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Hybrid war is everyone’s problem. It is a whole of government and whole of society problem. While it can’t be effectively fought — because the enemy remains elusive — it can be effectively managed because we can know what we are managing and can strive to get it right, it becomes therefore a ‘tame’ and not a ‘wicked’ problem

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Hybrid War: Whose problem is it any way?

crystal ball gazing. In a hybrid war scenario, even insight into an enemy’s capabilities and intents; combat power; contours of its military strategy and even enablers and catalysts across other lines of operation may yield little or nothing of value for actual policy and the development of an effective counter-strategy. Much has happened since the military community last talked about the changing face of combat and conflict in the 21st Century. Many of the technological and structural developments in war led to some success even if in the overall analysis the West effectively ‘lost’ the war in Iraq. Intelligence successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly and most significantly in detection and Counter IED, is something the military and associated industry can be proud of. These technical achievements, while preventing repeat of these tactics, are not helpful in predicting the next lone-wolf armed with an idea and a knife, or a driver gearing up to ram into a crowd. Hybrid war, and its connection with 3GI produces a different world of challenges. The human domain, the military and technology have large gaps to cover before we can begin to upset and disrupt the advantages a state pursuing a hybrid war against another or the third generation insurgents enjoy. Future technologies must approach semantic, the synaptic and the physical layers of the info-sphere from a human perspective and this approach will need to be adaptive to understand behaviour, sentiment and dissonance. While crafting their movements, insurgents no longer need a sanctuary. Cyberspace is their safehouse. It is a world far more forgiving than the physical one and promises rapid impact and effects on a global scale. Insurgency within a hybrid war (whether state or sub state) also includes the use of ‘coercive covert power’, the use of mercenaries, acts of sabotage, false flag operations, and rogue groups in ways that remain ambiguous to an ideological or religious cause. To this end more in depth understanding is required of the morphology of all sorts of crime, particularly understanding criminal

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and terrorist activities and their communication (including the role of cyber, cellular and other means); and indeed an interpretation of threats risks from criminal organisations and violent social movements. Conflicting paradigms, Kuhn would argue, do not coexist, however, the First and Second Paradigm shifts we find do just that and may play side by side. Perhaps, we need a different term of reference for 3GIs to de-conflict this departure from an academic perspective, but that is a discussion for another time. To manage Hybrid war at the national level, a greater cohesion between people, government and the military will be needed. At the military level, it translates into a merger of human and the technical domains to synergise the physicalmoral and conceptual elements of combat power. Understanding of interconnections between methods used by various organised criminal groups; their motivations; their structures and networks; transferable techniques; public perceptions and workings of transnational organised crime is vital for making sense of how a hybrid war strategy may

tap into the fabric of a nation and how it may then hollow out the state one layer at a time. A new breed of analysts and planners is needed. There is a requirement for scholars and students to think and perceive outside of the systems approach, who are comfortable with ambiguity and extremes of information. Above all, political and military leaderships need to be less prescriptive and embrace complexity and the art of dealing with adaptive problems; something militaries are not traditionally good at. As the Russian incursion into Ukraine proved and as we have learnt more about Islamic State for example, societies can be subverted in an imaginary sphere of false news, questionable narratives of historical suffering as well as through the some time false promises of more prosperous futures and better governance. It is the ‘people’ who will be targeted to undermine a society and a community. To counter future threats ‘joined up’ thinking will be required across government, media and the armed forces as well as our own people. Hybrid war — it is everybody’s problem!

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It is the ‘people’ who will be targeted to undermine a society and a community. To counter future threats ‘joined up’ thinking will be required across government, media and the armed forces as well as our own people

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Acknowledgment

We would like to acknowledge the help of Professor Chris Bellamy of the Oxford Changing Character of War Programme with this piece. Notes 1.

National power is defined as the combination of Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) Power of a state. Used originally in the US military, the term is now more widely used around the world. UK’s Royal College of Defence Studies has also embraced this typology and it is this

2.

definition to which we refer. However, we include ‘Culture’ as a separate and influential component National Power which in the UK and US constructs is not treated separately. See RCDS (2017) Getting Strategy Right Enough. London: RCDS. Murray Williamson & Peter R, Mansoov (Eds.) (2011) Hybrid Warfare Fighting

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3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

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Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. John Mueller (1995) Quiet Cataclysm Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics. London: Harper Collins. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S Nye (1998) ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age.’Foreign Affairs. September/October, 77.5. Ron B. Hassner (2009) War on Sacred Grounds. New York: Cornell University Press. Michael Ignatieff (2001) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. New York: Picador. Jason Burke (2011) The 9/11 Wars. London: Allen Lane. Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi (2009) The Conduct of War and the Notion of Victory. Shrivenham: Cranfield University. Lloyd Gardner, Killing Machine The American Presidency in the Age of Drone Warfare, New York: The New Press, 2013. BBC (2014) As it Happened: Pakistan School Attack. BBC News Online: https:// www.bbc.com/news/live/world-asia-30491113. Accessed on September 3, 2018. CNN (2015) 2015 Paris Terror Attacks Fast Facts. CNN News Online. https:// edition.cnn.com/2015/12/08/europe/2015-paris-terror-attacks-fast-facts/index. html. Accessed on September 3, 2018. Mary Kaldor (2012) New Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (2nd Ed.). Cambride: Polity. David Keen (2012) Useful Enemies When Waging Wars is more Important than Winning Them. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. David Kilcullen (2009) The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University Press Thomas Ricks (2006) Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. London: Allen Lane Alfred D. Chandler Jr. (1962). Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press The idea of a generational shift in how insurgencies operated and what their future direction was tending towards was developed by Dr M. I. Zaidi classifying three generations of insurgent organisations. The events of 22 May 2013, where a British soldier was murdered by two individuals working in concert but acting independent of external control or funding, reinforced the idea and provided a brutal example of a third generation insurgency practice. See also Mohammad Iftikhar Zaidi (2014): Insurgencies: The Third Generation: A conference paper presented at the AOC Crows conference. Edinburgh. Online: https://www.eweurope.com/Content/14th-15th-May-MainConference-Programme/6_12/ CNN (2017) London mosque attack suspect named, according to media outlets. CNN Online. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/18/europe/urgent---london-vehicle-

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collision/index.html. Accessed on September 3, 2018. Andrew Monaghan (2015) “Putin’s Way of War. The ‘War’ in Russia’s Hybrid Warfare.” Parameters, 45 940 Winter, 2015-2016. 20. Ibid 21. Keir Giles (2016) Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power. Chatham House, Research Paper. Russia and Eurasia Programme. 22. Roger McDermott (2015) ‘Does Russia’s “Hybrid War; Really Exist.” Eurasia Daily Monitor. Volume 12 Issue 103. June. 23. Ari Heistein and Shapir Michlin (2016) “Russia’s Hybrid-Warfare Victory in Syria.”The National Interest. May 19. 24. Roger McDermott, Op. Cit. 25. Andrew Korybko (2015) Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change. Moscow: Unknown. Kindle Edition. Pp.1574-1586. 26. Henry Mintzberg (2007) Tracking Strategies: Towards a General Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 27. Johnson et. al. (2017) Exploring Strategy: Text and Cases, (11th Ed.). London: Pearson. 28. Sun Tzu (2000) The Art of War (A Modern Chinese Interpretation). Tao Hanzhang and Youan Shibing (Trs.) New York: Sterling Publishing Company. 29. Ronald A. Heifetz, Alexander Grashow and Marty Linsky (2009) The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing your Organisation and the World. Boston: Harvard Business School. 30. Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences. Volume 4, Issue 2, June: pp 155–169. 31. Keith Grint (2010) “Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions: The Role of Leadership” in Stephen Brookes, Keith Grint (Eds.)The New Public Leadership Challenge. Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan: pp. 169-186. 32. Andrew Korybko, Op. Cit. 33. See Metz, 2007 Op. Cit.; Galula, 2006 Op. Cit.; Kilcullen, 2010 Op. Cit.; Bunker, 2016, Op. Cit and Zaidi, 2014 Op. Cit. 34. See R. J. Bunker, 2016. Op. Cit. p. 39. 35. Steven Metz (2012) “The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency.” Parameters. Carlisle: SSI Autumn. 36. Department of Defence (2011) Cyberspace is a New Warfare Domain. Online. https://www.securityweek.com/department-defense-cyberspace-newwarfare-domain 37. Zaidi (2014), Op Cit. 38. Frank Gardner (2013). “Two guilty of Lee Rigby murder: Analysis”. BBC News. Internet. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-25450555. Accessed on September 1, 2018. 39. Vikram Dodd and Kevin Rawlinson (2018) “Finsbury Park attack: man ‘brainwashed by anti-Muslim propaganda’ convicted” The Guardian Online. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/01/finsbury-park-van-attackerdarren-osborne-found-guilty-murder-makram-ali. Accessed on September 1, 2018. 40. Andrew Korybko, Op. Cit. 41. Sun Tzu (2000) Op. Cit. 19.

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RE-APPRAISAL OF

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH TENETS OF MILITARY STRATEGY period in the history of nations ‘‘willEach have its own theory of war, as every age could have its own kind of war and its own limiting conditions

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Lieutenant General Raza Muhammad Khan, HI (M) (Retired), former Corps Commander and former President of the National Defence University, Islamabad

Clausewitz

Abstract The arguments proffered in this rendition seek to provide additional food for thought on doctrinaldevelopment. It questions the relevance, scope and adequacy of the existing principles of war and expounds their relationship with common aphorisms of military strategy. The exposition aims at grasping and comparing the dynamics and philosophies of past and contemporary wars, and suggests a reinterpretation and expansion of the current thinking on the matter. It recommends the adoption of four new precepts and rearranging the existing principles to win, or-terminate modern conflicts on a favourable note. Keywords: Principles of War, Doctrine, Conflict, Military Strategy, Victory

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he principles of war are as old as the history of warfare itself and many of these were formally listed and first applied during the Napoleonic era. The prevailing principles of war, adopted by most countries, with some variations, comprise about a dozen fundamental axioms that represent the best efforts of past military thinkers, to identify those aspects of warfare that could be universally true and perpetually relevant to ensure victory or to avert defeat in a war. These are: selection and maintenance of aim or objective, offensive, mass or concentration, economy of force, mobility or manoeuvre, unity of command/effort, security, surprise and simplicity. The British and Canadian defence doctrines also include maintenance of morale as a principle of war. The Russian principles of war include readiness, information warfare, joint and combined operations and moral and political factors. There has been some divergence of opinion about these principles even among great captains of war. Napoleon felt that ‘the principles of war are the same as that of siege. Fire must be concentrated on one point and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing’.1 Jomini propounded four broad principles in his famous ‘Precise’, i.e. directing the mass of force against the communication lines of the enemy’s main effort, superiority at the point of decision at the strategic level, a similar action at the tactical level and speed.2 Clausewitz, the philosopher of war, listed many important principles for the conduct of war.3 He theorised the three general principles of war i.e., ascendancy of the moral to the physical, calmness/firmness and audacity. Clausewitz himself modestly, but, perhaps rightly observed that the principles had been drawn up by him in a haste and therefore, they may not be able to stand severe criticism. Marshal Foch enunciated four principles of war, e.g., economy of force, freedom

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The prevailing principles of war, adopted by most countries, with some variations, comprise about a dozen fundamental axioms that represent the best efforts of past military thinkers, to identify those aspects of warfare that could be universally true and perpetually relevant to ensure victory or to avert defeat in a war

of action, free disposal of forces and security. He also propounded two principles of strategy, ‘the intellectual element and the philosophy of reason, the spiritual element and the exaltation of the will’. His emphasis on the offensive as the ‘law of war’ is also well known4. Liddell Hart crystallised his entire thought process on winning of wars in six positive and two negative maxims (indirect approach being the dominant maxim), however he also preferred to parallel these with the principles of strategy. Andre Beaufre is of the view that since modern wars are no more a mere military phenomenon, there is an overlap in it in the sphere of internal policy, external affairs, economics and military operations.5 He goes on to recommend that mastery of strategy in these fields should be acquired to assist policy for the purpose of winning wars. Bernard Brodie has opposed any conception that suggests a ‘computerised tabulation or keyboard where pressing the right button produces the right answer’ but agrees that ‘the consideration of a catalogue of numbered principles (usually fewer than a dozen) with the barest definition of the meaning of each may be necessary to communicate to second-order minds (or minds too busy with the execution of plans to worry about the specific validity of the ideas behind them), some conception of what the business is all about’.6 From the brief discussion above, it appears that while some military thinkers have mixed the application of the principles of war with that of strategy, others have chosen to keep the two separate. Not much is apparently wrong with either of these approaches, as belligerents seem to have tested them practically, during the conduct of warfare. It therefore appears that it may be a rather difficult undertaking to make an attempt to re-appraise these principles or methodologies. Challenging them could be even more exacting. It is perhaps for this reason that apparently no recent attempts seems to have been made, either to review their efficacy or to redefine/revisit them, despite epochal changes in the nature of wars and conflicts, since these principles were first propounded. This could result in applying outmoded lessons to future wars and costly miscalculations. There is also variation, as well as ambiguity in the exposition of the principles of war, which evokes the need for their reassessment, questioning their adequacy and relevance. To do so, the following four cardinal questions may need to be answered as part of the re-appraisal effort in this discourse. First; whether the current principles of war are relevant in the present and future, domestic, regional and global environment? Second; what is the scope of these principles and do they provide guidance at all levels at which wars and conflicts ruminate? Third; if the various types and

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Environmental Tests of the Principles of War The environment includes the totality of the significant external and internal conditions that prevail within a given time period. The most important transformation in the regional environment includes the overt nuclearisation of the Sub-Continent and the events in Afghanistan after 9/11, with its fall out in Pakistan. There is also a consensus on the grave dangers of a conflict between nuclear armed neighbours, yet limited, nuclear as well as conventional wars are still being considered as options to resolve contentious issues related to territorial and other disputes. Limited conventional wars could escalate to the use of the ultimate weapon; with consequences too disastrous to be managed by any one, yet attitudes on addressing the causes of conflict remain unchanged. As I write, almost one third of the Pakistani troops are involved in counter insurgency/counter terrorism and ‘in aid of civil power’ duties. These commitments have their own rules and dynamics that may be different from the traditional principles of war. Additional visible trends are the phenomenal developments in information technology, major role of the media and increasing globalisation of the economies. As a consequence, greater reliance on a collective response for the use of coercive diplomatic measures and the application of force, at the regional and global levels could ensue. International support is dependent on the mutuality of common interests and challenges/threats. The Indo-Russian ties, the

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There is also variation, as well as ambiguity in the exposition of the principles of war, which evokes the need for their reassessment, questioning their adequacy and relevance

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forms of war, such as cold, conventional (limited and total), nuclear, guerrilla asymmetrical wars and low intensity conflicts, including insurgency and counter insurgency, to name a few, can also be governed by the present set of principles? And Fourth; to inquire into the sphere of influence of strategic doctrine on the existing principles and ascertain if there is any interrelation.

Indo-US nuclear deal, the Indo-Israeli defence cooperation, the CPEC and Pakistan-China security understanding and US actions in Afghanistan are some examples. Due to the current recession in the economies of many countries, predominantly Pakistan; the FATF, IMF, the World Bank, and other donors could also exert a much greater (though selective) influence on state policies, than it did in the past. Pakistan is one of the largest contributors to UN peace keeping and enforcement operations. Its armed forces are therefore expected to participate in a variety of military operations other than war (MOOTW). As these factors will shape all future security imperatives of nations, there will be a requirement to take greater cognisance of their presence. The existing principles of war do not entirely seem to cater for adjustments necessitated by these compulsions or the fact that victory in modern wars is dependent on the will of the masses and the harmonisation of the socio-political, administrative and military strategies.

Scope and Level of Application The current principles of war may have stood the test of recent wars at the operational and tactical levels, yet, there are higher levels at which lower level postulates could be meaningless. Consider the deliberations at the National Security Council, the National Command Authority, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the Defence

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Consider the deliberations at the National Security Council, the National Command Authority, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the Defence Council, the Ministry of Defence or the Joint Services levels where major decisions related to war and peace, including the military system are made

‘‘

Council, the Ministry of Defence or the Joint Services levels where major decisions related to war and peace, including the military system are made. The first three echelons of the higher defence organisation will provide only broad guide lines and precepts for the planning and conduct of the conflict or war. Such forums may reject war as a concept to solve the crises at hand and will rarely consider principles like offensive action, concentration, or mobility etc. They will be reflecting on bigger issues outlined in the national security policy/strategy, the defence policy and the military strategy, like public opinion, international support and the general state of preparedness for war, or the lack of it. The senior military leadership will always be expected to advise the political leadership on such issues, yet these factors are not included in the existing principles of war. It may be argued that the domain of the general is distinct from that of the statesman, and therefore the two could have a different set of guide-lines for war fighting. While this may be true, conclusions from the environment outlined earlier, suggests that there has to be an overlap between the two. Besides, an exclusive catalogue of principles, meant only for use by political leaders is hard to find. In fact, it is the lack of such guidance that makes the

search for a common list, so important and urgent. This very cursory reference to the components of any higher defence organisation and its mandate, points towards other principles that may be needed at the uppermost levels in all wars and conflicts, present or future.

Response to the Nature of Wars Wars may range, from very high intensity armed conflicts at one end of a spectrum to irregular warfare and low intensity operations at the other, which include insurgency and counter insurgency. If wars had to be guided by a set of rules or principles, they must ideally hold good for the successful execution of all these forms of war. Then there are limited wars, all out wars, nuclear wars and the wars against terrorists. The principles of war must satisfy and take into account all these forms and shades of wars, failing which, they need to be updated. These principles also evoke other expectations like provision of a generic formula for victory, major guide lines for the conduct and rules of engagement of each type of mission, and an assurance of victory that will be permanent in nature. However, the current principles of war are silent on such prospects and appear more applicable to specific National Security Committee Meeting

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conventional operations, campaigns and battles, rather than the entire range of warfare alluded earlier. For instance, the principle of ‘mass/concentration’ may not be relevant to nuclear, chemical or biological warfare milieu. The necessity for wars to be perceived as legitimate and just, for their successful prosecution and counsel for asymmetric wars also appears outside the scope of the existing principles. Considering the revolutions in military affairs, brought mainly by technological developments, there certainly is place for some fundamental and key axioms in the theory and practice of war that can deal with information operations and the ‘soft’ or cyber wars. The existing principles do not specifically address low intensity conflicts or insurgency and counter insurgency operations, wherein primacy of the political factors, intelligence based operations and ensuring legitimacy are the key factors. This inadequacy is glaringly evident when considered in the light of the violent events in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the world. It is also paradoxical that such factors that are vital for the conditions of the peace, subsequent to the initial victories in conflicts and wars have rarely been collectively discussed under some imposing appellation, such as the principles of war. It may be noted that a theory, precept or a notion of war can be labelled as a principle on the condition that it provides guidelines for the successful execution of all present as well as future wars/conflicts. The current list of principles of war appears restricted to provision of guidance, mainly for the latter and is therefore imperfect. Besides, they may not be able to stand the acid test of sufficiency/adequacy at the highest levels of policy and strategy. Besides, the resilience and power potential of a country is remarkably influenced by many constant factors, before, during and often after the end of major combat actions as well. Four such factors are: internal consensus and public opinion (supportive or against), international support and environment, the state of preparedness for war and the impact of information operations on the entire spectrum of warfare. The following discussion in this rendition shall examine these and a few other dynamics as possible new principles of wars/conflicts, in the light of generally accepted norms and selected historical evidence. 34

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Possible New Principles of War Internal Consensus and Public Opinion The significance of Clausewitz’ trinity of ‘the people, the government and the military’, in all the affairs of warfare is well known. He was of the view that any theory that did not consider this trinity was useless. In future wars, the people are not likely to allow governments to take decisions on war and peace, over their heads. Similarly, the armed forces alone Clauswitzian Trinity of War

or a superior technology may not prove useful in winning wars unless the people are ready, willing and motivated to participate in their own defence. We know that modern democratic institutions are mainly built on the will of the people and war is, therefore, the concern of all citizens. Domestic consensus among the elected leaders, the intelligentsia and even the media should, therefore, be the corner stone of all war policies/plans. History bears testimony to the fact that a conflict between the will of the people and the policies of the government or even the military could prove extremely detrimental to the achievement of the war objectives. Sometimes it may not be possible to find military solutions to problems that may be essentially political, ideological or economic in nature. In such cases, the military’s main job would be to create conditions that are suitable for arriving at domestic consensus and public support in the target countries/

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History bears testimony to the fact that a conflict between the will of the people and the policies of the government or even the military could prove extremely detrimental to the achievement of the war objectives

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The current principles of war may have stood the test of recent wars at the operational and tactical levels, yet, there are higher levels at which lower level postulates could be meaningless

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Preparedness for War Any consideration about the type of response to aggression or the likelihood of the same could include multiple choices. Inordinate delays in the choice of response options could have catastrophic consequences.

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The people will carry on a war regardless of the outcome if that war is favoured by them, but if it is detested, the people will refuse to take part in them, which may in turn force the government to make peace for fear of its own safety

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areas on these issues. The support of the population lies at the core of counter insurgency operations; however, the US failure to achieve this support in Afghanistan is largely responsible for their present predicament in that country. Sometimes public opinion may sway back and forth, against or in support of wars, and conflicts in accordance with the way in which military operations progress. Such a state of affairs may arise if the people have not been prepared by the leadership, for the impending events, in advance. This preparation will not be possible unless its significance is acknowledged. Even a quick look at recent military history verifies that in case of a protracted war or post war insurgency/counter insurgency or a war that leads to large human casualties, the people must have a very strong conviction in the cause for which the nation has gone to war. The absence of this condition will invariably lead to an erosion of the public support to military operations, which in turn could lead to an erosion of military morale and may even compel the national government to terminate the war – sometimes under undesirable conditions. Strong proof of such phenomena could be found in the Vietnam War, the Soviet and US invasions of Afghanistan. It is also well known, that the success of our armed forces military operations against terrorists, since the last many years, were greatly facilitated by a favourable public opinion. Sometimes, ‘the people will carry on a war regardless of the outcome if that war is favoured by them, but if it is detested, the people will refuse to take part in them, which may in turn force the government to make peace for fear of its own safety’.7 The support of the population of countries which are invaded can only be won if the invaders are perceived as liberators, just and friendly and/ or the general conditions after the war/conflict are better than what they were before the conflict. The post occupation measures like the Marshall Plan etc. put in place in Germany and Japan by the Allied Powers after World War – II, provide a good example of this. Thus, the need to elevate this factor to its rightful place as a principle of war.

Within these options, the politico-military strategy must also consider the type of force best suited for the campaign. The preferences could range among others, from the use of minimum force, covert actions, and single armed service, like the Special Forces, air force, navy, army or a suitable combination of these means. Such decisions would be based on an in depth analysis of the capabilities, limitations and consequences of the use of each type of force, with its own peculiarities and rules of employment. Most of these decisions will essentially be politico-military in nature, requiring a thorough understanding of the theories of warfare by the senior most politicians and military leaders. This will need time for preparation. But as military strategy always flows out of policy, the bigger onus of responsibility will be on the political masters, who have to be prepared and trained, during peace time, to take such decisions, through formal and informal military education and war games. Preparation for war also includes acquisition of weapons, equipment, munitions, fuel etc. from within the country and abroad. This will require a long period, spread over many months, sometimes years. Readiness will include what Sun Tzu termed ‘knowing yourself and the enemy’. It will also embrace training for new missions necessitated by changes in the environment, or in the adversary’s

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In future wars, the people are not likely to allow governments to take decisions on war and peace, over their heads. Similarly, the armed forces alone or a superior technology may not prove useful in winning wars unless the people are ready, willing and motivated to participate in their own defence

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doctrines. Mobilisation of forces and training of reservists and second line forces will also need careful consideration. This was indeed a major lesson learnt by the Pakistan armed forces during the Indo-Pak tensions and deployments of forces, at the borders in the years 2001/2002 and 2008, as we realised that the various government departments will need time to reorient and train for their war time functions. The civil defence organisation and the disaster management authorities will have to be readied, equipped and deployed during the pre-hostilities period. Particular attention will have to be given to the psychological preparation of the people for war. All training must be extensive to save blood and designed around future and not the past wars. If a conflict or war is imposed in a state of un-preparedness, the politico military objectives will have to be modified and tailored accordingly. Protection of vulnerable areas/points, strategic assets and dispersion of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery is also a part of preparedness for war. Preparedness is now the first principle of the Russian and many of the CIS countries, armed forces. Finally, and most importantly, increased readiness levels of conventional and nuclear forces helps deterrence, which happens to be the primary mission of all armed forces. “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles” Sun Tzu

The readiness list can be very long indeed, however the single most important area that can enhance or curtail liberty of all-action in war, will be state of information operations. As the transformation of the world continues with developments in the means of communications and information technology, future wars and conflicts are likely to be influenced more by these phenomena than anything else. This is discussed in the ensuing text. Information Dominance Sun Tzu advised us over 2500 years ago that if we kept ourselves informed about our adversaries as well as ourselves, we could hope to win hundreds of battles. He also stated that ‘all warfare is based on deception (and surprise)’. Surprise and deception will depend predominantly on information manipulation. Machiavelli believed that a good general could be differentiated from an ordinary one on account of the former’s foreknowledge about the enemy. Napoleon equated an agent at the right place to 20,000 soldiers. One of the major reasons given by Wellington for his victory at waterloo was prior information about Napoleon’s forces. Jomini paralleled knowing with conquering. Clausewitz devoted a full chapter to information in war in his monumental work, ‘On War’. He stated in the opening sentences of Chapter 6 that ‘… information is the foundation of all our ideas and actions, in war’. All the three ‘general principles of war’, suggested by Clausewitz, that include ascendancy of the moral to the physical, calmness and even audacity could be influenced positively or negatively by information operations. These thoughts per se could have influenced the German Army to adopt this principle of war. The Information Age in which we are living today has fundamentally altered the nature of warfare. It has almost eliminated the ‘fog’ of war, enabled most senior commanders to fight the war through remote controls, reduced the need for ground reconnaissance and made the necessity for upwards flow of information less critical. It has the potential to save resources, time and much sweat. Information operations can be used to influence the attitudes, behaviour and even the deep-seated

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The readiness list can be very long indeed, however the single most important area that can enhance or curtail liberty of all-action in war, will be state of information operations

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beliefs of the people if applied for a sufficiently long duration. In the last two decades, the main thrust of worldwide research and development has been directed at information technology. Pakistan is doing its utmost to catch up with the tremendous benefits of the information revolution. As Pakistan’s ‘net-work’ dependency grows; its survival can be threatened by anyone who can disrupt this network. This is equally applicable to the civil as well as the military sectors. With E – Commerce, free flow of capital is possible. This could affect national security, if financial institutions, multinational companies or even individuals decide to suddenly shift out funds or investments.

and civilian applications of artificial intelligence is fundamentally transforming the nature of warfare. Like telecasts and radio broad casts, the Internet does not recognise national or international boundaries and terms like hybrid, non-lethal or soft wars, utilising the powers of this media are already in vogue. However, the lack-some say even absence of state control over the internet is giving rise to serious concerns among government circles. The dangers of ‘web spoofing’, and other forms of attacks by hackers are quite well known and some counter measures to these have only recently surfaced. ‘Trojan horses’, ‘logic bombs’, ‘trap doors’, ‘worms’, ‘chipping’ and ‘Nano machines’ are some of the new weapons of this type of war. Modern satellites, aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles can pin point minute details with great accuracy, by day and night and in all weather conditions. Everything else being equal, the side that has information domination is more likely to win the contest. In view of the forgoing, there is a need, to give information dominance and intelligence the place they deserve–that of a principle of war. But information dominance, as well as preparedness for war may be dependent on international support for many developing countries, including Pakistan. This is discussed next. International Support

As in the past, the outcome of wars/conflicts in the next century will also be contingent upon the world opinion and the support of the comity of nations. For this, a timely successful ‘exterior With the proliferation of TV channels and manoeuvre’ that aims at an adroit manipulation broad band internet, the attitudes and convictions of the foreign affairs to shape the international of the masses, so vital to the success of all forms environment would play a vital role. Some of military operations, are increasingly being consequences of ignoring this compulsion were: influenced by the media. Information warfare, despite his operational genius, demonstrated in that shall include propaganda to sap the morale of the battles of Austerlitz and Jena etc., Napoleon the rivals and measures was decisively defeated to keep the spirits of at Waterloo by the last own population and the Machiavelli believed that a good Coalition of Nations that armed forces high, will be against him. general could be differentiated from an formed possible through media This Coalition abhorred reports and coverage ordinary one on account of the former’s Napoleon’s foreign during the tension policy manifested by the foreknowledge about the enemy period and the conflict. ‘Continental System’. The electronic media, that includes commercial Perhaps Napoleon needed some principles other broadcasts/telecasts, the print media and the internet shall continue to play the most dominant than those existing at the time for him to follow, in role and anyone who controls such assets may order to win the war and not only battles. The German Blitzkrieg in Poland in 1939 and be able to shape and control present and future France in 1940 were indeed very fascinating and events, whether these are at home or abroad. With computing powers more than doubling impressive; however, Hitler failed to keep one of every eighteen months or so, and developments in the great powers i.e. the USA, Britain or Russia fibre optics technology allowing transmissions of neutral, during the conflict, which led to his defeat an entire encyclopaedia in a few seconds, military in World War II.

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The erstwhile Soviet Union was humiliated in Afghanistan due to lack of international support for their actions in that country. Post World War II history of warfare also indicates that purely bilateral wars may not be easily winnable in view of the heavy inter-dependence of countries on others for the sinews of war and the inter-connectivity of the economies of states. The outcomes of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan prove that wars for permanent conquests of territories or even for change of regimes, without convincing justification and legitimacy, accepted by a majority of nations, are a very costly and difficult undertaking. Even the most powerful nations in the world have often preferred to fight as part of a bigger coalition, though the US did not learn its lesson from Vietnam when it tried to fight a war mostly by itself in that country and did the same in Iraq to end the Saddam regime. The war in the Gulf to end the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the war in Kosovo and the war in Afghanistan are recent, well known, examples of a unified action that enjoyed almost a unanimous international support. The triumphs in many of these instances were obviously due to the international agreement on the disputes in question. A collective response formulated through a successful exterior manoeuvre was prevalent in the past and is still a logical course, but strangely, it does not figure out as a principle for the conduct of wars.

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The role of diplomacy for forming coalitions after the events of 9/11 and its impact on the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan needs no reiteration. These issues would assume greater significance in all future wars and conflicts, of whatever intensity. Saddam Hussain of Iraq and his people paid a very heavy price for acting against the international will when it invaded Kuwait, but paradoxically, the United States, the leader of the early Coalition against Iraq did not learn this lesson. As a consequence, it faced serious problems in Iraq; chief among which was the cost of sustaining the war effort, which is in trillions of US dollars by some estimates.8

Lessons Learnt for the Future Diplomacy must assert and at times even over assert its legitimate role as the first means for achieving the political aims and interests of nations. At the same time, aggressors would be disciplined through punitive measures by the international community, sometimes applied against them by the UN, while at other times; it may be without the UN endorsement. Sometimes even super power interests may not take precedence over global concerns and international outlook. From this, it could also be inferred that while the ultimate outcomes of the serious disputes in Asia and the Middle East cannot be determined at this time, the opinion of the comity of nations may eventually prevail in these conflicts as well. This factor is indeed more pertinent for smaller powers, which may wish to further their interests against equal or bigger, more powerful states. However, in future, international support to war related acts by smaller countries may not be easily forthcoming, unless there is commonality of threat or shared interest of other states. Finally, most wars and even military operations other than war, fought after World War II, under a UN or some other multinational umbrella have generally been successful. The present arrangement in Afghanistan (ISAF legitimised through the UN) is a good example, but this dispensation is not as successful as it ought to be. The main reasons are that the UN is not in the lead role and there is lack of enough public support to the continuous presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan.

The German Blitzkrieg in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 were indeed very fascinating and impressive; however, Hitler failed to keep one of the great powers i.e. the USA, Britain or Russia neutral, during the conflict, which led to his defeat in World War II

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This alone proves that foreign decisions cannot be imposed unless the domestic public opinion has been prepared for them simultaneously and all other fundamentals have been considered before, during, and after the war.

Relationship of Principles of War and Tenets of Strategy As strategy deals with the best ‘ways’ to employ the ‘means’ at our disposal to meet the ‘ends’ in war, the principles of strategy and those of war have similar aims i.e. winning of wars, and thus, combining the two for the purpose may be in order. Strategy also comprises two components i.e., the employment and development of forces. Put together, the principles of war and strategic doctrine should cater for a comprehensive response, at most levels. However, it must be clearly understood that military and operational strategies are unlikely to succeed if the principles of war are circumscribed, or violated. Clausewitz enunciated five general principles of strategy; concentration of force at the decisive point, economy of force, speed, public opinion and pursuit. In addition, he outlined a separate set of principles for offensive and defensive operations at the tactical level. His view about putting public opinion as a principle of strategy and not war may have been true in his time, when monarchs generally ruled and public support to government decisions was not as significant, however, nowadays, it needs to be a tenet for both. In strategic terms, consideration of the wellknown notions of ‘time, space and relative strength (TSR) matrix’, maintenance of a state of ‘balance’ at all times, selection of the attrition or the manoeuvre or a combination of the two warfare theories to achieve the war objectives would depend on the state of relative preparedness of the two sides and an analysis of the adversary’s centre of gravity (COG). Whether it is war or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the first and perhaps the most vital factor for planning would be the identification and the tackling of the adversary’s COG. In fact, no war planning can proceed as desired or succeed without the correct determination of the opposing COG at many levels, yet this vital aspect fails to find a mention in the current list of the principles of war. It could be argued, that

the first principle i.e. ‘Objective’ may well include a determination of the COG, however, such a contention is not purported in the glossary of the terms found in commonly known military publications or literature. In any case, ‘Objective’ would mean the political or military purpose or aim of the war and thus, it would remain distinct from the term COG. Tackling the adversaries COG at the least expected time and place has been strongly advocated by Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart,

Strategic centre of gravity Strategic Operational Tactical

Operational centre of gravity Tactical centre of gravity

and is an accepted norm in our strategic thinking; however, the Principles of War are silent on the matter. Thus, there a need to undertake this exercises concurrently, as an essential step, after consideration of the first, existing principle of war i.e. ‘Selection of Aim’. While some references to these postulates could be found in the explanation of the principles of ‘mobility’ and ‘concentration of force’ but it is difficult to find instances where these principles and the said notions were viewed together for planning/waging of wars.

Conclusions and Recommendations The preceding discussion may have provided some answers to the fundamental questions raised at the beginning of this part. These are: First; that a reappraisal of the existing principles is needed with a view to bringing them in harmony with the dictates of the environment and the mission. Second; that their relevance to all forms of warfare is doubtful. Third; that their scope is rather narrow and limited to address national security issues at higher levels and finally that there is a need to expand the principles of war and synchronise them

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As strategy deals with the best ‘ways’ to employ the ‘means’ at our disposal to meet the ‘ends’ in war, the principles of strategy and those of war have similar aims i.e. winning of wars, and thus, combining the two for the purpose may be in order

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Diplomacy must assert and at times even over assert its legitimate role as the first means for achieving the political aims and interests of nations

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with our defence doctrine for optimum effects. It is sometimes argued that the principle of primacy of the political factors,9 may not serve a useful purpose, as military commanders may not be in a position to influence political decisions. This observation is negated by the recent events at the politico-military level in the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, there is a need to formulate a separate guide for policy makers on counter insurgency in the 21st Century as this form of conflict is thought to be eighty per cent political and only twenty per cent military in its nature. However, the true purpose of such direction can only be met in the context of a balance of the political and military factors at the top10 that will provide better environment for the application of lower level postulates. International understanding and domestic consensus are likely to ensure primacy of political issues and legitimacy and information dominance would cover the vital intelligence needs of such operations. The new/supplementary principles

of war take a broader, all-encompassing view of war. They provide guidance at the level at which decisions concerning war and peace are made. Global and regional powers as well as smaller nations, may have varying perspectives on wars and different pedestals from which they view them, nevertheless, in the present day interdependent, inter connected/networked world (a phenomenon that is likely to increase many fold in the near future) they must look for such principles of war that are applicable at the global, regional and local levels (or grand strategic, strategic and operational tiers). Equal relevance at all these levels would obviously be preferable but not essential. The principles of ‘International Support’, gained through a successful exterior manoeuvre, ‘Internal Consensus and favourable Public Opinion’, and ‘Information Dominance’, are directly pertinent at the first two levels and indirectly at the last level. All of these principles are applicable to most MOOTW, including UN peace keeping and enforcing operations. They, therefore, merit consideration and adoption after due adjustment for local conditions and requirements. The first two, new principles, may apparently look irrelevant below the national level, but this may be a faulty supposition as any errors, omissions, shortcomings or successes at that level will profoundly influence the conduct and outcome of wars, campaigns and battles at the other levels. In other words, we must take cognisance of one major lesson learnt repeatedly from history; that

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In fact, no war planning can proceed as desired or succeed without the correct determination of the opposing COG at many levels

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ones could be designated as ‘principles of military campaigns, battles and operations’, for exclusive military consideration, usage and application at the tactical/lower levels. Alternatively, the new principles could be added to the existing ones, beginning with the former and thereby adopting a total of thirteen (four new plus nine old) principles. Such a list may appear a bit long but the expansion will pass most of the validity tests mentioned in this paper. Notwithstanding the numbers or form of listing, the new principles should be applicable at the strategic and higher levels (state, regional, global) and the existing principles must logically flow out from these for all lower tiers. For the sake of doctrinal harmony, all notions and main tenets of strategy could flow from the existing principles (such as ‘mobility’, ‘concentration’ and ‘selection and maintenance of aim’) and need to be read in conjunction with the new principles, suggested in this paper. The existing principles of war should also be re-defined to accommodate the major tenets of strategy. However, the identification and tackling of the adversaries COG is worth particular consideration at higher levels and this factor could even merit the status of a separate principle of war at some levels. This exercise should be a combined attempt of the civilian controllers and the military authorities. While the new list of principles is made to mean provision of general guidance, mainly for the

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The current principles totally ignore the primary mission of the armed forces, i.e. to deter war/conflict. Preparedness, by nuclear and conventional forces shall reinforce deterrence and, therefore, it warrants recognition as a principle of war

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a viable strategy at the top level can sustain many lower level flaws, however, the opposite is rarely true. These two new principles will call for a much closer interaction and accommodation on the issue between the political and senior military leadership. The new principles will be equally (if not more) relevant in considerations related to nuclear, biological and chemical warfare where the end state is always difficult to envision. In such conflicts, well contemplated and candid professional advice, rendered by well informed and experienced senior/ strategic military leadership, at the highest level, to the national leadership about the ominous consequences of such wars will be vital. All strategic leaders must therefore prudently ponder over these new principles, well before entering a conflict of this nature. The current principles totally ignore the primary mission of the armed forces, i.e. to deter war/conflict. Preparedness, by nuclear and conventional forces shall reinforce deterrence and, therefore, it warrants recognition as a principle of war. If war is a ‘continuation of policy by other means’ as stated by Clausewitz, it must be based on the most authentic, precise and timely information. If war is a ‘clash of two opposing wills’ as enunciated by Liddell Hart, these wills can be impinged upon as much by information operations as by kinetic military operations. The Principle of Information Dominance must come up to this expectation. If it does not, the future may see more wars like the one in Iraq, initiated due to faulty intelligence. The new principle of ‘Information Dominance’ is mainly driven by technological considerations and it therefore tends to induce over reliance on technological solutions. This may be an aberration and needs to be guarded against, since war fighting will remain both an art as well as a scientific phenomenon. The new precepts could preferably be termed as the general principles of war and for MOOTW at the politico military level, while the current

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planning and conduct of most wars and conflicts, some additional/separate principles will always be needed for nuclear, chemical or biological or other specialised forms of wars and conflicts like COIN etc. Notes

Quoted by Liddell Hart; ‘Decisive Wars of History’, (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1929, First Edition) p.91. 2. Quoted by Felix Gilbert; ‘Makers of Modern Strategy’, (USA: Princeton University Press, 1973) p.85 and Michael Howard in ‘Clausewitz’, (New York: Oxford University Press. 1983) P.24. 3. Summarised from ‘On War’, edited by Michael Howard (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976) 4. Quoted by Etienne Mantour, in the ‘Makers of Modern Strategy’, (USA:Princeton University Press, 1973). P. 219 5. Quoted by Michael Carver from ‘Introduction to Strategy’, by AndreBeaufre,(London: Faber and Faber, 1965) in the ‘Makers of Modern Strategy, Part Five, P788. 1.

Notwithstanding the numbers or form of listing, the first and most important existing principle of war, i.e., selection of aim must flow out of the new principles. The new principles must find an emphatic mention in the defence doctrines, and the joint staff, as well as the individual service training publications. The arguments proffered in this work do not claim to challenge existing doctrine or related fundamental issues on the subject. However, they do seek to provide additional food for thought on the matter by outlining some new embryonic ideas for doctrinal improvement. It is hoped that the inputs (some general and some specific) contained in this exposition shall assist those who are inclined to reinterpret or expand the existing principles to win wars or at least to end them on a favourable note, at an affordable cost. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Brodie Bernard, ‘War and Politics’, (New York; Mac Millan, 1973). P.446 Gleaned from the ‘Principles of Strategy: Illustrated mainly from American Campaigns’, Bigelow, John, Captain (New York: Green Wood Press, 1968).P224233 www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/article titled, ‘The Three Trillion Dollar War’ by Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes For a detailed description of the US Counter Insurgency Doctrine (COIN), refer to; FM3-24, Chapter 1, p.28 & 29. The US COIN doctrine has been realistically analysed by Alexander Alderson, in the ‘Parameters’, published by US Army War College, Winter 2007-08.ps 42 -44. This article includes revised passages from the author’s Book: Peace and War: Their Precepts and Principles, (Ferozesons . Pvt Ltd 2013, Lahore).

LAWFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

Barrister Ahmer Bilal Soofi is former Federal Law Minister, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan and President Research Society of International Law, Pakistan

Abstract Lawfare is on a roll not only in the region but also at a global level and it is becoming manifest in new evolving alliances between China & Russia on the one hand and the US & Israel on the other. The article takes cognisance of this development from a legal lens, apart from reviewing Pakistan specific lawfare moves. It puts spotlight on more recent indications of lawfare moves, particularly the one alluded to by Indian foreign minister in her UNGA speech. It also refers to the legal push back by Iran, a state otherwise a subject of serious lawfare sanction regime and the dividends that it could extract from a global judicial forum against the most powerful state in the international system. Lawfare is now a reality and a unique dimension of 4th Generation Warfare. It must, therefore, be factored into the security calculus of Pakistan by the policy makers in the government so that the proper resources are allocated to effectively counter the lawfare moves by our rival states. Keywords: Lawfare, Sino-Russian Joint Declaration 2016, Kulbushan Jhadav, Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), Kashmir, RMI vs Pakistan

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mundane and limited conception aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or in imposing of international law perceives it as sanctions on states including, recently on China, merely a set of rules that constrain Russia, Iran and North Korea, the US has resorted state autonomy and sovereignty to the tools and frameworks of international law to through mandatory compliance. In my achieve its foreign policy aims. study and practice of international law It developed, for instance, a white paper stretching close to three decades, I have, however, justifying use of force and drone attacks against come to appreciate a more encompassing view of Taliban moving targets in various states. The same international law. On this view, which also finds was developed by a team of lawyers led by Mr Harold favour among leading scholars including Harvard Ko, a distinguished professor of International Law School’s David Kennedy, states actively make law and, later, legal advisor to state department. tactical and strategic uses of international law as a At that point, I happened to be the Federal Law vital instrument of national power to advance and Minister in a caretaker set up and commissioned a safeguard their foreign policy goals and objectives. team of young lawyers to prepare a rebuttal of the In both my writings and various public said white paper and the same was passed on to speaking engagements in the last few years or so, I Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. With respect to Iran, the US has exercised have diligently advocated for Pakistan to adopt this ‘lawfare’ paradigm in the formulation of its foreign its sovereign right of consent under international law to enter into policy.1 The need for such and withdraw from an approach has never international agreements. been more urgent given The American military has coined Thus, when the Obama the adoption of this a word: ‘lawfare’ – law as a weapon, law administration’s preferred paradigm by our rival foreign policy position states to successfully as a tactical ally, law as a strategic asset, was conciliation over undermine the pursuit of an instrument of war. The US (Military) continuing confrontation our national interests in with Iran, the US used the international arena. observes that law can often accomplish international treaty Lawfare is a phrase what might once have been done with framework in spearheading which has found traction bombs and missiles; seize and secure the efforts to conclude in international political the Joint Comprehensive discourse and which has territory, send messages about resolve Plan of Action (JCPOA) since been interpreted and political seriousness, even break the Agreement with Iran in to refer to a variety of will of a political opponent 2015 whereby Iran would different elements. redesign, convert, and The phrase has, however, David Kennedy reduce its nuclear facilities been also formulated as a doctrine by Professor David Kennedy, who summed and accept the Additional Protocol of the IAEA in up lawfare as: “The American military has coined a order to lift all nuclear-related economic sanctions, word: ‘lawfare’ – law as a weapon, law as a tactical freeing up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue ally, law as a strategic asset, an instrument of war. The and frozen assets. US (Military) observes that law can often accomplish The Trump administration, adopting a more what might once have been done with bombs and hard-nosed foreign policy towards Iran, reversed missiles; seize and secure territory, send messages the initiative of the previous administration by about resolve and political seriousness, even break withdrawing the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and rethe will of a political opponent”. Notably, with its imposing broad sanctions on Iran. array of distinguished international law experts in both the government and the academia, the United States has carefully developed its capacity to use international law in this manner. Whether justifying its broad conception of the right to use force in self-defence in the

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prioritise and engage with international law and its institutions stand to reap dividends in the conduct of their foreign relations. Perhaps taking their cues from Iran and Israel, the Gulf States are also increasingly resorting to international law to advance their political agendas in the international arena. Thus, in the wake of the diplomatic spat between the Gulf States in 2017, Qatar has taken the UAE to the ICJ. The Court has already granted partial relief to Qatar in the form of provisional measures declaring certain acts of the UAE against Qatar as discriminatory in contravention of the International Convention Eliminating Racial Discrimination. Russia and China, two of the five permanent members of the UNSC, besides emphasising the indispensability of international law for the conduct of foreign relations, reaffirmed their commitment to it in 2016 in a Joint Declaration on the Promotion and Principles of International Law.

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The US-Iran example offers an important lesson for policymakers around the world – that the United States is not alone in employing the doctrine of lawfare in its foreign relations. Besides Iran; Israel, the Gulf states, India, Russia and China have all adopted the lawfare paradigm and accordingly invested heavily in developing their international law capacity

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The two successive occupants of the White House have, therefore, strategically utilised international as well as US domestic law in opposing ways in the pursuit of their respective foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Iran. In response to these US lawfare moves, Iran has employed its own counter-lawfare-moves. The conclusion of the JCPOA itself was a successful counter-move by Iran to negate the complex web of UNSC sanctions crippling its economy. With respect to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions upon it, Iran has made a counter-lawfare move by taking the US to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the ongoing Iran v. United States’ (Nuclear sanctions) case, the ICJ has found jurisdiction in the matter and has already granted limited relief to Iran through preliminary measures, exempting certain goods from US sanctions on humanitarian grounds. The US has countered this by employing its own lawfare move by terminating its 1955 Treaty of Amity with Iran, which allowed the ICJ to exercise jurisdiction in the instant case. The US-Iran example offers an important lesson for policymakers around the world – that the United States is not alone in employing the doctrine of lawfare in its foreign relations. Besides Iran; Israel, the Gulf states, India, Russia and China have all adopted the lawfare paradigm and accordingly invested heavily in developing their international law capacity. Israel, through writings of its international law experts and the decisions of its judiciary, has for over two decades been at the forefront in progressively developing international law on targeted killings in a manner that optimises its foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. Israel’s lawfare moves amply demonstrate that states that

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The Declaration also, significantly, spells out Chinese and Russian counter-lawfare moves against US imposition of sanctions as well as with respect to the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. Its pertinent paragraphs read as: ── The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China reiterate their full commitment to the principles of international law as they are reflected in the United Nations Charter, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. They are also guided by the principles enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. ── The principles of international law are the cornerstone for just and equitable international relations featuring win-win cooperation, creating a community of shared future for mankind, and establishing common space of equal and indivisible security and economic cooperation. ── The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China share the view that the principle of sovereign equality is crucial for the stability of international relations. States enjoy their rights on the basis of independence and on an equal footing, and assume their obligations and responsibilities on the basis of mutual respect. States have the right to participate in the making of, interpreting and applying international law on an equal footing, and have the obligation to comply with international law in good faith and in a coherent and consistent manner. ── The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China share the view that good faith implementation of generally recognised principles and rules of international law excludes the practice of double standards or imposition by some States of their will on other States, and consider that imposition of unilateral coercive measures not based on international law, also known as «unilateral sanctions», is an example of such practice. The adoption of unilateral coercive measures by States in addition to measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council can defeat the objects and purposes of measures imposed by the Security Council, and undermine their integrity and effectiveness.

is of utmost importance that the provisions of this universal treaty are applied consistently, in such a manner that does not impair rights and legitimate interests of States’ Parties and does not compromise the integrity of the legal regime established by the Convention.

Sino-Russian­­Joint Declaration on the Promotion and Principles of International Law (2016)

This is a very vital development as two permanent members of UNSC have formulated fresh emphasis on international law principles of non-intervention and few others. Further, both the states have jointly and formally snubbed unilateral sanctions by US as being against the spirit of UN. This is a bold move. In other words, both China and Russia are alienating US on its moves that dent rule of international law. Pakistan will have to choose going with rule of international law approach that China and Russia has formulated through the joint declaration. I believe Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs should examine the full contents of the said declaration and consider aligning itself with various specific positions that both countries have taken on several aspects of international law. Most troublingly from the perspective of Pakistan, India has been persistently executing well-planned lawfare moves in the international arena calculated and tailored to undermine Pakistan’s policy positions and its global prestige and standing. Indian FM Sushma Swaraj’s insistence upon the global adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) in her recent

── The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China emphasise the important role of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in maintaining the rule of law relating to activities in the Oceans. It 46

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Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s insistence on CCIT at UNGA - A pre-meditated lawfare move against Pakistan

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remarks at the UNGA is a text book example of a pre-meditated lawfare move against Pakistan. Pakistan’s FATF grey-listing, the Kulbhushan Jadhav case at the ICJ, India’s objections over Diamer Bhasha Dam, and its hardening stance over the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and the Mumbai attacks are further instances of such moves. However, Kulbhushan’s disclosures are startling evidence of interference by a third state and we need to position his disclosures in various global forums as they always appreciate much better dossier containing material that is obtained pursuant to a legal process as opposed to material obtained from intelligence sources. Therefore, the copies of his statements given under provisions of Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan are more valuable and much better received than general narration of facts or episode from intelligence sources. Pakistan may want to not only provide statements but also the provisions of laws under which they were obtained. I have also already written extensively on Indian lawfare moves and potential Pakistani counter-lawfare moves with respect to the IWT.2 Perhaps the most insidious lawfare moves by India have been with respect to attempts to de-legitimise the Kashmiri indigenous struggle for self-determination as terrorist activity sponsored by Pakistan. In this context, India has quite deliberately tried to shape as well as exploit the evolving international law on terrorism in the aftermath of 9 /11 terrorist attacks in a manner that aligns it in the maximum possible manner with its policy positions on Kashmir. To this end, India has managed to get Pakistani based entities and individuals it deems inimical to its interests in Kashmir listed on CTC terrorism lists under UNSC Resolution 1373.

“Each year, for the last five years, India has been arguing from this podium that lists are not enough to check terrorists and their sponsors. We need to bring them to accountability through international law. In 1996, India proposed a draft document on CCIT at the UN. To date, that draft has remained a draft, because we cannot agree on a common language. On the one hand we want to fight terrorism; on the other, we cannot define it. This is why terrorists with a price on their head are celebrated, financed, and armed as liberation heroes by Pakistan. I, therefore, appeal to this body to come to an agreement on CCIT as one of the necessary measures in a long-running war.”3 Indian FM’s only new legal argument is about reminding the world to proceed with the draft convention on international terrorism. This is interesting and it seems that she wants to kick alive the debate that freedom fighters do not have the right to use force or alternatively bring forth the point that everyone taking up arms against the state is a terrorist. Pakistan needs to prepare itself in advance to handle this upcoming argument as it has also battled against non-state actors using arms against the state. Pakistan may wish to tie up the additional

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Perhaps the most insidious lawfare moves by India have been with respect to attempts to delegitimise the Kashmiri indigenous struggle for self-determination as terrorist activity sponsored by Pakistan

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India has been lobbying successfully with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Headquarters to get Pakistan grey-listed

It has twice lobbied successfully with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Headquarters to get Pakistan grey-listed on account of apparent deficiencies in its antimoney laundering – combating the financing of terrorism (CFT/AML) legal and administrative framework. More recently, it has been vigorously pushing for the global adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), which if adopted, would eviscerate the fine distinctions under international law between legitimate freedom movements based on selfdetermination and terrorist activity. India’s FM Sushma Swaraj’s remarks at the UNGA this year sums up this lawfare move against Pakistan:

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argument that when a freedom struggle is recognised by UN and is long standing linking to a territorial dispute, it is not comparable with use of force by violent non-state actors. From a legal perspective, Indian FM’s showcasing this argument in UNGA should kind of tip Pakistani policy makers in advance as to which way Indian Government plans to take the lawfare game. India, through lawfare moves tying GiligitBaltistan to the broader territorial dispute over Kashmir, has also been attempting to undermine Pakistan’s ability to construct Diamer-Bhasha Dam by curtailing its financing o ptions. I nternational lenders, like the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, have now conditioned any financing of the dam upon no-objection certificates from India.4 Cumulatively, all this not only highlights the necessity for Pakistan to adopt its own counter-lawfare moves in these cases, but is also a clarion call to the State to proactively and broadly utilise international law to advance its own national interests and foreign policy agenda. From Pakistan’s point of view, lawfare means the use of international law to develop pressure points on strategic issues in order to make political gains. Lawfare should be the State’s preferred option over Kashmir, more so because all aspects of the Kashmir issue are essentially legal propositions. It is a territorial dispute involving the interpretation of UN law and bilateral treaties, the Indian and Pakistani constitutions, and holds many other legal elements such as the implications of the exercise of continuing sovereignty by Pakistan over Azad Jammu and Kashmir, not to mention the Modi government’s attempts to invalidate or whittle down Article 370 of the Indian constitution. Pakistan, by writing to the UN Secretary General, should also push for the establishment of an inquiry commission over Kashmir as recommended by the first e ver 4 9-page r eport issued by the UN Human Rights Office, de tailing gruesome human rights abuses by Indian forces in Indian Occupied Kashmir. With respect to the status of Giligit-Baltistan, Pakistan must forcefully assert its legal linkage with the remaining territories of Pakistan at all international fora. Equally important, Pakistan should share evidence of Indian sponsored terrorism in Pakistan with the global community. Its counter-lawfare strategy should highlight repeated Indian noncooperation on Mumbai trials as well as over Uri and Indian top court grants bail to Colonel linked to Malegaon, Samjhauta Express attacks

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Pathankot probes, besides raising miscarriages of justice in the Samjhauta Express trials held in India. With respect to trials of Mumbai suspects in Pakistan, India has failed to provide any admissible evidence required under Pakistani law for conviction of these suspects. Despite Indian noncooperation in a trans-national crime, Pakistan has been making good faith efforts at great expense to its exchequer for close to a decade to bring these trials to a conclusion. It, however, cannot be expected to side-step its domestic legal procedures to forcibly convict Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and other suspects in Mumbai attacks. Pakistan’s lawfare response to India’s socalled surgical strikes should entail exposing this pretense and its threats as a flagrant violation of settled principles of international law on noninterference and against aggressive use of force enshrined in the UN Charter. Pakistan should cogently put India on notice that any such strikes or their threats thereof will clearly constitute unlawful use of force against Pakistan granting it the legal right under Article 51 of the UN Charter to respond with force against India in self-defence. With regards to getting off the FATF greylist, Pakistan should present a comprehensive and well thought out plan to the FATF secretariat encompassing legal and administrative reforms necessary to comply with the FATF guidelines. Former Director General Military Operations, Ranbir Singh aggressively claiming “Surgical Strike” across the Line of Control in Kashmir

The state should make efforts to replicate its previous successful efforts to get off similar watch lists, most notably in moving up the US Human Trafficking Index in 2018 and in getting removed from the US Intellectual Property Watch List in 2016. A rare instance of Pakistan’s successful counterlawfare move is the ‘Republic of Marshall Island’ (RMI) vs Pakistan case at the ICJ, which is also a significant reminder that if the state can manage to harness its indigenous international law expertise and potential, it can achieve victories at the highest forums in international law. In a landmark ruling in

2016, the ICJ, the United Nation’s top court, knocked out the RMI case against Pakistan on ‘Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms’ Race and to Nuclear Disarmament,’ accepting Pakistan’s legal arguments that it lacked the jurisdiction to proceed in the case any further on the merits. The ruling represents a historic first victory for Pakistan at the ICJ and formally brought the RMI lawsuit against Pakistan to a conclusion after two and a half years.

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Since lawfare demands active participation in international fora, Pakistan must make all efforts to win memberships at various UN bodies, Commissions and Committees and get its nationals appointed as judges and arbitrators at international courts and tribunals including the ICJ, the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

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In a text book lawfare move, the RMI had originally filed applications before the ICJ in April 2014 against all nine nuclear-weapons’ states including Pakistan but only lawsuits against Pakistan, India and the United Kingdom proceeded to the jurisdiction stage as a consequence of their qualified advance consent to the Court’s jurisdiction. In response to the RMI’s written pleadings on jurisdiction and admissibility issues, Pakistan’s legal team submitted a robust counter-response arguing that the case should not proceed to the merits because Pakistan’s nuclear programme is a matter of its national defence and security which falls exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction and is, therefore, not to be called into question by any court including the ICJ. Moreover, it was conveyed to the Court that the RMI lacks the requisite standing to institute the current proceedings since there is no dispute, let alone a legal dispute, that exists between the RMI and Pakistan. This is manifested by the fact that the RMI has never suffered any damage caused by Pakistan either directly or indirectly, and by the lack of any formal or informal communication initiated by the RMI with Pakistan until it filed its application in the ICJ Registry on 24 April 2014. Pakistan’s written pleadings further stressed that the injury claimed by the RMI cannot be redressed by compelling the specific performance in the absence Notes 1. 2. 3.

See Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Lawfare versus Warfare, DAWN, October. 25, 2014. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, The Three-Basket Approach to IWT, DAWN, Janauary. 31, 2017. SushmaSwaraj, Full Text of Speech at the UNGA (2018), available at: https://

of other nuclear-weapons’ states by only Pakistan, which is neither “an interested party” nor a party “directly concerned” with obligations enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While accepting Pakistan’s legal arguments, the Court in its judgment especially noted the lack of a legal dispute in the case and crucially affirmed that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not illegal under international law.

Moving Forward Pakistan ought to integrate lawfare in the conduct of its foreign policy in an institutionalised manner. This crucially means that in addition to capacity building measures and lawfare formulations suggested in this article, the state should proactively engage with international institutions to enable itself to participate in the progressive development of international law which safeguards its national interests. Given the fast-paced and dynamic nature of international law, issues that significantly threaten our security and economic interests such as evolving international laws on autonomous weapons and cyber warfare and the negotiations on WTO rules, urgently need careful scrutiny by international law experts. Lastly, since lawfare demands active participation in international fora, Pakistan must make all efforts to win memberships at various UN bodies, Commissions and Committees and get its nationals appointed as judges and arbitrators at international courts and tribunals including the ICJ, the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/full-text-of-sushma-swarajs-statement-atun-general-assembly/articleshow/66009354.cms (last accessed on October. 7, 2018). 4. (https://www.dawn.com/news/742060)(https://tribune.com.pk/story/514063/ diamer-bhasha-dam-world-bank-not-adb-presses-for-seeking-indian-noc/)

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PAKISTAN AND THE SHIFTING CONFIGURATION OF GEO-POLITICS Salman Bashir is a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Ambassador to Denmark, Lithuania, China, Mongolia and High Commissioner of Pakistan to India

Abstract Asia is now the centre stage of geo-politics; relations between major powers are slipping towards uncertainty, competition and rivalry. Melt down of the global order. Societal changes across the globe impelled by demography, generational shift, globalisation and technology. Strategies at China containment − smack of a new cold war. Globalisation is irreversible. It is impelling deepening of global interdependence and warrant international cooperation. Geo-politics cannot upend geo-economics. The concept of IndoPacific as endorsed by the US brings India and Indian Ocean into emerging power equations. President Trumps’ Afghanistan and South Asia strategy is a variant of a broader US’ Indo-Pacific policy. US’ policy incoherence and contradictions are causing confusion and raise serious questions about US’ will and ability to shore up global order. Trump’s world view is shaped by his business background and quest for America’s national renewal. US will remain the primus inter pares and continue to wield influence across the globe. Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is good for the world; an inclusive concept of voluntary partnerships for development and win-win cooperation. Interests of US and China converge over a broad spectrum. China has no interest in challenging the US’ preeminence. Rational way forward for US and China is to cooperate and concert efforts for attaining shared goals. India is being consumed by its misplaced ambitions and is misreading the global power dynamics. Pakistan’s geo-strategic vulnerabilities are being overcome and converted into strength by CPEC. Pakistan is well situated to delineate a CPEC Plus Vision for building concentric circles of stability, peace and development in our region-Afghanistan and beyond. Real interests bind Pakistan and the US, in the Afghanistan context. There are good reasons for reworking Pakistan − US partnership. New government in Pakistan has brought hope for socio-economic transformation. Working the domestic agenda and stabilising external environment to suit national interests must be a priority. Good relations with neighbours and all major powers is a must. Need to eschew any unnecessary external liabilities. Centenary independence vision 2047 − a developed Pakistan should inform and guide national endeavours. Keywords: Geo-Strategy, Geo-Politics, Globalisation, Indo-Pacific, Asia-Pacific, CPEC

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he centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from west to east. Asia-Pacific is the new locus of global strategic power play. The rise of China, rejuvenation of Russia and India’s growth potential have compelled a re-think in the US global strategy − China and Russia are now declared strategic competitors/rivals and India a partner of choice in the ‘China containment’ strategy. A triangular power equation–US, China and India- is shaping the geopolitics of the region. Situated in the heart of Eurasia, Pakistan’s destiny will be impacted by contemporary trends and in turn Pakistan is destined to play a critical role in determining future outcomes. Given its history of close partnership with both, the US and China, Pakistan is well positioned to make a positive contribution to global peace, security and development.

Unpredictable US foreign policy

Global society has undergone a profound The melt down of transformation − impelled by The center of gravity of global globalisation, demographic world order − signifies politics has shifted from west to and generational shifts an inflexion point in and the unprecedented contemporary history − east. Asia-Pacific is the new locus pace of technological made stark by the advent of global strategic power play. advancements. Systems of President Trump on The rise of China, rejuvenation of of politics, economics and the global scene. Anxiety governance no longer match and uncertainty abound. Russia and India’s growth potential new requirements. US shaped the twentieth have compelled a re-think in the Old tools of strategic century world. However, it US global strategy-China and analysis and standard is now becoming difficult prescriptions no longer to discern US’ policy Russia are now declared strategic apply. In a perceptive essay direction. Widespread competitors/rivals and India a title the ‘Big Shift’, Walter lament on the fading away Russell Mead examines how partner of choice in the ‘China of the liberal order and American democracy fails loss of the moral compass, containment’ strategy its way forward to success. to save, if not reinforce the foundations of the international system, premised He notes that ‘the Information Revolution is on the principles and purposes of the United disrupting the country’s social and economic order as profoundly as the Industrial Revolution did. Nations Charter, is a cause of anxiety.

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Global Disarray

A triangular power equation – US, China and India- is shaping the geopolitics of the region

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Western sea board of Eurasia shaped the history of the world. Ascendency of the West, over several centuries, exemplified by the Euro-Atlantic alliance since the Second World War was a sine qua non for global security as well as the ideals and values that underpin our civilisation. Its roots were in ancient Greece, Rome and Christianity

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The ideologies and policies that fit American society a generation ago are becoming steadily less applicable to the problems it faces today… intellectual and policy elites, for the most part, are too wedded to paradigms that no longer work, but the populists, who seek to replace them, don’t have real answers, either. It is, in many ways, a stressful and anxious time to be alive. And that anxiety has prompted a pervasive sense of despair about American democracy − a fear that it has reached a point of dysfunction and decay from which it will never recover’.1 This quote gives a sense of what is being felt in the US and more generally in the world. Established systems do not work any longer. The concepts and intellectual constructs have become outdated and out paced by the speed of societal change. But where is the new thinking or even new understanding of the phenomenon of ‘change’. Mead further states ‘The challenge is immense. The foundations of societies are quaking at home, even as the international order threatens to splinter….The old answers in the old text books don’t seem to work anymore, the new answers haven’t been discovered yet, and those who will someday write new answers are still in primary school. To reflect on the upheavals that accompanied the 52

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Industrial Revolution − the most destructive wars and the most unspeakable tyrannies in the history of our species − is to realise just how much peril we face…Yet humans are problem solving animals. We thrive on challenges…The good news and bad news are perhaps the same: the American people, in common with others around the world, have the opportunity to reach unimaginable levels of affluence and freedom? But to realise, that opportunity, they must overcome some of the hardest challenges humanity has ever known. The treasure in the mountains is priceless, but the dragon who guards it is fierce’.2 Western sea board of Eurasia shaped the history of the world. Ascendency of the West, over several centuries, exemplified by the Euro-Atlantic alliance since the Second World War was a sine qua non for global security as well as the ideals and values that underpin our civilisation. Its roots were in ancient Greece, Rome and Christianity. Waves of globalisation generated by the intellectual, technological and economic prowess of the West impacted and transformed societies and institutions everywhere. Asia has benefitted from these processes that encompassed not only economy and trade but also organising principles of society and institutionspolitical pluralism, democracy, human rights, free trade and capitalism. The triumph of liberalism over communism in the 1990s was a watershed in human history. As President Obama in delivering the Nelson Mandela lecture in Johannesburg noted, ‘at the end of the twentieth century, while some Western commentators were declaring the end of history and the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy and the virtues of global supply chain, so many missed signs of a brewing backlash…Look around. Strong man politics are ascendant, suddenly, whereby elections and some pretense of democracy are maintained − the form of it − but those in power seek to undermine every institution or norm that gives democracy meaning….

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In the West, you’ve got – right parties that a new age, where standard geo-political constructs often times are based not just on platforms of have become unworkable? Is Globalisation protectionism and closed borders but also on reversible? barely hidden racial nationalism. Many developing Multilateral cooperation is a function countries now are looking at China’s model of of ‘interdependence’. Unilateralism, narrow authoritarian control, combined with mercantilist nationalism and what President Obama has capitalism, as preferable to the messiness of repeatedly decried – ‘neo-tribalism’ have become democracy. pervasive. Rise of xenophobia, intolerance, racism, Social media – once seen as a mechanism and all the other signs and symptoms of populism to promote knowledge and understanding and made legit by the ballot are indicative of the chaos solidarity − has proved to be just as effective resulting from processes of societal transformation, promoting hatred and paranoia and propaganda in nearly all parts of the world. and conspiracy theories’.3 Democracy has tended to serve the rich In an article in the New Yorker titled “Francis and powerful. The digital age has empowered Fukuyama Postpones the End of History”, Louis individuals and made them more aware of the Men and writes, ‘Fukuyama’s argument (back in context and contrasts of their own existence. ‘Asymmetry’ in terms of 1989) was that, with the politics and economics is imminent collapse of the creating a lethal brew of Soviet Union, the last Social media – once seen as a social despondency if not ideological alternative to liberalism had been mechanism to promote knowledge and revolt. Is this increasingly the new normal? eliminated. Fascism understanding and solidarity – has had been killed in the The fading away of Second World War, and proved to be just as effective promoting the liberal era, may well now Communism was hatred and paranoia and propaganda prove to be a passing imploding. In states, phase. The US will and conspiracy theories like China, that called remain the predominant themselves Communist, power, it will undergo a political and economic reforms were heading in the process of national renewal and continue to speed direction of a liberal order. Twenty nine years later, ahead not only in military might but on the wings it seems …that history has a few more tricks up its of technology, transforming our planet into a more sleeve. It turns out that liberal democracy and free tightly knitted and thus highly interdependent trade may actually be rather fragile achievements. community. There is something out there that doesn’t like liberalism, and is making trouble for the survival Unburdening of America of institutions. Fukuyama thinks he knows what President Donald Trump has in a short span that something is, and his answer is summed up of just two years rocked, if not demolished, the in the title of his new book, “Identity: The Demand foundations of the international system. In official for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment”. and think tank community in Washington DC The demand for recognition, Fukuyama says, there are nuances and contradictions on the US is the “master concept” that explains all the perspective on the world. However, the President contemporary dissatisfactions with the global liberal order… Present trends don’t continue. They produce backlashes and reshufflings of the social deck. The identities that people embrace today are the identities their children will want to escape from tomorrow. History is somersaults all the way to the end’.4 Globalisation has brought about a fundamental restructuring of the global economy-manufacturing and services sectors have moved east to Asia. Financial sectors were hit by the 2008 recession. Asia’s rise was a consequence of a number of factors – demography, technology and nature of governance. Are these transformations on a civilisational scale? Is ‘confrontation’ the perennial theme in the rise and fall of nations? Are we now at the cusp of

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has taken the lead in reframing US’ world view and consequently the view of the world about the United States. Defining instances of the Trumpian world view were the G-7 Summit in Quebec on 8-9 June 2018, Brussels NATO Summit on 11-12 July 2018, President Trumps visit to the UK on 13 July 2018, the Helsinki Summit with President Putin on 16 July 2018 and the meeting with Kim Jong Un of North Korea, in Singapore on 12 June 2018. These encounters revealed an abandoning of standard constructs about alliances and interestsa series of deliberate knocks to signal change in US’ thinking about the world, which is, of course, hugely consequential. Commenting on Trump’s behaviour at the G-7, CNN Editor — at large — stated, “in space of less than 48 hours, the President of the United States attacked the leader of Canada as ‘very dishonest and weak’ and praised the leader of North Korea for working toward a deal on the Korean peninsula…. The extent to which Trump has clashed with longtime allies (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Australia and on and on and on) is remarkable. As is his willingness to publicly explode the usually staid-managed international gatherings like the G7. His allies have — and will cheer his name calling and his long-distance tendency toward confrontation…The US has been the steadying force in international affairs for decades…If the US no longer plays that role — or shrinks from it in any meaningful way — the balance of the world is shaken and changed. And those changes are unpredictable — and not necessarily beneficial to the United States. Power and vacuums and power and shifts are filled rapidly in politics and foreign affairs”5 Under the banner of ‘America First’, Trump seeks national self-renewal. This is akin to the Chinese Communist Party slogan of ‘national rejuvenation’. But the means and methodologies are strikingly different. It would be a folly to read Trump’s policy as merely erratic or naive. This is a deliberate effort at ‘unburdening’ the US from responsibilities it had assumed as the sole super power in guarding world peace, security

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In official and think tank community in Washington DC there are nuances and contradictions on the US’ perspective on the world. However, the President has taken the lead in reframing US’ world view and consequently the view of the world about the United States

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and development — and the norms and values associated therewith in terms of the free world or liberal order. It can perhaps be better construed

President Donald Trump slammed Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as ‘very dishonest and weak’, what the White House called a ‘great meeting’ between the two leaders during G-7 Summit 2018

as creative destruction — to usher a new wave for re-establishing US’ primacy by carrying to the ultimate extreme the notion of US ‘exceptionalism’. In this sense, US is no longer a status quo power. The perception of unburdening of the US has had profound repercussions everywhere and, especially, in the Asia-Pacific region. The US’ allies in the Pacific such as Japan and South Korea as well as among the ASEAN Ten have read the tea leafs. These countries, given their economic interests with China and uncertainty now associated with the US security guarantees, are now re-positioning themselves. A good indicator is the net flow of investments and trade between Japan and China and South Korea and China. India has some $85 bn of trade with China. The financial math does not match up with geopolitical posturing. Money trails are fairly good indicators of real interests. On the other hand, China has tried hard to play by the old rule book, demonstrated its adherence to the established global order. It is evident that the global order suited China’s national interests. In this sense, China is a status quo power. It is not interested in challenging US’ primacy but in pursuing its own economic growth trajectory. In face of US’ retreat, China has been assuming a greater share of responsibility with respect to maintaining global order and stepping in where US is unable or unwilling to support existing international structures — such as the UN and Bretton Woods system. The world sees China’s role as benevolent and beneficent, as it is increasingly

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US and Indo-Pacific: Ramping up China Containment The US’ Indo-Pacific strategy has a strong military dimension. It builds on President Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia by reinforcing its Pacific Command

by encompassing the Indian Ocean. The concept of Quad — Japan, India, Australia and the US — was revived in 2017. Politically, the Pacific ring is being aligned more closely with US- China containment approach. However, economic strands, are missing. By walking away from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US has left its partners wondering about the direction and substance of US policy.

Donald Trump Just after pulling the US out of TPP

Firing of the first few rounds of tariffs by the US in a trade war with China has compounded economic uncertainty with profound consequences for global economy. The US’ ‘go it alone’ attitude is somewhat disconcerting for its allies, both across the Atlantic and Pacific. Chinese access to high technology is also being restricted. The ostensible purpose is to balance trade and retard China’s economic growth and technological progress. In an article in the Asia Times titled ‘Sun Tzu and the art of fighting a trade war,’ Pepe Escobar writes about the US triggered trade war with China and states, ‘It will be nasty and Trump would be foolish to underestimate Xi and the resolve of China…the Beijing leadership identifies… in the Chinese culture terminology, as the three threats…A threat to their foreign policy concept

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In face of US’ retreat, China has been assuming a greater share of responsibility with respect to maintaining global order and stepping in where US is unable or unwilling to support existing international structures – such as the UN and Bretton Woods System

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the only one that is in a position to roll out funds and technology for development on the basis of mutually beneficial partnerships.

for the coming decades, such as the Belt and Road Initiative…Trump attack on “Made in China 2025”… (it) does not alter the fact that the world’s second largest economy is relentlessly climbing up the manufacturing ladder. Eventually it will overtake the US in technological innovation…China’s military “adventurism’ allows the Pentagon to come up with a Space Force. China is also barred from investing in US industries related to national security…And China is increasingly depicted as a “malign” — the buzzword of choice that makes Trump, in this case, fully aligned with the industrial-military-security-think tank complex.’6

India’s Strategic Dilemmas India had tried to cozy up to the US for its own reasons. In its quest for global respectability and power it desperately wanted US’ support to become a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Club and a Permanent member of the Security Council. More important was India’s desire to get the US on its side in its perennial hostility towards Pakistan. It had hoped for US support in isolating Pakistan and to de-legitimise the freedom movement of the Kashmiri people for the exercise of their right to self-determination, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. US promised India high technology and sophisticated weapon systems. US also sensed that India was a large market and thus relevant to US’ economic interests. It has declared India as a major defence partner and signed logistics and basing agreements. The US’ decision to place India in tier one for receiving high technology defence equipment, exempting it from licensing requirements, is another shot in the arm of the China containment strategy. From the US’ perspective, what matters is the Indian Ocean. The maritime component of global strategic play in which US and Indian navies could cooperate in ensuring freedom of navigation and if required choking of sea links for strategic supplies bound for China. Succinctly, Pan-Eurasian-ism vs Atlantic-ism seems to be the essential dynamics of geo-politics today. Green Book 2019

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India consistently signalled its readiness to play the role of a junior proxy for the US on the grand Asian-Pacific chess board. But lately

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From the US’ perspective, what matters is the Indian Ocean. The maritime component of global strategic play in which US and Indian navies could cooperate in ensuring freedom of navigation and if required choking of sea links for strategic supplies bound for China. Succinctly, Pan -Eurasianism vs Atlanticism seems to be the essential dynamics of geo-politics today

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Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman held crucial talks with Former US Secretary of Defence James N. Mattis and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo – New Delhi (6 September 2018)

Indian policy establishment is faced with strategic dilemmas. China has demonstrated immense ‘strategic patience’ and appears to be succeeding in impelling a rethink in New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been to China twice (Wuhan and Qingdao in April and June 2018) and met President Xi Jinping also at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in July 2018. The Communiqué of the India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan inter alia states that “the simultaneous emergence of India and China as two large economies and major powers with strategic and decisional autonomy has implications of regional and global significance. They shared the view that peaceful, stable and balanced relations between India and China will be positive factor for stability amidst current global uncertainties.”7 India realises that it needs to take the cover of ‘strategic autonomy’ to play (and benefit from all sides) as a balancer. There are clear indicators of its warming up to China. This rethink is also occasioned by uncertainties about the US and its global role.

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), seeks to connect Eurasia and Africa into a cohesive economic whole. It is premised on inclusivity, voluntary participation, mutual benefit and winwin cooperation. While rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the Chinese dream, the greater dream is creating a community of shared destiny. China has created the mechanisms and the infrastructure for realising these worthy goals. This visionary initiative of President Xi Jinping holds the promise of bringing about a historic transformation in the global economic and political landscape. As a concept and in its working, this represents an original and most consequential

Chinese Dream The Chinese dream, after all, is the dream of the people. We must realise it by closely depending on the people. We must incessantly bring bene its to the people.

Rise of China On the Eurasian island, new centres of economic development are conferring vigour and vitality to the global economy. The truly inspiring development has been the magnificent transformation of China into the second largest economy of the world. We are witnessing the renaissance of the Chinese civilisation. It is not only in terms of economic statistics but in thought, philosophy, arts and crafts. China has a unique reading of global history and this imbues it with long-term perspectives. For the people of Pakistan China’s rise is a source of immense inspiration and satisfaction.

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Realising the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history. ---- quotes from Chinese President Xi Jinping

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contribution of China to the future of mankind. The BRI seeks to convert the Eurasian land mass into a single economy by interconnecting it with a network of roads, railroads, pipelines, ports, airports, and telecommunications links, and, based on these, to create a series of development corridors containing large zones of productive economic activity and, ultimately, prosperity. Supplementing this essentially continental development is a maritime component (the “Road”), aimed at investing and fostering collaboration in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North Africa, through several contiguous bodies of water – the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean. The Polar access Route is also being worked. Chinese position on all international issues was enunciated on the basis of principles. China did not ask for a re-writing of the rules and/or principles of international relations. It wanted everyone to ‘own’ and ‘live by’ the accepted norms and principles. China’s voice at international forums has been a ‘moral’ voice. China has scrupulously eschewed power politics, hegemony and has stood for the rights of the under privileged and poor in the Third World. With the accretion in China’s economic might, we have seen the practice of the principles of sovereign equality, non-interference, mutual interest and mutual benefit getting even more pronounced in China’s dealing with its neighbours and partners in the world. China is today the number one economy of the world in terms of purchasing power parity and its GDP in nominal terms is projected to overtake that of the US in the next few years. China has been taking practical steps to build peace and shared prosperity. It leads the way, especially in cooperative enterprises such as SCO and in multiple regional and inter-regional processes such as AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM). China’s economic strength is being utilised to set up financial institutions to promote economic growth in the Asian region and beyond. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund, the SCO Development Fund,

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This visionary initiative of President Xi Jinping holds the promise of bringing about a historic transformation in the global economic and political landscape. As a concept and in its working, this represents an original and most consequential contribution of China to the future of mankind

BRICS and other enterprises are directed towards consolidating and promoting development across continents.

Pakistan and China Pakistan takes great pride in its friendship with China. This is a time tested all weather partnership and friendship. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of the BRI, is only one dimension of the concrete manifestation of this mutually beneficial friendship. Pakistan is developing high grade infra-structure with Chinese assistance – Gwadar Port, roads, bridges, rail tracks and special economic zones.

Agricultural, energy and industrial cooperation have been prioritised. China-Pakistan cooperation is for development and not directed against any country. In fact, the entire region and the world can benefit from CPEC. China’s outreach to the world, especially to its neighbours, is consequential. China has ample number of times stated that the world is big enough to accommodate the aspirations of all. The reach out to India is an example of Chinese sagacity and strategic patience. China sees its southern neighbours as important for its own stability, peace and prosperity. It has always advocated peaceful resolution of Pakistan-India disputes. It proceeds from a position of principle, something that is increasingly rare in contemporary times. Pakistan would view an improvement in ChinaIndia relations as a positive development. India’s opposition to the BRI is unfortunate. The BRI is a concrete manifestation of globalisation. It is not about the East wind prevailing over the West. Corridors and connectivity are two ways. Hence by definition neutral by way of geo-political significance. Pakistan’s stands to benefit from the BRI and CPEC. The long-term vision that would make perfect sense for Pakistan is that CPEC extends further in all directions. Green Book 2019

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CPEC Plus vision would see the incorporation of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and the Gulf States on the one hand and Central Asia to Russia on the other. CPEC, as a BRI adjunct would extend to Africa. It could also leap east towards India, if India could reconcile to Pakistan’s existence as ‘equals’ and agree to resolve peacefully all disputes. Drawing in extra regional powers to contain or countenance the rise of China by re-inventing the age of bloc politics will not only be counterproductive but also prove to be unworkable. Concepts of the Quad or alliance of ‘maritime democracies’ based on geo-political considerations, are notions that will only stall, albeit temporarily, the Eurasian dynamics of win-win cooperation for stability, predicated on shared prosperity.

IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS No Zero Sums: US – China/ Pakistan – India It is a mistake to consider China-US relations as a zero-sum game. Despite the US Security and Defence Strategies and the Nuclear Posture Review, the fact of huge interdependence between US and China cannot be ignored. Russia’s rejuvenation as politically consequential entity on the Eurasian continent and its cooperative endeavours with China to stabilise Eurasia constitutes an important factor in the emerging global scenario. From North Korea to Afghanistan, all pressing issues require China-US-Russia cooperation. In Pakistan’s immediate vicinity such cooperation would contribute to stabilising the situation in Afghanistan. The ongoing processes, for peace and national reconciliation in Afghanistan, could pick up momentum if a collaborative approach is devised to prioritise economic and social development of Afghanistan. The challenge for Afghanistan and Pakistan is to convert their respective strategic vulnerabilities into strength. This has started to happen with the ongoing progress in CPEC related projects in Pakistan. It will be fortified by economic development and peace in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Pakistan-India have remained in a tense stand-off. Both are nuclear weapon states. Regrettably, India has closed avenues for deescalation by blocking mechanisms of engagement and dialogue. The peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is the key to unblocking the potential of win-win cooperation between Pakistan and India.

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Both India and Pakistan need to overcome their mental blocks about each other. Pakistan’s Asian calculus does not factor India. Similarly, for Indian policy makers, Pakistan does not exist in their global strategic calculus. Both Pakistan and India have confined themselves to merely ‘managing’ their relations in a narrow band. It is tedious, exacting and demanding. Shorn of imagination or creativity, it is for diplomats, a well-rehearsed exercise that has been played out numerous times bilaterally and at the UN. Both India and Pakistan need to realise that considering each other as distant-abroad is not a viable option. The deliberate disruption of SAARC process has eviscerated the hopes for emergence of a South Asian stream in the story of Asia’s rise. Classic geo-political power play and wornout themes and notions seeking extra-regional intervention, to fill-in the balance of power gaps, are indications of this sad reality. India’s declared policy is to ‘isolate’ Pakistan. It not only opposes but is actively trying to subvert CPEC. India did not participate in the BRI Summit in Beijing and remains staunchly opposed to the BRI. The China containment theme underlying India-US Alliance and Defence Partnership could introduce a new cold war in South Asia. This will prove to be hugely detrimental to the interests of this region. A frigid winter will descend and lives of billion plus people will be jeopardised. Such short-sighted approaches will not succeed and prove to be self-defeating. One, Pakistan will not allow CPEC to be disrupted at any cost. Two, by opposing BRI, India loses a precious opportunity for its own development. Three, BRI is already a reality. Eurasia has been connected by road and rail links. The East Asian and Pacific states are supportive. Four, India may cut itself from the Eurasian development mainstream. Five, the notion of contest for the dominance of the Indian Ocean Region is far-fetched, archaic and mainly academic. Despite the disputed border, China has continued to urge India to join its endeavours for economic development, across continents and sought cooperative relations. India’s admission in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a testimony to China’s maturity and sagacity. Pakistan has been able to maintain a relatively stable power equation with India at the strategic and conventional planes. The conflict simmers,

Concepts of the QUAD or alliance of ‘maritime democracies’ based on geo-political considerations, are notions that will only stall, albeit temporarily, the Eurasian dynamics of win-win cooperation for stability, predicated on shared prosperity

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The China containment theme underlying India-US alliance and Defence partnership could introduce a new cold war in South Asia. This will prove to be hugely detrimental to the interests of this region. A frigid winter will descend and lives of billion plus people will be jeopardised

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however, at the sub-conventional levels. The Indian campaign to foment insurgency and terrorism in Balochistan is a deeply disturbing example of the new dimensions of the bitter stand-off. All this is wholly unnecessary. Pakistan is not in competition with India but would not succumb to intimidation or hegemony. Pakistan would like to develop normal relations with India, on equal terms. A meaningful resumption of dialogue and settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute would liberate the South Asia from the stranglehold of enmity that has sapped its strength and vitality.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi meets US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo – State Department, Washington (2 October 2018)

CPEC Plus Vision

Pakistan and the US: Convergences

CPEC will become the anchor for extending concentric circles of stability, peace and developments in our greater region. The Vision CPEC-Plus can become the defining nomenclature for bringing the benefits of win-win partnerships and to realise the dividends of China’s economic development and the promise of an Asian century to our region. CPEC Plus together with revived regional cooperation in South Asia could have significant positive effects for the economic and social development of the region as a whole.

Pakistan and the US have a long history of cooperation. Unfortunately, the relations are strained for now, primarily over the Afghanistan issue. Pakistanis have a lingering sense of betrayal and feel that US is trying to scapegoat Pakistan for the failure of its mission in Afghanistan. On the other hand, some sections in the US policy community are venting their frustration over alleged Pakistani cover to the Afghan Taliban namely the Haqqanis. There is an ever-widening communication gap. Inter-agency processes in DC and Islamabad remain dead locked on determining the best way Green Book 2019

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An important aspect of changing US policy options on Afghanistan is the correct decision to see this issue separately and not link it to the IndoPacific Strategy. This would make it possible for other neighbours of Afghanistan, such as China to be more actively involved in providing support for building the economic foundations for sustained peace

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forward, both with respect to Afghanistan and the US-Pakistan relations. The US Administration’s Afghanistan and South Asia strategy announced in August 2017 was construed as a variant of its Indo-Pacific Policy. President Trump’s own instincts were to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan but he was persuaded by the generals to persist with what was a costly and militarily, an unwinnable venture. The South Asia Strategy seeks to ratchet up pressure on Pakistan, recognises India’s role in Afghanistan, inter alia provides for an increase of US troop levels in Afghanistan, and refers to a ‘conditions-based’ approach to Afghanistan. Viewed from Islamabad, adding India and China factors would have resulted in making Afghanistan a ‘forever’ victim of the new games on the Asian chessboard. However, the US policy position on Afghanistan has seen a notable evolution. Angling for a political settlement, the US Administration has signalled readiness for direct talks with the Afghan Taliban, including on the question of US troop presence thus meeting key Taliban conditions for a negotiated end to over seventeen years of war. It is now evident that the war is unwinnable and a military outcome is not possible. It would be to President Trump’s credit that he agrees to strike a deal with the Taliban for durable peace and stability in Afghanistan. Indeed, a political settlement would bring lasting credit to President Trump politically and personally. It will be welcomed by the Afghans and the region. After a long time, there is a convergence of interests of the US, Pakistan and the Taliban on core issues regarding Afghanistan, which is more importantly super imposed by the will and aspirations of the Afghan people for peace. Pakistan shares US concerns that Afghanistan must never again become a safe haven for international terrorists. The presence of ISIS is as much a concern for the US as for Pakistan and the Afghan National Unity Government. The Afghan Taliban are strongly opposed to ISIS and thus a four-way convergence of interests would make it possible to join efforts for neutralising terrorism in this part of the world. Pakistan has been making extraordinary efforts to repair relations with Afghanistan. The Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa has undertaken several visits to Kabul. The Afghan-Pakistan Action Plan is derived from broad agreement on the way forward. Specific steps have been taken to set up Ground Coordination Centres and post liaison officers on both sides to coordinate efforts against terrorists and unauthorised crossings.

An important aspect of changing US’ policy options on Afghanistan is the correct decision to see this issue separately and not link it to the IndoPacific Strategy. This would make it possible for other neighbours of Afghanistan, such as China to be more actively involved in providing support for building the economic foundations for sustained peace. The Afghan Taliban should respond positively to the political signals from Washington, Kabul and Islamabad and opt for moving forward from direct contacts to formal talks with the US. The Taliban need to transform themselves into a political entity. Their resilience, if not battlefield gains need to be converted into political capital. But what is more important is to keep in view the imperative need for making Afghanistan a united, sovereign, independent and peaceful state, respecting the rights and aspirations of all its citizens and contributing to regional peace and development. Pakistan and the US need to work closely for the success of peace in Afghanistan. Other regional states would also stand to benefit. Pakistan views US presence in Afghanistan as a factor of stability. Moreover, we are keen to see US succeed in Afghanistan. This is a major point that is somehow lost on the DC establishment. It entirely possible for Pakistan and the US to find ways to bring about an Afghanistan end state, that is entirely in consonance with the aspirations of the Afghan people and serves interests of all three-namely US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s new administration led by Prime Minister Imran Khan has signalled building of mutually beneficial relations with the US. Pakistan wishes to prioritise its economic development and thus is interested in improving relations with all of its neighbours. With Afghanistan, Imran Khan has spoken about tranquil and open borders and high priority to peace, which is indispensable for peace in Pakistan. With India, he has signalled a determined effort to improve relations including

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normalising trade. A peaceful and progressive South Asia, well integrated economically would open huge prospects for development and offer economic opportunities for the world. The corporate sector from across the globe could be incentivised to participate in multinational CPEC projects and work the Central-South Asia resources and growth opportunities for profit. Incidentally, this happens to be the view of China as well. Renewed efforts for bringing about conceptual clarity and congruity between the US and Pakistan and other important stakeholders in Asia-Pacific could open new horizons for sustainable peace and development. A high degree of optimism is sweeping across Pakistan with the people hopeful and confident

that the new government will correct course domestically and in foreign affairs to suit national interests. Working the domestic agenda must remain a priority. A stable and conducive external environment is absolutely essential for this purpose. Good relations with all major powers, neighbours and eschewing unnecessary external liabilities will enable Pakistan to go forward economically and socially. The governance needs to be fixed and institutions rebuilt. It is heartening to see the real issues now coming to the fore of State’s priorities. A futuristic vision of Pakistan becoming a moderately developed country by 2047, the centenary of independence must inform and guide national endeavours.

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Pakistan’s new administration led by Prime Minister Imran Khan has signalled building of mutually beneficial relations with the US. Pakistan wishes to prioritise its economic development and thus is interested in improving relations with all of its neighbours. With Afghanistan, Imran Khan has spoken about tranquil and open borders and high priority to peace, which is indispensable for peace in Pakistan. With India, he has signalled a determined effort to improve relations including normalising trade

1. Mead, Walter Russells, The Big Shift, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018 issue. 2. ibid 3. The New Yorker. The Nelson Mandela Lecture, Barack Obama, July 18 2018. 4. The New Yorker, Francis Fukuyama Postpones The End of History, Menand Louis, September 3, 2018.

5. 6. 7.

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Notes

CNN POLITICS, ‘The absolute chaos of Donald Trump’s G7 meeting, Analysis by Chris Cillizza, CNN Editor-at large, 11 June 2018 Asia Times, Sun Tzu and the art of fighting trade war, Pepe Escobar, August 23, 2018. Ministry of External Affairs New Delhi, India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan, April 28, 2018

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IMPACT OF CPEC ON

PAKISTAN IN

SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC & LEGAL DOMAINS

Brigadier Kamal Azfar is serving in Pakistan Army

Lieutenant Colonel Wasif Mahmood is serving in Pakistan Army

Abstract This paper discusses the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) long-term infrastructural project as a major part of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) the major global initiative by the Chinese government, scheduled to complete by 2030. CPEC is a joint project that Beijing and Islamabad agreed to finance through Chinese investments utilising investment loans largely by Chinese financial institutions; nevertheless, Pakistan will also be responsible for investing approximately 15 billion dollars on its own in the process. While the project has been welcomed by Greater Eurasia (including Russia, Iran, and Central Asia) besides the United Kingdom and Western European Countries, albeit vehement opposition by India. Paper carries out realistic appraisal of CPEC with respect to its anticipated social, demographic, economic and legal implications for Pakistan with a view to proffer viable strategy for optimising the benefits from this project. It highlights the opportunities, challenges and the impact that this mega project will likely have to the existing socioeconomic infrastructure, job opportunities, poverty level index, and regional peace and security. Keywords: CPEC, BRI, Game Changer, Challenges and Opportunities, Infrastructure Development, Labour Force, Socio-economic, Regional Peace and Security

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CONCLUSIONS FROM CPEC RELATED ENVIRONMENT

C

hina-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), being the flagship project of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has been rightly termed as a potential game changer for Pakistan due to its potential of being the harbinger of economic, demographic, political and social progress for the country. As per the vision of Chief of Army Staff, “CPEC is the grand manifestation of the deep-rooted ties between China and Pakistan. Much larger than its bilateral benefits, CPEC is indeed a corridor of peace & prosperity, not only for the people of Pakistan and China but also for the region and beyond. It will bind all these nations together and bring about an economic transformation through enhanced connectivity’’.1 CPEC needs to be taken as an environment; not only as a port, some roads and projects etc. It is going to be an amalgamation of internal, regional and trans-regional connectivity and merger. CPEC will, therefore, affect Pakistan in every domain which may have long lasting social, demographic and economic implications. On the other hand, the legal aspects of CPEC also need to be considered to protect Pakistan’s interests in the future.

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Global Environment America First policy has forced many countries to recalibrate their approach towards USA and its unpredictable foreign policy choices. Latest US policy revision for Afghanistan and South Asia adds confusion and uncertainty to an already complex and delicate situation. USA views CPEC as Chinese geo-political riposte to hedge against her Pivot to Asia policy. US does not favour CPEC because it offers a back door to China right at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and can facilitate her trade of petrochemicals and other commodities through Pakistan using ports in the Persian Gulf and Africa. President Putin has already expressed interest in CPEC as a regional connectivity option and has been successful in obtaining Chinese investment in Russian Federation. Russia may further its cooperation with China by getting on board CPEC project besides other bilateral trade and commerce initiatives with China, which in turn can result in better security for the region.2

CPEC is the grand manifestation of the deep-rooted ties between China and Pakistan. Much larger than its bilateral benefits, CPEC is indeed a corridor of peace & prosperity, not only for the people of Pakistan and China but also for the region and beyond General Qamar Javed Bajwa, COAS Pakistan Army

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Russia has shown interest in CPEC

Japan is firmly behind Indian initiative to open up a route to CARs through Iran and Afghanistan. This is indicative of lack of Japanese interest in CPEC owing to historic animosity with China. Resultantly, Japan is likely to maintain somewhat neutral outlook viz a CPEC projects. USA views China’s growing economic and military power with concern and wants to affect its containment. However, China has adopted a prudent approach in handling America’s provocative questioning of One China policy and other contentious issues. China is expected to act strictly in accordance with its perceived national interest’s sans direct confrontation with the US to the extent possible.

Regional and Domestic Environment India views the development of Gwadar Port by China as a security threat. In order to stall CPEC’s progress, she is helping Iran develop Chabahar Port as a strategic counter weight to Gwadar, improving its diplomatic and trade relations with Pakistan’s traditionally friendly countries in Middle East. After some hiatus, bilateral relations b/w Pakistan and Iran portend a positive tone. Iran also has strengthened bilateral trade relations with

China. Furthermore, continued diplomatic pressure from USA is also likely to indirectly force Iran to enhance her relations with Russia and China. Internal Security situation in South and Central Balochistan is not optimal. For CPEC to succeed, these regions would have to be made fully secure and peaceful for transportation of cargo along national highways passing through these areas. A host of narratives among segments of society against both China and Pakistan viz CPEC are noticeable ranging from “What has CPEC given us but more poverty, misery and loss of our lands?”, “People of Gwadar are going to be replaced by

India sees CPEC as a security threat

outsiders due to CPEC”. Unless addressed properly in all domains, such propaganda/narratives can pose problems for CPEC going forward. There is broad national consensus across the political spectrum on friendly relations with China and importance of CPEC as the main engine of growth for Pakistani economy in the near future.

CPEC Projects Perceived to Affect Social and Demographic Domains

── Population. A population of 194 million can provide very rich human resource for CPEC projects. If this resource is properly equipped and utilised, it likely to multiply dividends of CPEC manifold.

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── Labour Force and Employment. In Pakistan, 32.3% of the population constitutes labour force having significant bearing on the productive

which is only sufficient for the residents of Gwadar. No worthwhile project is expected in this domain in the country.

Economic Perspective ── Pakistan’s State of the Economy. Pakistan’s economy is broadly divided into three main sectors i.e. agriculture, industry and services. In order to ascertain performance of various components of the economy over the past five years, an incisive sectoral analysis of Pakistan’s economy has been carried out. Each of these is being discussed in ensuing paras. ── Rate of Inflation.4 Inflation rate remained 4.09% during last year while the volume of Pakistan’s economy surpassed US $300 billion. ── Fiscal Deficit. Fiscal deficit has also registered a decrease. From last year, when it was 4.6 %, fiscal deficit has been brought down to 4.2 %.

capacity (Crude Activity Rate). All these CPEC projects (especially energy and infrastructure ones) will provide huge employment opportunities for the people, especially for unskilled labour. ── Education. Having official literacy rate of 58%, total 245,387 educational institutes of all types (primary schools to universities) and student teacher ratio of 29.45 to 1 (42357.5 thousand students and 1437.8 thousand teachers),3 warrants colossal efforts in this domain. While analysing CPEC projects, it is evident that this domain has been seriously neglected which is substantiated from the fact that out of 58 x planned projects, there are only two projects in the field of education.

── Agriculture Sector. Agriculture sector recorded a growth of 3.46 % in FY 2017 as compared to 0.27 % the previous year.

2012-13 8.2 %

2013-14 5.5%

2014-15 5.3%

2015-16 4.6%

── Health 00

00

With entire world including China moving towards green energy, establishment of 8 x coal-based electricity generation plants in different areas of Pakistan raises concerns. Projects which are likely to have an impact on health of the people are very limited. This is due to the fact that only recognised CPEC project pertaining to health is up gradation of GDA Hospital in Gwadar.

── Water Supply and Sanitation. Apart from 9 x SEZs, which may contribute towards improving water supply and sanitation in those particular areas, only one project has been planned (5 MGD Desalination Plant)

2016-17 4.2% 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP

── Industrial Sector. Industrial sector recorded a growth of 5.02 % as compared to 5.8 % the previous year. ── Services’ Sector. Services’ sector witnessed a growth of 5.98% as compared to 5.55 % the previous year. Share of services’ sector has reached to 59.59 % of GDP in FY 2017/18.

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PAKISTAN ARMY CPEC will curb brain drain and generate employment opportunity for youth

── Per Capita Income. It is historically one of the most commonly used indicator to assess the economic development of a country. Per Capita Income in dollar terms increased from US $ 1,531 in FY 2016/17 to US $ 1,629 in FY 2017/18. Main contributing factors for this

are higher real GDP growth, lower growth in population and stability of Pakistani Rupee. Figure displays the progressive improvement in per capita income for Pakistan during last ten years.

Pakistan - Per Capita Income ($) 1700

1629

1600

(US $)

1500 1400

1274

1300 1200 1100

1053

1026

2007-08

2008-09

1320

1334

2011-12

2012-13

1514

1531

2014-15

2015-16

1389

1072

1000 900 800

Source: PBS

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2009-10

2010-11

2013-14

2016-17

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ANALYSIS Social and Demographic Domains Positive Implications

── Employment Generation. One of the most obvious domains in which CPEC is likely to benefit Pakistan is job creation. According to official data, 30,000 jobs have already been created for Pakistani engineers and labourers in the Early Harvest projects which are to be completed in 2018.5 International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that CPEC will create around 400,000 jobs while Applied Economics Research Centre (AERC) estimated that CPEC is expected to create over 700,000 direct jobs between 2015 and 2030.6 ── Better Infrastructure. One of the key areas around which the success of CPEC will be measured is infrastructure. In this context, many roads have been built or are being constructed. Besides catering for expected increase of traffic on our roads in future, this will also enhance connectivity especially in the shape of farm-to-market roads. ── Inculcation of Chinese Work Ethos. Working on CPEC projects under Chinese managers and with Chinese counterparts is definitely going to improve the work ethos of Pakistani work force making them more committed to their job and adopting a more professional approach in their working. Working on CPEC projects is also likely to give excellent exposure to Pakistani professionals regarding international business environment and practices. ── Alleviation of Poverty. CPEC projects are likely to generate a large number of jobs in the local market, thus helping reduce poverty levels in Pakistan to some degree. According to  Pakistan Vision 2025, Pakistan aims to reduce its current poverty level by half. With current poverty rate at 39%,7 this means that by 2025, the rate might drop to around 19%. ── Curbing Brain Drain. CPEC can help the Government create better education facilities,

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International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that CPEC will create around 400,000 jobs while Applied Economics Research Centre (AERC) estimated that CPEC is expected to create over 700,000 direct jobs between 2015 and 2030

job opportunities and improve the lifestyle of its people; thus preventing brain drain from the country. With basic necessities being available in their own motherland, there would remain little incentive for people to go abroad looking for jobs.

Negative Implications ── Human Resource. Human resource of more than 200 million, if not channelled properly, might become a menace for the initiative, ushering silent detractors initially and active dissatisfaction/unrest in later stages. It is essential that the population feels that effects of CPEC are trickling down to common and deprived citizen of Pakistan. ── Education. While analysing CPEC projects, it is evident that this domain has been seriously neglected. Pakistan China Friendship School in Gwadar may provide improved education to a few children of Gwadar but it will not make any real contribution towards providing education to 2.5 million out of school children existing in Pakistan. ── Health 00

With entire world including China moving towards green energy, establishment of 8 x coal based electricity generation plants in different parts of Pakistan raises concerns. Environmental hazards of these plants viz their benefits need to be weighed. Green Book 2019

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00

Medical facilities being set up at Gwadar will only provide basic medical facilities to a small segment of the population.

── Water Supply and Sanitation. With a boom in CPEC projects and related migrations, urbanisation is likely to increase. Industrialisation and coal based power plants will pollute existing water reservoirs. ── M ass Migration. As a result of mass migration, following issues are likely to surface: 00

Sense of deprivation among locals if they are unable to compete with settlers for jobs.

00

Threat to livelihood means of locals due to industrialisation/developmental work, fishermen of Gwadar are a case in point.

Economic Domain

Positive Implications ── Trade Prospects and Potential Industries 00

About US $16 billion of trade with China occurs mainly through the sea (97%) and only 1% through land. Improving the infrastructure (rail and road network) will help increase trade by reducing transportation and transaction costs.

00

China is taking keen interest to invest in agribusiness to add value to Pakistan’s agriculture raw products. Same can be exploited for improving Pakistan’s agriculture-based exports to China (constituting 15% of Pakistan’s total exports).

00

With Chinese investors’ interest in local businesses, Pakistan’s textile industry

‘‘

can look to attract investment and ensure value addition to increase its exports. 00

In view of the planned alignment of CPEC routes, marble and mineral processing, food processing/packaging and leather products trade have great potential in improving the trade balance with China.

── Financial Inclusion 00

New international commercial banks such as Bank of China have established their branches in Pakistan. It brings new and modern financial products which can augment our existing financial system.

00

There are new opportunities to provide consultancy and brokerage services for Chinese and Pakistani investors.

── Employment Opportunities. According to the International Labour Organisation, CPEC would bring more than 400,000 jobs to the country while the Applied Economic Research Centre has estimated that the mega initiative would provide around 700,000 direct jobs between 2015 and 2030.8 Planning Commission’s data shows even more promising results, with CPEC generating around 800,000 jobs in the next 15 years. ── Urban Development 00

Rapid urbanisation under CPEC is creating agglomeration economy with opportunities in the sectors of real estate, urban infrastructure, construction and municipal service delivery.

00

CPEC is likely to attract investments from Pakistani private sector in ‘Low-Carbon Urban Transportation’ and other ‘Clean Technologies for Cities’ through Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other global funding opportunities.

00

CPEC, an economic corridor can become an ‘Environmental Corridor’ if the mechanism for development of ‘Regional Renewable Energy Trade’ between China & Pakistan is formulated and implemented. Benefiting from Chinese experience, Pakistan can move on the path of “Green Development”.

── Poverty Reduction. CPEC is likely to lift millions of Pakistanis out of poverty. CPEC

China is taking keen interest to invest in agribusiness to add value to Pakistan’s agriculture raw products. Same can be exploited for improving Pakistan’s agriculturebased exports to China (constituting 15% of Pakistan’s total exports)

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‘‘

Negative Implications

Gwadar port city is expected to soon become one of the most sought after real estate investment destinations in Asia

── Over Dependence on CPEC. At present, Pakistan’s economic progress has been linked in its entirety to CPEC allied projects. This policy of putting all eggs in one basket can prove to be counter-productive. With our economic stakes linked with CPEC only, its failure on any account will prove to be catastrophic.

‘‘

embraces the construction of textile garment, industrial park projects, construction of dams, installation of nuclear reactors and creating networks of road and railway lines which will generate numerous employment opportunities.

── Debt Trap

── Gwadar as a Trading Hub. With 120 berths in future, Gwadar Port will be able to deal with trade traffic of about 45-65 million tons (in 15 years) up to 300 million tons (in 50 years).9 Besides strengthening trade ties with landlocked countries, it is estimated that up to 4 % of global trade will pass through Gwadar by 2020. About 70% increase is expected in maritime trade through Gwadar. Revenue from the port, once fully operational, is estimated to be US $40 billion annually. ── Real Estate Business. Gwadar port city is expected to soon become one of the most sought after real estate investment destinations in Asia. An annual population growth rate of 2.8% (Source: FBS, 2016) otherwise entails that more housing projects would be needed in future.

00

CPEC is based on a US $62 billion outlay whose major component is either loan or investments by Chinese companies.

00

In 2017, Pakistan had nearly US $72 billion  foreign debt. Current Account Deficit in first 5 months (Jul-Nov 2017) of current fiscal year has risen to 89%.10

00

With CPEC, if it is assumed that the interest will be in the range of 7%, payable in 25 to 40 years, this would mean China will have to be paid back approximately US $ 7-8 billion as Equated Monthly Instalments (EMI) for next 43 years from 2018  onwards. Pakistan will find it difficult to pay back even the interest, let alone the principal amount.

── Increased Trade Deficit. Pakistan’s trade deficit has widened in recent years because exports are much lower than imports. Pakistan had trade deficit of US $32.4 billion during last fiscal year11 out of which US $11 billion is with China alone. However, we continue to exempt duty from more and more items for the Chinese which is likely to hurt the local industrialist for the benefit of Chinese individuals.

── Tourism. CPEC is likely to boost ecological tourism in Gilgit-Baltistan and coastal tourism in the Coastal Belt of Pakistan. This is going to benefit not only the local people but will also be a good source of revenue generation for the country.

── Reduction in Remittances. Foreign remittances have also seen a downward trend

PAKISTAN REMITTANCES

5600

5530

5400 5246 5200

5125

5000 4722

4699

4740

4791

4765 4600

4387

4800

USD Million

4966

4600

4434

Jan 2015

4400

Jul 2015

Jan 2016

Jul 2016

Jan 2017

Jul 2017

4200

SOURCE: TRADINGECONOMICS.COM I STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN

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── Overwhelming of Pakistani Industries 00

Pakistan cannot compete with products of other countries because of  high taxation, exorbitant electricity rates with erratic supply, inconsistency of policies etc., for industrial sector.

00

Pakistan is providing free trade and low tariffs on products imported from China, thus making them cheaper than Pakistani goods. This is counterproductive to our industries and their export potential.

00

Asymmetric trade balance exists between Pakistan and China. While Pakistan has very less export items for Chinese markets, our markets are flooded by cheap Chinese goods. These may harm Pakistani Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the long term.

── Reliance on Own Workforce by China. China is having huge under-utilised capacity of industrial production and workforce. Majority of workers, goods and material being employed on CPEC projects is of Chinese origin. Apparently, Pakistani work force, if utilised, may only be employed on odd jobs while the lion’s share would go to Chinese work force.

‘‘

Pakistan is providing free trade and low tariffs on products imported from China, thus making them cheaper than Pakistani goods. This is counterproductive to our industries and their export potential

‘‘

in third quarter of 2017 whereby they have decreased to US $4791 million as compared to US $5246 million in the second quarter of 2017.12

── Energy Mix. In overall outlay of CPEC energy projects, the main thrust at present is on coal generation. We need to keep an eye on ratio of coal’s share in the overall energy generation mix. At the current pace, by 2025, coal’s share could be as high as 55-60%, a figure highly undesirable both from environmental perspective as well as financial burden. ── Environmental Hazards from Coal Power Plants. Through CPEC,  China is installing coal-based power plants in Pakistan which have adverse effects on human health and are in contradiction to environmental safe guards and regulations. This is alarming since China is closing down its own coal power plants due to environment degradation issues. ── Absence of HRD. Pakistan lacks skilled and well trained work force. This human resource (including engineers, technicians and administrators etc.) will be required at enhanced scale once CPEC projects get operational at their optimum levels. Nandipur

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Combined Cycle Thermal Power Plant is one of the example where after a lot of operational failures, Pakistan handed over its operations to Chinese Company. No concrete planning is underway for capacity building of local HRD to meet projected requirements.

with Pakistan. The whole exercise is aimed at enhancing competitiveness amongst Chinese companies with possibility of better dividends. 00

── Lack of Development along Corridors. There are no worthwhile cities and rest areas along CPEC routes from Gwadar towards Khunjerab for supporting passengers and cargo traffic along these roads. ── Development of Maritime Sector. Exploration of offshore natural resources promises tremendous economic potential. Although some CPEC projects aim at promoting coastal tourism and the fishermen community but the fact is that the activities of Pakistani fishermen are hampered by illegal trawling inside Balochistan waters, lack of support from the government and poor economic condition of fishermen community. Government needs to do much more for this community all along the Coastal Areas of Pakistan. ── Weak Diplomatic Corps. We have not been much successful in establishing our diplomatic foot print in emerging markets. Moreover, due to absence of meritocracy, country’s interests are not being served in an apt manner. ── Absence of Freight Forwarding Facilities. On operationalisation of Gwadar Port, huge volume of cargo is likely to be transported from here to China and other destinations. It would require companies holding sizeable freight carrying trucks. However, presently there are no government/private owned transport companies in Gwadar having capability for provision of said facilities to meet the requirements.

Legal Aspects

── Principle Variations. Chinese government has approached CPEC by opting to invest in commercially viable ventures. The fundamental variations from standard practices are as follows: 00

‘‘

China will invest through its state owned companies in the projects collaborating

In present day world, geo-economics is overtaking geo-politics which has necessitated reorientation in Chinese approach. However, CPEC being flagship project is likely to face stiff resistance due to evolving global power politics and security challenges.

── Implementation of Local Laws. Being a signatory of WTO, Pakistan has to clearly elucidate in laws that privately owned Chinese companies as well as Government firms shall be given same preferential treatment.13 Similarly, exceptions and preferential access available to Chinese products throughout Pakistan will have to be provided to other WTO signatory competitors. It is likely to invoke complications over struggling economic structure being borne by Pakistan. ── Policy Framework Bindings. CPEC projects are spread over three decades. Given the history of bilateral relations with China as well as perceived interdependence after CPEC, this cooperation is likely to continue. Therefore, our internal as well as external policies shall remain contingent upon this collaboration. While such nature of relations act as a surety, there is also an element of predictability attached to it which shall limit our coalition options.14 ── Labour Standards. SEZs act was promulgated in 2012, which facilitates public private partnership as well as private developers in developing economic zones. However, a global study15concludes that these zones generally neglect welfare of labourers. Therefore this aspect has to be focused. ── Focus of Agreements 00

CPEC will enhance China’s global outreach. Therefore Chinese priority will be more on infrastructural development rather than trade with Pakistan.

00

Manner in which different contracts have been handed over to Chinese companies has come under debate/scrutiny. Non

In present day world, geo-economics is overtaking geo-politics which has necessitated reorientation in Chinese approach. However, CPEC being flagship project is likely to face stiff resistance due to evolving global power politics and security challenges

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Prime Minister Imran Khan in delegation level talks with President Xi Jinping – Beijing, China (2nd November 2018)

── Investment Agreements. Pakistan and China have comprehensive investment agreements in form of BIT & FTA. BIT focuses more on “equitable treatment” for investors, FTA is comparatively more comprehensive in addressing the voids in BIT by focussing on “fair and equitable” treatment.

00

── Migration 00

Ministry of Planning and Development to plan new cities/towns in relation to CPEC projects with a view to curb urbanisation of already over-crowded major cities.

00

Mass awareness campaigns be initiated in order to promote inter-cultural and inter-ethnic harmony.

RECOMMENDATIONS Social and Demographic Domains National Level ── Education 00

00

More good quality schools under CPEC project be started in different parts of Pakistan to provide quality education to the under-privileged. Chinese language be taught as an elective subject at intermediate and graduation level. This will contribute in reducing the gap between Chinese and Pakistani societies to some extent.

── Health 00

00

72

Primary, secondary and tertiary medical care facilities be made part of CPEC. Special focus be given to Southern Balochistan, Western half of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Northern areas of Pakistan. Joint research institutes for medical sciences be established in major cities of Pakistan with collaboration of Pakistani and Chinese authorities.

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Exchange programmes for doctors and para-medics be organised in order to accrue benefit from Chinese expertise in this domain.

── Designated Areas for Chinese. In order to prevent any untoward incident which may create bad blood, areas may be designated where Chinese people can live separately from the local population. Present system of Chinese accommodation at Gwadar port may be taken up as an example in this regard. ── Changes in Structure of Population. Preparations be made for imminent arrival of large number of Chinese and focus on proactive measures such as: 00

Transparent process of visa issuance to Chinese nationals.

00

Coordination of NADRA with Chinese

‘‘

Primary, secondary and tertiary medical care facilities be made part of CPEC. Special focus be given to Southern Balochistan, Western half of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Northern areas of Pakistan

‘‘

adherence to standard practices and abstinence of market competition can be challenged in courts, detrimental to CPEC perception.

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Hukou System16 to gain information about Chinese nationals coming to Pakistan. 00

Making policies of giving visa to individuals after obtaining a Non-Criminal Record Certificate from Chinese authorities.

── Relocation of Population. Shifting of population be carried out under a national strategy so that people from backward regions of Pakistan are relocated along CPEC routes to help evolve new cities/towns.

plants and storage tanks be planned along all CPEC routes inside Balochistan where the entire region faces acute shortage of water.

Army Level

── Education

── Concession for Locals. With advancement of CPEC, price hike in certain areas will affect land prices. Locals will then be unable to purchase land being monetarily inferior to international companies. A scheme must be devised to set prices after concession only for the locals so that they are not wiped out altogether from business opportunities offered by CPEC. ── Pakistanis on Key Positions on Projects. A certain ratio of key positions be reserved for Pakistanis in all CPEC projects (40% – 50%). This ratio may be less in the initial 3-5 years and it may be demanded that after utilising this period for training of Pakistani people, this ratio be increased.

00

Army should focus on development of education sector  in Balochistan and Sindh, especially in areas along CPEC routes by establishing Army Public Schools and Cadet Colleges to provide good quality education facilities to locals of these areas.

00

Contribute towards establishing of excellent quality education institutions in Academia-Industry-Research (AIR) Clusters with NUST in the lead, at SEZ locations planned at Dera Ismail Khan, Zhob, Quetta, Kalat, Khuzdar, Turbat and Gwadar.

00

Establish National Defence University campus at Gwadar by clearing bureaucratic hurdles in Balochistan.

── Health

── Human Resource. A number of measures be taken for correct utilisation of Pakistan’s Human Resource by offering incentives to educated Pakistani diaspora working abroad with the aim to bring them back to Pakistan and become part of CPEC projects. This will also reduce the brain drain faced by Pakistan.

00

Identify dysfunctional hospitals and adopt them on the lines of GDA Hospital, Gwadar under proper legislation by respective provincial governments. Same may be run by Army Doctors on supervisory role while undertaking capacity building of local doctors.

00

Monitoring of health facilities in Sindh and Balochistan provinces in collaboration with provincial health departments after necessary legislation at federal/provincial levels.

00

Organise free medical camps in remote areas’ especially in Sindh and Balochistan to provide health care services to marginalised communities.

── Jobs 00

‘‘

A scheme must be devised to set prices after concession only for the locals so that they are not wiped out altogether from business opportunities offered by CPEC

‘‘

── Water Supply and Sanitation. Water supply and sanitation projects be planned under CPEC umbrella to improve these facets in cities/newly developed areas/ SEZs. Furthermore projects like water supply schemes, desalination plants, water filtration

Locals (unskilled/ semi-skilled/ skilled work force) be inducted in military institutions such as FWO, MES etc., besides induction in Army.

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PAKISTAN ARMY

00

Vocational Training Centres be established in far flung areas for skill development to get employment in CPEC projects.

Economic Domain

National Level ── Debt Management. Apart from the oft repeated recommendations of credible experts regarding debt management of the country, proper evaluation of CPEC related contracts for mapping out a debt payment strategy be done immediately to avoid default on their payments. ── CPEC Central Command Authority. A CPEC Central Command Authority be established for supervising and undertaking all CPEC related policy decisions and projects. Timely completion of Early Harvest Projects to be ensured so as to operationalise CPEC within the envisioned timeframe. Transparency to be brought in development of SEZs as clusters of Industry, Academia and Human Resource Development to spurt industrial revolution in the country in a wholesome manner. ── Industrialise the Country. Achieve industrial growth at 7-8% in short to medium term & 9-10% in long term by providing uninterrupted power supply to optimise existing potential of industrial output. Facilitation package (tax concessions, skill development, import concessions etc.) at

‘‘

Gwadar Industrial Zone and SEZs along the routes of CPEC be implemented to promote local industries. ── Ship Breaking and Shipbuilding Industry. Owing to strategic importance of ship building industry, Pakistan must develop its ship breaking and building industries on firm footings. South Korean shipping industry reforms be consulted as a guideline for better results. ── HRD. Invest in HRD at all tiers. Inculcate and promote research culture in universities, especially the ones related to economic sectors of interest for Pakistan. Simultaneously, related fields also may not be neglected such as Contract Management, Contractual Law, and International Law etc. Malaysian economy is a good example of how a country can successfully reshape its HRD model for achieving outstanding progress. ── Business Friendly Environment. Government must unleash a new plan to resurrect a struggling industrial environment especially in Gwadar. Implement sweeping changes for making Pakistan’s economy attractive for investment. Spur job creation for the locals of Gwadar and Balochistan. Some suggested steps are as follows:00

Reduce tariffs to regional parity and provision of uninterrupted energy to industry.

00

Promotion of financial credit facility to SMEs.

Apart from the oft repeated recommendations of credible experts regarding debt management of the country, proper evaluation of CPEC related contracts for mapping out a debt payment strategy be done immediately to avoid default on their payments

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PAKISTAN ARMY

00

Establishment of SEZs for specialised industry clusters for enabling SMEs to complement resources and expertise.

00

Graduated devaluation of currency.

── Integrated Energy Development Model. CPEC energy funds be re-allocated with revised priorities favouring hydel, renewables and nuclear options. This should be supplemented with an “Integrated Energy Development Model” which can help achieve savings of 15-20% in our total energy consumption. Moreover, private investments in hydel and other renewable sources be encouraged. ── Development along CPEC Corridors. Construction of rest and administration areas should be carried out along the CPEC corridors as this will not only have a positive effect on economy but also make the locals stake holders partners in benefits of CPEC. ── Transparency and Meritocracy. System of transparent bidding for CPEC projects and strict enforcement of meritocracy in all employment opportunities in CPEC projects be ensured. Quarterly and yearly audits of CPEC projects’ financial transactions be ensured through reputable international audit firms. Details of all financial undertakings be floated for public consumption. ── Contingency Planning for National Economy. Effective measures be taken to improve all sectors of our economy. CPEC can be means to an end but not the end itself. ── Capacity Building in Targeted Sectors. After carrying out a detailed analysis of countries

having potential for Pakistani exports, Pakistan must aim at enhancing its capacity in targeted industrial sectors such as cotton products, leather products and electrical industry. ── Development Strategy. Proposed development strategy is premised on transition from agrarian economy to industrialised economy having export oriented outlook. Salient aspects of proposed development strategy for Pakistan are appended below: 00

Initiation Phase ƒƒ

Ascertain target countries where Pakistan can focus on increasing trade volume. For this purpose, import pattern of these countries to be studied and same may be compared with own production potential in areas of interest.

ƒƒ

D evelop CPEC communication infrastructure (both road and railways) and allied facilities at the earliest.

ƒƒ

Establish SEZs along the CPEC routes as per the local area products. Businessmen/Consortiums setting up their businesses in these SEZs be given economic incentives in the shape of tax exemptions etc.

ƒƒ

Carry out analysis of import patterns of target countries to ascertain areas of focus for development of above mentioned SEZs.

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PAKISTAN ARMY

00

Implementation Phase ƒƒ

ƒƒ

In addition to other facilitation mechanisms, the government would have to facilitate targeted industries/ businessmen at least initially to enhance the competitive value of own exports to the targeted countries. Effective marketing of own products through diplomatic missions/ commercial councillors and diplomats to cement trade ties with the targeted countries.

Army Level

── Establishment of AIR Clusters. Army must support trio of top notch educationists, businessmen and research fellows in establishment of world class AIR clusters along CPEC routes. ── Assistance to Ministries for Kick Starting Exports. Maximum support be rendered to Ministries of Finance and Commerce in increasing our trade footprint on African continent. For this purpose, our contingents deployed in United Nations missions be dovetailed for making inroads into trade

Notes

circles and importers of targeted countries with the aim to increase our trade volume with these countries. ── Tasking of Defence Attaches. Defence Attaches be tasked to also assist in pursuing economic diplomacy by concerned staff at our embassies in Africa and other countries (including their accredited countries). Military diplomacy to pave the way for proper diplomatic relations transitioning to economic diplomacy. ── Security of CPEC Routes. Army to continue ensuring security at mining prospects and along farm-to-market roads besides the main CPEC routes to allow raw materials to reach AIR cluster factories.

Conclusion CPEC can indeed prove a game and fate changer for Pakistan. Pakistan can acquire numerous advantages from CPEC in social, demographic and economic domains, for which a holistic approach and sound strategy are required. With honest pursuit of national interests using CPEC as the main vehicle for growth, Pakistan stands to emerge quite successful in the comity of nations in the future. 8.

CPEC creates over 30,000 jobs” Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation, accessed on February 28, 2018,http://www.app.com.pk/cpec-projects-createover-30000-jobs-officials/.

9.

Interview with Mr Zhang Bao Zhong, Chairman China Overseas Port Holding Company (CoPHC) at Gwadar on June 12, 2018

10.

Salman Siddique, “Current Account Deficit Widens 28.74 % to $1.61 Bn” Express Tribune, (February 21, 2018).

Pakistan Economic Survey 2017/18, Ministry of Finance website, http://www. finance.gov.pk/survey_1718.html, accessed on 22 February 18

11.

Shahbaz Rana, “Trade deficit widens to $17.97 Billion”, Express Tribune (February 23, 2018).

4.

“Pakistan Economic Survey 2016-2017 Ministry of Pakistan website, accessed on February 22, 2018, http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1617.html.

12.

“Pakistan Remittances” Trading Economics, accessed on March 24,https:// tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/ remittances.

5.

The Nation, dated 06-06-2017 by Fawad Yousafzaihttp://www.cpecinfo.com/ news/cpec-early-harvest-projects-create-over-30000-jobs-for locals/MzE3Nw & “Over 30,000 jobs created under CPEC early harvest projects” Pakistan Obsever, accessed on July 21, 2018, https://pakobserver.net/30000-jobscreated-cpec-early-harvest-projects/

13.

Malik, Ahmad Rashid, “The Sino Pakistan trade and investment relations”, Margalla Papers, 2013.

14.

Jaspal, Dr Zafar. “Challenges to CPEC”, The Pakistan Observer, http:// pakobserver.net / challenges-to-cpec/ (last visited 31 Marc 2018).

15.

Report, “SEZs: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone Development”, World Bank Group, April 2008.

16.

Priyanka Junejo, “China’s Hukou System”, The Diplomat (July 14, 2017).

1.

“COAS Address at Gwadar” Pakistan Army website, accessed on 20 February, 2018, https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/awpreview/pDetails. aspx?pType=PressRelease&pID=646

2.

Saddam Hussain, “The possibility of a Russia-Pakistan Economic Corridor” Opinion Editorial Daily Times, 29 April,2018,http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/ the-possibility-of-a-russia-pakistan-economic-corridor/NTIxMA

3.

6.

CPEC creates over 30,000 jobs” Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation, accessed on February 28, 2018,http://www.app.com.pk/cpec-projects-createover-30000-jobs-officials/.

7.

“Pakistan 2025 One Nation - One Vision” Planning Commission of Pakistan website, accessed on February 28,20 8,http://pc.gov.pk/web/vision.

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STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE

PAKISTAN ECONOMY THROUGH

SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

Dr. Zafar Mahmood is a Professor of Economics & HOD Research, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad

Abstract For the past many years, Pakistan’s economic growth performance has remained sluggish and uneven. It is mainly due to unrealised growth potential, including under-utilisation of the installed capacity. This is happening despite the fact that Pakistan holds some essential natural endowments and strategic advantages viz-a-viz economic fundamentals that can enable it to harness the unrealised potential. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project has become an antecedent for fast-tracked industrial growth phase. Next phase of CPEC will establish Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Pakistan. SEZs will open a new window of opportunity for both countries to cooperatively integrate and grow fast. While embarking on to establish SEZs, Pakistan undeniably will face a number of challenges that it will have to manage. SEZs once established will provide much needed impetus to stimulate economic activities. They will also provide a life-time opportunity for Pakistani companies to work together with Chinese companies for the transformation of export-oriented manufacturing industries. To make this a reality, in this article, I propose a pragmatic approach whereby, from the beginning, SEZs should be linked with the Domestic Zone including industrial clusters in Pakistan for a win-win outcome via extensive capacity building and the resulting technology and productivity spillovers. These links, with a proactive role of the Pakistani Diasporas, would facilitate transfer of technologies and knowledge, adaptation of modern management practices, and creation of new business for cluster-based firms and ancillary service providers. The paper provides detailed strategic policy directions and policy actions to draw maximum inclusive-benefits on sustainable basis from the establishment of SEZs. Keywords: Special Economic Zone, Industrial Transformation, Industrial Clusters, Strategic Policy Directions

78

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Map of 9 SEZs

P

akistan’s economic growth performance over the past 10 years, like the “lost decade of the 1990s”, has remained low and uneven. This weak performance was mainly due to unrealised growth potential, including under-utilisation of the installed capacity. The Pakistan economy is globally ranked at 115th (2017) in terms of competitiveness, 113th (2016) in innovation, 118th (2016) in human capital and 147th (2018) in ease of doing business.1 Such dismal rankings have a very direct adverse impact on investment and divulge of precarious economic performance. This situation also indicates that Pakistan considerably lags behind its economic growth potential, which calls for transformation of the economy, not mere restructuring, to put back the economy on a path of better social-economic well-being and prosperity. These goal paths are achievable as Pakistan holds some essential natural endowments, strategic advantages and economic fundamentals that can enable it to harness the unrealised growth potential. Realisation of the potential will make it possible for Pakistan to secure a bigger share in global production and exports. It may be noted from the latest available statistics that Pakistan’s share in the world GDP was 0.37% (2015), while the share in world’s total exports was 0.13% (2017) that has declined from 0.18% in 1991. Notwithstanding the above described situation, Pakistan has a favourable demographic profile with a large proportion of bright youth (i.e.,

60% of population), which has the potential to drive the economy onto a higher economic growth path, thus creating a demographic dividend.2 Pakistan has an additional advantage of large Diasporas residing abroad. Some of them can return if conducive work and living environments are created in the country. Diasporas carry a further advantage of working with foreign workers and multinational companies. They can play a decisive role in providing expertise, know how and even investments for the new phase of industrialisation in the country. Pakistani Youth Bulge – Greater potential for economic growth

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Pakistan has a favourable demographic profile with a large proportion of bright youth (i.e., 60% of population), which has the potential to drive the economy onto a higher economic growth path, thus creating a demographic dividend

‘‘

Pakistan’s driving force to attract investment in SEZs also include growing urbanisation, rising middle class, and increasing consumer spending. The economy is currently powered by such dynamisms and foreign investors are weighing to seize this opportunity. At this juncture as Pakistan is preparing to take some strategic economic decisions, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project has become an antecedent for fast-tracked industrial growth. Completion of infrastructure projects have laid down a solid foundation and created positive externality3 (multiplier effects) for the next phase of CPEC. The next phase is the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). To benefit from SEZs, Pakistan aims at establishing resilient and potentially productive industries to initiate a new era of industrialisation and trade, including high-end textiles, sports goods, surgical goods, telecom parts, engineering and knowledgebased industries, fish and marine products, food packaging, and modern storage facilities for fruits and vegetables, jointly or side-by-side with Chinese companies to be based in SEZs. SEZs will open new vistas of opportunity for both countries to cooperatively integrate and grow fast. Thus, SEZs are likely to become new growth poles. Chinese investors, on their part, are looking for profit-making opportunities around the globe. They have shown keen interest in investing in SEZs being exclusively developed for them in Pakistan. This is happening at a time when rapid industrial expansion has over burdened China with ‘price-sapping supply gluts’ in many of its industries. Despite several policy initiatives, China

‘‘

SEZs would provide an opportunity to attract Chinese investment and locate Pakistan in the global supply and value chains to boost economic development

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80

has struggled to force its outdated and loss-making plants to restructure or shut down. Chinese industries having excess capacity simply want to escape weak demand and soaring environmental costs in China by moving abroad through the courtesy of the “One Belt One Road” initiative that intends to shift such production abroad.

Pakistan should be careful in opening its SEZs for Chinese investment. While safeguarding its interests, Pakistan should welcome only the above reported industries, they should not unnecessarily impose cost on the economy or distort domestic markets. Planners should attract those industries that should deliver both static and dynamic benefits. Given the successful record of China in establishing many SEZs, Pakistan finds a new conviction to establish SEZs jointly with China. Pakistan is ready to benefit from the Chinese experience in ensuring the success of its prospective SEZs. SEZs would provide an opportunity to attract Chinese investment and locate Pakistan in the global supply and value chains to boost economic development. SEZs can help make economic development process more inclusive across Pakistan. Pakistan should capitalise on its existing cheap labour, diasporas, land and other endowments to attract investors. Needless to state that while capitalising on the opportunities arising from SEZs, Pakistan will have to, effectively, manage many challenges including: consistency in economic policies and avoidance of

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sudden policy reversals, transparency in decisionmaking, expansion of financial markets to provide adequate finance to industries, availability of qualified personnel through execution of vocational training and skill development programmes, and favourable business environment, including strong property rights protection and fair and speedy dispute resolution.4 SEZs, once established will provide much needed impetus to stimulate economic activities. They will also provide a life-time opportunity to Pakistani companies to work together with Chinese companies for the development of export-oriented manufacturing industries, while managing the above stated challenges with the assistance of reformed public sector institutions. To make this happen, I propose an integrated-multi-sectoral approach via extensive capacity building. This should stimulate inclusive and sustainable growth, generate decent and productive jobs, develop industrial and business infrastructures, and develop global and domestic supply and value chains.5 To harness these benefits6 this approach suggests to connect SEZs with existing industrial clusters while introducing comprehensive strategic reforms.7 These links would facilitate transfer of new technologies and knowledge, adaptation of modern management practices, and creation of new businesses for cluster based firms and other ancillary firms. Within the above perspective, this paper discusses the potential role and effectiveness of SEZs on the basis of international experience, A critical evaluation of existing SEZs in Pakistan and proposed CPEC-related SEZs, Potential threats to CPEC-SEZs, Approach to connect clusters and SEZs, Strategic policy directions and policy actions to draw benefits from SEZs.

Potential Role and Effectiveness of SEZs SEZs are established around the globe to catalyse economic development and structural transformation, as they create special environment conducive to business, where governments otherwise face great difficulties doing so. The basic rationale to establish SEZs is that by removing critical ‘binding constraints’8 to economic growth in a controlled environment, their policies create incentives for firms and investors that might not otherwise be attracted.9 Governments also use SEZs as a way to attract investments in sectors with no obvious comparative advantage, or as a way of increasing value-added in export activities.10 Conceptually, SEZs are characterised and designed as: ── Geographically demarcated areas. ── Single management/administration. ── Special fiscal incentives and regulatory regime. ── Incubators for the application of new policies and economy-wide approaches. ── Separate customs’ area and its streamlined procedures. ── Modern and reliable infrastructures.11 SEZs are generally self-contained in the procurement of raw materials (from local and international markets), power generation, mitigating pollution, sewage treatment and support services. They have practically everything from transportation to cultural and educational facilities. So, they are perceived to provide significant insulation from the uncertain domestic zone (DZ, Note: domestic zone is comprised of rest of the country) environment.12 Special Economic Zone

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manufacturing by leaping up value chains and prompting positive externalities. ── Create competition and hence efficiency. ── Alleviate unemployment. ── Promote exports and industrialisation. ── Ensure ease of administration and management. ── Allocate resources for socio-economic uplift in adjoining areas for their acceptability by the locals. ── Diversify economic and political risks. Despite gainful role played by SEZs worldwide, in some countries they have been criticised for being less legal and socially protective for workers, misusage of allotted land for real estate speculation and tax evasion. International experience suggests that the main reason as to why SEZs fail is that initial investors (harvesters) locate themselves in SEZs to escape from taxation and resist in improving their competitiveness. They move out when the time-constrained subsidies and other incentives expire. For less dynamic firms, SEZs are simply a source of rentseeking. Other reasons for SEZs’ failure include: weak governance, regulatory issues, bilateral disputes, lack of a dispute resolution mechanism, etc. To avoid such problems and to ensure effective management, countries assign decentralised decision-making roles to private-public partnership arrangements of SEZs with inclusiveness of local communities and institutions.15 Moreover, the situation is improved by creating coalition of local workers, local governments and SEZ-investors who have invested in SEZ infrastructure.

Existing SEZs in Pakistan - A Critical Overview Virtually, every district headquarters of Pakistan has an Industrial Estate or Area. Industrial Estates have requisite infrastructures and offer many different incentives. Punjab has 26 industrial estates, whilst Sindh, Balochistan and KP, have 30, 7 and 12 industrial states, respectively.16 In addition to Industrial Estates, eight Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in Pakistan include: Export Processing

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International experience suggests that the main reason as to why SEZs fail is that initial investors (harvesters) locate themselves in SEZs to escape from taxation and resist in improving their competitiveness

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Laws and regulations of SEZs are different from those generally applicable laws and regulations in the DZ. SEZs are generally duty free enclaves for both trade and manufacturing. Several fiscal and regulatory incentives are offered to investors within zones by national, provincial and local governments. Nonetheless, international experience suggests that decisions to invest in SEZs are rarely based on financial incentives alone; indeed such incentives are not the key to SEZs success that may attract weaker firms. Success factors for them include; efficient and cost effective infrastructures, and good governance (or absence of over-intrusive governance) that distinguish them from DZ. Success of SEZ inspires DZ, encouraging more effective provision of public services and infrastructures, and forcing policy makers to introduce economic reforms to achieve what was not achieved before.13 Key successful international experiences, especially of China, suggest gradualism with an experimental approach, a strong political commitment, preferential policies and broad institutional autonomy, foreign investment and investment from diaspora, strong business value chains and social networks, continuous technology learning and upgrading, and active and pragmatic facilitation by the government. SEZs if ill-prepared will not be able to attract investors and will not benefit from their efforts. Countries that fail to liberalise trade, and do not adopt export-oriented strategies are less likely to experience positive impacts of SEZs on exports.14 Of course, SEZs have played varied roles in terms of export diversification. Substantial exports from SEZs have been observed in some sectors that were already outward-oriented, thus making export performance difficult to attribute directly to the presence of SEZs. Thus successful SEZs spurto: ─ ─ Establish complementarity between economies. ── Diversify the economy to produce new and value-added goods. ── Attract local and foreign investment especially towards under-privileged regions, reducing regional disparities. ── Generate complementarity with local industries, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs). ── Develop skills of local labour force. ── Transfer technology and disseminate knowledge to domestic industries. ── Promote ancillary industrial activities. ── Develop local entrepreneurship. ── Enter into basic and intermediate

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Pakistan has also developed many clusters, mainly through private initiatives that have promoted industrial development

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Zone (Karachi), Export Processing Zone (Risalpur), Export Processing Zone (Sialkot), Export Processing Zone (Gujranwala), Special Economic Zone (Khairpur), Economic Zone (Rashakai Mardan), Gadoon Economic Zone (Gadoon-Amazai), and Hathar Economic Zone (Hathar-Haripur). There are also some Industrial Parks: Rachna Industrial Park (Lahore), Marble City (Lahore), and Textile City (Port Qasim). Some of the newly established industrial estates are: Value Addition City (Sheikhupura-Faisalabad Expressway), Industrial City (Faisalabad), and Quaid-e-Azam Apparel Park (Lahore). Some of these industrial zones are successful while others are unsuccessful, because they are established in remote areas lacking necessary skilled work force or basic amenities for workers, despite abundance of raw materials in the region. Generally, these estates are far away from existing industrial clusters consequently they could not benefit from economies-of-scale external to firms.17 Small private investment that took place in many Industrial Estates resulted into higher per unit service and utility costs, which made them unfeasible. The Estates were not linked to domestic or global supply or value chains as they were far away from traditional supply routes, mainly highways and ports. Moreover, due to local influence allotted land was used for other purposes. Pakistan has also developed many clusters, mainly through private initiatives that have promoted industrial development. They are developed on the basis of their strength in skilled workforce, raw materials availability, supporting institutions and deep historical links with domestic and global supply and value chains. These clusters include: sports and surgical clusters in Sialkot,

textiles cluster in Faisalabad, fan cluster in Gujrat, and engineering cluster in Gujranwala, to name the major ones.

CPEC – SEZs Both China and Pakistan have proposed the following nine SEZs to be established in Pakistan: ── Rashakai Economic Zone (Nowshera). ── China Special Economic Zone (Dhabeji). ── Bostan Industrial Zone (Quetta). ── Punjab-China Economic Zone (Faisalabad). ── ICT Model Industrial Zone (Islamabad). ── Development of Industrial Park on Pakistan Steel Mills Land (Port Qasim). ── Bhimber Industrial Zone. ── Mohmand Marble City. ── Moqpondass SEZ (Gilgit-Baltistan). Of these, three prioritized SEZs set to take off soon are: Faisalabad, Rashakai and Dhabeji. The whole political sphere in Pakistan has a consensus to fast establish SEZs. The All Parties Conference held on 15th January 2016, provided a much needed reassurance to both Chinese and Pakistani governments and their private investors. Despite some reservations, stakeholders in two

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countries now perceive CPEC as a project that would transform Pakistan into a hub of manufacturing and trade activities in the region.

Possible Threats to SEZs

be limited if SEZs employ few local workers, especially if workers will be concentrated in low-skill jobs. ── SEZs can create distortion within the economy as they will receive incentives different from DZ and domestic industrial clusters. ── Threat of sabotage from bureaucracy, who may not wish to work in free market environment and do not want to lose their clout. ── Footloose industries would draw benefits from fiscal incentives and may leave the country, so sustainability of SEZs would be the biggest threat.

The main threats that are likely to be faced by the Pakistani industries located in SEZs and DZ may include:-18 ── If the state land is not available to establish SEZs, then a forceful land dispossession would be a source of ‘land conflicts’. Resistance from land owners and local people could be hostile for SEZs and may jeopardise its very existence. A Pragmatic Approach to Establish ── Adjacent local communities feeling socially threatened or not economically benefiting Complementary SEZ - Cluster can create security threat for SEZs. So far, To draw maximum benefits from the no specific threat has emerged against CPEC establishment of SEZs, I propose here a pragmatic projects except occasional rhetoric. approach whereby Pakistan should carefully ── Threat to local industry could be significant design and plan to attract large-scale Chinese firms from low-skill, labour-intensive and low- mainly producing intermediate inputs and largetechnology SEZ-based Chinese firms and medium-sized firms producing final goods. producing similar products. These firms should be integrated with domestic firms located in the ── Sustainability of DZ, including domestic export-led growth industrial clusters. This strategy for SEZs Some Chinese investors may choose integration should be will be threatened created on the basis by global trade to operate outside SEZs in an attempt of complementarity frictions that are to avoid governmental control, and high between Chinese and looming, with domestic firms. increasing global rents and utility costs in underpopulated protectionism and In preceding SEZs. This may create a conflict of fears of global paragraphs, the role of interest trade wars. SEZs was discussed in ── SEZs’ success is detail. Here, I begin by linked with institutional reforms and efficient discussing the role of industrial clusters in creating institutions. Absence of reforms and reformed their possible complementarity with SEZs. An institutions will be a recipe for SEZs failure. industrial cluster is a geographical concentration of ── Pakistanis interested in getting access to intertwined firms in a specific industry (e.g., sports Chinese technology, while Chinese investors goods) with their links to input supplier firms, will try to protect their intellectual properties financial, technological and other institutions all in Pakistani market. Any resistance to transfer based in the cluster. Firms in a cluster are inter of technology and knowledge by Chinese connected through their positive externalities firms may create a conflict situation. and complementarities and are usually located ── SEZs will be threatened, if they could not near to each other. Cluster is thus a mechanism achieve the desired impacts of moving up to for enabling firms to combine their efforts and higher value-added activities, and generating resources for achieving competitiveness. significant technology and productivity This character establishes the platform for spillovers for local industries. sustainability and expansion of clusters in the ── Local participation in SEZs may be restricted long run. There are three main reasons19 as to due to reluctance of Chinese firms to seek joint ventures (Chinese firms strictly protect their why a cluster of firms may be more efficient than firms established in isolation across the country: proprietary knowledge and trade secrets). ── Some Chinese investors may choose to specialised input suppliers based in a cluster know operate outside SEZs in an attempt to avoid the exact needs of cluster-based manufacturing governmental control, and high rents and firms, labour pooling of cluster firms reduces job utility costs in underpopulated SEZs. This may search and training costs, and knowledge spillovers through informal intermingling of workers from create a conflict of interest. ── Skill transfer through labour turnover might different firms. Clusters thus provide distinctive

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them to expand. Of course, emergence of satellite clusters out of SEZs would depend on the success of the later. Such clusters would initially use low and labour-intensive technology. Some of them would gradually upgrade and move up the value chain. For creating complementarities between SEZ and cluster firms, Pakistan needs to plan systematically from the outset. If SEZs are established to work in isolation, then Pakistan will not benefit much from their existence. Only by creating complementarity/synergy between SEZs and existing industrial clusters, all the participants will benefit for a longer time. SEZs will initially be developed by the private sector developers with assistance from the government, which will ensure all required infrastructures, services, utilities and institutional support (see, Chart 1). SEZ firms will mainly produce ‘intermediate inputs’ and ‘final goods’. SEZs produced intermediate inputs will be supplied to SEZ firms producing final goods and existing local clusters, while remaining intermediate goods will be sold in foreign markets. SEZs will export their final goods to domestic and foreign markets. In their complementary role, existing clusters will supply intermediate inputs and ancillary services to SEZs. SEZ in the long-run will also create satellite cluster independently or jointly with existing cluster in their vicinity. Initially, SEZs firms will use established local distribution/marketing networks available in local clusters or DZ, and later, they can have their own distribution network. Clusters normally have small to medium-sized enterprises; they cannot directly enter into foreign export markets. They can join hands with SEZ large firms to enter into foreign export markets and thus can benefit from established foreign distribution networks of Chinese firms based in SEZs. Local clusters can be an important source of supply of skills to SEZs (i.e., labour pooling). With movement of workers between SEZ and cluster firms, spillover of technical knowledge will also take place. Institutional role would be to facilitate and encourage both clusters and SEZs to complement each other. They would also create a match between cluster and SEZs firms from the beginning. Some

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Cluster is thus a mechanism for enabling firms to combine their efforts and resources for achieving competitiveness

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opportunities for firms to take advantage of a wide range of links, which then stimulate learning and innovation processes across firms. Formation of clusters, however, takes time and needs an ecosystem based on market forces.20 Most clusters are essentially established through “bottom-up” private initiatives. However, these initiatives do not exclude government’s role of facilitation to create a cluster, especially through improving the business environment and making appropriate policy interventions. SEZs, on the other hand, are established through a “top-down” approach mainly by the government policies. Prospects for the SEZs to build backward and forward linkages with domestic competitive industrial clusters and ancillary suppliers are potentially strong. This is possible if the SEZ firms would source intermediate inputs from clusterbased firms or sub-contract/outsource some of their production to them. Thus, direct and indirect linkages need to be developed between SEZ firms and existing industrial cluster firms with concerted efforts. Supply of domestic inputs intended for SEZs is a key to its integration with DZ including clusters (see, Chart 1). If no input from clusters is used in the production by the SEZ firms, then SEZ would merely be an isolated enclave. The build-up of linkages between the SEZ and DZ can motivate domestic producers of intermediate inputs to produce higher quality inputs so that SEZ firms demand these inputs domestically and do not outsource to their foreign networks. Likewise, producers of intermediate inputs based in SEZ can supply their output to DZ and cluster-based final goods producing firms, who will thus be affected positively by such linkages. In general, the exchange of goods between SEZ and DZ will pressurise firms to increase productivity via upgrading their technology or alternatively they will crowd out each other. These linkages will not only create business for local firms but will also enable Chinese firms to firmly place themselves in SEZs for a long time. Zone management should encourage Chinese investors to establish joint ventures with local partners in SEZs and create backward and forward linkages with cluster and DZ firms. These linkages are possible only if strong domestic supply chains (DSCs) and domestic value chains (DVCs) are created and jointly used and operated by SEZ and cluster firms. Such chains can be promoted by developing efficient and cost effective infrastructures and logistics. Satellite clusters would also start emerging out of existing saturated clusters and SEZs, independently or jointly (see Chart 1). Market forces initially produce satellite clusters, but later on government support and facilitation, including setting up of various institutions, would enable

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Chart 1: A Pragmatic Approach to Link SEZs and Clusters

SEZ Developers Zone Management

Special Economics Zone (SEZs) Final Inputs Producers (Large & Medium Firms)

Supplying of Skills, Ancillary Goods and Services

Spillover of skills & technology, dissemination of knowledge

Utilities, Infrastructures

Industrial Cluster

Facilitation

Government Institutions Special Fiscal Incentives

Intermediate Inputs Producers (Large Firms)

Provision of Land Technical Assistance Rules and Regulations Infrastructure Link with GSC & GVC Environment Regulations

Skill Development Support Provision of Technology Finance Facility Labour Laws Environment Regulations

Supplying of Intermediate Inputs

Joint Satellite Cluster

SEZ Satellite Cluster Domestic Markets: DVC, DSC

of SEZ and cluster-based firms will eventually be competing for their shares in domestic and foreign markets. As a practice, competition should be encouraged on the principles of globally accepted business norms, rules and regulations. The crux of this approach is to create a complementarity/synergy between SEZ and cluster firms from the beginning for the sustainability of SEZs; attract large scale Chinese firms producing intermediate inputs and final goods, not just having assembly lines based on imported intermediate inputs from their parent companies in China. It will be difficult to safeguard Pakistan’s interest once Chinese investment starts pouring into SEZs, but not impossible. In this regard, I put forward some strategic policy directions and strategic policy actions in the next section.

Strategic Policy Directions and Policy Actions SEZ strategies should be fully integrated into economic development strategies and national industrial policies. The SEZs should be so designed that they complement and support national comparative advantages and be validated through strategic planning. While developing SEZs, policy makers must consider their commercial viability, fix

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Firms: Large, Medium, Small Producers of: Final Goods, Intermediate Inputs Ancillary & Supplier Firms Labour Pooling Knowledge Dissemination Distribution Networks

Competition Law

Adaptation of Modern Management Practices

86

Domestic Zone (DZ)

Other firms outside cluster working at isolated places in DZ

DZ Satellite Cluster

Foreign Markets: GVC, GSC

targets for businesses, markets and growth, ensure availability of efficient infrastructures, technology innovation capability, and environmental sustainability21. The success of SEZs would require that pragmatism prevail. A very capable private administration, political will and determination are needed to introduce SEZ cluster – based industrial transformation, of course, with a cautious and gradual approach, so that the reform process does not fall captive to vested interest groups. Policy actions that need to be introduced while establishing SEZs should include: ── Location Decision. Decision-makers have to take location decisions as per the local dynamics and characteristics. Chinese private investors are least interested in investing in a region without complete necessary infrastructures, the supply of skilled workers and developed markets for other inputs and raw materials. Thus, while making a decision, the objective of developing an export-oriented SEZ and the development of backward regions may be contradicting, they should be dealt separately. Initially locate SEZs near to established industrial clusters. ── Planning of SEZs. Do not develop too many SEZs at a time, otherwise competition among

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zones to attract Chinese companies would increase the bargaining power of Chinese investors, which in turn would impose higher costs on the country. This is because as each region starts offering more and more preferential incentives—longer tax holidays, lower land and utility charges, and subsidised inputs, the only gainer of this competition would be investors, who would get the most favourable conditions. Therefore, there is a need to formulate a long-term coordinated development plan in consultation with all provinces. ── It is important that SEZs have direct links to major international trading routes at a low cost, because only in this way SEZs will be motivated to produce goods for export markets. Customs authorities should be involved from the beginning because they will be directly dealing in trade activities with SEZs’ investors. For a successful development of SEZs, it is crucial to have a well-planned initial stage, which includes all major development steps in the short run. If this first stage takes too long, it will create distrust for potential Chinese and Pakistani investors. ── Investment Restrain. Industries in which Chinese engagement would be allowed, need to be carefully chosen, as discussed earlier. Such industries should be chosen that have a strong backward and forward linkages with DZ, especially with industrial clusters. At the same time, domestic companies with enough abilities and strength to establish production in the SEZs should get the same preferential treatment as Chinese companies. ── Infrastructures. SEZs should attract Chinese investment mainly in export sectors. It is, therefore, important that the produced goods or raw materials and intermediate inputs can be transported to the production site at a low cost. Thus ensure availability of all the infrastructures, utilities and services for a modern production processes at global competitive rates. ── Investment Decisiveness. Policymakers should not overestimate the possible impact of fiscal concessions on the investment decision of Chinese investors. Other factors,

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like the growth potential, the quality of the infrastructure and political stability are considered to be much more important by the investors. Thus fiscal incentives, including tax holidays, are not decisive, but incentives like duty-free imports of raw materials, other privileges (such as preferential fees for land or facility use, rapid customs clearance, depreciation allowance on capital, repatriation of profits and invested capital, and permission to sell a certain proportion of output in the domestic market) often influence the investment decision. Fiscal incentives should be given just to compensate investors for higher risks of their investment in new environment; they must not be the only reason for investment decision, otherwise the investors will think about moving out of SEZ as soon as the incentives are abolished. ── Industrial Innovation. As production costs or the costs of doing business increase, SEZs need to be more innovative to move up the global value chains (GVC). For SEZs to enhance productivity and sustain long-term competitiveness, they must keep pace with technological and industrial innovation. To realise this, they need to expand well-focused and applied research and development (R&D) activities, strengthening academiaindustry linkages, support targeted business incubators, and attract talent22. ── Develop Relevant Skills. Chinese investors are likely to mostly demand low skilled workers for simple assembly and processing, whereas Pakistan is interested in transfer of modern technology. Chinese investors should be convinced to reciprocate Pakistan’s fiscal incentives for their transfer of technology. But this would require sufficient availability of high-skilled workers, which might be a decisive prerequisite for transfer of technology. The lack of skilled workers will be a big disadvantage for a successful technology transfer. Therefore, one of the highest priorities should be to provide customised and specialised education and training that generate, upgrade and deepen knowledge and skills. Without exception, training must be constantly updated to keep pace with changing business and industrial

The success of SEZs would require that pragmatism prevail. A very capable private administration, political will and determination are needed to introduce SEZ cluster – based industrial transformation, of course, with a cautious and gradual approach, so that the reform process does not fall captive to vested interest groups

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development needs. Certain incentives can be accorded to encourage Chinese firms to provide training to their local workers.

need to be linked with key infrastructures (like airports, seaports, railways and highways), logistics and customs’ services.

── Attract Diasporas. Who can spearhead SEZs activities from the Pakistani side and can be champions and drivers of SEZs. Therefore, encourage them by giving full confidence that their investments and transfer of skills and knowledge will be absolutely secured and highly valued by the nation.

── Create Linkages. The success of SEZs is entwined with DZ. SEZs need to be built on local comparative advantages and should have local suppliers as part of their supply and value chains. SEZs established without strong linkage to DZ and local cluster firms will not be very successful. Government and SEZ management should encourage zone firms to link with local cluster firms through supply and value chains or sub-contracting/ outsourcing relations to create technology and productivity spillover effects23.

── Legal Framework. A predictable and transparent legal and regulatory framework would be needed to ensure the clarity of roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders, and to provide protection and certainty to SEZ developers and investors. Such a legal framework would ensure that SEZs attract the right investments that will set high business, social and environmental standards. The legal framework will also buffer SEZs from unpredictable political risks or interference. The legal framework is also important for strict enforcement of protection of property rights including intellectual property. Absolutely discourage rent-seeking activities, don’t allow investors to exploit policies or circumvent the very objective of establishing SEZs. In addition, long-term government commitment would provide supplementary support for SEZs’ success by ensuring policy continuity and uninterrupted provision of public services. ── Strategic Connectivity. Connectivity among individuals, firms, provinces and countries is a key factor in achieving competitiveness. To be a catalyst for structural transformation, SEZs

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── Administration. An effective and flexible administration, based on a transparent and consistent legal framework, can be a catalyst to reduce the costs of doing business substantially. This can be made possible through the introduction of a single administration agency, which deals with SEZ investors. But for this agency to be efficient and effective, it must be empowered to negotiate directly with different governmental bodies. ── Establish Representative Office. Establish a representative office of SEZs in China, to disseminate important information to potential Chinese investors, about facilities and incentives to be available in SEZs. This office should also provide information on domestic zone and cluster firms, who can possibly provide ancillary services and intermediate inputs to Chinese firms or can join hands for joint ventures. Also establish

Fiscal incentives should be given just to compensate investors for higher risks of their investment in new environment; they must not be the only reason for investment decision, otherwise the investors will think about moving out of SEZ as soon as the incentives are abolished

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Chinese firms and Pakistani clusters as well as Diasporas can play important roles in the success of SEZs by attracting investment, technologies, and management skills; generating learning and technology spillovers; and ultimately helping to build modern industrial capacity

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a labour service company that can assist Chinese investors to find qualified workers, and can provide information on wages and local labour contract requirements. ── Reliable Supplies. Chinese producers in SEZs may not demand intermediate inputs from local suppliers because of low quality or if the timely supply is not guaranteed. In this case, it is important to incentivise domestic producers to upgrade their production technology, improve their management quality and make their supply more reliable. In addition, the logistic infrastructures have to be improved so that intermediate inputs to and from DZ and cluster firms can be shipped just-in-time. In sum, SEZs must be built on the basis of local comparative advantage. A long-term vision is important because industrial transformation via SEZs can take many years. In this regard, it is important for policymakers to undertake joint actions to promote synergies and coordination among different stake holders. Successful SEZs need a holistic and systematic approach proposed earlier, which carries all the important aspects of building conducive industrial and business ecosystem. More specifically, SEZs need a strategic location with sound infrastructures and strong commercial viability, strong institutional support, effective one-stop-shop services, and a robust legal framework. Government should restrict its own direct involvement in SEZ management and should transfer maximum responsibility to private agents. Chinese firms and Pakistani clusters as well as Diasporas can play important roles in the success of SEZs by attracting investment, technologies,

and management skills; generating learning and technology spillovers; and ultimately helping to build modern industrial capacity. Efficient infrastructures and ease of doing business coupled with incentives can provide a great opportunity for Chinese companies, DZ companies and Diasporas to invest in SEZs.

Conclusions Following conclusions need to be kept in front while establishing SEZs to maximise static and dynamic socio-economic benefits for the country: ── Make SEZs development as a core of national development strategy and treat them as platforms for transfer of technology and knowledge beyond their impact on economic growth and productive job creation. ── Encourage local investment in SEZs, this will allay the concerns of locals that Chinese investors are accorded with various incentives at high opportunity cost to DZ. ── Local participation by firms and workers in SEZs is critical to realise productivity and technology spillovers; therefore, incentivise local firms to invest in SEZs and facilitate workers to avail job opportunities in SEZs. ── The industry selection for SEZs should be determined by consulting local and Chinese stakeholders. This is important for the alignment of activities with domestic needs in terms of industrial development and that any resulting technology spillover is more readily absorbed by domestic clusters and DZ firms. ── Systemic constraints to SEZ development will take longer time to overcome, but they must not be neglected. Government must prepare local firms ready to absorb technology. This

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── Given the complex and heterogeneous environments in which SEZs would operate, a clear legal framework is needed to guide their operations. Such a framework should include clear roles and responsibilities for the government and private sector.

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A long-term vision is important because industrial transformation via SEZs can take many years

Establishment of SEZs and their linkage with domestic cluster and DZ firms is not likely to be an easy one and may not please everyone. Therefore, Pakistan needs to ensure that all (Chinese and Pakistani) stakeholders are on board and they patiently play their constructive respective roles for the success of SEZs. Needless to say, there will be heavy cost to establish SEZs and other requisite infrastructures that will be borne by Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan must ensure reciprocal compensation from SEZ firms in terms of visible and significant transfer of technology and knowledge to DZ and cluster firms, creation of jobs for local workforce, sizeable exports to foreign markets, and investment in complementary activities by establishing joint ventures. These should be at the core of the SEZ strategy to transform the Pakistan economy.

Notes

In addition, the big three international rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch in 2018 graded Pakistan’s economy with “B3 (negative)”, “B” and “B (negative)”, respectively, i.e., the economy is highly speculative. This suggests that if right measures are not timely introduced then the economy may plunge into bankruptcy. 2. Demographic dividend is the economic growth potential that may result from changes in the age structure of population, especially when the share of the working-age population is larger than the non-working-age share of the population, so number of dependents are less than number of workers in the labour force. Because of this change in age distribution, fewer resources would be required to meet the needs of the dependent age groups and thus resources are freed up for their employability in productive activities, this is called the “demographic dividend.” 3. A Chinese proverb says, ‘if you want to be rich build a road’. It basically points to positive externality of building road infrastructure. So roads and power infrastructures provide sound base for industrialisation. 4. See, Mahmood, Zafar (2018a) Opportunities and challenges of special economic zones under CPEC for Pakistan. S3H Monograph Series 01:2018, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad. 5. Supply chain is a tool of business transformation, which establishes a network between suppliers (of raw materials), manufacturers (semi- or manufactured products), wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and the end consumer—a link from the point of origin to its final destination, i.e., consumption. Value chain is referred to a range of activities that adds value at every single stage in designing, producing, and delivering a quality product to the user. 6. In general, if implemented successfully, SEZs accord two types of economic benefits: ‘static’ or ‘direct’ and ‘dynamic’ or ‘indirect’. Static benefits include direct employment creation, export growth and export diversification, revenue generation, and foreign exchange earnings. Whereas, dynamic benefits include indirect employment creation, skills upgrading, technology transfer and innovation, economic diversification, demonstration effect arising from application of ‘best practices’, regional development, and productivity enhancement of local firms. These benefits elucidate SEZs’ acceptance in general in the country and by local communities in particular (See, Zeng, Douglas Zhihua (2010) Building engines for growth and competitiveness in China: experience with special economic zones & industrial clusters. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank). 7. Comprehensive reforms could not be introduced earlier because of strong resistance from various local interest groups. 8. These constraints broadly range from regulatory regimes and infrastructure to land acquisition and trade logistics. 9. Thus, SEZs should only be used to address market failures (distortions) or

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calls for substantial investment in local R&D institutions and the provision of incentives for firms to train their workers, and adopt best management practices. ── Remove administrative and regulatory constraints to local supplier firms. Provide a platform to SEZ and DZ firms to work together to create strong and sustainable mutual/joint partnerships. ── Set up training arrangements with assistance from Chinese vocational institutions. Establish industrial technology parks, as is being established in National University of Science & Technology (NUST) with Chinese assistance, to meet technology needs of SEZs and DZ firms.

1.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

18.

19. 20. 21.

22.

23.

binding constraints that cannot be addressed through other policy options. If the constraints can be addressed through countrywide reforms, then SEZs might not be necessary (see, Rodrik, Dani (2004) “Rethinking growth policies in the developing world.” Draft of the Luca d’Agliano Lecture in Development Economics, delivered on October 8, 2004, in Torino, Italy). See, Cirera, Xavier and Raith W. D. Lakshman (2014) The impact of export processing zones on employment, wages and labour conditions in developing countries: systematic review. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 9:3, 344360. See, Zeng, Douglas Zhihua (2016) Special economic zones: lessons from the global experience. PEDL Synthesis Paper Series, No. 1. See, Mahmood, Zafar (2017) A win-win proposal to establish China-Pakistan special economic zones. Hilal, October 2017. See, Zeng (2016) Ibid. See, Johansson, Helena and Lars Nilsson (1997) Export process zone as catalysts. World Development, 25:12, 2115-28. These institutions may include producers’ associations, chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions, local governments and local banks. Their participation is essential for the success of SEZs. See, Mahmood (2018a) Ibid. External economies-of-scale imply that as the size of an industry grows larger, the average costs of doing business within the industry falls. This may occur due to increased specialisation or training of workers, faster innovation or shared supplier relationships. Also see, Mahmood, Zafar (2018b) Potential threats and challenges to the special economic zones under CPEC. Chapter 14, in Zafar Iqbal Cheema (ed.) “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Potentials and Prospects”, Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. See, Krugman, Paul, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc Meltiz (2017) International economics: theory and policy. New York: Pearson 11th Edition. See, Krugman, Paul and Anthony Venables (1996) Integration, specialisation, and adjustment. European Economic Review, 40:3, 959-968. See, Farole, Thomas (2011) “Special economic zones in Africa: comparing performance and learning from global experience.” Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. See, Zhang, Ming (2008) What can cities do to enhance competitiveness? Local policies and actions for innovation. En breve. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Retrieved on July 13, 2018 from: http://documents.worldbank. org/curated/en/2008/07/10133626/can-cities-enhance-competitivenesslocalpolicies-actions-innovation. See, Zeng, Douglas Zhihua (2015) “Global experiences with special economic zones: focus on China and Africa.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7240. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

CHINA:

ECONOMIC BULWARK AGAINST TERRORISM? LESSON FOR OTHERS

Imtiaz Gul is the Executive Director of Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad

Abstract China in the last decade or so has emerged as a big economic connector on the back of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed by President Xi Jinping. Soon after becoming the most powerful person in contemporary China in 2012, Xi embarked on the most ambitious plan any country has ever conceived. The BRI, But he was also conscious of the pitfalls in this regional and global connectivity undertaking. One of these pitfalls is the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and its consequences for the rest of the world. Particularly after the bulk drawdown of the US-NATO troops from the war-battered country in December 2014, it became clear that regional powers shall have to fill the ensuing vacuum and create firewalls against the growing menace of trans-border terrorism. China’s appointment of a special envoy for counter-terrorism and special out-reach to both Afghanistan and Pakistan underscored the concerns arising out of the spiralling terrorist violence in Afghanistan. Beijing was also conscious of the fact that success of the BRI, of which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project, hinged on getting a handle on terrorism-induced violence. And this, the Chinese concluded, depended on a regional security architecture involving regional stakeholders such as Russia, India and Pakistan. That is why China has been pushing the idea of a regional security architecture since 2014 to successfully fight terrorism and terrorist proxies. This paper argues that since 2014 or so China, cognizant of the growing Indo-US influence in the region, has been attempting to bring these countries plus Afghanistan together for a regional Afghan peace and counter-terrorism policy, which it believes is crucial for the success of all BRI-related initiatives aimed at connecting China with the world – north and south of it. By pursuing this dream of trade connectivity, China has assumed an unusual role in the global war against terrorism, without deploying high-handed tactics against smaller countries, a perception that accompanies the US counter-terrorism policies. This unique focus on the need for a regional anti-terror strategy comes in handy for Pakistan too; following 17 years of turmoil following its partnership in the global war on terror, Pakistan has suffered enormous losses – both human and material. China happens to be the only country to empathise with the complex situation that Pakistan faces and herein lies a chance for it to align its counter-terror policies with China and other regional powers such as Russia for better and lasting solutions to problems induced by the trans-border terrorist networks. Keywords: Regional Peace, Chinese BRI, Counter Terrorism Strategies, Indo-US Nexus, Pakistan and Peace Process

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For the past 13 years the US and NATO have been playing a major role in Afghanistan and we made a contribution and gave them support - but now with the US leaving, Afghanistan is facing a critical period……we are ready to do more, we want to play a bigger role

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uietly, but resolutely, China has been choreographing its Afghanistan and counter-terror policy in consultation with regional stakeholders, Pakistan and Russia in particular. With this quiet diplomacy, it has emerged as the economically strong bulwark against terrorism, a power that is underpinning regional counterterrorism efforts through its economic clout. Apparently, the impending US-NATO drawdown in December 2014 served as the trigger for Beijing’s activism on the Afghan front. “For the past 13 years the US and NATO have been playing a major role in Afghanistan and we made a contribution and gave them support – but now with the US leaving, Afghanistan is facing a critical period……we are ready to do more, we want to play a bigger role.” This excerpt from China’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Sun Yuxi’s rare interview with the BBC back in 2014 was quite instructive.1 Ambassador Sun went on to offer to even host an intra-Afghan dialogue. “We would welcome the Taliban in any neutral venue such as in China …we will make negotiations happen but the process must be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led – the agenda must be proposed by President Ashraf Ghani,’’ he underscored. The appointment of Sun Yuxi, 63, who has known Afghanistan since 1981 as a young diplomat, was itself a clear manifestation of Beijing’s strong desire to get involved in Afghanistan. Nearly two years later in January 2016, Beijing played host to the Afghan foreign minister,

Ambassador Sun Yuxi

Salahuddin Rabbani, with the obvious objective of paving way for bringing Afghanistan’s warring factions to the negotiating table.

Engagement with Afghanistan and Taliban Days after the Taliban trip to Beijing, Deng Xijun, the Chinese special envoy for Afghanistan, flew into Kabul to convey to President Ashraf Ghani that his country had “encouraged the Taliban during our contacts with them to join the peace process,” Ghani’s office confirmed after Xijun’s meeting with Ghani.2 “China has always conveyed to the Taliban that it recognises the Afghan government and the president and that talks are the only option for them,” the statement quoted Xijun as saying.3 Interestingly, preceding the Taliban trip to Beijing was a close consultation among Chinese, Russian and Pakistani officials in December 2016 at Moscow,4 where all welcomed the lifting of international sanctions on some Taliban

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Ambassador Sun Yuxi China’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

defeating terrorist groups and restoring peace in Afghanistan, considered a sanctuary for several pan-Islamist terror groups such as Al-Qaeda, Daesh as well as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which specifically relates to the Uighur Sunni Muslims of Xinjiang. China also considers peace and stability as central to curbing drugs that are grown and processed in ungoverned spaces of Afghanistan. Some of it travels through to its markets via Xinjiang too.

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leaders. Their Qatar office was quick to appreciate the outcome of the Moscow meeting as an acknowledgment by major stakeholders “that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a political and military force.” By inviting the Afghan foreign minister, followed by the Taliban delegation and active participation in the Moscow meeting, the Chinese leadership underscored its quest for regional peace – whatever way possible – which it considers critical for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese scholars and former diplomats point out that with the economic rise of their country, their leaders feel the pressure that comes with the global economic status. “The big backdrop is that the United States will have withdrawn most of its troops from Afghanistan with the antiterrorism mission unfinished, which is leaving the country a mess,” said Du Youkang, who worked in Islamabad, Pakistan, as a diplomat and is now the director of the South Asia Studies Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai. “Bombings have never stopped, even in the capital. Afghanistan shares a border with China, so in this case China must get involved to promote the talks and to secure the stability in the region.” 5

Bombings have never stopped, even in the capital. Afghanistan shares a border with China, so in this case China must get involved to promote the talks and to secure the stability in the region

Du Youkang, Director of the South Asia Studies Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai Narcotics indeed is part of the deadly mix that keeps Afghanistan on tenterhooks and creates the space for all kinds of non-state actors including drugs’ smugglers, criminals, and terrorists. A former US commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, who commanded 150,000 US and NATO forces from July 2011 to February 2013, too, pointed to these elements as a source of continued strife in Afghanistan. General Allen gave his assessment at the Brookings Institution in May 2018. “In my mind, there was a triangular threat to Afghanistan’s future but also, in a military context, you had the ideological insurgency, which we would

Securing Belt and Road Initiative? Another reason for China’s engagement has been the BRI’s flagship project – the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Both Beijing and Islamabad know that Afghanistan remains a critical trans-border transportation hub to connect with Central Asia. The Uighur Islamist insurgency in its western Xinjiang region, the largest in size and rich with mineral wealth, is another factor that may be fuelling Beijing’s desire to proactively get involved in Afghanistan but the larger focus remains on

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Narcotics indeed is part of the deadly mix that keeps Afghanistan on tenterhooks and creates the space for all kinds of non-state actors including drugs’ smugglers, criminals, and terrorists. A former US commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, who commanded 150,000 US and NATO forces from July 2011 to February 2013, too, pointed to these elements as a source of continued strife in Afghanistan

Convergence with Regional Actors This is where positions of China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey converge, allowing China to be the visible force behind a coordinated regional counter-terrorism policy. China, Afghanistan and Pakistan political and counter-terrorism cooperation dialogues – both at official as well as the civil society level. It is also part of a regional group ‘Six Plus One’, comprising US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

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euphemistically called the Taliban, you had the drug enterprise which fuelled an awful lot of insurgent and criminal behaviour and then you had the criminal patronage network. I don’t believe we were properly organised frankly to deal with that.”6

Another trilateral forum comprising China, US and Afghanistan is pursuing the same objectives but – ostensibly for political reasons - Chinese officials would not publicise it as much as they do with other tracks. No surprise that between February and July 2017 alone, defence officials from Israel, Turkey, Pakistan and the UAE visited Beijing to discuss security cooperation with China. Beijing also sent the PLA Navy (PLAN) to visit the region on several occasions. Navy ships called on ports in several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, Oman, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and the UAE. Some of these port-calls were the first such visits in years.7 The CHINA GLOBAL SECURITY TRACKER also spoke of the Chinese Navy’s permanent presence in the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea since 2008, as a result of its continued participation in counter-piracy operations. Meanwhile, China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti also became operational in 2017. The same year in March, China launched the second joint counter-terrorism and humanitarian rescue drill – Dragon Gold 2018 – with Cambodia at a training field in the Maras Prov Mountains. It involved some 280 soldiers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and 216 soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).8 This reflected the seriousness with which Beijing pursued its focus on counter-terrorism, taking countries of its entire neighbourhood on board for the trans-border phenomenon.

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China had long been averse to getting involved in the Afghan or any other conflicts, not wanting to be seen as taking sides. But Afghan officials, beginning under the administration of President Hamid Karzai, have been insistent, pressing Chinese leaders at every opportunity to use their influence on Islamabad to curb the Taliban.9 China was also part of a similar track known as the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) but it came to a literal grinding halt after a US drone strike killed Taliban leader Mulla Akhtar Mansoor in May 2016. Li Shaoxian, a Chinese scholar and vicepresident of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies, said he believed it was important for China to establish direct contact with Taliban representatives. “ I went to the country in 2000, and I have to say that the Taliban simply will not be wiped out, because they are deeply rooted in the rank-andfile of the society and are a representative of the Pashtuns,” Mr. Li said, referring to the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan. “So now Beijing, Washington and Kabul have all accepted the fact that, well, we need to include them in the peace and reconciliation process’’. In broader sense, the Chinese push for a multi-lateral engagement on peace in Afghanistan dovetails its strong, but less articulated, focus on trans-national terrorist outfits, which it describes as a “common security threat’’.

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Counter-Terror Diplomacy Expands No coincidence, therefore, that the China Association for Friendship, a helping arm of the Ministry for Public Security for outreach, organised the first unofficial counter-terrorism symposium in Beijing involving Pakistan and Afghanistan and the hosts.10 Chen Zhimin, President of China Association for Friendship

Chen Zhimin, the President of the Association, opened the dialogue and declared that the crossborder mobility of terrorist networks and their technical capabilities represented a major threat to all regional stakeholders. At the same time Zhimin, who enjoys the rank of a minister, underscored the need for improving connectivity among all regional powers. Real connectivity would deny terrorists the chance to network and help break the nexus between terrorists and criminal networks, Zhimin said. At the same time the President acknowledged that both Afghanistan and Pakistan had been suffering because of being at the forefront of the anti-terror war. ‘‘We are with you, thank you for fighting ETIM and thank you for standing up to other terrorist and criminal networks’’, he said. Only two weeks earlier, senior Chinese officials went into an unprecedented huddle with their Russian, Iranian and Pakistani counterparts at Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital to share thoughts on developments around them, with a particular focus on the buildup of Islamic State in turmoil-hit Afghanistan.11

I went to the country in 2000, and I have to say that the Taliban simply will not be wiped out, because they are deeply rooted in the rank-and-file of the society and are a representative of the Pashtuns. So now Beijing, Washington and Kabul have all accepted the fact that, well, we need to include them in the peace and reconciliation process Li Shaoxian, Vice-President of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies Green Book 2019

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Daesh-IS: The Common Denominator A spokesperson for Moscow’s Foreign Intelligence Service also confirmed that the emergence of IS in Afghanistan prompted the deliberations in Islamabad, and that director of the Russian spy agency, Sergei Naryshkin represented his country in a meeting that shocked many in western capitals. “The conference reached understanding of the importance of coordinated steps to prevent the trickling of IS terrorists from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan, where from they would pose risks for neighbouring countries,” Sergei Ivanov told staterun TASS media outlet.12 This meeting also signalled a synergy of views on the mysterious phenomenon of Islamic State of Khorassan, or Daesh, in Afghanistan. Although China never took a public position on the Russian allegations that the IS is a US-sponsored entity, particularly in northern Afghan provinces next to the border with Central Asian countries, yet its presence at the quadrilateral meeting in Islamabad was viewed by many in the West as an endorsement of Moscow’s view on Daesh.

Nebenzya said, reiterating the Russian view, which Iran, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, also shares.

Washington, though, dismissed the charges as rumours, and an attempt to justify Moscow’s links to the Taliban insurgency. IS calls its Afghan branch Khorasan Province, or ISKP, and it routinely carries out deadly suicide bombings in the war-hit country and occasionally plots such attacks in neighbouring Pakistan.

Vasily Nebenzya, Russian Envoy to the United Nations

Russian envoy to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, while addressing a Security Council meeting on Afghanistan in June 2018 had asserted that IS is creating training camps in Afghanistan for its fighters, including those who come from Central Asian States. “This is a group, which has up to 10,000 fighters in its ranks, and it is already active in at least nine out of 34 provinces … and is constantly consolidating its positions in the north of the country, turning it into a springboard for its expansion into Central Asia,”

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Pakistan – Victim of suicide attacks

Russian Envoy to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, while addressing a Security Council meeting on Afghanistan in June 2018 had asserted that IS is creating training camps in Afghanistan for its fighters, including those who come from Central Asian States

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Although Pakistan failed to escape being grey-listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2018, China stood by Pakistan in urging the international community to view the country’s anti-terrorism efforts in an objective and impartial way, an attempt to shoulder some of Pakistan’s political burden

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Pakistani officials also believe the terrorist group has established strong bases in “ungoverned spaces” in Afghanistan and plans cross-border terrorist attacks from there.

anti-terrorism efforts in an objective and impartial way, an attempt to shoulder some of Pakistan’s political burden. “The government and people of Pakistan have contributed and sacrificed a lot in their fight against terrorism and made great efforts in ground operations as well as combating terrorism in the financial sector,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said at a routine press conference.14 Lu’s comments came after some countries persuaded members of the FATF last week to place Pakistan on the “grey list” of nations with inadequate efforts to control terror financing. ‘‘China, as an all-weather strategic cooperation partner of Pakistan, will continue to strengthen communication and coordination with Pakistan in anti-terrorism cooperation’’, Lu said. “ ….we stressed many times that Pakistan has made important sacrifices and contributions to the global anti-terrorism cause and the countries should strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation on the basis of mutual respect instead of finger pointing at each other. This is not conducive to the global efforts,” China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said during his regular press briefing here.15 The spokesperson underscored that the Chinese side opposed linking of terrorism with any certain country and disagreed to place the responsibility of counter-terrorism on a certain country. “First, and the foremost, I would like to say that terrorism is common enemy of the world cracking down on the terrorism needs joint efforts from the international community”, he said.

They also cite US military assessments that the Afghan government controls less than 60 per cent of the territory, particularly referring to estimates by John Sopko, the US Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) . Islamabad, Moscow, Beijing and Tehran maintain contacts with the Taliban, saying they are meant to persuade the insurgency to seek a negotiated settlement to the Afghan war. But the diplomatic ties with insurgents have upset both Kabul and Washington because they see them as an attempt to legitimise the Taliban’s violent campaign.

Sino-Pak Synergy on Counter-Terrorism Although Pakistan failed to escape being greylisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)13 in June 2018, China stood by Pakistan in urging the international community to view the country’s

“The government and people of Pakistan have contributed and sacrificed a lot in their fight against terrorism’’ China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Lu Kang

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Using Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) for inter-state synergy on terrorism At the same time, Beijing also kept trying to bring India and Pakistan closer at multi-lateral fora such as the maiden joint counter-terrorism exercises under the SCO held in Russia in August 2018. “We sincerely hope that they can enhance their dialogue and cooperation both bilaterally and within multilateral mechanisms like the SCO, work together to improve their ties and jointly maintain regional peace and stability,” the spokesperson added,16 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying said at a news briefing, adding that both India and Pakistan are important countries in South Asia and that ‘‘stability in their ties was the key to peace and development in the region and the world.”

The counter-terrorism drill by SCO countries – involving at least 3,000 soldiers from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India

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and Pakistan - was the largest under the SCO charter with the participation of India and Pakistan for the first time. The drill plays a positive role in deepening defence and security cooperation among member countries, enhancing capacity in tackling new threats and challenges and safeguarding regional peace and stability, China’s Ministry of National Defence spokesperson Ren Guoqiang said. The previous SCO counter-terrorism drills had mainly been limited to Central Asia. But because of the entry of India and Pakistan, the SCO’s counterterrorism mission had expanded to South Asia. The effective counter-terrorism cooperation among SCO countries has greatly undermined terrorist groups in Central Asia in recent years and it’s expected that this cooperation will also boost stability in South Asia, a region facing a more complicated counter-terrorism situation with a variety of active terrorist groups,” Li Wei, a counter-terrorism expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, said. Sun Zhuangzhi, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences called the “Peace Mission 2018” a “rare opportunity for Pakistan and India,” which have long been involved in the military conflict, to enhance military exchanges and trust. This could improve regional stability.17

Peace Mission 2018 – SCO Countries Joint Counter-Terrorism Exercise, Russia (August 2018)

With the rise in its economic might, China has also emerged as the biggest proponent of peace and the advocate of a regional approach in countering the complex web of global terrorism. Beijing’s focus on this particular issue has also dovetailed with Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy as well its longdrawn and hard battle against terrorist forces. We have been fighting monsters who were receiving support from both in and outside the country, said General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan Army Chief in an off-the-record talk with three dozen leading journalists and writers.18 It indeed took the Pakistani state security apparatus to get a handle on the various proponents of terror – most of them external proxies – between August 2008, when the Operation Sherdil (Lion’s Heart) was launched in Bajaur tribal region, to Swat Operation (May 2009) to the South Waziristan Operation (October 2009) to Operation Zarb-e-Azb , North Waziristan (June 2014). China was among the few friendly countries that demonstrated visible understanding of the complexity of the situation and the calibrated Pakistani response to it. Leaders and officials in Beijing also seem to learn from the way Pakistani forces – through a multi-pronged but sequenced strategy – attacked, disrupted and neutralised most of the terrorist outfits.

One can, therefore, assume that success of China in counter-terrorism translates into gains for Pakistan as well. This has also helped in creating a regional ownership for a war that knows no boundaries but can still be restricted and effectively countered if major stakeholders, including China and Russia, can synergise their thoughts and actions. This represents a great opportunity for Pakistan to align its counter-terror policies with China and other regional powers such as Russia for better and lasting solutions to problems induced by the trans-border terrorist networks. At the same time, the country needs to draw on experiences of China in particular in not only counter-terrorism but also in maintaining trade relations even with countries with which it is locked in political and territorial disputes.

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We have been fighting monsters who were receiving support from both in and outside the country

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Conclusion

General Qamar Javed Bajwa COAS Pakistan Army

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1. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30273431, 2014 2. https://crssblog.com/2017/03/14/future-prospects-of-taliban-china-afghanpeace-negotiations-tahir-khan/ 3. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1348055/afghan-talibans-political-negotiatorsvisit-china/ 4. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-russia-pakistan-cidUSKBN14G19I 5. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/world/asia/china-considers-largerrole-in-afghanistan-peace-process.html 6. https://dailytimes.com.pk/246503/us-officials-question-their-states-af-paknarrative/+http://southasianmonitor.com/2018/06/12/us-officials-questiontheir-states-af-pak-narrative-2/ 7. https://www.merics.org/en/china-monitor/content/3211 8. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/17/c_137046090.htm 9. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/world/asia/china-considers-largerrole-in-afghanistan-peace-process.html 10. The tripodal dialogue, held July 2018, involved high-ranking Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and intelligentia from Afghanistan, Pakistani private sector security and terrorism experts (including the author) and Chinese officials as well as academia. The first official counter-terror (CT) trilateral dialogue had taken place in December 2017 at Beijing.

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11. https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-hosts-unusual-meeting-of-regionalspymasters/4478723.html 12. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1756610/1-pakistan-hosts-spy-chiefs-russiachina-iran/ 13. FATF is a 37-nation inter-governmental body established in 1989 to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. 14. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1091020.shtml, 2018/2/27 15. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/01/08/china-appreciates-pakistanssacrifices-in-anti-terror-cause/ 16. http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/stable-pakistan-india-relationshipimportant-anti-terror-drills-a-way-forward-for-the-two-countries-chineseforeign-ministry/NTc3OQ== 17. https://dailytimes.com.pk/289143/china-hails-participation-of-indiapakistan-in-sco-anti-terror+ drill/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1539127.shtml 18. The author was part of the meeting that took place on March 9, 2018.

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AN ANALYSIS OF

PAKISTAN’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY POTENTIALS AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS: CASE STUDY OF ISIS

Ms Sidra Jamil Bajwa is an adjunct lecturer at International Islamic University, Islamabad

“Our Resistance War is a long and hard struggle and we have mainly to rely on our own forces”1 Mao Tse Tung

Abstract With the Karachi bus attack of 2015 , Pakistan has become centre of attention for international media and scholarship viz-a-viz footprints of Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS). Anti-Pakistan elements did not hesitate to label the country as the birth place of ISIS without any concrete evidence. A successful claim of footprint requires its presence, scope and membership of ISIS in Pakistan. This paper discusses the David Galula’s prerequisites of successful insurgency and examines that to what extent Pakistan meets the prerequisites of a successful insurgency, required for any non-state actors including ISIS to hold footprints in the country. The current research is based on secondary sources including books, scholarly articles and newspapers. The review of literature reflects that the countries having footprints of ISIS are either politically or socially instable, and ISIS formed hybrid composition with local groups to advance its ventures. The present research reveals that Pakistan’s counter-insurgency potentials are adequate to prevent the country against any non-state actor including ISIS. Pakistan does not meet the prerequisites of Galula’s successful insurgency, therefore, it is almost impossible for ISIS or any other non-state actor to have footprints in Pakistan. Keywords: Counter-Insurgency Potentials, Non-State Actors, ISIS, Pakistan

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ISIS is trying to achieve its presence, scope and membership that can be labelled as “Global” in real sense. Terrorist activities of ISIS are not confined to Middle-East only, but the organisation has carried out brutal attacks in Europe, North Africa, Asia, America and Africa. Since June 2014, with the declaration of its caliphate till Sep 2018, ISIS has conducted two hundred twenty five in numerous countries other than Iraq and Syria.9 These terrorist attacks have killed more than 7,734 people and wounded thousands more.10 For the first time, ISIS took the responsibility of carrying out terrorist attack in Pakistan in May 2015, which killed forty-six people on the bus in Karachi.11 With claim of ISIS, taking responsibility for Karachi bus attack engendered a new debate on footprints of ISIS in Pakistan. Academics and civil-military bigwigs kept on nulling and voiding the casting shadows of ISIS in Pakistan, but international media not only exaggerated the issue negatively but tried to relate and link Pakistan in every best possible way. Some people labelled Pakistan as “Birth Place of ISIS” without any hesitation and hiccup.12 Arrest of three hundred militants and video released by the students of Jamia Hafsa (religious seminary) supporting and inviting ISIS was used to second the left-hand propaganda against Pakistan.13-14

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For the first time, ISIS took the responsibility of carrying out terrorist attack in Pakistan in May 2015, which killed forty six people on the bus in Karachi. With claim of ISIS, taking responsibility for Karachi bus attack engendered a new debate on foot prints of ISIS in Pakistan

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issimilar to delinquency and poverty, terrorism on international canvas is a new phenomenon.2 Modern terrorism has well established roots around the globe, though it has history of only one hundred and twenty-five years, categorised into four waves.3 The first global or truly international terror incident occurred in Russia in 1880s, which gave birth to “Anarchist Wave of Terrorism” that spread across the Western Europe, Balkan and Asian regions.4 Anarchist wave is considered as the first wave of terrorism, followed by “Anti-Colonial Wave,” which started in 1920s and continued for around forty years. Afterwards, “New Left Wave” emerged, which longed till the end of twentieth century, leaving some active cells till date in Nepal, Spain, United Kingdom, Peru and Columbia5. The fourth and existing wave of modern terrorism is called “Religious Wave,” which started in 1979 and will end till 2025.6 With the start of religious wave, number of revolutionary campaigns, insurgencies and civil wars emerged globally such as Buddhist-Hindu rivalry in Sri Lanka, Khalistan Movement in India, Christian Identity Movement in United States, struggle for Akhand Bharat (undivided India) in India and Muslim atrocities by Jews in Palestine. Islam is at heart of this wave because international media exaggerates the terror attacks by Muslim at maximum.7 A large number of so-called Islamic militant organisations appeared to implement their version of Islam on international canvas. The most significant, lethal and intense terror activities are conducted by so-called Islamic groups globally.8 From Al-Qaeda to Taliban, and now Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), non-states actors conducted brutal terrorist attacks on the name of religion. ISIS was formed in 2003 with the aim of establishing its own caliphate—an Islamic empire governed by a Caliph, who they consider the actual successor of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

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David Galula (1919–1967) — A French military officer and scholar who was influential in developing the theory and practice of counter insurgency warfare

From the statement of Clausewitz, it is evident that in modern nation state system, an international sovereign can be invaded by another sovereign, but foreign insurgents cannot penetrate into a state without local support. Insurgency is always carried out by local groups. Hence, it is impossible for ISIS to prosper in the context of presence, membership and scope in Pakistan, without having alliance with local insurgents, particularly the Tehreek-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) operational in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). David Galula’s theory of ‘Successful Insurgency’ states that a successful insurgency has some characteristics; it needs a cause, suitable geography, weakness of counter-insurgency force, and external support.17 In addition to alliance with local groups, the abovementioned parameters of successful insurgency given by David Galula are crucial for ISIS to carry out insurgency in Pakistan The later parts of the paper will discuss the current status of ISIS, and its future in Pakistan by analysing the situation of the country through the prism of David Galula’s successful insurgency.

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Revolution, insurgency and civil war is the pursuit of policy of a group, inside a sovereign, by all means and resources. These phenomena are always internal (intra-state) not external

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A quarrelsome argumentation at academic level is going on between those who second and who deny the footprints of ISIS in Pakistan. To untangle the myths of presence and prospects of ISIS in the country, it is important to consider the very nature and characteristics of revolutions, insurgencies and civil wars. According to Clausewitz, “revolution, insurgency and civil war is the pursuit of policy of a group, inside a sovereign, by all means and resources. These phenomena are always internal (intra-state) not external”.15 The statement of Clausewitz defined that insurgency and civil war are primarily emerged from inside the country that may gain external support at latter stages.16

Clausewitz

ISIS: Evolution, Demise and Re-Emergence ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Al—Sham)18 is known by various acronyms—IS, ISIL and Daesh.19 ISIS has its pedigrees in Al-Qaeda which was founded by Jordanian national Abu Musab AlZarqawi. Al-Zarqawi was sentenced for fifteen years by Jordan on the acts of terrorism during SovietAfghan war. In prison, Al-Zarqawi met his old companion from Afghan Jihad, Abu- Muhammad Al-Maqdisi — a Jihadi theorist. Fundamentalist theology and jurisprudence of Al-Maqdisi left great impact on Al-Zarqawi’s personality.20 Al-Maqdisi articulated the doctrine called al-Wala’ w-al-Bara’, meaning “Loyalty and Disavowal”. This concept expects the Muslim to distance themselves from everything that contradicts from ‘Sharia’, for example, democracy.21 Al-Zarqawi was pardoned in 1999 and went to Afghanistan.22 In 2002, Al-Zarqawi escaped to Kurdish dominated Iraq held by Al-Qaeda associated faction called Ansar Al-Islam.23 In 2004, he gave bay’a (oath of loyalty and allegiance) to Usama Bin Ladin, and renamed his organisation Qai’datal Jihad fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn (Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, or more commonly known in the West as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI), which was initially called Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (monotheism and jihad).24 In 2006, Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) was formed to unify the foreign jihadi groups fighting in Iraq, and to maintain the AQI’s identity.25

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On June 7, 2006, Al-Zarqawi was killed,26 and the two successors of Al-Zarqawi; Abu Hamza al Muhajir27 and Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi28 continued the cause under the flag of MSC and proved themselves more violent and brutal than their predecessor. In October 2006, MSC established Islamic Emirate in Iraq (IEI) that later transformed into Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).29 Their territory was consisted of the Western and Northern Province of Iraq. Although emirate remained unsuccessful due to clash of ideology of foreign Jihadists with IEI and increasing demands of local Iraqi fighters for political and economic patronage, yet the organisation somehow survived.30 The rebranding of IEI into Islamic State of Iraq , facilitated United States (US) to assimilate tribal militias against jihadi groups. With the effective tactics of the US, active support of Islamic State of Iraq by local population started to decline.31 Following are the reasons for the Islamic State of Iraq’s decline in Iraq: ── Tribal leaders realised that political process is a better option to follow than to support and facilitate Islamic State of Iraq against the coalition; ── Goals and objectives of Islamic State of Iraq were not only contradictory to the tribal, but odd and too violent in nature; ── US cashed the prevailing frustration among the tribal militias (the Sahwa, or awakening council), by reaching them and facilitating financially and logistically to fight against Islamic State of Iraq. Discontinuation of popular support by tribal militias proved a great setback for Islamic State of Iraq . Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir were killed in joint raid of Iraqi and US forces in 2010.32 In addition to it, thirty-four top leaders of the IS were killed or imprisoned in the same year.33 According to Michael Knights, “in second half of 2010, Islamic State of Iraq was dead on its feet”.34 After the death of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, AbuBakar Al-Baghdadi stood out as an Emir of Islamic State of Iraq in 2010. Abu-Bakar took charge at

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The rebranding of IEI into Islamic State of Iraq , facilitated US to assimilate tribal militias against jihadi groups. With the effective tactics of the US, active support of Islamic State of Iraq by local population started to decline

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Local Iraqi volunteers gathered to stop Islamic State of Iraq

the time when organisation was about to dissolve. New Emir eschewed the efforts to regain its control on the territory and preferred to rejuvenate its classic-styled terrorist attire; assembled on an underground organisation.35 With the withdrawal of US from Iraq, once again Islamic State of Iraq got chance to re-emerge, and conducted more lethal attacks. When Syrian conflict broke out, Abu-Bakar initiated his long-term plan of creating Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Abu-Bakar sent his commander Al-Golani to Syria, who successfully formed a group called Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN).36 In 2012, when Abu-Bakar was hard at work in Iraq, Golani was struggling in Syria. In July 2012, Abu-Bakar launched a campaign called “Breaking the Walls” which increased violence in Iraq at maximum. The campaign longed for one year from July 2012 to July 2013. Through this campaign, eight prisons were attacked, among them Abu Ghraib prison attack is the most significant; above five hundred highprofile so-called jihadists managed to escape, who were imprisoned during confrontation against US and New Iraqi regime.37 According to a preeminent analyst, Jessica Lewis, the “Breaking Walls” campaign reflected that Islamic State of Iraq had rebuilt itself a professional military force that is capable of planning, training, financing, and executing synchronised and complex attacks in Iraq.38 On April 8, 2013, through an audio message Abu Bakar broadcasted the unification of Islamic State of Iraq and Jabhat Al-Nusra, and titled joint alliance as “The Islamic State in Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)”.39 After some days, Al-Golani, the head of Jabhat AlNusra in Syria, through an audio message, cast off the news of union of Islamic State of Iraq and Jabhat Al-Nusra, and gave his allegiance to AlZawahiri and Al-Qaeda Core (AQC).40 A letter, dated May 23, which was leaked in June 2013 to Al-Jazeera revealed Al-Zawahiri’s statement that Jabhat AlNusra is the only affiliate of Al-Qaeda (AQ) in the region.41 In response, Abu Bakar reaffirmed the name of his organisation (ISIS), and continuation of activities in Iraq and Syria. With this statement ISIS officially separated from Al-Qaeda.42 Since

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then, Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi, a self-proclaimed caliph of Ummah (Muslim world) claims authority over entire Muslim world, and is trying to enhance presence, membership and scope of ISIS at global level. Footprints of ISIS are observable across the globe. The major victims of ISIS include Libya, Sinai region, Algerian province, West African

Recruits of ISIS are captured across the globe including US, Canada and Europe. Some seized ISIS recruits do not endorse the footprints of ISIS in these countries. Footprint means presence, membership and scope of an organisation in a particular country. It is unjustified to link footprints of ISIS with a country until it meets the David’s prerequisites of a successful insurgency.

ISIS and Pakistan The very first incident linked to ISIS in Pakistan was the attack on a bus on May 13, 2015. Forty-five people were killed and thirteen injured in the attack. Jundullah, a pledged ally of ISIS in Pakistan, claimed the responsibility of the attack.43 The attack commenced a new debate on presence of ISIS in Pakistan, which was fuelled by anti-Pakistan actors at maximum. International media has done all-out effort to defame Pakistan.

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Hither, some newspapers and TV channels did not hesitate to call Pakistan as birth place of ISIS. Afterwards, one after another, every terrorist activity in Pakistan has been linked with ISIS including Lahore bombing in March 2016, and hospital attack in Quetta in August 2016. However, a report published by Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) nullified the traced links of above mentioned events with ISIS.

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region, Northeast Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Yemen, Chechnya, Palestine and Afghanistan etc. Keeping in view the above-mentioned facts, evolutionary history of ISIS can be categorised into three phases. In first phase, the ideology and vision of ISIS was established, followed by strengthening its membership and presence in Iraq. In second phase, ISIS remained unsuccessful in gaining popular support and formation of Islamic Emirate in Iraq. Lack of popular support weakened the ISIS and it went underground. In third phase, three factors helped ISIS to make a successful rise in Middle East: a shift in ISIS’ leadership; withdrawal of American forces from Iraq; and outbreak of Syrian conflict. Presence of vacuum, cause, leadership, suitable geography, popular support, finances, and lack of counter-insurgency force helped ISIS not only in rejuvenation within the Middle Eastern region but opened prospects of its global reach. The careful observation on the scope of ISIS in the world exposed that footprints of ISIS are only evident in the regions that are either politically or socially instable.

The careful observation on the scope of ISIS in the world exposed that footprints of ISIS are only evident in the regions that are either politically or socially instable

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Recruits of ISIS are captured across the globe including US, Canada and Europe. Some seized ISIS recruits do not endorse the foot prints of ISIS in these countries. Foot print means presence, membership and scope of an organisation in a particular country

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According to the report, the analysis of patterns of attacks claims that the attack on Police Academy in Quetta was the first attack carried out by ISIS in Pakistan.44 Report also tells that style and pattern of attack was typical “Fidayeen Style”. There was a time when this style of attack was a trademark of one group but now many groups in the region have adopted this style of storming into a facility, holding out and fighting till death. Therefore, one cannot ascertain exactly that which group was behind the attack. But, after the incident of twin towers (9/11), the group formed coalition with non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and TTP against the Pakistani State, parallel to targeting Shia community. Later the spokesman of Laskar-e-Jhangvi AlAlami endorsed the statement of IGFC and said, “the attack was the joint venture of LeJ Al-Alami and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’’.45 The second attack which is carried out by the ISIS; confirmed by sources and claimed by ISIS is the attack on Shah Noorani Sufi Shrine in Khuzdar District of Balochistan, in which more than fiftytwo people have lost their lives and a hundred were injured.46 Till date, the above mentioned two attacks are done by ISIS with collaboration of local non-state actors operating in Pakistani territory. Just like other parts of the world, ISIS attacks in Pakistan confirmed that the so-called Islamic State cannot come directly to invade, but it always needs local non-state actors to exploit fault lines to pursue its goals. The coming below discussion reveals that does ISIS actually fulfils the prerequisites for conducting successful insurgency in Pakistan as it is portrayed by international media or it is just a false propaganda to defame Pakistan.

Assessment of Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Potentials The above sections of the study revealed that ISIS cannot operate in Pakistan without acquiring the membership of local insurgent groups. Insurgency is a vanilla term that is usually confused with militancy and terrorism. Militancy is the use of force by external elements (non-state 106

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actors) against the state and civilians.47 Whereas insurgency is the use of force by local groups against the state and masses.48 Terrorism, on the other hand, is the amalgam of militancy and insurgency. ISIS falls under the category of terrorist organisation that cannot operate in any region without the assistance of local insurgents.49 Therefore, it is crucial to assess Pakistan’s counter-insurgency potentials to accept or reject the footprints of ISIS in the country. Following are the details of prerequisites:

Lack of Cause: A Wanting Prerequisite for Insurgency For an insurgent and a non-state actor, it is very important to have an attractive cause to attain popular support. Cause is a primary prerequisite to pry the population away from the state, and to control and mobilise them against the state. Al-Zawahiri clearly said that Al-Qaeda is not the ally of ISIS.50 The present deadly battle between Afghan Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan seconds his statement.51 Pakistan has a clear non-discriminatory policy against insurgents and non-state actors.52 Pakistani nation is united against extremism and terrorism, and local groups have no attractive cause to acquire popular support in Pakistan.53

Strengths of Pakistan as Counter-Insurgency Force Origin of an insurgency takes place just like the process of seed germination. It needs proper environment and protection to spread the scope of its roots. An insurgency seeks protection and avenues of its growth in the weaknesses of counterinsurgency force. Therefore, it is very important to analyse Pakistan as a politic body resistant to any insurgency in general, and ISIS in particular. Below are the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan as a counter-insurgency force that will help to develop a better understanding on the scope and future of ISIS in the country: ── Ability to Address the Problems. It is practically impossible for a sovereign to acquire hundred percent immunity from the problems. Inability of a government to address insurgency effectively helps insurgents to carryout insurgency, but Pakistan has a history to manage the problems efficiently and effectively. Pakistan has launched several military operations since 9/11 and remained successful. Pakistan has maintained sustainable peace and stability in Swat region through military operation called “Rah-e-Rast”.54 Currently

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Insurgency is a vanilla term that is usually confused with militancy and insurgency. Militancy is the use of force by external elements (non state actors) against the state and civilians. Whereas insurgency is the use of force by local groups against the state and masses

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Pakistani counter insurgency forces are carrying out military operation called Raddul-Fasaad in Waziristan, which is also bringing about positive results.55 According to data of South Asia Terrorism Portal, the fatalities of civilians from terrorist violence are declining in number every year. Civilian fatalities have been dropped to 40 percent in 2014, and 65 percent in 2015, and 74 percent in 2016.56 Moreover, the militancy in Pakistan is only confined to certain areas located at PakAfghan border due to porous border, whereas rest of the country is living in peace. ── National Consensus. It is the primary factor on which solidarity of a nation is based. In Pakistan, whole nation is standing united against the insurgents or non-state actors prevailing in the country. National consensus in Pakistan is developed as the result of phenomenal security gains. All the national institutions along with central and provincial governments have contributed at their maximum to eradicate terrorism and extremism across the Country. Pakistan has formulated a comprehensive National Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism and launched operations across the country under NAP. Pakistan is praised by international community on its success achieved against insurgents.57-58 Pakistan has targeted all nonstate actors without any discrimination. General Raheel Shareef said, “the operation was against militants of all hues and colours. It is without any discrimination, whether it is Haqqani network, TTP or any other group”.59 Recently, Pakistan Army has launched Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad across the country to eliminate anti-Pakistan activities.60 Every citizen of Pakistani state is all ready to offer any sacrifice to mitigate anti-state activities and terrorism from the country. Not only that, but neighbouring China is also standing hand in gloves with Pakistan against terrorism and offered its full support for this global cause.61 ── Resoluteness of the Counter-Insurgency (Government) Leadership. Firmness of counter-insurgency leadership is third important factor to prevent insurgency. Insurgency does not develop overnight, it is a slow process, and hence sometimes counter-

insurgency force does not pay heed to the development and evolution of insurgency, which eventually becomes troublesome for the counter-insurgency force to counter later. The successful insurgencies developed across the globe such as in Sudan, Rwanda and Sri Lanka were the result of negligence of state for a long time. Pakistan, however, has shown resoluteness in countering insurgency and launched successful military operations. In operation Al-Mizan (2002-2006) 70,00080,000 troops were engaged, and operation suspended with a ceasefire agreement between Pakistan Army and tribal men.62 With the breach of agreement, Pakistan launched Operation Rah-e-Haq (November 2007) that resulted into deaths of 615 militants.63 In Operation Sher-e-Dil (September 2008) more than one thousand militants were killed in first three months. Similarly, in Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2013), 3400 terrorists were killed, 837 hideouts were demolished and 21,193 terrorists were arrested.64 Moreover, with the launch of National Action Plan (2015), National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) confirmed that 1,808 terrorists are arrested whereas 5,611 killed.65 ── Counter-Insurgency Leaders’ Knowledge of Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Resoluteness alone is not enough; a counter-insurgency force must know the effective strategy and tactics required to fight an insurgency. Pakistan is a nuclear power and holds sixth most equipped and trained armies (including land, air and naval force) in the World, and largest among the Muslim world. Pakistan not only possesses the capability to defend her territory from external and internal threats, but is also engaged in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Missions; being one of the World’s largest troop contributor in UN. Up till now Pakistani forces have intervened globally in various intra-state and inter- state conflicts under the banner of UN. In a nutshell, Pakistan’s civil and military leaders have the concrete knowledge, strategy and tactics of Counter Insurgency Warfare. ── The Machine for the Control of the Population. The fifth most important prerequisite of counter-insurgency is to Green Book 2019

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○○ In addition to that Pakistan’s political structure is divided into one centre and four provinces due to which government’s civil bureaucratic system is successfully serving at every nook of the country. ○○ The Administrative Bureaucracy. Administrative bureaucracy is considered as the engine of progress, growth and agent of transformation. Bureaucrats along with public institutions are expected to provide leadership and deliver order and stability. Pakistan inherited the system of administrative bureaucracy from Joint Indian Royal Services. The system, till date is considered as the most effective and efficient to deliver at grass root level. Pakistan’s administrative system is divided into factions from sub-district to district, then from district to division, and further to provincial till federal level. In presence of this kind of effective,

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Pakistan not only possesses the capability to defend her territory from external and internal threats, but is also engaged in UN Peacekeeping Missions; being one of the World’s largest troop contributor in UN

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have concrete state machinery which includes political structure, administrative bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces: The Political Structure. Political structure decides the fate of any nation. Flaws within the political structures are responsible for the catastrophes at national level. Unnecessary oppression, dictatorship or political unrest gives the reason for the development of an insurgency. Pakistan is a modern democratic country in which people choose their political bigwigs as per their will. Democracy gives minimum chances to any insurgency to raise head.

efficient, transparent and accountable administrative structure, it is impossible for insurgents to carry out any non-state activity within Pakistan. ○○ The Police. Police is considered as the eye and arm of any political entity for pertaining internal law and order. Any insurgency that flares up, faces police as the first counter-insurgent institution. The efficiency of police as an institution depends on number of factors: numerical strength; capability of their personnel; their loyalty for the state and the government; and concrete and continuous support from other state institutions.66 Pakistan’s police department is capable enough to deal with any challenge. Police is working in parallel to other law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order in Pakistan.67 ○○ The Armed Forces. Besides strengths required for armed forces to fight all kind of wars, numerical strength, composition of armed forces, devotion of troops for

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the cause, and the time lapse before intervention are most relevant to fight an insurgency.68  Numerical Strength. Numerical strength of counter-insurgent army must be in relation to the population size of the country. Insurgency means two-dimensional combat to control the population; therefore sufficient numbers of army troops are required not only to fight insurgency but to control population. Pakistan has sixth largest army of the world with 560,000 active personnel.69  Composition of Army. Unlike the conventional warfare, less sophisticated counter-insurgent force is better to fight insurgency. For instance, in France’ NATO divisions in Algeria, modern equipment and specialised units had to be hurriedly transformed into ordinary infantry. In an insurgency, Naval force requires sufficient force to maintain blockade effectively and air force needs are slow assault fighters, short take-off transport planes, and helicopters.70 Pakistan army has in-depth knowledge of country’s geography and climate. Military composition of Pakistan: land, air and naval forces are capable enough to operate in any situation including natural and man-made disasters.  Devotion of Individuals towards the National Cause (CounterInsurgency). Devotion of every single individual of armed forces towards the state is crucial to fight an insurgency successfully and effectively. In every military operation, a large number of young Pakistan army officers volunteered their services that truly reflects their dedication and devotion to the national cause.71

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○○ The Delay in Intervention: It takes a sufficient period for insurgents to transform peace into a war. Usually political governments hesitate to let army intervene, which favours the insurgents to gain strength. ○○ Pakistani parliament, however, tried to address the problem immediately with the help of civil and military institutions as mentioned above. ── Outside Support. Following are the forms of outside support: ○○ Moral Support. It is an important factor through which cause of an insurgent or a non-state actor goes along the wind of the history. Propaganda is the key instrument to gain popular support and sway public opinion or reinforce the public sympathy, but fortunately entire international community is condemning the attacks launched by ISIS, and the organisation is being badly discouraged throughout the global canvas in general, and Pakistan in particular. ○○ Political Support. Direct political support of insurgents or indirect influence through international forums builds pressure on counter-insurgent force. Unlike the other organisations operating in the region, ISIS failed to impress the populations of South Asia by its political ideology. Every South Asian country sees it as an enemy: the organisation has sectarian rivalry with Shiite majority Iran; its ideology contradicts to Taliban. Therefore, ISIS left with empty hands in South Asia.

Policy Recommendations Although Pakistan has all the key elements to deal with anti-state actors yet following additions to counter-insurgency strategy can further help strengthening the Pakistan’s counter-insurgency potentials: ── Border Monitoring. Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) are located on border of politically instable Afghanistan. Porous PakAfghan border facilitates non-state actors to

Any insurgency that flares up, faces police as the first counter-insurgent institution. The efficiency of police as an institution depends on number of factors: numerical strength; capability of their personnel; their loyalty for the state and the government; and concrete and continuous support from other state institutions

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success story in the history of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism warfare, and the lessons learned from that success episode must be utilised in FATA region too. ── Selection of Areas of Efforts. Use of force is not the ultimate solution, other areas that are social and economic in nature must also be kept in focus and addressed to attain sustainable peace and security in the country. It is observed that poverty, lack of education, and food and health insecurity, are the factors contributing in uplifting an insurgency. Basic needs of the population must be addressed to restore their confidence on government.

── Strengthening the Political Machine. Political machinery must further be strengthened in areas that have faced problem of insurgency such as South Punjab and FATA. Civil services departments: Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) and Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) must play an active and efficient role in these areas to address the problems from grass root level. ── The First Area as a Test Area. Pakistan may have a well-prepared, trained and indoctrinated counter-insurgency force, but mistakes are bound to happen. Pakistan must learn from its experiences of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism warfare and try to identify the gaps left in earlier operations and must not repeat the same mistakes in future. For example, Swat is a

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── Contact with Population. Counter-insurgency authority must stay in contact with the terrorism affected population. Pakistani government must

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Propaganda is the key instrument to gain popular support and sway public opinion or reinforce the public sympathy, but fortunately entire international community is condemning the attacks launched by ISIS, and the organisation is being badly discouraged throughout the global canvas in general, and Pakistan in particular

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transport across the border. Erection of PakAfghan border has already been started but fence must be planned for complete border and expedited to bar the entry and exit of nonstate actors.

── Deployment of Static Units. Disengagement of police and army from field, sometimes help the non-state actors to re-unite, therefore static units from Pakistan army and police must be deployed to ensure the non-violence and to carry out surveillance of the rehabilitation activities.

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Border Fencing Pak-Afghan Border

isolate the population from vestige non-state actors and their sympathisers by enforcing authority. Left over political cells of non-state actors should be eliminated by intelligence led-operations. ── Coordination of Efforts. Government institutions, religious clergy and civil society must work hand in hand to restore positive peace in the society. Collective efforts can transform the terrorism affected areas in a constructive way. ── Political Participation. Political participation of those who surrendered or are ready to negotiate with counter-insurgency authority must be ensured. They are given the chance to be elected through elections so that their demands can be addressed in a legitimate way. ── Testing of the Local Leaders. The ultimate outcomes of the government’s efforts regarding affected population hinge on the efficiency and effectiveness of the locally elected representatives. Elected men are worthless if they remain unsuccessful in meeting the targets set by the government for the affected region. Local leadership must be tested by giving them concrete task such as running the local government, undertaking local projects etc. Their public support will consolidate; if they succeed in living up to the

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expectations of the government, otherwise new people will be given chance to serve the local population.

Conclusion In the light of above discussed prerequisites of successful counter insurgency, it is evident that it is almost impossible for any non-state actor to carry out insurgency in a country like Pakistan which has all the potentials of counter-insurgency warfare. In Pakistan, non-state actors are only present in some areas located on western border which is due to politically instable landscape of Afghanistan. Porous border sharing with neighbouring Afghanistan and easy escape of insurgents to other side of the border during military operations hinders Pakistan’s counter-insurgency force to eliminate them. Other than western border region, whole country is living in peace. The comparison of what faced by Europe and Pakistan due to ISIS in last two years reflects that Pakistan has gone through less loss than Eurozone. As few attacks conducted by ISIS in Europe do no endorse footprints of ISIS in the region, similar is the case with Pakistan. Outsourcing four to five attacks through non-state actors operating locally (which have already entered in the phase of demise) by ISIS in no way certify the footprints—presence, scope and membership of the organisation in the country. In sum, Pakistan nulls and voids all the prerequisites mentioned by David Galula for a successful insurgency.

As few attacks conducted by ISIS in Europe do no endorse footprints of ISIS in the region, similar is the case with Pakistan. Outsourcing four to five attacks through nonstate actors operating locally (which have already entered in the phase of demise) by ISIS in no way certify the footprints—presence, scope and membership of the organisation in the country

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Tung, Mao Tse. “Quotations from Mao Tse Tung - Chapter 8.”Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals by Immanuel Kant. Accessed on August 04, 2018. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch08.htm. 2. David C. Rapoport. Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London, England: Routledge, 2006, P4. 3. Ibid, P4. 4. Ibid, P5. 5. Ibid, P5. 6. Ibid, P4. 7. Chalabi, Mona. “Terror attacks by Muslims receive 357% more press attention, study finds,” In The Guardian, July 20, 2018. Accessed on July 27, 2018.https:// www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/20/muslim-terror-attacks-presscoverage-study. 8. Rapoport, David C. “Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups.” In Fundamentalism and State, 429-61. Chicago, United States: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Islamist_terrorist_attacks 10. Ibid. 11. Silva, Christina. “ISIS threat in Pakistan: Islamic State violence continues with death of intelligence officer,” In International Business Times, October 24, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-threat-pakistanislamic-state-violence-continues-death-intelligence-officer-2430508. 12. “Pakistan birthplace of ISIS: Tarek Fatah.” In Times of India. May 10, 2015. Accessed on July 28, 2018.http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/ Pakistan-birthplace-of-ISIS-Tarek Fatah/articleshow/47218188.cms. 13. “Four ISIS men arrested in Lahore raid,” The Nation, September 17, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/national/17-Sep-2016/four-isismen-arrested-in-lahore-raid. 14. Azeem, Munawar. “Police to act against Jamia Hafsa over Daish video,” In Dawn, January 09, 2015.Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www.dawn.com/ news/1155803. 15. Galula, David. Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York, United States: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, P3. 16. Ibid, 3. 17. Ibid, 13-32. 18. Ash-Sham (al-Sham) is a historic term for Greater Syria, which in modern terms means the Levant. The organisation is known by many names as will become apparent in the report, ISIL is short for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and is the acronym that the U.S. administration prefers to use. ISIS is short for the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Daish, which is the Arabic acronym for ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyahfīl-ʻIraqwa ash-Shām; or IS, the Islamic State as the organisation now prefers to be known. This report will henceforth use the acronym ISIS because it reflects the organisation’s current areas of engagement. 19. Ibid. 20. Kazimi, Nibras. “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi.” Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 02 (September 15, 2005): 59-73. September 15, 2005. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://www.hudson.org/content/ researchattachments/attachment/1453/current_trends_islamist_ideology_v2.pdf. 21. Brachman, Jarret M., Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. London, England: Routledge, 2009, P 22. 22. Rabasa, Angel. Beyond al-Qaeda.Part 1.The Global Jihadist Movement. Santa Monica CA, United States: RAND Corporation, 2006, P 136. 23. O’Neill, Brendan. “Zarqawi: Western Fearmongering Made Flesh.” Spiked. June 13, 2006. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www.spiked-online.com/ newsite/article/389#.W3P4cs4zbIU. 24. Faraj, Caroline. “Al-Zarqawi Group Claims Allegiance to Bin Laden.”CNN International. October 18, 2004. Accessed on July 18, 2018. http://edition.cnn. com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/17/al.zarqawi.statement/. 25. Rabasa, P 141. 26. Burns, John F. “U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse.” New York Times. June 08, 2006. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/ world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html. 27. Holmquist, Erika. ISIS and Hezbollah: Conduits of Instability. Sweden: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2015, P 15. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman. “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records.”Combating Terrorism Centre, January 02, 2007. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-iniraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records/. 31. Hafez, Muhammed M. “Al-Qa`ida Losing Ground in Iraq.” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 1 (December 2007). Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidalosing-ground-in-iraq/. 32. Arango, Tim. “Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported Killed in Raid.” The New York Times, April 19, 2010.Accessed on June 03, 2018. https://www.nytimes. com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/ 20baghdad.html. 33. Shanker, Thom. “Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Neutralised, US Says.” The New York Times, June 4, 2010. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://www.nytimes. com/2010/06/05/world/middleeast/05military.html. 34. Knights, Michael. “The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 12, 2013. Accessed on July 18, 2018. 35. Fishman, Brian. “Redefining the Islamic State: The Fall and Rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” New America Foundation, July 18, 2011. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4343-redefining-the-islamic-state/ Fishman_Al_Qaeda_In_Iraq.023ac20877a64488b2b791cd7e313955.pdf.

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Abouzeid, Rania. “The Jihad Next Door.”Politico Magazine, June 23, 2014. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/ al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214. 37. “Iraq: Hundreds Escape from Abu Ghraib Jail.” The Guardian, July 22, 2013. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/ iraq-prison-attacks-kill-dozens. 38. Lewis, Jessica. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: Part II.” The Institute for the Study of War, September 2013, P, 7. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://www. understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent-part-ii. 39. Joscelyn, Thomas. “ Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Nusrah Front Emerge as Rebranded Single Entity.” The Long War Journal, April 9, 2013. Accessed on: April 10, 2018. 40. Holmquist, P 18. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ali, Imtiaz. “43 killed in attack on bus carrying Ismailis in Karachi,” Dawn, May 14, 2015. Accessed on January 28, 2017.http://www.dawn.com/news/1181698. 44. Khan, Abdullah. “First ISIS Attack In Pakistan – Can We Learn Some Lessons?” Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, October 29, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.athttps://www.picss.net/archives/5849. 45. Ibid. 46. Shah, Syed Ali, Imtiaz Ali, and Ismail Sasoli. “At Least 52 Killed, 102 Injured in Blast at Khuzdar Shrine.” Dawn, November 13, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018. athttp://www.dawn.com/news/1295928. 47. Azam, Maryam, and UmbreenJavaid.”The Sources of Militancy in Pakistan.” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan 54, no. 02 (December 2017): 189-98. 48. Oxford English Dictionary second edition 1989. 49. Sinclair, Samuel Justin, and Antonius Daniel.The Psychology of Terrorism Fears. USA: Oxford University Press, 2012, P 14. 50. Holmquist, P 18. 51. Brennan, David. “ISIS Vs. Taliban: Dozens Killed as Battle for Afghanistan continues.” news week, July 17, 2017. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https:// www.newsweek.com/isis-vs-taliban-dozens-killed-battle-afghanistancontinues-1028441 52. “Nation United against Terrorism: DG ISPR.” The News, January 20, 2015. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/619-nationunited-against-terrorism-dg-ispr. 53. “Nation united against terrorism, extremism: Pervaiz.” The News, March 17, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/105913Nation-united-against-terrorism-extremism-Pervaiz. 54. Sheikh, Ismail. “Timeline: Major offensives launched by army against militants.” The Express Tribune, June 15, 2014. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/722391/timeline-major-offensives-launched-byarmy-against-militants/. 55. Ghazanfar, Saima. “Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two years of success.” The Nation, September 06, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/ national/06-Sep-2016/operation-zarb-e-azb-two-years-of-success. 56. Ibid. 57. “Pakistan is winning the war against terrorism under NAP: US Country Report.” Times of Islamabad, August 07, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://timesofislamabad.com/pakistan-is-winning-the-war-againstterrorism-under-nap-us-country-report/2016/08/07/. 58. “COAS visit: Chinese military appreciates Pakistan’s consensus against terrorism.” The Express Tribune, January 25, 2015. Accessed on July 18, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/827292/coas-visit-chinese-military-appreciatespakistans-consensus-against-terrorism/. 59. “Army targeting all militants without discrimination: General Raheel.” The Express Tribune, November 20,2014.Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://tribune. com.pk/story/794198/army-to-ensure-terrorists-are-unable-to-reestablishtheir-base-in-pakistan-coas-tells-us-senators/ 60. “Army launches ‘Operation RaddulFasaad’ across Pakistan.” The Nation, February 22, 2017. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/national/22Feb-2017/army-launches-operation-radd-ul-fassad-across-pakistan. 61. Sharjeel, Hussain. “War on terror continues.” The Nation, March 03, 2017. Accessed on July 18, 2018.http://nation.com.pk/columns/03-Mar-2017/war-onterror-continues. 62. Nabi, Adiya. “List of Military Operations in Pakistan.” News Agency, December 28, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.liverostrum.com/pakistanarmy-operations/1025510.html. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. “Pakistan is winning the war against terrorism under NAP: US Country Report.” Times of Islamabad, August 07, 2016. https://timesofislamabad. com/pakistan-is-winning-the-war-against-terrorism-under-nap-us-countryreport/2016/08/07/. 66. Galula, P 23. 67. “Police, agencies carry out 1,423 search operations in Punjab.” The News, April 06, 2016. Accessed on July 18, 2018.https://www.thenews.com.pk/ latest/110739-Police-agencies-carry-out-1423-search-operations-in-Punjab. 68. Galula, P 23. 69. The Military Balance 2017, by The International Institute of Strategic Studies. London, England: Routledge, 2017. 70. Galula, P 24. 71. Interviews with army officers. 36.

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Tackling Terrorism: Pernicious Implications of Poor Policing

Dr Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, is a renowned former Senior Police Officer, who currently as Senior Fellow at Global Think Tank Network, and Strategic Advisor to Centre for Research on Security Studies, plays a leading role in security, justice and governance policy organisations

Abstract The problem of terrorism has raised a lot of questions about how this complex and sophisticated threat should be responded to. Should terrorism be dealt with by specialised counter-terrorism agencies or local police or both? What are pernicious implications of poor policing vis-à-vis tackling terrorism? Has poor policing made handling of complex problem of terrorism even worse? The police is the largest component of the network of security forces, serving not only as first responders but also as intelligence officers and bridge-builders to communities suspected of contributing disproportionately to terrorism. How counter-terrorism ‘high policing’ impacts local policing? How critical is intelligence in countering terrorism? Should local police be involved in covert terrorism prevention or counter-terrorism intelligence gathering? Is Pakistan’s inherited policing model relevant to present-day challenges, particularly terrorism? If not, what is the relevance of democratic policing principles to counterterrorism? What reforms are needed to reform the anachronistic police system, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism? This paper attempts to address these questions. Keywords: Police, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Intelligence, High Policing, Low Policing, Police Reform, Security Forces, Police Act 1861, Police Order 2002, Capacity-building, National Police Bureau, Internal Security

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akistan inherited, in 1947, a more-thaneighty-year-old police system from the British. The overriding consideration before those who designed the police organisation in 1861 was to create an instrument in the hands of the – colonial – government for keeping the natives on a tight leash. Police was not meant to be an operationally neutral public service agency geared to enforce law fairly and justly. Established in the backdrop of ‘Mutiny’ of 1857, principal objectives of this design included keeping the people fully under control through a “rough and ready” system of maintenance of law and order, a euphemism for what Justice Cornelius called the rule of danda (stick); seamless collection of land revenue; and safeguarding and promoting Great Britain’s trading interests.

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The Historical Context of Policing It is crucial to understand the basic difference between a colonial police force and a police service meant for a free country. Whereas the former was geared at raising semi-militarised, semi-literate, underpaid bodies of men for maintaining order by overawing an often turbulent and hostile population, the latter aimed at creating law enforcement professionals tasked to prevent and detect crime in plural, multi-ethnic and rights’ conscious communities, through just and impartial enforcement of laws. The former knew how to rule, the latter to serve. 

As the overriding objective of police organisation designed in 1861 was to maintain the stability of the Raj, the purpose was admirably achieved through emulating the Irish Constabulary model – by placing police under direction and control of the executive authority through the office of the European District Officer who acted as the agent of the colonial government.

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The overriding consideration before those who designed the police organisation in 1861 was to create an instrument in the hands of the – colonial – government for keeping the natives on a tight leash. Police was not meant to be an operationally neutral public service agency geared to enforce law fairly and justly

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misbehaviour is a bitter fact of every-day life, borne out of experience of successive generations at the hands of a force widely believed to be working beyond the bounds of civilised code of behaviour. It is the behaviour that defies change and is impervious even to the most scathing criticism by leaders of civil society. Could the ordinary citizen do anything when things went wrong, grievances arose, or complaints about police fell on deaf ears? Not much, because, badly enough, whatever remedial arrangements existed were woefully inadequate, lacked public confidence and were far from user-friendly. It is citizens’ widely-held belief that police could get away with anything and everything. There existed no independent mechanism of policing the police notwithstanding that an increasingly expanding range of coercive powers at their command required stricter accountability controls. Public confidence in the police has never been lower. We know why? We even know how to fix this problem.

The Problem Serious inadequacies of police range from incompetence, inefficiency, arbitrary and insensitive handling of public complaints to institutionalised abuse of power and perceived widespread resort to corruption. No wonder that citizens lend little or no co-operation to the police. They perceive police not as an instrument of rule of law but as a highly politicised service operating principally to look after the interests of the powerful.  Unacceptably high level of mistrust in the police did not come about lightly or suddenly. For most citizens confronting routine police 116

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A clear intent to reform police surfaced in independent Pakistan right at the start when Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in August 1947, issued a directive for establishing a modern police force for the city of Karachi, the reform bill (XXV of 1948), passed on 7th February 1948, couldn’t get assent of the Governor General, thanks to politics of police reform

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Faced with a deepening crisis both internally within its own organisation and externally in its relations with the public, the 1861 policing system started running around under the strain of social change brought about in 1947 by the freedom from colonial rule. Though a clear intent to reform police surfaced in independent Pakistan right at the start when Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in August 1947, issued a directive for establishing a modern police force for the city of Karachi, the reform bill (XXV of 1948), passed on 7th February 1948, couldn’t get assent of the Governor General, thanks to politics of police reform. In the backdrop of deteriorating health of the Father of the Nation, Legal Advisor to the Governor General, returned the bill unsigned for making certain ‘minor corrections’. There were over twenty police reform commissions/committees, both national and foreign, in the past seventy years, but their recommendations remained largely ignored. No surprises that Pakistan’s policing crisis has continued to exacerbate over time.

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Toward Comprehensive Police Reform The opportune moment to reinvent police apparently came when the Ministry of Interior, in November 1999, decided to set up Focal Group on Police Reforms and tasked it to suggest fundamental restructuring of police. The Focal Group submitted its recommendations in February 2000. In the meanwhile, the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), as part of their good governance and devolution of powers programme, decided to accord high priority to long overdue police reforms. The NRB’s Think Tank on Police Reforms comprised a Justice of the Peace from Britain and three senior police officers who knew the police best – who knew what worked, what didn’t; and how things ought to be changed. The NRB, after extensively deliberating aspects of police reforms, concluded that police could only perform well if founded on valid organisational principles. In the case of police, these principles

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As the ground conditions that made the 1861 arrangement expedient had long ceased to exist, it was clear that police needed a fundamental transformation – from its colonial mould to an organisation structured on standard, democratic policing principles meant for ensuring rule of law

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Discussing in detail different factors that contribute toward poor policing in Pakistan, Abbas (2012)1 argues that first and foremost of these factors is outdated Police Act of 1861, which is still applicable in two Provinces: Sindh and Balochistan. Other factors such as corruption, political interference, structural problems, Thana Culture, poor training and lack of advanced technology play key role in police not being able to counter-terrorism. Poor policing over time also became a serious threat to social order. Although the country spent tens of billions every year on police, civil armed forces and security agencies, yet the citizen continued to suffer from a creeping sense of insecurity. It was almost as if the anachronistic police system was designed not to work. The way forward to long debated package of police reforms lay in radically changing the way the police operated; in developing a sub-culture of professional policing, trained and equipped to uphold the rule of law; in shifting from oppressive policing practices to humane service delivery; and in reinventing the police which had miserably failed to win much-needed partnership with citizens and communities. It was time for police to enter into a customer service contract with the people of Pakistan, a guarantee of more effective, efficient, responsive, accountable policing. It was time to implement ideas that worked and get rid of those that didn’t. As the ground conditions that made the 1861 arrangement expedient had long ceased to exist, it was clear that police needed a fundamental transformation – from its colonial mould to an organisation structured on standard, democratic policing principles meant for ensuring rule of law.

were ruthlessly violated over the years. This resulted in the creation of a corrupt, inefficient and highly politicised police force. Consequently, the task of maintaining law and order suffered serious setback. Increasingly the police were rendered to act as agents of the political executive rather than as instruments of a democratic polity. Selective application of law against opponents, whether due to political interference or at the behest of persons of influence, became the norm rather than an exception. Personal and clan vendettas were waged and won through manipulation of instruments of the state. Whatever safeguards existed against the floodgates of pressure, inducement or threat from criminals or ethnic, sectarian or other powerful elements virtually became non-existent. The net result of this all was that people perceived the police as agents of the powerful, not as members of an organisation publicly maintained to enforce law. The Police Act 1861 was finally replaced by Police Order 2002 promulgated on 14th August 2002. The latter sought to provide the police with operational autonomy and freedom from illegitimate political interference. It envisaged effective accountability of the police, both internally and externally through independent Police Complaints Authorities. The Police Order 2002 obligated the police “to function according to the Constitution, law and democratic aspirations of the people”. It redefined the police duties, police powers, as also the control mechanisms over police. It aimed at bringing about a radical transformation in the ‘old police culture’ and turning the police into a vehicle for establishing and promoting rule of law. Implemented in its true spirit, the Police Order 2002 could have led to policing best practices, effectively meeting the 21st century law and order challenges. However, that didn’t happen. The Police Order 2002 was massively amended in 2006, solely due to political considerations. Not only did the

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Implemented in its true spirit, the Police Order 2002 could have led to policing best practices, effectively meeting the 21st century law and order challenges. However, that didn’t happen. The Police Order 2002 was massively amended in 2006, solely due to political considerations

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amendments dilute the operational independence of the police, they also rendered the long sought for police de-politicisation mechanisms ineffective, defeating the very purpose of the whole reform effort. In yet another retrograde step, the Provinces of Sindh and Balochistan, in 2011, reverted to the old Police Act 1861. In 2017, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also replaced the Police Order 2002 with the Police Act 2017, leaving Punjab as the only Province that has, till date, retained the Police Order 2002, with amendments. Police Access Service (PAS) – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

executive, the nature and extent of police-public interaction is fundamentally different. Impolite and unfair policing only exacerbates negative perceptions to voluntary cooperation by the public. Improved police-public relations require positive community perceptions of everyday police practices. Mastrofski (1999)3 has identified six basic ingredients for the police in order to elicit more effective support and cooperation from the public: ── Attentiveness– Police should attend to their public’s problems and ‘be around’. ── Reliability– There needs to be a degree of predictability about what the police do. ── Responsiveness– The police should provide a client-centred service that is reassuring to the public. ── Competence– The public respects police who can get the job done and where this cannot be done, public respect police who clearly and honestly explain why. ── Manners– Far more significant than what the police accomplish is how they treat people on an interpersonal basis. ── Fairness– Police should treat all people fairly.

Impact of ‘High Policing’ Practices on Police-Public Relationship According to Brodeur (1983),2 ‘high policing’ is primarily concerned with protecting the state and nation as a whole and is carried out by the security services to pre-empt, infiltrate and subvert insurgent groups deemed a threat to the state and larger public interest. This is in contrast to traditional ‘low policing’ where the police remained concerned more with bringing the offenders to justice after the commission of crime. As noted, the colonial underpinning of our police has historically meant that the public is less willing to engage with the police. In jurisdictions where police are seen as an instrument of rule of law, not an oppressive tool at the hands of the 118

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While basic guidelines on sensitive and fair policing are integral to all forms of police work, their significance increases with regard to counter-terrorism operations. If individual police officers are appropriately trained to undertake their activities humanely and courteously, the risk of undermining police legitimacy in counterterrorism practices is significantly reduced. Clancy et al. (2001)4 suggests that the police’s ‘poor demeanour’ is most frequent source of the public being ‘really annoyed’ with the police. According to Tyler (2004),5 police should afford people input into wider policing decisions; be objectively neutral and transparent; be polite and treat people with dignity and respect for their human rights; and be sincere, explaining their decisions and conduct in a benevolent manner. Skogan (2006)6 likewise found that fair and courteous treatment in police-initiated contacts, giving people reasons for what police do and explaining them their rights, contributes to satisfaction with ‘police encounters’. Lowe and Innes (2008)7 suggest that as front-line, ‘public-facing’ police officers get

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to know the everyday ‘rhythms and routines’ of social life in their local communities, they tend to get into an advantageous position when it came to noticing subtle changes in their environments that outsiders may be unaware of. A prerequisite for community engagement to succeed is that counter-terrorism teams involved in ‘high policing’ operations not only engage cooperatively and wholeheartedly with the local police but also improve their intelligence-sharing propensities and mechanisms. Evidence suggests that intelligence continues to be held within ‘high policing’ teams and is not effectively shared with local levels (Audit Commission and HMIC, 2008).8 Also, whilst deployment of trained intelligence officers in specific localities known to house actual or potential terrorists is vital for more targeted intelligence, a significant problem arising from spreading an intelligence-collection net too wide is that much irrelevant material is pulled in, impairing its usefulness. Another negative consequence is that security services start suffering ‘information overload’. It is clear that in order to build legitimacy the police needs to invest significant resources in improving the quality of community engagement. Not only should police develop clear guidelines, emphasising that individual officers interact with the public fairly, honestly, and reliably, but performance indicators of police should include meaningful accounts of specific community concerns addressed. Indeed, these guidelines can go a long way toward developing local solutions to preventing crimes, and thereby building improved community relations that contribute to the long-term prevention of terrorism.

Pernicious Implications of Poor Policing A four-member British delegation headed by Sir Richard Barrat,9 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, visited Pakistan from 21 to 26 January 1990, emphasising that Pakistan’s existing

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The colonial underpinning of our police has historically meant that the public is less willing to engage with the police. In jurisdictions where police is seen as an instrument of rule of law, not an oppressive tool at the hands of the executive, the nature and extent of police-public interaction is fundamentally different

police establishment was a continuation of the police appointed during the British days, the delegation observed: “The central problem surrounding police … in Pakistan is that the present system was created many years ago under colonial rule and has not been refined or evaluated to keep pace with the changing face of the country in the last decade of the twentieth century … Police … throughout Pakistan has clung to the role envisaged by the Police Act of 1861, in which the main functions were the maintenance of law and order and preservation of the status quo by methods of suppression and control.”

A UN Mission led by Vincent M. Del Buono, UN’s Interregional Advisor for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, visited Pakistan from 26 March to 10 April 1995. Making a number of categorical recommendations, the UN Mission10 observed: “The present crisis comes as no surprise. Since 1960, there have been eleven separate committees or commissions established by governments in Pakistan and four international missions requested by the Government of Pakistan which have recommended major reforms of policing in Pakistan. These have, for the most part, been ignored and the remedies suggested have been unimplemented. Had the proposed reforms been undertaken, much of the present crisis could have been avoided.  The present police system, which has been allowed to deteriorate so badly by successive governments and been so abused for political patronage, has not yet completely broken down due to the dedication, integrity, initiative and professionalism of a large number of individual officers and constables. In spite of their best efforts, policing will collapse not Green Book 2019

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only in Karachi but also in other parts of the country unless law enforcement institutions are strength ened immediately.”  A Japanese experts team11 led by Mr. Sekine, Director General National Police Agency, visited Pakistan in April 1996 on the invitation of Government of Pakistan. After discussing police reforms of 1947-54 in Japan, the team observed that it was crucial that police reforms in Pakistan be focused on building a relationship of trust between the people and the police, and that the police in Pakistan should adopt a public service concept. In their February 1999 Report on Sustainable Peace in Karachi, the Colombian12 experts succinctly cautioned: “If a professionally competent, politically neutral and democratically controlled Karachi Metropolitan Police Force is not formed, there will, probably, be no police reform or reconstruction of the public sector, both of which are essential elements for sustainable peace.”  As policing continued to deteriorate over time, the last decade of 20th century particularly witnessed an almost complete collapse of law and order in Karachi. Urban terrorism during the 1990s claimed tens of hundreds of innocent victims and brought Karachi the infamous title of ‘the City of Death’.

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The economy also lost hundreds of billions of Rupees. A very large number of officers of Karachi Police, over 260, got martyred at the hands of terrorists in 1995 alone. In the exclusively policeled counter-terrorism operation,13 Karachi Police played a heroic role in effectively taming the dinosaur of terrorism exceptionally in a little over six months. Sadly, the Government’s failure to consolidate and sustain the rare law and order gains yet again resulted, in 1998, in serious deterioration of the security situation, costing the nation dearly in terms of quality of life, economy, and Pakistan’s image abroad. Abbas (2009)14 has argued that despite frequently occurring law and order problems and internal strife, the Pakistani state did not give due attention to build capacity of the police. Referring to 1995-96 successful counter-terrorism operation in Karachi, he concluded that police leadership factor, political support, extra resources and financial incentives played a key role in success of the operation. According to him, lacklustre implementation of Police Order 2002, poorlyresourced National Police Bureau, and absence of specialised training to selected police officers all have negative implications for effective policing. Analysing capability of Pakistan’s security apparatus to meet emerging internal security challenges, Fair (2011)15 has thus observed: “Not only has Pakistan demurred from making critical investments in police forces, but the state has also failed miserably to provide a modern policing framework.” According to her, the state of Pakistan has not fully realised the importance of the institution of police and failed to reform and rebuild it according to the requirements of changing time. Modern policing places more emphasis on problem-oriented and intelligence-led approaches. Information technology is critical to building police capacity to store, search, interpret and analyse data. Through processing data in a myriad of ways, analytical software supports enhanced crime prevention and investigation capabilities, providing police new insights in understanding the ‘crime problem’. Alongside enhanced use of modern technology, police officers, working in ‘high risk’ localities, need to be aware of the potential contribution they

It is clear that in order to build legitimacy the police needs to invest significant resources in improving the quality of community engagement. Not only should police develop clear guidelines, emphasising that individual officers interact with the public fairly, honestly, and reliably, but performance indicators of police should include meaningful accounts of specific community concerns addressed

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Initially established for crime control and maintenance of public order, today’s police have to deal with multifarious, complex and growing tasks, including terrorism, transnational organised crime, white-collar crime and cybercrime

Police Role in Counter-Terrorism Counter-terrorism incorporates practices,  tactics techniques and strategy that government, law enforcement, military, paramilitary and intelligence agencies  use to combat or prevent  terrorism. Counter-terrorism strategies include countering financing of terrorism. If  terrorism  is part of a broader  insurgency, counter-terrorism may employ  counterinsurgency  measures. Initially established for crime control and maintenance of public order, today’s police have to deal with multifarious, complex and growing tasks, including terrorism, transnational organised crime, whitecollar crime, cybercrime. According to Wilkinson (2001),16 there are three models of counter-terrorism response: (1) political reconciliation bringing the terrorist groups out of terrorism by pursuing negotiations and diplomacy, (2) the use of law enforcement and criminal justice

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can make to countering terrorism through their everyday policing activities. However, this being a relatively new area of research, the available evidence showing positive linkage between routine policing activities and counter-terrorism needs to be explored further. Also, as one cannot always generalise from studies conducted in foreign jurisdictions, the Higher Education Commission and our universities and institutions of higher learning should increasingly encourage and promote local criminological research, with focus on contemporary internal security challenges.

system, and (3) the use of military force. These models are not mutually exclusive, and elements from each of them may be combined into a set of policy guidelines according to the circumstances. Though the incidents of 9/11 brought the issue of international terrorism and use of military force into a new debate, there is no consensus in favour of the high-handed military response as a preemptive measure. “The rules of international law could not simply be interpreted by a single country like the US to its own motives. If the interpretation is unilateral by the strong according to its will and weak is to accept it, then we are back in the dark ages.” contends Maogoto (2005).17 Underscoring the need to realign the existing rules on the use of kinetic force to match the altered international security environment, he suggests clearly defined limits to the use of military force. After studying seventeen successful counterinsurgencies, Sepp (2005)18 has concluded that the role of police is central to any successful counterinsurgency campaign. The best practices discerned include: ── Police in the lead with the military providing backup support; and ── Strengthening the police with relevant capabilities to help address the security needs of the at-risk population. There are some disadvantages though to using local police in covert counter-terrorism. These disadvantages include burdening scarce resources available with the local police and diverting local

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── Analysing crime patterns indicating propensity to commit terrorist activity or making preterrorism preparation; ── Developing partnerships with local businesses and civil society organisations; ── Validating intelligence produced by specialised counter-terrorism agencies; ── Contributing in covert surveillance, penetration and target hardening; and ── Using local knowledge to recruit informers.

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Explaining the role of local police in counterintelligence programmes during the Cold War period and in counter-terrorism after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Waxman (2009)23 argues that local police is better equipped in terms of resources, capabilities and opportunities to counter terrorist activities. Dividing the challenges posed by international and local terrorism to the police in three categories: (1) organisational challenges, (2) political accountability challenges, and (3) mission challenges, he contends that these challenges stem from decentralised, heterogeneous and fragmented policing systems. According to a survey conducted by Bayley and Weisburd (2009),24 all police services, whether centralised or decentralised, engage in domestic counter-terrorism, and there are no examples of specialised counter-terrorism agencies separated from the police at sub-national level. Likewise, according to Abbas (2011):25 “Police capacity is critical for taming terrorism and controlling insurgencyinfested areas. A growing body of empirical research has established that law enforcement, not military force, is the most effective tool for this task.” The recent phase of–post-9/11–terrorism though largely tamed has quite bedevilled our counter-terrorism communities. The changing forms and manifestations of terrorism continue to pose a serious challenge to capacities and capabilities of security forces around the world. Most countries have created specialised national police agencies for effectively tackling terrorism. Although Pakistan established NACTA in 2009, still it is not the only agency looking after countering the terrorism because of the current inadequacies. Whilst each Provincial Police and Islamabad Police has its own Special Branch primarily to gather, process, and analyse local intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) in recent years has assumed a growing counterintelligence role at national level. In addition, there are Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) that have a major counter-terrorism role. However, meaningful and prompt sharing of intelligence, held by different agencies, civil and military, remains a huge challenge. Bayley and Perito (2012)26 have identified three elements of strategy commonly adopted by the police in countering terrorism: ── Target hardening.

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Partnership among national security organisations, intelligence agencies and local police is necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks

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police from their normal routine duties. However, on balance, local police can actually contribute more to counter-terrorism by performing their normal duties with increased focus and efficiency, particularly through improved interaction with the local communities and enhanced intelligencegathering capabilities. Analysing police role in counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Cyprus, Corum (2006)19 concluded that nearly all major twentieth century counterinsurgency campaigns relied heavily on indigenous police as well as military forces. Building up the case that partnership among national security organisations, intelligence agencies and local police is necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks, Clarke and Newman (2007)20 observe that police play an important and central role in this partnership because they are in a better position to learn about emergence of local terrorist threats, their knowledge of possible targets and being in a position to offer first response to terrorist attacks. In their view, an extension of community policing can be helpful not only in the collection of intelligence but also prevention of situational and ordinary crime. After analysing 648 terrorist groups that existed worldwide between 1968-2006, Jones and Libicki (2008)21 of RAND Corporation concluded that most groups ended because they either joined the political process or came in mainstream politics or they were neutralised by police and intelligence agencies through eliminating key leaders. The authors contend that policing was the most effective counter-terrorism strategy against those terrorist groups which did not join the mainstream politics and continued their terrorist activities. Based on their research, they ended up suggesting to the US’ policymakers that they should stop using the phrase “war on terrorism” because there was no battlefield solution to ending terrorism. Bayley and Weisburd (2009)22 suggest several ways in which local police can contribute to counter-terrorism, including by: ── Observing and interacting with local people during routine policing activities;

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attacks and undertaking covert operations to prevent such attacks is a police responsibility.

Counter-Terrorism Challenges and Reliability of Policing Services

── Arresting, investigating, and prosecuting terrorists. ── Pre-emptive disruption. Target hardening refers to provision of effective security to the potential terrorist targets, including important persons and places. Special police units, private security agencies, security and surveillance equipment like CCTV cameras, walk through gates, metal detectors and jammers play an important role in target hardening. Apart from technical equipment, trained sniffer dogs are also being used for crime detection and in sweep and search operations. Even though counter-terrorism is a multidisciplinary and multiagency endeavour, the role of police in arresting, investigating, and prosecuting terrorists is pivotal and critical. Political scientists, sociologists and criminologists generally take the phenomenon of terrorism as a crime and not as a military combat. A minority view though is that crime and terrorism are different phenomena and a successful crime control strategy may not always be relevant to counter-terrorism. Pre-emptive disruption, third element in terrorism control strategy, means a measure taken in advance to forestall a terrorist act. It entails neutralising terrorists’ plans and capabilities with a view to preventing them from achieving their goals. Whilst target hardening and investigating and prosecuting criminals are mandated responsibilities of police, pre-emptive disruption is rarely conducted in open. Even interaction with general public is seldom made during execution of terrorist-related plans notwithstanding that gathering intelligence about potential terrorist

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For decades, international terrorist organisations have spread their networks across the globe. More recently, the internet and social media have provided new tools not only to identify and communicate with terrorist sympathisers but also to radicalise them to carry out terrorist attacks at targets of their choosing. Indeed, information technology poses huge counter-terrorism challenges for contemporary policing, including: ── Using limited police resources more efficiently to fight crimes such as terrorism. ── Providing a local, national as well as an international response to terrorism. ── Building capacity for solving terrorism-related crimes having national and international implications. ── Solving terrorism-related cases with limited intelligence or sometimes intelligence that is not available locally. ── Improving neighbourhood policing for counterterrorism. ── Continuous professional development of police officers so that they can see the bigger picture of fighting terrorism. ── Monitoring internet and social media for hate speech, recruitment of terrorists and identifying terrorist networks.

Police capacity is critical for taming terrorism and controlling insurgency-infested areas. A growing body of empirical research has established that law enforcement, not military force, is the most effective tool for this task

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── Adopting latest information technologies. ── Safe city projects in major cities and their monitoring through drone and CCTV cameras. ── Centralised sharing of intelligence. ── Well-trained specialist investigators, with access to modern technological tools and supported by latest forensics. ── Promoting partnership between intelligence agencies and police. ── Intelligence based police operations. The World Economic Forum’s 2017 Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report ranks Pakistan at 133/136 in the safety and security pillar, beating only El Salvador, Yemen and Colombia. Indicators specific to safety and security pillar include: (1) business costs of crime and violence, (2) reliability of police services, (3) business costs of terrorism, (4) index of terrorism incidence, and (5) homicide rates per 100,000 population. Ranking these five indicators at 123/136, 116/136,132/136, 126/136 and 99/136 respectively, the Report shows Pakistan Police in obvious bad light. Discerning debilitating aspects of a police force ranked at the bottom in South Asia, the long-debated causal factors like outdated laws, under-resourcing, poor professionalism, police politicisation and lack of advanced technological tools to effectively execute police mission readily come to mind.

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Though terrorism stands substantially controlled over the past couple of years, the need to reinvent Pakistan Police as a matter of urgent national priority cannot be overstated.

Way Forward Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the Federation to protect every Province against external aggression and internal disturbances [Article 148(3)]. Paradoxically, whilst the Constitution obligates the Armed Forces to defend Pakistan against external aggression, and, when called upon, to act in aid of civil power [Article 245 (1)], there is no dedicated civil force available to the Federation to protect Pakistan against internal disturbances. Even when extent or nature of internal disturbances is beyond a Provincial Government to handle, how the Federation is to discharge its constitutional duty to protect the Province, is not unambiguous. In the Provinces’ view, law and order is their exclusive responsibility. No wonder that National Action Plan (NAP), enforced in the backdrop of 16 December 2014 brutal terrorist attack on Army Public School, Peshawar, involving massacre of over 150 people, 132 of them children, failed to get a clear go ahead from the Provinces for establishing a dedicated counter-terrorism force. Though of late terrorism has been largely contained, the establishment of a dedicated counter-terrorism force by the Federal Government remains a constitutional imperative.

Even though counter-terrorism is a multidisciplinary and multiagency endeavour, the role of police in arresting, investigating, and prosecuting terrorists is pivotal and critical. Political scientists, sociologists and criminologists generally take the phenomenon of terrorism as a crime and not as a military combat

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Not only is counter-terrorism dependent on effective intelligence but the principal weapon to win the fight against terror is actionable intelligence. As democratic policing principles that emphasise increased police legitimacy and improved community relations when implemented proactively tend to have positive impact on police ability to gather vital intelligence, there is urgent need to recognise that Pakistan’s contemporary policing scene – still stuck with the 19th century ‘third degree’ model – requires urgent reinvention. As full adherence to basic rights of lawviolating minority cannot be achieved except at the expense of rights of the law-abiding majority, there is a need to debate the public policy imperative of tampering the basic rights of wayward individuals. However, police should strive to keep the extent of infringement of rights of the wayward minority to a bare minimum. This is possible if ‘high policing’ organisations, in particular, possess specific human interaction skills and their operating practices are kept continually evaluated and updated. Intelligence being lifeblood of police and counter-terrorism work, it makes sense that police and relevant agencies take full advantage of latest information technology tools for increased and efficient monitoring of country’s telecommunication network, subject to effective checks and without undermining law-abiding citizens’ rights to privacy and free expression. What is required is a state-ofthe-art National Monitoring System (NMS) that is capable of real time monitoring of all phone and Internet traffic, bypassing service providers. In the meantime, phone and Internet monitoring by service providers needs to be made accessible by all law enforcement and security agencies. A lot of real time criminal intelligence is potentially available at the Police Station level. Due to adversarial police-public relationship, the lines of intelligence flow from the community to the local police are virtually choked. That is why it is so critical to reinvent the Police Station. Besides, there being no institutional mechanism for efficient intelligence sharing, the intelligence available with different agencies is not put to effective use. What we require is build stronger

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As full adherence to basic rights of law-violating minority cannot be achieved except at the expense of rights of the law-abiding majority, there is a need to debate the public policy imperative of tampering the basic rights of wayward individuals

partnerships between various stakeholders. In 2008, the Office of National Security Advisor was established in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. More recently, on 18 March 2014, the Prime Minister directed that a National Intelligence Directorate Changing Police Station Culture

(NID) be immediately established under National Counter-Terrorism Authority to pool together national and provincial intelligence resources. However, obstacles to real time intelligence sharing still remain. There are serious infrastructural and capacitybuilding issues inflicting the police forces across Pakistan. Though of late there is growing awareness and interest in relation to the use of information and forensic technologies by law enforcement agencies, there is a need for a sharper focus. The National Police Bureau played a pivotal role as national focal point for addressing infrastructural and capacity-building issues on a sustainable and standardised basis when it steered four flagship police modernisation projects relating to common services at an estimated cost of Rs 7,952 million during 2004-2008.27 The projects included: ── Automated Fingerprint Identification System (Rs 1,107 million). ── Police Record and Office Management Information System (Rs 1,405 million). ── Nationwide Integrated Trunk Radio System (Rs 1,952 million). ── National Forensic Science Agency (Rs 3,488

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million). The entire effort was to provide new tools to upgrade police investigative capacity. Sadly, no new projects were added during past ten years. Even on-going projects suffered neglect for want of funds. The National Police Bureau has a statutory responsibility to perform its mandated functions like advising the Federal and Provincial Governments on matters concerning police planning; development and standardisation of police administration and equipment; police education and training; police communications; criminal identification facilities; developing standard operating procedures based on internationally accepted good practices particularly in relation to recruitment, appointment, promotions, transfers, tenure and discipline; and arranging research in such areas as terrorism, sectarian and ethnic violence, drug trafficking, organised crime, crime having interProvincial and inter-National dimensions. What National Police Bureau needs is better quality human resource and a medium to longterm development strategy to bring it at par with international bodies like the College of Policing in England and Wales. Setting standards in professional development, including codes of practice and regulations, the National Police Bureau must ensure consistency in training, skills and qualifications across the police forces in Pakistan. The Provinces in recent years have also started to invest, relatively, generously in capacitybuilding and modernisation of their police forces, particularly their Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTDs). Punjab has particularly taken lead by establishing a state-of-the-art forensic lab and a modern command and control centre in Lahore. Sindh has established a much-needed forensic training school that imparts training in crime scene management, physical evidence analysis, basic detection, and fingerprint proficiency. Its Digital Computer Forensic Lab assists in antiterror investigations by recovering lost and deleted electronic files, deleted browsing history, deleted

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A lot of real time criminal intelligence is potentially available at the Police Station level. Due to adversarial police-public relationship, the lines of intelligence flow from the community to the local police are virtually choked. That is why it is so critical to reinvent the Police Station

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email, or data from damaged devices. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, apart from improved facilities for specialised training, Mobile Forensic Laboratories have been established at Peshawar, Abbottabad, and D. I. Khan. IT-based policing tools such as Geo Tagging, Identity Verification System, Digitalisation of FIRs, Vehicle Verification System, Tenants Information System, Police Assistance Lines, and Police Access Service are other welcome additions. Balochistan received two mega infrastructural projects under a 2004 Federal Grant of more than

Rs.10 billion. However, the Provincial Government took a retrograde step in rolling back Conversion of “A” Area into “B” Area Project in 2008. However, without fundamentally changing the long-existing Thana Culture, the induction of latest technology alone is unlikely to make a significant difference. For efficient and effective service delivery, police will have to turn more-than-century-old policing practices upside down. The crisis is more profound when there is inadequate provision of quality preand in-service training, when career progression is not based on performance, when postings and transfers are politicised, when policemen live off the land, and when accountability mechanisms are either blunted or virtually non-existent. Policing is no longer a vocation. Ways and means based on international good practices will have to be devised to turn policemen into competent professionals. Their education and training courses must cater to leadership development needs, as also to stimulation of critical and innovative thinking. There is little evidence that BPS 18-20 police officers undergoing mandatory general-purpose courses – Mid Career Management Course, Senior

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Major structural reforms, including a standard police law that criminalises extraneous interference in police administration and guarantees provisioning of adequate resources, are necessary to create and sustain wellperforming, effective and accountable police forces

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Management Course, and National Management Course – become better police professionals. The way forward is a fundamental restructuring involving a short spell of 2-4 weeks of common instruction at the National Institutes of Management or National School of Public Policy (NSPP)/National Defence University, as the case may be, followed by 2-5 months of intensive specialised training at the National Police Academy. Also, different categories of police professionals may be issued ISO type certifications. These certifications may be suspended for misconduct, poor performance or for failure to fulfil minimum continuous professional development requirements. Finally, politicised police recruitments, postings and promotions are the bane of our police system. If policemen are not recruited on merit, they neither take trainings seriously nor readily accept postings which are not of their liking. Using extraneous influence, they will successfully manage their postings, transfers and promotions. The seniors will find it hard to hold them accountable even for manifest acts of misconduct. Indeed, their insatiable propensity to subvert normal departmental processes all through their careers is a source of severe impairment for the organisations they serve in. Major structural reforms, including a standard police law that criminalises extraneous interference in police administration and guarantees provisioning of adequate resources, are necessary to create and sustain well-performing, effective and accountable police forces.

Conclusion Terrorism is a form of crime that has bedevilled Pakistan for many years. Political terrorism in Balochistan lasted for couple of years, before it ended in 1977. Terrorist outfit, Al-Zulfiqar, remained active for more than a decade, starting 1979. Ethnopolitical urban terrorism in Sindh peaked in 1990s. Sectarian terrorism has remained with us for several decades. However, the terrorism that AlQaeda and their affiliates started and sponsored in the aftermath of 9/11 has proved to be the deadliest.

Though military and paramilitary forces in Pakistan are playing a key role in the fight against terrorism, counter-terrorism is primarily a police function. If well-trained, well-equipped, and wellresourced, the police is generally better suited to counter-terrorism. Police intelligence network going down to local Police Station is potentially a more effective counter-terrorism tool. Police and security agencies have made tremendous sacrifices while countering terrorism, and have won many a battle. They can do better. Major reasons, why police is not able to do better, include outdated laws, politicisation, poor professional development, inadequate resources, police-public estrangement, police highhandedness, corruption and ineffective accountability. Police need to build stronger partnerships with the community to improve their intelligence-gathering capabilities. Structured under the Police Act of 1861, Pakistan’s public-frightening police forces are neither adequately equipped nor sufficiently trained to effectively deal with mundane criminal activity, let alone serious crimes like terrorism. For effective counter-terrorism, we need a police system which is politically neutral, nonauthoritarian, accountable and responsive to the community, professionally efficient, and last but not least, which is an instrument of the rule of law. There are several systemic issues confronting the police forces in Pakistan. These include serious quantitative and qualitative constraints, extraneously-influenced policing operations, police performance measures not based on internationally-accepted key performance indicators but personal liking/disliking of those who mattered. Inadequate police budgets, poor working conditions, insufficient support of forensic and information technologies, and lack of real time intelligence sharing between police and security agencies. The abysmally poor budgetary allocation inevitably means that not enough money is available for improving rank and file salaries, housing, transport facilities and health care. As around 88% of the police force consists of lower rank constables and head constables, absence of shift system and poor promotion prospects adversely affect their morale and productivity. It is time the police leadership came up with viable solutions, based on international good practices, for administering larger police forces efficiently and effectively. It is time to seriously consider delegating maximum powers to the field officers and the Inspector General Police dealing mainly with policy matters. Like most countries that have specialised counter-terrorism agencies, Pakistan needs to have a dedicated centralised counter-terrorism force to Green Book 2019

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deal with terrorism having inter-Provincial and transnational dimensions. Forming partnerships with local communities and businesses, police can use local knowledge to assess the validity Notes

1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Abbas, H. (2009) ‘Role of Pakistan Police In Counterinsurgency’Brookings. Brodeur, J. (1983) ‘High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the Policing of Political Activities’, Social Problems, 30(5): 507-520. Mastrofski, S. (1999) ‘Policing For People’, Ideas in American Policing, Police Foundation: Washington. Clancy, A., Hough, M., Aust, R. and Kershaw, C. (2001) Crime, Policing and Justice: The Experience of Ethnic Minorities.Findings from the 2000 British Crime Survey. Home Office: London. Tyler, T. (2004) ‘Enhancing Police Legitimacy’, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 593(1): 84-99. Skogan, W. (2006) ‘Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with the Police’ Policing and Society 16(2): 99-126. Lowe, T. and Innes, M. (2008) ‘Countering Terror: Violent Radicalisation and Situational Intelligence’, Prison Service Journal, September 2008, No. 179. Audit Commission and HMIC (2008) Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise. Department of Communities and Local Government: London. Barrat, Sir Richard, Aspects of Policing in Pakistan, 1990. Report of the UN Mission to Pakistan: Organised Crime, 1995 (Islamabad: UNDCP) Report of the Japanese Police Delegation on the Police System in Pakistan, 1996 Report of the Colombian Mission, 1999 (Karachi: CPLC) The author was Chief of Police Karachi during this operation. Abbas, H. (2009) ‘Role of Pakistan Police In Counterinsurgency’ Brookings. Fair, C (2012) ‘Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, But Many Challenges Persist’, CIGI Wilkinson, P. (2001) Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State

of intelligence produced by specialised counterterrorism agencies. On balance, general-duty police can contribute more to counter-terrorism than specialised counter-terrorism agencies. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

Response. Frank Cass: Abingdon. Maogoto, J. N. (2005). Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspective on the Use of Force and the War on Terror.Aldershot, Hampshire, UK, Ashgate Publishing Limited. Sepp, K. I. (2005), ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review. Corum, J. S. (2006).Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A tale of two insurgencies.Strategic Studies Institute. Clarke, R. V. and Newman, G. R. (2007) ‘Police and the Prevention of Terrorism’ in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice’ (Oxford University Press). Jones, S. G. and Libicki, M. C. (2008) ‘How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al-Qaeda’, RAND Corporation. Bayley, D. H. and Weisburd. D. L. (2009), ‘Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counter-terrorism’ into Protect and to serve: Policing in an age of terrorism. Waxman, M. C. (2009), ‘Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counter-Terrorism after 9/11’, Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Vol 3:337 Bayley, D. H. and Weisburd. D. L. (2009), ‘Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counter-terrorism’ in To Protect and to serve: Policing in an age of terrorism. Abbas, H. (2011), ‘Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure’, Special Report 266, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC. Bayley, D. H. and Perito, R. M. (2012).The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent Crime. New Delhi: Viva Books. The author was Director General, National Police Bureau, during 20042008.W

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GROWING STRATEGIC COERCION AGAINST

PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSE

most complete and decisive victory ‘‘is The to compel one’s enemy to give up its

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purpose, while suffering no harm to oneself Belisarius1

Brigadier Sheikh Ghulam Jilani is serving in Pakistan Army

Abstract Of late international/regional powers are vehemently trying to mount a full scale hybrid warfare against Pakistan. Threat spectrum of Pakistan has thus diversified quicker than anticipated. If this intimidation remains unabated; Plummeting Economic Conditions, Internal Challenges and External Pressure may push Pakistan towards a corner with limited response options. Such a situation may not be favourable for Pakistan, region and the world. Paper takes stock of the existing drivers, players, dominant challenges of strategic game and likely spectrum of conflict. A reappraisal of certain dynamic measures to avert this worst case scenario ensuring uplift of Pakistan is also touched upon. Keywords: Power Centres, Coercion, Hybrid Warfare, Strategic Goals, CPEC, Nuclear, Diplomacy, Internal Security, Spectrum of Conflict, Threat Manifestation

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orld Order is continuously morphing due to the power play of existing and emerging power centres. International political fabric is knit around competing interests of nation-states. We are living in an era of complex interdependence, wherein cooperation and coercive approaches continue to be applied concurrently. Actions like, economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, information operations and limited use of force are being undertaken by states to meet the political objectives.

Pakistan is the geo-strategic and geo-economic pivot of Asia and it is interesting that same was also prophesised by Quaid in 1948.2 However, due to its strategic location and hegemonic India, coupled with competing global interests, it has remained a target of coercion. Importance of Indian Ocean and place of Pakistan aka Gwadar is much evident as it’s being manifested now and was visualised much before.3 Role of other variables (CPEC, Brexit, Trump-ism, JCPOA, and Economy) and perpetual hostility against Pakistan with manifestation as Hybrid War4 is also growing, gnawing, hedging and compelling. Pakistan is a declared nuclear state whose isolation/strangulation may have serious regional/global implications. It’s a known fact that any misadventure against Pakistan would only materialise if Pakistan’s behaviour seriously impinges on US strategic goals – physically or in cognitive domain. US and its conglomerates would progressively employ all options for a coercive compliance – for instance to act against the Afghan Taliban and pro-Kashmiri groups and as a rider clause to accept unilateral restraints on Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes. US’ obsessive fixation on attacking the so called safe havens of the TTP which might actually be a mere smoke screen to target nodal points of the OBOR/ CPEC. Moreover using Daesh as proxy by US is a high probability so that it weakens Afghan Taliban internally and foments terrorism inside Pakistan simultaneously. The materialisation of any serious threat against Pakistan will entail shaping of environment involving regional and extra regional forces.

Global Players

Iran. Since long, Iran has been a subject of stringent economic isolationist policies of US. Divergence in EU and US on Iran, issue is weakening US while Iran a militarily strong nation, is grappling with the situation under a strong leadership and nation- hood. Russian relations with Iran are strategically very important. Economic and financial isolation of Iran by coercing the country’s financial institutions and banks economically engaged with, it has been an important part of the coercion strategy. But Iran still finds countries like Russia and China who trade with. As Stefano Salustri says, Iran’s nuclear programme problem remains unresolved and the pressure put on Iran, by the US, Israel and the other countries, is rebuffed

Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah

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Pakistan is a declared nuclear state whose isolation/strangulation may have serious regional/global implications

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“Pakistan is the pivot of the world, placed on the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves”

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Turkey. Despite having strong historical relations with US and economic ties with Israel, Turkey is also being targeted explicitly by US on accounts of its role in the global politics, especially Syria and Palestine issues. KSA-Turkey entanglement on Khashoggi murder is also affecting the regional canvass. Pak-Turk relations are historically very good and can assist in a big way in any misadventure. China. It is the only nation which is challenging US in the region mostly due to economic strength and matching military capability. Chinese BRI initiative is causing ripples across the globe and US led world order is being challenged due to its inclusivity. The US-India axis is genuinely scared of the OBOR/CPEC initiatives as China threatens to overtake the US as the pre-eminent economic power of the world and simultaneously leave India far behind in its wake at the regional level. This will adversely affect US

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Economic and financial isolation of Iran by coercing the country’s financial institutions and banks economically engaged with, it has been an important part of the coercion strategy

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by Russia and China. Hence effective isolation will always be difficult, especially in the changing world economic environment. Yet the US is willing to take pains at plugging all possible financial loopholes and convincing her global partners to support her tireless efforts patiently. Redundancy of global transactions and willingness of countries to circumvent the US-led economic sanctions for their peculiar state interests emerge as important barriers to strategic coercion. Leaning of Iran towards Pakistan is obvious and can be of a great assistance in the grand strategic game.5

spheres of influence in critical spaces around the globe and ruin India’s regional ambitions. It would also make Pakistan economically self-reliant and increasingly defiant of Indian belligerence and domination and US coercion. This is unacceptable to both, thus they feel compelled to challenge China’s ingress into the region. China Russia cooperation is also causing concerns to US,6 while Pakistan is being targeted by US and India for its high profile role in BRI through CPEC.7

Russia. Russian resurgence and growing influence in the Eurasian bloc is alarming for US. Increased cooperation with Iran, Syria and Turkey is directly against the US interests and same is voiced by US as well. SCO is exerting now beyond security as well with increase in its members and activities. Russia immediately filled the political and military void which has been created as a result of increased US coercion against Pakistan. Such concerns have now resulted in the US freezing military assistance, which included anti-terrorism training. Moscow’s increased assistance has included training in counter-terrorism, and Russia has been conducting joint military exercises with Pakistan despite years of discord between the two countries. Pakistan’s recent coziness with Russia is being viewed frantically by US while it is much needed in present times.

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Pak-China joint training exercise

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India. With a strong economy, diversified diplomacy and relevance to US, Israel, Afghanistan and other nations it is hedging Chinese influence. US-India multidimensional assault on Pakistan is taking a concrete shape now. The Indian sponsored terrorist and militant prongs were exemplified by the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav, the Indian master spy, from Balochistan. Modi Administration through RAW sponsors a media prong which recently organised a “Free Balochistan” campaign in Geneva.8 This unexpected upsurge of moral indignation, timed superbly with the projected visits of US functionaries to Pakistan is clearly intended to put it (and China) under increasing pressure and acquiring a more domineering negotiating posture. Prime issue of Kashmir remains unsettled and it dominates all other initiatives by either side – intentions not-withstanding.

any positive act remains hostage to this feeling. However, Taliban have a different orientation towards Pakistan.

Possibility of Emergence of a New Strategic Bloc

Kulbhushan Jadhav – Indian Spy arrested from Balochistan

Afghanistan. US’ failures in the longest war are so far causing pressures domestically and internationally as well. NATO policies (mostly USled) have yet to deliver. The US is literally isolated in the region; only tenuously established in northern Afghanistan, with an estranged Pakistan in the East and peripheral India distant and unwilling to take part militarily. Failure of US-Taliban talks and tagging Pak as part of problem is not auguring well. Recent victories of Taliban have also put the Afghan government and US/NATO forces in a quandary. Afghan government itself suffers from induced hatred for Pakistan due to US/Indian factor and

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China-Russia cooperation is also causing concerns to US, while Pakistan is being targeted by US and India for its high profile role in BRI through CPEC

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Given the above parameters, there is a likelihood of emergence of a new regional bloc involving Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and back up support of China and Russia. If materialised may change the geo-strategic great game; likely to make India irrelevant in the strategic equation, partially reduce the influence of US in the region and also induce attraction for littoral states of Maldives, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Japan and Korea. CARs and other existing energy corridors (Persian Gulf, Black Sea and Caspian Sea) may be denied to US-led strategic blocs. This also coincides with the BRI concept of strategic linkages.

Miscellaneous Contributory Factors

── Nuclear Issue vis-a-vis Terrorism. Of late, despite fail-safe mechanism emplace, nuclear issue is being linked with terrorism through propagating the narrative of “nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorists.9 On the contrary, India is being facilitated for membership of Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) thus coercion against Pakistan on nuclear issue is adjudged as selective and discriminative.10

── Kashmir Issue. Since 2001, India has unsuccessfully tried to link Kashmiri freedom struggle with terrorism. Off late, the trend of blaming Pakistan without any credible evidence and threat of use of force has

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increased as witnessed during the events of Mumbai attack in 2008, Pathankot, Uri incidents and fake surgical strikes in 2016. It also continues to commit unabated gross human rights’ violations not only to subdue the indigenous freedom struggle but to coerce Pakistan to abandon its political, diplomatic and moral support of legitimate Kashmir cause. ── Pakistan’s new regime and developing trajectory is not acceptable to India as it goes against their strategic interests. ── Pakistan’s growing alliances with China, Russia and Iran are emerging as a counter weight in the region. With China growing each day and entering of more nations in CPEC, it is gnawing the space and hedging out all other players who are opposing CPEC/BRI/OBOR ── Failure of US in Afghanistan.

Possible Threat Manifestation ── US & Allies (IFIs) to exploit Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities – economic coercion and strangulation. Pakistan due to

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To contain Chinese influence in IOR, US is stepping up quadrilateral efforts to check assertive and aggressive Chinese behaviour through joint regional infrastructure scheme aided by India, Japan and Australia

Prime Minister Imran Khan performed the groundbreaking of the long-awaited corridor connecting Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Kartarpur to India’s Gurdaspur district (28 Novmeber 2018)

its economic mainstay on IMF/IFIs as well as military assistance11 from US is vulnerable to strategic coercion – economic sanctions as experienced in the past. The external loans12 and balance of payment issues can afford an opportunity to inimical forces to dissuade Pakistan; policy change/regression on certain issues. However, due to emerging multipolarity and emerging power blocs, the effects may not be that severe, lest other global players, allies and IFIs completely comply with the inimical forces. ── Chinese initiative of OBOR/BRI is attracting international propaganda, especially from US lobby. CPEC while centre piece to complete idea is also in the eye of the storm. Indian lobby, US think tanks and other experts are

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Pakistan’s Total External Debt

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The China-Russia-Iran-PakistanTurkey (CRIPT) alignment as a competing pole to the US-India axis must crystallise post haste. This alliance is supported by geography, convergences and the dictates of the prevailing geo-political environment

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causing aspersions on the intentions of China quoting Humbantota models.13 ── US maritime presence in IOR shall continue to not impose check on BRI, but will also play significant role in economic strangulation. The strategic environment in the Indian Ocean is changing fast. In the last few years, the growing strategic rivalry between major powers like China and India is expanding. To contain Chinese influence in IOR, US is stepping up quadrilateral efforts to check assertive and aggressive Chinese behaviour through joint regional infrastructure scheme aided by India, Japan and Australia.14 China’s moves and Indo-US responses are brewing a new cold war in IOR.

── Project Pakistan as safe haven for Taliban and virulent Information Operations campaign to isolate Pakistan.

Response Strategy Longer-term perspectives, rational mindsets, due diligence and honest common sense are required for policies to develop credibility, direction and momentum. Stage 3 is the worst case and has to be avoided by mitigating the effects of Stage 2 with an aim to get out of even Stage 1. New regional bloc is a great game changer and strategically very rewarding. Its pursuance may be a sagacious and prudent step with necessary preparations. Measures required to mitigate the effects of coercion in various domains include: ── Diplomatic

── Enhanced efforts to counter Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities, including cyber attacks.15 ── Selective application of ‘Lawfare’ and ‘R2P’16 in the garb of human rights violations, and subdue Pakistan’s sovereignty.

○○ Pakistan’s approach towards regionalism should be the hallmark of foreign policy. Regional crisis management involving China; rebuilding trust with Kabul; and mutual trust with US and cordial relations should be maintained with Russia, Turkey, Iran and KSA. ○○ Pakistan must endeavour to save its relationship with the US without prejudice to its national interests. Simultaneously, it must pre-empt this expected US coercion by engaging China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, KSA, GCC and major world capitals on the threats posed to it and the region. ○ ○ The China-Russia-Iran-Pakistan-Turkey (CRIPT) alignment as a competing pole to the US-India axis must crystallise post haste. This alliance is supported by geography,

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Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stages

Coercion

Politico-EconomicDiplomatic Coercion

Enhanced PEDWC (CPEC disrupted, Economic Blocade)

Status

Ongoing as of today

Strangulation, Isolation by slapping sanctions on Pakistan using any reasons

Various reasons carved for pressurising Pakistan to become a pliant state (using both kinetic and non-kinetic means)

Response

Not acceptable to Pakistan

Pakistan to break the vicious cycle by diplomacy

Pakistan decides to retaliate all out with help of its allies

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convergences and the dictates of the prevailing geo-political environment. ○○ It must also seek alternate sources of trade, economic sustenance and cooperation. Pakistan must forge national solidarity and unity and prepare its multidimensional responses vis-a-vis the US presence in Afghanistan. Under no circumstances should it agree to fight the Afghan war on terror in Pakistan, again. ○○ Information operations are vital for perception management17 and to dispel false narratives. In this domain following needs to be done: ƒƒ

Under the umbrella of NACTA, specialised platform may be established to develop narratives18 to counter information onslaught against Pakistan.

ƒƒ

Establish Pakistan centre in leading think tanks to promote positive perception across the globe.

ƒƒ

Encourage academia to participate in international seminars and conferences, with a positive message from Pakistan.

○○ Foreign policy must have its objectives, priorities and red lines. Special emphasis be given to the foreign missions in Iran, KSA, India, USA, and Russia. ○○ Pakistan to remain relevant in Afghan peace equation through effective military diplomacy and security agreements. Moreover any Indian security role in Afghanistan be opposed.

── Military ○○ Pakistan should continue to focus on technological advancements to offset the conventional asymmetry. ○○ Build on existing military-to-military relations and forge new partnerships encompassing all areas of cooperation. ○○ Pakistan must continue to maintain its policy of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. ○○ Enhanced military regional countries.

diplomacy

with

○○ Exercise vigilance internally and in all relevant institutions to prevent and counter attempts by the hostile actors to develop such ‘rationales’ to constrain Pakistan’s strategic programmes. ○○ Terrorism and other sub-nationalist tendencies which can be exploited for conversion into proxies must be kept under watch. ○○ Pakistan should extend sincere desire for conflict avoidance and strategic restraint in South Asia. ── Internal Security. Domestically taking necessary measures to eliminate residual threat across the board by logically concluding operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad with enhanced focus and political will. ── Economic ○○ While CPEC offers a lifetime opportunity to Pakistan for its economic rise to thwart challenges, stakes of other countries in the project is recommended to be developed. ○○ Best practices for economic development must be institutionalised by taking correct decisions. ○○ Diversification in economic development. ○○ Domestic measures – anti corruption. In order to reduce dependency on IFIs, attention may be given to a progressive and self-sustained economic growth. ── Political. Ensuring good governance and building national consensus through an inclusive approach engaging all stake holders through dialogue and promotion of a strong national narrative. ─ ─ Legal Framework and Lawfare. Despite an increased Indian diplomatic clout which India maintains and as a consequence is able to garner more support internationally, Pakistan must continue to highlight contentious issues. Pakistan should also develop its expertise in understanding of international legal framework and using Green Book 2019

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lawfare as a means to achieve to desired ends. In this regard, it is suggested to establish an International Legal Framework Division under the foreign office to identify legal avenues which can be explored and utilised to counter Indian designs.

Conclusion Strategic challenges confronting Pakistan could be addressed through governance at home; geostrategic and geo-economic cooperation with China & Russia; substantive relations with US based on mutual concerns. A non-confrontational, dialoguebased and problem solving working relationship with India despite outstanding differences and developing mutual confidence with Afghanistan. Such an integrated approach could progressively limit India’s ability to use Afghanistan against Pakistan; improve Pakistan’s image and reduce US suspicion and Indian hostility. This under a strong and sincere leadership needs policy realism and imagination; a well-resourced and influential foreign service; and an intellectually active foreign policy community. These priorities will need to be embedded in a national transformation process. Notes 1. 2.

11.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belisarius Interview of Quaid by Margaret Bourke White, published as cover story of LIFE magazine January 1948, https://www.youlinmagazine.com/story/vision-ofthe-founding-father-quaid-i-azam-muhammad-ali-jinnah 3. Book, Monsoon. Penned by , Robert D Kaplan: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power 4. Article, India’s Hybrid Warfare and Pakistan’s Response, published on 25 May 2018 at https://nation.com.pk 5. Article, Pakistan – Iran vow to improve military ties by Baqir Sajjad Syed, published on July 17, 2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1420539 6. Article, Why Russia and China Are Strengthening Security Ties by Alexander Gabuav, published on September 24, 2018 at https://carnegie.ru/2018/09/24/ why-russia-and-china-are-strengthening-security-ties-pub-77333 7. Article, The China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beyond the Rule of Capital? by Aasim Sajjad Akhtar published on June 01,2018 8. Article, US’ Coercion and Pakistan by Imran Malik, Published in The Nation published on October 11, 2017 at https://nation.com.pk/11-Oct-2017/uscoercion-pakistan 9. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-worriedpakistans-nuclear-weapons-could-land-up-in-terrorists-hands-official/ articleshow/60220358.cms 10. Article, At 2+2 talks, India seeks US help in a new bid to enter NSG published on October 15, 2018 in Hindustan Times, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india-news/india-seeks-us-push-for-entry-into-nsg

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Article, US Sanctions on Pakistan and their failure as a Strategic Deterrent by Shublangi Pandey, published on August 1, 2018 at https://www.orfonline.org/ research/42912 12. Pakistan Economic Survey; Pakistan Foreign Debt and Liabilities Surged 14 per cent in FY18, Touch $ 95.097 billion https://profit.pakistantoday.com. pk/2018/08/16/pakistan-foreign-debt-and-liabilities-surged-14-percent-infy18-touch-95-09713. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303946910_HAMBANTOTA_ SRI_LANKA_CHALLENGES_IN_USING_A_%27NEW_CITY%27_PLANNING_ APPROACH_TO_REGIONAL_GROWTH_IN_DEVELOPING_COUNTRIES 14. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-beltandroad-quad/australia-us-india-and-japan-in-talks-to-establish-belt-and-road-alternative-reportidUSKCN1G20WGAustralia, U.S., India and Japan in talks to establish Belt and Road alternative: report February 19 2018. 15. Article, US Cyber Warfare against Pakistan, by Riaz Haq, published in Pakistan Defence on October 19, 2018 at https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/us-cyberwarfare-against-pakistan.135552/. 16. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Soverignity on Responsibility to Protect; published in December 2001 at https://www. lawfareblog.com/tagged/responsibility-protect-r2p. 17. Article, Shaping the Information Space by Douglas Dearth published in Volume 1, Issue 3 of Journal of Information Warfare 18. https://nacta.gov.pk/national-narrative/

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Exercise Peace Mission 2018, Heads of Armed Forces of SCO countries

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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVE FOR PAKISTAN

Shafqat Kakakhel is a former UN Assistant Secretary General, Deputy High Commissioner in New Delhi and High Commissioner in Nairobi. Presently he is Chairperson of Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) – Islamabad

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Abstract Climate Change is widely recognised as the defining challenge of our times and an existential threat to the planet and its inhabitants. The global consensus on climate change, including its causes and consequences, has been shaped and sustained by robust scientific research. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in the Brazilian city of Rio in June 1992 represents the quintessential statement of global consensus on climate change.1 UNFCCC has facilitated annual climate change conferences aimed at translating the objectives of the UNFCC into concrete measures. The security implications of climate change have received increasing attention following debates on the subject by the UN General Assembly and Security Council in 2007-8.2 The security-related impacts of climate change include declining fresh water leading to reduced food production; sluggish socio-economic development; heightened health hazards; internal displacement and migration, and intra-regional conflicts over distribution of natural resources jeopardising national unity. All these are relevant for Pakistan’s national security and, therefore, deserve due recognition and response. Keywords: Climate Change, Global Consensus on Climate Change, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement (2015), Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change, Adverse Effects of Climate Change, the Climate Change —National Security Nexus security as well as determined and coordinated actions to protect Pakistan’s socio-economic development from the ravages of climate change impacts. It also calls for strengthening the resilience of our people and the natural ecosystems to counter the risks posed by climate change. It also refers to the positive contribution of Pakistan defence forces to climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Global Consensus on the Drivers and Consequences of Climate Change The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as the Rio Summit) held in Rio

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Climate change is a threat resulting from human actions, in particular the huge increase in emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), especially carbon dioxide (CO2) caused by the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil for producing energy to drive large scale industrial and agricultural production and controlling severe cold weather

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C

limate change impacts can only be addressed through deliberate and concerted efforts at national level and regional and global cooperation underpinned by science and motivated by global solidarity. Whilst some impacts of climate change will be irreversible, mitigation of the drivers of global warming and adaptation to its negative consequences will enable the international community to reduce the damage caused by climate change. Climate change is a threat resulting from human actions, in particular the huge increase in emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), especially carbon dioxide (CO2) caused by the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil for producing energy to drive large scale industrial and agricultural production and controlling severe cold weather. The likely security implications of climate change have been discussed by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. The climate change- security nexus in relation to Pakistan’s national security has also been examined by official and independent Think Tanks and experts.3 This paper probes the likely implications of the negative effects of climate change on Pakistan’s national security according to both the traditional and contemporary definitions of national security. It calls for recognition of climate change as a key national and human security imperative in a new, comprehensive definition of Pakistan’s national

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(Brazil) in June 1992, states the global consensus on the causes and consequences of climate change and how the international community could address it.4 The negotiations leading up to the agreement on the Climate Convention were preceded by a number of high level conferences convened by UN agencies and the first report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the UN in 1988 to assess the global climate change and suggest response measures, issued in 1990.5 The UNFCCC recognised that human- induced climate change had taken place mainly due to the huge increase in the emissions of heat-trapping greenhouse gases (GHG), especially CO2, by the industrialised countries caused by the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas for producing energy for large scale production of goods as well as overcoming severe cold.

hurricanes, heat waves, and droughts; rapid melting of snow and ice stored by high altitude glaciers, as well as in the Arctic. Accelerated melting of ice and snow would trigger higher sea levels and in the long run cause diminished supply of fresh water. The UNFCCC recognised that the adverse effects of climate change would hit the developing countries the hardest and proclaimed the obligation of developed countries to provide finance, technology, and capacity building assistance to the developing countries so as to enable them to cope with the negative consequences of climate change and continue to achieve socio-economic development. The Convention established a conference of parties (known as COPs) to be held annually in order to legislate measures for enhanced international

It also recognised the impacts of climate change such as higher surface and ocean temperatures; rising sea level; increase in the number, frequency and intensity of extreme weather events like floods,

cooperation for stabilising the global climate through the implementation of the international commitments stipulated in the Convention. In 1997, the conference of parties held in the Japanese city of

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The UNFCCC recognised that the adverse effects of climate change would hit the developing countries the hardest and proclaimed the obligation of developed countries to provide finance, technology, and capacity building assistance to the developing countries so as to enable them to cope with the negative consequences of climate change and continue to achieve socio-economic development

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Kyoto adopted a protocol called the Kyoto Protocol whereby 38 industrialised countries agreed to slash their GHG emissions by 5% below the 1990 levels up to 2012.6 (The US failed to ratify the Protocol). Inter-governmental negotiations held at the COPs since 2009 aimed at a new post- 2012 Agreement made negligible progress owing to the apparent unwillingness of the developed countries to commit themselves to deeper cuts in their GHG emissions as well as to fulfil their commitment to provide financial, technology, and capacity building assistance to developing countries. Industrialised countries called for GHG reduction by rapidly developing countries such as China. Their negative disposition stiffened despite warnings by the IPCC based on the findings of scores of climate change centres in the developed countries that the pace of global warming had accelerated due to unabated increase in GHG emissions leading to a spike in climate-related extreme events in different parts of the world, especially in the developing countries and warranted strong global responses.7 Following protracted and deeply polarised negotiations, the UNFCCC COP held in Paris in December 2015 adopted a non-legally binding agreement called the Paris Agreement (PA) which reiterated the consensus achieved in 1992 and substantiated by scientific research that climate change represented “an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet” and pledged to “uphold and promote regional and international cooperation in addressing climate change.” The PA proclaimed the global goal of limiting surface and ocean temperature increase to less than two degrees Celsius (2°C) through reduction on voluntary basis by all countries in their GHG emissions. The reduction measures are to be listed and updated periodically in a document called “Intended Nationally Determined Commitments” (INDCs).8 The PA established several mechanisms for supporting developing countries, namely: ── Green Climate Fund. to which developed countries shall provide US$ 100 billion annually up to 2025 (prior to a new ceiling to be set before 2025).

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President Trump’s decision on US withdrawal from the PA and his relentless efforts to reverse the initiatives of the previous US Administrations to promote development of renewable energy and curb GHG emissions by various sectors within the US have caused a setback to global climate friendly actions

── The Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage. to support developing countries in coping with the damage and loss resulting from climate change impacts. ── Technology Mechanism. for promoting transfer of climate friendly technology to developing countries. ── Network of organisations. for promoting capacity building related to climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The various arrangements stipulated in the PA were to be operationalised through decisions of the COP no later than 2018.9 Whilst representing a success of multilateral diplomacy, the PA has been decried by scientists as an inadequate response to climate change. The removal of distinction between developed and developing countries that were a corner stone of the UNFCCC and the voluntary nature of GHG reduction pledges have also been criticised. The progress in finalising the operationalisation of the key provisions of the PA has been excruciatingly slow. It would not be less than a miracle if COP 24 in Poland in December 2018 is able to accomplish the unfinished agenda of operationalising the PA. President Trump’s decision on US withdrawal from the PA and his relentless efforts to reverse the initiatives of the previous US Administrations to promote development of renewable energy and curb GHG emissions by various sectors within the US have caused a setback to global climate friendly actions.10 China has increased its development and deployment of clean energy, phased out coal fired plants and taken other carbon reduction

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Global Discourse on Climate Change-Security Nexus The security dimension of climate change was recognised as far back as June 1988 by a major international climate change conference convened by the Canadian Government in Toronto on ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’. The conference had warned that changes in world climate “represent a major threat to international security”, adding that “the potentially severe economic and social dislocation for present and future generations would worsen international tensions and increase the risk of conflicts among and within nations”.12 However, the emphasis on the security implications of climate change was not echoed in the global discussions and negotiations on climate change. This was perhaps because influential countries did not wish to re-define the mandates of the UN Security Council and other inter-governmental processes concerning international peace and security. In 2007 the Security Council deliberated the security implications of climate change at which representatives of developing countries highlighted the threats to their security and in the case of island states to their very survival. The Security Council called on all UN agencies “to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its security implications”. It requested

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The spirit of global solidarity forged in Rio and renewed in Paris faces serious challenges leaving developing countries to fend for themselves

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Throughout the 21st century climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty alleviation more difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps

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measures. It has also pledged to promote enhanced international cooperation to reduce GHG emissions. Overall, there is a discernible decline in support for international cooperation for climate change among the OECD countries thanks to the recrudescence of narrowly defined nationalism in several European countries. The spirit of global solidarity forged in Rio and renewed in Paris faces serious challenges leaving developing countries to fend for themselves. There are encouraging signs of enhanced cooperation on climate change in various regions. However, in South Asia the initiatives launched under the umbrella of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have not made any significant headway, especially in view of the present Indian Government’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for SAARC.11

the UN Secretary General (UN SG) to submit a report on “the possible security implications of climate change’’ “at the next 64th session of the UN General Assembly” (in 2008). The UN SG’s report on ‘Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications’ noted that climate change could heighten human insecurity by threatening food security and human health by causing increased exposure to extreme events such as floods, droughts, storms, hurricanes etc. Second, it could slow down and reverse the gains of socioeconomic development, thereby undermining the ability of states to maintain internal peace and stability. Third, climate change could increase the risk of domestic conflict by triggering population displacement, involuntary migration, domestic conflict or violence related to competition for natural resources including water and land in Africa and South Asia. Fourth, climate change could cause loss of territory and statelessness, especially in the case of small island developing states as a result of sea-level rise and inundation. Finally, climate change could potentially cause conflicts between countries sharing trans-boundary water or other resources, e.g., in South Asia and Africa. The report specifically referred to the India-Pakistan Indus Waters Treaty and the need for “efforts…at all levels to ensure its continued effectiveness”.13 The UN SG’s report recognised that climate change could act as a “threat multiplier” that would exacerbate existing threats posed by persistent poverty, weak state institutions for resource management and conflict resolution, fault-lines and historic mistrust between communities and nations as well as inadequate access to information and resources. However, the report also listed a number of “threat minimisers” which could reduce climate-related insecurity such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, economic development, democratic governance, strong local and national institutions , international cooperation, preventive diplomacy and mediation, timely availability of information, and increased support for research and analysis to improve understanding of climate change—security inter-linkages. The report called for “a comprehensive, fair, and effective global agreement” that could help stabilise our climate,

With 80% of our staple grains dependent on irrigated farming, any reduction in water supply will cause a drop in food production and threaten our fragile food security

protect development gains, assist vulnerable nations adapt to climate change and build a more secure, sustainable and equitable society”. The General Assembly expressed support for the SG‘s recommendations.14 Significantly, the latest, fifth assessment report of the IPCC(2013-14) included a sub-section on the impacts of climate change on human security such as increased displacement of people due to lack of resources and extreme weather events in poor countries which could increase the risk of violent conflicts. The report also referred to the “trans boundary impacts of climate change such as changes in sea ice, shared water resources.” and warned that “throughout the 21st century climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty alleviation more difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps”.15 At the national level, the US and a few other countries have identified climate change as a national security imperative. The respected Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change comprising senior retired military officers (including Ex-Defence Secretary General Tariq Waseem Ghazi) of several countries has issued a number of reports underlining the security dimensions of climate change.16

The Impacts of Climate Change on Pakistan and their Security Implications Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate change is dictated by a host of geo-physical and man-made factors. The former include the country’s location in a pre-dominantly warm, sub-tropical zone with low average rates of precipitation (60% of the country receives less than 250 mm rain annually; only 24% get between 250-500 mm of rain); Pakistan’s arid land and soil conditions and seasonal variations in supply of water, the country’s critical dependence on surface water supplied by the Indus River System and the twice annual monsoons .

The main sources of Pakistan’s surface water are the melting of snow and ice melt in the high altitude Himalaya-Karakoram-Hindukush (HKH) regions and the monsoons. Both are highly vulnerable to climate change. Like all high-altitude glaciers those in HKH have experienced rapid recession. The indispensability of irrigation for Pakistan’s agriculture sector is a crucial determinant of its vulnerability given the likely decline (up to 25% according to some estimates) in surface water due to recession of glaciers and variable precipitation from the monsoons’ winds. With 80% of our staple grains dependent on irrigated farming, any reduction in water supply will cause a drop in food production and threaten our fragile food security.t Agriculture and Livestock sector contributes a fifth to our GDP; provide 40% of all jobs; supports livelihoods of the majority of our population in the rural areas; and nearly 80% of raw material for our largely agro-based exports. This is a serious source of vulnerability. Population explosion illustrated by a six-fold increase in population (from 32 million in 1947 to around 200 million at present) constitutes a major factor of vulnerability. Pakistan’s 1000 km long coastline exposes our coastal cities and communities to all the socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences of higher sea levels destroying human settlements and livelihoods and contaminating surface and ground water sources. Unabated de-forestation in Pakistan accentuates our vulnerability given the vital role of forests in restraining flooding and providing livelihoods. The non-physical causes of Pakistan’s climate-related vulnerability include: low rates of economic development leading to growing unemployment and poverty; inefficient and unaccountable governance; mismanagement of fiscal and other resources; endemic corruption; huge losses made by large state-owned and staterun enterprises; terrorism linked to Pakistan’s Green Book 2019

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involvement on conflicts in the region and religious The Human and National Security Impacts extremism; decaying physical infrastructure and of Climate Change decadent human resources; and unsatisfactory Pakistan’s national security narrative has, relations with neighbours warranting growing expenditure on defence exacerbate Pakistan’s by and large, emphasised the military dimension acute vulnerability to the disruptive and destructive given our seven decades long adversarial relations with India and our turbulent relations with effects of global warming and climate change. Pakistan’s macro-level fault lines which are Afghanistan. However, as articulated by our likely to be amplified by climate change impacts political leaders and armed forces’ chiefs as well such as rising sea level, recession of HKH glaciers, as national security experts and Think Tanks, our erratic monsoons, decline in availability and national security doctrine must include recognition deterioration of the quality of fresh water and of socio-economic development, human resources, the consequent decrease in already stagnant national health, the state’s capacity to deliver agricultural productivity, increase in the frequency justice, basic social amenities and timely relief to and severity of floods , droughts, hurricanes, heat people affected by floods, droughts, heat waves and waves and storms coupled with poor governance other extreme weather events as key determinants will further slowdown socio-economic development and paramount objectives of our national security. It is widely recognised that the adverse socioand make poverty eradication virtually impossible. The sectors especially sensitive to the adverse economic consequences of climate change would effects of climate change include: agriculture and make adequate military budgets in-feasible. livestock; energy production affected by non- Frequent extreme events such as floods and droughts would directly availability of water threaten vital military needed for hydroelectric and strategic assets and plants; health care; disaster prevention and A likely decline in the flows of the installations such as management capacity at Indus River due to climate change military cantonments; hydropower and nuclear national and provincial impacts is likely to accentuate tensions power generation levels; arid and semirailways, arid regions. These in Indo-Pak relations. Similarly, a capacities; roads and other adverse impacts will also decrease in the inflows of the Kabul transport infrastructure. exacerbate political and River originating in Afghanistan could These will necessitate social conflicts, including inter-regional and intracause additional strains in our accident- increasing involvement of our military forces regional differences.17 prone ties with Afghanistan in providing relief Nearly 80% of the assistance and waters of the Indus River Basin originate outside Pakistan, in Tibet rehabilitation of vital infrastructure which would plateau, in India, and in Afghanistan which mean thinning down their presence in sensitive makes continued access to trans-boundary rivers border regions and other locations. a national security imperative. A likely decline in Our defence forces can make invaluable the flows of the Indus River due to climate change contribution to efforts to alleviate the hardships impacts is likely to accentuate tensions in Indo-Pak caused by extreme weather events linked to relations. Similarly, a decrease in the inflows of the climate change, such as the 2010 country wide Kabul River originating in Afghanistan could cause floods and more recently the planting of ten million additional strains in our accident-prone ties with saplings by armed forces’ personnel on the specific Afghanistan.18 orders of the Army Chief as a corollary of the new government’s tree plantation campaign. The armed forces can also contribute to the mitigation of’ and adaptation to climate change in Pakistan through large scale afforestation, protection of water resources, especially the large lakes in Sindh and Punjab, from pollution caused by dumping of industrial, agricultural and municipal waste; climate friendly procurement, production and consumption practices by all defence enterprises; mobilisation of retired personnel for strengthening the resilience of communities threatened by climate disasters etc.

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Chief of the Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa initiated a nationwide plantation drive with the objective of planting 10 million trees

Pakistan‘s Response to Climate Change related Challenges The first significant initiative undertaken by Pakistan to address the challenges posed by climate change was the establishment, in October 2008, of a multi-stakeholder Task Force on Climate Change (TFCC) under the umbrella of the Planning Commission. The TFCC produced a comprehensive report in 2010 succinctly listing the negative effects of climate change on our key economic sectors, our communities, and animal and plant species and suggested a number of policy measures to alleviate them. In 2014, a National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) was developed enumerating over a hundred policy measures related to energy, water resources, food production, health, disaster prevention and management and coastal regions and the Indus Delta. The NCCP was largely anchored in the report of the TFCC. The Ministry of Climate Change formulated a National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) in 2012 but failed to promote its wide acceptance by the Federal and Provincial Governments.

The most significant climate change-related development is the enactment by our parliament in 2017 of a Climate Change Act. The Act provides for a potentially robust institutional architecture for addressing climate-related risks. It envisions the establishment of a National Climate Change Council (NCCC), headed by the Prime Minister or a Minister nominated by him and comprising the Chief Ministers of provinces and key federal ministers. The NCCC is mandated to approve national climate-related policies and coordinate their

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Pakistan has made considerable efforts to increase hydropower generation capacity; develop renewable energy resources such as solar and wind; and promote efficiency

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implementation. The Act also provides for the formation of a National Climate Change Authority (NCCA) to approve climate change programmes and projects, particularly those submitted for funding by the UN Green Climate Fund and other multilateral finance windows, including the International Finance Institutions (IFIs).The Act also calls for the establishment of a National Climate Change Fund for activities unlikely to receive funding from external sources.19 The previous Government had also decided to strengthen the Global Change Impact Study Centre (GCISC) as the country’s major climate-related Research and Development (R&D) Centre. The success of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa provincial Government’s Billion Tree Campaign is globally acclaimed. Apart from the initiatives specifically described as being climate change-related, Pakistan has made considerable efforts to increase hydropower generation capacity; develop renewable energy resources such as solar and wind; and promote efficiency in use of economic side energy. Pakistan’s environmental community has supported all these initiatives whilst criticising a number of large coal-based power projects, including those under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which has increased our historically low coal-base power generation capacity. Since 2010, Pakistan has established an elaborate institutional infrastructure comprising disaster risk reduction and management authorities at the federal and provincial levels and formulated comprehensive disaster-related strategies and plans of action. The speed of implementation of the disaster-related policies has been impeded by resource constraints.

The adoption of Pakistan’s first ever National Water Policy (NWP) based on the paradigm of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)

formulated by the Federal Government and endorsed by all the Provincial Governments in April 2018 constitutes a historic political and institutional development. It is a timely initiative given that almost all the impacts of climate change would affect the supply and quality of water. The NWP calls for a substantial increase in federal and provincial public sector investment in projects related to fresh water resources which had stagnated at low levels over the past several decades. It also calls for strengthening the institutional capacities of the state to conserve and develop our water resources in order to forestall a looming crisis of existential nature.20 A review of Pakistan’s climate change policy landscape calls out a number of deficits and fault lines. These include lack of harmony among different sectors and sectoral policies; lack of coordination and coherence between the federal and provincial governments; inadequate financial and human resources causing delay in the

Pakistan could face mass droughts by 2025 as water level near ‘absolute scarcity’ Rachel Roberts The Independent 15 September 2017

Pakistan could face drought in the near future, experts have warned in a fresh report: Unicef

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operationalisation of the mechanisms enshrined in the landmark National Climate Bill; and the inability of the Federal Ministry of Climate Change to promote country-wide policies on climate change owing to chronic fiscal and human resource limitations. Pakistan has neither been able to translate its NCCP into operational strategies and plans of action nor forged cooperative ties with China and other friendly countries able and evidently willing to support its climate change initiatives. The unprecedented emphasis laid by the newly elected Government on environmental protection has rekindled hopes for greater attention by the state and non-state stake holders to climate change adaptation and mitigation.

The Way Ahead In August 2013 the Government reconstituted the erstwhile Defence Committee of the Cabinet as the Cabinet Committee On National Security (CCNS) with a mandate to “frame a national security policy” that would focus on national security agenda with the aim to formulate a National Security Policy which will become the guiding framework for its subsidiary policies-defence Policy, foreign policy, internal security and other policies affecting national security. Subsequently a National Security Adviser was appointed and a National Security Secretariat was established. However, this far no comprehensive national security policy has been evolved. It is recommended that the Government consider the development of a detailed national security policy (NSP) to guide security-related initiatives. The NSP should, inter alia, recognise climate change as a key factor of national security in view of the profound implications of this multidimensional challenge on our critical economic sectors and our quest for sustainable development and poverty eradication. Such recognition will lend impetus to the coordinated implementation of the NCCP and help in reducing the adverse effects of climate change. Our defence forces should consider the formulation of a framework policy on their contributions to climate change mitigation and adaptation as a significant input to the formulation and implementation of Pakistan’s NSP. Government should make renewed efforts to promote cooperation with India, China, and Afghanistan on trans-boundary rivers and other climate related issues. Common challenges

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Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurating Tree Plantation Campaign

posed by climate change in South Asia, which could be addressed through greater regional cooperation include: rising temperatures; extreme weather events; glacier melting; sea level rise; infectious diseases; and black carbon. The achievement of this objective would necessitate strengthening of the capacities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and institutions entrusted to address climate changerelated actions. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy must integrate climate change imperatives in its core mandates and functions with a view to enhancing Pakistan’s contribution to the global climate change conferences and secure support from the international community for mitigation and adaptation efforts. Pakistan should make efforts to resuscitate the plans of actions approved by SAARC summit and ministerial meetings for enhanced cooperation in addressing climate change-related challenges, including food, energy, and health security as well as preventing and managing extreme events likely to be multiplied by climate change.

Conclusion The multiple adverse impacts of climate change and their undeniable implications on Pakistan’s human and national security cannot be countered by a “business as usual attitude” by the state and

The NSP should, inter alia, recognise climate change as a key factor of national security in view of the profound implications of this multi dimensional challenge on our critical economic sectors and our quest for sustainable development and poverty eradication

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non-state stake holders. Nor is this a sectoral issue to be handled by an inadequately resourced federal and equally crippled provincial climate change ministries and departments. What is urgently needed is a “whole of government approach” toward

climate change informed by scientifically credible knowledge and regularly updated data guiding efforts at local, provincial, and national levels augmented by robust regional and international cooperation.

Notes

11. Majaw, Baniateilang. Climate Change and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: a Regional Response. Volume 4, No 2, 2012 ISSN: 1309-8063 12. Bodansky, Daniel. The History of the Global Climate Change Regime. 1988. http:// graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/admininst/shared/docprofessors/luterbacher%20chapter%202%20102.pdf 13. United Nations General Assembly. Climate Change and its possible security implications. http://www.un.org. 2009. http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/ res_pdfs/ga-64/SGReport_on_Climate_Change_and_security.pdf 14. United Nations General Assembly resolutions on debate on Climate Change and its possible security implications Session A/64/350 15. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. http://www.ipcc.ch. 2013-2014. http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/ 16. Ghazi ,TariqWaseem.,Muniruzzaman A.N.M.,and Singh A.K.Climate Change and peace in South Asia Cooperating for peace. GMACCC Papers. 2016 17. Task Force on Climate Change.Planning Commission of Pakistan. 2010. http:// www.mocc.gov.pk/moclc/userfiles1/file/MOC/Publications%20on%20Env%20 and%20CC/Reports/TFCC%20Final%20Report%2019%20Feb%202010.pdf 18. Kakakhel, Shafqat. Afghanistan-Pakistan Treaty on the Kabul River Basin? thethirdpole.net. 2017. https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/03/02/afghanistanpakistan-treaty-on-the-kabul-river-basin/ 19. Pakistan Climate Change Act 2017. Islamabad. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/ documents/1491459994_555.pdf 20. National Water Policy 2018.Government of Pakistan.http://www.ffc.gov.pk/ download/AFR/National%20Water%20Policy%20-April%202018%20FINAL.pdf

1.

United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, unfccc.int,1992https:// unfccc.int/ resource/docs/ convkp/conveng.pdf 2. United Nations Security Council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate change on peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers. 17 April 2007. https:// www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm> United Nations General Assembly. General Debate of the 64th Session. September 2009. https://www.un.org/ga/64/ generaldebate/ 3. Kakakhel, Shafqat. Climate Change Impacts and Security Implications for Pakistan.Islamabad. Institute of Strategic Studies. 2016 4. United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, unfccc.int, 1992 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf 5. Climate Change the IPCC Scientific Assessment. www.ipcc.ch. 1990.https://www. ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_full_report.pdf 6. Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change. unfccc.int. 1997. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/kpeng.pdf 7. Climate Change 2014 Synthesis report. www.ipcc.ch. 2014. https://www.ipcc.ch/ pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf 8. Paris Agreement.unfccc.int. 2015.https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_ nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf 9. Ibid 10. Hai-BinZhanga, Han-ChengDaib, Hua-XiaLaic, and Wen-TaoWang. US. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, impacts, and China’s response. Volume 8, Issue 4, December 2017, Pages 220-225.

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CYBERSECURITY: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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Brigadier Dr Abdul Rauf is serving in Pakistan Army

Brigadier Dr Ashraf Masood, (Retired) is an Adjunct Faculty member at the Department of Information Security, Military College of Signals (MCS-NUST), Rawalpindi

Abstract The increasing reliance on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for routine tasks has intensified the sophistication and frequency of cyber-attacks manifolds. Apart from data leakage, financial losses and disruption of normal functioning of the digital infrastructure, cyber-attacks can also pose a pernicious threat to the national security, stability, economic vitality and public health. It is for this reason that cyberspace is believed to be the fifth dimension of military war, after air, water, land and space.1 Many countries across the world have also accepted cyber-attacks as a top national security threat and therefore the development of defensive and offensive cyber capabilities is fostered to cope up with this growing cyber peril. Pakistan, unfortunately, is busy in fighting an aggressive war against terrorism along with dilemmas of poverty, illiteracy, corruption etc Owing to this, cybersecurity has not been considered as an integral element of the National Security Policy of Pakistan. However, few initiatives have been taken at national and organisational level to curb cyber menace and build cybersecurity capacity in Pakistan. In an endeavour to improve the security of the national cyberspace, this document highlights the existing and emerging threats posed to Pakistan’s cyberspace. The comparative analysis of contemporary National Cybersecurity Strategies of leading countries has also been carried out, based on which recommendations are provided to improve national cyberspace security. This will ultimately guarantee national security from evolving cyber-attacks. Keywords: Cybersecurity, Pakistan’s Cyberspace, Threat Landscape, National Security, Cyber-attacks

Ms Narmeen Shafqat is Lecturer at the Department of Information Security, Military College of Signals (MCS-NUST), Rawalpindi

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he concept of National Security was originally confined to the military security or protection of country’s sovereignty against external military agents. However, with time, it has evolved to include some non-military aspects like human security, energy security, economic stability, cybersecurity, environmental security, freedom from political coercion etc Like Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has revolutionised all sectors (including finance, telecom, academia, energy, transport, government etc), nation-states have also employed ICT for the development of smart weapons, intelligence monitoring, data mining, emergency operations etc2 to enhance national security and public safety. However, this increasing reliance on Internet and ICT and the simultaneous increase in frequency of cyber-attacks, have now made cybersecurity one of the most crucial aspect of national security. In layman's terms, cybersecurity is referred to as the protection of IT systems from damage, the resident information from unauthorised access or modification and the network and e-services from being disrupted by the cyber-offenders. Thus, any deliberate exploitation of ICT systems, applications, e-services or network to gain unauthorised access, expose or alter data, disrupt online services etc, fall under the category of cyber-attack. Countries should therefore assume their responsibility for securing the fraction of the digital domain that they operate in, also referred to as the national cyberspace.

Effects of Cyber Attacks on National Security The Global Attack Timeline shown here depicts that the frequency of cyber-attacks has drastically increased over the recent years with attacks becoming deadly than ever. Today, cyber-attacks occur after every 39 seconds; sometimes causing breach of integrity, confidentiality and availability of data, and other times incurring heavy financial loss.

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Increasing reliance on Internet and ICT and the simultaneous increase in frequency of cyber-attacks, have now made cybersecurity one of the most crucial aspect of national security

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In layman's terms, Cybersecurity is referred to as the protection of IT systems from damage, the resident information from unauthorised access or modification and the network and e-services from being disrupted by the cyber-offenders

Cyber-attacks have even caused explosions in a furnace at German Steel Mill and a pipeline in Iranian Petro-chemical company in 2014 and 2016 respectively.

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According to Symantec’s Internet Security Threat Report, as more and more devices get connected, the average cost of a data breach will go beyond $150 million by year 2020.3 Few notorious cyber-attacks of the past have also raised extreme concerns about national security as well. The unprecedented wave of powerful attacks that hit national websites and IT systems of Estonia in 2007, exposed sensitive data and rendered many IT systems useless. Few years later, the Iranian Nuclear Facility was struck by “Stuxnet” attack. This attack utilised a specially crafted worm to infiltrate numerous computers in the facility and destroyed one-fifth of the nuclear centrifuges. The Stuxnet attack, if not stopped timely, could have wreaked havoc in Iran.4 Stuxnet destroyed one-fifth of Iran's Nuclear Centrifuges Explosion in Gas Pipeline of Marun Oil and Gas Production Company, Iran in July 2016 is believed to have been caused by cyber-attack.7

Also, a Saudi Energy Company “Aramco” was hit by the “Disttrack Wiper” Malware in 2016. It damaged around 30,000 computers and also caused two weeks of system unavailability in the company.5 With the passage of time, cyber-attacks grew more and more powerful. Furnace at a German Steel Mill blown up by cyber-attack. 6

These explosions caused by cyber-attacks are a threat to human lives as well. It is believed that the loss incurred by organised cyber-attacks can even exceed the loss caused by a natural calamity or physical terrorism.8

“Sophisticated and virtually untraceable political ‘hacktivists’ may now possess the ability to disrupt or destroy government operations, banking transactions, city power grids, and even military weapon system’’. Stephan Herzog, Security Expert In the worst scenario, cyber-attacks can also trigger inadvertent cyber wars between nations or groups. Hence, national security necessitates effective security of the national cyberspace. Green Book 2019

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Amid cyber-attacks, countries across the world have made cybersecurity an important constituent of their National Security Strategies. More than 50 countries, including USA, UK, Singapore, Estonia etc, have even formulated detailed National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSS) and have allocated massive budgets for national cybersecurity initiatives.

Paralysis of IT Systems

Inadvertent Cyber Wars

Panic / Cyber Terrorism

Effects of Cyber Attacks on National Security

Loss of Critical Information

Collapse of Critical e-services

Massive Financial Losses

Edward Snowden, a popular whistleblower revealed in year 2013 that National Security Agency (NSA, USA) is carrying out extensive surveillance of information infrastructure world wide.9 This revelation triggered the establishment of cybercapability and development of secure indigenous IT products in many countries.

Edward Snowden, NSA Whistleblower Despite escalating cyber risks to the national cyberspace, Pakistan has not paid heed to this critical issue of cybersecurity. According to the Guardian’s report, Edward Snowden claimed that Pakistan is the second most spied over country by NSA.10 In a report published by Microsoft in year 2015,11 Pakistan was reported to be the most malicious country of the world. Despite these revelations, Pakistan still has no National Cybersecurity Strategy, Cyber Regulatory Framework or dedicated government organisation responsible for securing the national cyberspace. With regard to the government’s commitment and dedication to cybersecurity, the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) ranks Pakistan at 67th position, as opposed to India at 23rd position.12 If cybersecurity is taken for granted for long, Pakistan may suffer deleterious security breaches, incidents involving cyber vandalism, massive financial losses and in the worst case, physical damage to IT infrastructure or casualties as well.

Emerging Cyber Threats to Pakistan The cheap access to Internet and increased utilisation of smart-phones in Pakistan have increased the usage of Internet in daily affairs, e-banking, e-commerce, academia etc, in the past couple of years. According to Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), Pakistan has around 47.5 million internet users (nearly 22% internet penetration rate).

Edward Snowden, NSA Whistleblower

Out of these Internet users (also called as netizens), 35 million people actively use social networking websites and applications like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp etc13 This has made the diameter of potential cyber threat scenario more sophisticated and complex than ever before.

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More than 50 countries, including USA, UK, Singapore, Estonia etc, have even formulated detailed National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCSS) and have allocated massive budgets for National Cybersecurity Initiatives

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has become a lucrative target for cyber-adversaries. Researchers consider Pakistan’s thriving IT sector and the recently introduced 3G/4G networks as the major future hotbeds for cyber-attacks in Pakistan.

Owing to the lack of cyberawareness amongst the masses and technical malpractices, Pakistan has become a lucrative target for cyberadversaries. Researchers consider Pakistan’s thriving IT sector and the recently introduced 3G/4G networks as the major future hotbeds for cyberattacks in Pakistan

Digital Snapshot - Pakistan (2018)

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Internet Stats of Pakistan, 201814 In the early twentieth century, the cyber risks posed to the national cyberspace of Pakistan were only confined to website defacements and smallscale hacking and intruding attempts carried out via malware infections. However, as the cyberattacks acquired momentum, the attack trend shifted to spamming (junk emails), phishing (lure victim to disclose sensitive information) and botnets (army of compromised devices) in 2005. Eventually the trend moved to Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs i.e. powerful stealth attacks) in 2010. Later in 2015, the attacks on cryptographic keys and digital certificates were increased. Currently, cyber espionage attacks carried out by foreign intelligence agencies are on the rise.15 Owing to the lack of cyber-awareness amongst the masses and technical malpractices, Pakistan

Population 210 Million

Internet Users 47.5 Million

Social Media Users 32 Million

Other cyber-attacks targeting Pakistan are likely to evolve from following domains in the near future: ── The increased usage of social technology/ networking apps will increase possibilities of abuse, misuse, data theft and identity theft. ── The existence of cryptocurrency miners (compromising victim PC to use it for running crypto-mining script) and social bots (bots controlling social networking accounts) are likely to emerge as well. ── The usage of mobile computing platforms for carrying out regular financial transactions

CYBER THREAT EVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN ATTACKS ON Social Technology Mobile Computing Critical Infrastructure Cloud Computing IoT Networks Trust Infrastructures Big Data

2010

Worms, Backdoor, Website Attacks

2000

Worms, Backdoor, Website Attacks

2015

2005

Botnets, Spams, Phishing, Session Hijacking

< 2000

Viruses, Password Crackers

Attacks on crypto keys & certi cates

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and weak Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies at work-environment will increase cross-platform attacks using botnets, drive-by exploits, malware, phishing etc. ── Critical Information Infrastructures of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet Exchange Points etc will be the focused target of cyber-attacks in near future, since the effect on cyber-attacks here can be incredibly disruptive. ── The growing trend of Cloud Computing and Internet of Things (IoT) in Pakistan is giving rise to a wave of attacks as well. Cloud computing involves a shared pool of computing resources for data storage etc, and hence cyber-attack on one party may affect other as well. The idea of Internet of Things (IoT) is to connect everyday computing devices e.g. TV, washing machine, lights etc with the Internet which ultimately increases the attack surface as well. ── Trust Infrastructures (i.e. ICT systems providing authentication services to establish secure communication) are also on risk. Thus, drive-by exploits, spear phishing, APTs, ineffective security controls etc, will be a matter of high concern in future. ── The growing trend of big data has also opened wide doors for crimes like data theft and manipulation. ── Researchers believe that hackers will make increased use of sandbox-evading malwares,

ransomwares and Artificial Intelligence (AI) powered attack tools to compromise IT systems in Pakistan. ── The growing global trend of ransomwares like WannaCry, Not Petya etc will be a matter of great concern for Pakistan as well.

Cyber Threat Landscape of Pakistan Cyber Threat Landscape of any country is referred to as the cyber-attack vectors (attack methods) and the cyber threat agents (adversaries) that harm the national cyberspace.16 Since the cyber activities go unchecked in Pakistan, the rate of cyber-crimes has dramatically increased in the recent years. This necessitates thorough understanding of the threat landscape of Pakistan in order to recommend effective measures to defend the national cyberspace.

Cyber Attack Vectors The cyber-perpetrators targeting Pakistan’s cyberspace generally make use of malware infections, especially Trojans and worms. These malwares help the attacker acquire unauthorised access to victim’s computer, gather sensitive information or disrupt normal operations of the IT systems. As already stated, the Microsoft’s Security Intelligence Report (Vol-19, 2015) highlights Pakistan as the most compromised country in the world with malware encounter rate (ER) of 45.1%, as opposed to world’s rate of 14.8%.17

Trends for the five locations with the highest encounter rates in 2015 (100,000 reporting computers minimum)

Encounter rate (percent of all reporting computers)

70%

Pakistan Indonesia Palestinian Authority Bangladesh Nepal

60%

50%

40%

30% Worldwide

20%

10%

0% 1Q15

2Q15

3Q15

4Q15

Pakistan with highest Malware ER (Microsoft Intelligence Report v. 19)18 156

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50

Pakistan

40

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Anti-Pakistan hackers frequently deface websites of government organisations, military etc, with racist, blasphemous, vulgar, politically subversive, or slanderous content, followed by actions like data theft, data manipulation

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Unfortunately, the malware encounter rate of Pakistan has continued to stay in the list of top five compromised countries of the world and it does not seem to reduce, until all netizens adopt secure cyber practices.

30

ER

20

World rate

10 0

2014

2015

2016

2017

Year

Today, cyber-criminals have made Electronic Forgery of mark sheets, certificates, currency notes, revenue stamps, etc a lucrative business. The increasing trend of Intellectual Property Crimes related to software piracy, infringement of

CYBER ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN BEFORE 2013

Pakistan with highest Malware ER (Results gathered from Microsoft Intelligence Report v. 19 to v22)19

Apart from malware infections, cyber-stalking is also a pervasive cyber nuisance in Pakistan. Around 80% of the cyber complaints reported to National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C) last year pertained to cyber-stalking of female community on Facebook/Twitter.20 This is often followed by incidents of cyber harassment or cyberbullying, where private pictures or conversations are leaked, and the victim is blackmailed. Mostly, Spam and Phishing Emails carrying malicious attachment or drive-by-download un-wittingly download malwares on victim’s system and help the attacker comprise it easily. Moreover, anti-Pakistan hackers frequently deface websites of government organisations, military etc, with racist, blasphemous, vulgar, politically subversive, or slanderous content, followed by actions like data theft, data manipulation, etc Unfortunately, the websites of PTA, Ministry of Railways, Supreme Court, Establishment Division etc have been hacked more than once, but are still insecure. The forthcoming cyber-attacks timeline depicts that there have been some security breaches in the history of Pakistan, that have exposed sensitive details of thousands of netizens and incurred financial losses as well. To add further, Dissemination of Offensive Material like sexually explicit content, racist propaganda etc on social media is also causing nuisance in Pakistan’s cyberspace. The Illegal Usage of cyberspace by terrorists and Interception of VoIP Gateways for international calling are also currently a menace.

2013

NBP E-Theft: Loss Rs 14 M Burj Bank (2012): DB leaked FBISE (2007): Result Leaked 1 day before NTC Server compromised (2010): 40 Government sites hacked

HEC:48k users DB leaked HBL: Employee DB leaked PKNIC: 23k accounts leaked PIA: E- Tickets of $7M stolen NADRA E.Sahulat: DB leaked

2014 - 15

2016

CTB Locker Ransomware: locked a Government site, loss of Rs 0.5 M

Warid: Customer DB leaked OpPakistani: 10 Government sites hacked, 23k bank records leaked

2017 - 18

HBL ATM Hacking: loss 10M, 579 customers affected WannaCry Ransomware: State Life Insurance, Shaukat Khanum Hospital etc affected Careem Data Leak: Details of 0.5 M Pakistanis exposed

Notorious Cyber-Attacks (less website defacements) copyrights, trademarks violations, etc, have also incurred huge financial losses to victims. Lastly, tides of Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism also present a horrid threat to the national cyberspace of Pakistan.

Cyber Threat Agents Threat Agent embodies all entities that can cause, spread, or support a cyber-threat/crime. Amongst these, the Indian state-sponsored hackers

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Homepage of NR3C, FIA21 are the most active adversary, Various Cyber Hacktivists (hackers with political agenda) also frequently deface government websites as protest against electricity load-shedding, high internet charges etc. Similarly, cyber espionage attempts conducted by Foreign Intelligence Agencies in search of information on sensitive domestic data, nuclear programmes, trade secrets etc, are also very alarming. Since cyber crime legislation, “Prevention of Electronic Crime Act 2016”, is not strictly enforced in the country, therefore cyber-offenders are free to commit cybercrimes. The insiders/employees often misuse their privileges and exfiltrate sensitive information from companies’ computers. Similarly, competitors are in a continuous struggle to get competitive advantage over their rivals through offensive tactics e.g. hacking, electronic vandalism, social engineering intelligence etc. Moreover, Scammers, APT Agents, script kiddies, crackers and Cyber Jihadis (particularly Al-Qaeda) are also harming the national cyberspace by regularly launching cyber-attacks. Since the use of IT is not widespread in Pakistan, therefore the rate of cybercrimes is significantly lower than in the first-world countries. However, the absence of cyber accountability and prevalence of cyber malpractices are likely to increase the cybercrimes beyond bounds in near 158

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future. The government should, therefore, adopt a pragmatic approach for reducing the cyber-attack surface; else national security will be at risk as well.

Cybersecurity Initiatives taken in Pakistan Since cybersecurity is not a matter of utmost importance for Pakistan, no National Cybersecurity Coordinating Body has ever been created. NR3C working under Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) is addressing cyber-crimes in the country. Also, the National Telecom and Information Technology Security Board (NTISB), a wing of Cabinet Division has been made responsible for advising government on cybersecurity Issues and carrying out security assessment of IT products to be used in government organisations.

Cyber Laws In the absence of any dedicated Cybersecurity Strategy, the Government of Pakistan has extended the applicability of various computer and internet related laws to govern and regulate the national Cyberspace.22 The Section 54 of Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act 1996 and Surveillance 101/ Fair Trial Act 2013 allow state and military to conduct online surveillance in “the interest of national security”. The National IT Policy and Action Plan issued in 2000 partially dealt with

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child online safety, provided minimum encryption standards, encouraged digital signatures and setting up of a local mail exchange. Moreover, the e-commerce and e-banking industry of Pakistan abide by the Electronic Transaction Ordinance (ETO-2002) and Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfer Act 2007. The electronic and broadcast media are regulated in Pakistan through the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA Ordinance 2002, 2007). Furthermore, Laws for Child Online Protection are enacted through Section 293 of Pakistan Penal Code, while online cases of slander, libel and blasphemy are dealt with The Defamation Ordinance (2002, 2004) and Sections 295 and 298 of Pakistan Penal Code.

regularly evaluate online content. Since then, blasphemous sites, pornographic material and anti-state links are regularly blocked.24

Incident Management Capabilities To deter national cyber-attacks, Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) like Pak CERT (2001), Pisa CERT (2009), and NUST CERT (2013) were established at national, private and academic levels. However, none of them is operational now. Currently, cyber-crimes are reported to NR3C through online portal and cyber hotline. The respective forensic investigations are carried out by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency and Digital Forensics Science Laboratory.25

National Cybersecurity Awareness Initiatives

Cybercrime Legislation In the past, cyber-criminals were penalised through legislations like Electronic Crimes Act 2004 and Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance (PECO 2007 and 2009). Today cyber-crimes are dealt under Prevention of Electronic Crime Act (PECA, 2016). PECA provides penalties for almost all major electronic crimes, cyber terrorism and cases of child pornography. However, it has not been strictly enforced as yet, owing to the unavailability of pertinent investigation infrastructure and lack of training of judges on various cyber laws.

E-Regulations Apart from these IT laws, the government has also issued several e-regulations23 like Net Café Regulation, Retention of Internet logs (for record), Monitoring of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP 2009, 2013), Protection from Spam and obnoxious communication (2009), SMS Filtering (2011), Internet & E-Mail Policy for Government Departments (2009, 2011) etc Also, an InterMinisterial Committee was formed in 2006 to

Government organisations, including State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), PTA, NTISB etc, have issued Cybersecurity Guidelines for creating cyber-awareness amongst their employees and regularly trains them in the field of Information Security (IS) as well. Public and private sectors organisations (particularly NR3C and PISA) and Civil Protection Agencies, have organised Awareness Seminars and campaigns to raise cyber-awareness amongst the masses.26 Academic institutes also play their part by organising cybersecurity conferences on annual or bi-annual basis.

Cybersecurity Manpower Development Currently, no cybersecurity education is provided in schools and colleges of Pakistan. At undergraduate level, few institutions like NUST and COMSATS are already offering specialised IS subjects (e.g. Digital Forensics, Network Security etc) as part of few BE degrees (e.g. Software Engineering, Computer Science etc). However, Air University and UET Taxila will be the first to

Cyber Secure Pakistan (CSP) Awareness Seminar (February 2018)

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introduce Cybersecurity Degree Programmes at undergraduate level this year. MS/PhD programmes in cybersecurity are currently offered in several academic institutes in twin cities like NUST, Riphah University, COMSATS, CASE, Air University etc NR3C has also started Cybersecurity Scouts Initiative to train students in order to combat cyber-crimes at the grass-root level.27 To build cyber capacity, NIMIS, MCSNUST, Riphah University, NR3C and Institute of Cybersecurity (ICS) conducts Cybersecurity Training Programmes for students and professionals on regular basis. Cybersecurity Research Centres particularly Pakistan Research Center for Cyber Security (PRCCS), Centre for Network-Centric Technologies (CENTech) etc have been established to promote development and usage of secure indigenous IT products in Pakistan. Fortunately, CENTech has been successful in certifying Pakistan’s first ever crypto module “Tahir Pak Crypto Library” (TPCL) from Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS).28 Recently, National Centre for Cyber Security (NCCS) has been established in Pakistan to conduct Research and Development (R&D) on IoT security, Block chain, Quantum Technology, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), development of secure indigenous IT products, protection of critical infrastructure, etc.

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IS Service and Certification Providers Few public and private sector organisations of Pakistan including Ebryx, Trillium, Tranchulas, Security Experts, i2C, MTBC, TransICT etc are already providing IS services (cyber risk mitigation, vulnerability assessment, forensic analysis, security audit etc) and consultancy to few national as well as international organisations.29

National and International Collaborations for Cybersecurity Pakistan has no government-approved venture or framework for the exchange of cybersecurity assets (people, processes, tools) with the national or international community. However, there exists a collaborative project, PISA R3C that promotes public-private partnerships (PPP) to enhance national cyber skillset and resources. With regard to International Cooperation, Pakistan has collaboration with ITU-IMPACT, Digital Crimes Consortium of USA, ICANN, G8 High Tech Crime Network (HTCN) etc and Global CERTs like APSIRCWG and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC-CERT).30 For a country like Pakistan, having netizens amounting up to 47.5 million and potent cyber enemies, there is a dire need to secure the cyberspace to ensure that communication, e-commerce and other electronic services run smoothly and efficiently.

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Timeline of Leading National Cyber Security Strategies 3

Version of NCSS

USA

2

Canada,

USA

Estonia

Germany

UK

France, Finland

1

USA

Canada, Estonia, Finland UK

0

2001...

Austria,

France, Germany, New Zealand

2010

2011

UAE

India, Japan,

Singapore

Saudi Arabia

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Year The measures taken so far show a positive trend for introducing cybersecurity in the country but are inadequate compared to the drastic increase in state-sponsored cyber-attacks happening these days.

Cybersecurity Strategies in Contemporary Countries Today, more than fifty countries have formulated National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSS)31 and regard cyber-attacks as a top-tier national security threat. In the recent Cybersecurity Ranking Document issued by ITU,32 NCSS of Canada, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Singapore, UK and USA have been particularly acknowledged. Owing to continuously changing threat spectrum, countries, especially UK, USA, Estonia etc, have even published subsequent versions of their NCCS.

Objectives stated in NCSS NCSS defines action plan of a country for addressing the national cybersecurity challenges. Most NCSS share common goals33 such as the

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creation of secure/resilient cyberspace, security of critical cyber assets, formulation of cybersecurity legislative framework, raising cyber-awareness, develop indigenous IT products, establish CERTs, promote public-private/international partnerships etc However, despite similar objectives, the country’s varying cyber threat landscape, level of cyber-consciousness, socio-political conditions, etc34 have brought significant variations in the preventive, defensive and offensive approaches adopted by each country.35

Diverse Understanding of Key Terms Owing to the absence of globally harmonised definitions, countries have self-defined key terms like cybersecurity, cyberspace, cybercrimes etc For instance, scanning/probing is considered an offence in Germany, but not in USA.36 The definition of cyberspace also varies across the countries. For instance, Australia, Spain, Germany, Canada, New Zealand etc perceive cyberspace as a network of all ICT devices connected with Internet only.37 However, USA, UK, France, Turkey etc also include all other virtual/physical ICT devices in their definition of cyberspace. These

The definition of cyberspace also varies across the countries. For instance, Australia, Spain, Germany, Canada, New Zealand etc perceive cyberspace as a network of all ICT devices connected with internet only. However, USA, UK, France, Turkey etc also include all other virtual/ physical ICT devices in their definition of cyberspace

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Lead Responsible Authority for Cybersecurity Majority of the countries including Canada, India, Malaysia, Turkey, Austria, Spain, Germany etc have given the responsibility of cybersecurity to one of their existing ministries (IT, Interior, Law or Defence). However, Estonia and France, have created new coordinating bodies, which centrally deal with cyber-threats and attacks.39

Security Incident Management 103 countries all over the world provide incident management capabilities at national level through CERTs. However, the goals and efficacy of these CERTs vary considerably, owing to varying expertise of incident handlers, inadequate funds, and the cyber threat landscape of the country.40

Cybersecurity Capacity Building To increase cyber-workforce, all NCSS promote research and education in cybersecurity and emphasise on the need for security certifications/ trainings for IT professionals. Cyber-Awareness Campaign conducted in USA Every October42

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To create cyber-consciousness amongst the masses, UK, Malaysia and Australia run national programmes like “Get Safe Online”, “Cyber Safe”, “Stay Safe Online” respectively

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varying perceptions of cybersecurity make it hard to adopt a holistic approach for addressing cyber issues worldwide.38

R&D on Cybersecurity To prevent the inherent vulnerabilities of IT products being exploited by adversaries, almost all countries have established national R&D centres to develop secure indigenous IT products and sponsor pertinent industrial/academic projects.

Cybersecurity Cooperation The NCSSs of Canada, Australia, UK, Saudi Arab and Netherlands have specifically emphasised upon effective incessant interstate collaboration with telecom vendors/operators and private sector organisations who own most of the internet infrastructure. On similar lines, the NCSS of Australia, Germany, UK and USA have also mentioned actionplans to improve global cooperation.43

NCSS Evaluation Framework Most countries have mentioned review frameworks in NCSS to frequently evaluate the progress of NCSS after certain years and revise it accordingly. Other NCSSs have provided review mechanisms as a separate act. In reality, very few countries have practically endeavoured to achieve the stated objectives and have, therefore, updated the first version of NCSS.

Analysis and Discussion

To create cyber-consciousness amongst the masses, UK, Malaysia and Australia run national programmes like “Get Safe Online”, “Cyber Safe”, “Stay Safe Online” respectively. US and Austria have gone one step ahead by annually observing “Cybersecurity Month”.41 Netherlands and Turkey in their NCSS have also emphasised on making cybersecurity part of all academic curriculums. 162

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Amid exponentially increasing cyber-attacks, cybersecurity has become the highest national priority worldwide. Countries today understand cyber-attacks can cause data leakage, massive financial loss, business interruption, physical damage etc and can thus affect national security as well. However, Pakistan has always shown apathy over this grave issue of cybersecurity. The past Governments being oblivious to the deleterious impacts of security breaches too believed that since Pakistan is lagging in the race of technology, the existing security controls are adequate to secure the national cyberspace. Today, cyber unconsciousness amongst the internet users and the uncertain cyber regulatory environment have made Pakistan’s cyberspace an ideal arena for various cyber offences. Cyber malpractices particularly usage of obsolete Windows XP and Win7 by 20% computer

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users,44 downloading movies/cracked software from Torrent, usage of proxies to circumvent blocked content, keeping easy passwords, allowing browser to remember credentials, ignoring Software Privacy Policies, not updating software/ tools frequently etc, have made Pakistan the most compromised country of the world. Microsoft Intelligence Report v22 reveals that 84% of the computer users in Pakistan do not even use antivirus solutions,45 the Chinese companies such as Huawei, Lenovo and ZTE Corporations that have been blacklisted by western governments for the inherent vulnerabilities in their products/ infrastructure are surprisingly in use by most of the telecom companies of Pakistan. Had there been any severe security breach accompanied by heavy financial loss to the state in the past or any major incident compromising national security, the government would not have taken cybersecurity for granted.

Are Current IT Laws and E-Regulations adequate to address Issues of Cybersecurity and National Security? As already discussed, the government has extended the applicability of IT laws to address major cybersecurity Issues. However, these laws only deal with the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the data and ignore aspects of authentication and non-repudiation, and the emerging cyber risks. Moreover, despite the fact that our cyber threat landscape is unique to us. Law-makers need to understand that ineffective or irrelevant laws will not secure the cyberspace and all efforts to strengthen the national security will still be in vain. Private and Civil agencies have often endeavoured to provide a draft of NCSS to government, however, these have been turned down on political grounds, despite negligible shortcomings. Weak enforcement mechanisms owing to shortage of acceptance of Presidential Ordinance (i.e. six weeks from the date of its promulgation) is another reason why  no cyber draft has ever reached the implementation phase. Even if a law is promulgated (e.g. PECA 2016), it is not strictly enforced, nor updated after a certain period of time. It is because of this uncertain cyber regulatory environment in the country that many international companies, especially E-bay, PayPal, Amazon etc, are not willing to provide e-commerce services in Pakistan. The unsupervised internet

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access to terrorists and anti-state agents and their continuous struggle to harm the national security necessitates an urgency to deploy a powerful content filtering system at the Internet and telecom exchanges. However, owing to the nagging fear that politicians will use nationalism and religion as a blanket for justifying the personal vendetta through internet surveillance and censorship, the idea of deploying content filtering system has always been met with massive uproar from media, vehement online campaigns by civil societies and ubiquitous condemnation in the form of street agitation. The terrorists are hence still free to communicate in the national cyberspace of Pakistan which is an absolute horrid threat to both; cyberspace security as well as national security. The basic solution to all the problems is the implementation of a well-defined cybersecurity governance, legislative and regulatory framework, as discussed in detail under “Recommendations” section.

Impact of National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Measures undertaken in Past As elaborated before, few public and private sector organisations, especially PISA, NR3C, etc, have often endeavoured to hold Cybersecurity Workshops, awareness seminars and training sessions in major cities of Pakistan. However, being technical in nature, their efforts could not make much impact for the regular computer users. Also, cybersecurity guidelines issued by certain organisations for their employees and customers was a good step for promoting cybersecurity culture, but owing to the weak enforcement mechanisms, the guidelines have always been bluntly ignored. Moreover, the lack of expertise, budget and accountability have exacerbated the capabilities of the existing law enforcement agencies to handle cybercrimes. FIA, for instance, does not have the required human resource and capacity to deal with cybercrimes executed by hackers through freely available proxies, such as TOR.46 The ‘PakCERT’ and “PISACERT” established with the aim of bolstering incident management capabilities, are also not operational owing to lack of budget and expertise.

Today, cyber unconsciousness amongst the internet users and the uncertain cyber regulatory environment have made Pakistan’s cyberspace an ideal arena for various cyber offences

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Cyber education is not provided up to undergraduate level in Pakistan. The MS/PhD programmes being offered in Pakistan are confined to twin cities i.e. Islamabad and Rawalpindi only. In order to build its own cyber-army, there is a dire need to make cyber education ubiquitous nationwide. With a strong cyber-workforce, Pakistan can definitely defend its national cyberspace and ultimately enhance national security too. Recommendations A country lacking cyberspace security offers an attractive target for cyber-perpetrators, and hence pose threat to its national security as well. Like other countries, Government of Pakistan should, therefore, consider cybersecurity as its toptier national priority. Accordingly, cybersecurity should be treated as the shared responsibility of everyone within the cyberspace and significant national budget should be allocated for developing and implementing cybersecurity capabilities at the national level. Till the time an effective cybercrime legislation is prepared, existing legislation i.e. PECA 2016 should be strictly enforced in the country in order to create effective cyber deterrence. Next, the Government should form an interim team comprising of one member from each; Ministry of Information Technology (MoIT), Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Law & Justice, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanied by few cybersecurity experts. The team will be responsible for formulating a comprehensive “Cybersecurity Governance Framework” in a period of 1 month. This framework shall clearly define role, responsibilities, authority and accountability for each stakeholder that needs to be included in the national supervisory body for cybersecurity (discussed in next para). In this regard, fair commitment of all national stakeholders including telecom providers, government, financial institutions, military, civil society, judiciary, religious leaders etc should be encouraged.

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Once the framework is ready, a National Cyber Security Council (NCSC), a supervisory body to address national cybersecurity issues, and oversee planning, implementation and evaluation of cybersecurity initiatives shall be established. For effective operation, NCSC can be divided into five major divisions. The National Cybersecurity Policy Division and Cyber Crime Division can formulate cyber laws (especially NCSS) and apprehend cybercriminals while the technical counterparts i.e. National Cybersecurity Capacity Building Division and the Cyber Incident Management Division shall endeavour to increase cyber-workforce of Pakistan and improve cyber-attack detection and responsiveness respectively. Lastly, National Cybersecurity Advisory Body comprising of separate technical, operational, policy and industry groups, shall put forward their consolidated recommendations on the performance of the other four divisions of NCSC.

r icy be Pol y C ity on i ur ivis c Se D

Cyber Security Advisory Body

C C yb Di rim er vis e ion

National Cybersecurity Council (NCSC)

Cyber Capacity Building Division

Cyber Incident Management Division

Proposed NCSC Organogram In order to ensure digital continuity and protection from cyber-attacks, Pakistan needs to implement an appropriate “Cybersecurity Technology Framework” as well. Accordingly, critical organisations shall discourage BYOD policy, restrict removable media, ban downloading and usage of cracked software etc Furthermore, to cope up with cyber delinquency and thwart cyber-attacks rampant in the national cyberspace, the creation and enhancement of cyber incident recognition, preparedness, response and recovery capabilities at national and organisational levels in the form of a 24/7 national and sector-specific CERTs should be encouraged. A cybersecurity hotline can be created where netizens can report confronted cyber irregularities immediately.

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C org (nat ERT an ion isa al/ tio na l)

National Cyber Incident Management

In Th tel re lig at en ce

Digital Forensic Investigation

Cyber Drills

rly Ea ning r wa ystem S

ical e Crit ructur t as on Infr rotecti P

Proposed National Cyber Incident Management Model Moreover, to lessen the rate of growing cybercrimes in the country, content filtering software for internet traffic and SMS shall be deployed at Internet Exchanges. However, to ensure that the conversations are only lawfully intercepted and privacy rights of the citizens are not invaded, the surveillance committee (i.e. government and intelligence agencies) shall be made accountable to a court body. To further stop terrorist moves in the cyberspace, all websites providing facility of Internet SMS shall be banned. With the Internet SMS service, anyone can send message to any victim without revealing his identity. The activities of cyber cafes shall also be strictly checked and only registered Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) shall be allowed. Similarly, to prevent foreign surveillance and malicious eavesdropping and to confine domestic information within the national cyberspace, it is recommended to perform security assessment of all IT products, search engines, social networking websites/applications etc All privacy invading applications shall be replaced with secure indigenous alternatives at priority until indigenous solutions are developed. Moreover, all national information systems, software and services reliant on obsolete OS or web browser should be updated at priority. The IT products of telecom vendors such

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A cybersecurity hotline can be created where netizens can report confronted cyber irregularities immediately

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Moreover, to access and enhance IT operator’s readiness and responsiveness to cyber incidents, national cybersecurity exercise programmes shall also be annually conducted. If a Threat Information Sharing Centre is also established, it would facilitate the exchange of sensitive and classified cyber threat information between government and stakeholders.

as Huawei, Lenovo and ZTE Corporation, that have been blacklisted by the western governments, should be thoroughly assessed for inherent vulnerabilities. Like military forces are trained to improve the physical security of the country, a strong cyberarmy or cyber-workforce should also be created by: ── Intensifying cyber-consciousness among the public, law enforcement agencies and judiciary regarding incident reporting and basic cyberspace security checks and practices. Like US, UK and Malaysia, the government should also organise a national cyber-security week or day. ── Organising cybersecurity trainings to enhance and perpetuate the technical and operational capabilities of IT professionals. ── Promoting national cybersecurity degree programmes to meet the scarcity of cyber experts. Also, organise hacking competitions, summer camps, internship programmes in cybersecurity to entice more students towards this domain. ── Incorporating cybersecurity course in the curriculum of all grades from primary to doctoral programmes, tailored according to their needs. ── Stimulating active R&D on cybersecurity and facilitating the development, implementation, and commercialisation of secure indigenous IT products in order to attain national selfsufficiency in cybersecurity. ── Developing credible cybersecurity certification and accreditation programmes for evaluating the competence of technical workforce and national IT infrastructure.47 ── Establishing cohesion at national level by encouraging exchange of cybersecurity expertise, threat intelligence etc. Similarly, avenues for developing bilateral and multilateral relations with regional partners (China, Iran, Turkey etc) and emerging cyber powers (USA, UK, Germany, France, Estonia etc) shall be explored. Cooperation should also be extended to Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Organisation for Security and Council in Europe (OSCE), Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Green Book 2019

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South Asian Association Cooperation (SAARC).

for

Regional

── Cases involving foreign cyber-offenders shall be strictly dealt with in order to strengthen national security e.g. taking aggressive diplomatic and economic measures against those countries, curtailing visas of its citizens, penalising the cybercriminals etc. Moreover, since Indian hackers deface our websites on daily basis, it is recommended to form a committee that performs security assessment of websites of all major organisations regularly. The inadvertent cyber wars with India can be prevented in the future by developing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and cyber rules of game.48

Training Awareness

Partnerships

Education

Certification

Accreditation

StandardResearch ization

Cybersecurity Capacity Building Lastly, there is a need to incorporate the principle of agility by subjecting the NCSS to regular reviews after every two to three years. The input from industry shall be solicited in order to keep pace with the technological advances and increasing cyber risk sophistication. While formulating NCSS for Pakistan, these recommendations can be considered to guarantee cyberspace security as well as national security.

Conclusion In the recent years, cyber-safety has become one of the top-level national concern worldwide. However, our government seems oblivious to, and undeterred by, the grave issue of cybersecurity and its debilitating effects on the national security. Before the cyber-attacks overwhelm our national security, the government needs to 166

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consider cybersecurity as an essential constituent of its National Security Policy, formulate a sound National Cybersecurity Strategy and take other defensive measures outlined in the document to make the national cyberspace secure, robust and profitable for the Pakistani citizens, government and business to conduct daily activities smoothly. Notes 1.

Kovács, László. “National Cybersecurity as The Cornerstone of National Security”. Land Forces Academy Review 23, no. 2 (2018): 113-120. doi:10.2478/ raft-2018-0013. 2. Demchak, Chris. “Introduction to MCA Issue, “Cyber, Economics, And National Security””. Military Cyber Affairs 3, no. 1 (2018). doi:10.5038/23780789.3.1.1042. 3. Milkovich, Devon. “12 Alarming Cybersecurity Facts And Stats | Cybint”.Cybint Solutions - A BARBRI Company, 2018. https://www.cybintsolutions.com/ cyber-security-facts-stats/. 4. Singh, Ajeet, and Anurag Jain."Study of Cyber Attacks on Cyber-Physical System".SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3170288 5. Bisson, David. “Shamoon 2: Nothing Whets Disttrack’s Appetite Like Destroyed Data”. The State of Security, 2016. https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/ security-data-protection/cyber-security/shamoon-2-nothing-whets-disttracksappetite-like-destroyed-data/. 6. RT. “Cyberattack on German Steel Mill Inflicts Serious Damage”, 2014. https:// www.rt.com/news/216379-germany-steel-plant-hack/. 7. Paganini, Pierluigi. “Iran Investigates Possible Cyber Attacks Behind A String Oil Industry Incidents”. Security Affairs, 2016. https://securityaffairs.co/ wordpress/50415/security/iran-cyber-attacks-fires.html. 8. Global Risks 8Th Edition. World Economic Forum, 2013. http://www3.weforum. org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf. 9. Greenwald, Glenn, and EwenMacAskill. “Boundless Informant: The NSA’s Secret Tool To Track Global Surveillance Data”. The Guardian, 2013. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-globaldatamining?CMP=twt_gu#_. 10. Ibid 11. Microsoft Intelligence Report V19. Microsoft, 2015. http://download.microsoft. com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_ Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_English.pdf. 12. Global Cybersecurity Index. International Telecommunication Union, 2017. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/GCI.aspx 13. PTA Annual Report. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), 2017. https://www.pta.gov.pk/en/annual-reports. 14. Ibid 15. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology (MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016. 16. ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2017.European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), 2018. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/ publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2017. 17. Microsoft Intelligence Report V19. Microsoft, 2015. http://download.microsoft. com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_ Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_English.pdf. 18. Ibid 19. Microsoft Intelligence Reports (V19 To V23). Microsoft, 2018. https://www. microsoft.com/en-us/security/intelligence-report. 20. Shahid, Jamal.”Cyberstalking: New Challenges”, 2014. http://www.dawn. com/news/1078417 21. “National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C – FIA)”, 2018. http://www. nr3c.gov.pk/index.html. 22. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology (MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016. 23. Ibid 24. Haque, Jehanzaib. Pakistan Internet Landscape.Bytes for All, 2018. https:// content.bytesforall.pk/sites/default/files/MappingReportFinal%20-%20 Published.pdf. 25. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology (MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016. 26. Ibid 27. Ibid 28. “Certificate Detail - Cryptographic Module Validation Program | CSRC”. Csrc.Nist.Gov, 2018. https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-modulevalidation-program/Certificate/1962. 29. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology (MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016. 30. Ibid 31. “Cybersecurity Strategy Documents”.CCDCOE, 2018. https://ccdcoe.org/ strategies-policies.html. 32. Global Cybersecurity Index.International Telecommunication Union, 2017. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/GCI.aspx

PAKISTAN ARMY 33. Luiijf, Eric, Kim Besseling, MaartjeSpoelstra, and Patrick de Graaf.”Ten National Cybersecurity Strategies: A Comparison: Critical Information Infrastructure Security”. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) Volume 6983: Springer, 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261987241_ Ten_National_Cyber_Security_Strategies_a_Comparison_Critical_ Information_Infrastructure_Security. 34. Lehto, M. “The Ways Means and Ends in Cybersecurity Strategies”. Proceedings of the 12th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security.:ProQuest, 2013. 35. Shafqat, Narmeen, and Ashraf Masood.”Comparative Analysis of Various National Cybersecurity Strategies”.International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security 14 (2016). https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/vol-14no-1-jan-2016. 36. National Cybersecurity Framework Manual. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence., 2012. https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/national-cybersecurity-framework-manual.html. 37. Alliance, BSA. “Asia Pacific Cybersecurity Dashboard”. 2015 BSA APAC Cybersecurity Dashboard, 2015. http://cybersecurity.bsa.org/2015/apac/index. html. 38. Shafqat, Narmeen, and Ashraf Masood.”Comparative Analysis of Various National Cybersecurity Strategies”.International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security 14 (2016). https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/vol-14no-1-jan-2016. 39. Štitilis, Darius, PauliusPakutinskas, and Inga Malinauskaitė. “EU and NATO Cybersecurity Strategies and National Cybersecurity Strategies: A Comparative

Analysis”. Security Journal 30, no. 4 (2016): 1151-1168. doi:10.1057/s41284-0160083-9. 40. Shafqat, Narmeen, and Ashraf Masood.”Comparative Analysis of Various National Cybersecurity Strategies”.International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security 14 (2016). https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/vol-14no-1-jan-2016. 41. Min, Kyoung-Sik, Seung-Woan Chai, and Mijeong Han.”An International Comparative Study on Cybersecurity Strategy”. International Journal of Security and Its Applications9, no. 2 (2015): 13-20. doi:10.14257/ijsia.2015.9.2.02 42. “National Cybersecurity Awareness Month”. Department of Homeland Security, 2018. https://www.dhs.gov/national-cyber-security-awarenessmonth. 43. “Cyberwellness Profiles”.Itu.Int, 2018. http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Pages/Country_Profiles.aspx. 44 Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology (MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016. 45. “One in Four Computers in Pakistan Are Attacked by Malware: Microsoft”. Propakistani.Pk, 2017. https://propakistani.pk/2017/09/19/one-fourcomputers-pakistan-attacked-malware-microsoft/. 46. Shafqat, Narmeen. “Pakistan’s Cyberspace: Critical Analysis and Countermeasures”. MS Thesis, National University of Sciences and Technology (MCS-NUST), Pakistan, 2016. 47. Kiertzner, Henrik. “Cybersecurity For Critical National Infrastructure”. Engineering & Technology Reference, 2016. doi:10.1049/etr.2016.0004 48. Yamin, Tughral. Cyberspace CbmsBetween Pakistan And India, 2014.

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NATIONAL RESPONSE TO

Dr Tughral Yamin is a retired Brigadier from Pakistan Army. He is currently Associate Dean at Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad

Abstract Warfare in the twenty first century has metamorphosed at a frightening pace. Instead of physically fighting the enemy, most war fighting now takes place in the virtual domain. With the increasing reliance on computers and computer networks, the scope and scale of cyber threats has grown exponentially. Cyberspace has become the fifth dimension of warfare. It is unregulated territory, where the customary rules of engagement are not practiced. Threats not only emerge from traditional sources but also from a host of non-traditional quarters. States actively carry out offensive operations as well indulge in pervasive surveillance, sparing neither friend nor foe. Terrorists are using cyberspace for recruitment, funding and propaganda. Criminals surreptitiously siphon off millions of dollars from Online e-commerce activity. The kids in the basement and freelance hacktivists hack out of fun or because of self-righteous patriotic fervour. This paper highlights the broad spectrum of cyber threats and the voids discernible in the cybersecurity at the policy planning level. It proposes a suitable response at the national level to the emerging cyber challenges. It recommends inter alia a policy covering all aspects of the threat. It underlines the importance of having a coordinating body at the national level to oversee and organise cybersecurity activities. It calls for devoting sufficient funds for national cybersecurity preparations. It also emphasises the need for cyber awareness and creating structures to deal with cyber threats. In the age of the digital revolution, leaders and advisors need to learn the art and science of crafting effective cyber policies and legislations. This is not only necessary to prevent the breakdown of critical infrastructure, disruption of communication services and damage to command and control systems but also to protect private businesses and industry from losing hours of productivity. The cyber planners also need to integrate unified cyber strategies in all matters related to domestic and foreign policies. Keywords: Cyber Threats, Cybersecurity, Cyber Policy, Cyber Budget

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terrorists and criminals consider it perfectly legitimate means to syphon off information stored in computer database to obtain an edge over their adversaries and competitors. Suffice is to say that the loss of data can be extremely harmful and traumatic for governments, public and private concerns. In fact there is so much upheaval in the digital world that it is hard to keep track of incidents of cyber breaches happening on a daily basis. Digital data continues to fall into the wrong hands and is used for the most malicious reasons. The proliferation of social media has made it easier to harvest information provided willingly by unwary users. The US elections 2016 were

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It is no longer necessary to destroy tanks, aircraft and battleships through kinetic means. Instead the command and control systems managing these war fighting systems are targeted to cause chaos and mayhem in the enemy ranks

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T

here has been a paradigm shift in the nature of warfare in the twenty-first century. Instead of fighting physically, all means are employed to defeat the adversary virtually. It is no longer necessary to destroy tanks, aircraft and battleships through kinetic means. Instead the command and control systems managing these war fighting systems are targeted to cause chaos and mayhem in the enemy ranks. Digital warriors sitting behind computer screens, and not the soldier in the trenches, now man the front-lines. They work assiduously to find chinks in the armour of enemy’s computer networks controlling the instruments of war to bring them down during the crucial phases of decision-making and execution. Cyber-attacks are, however, no longer restricted for periods of active hostilities. Hostile agencies use the social media to degrade national morale and defeat the enemy even before the first bullet is fired through aggressive and sinister use of social media. The dialectic of opposing wills is now a contest that includes the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Cyberspace is unregulated territory and spy agencies, business rivals,

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It is hard to keep track of incidents of cyber breaches happening on a daily basis

supposedly influenced because of the data gleaned by Cambridge Analytica, a digital mining firm from an application that they uploaded on the Facebook to find clues to the likes and dislikes of potential voters.1 The campaign team of the unlikely candidate Donald Trump could turn the tables on Hillary Clinton because they knew what kind of sales pitch they were required to adopt. The Facebook has also been used to spread fake news. This has shaped public opinion among its users. Unsubstantiated messaging on Whatsapp messaging service has caused the lynching of innocent people in India. The company was forced to publish full page advertisements to warn the public of spreading unsubstantiated information through their application. In July 2018, the European Union was fined €4.345 Billion for securing dominance for its search engine on android phones. Google had managed to add Google maps on all android phones. European competitors considered this a violation of the rule for fair competition. In Pakistan the data of Careem ride share services was hacked causing a huge embarrassment for the company.

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There is a visible dearth of national debate on Cybersecurity. Whatever is reported in the print and electronic media lacks direction and focus

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Domestic politics was rocked, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted from office after toxic load of data was made public by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) that it hacked from the database of a Panama based legal firm the Monseck Fonseca. This information among other things provided incontrovertible evidence about Sharif’s family business investments in dubious off shore companies.2 The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) that emerged as the largest political party in the national elections 2018 on an anti-corruption agenda effectively used its social media to

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discredit Sharif, his family members and cronies on the basis of the data made available due to the so-called Panama Leaks.3 Before the elections, officials of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) had to explain to suspicious political parties that voter data publicly made available was not meant to skewer the results but to facilitate the voting public.4 Immediately after the elections, another controversy broke out when the losing parties voiced allegations of poll rigging because of the failure of technology. The collapse of the Result Transmission System (RTS) fuelled speculations that it was done to doctor ballot count and manipulate the final results.5 Unfortunately data security in Pakistan is not the top of the national agenda despite the fact that databases are being blatantly breached. There is a visible dearth of national debate on cybersecurity. Whatever is reported in the print and electronic media lacks direction and focus. The most visible activity on the Pakistani cyber landscape has been the legislation on cyber crime. The Cyber Crime Bill or the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) was approved in 2016 by both houses of the parliament after incorporating several amendments raised by digital rights activists. The very vocal activist lobby had waged a relentless campaign to oppose those parts of the Bill that they thought infringed upon the rights of the netizens. The animated discussion over the PECA actually diverted the attention of all concerned from the real issue at hand i.e. cybersecurity. It is indeed disconcerting to note the complete apathy and disregard for this important facet of national security. Clearly, people at the helm of affair fail to grasp the importance of cybersecurity. Not only is there a complete absence of policy in this regard but also management and organisational structures are either non-existent or at a very nascent stage. There is, therefore, a pressing need to establish a well-defined cybersecurity on sound footings at all levels within the country and this means thinking beyond the puny Information and Computer Technology (ICT) Departments that private and public firms have.

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National Security National security covers a wide spectrum of issues, such as its territorial integrity, political sovereignty, economic autarky, self-sufficiency in food and energy, environment protection and in the modern age and era of cybersecurity. It is, therefore, quite obvious that national security is given very high importance by any government. The policy formulation is always done at the highest level involving the top most decision and policy makers. This invariably includes the chief executive of the country (the president or the prime minister) and his cabinet. They receive inputs from all the institutions of the state i.e. the armed forces, intelligence agencies and the concerned ministries to formulate policy. Traditionally, before being finalised, all national security issues are discussed at the level of the National Security Committee (NSC)/ National Command Authority (NCA), the relevant parliamentary committees and the parliament itself. The NCA is convened, when it involves nuclear decision-making. It is the constitutional duty of any government to ensure that the interests of the state and its citizens are protected from all kinds of external aggression and internal turmoil, while ensuring the civil rights and liberties of its citizens. To ensure that the writ of the state extends all over its sovereign territories, it uses all instruments of the state such as the armed forces and law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to implement the national security mandate. A citizen owing allegiance to a state is required to support the government in this sacred duty.

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In Pakistan NSC brings together the civilian and military leadership so that they are on one page insofar as national security is concerned. Besides the NSC’s office, there are cabinet and parliamentary committees that look into national security matters

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National security covers a wide spectrum of issues, such as its territorial integrity, political sovereignty, economic autarky, self-sufficiency in food and energy, environment protection and in the modern age and era of Cybersecurity

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An interview with the federal minister of IT in the summer of 2015 confirmed my worst fears. The minister candidly admitted that the issue of cybersecurity “had not blipped on the official radar.” She wasn’t sure who was responsible for it i.e. her ministry or the Ministry of Interior (MoI) or the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or the intelligence agencies.6 She was right; cyberspace is the collective responsibility of a number of ministries and departments and needs joint ownership. This is in fact true for all national security issues.

The national power potential is directly proportional to its political power, diplomatic influence, economic capacity and military might. A number of governments including Pakistan arrogate the responsibility of coordinating national security matters to the NSC. In Pakistan NSC brings together the civilian and military leadership so that they are on one page insofar as national security is concerned. Besides the NSC’s office, there are cabinet and parliamentary committees that look into national security matters. National security policy is underpinned by four pillars i.e. a strong national leadership that can provide strategic vision and across the board coordination on security matters; a policy framework with clear cut and precise mission statement; the Terms of Reference (TORs) for the execution the policy and adequate material and human resources for its implementation. To produce a worthwhile policy, the national security managers operate under clear and unambiguous sets of rules and regulations to cover the overarching national security agenda.

Cybersecurity One of the primary issues of cybersecurity involves protection of personal, professional and official data. In simple words cybersecurity means protecting computers and computer networks from harmful intrusions. Expanding on this basic definition, the entire gamut of cybersecurity includes protecting, detecting and responding to attacks directed against computers and servers storing private and official records; personal computers and cell phones; entertainment gadgets like digital cable, mp3s; intelligent systems controlling the means of travel like car engines and aeroplane navigation systems; online electronic shopping stores and credit cards etc. In order to survive in the digital world, country must enable digital frontiers. Clearly this means leadership, policies and guidelines, and resources both in term of trained manpower and funds.

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Cyber-attacks can result in long downtimes that can disrupt the decision-making process in a critical point of time. There are also minor irritations like the defacement of official and private websites that needs time and resources to repair. Major disruptions can be caused crashing of servers or loss of huge amounts of data. Cyber-attacks can not only cause psychological trauma but also physical damage and financial losses and acute loss of faith in a system. It can cause panic among the people, collapse of a system and paralysis at the highest echelons of decisionmaking. As mentioned earlier in this article, cyberspace is not the sole preserve of state actors. It is open territory for non-state actors, criminals, freelancers and the kid in the basement to operate with impunity. This makes it all the more difficult to forensically trace the trail of a cyber-attack and attribute it to a particular person or entity. Many times the actual source of attack is an insider within the organisation. A disgruntled employee for example may be trying to settle a score. It is difficult to mount a cyber counter-attack because of problems related to attribution, absence of set rules of engagement and the proportionality of the response. International norms and rules on the subject are hazy but countries and organisations have crafted laws to persecute those interfering with their digital systems. The issue of information security has been on the UN agenda since 1998; however, to date there has been no international treaty to make cybersecurity an international norm. Most modern day national governments attach great importance to their national cybersecurity. Substantial funds have been allocated and trained manpower has been made available for these tasks. 172

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Policy guidelines have been issued to streamline cybersecurity management.

Cybersecurity Models Most countries of the world have designated organisations to deal with national cybersecurity needs. The leadership is usually assigned to powerful and influential people with direct access to the country’s chief executive. Adequate sums of money are allocated for cybersecurity and clear cut policy guidelines given to give a framework to cybersecurity managers. The US cybersecurity model is perhaps the most well-known. The national cybersecurity policy comes from the President himself, through executive orders and policy guidelines.7 To assist the President is the National Cybersecurity Coordinator.8 This person is the cybersecurity ‘czar’ and has direct access to the President. Currently three agencies in the US are

responsible for cybersecurity i.e. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Security Agency (NSA) and US Army Cyber Command or Cybercom.9 The DHS more or less resembles the MoI in Pakistan. This agency was created after the 9/11 attacks with the express mandate to protect the national critical infrastructure. This remotely monitors, controls and operates systems with coded signals over communication channels and are extremely vulnerable to cyber-attacks.

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Cyber-attacks can not only cause psychological trauma but also physical damage and financial losses and acute loss of faith in a system. It can cause panic among the people, collapse of a system and paralysis at the highest echelons of decision-making

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As digitisation becomes common place, governments are increasingly worried about the protection of electronically controlled national critical infrastructure. This includes inter alia the national electricity grid, water works, railways and airlines controlled through Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). It also covers the protection of national critical infrastructure.

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A designated Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) under the DHS provides a united response to cyber emergencies. The NSA and Cybercom carry out cyber surveillance and offensive cyber operations respectively. Both these organisations are being run by the military. The NSA and the Central Security Service (CSS) leads the US Government in cryptology that includes both Signals’ Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) to provide it a decisive edge in Computer Network Operations (CNO). The NSA won international notoriety after the Snowden leaks in 2013. A substantial amount of money is allocated for cybersecurity in the US. According to official US sources: The FY 2019 President’s Budget includes $15 Billion of budget authority for cybersecurity-related activities, a $583.4 million (4.1 per cent) increase above the FY 2018 Estimate. Due to the sensitive nature of some activities, this amount does not represent the entire cyber budget.10 Like most countries, cyber warfare is the responsibility of the military in China. Reportedly, the Strategic Support Force (SSF) has been designated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to lead the country in matters related to cyber warfare, space security and electronic surveillance. The Pentagon alleges that Unit 61398 of the PLA has been engaging in gathering corporate intelligence.11 In Australia, the lead agency in cybersecurity

is the Australian Cybersecurity Centre (ACSC).12 CERT Australia looks after national computer emergencies in Australia. In the UK computer emergencies are handled by CERT-UK. The Office of Cybersecurity & Information Assurance (OCSIA) in the UK supports the ministers and the NSC to manage cybersecurity.13

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In India the special secretary in charge of cybersecurity in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is the Cybersecurity Chief. India has national cybersecurity policy since 2013.14 It has more than 5000 cyber warriors to conduct offensive and defensive operations and adequate funds to conduct such activity. CERT-In is a designated body to respond to computer emergencies.15 Government of India has a number of cybersecurity agreements

with countries such as the US, Israel, Russia, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan. India has a regular cybersecurity dialogue with the US. In a joint declaration released after a cyber-dialogue, it was announced to increase cybersecurity cooperation. India is also expanding relations with Israel in the area of cyber cooperation. In January 2018, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited India. A number of areas including cybersecurity were identified for cooperation.16 In February 2018, the second round of Indo-Russia Consultation on Security regarding use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) was held in New Delhi. This was a follow up by the Indo-Russia Bilateral Agreement on Cooperation in ensuring security in the use of ICT signed on the sidelines of 8th BRICS Summit held in October 2016.17

In India the special secretary in charge of Cybersecurity in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is the Cybersecurity Chief. India has national Cybersecurity policy since 2013. It has more than 5000 cyber warriors to conduct offensive and defensive operations and adequate funds to conduct such activity

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It is not India alone that wages a strong cyber offensive against Pakistan, many other countries are using cyber means to syphon off critical data. US is one of those countries that actively and regularly spies upon Pakistan. According to cyber whistleblower Edward Snowden Pakistan is one of the most cyber spied upon country in the world.18 Snowden had also claimed that the UK has acquired vast amounts of communications data from inside Pakistan by secretly hacking into routers manufactured by the US based company Cisco.19 It is unfortunate that the issue of cyberspying has not been raised with either the US or the British governments; notwithstanding the fact that London and Washington remain the favourite ports of call for most of our politicians. National security covers both internal and external threats. In Pakistan, these threats are discussed under heading of the National Defence Policy and the National Internal Security Policy (NISP). The defence matters are dealt with by the MoD and by extension usually remains the exclusive preserve of the armed forces. The NISP is issued by the MoI. All civil and military intelligence agencies are involved in identifying the internal and external threats. NISP 2014 does mentioned cybersecurity without going into the specifics and recognises its importance within the framework of counter terrorism. The NISP is supplemented by the National Action Plan (NAP) 2015 with a twenty

‘‘Pakistan is one of the most cyber spied upon country in the world’’ Edward Snowden

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There is no mechanism of interstate understanding or sharing of best practices on regional basis

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Cybersecurity in Pakistan

point agenda to eliminate terrorism. NISP 2018 lays down road map for Internal Security (IS) for the next five years.20 There are clearly identifiable hurdles in establishing a meaningful cybersecurity architecture in Pakistan e.g. there is no central authority to coordinate cybersecurity matters and advise the prime minister about emerging cyber threats. There is a palpable lack of awareness within the policymaking circles about this important issue. Apart from the Cyber-crime Bill there is no clear cut policy on the subject of cybersecurity. The cybersecurity stakeholders are not clearly defined and their turfs not properly marked out. There is no PK-CERT and no funds allocated for cybersecurity purposes. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) has a National Cyber Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C).21 Its mandate is limited to tracking down cyber-crime and it lacks the wherewithal to act as first responder in case of a computer emergency. Pakistan is represented at the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security,22 but the national points of view expressed on these forums are not shared with the public. There is no mechanism of interstate understanding or sharing of best practices on regional basis. The Bangladesh central bank lost 81 million dollars in a cyber-heist in 2016. The State Bank of Pakistan did not issue any instructions to avoid a similar occurrence in our country. It is not known, if any advice was sought from Bangladeshi counterparts on the subject or from SWIFT, the international banking forum through whose portals the request on Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves was made. In fact there is no coordination or collaboration in the South Asian region or the member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This is in stark contrast to the active collaboration among the countries of the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on cybersecurity collaboration.

Recommendations A number of steps can be taken to improve Pakistan’s cybersecurity situation. Some of these, in no particular order are listed below: ── Human Resource Development. Pakistan has a very huge and talented human resource. Some of the best IT graduates are being produced in universities like National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST) and National University of Computers & 174

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Emerging Sciences (FAST-NU). The only thing lacking is direction, policy and adequate funds. This condition can be improved by having good cyber managers and planners. This should include not only people with technical education but also those who have policy planning skills and knowledge of international relations and law. Most people at the top echelons of the security establishment lack the knowledge and vision to properly organise cybersecurity. Crash courses in cyber awareness to senior government officials and parliamentarians can improve the lackadaisical cybersecurity milieu in Pakistan. Courses already being taught in cybersecurity management in the universities can be modified to suit the emerging requirement. Cybersecurity should also be included in the curriculum of the security workshop arranged by National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad. ── Policy Level. A number of things can be done at the policy level. First and foremost, there is an urgent need for well-defined national cybersecurity architecture. The powers of coordinating all issues related to cybersecurity should be vested in the office of a cybersecurity coordinator working directly under the prime minister. The cybersecurity

chief should be provided secretarial services by the NSC. The NSC could be one forum, where all cybersecurity measures may be discussed. Second, a cyber-taskforce (CTF) should be created and placed under the NSC. The mandate of the CTF should include issuing policy guidelines on cybersecurity. Third, the creation of PK-CERT is a long outstanding demand. The national CERT should be established and asked to practice cyber emergency drills on regular basis. Fourth, cyber funds should be allocated in the national budget and their proper utilisation ensured by the national cybersecurity coordinator. Fifth, cybersecurity cooperation with other countries, particularly those belonging to regional forums such as SAARC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is advisable. Since there is little traction for Pakistan in SAARC due to the open hostility of India, it would be advisable to concentrate on SCO. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) can be another forum but this too has become moribund due to internal differences in the Muslim world. ── Ownership. Currently there is a complete lack of ownership at political level about the subject of cybersecurity. It would certainly be a good idea if the new political government Green Book 2019

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considers this issue seriously and develops structures and allocates resources in this regard. cybersecurity cooperation should be made an agenda item for discussion with friendly countries like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

From the above discussion it is quite clear that cybersecurity is a neglected issue in the national security discourse. In this time and age it should be taken very seriously. In fact a national emergency should be declared to highlight the importance of this neglected sector. Unless there is awareness at Notes 1.

2. 3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

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Cambridge Analytica uses data to change audience behaviour and has commercial and political divisions to serve their client’s needs. Details about the services being offered by them are available at their website: https:// cambridgeanalytica.org/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018). The ICIJ take credit for the imprisonment of Nawaz Sharif on corruption charges in their website https://www.icij.org/(Accessed on August 9, 2018). Danish Hussain, PTI launches aggressive social media campaign against PML N, Express Tribune, November 29, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1247545/ jhooton-ki-dastan-documentary-expose-launched-social-media/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018). Syed IrfanRaza, “No Breach of Voters’ Data Security, NADRA,”Dawn, June 20, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1414889 (Accessed on August 9, 2018). “Result Transmission System failure causes delay in election results: ECP,” Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), July 26, 2018, https://www.app.com.pk/ result-transmission-system-failure-causes-delay-in-election-results-ecp/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018). Interview with the Minister of IT, Summer 2015. Hogan Lovells, “US Cyber security Policies – A year-to-date roundup,”https:// iapp.org/news/a/u-s-cybersecurity-policy-developments-a-year-to-dateroundup/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018). For details go to the website Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues: https:// www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/. For details regarding NSA and Cybercom read Gen Michael Hayden, Playing to the Edge; American Intelligence in the Age of Terror (New York: Penguin Random House, 2017). Cyber security Funding, The Whitehouse, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/ap_21 _cyber_security-fy2019.pdf (Accessed on August 8, 2018). MeghaRajgopalan, “Chinese Military Force to Take Lead on Cyber Space Defense,” Reuters, January, 29, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-military/chinese-military-force-to-take-lead-on-cyber-space-defenceidUSKCN0V714B (Accessed on August 8, 2018)

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the highest level about the potential threat that looms in front of us, nothing substantial would be done. Therefore, it is of utmost necessity that a campaign should be launched at the highest level to sensitise our leadership about it. The political chief executive, his cabinet and indeed the complete parliament should be briefed about the challenges ahead. The responses should be mounted jointly involving the military and the civil government and members of the industry and businessmen. It should be a whole of government approach and cover all non-official sectors as well. A joint national plan for cybersecurity is the need of the hour. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

Details available at the official website https://www.acsc.gov.au/. “Cybersecurity in the UK,” Houses of the Parliament, Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/ postpn389_cyber-security-in-the-UK.pdf (Accessed on August 8, 2018). India’s national Cyber Security Policy is available at the website of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (Meity): meity.gov.in/. Information available at official website www.cert-in.org.in/. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhry, “India, Israel sign nine pacts on cyber security, other sectors,” The Economic Times, January 16, 2018, https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-israel-ink-nine-pacts-oncyber-security-other-sectors/articleshow/62507272.cms (Accessed on August 8, 2018). “India, Russia to deepen practical cooperation in ICTs,” The Business Standard, February 20, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/ptistories/india-russia-to-deepen-practical-cooperation-in-icts-118022001480_1. html (Accessed on August 8, 2018). Isaac Chotiner, “Why the Latest Snowden Leaks about Pakistan Are Scary,” The New Republic, September 3, 2013, https://newrepublic.com/article/114573/ snowden-leaks-united-states-and-pakistan (Accessed on August 9, 2018). “UK hacked routers in Pakistan to identify terrorists, claims Edward Snowden,” The Indian Express, October 7, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/ world-news/uk-hacked-routers-in-pakistan-to-identify-terrorists-edwardsnowden-nsa-twitter/(Accessed on August 9, 2018) The details regarding Pakistan’s National Internal Security Policy (2014-18) are available at https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/NationalInternal-Security-Policy-2014.pdf (Accessed on August 9, 2018). National Response Centre for Cyber Crime (NR3C), http://www.nr3c.gov.pk/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018). Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, UNODA, https://www.un.org/disarmament/ topics/informationsecurity/ (Accessed on August 9, 2018).

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MINERAL WEALTH OF PAKISTAN

Dr Samar Mubarakmand, NI, HI, SI, is a globally renowned & acknowledged Nuclear Scientist. He is Chairman (Board of Governors) Underground Coal Gasification Project, Block-V & Chairman (Board of Directors) Punjab Mineral Company

Abstract Pakistan is extra-ordinarily gifted by nature with a very valuable and wide diversity of mineral wealth. copper, gold, silver and iron are among the principal valuable deposits of metallic minerals. In quantity and quality, the gemstones of Pakistan are famous in the world and fetch very good prices in international exhibitions in the world. Among minor metals the country can also boast of significant quantities of gallium, tungsten, beryllium, cobalt, zirconium and chromium. The recent discovery of cobalt in Gilgit Baltistan is especially good news for the country as this metal is finding wide spread applications in the manufacture of high current density batteries for electric cars. Nature has endowed Pakistan with Rare Earths such as cerium, yttrium and lanthanum etc. which have important applications in Optics, Nuclear detectors, Electronic industry as well as in Medicine. Among non-metallic minerals, Pakistan can boast of very large deposits of coal, marble, granite, onyx and a large variety of beautiful stones for use in civil construction. The Shale oil and Shale gas deposits lie under ¾ of the surface area of Pakistan which ranks at 9th place among the top ten Shale oil and gas countries in the world. There is a need to realise the potential of this mineral wealth, mine it, refine it and channelise it into the economy of Pakistan. Keywords: Metallic Minerals, Minor Metallic Minerals, Non Metallic Minerals, Shale Oil/Shale Gas Extraction, Gemstones, Rare Earths, Coal

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ineral wealth of countries are gifts of nature. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Malaysia and several more countries had histories of poverty and backwardness prior to the discovery of oil, gas and other minerals. These countries have now become forerunners of affluent economies and boast of very high per capita incomes and national growth.

Types of Minerals Broadly minerals are classified into metallic and non-metallic types. Metallic minerals include mineable deposits of iron, copper, gold, nickel, tungsten, cobalt, aluminium, zinc, platinum etc. and strategic metals such as molybdenum, lithium, thorium, radium, uranium etc. An under the surface presence of different metals as pure elements or in the form of metal salts / compounds may occur. But the scattering of minerals in the soil is sometimes an indicator of mineable deposits in the form of thick seams. Borehole drilling, extraction of ore samples from different depths and their chemical analysis can determine quality and quantity of a minable metal from below the surface of earth. To classify such metallic deposits under the earth as economical or un-economical, various factors come under consideration. The international price tag on a metal will determine the investment in its mining and refining effort. Gold, platinum or radioactive metals or rare earths are of such high value that deep mining with challenges of water influx may be worth overcoming during open pit or tunnel mining. In case of cheaper metals like iron, aluminium etc. too much cost in mining would make the ultimate price of the mined metal uncompetitive in the world market and the entire effort would not be worthwhile. Cheaper metallic deposits of reasonable thickness and lighter over burdens can be mined economically. Non-metallic minerals commonly found in Pakistan include lime stone, clay, fire clay, ceramic, gemstones, granite, graphite, gypsum, dolomite, marble, quartz, sulphur, zirconium, onyx etc.

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Lime stone, gypsum and clay are extensively used in cement manufacture. Fire clay bricks have applications in lining high temperature furnaces and ceramic mixed with gypsum and clay is used in the manufacture of earthenware and crockery. Granite and marble decorate our civil construction. Dolomite of high quality exists in Pakistan and is of great value in the chemical industry as well as in glass manufacture. Graphite is a very pure form of carbon. It is used in manufacture of cells and graphite electrodes. Gemstones found in Pakistan are especially famous for their high quality. A few years ago, some un-scrupulous elements of society would dig out raw gemstones and sell them of to foreign countries at a few rupees per kilogram. The Federal Government took cognisance of this colossal waste of national wealth. Several batches of precious stone cutters and polishers were trained. Three gemstone cutting facilities were established in the country where raw stones are cut and polished. Annual exhibitions are held in the country where international and national buyers get an opportunity to purchase the entire product of Pakistan.

Natural Occurrence of Metallic Minerals Usually occurrence of metallic minerals is seen to exist in worldwide belts which run through continents. For Pakistan, we are very fortunate to have the existence of Tethyan copper belt passing through the country. The belt originates in China close to Tibet. It moves parallel to Himalayas on the Chinese side and enters Pakistan from the north. This belt has a north to south trajectory passing through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan and then swings west into Afghanistan and ends up in Turkey. A close look at the Tethyan copper belt shows large copper deposit at Reko Diq and Saindak in Pakistan, another large deposit of copper in Sarcheshmeh, Sari Gunay in Iran and minor and major deposits along the belt ending in Turkey. gold and silver exist with copper in Saindak, Reko Diq and Sari

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Reesk

Tethyan Copper Belt

Rosia Montana Majdanpek Bor Chelopech

Olympias

Kisladag

Copler

Reko Diq Sari Gunay

Skauris

Sari Chesmeh 500 kms

Saindak

Gunay. A small shallow deposit of copper/cobalt has been reported by FATA Development Authority in Shinkai North Waziristan.

Saindak Copper Mines The Saindak copper mines are located in the west of Balochistan on the Tethyan copper belt and about 40 km from the famous Reko Diq deposit. Initially, Saindak copper was discovered by Geological Survey of Pakistan in 1973 with a preliminary estimation of 400 million tons of ore containing 0.4% copper and 0.30-0.48 g/ton of gold. Later on Tethyan copper company in its feasibility report on Reko Diq mentioned a total asset of 1.8 million tons

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of pure copper and 217 tons of pure gold at Saindak.1 The contract for mining and production of blister copper / gold / silver was awarded to the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) in 2001 for an annual production of 15000 tons of copper metal, 1.5 tons of gold and 2.8 tons of silver. There are three mineral deposits in Saindak. To date, the largest of the three deposits has been completely mined and work is going on the second deposit since 2015.

Reko Diq Copper Deposits The Geological Survey of Pakistan discovered copper, gold and silver deposits at Reko Diq in 1978-79. There are about 36 individual mineable deposits in 400 Sq. Km area of Reko Diq. The largest deposit of copper, gold and silver lies in the western porphyry (H-13, H-14 and H-15) totalling 22 million tons of copper metal and 39 million ounces of gold. Another significant deposit of 2.42 million tons of pure copper metal exists in Tanjeel (H-4). In all, the aggregate endowment of ore in the greater Chaghai belt amounts to 7 billion

The international price tag on a metal will determine the investment in its mining and refining effort. Gold, platinum or radio active metals or rare earths are of such high value that deep mining with challenges of water influx may be worth overcoming during open pit or tunnel mining

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.

Shinkai Copper Based on several years of geophysical surface investigations and exploratory drilling, a reserve of 35 million tons of copper ore was established with an average grade of 0.8% copper in ore at depths of up to 150 metres. Other associated metals including lead, zinc, silver, cobalt, iron and sulphur were considered as additional by-products.3

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The major deposits of copper and other metallic minerals in North Waziristan are located at Shinkai. The exploration was carried out through 3300 feet of core drilling, core analysis and geophysical survey. The relevant area of the deposit has 700 metres of radial extent and 400 metres of width going down to a depth of 150 metres. The total assets of copper, silver, cobalt, and gold are valued at $ 4.987 billion at current value of LME.

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Tethyan copper company in its feasibility report on Reko Diq mentioned a total asset of 1.8 million tons of pure copper and 217 tons of pure gold at Saindak

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tons, yielding 27 million tons of copper and 52 million ounces of gold with a present day value of $ 228 billion on the London Metal Exchange (LME). At Reko Diq, the average grade of ore is 0.8% copper and 0.285 grams of gold per ton of ore. The total ore estimated, at Reko Diq only, is 5.9 billion tons which would yield 24.5 million tons of copper metal and 42 million ounces of pure gold.2

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Iron ore deposits occur in several locations in Pakistan. The significant deposits are at Naukundi, Chiniot, Haripur and the largest deposit is at Kalabagh.4 It was established through UN-PAK Mineral Survey Project Report (1962-1963), that an estimated 52 million tons of iron ore is at Chughlan near Kalabagh, 35 million tons at Kuch-Kartoop (north of Kalabagh), 213 million tons East and West of Chichali pass and 50 million tons at Makerwal. All these deposits called the Kalabagh iron ore deposits total 350 million tons. The thickness of iron ore ranges from 8-25 ft. Recently, IMC-Montan Consulting GmbH (Germany) has developed economically viable process for sponge iron and steel using Kalabagh iron ore and indigenous Pakistani coal. Historically in the sixties at the time of the discovery of iron ore the process for its conversion into steel could not be established at economical

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The total assets of copper, silver, cobalt, and gold are valued at $ 4.987 billion at current value of London Metal Exchange

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Iron Ore in Pakistan

level due to the technologies available at that time. The recent study by IMC-Montan has deployed the latest reduction technologies to convert the Kalabagh ore to high grade steel at an economical cost using indigenous coal.5 Geological Survey of Pakistan during surface studies for metallic minerals comprising gravitational method, polarisation studies and geomagnetic survey had strongly indicated presence of high grade iron ore in Chiniot and its vicinity of Rajoa.

Kalabagh

Ko h

Su lam an

Ra ng e

Chiniot

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Pakistan has deposits of 4.5 million metric tons of chromite in Zhob, Shangla, Muslimbagh, Khanozai, Nisai and Gowal

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About four years ago, the Punjab Mineral Company (PMC) was tasked by the Punjab Government to carry out detailed exploration over an area of 28 Sq. Km to ascertain the content of iron ore and other minerals present in the Chiniot zone. Exploratory targeted drilling was carried out after surface studies pin pointed locations of occurrence of high concentrations of metallic minerals underground. Thousands of core samples extracted from different depths were chemically analysed in international laboratories. The work was carried out by a Chinese company and supervised by a leading German consultant. The net result confirmed the presence of high grade iron ore of 150 million tons valued at $ US 4.5 billion --sufficient to feed a one million ton steel mill for 30 – 40 years. The total cost of this initial effort of phase-I exploration is about Rs. 3.2 billion. Towards the end of this exploration effort in phase-I, strong indications of copper, gold, zinc and graphite were observed. In the second phase, surface studies were extended to an area of 2000 Sq. Km from Kirana in the North West to Chak Jhumra in the South East of Chiniot. Apparently, according to the German experts these minerals were thrown up by a volcanic activity in the vicinity of Chiniot town millions of years ago. A second phase (phaseII) of exploration work is now underway and so far the results for the occurrence of more iron ore and copper are very encouraging.

Chrome Mining Pakistan has deposits of 4.5 million metric tons of chromite in Zhob, Shangla, Muslimbagh, Khanozai, Nisai and Gowal. A few more deposits occur just under the surface in several locations of South Balochistan. Open pit mining is resorted to for ore excavation.6 Annual production of chromite and small quantities of magnesite ore mined from different sites amounts to 1.5 million metric tons.

Bauxite (Aluminium) Reserves Pakistan has 74 million tons of bauxite reserves which are classified as low to medium grade. Bauxite occurs in Muzaffarabad, Ziarat, Kalat and Khushab. The annual production from different bauxite mines aggregates to about 10,000 tons annually.7

Bauxite Ore

Lead and Zinc The Geological Survey of Pakistan has discovered several deposits of lead and zinc ore in Lasbela-Khuzdar region of Balochistan Province. They are associated with carbonate rocks of Winder Group and Shirinab formation. UNDP and JICA funded projects have helped Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP) to estimate lead and zinc deposits at Duddar of 6.86 million tons of proven reserves and 3.43 million tons of inferred reserves. These reserves contain 11.34% of zinc and 2.01% lead.

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Gowal Open Pit Chrome Mine

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Annual production of chromite and small quantities of magnesite ore mined from different sites amounts to 1.5 million metric tons

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Manganese Manganese is a silver grey metal with a pinkish tinge. It is found in many localities in Lasbela, Kharan, Chaghai and Zhob districts in Balochistan. It is also found in Warsak Killi area in KP. Presently total estimates of ore available in the country are 600,000 metric tons with an annual production of 2,712 metric tons.

Manganese Manganese has important applications in the production of high quality steel. It adds strength to the alloy by the removal of oxygen and sulphur impurities from raw iron. It also forms alloys with

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Pakistan has vast reserves of cobalt at Shinkai in North Waziristan where 35 million tons of ore contains 1100 grams per ton of cobalt in the ore

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Present estimate of available ore in the country is over 23 million tons. Mining of lead and zinc commenced during 2010-2011 with a total annual production of 12,692 metric tons.8 Lead is widely used in the production of lead acid batteries. Some of its minor uses includes protectors against radiation, sound proofing and as an additive in car fuel to prevent engine knocking. Zinc is used in galvanising steel to protect it from rusting. Zinc compounds are used in plastics, rubber and cosmetic industry.

aluminium and copper for the production of battery cathodes, soft ferrites used in computer memories. It is also used as a micro nutrient in fertilisers. Using in trace quantities with enzymes it acts as a detoxification agent. It aids the body in absorbing vitamin B-1 and makes bones strong and flexible. A common compound, potassium permanganate, is commonly used to remove bacteria from fruit, water and other eatables.

Cobalt One of the most valuable metals in current industrial use is cobalt with a price tag of $ US 55,500 per ton. The recent steep demand of cobalt is due to its application in high performance rechargeable batteries. Cobalt delivers very high energy density for power, performance and charge life in lithium-ion batteries. Cobalt combines with lithium, or with nickel and aluminium or with nickel and manganese in the manufacture of different types of rechargeable batteries. These batteries can deliver high currents for longer times in smaller sizes and weights. Cobalt has special applications in aerospace industry also. In earlier models of electric cars recharging was required every 100 KMs of driving. With the production of advanced cobalt lithium batteries electric cars can now run for 400 KMs before recharging. With this latest breakthrough 2017 is called “The Year of Cobalt”. Pakistan has vast reserves of cobalt at Shinkai in North Waziristan where 35 million tons of ore contains 1100 grams per ton of cobalt in the ore. In addition, there is occurrence of copper, gold and silver. The Mineral Development Corporation of Pakistan during the Regional Chemical Survey has discovered this precious metal at 255 potential target points. Cobalt has occurred in quantities of 1458 grams per ton in association with copper, gold and silver. There is occurrence of other precious and

Manganese is found in many localities in Lasbela, Kharan, Chaghai and Zhob districts in Balochistan. It is also found in Warsak Killi area in KP. Presently total estimates of ore available in the country are 600,000 metric tons with an annual production of 2,712 metric tons

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Yttrium is a soft metal with a silver metallic appearance. It has applications in the production of Light Emitted Diodes (LEDs), Red Phosphors (crystals which produce red light on the impact of electrons), Television screens, Cathode ray tubes, and high powered Yag Lasers and Super conductors

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base metals above the threshold value of 70 and 25 gm/ton. The top most cobalt anomaly has occurred in 4 sq. Km of Pakora Valley of Gilgit Baltistan. The chemical analysis of a representative sample from this location has been chemically analysed yielding Cobalt = 1457.7, Gold = 34.4, Copper = 4164.8, Lead = 3540 and Zinc = 1197 grams per ton.9 Incidentally, it may be mentioned that at Reko Diq the ore contains 7,000 grams of copper and 0.285 grams of gold per ton.

Gallium The rare metal gallium occurs with a typical concentration of 50 parts per million (ppm) in bauxite ore. During the extraction process gallium can be extracted with 15% efficiency during the processing of bauxite for separation of alumina. Pure gallium is a soft silvery blue metal with a melting point of 29.76oC. Gallium arsenide has very

Gallium Crystal important applications in electronics. It is used in microwave, high speed switching circuits, infrared circuits, production of light emitting diodes and diode lasers.10

Xenotime (Yttrium)

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Rare Earths ── Yttrium is a rare earth which occurs as a phosphate in xenotime.11 Occurrence of xenotime is reported in Warsak Mountains 40 Km from Peshawar. Yttrium is a soft metal with a silver metallic appearance. It has applications in the production of Light Emitted Diodes (LEDs), Red Phosphors (crystals which produce red light on the impact of electrons), Television screens, Cathode ray tubes, and high powered Yag Lasers and Super conductors.12 ── Cerium and Lanthanum occur in the form of carbonate fluoride mineral in bastnaesite which is found in KP province in the Warsak Mountains. Their content in the compound are almost equal. Cerium is a heavy metal. When mixed with aluminium and a small quantity of magnesium or silicon an extremely high strength alloy is produced which can be used at high temperatures. It has important applications in space technology. Cerium is also used as a compound ceria for polishing glass and producing high quality optical surfaces with applications in optical and laser industry. Lanthanum is the costliest of the rare earths occurring in the Warsak range and has a price tag of $ 64 per gram. It is used in nuclear radiation detectors as a scintillator. It has applications in production of electron cathodes and has important applications as phosphate binder in cases of renal failure.13

Bastnaesite

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── Topaz & Aquamarine from Pakistan. Dasu

Lanthanum

Non Metallic Minerals Pakistan is situated in a zone of the subcontinent which has the Himalayas, the Karakorams, the Hindu Kush and the Koh-Suleman ranges. There is a great wealth of non-metallic minerals/rocks available in these mountain ranges. Pakistan is famous for its large resource of marble, granite, quartz, rock salt, onyx, limestone and coral rock. These materials are extensively used all over the world to provide beautiful floors and facings for modern buildings. Lime stone, gypsum and clay form the basic ingredients for the production of cement in the country. Pakistan exports large quantity of cement and earns valuable foreign exchange through its trade.

Gemstones A very wide variety of precious gemstones occur in north of the country. Some of the most popular gemstones in the world market are as follows: ── Purple-Lavender Hued Topaz. This is found at Katlang in the Mardan district of KP. These stones are extremely rare and very valuable. They fetch a high value on the world market.

Purple Lavender Hued Topaz

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and Shigar valleys in the Skardu district boast of top quality Topaz and Aquamarines. The quality of these gemstones is based upon their size, clarity and transparency. They are being mined since 1988 and after the creation of Gemstone Corporation of Pakistan, the cutting and polishing of all our gemstones are in the hands of much specialised trained technicians equipped with the latest cutting and polishing machines.

Topaz

Aquamarine

── Rubys and Sapphires are found in Dir. They occur in corundum clusters. One such corundum specimen containing Rubys is shown below in the natural form. The value and beauty which our craftsmen add to such rough stones can be seen in the polished

Uncut Ruby

Pakistan is situated in a zone of the sub-continent which has the Himalayas, the Karakorams, the Hindu Kush and the Koh-Suleman ranges. There is a great wealth of non-metallic minerals/rocks available in these mountain ranges. Pakistan is famous for its large resource of marble, granite, quartz, rock salt, onyx, limestone and coral rock

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gemstones offered at the international exhibitions by the Gemstone Corporation of Pakistan.

Dir Ruby

Swat Emerald

Coal There are four types of coal. Grading them in quality at the top is Anthracite followed by Bituminous, Sub-bituminous and Lignite coal. The heat value of Anthracite is 12910 Btu/lb. while the heat value of Lignite coal is 6900 Btu/lb. Pakistan has extensive coal reserves which are in excess of 185 billion tons. The main coal deposits are in Sindh at Thar, Sonda, Jharruk, Lakhra and Thatha aggregating a total of 184.623 billion tons. The coal deposits of Thar are based on Lignite. A Log of Coal Hydrogeology at Thar (Courtesy UCG Project Block-V)

This coal ranks as the lowest among all coal types. It is light brown in colour with a texture like compressed carbon powder. The water content in the coal is between 35-45%. Fortunately, it is low in sulphur with an average of 0.8%. Being powdery in nature, Thar lignite is porous and most suitable for underground gasification. Extensive exploratory studies have been carried out on the hydrogeology and physical as well as chemical properties of this principal reserve of coal of Pakistan. The coal log demonstrates a layer of 80 metres of sand at the top followed by two water layers. The first layer of water (aquifer) is 80 metres below the surface and has a thickness of 4 metres. It is formed with penetration of rain water through the sand which stops at an impenetrable layer of clay. The Total Dissolved Salts (TDS) in aquifer-1 are about 2000 parts per million and the people of Thar use this water for drinking and irrigation purposes. The second aquifer is at a depth of about 130 metres below the surface and is fed from the waters of the Rann of Kutch. The thickness of this water layer is about 10 metres and its TDS value is between 7000 – 8000. It is highly brackish and totally unfit for human consumption or irrigation. The coal seams just below the second aquifer have thicknesses of less than 2.5 metres. They are interspersed and discontinuous. The principal coal seam which contains 80% of the coal occurs at a depth of between 165 to 175 metres below the surface. The occurrence of water aquifers pose the main impediment in open pit mining. One can imagine easily that in a mine of depth of 170 metres, the Lignite coal will be immersed under deep water. Any attempt at pumping out the water would be very costly. A total of 27,538 cubic metres per day of water will have to be pumped out continuously from the mine of 4 Sq. Km.14 The damage to the environment of Thar can be imagined from the fact that salt water lakes would be created by water being pumped out from the coal mines. The best quality coal in Pakistan is available at the Chamalang mines in Balochistan which contain high quality Anthracite coal. The salt range has coal mines at several places with outcrops in Bannu and Jhelum districts. This coal is subbituminous in nature with a mixture of lignite in it. The total coal in the salt range is estimated at 0.235 billion tons and in Balochistan the coal from all deposits comes to 0.217 billion tons.15

Shale Oil and Shale Gas An extensive study completed with USAID in 2015 covering 33% of the area of sedimentary rock in Pakistan has yielded a presence of 3778 trillion cubic feet of Shale Gas and 2323 billion stock tank 186

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barrels of Shale oil. A total of 124 wells were drilled into the sedimentary rock and core samples of shale stone were analysed in the USA. The presence of Pakistan’s Shale oil and Shale gas reserves have been authenticated as a result of the above detailed study.16 Pakistan now stands as ninth country in the world having massive Shale reserves which exist at depths between 4,000 to 15,000 feet.17 China has operating plants for the extraction of Shale oil and gas from shale stone. The Author visited one such facility in the city of Longkou in Shandong province. To exploit our own reserves on commercial basis it would be very pertinent to approach China to launch a big project under CPEC for the production of Shale oil and Shale gas. Shale reserves can be tapped at locations in close proximity to existing natural gas purification facilities or oil refineries. This would eliminate the expenses on laying long distance pipelines Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.

TCC Reko Diq Feasibility Report Executive Summary page-5. TCC Reko Diq Feasibility Report Executive Summary page-4. FATA Development Corporation Report on Shinkai Copper December, 1992 Mining in Pakistan. Iron Ore. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mining_in_ Pakistan 5. Kalabagh Iron Ore http://punjabmineralcompany.pk/wp-content/

to connect Shale oil and gas wells to purification and refining facilities. This is where the future of Pakistan’s economic prosperity lies.

Conclusion The large variety and very high value of mineral resources of Pakistan have been discussed. This mineral wealth has been lying under the soil of our country for millions of years. It has stayed untapped and unexploited so far. Now that we have the technology and a very valuable and trained human resource it would be in the best interest of our country to exploit this natural wealth for the benefit of our people. At this time in our history, the will of the Government is now needed to pick up the gold, the copper, the silver, rare earths, valuable minor metals, precious gemstones and above all the sea of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas which lie under our feet. Ninety five per cent of Pakistan’s wealth exists below its soil. 6. 7. 8.

uploads/2017/12/kalabagh.pdf Gowal Open Pit Chrome Mine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_ Chrome_Mines_Ltd#Reserves Government of Pakistan Statistics Division Federal Bureau of Statistics Islamabad. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/industry_mining_and_ energy/publications/cmq200506/Mining%20Report%20Final.pdf Lead and Zinc (A Compilation Report on Mineral Ores of Pakistan by H. Jawad

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9.

10. 11. 12.

Sohail Geologist) https://www.slideshare.net/HJawadSohail/a-compilationreport-on-the-mineral-ores-of-pakistan A Global Outlook of Cobalt Beyond 2017 and its prospective exploration targets in Pakistan published on May 20, 2017 (Muhammad Yaqub Shah) https:// www.linkedin.com/pulse/global-outlook-cobalt-beyond-2017-its-prospectiveexploration-shah Gallium https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gallium Xenotime https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenotime Yttrium (Xenotime) from Zagi Mountains https://www.mindat.org/loc-51430. html

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13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Lanthanum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lanthanum China Northeast Coal Geological Bureau (CNGB) (Block-V Tharparker Report) Coal Reserves of Pakistan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_Coal_ Mines_and_Resources Pakistan & Gulf Economist http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/2018/01/22/ tapping-shale-oil-gas-potential-pakistan/ Shale Oil and Gas (Lifeline for Pakistan) Sustainable Development Policy Institute (Engr. Arshad Abbasi) SDPI Report 2014 (Page 36 – Table-1)

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THE LAST POST

A SOLDIERS’ GENERAL, LOVING FATHER & AN AFFECTIONATE HUSBAND

(Based on an interview with Begum Major General Sana Ullah Khan,TBt, Shaheed)

“And do not think of those killed in Allah’s path as dead: indeed they are alive and receive their sustenance from their Lord’’ (Al-Qur’aan, 3:169)

All officers of Pakistan Army take great pride in leading troops from the front. Resultantly, the casualty ratio between the leaders and the led in Pakistan Army is one of the highest in the world. In the same context, a new chapter was added in the archives of audacious achievements of Pakistan Army, when Major General Sana Ullah Khan, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 17 Division, embraced Shahadat at PakAfghan border in District Upper Dir in 2013. Born on 10th September 1960 in a respectable family from Daudkhel, Mianwali, the people of which are known for their valour and respect for human values. He was brought up to become an upright and an honest human like his father, Deputy Superintendent Police Ikhlas Khan, a legendary Police officer from his area. After his basic education, he joined Pakistan Army in December 1983 and was commissioned in one

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of the prestigious Baloch Regiments. Living upto the expectations of his friends and family, he rose steadily in the Army through his competence and hard work, reaching the prestigious rank of Major General in the Army, He assumed command as GOC of 17 Infantry Division deployed in Swat on 17th January 2013 — the appointment he held till his Shahadat.

PAKISTAN ARMY Major General Sana Ullah Khan Niazi (Shaheed) with father Khan Ikhlas Khan Niazi & General Zia at Passing Out Parade - 1982

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He was like a friend to his daughters, helping them in their studies and constantly guiding them about various facets of life

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Remembering Major General Sana as a husband and father of two daughters, Begum Sana recollects, “Sana was my best friend and a very affectionate, cooperative and caring husband I could ever have wished for as a life partner. He was the most kind hearted, generous and loving father to his daughters. The memories we had together are etched in my mind and heart forever. His children will grow up knowing all this about him. He was like a friend to his daughters, helping them in their studies and constantly guiding them about various facets of life. Everyone including myself, my kids, his friends and colleagues enjoyed his charismatic presence and felt at ease in his company”. He was a man of strong character and made up of very sound moral fibre having unflinching belief in Allah Almighty. He always remained calm and composed in the time of crisis. In the words of his spouse, “He always believed in destiny and Allah’s Will. Even in any kind of difficult times, he used to say that Allah will protect, help and guide us, nothing to fear’’. On the professional front, he always stressed upon setting a personal example and ensured high morale of troops by his presence in the front lines. He always used to say, “My soldiers are waiting for me in front lines; I have to be there with them,

so that they never feel that they are alone.” It was due to this insistence he very regularly used to visit forward posts. His affection and concern for his troops had earned him an eternal name; A Soldiers’ General. On 14th September 2013, he departed from his Headquarters on operational visit to border posts in Chitral and Upper Dir. Before leaving for visit he called his wife and told her that he was going to spend a night in the company of his brave soldiers on the front line. She was a bit worried on that day, feeling restlessness and shared her thoughts with him. He replied, “Don’t worry, we are fighting in the way of Allah and for our beloved motherland, nothing can harm us. Just take care of yourself and kids and I will be back soon. Allah be with you”. Begum Sana tried to calm herself by constantly telling herself,’’ it is not the first time, he was going on front lines, I, being a wife of soldier, should be used to this.’’ But after all, she, being a devoted wife, was worried and something unknown was making her impatient.

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On 15th September, after night stay at the border post, while moving to the Battalion Headquarters of 33 Baloch, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploded under his vehicle resulting in his Shahadat. Begum Sana recalls that day, “Suddenly, I received a call from 17 Division that Sana Ullah has embraced Shahadat. I told my Batman not to inform kids regarding the incident. At the time of his Shahadat my daughters were in school but in few moments the news of his Shahadat was on every channel. By the time, my daughters entered the house, they knew, their father had embraced Shahadat. Tears started flowing like stream of water from our eyes. I thought the life has come to an end, but nothing can be done against nature’s rules as Allah says that every soul shall have taste of death”. “Like always, he fulfilled his promise of coming back, but this time his body was in a coffin box wrapped up in a green flag. There were tears in everyone’s eyes. On that day I actually realised, how much his soldiers and officers loved him”. The time spent with him is the most memorable time of my life, which I can never forget. I can still see the glimpse of his personality in my daughters. Like all girls, my both daughters were very close to his heart”.

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Major General Sana’s distinct attributes of personality not only earned him love and trust of his family, but also great respect of his subordinates, colleagues and seniors. He truly was a remarkable man, whose sacrifice will remain a source of inspiration to all ranks of Pakistan Army.

Long Live Pakistan Army Long Live Pakistan

Like always, he fulfilled his promise of coming back, but this time his body was in a coffin box wrapped up in a green flag. There were tears in everyone’s eyes. On that day I actually realised, how much his soldiers and officers loved him

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Progress

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CPEC

Prosperity

Connectivity

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PAKISTAN Gwadar – Gateway toARMY CPEC

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Then

Misguided Youth

Temporarily Displaced Persons

Militants Blow up New Government School – Dir

Bomb Blast at Koto Girls High School – Lower Dir

Destroyed Shrine – South Waziristan

Blast in Khwaja Jan Market – Miranshah

Check post, shops destroyed –Kurram 2019 196 Green Book Agency blast

Reign of Terror

Mainstreaming of Tribal Areas (Now Part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province)

Now

International Exhibition T20 Cricket Match – North Waziristan

Tribal women create history by casting vote in General Elections – 2018

Market Complex – Miranshah

Learning New Skills

We will Rise and Shine

Successful WHAM Campaign

Cadet College Wana

Pak – UAE Friendship Road South and North Waziristan

Educating, Inspiring, Developing

PAKISTAN ARMY General Headquarters Rawalpindi