Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 9780773563445

Citation preview

Painting the Map Red

CANADIAN WAR MUSEUM

HISTORICAL

PUBLICATIONS

Series editor: Fred Gaffen Previous Titles in the Series [1] Canada and the First World War, by John Swettenham. Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1968. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. [2] D-Day, by John Swettenham. Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1969. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. [3] Canada and the First World War, by John Swettenham. Based on the Fiftieth Anniversary Armistice Display at the Canadian War Museum. Toronto: Ryerson, 1969. Published in paperback. MacGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1973. OUT OF PRINT. [4] Canadian Military Aircraft, by J.A. Griffin. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. 5 The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885, by Desmond Morton. Toronto: Hakkert, 1972. 6 The Evening of Chivalry, by John Swettenham. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1972. French edition available. 7 Valiant Men: Canada's Victoria Cross and George Cross Winners, ed. by John Swettenham. Toronto: Hakkert, 1973. OUT OF PRINT. 8 Canada Invaded, 1775-1776, by George EG. Stanley. Toronto: Hakkert, 1973. French edition available. 9 The Canadian General, Sir William Otter, by Desmond Morton. Toronto: Hakkert, 1974. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. 10 Silent Witnesses, by John Swettenham and Herbert F. Wood. Toronto: Hakkert, 1974. French edition available. 11 Broadcast from the Front: Canadian Radio Overseas in the Second World War, by A.E. Powley. Toronto: Hakkert, 1975. 12 Canada's Fighting Ships, by K.R. Macpherson. Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1975. OUT OF PRINT. 13 Canada's Nursing Sisters, by G.W.L. Nicholson. Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1975. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. 14 RCAF: Squadron Histories and Aircraft, 1924-1968, by Samuel Kostenuk and John Griffin. Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1975. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT.

15 Canada's Guns: An Illustrated History of Artillery, by Leslie W.C.S. Barnes. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1979. French edition available. 16 Mililtary Uniforms in Canada 1665-1970, by Jack L. Summers and Rene Chartrand, and illustrated by R.J. Marrion. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1981. French edition available. 17 Canada at Dieppe, by T. Murray Hunter. Ottawa: Balmuir, 1982. French edition available. 18 The War of 1812: Land Operations, by George F.G. Stanley. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1983. French edition available. 19 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, by Reginald H. Roy. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984. French edition available. 20 Redcoats and Patriotes: The Rebellions in Lower Canada, 1837—38, by Elinor Kyte Senior. Stittsville, Ont.: Canada's Wings, 1985. French edition available. 21 Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, by Ronald G. Haycock. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986. 22 General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography, by A.M.J. Hyatt. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. 23 Volunteers and Redcoats - Rebels and Raiders: A Military History of the Rebellions in Upper Canada, by Mary Beacock Fryer. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1987. 24 Guarding the Goldfields: The Story of the Yukon Field Force, ed. by Brereton Greenhous. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1987. 25 Toil and Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River, by George F.G. Stanley. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989. 26 Tangled Web: Canadian Infantry Accoutrements, 1885—1985, by J.L. Summers. Museum Restoration Service, 1991. 27 The Last Invasion of Canada: The Fenian Raiders, 1866-1870, by Hereward Senior. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991. For further information on these titles, please write to the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, Canada K1A OM8.

Canadian War Museum Historical Publication No. 28

Painting the Map Red Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 CARMAN

MILLER

Canadian War Museum and McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

Canadian War Museum 1993 ISBN 0-7735-0913-5 Legal deposit first quarter 1993 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Publication has also been supported by the Canadian War Museum.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Miller, Carman, 1940Painting the map red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-0913-5 I. South African War, 1899-1902 — Canadian participation. 2. South African war, 1899—1902 — Foreign public opinion — Canadian, 1. Canadian War Museum. II. Title. FC553.s6M45 1993 968.0488 092-090380-0 DT1913.C3M45 1993 Typeset in Baskerville 10/12 by Caractdra production graphique inc., Quebec City.

Contents

Illustrations follow pages 64, 122, and 390 Maps ix Preface xi 1 Splendid Imperialism

3

2 The Anatomy of Canadian Opinion

16

3 The Campaign for Participation 31 4 Fielding a Canadian Contingent 49 5 Making Citizens into Soldiers 65 6 The Battle against Boredom

75

7 Bloody Sunday 86 8 The Dawn of Majuba Day 102 9 The Spirit of Belmont 113 10 Gaining and Guarding Pretoria 123 11 The Return

141

12 Sending a Second Contingent 152 13 The Karoo Campaign 171 14 Mafeking and Pacifying

179

15 Rebel Chasers and Railway Artillery 16 The Test of Battle 219

198

viii Contents

17 On Fighting Patrol 241 18 Liliefontein 262 19 The Riotous Return 277 20 Lord Strathcona's Horse and Foot 289 21 Buller's Scouts 309 22 The Lydenburg Campaign 328 23 Chasing De Wet 340 24 Bringing the Heroes Home 358 25 The Unhappy Warriors 368 26 Harts River 391 27 Canada's Last Contingents 414 28 The Home Front 424 Appendix The Other Canadians 445 Notes 459 Index 515

Maps

Royal Canadian Regiment: area of operations, 31 December 1899 — 27 February 1900 89 Battle of Paardeberg, RCR'S first engagement, 18 February 1900 96 Battle of Paardeberg, RCR at Cronje's Laager, 27 February 1900 110 Royal Canadian Regiment, Paardeberg to Bloemfontein, 28 February — 3 April 1900 116 Royal Canadian Regiment, Bloemfontein to Pretoria, 21 April - 31 October 1900 128 Battle of Doornkop, Royal Canadian Regiment, 29 May 1900 131 Karoo Expedition, Canadian Mounted Rifles, D and E Batteries, RCFA, 6 March - 14 April 1900 176 March to Mafeking, C Battery, RCFA, 21 April 19 May 1900 182 Sanie Station, C Battery, RCFA, 16 May 1900 186 Mafeking to Pretoria, C Battery, RCFA, 21 May - 13 December 1900 195

x Maps

Battle of Faber's Put, E Battery, RCFA, 30 May 1900 202 Rebel Chasers, E Battery, RCFA, 14 April 3 November 1900 208 Railway Artillery, D Battery, RCFA, 13 July 8 October 1900 214 Royal Canadian Dragoons and 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles, 9 April — 6 June 1900 227 Coetzee's Drift, Royal Canadian Dragoons and Canadian Mounted Rifles, 5 May 1900 229 Pretoria to Middelburg, RCD and 1 st CMR, 6 June - 27 July 1900 251 On Fighting Patrol, RCD and 1st CMR, 28 July 17 November 1900 259 Liliefontein, 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., 7 November 1900 272 Strathcona's Horse, 20 June - 1 September 1900 316 Lydenburg Campaign, Strathcona's Horse, 1 September - 6 October 1900 333 Chasing De Wet, Strathcona's Horse, 21 October 1900 - 9 January 1901 348 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles, 19 March 16 June 1902 404

Preface Right here there's a group of statues, coppery-green with black smears running down like metal blood . . . This monument is in honour of the South African War, ninety years ago, more or less. I wonder if any one remembers that war, or if anyone in all these cars barging forward ever even looks. Margaret Atwood, Cat's Eye

Across Canada numerous prominently placed statues, monuments, and memorials, or an occasional street or place name, still stand as silent witnesses to a past generation's efforts to preserve the memory of some 7,368 restless, adventurous young Canadians who served in the South African War — the men who assisted Britain paint another portion of southern Africa red. For almost three years, from 1899 to 19°2' this distant, bloody conflict occupied a central place in many Canadians' private and public discourse, engaged their imaginations, and claimed their time and resources. Voluntary groups raised large sums of money to entertain, insure, support, and reward the soldiers, assist their dependants, and perpetuate their memory in glass, bronze, marble, and stone. The war affected industry, trade, transportation, and fashion, as well as political perceptions. It influenced literature and music. It left its participants with life-long memories and friendships; and it brought death, injury, disease, rivalry, and personal bitterness. Until overshadowed by the Great War (1914-18), for many Canadians the South African War was the most significant public event of the twentieth century. Most historians agree that the South African War had a profound impact upon Canadian life and politics. According to them, the war weakened Canada's imperial ties,1 strengthened English Canadian nationalism,2 "split open the cleft between" English and French Canadians,3 launched the twentieth-century French-Canadian nationalist movement,4 broke Laurier's "power" in Quebec,5 stimulated militia reform,6 and served as a dress rehearsal for the First World War.7 But despite its admitted importance, more than ninety years after Canadian troops first landed at Cape Town, there is still no comprehensive study of Canada's participation in this war. Nor have recent general accounts of the war provided more than a passing, often inaccurate, reference to Canada's significant contribution.

xii

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In contrast to the dearth of later historical analysis, contemporary Canadians enjoyed an extensive literature on their country's part in the war. Apart from the two instant histories, journal and periodical articles, and several frequently reprinted popular memoirs and reminiscences attempted to satisfy the Canadian public's seemingly insatiable curiosity in the war. Of the two instant histories, T.G. Marquis's Canada's Sons on Kopje and Veldt (Toronto 1900) provides a lively, patriotic, though often sketchy and inaccurate account of the first year of the war, based upon the Canadian commanding officers' reports to the Canadian government, Canadian news despatches, and "hundreds of letters - honest, straightforward, soldierly letters — from sons and brothers and husbands in the contingent." W. Sanford Evans's The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism: A Study of a Story (Toronto 1901) contains a more sober, comprehensive, and perceptive analysis of the rancorous prewar debate on Canadian participation, the contingents' military operations, and the war's effect upon Canadian political evolution. Published before the war's end, both remain incomplete records at best. Canadian historians' relative neglect of this war was more than an oversight. The memory of Kitchener's scorched-earth policy, with its farm burnings and concentration camps, which many Canadian soldiers found distasteful, had dampened that initial idealism and sense of sacred purpose8 which had characterized the early months of the war. After the war, the need to integrate "our brother Boer"9 into the imperial family, best exemplified by the warm reception of three Boer farm delegates to Canada in October 1903, turned the memory of the conflict into little more than an unfortunate family squabble. Other Canadians, conscious of the internal ethno-political divisions created by their country's participation in this war, were all too anxious to relegate this conflict to the dark and distant past. After 1918 Liberal-autonomist historians, interested in charting Canada's evolution from colony to nation, were even more unhappy with Canada's willingness to imperil national unity by joining an imperial crusade to crush Afrikaner nationality and impose "its rule on a small nation against its will."10 In their view, Canada's participation in this war was a backward step in the nation-building process, imposed upon their country by imperial conspirators such as the governor general, Lord Minto, and the general officer commanding the Canadian militia, E.T.H. Hutton, working in tandem with the British colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. The recent reinterpretation of the Canadian imperialist movement by Penlington, Berger, Page, Cole, and others makes an examination of the politics of Canadian participation in the South African War even more imperative. In some respects, the war's historiographical neglect has been more apparent than real. For example, Canadian historians' obsession with

xiii

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French-English Canadian conflict has generated an extensive literature on the acrimonious public debate on the despatch of Canada's First Contingent, and its consequences. Furthermore, many recent studies on the intellectual, social, and political character of the imperialist movement have challenged earlier historical assumptions on the war and its opponents. Similarly, the growing number of books, articles, and theses on the post-Confederation Canadian militia (including regimental histories) has shed light on the war's effect upon the growth and professionalization of the militia. Added to this literature are biographies of prominent South African veterans, in which a chapter or more is devoted to the subject's war record. All have extended our knowledge and understanding of the context and consequences of Canada's participation in the South African War. The large quantity of public and private, printed, and manuscript material, in Canadian repositories and abroad, makes research of this subject a formidable task. W.B. Kerr's review article in the Canadian Historical Review (December 1937) contains but a partial list and assessment of the extensive contemporary periodical literature, memoirs, and accounts, British and Canadian, treating Canada's part in the war. Sermons, pamphlets, souvenir booklets, programs for patriotic concerts, calendars, music, poetry, handbills, reports of charitable works, and other ephemera help trace the pattern of civilian reaction to the war. Although the Montreal Herald, the Montreal Star, the Toronto Globe and the Toronto Mail and Empire sent reporters, who remained in South Africa until September 1900, other daily and weekly papers printed letters and articles by the soldiers themselves, "each one almost to a man a war correspondent."11 At least one newspaper carried a weekly newsletter from Lieutenant E.W.B. Morrison, of D Battery, Royal Canadian Field Artillery, later revised and published in his controversial book With the Guns in South Africa (Hamilton 1901). Direct reports from the front, however, are no guarantee of authenticity. Stories were often biased, garbled, and occasionally outright fabrications. For example, the story of the Montreal Star's reporter, W. Richmond Smith, that the Strathcona's Horse had "covered themselves with Glory," and had done "a deed which will live in history," by blowing up a railway bridge at Komati Poort, effectively bottling up the Boers and cutting their communications with the sea, was totally untrue. The Department of Militia and Defence's Sessional Papers, especially those containing the detailed description of the organization, equipment, and despatch of all nine contingents, together with their commanding officers' final reports, are valuable. More important are the National Archives of Canada's RG 9, u, A3 series, volumes 16 to 34, which contain the accounts, casualty lists, nominal rolls, reports, battalion, brigade and battery diaries, orders and correspondence. Of

xiv

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even greater importance is the large body of private papers, diaries, memoirs, and letters in various repositories, which provide detailed accounts of the material conditions, routine, perceptions, health, and discipline of the common soldier. This study sees the war as more than simply an ideological conflict or political contest between French and English Canadians. The hostility, indifference, and ambiguity towards the war among many English Canadians, the regional, partisan, and pragmatic character of the pro-war campaign, and the personal and material motivations of many of the volunteers, suggests that English Canada's response to the war was less monolithic and selfless than many historians have assumed. This study also explores some of the themes of the "new" military history.12 It attempts to recreate the experience of Canada's citizen soldiers, their constricted, tedious routine, with its fears, physical privations, boredom, dirt, disease, death, and personal rivalry, punctuated only occasionally by heady acts of courage and daring; it deals with their moments of success and comradeship, as well as their frustrations, looting, violence, drunkenness, and animosity. Although reluctant to claim that the South African War was the crucible of Canadian nationalism, Canada's citizen soldiers' encounter with British troops, the relative success of Canadian arms, and the subsequent public criticism of the British army and society, enhanced English Canadians' sense of distinctiveness, pride, and importance. It stimulated their desire for greater autonomy or a larger role in imperial diplomacy, which was perhaps best expressed in the postwar militia reform. The war exacerbated relations and accentuated differences between French and English Canadians, and left a bitter legacy of misunderstanding and resentment which culminated in the tragic conflict over the manpower crisis of the First World War. The unfashionable character of the subject, together with the voluminous quantity of primary and secondary material, have not been the only deterrents to the writing of a comprehensive history of Canada and the Boer War. The subject itself possesses its own difficulties, especially if one attempts to cover both the war and home fronts, extract the Canadian story from the larger context of the war, and provide a coherent, detailed analysis of the activities of the nine contingents of Canadian troops recruited at different times during the thirty-two-month conflict. Although the 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry and the Strathcona's Horse are relatively well served by the secondary literature, the story of the other Canadian units in South Africa, such as the Second Contingent's artillery, the Canadian Constabulary, and the later mounted contingents, can be reconstructed only through letters, diaries, and regimental reports. Unfortunately the need to treat each unit separately, to have the Royal Canadians marching to

xv Preface Pretoria with Hamilton's column and the Dragoons and the Canadian Mounted Rifles riding to Pretoria with Roberts' main column, leads to a degree of repetitiveness, which can scarcely be avoided. At times it gives the study the character of a collection of battalion histories; it also accounts for its length. For scholars interested in greater detail, a larger manuscript will be deposited in the National Archives upon the publication of this book. Finally, the author, editor, and cartographer have attempted to maintain textual consistency in the spelling of South African place names, variously recorded by contemporary sources, sometimes translated and often phonetically rendered. THE GENEROUS ASSISTANCE of several institutions and individuals has been invaluable to the completion of this study. Grants provided by McGill University's Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research to begin and complete this study, as well as funds to type this lengthy manuscript, thanks to the considerate and timely intervention of Gordon A. Maclachan, then vice-principal, research, greatly facilitated its research and publication, as did a SSHRCC sabbatic leave grant, which I acknowledge with thanks. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federation, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Similarily the Canadian War Museum has contributed generously to the costs of this book's publication. Bill Constable's maps have helped to make sense of the various Canadian units' peregrinations about South Africa. The staff of libraries and archives across Canada and in England have assisted me on many occasions, always with courtesy and efficiency; perhaps none has been more helpful than the staff at Interlibrary loans, McLennan Library, McGill University. A number of persons have assisted me over the years with their time, skill, advice, and encouragement. Arthur Sheffield, now an Anglican minister but then a very able history student, performed the heroic task of coding nominative data from attestation papers one hot Ottawa summer. Some years later Pamela Miller undertook to type this manuscript but, like many of the stalwart young volunteers of this study, exhaustion overcame her on the road to Paardeberg. James Critchley then took up the task of translating my handwriting into text with remarkable accuracy and patience; he subsequently typed the substantial revisions required to shrink the manuscript to a publishable size: I owe him much thanks. To have had Diane Mew as my editor needs no further comment to those who have been fortunate enough to have worked with her. But from the beginning Diane took more than the usual interest in this study. Her knowledge of the land, people, and history of South Africa has saved me from many errors. George Rawlyk read a version of

xvi Preface

this text, suggested revisions, and provided advice and his usual unfailing encouragement. I would also like to thank Fred Gaffen and David McCall for their counsel and many editorial suggestions. The advice, cooperation, and support of Philip Cercone and Joan McGilvray of McGillQueen's University Press went well beyond the call of duty; I acknowledge their help with much thanks. My greatest critics and source of support were Danielle, Marc, and Andrew.

Painting the Map Red

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CHAPTER ONE

Splendid Imperialism

The 7,368 or more Canadians who served in the South African War grew up during a decade or so of rapid social and economic change. During that time the country's local, religious, and ethnic loyalties were increasingly challenged by new technologies and political imperatives. In the countryside, where 68 per cent of Canada's population of nearly five million lived in 1891, changing market structures and mechanization1 were reshaping the character, opportunities, and remuneration of rural life. In urban Canada the growth and consolidation of industry and the expansion of the service sector offered young men a variety of opportunities. The telephone, the typewriter, and new corporate and administrative structures were transforming urban work in ways which workers often resented. Many new jobs required training and discipline, which prolonged childhood dependence and enhanced the role of schools, churches, and voluntary organizations, charged with moulding youth into productive members of society. State-supported, compulsory education was also creating a literate society increasingly vulnerable to the power of the printed word and the era's ideological fashions. None was more popular than imperialism. To the young men of these decades, imperialism offered various schemes to build a greater Canada within a united empire. Drills, demonstrations, and patriotic exercises had become part of the EnglishCanadian school curriculum.2 Many had read Rudyard Kipling, G.A. Henty, Robert Michael Ballantyne, H. Rider Haggard, as well as Chums and the Boy's Own Paper. They were familiar with their stories of manly adventure, endurance, heroism, "Christian manliness and empire building."3 In their churches, where the flag, the Bible, and the English language seemed as indivisible as the Trinity, young men were urged to rid the land of evil and win the world for Christ in their generation. Some, especially young out-of-town men, in search of friends and

4 Painting the Map Red

identity, joined one or more of the recreational or patriotic organizations that promoted the imperial cause: the Navy League, Boys' Brigade, Cadet Corps, Sons of Canada, Sons of England, St George's Society, United Empire Loyalist Association, the Orange Order, the Anglo-Saxon Union, rifle associations, and militia units. As militiamen they had taken part in the mock battles, march pasts, and church parades which became a regular feature of their community's celebration of patriotic occasions. They were exhorted by schools, the press, the pulpit, and public men to rise above local identities to claim, defend, and spread their imperial heritage of British law, liberty, and justice. Songs, poems, and the iconography of the period reinforced the imperial message. Behind its popular public facade, the imperialist movement cloaked a welter of conflicting, and often self-serving, motives and aspirations. It thrived on ambiguity and served as a united appeal for many of the era's fashionable ideas, including the social gospel, nativism, social darwinism, and racialism. Although Benjamin Disraeli attempted to define the nascent British imperialist movement in 1872 as the military, tariff, political, and moral unity of the empire, for many Canadians imperialism came to mean much more. Despite its transatlantic affiliations, the Canadian imperialist movement had a purpose, program, and character of its own. The Imperial Federation League, a small but influential organization, did much to coordinate, articulate, and focus Canadian imperial sentiments. The first Canadian branch of the league, established in Montreal in May 1885, attracted litde initial public support and much criticism, until commercial union with the United States became a central political issue in i887-4 Then a small, vocal, and influential Toronto group, centred around Colonel George T. Denison, took command of the organization and gave it a Canadian raison d'etre. The grandson of a Loyalist family, Denison was an officer of the Queen's Own Rifles. He had served during the Fenian raids and the North-West Rebellion, and was the author of a widely acclaimed study, Modern Cavalry: Its Organization, Armament, and Employment in War. So keen were Denison's fears of American designs on Canada that he kept a list of traitors should he need to defend his country with arms.5 As one of the five founders of the Canada First movement, which had flourished in Toronto in the 18708, Denison's nationalist credentials were impeccable.6 Around him gathered a coterie of well-placed, articulate men such as George M. Grant, the principal of Queen's University; George Parkin, the recently appointed headmaster of Upper Canada College; James L. Hughes, the progressive Toronto school inspector; and Castell Hopkins, then a bank clerk but soon to become a prolific writer and propagandist. With these men and others, Denison set about to revitalize

5 Splendid Imperialism

the league. An aggressive recruitment campaign followed, women were admitted to membership, three secretaries were appointed, the league's finances were reordered, and its effective headquarters was moved to Toronto. To Denison and his crusading comrades, the league's primary purpose was to destroy the depression-bred annexationist party, in whatever guise it appeared. Their most effective weapon was an economic plan designed to meet and beat annexation in its most visible and insidious guise: commercial union. An imperial preferential tariff became their rallying cry, and despite the British parent organization's opposition, the Canadian League had persuaded both federal political parties to endorse an imperial tariff by 1893. The anticipated material benefits of imperial unity initially attracted many Canadian entrepreneurs. They saw it as a means of increasing Canadian markets, expanding Canadian credit, encouraging immigration, securing an imperial penny postage system, an all-red cable route, and subsidies for a fast Atlantic and Pacific steamship service — to name but a few of the league's commercial projects. These practical schemes remained among the most popular parts of the Canadian league's program, and served as a useful foil to commercial union. Political union and imperial defence encountered a cooler reception, particularly if they offered no tangible benefits, entailed a pecuniary burden, or circumscribed Canadian autonomy. On these subjects political necessity made ambiguity the best policy. Imperial defence was fine so long as it could be construed as a British commitment to protect Canada from its expansionist southern neighbour and restricted Canada's contribution to its own corner of the imperial estate. Similarly, political federation was scarcely more than an interesting debating topic. Most Canadians regarded imperialism simply as a means to "mature nationalism," a half-way house between the dangers of independence and the humiliation of continuing colonial dependency. Some shrewdly viewed it as a sound investment, an insurance policy, and cheap form of collective security. In short, they saw imperialism as a highway to a larger world. By sharing the responsibilities of empire they expected to help shape those imperial policies which affected Canadian interests. In their mind, "Canadianism" was but the extension of imperialism.7 Moral unity, a commitment to "British ideals," proved a more popular but nebulous concept. To the educationalists, journalists, and literati among the league's membership, British ideals provided identity and significance to the disparate, fragile British North American community of the i88os. Determined to provide a patriotic education for the country's youth, in February 1890 Denison and Parkin led a delegation to ask the Ontario minister of education, George Ross, to "expurgate" school

6

Painting the Map Red

books of everything "un-Canadian," and order that the "national flag" (presumably the Canadian red ensign) be flown in all schools of the province.8 Ross, a former school teacher, a shrewd politician, and an eloquent and ardent imperialist, had no difficulty meeting all their requests. That same year the imperialists persuaded one of Toronto's daily newspaper, the Empire, to sponsor a provincial contest. The prize was a Canadian ensign, twelve feet by six feet in size, "to the school in each county which could produce the finest essay on the patriotic influence of raising the flag over the school houses." Some thirty Ontario counties participated. Denison, the contest's adjudicator, was so impressed by the contestants' "depth of patriotic feeling" that he prepared a small volume of patriotic songs and poems, entitled Raise the Flag, which he published and sent to the headmasters and contestants of each school. Not to be outdone, in 1893 George Ross himself published a volume entitled Patriotic Recitations and Arbor Day Exercises, designed to assist schools "celebrate Canadian and Imperial holidays." The patriotic education of the youth not only moulded tomorrow's citizens but spread patriotism into "homes through the children." As critics of "selfish" individualism, imperialists preached collective values, discipline, and the subordination of self to the common good. Their promotion of school, athletic, and military drill and uniforms endeavoured to inculcate a sense of community, and loyalty to ideals and institutions.9 They also called for monuments and the celebration of patriotic anniversaries. A hundred years after the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists was a prime time to celebrate historical heroics and construct monuments. The Americans had just celebrated the centennial of their rebellion and independence with literary and rhetorical excesses which did considerable violence to the reputations of the Loyalist exiles, the "fathers of British Canada." To right this wrong, their Canadian descendants' support of historical and genealogical societies, and production of historical monographs, novels, and poetry, did more than justice to these "suffering servants of Empire" who had struggled against great odds, and often with force of arms, to preserve the vestiges of British civilization on this continent.10 Patriotic anniversaries served a similar purpose. In addition to demonstrative celebrations of Dominion Day and the Queen's birthday, the anniversary of Sir Isaac Brock's victory and death at Queenston Heights on 13 October 1812 was placed on the patriotic calendar. The first Toronto celebration of Queenston Heights Day in 1890 featured a full school program of patriotic songs, poems, speeches, and a parade of boys carrying flags and wooden rifles before an estimated thirty thousand spectators. As support for imperialism grew, particularly after the

7 Splendid Imperialism

Queen's Diamond Jubilee of 1897, ceremonies became more elaborate and widespread. Perhaps none surpassed the Queen's birthday, renamed Empire Day in 1890, and declared a school holiday in Nova Scotia, Ontario, and the Protestant School Board of Quebec, following a recommendation of the Dominion Education Association.11 The celebration of Empire Day in 1899, only five months before the dispatch of troops to South Africa, included a particularly formidable schedule of festivities across the country. Montreal's program featured a big military tattoo in the presence of the new governor general, the fourth Earl of Minto; the prime minister, Wilfrid Laurier; the general officer commanding the Canadian militia, Lieutenant-General E.T.H. Hutton; and members of the provincial and federal cabinets. The highlight of the celebrations was an evening concert in the Montreal Arena organized by the Protestant School Commission, which drew an estimated ten thousand people. A choir of a thousand school children performed popular patriotic melodies, including "The Land of the Maple," "Rule Britannia," "Crosses Three," and "Here's a Health unto Her Majesty." The Baron de Hirsch Institute formed a guard of honour and trooped the colour, while the choir sang "Stand Canadians." The oration was given by George Eulas Foster, a former Conservative cabinet minister and a powerful public speaker, who incited Canadians to take up the British mission to civilize, administer, and develop, "proud of our great Dominion and true to the great Empire."12 In Ottawa the city's militia supplemented the school program with a sham battle, a cadet parade, and a boat excursion to Montreal to "shoot the chute" at the Lachine Rapids. Toronto's Carleton School sponsored a demonstration of physical exercises, the boys in peaked hats and the girls in red, white, and blue sashes. In large cities and in countless smaller centres, similar programs were enacted. Imperialists could scarcely have asked for more; and it had all been accomplished within a decade. While the Imperial Federation League and its successor, the British Empire League, shaped and directed the imperialist movement in Canada during the first years of the decade, its membership was never large nor representative of Canadian society. At its peak it claimed no more than two thousand members, a third of whom came from Toronto.13 Confined largely to urban Ontario and the larger centres of English Canada, it drew its members mainly from the professional and business classes. But what the imperialists lacked in numbers they possessed in influence. Membership in the country's political and economic elites provided ready access to the corridors of power. Through their membership in various military, religious, fraternal, and patriotic bodies, and their access to the press, they were well placed to persuade and influence. Denison had no qualms about using militia units and military institutes

8

Painting the Map Red

to promote his patriotic projects. Castell Hopkins, too, used the St George's Society of Toronto to harass Goldwin Smith for his continentalist views. Yet for all its influence, the league scarcely accounts for the apparent strength of imperialism in English Canada in the decade before the outbreak of war in South Africa. Without other agencies, individuals, and groups, many of whom had no affiliation with the league, imperialism could never have reached so large an audience nor made so forceful a case. None was better placed to define and convey the imperial message to Canada's increasingly literate and urban society than the intellectual, literary, and artistic community. Through their writings they attempted to map a nation, to identify, and sometimes fabricate, a community of interests. Above all, they sought to provide a sense of direction to the recently contrived political federation, composed of competing regional interests, local loyalties, and racked by religious and cultural conflict and tardy economic growth. Writers such as Robert Haliburton, William Foster, and Charles Mair, those pioneers of the Canada First movement, consciously set out to forge a nation from the fashionable notions of race and climate. They portrayed Canadians as a distinct, superior, Nordic race - a notion which in 1884 received its most authoritative explication in Sir William Kingston's pseudo-scientific treatise, The Climate of Canada, a vision which inspired poets, novelists, musicians, and even painters of the period.14 Other writers, notably John Bourinot, defined Canada's distinctiveness in constitutional terms, derived from British parliamentary institutions, with their passion for liberty and genius for government, be it self-government or the rule of others.15 While a few men, such as D'Alton McCarthy, the erstwhile president of the Canadian Imperial Federation League, insisted upon the essential unity of language and nationality, generally the imperialists' stress on Canadians' common racial, physical, and institutional inheritance was designed to bridge Canada's language lines. It was also a useful ideological reinforcement of the forty-ninth parallel. According to the imperialists, while that border was threatened, the "thin red line of Empire" remained Canada's best defence. Other imperial themes had a more direct military application. Struggle occupied a particularly prominent place in their writing - struggle against nature, for the border, for popular institutions or for imperial unity. The era's Darwinian obsession with struggle, and growing interest in gender, was underscored by its passion for athletics and combative sports, "the ultimate sport, of course, being war."16 War and war heroes were popular historical topics, especially the War of 1812. Among the era's favourite war heroes were James Wolfe, Isaac Brock, and Tecumseh, all of whom inspired songs, literature, and

9 Splendid Imperialism paintings, as well as a lively and sometimes fraudulent trade in memorabilia.17 In these accounts, war was a nation-building stimulus, an experience in which courage and stamina triumphed over organization and efficiency, though often at the cost of death. Out of these notions grew the Canadian militia myth, the belief in the superiority and dependability of the untrained citizen soldier over the disciplined, barrack-bred British regular. While admitting the qualities of individual British regular generals in building and defending Canada, the Canadian militia myth stressed occasions when the "British ranks broke and fled," as at Moraviantown when the day was saved by Tecumseh. Or they emphasized the importance of the Canadian contribution at the battle of Chateauguay, conveniently forgetting that its French-Canadian hero, C.M. de Salaberry, was a well-trained British regular. The Fenian raids, the Red River expedition, especially the North-West Rebellion, provided further confirmation of their claim. Many who had served in the North-West campaign were convinced that it had been needlessly prolonged by the timidity of their inept British regular commander, Major-General F.D. Middleton, and that victory at Batoche had been secured only by the unauthorized attack of the Canadian militia. The militia myth, the notion that war was the duty of citizen soldiers, made war a people's crusade rather than the preserve of skilled professionals. Apart from the public school, no other institution exercised a more pervasive influence upon late nineteenth-century Canadians than the churches. As Robert Page has pointed out, it was the union of throne and altar, the confusion of the Pax Britannica with the Pax Christi, which gave late nineteenth-century Canadian imperialism its potency. The pulpits and press of Canada's three largest Protestant denominations, the Methodist, the Presbyterian, and Anglican, generally condoned and inspired the growth of imperialism.18 As these denominations moved away from doctrinal disputation and fell under the spell of the social gospel, with its emphasis on the material and sociological imperatives of Christianity and the affinity of the sacred and secular, they often confused the material health of the nation with its spiritual welfare. In their zeal to remake the world in the image of their class and culture, to Canadianize, socialize, and Christianize it, their gospel came to be a national, and sometimes a nationalistic gospel,19 though not confined to national boundaries. Foreign missions fired the passion of the nineteenth-century church. Religious denominations and their auxiliary organizations such as the Young Mens' Christian Association confidently proclaimed their determination to win the world for Christ in their generation, and they raised large sums to accomplish this task. Missionary societies for adults, mission bands for the young, mission Sunday, missionary hymns and literature,

io Painting the Map Red sustained and promoted the cause. In social gospel terms, this "white man's burden" entailed bringing their charges more than doctrine - it included material benefits, "medical help, education, political efficiency and stability and trade." A wealth of popular romantic literature on the selfless deeds of explorers and missionaries such as David Livingstone, H.M Stanley, A.M. MacKay of Uganda, and other missionary heroes, was designed to fire the imagination and recruit men and funds for missions. Military metaphors which permeated hymns and promotional literature reinforced the message. The Methodist Church, for example, promoted its One Million Dollar Fund Campaign, by calling for the spiritual conquest of "more territory for Christ's empire; more soldiers in His army; more ships in his white-winged navy of beneficence; more towers and fortresses thundering against sin; better enginery and better disciplined battalions ... Chivalry and prowess, heroism and endurance, storm and siege, standard and battle shout, rout and victory ... "20 Convinced of their virtue and superiority, it was but a short step for churchmen to demand secular troops to defend a holy cause. Some clerics had already come to believe that war was "the ploughshare to break up the fallow ground and prepare it for the gospel."21 Once war began, Canadian churchmen, with some notable exceptions, had no difficulty seeing the war as justifiable and necessary, "given our defence of Christian liberty and the highest civilization for the human race."22 Few of Canada's South African soldiers could have remained oblivious to their schools', churches', and voluntary associations' growing commitment to imperial patriotism during the last decade of the nineteenth century. To young men in search of social and geographic mobility and wider ideological horizons, the imperialist commitment to community, struggle, and social service promised identity, challenge, and purpose. To those who heeded its missionary call to action, it offered the possibility of adventure, heroism, and a temporary relief from an often restricting workplace. WHILE THE WAR THAT BEGAN in South Africa in 1899, which pitted Britain against two small, white, Protestant states, may seem far from that holy cause promoted by contemporary missionary literature, much depended upon how one viewed the troubled history of the area. For some contemporaries the war was a product of the machinations of international capitalism, a theory best expounded by John Hobson's The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects, published in England in 1900. Others saw British intervention as part of a civilizing mission to bring lasting peace, justice, and freedom to an otherwise dark and troubled continent. Similarly, historians have disagreed upon whether to interpret the conflict

11 Splendid Imperialism

in socio-economic or ethno-cultural terms; or as a piece in the larger European rivalry over the partition of Africa. Established by the Dutch East India Company in the late seventeenth century as a strategic post and provisioning station, the Cape of Good Hope's initial European population was composed of Dutch peasants, joined later by French Huguenot families fleeing Louis xiv's antiProtestant edicts. With the decline of the Dutch East Indian trade, the Cape population, fed by a few additional immigrants, and increasingly cut off from Europe, developed a distinct and homogeneous society which numbered no more than fifteen thousand Europeans by 1795. Encounters between the British and the Dutch-speaking Afrikaner, or Boer, population had never been cordial since the British seized the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope in 1795 in the name of the Prince of Orange. Returned to the Dutch in 1803, following the treaty of Amiens, the British reoccupied the colony in 1806, then purchased it in 1815 following the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. Initially Britain required little more than a military garrison at the Cape to secure the sea lanes to India. In 1820, however, the first large instalment of about four thousand British immigrants arrived. Although a more reliable defence of the garrison, these immigrants constituted an irritant to British-Boer relations, especially when the intrusion of British law altered the colony's economic and social relationships. No British law seemed more obnoxious to the Boer population than the British Parliament's abolition of slavery in 1833. Seen as a threat to their material existence, and pushed by demographic pressures, over five thousand Boers, and as many slaves, largely from the Graaff Reinet district of the Cape Colony, packed their possessions and trekked north into the interior in search of better land, labour, and freedom from British control. Crossing the Orange River, one group of Voortrekkers formed a community later called the Orange Free State. Another group, moving farther north beyond the Vaal River, established the Transvaal or South African Republic. Others continued east, settling beyond the effective jurisdiction of any political community. To the British the Voortrekkers initially served as a useful first line of defence, advance guard and buffer zone, between themselves and the Bantu peoples. The subsequent troubled, triangular relationship between Bantu, Boer, and British delineated the changing political boundaries of the area. Relations became increasingly violent, as British settlement encroached upon Boer and Bantu, particularly after the British annexation of Natal in 1843. Only by force of arms would the British recognize the independence of their Boer subjects who had trekked north. In retrospect, the Sand River Convention of 1852, by which the British recognized the

12

Painting the Map Red

independence of the Transvaal republic, and the Bloemfontein Convention two years later, which accepted the autonomy of the Orange Free State, were more a truce than a settlement. Real autonomy depended upon the Boer republics' capacity to defend themselves against the British and the Blacks. The Boers' inability to defend themselves during the 1877 Boer-Zulu conflict forced the Boers to seek British military and monetary assistance. The surrender of Boer independence was a high price to pay for British protection, but at the time they had little choice. Boer subservience was short-lived. In 1880—1 Paul Kruger, later president of the Transvaal, and Piet Joubert, his sometime political opponent, led a successful rebellion to wring Boer self-government from the British upon terms outlined in the Pretoria Convention (1881), later modified by a London Convention (1884). While this "first" Boer War lasted only four months, several decisive British defeats, especially the final one at Majuba Hill, left a lasting resentment in the British army and a portion of British society, which was not to be appeased until the Boer-British confrontation of 1899—1902. Similarly, the Boers' military success gave them a lively, perhaps exaggerated, sense of pride and self-confidence in their own military prowess.23 To those who interpret the second Boer War in ethnic terms as a struggle between Boer and Briton, these early Boer-British conflicts were primarily a contest of language, law, and customs. During the next decade, however, no one can deny the importance of economics - particularly the discovery of diamonds and gold — and the social conflict engendered by the region's subsequent economic transformation.24 While social and economic historians disagree on the precise role diamonds and gold played in precipitating war, there is little doubt that the discovery of diamonds in 1867, and gold on the Witwatersrand in 1884, enhanced tremendously the power of the Transvaal within southern Africa. Exploited largely by foreign capitalists such as Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit, Transvaal gold quickly swelled the size of towns and cities, enlarged internal markets, and accelerated social diversification. The influx of large numbers of foreigners, or Uitlanders, with different languages, religions, customs, and values challenged the Boers' culture. The Cape Colony British were no less alarmed by the power of Transvaal gold. Germany's publicly declared support of the Transvaal in its various border disputes with Britain gave these conflicts an imperial dimension. Kruger's armament campaign and attempts to establish rail access to the sea through Swaziland confirmed Britain's worst fears. As economic power in South Africa shifted from the coast to the interior, increasingly binding the prosperity of its colonies at the Cape and Natal to that of the Boer gold and diamond fields, the British feared that a

13 Splendid Imperialism

union of South Africa might well materialize but not under British aegis.25 To mitigate these perceived strategic dangers, the British countenanced several measures short of war. Their first line of "offence" was the Uitlanders, a heterogeneous group whose political influence was restricted by a Transvaal electoral law limiting the franchise to males over forty years old who had been resident in the state for at least fourteen years. Disgruntled Uitlanders, many of whom were British subjects, were convenient allies. Many were influential capitalists whose fixed investments in deep-level gold mining entailed a longer commitment to the industry and the country, men of sophisticated managerial skills and capable of accommodating social relationships. These men were especially anxious to secure a more responsive, sympathetic government, and were prepared to do what was required to obtain that end.26 Initially the British government was content to leave the battle in their hands. This strategy seemed particularly sound since opposition to Kruger's government was not confined to the Uitlanders, but found growing support among the burghers themselves. Burghers were unhappy with Kruger's financial policy, concessions, monopolies, railway deals, administrative inefficiency, corruption, and apparent preference for using Hollanders as advisers, as well as his education and linguistic policy and his reluctance to grant the franchise to the Uitlanders.27 These issues united burghers and Uitlanders in an informal alliance under the leadership of Piet Joubert. But as the franchise became the centrepiece of the BritishUitlanders campaign to dislodge Kruger's government, the UitlanderBoer coalition became an increasingly tenuous alliance. From a narrowly British perspective the franchise was a useful ploy. Not only did it unite Uitlander and Afrikaner across national and class lines, but it appealed to the sensibilities of British Liberals who might otherwise support the Boers. It also provided a convenient legal pretext for British intervention, since the Pretoria and London conventions granted legal equality to the white race in the area. Above all, since the Uitlanders were thought to constitute a majority of the eligible male population, their enfranchisement provided a legislative resolution to the various "grievances," including the overriding British "fear of an Afrikaner dominated South Africa - led by the Transvaal."28 But to Paul Kruger, the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders was nothing less than a betrayal of his people's past and future, a peaceful surrender of the republic as he and the Voortrekkers knew it. For even if the Uitlanders were not yet a majority of the potentially eligible electorate (and Kruger was convinced they were), they would surely be so shortly and thereafter dominate the republic alone or in concert with his Boer opponents. Neither he nor his people could be expected to permit that,

14 Painting the

ap Red

even if the British would be satisfied with nothing less. Consequently when agitation, petition, and negotiation failed, the British began to countenance a more forceful solution, first in the form of an insurrection. The insurrection, however, proved an unmitigated disaster for the British. Months before the abortive raid, Dr Leander Jameson, with the assistance of Cecil Rhodes, the premier of Cape Colony, and with the knowledge of Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, began recruiting a military force to enter the Transvaal in support of a planned Uitlander insurrection in Johannesburg. With fewer than half the required number of soldiers, on 29 December 1895 Jameson led about six hundred men, many less than sober, into the Transvaal, more to precipitate than support an insurrection. When the Uitlanders failed to respond, within four days Jameson and his companions were ensconced in a Pretoria gaol. Chamberlain immediately condemned the raid; Rhodes was forced to relinquish the premiership of Cape Colony, and British support for the Uitlanders' cause waned. Meanwhile Kruger's hand was strengthened, his conspirators discredited, and with the working understanding between his parliamentary opposition and the Uitlanders compromised, an internal solution to the conflict became an increasingly remote possibility. While war might have been avoided by more astute Transvaal diplomacy, Alfred Milner's arrival in South Africa as high commissioner in May 1898 made a satisfactory settlement unlikely. Backed by friends in both British political parties, Milner immediately took control of the situation, determined to impose terms more exigent than those of many of his collaborators. Bent upon breaking the power of Afrikanerdom, Milner invoked the clause in the Pretoria Convention assuring legal equality of the white race in the republics. In a much-publicized dispatch to the British government, he insisted that Kruger's refusal to honour this convention placed the British subjects in the Transvaal "permanently in the position of helots," and Britain was duty bound to intervene. When a meeting between himself and Kruger at Bloemfontein failed in early June 1899, both parties began preparations for an armed conflict. Although negotiations continued with Kruger throughout the summer, and at times Kruger seemed ready to make some concessions on the franchise, he would not be stampeded. Meanwhile a strident imperial press, the Uitlanders' public petition seeking assistance, and sympathetic support from the English public reinforced the hard-liners' position in the British cabinet. Therefore Kruger's government, despairing of negotiating an honourable settlement and sensing the military advantage shifting to the British side as more troops steamed towards South Africa, issued its famous ultimatum. Calling upon the British to withdraw all troops from the borders of the Transvaal Republic,

15 Splendid Imperialism

and to recall those on the high seas or which had landed in South Africa since June, Kruger challenged the British to submit their grievance against his state to arbitration. In less than Kruger's 48-hour time limit, the British gave their predictable reply. Early in the morning of 11 October 1899, Boer troops moved into British territory.

CHAPTER TWO

The Anatomy of Canadian Opinion

Months before Kruger's ultimatum, Canadian newspapers reported the deteriorating relations between Britain and the South African Republic with growing interest and foreboding. In July 1899 Parliament had discussed the crisis and had passed a resolution which, while it endorsed the Uitlanders' call for "political liberty," avoided any promise of military aid. Nevertheless, the Militia Department began to plan for the dispatch of a Canadian contingent, and professional and part-time soldiers started to jockey for positions. The anticipated war came increasingly to occupy a central place in public and private conversation at militia camps, military institutes, and patriotic associations. Since not all Canadians were convinced that their country ought to participate in this conflict, an acrimonious political debate preceded and followed the dispatch of Canadian troops to South Africa. No aspect of the South African War has received greater attention from Canadian historians than this rancorous public controversy. Viewed as a contest of wills between French and English Canadians, historians have seen the pro-war advocates' triumph as a political watershed. In their view, the controversy "split open the cleft" between English and French Canadians, launched the twentieth-century French-Canadian nationalist movement, broke Laurier's power in Quebec, and served as a dress rehearsal for the First World War.1 Canada's response to the South African War, however, was more complex than this simple dichotomy suggests. No one can deny that there was a strident pro-war party confined largely to English Canada, and virtually unanimous opposition and indifference to Canadian participation in French Canada. Less well known is the opposition and widespread indifference to the war in many areas of English Canada. Moreover, the social, philosophical, and regional character of Canada's response to the war often had little to do with ethno-linguistic issues.

17 Anatomy of Canadian Opinion Confined largely to central Canada's English, urban, middle class, the pro-war party consisted of a loose coalition of progressives, nationalists, pragrnatists, and partisan politicians - groups most likely to favour imperialism. Britain's case against the South African Republic particularly appealed to many progressives, social gospellers, educationalists, trade unionists, moral crusaders, and urban reformers. Men such as James Simpson, the Toronto socialist and trade unionist; Salem Bland, the rising star of the social gospel; E.S. Rowe, the dynamic young president of the Ontario Christian Endeavour and one of "the high priests of Toronto radicalism";2 F.S. Spence, the prohibitionist; J.W. Bengough, the poet, cartoonist, and single-tax crusader; J.J. Kelso, the child saver; W.F. Maclean, the urban reformer; progressive writers such as Agnes Maud Machar, B.C. Scott, and EG. Scott - all were strident advocates of British intervention in South Africa. Supported by papers such as Toronto's News, World, and Telegram as well as the Montreal Star -journals that began as part of the progressive "peoples press" movement — the pro-war party counted among their number spokesmen of Canada's leading Protestant denominations. In their minds the South African contest was one between British progress and Boer decadence. The Boers stood for all that was exclusive, backward, "medieval," corrupt, and oppressive; in other words, a replica of seventeenth-century Europe.3 To support their impressions, progressives evoked the authority of Bavid Livingstone's unflattering descriptions of the Boers, especially their enslavement of the black population, which made a mockery of the Boers' professed piety and religion.4 Progressives were men of action, missionaries committed to social change and justice, ready to compel "the decadent and medieval nations" to conform to "the cannons of common civilizations."5 Most favoured peaceful change, their model being the British transformation of Egypt as described in Alfred Milner's England in Egypt. But occasionally they favoured "the cannon's mouth" to right a great wrong such as slavery, or the United States' recent subjugation of Cuba and the Philippines - a conflict which some saw simplistically as a contest between "an open and closed Bible."6 In their view, the Boer War was just such a cause. "What is needed," thundered the Victoria Daily Colonist on 10 September 1899, "is to have progressive ideas knocked into him [Kruger] in some way. If it is to be done by bullets, let us hope that after the Uitlanders have become enfranchised it will be by ballots." Even less bellicose progressives believed that Kruger's denial of the franchise to the Uitlanders made peaceful change impossible, and that his subsequent ultimatum and invasion of the Cape Colony compelled Britain to protect its colony. While a defensive war, it was also a God-given opportunity to rescue Africa from "Butch terrorism," and bring another nation to the feet of Christ.

i8 Painting the Map Red

In their view, British soldiers were merely "missionaries togged in khaki, bibles on the end of guns."7 "Civilization Advances" is how one Canadian newspaper headline hailed the beginning of war in South Africa.8 Progressives also saw the South African conflict as an extension of Canadian historical development - "our war," to use the title of an article in Vox, Winnipeg's Wesley College student paper.9 T.G. Marquis, the Queen's University professor of English literature, compared the Uitlanders' cause to the Canadian reformers' struggle against the Family Compact for responsible government. Canada's acquisition of western Canada, its own colonial territory, was likened to Britain's "civilizing" mission in Africa, in which the South Africa Chartered Company played the role of Canada's Hudson's Bay Company, the adventurous traders who had preceded civil government.10 The Uitlanders were the beleaguered Canada party, while the Metis served as the Boers, resisting the imperatives of progress and civilization. Others saw the Uitlanders as a South African edition of Canada's Equal Rights Association, not an inappropriate analogy if one saw the movement's aim not as equal rights, but the supremacy of English. Then, too, there was the inevitable and frequent analogy drawn between the English and French in Canada, and the Boer and Briton in South Africa. In many progressives' view the war was but a continuation of Canadian history, an extension abroad of the Canadian experience. Tolerance was not one of the Canadian progressives' strongest suits. In the name of democracy they rarely hesitated to impose their views upon those whom they felt retarded the march of progress at home or abroad. To persuade Canadians that the Boers were a vicious, dangerous people, they personalized the conflict and turned it into a crusade "against Krugerism" — a campaign to unseat a corrupt, dictatorial tyrant. To prohibitionists, Kruger was a man who was supposed to drink four gallons of beer a day; to democrats he was an autocrat who had turned the simple agrarian republic into a personal empire and surrounded himself with submissive, self-serving minions; to liberals he was a man who ruled above the law, breaking judges who crossed his path; to political reformers, he was a lackey of monopolists, liquor interests, spies, and foreign intriguers.11 Cartoons depicted Kruger as a poison mushroom, a slovenly, secretive peasant, or an uncontrolled tyrant. Liberating the Transvaal from Kruger's despotism promised relief not only for the Uitlanders but for the oppressed Boer citizenry. Progressives were no more generous to their Canadian opponents. They condemned especially what they saw as the dead hand of conservatism, notably in Quebec, where the so-called ignorant and priest-ridden French Canadians impeded social change - an incongruous anachronism whose power must be broken. Insultingly dismissed as Frenchmen

ig Anatomy of Canadian Opinion

"modified by cold weather and Holland gin" who "were unwisely granted linguistic and religious privileges," French Canadians were compared to the Irish where "the ignorant sections were under the control of the priests, malcontents and enemies of the Empire."12 Progressives could not permit this unenlightened power to prevent Canadians from participating in the remaking of South Africa. To make the point, the Toronto World spoke ominously of the Boers in Canada who, if ballots failed to fix, "bayonets would," and Fredericton's prohibitionist journal, the Reporter, warned that Canada was "honey-combed with traitors and conspirators," meaning those French and Irish Canadians who opposed Canadian participation in the war.13 Even as prominent a Liberal as John Charlton speculated publicly that trooops might be required in Quebec to assure that province's loyalty. Not all war advocates were fanatics: many were embarrassed by the inflated rhetoric of their pro-war colleagues. Fortunately, most of the verbal violence was confined to Ontario and English Quebec. Western Canadian papers, Liberal, Conservative, and independent, tended to dismiss the "racial" agitation as an "eastern question,"14 and condemned it as dangerous, disloyal, and disruptive of the war effort. Moreover, many pro-war advocates employed more pragmatic arguments in support of Canadian participation. They saw practical reasons to participate in the war, not least an opportunity to rid Canada of its irksome colonial status and gain greater influence and responsibility within the imperial community. To them, Canadian participation was an initiation rite to establish beyond doubt Canada's claim to a voice in the empire's councils, thereby extending rather than reducing Canadian autonomy. It was a timely opportunity to demonstrate the country's unity, strength, and character, and to forge a mature relationship with Britain, in which Canada would be no longer a dependency but a partner in imperial affairs, ready to share the burdens and responsibilities of empire.15 Pragmatists also believed that participation would purchase British protection of Canada's territorial interests. By doing "Its Bit for the Thin Red Line," to use the words of the Canadian poet, Wilfred Campbell, Canada would not only repay Britain a portion of the estimated $55 million that Britain was assumed to have spent on Canadian defence since Confederation,16 but would establish a right to British support of Canada's tenuous territorial claims against its avaricious neighbour. The point was particularly pertinent along the Alaska boundary, an area of special concern to Canadians following the failure of an International Joint High Commission to agree on the border earlier in the year. The opportunity to buy British support was, according to one author, "the underlying issue that brought Canada into the South African War."17

20 Painting the Map Red

Participation in the war constituted a small fee to pay for membership in this useful defence club, an "insurance we pay for the defence of our liberty and our lives."18 More immediate, tangible rewards for participation excited the imaginations of hard-headed businessmen and politicians. "Canada has a strong commerical reason for seeing British ideas prevail in South Africa," wrote E.B. Biggar, a Canadian war propagandist, who had spent five years in South Africa. He then went on to explain how Canada could profit from the export of food, agricultural machinery, lumber, and all manner of manufactures.19 Even before hostilities commenced, Canadians were aware that considerable business might accrue to Canada through participation. Indeed, the Canadian minister of militia and defence, EW. Borden, explained to Laurier that war meant "the sale of Canadian horses to Imp. Gov. ... the outfitting of uniforms, equipment, saddlery & means employment of Canadian labour and materials."20 Some weeks before war began several businesses had an opportunity to appreciate the sweet logic of the minister's argument as Borden let generous emergency contracts for clothing and supplies in the event Canada followed his advice and sent troops. Others spoke confidently of increased British investment, immigration and greater popularity for "our food products."21 The challenge to all these pro-war advocates was how to make their case without falling into the pit of partisan politics. In this they failed. Although there were a growing number of independent daily papers in Canada, most public issues were defined within the stifling parameters of party advantage. While one author has argued that by the turn of the century political parties did not possess a disciplined press, on the subject of Canada's participation in the South African War the Canadian partisan press remained remarkably disciplined.22 On the eve of a federal election the Conservative party watched with growing satisfaction the Liberals' division and discomfort over the South African issue, and sought to turn it to their advantage. Although Liberals accused Conservatives of using the "race cry," apart from the Mail and Empire and the Hamilton Spectator, the Conservative press took care to avoid crude forms of racial rhetoric. Not only was it politically dangerous to their support in Quebec, but it was also distasteful to many EnglishCanadian Conservatives. These papers distinguished carefully between the traditional loyalty of the French-Canadian people and their Liberal leaders, pointing proudly to the support of French-Canadian militia officers and Tupper's Quebec lieutenants, Thomas Chase Casgrain and J-G. Bergeron. To them the issue was not one of race but party. Laurier's minister of public works, Israel Tarte, bore the brunt of the partisan press, "one of the most bitter campaigns in Canadian political

21 Anatomy of Canadian Opinion

history against a Minister of the Crown."23 An ideal target, Tarte was an irreverent, irrepressible man, and a renegade Conservative who had helped deliver Quebec to Laurier's Liberals. Although difficult "to cherish personal hatred against him,"24 he proved a convenient butt of partisan and ethnic tension and frustration. Cartoons depicted him speaking an illiterate English with a European French accent. Soon after the war began students, townsmen, and even a Toronto-based company of soldiers burned the unpopular minister in effigy, the less literate believing him to be one of Kruger's generals. In their minds, Tarte was the wicked wizard of the Laurier administration, the protector and abettor of disloyal French-Canadian extremists, whose utterances came perilously close to treason. "When British women and children are being murdered wholesale by the Boers," wrote the Hamilton Spectator, "it is high time that the Boer's friend Tarte was out of the government of a loyal British Colony."25 Few cared to recall that Israel Tarte was one of the few French Canadians who belonged to the British Empire League. Fewer still cared to remember that Tarte had had little time to scheme and plot since he had spent most of the summer in Europe for an operation, returning to Canada only on 21 September.26 Laurier also came in for his share of abuse. The partisan press pictured him as a weak, vacillating man, an eloquent, polished but facile grandee, ready to celebrate the Queen's Diamond Jubilee of 1897 and accept British honours, but the last to offer material assistance in time of need. More cynical observers recalled Laurier's attack on the Canadian government's handling of the North-West Rebellion, his public statement that had he been born on the banks of the Saskatchewan he would "have shouldered a musket to fight against the neglect of governments," and his support of "veiled treason" in i8gi. 27 Some compared him to W.P. Schreiner, the Afrikaner premier of the Cape Colony, whose efforts to avoid war were branded treason by sections of the loyalist press.28 Not to be outdone by any other paper, the Montreal Star stretched credibility with a story that Laurier was prevented from growing a beard only by fear of "betraying his sympathy for Kruger."29 Letters to the editor suggest the effect of this campaign on public opinion. Dr Sterling Ryerson, a respected Toronto citizen, could not believe that "this man rules British Canada" and suggested that "It is time, sir, to wake up in this country to the fact that we may have questions to settle which may not be set to rest by the ballot."30 What many non-partisan war advocates feared had happened: a holy crusade had been turned into a political movement, a campaign to discredit and dislodge the Liberal government. The pro-war coalition's strength, however, was its diversity, its chameleon ability to appeal at the same time to idealism, pragmatism, nationalism, and crass partisanship. In this respect it resembled the Canadian imperialist movement.

22

Painting the Map Red

Not all English Canadians supported British intervention in South Africa, much less Canadian participation. A small, well-defined but ineffective opposition existed in English Canada, drawn largely from the farming community, radical labour, Protestant clergy, and anglophobic groups, principally Germans and Irish Canadians. Their opposition was based upon a broad range of liberal, socialist, pacifist, ethnophobic, and practical considerations; but their ideology was too diverse and their numbers too small and scattered across the country to form a viable opposition to their pro-war opponents. At least five small farm weeklies, the Bobcaygeon Independent, the Weekly Sun, the Canadian Gleaner, the Regina Standard, and the Antigonish Casket, opposed the war. All employed similar arguments to explain their opposition to British intervention, though there were differences of emphasis among them. Most identified with the Boers, whom they described as sober, God-fearing, brave, and unyielding, not the "race of uncultivated and incorrigible savages" depicted by the yellow press. In their opinion the Boers, like themselves, were pioneers, "a poor pastoral people" courageously "fighting under a grim old Kruger who trusts God and keeps his powder dry." (The editor of the Antigonish Casket, Michael Donovan, however, had no illusions about Kruger, that "antiquated bigot,"31 who could not "care a fig" for Catholic rights; Donovan simply felt that Chamberlain was "a worse and wilier potentate than Oom Paul"). These journals also stressed the common ties of "race," "our cousins," and religion, the irony of worshipping "the same God we profess and follow and who are pleading the righteousness of their cause at His feet."32 Most of the anti-war group were classical liberals, opposed to the new imperialism, big government, big business, standing armies, and taxation.33 They saw Canadian participation as an invitation to empire, a dangerous, costly precedent obliging Canada to participate in future wars, a violation of the sacred principle of no taxation without representation. They failed to understand the sense of Canadians throwing away either their "life or treasure in the African wilderness" when both were so urgently needed to develop Canada's natural wealth.34 Opposition to the war among the ranks of labour went well beyond the predictable dissent of radicals such as J. Phillips Thompson, Alfred Jury, and Walter A. Radcliffe, the blind poet. At least seven labour journals — Toronto's Citizen and Country, Winnipeg's The Voice, the Nelson Miner, the New Denver Ledge, the Sandon Paystreak, London's Industrial Journal, and for a time Fredericton's Butler's Journal - opposed the war. Farm and labour war opponents agreed on several points. Both feared the war's cost, its wastage of men and physical resources, and the growth of a military establishment.35 They condemned the intolerance and the verbal and physical violence condoned by the loyalist press. They worried

23 Anatomy of Canadian Opinion

about the constitutional implications of participating in a colonial war, not of their making nor in their interest. They also possessed a similar romantic sympathy for Kruger that "fine old man," "the little Boer Republics" and their pious, courageous, pioneer people, who had subdued a wild country and whose bullets "have sung the song of desperate resistance."36 Labour journals tended to hold capitalism as a system, rather than a few capitalists, responsible for the war. In their view the war was the "natural effect" of a system based on greed and exploitation, and imperialism was only its crudely fashioned cloak. When war came the farm journals did not go to the lengths of the labour press, which called upon soldiers and workmen to refuse to fight, and condemned those who volunteered as "curs," who "left their families in destitute circumstances" to "bayonet human beings for $0.40 a day and the chance to get a piece of metal with v.c. stamped on it."37 Even the radical labour press was not entirely of one mind. The Kootenay papers had no sympathy for the Citizen and Country's and the Voice's Christian socialism and their concern for what Christ thought of imperialism or what Jesus might do if he were now on earth. "God," the New Denver Ledge sarcastically pointed out, was "always on the side that has the most men and the greatest number of guns."38 The Citizen and Country's Christian socialist editor, George Wrigley, was all too painfully aware that the Canadian clergy, whom he had expected to lead the peace crusade, were largely upon the side of the big guns. In all major Protestant denominations, however, there were war opponents among the clergy and prominent laymen even while their colleagues continued to mumble "military prayers" and bless "men whose business is to murder."39 While some clerical war critics incurred the wrath of their congregations, which in the case of the Reverend J. Herbert Bainton led to the founding of a rival Congregational church in Vancouver, most congregations tolerated their minister's pronouncements and sometimes endorsed them. Most based their opposition on Christian pacificism, and their dislike of imperialism. At least one churchman expressed a clear preference for the Boers and the justice of their cause. Apart from the Society of Friends, the Mennonites, and the Brethren in Christ, who reaffirmed their dogmatic opposition to war, the Brethren going so far as to disown one of its members because he had gone to war,40 the only organized Protestant body to oppose the war was the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). One of the most progressive organizations at the time, the WCTU was more than a one-cause organization. Since its entry into Canada in 1874, it had possessed a vigorous Peace and Arbitration Committee, and had attempted to retain its support of "peace and arbitration" - what Kruger had demanded in

24 Painting the Map Red his famous ultimatum — at a number of regional meetings during the early months of the war.41 Although the precise number of Protestant peace advocates may never be known, it is clear that the Prince of Peace possessed some vigorous advocates among Canada's Protestant clergy and laymen. Ethnic opposition to the war found support among Canadians of German and Irish descent. Since this study is based primarily on Englishand French-language newspapers, reports of German opposition are frequently filtered through an unfriendly source. Both the loyalist and anti-war press, however, reported verbal attacks on German Canadians as well as German demonstrations of support for the Boers, such as the raising of a Boer flag in the German section of Ottawa, or the attempts of West Coast German and Belgium merchants to establish a pro-Boer aid fund.42 Irish Canadian support for the Boers was even more vocal and conspicuous. The Canadian Freeman, an Irish Catholic weekly published in Kingston, and Montreal's Lodge No. i of the Ancient Order of Hibernians both publicly proclaimed their wholehearted support for the Boers.43 In other Irish societies, such as Ottawa's Irish Literary Society (where its vice-president, the son of Laurier's cabinet minister, Richard Scott, tried but failed to secure support for the Boers), more moderate opinions prevailed.44 Nevertheless, within these societies, and in some small Irish communities where sympathies were unmistakably pro-Boer, they could not resist an opportunity to humble an old enemy.45 Whatever the size and distribution of English-Canadian opposition to the war, without organization and leadership, it exercised only limited influence. A few opponents penned letters to Laurier. Others wrote to their local newspapers. Small organizations such as the North Essex Independence of Canada Movement passed resolutions declaring that Canada had no business fighting in a "foreign war." And the Montreal Trades and Labour Council even published and distributed a flyer entitled "Stop the War and Arrest the Murderers."46 Their numbers, however, were too small, their support too scattered and diverse to exert any real power. They were all too easily, if unfairly, dismissed by their opponents as agitators, cranks, and chronic objectors, or as traitors, villains, and egotists. Between the pro-war advocates and their opponents there was another large amorphous body of English-Canada opinion, almost entirely ignored by historians of the war, who through apathy, conviction, or blind partisanship adopted a more tentative position. Frequently a forum for alternate opinion, they sought to check the excesses and intolerance of more committed contemporaries, and during the pre-war public debate their opinions assumed an inordinate importance among sensitive politicians. The assumption that most the English-language papers competed with each other in their patriotic zeal for England's cause in South Africa ignores not only the anti-war sentiment in English Canada but the large

25 Anatomy of Canadian Opinion number of rural weeklies who were indifferent to the conflict. These weeklies were concerned more with material and local matters, be they the increased number of wolves in their vicinity or simply the weather's effect upon crops. Even the growing political character of the pre-war debate failed to stir otherwise highly partisan papers from their apparent apathy and indifference. And those that reported the crisis regarded it as a conflict confined entirely to Britain and its South African colonies and never suggested the need for Canadian participation.47 Not without reason did Sam Hughes and other contemporaries complain to the press on the eve of war that the "public has not shown enough of energy ... the masses of the people have been too passive."48 While prominent independent journals such as the Montreal Star, the Toronto News, the World, and the Telegram led the stampede for Canadian involvement, other independents such as the Ottawa Journal, the Montreal Witness, the Quebec Telegraph, the Hamilton Herald, the Sherbrooke Record, the Stanstead Journal, and even Toronto's fashionable Saturday Night, followed a more critical judicious path. Generally theirs was a waitand-see policy. According to them, the British had made no call for volunteers, and there was no reason to believe that British regulars could not handle any eventuality. The "more a person thinks of the agitation for the rushing of a Canadian Contingent to the Transvaal," the Ottawa Journal concluded only a few days before hostilities began, "the more senseless it appears."49 Many members of Canada's clergy shared these independent papers' judicious approach to the war. According to Gold win Smith, the Catholic church's dignified impartiality throughout the war was the price it paid for peace in a church containing large numbers of anti-war critics. In other denominations many clergy, whether deliberately or through indifference, scrupulously avoided any reference to the war in their Sunday sermons. Others raised their voice to protest the warmongering of their clerical colleagues. The religious press, particularly the Presbyterian Record, the Westminster, and for a time the Christian Guardian, attempted to dampen the fanaticism of the pro-war press. Even the Toronto-based Canadian Clergyman, the Church of England's family newspaper, prided itself in having "countenanced no jingoism" and prayed to the last "that England may be spared a war which ... cannot but bring in its train consequences so disastrous and so dishonouring." An even greater ambivalence stalked the pages of other religious journals, such as the Methodist Recorder and the Canadian Congregationalist, the latter hoping "that Canadians ... called upon to serve in Africa may never stain their hands with the blood of their fellowman."50 In addition to the apathetic and moderate independent press in English Canada, the Liberal partisan press remained remarkably disciplined, and occasionally ambiguous on the South African conflict. Assailed by their

26 Painting the Map Red

Tory opponents, Liberal editors fought back, condemning the Conservatives' "gilt-edged loyalty" and race cry, and dismissing their agitation as "the ribald ravings of the senile leader of the opposition," backed by Tory militia officers craving medals and glory.51 The Sarnia Observer, the Hamilton Times, and the London News, all good Liberal papers, were especially fierce with their Tory tormentors, whom they branded "a regular syndicate of liars," and their "criminally malicious" allies such as the Montreal Star. Others such as the Toronto Star and the Manitoba Free Press avoided 'inflammatory writing' and tried to take a stand close to that of Laurier, difficult as that was.52 In the absence of clear direction from the Liberal hierarchy, some partisan papers may have appeared more opposed to the war than they intended. While a section of the Liberal press, notably the Toronto Globe, the London Advertiser, the London Free Press, and the Halifax Chronicle, greeted the government's decision to send troops with obvious relief and immediately joined the imperial chorus, loudly protesting their loyalty and devotion to the empire and abusing the Boers, others, notably the Sarnia Observer, the Huron Expositor, the Moncton Transcript, the Fredericton Herald, the St John Globe, the Eastern Chronicle, and the Ottawa Free Press rallied more slowly and reluctantly to the cause.53 The comments of some might even be interpreted as sympathy for the Boers. Affectionately tagged "old Paul Kruger" and his wife as a "good solid farm woman, scrubbing, waiting on the table, to save the penny,"54 their images of Kruger were far from those created by the pro-war press. To many of these journals the necessity of sending Canadian troops to South Africa was not apparent at first. Their subsequent opposition to the dispatch of a second contingent,55 their grumbling about the expenditure of millions "to cause death, sorrow, devastation, destruction and waste," their charity towards dissent, their intolerance of excess and their thinly veiled scorn for "sojoring" suggest that their initial reservations on the war may have been motivated by conviction as well as party loyalty.55 IN CONTRAST TO THE AMBIVALENCE in a section of the anglophone press, French-Canadian attitudes towards Canadian participation in the South African war were unequivocal, if one can judge by the francophone press before and immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Not one journal - Liberal, Conservative, independent, religious, recreational, or commercial — advocated the dispatch of Canadian troops. Most rejected Canadian participation in unmistakable language, and many expressed their sympathy for the beleaguered Boers. Reporters in Quebec on the eve of war wrote of the "practical unanimity" among French Canadians "on the street, in clubs and on cars."57 This sentiment was not confined to Quebec, but included Acadians, Franco-Ontarians, and western francophones.

27 Anatomy of Canadian Opinion

The handful of French-Canadian federal, provincial, and municipal politicians and militia officers who were prepared to advocate participation were exceptions to the virtual unanimity among French Canadians. Many French Canadians found it difficult to understand their compatriots' dual allegiance to Canada and Britain. "Nous CanadiensFrangais, nous n'appartenons qu'a un pays, le Canada," Henri Bourassa never ceased to remind his audience.58 He and others believed that Canada had no business interfering in South Africa. The war constituted no threat to Canada. It challenged no vital interest and promised no tangible rewards. Canada owed Britain little, and expected little in return. Britain did not need Canada's assistance; and to dispatch Canadian troops abroad, while Britain was preoccupied in South Africa, simply exposed Canada to the danger of American attack.59 To help stop this peculiar folly papers appealed to other groups, especially Irish Canadians. Before the Boer War, a non-partisan consensus existed among French Canadians on national and imperial defence.60 It envisaged a strong commitment to Canada's defence, and by extension to Britain, should its security be threatened, simply because Britain constituted Canada's first line of defence. Laurier renewed this commitment in 1897 when he promised that if England were "in danger," Canada would do whatever "can be done ... to help her," a promise he had made in the House of Commons even before he became prime minister.61 This commitment did not extend, however, to Canadian participation in colonial wars, or contributions of men or resources for imperial defence beyond Canadian borders. In French Canada, colonial wars were seen as dubious adventures, promoted by a powerful and insidious British political movement called imperialism, which threatened to dismantle the liberal colonial settlement based on self-government, liberty, and diversity. In many French Canadians' view, imperialism's primary object was to subordinate all British possessions to a central authority, maintained by military force, and supported by a tax on colonial men and resources. For this reason, Henri Bourassa, French Canada's most articulate and influential war critic, defined imperialism as "military contributions from the colonies to Great Britain, in men and treasure, but mainly in men."62 From the start French Canadians had opposed the Imperial Federation League. They protested what was thought to be the league's primary object - namely, a tax on Canadian men and resources, - and predicted that Canadians would be called upon to pay for expeditions to Africa. Honore Mercier, the Quebec premier, predicted it would "impose upon us a regime which, by means of conscription might disperse our sons from the ice of the Pole to the burning sands of the Sahara."63

28 Painting the Map Red

Imperialism posed other dangers as well. Given the racial rhetoric pervading much of the movement, it is not surprising that French Canadians associated the league with unilingualism, militant Protestantism, and majoritarianism, so forcefully represented by D'Alton McCarthy, the erstwhile president of the Canadian Imperial Federation League and the man who led the assault on French-Canadian linguistic rights outside Quebec. It mattered little that McCarthy's activities were unrepresentative of the league's official views and had led to his removal from its presidency in 1891, or that many of the league's prominent spokesmen believed in bilingualism, cultural duality, and shared many of the patrician social values of the French-Canadian elite.64 French-Canadian confidence had been too badly shattered by a quarter-century of bickering over cultural rights to trust in the good will of a few men, be they ever so articulate, influential, and genteel. Moreover, imperialism's emphasis on economic reorganization, social reform, and national regeneration challenged traditional FrenchCanadian institutions and values, already threatened by rapid industrialization, urbanization, anglicization, and materialism.65 Imperialism aroused fear and suspicion, and consolidated French-Canadian opposition to imperial adventures, particularly colonial wars, which might serve as a pretext to initiate imperial federation. Many French Canadians identified with the Boers, like themselves a minority trying to preserve their national identity against the corroding influences of an alien culture. Frequent press references to the Boers' Latin origins, their agrarian life, their patriarchal families, their simple manners, their deep piety, their courage, resourcefulness, determination, and passion for liberty, suggest the extent of French-Canadian sympathy for the Boers.66 Some French-Canadian journals drew historical analogies between themselves and the Boers, likening French-Canadian colonization in the Lac St Jean area to the Great Trek, the 1837 rebellion to early Boer-British conflict. They referred to their common struggles to protect their respective language, laws, autonomy, and rich physical resources against "Anglo-Saxons'" grasping greed and will to dominate.67 "Qui sait," one journal asked, "si un jour la pomme de discorde ne viendra pas des rives du Saint Laurent?"68 Had French Canadians chosen which army to join, the small Ottawa Liberal daily, Le Temps, concluded, many would have chosen 'Tarmee commandee par les Joubert, les Cronje, les Viljoen."69 As war approached, however, the francophone press was compelled to resort to more convincing arguments than their alleged historical, cultural, and ethnic affinities to the Boers. Economic and constitutional objections, therefore, were pressed into service. It seems strange, La Presse commented, not without bias and

29 Anatomy of Canadian Opinion

exaggeration, that "20,000 Canadiens vont partir pour se faire Kaffirs, et, en echange, on nous amene 25,000 Doukhobour pour en faire des Canadiens."70 If English Canadians wanted to go to South Africa, they could join an English regiment, but there was no reason why Canadian taxpayers' should organize, equip, transport and pay for their regiment.71 It seemed to many French Canadians that English Canadians were determined to make a trip and have Jean Baptiste pay for it.72 The economic argument by itself, however, was limited, even niggling, and easily dismissed as mercenary. Canadians "would Fight if it paid," the Montreal Star sarcastically retorted.73 Placed in a larger constitutional context, the argument possessed a greater force, even in English Canada. Initially the man who put the constitutional case most effectively was Laurier's much-abused minister of public works, Israel Tarte. Shrewdly tailoring his arguments to appeal to English Canadians, Tarte made his case as an advocate of imperial federation, opposed to participation in a war for which Canada possessed no responsibility, and paying a tax without representation — an action designed to retard imperial federation. Tarte's argument was too clever by half. And when the exigencies of federal politics obliged him to support the dispatch of troops, Henri Bourassa took up the torch and made it clear that French Canada was opposed to British imperialism in any form. But even he was careful to place himself within the tradition of British liberalism. Most francophone journals supported Bourassa's contention that imperial federation had no place in their blueprint for Canadian political evolution. In French Canada there was also a more basic moral and emotional revulsion against the war, occasionally aired in Parliament and the partisan press, but which found more persistent expression in small, independent journals. Ideologically these journals represented a broad spectrum of opinion, ranging from Jules-Paul Tardivel's small Catholic nationalist weekly La Verite, to Montreal's radical anti-clerical Les Debats. Among their number was Le Monde Illustre, a Catholic weekly devoted to family and the arts, the Montreal weekly Le Samedi, and the bi-monthly Le Passe-Temps, a secular journal of the arts and recreation, with a strong interest in theatre. Other independent anti-war journals included La Semaine religieuse de Quebec, a small weekly owned by the Quebec Catholic diocese, Montreal's bilingual Trades and Labour Council Journal, and L'Oiseau Mouche, a small student paper published by the Seminaire de Chicoutimi. Although anglophobic and designed for a home market, their moral arguments were not parochial, but drawn from the British, French, Irish, German, and American press.74 Basically they saw the conflict as one of right against might, a contest between a small pastoral people fighting

3o Painting the Map Red

to preserve its autonomy against a relentless, imperial power, manipulated by the insatiable greed of heartless capitalists. Many prayed openly for a Boer victory, though at first it seemed a tall order. Partisan politics were never far from the surface. The opportunity to embarrass a political opponent, to settle an old score, was too good to be lost. Conservative journals took special delight in accusing Laurier and Tarte of being imperialists and reminding readers of Sir Wilfrid's declaration at the Diamond Jubilee that "we are British to the core," an assertion which Laurier denied, or Tarte's rhetorical offer to raise a French Canadian contingent of two thousand if Britain should need assistance.75 But although partisan advantage was exploited wherever possible, opposition to the war and imperialism transcended party lines, and a few journals broke ranks and attacked their own leaders to make the point. It was upon this non-partisan opposition to imperialism that Bourassa based his nationalist hopes. He did so, however, only after his efforts to build an anti-imperialist peace party across language failed. Although French and English Canadian anti-war critics agreed substantially on their analysis of the war, their larger ideological differences, as well as the nature of English-Canadian dissent, made cooperation difficult. Clearly Canada's response to the war was more than an ethno-linguistic contest of wills. Its diversity created a tortuous dilemma for the Laurier government on the eve on an election. French Canada's virtually unanimous hostility to Canadian participation left the government with little room to manoeuvre. The existence of English-Canadian opposition and a sizeable body of moderate, independent opinion, often indifferent to the South African crisis, together with a relatively disciplined party press, however, persuaded Laurier for a short time after the war had been declared that he could safely side-step the issue. But Laurier was mistaken.

CHAPTER THREE

The Campaign for Participation

Historians have often argued that Canada was compelled to send troops to South Africa by the machinations of a coterie of imperial conspirators which included the governor general, Lord Minto, the general officer commanding the Canadian militia, E.T.H. Hutton, and the British colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. Although this conspiracy theory has largely been discarded, few would deny the importance of the concerted public campaign to overcome the Laurier government's reluctance to participate in this war. Many years ago H. Pearson Gundy pointed out that the imperial conspiracy theory does not bear close scrutiny.1 Ever since the Jameson raid Minto had deplored that "d - - - blackguard" Rhodes and his Chartered Company and had been uneasy about Chamberlain's association with the "disreputable" incident.2 Consequently, when he learned in early May 1899 that the Uitlanders' South African Association had appealed to the Canadian British Empire League for support, and that the Canadian government might be asked for some token of sympathy, he warned Laurier to have nothing to do "in any way with South African complications," since he regarded the South African Association as hirelings of the Chartered Company, and believed there would be plenty of opportunity later "to show our good will" when the imperial government had declared itself.3 That opportunity came two months later, when Chamberlain wrote Minto two letters explaining the troubled situation in South Africa and how a "really spontaneous" offer of colonial military assistance would demonstrate "the solidarity of the Empire" and help secure a pacific settlement.4 The Bloemfontein conference's failure in early June 1899, however, seemed to have destroyed Chamberlain's confidence in a peaceful settlement of the South African crisis. Thereafter he determined to "take the bull by the horns" and prepare for war, confident that "it

32

Painting the Map Red

was the only possible way of saving South Africa for the British empire."5 To convince his more timid cabinet colleagues and impress rivals at home and abroad, Chamberlain wanted to give the South African cause an imperial dimension. Although Chamberlain made it clear that colonial military contributions would be used, the real value of a colonial offer was political. All he required at this point was Minto's assessment of "the views of those concerned," and warned him against any appearance of "external pressure or suggestion." Chamberlain had good reason to believe that the Canadian government might accede to his request. In April 1899 he had learned of a lengthy correspondence between the War Office, the Admiralty, two Canadian governors general, and members of the Canadian government on the Canadian militia's liability for service abroad under section 79 of the Militia Act. In this exchange of letters Laurier, as opposed to Minto, had agreed that the act gave the British government undisputed power "to move troops anywhere within or without the Dominion."6 Although Chamberlain had little interest in the legal right of the British government to compel Canadian troops to serve abroad, he was reassured that no constitutional barrier prevented the movement of Canadian troops, should Laurier make a "sentimental offer"; and he had thanked the prime minister for his "patriotic" response.7 Minto did not disguise the gravity of the South African crisis or the possible implications of the dispatch of Canadian troops. He informed Laurier that an offer of Canadian troops would "signify the acceptance of a principle which ... would ... do much for the future history of the Mother Country and her colonies." He made no effort, however, to compel Laurier, and confessed that he quite understood "that questions of Imperial emergency may arise in which a colony deeply interested in its own development might justly not see its way to assist."8 Minto's suggestion of imperial federation aroused rather than allayed Laurier's suspicions. It also suggested an easy escape and Laurier needed no prompting. After several interviews in July 1899 with Minto, Laurier, while expressing his confidence in the righteousness of the Uitlanders' cause, cited three major reasons which prevented his government from making a commitment at this time: the uncertainty of the CanadianAlaskan border; the tax of a contingent upon the Canadian treasury; and French-Canadian hostility to imperial expeditions.9 Minto was not deceived by Laurier's response. He appreciated Laurier's political logic, and warned Chamberlain against pushing the Canadian prime minister too far on the subject of troops for the Transvaal. Minto was also disturbed by the "racial hatred" of a section of the pro-war press, which he thought "positively wicked,"10 and did what he could to dampen the enthusiasm of his friend Major-General Hutton. In Minto's

33 The Campaign for Participation mind there was "a great deal of irresponsible and unreliable talking connected with" calls for Canadian participation, and confessed confidentially to his brother Arthur, less than three weeks before the war, that he recognized "the iniquity of the war" and saw no reason why Canadian statesmen should "commit their country to the expenditure of lives and money for a quarrel not threatening Imperial safety and directly contrary to the opinion of a Colonial Government at the Cape."11 These were scarcely the words and actions of a serious conspirator. In his manuscript memoirs, however, Hutton boasted that he and Minto had forced "the weak-kneed and vacillating Laurier Government with their ill-disguised French and pro-Boer proclivities to take a part nay a leading part - in the great movement which has drawn the strings of our Anglo-Saxon British Empire so close."12 Hutton not only misunderstood Minto's position and exaggerated his own part, but he underestimated the contribution of other more influential persons. Hutton's own reasons for pressing for a Canadian contingent were far from disinterested. An ambitious British regular loaned to the Canadian government and given the Canadian rank of major-general, he exercised his Canadian command under the authority of Canadian law and upon the instructions of the Canadian government. Nevertheless, he regarded himself as "the very humble instrument of an All-wise Providence," with a self-appointed mission to reform the Canadian militia, purge it of political corruption and prepare it for imperial service abroad.13 These objectives were designed more to secure the gratitude of his British superiors than to gain the support of the Canadian government. War in South Africa offered Hutton the opportunity to advance his career. Consequently, when Minto informed him of Chamberlain's request and asked him "privately the minimum force which Canada might reasonably contribute toward military operations in South Africa" the general immediately set about planning for the despatch of a Canadian contingent, composed of two small infantry battalions, one field battery, and one hundred mounted rifles, with a total strength of twelve hundred men, at a cost of some $300,000. Although Laurier had refused Chamberlain's request for military assistance, both Minto and Hutton informed Chamberlain and Sir Garnet Wolseley, the commander-in-chief of the British army, of the "probable" composition of a Canadian contingent should Laurier change his mind.14 Hutton's personal interest became even clearer when he volunteered to lead a combined colonial force. This was a position for which he felt himself eminently qualified, since before coming to Canada he had commanded the militia of New South Wales.15 This larger post, however, depended upon a full-scale, official Canadian military contribution. Aware that there existed in "Upper Canada a small coterie of eminent

34 Painting the Map Red

men who had banded themselves together for the purpose of enforcing through the press, the policy of forcing the Laurier Government into cooperating with the Mother Country in a crisis involving Imperial affairs," during August and September of 1899 Hutton attempted to work "a spirit of patriotism and military enthusiasm ... to a white heat throughout Canada."16 At militia camps, in public addresses and private conversations, Hutton exalted the virtues and rewards of military life and stressed the importance of Canada's participation in the defence and promotion of the imperial mission. Several militia officers were offered positions in the proposed contingent,17 and as the news of the organization of a contingent for South Africa spread, individuals and units began to volunteer for service, and jockey for positions. A small unit in the Niagara peninsula, the 2nd Dragoons, was one; and Hutton assured Chamberlain others would follow with but "a little encouragement."18 As long as these offers served his ends, Hutton was content. But the offer of one prominent militia officer threatened to undermine Hutton's entire strategy. In May and again in July of 1899, Sam Hughes, an early advocate of imperial federation and the Conservative member of Parliament for Victoria North, volunteered to recruit and command a Canadian contingent, with or without government support. In Parliament he pressed the government to offer a contingent, and in the press he advertised his desire to lead as many as twenty thousand Canadians into battle. Then on 24 July he made a similar offer to the colonial secretary, with copies of the letter to the general officer commanding the Canadian militia and the minister of militia, requesting them to endorse and transmit it to the colonial secretary. The Canadian government had no objection to Hughes's activities, since private offers helped deflect public attention from the government's inaction. Indeed, the government went out of its way to encourage Hughes. The minister of militia, who was a personal friend of Hughes, endorsed his letter and sent it to the cabinet and the governor general for transmission to Chamberlain. Israel Tarte, in truth or jest, even offered to recruit French Canadians for Hughes's contingent. Hutton immediately saw the danger of Hughes's offer and determined to block him. He refused to send his copy of Hughes's letter to Chamberlain, and reprimanded Hughes for communicating with a politician in his role as a militia officer. An acrimonious public controversy ensued, which reflected credit on neither man. Hughes had always resented the general's condescending attitude towards the Canadian militia, especially the non-permanent force. In a flamboyant letter to Hutton, Hughes demanded to know by what authority he had been reprimanded, and used the occasion to remind Hutton of the stupidities of British regulars through the ages. Then, to prove that he could recruit men, Hughes

35 The Campaign for Participation advertised in local papers for volunteers to serve under his command — an action that further enraged Hutton. The general's intemperate reply to Hughes, in which he disparaged the martial virtues of the Canadian militia, together with his threat to remove Hughes from command of his battalion and charge him with violation of the Army Act, which forbade unauthorized recruitment, did nothing to enhance Hutton's reputation among many Canadian imperialists and militiamen. Hutton's treatment of Hughes suggests the limits of his influence. Among the leaders of the pro-war group Hutton had few supporters. Denison had no time whatever for him, and Hugh Graham, the editor of the Montreal Star, and the loyalist press made no secret of their support for Hughes in the contingent controversy.19 Moreover, when the intensive public pressure for Canadian participation began to crystallize during the last week in September and in early October, Hutton, the selfappointed conspirator, was off in the North-West and British Columbia inspecting militia units. A more plausible conspirator was J. Davis-Allen, the secretary of the Capetown and London South Africa Association, who arrived in Canada in mid-July of 1899. Cutely described as a friend of "Jim (Jameson) the Raider, whose hobby was British supremacy in South Africa," DavisAllen's arrival received front-page coverage in several dailies. Armed with letters of introduction, Davis-Allen gained easy access to men of political power and influence, which he shrewdly used to solicit support for the British cause in South Africa. Convinced that there existed a conspiracy to destroy British supremacy in South Africa, his first task was to secure a non-partisan parliamentary resolution of support, together with an offer of material assistance for the Transvaal Uitlanders, an object he pursued with diligence and guile. In Ottawa he interviewed Lord Minto, who at first was reluctant to meet a friend of Jameson.20 Then he visited Canada's two federal political leaders. After his interview with the prime minister, Davis-Allen, either by mistake or design, cabled Chamberlain, informing him that Laurier would move a resolution in the Commons, but only if it were the colonial secretary's desire. Chamberlain immediately informed both Minto and Lord Strathcona, the Canadian high commissioner, that a resolution from a non-British imperial leader would be of immeasurable assistance.21 Annoyed but compromised by Davis-Allen's misrepresentation, and afraid that the Conservative leader, Charles Tupper, might seize the initiative to embarrass his government, on 31 July Laurier reluctantly moved a cautiously worded resolution. It regretted the Transvaal Republic's "refusal to accord to Her Majesty's subjects now settled in that region an adequate participation in its Government" and expressed Canada's "sympathy with the efforts of Her Majesty's Imperial authorities to obtain"

36 Painting the Map Red

for these subjects "such measures of justice and political recognition as may be found necessary to ensure them in the full possession of equal rights and liberties." While recommending the Canadian example where "men of different races, but races of equal rank" receive justice, Laurier appealed "to the conscience and judgement of mankind at large"22 rather than to the threat of physical force to secure the Uitlanders' just claims. Above all he avoided a promise of military assistance. Seconded in the absence of Henri Bourassa by George Eulas Foster for the opposition, the resolution was endorsed unanimously by the House of Commons. Three French-Canadian senators, Charles-Eugene de Boucherville, Thomas-Alfred Bernier, and Auguste-Charles Landry, gave the resolution closer scrutiny. Questioning the reliability of information on the South African crisis, they called for more "authentic information" before condemning "our co-subjects," the Boers, and mischievously asked if the government might consider adding "a paragraph to sustain the rights of the British subjects in Manitoba." The Conservative leader of the Senate, Sir Mackenzie Bowell, intervened to end additional embarrassing questions. With Bowell's assistance the resolution passed the next day without division, the senators emulating commoners by a hearty rendition of "God Save the Queen."23 Soon after the Uitlander resolution passed, Parliament was prorogued. Politicians returned to their constituencies and Ottawa settled into its familiar but deceptive August quiet. Meanwhile Davis-Allen remained busy. The parliamentary resolution was but one of his goals. Another was the creation of a pressure group to inform the public on South African affairs and see that the government took the appropriate action. When the Commons' Speaker, J.D. Edgar, refused Davis-Allen the use of the Railway Committee room, some friendly senators found Davis-Allen a meeting room in the Senate's quarters, where he organized a Canadian parliamentary branch of the South African Association. The Canadian committee was almost a model of political, regional, and ethnic balance, "a few heads from every herd," as Henri Bourassa sarcastically remarked.24 Of its sixteen members, the committee counted eight Conservatives, seven Liberals, and Sir John Bourinot, clerk of Parliament, who was nominally independent. Seven members came from Ontario, one of whom was a French Canadian; four were from Quebec, two English and two French Canadians; two were Maritimers; one came from Manitoba, and one from British Columbia. Although none was a front-bencher, (Robert Borden was moved to the front bench later in the month), all were influential men. Three were senators and four were newspaper editors. Indeed, the committee was so representative of the diversity of parliamentary opinion that it proved largely ineffective as a political pressure group.

37 The Campaign for Participation

Davis-Allen, however, had not invested his entire confidence in the Canadian committee. He remained in Canada until early September "at work behind the press."25 As soon as the Uitlander resolution passed Parliament, Davis-Allen left Ottawa to inform influential men in Montreal and Toronto of the dangerous situation in South Africa. In Toronto Davis-Allen's most useful conquest was Colonel Denison, to whom DavisAllen had written in late April, to seek the Canadian league's support for the Uitlanders' cause. Although Denison, upon the advice of the league's London headquarters, later tried to take his distance from DavisAllen, and refused to permit him to use the Canadian league to publicize the South African issue, he had five interviews with the South African publicist.26 Before these meetings Denison had been inclined to agree with G.M. Grant's feeling "that the Boers had opened up the country and should not be disturbed."27 Davis-Allen convinced Denison that the Transvaal Boers, together with those of the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony, planned to drive the British out of South Africa. "After these explanations, and reading the dispatches of Lord Milner," Denison "took up a very decided stand against the Boers."28 Denison proved one of Davis-Allen's most important Canadian converts in view of the British Empire League's subsequent role as "the rallying point for those who pressed for immediate and full (Canadian) support in men and arms."29 Although by 1899 the league seemed "little more than the personal appendage of the redoubtable George Taylor Denison," its bipartisan character, the prestige and power of its membership, gave it an influence well beyond its limited numbers.30 In fact, it was on 30 September 1899, at a specially called meeting of the Canadian Military Institute, "that the first step was taken" to bring pressure upon the Canadian government to participate in the war.31 In moving the resolution calling upon the Canadian government to offer military assistance, Denison based his call not upon a defence of Uitlander rights, but the "widespread conspiracy among Dutch-speaking settlers over the whole of South Africa" to end British rule, a claim he attempted to substantiate by reference to Milner's dispatches. He also declared that he believed that the retention of "the power of the Empire" remained an essential guarantee of Canadian security on this continent.32 Davis-Allen had good reason to be pleased with his Toronto visit. In Montreal Davis-Allen enjoyed a comparable success with Hugh Graham, the editor of the Montreal Star. Only too willing to place his paper at the service of the cause, Graham assured Davis-Allen that Canada would fight to keep South Africa British. In an eighty-eightpage typescript entitled "Secret History of the Actions of the Canadian Government in Regard to Sending a Contingent to South Africa" written by Hugh Graham at the close of the war and sent to several public men,

38 Painting the Map Red

including the governor general, Graham described the campaign for Canadian participation as a victory of the fourth estate, more particularly for the Montreal Star, "the only paper in Canada which could have conducted a campaign with such results." While clearly a self-serving exaggerated claim, it contained considerable validity, as Laurier himself later confessed. Through an extravagant press campaign, a few aggressive, urban, English-language dailies attempted to stampede public opinion into demanding the dispatch of Canadian troops to South Africa. Bold headlines, sensational and often fabricated news stories, incendiary editorials, carefully selected letters to the editor, poems, and cartoons were all used to portray the Uitlanders as suffering servants of empire besieged by a cruel and crafty people, determined to destroy the last vestige of British power in South Africa. Meanwhile, Canadians were being prevented from joining the imperial rescue mission by a cowardly, unrepresentative government manipulated by anti-British extremists in French Canada. The Montreal Star's close ties with the Conservative party and its leader made a mockery of its claim to independence. The same might be said of the Toronto Telegram, owned by John Ross Robertson, an independent Conservative (and member of Davis-Allen's Canadian branch of the South African Association), the Toronto World, edited by W.F. Maclean, an independent Conservative, and the Toronto News, all avid pro-war advocates. Quickly joined by the Mail and Empire, the Hamilton Spectator, the Ottawa Citizen, and the Montreal Gazette, self-professed Conservative journals, the campaign to solicit Canadian military assistance for South Africa took on the appearance of a partisan ploy to embarrass the government on the eve of a general election. Throughout July, August, and September of 1899 the pro-war press reported the deteriorating situation in South Africa, frequently representing it as a conspiracy against British supremacy. Rumours circulated freely, many based on fact, some simply speculations. A roll-call of the colonies who had offered troops - all except Canada and Hong Kong was designed to isolate and embarrass the Canadian government. Lists of volunteers, or those who offered to raise troops, were published. The press circulated fairly accurate information on the composition and command of the hypothetical Canadian contingent, said to consist of thirteen hundred men, of whom eight hundred were to be infantry, the rest artillery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel William Otter. A public controversy even began over the command of the contingent, as to whether it should be commanded by a Canadian or imperial officer. A more concerted, sustained campaign to compel the Canadian government to offer troops, however, was launched only about two weeks before fighting commenced. Inspired by the news that Britain had

39 The Campaign for Participation

ordered ten thousand troops to the Cape, on 30 September a small group of Toronto's senior militia officers, led by Lieutenant-Colonel James Mason, called a public meeting of the Canadian Military Institute to press the government to offer troops. Chaired by Sir Oliver Mowat, Ontario's aged Liberal lieutenant-governor, this meeting received wide publicity. Copies of its two resolutions, one requesting the immediate offer of a Canadian contingent and the other calling upon the government to assume full costs of the contingent, including its pay while in South Africa, were sent to all members of Parliament, commanding officers, and associated military organizations. Almost immediately other military groups met and made similar requests. Commanding officers of militia battalions were interviewed by the pro-war press. All were predictably anxious to go, or see their men go, to South Africa. Meanwhile officers and men in Quebec City, London, Halifax, Kingston, and various other towns and cities across the country met in drill halls to talk and plan ways of hastening the government's decision. Support for Canadian participation was not confined to the military. Other patriotic groups, notably the British Empire League - Denison again — met and called for Canadian troops. The Conservative party had already endorsed the dispatch of a Canadian contingent. Soon after passage of the Uitlander resolution, Sir Charles Tupper left for England and remained there until 18 September. There he discussed the South African crisis with several imperial politicians, including Joseph Chamberlain. Upon his return to Canada on the 27th, he announced his party's official position, which suspiciously coincided with the non-partisan Toronto movement initiated by the Canadian Military Institute. Anxious to place themselves at the head of what appeared to be a popular movement, Conservative journals launched a particularly unscrupulous, partisan campaign to discredit Laurier's government and force it to offer Canadian troops. True to his promise to Davis-Allen, Hugh Graham's Montreal Star led the way, in a "campaign unique in Canadian journalistic history." In close communication with Davis-Allen's friends in Ottawa, Graham's Star and other journals published front-page stories, supposedly "amply verified," of Boers dynamiting train-loads of women and children, kicking to death the secretary of the South African League, and abusing fleeing British women and children. Such stories were tailored to produce a "thrill of horror" to scandalize Victorian sensitivities, to create a sense of outrage, designed to justify bringing law, order, and civilization to this troubled portion of the dark continent.33 Characterized as cruel to their cattle, bullying towards their servants, one paper informed its readers that Natal Boers had enslaved and murdered two thousand native men, women, and children. Those who defended the barbarities of these "slave owning

40 Painting the Map Red

Boers," who abused our kinsmen, the Uitlanders, robbing them of their gold to purchase arms to suppress them, were dismissed as hirelings and bondsmen. Clearly these abuses must be stopped and if necessary by gunpowder, and the time to ignite the fuse was now.34 When the pro-war press's demands failed to move the Canadian government, it made a direct "appeal to Caesar." To create the impression of a massive pro-war movement across the country, the Montreal Star sent some six thousand pre-paid and often pre-worded wires to all the reeves, mayors, commanding officers of militia regiments, prominent clergymen, and other notables asking their opinion on Canada's duty should war begin in South Africa. After careful editing, the paper printed the replies supporting the war, together with a carefully selected number of those opposed, mostly from French Canadians.35 These replies, printed over several days, portrayed as warnings of commanding officers, the "murmuring of an insulted nation," together with the pronouncements of prominent Montrealers in a "For Motherland" column, gave the impression of an irresistible groundswell of public support which a politician might ignore at his peril. Taunts, ridicule, and melodramatic poetry were also pressed into service, shaming Canada for its failure to offer troops.36 Other pro-war journals copied and commented on the Star's articles and emulated its rhetoric. To fuel the flame, Graham turned the contingent controversy into an ethnic contest between French and English, in which a supposedly "insignificant" minority held hostage the English-Canadian majority. According to Graham, cowardly English-Canadian cabinet ministers submitted meekly to the dictates of their French-Canadian colleagues, while Canada was being humiliated in the eyes of the empire, bartering away its claim to security, prestige, and material benefits.37 Canada, Kipling's "Lady of the Snows," had lost the opportunity of being first in the battle. Hostages of power, the Liberal party's behaviour made a mockery of democratic government, leaving those who sought redress with no alternative but to support their opponents. Faced by the growing press violence, Laurier attempted to stare down the crisis, convinced that the South African agitation would die of asphyxiation. Consequently he failed to inform his cabinet of Chamberlain's July inquiry, not wishing to arouse their interest. And when he was obliged to sponsor the Uitlander resolution, he deliberately avoided a promise of military assistance. This policy, however, had serious limitation. Unaware of Laurier's objections to the despatch of Canadian troops abroad, F.W. Borden, the minister of militia, not only countenanced Hutton's contingency plans, but at a large banquet at the Windsor Hotel on 5 September 1899 for Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Girouard, he offered to send Canadian troops to

41 The Campaign for Participation

defend the empire "wherever they may need such defence."38 Laurier immediately informed Borden that he was opposed to "sending an armed force to Africa" since "we have too much to do in this country to go into military expenditures," a point he made the same day in letters to John Cameron, the editor of the London Advertiser, and J.S. Willison, the editor of Toronto's Globe.39 Laurier's quiet campaign to dampen the war spirit continued during a fence-mending tour of southwestern Ontario in mid-September, where he appealed to many of the "old hard-headed, close-fisted rural Liberals" who shared his objections.40 Laurier attempted to create the impression that the imperial government neither wished nor needed Canadian troops, a position supported by his party press and the moderate independent journals almost until the first shots were fired. So confident was he of his success that he informed Bourassa only two weeks before the war began that "vous n'enverriez pas des soldats en Afrique."41 Laurier's tactic of holding "a block of ice to the back of Canada's neck"42 was in ruins by 3 October, when the public release of Chamberlain's telegram to the Canadian government stripped his policy of any credibility. At first glance the telegram seemed unobjectionable. Addressed to all the self-governing colonies, it simply thanked "the people of Canada" for their patriotism "in offering to send contingents to South Africa" and stipulated the terms upon which troops would be accepted. According to Chamberlain's instructions, volunteers were to be drawn from the infantry, mounted infantry, or cavalry. Each was to bring his own equipment, and the trooper his mount, and all were to be armed with guns, supplied if necessary by the imperial government. Organized into company size units of 125 men, each was to be commanded by a captain and three subalterns, and were to leave Canada not later than 31 October. The imperial government would be Habile for the men's maintenance and pay upon their arrival in South Africa and for their return to Canada. The telegram further asked that this information be given "to all who have offered to enlist volunteers." Whatever its wording, both friends and opponents of the colonial secretary saw the wording of the telegram as a direct appeal to the Canadian people for military aid. What gave the telegram a sinister appearance, and suggested design and coordination, was the simultaneous, unauthorized publication of the Militia Department's detailed plan for a Canadian expeditionary force to Africa in the Canadian Military Gazette, a paper with close ties to military headquarters and the GOC. The plan called for a force composed of infantry (981 NCOS and men, twenty-nine officers), cavalry (154 NCOS and men, twenty-nine officers, and 161 horses), and a battery of artillery. "If war should be commenced in the Transvaal," the editor confidently asserted, "the offer of a force from the Canadian Militia ... will be made

42 Painting the Map Red by the Canadian Government." In view of these plans, the editorial continued, it will be unnecessary for idiosyncratic "fire-eating warriors ... and self advertising promoters ... to make themselves ridiculous by recruiting "innocent, guileless persons for service abroad. For "when the time comes for Canada to offer the services of a force, it will be done by the Government of Canada through its proper officers, and not by unimportant self-seeking notoriety hunters." In tone and content the article bore the mark of General Hutton, and appeared to be but another round in his vendetta with Sam Hughes. The simultaneous release of the Militia Department's plan and Chamberlain's telegram elicited a predictable chorus of contradictory responses. The pro-war press hailed the two documents with undisguised delight: Chamberlain's telegram was proof of the British government's need and desire for Canadian troops; and his thanks to "the people" rather than the government of Canada was a clear censure of Laurier's failure to offer assistance. Coming at the beginning of the pro-war press's intensive campaign to coerce the Canadian government to offer a contingent, the telegram bestowed imperial endorsement on the partisan debate. To those who believed in an imperial conspiracy, the telegram and the unauthorized release of the Militia Department's plan seemed proof of their suspicions. In their view, Chamberlain's virtual request of Canadian troops made a mockery of responsible government. By publishing the telegram without the Canadian government's consent, Chamberlain had cast his lot with the opposition and appealed to the people over the heads of their elected government. More incriminating still were the references to offers of troops, unauthorized by the Canadian government. Who, they wanted to know, had made these offers, and upon what authority? Two cabinet ministers, Israel Tarte and Richard Scott, both opposed to the dispatch of troops, were convinced that Hutton and Minto were the culprits.43 Laurier was now in a fine fix. Publication of Chamberlain's telegram concerned him little since he knew that Colonel L.-J. Pinault, the deputy minister of militia, had been responsible for its unauthorized press release.44 What mystified Laurier more was Chamberlain's reference to offers of Canadian troops. Hughes had been the only person to offer troops directly, and Minto had refused to transmit his offer to the Colonial Office, despite its endorsement by the Canadian government. Laurier could only conclude that some more highly placed person had done so. More damaging still was the revelation that Britain needed and would accept men, and that the Militia Department was able and prepared to provide them. All that was now required was a decision from the Canadian government. Pro-war advocates could not have asked for more.

43 The Campaign for Participation Laurier attempted to contain the political damage. Roden Kingsmill, the Toronto Globe's Ottawa reporter, was summoned to the prime minister's office to receive a new gloss on the government's policy. Laurier dismissed as a "pure invention" the Canadian Military Gazette's claim that the Militia Department possessed a plan for the dispatch of troops. He insisted that the expenditure of public funds must be approved by Parliament, which had been adjourned for less than two months and was unlikely to reconvene. Moreover, once assembled, Parliament would have to amend the Militia Act since, as Laurier explained, section 79 restricted the use of Canadian militia to the defence of Canada and it was difficult to see the South African Republic as a "menace to Canada." Finally Laurier, exploiting the ambiguity in Chamberlain's telegram, invited all volunteers who wished to serve with British troops in Africa to do so by following the 3 October telegram's guidelines. The Militia Department, he assured the reporter, would readily transmit these and similar offers to the imperial authorities. By following Chamberlain's telegram to the letter, Laurier hoped to escape the wrath of the loyalist lobby, dodge a divisive political decision, and deflect public attention from the inaction of his government. So anxious was he to encourage private volunteers the sort of scheme Sam Hughes had proposed - that he wrote at once to the governor general, who was in New York on private business, to seek Minto's permission to publish the full text of the telegram in the official Canada Gazette.45 Laurier's diversionary tactics alarmed Minto. Conscious that the wording of Chamberlain's telegram lent itself to Laurier's interpretation, Minto cabled Chamberlain for a more precise interpretation and explained to the colonial secretary his personal objections to non-official offers. Some days later Chamberlain replied that he had no intention of accepting "any offers from volunteers."46 He would have an official Canadian contingent or nothing. Meanwhile Minto advised the prime minister against encouraging private recruitment. In Minto's view, a Canadian contribution ought to be official and reflect the country's size and importance, since its value was symbolic, not practical. By the time Minto's letter reached Ottawa Laurier faced a partisan press revolt. Not even Laurier's most faithful supporters believed that the Militia Department possessed no plan for an expeditionary force. The Globe was particularly annoyed that it had been used to transmit this false message, and its editor bluntly asked Laurier what the advantages were of serving the government when other journals possessed more accurate information.47 How Laurier's denial could have been so categorical is difficult to understand, since the plan was an open secret; scarcely a month before

44 Painting the Map Red

Borden had informed him of its existence and anticipated cost. It is possible that Laurier thought his reply to Borden, dismissing a Canadian contingent, had countermanded the plan. As political deception it was a dismal failure. His insistence upon parliamentary approval held even fewer terrors for his opponents. Aware of the bipartisan popularity of imperialism, they were confident that the government could not withstand a confrontation in the House. Laurier's constitutional objections, too, were dismissed as a quibble, "a miserable ... subterfuge, or pretext to avoid a commitment." "It is not the law that is lacking," the Montreal Gazette objected, "it is the heart."48 Moreover, the Military Gazette's disclosure of the official plan crippled Laurier's attempts to encourage private recruitment. "It would be a criminal act of folly," the Military Gazette wrote, "to appoint an amateur Militia officer without army experience to command a battalion."49 Even Hughes's supporters counselled him against raising a private contingent which might release the government from its responsibility to send an official contingent under Canadian officers. Nor could Hughes expect Canadian volunteers to bear the considerable cost of equipment and transportation to South Africa stipulated by Chamberlain's telegram, when they knew there were plans to send an official contingent. Laurier agreed; if troops went to South Africa, he assured the anxious governor general, they would constitute a force worthy of the size and importance of Canada. The prime minister, however, still believed he could avoid sending troops, despite the bitter, partisan debate. His own Liberal press remained loyal and the independent journals had not yet altered their position. So confident was he that the storm would blow itself out that he left Ottawa on 6 October for four days to attend the opening of a Chicago post office building. To the end Laurier seemed to believe that the Boers would back down and war would be avoided. Before leaving Ottawa, however, Laurier attempted to reassure his followers and secure support for his position. Both he and Clifford Sifton, his powerful minister of the interior, wrote to the editor of the Globe, whose opinion counted for much, discounting the agitation for a contingent as a Tory fracas got up to embarrass the government. "In a real emergency," Laurier assured Willison, Parliament would be asked for "millions in money and thousands of men," but he could not see why Canada ought to participate "in all the secondary wars in which England is always engaged."50 Those members of the cabinet who were in Ottawa were also called together the afternoon before Laurier left for Chicago, to consider the political implications of the agitation for a Canadian contingent. During the meeting Scott and Tarte persuaded many of their colleagues that there was an imperial conspiracy to coerce the government

45 The Campaign for Participation

into participation. The ministers' prime target was Hutton, whose indiscretions were increasingly a cause of cabinet concern. Two weeks before, Hutton had upset several cabinet ministers by refusing to permit Toronto's 48th Highlanders to join Admiral George Dewey's victory parade in New York, owing to Britain's friendship with Spain. During the cabinet meeting Scott related how Hutton had informed him that Canadian public opinion would force the government to send "not a few" but five thousand troops to South Africa, and when the minister had challenged him, the general boasted that he, as general officer commanding the militia in New South Wales, had overturned that government when it refused to accept his counsel. Although Borden attempted to protect the general, he received little support in the cabinet. W.S. Fielding, the finance minister, objected to imperial interference, and Clifford Sifton entertained a particular animosity towards the governor general. After a heated discussion, Borden agreed to wire Hutton, who had left for the Northwest on 25 September, to discover if he had made unauthorized offers of troops. Meanwhile the acting prime minister, Richard Scott, informed the governor general of the cabinet's deliberations upon Minto's return from New York. The first casualty of the crisis was the government's relations with the governor general. Until this point Minto's relations with his government had been cordial. Scott's long meeting with Minto on 9 October, however, changed that. Old and irascible, Scott lacked Laurier's charm and tact. Questions turned into accusations, and each man parted resentful and suspicious. Scott had refused to accept Minto's assurances that Hutton had nothing to do with the release of the Militia Department's contingency plan. And Minto's reluctance to ask Hutton if he had ever offered or suggested to the British authorities that they could depend upon Canadian troops fed Scott's suspicions. Scott's failure to secure satisfaction from Minto left Laurier with the unpleasant duty of doing so upon his return, a task made more difficult by Scott's interview. Nor was Laurier's task made easier by the increasingly hysterical tone of the pro-war press and its insulting references to the war's opponents as the Boers in Canada. More significant was the fact that some of the moderate papers, such as the Ottawa Journal, while rejecting the language of the loyalist press, began to waiver and call for a token offer. In Laurier's absence, cabinet solidarity began to crumble, a fact painfully obvious from a glance at the press. While Tarte's journal, La Patrie, defended French Canadians from threats and insults, and assured its readers that Canadians would not be sent to Africa, the Toronto Globe confirmed the existence of a contingency plan and declared that Canadian troops would go to Africa if they were needed. On 11 October, the day Boer troops moved into British territory, the Globe informed its readers that a

46 Painting the Map Red

Canadian contingent was prepared to go to the aid of Britain — information leaked to the Globe by Borden.51 The pro-war press was jubilant. Exploiting the apparent divisions in the cabinet, it praised Borden as the only cabinet minister with the courage to defend his convictions. The outbreak of war took Laurier by surprise. He had been assured "through British sources in Chicago, that the Republics would submit to the demands of Great Britain." All during his Chicago trip Laurier had argued with his Liberal entourage, his devoted friend, L.-O. David, the mayor of Montreal, Raymond Prefontaine, and the editor of the Globe, J.S. Willison, against Canadian participation. When Laurier, upon his return, learned at the London station stop of the war's outbreak, the issue became more than a debating point. "During the journey between London and Toronto" Laurier became "very sober and silent," as Willison pleaded with him for immediate action, and warned him of the consequences: "He would either send troops or go out of office." When they parted in Toronto, the prime minister still remained "reluctant, unconvinced and rebellious."52 It became obvious, however, that resistance would be difficult. The news got worse as Laurier proceeded. In Montreal Tarte met the train and complained of the Globe's tacit support for the dispatch of troops, and Borden's communications to the press. He warned the prime minister of the Quebec caucus's hardening opposition to Canadian participation. That very night a large Liberal meeting in east-end Montreal, attended by some of the party's most outspoken war opponents, applauded speeches denouncing jingoism and attempts to force French Canadians "to fight with Zulus and Barbarians." At this meeting Odillion Desmarais, the Liberal member for St-Jacques, promised to resign his seat should the government sent troops to Africa. Although few Quebec members of Parliament were likely to follow Desmarais's example, fewer still agreed with Raymond Prefontaine's support for the dispatch of Canadian troops. Laurier knew that most remained uncommitted publicly, amenable to the dictates of party discipline. To avoid further dissension, Laurier instructed Tarte to call a Quebec caucus meeting for the next day, 12 October, making certain that the prominent opponents of participation were present. Laurier summoned an emergency cabinet meeting for the same day. The cabinet meeting lasted from 11:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. Tarte and Scott opposed any official military contribution, concentrating their attack on the imperial conspirators, Chamberlain, Minto, and Hutton. On the other hand Borden and William Mulock, the postmaster general, demanded a full Canadian contingent, recruited, equipped, transported, and paid by the Canadian government. Between these poles were moderates such as W.S. Fielding, who acknowledged the political wisdom of

47 The Campaign for Participation

a Canadian contribution, but wished to reduce the financial burden to a minimum. To them, Chamberlain's suggested small units of 125 men, maintained and returned to Canada at British expense, was the best solution. Although this was the plan which eventually triumphed, when the cabinet rose on the first day Tarte and Scott had made the better case. Well prepared, they had focused their attention on the imperial conspirators, especially Minto's failure to ask Chamberlain to explain his reference to offers of troops. No decision had been taken at this meeting, however, except to meet again the next day. Laurier went at once to see the governor general. There he painted a bleak picture of cabinet dissension. Speaking darkly of the "clandestine attempt which is being made to force our hand," Laurier explained how his cabinet's suspicions impeded rather than facilitated a positive decision. These suspicions, he continued, could only be dissipated if Chamberlain explained "what were these communications and from whom and through what channels they were sent." The rancour and suspicion in the cabinet surprised Minto, and when Laurier had finished his dark tale, Minto was convinced the cabinet would refuse to send troops. Although Minto attempted to persuade Laurier of the practical wisdom of sending troops, referring to Canada's need of British support on the Alaska border dispute, the apparent desire of many Canadians to participate, and the wisdom of consulting Parliament should the cabinet refuse to participate, he was convinced that he had failed. Then, in a last ditch effort to persuade Laurier, Minto agreed to cable Chamberlain immediately, explaining the situation as best he could. The next day Chamberlain cabled Minto that he had received only two offers from Canada, one from Sam Hughes, the other from the province of British Columbia. He also made it clear that while the imperial government would appreciate troops as a "practical demonstration of unanimity throughout" the empire, it had no intention of asking for them.53 The more Laurier considered the first day's cabinet debate, the more resistance must have appeared impossible. Although Willison had promised that the Globe would not declare itself before the government, its sympathies were now no secret. How long Willison could withstand the growing public pressures was impossible to determine. The Globe's defection would inevitably lead to other desertions, particularly in important urban centres where the party was most vulnerable, and where public meetings were turning into loyalist demonstrations. Even moderate nonpartisan organizations, such as the Canadian Club of Toronto, joined in the growing call for Canadian troops. The Montreal Corn Exchange interrupted its transactions to intone patriotic refrains. Rumours of large public meetings being planned in Hamilton, Toronto, and Montreal seemed more ominous still, especially in Montreal where a demonstration

48 Painting the Map Red

might well degenerate into a physical confrontation between French and English. Meanwhile two absent cabinet colleagues, David Mills in British Columbia and Louis Davies in London, wired Laurier urging him to send troops. Lord Strathcona had also cabled his support for a Canadian contingent. Even before cabinet reconvened, Laurier, besieged on all sides, realized that resistance was politically impossible.54 But Scott and Tarte, who had promised their followers "not a man, not a cent for South Africa,"55 remained unconvinced. Faced by Chamberlain's disclaimer, however, the onus was now on them to persuade their colleagues. Moreover, the public clamour and private pressure had worked its spell; when the cabinet reconvened for its second day, the majority seemed to support participation. Undeterred, Scott and Tarte maintained their resistance. The discussion came to a head, however, when William Mulock, a firm advocate of participation, stormed angrily from the meeting, seemingly never to return. Although Mulock's anger may have been enhanced by Laurier's recent admission to the cabinet of James Sutherland, a pragmatic party man and a rival Ontario adviser, nevertheless Mulock's gesture proved sufficient. Realizing he could temporize no longer, Laurier called a recess to permit him to consult his Quebec caucus. The price of its support was a "no precedent" clause; whereupon cabinet reconvened to arrange a compromise and agree upon a public statement. At the close of the cabinet meeting W.S. Fielding (not Richard Scott, who usually acted in Laurier's absence) announced the decision to the press, while Laurier left for Rideau Hall to inform the governor general. Fielding's statement was brief: the Canadian government would assist those anxious "to serve in the British army now operating in South Africa" by recruiting, equipping, and transporting "a certain number of volunteers by units of 125 men, with a few officers," the total "not to exceed 1,000 men." Thereafter the War Office would pay, maintain, and return the troops to Canada at the imperial government's expense. The slight expenditure of funds, Fielding insisted, was "under no circumstances to be regarded as a departure from the well-known principles of constitutional practice, nor construed as a precedent for future action."56 To the pro-war advocates, Laurier later described his government's action as a loyal adherence to Chamberlain's 3 October telegram. To those opposed, especially those in Quebec, he explained his government's actions as a low-cost formula to permit English Canadians to join the British army. The government's compromise deceived no one. It was a reluctant, politically motivated, capitulation to the strident demands of Canada's pro-war advocates, not the clandestine machinations of a handful of imperial conspirators.

CHAPTER FOUR

Fielding a Canadian Contingent

Although the men who volunteered for service in South Africa were moved by a variety of motives, the pro-war advocates were determined that the men of Canada's First Contingent would be more than a consignment of recruits for the British army, as the October Privy Council minute suggested. Within the limitations of size and colonial status, every effort was made to enhance their importance, extend their autonomy, and retain their Canadian character. What they wanted and got was a contingent worthy of Britain's senior Dominion. The prime minister had scarcely finished justifying the limited nature of Canada's military commitment when the cabinet amended its decision to make the offer "more worthy and representative" of Canada's size and imperial importance. Few people had been happy with the decision to organize the men into small, independent, company-sized units, which could be broken up and readily absorbed into the imperial army. Those who seemed reconciled to this arrangement were reconciled only because they saw Chamberlain's instructions as part of a larger War Office scheme which applied to all colonies "without any exception."1 Minto and Hutton were determined to reverse Chamberlain's instructions. Ironically, both were subsequently charged with having attempted to break up the Canadian contingent by those who felt that they were incapable of a larger "Canadian" perspective.2 Borden, Mulock, and even Richard Scott, were also anxious to resuscitate Hutton's plan for a balanced field force representing infantry, cavalry, and artillery — this last being considered Canada's "best arm." With Laurier's permission, Minto wired the Colonial Office on the evening of 13 October, requesting permission to organize a Canadian contingent of all arms. What he suggested was a battery of artillery, one hundred mounted rifles, and two battalions of infantry. The colonial secretary saw at once the political advantage of the proposal, and wrote to Lord Lansdowne, the secretary for war, insisting that he would "not accept the War Office's refusal."

50 Painting the Map Red

Anxious "to please the loyal Canadians and not Mr. Tarte of Quebec,"3 the War Office raised no objection except the "slight reservation" that Sir Redvers Buller, the commander-in-chief in South Africa, retain a "free hand to deal with the Brigade as he likes."4 Opposition surfaced soon enough from Tarte and several members of the Quebec caucus. Still stinging from their failure to prevent the dispatch of Canadian troops, they refused to countenance any tampering with the terms of the cabinet compromise. In face of their opposition, Laurier withdrew his public support for an integrated force.5 The most the Department of Militia conceded, however, was to delay, not abandon, formal creation of a mixed contingent. Confident that the cabinet would eventually see things differently, the department took considerable liberties in organizing the contingent - liberties which the prime minister studiously ignored. Hutton's original plan, drawn up by his chief staff officer, Colonel Hubert Foster, called for a balanced force consisting of a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of field artillery, altogether a unit of 1,209 men, 314 horses, and six field guns. According to this plan, Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence Buchan would command the infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Frangois-Louis Lessard the cavalry, and LieutenantColonel Charles W. Drury the artillery. The entire force would be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William Dillon Otter. Despite Tarte's objections, the First Contingent bore a striking resemblance to Hutton's plan. Although reduced in size from twelve hundred to one thousand men, this "infantry" contingent contained 173 NCOS and men drawn from the Canadian Artillery, a number equivalent to the one field battery suggested by Hutton. The contingent also carried two Maxim field guns and an officer charged with training a machine-gun section. It also contained two adjutants, one of whom was an artillery officer, and eight lieutenants in excess of the War Office establishment for an infantry battalion, as well as four supernumerary officers "for instructional purposes." Among its supernumerary officers was Charles Drury, of the Royal Canadian Artillery, the man slated to command the field battery. Moreover, five of the contingent's lieutenants were artillery officers! Similarly, the First Contingent contained over fifty cavalry (dragoons) recruits. Although this was only one-half to one-third of the number designated in the earlier plans, everyone agreed at the time that if cuts were made, they ought to be from the ranks of the cavalry or infantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Lessard, commanding officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, to whom Hutton had offered a position in his proposed first contingent,6 however, accompanied the contingent as a supernumerary cavalry "commanding officer in waiting." With him went Captain William Forester, who at one time was considered for the cavalry

51 Fielding a Canadian Contingent

command position, and Lessard's obvious second. Given the composition of the First Contingent, it would have taken little more than a cabinet decision to reconstitute a Canadian contingent of all arms. The Militia Department was equally determined to retain the Canadian character of the contingent and to avoid having it broken up and integrated into the British army, even though this might (and did) delay its employment in active combat. With Laurier's knowledge but unknown to Tarte, the Militia Department organized the Canadian volunteers into a regiment composed of two battalions, each containing four companies. This decision preserved the unity of the Canadian contingent and permitted the appointment of many more Canadian officers. It also required the creation of a regimental administrative structure and justified the addition of auxiliary staff, all of which enhanced the contingent's prestige, autonomy, and self-sufficiency. The first beneficiary of the reorganization was Lieutenant-Colonel William Otter, the officer commanding Military District 2, whom Borden had asked initially to shepherd the Canadian volunteers to Cape Town and hand them over to the British authorities "for distribution to such units as they might assign." While performing these duties Otter was to possess only the rank of major, the rank suggested by Chamberlain's dispatch; once in South Africa he was at liberty to return to Canada or take his chances at securing an imperial appointment. As the commanding officer of a Canadian regiment, however, he possessed combatant status, and retained his rank of lieutenant-colonel. He was also entitled to the services of two majors, one for each battalion, one of whom would be his second-in-command. A regiment, too, needed an administrative structure, a headquarters, to care for its internal government, and that meant the appointment of a regimental and two battalion adjutants, a quartermaster, a paymaster, and a transport officer as well as seven regimental staff sergeants. Regimental status also justified the attachment of auxiliary staff, chaplains, medical officers, nurses, an historical recorder, instructional officers, and later, a postal corps. In short, the regiment which left Canada on 30 October was closer to that planned by Hutton than that outlined by the Privy Council order of 13 October. Similarly the First Contingent's cumbersome official designation, the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry, was more than an attempt to retain a sentimental association between it and the Canadian permanent militia's only infantry regiment. Its name was carefully chosen to describe the contingent's status, to make it clear that, contrary to the stated intentions of the initial Privy Council minute, the men of the First Contingent were not British army recruits but men with a temporary appointment in the Canadian permanent militia.

52

Painting the Map Red

Although Laurier had argued earlier that the Militia Act restricted the use of militia to the defence of Canada, the men of Canada's first two contingents were raised by authority of section 79 of the Canadian Militia Act, sworn to serve under and remain subject to "the Militia Act of Canada so far as it applies,, under the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army and the Army Act."7 The British North America Act's restriction of Canadian jurisdiction to its territorial limits was mitigated by the provision of section 179 of the United Kingdom's Army Act, which permitted a colony to make troops, raised under colonial law, subject to its laws, within or without the borders of that colony. Consequently, Canada continued to exercise considerable extra-territorial control over its troops in South Africa. The commanding officers of Canada's first two contingents left for South Africa under orders from the GOG the Canadian militia, which required them to maintain a daily diary of their unit's activities, and make weekly returns and reports to both the Canadian and British military authorities on its strengths, including deaths, casualties, and illness. Questions of supply and discipline went to the British authorities but were reported to Ottawa. In turn, the contingent's commanding officer received a semi-official weekly letter from the Department of Militia's chief staff officer, containing requests for information, advice, and instruction. Appointments, transfers, and promotion of officers within the contingent required the Canadian GOG'S consent and became official only upon publication in the Canadian Military Gazette. Any administrative misunderstanding between the Canadian contingent and the imperial military authorities which could not be settled in the field was referred to the Canadian government to be resolved through communication with the British government,8 which seemed to recognize the special status of the Canadian contingent. Even before Otter's men left Canada, the British government made a distinction between Canada's troops and those in the British army. For example, when the Canadian government sought permission to send medical officers and female nurses with its First Contingent, the British government raised no objection so long as they served only Canadian troops, since British law stipulated that British troops could only be "attended by surgeons registered in the United Kingdom and nurses belonging to the Army Reserve."9 The burdens of defining the practical limitations of these instructions was left largely to the contingent's commanding officer. And Otter, the fifty-six-year-old, diligent, dutiful commanding officer of Canada's First Contingent, found the demands of "serving two masters" a trying experience and complained incessantly to his wife of the ambiguity of his command.

53 Fielding a Canadian Contingent

The contingent's financial arrangements underscore this jurisdictional ambiguity. Canada paid the cost of recruiting, clothing, arming, equipping, paying (until they reached Cape Town) and transporting the men to South Africa. Thereafter the British government maintained, paid, supplied and returned the troops to Canada. Under considerable public pressure, the Canadian government subsequently undertook to make up the difference between the lower pay schedule for British infantry and that of the Canadian active militia.10 Canada also continued to provide reinforcements, special supplies, and any pensions or allowances, including separation allowance, due to them under Canadian law.11 Moreover, it agreed to pay the entire cost of the support personnel it had attached to the First Contingent. Altogether the first two contingents cost the Canadian Treasury $1,996,867.45,12 a price many Canadians were only too willing to pay to affirm the special status of the Canadian troops and maintain a semblance of its government's control. TO GIVE THE FIRST CONTINGENT a "representative" Canadian character, recruitment offices were opened in the principal cities of each province. Volunteers were grouped into eight, regionally defined companies, designated by letters from A to H, each company containing 120 men. Recruits from British Columbia, the North-West, and Manitoba were designated A Company, those from western Ontario, B Company, the Toronto and vicinity men, C Company, Kingston and Ottawa, D Company, Montreal, E Company, Quebec, F Company, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick, G Company, and Nova Scotia, H Company. Each company possessed a captain and three lieutenants, wherever possible from the region. Attempts were also made to recognize the country's bilingual character. French Canadians, including Franco-Ontarians and Acadians, were placed in F Company. All officers in F Company and half the NCOS were francophones and frequently served, along with E, G, and H companies, under a French-speaking major, Oscar Pelletier. As originally planned, one Catholic (bilingual) and one Anglican chaplain were assigned to the First Contingent. Under sectarian pressure, however, a Presbyterian chaplain accompanied the contingent, and a YMCA representative acted as an evangelical lay pastor. Of the two medical officers, one was Frenchspeaking, the other English-speaking. Differences in dress and equipment also distinguished Canada's First Contingent from other infantry regiments in South Africa. Each man received three suits of clothing: two serge suits of a dark green (rifle), and the other of khaki colour, made in Canada of brown canvas (rather than British brown drill). Canadians also possessed a white (later dyed

54 Painting the Map Red

coffee) helmet and khaki felt field cap. Ordered from England, the field caps were only available when the troops arrived in Cape Town. Their black leather Canadian ankle boots, though "great big heavy things,"13 were of a lighter weight, more solidly soled and durable than the British equivalent. Their light-textured, close-fitting greatcoats, with a detached, all-round belt, however, proved cold and less serviceable that the imperial issue. The Canadian officers also possessed Sam Browne belts and all carried the distinctive Oliver equipment - a white cross-belt, ball bag, and haversack designed by J.W. Oliver, a retired British army surgeon. In addition, Canadian troops received special brown leather valises, a bandolier, small water bottle, blankets, and an unfortunate, adulterated emergency food ration, all to be tested, and some to be found wanting, during the rigours of war. For those still unable to distinguish the Canadians troops from their imperial confreres, the men of the First Contingent wore first on the left side of their helmet, then on the left side of the collar of their tunic, a large three-inch badge containing an imperial crown superimposed on a maple leaf with the word CANADA marked clearly below the base of the crown - an insignia which proved a great source of pride to many recruits. Ironically this was first advocated by Hutton, clearly one of his more popular suggestions.14 Quite apart from providing distinctive identification for Canadian troops, the war gave Canadian military authorities an opportunity to test Canadian-made dress and equipment and assess the capacity of the Department of Militia to recruit and mobilize a military force quickly and efficiently. The task was immense. In sixteen days the department was required to recruit, organize, clothe, equip, arm, and despatch to South Africa a body of men equivalent in size to its entire permanent militia, and supervise the expenditure of a sum of money equal to onethird of the department's annual budget. In the short time available, securing suitable transportation to South Africa for forty-one officers, 978 NCOS and men, and seven horses seemed a tall order. The only available vessel of sufficient size, the Allan Steamship Line's 425 foot long by forty-six foot wide Sardinian, required extensive renovation to convert it to a troopship. While the officers and NCOS could be quartered comfortably in staterooms on the main decks (in the case of officers two men to a room, with separate toilets and mess rooms), bunks and stowable mess tables had to be constructed on the steerage deck for half the men. The other half were assigned closely placed hammocks attached to the ceiling on the main deck with stowable mess tables beneath. On the spar deck were constructed latrines, wash houses, a galley, bake house, canteen, two miniature rifle and two revolver ranges, as well as stalls for the seven horses. Electric lights and ventilation fans were installed throughout the ship, and it was repainted inside and out. All these renovations were

55 Fielding a Canadian Contingent

made in Montreal and Quebec City in a remarkably short period of time.15 Since the contingent's strength approximated that of the permanent militia, the Militia Department's stores possessed sufficient quantity of many of the requisite supplies, particularly arms and Oliver equipment. Moreover, several weeks before the outbreak of war the minister of militia, in anticipation of the war, had wisely ordered the replenishment of exhausted or depleted stocks of clothing. As a result the men were more readily supplied than they might have been otherwise. Still, there was more than enough to do, procuring additional material, making good deficiencies, issuing and accounting for supplies and matching clothes even taking into account the variety of possible head, chest, waist, or foot sizes - for a thousand men. The number of necessary items seemed endless, and mistakes were made. Space, too, had to be found for the gifts sent to the contingent by business companies, volunteer organizations and individuals, those whom the popular press described as "thoughtful friends and public-spirited citizens." Public-spirited these companies may have been, but their generosity was not entirely disinterested. Many turned their gifts to commercial advantage by advertising the beef, ink, pink pills for pale people, or tobacco used by Canada's men in South Africa. Tobacco was a particularly popular gift. Apart from the American Tobacco Company's and J. Davis & Sons' contribution, the Montreal Soldiers' Wives League sent twenty thousand cigarettes, one thousand pipes and over six thousand pounds of tobacco. Indeed, some people objected to sending "so much tobacco and so few Bibles."16 Devotional material, however, was not neglected. While the Soldiers' Wives League could only secure three hundred New Testaments, the Quebec Bible Society and the Watford Bible Society contributed sufficient bibles, in French and English, to make one available to each volunteer. The Methodist Book and Publishing House, too, did its part, by sending 150 volumes of patriotic and religious literature.17 Boxing gloves, punching bags "in sufficient number to stock a prize-fighters gymnasium," a harmonium, quantities of whiskey, and over two hundred cases of unspecified comforts, delicacies, games, papers and books, as well as many other items were loaded aboard the overstuffed Sardinian. Although Hutton's friends and contemporaries showered the general with extravagant praise for the smooth, efficient mobilization and dispatch of the First Contingent, in fact he was absent from Ottawa for two weeks before the outbreak of war and did not return to Ottawa until late in the evening of 25 October, two days before the various companies began to assemble in Quebec City in preparation for departure. And when he did return he began almost immediately to quarrel and find

56 Painting the Map Red

fault with the tired, overworked members of the Militia Department; Minto, Hutton's faithful friend and apologist, had to intervene and plead with the general to be more reasonable. His absence and that of the adjutant general, Colonel M. Aylmer, left Hubert Foster, the chief staff officer, the quartermaster general, and senior officers at headquarters to do most of the work. And according to Laurence Drummond, the governor general's secretary, who accompanied the contingent, Foster's contribution to the dispatch of the contingent left much to be desired.18 Mobilizing the First Contingent provided a real test of the effectiveness of Canada's district system of military organization, since the burden of recruitment fell largely upon the district officers commanding. To them went the task of enrolling, attesting, providing for a medical examination, and billeting the recruits assigned to their district until they left for Quebec City. Any stores in stock at district or company headquarters were distributed to the men, and the deficiencies, including measurements for clothing, reported immediately to Ottawa. Recruitment centres were immediately opened in twelve Canadian cities: Vancouver, Victoria, Winnipeg, London, Toronto, Ottawa, Kingston, Montreal, Quebec City, Saint John, Charlottetown, and Halifax. Given the very general selection criteria, any man between the ages of twenty-two and forty, with a minimum height of five feet, six inches (two inches more than required for service in the British army), a chest measurement of thirty-four inches or better, who passed the standard medical examination of recruits for the Canadian Militia, and possessed "a knowledge of drill" and was a "fairly good shot,"19 was eligible to go. The quality of the men selected depended upon the care and judgment of the district officers and the officers commanding companies to whom they delegated much of the responsibility for enrolling the men. The competence and integrity of the medical officer appointed by the district officer was also an important factor in the volunteer's success, since the medical examination prescribed by the Militia Department was a rigorous one. Departmental directions called for medical officers to test the recruits' intelligence, vision, hearing, and speech. They were to measure and weight the men, examine every important organ, look particularly for varicose veins and defects to the feet, and to see that both testicles were down. They were also asked to examine the men for venereal disease and any bodily deformity, and indicate whether the recruit's stated age agreed with his appearance.20 Any serious defects were grounds for rejection. Those who failed to pass the medical but had influential friends or encountered sympathetic doctors often went anyway. For example, Jesse Carl Biggs, a sergeant in the Essex Fusiliers, who went to London, Ontario, with "a bunch from Windsor" to enlist in the First Contingent,

57 Fielding a Canadian Contingent

was rejected because of his chest measurement, and was about to return home when he met a friend with "considerable (political) influence" who offered to speak to the doctor and major.21 Biggs went to South Africa, where he celebrated his twentieth birthday. Others simply lied, confident that the doctor would never guess, a practice which seemed fairly widespread and may account for the large number of official twenty-two-yearold volunteers in this and other contingents! Where there were units of the permanent militia, the task of the district officers was less difficult. There they could call upon the services of the clerks and doctors attached to these units, quarter the recruits in their barracks, and requisition their rations. Elsewhere they were required to hire clerks and doctors and procure food and accommodation for the men as best they could. In these areas recruits frequently found themselves bedded down on straw in drill halls or sheds until they were ordered to board trains for Quebec City. When the First Contingent finally assembled in Quebec, 1,039 men strong, the Department of Militia had good reason to feel pleased with its accomplishment. Much credit for the contingent's successful mobilization belonged to the men in the department, some of whom the professional soldiers often dismissed as "the ignorant civilians." To them fell the tedious task of accounts and correspondence, the letting of contracts, the purchase and packing of supplies, and all the other mundane details of fielding a small fighting force. Though some perceptive observers noted the importance of their contribution, too often their services received but scant recognition in the rhetoric of farewell speeches.22 Historians, concerned to chronicle the growth of professionalism, have been even less generous. Nevertheless, theirs was a success in the amateur, heroic mould, a triumph of stamina and will rather than efficiency and organization. No one worked harder than the minister himself, F.W. Borden, and his deputy minister, Colonel L.-F. Pinault. As soon as the cabinet made its decision to send troops, the minister left for his office where he and his deputy remained in close conference for some time. Thereafter they spared neither time nor energy, both men working long days, and often well into the night, day after day, including weekends. Heads of departments, particularly Captain A. Benoit, in the purchasing branch, Lieutenant-Colonel D.A. Macdonald, chief superintendent of stores, Captain Paul Weatherbe, chief engineer, and J.W. Borden, the departmental accountant, followed their example and worked night after night for weeks. Thanks to them, and without employing one additional clerk, a relatively self-sufficient, "semi-autonomous" Canadian militia unit was ready to leave Quebec City one day before the War Office's deadline of 31 October.

58 Painting the Map Red

WELL BEFORE NOON ON Monday, 30 October, the men of Canada's First Contingent, led by the pipe band of Montreal's 5th Battalion of Royal Scots (a unit which had contributed thirty-seven men to the contingent), marched smartly on to the Esplanade in Quebec City. Already an estimated crowd of some fifty thousand anxious spectators had assembled to view the embarkation ceremonies. As the men stood there that clear, cold autumn day waiting to be inspected by the GOC and flattered and admonished by the governor general, the prime minister, the premier of Quebec, and other civil dignitaries, they seemed to have lost their individual identity. Dressed as the soldiers were in their new green serge uniforms and white helmets, their Oliver equipment with belts and cross straps, and arranged in neat lines or moving in unison, friends and relatives had difficulty recognizing the men they had come to admire. A stranger to the city might well have wondered who these men were, and why they had volunteered to fight in a war so far from their own country. Many pro-war advocates might have explained to the stranger that these troops were a cross-section or mirror image of Canadian society, "the representatives of ideal Canadian manhood," the "pick of the nation's sinew and brain." Pro-war advocates were no less certain of the men's motives, whom they described poetically as "Lords of the Northland," "pure as the air of the sunlit North." They saw the volunteers as actuated by the highest and purest patriotism, who had responded to the call of religion, blood, right, glory, progress and freedom, "to fight and bleed for the world's great need."23 Effective as these ideological slogans may have been in rallying public support for the dispatch of a Canadian contingent, they fail to explain the men's decision to participate in a struggle about which they knew little. While the men may have been moved by the tense, emotional, pre-war debate, many had more personal and material motives. "There was no great patriotism involved," Herbert Priestman, a British-born Canadian recruit recalled many years later, "I thought it would do me some good. And I was searching for an adventure," a sentiment he shared with many imperial volunteers.24 Even those who attributed their desire for military service to patriotism or Ontario's persuasive educational crusade of the 18gos may have been moved by several motives. For example, the twentytwo-year-old, Charlottetown-born jeweller and graduate of Prince of Wales College, Roland Dennis Taylor, who declared that he was going to South Africa because "my father is an Englishman and I am a son of England," may also have seen the war as an avenue to escape the confines of the Island, pursue his preference for outdoor employment, or save some money to help purchase the farm he wished to procure in the North-West, a dream cut short during the bloody battle of Paardeberg.25 Similarly another recruit, Victor Odium, a Ontario-born student at

59 Fielding a Canadian Contingent

Columbia College, New Westminster, who explained to the Sentinel Review that he went to South Africa with the notion that "If I die, t'will help the Maple leaf to live," sought military service abroad well before South Africa became a burning issue in Canadian politics, and later confessed that a spirit of youthful adventure had equally influenced his decision.26 Most of the volunteers were young, urban, and low-paid, the type of men who joined urban militia units. They were clerks, grocers, bookkeepers, carpenters, machinists, painters, plumbers, blacksmiths, and electricians. White-collar workers and skilled blue-collar workers together made up some 64 per cent of the men of the First Contingent. One volunteer in four had been employed in sales and clerical occupations, a percentage far in excess of the British figures. In the British Imperial Yeomanry, for example, only 11.4 per cent belonged to the "commercial i.e. clerk" category, an occupation which represented only 2.9 per cent of Canada's male workers over fourteen years of age.27 Employed in low-status, tedious tasks, many men volunteered for adventure or material benefits. Perhaps the material incentives were not so evident at first glance, since privates received only 50 cents a day, whereas ordinary labourers could secure between $1.25 and $1.50 a day, and skilled occupations and clerical positions paid somewhat more. Military life, however, offered board and lodging, such as it was on campaign, an item which cost between $3.00 and $4.50 a week in leading Canadian cities. To some blue-collar workers, whose employment and wages followed a seasonal cycle, steady work and free accommodation was especially attractive towards the end of October and the approach of winter. Many regular militia received a temporary promotion to the non-commissioned ranks, as the military authorities sought professional soldiers to stiffen the companies. From a longer perspective, it also offered military experience and the prospect of professional advancement in the Canadian militia or British regular army. To some the opportunity to participate in a real war was sufficient incentive to enlist. "Ce que je desirais depuis si longtemps," wrote one volunteer, was "voir une vraie bataille, entendre le sifflement des balles, le grondement des canons."28 Even salaried recruits — those volunteers whose civilian salary considerably exceeded the $182.50 stipend for a year's military service - suffered little economic loss and sometimes improved their lot. For example, several commercial companies, including the Sun Life Insurance Company, the Imperial Oil Company, and the Standard Bank, guaranteed their employees' position and seniority. More generous still were the MacDonald Tobacco Company and the Home Saving and Loan Company, which promised to keep patriotic volunteers on the payroll during their absence. On average municipalities granted each private from their community $25 to $5O.29 Municipalities, such as Victoria, British Columbia,

6o Painting the Map Red

secured such a large public subscription that they gave each man $25, and sent the rest to Quebec City, to be spent on purchasing additional comforts for their men. Some company commanders simply divided these sums among the eligible men. Others used the money to supplement their men's meagre rations in South Africa.30 Many voluntary organizations paid their members' fees and beneficiary assessments during their absence on active service. The number and value of these gifts depended upon the volunteer's prominence, his community, associations, and the generosity of his friends. For example, Toronto presented Otter with a purse containing $750. Otter's popular second-in-command, Major Lawrence Buchan, received $500, and so it went. While there is no record of private soldiers being so well treated, the sizeable monetary gifts from public and private sources, together with their military pay and accommodations, compensated many lowpaid white-collar workers for the loss of their salary. Those who remained on their employer's payroll during their absence profited even more. Boredom drove many urban white-collar workers to enlist. Many young single salesmen and clerks, with little chance of advancement, saw their civilian employment as "sedentary slavery,"31 and sought a temporary escape. This apparently low-risk venture to a land famed for its mineral wealth and riches seemed to some little more than a winter cruise or a gigantic picnic. Few imagined it would last more than three to six months. Meanwhile it offered an escape from their mundane, increasingly segmented, impersonal urban world into a simpler, fraternal, outdoor society. One man, Private James Carnegie, who enlisted in A Company as James Clubb, had less idealistic notions: he was a deserter from the ist Gordon Highlanders. Others left with longer-range ambitions. They saw South Africa as a land where "les montagnes sont remplies des mines d'or ou d'argent," a land where "un homme qui voudrait travailler ici pourrait se faire un bel avenir en peu de temps." Some left Canada with letters of recommendation to civilian employers, clearly determined to seek civilian employment in South Africa and "make their fortunes as Beit and Rhodes had done."32 At least twenty-one men in the First Contingent took their discharge in South Africa,33 ready to try their luck at other employment. To restless fortune hunters, enlistment provided a free passage to a more lucrative future. Subtle and coercive social and family pressure pushed other men to volunteer. Particularly vulnerable were sons of prominent political and military families. "Where is the son of the Minister of Militia?" asked the Conservative Halifax Herald the day the First Contingent sailed for South Africa. The minister's only son, H.L. Borden, a third-year medical student at McGill University and a major in his local militia unit, against

6i

Fielding a Canadian Contingent

his father's advice, volunteered for service in the next contingent and never returned. Other, more subtle pressures were equally effective. During the 1900 general election Liberals boasted that their party had more sons in South Africa than did their political opponents. Brothers frequently volunteered for service in the same unit; the First Contingent contained at least forty-three pairs of brothers, usually in the same company. Few went to the extent of the mother who incited her son to defend the empire as his father and grandfather had done, or the Barry family of Montreal who, having lost their twenty-two-year-old son Cecil during the first battle of Paardeberg, sent his older English-born brother to take his place.34 Families, however, encouraged men to accompany their brothers as companions, or committed sons to the care of a friendly officer who promised to advance their faltering career. Perhaps none proved more persuasive than friends and team-mates. For example, Jesse Biggs's pals from Windsor had shared the same tent during the previous summer's militia camp, and they remained together throughout the South African campaign. The Ottawa Rough Riders sent at least five of their best men. Similarly Fred W. Coombs, a twenty-fouryear-old clerk born in Prince Edward Island and working in Saint John and captain of that city's renowned Mohawk hockey team, served alongside four of his team-mates. Athletes came from various sports, and included men such as James Robertson, a member of the Victoria Rifles and the Montreal Lacrosse Club, and William Ironside Scott, stroke oar of the International Champions of America and winner of the Junior Single Sculls of the dominion. With them "were five or six others almost as famous in aquatic sports."35 Urban militia units, however, were the greatest source of recruits. There recruitment became a point of honour and rivalry. Although some ninety-six different militia units (excluding the permanent force) were represented in the ranks of the First Contingent, forty-eight units were represented by less than four, twenty-five of these units by only one man. Most men came from a few active city units, ten of which supplied close to one-third of all the men in the First Contingent. Two or three of these units dominated each of the companies. Although several anti-war journals reported a lack of interest in the war in rural English Canada, except in Quebec City the First Contingent had no difficulty filling its ranks with willing urban volunteers. In Nelson, British Columbia, eight men were selected from seventy applicants; in Vancouver seventeen men were chosen from sixty applicants.36 A flood of offers from Canadians resident in New York, Boston, St Paul, Chicago, St Louis, and Louisville, deluged the Militia Department.37 The small number of farmers in the First Contingent probably had more to do with their distance from recruitment centres and the military authorities'

62

Painting the Map Red

preference for men from the more efficient city regiments, than opposition to the war "in the peaceful homes of the farmers."38 If so, the Ottawa valley farmers were unaware of it; en route to Quebec, at each station from Ottawa to Alexandria, "the farmers were lined up with Snider rifles and saluted as the train came in."39 AS THE THOUSAND MEN STOOD on the Esplanade, awaiting the end of the seemingly interminable departure ceremonies, few would have been able to identify the incentives or social pressures that had brought them to Quebec City's old parade square. No one, however, could have doubted the public support and popularity of their decision. Showered with gifts, feted, and praised for their patriotism and devotion to Christian duty, no language seemed too exaggerated to applaud their decision to volunteer. Most of the men had already endured elaborate civic ceremonies when they left their various villages, towns, and cities to join their company in larger centres. At the concentration centres in cities across the country, grander demonstrations were staged with triumphal arches, bands, parades, and cheering crowds lining the streets, not to mention the banquets and interminable speeches by the mayor, clergy, and local notables. Civic authorities and businesses granted their employees a holiday to join the celebrations. All along the way to Quebec, small crowds gathered at rail stations to cheer and secure souvenirs from the men. Even "in the dead of night," a Kamloops paper reported, "stirring British cheers awoke the mountains and rivers telling the tale of brave British hearts passing along to defend the honour and glory of the old Flag." At Quebec City the country's political, military, and ecclesiastical leaders had assembled to bid the men farewell. Each had an opportunity to affirm his support for the war and express his gratitude to the assembled volunteers. The churches' turn came on Sunday, the day before the contingent left Quebec. There and across the country Protestant congregations were assured of their clergy's loyalty and devotion to the British cause. Early in the morning Major Oscar Pelletier led the contingent's Catholics through a steady, dispiriting drizzle to a low mass in the Basilica celebrated by the regiment's little Catholic chaplain, Peter M. O'Leary, whose sermon vibrated with patriotic pronouncements. But no service excelled that arranged by the dean of Quebec's Anglican Cathedral of the Holy Trinity, whom the military authorities had asked to hold a special church parade, including communion. The official character of the Holy Trinity service, and the exceedingly high percentage of Anglican recruits in the First Contingent, made its service the focus of public attention. The service was conducted by the dean and assisted by nine neighbouring Anglican clergymen, including the contingent's Anglican chaplain, the Reverend John M. Almond. The hymns "Onward Christian

6s Fielding a Canadian Contingent

Soldiers," "Stand Up for Jesus," and "Fight the Good Fight," the i44th Psalm "Blessed be the Lord my strength, which teacheth my hands to war, and my fingers to fight," the prayers and sermon were unequivocal. The text of the sermon preached by the Reverend Frederick George Scott, the rector of the city's St Matthew's parish, an ardent friend of soldiers, and a poet of the blue-water school, was taken from Moses' final charge to the children of Israel. According to Scott, "the charter of the world's freedom," once given to the Israelites, was "now in England's keeping," and could only be maintained if Britain, that "democratic monarchy" and its empire, a confederation "of peoples, nations, tongues, languages and creeds," were prepared to destroy the effete "tyranny of Dutch lyth century despotism" and share that charter with others.40 Kruger himself could not have made a more skilful use of scriptures and liturgy to justify his cause. The next day's secular rhetoric was no less lavish. Although some enjoined the men to "bear the banner of civilization into the very heart of Africa, and plant firmly there the principles of justice, tolerance and equality," most speakers concentrated on its national significance. The volunteers were nailed as makers of history, "united in a great and holy cause," "drawing together the two races from which the Canadian nation has sprung." They were compared to Jacques Cartier, Champlain, Wolfe, and Montcalm, and pictured as the heirs of the heroes of 1812, and those who had defended the country against the Fenian raids, or had joined the ranks of the Nile voyageurs. Frequently references were made to the historic setting, close to the Plains of Abraham, "hallowed" by the deaths of Wolfe and Montcalm, as well as to Carleton's "stubborn and successful resistance" of the American invaders. To the governor general, a history buff, the dispatch of French- and English-Canadian troops from a site only a few steps from the monument to Wolfe and Montcalm demonstrated the indissolvable unity of the country. To the minister of militia, the dispatch of "the gallant thousand" was nothing less than the voice of Canada, announcing that it was no longer a colony but a mature nation of the empire. To the mayor of Quebec, Canada's participation in this war was was a firm guarantee against disintegration. "If," he argued, "the West should ever cry for separation from the East, the blood of lads from British Columbia, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces will cry to us from kopje and veldt, we will be true to our past and remain united."41 In more measured language, Laurier appealed to the God of Justice, and explained that Canadians were sent to South Africa not "to stamp out Dutch nationality but to establish liberty, civil rights and religious freedom."42 The charge was a heavy one, particularly for the "gallant thousand," dressed in battle attire since 8 o'clock that morning, carrying a full kit

64 Painting the Map Red

weighing some seventy-five pounds. It was with a visible sigh of relief that the men greeted the order to begin their final march through the winding streets of the old town towards the Sardinian, led by the bands of Montreal's 5th Royal Scots and Quebec's garrison of Royal Canadian Artillery. At 3:30 p.m. the ship finally left the Allan wharf, as the Citadel's guns fired a thirty-one-gun salute, and the combined bands played "God Save the Queen." There, amidst the shriek of sirens, ships' whistles, and rockets fired from the Sardinian, a cheering crowd said its farewell to the men of Canada's First Contingent. After all the heady secular and religious rhetoric and the extravagant demonstrations marking their departure, it would have been difficult for the men, whatever their original motives, not to believe in the idealistic nature of their mission.

"Raise The Flag": patriotism's appeal to Canadian youth in the 18905.

The Canadian Cabinet: Sir Wilfrid Laurier is on the extreme left, F.W. Borden on the extreme right. (National Archives of Canada [NA])

Canadian soldiers' prized Canada Badge, modelled on that of the Queen's Own Regiment. (Barbara Wilson Collection, NA PA 181425)

Nova Scotian civilians volunteer for service. (Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia)

The Sardinian leaving Quebec for Cape Town. (Canadian War Museum [CWM])

"La Guerre, Fleau Terrible": The war as seen by Israel Tarte's paper's La Patrie. Right A Montreal trade union flyer condemning the war. (Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library)

THE SHAME OF CANADA. A short time ago the //r«/ 356 Barker, Capt. R.K., 68, 69, 78, 79, 81, 106, 140, 144, 437 Barrie, Dr H.G., 69, 71, 430 Barry, Pte. Cecil, 61 Barton, Gen. G., 340, 341, 343, 359 Bates, Sgt. Earl, 397 Batoche, 9, 160 Battalions: 42nd, 200; 47th, 307; 72nd, 294; goth, 234, 434 Battery, 84th, 263, 265, 267, 268, 270, 275 Battleford, 66 Beadle, J.P., no Beattie, Maj. A., 448 Bechuanaland, 180, 199, 204 Bedfordshire Regiment, 79

Beer, Capt. G.S., 378 Begin, Lt. J.V., 164, 267, 268, 269 Begin, Mgr. LouisNazaire, 155, 442 Beira, 180, 181, 191 Beira-Salisbury Railway, 181 Belcher, Insp. Robert, 340, 367; appointment 291—2; Carolina, 323; Casement expedition, 310; De Wet chase, 349, 353, 355; illness, 345; Lydenburg expedition, 326, 331, 332, 335; Machadodorp disturbance, 338—9; Maitland, 306-7 Belfast, 211, 216, 262, 263, 265, 266, 269, 275, 277, 278, 285, 320, 327, 369; battle of, 215, 253, 324-6; Dragoons at, 256-7, 258, 260, 261, 279 Belford, Sgt. J.A., 218 Bell, Capt. A.C., 72, 93 Bell, Lt. W.H., 418 Belmont, 86, 87, 104, 118, 120, 172, 199, 200—18; Royal Canadians at, 78-84 Bennett, Pte. Arthur, 120 Bennett, Capt. C.C., 378,

r, E.B., 20, 425, 437 Biggs, Pte. Jesse Carl, 56, 57, 61, 90, 417-18 Birdwood, Maj. W.R., 326, 384 Bishop, Pte. W.G., 418 Black Week, 75, 154, 155, 289, 426, 451 Blanchard, Capt. M.G., 434 Bland, Salem, 17, 393 Blankfontein, 250, 253, 255 Blikfontein, 205 Bliss, Maj. D.C.F., 220, 269, 449 Bloemfontein, 86, 90, 91, 92, 115, 123, 125, 130, 136, 171, 180, 301, 379- 383, 451- 457: Canadian constables at, 377-8, 380; D Battery at, 210-11; Dragoons and Canadian Mounted Rifles at, 222-5; nursing sisters at, 451; Royal Canadians at, 113, 117—22; Strathcona's Horse at, 346—7 Bobcaygeon Independent, 22

Boesman's Kop, 121, 122, 124 Bokfontein, 245 Boksburg, 135 Bonaventure Station, 166, 300, 301 379 Bond, Cpl. John, 405, 409 Benoit, Capt. A., 57 Borden, F.W., 34, 60, 409; Benson, Col. F.W., 445 2nd Canadian Mounted Beresford, Maj. Park, 378 Beresford, Pte. W. DelaRifles, 391-4; Hutton dispute, 153, 231, 290; poer, 296 knighted, 436; last Bergendal Farm, 216, contingents, 415, 421; 324, 325, 326, 335, 338 medical assistance, Berkshire Regiment, 164 Bernier, Thomas-Alfred, 453, 454, 456; militia reform, 439, 449; 36 Patriotic Fund, 431; Best, Thomas F., 257, 281, patronage, 419; prewar 430, 437, 44i debate, 20, 40, 41, 44, Bethal Commando, 325, 45, 46, 425; Royal 326

517 Canadians, 49, 51, 57; SAC terms of service, 371; SAC complaints, 386; son's death, 248; Strathcona's Horse, 290-1, 301, 367; war graves, 435 Borden, Lt. H.L., 60, 162, 169, 211, 221, 228, 238, 434; death, 249 Borden, J.W., 57 Border Mounted Rifles, Si? Boredom, 60, 78, 84, 135, 3«5' 335' 379-80 Borland, Sgt. David, 70 Borthwick, Rev. J.D., 433, 437 Boschbult Farm, 403, 406, 408. See also Harts River Boschman's Kop, 225 Boschpoort Valley, 257, 258 Boshof, 209, 343 Boskop Station, 343 Botha, Christiaan, 321, 323 Botha, Gen. Louis, 113, 327, 438; battle of Belfast, 324; battle of Lydenburg, 328, 329, 33i, 332, 333. 334; battle of Tigerspoort, 137, 138, 241 Bothaville, 235, 346 Boucherville, CharlesEugene de, 36 Boulanger, Lt. G.L., 418 Boulanger, Lt.-Col. T.L., 418,419 Bourassa, Henri, 444; opposition to war, 27, 29, 30, 36, 41, 442, 443; peace, 441 Bourinot, John, 8, 36 Boyd, Capt. A.J., 127, 347> 374, 375 Boylea, Pte. Arthur N., 117, 118, 119

Index

Brabant, Maj.-Gen. E.Y., 223 Brabant's Horse, 340, 391, 445' 446 Brace, Pte. Albert, 406 Bradley, Dr. Robert, 175 Bradshaw, Pte. J.L., 96, 97 Brakfontein, 190 Brak River, 178 Brak Spruit, 402 Brandfort, 225, 226 Brandon, 161, 298, 393 Brigades: 6th, 340; i8th, 123; igth, 86, 124, 127, 1 37, 457". 20th, 124; 2ist, 127; 3gth, 95 British Army Post Office, 456 British Columbia, 35, 36, 48, 53, 59, 61, 62, 324, 327, 393; 3rd Canadian Mounted Rifles, 416; military bounty, 425; monuments, 434; offers troops, 47, 293, 294; SAC, 378

British Columbia legislature, 293, 294 British Empire League, 7, 21, 31, 37- 39 British government: jurisdictional disputes with, 52; negotiations with Boers, 14; recruitment, 32, 154, 289, 380, 391, 392, 393, 395- 414, 415 British South African Police, 183, 185, 194 Broadwood, Maj.-Gen. R.G., 121, 138 Brocklehurst, Maj.-Gen. J.F., 216 Brodrick, Earl St John Williams, 392 Bronkhorstspruit, 213 Brothers, Sgt. John, 330, 33i Brown, Pte. A.W., 248 Brown, Pte. Fergus, 225

Brown, Pte. Hugh Frederick, 455 Brown, Stanley M., 68, 74, 437 Bruchesi, Mgr. Paul, 442, 443 Buchan, Lt.-Col. Lawrence, 60, 426; battle of Israel Poort, 124; battle of Paardeberg, 106; battle of Sunnyside, 79; battle of Zand River, 129; command, 50, 125-6; at Elandsfontein, 139, 143; at Lindley, 130; and Otter, 68, 69, 70, 77, 85, 140, 144; at Waterval Drift, 122; at Windsor, 149 Buchanan, Sgt. John James, 319 Buffelsdoorn Pass, 343-5 Builder, Sgt. Nelson, 275, 276 Bulawayo, 180, 183, 184, 188 Bull, Pte. Victor Joseph, 345 Buller, Gen. Sir Redvers, 50, 199, 246, 264, 310, 320, 331, 361, 362, 363, 364; battle of Belfast, 215, 324-7; battle of Colenso, 75, 154; Lydenburg campaign, 216, 328, 329, 331-7; men's regard for, 312, 337, 364 Burch, Lt. J.E., 248, 249 Burghersdorp, 222 Burrell, Pte. Arnold, 38o Burstall, Lt. Henry, 104, 127, 129, 378, 379, 386, 425 Caledon River, 347, 349, 35°, 354 Calgary, 167, 288, 292, 293, 294, 298, 434

518 Index Callaghan, Lt. Thomas H. "Casey": battle of Harts River, 401, 402, 408; i st Canadian Mounted Rifles, 243, 252, 255; 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles, 395, 400, 411; Howard's Scouts, 447 Cameron, Florence, 452, 453 Cameron, Capt. George: 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles, 394, 399, 400; Strathcona's Horse, 293, 314, 328, 343, 344 Cameron, Lt. H.H., 418 Campbell, 201, 204, 205 Campbell, Sgt. John Sydney, 70, 80, 147 Campbell, Wilfred, 19 Campbellton, 301, 366 Canada Club, 47, 150 Canada Defence Committee Report, 449 Canada First, 4, 8 Canada Gazette, 43 Canadian Artillery, 50, 366 Canadian Carriage Company, 428 Canadian Club, 434, 440 Canadian Congregationalist, 25 Canadian Field Hospital, loth, 397, 406, 407, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457 Canadian Freeman, 24 Canadian Gleaner, 22 Canadian government, 449; despatch of Strathcona's Horse, 300; financing troops, 142, 143; nominating SAC officers, 370; participating in war, 32, 40; postal corps, 457; recruitment policy, 392; return of Royal Canadians, 142, 143 Canadian Magazine, 425, 437

Canadian Manufacturers' Association, 426, 428 Canadian Military Gazette, 4i, 43, 52, 311 Canadian Military Institute, 37, 39 Canadian Mounted Rifles - ist, xii, 157, 167, 211, 216, 291, 292, 295, 295, 296, 297, 329, 338, 39°' 393, 395417, 446, 447, 449; arrival, 172; battle of Boschman's Kop, 225; battle of Coetzee's Drift, 226-8; battle of Kameelfontein, 241-2; battle of Klip River, 235—7; batde of Zand River, 230-1; battle of Witpoort Pass, 247—9; Bothaville, 234— 5; Cape Town Riot, 282-4; command crisis, 231—4; composition, 164—5; departure, 169; dress, 158; duties, 219— 20; fighting patrol, 250—5; Fischer's Farm, 224; Karoo expedition, 173-8; leadership, 221; line of communication duty, 242-4; Pretoria, 239—40; renamed, 163; return, 279-88; Rietvlei, 247; strength, 280; Victoria West, 173; voyage, 169—70 - 2nd, 381, 415, 421, 423, 452, 453, 454, 455, 45^ battle of Harts River, 401-9; command crisis, 399; composition, 393-5; debate, 392-3; departure, 396; Klerksdorp drive, 409-10; name, 395; Newcastle, 398^9J officers, 394—5; origins, 391—2; peace, 412; return, 413; voyage,

398—9; Vryburg drive, 410-11; Witpoort drive, 401-9 — 3rd, 414; arrival, 421; composition, 417; departure, 419; discharge, 421; officers, 417-8; recruitment, 417; return, 422—3 — 4th, 414; arrival, 421; composition, 417; departure, 419; discharge, 421; officers, 417—18; recruitment, 416; return, 422—3 -5 th > 394,4H, 419: arrival, 421; composition, 417; departure, 420; discharge, 421; officers, 418; recruitment, 416; return, 422-3 - 6th, 414; composition, 417; discharge, 421; officers, 418; recruitment, 416; return, 422-3 Canadian Nursing Service, 451,452 Canadian Patriotic Fund, 429,430, 431, 432, 433, 435 Canadian Postal Contingent, 456 Canadian Rangers, 391, 392, 399 Canadian Red Cross, 429, 430, 433, 452 Canadian South African Memorial Association, 435 Canadian Yeomanry, 393, 395. See also 2nd Canadian Rifles Carnarvon, 172, 173, 174, 1 75> !77> !79> 233 Cape Colony, 12, 14, 17, 21, 33, 37, 75- 78,86, l8o,

206,

222,

347;

rebellion, 172, 346

519 Index Cape Mounted Police, 200, 201, 204 Cape Mounted Rifles, 283 Cape Town, ix, 35, 53, 54, 66,68,69,81,82,86, 104, 109, 123, 181, 184, 205, 244. 292. 419, 427, 428; Canadian Mounted Rifles, ist, 170, 172, 175, 233, 234, 279; Canadian Mounted Rifles, 2nd, 397' 398; Dragoons, 158, 165, 170, 179, 221, 279; Howard's Scouts, 446; nursing sisters, 450, 452, 453; Post Office, 457; RCFA, 170, 171, 180, 194, 277, 279; riot, 282—4; Royal Canadian Regiment, 76, 77. 83, 84, 87, 127, 144, 145, 147, 148; South African Constabulary, 374, 377; Strathcona's Horse, 304, 305— 6, 307, 309-11, 317-18, 320, 358, 359, 360 Carew, Col. G.A.L., 356 Carey, Pte. Spence, 323 Carnegie, Pte. James, 60 Carolina, 263, 266, 267, 268, 320, 323 Carolina Commando, 269, 274 Carpenter, Capt. A.E., 127 Carrington, Maj.-Gen. Frederick, 180, 181, 183, 187 Carruthers, Lt. Bruce, 394. 403. 45. 4o6, 407, 408, 409 Carter, Pte. Arthur, 257, 396, 398 Carter, Pte. Gerald, 257, 396 Cartwright, Capt. Francis, 294, 326, 355, 367 Casement, Roger, 309, 310,311

Castellian, Pte. Louis, 374 Casualties, 429; Canadian Mounted Rifles, ist, 230, 236, 242, 253, 254. 255, 264-4; Canadian Mounted Rifles, 2nd, 402, 405, 407; Dragoons, 225, 246, 247, 248, 257, 260, 274, 275, 276; RCFA, 203—4; Royal Canadian Regiment, 96-100, 104, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130; South African Constabulary, 379; Strathcona's Horse, 313, 314,315,317,319, 323. 326, 329, 330, 332, 343, 344, 353 Catholic Church, 25, 53, 62, 97, 898, 353, 442 Cestrian, 419, 421, 422, 423 Chalmers, Lt. T.W., 164, 221, 226, 235,

243,

252, 264, 265, 266, 434 Chalmers, Sgt.-Maj. W., 379 Chamberlain, Joseph, x, 31, no, 364,409,442; Canadian troops, 32, 33, 34, 35. 39-49. !54, !55. J56. 289, 375, 414; Jameson raid, 14; Montreal riot, 443 Chaplains, 62, 169, 215, 235. 244, 267, 450 Chapman, Col. A.J., 193 Charities, 429—33 Charlottetown, 56, 57, 434 Charlton, John, 19,441 Chermside, Maj.-Gen. H., 137 Chetwode, Capt., 216 Chevalier, Pte. Eugene, 372 Chicago, 44, 46, 61, 133 Chicago, 310 Christiana, 209

Christian Endeavour, 17 Christian Guardian, 25 Christian socialism, 23 Christie, Lt. A.E., 293, 327, 335. 35°. 363, 367 Christmas dinner controversy, 81, 118-19 Chronicle (Halifax), 26 Church, Capt. Frank, 394, 405 Church parade, 7, 174, 206, 235 Citadel (Quebec), 64, 73, 153 Citizen (Ottawa), 174, 392, 438, 444 Citizen and Country (Toronto), 22, 23 City Imperial Volunteers, 142, 145. 224 Civil-military relations, 168, 420; Boers, 215, 345; Ottawa, 199; South African Constabulary, 387-90 Clergy, 22-5, 393, 441-2 Clery, Lt.-Gen. C.E, 313, 315. 317 Cline, Pte. John, 406 Clocolan Spruit, 353 Clouston, E.S., 290, 291, 365 Clubb, James, 60. See Carnegie, James Cochrane, Pte. Robert L., 296 Cockburn, Lt. H.Z.C., l6l,

221, 271, 273, 275

Coetzee's Drift, battle of, 226-8 Coldstream Guards, 148, 345. 36i Colenso, 75, 312, 341, 398. 452 Colmer, Joseph, 360, 363 Colleton, Lt.-Col. R.A.W., 342 Colonial Troops Entertainment Committee, 148, 150, 358, 360

520 Index Colonial Office, 49, 154, i56' 37°. 373. 374, 375' 391 Colt revolver, 158, 220 Colvile, Gen. Henry, 83, 88, 91, 109, 115, 117, 121,

124

Columbia, 310 Columbian, 180, 181 Commando Drift, 209 Commando Nek, 189, 190, 191, 354 Commissie Drift, 347, 349> 354 Commission of Inquiry (Constabulary), 1905, 39° Common (Halifax), 168, 376, 397 Connaught, Duke of, 362 Connaught Rangers, 213, 215 Conservatives, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 36, 39, 60, 153, 392, 395, 444- See also Tory Constantia Siding, 226, 231 Cook, Pte. R., 455 Cookson, Col. G.A., 399403, 407, 408, 410, 455 Coombs, Cpl. Fred W., 61 Cooper, Tpr., 379 Cooper, Col. E.J., 307 Corinthian, 420, 421, 453 Corps of Guides, 439 Corps of Mounted Rifles, 8th, 138 Corps of Signals, 438—9 Cotton, Pte. Harry, 126 Cotton, Lt.-Col. W.H., 292 Court martial, 238-9, 381 Courtney, Lt. Reginald, 293 Cox, Rev. J.W., 215 Cranbrooke, 294 Critchley, Capt. T.O., 377, 378 Crocodile Poort, 218 Crocodile River, 239, 245, 328

Cronje, Gen. Piet, 28, 98, 115, 223, 426; battle of Cronje's laager, 105—12; Mafeking, 180; Paardeberg, 90, 91, 95, 102112, 114, 124, 129; surrender, 109, 113, 114, 117 Crosby, Lt. F.L., 164 Cruickshank, Pte. Charles, 330, 331 Cummings, James, 427, 428 Cuthbert, Capt. A.E. Ross, 164 Cypherfontein, 130 Dafoe, Pte. Joseph, 124 Daily Colonist (Victoria), 17 Daily Mail (London), 433, 440 Daily News (London), 262 Dalmanutha, 325 Daly, Lt.-Gov. M.B., 167 Daman t's Horse, 400, 402, 403, 412 Dandurand, Sen. Raoul, !55 Danielskuil, 204, 205 David, L-O., 46 Davidson, Lt. H.J.A., 164, 244 Davies, Louis, 48 Davis-Allen, J., 35, 36, 37, 38,39 Day, Pte. Thomas, 406 De Aar, 359; Dragoons, 222; RCFA, 172, 173, 175. 177. !78, 198-9, 200, 210; Royal Canadian Regiment, 76, 77, 78, 147 De Beer, Comm. Tolle J.F., 207, 411 Debats, Les, 29, 155, 442, 446 Deerdepoort, 194, 242, 244-6; Dragoons, 246, 280

Delagoa Bay Railway, 123, !37> !39> 3 10 > 324 De la Rey, Gen. J.H., 88, 188, 189, 190, 225, 226, 241, 342, 343, 399, 402, 410, 412, 413 Denison, George T, 4, 5, 6, 7, 37, 39- 438 Denison, Capt. S.J.A., 67, 79, 83, 224, 391- 392 Derbyshire Regiment, 205 Deseronto, 160, 212 DesLauriers, Pte. Edward, 66 Desmarais, Odillon, 46 Despatches, 228, 245, 395, 445 De Villiers, Frederick, 437 De Villiers, Piet, 201, 204, 205 Devil's Knuckles, 331, 332,333 Devine, Lt. J.A., 164, 234, 407, 409 Devonshire Regiment, 445 De Wagen Drift, battle of, 212 De Wet, General Christiaan, 88, 207, 402, 438,; career, 137-8; command, 113—14; Edenburg, 210; first hunt, 138—9, 190, 191, 213, 215, 241, 250, 253; Jammersberg, 222; Paardeberg, 95, 103, 105, 109; Poplar Grove, 115; Sannah's Post, 121; second hunt, 340, 34i, 342, 346, 347349, 350-5: train wrecking, 242; Wegdraii Drift, 90 De Wet, Piet, 356 DeWetsdorp, 346, 351 Diamond Hills, 241, 242, 285 Diamond Jubilee, 7, 21, 30 Dickie, Lt. H.A., 418

52i Dickson, Maj.-Gen. J.B.B.,

Index

Dodd, Pte. George Spence, 317 Dirksburg, 230 Doll, Sgt. J.E., 449 Dominion Cartridge ComDirkson, Cmdt., 253, 254 pany, 446 Discipline, 281; Canadian Dominion Education Mounted Rifles, ist, Association, 7 250-2, 254, 287-91; Canadian Mounted Dominion Land Survey, Rifles, 2nd, 397, 413; 164 Dominion Millers' AssociCape Town riot, 282—4; last contingents, 420, ation, 427 Dominion Radio Com422—3; Machadodorp disturbance, 338-9; pany, 428 Dominion Suspender RCFA, 175, 199, 218; Company, 426 Royal Canadian RegiDonaldson, Pte. Charles ment, 83-4, 117-8, 145, 147; South African A., 107 Constabulary, 376, 379- Donovan, Michael, 22 Doornhoek, 337 82, 385; Strathcona's Doornkop, 130, 131-3; Horse, 305-6, 324, 334, battle of, 134, 142, 236, 354-5' 358-9» 36off. See also Drunkenness, 237, 253 Looting, Morale, Dorncomb, 412,413 Prison, Rape) Dougall, Pte. Wilfred, 275 Disease, 78, 194, 198, Douglas, 79, 200, 201 Douglas, Maj.-Gen. 199. 244, 280, 359, C.W.H., 344 429; dysentery, 82, 121, Douglas, Lt. Harry !75, *99, 218, 235, Edward Manning, 445 421.45 1 - 453,454; enteric, 82—3, 104, 117, Draghoender, 175 Dragoons, 2nd. See Royal 120—2, 177, 188, 235, 284, 342, 360, 380, Scots Greys Dragoon Guards, 6th, 421, 451; influenza, 166; measles, 397-8; 337 pneumonia, 167, 376, Dress, 53—4, 66, 158, 361, 377- 395; Howard's 377, 378> 419, 420, Canadian Scouts, 447; 421; typhoid, 104, 117, nurses, 450 120—2, 166; venereal disease, 207, 305, 422 Driefontein, 115, 117, Distinguished Conduct 209, 237 Medal, 267, 276, 367, Driekuil, 402, 408, 409, 410 395, 4o6 Distinguished Service Drowe, Pte. A.R., 218 Drum, Surg.-Lt. Lome, Order, 228, 267, 276, 367, 445, 449 415, 454 Divisions: 2nd, 313; 4th, Drummond, Laurence, 56, 69, 439 329, 332; 6th, 88, 91, Drunkenness: Canadian 92; 7th, 88, 91, 114; gth, 88 Mounted Rifles, 2nd, Dixon, F.J., 68 397, 412, 413; last con249

tingents, 422; Royal Canadian Regiment, 66, 68, 145, 147, 148; Second Contingent, 282; South African Constabulary, 377—80, 382, 390; Strathcona's Horse, 282, 298, 299, 303, 305-6, 338-9, 363, 364 Drury, Lt.-Col. Charles W., 50, 162, 179, 198, 200, 203, 249, 374, 375> 377- 394, 426; career, 160; command, 171, 189, 194-5, 285; Karoo expedition, 172, !73> !74, J 77; return, !97, 279, 369 Drury, Pte. Percival Stratton, 252 Du Toit, Gen. S.P., 239 Dublin Fusiliers, 340, 445 Duff, Surg.-Maj. R.H., 407, 409 Duhamel, Mgr. J.-T., 155, 442 Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (2nd Bn.), 87, 93,95, 97- 99- 101, 104, 132 Duke of Edinburgh's Own Volunteers, 200, 201 Dullstroom, 216, 278 Duncan, Sara Jeannette, 436 Dundee, 312, 398 Dundonald, Earl Douglas M.B.H. Cochrane, 296, 361, 362, 363, 434, 436; Lydenburg expedition, 216, 328, 329, 332, 334, 335- 337; Natal Field Force, 312, 313, 317, 321, 322, 323, 325, 326,327 Dunham, Pte. F.H., 82, 97, 107 Durban, 309, 310, 311, 312, 318, 333, 384,

522 397. 398, 399. 364, 413, 419, 421, 422, 451 Dyer, Sgt.-Maj. William A., 401, 410 Eaton, Lt. D.I.V., 213, 417 Eaton, Cpl. Robert, 264, 267 Eastern Chronicle (New Glasgow), 26 Eby, Pte. M.D., 455 Ecclestone, W.R., 456, 457 Edenburg, 210, 378, 382, 383 Edgar, J.J., 36 Edmonton, 225, 287, 293, 298 Edwards, Col A.H.M., 377 Edward vn, 360, 361, 362, 363, 384,421 Eerste Fabrieken, 139, 140, 142, 146 Eland Kop, 218 Elandsfbntein, 135, 137, 139, 142, 143, 144, 189, 358, 359, 380, 413. 456 Elandskop, 356 Elder-Dempster Line, 291- 359, 428 Elizabeth Rust, battle of, 209 Elliot, Arthur, 33 Elliot, Sgt.-Maj. Frank, 306 Elmsley, Lt. James Harold, 161, 273, 275, 276, 394 Elswick Battery, 212, 217, 340, 34i England, 54, 148, 150, 154, 160, 280, 284, 360, 395, 409, 453, 457 English Canadians, 16, 19, 22, 25, 30, 36, 440i Equal Rights Association, 18 Esplanade (Quebec), 58, 62

Index

Ermelo, 320, 321 Ermelo Commando, 269, 271 Eshowe, 309, 310, 311 Esquimalt, 439 Essex Fusiliers, 56 Essex Regiment, 340 Eustace, Lt. R.W.E., 164 Evans, Pte. Charles, 405, 409, 433 Evans, Maj. Thomas, 221, 417, 421, 422, 426, 454, 455, 456; Canadian Mounted Rifles, ist, 228, 231, 233, 234, 237, 242, 244, 248, 252, 253, 254, 255, 266, 269, 270, 271, 279, 280, 281, 285; Canadian Mounted Rifles, 2nd, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 412; career, 163; command crisis, 398—400; Dragoons, 162, 168; Harts River, 402, 405, 407, 408, 409 Evans, W. Sanford, x, 425, 437, 440 Ewan, John A. 437 Exhibition Building (Halifax), 166, 168, 301, 395. 419 Exhibition Building (Ottawa), 298, 367 External Affairs, Department of, 440 Faber's Put, 201—3; battle of, 204, 205, 285 Fair, Col. F.K., 377 Fall, Lt. Percy, 293, 370, 371. 372, 373, 375, 376, 377.379 Farm burning, 191, 194, 196, 256, 262, 277, 278, 279, 345-6, 410ii,442 Fenian Raids, 4, 9, 63, 66, 291

Ferreira Siding, 117 Ficksburg, 354 Field Batteries: ist, 418; 2nd, 160; 6th, 199; i6th, 199; 74th, 135 Fielding, W.S., 45, 46, 48 Filson, Cpl. Edward A., 275, 434 First Contingent. See Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry, 2nd Bn.) First World War, ix, 245, 425,433,444,45! Fischer, C., 372 Fischer's Farm, 233, 224 Fiset, Dr Eugene, 68, 94, 97, *3o Fish Creek, 160 Fisher, Sydney, 425 Flintoff, Cpl. Walter, 332 Floyd, Pte. Francis G.W., 129 Flynn, William Bernard , 253 Food, 96, 97, 122; complaints, 119-20; 148, 258, 385, 413, 422; distribution, 73; exchange, 114, 120; lack, 115, 127, 175, 177, 205-6, 236; packages, 82, 119; rations, 71, 87, 139, 174, 175, 212-13, 215; supplementary, 90, 232, 240, 243, 350, 354; theft, 117 Forbes, David, 310, 311 Forbes, Sarah, 69, 450, 452 Foreign Office, 309, 310 Forestier, Capt. William, 5°. l63 Forestier-Walker, Lt.-Gen., 284 Fort Canada, 189, 190, 191, 196, 197 Fort Hay, 421 Fort McCready, 398, 454 Fort Munster, 199

523 Index Fort Steele, 294, 298 Fortescue, Eleanor, 452 48th Highlanders, 45 Foster, George Eulas, 7, 36, 43i Foster, Col. Hubert, 50, 55, 100 Foster, William, 8 Fotheringham, Pte. David, 253. 254 Fourie, Gen. J.C., 269, 270, 271, 274 Francophones, 26, 53, 416,417 Fraser, Lt. C.K., 106 Fredericton, 19, 22, 71 Fredericton Herald, 26 Frederikstad, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 346; battle of, 342 Free Press (London), 26 French, Gen. Sir John, 88, 90, 91, 115, 130, 213, 215,

221, 23O,

231,

235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 247, 249, 250, 253, 320, 324, 327, 337, 447 French's Scouts, 238 Froneman, Comm. C.C., 34i Fullerton, Rev. T.F., 68 Gage, W.J., 426 Gambling, 71, 412 Garner, Pte. Albert, 330 Garrison Club, 73, 152, 162 Gatacre, Lt.-Gen. W.F., 75 Gazette (Montreal), 38, 44 Geoghegan, Pte. John, 254 George's Island, 167 Geluk Farm, 325 General hospitals: No. i, 450; No. 2,451,452; No. 10, 451 Germans, 29, 332, 372 German Canadians, 22, 24

Gibbs, Sister, 377, 379 Girouard, Desire, 431 Girouard, Lt.-Col. Percy, 40, 78, 445 Glencoe, 312 Globe (Saint John), 26 Globe (Toronto), xi, 26, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 68, 393, 437, 438, 443 Glynn's Lydenburg, 334 Godfray, Lt.-Col. J.W., 258 God Save the Queen, 130, 150, 301 Godwaan Station, 217, 218 Goedehoop, 269 Gold Hoop, 347, 350 Good Hope Farm, 250 Good, Lt. W.C., 200, 201, 204, 205, 206 Gordon, Lt.-Col. J.R.P.,

358, 374

Gordon, Tpr., 379 Gordon, Pte. Walter, 396 Gordon, Maj. W.P., 418 Gordon Highlanders, 76, 119; battle of Belfast, 324; battle of Doornkop, 132, 133; battle at Paardeberg, 93, 102, 105, 107; Lydenburg expedition, 331. 332; Royal Canadian Regiment, 60, 77, 78, 87, 126, 127, 147; Second Contingent, 263, 265, 266, 267, 277, 278, 279; Springs, 136, 137 Gotro, Pte. Melvin, 419 Governor General's Body Guard, 161, 391 Grabler's Farm, 218 Graham, Hugh, 35, 37, 38, 39>4o,43i Granby, 159, 434 Grand Hotel (Cape Town), 76, 283, 338, 446 Grant, George M., 4, 37

Graspan, 87 Gravett's Commando, 325 Great Eastern Mine, 135 Grecia, James, 84 Green Point Common, 76, 171, 172, 179, 305, 307, 3o8 Greenwood, Lt.-Col. Henry, 412, 435 Grenadier Guards, 361, 362 Greylingstad, 314, 315, 3i8, 319 Griesbach, Tpr. W.A., 287, 425 Griqualand, 175, 179, 199, 204, 205 Griquatown, 200, 201, 204 Grobler, Gen. Hans, 269 Groote Konig, 205 Groot Pan, 209 Guild of Loyal Women of South Africa, 435 Gundy, H. Pearson, 31 Gun Hill, 93, 100, 102, 103, 341 Gunn, W.W., 304 Gunn, Sgt. John Grant, 455 Gwelo, 184 Gwyn, Sandra, 303 Hackett-Thompson, Col. F-, 449 Haldimand Rifles, 37th, 294 Hales, A.G., 362 Haley, John, 396 Haliburton, Robert, 8 Halifax, 26, 39, 56, 97, 1 55> 291, 392,430, 439, 452, 453, 454, 456' 457, 458; Canadian Mounted Rifles, 2nd, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399; Dragoons, 168, 222; last contingents, 415, 419, 420, 422, 423; Second Contingent, 157, 159, 165,

524 Index 166, 167, 169, 284, 285, 286, 287; South African Constabulary, 368, 373, 376; Strathcona's Horse, 297, 298, 299. 3oi, 304, 365, 366, 367 Halifax Rifles, 63rd., 419 Hallett, Tpr. C., 379 Hamanskraal, 211, 212 Hamilton (Ontario), 38, 47- i59> 174, 189, 426, 430, 432, 444, 45°, 456 Hamilton, C. Frederick, 68, 71, 437 Hamilton, Gen. Ian, xiii, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136,

190,

211,

213,

2l6,

217,

224,

226,

230,

231,

237,

238,

249,

329,

331,436

Hamilton's Scouts, 212 Hamilton Times, 26 Hancock, Pte. Charles, 97 Hannan, Tpr. William, 380 Hare, Pte. William Archibald, 268 Hare, Cpl. William Robinson, 268 Harper, Lt. E, 315, 318, 370 Harris, Admiral R.W., 310 Harrismith, 453 Hartebeestfontein, 402, 410 Hart, Maj.-Gen. Fitzroy, 138, 139, 141, 313 Hart's Column, 5th Brigade, 139 Harts River, battle of, 391, 401, 402, 411, 433, 439> 455 Hatherley Distillery, 140, 241 Hawarden Castle, 148 Haynes, Sgt. John, 254, Hebert, L.-P, 435 Hebron, 193

Heidelberg, 313, 319, 320, 326, 378, 382 Heilbron, 130, 137, 231, 356 Helio Kop, 190 Hell's Gate, 331, 334 Helvetia Farm, battle of, 327, 35°, 351 Henderson, Pte. James, 455 Hendryx, Pte. Peter, 402, 408 Herald (Halifax), 60, 366, 376, 392, 434 Herald (Hamilton), 25 Herald (Montreal), xi, 68 Herbert, Maj.-Gen. Ivor C., 222 Herbert, Col. I.J.C., 347 Herchmer, Lt.-Col. Laurence William, 168, 175, 220, 221, 291, 295, 426; career, 163—164; command crisis, 231— 234 Herchmer, Cpl. Sherwood, 264, 265 Herchmer's Horse, 167, 417. See also Canadian Mounted Rifles Herchmer's Rough Riders, 172. See also Canadian Mounted Rifles Heriot, Cpl. James, 257 Herridge, Rev. W.T., 300 Hereford, Marquis of, 296, 361 Hex Rivier Berg, 351 Hickman, Lt.-Col, 194, 196, 197 Hicks, Col. H.T., 340, 341 Higgins, Pte. Henry, 419 Highland Brigade, 3rd, 75, 88, 91, 92, 94, 114 Highland Light Infantry, 35° Hilder, Cpl. Albert E., 396, 401, 403, 408, 411 Hilliam, Capt. Edward, 390, 447

Kingston, Sir William, 8 Hobson, John, 10 Hobson, Pte. Jonathan, 313, 440 Hodgins, Lt. A.E., 132 Hodgins, Sgt. Edwin William, 405 Hoenvelsfontein, 249 Holgatefontein, 317 Holland, Lt. B., 418 Holland, Sgt. Edward, 266, 268, 270, 273, 275 Hollanders, 135, 136 Holy Trinity (Quebec), 62 Home Saving and Loan, 59- 432 Honing Spruit, 242; battle of, 243-4 Honkop, 379 Hoopstad, 209, 231 Hope, Robert, S., 193 Hopkins, Castell, 4, 7, Hopkins, Pte. John Alexander, 238 Hornibrook, Pte. John, 98 Hore, Lt.-Col. C.O., 139, 180 Home, Margaret L., 451 Horses, 167, 179, 181, 203, 335, 397; care, 220-1, 420; condition of, 177, 205-6, 352; disease, 167, 175, 188, 218, 303-5, 39 8 ,4i9; disposal of, 337-8; purchase, 157, 296, 297, 395, 427; remounts, 171-2, 247, 307; strength, 297; theft, 232; training, 168; transport, 165—6, 169, 298, 310 Hosmer, Maj. E.A.C., 418 Hospitals, 83, 120—i, 281, 45°-i, 453-6 House of Commons, 27, 36, 118,386,414,438, 442 Hou water, 175

525 Index Howard, Maj. A.L. "Gat", 220, 246, 258, 260, 261, 266, 434; career, 446, 447; death, 448 Howard, Capt. Donald MacDonald, 292, 313, 326, 343, 349 Howard's Canadian Scouts, 280, 395, 445, 446, 449; action, 447-8; recruitment, 447; training, 447 Howe, Maj. Joseph, 164, 175. 233, 234 Hubly, Pte. C. Russell, 74, 121,437.438 Hudon, Maj. Joseph Alfred, 160, 168, 169, 181, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 191, 192, 194, 279, 285 Hudson's Bay Company, 18, 433 Hughes, James L., 4 Hughes, Sam, 25, 34, 35, 42, 43, 44, 47, 69, 175, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 291, 292, 3o8, 437 Hurcomb, Deborah, 451, 452, 453 Hurdman, Maj. W.G., 160, 166, 169, 172, 199,

21O, 2 1 1 ,

212,

215, 2l6,

217,

2l8,

250,

279,

285,

256,

417,418

Huron Expositor, 26 Hussars: ist, 161; 4th, 161; loth, 315; i8th, 329; igth, 216, 217, 328, 329 Hutton, Maj.-Gen. E.T.H., x > 7, 79, !52, 213, 289, 290, 291, 303, 306, 307, 308, 431, 438, 439, 448, 449, 457; battle of Tigerspoort, 137, 246, 247, 248; Canadian participation

in war, 31-5, 40, 45, 46; dislike of, 231-3; despatch of Royal Canadian Regiment, 49, 50, 51, 54-6, 153; Hughes dispute, 34, 35, 42; Second Contingent, 156, 157, 162, 165, 216, 224, 225, 226, 228, 230, 231, 234, 235-8, 241-2, 245-50, 254, 258, 262, 281 Hutton's Scouts, 448 Hynes, Sgt.-Maj. John, 396

Idaho, 145, 146 Imperial Federation League, 4-8, 27, 28, 444 Imperial Hay Company, 427 Imperialism, 4ff, 27, 28, 152-3; lessons of, 4367 Imperial Light Horse, 246, 341, 343, 344, 377 Imperial Military Railway, 135, 412 Imperial Oil Company, 59 Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire, 435 Imperial Yeomanry, 8th Bn., 200, 201, 203, 204, 307, 393, 454 Inchiquin, Lord, 296 Independence of Canada Movement, 24 Ingram, Pte. William Henry, 353 India, 11, 294, 427 Industrial Canada, 428 Industrial Journal (Hamilton), 22 Inglis, Sgt. Leopold J., 285 Inglis, Lt. W.M., 168, 243 Intercolonial Railway, 145, 301, 376

International Boundary Commission, 164 International Joint High Commission, 19 Irene, 211, 282 Irish, 29, 332 Irish Canadians, 19, 22, 24, 27 Irish Catholic, 24 Irish Hospital, 451, 452 Irish Literary Society, 63 Irish Yeomanry, 347, 349, 354, 355 Irving, Lt.-Col. D.T., 431 Irving, Lt.-Col. J.D., 418, 421, 422 Irving, Lt. L.E.W., 188 Irwin, F.B., 372 Israel's Poort, 125, 134 Jackson, Maj. R.W.M., 185 Jacobsdal, 90, 91 Jaffray, Robert, 431 Jameson, Leander, 14, 35; Jameson Raid, 14, 31, 67,88 Jammersberg, 222, 223 Jan Massibi, 184, 185 Jardine, J.G., 427 Jarvis, Maj. Arthur M., 293, 32i, 322, 334, 343, 347, 349, 353, 355, 367, 374, 375- 383 Jenkins, Pte. Angus, 313 Jericho, batde of, 194, 196 Johannesburg, 14, 123, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137, 235, 236, 237243, 244, 249, 312, 340, 371, 377, 453 Johnson, Alfred William, 353 Johnson, Capt. H.D., 454 Johnston, Pte. Douglas, 253, 254 Johnston, Sgt. Rowan, 457 Johnstone, Granville, 98 Jones, Maj. G.C., 454

526 Index Joubert, Piet, 12, 13, 28, H3 Journal, Le, 300, 443 Journal (Ottawa), 25, 45 Journal (Stanstead), 25 Journal (Trades and Labour Council), 29 Jury, Alfred, 22 Kaap Plateau, 201, 204, 205 Kaapschoop, 217 Kafferspruit, 246, 247, 248, 356 Kaffir Kop, 355 Kalpan, 225 Kameelfontein, 241, 242 Kameelspruit, 241 Kamloops, 62, 294, 298 Karee Poort, 347, 349 Karee Siding, 225, 226 Karoo, 77, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 198, 199, 210, 216, 218, 224, 233, 282, 285 Katsbosch, 243 Kean, Tpr. J.J., 380 Keenan, Dr C.B., 290 Keir, Col. J.L., 402, 410 Kekewich, Col. R.G., 410 Kelly-Kenny, Lt.-Gen. Thomas, 88, 91, 95, 102, 445; command dispute, 92 Kelly, Pte. P.H., 407, 409 Kelso.JJ., 17 Kenhart, 172, 173, 174, 175, 178, 179 Kennedy, Pte. James, 94 Kensington Barracks, 148, 149, 361, 362 Keogh, Lt.-Col. A., 452 Kerr, Pte. Robert, 243, 244 Kerr, Pte. G.T., 345 Kerr, Cpl. Thomas, 273 Ketchen, Lt. H.B.D., 293, 315. 345. 425 Kimberley, 78, 86, 88, 90, 91, 154, 171, 172, 180, 181, 200, 203, 204,

205, 206, 209, 277, 281, 400, 451 Kincaid, Lt.-Col. W.F., 106 King, Lt. Arthur H., 161, 183, 188, 189, 196, 2 2 1 , 256, 265,

266,

425. 447 Kings County Hussars, 162 King's Own Scottish Borderers, 146, 258 Kingsmill, Roden, 43 King's Own Shropshire Light Infantry, 2nd Bn., 87.93 King's Royal Rifle Corps, istBn., 331, 333, 334 Kingston (Ontario), 24, 39. 53. 55. !59. l G l . 166, 184, 189, 194, 288, 445 Kingston School of Gunnery, 160, 293 Kipling, Rudyard, 3, 40, 198, 433, 446 Kirkpatrick, Lt. Guy, 293, 313, 330, 347. 394, 409 Kirkpatrick, Maj. G.M., 445 Kitchener, Maj.-Gen. Horatio Herbert, x, 86, 91, 92, 95, 100, 102, 146, 173, 174. 175.

222,

262, 278, 310, 340, 342, 358, 359. 37°. 400, 407, 409, 414 Kitchener's Hill, 95 Kitchener's Horse, 126, 446 Kitchener, Maj.-Gen. Walter, 399, 400, 402, 408,410,412,454,455 Kitson, Col. Gerald, 295 Klein Harts River, 403 Klerksdorp, 190, 342, 344, 399. 4oo, 401, 402, 406, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 454, 455. 456 Klip Drift, 90, 91 Klip Kop, 245

Klip River, 130, 131, 191, 192, battle of, 235—7 Klipfontein, 258 Klipriviersberg, 236 Klipstapel, 322 Knisley, Pte. William Albert, 274, 275, 276, 406, 408 Knoffelfontein, 204, 204 Knox, Maj.-Gen. Sir W.G., 210, 346, 347, 349, 35°. 351- 352, 353, 354. 355. 356 Koch, Robert, 387 Komati Poort, 216, 309, 3io, 338 Komati River, 263, 265, 268, 269, 309, 324 Koodoosrand, 114, 115 Kosi Bay, 309, 310 Koster River, 190, 196 Kroonspruit, 129 Kroonstad, 129, 205, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234- 235. 242, 243, 282, 355, 356, 357, 358, 452 Kruger, President Paul: battle of Belfast, 326; departure for Europe, 137, 193, 207; house, 239; Mafeking, 180; opinions on, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26; outbreak of war, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; Paardeberg, 105, 109, 112, 114; Poplar Grove, 115; Sammy Marks, 140 Kruger, Piet, 188 Krugersdorp, 342, 377, 378, 413, 456 Kruger's Post, 336 Kuruman, 200, 201, 204, 205 Labour journals, 23 Labat, Gaston, 437 Lac St Jean, 28 Ladysmith, 86, 113, 154, 300, 312, 398, 436

527 Lafferty, Lt. F.D., 135 Laidlaw, Lt. G.E., 325, 329. 343, 344, 347- 357 Laing's Nek, 312 Lake Bennett, 293 Lake Erie, 233, 359, 360 Lake Champlain, 150, 151 La Ligue nationaliste, 444 Lallier, Sgt. Joseph, 457 Lancers: 5th, 263, 267, 270; gth, 292, 351, 353; 2ist, 377 Lancet, 437 Landry, August-Charles, 36 Lane, Rev. W.G., 235 Lansdowne, Marquis Henry Charles, 49, 155, 290, 363, 364 Lansdowne Park, 146, 298, 300 Laurentian, 147, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171,45!, 457 Laurie, Maj. Richard C., 314 Laurier, Wilfrid, ix, 7, 16, 24, no, 440; British recruitment, 181, 414; Canadian participation, 20, 21, 26, 27, 30, 313, 35, 36, 38-48, 442, 443; despatch of Royal Canadian Regiment, 49, 51, 52,63, 153; mediator, 440—1; Montreal riot, 444; Patriotic Fund, 431; Second Contingent, 152, 154, 155: South African Constabulary, 371, 384, Strathcona's Horse, 289—90 Latimer, Pte. William, 203 Lavie, Lt. C., 418 Lawless, Lt. W.T., 129, 378 Leconteur, Rolland, 145 Leckie, Lt. John, 294, 327, 332, 349, 353, 355- 425 Leckie, Capt. R.G.E., 394, 409, 413, 425

Index

LeDuc, Lt. L., 106 Lee, Cpl. Benjamin, 314 Lee, Sgt. Henry, 408, 409 Lee-Enfield rifle, 158, 219- 377,413 Leeuw Kop, 122 Leewfontein, 250 LeGallais, Lt.-Col. P.W.J., 346 Lemmer, Lt.-Col. H.P., 190 Lemmer, Comdt. H.L., 223 Leonard, Pte. George W, 129, 433 Leslie, Lt.J.N.S., 183, 190, 191 Lessard, Lt.-Col. FrancoisLouis, 163, 220, 233, 394, 396, 417, 426, 437-439, 44i,45 8 ; battle of Coetzee's Drift, 228; battle of Klip River, 236; battle of Witpoort Pass, 246, 248, 249; Belfast, 256, 258, 260, 261, 264, 265, 266; career, 162; character, 221, 225-6, command, 50, 51, 158, 179, 222, 225—6, 235, 260—1; court martial, 238—9; Hutton, 231; Liliefontein, 267, 268, 270, 271, 273; Pyramid Kopjes expedition, 245; return, 279, 280, 281, 285 Levis, 166 Liberals, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 36, 40, 44, 46, 61, 153, 164, 393,425> 442, 444 Lichtenburg, 413, 455 Liebenberg, P.J., 340, 341 Liet Spruit, 319 Life Guards, 148 Liliefontein, 247, 262, 267, 268, 277, 285, 394, 403, 405, 406, 439; battle of, 269-76

Lindeque Drift, 138 Lindley, 129, 355- 356 Line of communication duty, i34-7> 139, 242-4 Liverpool (England), 150, 364, 365 Liverpool (Nova Scotia), 45° Living, Pte. Fred, 96 Livre d'Or, Le, 437 Loch's Horse, 135 Logan, Sgt. Archibald E.H., 330, 331 London (England), 48, 143, 148, 149, 150,205, 281, 284, 358, 360, 363, 364, 365, 37i, 384, 386, 391,436, 438, 452, 453 London (Ontario), 22, 26, 39,46, 56, 159, 161, 288, 393, 435 London Gazette, 367 London News, 26 London Convention, 12, 13 Loog Kop, 114, 115 Loosemore, Pte. H.H., 275 Looting, xiii, 80, 84, 90, 117, 118, 130, 136, 174-5, 232, 240, 243, 250-2, 278, 318, 321-2, 326, 334-5, 442 Losberg, 138 Louise, Princess, 150, 363 Louisville, 61 Lourenco Marques, 309 Louwbaken Valley, 241 Lowe, Col. W.H.M., 410 Lower Tugela, 311 Lubbe, Comdt., 80 Lydenburg, 216, 217, 285, 327, 328, 329, 33i, 335, 336, 337 Lyttleton, Lt.-Gen. H.G., 322, 333 Machadodorp, 216, 218, 241, 326, 336, 338, 353, 37°

528 Index Machadodorp disturbance, 338-9 Machberg Mountains, 33i, 332

Machell, Pte. Samuel, 343 Machin, Pte. H.A.C., 425 Mackie, Capt. E.F., 418 Mackie, Capt. H.J., 200, 336, 350. 358, 363, 367 Mafeking, 86, 154, 179, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 197, 306, 369, 400, 411 Magaliesberg, 138, 189, iQ 1 * 239.449 Magato Nek, 196 Magersfontein, 75, 88, 445 Mahon, Brig.-Gen. Bryan, 184, 185, 186, 187, 246, 247, 261 Mail and Empire (Toronto), xi, 20, 38, 68, 74, 364, 385, 386, 392, 437, 444 Mair, Charles, 8 Maitland Camp, 282, 306, 307 Majuba Day, 104, 105, 109, 112 Majuba Hill, 12, 109, no, 312 Makapan's Stadt, 194 Manchester Guardian, 440 Manitoba, 36, 53, 77, 162, 292, 307, 372, 378, 393. 4i6 Manitoba Dragoons, 161, 164, 257 Manitoba Free Press, 26 Mansion House Fund, 432 Maple Creek, 243, 252, 287, 293, 295, 298 Maple Leaf Forever, 80, 150, 366 Marandellas, 182, 183, 184, 188, 280

Maritimes, 36, 63, 127, 372, 373- 376, 378, 395. 4i6 Markham, Lt. R.F., 407, 409, 412 Marks, Sammy, 140, 241 Marquis, T.G., x, 18, 437 Mashona, 183 Mason, James, 39, 99 Mason, Lt. J. Cooper, 99 Masonic Temple, 451 Masse, Vet.-Maj. James, 200 Massey, Maj. W.G., 346 Massey-Harris Company, 428 Massiah, Kate, 384, 385 Matabele Wars, 183 Maude, Maj. F.S., 431 Mauser rifle, 99 Maxim gun, 132, 185 Maxwell, Maj. Cedric, 222 Maxwell, Maj.-Gen. J.G., 147 McArthur, Pte. Alex, 319 McBeth, Pte. George, 407, 409 McBride, Pte. Archibald, 363 McCall, Pte. Wally, 287, 405 McCall, Pte. R.C., 406 McCarthy, DAlton, 8, 28 McCarthy, Hamilton, 434, 435 McCarthy, Lt. M.O., 380 McCarthy, Pte. Plantagenet, 260 Macauly, Pte. Angus, 98 McCormick, Pte. Edwin, 325. 34L 342, 400 McCrae, Lt. John, 174, 177, 178, 179, 198, 199,

21O, 212,

217,

2l8,

213,

284

McCreary, Pte. Patrick, 98 McCulloch, Sgt. David, 225 McDonald, Pte. Angus A., 265, 266

Macdonald, Col. D.A., 57, 286 MacDonald, Maj.-Gen. Hector, 88 Macdonald, Lt. J.F. 294, 327 Macdonald, Margaret C., 45!. 452 MacDonald Tobacco Company, 59 Macdonell, Capt. Archibald Cameron, 164, !74, 175. 177. !?8, 221,

228,

23O,

233,

234,

242,

418,

420,

421,

423,

425

Macdonell, Capt. A.H., 68, 70, 106, 108, 120, 146, 149 McDonnell, Charles, 338, 353, 425 MacDougall, Maj. James Charles, 104 McDougall, Pte. Jonathan, 319 McDuff, Pte. John, 330 McEachran, Prof. Duncan, 290, 296, 297, 301, 304 McGillivray, Pte. Allan, 328 McGill University, 60, 162, 199, 290, 296, 300, 433, 434. 443, 444, 451 McGivern, Capt. W.L., 378 Machar, Agnes Maud, 17 McHarg, Cpl. William Hart, 67, 73, 133, 134, 425, 437, 438 Mclllree, Lt.-Col. J.M., 291 Maclnnes, Capt. D.C., 244 Mackay, A.M., 10 Mackay, Lt. G.B., 407 Mackie, Lt. Ernest, 292, 335 McLean, Pte. A.R., 129 McLean, Lt. C.W.W., 83, 372

529 Index Maclean, WE, 17, 38 Macleod, 292, 293, 296, 298 McLeod, Annie, 437 MacMaster, Sen. Donald, 153 MacMillan, Sgt. Alexander, 449 Maguatlen's Nek, 352 Mahemsfontein, 209 Manhattan, 393, 397, 398, 399 Maplemore, 310 Maxse, Gen. Ivor, 369 Medical service, 53, 56—7, 120—i Medicine Hat, 293, 295, 298 Medway, Tpr., 379 Merchants Bank, 432 Mercier, Honore, 27 Merritt, Maj. William Hamilton, 391, 392, 394, 397, 398, 399, 4*3 Metcalfe, Sgt. Fred R, 275 Methodist, 9, 10, 235, 393 Methodist Book Publishing House, 55 Methodist Church (Brunswick Street), 117 Methodist Recorder, 25 Methuen, Lt.-Gen. Lord P.S., 77, 78, 190, 191, 399, 403 Metis, 18, 66 Middelburg, 136, 211, 213, 215, 247, 249, 250, 253, 254, 256 Middelburg Commando, 273 Middleton, Maj.-Gen. F.D., 9 Middleville, 450 Miles, Pte. Henry Vere, 243,244 Miles, Cpl. Thomas Routledge, 243, 244 Military Bounty Act, 425 Militia Act, 32, 43, 52, !55> 297

Militia Council, 439 Militia, Department of, 427,43i,445,45 6 ; Canadian Mounted Rifles, and, 391, 392, 395; last contingents, 415, 416; plan, 16, 41, 42,43, 45, 5°, 51: reports to, 52, 175, 285; Second Contingent, 157, 159, 162, 286; South African Constabulary, 370, 371, 373, 3755 Strathcona's Horse, 289, 290, 318 Militia Gazette, 44 Militia myth, 9, 72 Militia Order 12, 370 Militia reform, 438—40 Mills, David, 48 Mills, Cpl. Thomas, 315 Milner, Lord Alfred, 14, 17, 37, 76, 110, 284, 359, 368, 369, 370, 371- 374, 375, 38o, 384, 387, 388 Milwaukee, 157, 158, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 179, 181, 298,458 Minchin, Pte. John A., 405 Minett, Pte. Harry, C., 405 Minto, 4th Earl, x, 7, no, 245> 409- 436, 439453; British recruitment, 181; Canadian participation, 31, 32, 33, 35, 42, 43, 45> 46, 47, 48; Canadian Mounted Rifles, 2nd, 392, 394; last contingents, 414, 415; Patriotic Fund, 430-2; Royal Canadian Regiment, 49, 56, 146, 153, 154; Second Contingent, 155- !56, 157, 165, 167; South African Constabulary, 370, 373,

374,375- 379,38i; Strathcona's Horse, 294, 300; Steele dispute, 373-5 Minto, Lady, 146, 167, 3oo, 435 Moberley, Pte. George Allen, 338 Modder River, 77, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 104, 105, 114, 115, 120, 122, 124,457

Moeller, Lt. B., 448 Moffat, Thomas, 427 Mohawk, 310 Moir, Lt. R.H., 412 Molopo River, 185 Molyneux, L/Cpl. C.R., 79 Moncton, 26, 301, 366 Monde Illustre, Le, 29, 442 Monet, Dominique, 442 Monetary Times, 371, 426, 443 Montague-Bates, Lt. F.S., 382,383 Monteith, Pte. W.E.S., 321 Monterey, 127, 291, 297, 298, 302, 304, 305 Montezuma, 166 Montford, 376 Montizambert, Dr E, 431 Montreal, 4, 7, 24, 29, 37, 38, 40, 44, 46, 47, 53, 54, 55, S6, 57- S8, 61, 64, 68, 155, 371, 392, 426, 430, 442, 451; Dragoons, 161, 162, 166, 288; monument, 434; patriotic philanthropy, 432, 433; riot, 443-4; Royal Canadian Regiment, 53, 146; RCFA, 159, 288; South African Constabulary, 372, 373, 378, 381, 383, 385, 386; Strathcona's Horse, 290, 291, 293, 299, 300, 318, 366, 367

53° Index Montreal Amateur Athletic Association, 300 Montreal Caledonia Society, 153 Montreal Corn Exchange, 47 Montreal Lacrosse Club, 61 Montreal Riot, 300, 443—4 Monuments, 433-6 Moodie, Lt. J.D., 164, 234, 254, 394 Mooi River, 342, 343 Mooifontein, 411 Moore, Lt. F.S., 376 Moore, Capt. F.W.L., 378, 38i, 384 Moore, W.W., 427 Moosomin, 293, 298 Morale, 138-9, 140, 147, 194, 196, 218, 239-40, 390; De Aar, 198-9, 210 Morden, Cpl. James, 243, 244 Morgansen's Nek, 336 Morris, Capt. E.M., 445 Morrison, Pte. Donald, 253 Morrison, Lt. E.W.B., xi, 218, 285, 437, 438; Belfast, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 267; De Aar, 179, 199; Edenburg, 210; Hamilton's Column, 212, 213, 329; Mutton's Column, 216; Karoo, 172, 173, 174; Liliefontein, 268—77; return, 424, 425 Morrison, Lt. F.S., 418 Mounted Brigade, 3rd, 216, 312, 313, 317, 321, 322, 325, 326, 329, 335 Mounted Infantry Brigade: ist, 224, 234, 245, 277, 287, 457;

Newcastle (Natal), 311, 312, 398, 399, 421, 453, 454 New Denver Ledge, 2 2 , 2 3 New Somerset Hospital, 45° New South Wales, 33, 45, 155 New South Wales Citizens' Bushmen, 189, 196 New South Wales Imperial Bushmen, 190 New Westminster, 59 New York, 43, 45, 61, 133, 45°, 451 New Zealand, 76, 181, 224, 282, 392, 410, 414 New Zealand Mounted Rifles, 173, 174, 245, 248 News (Toronto), 17, 25, Naauwpoort, 250 38, 438 Niagara, 34 Nanton, Capt. H.C., 445 Nichol, Sgt. Herbert, 313 Napanee Star, 371 Nicholson, Pte. Cecil, 332 Natal, 11, 12, 39, 75 Nicholson, Maj. J.S., 183, Natal Field Force, 75, 309, 386 310, 312, 313, 318, Nicholson's Nek, 154 320, 321 Nickerson, Lt. William Natal Spruit Station, 236 Henry Snyder, 446 National Council of Nicks, Pte. John, 323 Women, 429, 430 Nield, Pte. John, 203 National Society for Aid to the Sick and Nomema, 124 Wounded in War, 429 Nooitgedacht, 250, 252, 256, 258, 262, 263, National Trust, 433 Navy League, 4 327; battle of, 253-4 Norris, Pte. Fred, 315 Neilson, Col.J.L.H., Northern Division, 374 453 Northumberland Fusiliers, Nelles, Sgt. Edwin, 421, 378 330, 335. 336 Nelson, 61, 293, 294, 298, Northway, Sgt. Richard John, 254, 447, 448 432 North-West, 35, 53, 58, Nelson Miner, 22 Nelspruit Station, 217, 77, 152, 153, 156, 157, 289, 290, 292, 296, 218 New Brunswick, 53, 74, 301, 307, 372, 388, 393, 425, 434 427. 434, 446 North West Mounted Newcastle (New BrunsPolice, 155, 156, 157, wick), 159 28th, 400, 403, 405, 408 Mounted Infantry Corps, ist, 222, 224 Mounted Infantry, ist Bn., 224 Mullen, Pte. William James, 253 Mullins, Tpr. E., 380 Mulloy, Pte. Lome W.R., 248, 429 Mulock, William, 46, 47, 49. 436, 456 Muncey, Pte. S.W., 207 Murcheson, Lome, 436 Murray, Lt. W.P., 203, 204, 205 Murray, Sgt. Kenneth Alexander, 456, 457 Myers, Gen. Lukas, 312

53i 163,

164,

165,

221,

233,

291, 292,

293,

294.

295,

297,

365,

370,

372,

387,

388,

39°. 393, 394, 396> 4i8 North-West Rebellion, 4, 9, 21, 66, 67, 68, 127, 160, 162, 163, 164, 220, 292, 293, 294, 295, 446 Norval's Pont, 222, 359, 378 Nova Scotia, 7, 53, 106, 372, 373, 376, 435- 45° Numidian, 365 Nursing sisters, 121, 140, 152 Nylstroom, 192 O'Brien, Pte. Arthur, 296 Ocean, Accident and Guarantee Company, 431-2 Observer (Sarnia), 26 Odium, Pte. Victor, 58, 84, 418, 425 O'Farrell, Maj. F.A., 418, 419 Officers' Life Insurance Fund,432 Ogilvie, Maj. George Hunter, 160, 166, 199, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 285 Ogilvie, Lt. A.T., 425 Ogilvy, Capt. J.H.C., 68, 69* 7°> 74> 124, 135, 140, 371- 372 Ohrigstand Valley, 336 Oiseau Mouche, L', 29 Old Viljeon's Drift, 235 O'Leary, Rev. Peter M., 62, 66, 68, 69, 97, 98, 432, 44i Olifants Nek, 190, 191 Olifants River, 139, 142, 143, 174, 178, 250, 253, 255 Olifantsfontein, 246

Index

Oliver, J.W., 54 Oliver equipment, 54, 55, 58 O'Neill, John, 66 One Tree Hill, 317 Ontario, 7, 19, 36, 41, 53, 58, 66, 127, 155, 161, 243, 248, 291, 294, 297- 3i8, 372, 378, 394, 4i6, 425, 432, 433, 436, 444, 45°, 454 Ootsi, 184 Orange Free State, 11, 12, 37, 80, 90, 117, 129, 1 3°> !37, !88, 190, 206, 207, 222, 226, 241, 340, 346, 359377, 449- 452 Orange Order, 4, 444 Orange River, 11, 175, 179, 199, 200, 222, 347- 39° Orange River Station, 77, 78, 81, 83 Orcana, 453 Ordnance Corps, 439 Ordnance Department, 347 O'Reilly, Pte. Edwin Pat, !99 Osborne, Dr A.B., 450 Othen, Pte. C.R., 396 Ottawa, 7, 24, 28, 35, 36, 37- 38, 39, 43, 44, 52, 62, 83, 154, 155, 212, 291, 292, 296, 297, 373, 374, 376, 392, 396, 429, 430, 433, 438, 439- 440, 442, 444; Canadian Mounted Rifles, ist, 167, 287; Dragoons, 161, 260, 288; monument, 434; RCFA, 159, 160, 175, 194, 199, 288; Royal Canadian Regiment, 53, 56, 146, 194; South African Constabulary, 370;

Strathcona's Horse, 298, 299, 300, 303, 304, 313, 366, 367 Ottawa Car Company, 427 Ottawa Children's Hospital, 450 Ottawa Free Press, 26 Ottawa Rough Riders, 61 Ottawa Valley, 62 Otter, Lt.-Col. William, 60, 76, 87, 156, 159, 163, 172, 190, 194, 223, 224, 231, 237, 302, 371, 372, 374, 375- 394, 403, 407, 418, 426, 430, 437; assessment of contingent, 67-9; Belmont, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83; battle of Cronje's laager, 105, 106, 107, 109; battle of Doornkop, 132-3; battle of Israel's Poort, 124-5; battle of Paardeberg Drift, 92, 94, 95> 97, 98, 100, 101; Boesman's Kop, 121-2; Boy lea affair, 117-18; Buchan, 77; career, 66; Christmas dinner controversy, 81; command, 38, 50, 51, 69-71, 82-5, 130, 148; criticism, 73—4, 79, 81— 2, 119—20; De Wet hunt, 138—9; discipline, 147; instructions, 52; line of communication duty, 139-40; Liverpool, 150; Pom-Pom Tuesday, 102-3; return controversy, 141-4, 146-7; return voyage, 150; Sardinian, 65, 67; Springs, 135—7; ten" sions, 118—19; training, 70—3; Windsor, 149; wounded, 125 Outpost Hill, 103, 114

532 Index Paardeberg, 58, 61, 91, 102, 105, 110—15, 124, 133, 134, H8, 171, 172, 222, 242,

248,

262,

407,

276,

3OO,

409, 426, 444 Paardeberg Day, 112, 424, 436 Paardeberg Drift, 90, 91, 92, 93-ioi, 103 Paardeberg Gate, 434 Paardeberg memorial, 435 Paardekop, 312, 313, 320, 321

Pacaud, Ernest, 441 Page, Robert, 9 Papineau, Lt. D.B., 418 Paget, Col. A.H., 138, 191, 192, 193, 196, 197 Paget's Horse, 200, 201 Palmietfontein, 216 Pan, 250, 253, 255, 339 Panet, Capt. Alexandre, 68, 69, 70, 171, 183, 189, 191, 194, 196, 197, 2 79 Papkuil, 204 Parent, E.N., 63, 434 Parker, Sgt. E.G., 294, 314 Parkin, George, 45 Parliament, 16, 43, 44, 155' 36o, 442, 443 Parliament Hill, 146, 167, 200 Parsons, Col. Charles, 172, 173, 174, 177. 199' 233 Parys Drift, 235 Passe Temps, Le, 29, 442 Patrie, La, 45, 395.441, 443 Patriotic Fund For Families of British Soldiers, 432 Pay Corps, Army, 439 Peace and Arbitration Committee (WCTU), 23 Pearce, Pte. William, 238

Pelletier, Maj. Oscar, 53, 62, 68, 69, 80, 85, 87, 106, 107, 124, 132, 139, 144, 145, 146, 148, 151, 426 People's press movement, i? Perkins, Pte. Albert, 71, 82, 90, 120 Perry, Sgt. Jo., 403, 405, 408, 409 Petawawa, 438 Peterborough, 161 Picot, Gnr. Elie, 199 Pickering, Pte. Bill, 435 Pictou County, 451 Pienaars Poort, 213 Pienaars River, 192, 193, 241 Pienaars River Station, 193, 194 Pietermaritzburg, 452 Pilcher, Lt.-Col. Thomas, 79, 80, 224, 235, 238, 245. 246, 346, 347. 354, 355 Pilgrim's Rest, 333, 335, 336 Pilkington, Col. H.L., 282, 378, 383 Pinault, L.-J., 42, 57, 375 Pincher Creek, 243, 244, 298 Plains of Abraham, 434 Platberg, 453 Plan, John, 67 Plumer, Col. H.C.O., 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197.279 Point Levis, 166 Point St Charles, 166 Pole-Carew, Gen. R., 146, 325 Polynesian, 167 Pomeranian, 157, 158, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172

Pooley, Lt. Thomas E., 294, 322,323, 418 Pope, Georgina, 69, 450, 452. 453 Pope, Joseph, 450, 453 Poplar Grove, 114, 115 Portage la Prairie, 161, 378 Porteous, James, 193 Port Hope, 159, 433 Portuguese, 181, 309, 387 Portugese East Africa, 180 Potchefstroom, 342, 343, 344, 345. 346, 358 Pousette, Capt. H.R., 378 Powell, Capt. A.H., 378, 381, 382, 383 Prefontaine, Raymond, 46 Presbyterian, 9, 68 Presbyterian Hospital, 450 Presbyterian Record, 25 Presse, La, 28, 154, 300, 395, 44L 443 Pretoria, xiii, 14, 86, 121, 122, 123, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137- !39> 140, 141, 178, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 196, 210, 219, 224, 230, 231, 235, 241, 242, 244, 245, 247. 249> 276, 346, 359, 368, 369, 379; annexation ceremony, 143, 147, 262; C Battery, 197, 277, 280, 281, 282; Canadian Mounted Rifles, 239, 240, 277, 281, 282; Howard's Scouts, 447; Nursing sisters, 451, 452; postal corps, 457; Royal Canadian Regiment, 134, 144, 146, 148; South African Constabulary, 370, 378, 387; Strathcona's Horse, 338, 339- 340

533 Index Pretoria Convention (l88l), 12, 13, 14

Pretorius Drift, 226 Price, Pte. N.O., 455 Price, Cpl. Percy, 274 Prieska, 172, 175, 199 Priestman, Herbert, 58 Prince Albert, 293 Prince Edward Island, 53, 58,61, 376,434,45 0 Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, 65 Prince of Wales College, 58 Prince of Wales Rifles, 164 Princess Louise Fusiliers, 66th, 419 Prinsloo, Cmdt. H.R., 269, 274 Prinsloo, Michael, 256 Prison, 239, 412, 422, 423 Protectorate Regiment, 180,189 Protestant School Board of Quebec, 7 Prohibitionists, 18, 19 Prospect, 130 Province (Vancouver), 392 Public Record Office, 368 Purdon, Sgt. Edward L., 245 Pym, Pte. Horace Monteith, 321 Pyramid Kopjes, 245, 246

Quagga Spruit, 130, Quebec, 16, 28, 68, 243, 294, 297, 396> 432, 446; attitude toward, 18; Canadian South African Association, 36; Canadian Mounted Rifles, 4th, 416, 418; caucus, 46, 50; draft, 127; English, 19; opinion, 26, 28—9, 4863, 141; politics, 20, 444; South African Constabulary, 376, 378

Quebec Bible Society, 55 Quebec City, 39, 64, 65, 76, 155, 429,433; Dragoons, 162, 166, 288; monument, 434; RCFA, 159, 288; Royal Canadian Regiment, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 72, 84, 104, 146, 152, 153 Queensland Mounted Infantry, 80, 183, 185 Queen's Own Hussars, 162 Queen's Own Rifles, 4, 69, 80 Queen's Quarterly, 437 Queen's Regulations, 52 Queen's South Africa Medal, 362, 406 Queen's scarf, 108, 375 Queen's University, 4, 18, 445 Queen Victoria, 108, 109, 143, 149, 235, 36o, 43i, 435. 452 Quinn, Martin, 10

Racism, 389, 444 Radcliffe, Walter A., 22 Railway Committee Room, 36 Ralfontein, 322 Ramdam, 87, 88 Ramathlabama, 188 Randall, Pte. Jack, 283, 447 Randfontein, 139 Rangatira, 76 Rape, 322 Ratcliffe, Pte. Archibald, 257, 258, 278 Rat Portage, 287 Raymond, Pte. W.J., 428 Reading, Capt. E., 378 Record (Windsor), 371 Recreation, 215, 412-13 Recruitment, 159—60, Red Cross, 450

Redford, Lt. A.D., 412 Red River Expedition, 9, 291, 312 Reeves, Col. John, 248 Reed, Pte. James, 344, 345 Reed, Pte. WE., 374 Regiment of Foot, i5th, 294 Regina, 288, 291, 292, 293, 298, 345, 451 Regina Standard, 22 Reid, Gen. Sir Charles, 294 Reporters, 19, 68, 118, 144, Retail Market, 425—6 Return controversy, 139, 141-7 Revelstoke, 294 Rhenoster Kop, 209 Rhenoster River, 205 Rhenoster Spruit, 410 Rhodes, Cecil, 12, 14, 31, 78 Rhodesia, 180, 181, 183 Rhodesian Field Force, 180, 181, 188, 286 Rhodesian Regiment, 180, 185, 191, 194 Richards, Sgt.-Maj. Jonathan, 321, 349, 394 Richardson, Pte. Arthur H.L., 319 Richardson, Marcella P., 45i Richmond, 87 Riddell, Lt. R., 164, 395 Ridgeway, battle of, 66 Ridley, Gen. C.P., 137, 138,378 Riet River, 88, 90, 382 Riet Valley, 188 Rietfontein, 122, 196, 246, 247, 356, 379, 410 Rietvlei, 245, 247, 249, 410,413 Rietvleifontein, 246

534 Index Rifle Brigade, 2nd Bn., 326 Rimington, Col. M.F., 449 Rimington's Scouts, 238 Riviere-du-Loup, 166 Roberts, Pte. Arthur H., 275' 407. 454, 455 Roberts, Lord, Frederick, 83, 90, 91, 115, 135, 140,

147,

171,

210,

217, 244, 301, 310, 312, 361, 362, 364, 409, 435' 436, 452; battle of Belfast, 215, 320, 324; battle of Diamond Hill, 241-2; battle of Tigerspoort, 246; Canadian Mounted Rifles, ist, 219, 222, 224, 225, 228, 248, 253, 254; Casement plan, 310-11; C Battery, 188, 191; command, 75, 91, 92, 400; De Wet hunt, 138, 213; Dragoons, 219, 224, 225, 281; hospitals, 120; Karoo, 173; Lydenburg campaign, 216; looting, 117; Mafeking, 180, 181; March to Pretoria, 123, 124, 126, 129, 130, 134, 219, 222, 223, 225, 226, 230, 231, 239; Middleburg march, 211, 249, 250; Paardeberg, 100, 102, 104, 105, 109, 112; pacification, 187, 190, 200; return, 207; return controversy, 142, 143, 144; Royal Canadian Regiment, 86, 87, 109, 112, 142, 143, 144, 222, 223; South African Constabulary, 368, 369, 370, 380; scorched earth policy, 342

Roberts' Horse, 139, 418, 446 Robertson, James, 61 Robertson, John Ross, 38 Robinson, Pte. Albert, 317 Rochefort, Lt.-Col. Boyd, 79 Rogers, Capt. Maynard, 106, 108, 144 "Rolling Polly", 167 Rondebosch, 451 Roode Kop, 193 Roodival, 242 Rooidaal, 216 Rooikopjes, 321 Rooipan, 200 Rooke, Pte. Charlie, 396, 412 Rooke, Pte. George, 396, 412 Rooke, Pte. R.P., 323, 324, 396,412 Roslin Castle, 284, 286,452 Ross, Capt. Charles, 307, 308, 447, 448 Ross, George, 5, 6 Ross, Lt. J.M., 137, 138 Rossland Rifle Company, 67 Ross Rifle, 439 Rouville, 349, 350 Rowe, E.S., 17 Roy, Lt. L.A., 418 Royal Army Medical Corps, 121, 407, 438, 445, 449- 45°- 452, 454 Royal Artillery, 83, 150, 167, 363; 38th Battery, 193 Royal Australian Artillery, 206 Royal Canadian Artillery, 50, 64, 68, 159, 160, 300, 369, 418 Royal Canadian Dragoons, 50, 157, 163, 168, 217, 298, 329,

377. 394- 396, 407, 412, 417, 418, 446,

449> 457, 458; arrival, 171; battle of Boschmer's Kop, 225; battle of Coetzee's Drift, 2268; battle of Kameelfontein, 241-2; battle of Klip River, 235—7; battle of Pietfontein, 247; battle of Standerton; battle of Steelpoort Valley, 260; battle of Witpoort Pass, 2478; battle of Zand River, 230—1; Bothaville, 234— 5; Cape Town, 179—80; Cape Town riot, 282—4; composition, 159-62; court martial, 238-9; Deedepoort, 244-6; departure, 169; designation, 161; dress, 158; duties, 219—20; Fischer's Farm, 224; Halifax, 286; Jammersberg expedition, 222-3; Klip Kop expedition, 245; Kroonstad, 231-5; leadership, 221; Liliefontein, 269—76; living conditions, 257—8; Pretoria, 239—40; return, 279-88; strength, 24456; voyage, 169-70; Worcester, 282 Royal Canadian Field Artillery, 157, 168, 169, 171, 200, 250, 302, 329, 369, 394, 405, 417, 418, 449. 454, 457; arrival, 171; battle of Faber's Put, 201—3; battle of Jericho, 196; battle of Sanie Station, 185—6; Belfast, 215; Cape Town riot, 282—4; dress, 158; Edenburg and Bloemfontein, 210— 11; garrison, 187-91, 206-7, 217-18; Halifax, 286; Karoo expe-

535 Index dition, 172—8; Liliefontein, 269—76; Lydenburg, 216-17; Mafeking, 181—7; Middleburg, 211—13; pacifying, 191-4; Pretoria, 211; recruitment, 159— 60; rebel chasing, 207— 10; return, 279—88; Worcester, 282 - C Battery, 159, 160, 179, 180, 188, 190, 191, 192, 200, 279, 285, 286; battle of Jericho, 196; battle of Sanie Station, 185-6; delay, 166; march to Mafeking, 181—7; Rustenburg, 189; strength, 194, 197, 280; Warm Baths, 193 — D Battery, 159, 160, 166, 167, 172, 173, i?4, 175' 179- i99> 256, 279, 280, 285, 418; battle of Belfast, 215; De Aar, 198; Edenburg and Bloemfontein, 210-11; garrison, 213-15, 217—18; Lydenburg, 216-17; March to Middleburg, 211—13; Pretoria, 211; strength, 281 — E Battery, 159, 160, 166, 173, 179, 200, 218, 277, 279, 280, 282, 283, 285; De Aar, 198—9; departure, 167; Campbell, 204; Faber's Put, 201—3; garrison, 205-7; rebel chasing, 207—10; strength, 281 Royal Canadian Hussars, 300 Royal Canadian Mounted Rifles, 367 Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry (2nd Bn.), xii, 38, 39, 44, 49, 50,

51, 52, 57. 152, 153, 155,

221, 222,

291,

394, 405, 429, 430,

431,449,456,457;

acclaim, 109-12; assessment, 67-70; battle of Cronje's laager, 105— 112; battle of Dornkop, 131-3; battle of Paardeberg Drift, 92-101; battle of Thaba 'Nchu, 124-7; battle of Sunnyside, 79-80; battle of Zand River, 127-9; Belmont, 78—85; bilingual, 53; Bloemfontein, 11722; Cape Town reception, 76; composition, 4i, 53, 59-6°; departure, 58, 62-4; De Wet hunt, 137—8; discharge, 148; discontent, 78-85; draft, 127; dress, 53—4; equipment, 54—5; financing, 53; food, 71; Koodoosrand, 114; line of communications, 139—40; London, 148— 50; looting, 84; medical, 56; mess, 73; motives, 58—61; organization, 49—57; Paardeberg march, 87—91; Poplar Grove, 115; Pretoria, 134; regional rivalry, 80—1; return, 144-8, 151; return controversy, 141-4, 146-7; routine, 71—2; strength, 104, 123, 134, 140; Springs, 134-7; ten~ sions, 71-4; 118-22, 147; training, 70-1 Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry (3rd Bn.), i45> 155, 286, 365, 366, 376, 439 Royal Canadian School of Artillery, 159 Royal Cape Artillery, 200

Royal Engineers, 105, 106, 244, 267, 310, 312 (No 2 Field Troop) Royal Field Artillery, 139, 196, 206 Royal Horse Artillery, 125, 216, 217, 226, 228, 234, 246, 247, 312, 315, 317, 325, 328, 329, 335, 338 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 326 Royal Irish Fusiliers, 215, 247, 248, 249, 277, 278, 279 Royal Military College, 67, 68, 163, 164, 293, 294, 295, 434, 445 Royal Munster Fusiliers Mounted Infantry, 200 Royal Palace Hotel, 361, 363 Royal Red Cross Award, 452 Royal Rifles, 8th, 153 Royal Scots, 5th, 58, 64, 217, 293 Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons), 163, 230 Royal Victoria Hospital, 290 Royal Victorian Order, 362 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 341 Runck, Comdt., 237 Rundle, Lt.-Gen. H.M.L., 210 Russell, Elizabeth, 69, 45°- 452 Rustenburg, 188, 189, 190, 196, 197, 377 Rustenburg-Pretoria Road, 239, 245 Ryerson, Dr G. Sterling, 21,429, 430,452 Ryan, Sgt. Robert H., 245. 258, 260, 394, 407,409, 412,425 Rycroft, Maj. W.H., 315

536 Index Sabine, Pte. Herbert, 307, 308, 317 Sabi Drift, 334 Sabi River, 331, 333,334, 335 Sackville, 446 St Andrew's Presbyterian Church (Ottawa), 300 St Catharines, 159, 161 St George, Lt. Frank T., 381,382 St George's Society, 4, 7 St Helena, 109, 145, 172, 179, 233 Saint John (NB), 26, 56, 61, 162, 372, 373, 376, 378, 381, 382, 384, 386, 393, 426, 427, 432 Saint John's Star Fund, 434 Saint John's Transvaal Committee, 432 St Luke's Hospital, 451 St Matthew's (Anglican), 63 St Paul's Presbyterian Church (Amherst Island), 434 St Vincent, 145, 284 Salish, 353 Samedi, Le, 29, 442 Sanders, Maj. G.E., 164, 175, 221, 232, 233, 234, 253, 254, 263, 264, 267 Sanford Manufacturing Company, 426 Sandon Paystreak, 22 Sanie Station, battle of, 185-6 Sannah's Post, 121, 211 Sardinian, 54-5, 64, 65-6, 7 1 , 73, 74, 76, 78, 81, 84, 148, 152, 169, 301, 429, 449, 45° Sarnia Observer, 26 Saskatchewan, 21, 292 Saturday Night (Toronto), 25, 393

Saxby, Pte. Horace, 323 Scarth, W.B., 427 Schell, Cpl. Joseph, 264 Schmidt's Drift, 201, 205 Schoon Spruit, 400 Schreiner, W.P., 21 Schweizer-Reneke, 207, 209 Scots Guards, 148, 341 Scott, Amy W., 452 Scott, D.C., 17 Scott, Rev. Frederick George, 63 Scott, Pte. Laughlin, 345 Scott, Richard, 24, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49 Scott, Pte. William, 345 Scott, Sgt. William Ironside, 61, 99 Scouting, 245, 252, 253, 255, 312-13, 323, 353, 359, 38o, 395,4oi, 402, 448 Seaforth (Ontario), 433 Seaforth Highlanders, 347 Sebakwe, 183 Second Contingent, 155, 161, 179, 277, 284, 289, 418, 429, 430, 452; accounts, 286; arrival, 171; Cape Town riot, 282-4; composition, 159—62; debate on 153-6; fragmentation, 165; Karoo expedition, 172—8; organization, 157; return, 286-8; size, 156; transportation, 165-6; voyage, 169-70; Worcester, 282. See also Royal Canadian Dragoons; Canadian Mounted Rifles; Royal Canadian Field Artillery Sefetili, 184 Selons River, 190 Semaine Religieuse, La, 29, »55 Seminaire de Chicoutimi, 29

Sentinel Review, 59 Settle, Col. Herbert, 172, 175, 177, 206, 207, 209, 245 Seymour, Pte. Edward B., 296> 299, 337 Sheddy, Pte. Frank J., 280 Shropshire Light Infantry, 102—3, IO 5> 1O7> !26, 132, 263, 267, 268, 270, 274, Sick Sisters Home, 453 Sifton, Clifford, 44, 45 Silverton, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 147, 194, 377 Simcoe Canning Company, 427 Simcoe County, 291 Simoonfontein, battle of, 196-7 Simonski, W.R., 68 Simpson, James, 17 Sinnett, Rev. J.C., 244, 267 Slagkraal, 115 Smaldeel Junction, 230 Smithfield, 349, 350 Smith-Dorrien, Maj.-Gen. Horace, 88, 103, 137, 457; battle of Cronje's laager, 105, 106, 109; battle of Paardeberg Drift, 92, 93, 95, 100, 102; battle of Thaba 'Nchu, 125, 126; battle of Zand River, 129; C Battery, 262, 263, 264, 265, 277, 278; Canadian Mounted Rifles, ist, 234, 243, 262, 263, 264, 265, 277, 278; command, 86, 87, 124, 147; Dragoons, 262, 263, 264, 265, 277, 278; Liliefontein, 267, 268, 269, 270, 275, 276; Royal Canadian Regiment, 87, 115, 144, 223, 231 Smith, Pte. Gavin, 264

537 Smith, Pte. George, 232, 240, 246 Smith, Goldwin, 7, 25, Smith, Margaret, 452 Smith, Richmond, xi, 68 Smuts, Jan, 113 Snowshoe clubs, 300 Snyder, Maj. Arthur Edward, 292, 315, 370 Social Gospel, 9, 10, 17 Social tensions (Canadian and British troops), 386-7 Soldiers' Home (Vryburg), 206 Soldiers' Monument (London), 435 "Soldiers of the Queen", 80, 367 Soldiers of the Queen Relief Fund, 432 Soldiers Wives' League, 55 Soleil, Le, 395, 441 Songs and Poems of the South African War, 433, 437

South African Association, 31, 35, 36, 38 South African Chartered Company, 18, 31, 181, 184, 187 South African Constabulary, xii, 192, 338, 358, 412, 415. 42i, 442; battle, 379; clannishness, 380; composition, 372-3; creation, 368-9; debate, 386; departure, 375-6; discharge, 3834; discipline, 379-80; grievances, 384—5; illness, 380; Minto-Steele dispute, 373-5; officers, 378-9; organization, 377-8; police service, 387-90; public reaction, 371; recruitment, 371-3; reduction, 38off; strike, 381-2; terms of enlistment, 370-1; uniforms, 377

Index

South African Light Horse, 79, 303, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 329, 332, 335. 336, 367, 368 South African League, 39 South Africa Medal, 457 South African Medal Association, 424, 436 South African Republic, 11, 16, 17, 43 South African Veterans Association, 424, 436 South African Veterans' Mutual Protective Association Limited, 425 Southampton, 148, 453 South Rhodesian Volunteers, 185 Spanish-American War, 396» 449, 45°. 45! Sparkes, Pte. George A.S., 319, 418 Spectator (Hamilton), 20, 21, 38, 174,444 Spence, Pte. Daniel McLean, 257, 258, 278 Spence, F.S., 17 Spender, Harold, 440 Spens, Col. J., 124, 263, 265, 267, 270, 271 Spion Kop, 325, 452 Spitzkop, 216, 331, 332, 333,334 Spleen, Cpl. H., 379 Springfield Farm, 123, 124 Springfontein, 222, 224, 346, 347. 452 Springhaan's Nek, 351, 352 Springs, 135, 136, 137, 139 Sproule, Tpr. H.J., 379 Stairs, Capt. Duncan, 68, 70, 106, 108, 135, 139, 143, 144 Standerton, 313, 314, 318, 319, 337,377 Standerton Road, 246—7, 439

Star (Montreal), xi, 17, 21, 25, 26, 29, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 68, 153, 154, 385, 386, 392,43L 432, 443 Star (Toronto), 26 Stationary Hospital No. 19, 453 Steelpoort Valley, 258, 260-1, 277, 278 Steele, Col. S.B., 221, 394, 396. 398, 4i6, 420, 426; battle of Badfontein, 329—30; battle of Belfast, 324-7; biography, 291; British direction of the war, 314, 315, 328, 329, 333. 326, 352-3; Canadian Mounted Rifles, ist, 232; Casement plan, 309, 310, 311; character, 303, 306, 307, 308, 364; command, 297, 306, 307, 308, 317, 320, 321, 323, 324, 370; departure, 300, 301; Devil's Knuckles, 332-3; De Wet hunt, 341, 347, 349. 35°. 35 i. 352-3, 354, 355, 357; farm burning, 346; Frederikstad, 342, 344; Kruger's Post, 336; leadership, 302; London reception, 358, 360, 363; Lydenburg campaign, 328ff; Minto dispute, 373—5; Natal Field Force, 3i2ff; organization, 296, 392; Pilgrim's Rest, 335-6; Potchefstroon, 345; Pretoria, 338, 340; recruitment, 294, 295; return, 359, 360, 365, 366-7; South African Constabulary, 37°, 371. 372, 373, 377, 378, 383, 384,

538 385, 386, 387, 388,

389, 390; training, 299, 305; transportation, 298 Steen Kamps, 209 Stellenbosch, 172, 179, 222 Stephenson, Gen. T.E., 217 Sterkstroom, 189, 197 Sterling, Pte. John, 419 Stevens, Cpl., R.C.H., 236 Stevenson, Vet.-Surg. George, 296, 297, 304 Stewart, Dr James, 290 Stewart, Pte. Jonathan, 323 Stewart, Lt. Lome, 418 Stewart, Pte. William, 434 Steyn, Comdt. Louis, 273 Steyn, President, 113, 114, 115, 129, 130, 137, 138, 190, 346, 347- 402 Stinson, Sgt. W.J., 218 Stoker, Dr George, 452 Stormberg, 75 Strange, Lt. Alexander, 293, 310, 356 Strange, Maj.-Gen. Thomas B., 293 Strathcona, Lord, no, 150, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 300, 301, 318, 320, 337, 358, 361, 362, 363,364, 365, 368, 375, 384, 391,421, 431,434 Strathcona's Horse, xi, xii, 127, 232, 295,357, 370, 373, 375- 385, 39!,394, 395,396, 398, 400, 415, 416, 417,418,431,436; accounts, 365; Amersfoort, 321; battle of Buffelsdoorn Pass, 3402; battle of Gold Hoop Farm, 347; battle of Kruger's Post, 336;

Index

battle of Wachout Spruit, 313; break-up, 366—7; Cape Town, 304; Carolina, 323; Casement mission, 309— 10; Christmas, 353—4; composition, 294-6; departure, 359; De Wet hunt, 346-57; dress, 266; Ermelo, 322; Halifax, 301; image, 296; Knox's blunder, 349—50; London, 360-4; Lydenburg, 331; lynching incident, 324; Machadodorp disturbance, 3389; march to Belfast, 320-4; Monterey, 302; Montreal farewell, 300— i; Natal Field Force, 312—37; organization, 289—91; Ottawa, 298300; Potchefstroom, 345; reinforcements, 318; return, 358; skirmishes, 315—19; Spitzkop, 332-5; status, 297; strength, 342, 360, 364; training, 298—9, 305-6; Vlackfontein, 314 Stretcher-bearers, 97, 129 Stillwood, Sgt. R.J., 449 Stuart, Capt. Duncan, 68, 104 Suffolks (ist), 267, 268 Sulley, Lt. W.P., 418 Sun Life Insurance Company, 59, 432 Sunnyside, 79, 80, 81, 200 Sussex (NB), 162 Sutherland, James, 48 Sutton, Lt. T.H., 260, 285 Swartkopjes, 216 Swaziland, 12, 309, 310, 377, 447 Sybrand's Kraal, 194 Sydney (NS), 159 Taaiboschkraal, 127

Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 29, 154 Tarte, Israel, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42, 44, 45- 46, 47, 48, 5°, 51, 155> 441, 442 Taylor, Fred H., 365 Taylor, Cpl. Joseph Robert, 253 Taylor, Lt. J., 164 Taylor, Roland Dennis Telegram (Quebec), 25 Telegram (Saint John), 393 Telegram (Toronto), 17, 25, 38 Telegram (Winnipeg), 393 Temple, Lt. Reggie, 70 Temps, Le, 28 Thaba 'Nchu, 123, 126, 127, 134, 351- 352 Theft, 84, 422 The Boer War, Its Causes and Interest to Canadians, 425, 437 The Canadian Contingents, 437 The Imperialist, 436 Thomas, Cpl. J.M., 107 Thomas, Pte. Percy, 97 Thomas, Surg.-Lt. Russell, 415 Thompson, J. Phillips, 22 Thompson, Pte. Richard Rowland, 96—7, 107, 108,375 Thornton, Pte. Fred, 257 Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, 312, 321, 352 Tigerpoort, 137, 241, 246, 247, 249 Times (Cape Town), 77 Times (London), 105, 440 Times' History, 102, 133, 187, 201, 312, 349, 407 Tobin, Lt. Seymour, 293, 3i3, 330, 332, 347, 355 Todd, Capt. Hamlyn, 65 Todd, Pte. James M., 402, 408 Todd, Pte. John, 95

539 Tootefontein, 139 Toronto, 4, 7, 21, 22, 25, 26, 37. 38, 39. 43, 45. 46, 47. 53. 60, 68, 69, 80, 81, 119, 159, 161, 168, 189, 237, 288, 364, 37L 378, 39L 392, 429. 43o, 434, 438, 443, 456 Toronto Bank, 432 Toronto Lithographing Company, 426 Toronto South African Memorial Association, 434-5 Tory, 44, 152, 392, 394, 395, 403. See also Conservatives Trades and Labour Council, 24, 29 Transcript (Moncton), 26 Transvaal, 11, 12, 13, 14, 35- 37> 9°, 130, 134, 138, 175, 180, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 197, 200, 206, 207, 215, 230, 231, 235, 253, 261, 262, 293, 309, 320, 343, 346, 359- 369, 377- 387, 399,4oo, 410,412 Tremayne, Lt. H.E., 454 Treston, Pte. John, 344 Truro, 301, 366 Tryon, Sgt. Charles Robert, 264,267,394, 400 Tucker, Maj.-Gen. Charles, 88, 115 Tugela River, 309, 310, 398 Tupper, Charles, 20, 35, 39,431,444 Turner, Richard, 162 Turner, Lt. Richard E.W., 162, 169,

221,

228,

235- 237,

245.

246,

248,

256,

257,

264,

265,

273,

274,

275,

276,

283,

405,

Tweefontein, 204

425

Index

Twyfelaar, 323, 324 Uitlanders, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 31. 32, 35. 36, 37.4o,3i8 Uitlander Resolution, 356, 37. 39. 40 Umtali, 183 Union Halifax, 432 United Empire Loyalist Association, 4 United Kingdom Army Act, 52, 297 United Kingdom, 52, 289, 358 United States, 4, 6, 17, 360, 396, 431 Universite Laval de Montreal, 300, 443 University Magazine, 437 Upington, 175, 176, 199 Upper Canada College, 4, 161 Vaal River, 11, 130, 138, 191, 200, 209, 235, 313, 322, 371, 400, 411 Vaalbank, 455 Valsch River, 129 Vancouver, 23, 56, 294, 298, 392, 396. 430 Van Luven, Robert Miles, 161 Van Straubenzee, Lt. Charles Turner, 161, 223, 225, 260 Van Tuyl, Lt. T.W., 179, 199,

210,

212,

Vernon, 294, 298 Vet River, 209, 226, 228 Veterans, 396, 424, 425 Veterinary Corps, 439 Veterinary service, 387-8 Victoria (BC), 56, 59, 293, 294, 298, 434 Victoria Cross, 108, 122, 203, 228, 262, 267, 275, 319' 445'446 Victoria Day, 130 Victoria North, 34 Victorian, 393, 397, 398, 454 Victoria Rifles, 61 Victoria Road, 172, 173, 177, 178, 179, 199, 233 Victoria West, 173 Vidal, Col. H.B., 286 Viljoen, Gen. Ben, 28, 215. 315 Viljoen's Drift, 356, 358 Virden, 161, 162, 293 Virginia Siding, 230 Vitnek Farm, 313 Vive la Canadienne, 149 Vlakfontein, 188, 250, 314, 315. 319. 320 Vogelspruitpoort, 325, 326 Voice (Winnipeg), 22, 23 Vredes Verdrag, 230 Vredefort, 130, 242 Vryburg, 206, 207, 209, 210, 245, 277, 410, 4ii,455

213,

2l8

Van Wyk's Rust, 236, 237 Van Wyk's Vlei, 174, 175, 177, 263, 265, 267, 270, 285, 324 Van Zuyl, 402, 411 Vaux, Capt. EL., 377, 379 Ventersdorp, 412 Venters Vlei, 117 Ventner, Comdt., 201, 203 Vereeniging, 242 Verite, La, 29, 441

Wachout Spruit, 313 Wakool, 310 Wakkerstroom, 446 Walherter's Kop, 189 Walton, Maj. Dalzell, 382, 383 Warm Baths, 192, 193, 384 War of 1812, 8, 63, 98 War Office, 48, 49, 50, 57. Ha, 154, 155, 156165,

l8l,

220,

267,

540 Index 289, 292, 294, 297, 368, 369, 370, 380, 391, 392. 4H, 4i5>

426, 427 War profits, 425-8 Warren, Lt.-Gen. Sir Charles, 179, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 281 Warren, Pte. William Campbell, 96, 407, 408 Warren's Scouts, 200, 201, 204 Warrenton, 206, 209 Water, 87-8, 96, 97, 103, 104, 122, 127 Waterford, Marquis of, 296 Waterkloof, 412 Waterval, 191, 194, 211, 315. Si?. 319 Waterval-Boven, 327 Waterval Bridge, 314, 320 Waterval Drift, 88, 90, 122

Watford Bible Society, 55 Wauchope, Maj.-Gen. A.G., 75 Weatherbe, Lt. Philip, 454 Weaver, Pte. James Oswald, 255 Weekly Sun, 22 Weeks, Capt. W.A., 83, 135 Wegdraai, 209 Wegdraai Drift, 90 Welgegund Drift, 238, 239 Welgelee, 230 Welkom Drift, 226 Welsh Regiment, 206 Welverdiend, 340, 341 Wemershoek, 216 Wessel's Farm, 349 West, Pte. Walter, 330 West Riding Regiment, 147 Western Australian Mounted Infantry, 174

Western Canada, 18, 19, 169, 318, 366, 372, 3?6, 378, 417 Westley College, 18 Westminster, 25, 360 Wetherbe, Capt. Paul, 57 Whale Island, 149 White-Fraser, Lt. M.H., 294, 314, 352, 355. 356' 374 White, Fred, 291, 431 White, Sir George, 75 White, Col. W.L., 352, 356, 357 Whitehead, Sgt. C.W.W., 321 Wickwire, H.H., 419 Widows and Orphans Fund,432 Wiggins, Pte. Henry J., 330 Wilberforce, Canon, 149 Wildebeestefontein, 410 Wildman, Pte. G.E., 230 Wilge River Station, 213, 215, 249 Wilkie, Lt. C.S., 70 Wilkinson, Cpl. J.S., 405, 407, 408, 409 Willetts, Lt. C.R.E., 384 Williams, Maj. Victor A.S., 163, 168, 223, 224, 245- 4^7' 419' 422, 425 Williams, Col. W.H., 347, 350, SSL 352 Willison, J.S. 41, 44, 46, 47 Wilson, Dr C.W., 68, 125 Wilson, J.C., 426 Wilson, Lady Sarah, 187 Winburg Column, 127, 134, 224, 226 Windsor Castle, 149 Windsor, 56, 61, 371 Windsor Hotel, 40, 300, 301, 430 Windsor Road Station, 209 Winifredian, 413, 419, 422, 453

Winnipeg, 22, 56,159, 161, 163, 165, 189, 234, 287, 288, 293, 298, 367, 378, 393, 396, 430, 434 Winnipeg Operatic Society, 433 Winter, Capt. C.F., 127, 135 Winyard, Pte. William, 280 Wiseman, Pte. Noel, 130 Witbank, 323 Witkloof, 263, 267, 268, 271, 285 Witness (Montreal) 25, 371 Witpoort, 130, 246, 247, 249, 278, 315,411, 455 Witpoort Pass, 247-9, 400, 401 Witwatersberg, 239 Wolfe, James, 8, 63 Wolseley, Gen. Garnet, 33, no Wolvehoek, 137, 242 Women's Christian Temperance Union, 23 Wonderboom, 197, 211, 279 Wonderfontein, 250, 253, 256, 258 Wonderhoek, 255 Wood, Lt.-Col., 451, 452 Woodman, Pte. J.J., 419 Woodstock (Ontario), 159, 433 Woodstock (Transvaal), 188, 189, 196 Woodstock Hospital, 377, 398 Woodville, Caton, no Woolwich, 150, 363 Worcester, 277, 282, 346 Workman, Mark, 426 World, (Toronto) 17, 19, 25,38 World War i, ix, 245, 425, 433, 444, 451 Worthington, Surg.-Maj. Arthur N., 200, 213, 454, 455, 456

541 Index Wrigley, George, 23 Wroughton, Lt. T.A., 164, 268 Wynberg, 450, 451, 452 Wynne, Capt.J.H., 287 Yeomanry, 343, 400 Young, Lt. D.D., 418 Young, Lt. Francis V., 161, 221, 223, 225, 245, 247, 248 Young Men's Christian Association, 9, 69, 71,

257, 281, 299,430, 437. 44i Yorkton, 161 Yukon, 291, 294, 330, 388,431 Yukon Field Force, 163, 234 Zand River, 127, 129, 230, 433 Zand River, battle of, 127—9, J 34> 226, 230-1 Zandfontein, 239

Zandspruit, 312 Zeederkerg, M., 183 Zeerust, 188, 196 Zoufontein, 209 Zoutpan, 193 Zoutpan Drift, 245 Zevenfontein Kopje, 218 Zuikerbosch Spruit, 319, 320 Zulu, 46, 389 Zululand, 311 Zulu War, 12, 87 Zwartbank, 130