Oxford Handbooks The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology [1 ed.] 019966224X, 9780199662241

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T h e Ox f o r d H a n d b o o k o f

THE E P I ST E M OL O G Y OF T H E OL O G Y

The Oxford Handbook of

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THEOLOGY Edited by

WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM and

FREDERICK D. AQUINO

1

3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6dp, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press 2017 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2017 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2016961439 ISBN 978–​0–​19–​966224–​1 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

To William Alston and Alvin Plantinga, pioneers in the epistemology of theology

Acknowledgements

This handbook has been long in the making; the editors are grateful that the various contributions are now in this book. We thank John Kern for helping prepare the text for publication, and Karen Raith and Tom Perridge for their editorial wisdom.

Contents

List of Abbreviations  List of Contributors  Introduction: The Epistemology of Theology  William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino

xiii xv 1

PA RT I   E P I ST E M IC C ON C E P T S W I T H I N T H E OL O G Y 1. Knowledge of God  John Greco

9

2. Revelation and Scripture  Sandra Menssen and Thomas D. Sullivan

30

3. Reason and Faith  Lara Buchak

46

4. The Experiential Grounding of Religious Belief  Thomas D. Senor

64

5. Saints and Saintliness  John Cottingham

79

6. Authority in Religious Communities  Linda T. Zagzebski

97

7. The Inner Witness of the Spirit  Paul K. Moser

111

8. Tradition  Mark Wynn

126

x   Contents

9. Ecclesial Practices  Colin M. McGuigan and Brad J. Kallenberg

141

10. Spiritual Formation, Authority, and Discernment  Frederick D. Aquino

157

PA RT I I   G E N E R A L E P I ST E M IC C ON C E P T S R E L AT E D TO T H E OL O G Y 11. Understanding  Jonathan L. Kvanvig

175

12. Wisdom in Theology  Stephen R. Grimm

190

13. The Epistemology of Testimony and Religious Belief  Jennifer Lackey

203

14. Virtue  Jason Baehr

221

15. Evidence and Theology  Trent Dougherty

236

16. Foundationalism  Michael Bergmann

253

17. Realism and Anti-​realism  Christopher J. Insole

274

18. Scepticism  Billy Dunaway and John Hawthorne

290

19. Disagreement and the Epistemology of Theology  Nathan L. King and Thomas Kelly

309

PA RT I I I   S A M P L I N G S F ROM T H E C H R I ST IA N T R A DI T ION 20. Paul the Apostle  Paul K. Moser

327

21. Origen of Alexandria  Robert M. Berchman

340

Contents   xi

22. Augustine  Scott MacDonald

354

23. Maximus the Confessor  Frederick D. Aquino

369

24. Symeon the New Theologian  William J. Abraham

382

25. Anselm  David Brown

395

26. Thomas Aquinas  James Brent, O.P.

408

27. John Duns Scotus  Scott M. Williams

421

28. Richard Hooker  A. S. McGrade

434

29. Teresa of Ávila  Steven Payne

446

30. John Wesley  Douglas M. Koskela

459

31. Jonathan Edwards  William J. Wainwright

471

32. Friedrich Schleiermacher  Kevin W. Hector

484

33. Søren Kierkegaard  M. G. Piety

497

34. John Henry Newman  Cyril O’Regan

510

35. Karl Barth  Paul T. Nimmo

523

36. Hans Urs von Balthasar  Victoria S. Harrison

535

xii   Contents

PA RT I V   E M E RG I N G C ON V E R S AT ION S 37. Liberation Theology  Devin Singh

551

38. Continental Philosophy  J. Aaron Simmons

564

39. Modern Orthodox Thinkers  Paul L. Gavrilyuk

578

40. The Epistemology of Feminist Theology  Harriet A. Harris

591

41. Pentecostalism  James K. A. Smith

606

Index 

619

List of Abbreviations

Amb.Io.

Ambigua ad Iohannem (Difficult Passages Addressed to John)

C

The Interior Castle

Car.

Capita de caritate (Centuries on Love)

C.Cels.

Contra Celsum

CJn

Commentary on John

Conf.

Conferences

EN

Nicomachean Ethics

Ep.

Epistula (Letter)

GA

An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent

H.Gn.

Homilies on Genesis

Hom.Ez.

Homilies on Ezekiel

Hom.Lev. Homilies on Leviticus Inst.

Institutes

KD

Kirchliche Dogmatik (Church Dogmatics)

L

The Book of Her Life

Met.

Metaphysics

Myst.

Mystagogia (Mystagogy)

NKJV

New King James Version

NRSV

New Revised Standard Version

OC

On Certainty

PeriArch. Peri Archon Philoc.

Philocalia

QD

Quaestiones et dubia (Questions and Doubtful Passages)

Q.Thal.

Quaestiones ad Thalassium (Questions Addressed to Thalassius)

Rep.

Republic

RSV

Revised Standard Version

SCG

Summa contra Gentiles

ST

Summa Theologiae

xiv   List of Abbreviations T

Spiritual Testimonies

Th.oec.

Capita theologica et oeconomica (Chapters on Theology and the Economy)

US

Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford

W

The Way of Perfection

WJE

The Works of Jonathan Edwards

List of Contributors

William J. Abraham  is Outler Professor of Wesley Studies and University Distingui­ shed Teaching Professor at Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. Frederick D. Aquino  is Professor of Theology and Philosophy at the Graduate School of Theology, Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas. Jason Baehr  is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, California. Robert M. Berchman  is Director General and Senior Fellow, Forum for Advanced Studies, Rome, Italy and Senior Fellow, Institute of Advanced Theology, Bard College, Annandale-​on-​Hudson, New York. Michael Bergmann  is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana. James Brent, O.P.  is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, DC David Brown is Professor of Theology, Aesthetics, and Culture at St Andrews University in Scotland. Lara Buchak  is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California in Berkeley, California. John Cottingham  is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Reading, Pro­ fessorial Research Fellow, Heythrop College, London, and Honorary Fellow, St John’s College, Oxford. Trent Dougherty  is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University in Waco, Texas. Billy Dunaway  is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri—​St Louis. Paul L. Gavrilyuk  is the Aquinas Chair in Theology and Philosophy at the University of St Thomas in Saint Paul, Minnesota. John Greco  is the Leonard and Elizabeth Eslick Chair in Philosophy at the University of Saint Louis in Missouri.

xvi   List of Contributors Stephen R. Grimm  is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University in the Bronx, New York. Harriet A. Harris  is the University Chaplain and the Head of the Chaplaincy Service at the University of Edinburgh. Victoria S. Harrison  is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Macau, China. John Hawthorne  is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, California Kevin W. Hector  is Associate Professor of Theology and of the Philosophy of the Reli­ gions at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Christopher J. Insole  is Professor in the Department of Theology and Religion at Durham University. Brad J. Kallenberg  is Professor of Theology at the University of Dayton in Ohio. Thomas Kelly  is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey. Nathan L. King  is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Whitworth University in Spokane, Washington. Douglas M. Koskela  is Professor of Theology at Seattle Pacific University in Seattle, Washington. Jonathan L. Kvanvig  is Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in Saint Louis, Missouri. Jennifer Lackey is the Wayne and Elizabeth Jones Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. Scott MacDonald  is Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. A. S. McGrade  is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut in Storrs, Connecticut. Colin M. McGuigan  is a doctoral student in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Dayton, Ohio. Sandra Menssen  is Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Thomas in Saint Paul, Minnesota. Paul K. Moser  is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois. Paul T. Nimmo  holds the King’s Chair of Systematic Theology at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland.

List of Contributors    xvii Cyril O’Regan  is the Huisking Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana. Steven Payne  is Principal of Tangaza University College in Nairobi, Kenya. M. G. Piety  is Professor of Philosophy at Drexel University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Thomas D. Senor  is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville, Arkansas. J. Aaron Simmons is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina. Devin Singh is Assistant Professor of Religion at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. James K. A. Smith  is Professor of Philosophy and is the Gary and Henrietta Byker Chair in Applied Reformed Theology and Worldview at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Thomas D. Sullivan  is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of St Thomas in Saint Paul, Minnesota. William J. Wainwright  is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin—​Milwaukee. Scott M. Williams  is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Asheville. Mark Wynn  is Professor of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Leeds. Linda T. Zagzebski  is George Lynn Cross Research Professor of Philosophy and Kingfisher Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics at the University of Oklahoma in Norman, Oklahoma.

I n t rodu ction The Epistemology of Theology William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino

It has been commonplace in epistemology to give careful attention not just to the subject itself as a general enterprise but also to explore in detail the epistemology of particular academic disciplines. The epistemology of science, for example, has received the lion’s share of interest; but attention has also been given to mathematics, history, aesthetics, and ethics. The crucial warrant for these later developments goes back to Aristotle’s insistence on what we might call a principle of epistemic fit (EN 1.3 in Crisp 2000: 5). We should fit our epistemic evaluations in an appropriate way to the subject matter under investigation. As a result, we do not expect historical claims to be evaluated by the kind of arguments that would apply to mathematics and the natural sciences. Surprisingly—​ given the attention directed to theological claims and the wealth of materials in both theology and philosophy—​this principle has not been systematically explored in the case of theology. To be sure, we acknowledge that this Aristotelian epistemic principle, like most epistemic principles, is contested. Epistemologists have naturally wanted a generic epistemology that would work across the board, regardless of subject matter. There have been plenty of epistemologists who have shared this goal even when it comes to theology. We have no desire to exclude this option and readily welcome its proponents to the table. Yet we are not persuaded that Aristotle is wrong and therefore consider it entirely appropriate to proceed on the assumption that his insight is both correct and fruitful. Those who disagree simply need to be aware that this is the framework we think appropriate; they are welcome to make their case on the other side; we simply hope our work will still be of interest to them and will provoke an illuminating response. For now we think that the principle of epistemic fit creates space for the work that follows. In this volume, we intend to remove the aforementioned lacuna by providing an orderly, constructive investigation of the epistemology of theology. By epistemology of

2    William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino theology, we mean a critical enquiry of appropriate epistemic concepts and theories in or related to theology. This involves examining and articulating what counts as appropriate epistemic evaluation in theology. The wide-​ranging nature of this kind of enquiry can be seen in the following distinction. On the one hand, this volume focuses on standard epistemic concepts that are usually thought of as questions about norms and sources of theology (e.g. reason; experience; tradition; scripture; revelation). On the other hand, it explores some general epistemic concepts that can be related to theology (e.g. wisdom; understanding; virtue; evidence; testimony; scepticism; disagreement). We believe that the time is ripe in both philosophy and theology for such an undertaking. There is a great need for the development of this new conversation that will take its natural place in the intersection of theology and epistemology. Accordingly, we seek in this volume to spell out how the epistemology of theology, as a new subdiscipline, attends more fully to the epistemological issues that arise in the course of doing Christian theology.

Carving out the Epistemology of Theology The time for unpacking and fleshing out the contours of the epistemology of theology is propitious. On the one hand, the whole field of epistemology has been revolutionized over the last fifty years. One fruitful and refreshing feature of recent work in epistemology is the expansion of its topics (see Alston 2005; Goldman and Whitcomb 2011; Greco and Turri 2012; Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard 2010; and Kvanvig 2005). The landscape includes, but is not limited to, developing accounts of knowledge, rationality, justification, warrant, understanding, wisdom, the intellectual virtues, and the social dimensions of cognition (e.g. testimony; trust; authority). Along these lines, some have already shown how different theological topics can be addressed in light of these recent developments in epistemology (e.g. Abraham 1990, 1998, 2006; Alston 1991, 1999; Greco 2009, 2012; Mavrodes 1988; Mitchell 1973, 1994; Moser 2008; Plantinga 2000; Swinburne 2005; Wainwright 1995, 2016; Wolterstorff 1995; and Zagzebski 2012). More importantly, these projects have paved the way for fuller theological appropriation and for moving ahead with the task of carving out the landscape of the epistemology of theology. As a result, the boundaries between philosophy and theology have been traversed in productive ways. This creates space for constructive work in epistemology as it crops up within theology. On the other hand, there are signs that some theologians are ready to participate in the development of the epistemology of theology. They have become aware of the role of epistemological assumptions in their own work, and are clearly ready to see epistemological issues as constitutive of their own work, in that they cannot avoid questions about the intellectual status of their claims about God (e.g. Abraham 1998, 2006; Aquino 2004; Coakley 2009; and Marshall 2000). Moreover, there is a wealth of material to draw

Introduction: The Epistemology of Theology    3 on in both earlier and more recent discussions within theology. Theologians have their own proposals to bring to the feast; they do not have to wait on the crumbs that fall from the philosophers’ table. Given the extraordinary diversity (or chaos) within theology at present, it is clear that beginning students are acutely aware of the need to sort through how to adjudicate the rival options in a responsible manner. They cannot really do so without getting into the epistemology of theology. We strive to make it clear in this volume that the Christian tradition encourages, rather than inhibits, the pursuit of epistemological questions. Along these lines, recent work in epistemology can help theologians make the relevant distinctions and alert them to epistemic components in the Christian tradition that have been ignored, neglected, or not formulated adequately. For example, some recent work in virtue epistemology may help identify epistemic materials in the canonical heritage that stress the importance of the proper function of cognitive faculties, conversion, volitional openness, and transformation for knowledge of God. Also, ‘ongoing work on the nature of perception may throw invaluable light on ways of thinking about perception of the divine’ (Abraham 1998: 478; see also Gavrilyuk and Coakley 2012). When the epistemic proposals, insights, and suggestions embedded in the canonical heritage of the Christian tradition are brought to light, we hope that other theologians and philosophers will join us in pursuing these matters carefully, rigorously, and thoroughly. A project of this sort requires the development of an illuminating map of the terrain. Given that this is uncharted territory we simply have to strike out as best as we can, hoping that our initial efforts can be radically improved as we proceed and as others join the work. We do have, for example, a good sense of what the well-​developed field of epistemology consists of, and so we are not reinventing the wheel here. We can also scout out other subdisciplines within epistemology; say, the epistemology of science, where there is a wealth of material. However, the gains from general epistemology have to be handled with care. There are generic considerations that cut across subject matter (e.g. perception; memory; and inference) but the epistemology of history differs prima facie from the epistemology of science precisely because the former deals with human action and the latter with the natural world. Likewise, we should expect that the subject matter of theology would make a significant difference in how we pursue appropriate epistemological insights. Accordingly, we recognize that the standard epistemological topics that show up within theology are relatively easy to identify. We are all familiar with debates within theology in and around, say, natural theology, divine revelation, the nature and function of scripture, religious experience, and the rationality of Christian belief. However, there is a readiness in some circles to reduce this wealth of material to a discussion of the epistemic status of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience. The crucial problem here is that composing the list of what constitutes the epistemology of theology proper is like watching an amateur musician playing an accordion: it expands and contracts without much rhyme or reason. Consequently, we intend to track the desiderata our intuitions pick out as broadly relevant to the epistemology of theology.

4    William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino In this regard, we can legitimately begin to classify this material as best as we know how, starting with conventional wisdom (in both philosophy and theology) and with what comes naturally to us. In time we will be able to see whether we can improve on our initial efforts. Certainly we can hope to introduce some order into our initial efforts at providing a systematic map of the terrain. Even then we should relax. The aim is not to introduce some kind of rigid system, imposed on the data. Instead, the aim is to make progress in the epistemology of theology and to find ways to teach it that will be fruitful and liberating to those puzzled by epistemological issues. Order is important if we are to achieve this or that end; but it remains here a means to the ends of better understanding and better teaching.

The Scope and Structure of the Volume The Handbook is divided into four parts. Part I focuses on some of the epistemic concepts that have been traditionally employed in theology, such as knowledge of God (Ch. 1), revelation and scripture (Ch. 2), reason and faith (Ch.3), experience (Ch. 4), and tradition (Ch. 8). However, it also includes concepts that have not received sufficient epistemogical attention in theology, such as saints (Ch. 5), authority (Chs 6 and 10), ecclesial practices (Ch. 9), the inner witness of the Spirit (Ch. 7), spiritual formation, and discernment (Ch. 10). Part II takes up some concepts that have received significant attention in contemporary epistemology and can be related to theology, such as understanding (Ch. 11), wisdom (Ch. 12), testimony (Ch. 13), virtue (Ch. 14), evidence (Ch. 15), foundationalism (Ch. 16), realism/​anti-​realism (Ch.  17), scepticism (Ch. 18), and disagreement (Ch. 19). Part III offers some samplings from the Christian tradition and accordingly seeks to unpack and develop the relevant epistemological issues and insights in these writers, as well as pointing out the challenges of connecting insights from contemporary epistemology with the subject of theology proper, namely, God (Chs 20–​36). The aim here is not to offer comprehensive coverage of the Christian tradition. As a result, the samplings include Paul the Apostle (Ch. 20), Origen (Ch. 21), Augustine (Ch. 22), Maximus the Confessor (Ch. 23), Symeon the New Theologian (Ch.  24), Anselm (Ch. 25), Aquinas (Ch. 26), John Duns Scotus (Ch.  27), Richard Hooker (Ch. 28), Teresa of Ávila (Ch. 29), John Wesley (Ch. 30), Jonathan Edwards (Ch. 31), Friedrich Schleiermacher (Ch. 32), Søren Kierkegaard (Ch. 33), John Henry Newman (Ch. 34), Karl Barth (Ch. 35), and Hans Urs von Balthasar (Ch. 36). Part IV identifies five emerging areas that warrant further epistemological attention and development: liberation theology (Ch. 37), continental philosophy (Ch. 38), modern Orthodox writers (Ch. 39), feminism (Ch. 40), and Pentecostalism (Ch. 41). The chapters in this volume explore how the various topics, figures, and emerging conversations can be reconceived and addressed in light of recent developments in epistemology. Along these lines, each chapter: (1) provides an analysis of the crucial moves, positions, and debates; (2) identifies and spells out the relevant epistemic considerations;

Introduction: The Epistemology of Theology    5 and (3) offers recommendations of how inquiry into the particular topic might more fruitfully be pursued. Though the Handbook is interested in the current fields of epistemology and theology, it is not a survey of modern theological and epistemological trends. Rather, the aim is to identify and spell out the relevant epistemic considerations for the theological topics at hand.

Conclusion We are convinced that the level of scholarly engagement within and around epistemology and theology has grown sufficiently to permit and justify a volume of this sort. In this respect, the volume seeks to match the best scholars in epistemology and theology with the subject matter in hand. However, no uniform epistemological and theological approaches are synonymous with the epistemology of theology. The volume, in fact, reflects a broad range of perspectives and methodological assumptions. The hope is that the intersection of these disciplines will prompt greater work on, attention to, and development of the relevant themes.

References Abraham, William J. (1990). ‘The Epistemological Significance of the Inner Witness of the Holy Spirit’. Faith and Philosophy 7: 434–​50. Abraham, William J. (1998). Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology: From the Fathers to Feminism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Abraham, William J. (2006). Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Alston, William (1991). Perceiving God:  The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Alston, William (1999). ‘The Distinctiveness of the Epistemology of Religious Belief ’. In G. Brüntrup and R. K. Tacelli (eds.), The Rationality of Theism. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 237–​54. Alston, William (2005). Beyond Justification:  Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Aquino, Frederick D. (2004). Communities of Informed Judgment: Newman’s Illative Sense and Accounts of Rationality. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. Aristotle (2000). Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coakley, Sarah (2009). ‘Dark Contemplation and Epistemic Transformation: The Analytic Theologian Re-​Meets Teresa of Ávila’. In Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea (eds.), Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 280–​312. Gavrilyuk, Paul L. and Sarah Coakley (eds.) (2012). The Spiritual Senses:  Perceiving God in Western Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

6    William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino Goldman, Alvin, and Denis Whitcomb (eds.) (2011). Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greco, John (2009). ‘Religious Knowledge in the Context of Conflicting Testimony’. Procee­ dings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83: 61–​76. Greco, John (2012). ‘Religious Belief and Evidence from Testimony’. In Dariusz Lukasiewics and Roger Pouivet (eds.), The Right to Believe:  Perspectives in Religious Epistemology. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 27–​46. Greco, John, and John Turri (2012). Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Haddock, Adrian, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.) (2010). Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kvanvig, Jonathan (2005). ‘Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal’. In Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 284–​96. Marshall, Bruce (2000). Trinity and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mavrodes, George (1988). Revelation in Religious Belief. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Mitchell, Basil (1973). The Justification of Religious Belief. London: Macmillan. Mitchell, Basil (1994). Faith and Criticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Moser, Paul (2008). The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Plantinga, Alvin (2000). Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press. Swinburne, Richard (2005). Faith and Reason, 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wainwright, William (1995). Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomena to a Critique of Passional Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wainwright, William (2016). Reason, Revelation, and Devotion:  Inference and Argument in Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolterstorff, Nicholas (1995). Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zagzebski, Linda (2012). Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pa rt I

E P I ST E M IC C ON C E P T S W I T H I N T H E OL O G Y

Chapter 1

Knowled ge of G od John Greco

Older discussions in religious epistemology tended to focus on the rationality or reasonableness of religious belief (see Clifford 1999; James 1979; Plantinga 1983). Questions about our knowledge of God were more or less off the table. Today, however, a good many philosophers are happy to raise issues regarding our knowledge of God. In fact, questions about whether knowledge of God is possible, and about how knowledge of God is possible, have come to the fore. How did this happen? What accounts for this shift in focus? The answer, I will argue, has less to do with how philosophers have changed their thinking about God, and more to do with how they have changed their thinking about knowledge. In this chapter I use the terms ‘general epistemology’ to denote theories of knowledge in general and ‘religious epistemology’ to denote theories of knowledge about God in particular. The term ‘epistemology of theology’ is used to designate the consideration of epistemological issues that arise in theology. Accordingly, questions about our knowledge of God are in the domains of both religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology. The first section looks at four important trends in general epistemology and touches on how they are manifested in religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology. The second section looks more closely at some recent discussions regarding our knowledge of God and how they too reflect current trends in general epistemology. The upshot is that general epistemology has taken an ‘externalist turn’ in its thinking about knowledge and related issues, and that contemporary religious epistemology has followed suit in this respect. The third and final section considers how general epistemology has more recently taken a ‘social turn’, and argues that religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology might fruitfully follow general epistemology in this respect as well.

10   John Greco

Recent Trends in General Epistemology Four trends in general epistemology are particularly important for understanding the current state of religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology, and especially discussions regarding our knowledge of God.

Rejecting Narrow Foundationalism First and foremost, the theory of knowledge in the late twentieth and early twenty-​first centuries has mounted a sustained critique against narrow foundationalism, a theory that tries to explain all knowledge in terms of a narrow range of sources. A different way to think about narrow foundationalism is in terms of evidence: the theory tries to explain all knowledge in terms of a narrow range of evidence, or kinds of evidence. For example, rationalist versions of foundationalism try to ground all knowledge in what is certain and indubitable. Empiricist versions try to ground all knowledge in what is immediately ‘given’ in experience. Contemporary epistemology now sees narrow foundationalism as a failed project. The essential problem is that it tries to explain too much with too little. That is, the theory tries to explain all of our knowledge in terms of too few sources of knowledge, too limited a variety of evidence. One place this becomes evident is regarding our knowledge of persons. How is it that we know what other persons are thinking or feeling, or that they have minds at all? If we have a limited conception of the sources of knowledge, it will be very hard to say. We will be faced with the ‘problem of other minds’. In effect, this is the problem of explaining how knowledge of persons is possible, but entirely in terms of what we can know from sensory experience, together with what we can infer from experience by means of sound reasoning. Contemporary epistemology rejects this as a pseudo-​problem, an artefact of an outdated approach to knowledge, and to human cognition more generally. That ‘one size fits all’ (or ‘a few sizes fit all’) approach has now been updated by the cognitive sciences, with a view of human cognition that admits a rich variety of integrated modules or faculties, each with its own job to do in different domains of knowledge. In fact, even common-​sense categories such as ‘perception’, ‘memory’, and ‘reason’ are now understood to be general and ham-​fisted, as we now know that there are many varieties of each, none reducible to the other. General epistemology has learned this lesson from the cognitive sciences and has accommodated it. Religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology have followed suit by rejecting outdated models of our knowledge of God. Most prominently, both now challenge the idea that our knowledge of God must be by means of ‘proofs’ or ‘demonstrations’, as if knowledge of God were akin to knowledge of mathematical theorems. On the contrary, contemporary religious epistemology takes seriously the idea that

Knowledge of God   11 our knowledge of God is a kind of knowledge of persons. But in general, our knowledge of persons is by means of our interpersonal experience of them as well as by means of what they reveal about themselves with their own words and actions. Religious epistemology is nowadays interested in pursuing analogous models of our knowledge of a personal God.

Rejecting Internalism A second trend in general epistemology is to reject strong versions of ‘internalism’. One important kind of internalism is ‘level internalism’; the view that, in order to know, one must know that one knows. Or better: In order to know, one must be in a position to explain how one knows, where such explanation is itself grounded in knowledge. General epistemology now rejects level internalism, and for much the same reason that it rejects narrow foundationalism: the theory is too restrictive, making it impossible to explain the range of knowledge that we think we have. One problem is that level internalism seems to require an infinite regress of increasingly complicated knowledge. Consider: if in order to know, I must know that I know, then it would seem that I must also know that I know that I know. Or if knowledge requires only that I be ‘in a position’ to know that I know, then it would seem that I must also be in a position to know that I know that I know, and so on, for increasingly complicated permutations. Assuming that human beings are in no such position, level internalism makes human knowledge in general impossible. A second problem with level internalism is that it seems to overly intellectualize ordinary human knowers. For example, it requires that to know that here is a hand or my friend is upset, one must know that one knows and/​or how one knows such things. But is that realistic? Cannot someone who has never thought about the latter, or who has no aptitude for thinking about such things, nevertheless know that here is a hand or that a friend is upset? Cannot a small child know such things, but without the theoretical sophistication that level internalism requires? It would seem so. But then, what made level internalism attractive in the first place? One motivation for level internalism is a different kind of internalism, what we might call ‘access internalism’, and which is in turn closely related to narrow foundationalism. Access internalism is the position that, whatever grounds one’s knowledge, it must be ‘immediately’ accessible to one; that is, it must be immediately knowable, or knowable ‘by reflection alone’. For example, if your knowledge is based on a particular set of evidence, then that evidence must be immediately accessible to you. This is very close to classical foundationalism, which restricts the sources of knowledge to such things as a priori reason, conscious introspection, and what is ‘given’ in experience. But then, if the grounds of knowledge must always be available to the knower in this special way, then it makes sense to think that, whenever one knows, one is in a position to reflect on one’s grounds, and thereby come to know that one knows. Be that as it may, general epistemology now rejects access internalism about knowledge. It is now widely accepted that, whatever knowledge requires, it requires more than

12   John Greco what is immediately accessible to the knower, or what is knowable by reflection alone. For example, it is widely accepted that knowledge requires appropriate causal contact with the object of knowledge. It also requires, or is widely taken to require, healthy cognitive functioning and an enabling cognitive environment. But none of these things are typically available in the way that access internalism requires. For example, I cannot typically know, just by reflecting on the question, that my cognitive functioning is healthy, or that environmental conditions are relevantly friendly. Going back to a previous point about over-​intellectualizing, the typical knower does not typically even think about such things, much less know that they are in place (for extended discussions of problems with level internalism, see Alston 1980 and Van Cleve 1984; for discussions of access internalism, see Alston 1986 and Greco 2010: esp. ch. 3). General epistemology, then, has embraced an ‘externalist turn’ in thinking about knowledge. How does this play out in religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology? One result is a decreased interest in the traditional arguments of natural theology. The traditional arguments and proofs might still have a place, but there is a general consensus that they are not the basis for ordinary beliefs about God, and hence not the basis for ordinary knowledge of God. In turn, there is now increased interest in how religious believers might come to know God through experience or revelation. Just as general epistemology has turned its attention to the actual grounds of ‘ordinary’ knowledge, and away from the rational reconstructions of philosophers, religious epistemology is now concerned with ordinary persons in the pew (or in prayer, or in distress, or in joy, or in service to others).

Knowledge versus Understanding A third trend in general epistemology is to make a clear distinction between knowledge and understanding. According to this way of thinking, there is an important difference between knowing that such-​and-​such is the case and understanding why or how such-​ and-​such is the case. For example, it is one thing to know that a particular chemical is combustible, and another to understand why it is. One motivation for this trend is to mark a distinction between contemporary discussions of knowledge on the one hand, and ancient and medieval discussions of episteme and scientia on the other (see e.g. Hankinson 1995; and Stump 2003: esp. ch. 7). Thus Aquinas reserved the term scientia for something like ‘scientific understanding’, or understanding grounded in a particular kind of explanation. A second motivation is to recognize a plurality of epistemic goods or values within our contemporary categories. Thus we English speakers make distinctions between knowledge, rational belief, understanding, wisdom, and other epistemic goods as well. One advantage of this, relevant to present purposes, is that the concept of knowledge does not have to do all the important epistemic work. In particular, knowledge and understanding can now come apart; in a given instance, we may concede that understanding is beyond our ken without thereby conceding that knowledge is as well (Greco

Knowledge of God   13 2010: esp. ch. 1). This is important in both religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology. There is now logical space for ordinary knowledge of God without philosophical or theological understanding. For example, one might know that God loves His people and wants His creation to flourish, but not understand how suffering is compatible with this. Such a position now becomes possible, if knowledge is not identified with understanding (or does not always require understanding). Moreover, the present approach returns natural theology to its traditional role; that of providing scientia (or understanding) as opposed to ordinary knowledge (cf. Wolterstorff 1986).

Explanation versus Vindication Traditionally, epistemology has been engaged in two projects. The ‘Project of Explanation’ is to explain what knowledge is. This is the project of Plato’s Theaetetus, where Socrates asks, ‘What is knowledge?’ and ‘How does knowledge differ from true opinion?’ This kind of project seeks to show or prove that we do indeed have knowledge. It is closely associated with the Pyrrhonian sceptical tradition, which argues that the project cannot be successfully carried out. Alternatively, a fourth trend in contemporary epistemology is to embrace the first project and to reject the second. More strongly, the Project of Vindication is now viewed as importantly misguided, and perhaps even incoherent. We will return to the Project of Vindication in the following section, and we will see in more detail why contemporary epistemology rejects it. For now, I will note how these different conceptions of epistemology’s project entail different ways of proceeding in epistemology. If the project is vindication, then a major task of epistemology is to answer sceptical challenges. Moreover, the sceptic must be answered on her own terms, using only assumptions that the sceptic would allow. Anything less would be dialectically unsatisfactory, begging the very question at issue. If the project is explanation, however, then things change dramatically. Now the aim is not to establish (against the sceptic) that we have knowledge, but to explain (to ourselves) the difference between knowing and not knowing. It is also to consider how beings like us, in the circumstances we find ourselves, might achieve the sort of knowledge in question. What this means for religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology is a retreat from apologetics. In older days, the task was to develop arguments in favour of God’s existence, to answer objections against these, and to critique arguments against God’s existence. The entire process was framed as a debate, with each side trying to prove its case against the other, using only premises that all could accept. This makes perfect sense if the project is vindication, but no sense at all if the project is explanation. Accordingly, present-​day religious epistemology deals more in explanations than in proofs; that is, theories are put forward regarding what knowledge of God would require for beings like us, and models are put forward regarding how we might fulfil those requirements. If the project is successful, it explains how knowledge of

14   John Greco God might be possible for beings like us.1 It does not establish that we do have knowledge of God, and certainly not by using premises that even a religious sceptic might accept.

Contemporary Religious Epistemology: Themes and Influences The first section described four trends in general epistemology, and touched upon how these are manifested in religious epistemology and the epistemology of theology. This section explores these trends in religious epistemology in more detail. The first subsection considers Alvin Plantinga’s rejection of classical foundationalism and his explanation of religious knowledge in terms of proper function. Here we find a case study of the dialectic described above: older ideas about the nature and requirements of knowledge are rejected in favour of a different theory that explains how knowledge of God might be possible for beings like us. The second subsection considers a similar dialectic in William Alston’s work. Specifically, Alston criticizes various traditional theories of perceptual knowledge on the grounds that they entail unacceptable sceptical results. If these theories were correct, the result would be that we lack perceptual knowledge of ordinary physical objects. Alston then defends a different theory of perceptual knowledge—​one that explains how ordinary perceptual knowledge is possible, and that allows for perceptual knowledge of God as well. For somewhat complicated reasons, primarily rhetorical, Alston avoids speaking in terms of ‘knowledge’ of God. He frames his discussion, rather, in terms of ‘epistemic justification’, or the sort of justification that knowledge requires (see Alston 1983 and Alston 1991: 2, 70–​1). Nevertheless, his discussion can easily be translated into talk about knowledge, and that is what I will do. Plantinga and Alston offer theories of knowledge and perceptual knowledge that, together with some further assumptions about ourselves and the world, explain how knowledge of God might be possible for beings like us. But even if those explanations are acceptable as far as they go, one might still reject the claim that we do have knowledge of God. For one, there is plausibly good evidence against God’s existence—​evidence of evil and suffering, for example—​that undermines or ‘defeats’ any would-​be knowledge of God. The last subsection takes up this and some related objections.

1 

The phrase ‘might be possible’ signals that two kinds of possibility are involved here. The first is epistemic: roughly, something is epistemically possible if it is consistent with what we know to be the case. The second is practical: roughly, something is practically possible if it could more or less easily be the case. The idea is that (a) knowledge of God requires conditions X, Y, and Z; and (b) for all we know (epistemic possibility), human beings can (practical possibility) fulfil those very conditions.

Knowledge of God   15

The Evidentialist Objection, Classical Foundationalism, and Proper Function Consider the evidentialist objection against religious belief, here formulated as an objection against knowledge of God, since that is our topic (the objection could also be formulated against the rationality of belief in God, or the reasonableness of belief in God; cf. Plantinga 1983, and Wolterstorff 1983). The Evidentialist Objection against Knowledge of God 1. One can have knowledge of God only if one’s beliefs about God are grounded in good evidence. 2. But there is no good evidence for God’s existence, or for beliefs about God’s properties, intentions, actions, etc. Therefore, 3. No one has knowledge of God. The evidentialist objection could be formulated in weaker terms. For example, it might claim that the typical believer does not have the required evidence, or that no one nowadays has such evidence, allowing for the possibility of knowledge of God in extraordinary circumstances. For present purposes, however, we may consider the objection as stated here. One way to respond to the evidentialist objection is to challenge premise 2.  The response of the natural theologian, for example, is to offer the requested evidence in terms of some proof or argument that God exists. Plantinga, however, challenges the second premise, pointing to what he sees as a long-​standing theme in the Reformed tradition. According to that tradition, beliefs about God can be ‘properly basic’; that is, believed without being grounded in further reasons or evidence, and properly so (Plantinga 1983). In later work, Plantinga cites both Calvin and Aquinas as endorsing this position (Plantinga 2000: 170–​7). According to the [Aquinas/​Calvin] model, this natural knowledge of God is not arrived at by inference or argument (for example, the famous theistic proofs of natural theology) but in a much more immediate way…. In this regard, the sensus divinitatis resembles perception, memory, and a priori belief. (Plantinga 2000: 175)

Here we have a substantive disagreement in religious epistemology:  the evidentialist objector claims that knowledge of God requires good evidence, while Calvin and Aquinas disagree. Plantinga traces this disagreement to one in general epistemology: behind the evidentialist objection are substantive theses regarding which kinds of knowledge require further grounding and which do not. Consider: we cannot assume

16   John Greco that all knowledge must be grounded in further reasons or evidence, on pain of an infinite regress. So why is it assumed that knowledge of God must always be grounded in further evidence? According to Plantinga, the evidentialist objection is rooted in ‘classical foundationalism’, a theory of knowledge that restricts the range of basic knowledge to (a) incorrigible beliefs about the contents of one’s own mind, (b) simple and obvious truths known by a priori reason, and (c) what is immediately given in sens