Overcoming Isolationism: Japan’s Leadership in East Asian Security Multilateralism [1 ed.] 1503611698, 9781503611696

Citation preview

Overcoming Isolationism

Studies in Asian Security series editors Amitav Acharya, Chief Editor American University

David Leheny, Chief Editor Waseda University

Alastair Iain Johnston Harvard University

Randall Schweller The Ohio State University

international board Rajesh M. Basrur Nanyang Technological University

Brian L. Job University of British Columbia

Barry Buzan London School of Economics

Miles Kahler University of California, San Diego

Victor D. Cha Georgetown University

Peter J. Katzenstein Cornell University

Thomas J. Christensen Prince­ton University

Khong Yuen Foong Oxford University

Chu Yun-­han Academia Sinica

Byung-­Kook Kim ­Korea University

Stephen P. Cohen The Brookings Institution

Michael Mastanduno Dartmouth College

Rosemary Foot University of Oxford

Mike Mochizuki The George Washington University

Aaron L. Friedberg Prince­ton University

Katherine H. S. Moon Wellesley College

Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington

Qin Yaqing China Foreign Affairs University

Avery Goldstein University of Pennsylvania

Christian Reus-­Smit Australian National University

Michael J. Green Georgetown University

Varun Sahni Jawaharlal Nehru University

Stephan M. Haggard University of California, San Diego

Etel Solingen University of California, Irvine

G. John Ikenberry Prince­ton University

Rizal Sukma CSIS, Jakarta

Takashi Inoguchi Chuo University

Wu Xinbo Fudan University

OVE RCOM ING IS O L AT I ON IS M japan’s leadership in east asian security multilateralism

Paul Midford

sta nford universit y press Stanford, California

S tan fo rd U n i vers i t y P re s s Stanford, California ©2020 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Ju­nior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of Amer­i­ca on acid-­free, archival-­quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Midford, Paul, author. Title: Overcoming isolationism : Japan’s leadership in East Asian security multilateralism / Paul Midford. Other titles: Studies in Asian security. Description: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2020. | Series: Studies in Asian security | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019037608 (print) | LCCN 2019037609 (ebook) | ISBN 9781503611696 (cloth) | ISBN 9781503613096 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Security, International—­East Asia. | Japan—­Foreign relations—1989–­| Japan—­Foreign relations—­East Asia. | East Asia—­Foreign relations—­Japan. Classification: LCC JZ1745 .M447 2020 (print) | LCC JZ1745 (ebook) | DDC 355/.0310952095—­dc23 LC rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2019037608 LC ebook rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2019037609 Typeset by Westchester Publishing Ser­vices in 10/13.5 Adobe Garamond

For my ­mother, Carol E. Midford

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Contents Preface List of Abbreviations Note on Japa­nese Transliteration and Names Introduction

ix xv xix 1

Part I. From Security Isolationism to Promoting Regional Multilateralism 1 Understanding Why States Pursue Regional Security Multilateralism

11

2 Japan and Its Regional Security Isolationism During the Cold War

28

3 Rethinking Regional Security Isolationism and Multilateralism

47

Part II. The Pivot ­Toward Regional Security Multilateralism 4 The Making of the Nakayama Proposal

71

5 Delivering and Defending the Nakayama Proposal

88

6 The Miyazawa Initiatives and Japan’s Leadership in Creating the ASEAN Regional Forum

104

Part III. Japan’s Role in Regional Security Multilateralism 7 Japan and Regional Security Multilateralism, 1994–2000

123

8 Japan and Widening Regional Security Multilateralism

142

Conclusion

161

Notes Index

177 237

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Preface

The origins of this book trace back to an internship I held at the Institute for East-­ West Security Studies in spring 1989. ­There I worked with David Youtz, an Asia-­ focused researcher. We started looking at the rapid normalization of relations across Cold War divides in East Asia but soon focused on the growing chorus of regional states, beginning with the Soviet Union ­under Mikhail Gorbachev but eventually including Australia, Canada, Mongolia, and South ­Korea, calling for the establishment of a regional multilateral security forum loosely patterned ­after the Council on Security Cooperation in Eu­rope (CSCE), now known as the Organ­ization for Security and Co-­operation in Eu­rope. ­These proposals, for an entity often referred to as the Council on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), ­were notably opposed by Japan and the US. David and I wrote a draft policy paper on the prospects for creating a CSCA-­type security regime in East Asia. Soon thereafter I made my first trip to Japan, in July 1991. The Japa­nese consulate in New York kindly arranged for me to meet an official specializing in regional security at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Two days ­after arriving, still fresh off my first flight to Japan, I met this official. ­After explaining to me that only once in postwar Japa­nese history had an Air Self-­Defense Force (ASDF) officer seconded to MOFA been asked to stay on as a permanent employee of MOFA, and that he was that officer, he proceeded to tell me about “Japan’s first regional security initiative since the end of World War II.” He handed me a copy of a speech given by Japan’s foreign minister at the time, Nakayama Tarō, to the Association of Southeast Asian

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Nations (ASEAN) Post Ministerial Conference of ASEAN foreign ministers and their dialogue partners, including Japan and the US. ­After our meeting, I read the speech, which has become known as the Nakayama proposal, and realized how impor­tant it was: ­after years of stubbornly opposing calls for a regional multilateral security forum together with the US, Japan had broken with the US and proposed a regional security forum, albeit one very dif­fer­ent from the CSCA-­like proposals that ­were being made by Australia, Canada, and the Soviet Union. That was the beginning of my fascination with the Nakayama proposal and Japan’s leadership in promoting regional security multilateralism. In our Institute for East-­West Security Studies policy paper, A Northeast Asian Security Regime: Prospects ­After the Cold War, published in 1992, David and I spent several pages documenting Japan’s long-­standing opposition to regional security multilateralism, but then added two paragraphs on the Nakayama proposal and what it might portend for Japa­nese security policy, although the longer-­term influence seemed uncertain. Following this publication, I started working on my doctoral dissertation, focusing on how countries with a history of committing aggression deal with the reputational aftereffects. My cases w ­ ere Japan and the Soviet Union in East Asia, and I hypothesized, building on Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, that such states, if socialized to the implications of anarchy, would attempt to reassure o­ thers about their dispositions as military powers. In the context of researching Japan’s reassurance strategy ­toward East Asia, the Nakayama proposal took on a pivotal role, prompting me to dig deeper to understand this initiative. This involved interviewing former foreign minister Nakayama, although I was unable to interview the reputed brains ­behind the proposal, Satoh Yukio, who was then serving as Japan’s UN ambassador. The results of this research ­were published in the Pacific Review in 2000. I subsequently went on to other topics. In fall 2003 I had the good fortune of fi­nally meeting Satoh at the Japan Association for International Security, where he was a keynote speaker. Satoh had read my Pacific Review article. He obviously had some disagreements with it, yet he was also very persuasive in urging me to consider writing a book about the proposal, observing that no one had yet done so. The following year Satoh, then president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, was generous with his time, giving me two interviews and introductions to other figures who had been central in formulating the Nakayama proposal. Satoh also informed me about his role in one of the Miyazawa proposals, a series of follow-up initiatives to the Nakayama proposal (discussed in Chapter 6) that helped pave the way for the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). My research on that aspect of Japan’s leadership culminated in an interview with the late prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi in April 2005, as well as two interviews with a grand­son of former prime minister Fukuda Takeo about his grand­father’s famous Fukuda Doctrine.

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­Later that year I made a major c­ areer switch, moving from Kwansei Gakuin University near Kobe to the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), where I became the director of the Japan Program. The time and effort involved in that big move and adjusting to a new position slowed down pro­gress on my Nakayama book proj­ect, as did some collaborative research proj­ects with less flexible deadlines. In 2008 I obtained funding from the Norwegian branch of the Scandinavia-­Japan Sasakawa Foundation to fund a summer of research at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, where Satoh had invited me to be a visiting researcher. During my stay I was able to have several valuable follow-up interviews with Satoh, who also provided me with a wealth of written materials and a few more follow-up introductions and interviews. I also had the plea­sure of getting to know and exchange ideas with Yuzawa Takeshi, a scholar researching Japan’s policy ­toward the ARF. In summer 2010 I started the first sabbatical of my c­ areer, at Doshisha University, thanks to an invitation from Murata Koji, fully intending to finish my book on the Nakayama proposal. However, I also wanted to see what I could find in MOFA’s diplomatic archives, and Robert Eldridge educated me on how to make Freedom of Information Act requests to MOFA. I made several such requests to MOFA, plus one to the Cabinet Office regarding Miyazawa’s advisory council on Japan and the Asia-­Pacific in the twenty-­first ­century. My efforts to find and declassify documents related to the Nakayama proposal, the follow-up Miyazawa proposals, Japan’s policy ­toward the ARF, and the Fukuda Doctrine, although slow to bear fruit, proved to be far more successful than I had anticipated, as I received thousands of pages of declassified documents by the time my sabbatical was drawing to a close. I also had the opportunity to visit Southeast Asia to interview Satoh’s interlocutors and o­ thers involved on their own, and in cooperation with Japan, in promoting the establishment of East Asia’s first regional multilateral security forum in the early 1990s. With this massive addition of new information, and returning to my usual teaching, administrative, and other duties following my sabbatical, I realized this book would have to wait ­until my next sabbatical. During my second sabbatical, in 2016–17, which I took at my alma mater, Pomona College, I was able to go through ­these archival documents and twenty-­five years of interviews and other materials and write the pre­sent book. In the course of writing, my horizon broadened beyond the Nakayama proposal and the follow-on Miyazawa initiatives, although ­these remain at the core of this book, to encompass Japan’s previous security isolationism, its codification in the Fukuda Doctrine, and Japan’s consistent championing of regional security multi­ lateralism since the 1991 Nakayama proposal. I owe ­great debts of gratitude to a vast number of ­people who helped me along the way to writing this book. Above all, I owe Satoh for being so generous with his time, and for his g­ reat inspiration, which motivated me to go beyond my 2000 Pacific

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Review article and write this book. At the same time, this book is in some ways dif­ fer­ent from the book he would write, and what he has written on the Nakayama proposal. Nonetheless, I have endeavored to do justice to his views, even when they depart from t­ hose presented in this book. I want to thank David Youtz for being a wonderful mentor, coauthor, and friend. Our collaboration launched my interest in this topic. I also want to thank Nishihara Masashi for being generous with his time during my early exploration of this topic in the mid-1990s, and the late Satō Seizaburō, who gave me the introductions and support that I needed when I first moved to Japan. I would like to thank Suzuki Kuniko, who attended one of my early talks on the Nakayama proposal and who then worked as a Diet secretary for Nakayama, for arranging two interviews with him. Some of the ­others whom I want to thank for their valuable insights include the late prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi, Desaix Anderson, Dennis Blair, Paul Evans, Ochi Takao, Rudolfo Severino, Togo Kazuhiko, Jusuf Wanandi, and Watanabe Akio. For invaluable comments and corrections on my manuscript, I would especially like to thank Tsuyoshi Kawasaki of Simon Fraser University. For valuable comments on portions of this manuscript, I would like to thank my former PhD candidate Henrik Hiim of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Tom Le of Pomona College. I would also like to thank the Trondheim Writers’ Circle and its members, including Jennifer Bailey, Torbjørn Knutsen, Ole Magnus Theisen, Espen Moe, and Sabrina Ramet, for their valuable comments on portions of my manuscript, and the VIP group in my department for feedback on Chapters 2 and 8. For sharp-­eyed editing of my manuscript, I would like to thank Noguchi Kazuhiko. For help with some difficult research questions, I would like to thank my oldest friend in Japan, Wada Shuichi. For valuable assistance locating documents, I would like to thank Itō Atsuki of the Japa­nese Embassy in Norway; Naomi Yabe Magnusson, Japan librarian specialist, and national trea­sure, at the University of Oslo; and Magnus Rom Jensen, the po­liti­cal science librarian at NTNU. I would like to thank my home institution, NTNU, and the Department of Sociology and Po­liti­cal Science, where I work, for providing crucial funding, including for two trips to Southeast Asia, that allowed me to complete the ASEAN portion of this book. I would like to thank the Japan Foundation’s Japa­nese Studies Fellowship for very valuable funding, the Norway-­Scandinavia-­Japan Sasakawa Foundation for partially funding my summer 2008 research trip to Japan, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for funding a research trip to Japan in summer 2007, when some of the research contained in this book was completed. I would like to thank the Japan Institute of International Affairs; Pomona College, especially Heather Williams; Doshisha University, especially Koiji Murata; the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, especially James Zumwalt and Jeffrey Hornung; and the Osaka School of International

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Public Policy at Osaka University, especially Kurusu Kaoru, for extending invitations and generously hosting me as a visiting researcher while I researched and wrote most of this book. I would like to thank David Leheny of Waseda University for shepherding this manuscript through Stanford University Press’s Studies in Asian Security series referee pro­cess, and Leah Pennywark and series editor Alan Harvey for enabling me to properly edit and prepare this manuscript for publication. Fi­nally, I would like to thank Ashley Moore and Brian Ostrander for patient and expert editing of my manuscript. Of course, any errors contained in this book are solely my responsibility. I dedicate this book to my ­mother, Carol E. Midford, for bringing me into this world, and for instilling in me the per­sis­tence, drive and optimism that I needed to complete this book over the course of many years.

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Abbreviations

ADB

Asian Development Bank

ADMM

ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting

ADMM-­Plus

ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus

ADSOM-­Plus ASEAN Defence Se­nior Officials’ Meeting AMF

Asian Monetary Fund

AMM

ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

APEC

Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation

APT

ASEAN Plus Three

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN-­ISIS

ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies

ASEM

Asia-­Europe Meeting

ASPAC

Asian and Pacific Council

ASPC

ARF Se­nior Policy Conference

CBM

confidence-­building mea­sure

xvi A bbrev iati ons

CSCA

Council on Security Cooperation in Asia

CSCAP

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

CSCE

Council on Security and Cooperation in Eu­rope

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies

EAC

East Asian Community

EAEC

East Asian Economic Caucus

EAMF

Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum

EAS

East Asia Summit

EASG

East Asia Study Group

EAVG

East Asia Vision Group

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

FOIP ­Free and Open Indo-­Pacific HaDR

Humanitarian and Disaster Relief

IISS

International Institute for Strategic Studies

IMF

International Monetary Fund

ISC

ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre

ISG

ARF Inter-­sessional Group

ISIS

Institute of Strategic and International Studies

LDP

Liberal Demo­cratic Party

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( Japan)

MRM

mutual reassurance mea­sure

MSDF

Maritime Self-­Defense Force ( Japan)

NDPO

National Defense Program Outline

NEA 3

Northeast Asian Three

NEACD

Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue

ODA

Official Development Assistance

A bbrev iat io ns

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development

OSCE

Organ­ization for Security and Co-­operation in Eu­rope

PMC

ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference

ReCAAP

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia

RIMPAC

Rim of the Pacific multilateral naval exercise

SDF

Self-­Defense Forces ( Japan)

SEATO

Southeast Asian Treaty Organ­ization

SOM

Se­nior Officials’ Meeting

ZOPFAN

Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

xvii

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A Note on Japa­nese Transliteration and Names

I have followed the Hepburn romanization standard for transliterating Japa­nese words and names and used macrons for long vowels (for example, ō for denoting “ou” and ū for denoting “uu”). However, I have made exceptions when citing English-­language sources that do not use macrons or spell out long vowels. Thus, when citing the Japa­ nese press agency Kyōdō Tsūshin from a Japanese-­language source, I use macrons, but when citing this press agency from an En­glish source, such as the Japan Times, I follow the original rendering in that source (Kyodo Tsushin or Kyodo). Words commonly rendered in En­glish without long vowels are so rendered ­here (Tokyo, not Tōkyō). As for Japa­nese names, in this book I give the ­family name first, then the person’s given name: thus, Nishihara Masashi, where Masashi is the given name. However, I make an exception for Japa­nese who publish extensively in En­glish. I also put the surname ­after the given name when citing Japanese-­language books and articles in endnotes. Fi­nally, Japa­nese authors who transliterate their names into the Roman alphabet without the use of long vowels, or who choose their own style when so ­doing, have their names rendered as per their own preference—­for example, Satoh (not Satō) Yukio.

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Overcoming Isolationism

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Introduction

Three Puzzles In a sudden and unexpected burst of leadership, Japan, beginning with the Nakayama proposal of July 1991 and continuing in 1992 and 1993 with several initiatives by then–­ prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi, played a decisive role in a pro­cess that culminated in the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1 Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia’s first region-­wide multilateral security forum, in 1993. The ARF, in turn, paved the way for additional multilateral security institutions to be created in subsequent years, institutions in which Japan’s leadership often played a crucial role. The 1991 Nakayama proposal (named a­ fter then–­foreign minister Nakayama Tarō) is widely regarded by many Japa­nese foreign policy elites as Japan’s first postwar regional security initiative.2 It and the subsequent Miyazawa initiatives of 1992–93 for creating a region-­wide security dialogue did indeed represent Japan’s first in­de­pen­dent international security initiatives since the end of World War II and the country’s first attempt to be a leading architect in constructing a regional security institution. ­These initiatives also marked the definitive end of Japan’s Cold War–­era policy of regional security isolation and ushered in a new era of increasing bilateral, as well as multilateral, security engagement with a growing range of security partners in East Asia.3 Japan’s leadership in promoting regional security multilateralism represents an impor­tant, but little-­recognized, success in Japa­nese foreign policy. This is b­ ecause the 1991 Nakayama proposal paved the way for the creation of the first regional multilateral security institutions in East Asia, starting with the ARF in 1993. In this context, Japan’s role in overcoming US opposition to regional security multilateralism proved

2 Int ro d uct io n

to be pivotal. According to Christopher Hughes, “That Japan, with its sudden burst of diplomatic activity had taken a leading role in establishing a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-­Pacific, was demonstrated by its having preempted US foreign policy for perhaps the first time since the Second World War.”4 The Nakayama proposal thus represents a bold departure from Japan’s previous policy ­toward regional security, which was isolationist and reactive to US demands, and marked the first time since the end of World War II that Japan had launched a regional security initiative, let alone in the face of clear American opposition. Tokyo’s previous role had been predicated on almost total dependence on the US alliance for security, and on a promise, embodied in the Fukuda Doctrine, that Japan would never again become a military power, a promise that meant steadfast abstention from any military cooperation with other East Asian states. Japan had refused even to talk about regional security with its neighbors. The Nakayama proposal set in motion two significant changes in Japan’s regional security strategy. First, although Japan continued to reaffirm its 1977 Fukuda Doctrine pledge to never again become a military power, Tokyo redefined this promise to allow it to openly discuss regional security with its neighbors, bilaterally as well as multilaterally, and to consider n ­ on-combat security cooperation beyond dialogue through regional multilateral structures. The Nakayama proposal thus marked the end of Japan’s Cold War–­era policy of security isolationism vis-­à-­vis its East Asian neighbors. Second, the Nakayama proposal paved the way for Japan to pursue activist leadership in promoting regional security multilateralism over the following quarter ­century, an activism this book traces, thereby revealing the shift from a reactive and security isolationist state to a proactive regional leader. This book thus addresses three overarching puzzles about Japan’s role in East Asian security. First, why, during the Cold War, did Japan pursue a strategy of regional security isolationism, shunning all cooperation (except with the US) and rejecting regional security multilateralism? Second, why, on the cusp of the Cold War’s end, did Japan suddenly reverse years of steadfast opposition to regional security multil­ateralism and propose East Asia’s first region-­wide multilateral security forum? Third, why has Japan consistently championed regional security multilateralism since 1991?

Security Multilateralism in East Asia Compared with Eu­rope and even other regions, East Asia has historically been under-­ “multilateralized.” The Sinocentric tributary system used exclusively bilateral forms of diplomatic relations.5 Even during the Cold War, most regional security relations ended up being bilateral, most notably in the form of the bilateral hub-­and-­spokes structure of security treaties radiating out from the US hub to several countries in the western Pacific. ­There was very ­little development of a multilateral (or even trilateral)

Introdu ct io n

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wheel rim linking t­ hese spokes. When the US initially proposed a multilateral “Pacific Pact” based on the NATO model in the early 1950s, Japan and other countries rejected the idea. Afterward the US came to prefer the hub-­and-­spokes structure, and to oppose all proposals for regional security multilateralism, especially un-­like-­minded multilateralism.6 During the Cold War, Japan largely avoided trilateral or multilateral proposals linking it with US allies, fearing entrapment in US wars. Other­wise, Japan followed US policy by rejecting proposals for multilateral security cooperation as enhancing the credibility of Soviet calls for an East Asian regional collective security mechanism and naval arms control, proposals that w ­ ere considered disadvantageous for Japan and the US. Japan also feared that the development of a multilateral security mechanism resembling the 1975 Helsinki pro­cess might, as was the case with the Council on Security and Cooperation in Eu­rope (CSCE, renamed in the early 1990s as the Organ­ization for Security and Co-­operation in Eu­rope, or OSCE), entail an implicit ratification of the territorial status quo, thereby strengthening Soviet claims to the disputed Northern Territories.7 Yet, in the early 1990s, this avoidance of regional security multilateralism suddenly dis­appeared with the emergence of the ARF and vari­ous track 2, unofficial, and track 1.5, semiofficial, multilateral security dialogues in East Asia.8 This blooming of East Asian security multilateralism was preceded and catalyzed by Japan’s dramatic switch in 1991 from opposing regional security multilateralism to becoming its leading champion.9 This book explains why Japan went from being passive and negative ­toward regional security multilateralism to becoming its major architect, in the pro­cess demonstrating a hitherto unseen in­de­pen­dent diplomacy (or jishu gaikō in Japa­nese), and how this influenced regional security and Japan’s relationship with its neighbors. This book builds on my ­earlier work, especially an article published in the Pacific Review that focused on the July 1991 Nakayama proposal.10 ­There I argued that Japan embraced regional security multilateralism as part of a reassurance strategy directed at Asian countries invaded by Japan before 1945.11 The timing of this initiative was influenced by Japan’s previous emergence as the world’s second-­largest economy (an economy then larger than China’s and all other East Asian economies combined), the end of the Cold War, growing frictions with the US, Japan’s decision to play a larger role in international security a­ fter the end of the Cold War (for example, dispatching the Self-­Defense Forces [SDF] overseas to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping, beginning with a deployment to Cambodia in 1992), and the goal of preventing this expanded role from provoking Asian perceptions of a revival of Japa­nese aggressiveness. This book thus argues that with the end of the Cold War, Japan came to see regional security multilateralism as a vital means for reassuring East Asian nations that Tokyo’s increasing involvement in international security (for example, participation in

4 Int ro d uct io n

UN Peacekeeping) would not cause Tokyo to repeat its history of aggression. Reassuring East Asian nations was recognized as necessary for dissuading po­liti­cal, economic, and even military counterbalancing by t­hese countries, and hence this motivation explains Japan’s sudden burst of leadership in promoting security multilateralism in the early 1990s. The Nakayama proposal is therefore an impor­tant modification of the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan’s first formal diplomatic doctrine. This book further argues that Japan has used regional security multilateralism to realize two other goals. First, Tokyo has used regional security multilateralism to help manage its alliance security dilemma with Washington, specifically to ameliorate new concerns about US abandonment that emerged ­after the Cold War, as well as its longer-­term fear of entrapment by its superpower ally. Second, Japan has sought to develop new security utilities not adequately provided by the US-­Japan alliance, and which Japan could not provide itself, especially in nontraditional security areas such as counterpiracy, counterterrorism, and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HaDR).

Significance This book is significant for three reasons. First, this is the first book-­length study of this critical turning point in Japa­nese security strategy, and one of very few studies that examine this case at any length.12 This study not only provides insights into an impor­tant and often overlooked turning point in Japa­nese policy but also offers rich case studies that show the motivations ­behind this policy shift and illuminates Japan’s foreign-­policy-­making pro­cess to a degree few other studies have attempted. It shows the role that policy entrepreneurs both outside and inside Japan played in the policy-­making pro­cess. This study challenges the ste­reo­type of Japa­nese security policy as being simply reactive, especially to American pressure. Tokyo’s promotion of regional security multilateralism often caused Japan to get out ahead of American policy. On several occasions, Japan led US policy away from its previous opposition to East Asian security multilateralism. In the case of the July 1991 Nakayama proposal, Japan persisted even in the face of American opposition. Second, this book offers a more well-­rounded understanding of Japan’s international role and foreign policy, especially in relation to its East Asian neighbors. Western observers commenting on Japan’s relations with other East Asian countries have focused heavi­ly on claims that Japan mishandles its history of war­time aggression (for example, through the visits by Japa­nese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine, and by supposedly whitewashing its history in school textbooks) and have often characterized Japan’s regional policy as inward-­looking and insensitive to the perceptions and concerns of the country’s neighbors.13 This book demonstrates that Japan has a much more multifaceted relationship with, and proactive policy ­toward, its East Asian neighbors than has generally been recognized. As discussed ­earlier, this

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study extensively tests the argument that ameliorating historically rooted suspicions of Japan through military reassurance was one of two main objectives ­behind Tokyo’s promotion of security multilateralism in the early 1990s, along with keeping the US militarily engaged in regional security. In short, although Western commentators have been right to note some deficiencies in Japan’s historical reassurance, they have almost entirely overlooked Japan’s military reassurance, which is a central theme of this book.14 Fi­nally, this book is timely ­because interest in regional security multilateralism in East Asia has rarely waned since the establishment of the ARF, East Asia’s first experience with regional security multilateralism, in 1993. This period has seen the establishment of the Asia-­Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), cooperation of the Northeast Asian Three (NEA 3)15 from 2003, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in 2004, the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus dialogue partners (ADMM-­Plus) in 2010, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2012. Undergirding this steady growth in security multilateralism has been Japan’s unwavering motivation to use regional security multilateralism as a platform providing it with a legitimate voice and nonthreatening means to participate in regional security.16 The consequence of this motivation has been Tokyo’s exercise of leadership in promoting regional multilateralism by building on the legacies of the Fukuda Doctrine and the Nakayama proposal, with Japan’s leadership especially notable in the cases of the APT, the NEA 3, ReCAAP, the EAMF, and the EAS.

Competing Explanations This book tests four competing explanations. First, it considers a liberal or constructivist Asianist explanation, which holds that Japan attempted to use regional security multilateralism to build an inclusive and un-­like-­minded security community to distance itself from the US alliance and overcome the regional balance of power dynamics.17 An extreme variant of this argument maintains that Japan has attempted to replace the US alliance with regional multilateral security institutions. A second competing explanation claims that, for Japan, ­there is an inevitable zero-­sum trade-­ off between security bilateralism and multilateralism.18 Third, this book considers a realist-­inspired competing explanation that argues that Japan has used regional security multilateralism to build a multilateral co­ali­tion of like-­minded countries to contain China and perhaps eventually even build a NATO-­like military alliance.19 A fourth explanation claims that Japan has oscillated between extremes, initially being enraptured with enthusiasm for regional security multilateralism, but then becoming pessimistic and skeptical.20 In short, Japa­nese policy elites initially saw the ARF as a coequal complement to the US-­Japan alliance, but ­later moved to the opposite

6 Int ro d uct io n

extreme and claimed that the ARF could “have no effect on e­ ither state be­hav­ior or the prospects for international stability.”21

Sources and Methods Using extensive new primary sources, this book tests the reassurance hypothesis against the competing hypotheses. While my ­earlier article already included significant primary research, including an interview with former foreign minister Nakayama Tarō, this book makes extensive use of a much wider array of interviews with Japa­nese diplomats involved ­behind the scenes in drafting the Nakayama proposal, as well as interviews of many of their American and ASEAN diplomatic and academic colleagues who provided feedback to Japa­nese diplomats on initial versions of the ideas that went into the Nakayama proposal and then, in the case of foreign diplomats, had responsibility for responding to this proposal and its follow-up initiatives on behalf of their governments. This book also analyzes for the first time an array of declassified Japa­nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) documents that I found in the Diplomatic Archives. Based on Japan’s National Information Disclosure Laws (similar to the US Freedom of Information Act), I obtained and analyzed an even wider array of previously classified documents from MOFA and the Cabinet Office (Naikakufu), including early drafts of the Nakayama proposal. Th ­ ese primary sources provide crucial evidence regarding Japan’s motivations for promoting regional security multilateralism, and how this translated via the policy-­making pro­cess into concrete proposals. This book also reexamines the main antecedent of the Nakayama proposal, Japan’s 1977 Fukuda Doctrine.22 This was an impor­tant step ­toward Japan’s promotion of regional multilateralism ­because it was through this doctrine Tokyo that became the first major state to recognize and deal with ASEAN itself as an impor­tant partner, and to promote that partner, rather than just dealing individually with its members. This, in turn, laid the foundations for ASEAN’s subsequent “centrality” in regional security multilateralism. This book uses declassified MOFA documents, including never-­published details of early drafts of the Fukuda Doctrine speech, and interviews with former diplomats and relatives of the late prime minister Fukuda Takeo to arrive at a new understanding of the Fukuda Doctrine in the context of Japan’s regional security strategy. This book goes beyond the July 1991 Nakayama proposal and analyzes Japan’s long-­ term leadership. An entire chapter focuses on the initiatives Prime Minister Miyazawa made in 1992 and 1993 and on the diplomatic pro­cess between ASEAN and Japan, and secondarily with the other members of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), that culminated in the formation of the ARF in 1993.23 This chapter builds on an interview I conducted with the late prime minister Miyazawa in April 2005.

Introdu ct io n

7

It also relies on interviews with Japa­nese diplomats and declassified documents from an advisory panel Miyazawa created to formulate Japan’s strategy t­oward East Asia in the twenty-­first ­century. Fi­nally, this book uses a variety of sources, including media accounts, published government documents, interviews with diplomats and academics, and declassified MOFA documents, to analyze Japan’s motivations and goals in its participation in and promotion of the ARF during the first quarter c­ entury ­after its establishment, as well as several other initiatives it has taken during the first fifteen years of this c­ entury to establish a wider range of regional multilateral security institutions. Methodologically, this book seeks to understand an intrinsically impor­tant case, and only secondarily to contribute to theory development.24 It uses three qualitative methods: pro­cess tracing, the method of difference, and data triangulation. Pro­cess tracing is the analy­sis of chains of events in an effort to uncover causal mechanisms and sequences of intermediate variables by which a change in the value of the in­de­ pen­dent variable produces a change in the value of the dependent variable.25 One definition applied to po­liti­cal science that well represents the methods of this book defines pro­cess tracing as the act of examining “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see w ­ hether the causal pro­cess a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”26 In this study, pro­cess tracing ­will be used to see ­whether certain motivations, most notably reassurance, can be observed driving the policy pro­cess from planning to execution, or ­whether other motivations become more impor­tant during the policy pro­cess. The second method this book employs is the method of difference, which involves examining ­whether change in the value of the hypothesized in­de­pen­dent variables correlates with change in the dependent variable. In the context of this study, the method of difference answers the question, When Japan’s threat profile changes, does its reassurance policy change or remain the same?27 Fi­nally, this book uses data triangulation, a methodology that employs more than one type of evidence to mea­sure a variable in order to cancel out potential biases or errors in any one type of data stream.28 This study utilizes several diverse streams of data, including interviews with policy makers, their published writings, secondary academic studies, declassified and public government documents, and contemporaneous media accounts from Japan and several other countries. By using interviews with multiple policy makers, their contemporaneous writings, diplomatic documents, and media accounts, it ­is pos­si­ble to uncover the policy-­making pro­cess and the motivations ­behind policy while controlling for the methodological shortcomings of relying on interviews (for example, individual biases and memory lapses) by comparing accounts.29

8 I ntrod u ctio n

Plan of the Book The remainder of this book consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 pre­sents the explanatory framework for understanding the reasons ­behind the rise of regional security multilateralism in East Asia in comparative perspective, and for understanding Japan’s sharp reversal from opposing regional security multilateralism to becoming its leading champion. Chapter 2 analyzes the emergence of security isolation in Japan’s regional security strategy at the outset of the Cold War in light of its neighbors’ distrust, culminating in the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 that formalized this isolationist strategy yet at the same time attempted to open a way for Japan to play a non-­security-­connected po­liti­cal role. Chapter 3 traces Japan’s rethinking of its strategy of regional security isolation and its opposition to multilateral security cooperation, as well as the intellectual background to the Nakayama proposal. Chapter 4 analyses the pro­cess of making the Nakayama proposal, including the crucial role played by ASEAN security intellectuals. Chapter 5 examines the delivery and contents of the Nakayama proposal itself, reactions to the proposal from other members of the PMC, and Japan’s efforts to defend and promote the initiative in response to ­these reactions. Chapter 6 traces the followon initiatives to the Nakayama proposal made by Prime Minister Miyazawa, as well as the negotiation pro­cess with ASEAN and other ASEAN dialogue partners that led to the decision to create the ARF, East Asia’s first regional multilateral forum, in 1993. Chapters 7 and 8 analyze Japan’s be­hav­ior within the ARF and its continued leader­ ship in promoting new regional multilateral security institutions. The final chapter draws conclusions from the case-study chapters in this book, especially t­ hose covering the Nakayama proposal, about Japa­nese foreign policy making in general; Japan’s success in overcoming the historically based mistrust of it as a military power; the f­ uture trajectory of Japan’s regional security strategy, including the ­future of Japan’s leadership in regional security multilateralism; and the implications for the US-­Japan alliance.

PART I

From Security Isolationism to Promoting Regional Multilateralism

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1

Understanding Why States Pursue Regional Security Multilateralism

to recap, this book addresses three overarching puzzles: Why, during the Cold War, did Japan pursue a strategy of regional security isolationism and reject regional security multilateralism? Why, on the cusp of the Cold War’s end, did Japan suddenly reverse years of steadfast opposition to regional security multilateralism and propose East Asia’s first region-­wide multilateral security forum? And why has Japan continued to champion regional security multilateralism since 1991? In answer to t­ hese three questions, this book tests the proposition that what can be called the reassurance imperative helps explain much of Japan’s regional security strategy since the country regained its in­de­pen­dence in 1952. This largely explains Japan’s decision to engage in security isolationism during the Cold War, and its decision to abandon that isolationism and become the leading champion for regional security multilateralism at the end of the Cold War. This chapter also develops two secondary hypotheses—­namely, that Japan has used regional security multilateralism to mitigate the alliance security dilemma, specifically its entrapment and abandonment fears vis-­à-­vis its ally the US, and that Japan has come to see multilateral security cooperation as providing additional utility in vari­ous aspects of nontraditional security, including counterpiracy, counterterrorism, pandemic responses, and HaDR capabilities. This chapter pre­sents the key concepts and explanatory frameworks of this book. ­These are used to test the reassurance hypothesis, along with the two secondary hypotheses, to better our understanding of Japa­nese foreign and security policy. This chapter pre­sents ­these concepts and explanatory frameworks in a broader context,

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suggesting their potential relevance for other cases, although this book does not examine any non-­Japanese cases. First, this chapter defines bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral security structures and outlines their potential utility for states. Second, it explains the reassurance imperative and how this, u ­ nder the right conditions, can alternately lead states to embrace security isolationism or security multilateralism, as well as other forms of security engagement. Third, this chapter pre­sents the alliance security dilemma as a secondary hypothesis for answering the three overarching questions of this book and considers the connections between the alliance security dilemma and the reassurance hypothesis of this book. Fi­nally, this chapter pre­sents a hypothesis on the utilities that states can build by using security multilateralism as a platform, especially in nontraditional security.

States, Threats, and Security Strategies In the interstate context, security can be defined as an absence of threats (that is, credible endangerment) to core values, including territorial integrity, national in­de­ pen­dence, the safety and integrity of the state’s citizens, and so on. Although economic security, the absence of threats to the state’s economic viability and well-­being, is also impor­tant, h ­ ere the focus is on traditional military or physical security and the absence of military threats. A secondary focus is on so-­called nontraditional security threats, including the threat to citizens and national welfare posed by piracy, terrorism, criminal trafficking, pandemics, and natu­ral disasters. States can maintain their security in several ways. The two most traditional means are unilateral and bilateral. Unilaterally, the state can arm itself, building police and military forces to protect its territory and in­de­pen­dence and maintain law and order. Beyond a unilateral arming strategy, the state can form an alliance with another state to aggregate material power resources against a common external threat. Although traditionally a bilateral form, some such alliances are now multilateral, NATO being the leading example.

Security Structures: Minilateral and Multilateral Beyond unilateral arming and traditional bilateral alliances are multimember security structures, beginning with a multimember alliance but also including other multimember security frameworks. Multimember security structures include minilateral and multilateral structures. Minilateralism can be distinguished from multilateralism, whose traditional definitions often include the condition of “nonexclusivity.” Robert O. Keohane defines multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions.” He further defines multilateral institutions as “per­sis­tent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that pre-­scribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”1 John Ruggie offers a more demanding definition2



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of multilateral institutions as involving three or more states and containing three ele­ ments: (1) the indivisibility of welfare among member states, (2) nondiscrimination or the equal application of generalized princi­ples, and (3) diffuse reciprocity.3 This book defines security multilateralism as institutions comprising three or more states that are established for the purpose of facilitating the exchange of security-­relevant information or for the purpose of coordinating the security policies of member states. Within the range of ­these functions, ­there is nondiscrimination and equal application of general princi­ples.4 By contrast, J. Martin Rochester defines minilateralism as “the pursuit of inter­ national co-­operation through ad hoc, mostly issue-­specific bargaining among like-­ minded, relevant actors in multiple arenas rather than in a system-­wide, universal context.”5 Similarly, Kuniko Ashizawa defines minilateralism as “collaborative behaviour by small numbers of selected, often privileged, states (or polities), as opposed to large-­number multilateralism.”6 The Pentagon’s 1998 East Asia Strategic Review described security minilaterals as “intended to be overlapping, and interlocking, complementing each other to develop an informal security framework for promoting understanding and mutual confidence, and facilitating bilateral ties between participants.”7 For the purposes of this book, the definition of minilateralism ­will be somewhat more l­imited: a structure of cooperation among three or more states that are confirmed like-­minded states or de facto allies in that they all at least share one ally. By contrast, noninclusive like-­minded multilateralism is a structure of three or more states that are like-­minded, but not necessarily allies, and can include neutral states. Of course, the distinction between minilateralism and noninclusive like-­minded multilateralism can be blurry and can vary in the eye of the beholder. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the 1991 Nakayama proposal to create a regional security dialogue defined the ASEAN states as confirmed like-­minded states, if not de facto allies, a definition that several ASEAN states rejected. Similarly, a consciously ­limited multimember structure is an impor­tant feature of my definition, since it is meant to cover institutions intended to exclude potential members. Thus, as the Nakayama proposal was explic­itly intended to exclude regional Socialist countries from the dialogue, it constitutes an example of exclusive like-­minded multilateralism (in MOFA’s eyes, it was almost minilateralism), as opposed to inclusive and non-­like-­ minded multilateralism. Even the PMC itself before 1996, to the extent that it was consciously intended to exclude certain potential members, such as China and the former Soviet Union/Rus­sia, could be considered an example of noninclusive like-­minded multilateralism. For the same reason, I define the multimember alliances, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organ­ization (SEATO) and NATO, as examples of minilateralism. Recent examples of security minilateralism in East Asia include Australia-­Japan-­US

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trilateral cooperation and the Quad: quadrilateral security cooperation between Australia, India, Japan, and the US.8

Security Multilateralism ­ ere are four distinct multilateral means for a state to promote its security: collective Th security, common security, cooperative security, and a socializing security community. Collective Security. Collective security is in effect a universal alliance potentially directed against any member that infringes on the security of any other member, and it constitutes inclusive multilateralism. Collective security requires member states to raise and pool effectively military force to punish an aggressor. While a collective security system in princi­ple can replace traditional alliances, no effective collective security system has ever been created ­because of the contradiction of being potentially aimed at one or more of the system’s own members, and b­ ecause it requires other­wise potentially disinterested states to contribute military forces, sacrificing lives and trea­sure in the pro­cess.9 Collective security is most closely associated with early and mid-­twentieth-­century idealistic versions of liberal institutionalism10 (but not neoliberal institutionalism). Common Security. The second type of multilateral security system is common security. Common security is a system devised among adversaries who share a common interest in avoiding the costs of war; it is an inclusive multilateral system.11 It aims to prevent war among adversaries and is based on the common danger posed to both sides by the hugely destructive nature of modern warfare. This system promotes mutual confidence building, reassurance, and cooperation as a supplement for deterrence and counterbalancing, and it does not use coercive means, unlike collective security.12 As Sugio Takahashi notes, security is enhanced “not by unilateralism, but by taking a certain degree of cooperative actions with the potential e­ nemy.”13 In terms of game theory, it corresponds most closely to an assurance game (or stag hunt), with the efficient provision of information to participants about the intentions and actions of rival blocs being its most impor­tant function.14 Concretely, its main function is providing information about intentions and actions that reduces the risk of accidental war through misperception. The leading example of a multilateral common security framework is CSCE during the Cold War.15 Common security is a multilateral security structure that corresponds to neoliberal institutionalism16 and defensive17 and postclassical realisms,18 as both paradigms identify misperception as an impor­tant cause of instability and war and recognize the potential utility of security multilateralism, along with more traditional tools such as diplomacy, in reducing the threat of war arising from such ­causes.19 Cooperative Security. The third type of multilateral security system is cooperative security. Developed at the end of the Cold War as an offshoot from common security,20



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a multilateral cooperative security system is one among states that are neither allies nor enemies. Cooperative security can take the form of e­ ither inclusive multilateralism or exclusive like-­minded multilateralism, although mostly it is the former. Like common security, a cooperative security framework seeks to prevent armed conflict by promoting confidence-­building mea­sures (CBMs) and institutionalized security dialogues that can reduce the risk of such conflict by preventing misperception. Again, it has no coercive means at its disposal.21 As Matake Kamiya notes, “In a cooperative security system, member states seek security with, rather than against, other members. It therefore emphasizes the importance of po­liti­cal and diplomatic, rather than military, means to achieve security.”22 Therefore, more than common security, cooperative security adopts a comprehensive approach to security and emphasizes concrete cooperation for responding to nontraditional threats to security, such as terrorism, piracy, smuggling and or­ga­nized crime, transnational pandemics, and natu­ral disasters.23 ­After the Cold War, as CSCE became OSCE, it changed from a common security multilateral institution to a cooperative security one as the clear ally-­enemy division broke down. In addition to being inclusive, OSCE remains an un-­like-­minded multi­lateral institution.24 The ARF and, since 2010, the ADMM-­Plus (see Chapter 8) are other examples of inclusive and un-­like-­minded cooperative security multilateral forums, although they also straddle the line between cooperative and common security (arguably, they increasingly became common security institutions ­after 2009, as friend-­enemy distinctions began to become salient again). Cooperative security is most closely associated with neoliberal institutionalism, although it can also be associated with defensive realism and neoclassical realism, especially to the extent that cooperative security ends up forming the basis for ­future minilateralism or an alliance. Moreover, for realists of all stripes, both cooperative and common multilateral security structures have an additional, if unintended, function: they offer the state an arena for competing against rivals and attracting potential allies to its side. Multilateral security forums can even be used to enhance the efficiency of counterbalancing.25 On the other hand, failing to play in this arena can hurt the state’s interests, as it offers rivals a chance to woo ­others to their side.26 For realists, security multilateralism, like diplomacy, is not only about the state’s ability to make gains; it’s also about using such forums to avoid losses. Socializing Security Community. The fourth type of multilateral security system is a socializing security community. As much a pro­cess as a type of security system, a socializing security system arguably starts as a common security system that then evolves into a security community, or “no-­war community,” where member values, norms, and perceptions homogenize via the norms brewery of this multilateral security system.27 Reflecting this logic, the ARF agenda, according to Sheila Smith, aims

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“to develop common understandings, and thus to develop norms that w ­ ill shape the way the states of the region seek to resolve their disputes.”28 A socializing security community is most closely associated with constructivism.29 Of course, it is pos­si­ble that the degree of socialization is not equal among all members, with some socializing more than o­ thers. In this case a socializing security system could give way to a traditional multilateral alliance in which the socialized states ally against the unsocialized. ASEAN itself is an example of such a security community, underpinned institutionally by the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and behaviorally by the ASEAN Way: the norms of observing mutual noninterference in each other’s affairs, avoiding divisive issues, focusing on economic development, and following a diplomatic style that avoids situations in which one party or another loses face through a clear defeat.30 According to Evelyn Goh, ASEAN has sought to socialize ­great powers by “enveloping” them “in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the long-­term aim of integration. In the pro­cess, the target state’s interests are redefined, and its identity possibly altered.”31 It seeks to achieve this through membership in its organ­ izations, most notably the ARF, in order to “tie them down by creating expectations and obligations through membership. Over time, membership itself may socialize ­these countries into embracing the princi­ples and norms of the institution.”32 Goh refers to this pro­cess and strategy as “omni-­enmeshment.” It is an omnidirectional strategy ­because it is aimed at all ­great powers with a stake in Southeast Asia.33 As discussed in Chapter 4, the origins of “omni-­enmeshment” can be traced back to the early 1970s Indonesian concept of creating a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), a concept ASEAN formally a­ dopted in 1972. ZOPFAN was based on the idea that Southeast Asia should develop ­free from interference by outside ­great powers. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, at the end of the Cold War, Indonesian strategist Jusuf Wanandi came to redefine ZOPFAN’s concept of neutrality or nonalignment not as the absence of ­great powers but as the involvement of them all, so they would effectively check and cancel each other out, allowing Southeast Asia to develop freely and in peace. By effectively turning ZOPFAN on its head in this way, Wanandi made it the undergirding princi­ple of the ARF, and l­ater of other ASEAN-­ sponsored regional multilateral security fora, such as the ADMM-­Plus, established in 2010 (see Chapter 8).

Motivations for Promoting Regional Security Multilateralism This book hypothesizes that Japan has had one overarching and two secondary motivations for promoting security multilateralism in East Asia. First, Tokyo has sought to minimize its reputational prob­lem as a military power, which stems from the expansionist policies it pursued up to 1945.34 Secondarily, it has attempted to minimize



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its alliance dilemma of abandonment versus entrapment vis-­à-­vis the United States.35 Third, it has endeavored to create new security functions not provided by its bilateral alliance with the US or easily provided unilaterally. Once ­these institutions have been established, Japan has had additional incentives to use them as assets for power competition with potential rivals, both to balance and isolate rivals and to prevent ­those rivals from using ­these institutions to balance and isolate Japan. At vari­ous times Japan has sought to use regional security multilateralism, both inclusive and noninclusive, although noninclusive multilateralism has been a consistent, but not dominant, preference. It has sought to use noninclusive multilateralism, such as the PMC if not ASEAN itself, to reassure what it regards as like-­minded states and prevent US abandonment through collective lobbying for continued US engagement while holding out the potential of multilateral burden-­sharing mechanisms. Japan has used inclusive multilateralism to reassure un-­like-­minded as well as like-­minded states, and to reduce the risks of war caused by misperception. Secondarily, Japan has used regional security multilateralism to reduce the alliance security dilemma dangers of abandonment and entrapment. Specifically, it used security multilateralism at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s to reduce the risk of US abandonment, both by building co­ali­tions of like-­minded countries that could lobby for continued US engagement and by holding out the potential for more effective regional burden-­sharing mechanisms. At other times Japan has seen regional security multilateralism as a means for avoiding entrapment, both by reducing the threat of regional conflict, one of the core functions of common and cooperative security multilateral structures such as the ARF, and by providing a multilateral venue where Japan can avoid being po­liti­cally entrapped by the US in its regional policies through bilateral channels.36 Third, Japan has used East Asian security multilateralism to develop functions and utilities that are not provided by the US-­Japan alliance and that it could not easily provide itself. Th ­ ese functions mostly concern nontraditional security: counterpiracy, counterterrorism, countering illicit trafficking in drugs, combating h­ uman smuggling, and HaDR operations. Since the establishment of multilateral security institutions, such as the ARF, ­Japan has at times gone beyond the cooperative or common security functions of the ARF and used multilateral security fora for power competition, specifically to build counterbalancing co­ali­tions and exert pressure on and isolate rivals such as China.37 Tokyo has thus used security multilateralism not only to realize gains but also at times to avoid losses. For example, it has sought to prevent China from building a co­ali­tion with ASEAN states based on common values, such as noninterference and nonintervention in domestic affairs,38 and more generally to constrain China’s ability to use multilateral institutions to isolate Japan.

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Reassurance in ­Grand Strategy Reassurance refers to the state’s more or less costly signals to another that it does not harbor an aggressive disposition or intentions ­toward another.39 According to Stephen Walt, in international politics, “policies that convey restraint and benevolence are best. . . . ​States . . . ​must take par­tic­u­lar care to avoid appearing aggressive.”40 According to Shiping Tang, “To reassure is to make other states worry less about one’s intentions (and hence one’s capabilities too) ­because one’s intention is genuinely benign.”41 By dissuading ­others from seeing the state as a threat, reassurance discourages ­others from counterbalancing the state eco­nom­ically, po­liti­cally, or militarily, a point Japa­nese diplomats have themselves explic­itly recognized in the context of Japa­nese foreign policy.42 Japa­nese foreign policy can thus be said to display what Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler term “security dilemma sensibility,” which “refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play” in o­ thers’ “attitudes and be­hav­ior, including crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear.”43 A security dilemma sensibility, and the reassurance policies that often result from that sensibility,44 are especially impor­tant for the foreign policy of a former aggressor ­toward a former victim. Former aggressors face an exacerbated form of the security dilemma: ­because of their past aggression, ­others, especially states victimized by that aggression, are quick to perceive that even modest armament that the state intends for defense in fact reflects an intention to again aggress against ­others.45 States have primarily employed two forms of reassurance: military and historical. The former includes mea­sures to convince another about a nation’s nonaggressive intentions, its military doctrine, the character of its military institutions, and the character and quality of the state’s control of its military. Historical reassurance, by contrast, entails convincing another that one’s view of history is not fundamentally dif­fer­ent from its own, especially in ways that could justify f­ uture acts of aggression.46 The Nakayama proposal and Japan’s attempts to promote security multilateralism are examples of military reassurance. B ­ ehind this type of reassurance are the “antimilitarist” lessons that Japan learned as a result of disastrous war and defeat: the military is a potentially dangerous institution, civilian control is difficult to achieve, and it is difficult for the state to judiciously or wisely use the military overseas in ways that have positive utility.47 By the state itself or ­others imposing restraints on the ability to wage war, the state can be prevented from again becoming an “aggressor.”48

Balance-­of-­Threat Realism and Reassurance This book uses balance-­of-­threat realism to explain the priority of reassurance in Japan’s security strategy. Unlike balance-­of-­power or structural realist theory, Stephen Walt’s balance-­of-­threat theory argues that the state balances against threat, defined as



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material capabilities plus perceived aggressive intentions (hereafter, perceived malign disposition).49 David M. Edelstein defines a state’s intentions as its “ambitions, how it is likely to act to achieve ­those ambitions, and the costs it ­will bear to realize ­those goals.”50 He further defines malign intentions as when “State B harbors ambitions that conflict with State A’s interests and State B is willing to employ military force to realize t­ hose ambitions.”51 This study focuses on perceived malign dispositions instead, in that the latter connotes perceptions of a general inclination by B to use force to achieve gains at A’s expense. Some East Asian states have perceived Japan as having an inclination (­whether by design or by character) to again resort to force against ­those states to make gains, perceptions—­stemming from Japan’s be­hav­ior during the first forty-­five years of the twentieth ­century—­that form the basis of Japan’s postwar reputational prob­lem. I define a state’s reputation as preexisting beliefs about the state’s disposition that ­others use to predict its ­future be­hav­ior. Reputation is a cognitive heuristic or shortcut o­ thers develop to deal with the difficulty of constantly evaluating the state’s disposition, and with the uncertainty that such an evaluation inevitably entails. It provides ­others with expectations about the state’s f­ uture be­hav­ior and w ­ ill 52 not be changed easily in the face of new information. Although Walt does not have a theory of perception to explain how the state evaluates the disposition of another, this book borrows from social psy­chol­ogy, in par­tic­u­lar attribution theory, to plug this theoretical gap. First, according to the correspondent-­inference hypothesis of attribution theory, an observer attributes a correspondence between the welfare impact of an actor’s be­hav­ior on the observer and the actor’s disposition. When the actor’s be­hav­ior harms the observer, the observer attributes this to malevolence. Conversely, when the actor’s be­hav­ior benefits the observer, this is attributed to a benign or friendly character. Structural or situational ­factors impelling the actor’s be­hav­ior are generally discounted by an observer.53 Second, the anchor and adjustment hypothesis claims that the initial attributions about another’s disposition become an anchor that is adjusted incrementally, if at all, in the face of new information.54 In the case of Japan, this modified balance-­of-­threat theory predicts that states that suffered the most during Japan’s invasion and occupation of East Asia ­until 1945 should be the most likely to attribute to Japan an aggressive or militarist disposition and should be more likely to balance militarily against Japan, and their beliefs should be the most resistant to change in the face of new information. Conversely, neither structural balance-­of-­power realism nor offensive realism predicts reassurance. Both argue that states balance against, and respond only to, material capabilities, not aggressive intentions.55 According to Tang, “Offensive realism believes that states are inherently aggressive ­either by nature or ­because of anarchy . . . ​ thus essentially eliminating the certainty over ­others’ intention from their strategic calculus.”56 Thus, neither can explain Japan’s postwar reputational dilemma in East

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Asia (the tendency of many states to view even a lightly armed Japan with few power-­ projection capabilities as a potential threat), the central role that reassurance plays in Japan’s security multilateralism, or Japan’s desire to keep the US militarily engaged in East Asia since the 1950s. The social-­psychological lit­er­a­ture on reassurance suggests that an actor can build trust in its intentions in the eyes of o­ thers through repeated unilateral acts benefiting the observer that are not tied to reciprocity or social norms of obligation. For a reassurance strategy to be successful, it must have three characteristics. First, it must involve sending costly signals that entail real cost or risk. Second, t­ hese costly signals must benefit the perceiver, e­ ither materially or by affirming its values. Fi­nally, t­ hese signals should be repeatedly iterated over a prolonged period.57 Security Multilateralism as a Reassurance Vehicle. Multilateral security fora can help the state reduce suspicions about its intentions in two ways. First, as discussed ­earlier, a common or cooperative multilateral security structure potentially offers a means for efficiently providing information about the state’s security policies and force structure, thereby making it easier for the state to demonstrate its benign intentions to ­others. Information can be provided through a multilateral security dialogue or through participation in multilateral transparency mea­sures and CBMs sponsored by a multilateral security institution. OSCE, the ARF, and the ADMM-­Plus are three multilateral security institutions that provide ­these functions. Second, a multilateral institution provides an opportunity to contain and channel the state’s contributions to regional and global security. Contributing to regional security through a multilateral structure in turn provides reassurance in two ways. First, the state avoids using its military unilaterally, and rather uses it only in consultation and cooperation with ­others.58 Second, through iterated contributions to regional security that benefit o­ thers, the state can become the recipient of beneficial attributions by ­others, as implied by the correspondent inference and trust-­building hypotheses, although this ­will be a slow pro­cess, as indicated by the anchoring hypothesis.

Secondary Motivations: The Alliance Security Dilemma and New Utilities The Alliance Security Dilemma. A secondary reason for Japan to promote security multilateralism is that it offered a means to potentially mitigate the alliance security dilemma of entrapment and abandonment. According to Glenn Snyder, “States in an alliance are subject to two opposing fears: the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment.”59 Abandonment means the ally leaves the alliance or fails to provide the state promised or expected support when confronting a hostile power.60 As Snyder states, “The cost of abandonment turns largely on a state’s own dependence on the alliance.”61 Fears of abandonment grow when threat perceptions ­toward a hostile third



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state increase.62 According to Snyder, “Entrapment means being dragged by one’s commitment [to an ally] into a war over the interests of an ally that one does not share, or shares only partially.”63 Moreover, “the costs of entrapment are a function of the divergence of one’s own interests from ­those of the ally” “and the estimated cost of war.”64 Although Snyder focuses on military abandonment and entrapment, the alliance security dilemma can be extended to include po­liti­cal and even economic fears of abandonment and entrapment.65 Galia Press-­Barnathan defines po­liti­cal entrapment as “a decline in one’s ability to make meaningful foreign policy decisions and to conduct meaningful foreign policy in­de­pen­dently,” or being forced to support an ally’s po­liti­cal positions that are not in the state’s interests.66 Po­liti­cal abandonment can be defined as an ally failing to po­liti­cally support the state’s interests as defined in their alliance, making po­liti­cal statements that downplay or condition alliance commitments, or engaging in po­liti­cal maneuvering with one’s joint ­enemy. Similarly, economic abandonment can defined as an allying failing to honor alliance promises to support the state’s economic interests, while economic entrapment can be defined as a decline in one’s ability to make meaningful foreign economic policy,67 or as a situation in which a state finds “itself financially supporting the po­liti­cal or military be­hav­ior of its ally, be­hav­ior of which it may not approve.”68 According to alliance security dilemma theory, “When fears of abandonment dominate fears of entrapment the state ­will move ­toward its ally, increasing its general commitment . . . ​in order to enhance the attractiveness of the alliance to the partner.” If the state believes its ally is “irrevocably in pro­cess of defecting,” then the state might defect itself.69 When fears of entrapment dominate fears of abandonment, alliance dilemma theory indicates that “states w ­ ill e­ ither loosen their general alliance commitment or withhold support from their allies” in disputes with adversaries. 70 Actions that reduce the danger of abandonment can increase the danger of entrapment, and vice versa. Security multilateralism offers the state additional means for responding to ­abandonment and entrapment fears. When fearing abandonment by a stronger or hegemonic ally, the state can use a multilateral structure of like-­minded states and allies to reduce the ally’s abandonment incentives and make continued engagement more attractive. This can involve coordinating with other like-­minded states or quasi-­allies to reduce the costs of continued engagement for the ally;71 facilitate burden sharing by devising a division of ­labor that offers attractive capabilities for the ally, and thereby the potential for issue linkage;72 offer more efficient financing; and provide a buffer between bilateral conflicts and the alliance.73 For example, the ARF and the ADMM-­Plus appear to play a significant role in ensuring continued US engagement simply by reducing the transaction costs for se­nior US diplomats and defense officials

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to engage with their counter­parts in East Asia and by anchoring them to the region through annual visits.74 Like-­minded multilateral structures could also be used to hedge against pos­si­ble abandonment by building security cooperation with o­ thers facing abandonment by a common ally. The state could also use un-­like-­minded common or even cooperative multilateral security structures to reduce the threat of conflict with a potential adversary, a use that would appear to be most promising when abandonment by the ally seems increasingly likely.75 The state can mitigate its fear of entrapment by building un-­like-­minded multilateral structures that do not include the ally to give the state more opportunities to pursue reconciliation with potential adversaries, as well as to reduce the constraints an ally can place on t­hese efforts. Conversely, the state can promote like-­minded multilateral security structures that can constrain an ally from dragging the state into conflicts that are not in its interest. The state might be able to call on other allies to exert enhanced group normative pressure on the common ally, although this could be just as useful in the case of abandonment as in the case of entrapment.76 According to Victor Cha, “Japa­nese encouragement of American participation” in regional multilateral security dialogues is a way for Tokyo to mitigate US “unilateral tendencies.” “Tokyo’s support for American active membership in all regional groupings has the effect of amplifying the voices of all other members who share the ­table with the United States. Despite its overwhelming power, the United States must re­spect and listen to its colleagues with an attention that would not be the case without t­ hese [multilateral security dialogues].”77 Fears of abandonment and entrapment, although always pre­sent in an alliance, are not static. Over time, as one fear waxes, the other wanes, and vice versa. At the beginning of the 1990s, fear of abandonment dominated for Japan. However, by the mid-1990s, fear of entrapment had supplanted fear of abandonment, a trend that continued u ­ ntil approximately 2005, when growing threat perceptions of North K ­ orea and China caused abandonment fears to move to the fore. During 2009–10, at the be­ ginning of the administration of the Demo­cratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ,78 entrapment fears again predominated, although a­ fter the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and a new Senkaku Islands crisis in September 2010, abandonment fears resurged as dominant. Fi­nally, perceived changes in US capabilities and commitment to East Asian security also influenced the urgency of Japan’s reassurance imperative. While reassuring Asian countries continued to be impor­tant for Japan, the perceived waxing of American power reduced regional concerns about the reemergence of Japa­ nese dominance and, therefore, Japan’s need to emphasize reassurance. Conversely, when US power and commitment appeared to wane, Japan’s need to reassure its neighbors increased. However, by 2010 the emergence of China as the largest economy and strongest military power in East Asia, and as a nation to whom many began at-



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tributing aggressive intentions, arguably reduced Japan’s need to reassure its neighbors, as the balance of perceived threats shifted ­toward China.79 New Utilities. For Japan, another secondary motivation for promoting security multilateralism is to provide security functions that are not provided by the US alliance or that Japan cannot easily provide unilaterally. ­These functions mostly address nontraditional security: counterpiracy, counterterrorism, and HaDR operations.80 As Cha notes, “In Asia ­there are a host of prob­lems, including piracy, environmental degradation, h ­ uman rights, refugee flows, maritime safety, narcotics trafficking, disease and terrorism that are considered salient non-­military issues. . . . ​The transnational nature of ­these prob­lems makes them not easily resolvable through the mere application of resources within the bilateral alliance.”81 Although cooperation in ­these areas is considered distinct from “hard” or “traditional” military security, nontraditional security cooperation nonetheless has implications for traditional security, especially when militaries and paramilitaries are involved. For example, exercises and a­ ctual cooperation in combating piracy or providing disaster relief create opportunities for militaries to practice working together, developing practical protocols and knowledge that could facilitate cooperation in combat situations or facilitate deconfliction in case of confrontation. They can also send reassuring or deterrent signals to like-­minded states and potential adversaries, respectively.82

East Asian Security Architecture: Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism? Describing the security architecture that began to emerge a­ fter the end of the Cold War, Kamiya argues that the emerging system is “a double-­layered security system similar to the one in ­today’s Eu­rope,” with “the ARF as a cooperative security system that ­will promote mutual understanding, mutual trust, and mutual reassurance among the regional states, and the U.S.-­Japan military alliance as an alliance system that ­will secure the U.S. military commitment to the region and ­will prepare to cope with military conflicts if the ARF fails to prevent them.”83 Arguably, it would be more accurate to describe the US-­Japan alliance as but one spoke in the US-­centered hub-­and-­spoke security system in the Asia-­Pacific, one that includes other spokes radiating out to South ­Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Even more impor­tant than t­ hese alliances themselves are US national military capabilities and the US military presence in the western Pacific. US regional capabilities are, in turn, part of a larger regional balance of power that also features significant military contributions from nonspoke countries China and Rus­sia. As such, it would be more accurate to describe the security architecture of East Asia as consisting of the regional balance of power, including regional bilateral alliances, on the one hand, and regional cooperative multilateral security frameworks such as the ARF, on the other. ASEAN itself plays a role as a Southeast Asian security community.

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During the first de­cade of the twenty-­first ­century, the ARF’s role was supplemented by the nascent addition of security issues to the APT and the NEA 3 summit and related trilateral cooperation mechanism; the ADMM-­Plus; nascent minilateral cooperation between the Australia, Japan, and the US,84 or the even more nascent cooperation among the so-­called Quad nations;85 and functional ad hoc cooperation regarding the Korean Peninsula in the form of the Six-­Party Talks. Consequently, rather than describing the regional security architecture as “double-­layered,” Satoh Yukio’s early 1990s description of it as a “multiplex” system of numerous overlapping multilateral frameworks is arguably more accurate.86 Although the previous section pre­sents hypotheses about the under­lying motivations for Japan’s attempts to promote security multilateralism in East Asia, one question that remains is w ­ hether Japan’s adherence to the US alliance and its support for regional security multilateralism are compatible, as Japa­nese officials claim, or ­whether they are fundamentally incompatible, with Japan facing trade-­offs between what Kamiya calls the “double-­layered” security structures. Christopher Hughes and Akiko Fukushima claim that for Japan, “bilateralism and multilateralism make uncomfortable and even irreconcilable bedfellows,” and they question w ­ hether “both types of approaches to security are capable of developing equally or are sustainable in conjunction.”87 Although insisting that Japan’s promotion of security multilateralism and “contribution to confidence building and stability in East Asia should not be belittled,” they nonetheless claim that “few Japa­nese policymakers ­really view multilateral frameworks as ­viable security options in terms of their assuming a major and effective role in guaranteeing Japan’s security over the medium to long terms.”88 Similarly, Takeshi Yuzawa argues that Japan had “long-­term expectations of a new regional security order in which the two separate security arrangements [the US-­Japan alliance and the ARF] would mutually reinforce each other by providing complementary functions. Japa­nese officials did not consider the ARF to be a mere adjunct.”89 He claims Japa­nese officials became disappointed and saw a trade-­off between the ARF and the US-­Japan alliance, and he argues that Japan’s participation in and support for the ARF and regional security multilateralism waned ­because the focus of Japa­ nese policy makers’ attention “was massively shifted to the bilateral security approach ­after the mid 1990s.” He claims that this shift began with the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and the 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security,90 even though both documents explic­itly endorsed regional security multilateralism and dialogue, and the two states’ active participation therein.91 Likewise, Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, in a mid-1990s report, claim that ­there was a zero-­sum trade-­off between multilateral security cooperation and the bilateral alliance. According to the two authors, “momentum and energy in Japa­nese



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policy planning are flowing away from the alliance” and ­toward security multilateralism.92 The two identify a zero-­sum trade-­off between the alliance and ­multilateralism, claiming, “Bureaucrats in the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are increasingly distracted from alliance concerns by other m ­ atters. In the 1980s, the best and the brightest worked on the alliance; now they work on peacekeeping, Asian relations.”93 ­Later in the report they characterize multilateralism as “a distraction (in terms of po­liti­cal and financial resources) from bilateral defense cooperation.” They identify the ARF and even the track 2 (non-­statecentric) Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) as sources of this distraction.94 On the other hand, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki argues that Japan has pursued an innovative strategy of layering security institutions so that they are in fact complementary and mutually reinforcing. According to him, “This strategy is to layer additional institutions carefully and selectively on top of the Japan-­U.S. alliance in such a way to generate cumulative effects . . . ​that ­will provide a wider range of utilities Japan can tap.”95 Kawasaki identifies a Japa­nese technique of “ ‘functional grafting’ and differentiating commitment levels” as the means for connecting “new institutions to the core alliance in order to establish a larger, multifunctional system.”96 Similarly, Cha argues that “setting collective security or collective defense as the conceptual endpoint” of regional security multilateralism “is a self-­defeating exercise.”97 Rather, complementarity has been created between the alliance and multilateral structures by narrowing the overlap between the two, and by “broadening the focus” of the latter “on nontraditional or ‘new’ security issues.”98 ­Because ­these multilateral structures “focus on nontraditional security issues outside the alliance’s purview, they are not only helpful, but are also nonthreatening to the alliance.”99 The US, Japan’s ally, supports the use of East Asian security multilateralism to address ­these nontraditional security issues.100 Although some of ­these functions are not provided by the alliance or by Japan unilaterally, “­others augment a function that the alliance is already supplying.”101 One impor­tant function that multilateral forums such as the ARF and the ADMM-­Plus share with the US alliance is the function of reassuring Asian nations that Japan ­will not again reemerge as a direct military threat. Therefore, according to Kawasaki, ­these multilateral structures “occupy an integral part of Japan’s post–­cold war security policy.”102

The Diffusion of Ideas Fi­nally, as this book explores major changes in Japan’s security strategy, a secondary theoretical focus is how new ideas contribute to policy change. This study utilizes Jeffrey Checkel’s framework from Ideas and International Po­liti­cal Change. Checkel proposes several conditions conducive to producing policy change. First, “­under conditions of

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high international uncertainty or foreign policy crisis, decision makers engage in an information search and are thus more receptive to new ideas.”103 Second, this information search thereby creates “policy win­dows” that “link the international and domestic environments and motivate advocates of new ideas to promote them.”104 Third, the role of policy entrepreneurs within government varies depending on the type of government and the insulation of elites: “Policy entrepreneurs ­will play a crucial role in empowering new ideas in centralized states, b­ ecause many of the other pathways for effecting change are blocked or diminished in importance. In a decentralized state, entrepreneurs w ­ ill see their comparative advantage diminished as elite insulation decreases.”105 On the other hand, once ­adopted, new policy ideas have a greater chance of being implemented in more centralized states than in less centralized ones.106 Although postwar Japan has been a democracy, foreign policy making was dominated by MOFA and its elite c­ areer bureaucrats, who w ­ ere relatively well insulated from societal pressures ­until at least the mid-1990s, with the partial exception of elected politicians. Consequently, as ­will become evident in Chapters 3–5, crucial policy entrepreneurship came through Japa­nese diplomats who had deep connections with domestic experts and especially external epistemic communities of regional security experts. Th ­ ese epistemic communities provided new “information to decision makers” that helped “them to articulate an understanding of the world and their own policies and interests” and provided “new causal arguments,”107 explaining how security multilateralism could contribute to national security. MOFA diplomats with access to ­these experts utilized ­these connections to borrow and develop new ideas, and to build support and legitimacy for ­those ideas. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, foreign security experts and diplomats introduced new concepts, specifically forms of multilateral security cooperation that ­were neither multimember alliances nor collective security but w ­ ere rather common and cooperative security, as defined ­earlier. The introduction of ­these new concepts provided Japa­nese diplomats with new options for pursuing reassurance and other security objectives, including mitigating the alliance security dilemma and pursuing new security utilities.

Why ­Didn’t Japan Always Promote Security Multilateralism? Fi­nally, the theoretical framework laid out in this chapter raises an impor­tant question: If security multilateralism offers such wonderful potential benefits, why ­didn’t Japan embrace it from the beginning, and why did Tokyo pursue security isolationism during the Cold War instead? The diffusion-­of-­ideas explanatory framework discussed ­here suggests one answer: the concept of security multilateralism was ­limited to multilateral alliances and collective security ­until the rise of common and cooperative security in



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Eu­rope beginning in the 1970s. As laid out in the next chapter, another reason has to do with the adequacy of readily available alternatives. The US promoted a multilateral alliance as a means for reassuring states that had formerly been victimized by Japan’s war making, as it had done with West Germany in Eu­rope. When t­ hese states rejected this option ­because the prospect of a rearmed and militarily regionally engaged Japan, even one contained inside a multilateral alliance, proved more threatening than reassuring, and when Japan itself rejected the idea for parallel reasons, the US settled on a bilateral alliance with Japan as a fallback structure.108 Bilateral alliances can have a third-­party reassurance impact when a previously threatening state is contained in such an alliance by a stronger partner.109 At the same time, Japan’s relatively low security interdependence with its neighbors as an island nation, and its still relatively small and recovering economy, meant that Japan’s isolation from involvement in regional security had little negative impact for the US, while offering Japan a way to reassure its neighbors and encourage them to accept Japan’s regional economic engagement. Japan’s regional security isolationism meant scrupulously avoiding military contacts with other nations, and even avoiding security dialogue with its neighbors. By avoiding overseas deployments and shows of military force, maintaining a low security profile, and containing itself in the US-­Japan alliance and in Article 9 of Japan’s war-­ renouncing constitution,110 as well as related frameworks such as the one ­percent of gross domestic product limit on defense spending, Japan was able to avoid provoking historically rooted threat perceptions among its neighbors. It was only as Japan’s economic weight transformed it into a potential ­great power that the country grew too large for continued containment exclusively within a bilateral alliance and Tokyo developed broader security interests that could be at least partially served outside the alliance, encouraging it to turn ­toward broader multilateral frameworks.

Conclusion This chapter has introduced the range of conceivable multilateral security structures available at the beginning of the 1990s and proposed an explanatory framework for understanding why Japan began championing security multilateralism beginning in 1991. It extends this same framework to explain why Japan opposed security multilateralism during the Cold War and applies the concept of the diffusion of ideas as a way to understand the policy-pro­cess by which Japan made the pivot from opposing to championing security multilateralism. The story starts in the next chapter with the emergence of Japan’s security isolationism during the Cold War.

2

Japan and Its Regional Security Isolationism During the Cold War

during the cold wa r, Japan pursued regional security isolationism. This isolationism rested on two pillars. First, Japan abstained from involvement in regional security. Tokyo largely refused to even discuss regional security with other Asian countries. Second, Japan entrusted American hands with its stake in regional security. Tokyo’s contribution to regional security was indirect and passive. Japan passively served as the major Asian platform for American military power.1 Japan’s indirect contribution to regional security came in the form of economic aid, specifically Official Development Assistance (ODA).2 In part, Japan’s strategy reflected the bipolar distribution of power, which dictated that the US would be the dominant partner in the alliance and that the US would assume a leadership role in regional security, most notably balancing Soviet power. Bipolar logic alone cannot explain Japan’s regional security isolationism, however. Smaller states, including Australia, the Philippines, and South K ­ orea, participated more actively in regional security than did Japan, most notably by sending troops to fight in the Korean and Viet­nam­ese conflicts.3 Rather, as outlined in Chapter 1, Japan’s extreme overexpansion, and the sometimes-­brutal way it conquered and ruled Asian lands, saddled Japan with an aggressive reputation in East Asia.4 Although a democracy, Japan has not been trusted to wield the sword. It has been aware of its aggressive reputation.5 This reputation means that Japan has faced an exacerbated form of the security dilemma, especially during the Cold War.6 For Japa­nese security during the Cold War, less was more: less involvement in regional security and fewer armaments discouraged o­ thers from balancing against Japan. In this way Japan reas-



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sured its neighbors. It escaped the security dilemma by maintaining a minimal and nonoffensive defense (senshu bōei) and isolating itself from regional security while relying on the US to deter potential threats. This chapter consists of four sections. The first section examines the US proposal for establishing a multilateral Pacific Pact in the early 1950s, and Japan’s reasons for rejecting it and instead preferring a bilateral alliance combined with regional security isolationism. The second section explains how Japan used security isolation as a form of reassurance. The third section pre­sents the origins, formulation, and institutionalization of the Fukuda Doctrine, and the final section draws conclusions.

Japan and the Pacific Pact Proposal Japan first faced the issue of regional multilateral security cooperation at the beginning of the 1950s, when its primary occupier, the United States, raised the topic. John Foster Dulles, then President Harry S. Truman’s special emissary, proposed a multilateral Pacific Pact to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru during their peace treaty negotiations in late January and early February 1951.7 ­Behind Dulles’s fixation with entangling Japan in a multilateral alliance was the belief that a multilateral alliance would be the ideal structure for constraining Japan’s military while si­mul­ta­neously helping Japan and its neighbors to reconcile. Drawing an analogy to Germany’s integration into NATO, Dulles wanted to see Japan’s military integrated into a multilateral Pacific Pact. Such an alliance would not only restrain Japan’s military, it would also promote a gradual growth of trust through military-­ to-­military contacts and allow Japan to play an active role in regional security.8 This might have produced a benign track rec­ord to supplant memories of Japan’s pre-1945 be­hav­ior. The “­bottle logic” of the reassurance value of an alliance ­toward third parties was clearly pre­sent in Dulles’s 1951 efforts to sell a Pacific Pact to other US-­aligned states.9 Dulles, while negotiating with Australia and New Zealand over his proposed Pacific Pact and the Japa­nese peace treaty, reassured the two countries that the presence of US troops in Japan would ensure that “­there would be no aggression by Japan.”10 The reassurance impact of the proposed US-­Japan alliance and the continued presence of US troops in Japan worked gradually to reassure t­hese and other countries. Nonetheless, the US had underestimated opposition to joining Japan in a regional multilateral alliance.11 In par­tic­u­lar, during his trip to the region in spring 1951, Dulles came to recognize the strong opposition of regional states to joining a multilateral alliance that included Japan.12 Nearly a year ­later, Dulles wrote that many prospective members of the proposed Pacific Pact “have memories of Japa­nese aggression which are so vivid that they are reluctant to create a Mutual Security Pact which ­will include Japan.”13 Many US allies

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who had previously been attacked by Japan saw Japan as more of a threat than Communist China and the Soviet Union: “They fear Japa­nese aggression, which they know as an actuality, more than Rus­sian or Chinese aggression, which they have never experienced.” Hence, the bilateral US-­Japan alliance and the continued presence of US troops in Japan “provides a shield between them [other US allies] and Japan.” Consequently, US allies “hesitate at the pre­sent time to engage themselves directly in what their ­people might misinterpret as a sort of ‘alliance’ with Japan.”14 For similar reasons, Japan itself opposed joining a regional multilateral alliance. From the very beginning, Yoshida rejected the idea of participation in a regional multilateral defense alliance. This marked the beginning of Japan’s Cold War policy of regional security isolationism and opposition to regional security multilateralism, policies that would continue for the following forty years. Yoshida based his opposition to participation in the multilateral Pacific Pact on five considerations. First, he refused Dulles’s invitation to join his proposed multilateral Pacific Pact ­because joining would entail rearmament that would provoke Asian neighbors. Giving his government’s official position on the war-­renouncing Article 9 of Japan’s new constitution in testimony in the Japa­nese Diet in July 1946, Yoshida stated, “­Because Japan renounces the right of war in its constitution, Japan’s status avoids the suspicions of other countries.”15 Years l­ater in his memoirs, Yoshida similarly argued that rearmament was risky: “We needed to remember that many of the countries with which we had been at war still held Japan in distrust, a distrust which could easily be fanned into active hatred.”16 Yoshida was not the only Japa­ nese conservative to hold this view. One historian of this period notes that Japa­nese conservatives feared that rearmament would “rekindle anxiety among Japan’s war­time victims [and] isolate the nation from its Asian neighbors.”17 Second, and relatedly, rearmament could even give rise to the very renewed militarism t­ hese neighbors, along with Yoshida himself, feared.18 A few years l­ater, Yoshida expressed his own personal fears about the Japa­nese military again usurping civilian control in a conversation with John M. Allison: When I was Ambassador to Japan and got to know Mr. Yoshida well, I often would discuss this prob­lem with him. I pointed out that in the new Japan the military had none of the special powers they had in prewar Japan and that with civilian control the military could be the servant, not the master of Japan. Mr. Yoshida would look up at me with twinkling eyes and an impish grin and say, “Yes, but they have guns, ­haven’t they?”19

Third, nonparticipation in a regional multilateral defense alliance and minimal rearmament was, ironically, a strategy designed to maximize autonomy, since a heavi­ly rearmed Japan in a multilateral alliance might have been drawn into vari­ous Asian hot spots at US insistence and ­under US command, a fear that was especially palpable



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­ ntil the end of the Korean War.20 Frank Kowalski, an American military adviser, u heard this concern during a conversation with a high-­ranking Japa­nese official: “If we or­ga­nize 300,000 troops . . . ​your government ­will insist that we send some of ­these troops to ­Korea. That is why the Prime Minister agreed to expand our forces only to 110,000.”21 For the same reason, Japan strenuously fended off US demands during negotiations over the 1951 US-­Japan security treaty for a “joint command” clause, which would have subordinated the SDF to a US commander during war­time. In the end, Japan was the only major US ally that did accede to this US demand.22 Fourth, ­because Japan did not have any land borders, and the US maintained naval and air dominance, Tokyo did not perceive a credible military threat from the Soviet Union or China, and therefore had no incentive to pool military power with other nations, besides the US, in a multilateral alliance. Fi­nally, Ōtake Hideo traces this reluctance to participate in regional security to Yoshida’s personality. Ōtake claims, “Yoshida never considered such politico-­military integration with neighboring nations pos­si­ble or desirable. . . . ​Although he was e­ ager for international economic integration, he wished to maintain a distinctive cultural identity for the Japa­nese ­people.”23 Although Yoshida also believed that entangling Japan in an alliance would serve to reassure Japan’s neighbors, he disagreed with Dulles on the form that alliance should take: bilateral or multilateral. In the short run, Yoshida’s logic proved more compelling since most other regional countries refused to join a Pacific Pact that included Japan (see the discussion ­earlier in this chapter). Thus, Yoshida chose a strategy that minimized short-­run provocation, but at the expense of long-­run dispositional reassurance. By insisting on a bilateral alliance, Yoshida built a structure that eventually permitted Japan to earn situational trust within its confines, but at the cost of earning unconditional dispositional trust by becoming a “familiar” regional power and building a track rec­ord of benign security cooperation. In the end Yoshida got his way. The US agreed to an exclusively bilateral defense treaty, one that was nonetheless highly unequal. Japan had no obligation to defend the US, play a role in regional security, or defend US allies. U ­ nder the original 1951 security treaty, the US had the right to intervene to put down domestic unrest in Japan. The US also received basing rights but was not formally obligated to defend Japan.24 Nonetheless, as Yoshida saw it, if Japan was attacked, the US, with bases in Japan, could hardly fail to come to Japan’s defense. Considering Japa­nese and regional opposition to a multilateral alliance of non-­ Communist nations, the US abandoned the Pacific Pact proposal. As Galia Press-­ Barnathan writes, “Once the allies rejected the pact as a means of containing Japan, however, the multilateral arrangement lost its edge.”25 In its place, Washington came to f­ avor a series of bilateral security pacts between the US and Asian allies, including

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with Japan itself, a structure that subsequently became known as the hub-­and-­spokes structure, with the US as the regional security hub and bilateral alliances radiating out from the hub. This structure gave the US greater influence, as it could deal with its weaker partners individually, instead of collectively. On the other hand, this structure sacrificed the power aggregation potential of a multilateral alliance, but without Japan inside, ­there was ­little such potential to be realized with other allies.26

A Multilateral Alliance Revisited During the mid-1950s, Dulles, as secretary of state, made several other démarches designed to involve Japan in regional multilateral security cooperation.27 In the late 1950s, during negotiations for a revised and more equal security treaty, the Eisenhower administration again broached the idea of involving Japan in the defense of Taiwan and South ­Korea, or, more vaguely, the western Pacific, Guam, or at least occupied Okinawa.28 During the Cold War, the potential rim of this hub-­and-­spokes structure, which could have formed a wheel, with ties developing between Amer­i­ca’s Asian allies, remained very much undeveloped, despite US efforts to use the US-­Japan alliance and the other spokes of its East Asian bilateral alliances to promote at least a modicum of security cooperation between Japan and its former colonies and war­time foes.29 During the 1950s, the US made several more attempts to bring Japan into a broader multilateral alliance framework.30 In the mid-1950s t­ here was discussion of including Japan in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organ­ization (SEATO), although this was blocked in part b ­ ecause “Australia and New Zealand opposed the inclusion of Japan in the relatively inconsequential SEATO on the grounds that to do so would be provocative in areas where the physical or psychological scars of the war remained unhealed.”31 Japan also refused to consider joining. Although Yoshida’s successor, Hatoyama Ichirō, drafted a new security treaty in July 1955 that would have given Japan a regional security role in the western Pacific, the US rejected Hatoyama’s demand to renegotiate the bilateral alliance, in large part ­because the draft also called for the withdrawal of all US forces from Japan.32 Subsequently, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and some leading factional heads of the Liberal Demo­cratic Party (LDP) briefly flirted with US proposals to multilateralize the US-­Japan security treaty when it was fi­nally renegotiated at the end of the 1950s. Nonetheless, they quickly retreated b ­ ehind the Yoshida Doctrine’s unconditional rejection of such a role.33

The Bilateral Versus Multilateral Alliance Choice Alliances are sometimes formed to help reconcile former opponents, as well as for power aggregation purposes.34 In 1951 the US saw that including, or containing, Japan in a regional multilateral alliance, a so-­called Pacific Pact, would help to reconcile



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Japan and its former adversaries in East Asia, as well as to mobilize Japan’s industrial economy in ser­vice of containing Communist expansionism. Thus, Japan’s reputational prob­lem alone cannot explain why Tokyo chose a bilateral alliance over a multilateral alliance, as ­either can have third-­party reassurance effects. However, reputation alone is not sufficient to explain why Japan rejected an in­de­pen­dent or unilateral defense strategy. For a state with an aggressive reputation, no other strategy can do more to raise the suspicions of ­others and to provoke economic and even military counterbalancing against the state.35 Thus, the best strategy for such a state is to embed itself in a bilateral or multilateral alliance.36 Of course, Japan chose a bilateral alliance, thereby allowing the US to become the proverbial “cap on the ­bottle” of Japa­nese remilitarization.37 Although Japan’s decision, like Germany’s decision to enter a multilateral alliance, was in part a function of domestic f­ actors, including Yoshida’s desire to avoid po­liti­cal and military integration with surrounding nations, the differing levels of threats facing the two countries also significantly influenced this decision. The Red Army that occupied East Germany posed a significant threat to the security of West Germany, so much so that American military power alone was insufficient to counterbalance it. Therefore, to counterbalance the Soviet threat, West Germany needed to engage in significant rearmament, and to rely on the support of other Western Eu­ro­pean nations as well.38 By contrast, American naval and air dominance in the western Pacific was so complete, at least ­until the late 1970s, that Japan had ­little to fear, militarily, from the Soviet Union, Communist China, or their allies. Hence, Japan had ­little need to spend much on defense, or to rely on the assistance of regional states. Maintaining no significant military and abstaining from regional security commitments was thus a better strategy for reassuring its neighbors. Compared with West Germany’s strategy of significant rearmament and participation in the multilateral NATO alliance, Japan’s minimalist defense posture, regional security isolationism, and dependence on, and self-­containment in, a bilateral alliance entailed less risk of provoking neighboring nations, especially during the initial stages of rearmament. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, maintaining a low profile in­def­initely can prevent the state from reassuring its neighbors through direct security interaction and the establishment of a benign track rec­ord; the state ­will remain an unfamiliar and mistrusted military power. As Japa­nese economic power grew in the 1960s and 1970s, one might have expected that Japan would have begun directly cooperating with other East Asian states, at least ­those aligned with the US, to help maintain regional security. However, the stability of the US-­Japan alliance, domestic opposition in Japan to playing a regional security role, and the US preference for the status quo made switching to a multilateral alliance, or some looser form of multilateral security cooperation, a less than attractive option compared with sticking with the tried and true hub-­and-­spokes structure.

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Whereas West Germany faced a formidable Soviet land-­based threat on its border and depended on the US and its other NATO allies for assistance, Japan did not face a significant external threat ­until the late 1970s (and then it was still significantly smaller than that faced by West Germany). B ­ ecause Japan was relatively insulated from the Soviet military threat, it had greater latitude for adopting a Gaullist free-­ rider and unilateralist security strategy (including the acquisition of a nuclear force du frappe). Indeed, the Gaullist option would have offered Japan much greater autonomy. However, what worked for France would not have worked for Japan ­because of its aggressive reputation. Rather, had Japan pursued a Gaullist option, it would have provoked its Asian neighbors to counterbalance it militarily and eco­nom­ical­ly; the US as well as the Soviets might have also felt compelled to counterbalance Japan.39 Amer­i­ca’s own concerns regarding Japan’s aggressive reputation, and its contentment with the status quo, help explain its reluctance in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to broach the idea of a new multilateral alliance structure, as well as its concern about Japan’s modest autonomous defense efforts. Even at the beginning of the 1970s, with the US drawing down its forward military presence in East Asia and calling on East Asian allies to become more self-­sufficient in defense ­under President Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, the call of the Japa­nese Defense Agency chief at the time, Nakasone Yasuhiro, for Japan to shift to a more autonomous defense ( jishu bōei) alarmed the US,40 indicating that even Washington had doubts about Japan’s ability to pursue a moderate and nonaggressive security policy on its own.

Japan’s Security Isolationism as a Form of Reassurance Looking back at the end of the Cold War, Satoh Yukio, a se­nior Japa­nese diplomat,41 speaking to a seminar of Asia-­Pacific security elites, explained Japan’s security and po­liti­cal isolationism this way: “Po­liti­cally, Japan has been keeping a low profile. ­Behind this has been a concern that a high po­liti­cal posture on the Japa­nese part might arouse skepticism and concern among Asian p ­ eople, who still remember the Japa­nese attempt to dominate them by force, let alone the horrendous conduct by the invading Japa­nese.”42 During the Cold War, Japan strictly adhered to its regional security isolationism. During the Cold War, the SDF was essentially isolated from all other militaries except for the US military. The Rim of the Pacific multilateral naval exercise sponsored by the US Navy is a striking example. When it began participating in 1980, Japan was always paired with participating US Navy units; it avoided interaction with non-­US navies. If a third country was assigned to the US-­Japan team, the team would be split into two groups so that the Maritime Self-­Defense Force (MSDF)



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did not work with third-­country navies. For Japan during the Cold War, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) was a bilateral exercise in close proximity to a multilateral one. 43 For the same reason, Japan even refused to discuss regional security issues with its neighbors. Japan’s security isolationism made it dependent on the US security guarantee to safeguard its stake in regional security. On ­those rare occasions when Japan did adopt mea­sures that directly affected regional security, such as its 1981 decision to extend its defense of the sea-­lanes of communication out to one thousand nautical miles from Tokyo Bay, Japan’s decision was largely a reaction to US pressure. This security isolationism contrasted with Japan’s active economic engagement, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Japan has been consistently promoting economic multilateralism since regaining in­de­pen­dence, beginning with the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and the Colombo Plan. By 1966 Japan was taking the initiative in establishing a regional multilateral economic body: the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia.44 In the mid-1960s Japan championed the establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB; see the discussion ­later in this chapter). Although Japan consistently maintained its policy of security isolationism throughout the Cold War, it did make one attempt to assume regional po­liti­cal leadership, specifically during the Ikeda administration in the early 1960s. In 1963 Tokyo drafted a proposal for an un-­like-­minded po­liti­cal multilateral forum, the Western Pacific Council (or Organ­ization).45 The proposal was first developed by Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, then enthusiastically embraced by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato.46 The first aim of this proposal was to implement confidence-­building mea­sures and help reduce Indonesia’s international isolation, especially from surrounding countries, most notably Australia and New Zealand, but also the US.47 The second aim was to help mediate the territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia regarding the latter’s territories of Sabah and Sarawak on the northern half of the island of Borneo (the rest of the island being controlled by Indonesia), a dispute that had erupted into an Indonesian-­sponsored insurgency in ­these Malaysian territories.48 Although Indonesia supported the proposal, the US opposed it, the Philippines also came out in opposition, and MOFA did not actively support it e­ ither. Suspicion that Japan was creating a po­liti­cally focused multilateral institution played a significant role in the US and Philippine opposition, and hence in killing the proposal. Consequently, Ōhira and Ikeda’s proposal for a Western Pacific Council was never officially made, and the proposal was quietly buried in diplomatic archives. 49 The Western Pacific Council thus represented the first furtive attempt to move beyond economic regional multilateralism into po­liti­cal regional multilateralism, and even

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t­ oward conflict resolution and confidence-­building diplomacy. Still, no attempt was made to become involved in regional security multilateralism. Whereas Ikeda had tried and failed to establish an un-­like-­minded multilateral forum to help overcome Indonesia’s isolation, two years l­ater South K ­ orea addressed the absence of regional po­liti­cal multilateralism by proposing a like-­minded regional po­liti­cal multilateral forum, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). ASPAC was to include Australia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, South ­Korea, South Vietnam, and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Notably, the US was not included, but as all members except Malaysia w ­ ere US allies, Seoul conceived of ASPAC as a forum for supporting regional US leadership. ASPAC was to be anti-­ Communist in orientation and promote security, if not military, cooperation as well as po­liti­cal, social, economic, and cultural cooperation. Soon ­after diplomatic relations between Japan and South ­Korea ­were normalized in 1965, Japan agreed to join and participated in the first meeting in Seoul in June 1966.50 ASPAC represents Japan’s first participation in a po­liti­cally focused regional multilateral forum. Arguably, the absence of the US made it easier for Japan to participate, as the risk of entrapment was reduced. Nonetheless, Japan conditioned its participation on ASPAC “not being a military alliance” and lobbied to downplay its anti-­Communist orientation.51 Indeed, Tokyo emphasized economic and social cooperation aspects of ASPAC. Japan was motivated by a desire to improve relations and promote goodwill with South ­Korea just ­after the establishment of relations, and to enhance Seoul’s international status. Japan appeared to fear military and po­liti­cal entrapment in ASPAC, and to worry about regional reactions if it did start playing a military role. At this time Japan implicitly appeared more interested in less like-­ minded po­liti­cal multilateralism, like Ikeda’s failed Western Pacific Council. Japan’s ambivalence ­toward ASPAC came to a head in 1972 when Tokyo normalized relations with the ­People’s Republic of China, causing it to withdraw from ASPAC in 1973, ­because the council was seen as too anti-­China and Taiwan remained a member. Soon thereafter, ASPAC was dissolved.52 On the other hand, by the end of the 1960s, Japan came to oppose un-­like-­ minded regional security multilateralism as a result of active Soviet support for the idea. Beginning in 1969, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev promoted a multilateral collective security pact for Asia. While this proposal aimed at containing China, it also targeted the US and its network of regional alliances, with clauses such as a ban on foreign military bases in Asia. It thus appeared to constitute more an effort to obtain unilateral advantage for Moscow than a plan for a serious regional multilateral security forum.53 Japan feared entrapment in Soviet-­designed un-­like-­minded regional security multilateralism that appeared aimed to eliminate US bases in the region and drive a wedge between the US and its Asian allies, especially Japan.54 More generally, Japan



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opposed a regional security multilateralism b­ ecause its regional security isolationism prevented it from meaningfully participating.

The Reassurance Imperative and The Fukuda Doctrine The Fukuda Doctrine would become Japan’s first high-­profile and at least partially successful initiative to claim a regional po­liti­cal role, an initiative predicated on the military reassurance promise not to become a military power and to maintain security isolationism (security nonengagement). It would not only reflect a desire to begin playing a po­liti­cal role but also be a way to respond to regional backlash against J­ apan’s increasingly dominant economic role, including attempts at exercising regional economic leadership. This backlash stemmed from regional memories of Japan’s pre-1945 be­hav­ior. Its attempt to claim the headquarters and leadership over the envisaged ADB proved to be the first major example of this dynamic. The evolution of Japan’s regional diplomacy ­after the 1950s continued to illustrate the impact of the changing balance of power and Japan’s reputation on its regional security strategy. In the 1950s and 1960s Japan ­limited its Asian relations to ones of trade, investment, and aid with non-­Communist Asia, mostly eschewing a po­liti­cal role and entirely avoiding security ties. In the wake of the American withdrawal from Indochina in the mid-1970s and Tokyo’s normalization of relations with Communist China in 1972, Japan saw an opportunity to begin playing a larger po­liti­cal role.55 However, concern over Japan’s growing economic dominance, combined with worries about Amer­i­ca’s relative decline and vivid memories of Japan’s war­time be­hav­ior, produced renewed concerns about a potential Japa­nese threat.

Fukuda Doctrine Origins Fukuda, on a personal level, experienced the lessons under­lying Japan’s postwar reassurance strategy. Entering the Ministry of Finance in 1929, he at one point had the unenviable and even dangerous job of being the bud­get auditor for the Japa­nese Imperial Army.56 Like Yoshida Shigeru and other conservative civilian bureaucrats, he had watched, and been personally affected, as civilian control broke down and the prewar military spun out of control.57 As such, Fukuda was deeply skeptical of the military and the possibility of civilian control, hence his willingness, if not enthusiasm, to promote Japan as a nonmilitarized economic g­ reat power, and his ability to take seriously Asian mistrust of Japan’s character as a military power. Fukuda, far from seeing Japa­nese nationalism as a root cause of the militarism of the 1930s, was led, like many other postwar Japa­nese leaders and intellectuals, by his ac­cep­tance of the domestic antimilitarist lessons of the postwar era (as discussed in the previous chapter) to conceive of reassurance in terms of controlling a potentially uncontrollable military, rather than as apologizing and reassuring the victims of aggression that Japan shared their view of history.

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The ADB: A Lesson in Asian Mistrust Fukuda personally encountered Asian mistrust of Japan as finance minister in the mid-1960s. During his first term, he was responsible for lobbying other Asian nations to agree to place the headquarters of the then envisioned ADB in Tokyo. The ADB reflected the economic multilateralism that Japan had been promoting since it regained in­de­pen­dence, and it sharply contrasted with its security isolationism. Tokyo was actively building economic ties even while shunning security ties and maintaining a very low po­liti­cal profile.58 Japan, as by far the largest and most developed economy in Asia, and the leading envisioned funder of the ADB, along with the US, argued that the bank’s headquarters should be placed in Tokyo and led by a Japa­nese. Several Asian countries, especially in East and Southeast Asia,59 opposed placing the headquarters in Tokyo and supported the Philippines’ proposal to place the headquarters in Manila. Tokyo was outvoted, and it was de­cided to place the headquarters in Manila, defeating Fukuda’s efforts. Reflecting on the reasons for this defeat, Fukuda identified “latent distrust” of Japan as the basic reason for Japan’s failure. If Japan “could not connect with the hearts of Asians, the same t­ hing would happen again.”60 Dennis Yasutomo summarizes the lesson Japa­nese policy makers more generally drew from this defeat as “beware of Asian fears concerning Japan’s aspirations in the region.”61 Fukuda’s perception of East and Southeast Asian mistrust prompted him to develop two directions in diplomacy and policy to reassure Japan’s East Asian neighbors. First, he began developing the concept that even as an economic g­ reat power, Japan would commit itself to not becoming a ­great military power. Second, he began to develop the idea that Japan had to build ties of confidence and trust with East Asians. Regarding the promise not to become a military power, Fukuda is known to have first committed the kernel of this concept to paper on April 25, 1970. ­There he indicated that Japan was a g­ reat economic power that would not become a g­ reat military power as had been the pattern of past ­great powers.62 As foreign minister, Fukuda, in a speech to a policy forum on January 24, 1972, declared that even as a ­great economic power, Japan would depart from the historical norm of a ­great economic power becoming a ­great military power. According to Fukuda, “This economic g­ reat power Japan ­will not choose the path that the world’s countries have in history, namely an economic ­great power moving in the direction of acquiring strong military power, in other words an economic ­great power being synonymous with being a ­great military power.”63 During a Diet question-­and-­answer session in February 1972, Fukuda stated that Japan had no intention to arm itself with power­ful weapons, including nuclear weapons. Instead, according to him, Japan would rely on po­liti­cal means to maintain the country’s security,64 a phrase that appears to refer to both the US-Japan alliance and his nascent ideas about reassuring neighboring



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countries. Ochi Takao maintains that Fukuda was claiming that even though Japan possessed the ability to procure power­ful weapons, notably nuclear weapons, Tokyo nevertheless resolved not to obtain such weapons, for reasons unrelated to constitutional restrictions (which Fukuda did not refer to).65 In July 1972, in a speech declaring his candidacy for president of the ruling LDP, and hence for prime minister of Japan, Fukuda argued that for the sake of securing trust and coexistence with other nations, Japan, “even while holding g­ reat economic power, is determined not to choose the path of becoming a military power. This is the challenge of realizing an example never before seen in history.”66 One of the slogans of his unsuccessful campaign for LDP president in 1972 was “Building a Peaceful ­Great Power.”67 In his speech marking the establishment of the Japan Foundation in October 1972, Fukuda pointed to the recent rise of unwarranted fear and threat perceptions of Japan in other nations. Citing foreign worries about “a resurgence of Japa­nese militarism,” and related criticism that Japan only pursued economic interests, Fukuda claimed it was an “urgent task” for Japan’s “reputation” (gaibun)68 “to communicate to overseas the country’s true orientation as a peace state and a culture state, sweeping away misperceptions.”69 The broom Fukuda proposed for sweeping away misperceptions about remilitarization and economic egotism was wide-­ranging “heart-­to-­heart contact” with other nations, specifically in the form of h ­ uman and cultural exchange.70 According to Ochi, Fukuda believed that “heart-­to-­heart” contact was the requisite basis for building mutual understanding.71

Tanaka Riots In the 1950s and 1960s Japan had ­limited its ties with East Asia to trade, investment, and aid relationships, resorting to self-­imposed security isolationism. Despite a few futile attempts (see the e­ arlier discussion), it avoided playing a po­liti­cal role, even t­ oward non-­Communist countries.72 However, in the wake of the American withdrawal from Indochina in the early 1970s, Japan saw an opportunity to begin playing a larger po­ liti­cal role in the non-­Communist ASEAN countries.73 Nonetheless, Southeast Asian memories of Japan’s invasion and brutal occupation, combined with more recent threat perceptions about growing economic domination, if not exploitation of Southeast Asian resources and markets, flared into anti-­Japanese riots during then–­prime minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Southeast Asia in January 1974.74 Although the Tanaka riots often targeted local ruling elites as much as they targeted Japan, the fact that Japan was such a po­liti­cally correct and con­ve­nient target (that is, a legitimate reason to riot)75 highlights Japan’s reputational prob­lem in the region.76 As Sumio Edamura, a Japa­nese diplomat with long experience in Southeast Asia, ­later explained, “it is undeniable” that the Tanaka riots w ­ ere “a volcanic eruption of pent-up anti-­Japanese

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sentiments prevalent at that time. . . . ​No less than 800 Japanese-­branded cars ­were cast into canals or set ablaze during the street protests.”77 The power vacuum created by the US withdrawal from Vietnam in the mid-1970s exacerbated perceptions of a looming Japa­nese threat. According to Masahide Shibusawa, “When the war in Vietnam was in full swing, Japan’s activities did not attract much attention. However, with the prospect of American withdrawal so near, Japan’s visibility greatly increased.”78

Formulating the Fukuda Doctrine The Tanaka riots w ­ ere a “shock” to Japan’s po­liti­cal elites79 and demonstrated that Japan’s hitherto eco­nom­ically focused diplomacy had been a failure. As Sueo Sudo notes, “The anti-­Japanese movement in 1974 was a decisive counterblow to Japan’s resource-­based diplomacy.”80 Edamura argues the Tanaka riots ­were “a catalyst to shocking and forcing Japan to rethink its appropriate role in Southeast Asia and the world.”81 At the same time, he also notes that the Fukuda Doctrine was a culmination of Japan’s response to Southeast Asian suspicions: “The Fukuda Doctrine . . . ​was not conceived in one day but out of a long gestation period starting from the growing anti-­Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. . . . ​[It] was born through the baptism of fire—­a bonfire of ­Toyota cars in Jakarta.”82 Thus, in response to the 1974 Tanaka riots, Japan fashioned a new and more comprehensive policy t­ oward Southeast Asia over the following three years, the policy that ­later became known as the Fukuda Doctrine. One concrete manifestation of this rethinking was Japan’s December 1976 proposal to establish an “ASEAN-­Japan Forum,” a proposal ASEAN accepted. The forum was to focus on economic development and technology transfer. The first meeting was held in March 1977.83 Japan also wanted this forum to cover po­liti­cal issues and facilitate Japan’s role as a diplomatic bridge builder between ASEAN and the Communist Indochinese nations. From its start in 1977, the ASEAN-­Japan Forum evolved into a regular meeting that occurred e­ very eigh­teen months, lasted a day and a half, and involved ­career bureaucrats from the two sides, starting with their respective foreign ministries but also including bureaucrats from other ministries (for example, in Japan’s case, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture). The ASEAN-­Japan Forum thus became an institutionalized mechanism for policy coordination between the two sides.84 The post–­Tanaka riot policy rethink culminated in a six-­week period in summer 1977 when Fukuda, together with MOFA bureaucrats but with relatively ­little input from his foreign minister, Hatoyama Iichirō, hammered out the text of the keynote speech Fukuda was to deliver during his tour of ASEAN countries. Owada Hisashi, Fukuda’s foreign policy secretary, was an impor­tant interlocutor between MOFA and Fukuda during the drafting of the doctrine. Owada was also the MOFA official who framed the speech as a “doctrine” defining key policy tenets, arguing that this was



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expected of a major power such as Japan.85 The first draft of the speech was produced on July 5, 1977, and consisted of six points, including a reference to heart-­to-­heart communication, but no mention of Japan renouncing the path of becoming a military power.86 ­After reviewing this first draft, Fukuda pressed to add the pledge that Japan would not become a military power as an amendment,87 reflecting, as discussed ­earlier, his long-­standing promotion of this concept from his time as foreign minister five years e­ arlier.88 By the time of the fifth and final draft, this pledge had become the first of three princi­ples.89

The Doctrine The first pillar of the Fukuda Doctrine was thus a clear renunciation of any military role. In his Manila speech of August 1977 laying out what came to be known as his doctrine, Prime Minister Fukuda explained the first pillar of Japan’s regional policy as follows: “First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia and of the world community.”90 Elaborating on this position, and echoing speeches he had been giving since the beginning of the 1970s, he pledged that ­great economic power would not translate into ­great military power: Throughout the world’s history, ­great economic powers have always been ­great military powers as well. Japan, however, has set for herself a new ideal, unpre­ce­dented in history, of relying for the safety and survival on the justice and good faith of nations. We have chosen not to take the path to ­great military power. Although we possess the economic and technological capability needed to produce nuclear arms, we have firmly rejected the acquisition of such weapons.91

As analyzed e­ arlier, this pledge, and the claim that Japan is unique as a g­ reat economic power that does not pursue ­great military power, originated with Prime Minister Fukuda himself based on personal encounters with foreign, and specifically Southeast Asian, mistrust of Japan.92 The second pillar of the Fukuda Doctrine was the promise to build “heart-­to-­ heart relations”: “Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia ­will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on ‘heart-­to-­heart’ understanding with ­these countries, in wide-­ranging fields covering not only po­liti­cal and economic areas but also social and cultural areas.”93 The third and final pillar concerned expanding economic and technical assistance to the ASEAN nations. Regarding the second pillar, Kikuchi Kiyoaki, a Japa­nese diplomat who played a major role in formulating the Fukuda Doctrine, claims that the Asia Bureau came up with the phrase “heart-­to-­heart,” although he acknowledges that it was Fukuda

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who made the decision about ­whether to include it.94 Similarly, Edamura claims that Tanino Sakutarō, then director of the Second Southeast Asia Division, proposed the catchphrase “heart-­to-­heart.”95 Nonetheless, as shown previously, Fukuda himself had started using the phrase while foreign minister several years e­ arlier to signify Japan’s need to reassure its neighbors in a positive sense, not merely in the negative sense of promising not to become a military or an economic threat. He backed this up by promising to set up a fund for promoting cultural exchange among ASEAN countries.96 In short, Fukuda’s use of this term in the early 1970s, and again in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, was aimed at overcoming external suspicions of Japan and building relations of trust. Similarly, Fukuda enunciated the goal of achieving “coexistence” with the Communist states of Indochina, starting with Vietnam, in order “to reassure Indochinese states that Tokyo’s support for ASEAN did not mean a hostile attitude ­towards them.”97 Fukuda himself placed greatest emphasis on the first two pillars of the Fukuda Doctrine, ­those regarding reassurance: the promise not to become a military power and to build heart-­to-­heart relations, especially the former.98 When looking back in 1985, Fukuda emphasized reassurance as the central message of the doctrine: “First, Japan would not become a military ­great power . . . ​that is the biggest concern that Asian countries have.”99 Elaborating further, Fukuda stressed, “For this reason I emphasized that Japan was determined not to become a military ­great power like in the pre-­war era.”100 Looking back a de­cade ­later, in 1995, Fukuda asserted that the promise that “Japan w ­ ill not become a military g­ reat power” was the “core [of the doctrine] and conveyed to the world Japan’s position and international role.”101 Ochi argues that the Fukuda Doctrine established an impor­tant framework for Japan’s regional diplomacy—­namely, the promise that Japan would not become a threat.102 Owada subsequently defined the Fukuda Doctrine as applying to Japan’s foreign policy ­toward East Asia more generally: “The doctrine is not oriented t­oward a specific regional economic bloc in the area. The declaration is a serious attempt to define the ­future role of Japan in this part of the world, and by extension the wider world.”103 Edamura, one of the Japa­nese diplomats involved in drafting the Fukuda Doctrine, emphasizes the second reassurance pillar of the doctrine—­“heart-­to-­heart relations”—­ and argues that it reassured Southeast Asian nations regarding their perceptions of Japan: “Perhaps this resonates with what the Southeast Asian elites and masses want Japan to be—­not a domineering and militaristic country again but a good neighbor sensitive to the sentiments and needs of the region.”104 Edamura also notes that the way Fukuda presented this pledge helped to ensure its ac­cep­tance both in Southeast Asia and domestically in Japan: “This determination not to become a military power again is set forth with pride and not as an apology for its war responsibilities. One reason why this commitment has been accepted at home and abroad without re­sis­



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tance to this day is ­because it was announced positively as a national conviction and norm, and not passively as an apology.”105 Indeed, as we saw e­ arlier in this chapter, Fukuda had been trying since his stint as foreign minister in the early 1970s to find ways to articulate this domestic consensus to international audiences. The overall thrust of the Fukuda Doctrine was thus to reassure ASEAN nations that Japan would not again threaten them, in order to build “special and intimate ties”;106 discourage Southeast Asian counterbalancing against Japan, ­whether eco­nom­ ically, po­liti­cally, or militarily; and gain ac­cep­tance from ASEAN nations for Japan to play a dominant economic role and to begin playing some sort of ­limited po­liti­cal role in the region. This “special relationship,” which was based on the reassurance pillars of the Fukuda Doctrine, was coupled with the economic aid that made up the third pillar, as well as the fact that Japan, alone among the major powers, combined perceived friendliness with attentiveness to ASEAN’s needs and the resources to make a difference. Indeed, Japan saw itself as a potential bridge between the Communist Indochinese states and the non-­Communist ASEAN states, with economic assistance being Japan’s main tool for achieving this.107 Thus, by explic­itly renouncing any security or military role, Japan attempted, according to Sudo, “to get involved in the power politics of the region, which had been virtually absent in Japan’s Southeast Asian policy previously.”108 While it is arguably an exaggeration to say that Japan was seeking involvement in regional “power politics,” Japan did seek to actively help resolve po­liti­cal disputes by diplomatic and economic means, the attempt to use the Fukuda Doctrine as a bridge between Communist Indochina and non-­Communist ASEAN nations being a leading example. Japan’s active support of ASEAN in its pressure campaign against Vietnam for its 1978 invasion of Cambodia is another example. The Japan-­ASEAN “special relationship” was to remain in place for nearly twenty years, and it provided Japan with greater scope to take po­liti­cal, and eventually even security, initiatives, as we ­will see in Chapters 4 and 5, which examine Japan’s proposal to create a regional multilateral security dialogue. Japan’s support for ASEAN from the Fukuda doctrine onward also played a major role in helping to build ASEAN’s centrality in East Asian regional security multilateralism from the early 1990s.

Institutionalizing the Doctrine and Reassurance Building on this special relationship, a year l­ater, in 1978, Japa­nese foreign minister Sonoda Sunao proposed a dialogue between Japa­nese and ASEAN foreign ministers. This dialogue was expanded and institutionalized from 1979 to include other foreign ministers from other dialogue partners. Specifically, foreign ministers from the United States, Australia, Canada, the Eu­ro­pean Community (initially France and the UK), New Zealand, and South K ­ orea joined Japan as dialogue partners over the next de­cade,

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entering what became known as the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), a meeting held following the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM).109 More than a de­cade ­later, the PMC in turn would provide a structure and an opportunity for Japan to begin playing a regional security role by promoting regional security multilateralism. As Tanaka Akihiko notes, the PMC was the only venue “in which foreign ministers of major countries in the Asia Pacific could gather together to discuss po­liti­cal issues.” However, “the issues discussed in the ASEAN PMCs w ­ ere largely ­limited to ­those related to Southeast Asia.”110 Moreover, economic issues w ­ ere also central and security issues w ­ ere generally not discussed, exception for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. Less than four years l­ater, in January 1981, Suzuki Zenko became the first Japa­nese prime minister since Fukuda to visit Southeast Asia; he visited each of the five ASEAN countries. During his visit, Suzuki, like Fukuda, gave a major speech outlining the main pillars of Japan’s policy t­ oward ASEAN. The first pillar was to reaffirm the first pillar of the Fukuda Doctrine: Japan ­will not play a military role in the international community. The second pillar was Japan’s assertion of its right to play a po­liti­cal role, specifically for the sake of helping to maintain world peace, commensurate with Japan’s status. The third pillar, like the Fukuda Doctrine’s, concerned expanding economic assistance to ASEAN, albeit in more specific terms than what Fukuda had outlined.111 Two years ­later, in April–­May 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro visited ASEAN. His proposal to the region focused on expanding vari­ous forms of economic assistance and cultural exchange. Notably, Nakasone, known as a hawk, did not repeat the Fukuda Doctrine’s promise not to become a military power. During his visit, he faced expressions of concern about Japan’s military posture, both from the media in ASEAN nations and from some leaders, most notably t­hose of Indonesia and the Philippines. This prompted Nakasone to emphasize the defensive nature of Japan’s military buildup and its sea-­land defense policy.112 Nakasone’s successor, Takeshita Noboru, visited ASEAN in December 1987 and was the only non-­ASEAN leader to attend the third ASEAN Summit. Speaking more than ten years a­ fter Fukuda’s landmark visit to ASEAN, Takeshita returned to the Fukuda Doctrine’s promise of “not becoming a military power,” coupled with a vow to play a po­liti­cal role.113 Yet, only a year ­later, an impor­tant sign emerged that Japan was beginning to rethink its security isolationism. At the 1988 PMC, Foreign Minister Uno Sōsuke proposed that the Japan-­ASEAN portion of the PMC begin including “dialogue” regarding “the peace and stability of the Asia-­Pacific region.” However, Uno also reassured his ASEAN colleagues by reaffirming the Fukuda Doctrine pledge that “Japan refuses to become a military power” and that “Japan is determined to make as g­ reat a contribution as pos­si­ble to peace and stability in the Asia-­Pacific . . . ​by non-­military means.”114 ASEAN did not respond to Uno’s initiative, but the AMM was beginning to



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move in the same direction, and within the PMC security issues ­were already touched on, especially as they related to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. Uno’s low-­key initiative thus indicated Japan’s willingness to discuss regional security issues, and as such it was an impor­tant milestone for the pivotal Nakayama proposal that would come three years ­later, which the next section of this book explores.

Conclusion Japan emerged from the ashes of defeat in World War II saddled with an aggressive and militaristic reputation. That, along with its palpable fear of entrapment by its superpower ally and its low threat environment, prompted Japan to pursue a policy of security isolationism, rejecting participation in a regional multilateral alliance, a Pacific Pact similar to NATO, in f­ avor of self-­containment in a bilateral alliance with the US. Japan’s security isolationism was first and foremost a reassurance strategy ­toward other East Asian nations, and secondarily a way to avoid entrapment in US conflicts. The emergence of Soviet multilateral security proposals at the end of the 1960s gave Japan another reason to oppose regional security multilateralism: fear that the Soviet Union would use such multilateralism to undermine the US-­Japan alliance and Japan’s security. Despite Japan’s security isolationism, Tokyo made tentative, if not very successful, steps ­toward assuming a regional po­liti­cal role in the 1960s. The Fukuda Doctrine institutionalized Japan’s regional security isolationism in the 1970s even while si­mul­ ta­neously attempting to secure regional ac­cep­tance of Japa­nese economic dominance and legitimate a Japa­nese po­liti­cal voice. Above all, the Fukuda Doctrine emerged from the efforts of Fukuda himself, who, based on personal war­time and postwar experiences, became a policy entrepreneur promoting reassurance as a key pillar of Japa­nese foreign policy in ways that initially differed from MOFA’s thinking. Nonetheless, the distinctive pledge not to become a military power thereafter became an oft-­repeated staple of MOFA’s regional diplomacy, a line that was repeated by visiting prime ministers thereafter (with the partial exception of Nakasone in 1983). Although the Fukuda Doctrine had laid the groundwork for Japan to begin playing a ­limited regional po­liti­cal role, for years ­after, Tokyo maintained that this role, as well as Japan’s continued dominant economic role, depended on reaffirming the Fukuda Doctrine’s unilateral renunciation of any intention to become a military power, thereby ­reaffirming Japan’s regional security isolationism. Just as the changing balance of power in East Asia, resulting from events such as the US withdrawal from Indochina and regional military drawdown, provided opportunities for Japan to play a greater role, t­ hese changes si­mul­ta­neously exacerbated Tokyo’s reputational prob­lem, thereby imposing severe limits on this role, and led to Japan’s distinctive renunciation of any military role. This renunciation was distinctive ­because

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Japan did not seek to reassure Southeast Asians that it was intrinsically trustable as a benign power and as a democracy. By defining reassurance as a promise to never again become a military power, rather than as the more conventional promise to be a responsible and moderate military power, Japan did not challenge, and perhaps appeared to endorse, the Southeast Asian perception that it might be incapable of being a benign and responsible military power. ­Behind this form of reassurance stood leaders such as Fukuda who had their own doubts about Japan’s ability to wield the sword.

3

Rethinking Regional Security Isolationism and Multilateralism

how did ja pan, having promised not to become a military power in the Fukuda Doctrine, and thereby also formalized its regional security isolationism, then come to abandon security isolationism even while maintaining the promise not to become a military power a mere fourteen years l­ater? And why, a­ fter years of consistently opposing regional security multilateralism and following the US position on this issue, did Japan suddenly reverse its position and get out in front of the US with its first regional postwar security initiative on the cusp of the Cold War’s end? ­These ­will be the questions this chapter and the next address by examining the motivations that drove Japan to reverse its position on security multilateralism, as well as the internal debates and policy pro­cess that led to this reversal, a pro­cess that thrust Japan from reactive follower to in­de­pen­dent leader. The Nakayama proposal has been widely regarded by many Japa­nese foreign policy elites as Japan’s first postwar regional security initiative.1 This initiative, made on the cusp of the Cold War’s end, also marked a definitive break from Japan’s previous position of opposing regional security multilateralism and si­mul­ta­neously recast Japan as a leader in promoting this very construct. Why was t­here such a dramatic and sudden change? This chapter identifies a combination of four key ­causes in Japan’s regional policy and role: a diffusion of new ideas about common security and confidence building, a resurgence of the reassurance imperative, growing fear of US abandonment, and an emerging regional leadership competition.

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Japa­nese Skepticism About Regional Security Multilateralism Although Japan had been the first major power to recognize ASEAN as a diplomatic partner it would work with, and although Japan had supported regional multilateral economic cooperation in vari­ous guises, it was consistently negative ­toward regional security multilateralism. In part this was a legacy of the country’s rejection of efforts by the US in the early 1950s to or­ga­nize a Pacific Pact regional alliance system, as discussed in the previous chapter. Japan preferred regional security isolationism to entering a regional alliance. This isolationism of course helped Japan avoid entrapment in the Vietnam War at a time when virtually all other US allies ­were sucked into this war, more or less. Renewed Soviet Proposals. Another major reason for Japan’s opposition to regional security cooperation was Soviet support for the idea dating back to 1969.2 In July 1986 in a speech in the Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev revived the idea of creating a multilateral security framework in East Asia. In contrast to Leonid Brezhnev’s collective security proposal, however, Gorbachev’s proposal was for a cooperative security regime modeled on CSCE,3 also known as the Helsinki pro­cess, ­after the 1975 Helsinki agreement that established CSCE.4 Nonetheless, Gorbachev’s proposal was vague and short on specifics: its structure and the issues it would tackle ­were left unspecified.5 Two years ­later, in September 1988, in Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev delivered his second major address advocating the creation of an Asian version of a CSCE, or a CSCA (A for Asia). He provided some more details about the pro­cess for establishing such a forum: he called for the creation of a “working committee” made up of the three Asia-­Pacific permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, the Soviet Union, and the US.6 However, the proposal remained vague regarding what a regional security forum would actually accomplish, and its membership and regional scope also remained undefined. Also, the proposal appeared self-­serving, as the “working committee” included the Soviet Union itself but excluded other major regional powers such as Japan. The Soviet Union appeared to be trying to achieve regional leadership by focusing on military issues and downplaying economics, where the Soviet Union’s regional role was truly tiny. Gorbachev’s proposals also created suspicion that they contained an ulterior motive, explic­itly stated in Brezhnev’s proposal, of disrupting US regional alliances with Japan and ­others by mandating the removal of foreign bases and so on.7 The US Position. Japan, not surprisingly, followed the US lead in opposing proposals for establishing a regional multilateral security forum in East Asia. The East Asia of the 1980s stood in sharp contrast to Eu­rope, where vari­ous like-­and un-­like-­ minded multilateral security institutions coexisted, including CSCE, NATO, the Western Eu­ro­pean Union, and the Warsaw Treaty Organ­ization. Although the US



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had promoted a NATO-­style Pacific Pact in the 1950s, Washington subsequently de­cided that its system of bilateral alliances (spokes converging on the US hub) was more advantageous (see Chapter 2). The US opposed an un-­like-­minded multilateral forum such as CSCA ­because of Soviet support for the idea. The US wanted to lock the Soviets out of the region, leaving them diplomatically isolated and depriving them of access to East Asia’s dynamic cap­i­tal­ist economies. The US also feared that the Soviet Union would use a multilateral forum as part of a wedge strategy8 to divide the US from its Asian allies. Washington, and especially the US Navy, feared that a multilateral security pro­cess would lead inevitably to naval arms control. This last motivation reflected not only the strong influence of the US Navy on policy in the Pacific but also the expectation that the Seventh Fleet would be called on to make large, asymmetrical cuts, just as the Soviet Union was eventually forced to do to ground forces in Europe—­thereby giving up a significant mea­sure of regional military superiority.9 Consequently, as the Cold War was winding down, the US even rejected multilateral security proposals put forth by its allies, including South ­Korea, Australia, and Canada. In October 1990, it unconditionally rejected security multilateralism for East Asia. In an address at the University of California at San Diego, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Richard H. Solomon argued, “The sources of tension that remain in the region—­indeed, the nature of the security challenges we anticipate in the years ahead—do not easily lend themselves to region-­wide solutions. When we look at the key determinants of stability in Asia . . . ​it is difficult to see how a Helsinki-­type institution would be an appropriate forum for enhancing security or promoting conflict resolution.”10 As late as August 1991, Solomon claimed that the US position had not changed.11 Meanwhile, in a secret letter dated November 19, 1990, from US secretary of state James Baker to Australia’s foreign minister Gareth Evans, Baker asserted that the US held “serious doubts” about ­whether a CSCA-­type institution “is ­really in e­ ither of our interests,” and he further argued that t­ here was no need for a change in any case, ­because existing “ ‘bilateral arrangements and agreements’ ­were more than adequate to meet regional security needs.”12 Japan’s Position. Tokyo shared Washington’s misgivings about the implications of security multilateralism in East Asia. Moreover, Japan, and especially the Eu­ro­pean Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, which included the hard-­line Soviet Desk (or Soren­ka),13 feared that the development of a multilateral security mechanism resembling the Helsinki pro­cess might, as was the case with CSCE, entail a ratification of the territorial status quo, thereby conferring Soviet sovereignty over the so-­called Northern territories, four islands northeast of Hokkaido that Japan claimed sovereignty over. This fear explains the emphasis MOFA placed on rejecting CSCE as a framework with any pos­si­ble relevance for East Asia.14 A se­nior diplomat from the Security

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Policy Division ­later recalled that Soviet multilateral proposals ­were ­little more than a “mechanical reflection” of Eu­ro­pean security arrangements.15 Tokyo, like Washington, feared that Soviet multilateral security initiatives, including several made by Gorbachev in the late 1990s, w ­ ere designed to drive a wedge between the US and its Asia-­Pacific allies, and to draw the US and its allies into naval arms control negotiations,16 again, largely at the expense of the US Seventh Fleet and American allies. Fi­nally, reflecting the Fukuda Doctrine’s pledge to not become a military power, Japan refrained from engaging in essentially any security interactions with any of its East Asian neighbors. Consequently, Japan did not believe that it could meaningfully participate in a regional multilateral security forum.17 Given Japan’s reactive and dependent regional security posture, and its security isolationism from the region, Tokyo closely followed Washington’s line of opposing the establishment of a multilateral security forum, even when the initiative came from Western allies. In August 1990, shortly ­after Australia and Canada made high-­profile proposals for establishing a regional security forum at that year’s ASEAN PMC,18 Japan rejected both proposals: “Japan is negative t­oward a plan for an Asia-­Pacific security grouping similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu­ rope (CSCE). . . . ​Japan doubts if such a grouping could produce fruitful results. . . . ​ Conflicts in the Asia-­Pacific region would be better settled through meetings of the concerned parties rather than at an international security forum.”19 As late as October 1990, Japan publicly dismissed any regional multilateral security framework for the Asia-­Pacific as unrealistic and premature.20

Japan’s Emerging Thinking About Security Multilateralism Despite MOFA’s stubbornly consistent opposition to regional security multilateralism, especially to any proposal that might resemble a CSCA or Soviet proposals for a Helsinki pro­cess and CBMs, foreign policy intellectuals w ­ ere quietly beginning to rethink the pos­si­ble benefits to Japan of regional security multilateralism. Th ­ ose ­doing the rethinking saw three major benefits for Japan in promoting multilateral security cooperation: first, neutralizing Moscow’s diplomatic offensive emphasizing security multilateralism and CBMs; second, facilitating a larger security role for Japan by reassuring Asian nations dubious of Japan’s disposition as a military power; and third, encouraging the US to remain militarily forward deployed in East Asia and in alliance with Japan. As early as 1988, Nishihara Masashi, a prominent Japa­nese defense intellectual (and subsequently president of Japan’s National Defense Acad­emy) at the National Institute for Defense Studies and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, identified the merits of regional multilateral security cooperation for Japan’s national interest. In From the Perspective of Strategic Studies (Senryaku kenkyū no shikaku), Nishihara argued that a multilateral security dialogue was useful less for the purpose of confidence



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building with the Soviet Union and more for the sake of allowing Japan to play a larger regional security role while reassuring surrounding nations concerned about a “resurgence of Japa­nese militarism.”21 He also saw multilateral cooperation as a way to support the regional security role played by the US military. Nishihara displayed a keen concern for Japan’s reputational prob­lem as a military power and the need for reassurance.22 According to Nishihara, Japan’s efforts at reassurance, or what he calls a “peace strategy,” are “often awkward. . . . ​It seems that Japan, even when it just repeats [the promise to uphold] its peace constitution and defensive defense, still provokes unease among neighboring countries about ‘a resurgence of militarism in Japan.’ ”23 This real­ity made it hard for Japan to play a security role beyond its borders and necessitated dependence on the US. If Japan pursued strategic independence, it would have to greatly strengthen its military, and this would cause “a large reaction among neighboring states, and cause Japan to lose a number of friendly countries.”24 Even a modest expansion of Japan’s security role within the framework of the US alliance was potentially risky. Nishihara observes, In the ­future, even if a majority of Japa­nese support the participation of the SDF in UN peacekeeping operations, but the reaction of Asian nations is as it is now, perhaps they w ­ ill hurl the accusation that this participation is preparation for the ­future use of force abroad by the SDF. This makes especially impor­tant mea­sures for more skillfully explaining to neighboring countries our strong intention that military force w ­ ill not 25 be exercised apart from self-­defense.

Although avoiding the word multilateral, Nishihara goes on in the next sentence to propose a multilateral security dialogue: “It might be useful to have a meeting involving a number of Asian countries about mutual military roles.”26 As discussed ­later, this proposal and its rationale bear a striking resemblance to the Nakayama proposal of three years ­later. Beyond proposing a regional multilateral security forum as a means for reassuring Asian nations, Nishihara proposed a separate multilateral framework for keeping the US militarily engaged in East Asia. Called the Pacific Common Security Fund, the fund was intended to help defray the costs of US forces forward deployed in the region and facilitate information exchange. Members would include the US, Japan, and other US friends in the region.27 This advocacy of like-­minded security multilateralism also found echoes in the 1991 Nakayama proposal. In March 1989, the Japan Forum on International Relations, a think tank led by a former diplomat, presented a report and policy recommendations to then–­prime minister Takeshita Noboru. Avoiding substantial input from the Foreign Ministry but endorsed by a group of leading scholars, politicians, journalists, and businessmen, this report advocated the use of multilateral approaches, as well as bilateral approaches,

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to regional security. It specifically advocated a regional multilateral security dialogue to build confidence with the Soviet Union.28 Although avoiding the term confidence building mea­sures per se, this report nonetheless advocated such mea­sures: In attempting to reduce tensions in the region, even if the effects of arms control are minor, we need to approach implementation with a step-­by-­step approach. . . . ​Although releasing information on deployments, giving prior notice of military exercises, and announcing the transfer of troops are minor aspects of arms control, a certain level of mutual trust can be built through ­these efforts and the basis for ­future mutual arms reductions can be improved.29

Although focusing on how to reduce military tensions with the Soviet Union, the Japan Forum on International Relations report nonetheless noted that Japan’s ability to play a regional military role was ­limited by Asian mistrust. According to the report, “It is clear that none of Japan’s neighbors want to see Japan accept a large military role. . . . ​Although Japan is an economic superpower, an extremely strong opposition would emerge in China and ­Korea, as well as the countries of Southeast Asia, if it should decide to undertake a military role in the region.”30 “If the Self-­Defense Forces ­were to maintain the offensive forces that Amer­i­ca now has, the countries of both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia would not welcome it.”31 Unlike Nishihara, however, this report did not consider the possibility that a regional multilateral security dialogue could be used to reassure Asian nations concerned about Japan playing a military role. Instead, the report argued that Asian mistrust of Japan as a military power necessitated continued reliance on forward-­deployed US forces.32 Another impor­tant innovation in the report was that it did not equate un-­like-­ minded security multilateralism or cooperative security, such as CSCE, with collective security. This is significant, as many Japan-­based analysts and even MOFA diplomats continued to equate all multilateral proposals that ­were not alliance based, including CSCE, with collective security. One Canadian scholar who briefed Japa­nese experts about Canada’s 1990 multilateral security proposal observed that the initial reactions he heard suggested that Canadian proposals for a CSCE-­like framework ­were conflated with collective security proposals.33 As late as 1992, the diplomat who was the architect of the Nakayama initiative was conflating CSCE with collective security;34 so did a prominent defense intellectual in an article published in 1994.35 Sueo Sudo, a Japa­nese defense intellectual then based in Singapore and a specialist on the Fukuda Doctrine, suggested in early 1991 that the time was right for Japan to begin playing a role in Southeast Asian security. Citing the negative reactions by several ASEAN countries to the May 1990 Thai proposal for naval and bilateral security cooperation between Thailand and Japan (see the discussion l­ater in this chapter), Sudo recommended that Japan play a low-­key and indirect role: “For



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example, Japan could provide indirect assistance to modernize the defense systems of Asean. It could also share the financial burden of American military involvement in Southeast Asia.”36 However, Japan “would first of all have to take some precautionary mea­sures, or confidence-­building mea­sures,” such as promoting “more openly security cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN countries.”37 Although Sudo does not specifically mention a multilateral dialogue, his insistence on the necessity of CBMs as a prerequisite for Japan beginning to play a regional po­liti­cal and security role largely corresponds in conception, if not in terminology, to the ideas that w ­ ere beginning to penetrate the cloudy gates of MOFA.

The Resurgence of the Reassurance Imperative Fall of the Berlin Wall. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the crumbling of the Soviet bloc over the following months, Japan’s long-­standing reputational predicament reemerged. ­These events caused Japan to loom larger in a region where the Soviet military was drawing down and bud­get deficits and economic frictions with Japan ­were putting pressure on the US military presence.38 Japan had long had an economy greater than t­hose of all other East Asian nations, including China, combined. Ironically, it was a US military officer who focused attention on Japan’s regional military potential and the need to “contain” Japan so it did not reemerge as a military threat. According to US Marine Major General Henry C. Stackpole III, “No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So we are a cap in the ­bottle, if you ­will.” Echoing ­earlier perceptions that have been at the heart of Japan’s reputational predicament, he elaborated that “the Japa­nese consider themselves racially superior. They feel they have a ­handle on the truth, and their economic growth has proved that.” Nonetheless, although claiming that Japan already has “a very, very potent military,” Stackpole insisted that Tokyo would remilitarize only “if US forces withdraw,”39 a remark not very reassuring to a region that was increasingly on edge about US staying power and fraying relations between Tokyo and Washington. In May 1990, reflecting the emerging post–­Cold War environment, but also Thailand’s benign view of Japa­nese military power relative to that of other Southeast Asian nations, Thai prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan proposed joint naval maneuvers in the South China Sea to visiting Japa­nese Defense Agency head Ishikawa Yōzō. He coupled this with a proposal for a meeting of se­nior Japa­nese and Thai military officers to discuss regional security in light of likely US military downsizing in the region.40 Chatichai reportedly told Ishikawa that some Southeast Asian countries w ­ ere worried about a power vacuum being created by the pos­si­ble withdrawal of US forces, and then he suggested that “other forces” could come contribute to regional stability. Ishikawa interpreted Chatichai’s words as an invitation to Japan to assume such a role.41

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Chatichai’s proposal provoked a negative reaction from Singapore and other Southeast Asian nations, with Singapore’s authoritative Straits Times criticizing Thailand for offering Japan a strategic “toehold” in the region.42 Malaysia’s defense minister told Ishikawa that the region was worried about the pos­si­ble reemergence of Japan as a military power.43 Noordin Sopiee, director of the Institute for Strategic and International Studies Malaysia, argued, “Perhaps it is better if this initiative comes from countries other than Thailand which has not come ­under Japan’s occupation. But then of course other countries are not prepared to do so.”44 Even within Thailand ­there ­were critical voices. The English-­language Nation editorialized, “At this point, any role Japan sees for itself in defense beyond its territory is out of the question.”45 Another indication of growing regional angst about Japan stepping in to fill an apparent regional security vacuum came at the July 1990 PMC, where Malaysia’s foreign minister openly expressed concern about the ­future direction of Japan’s defense policy.46 The Gulf War. US demands for Japan to dispatch the SDF overseas to support US military operations during the Persian Gulf crisis and the subsequent Gulf War between August 1990 and April 1991 only deepened Japan’s reputational predicament, as this raised challenges to Japan’s long-­standing policy of not dispatching the SDF overseas for any reason. The LDP and cabinet of Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki responded by proposing a UN peace cooperation bill before the National Diet in October 1990. The SDF and other personnel would be members of what the bill called the UN Peace Cooperation Corps. Preemptive efforts by Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō to reassure Asian nations in advanced of the bill’s introduction that the SDF’s overseas dispatch to cooperate with UN Peacekeeping operations would not pose a threat proved unsuccessful,47 as this bill provoked criticism from several East Asian nations. The countries that had suffered the most ­under Japa­nese occupation, China and ­Korea, reacted with the most suspicion,48 whereas Southeast Asian countries, somewhat less brutalized by their war­time experiences with Japan, ­were less outspoken in their opposition.49 ­After a month of debate, the bill was scrapped, with Japa­nese public opposition playing the key role in killing the bill.50 Yet even in MOFA t­here was recognition of the significance of “strong opposition” not only in Japan but also “in the Asia-­Pacific region as a w ­ hole to the concept of Japan’s sending combat forces abroad,” which “derives from memories of Japa­nese aggression before and during World War II.”51 In the wake of this debacle, Japan faced renewed pressure to support with “boots on the ground” US military operations during the Gulf War. ­After attempts to dispatch the Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) planes to transport refugees failed, Japan eventually sent MSDF minesweepers to ­waters off



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Kuwait and Iraq following the end of hostilities, the first deployment of the Japa­nese military overseas since World War II, and a deployment that raised more questions about Japan assuming a military role beyond its borders. MOFA ordered its ambassadors to brief regional countries about the dispatch and evaluate their reactions before deciding the dispatch. Given the noncombat and postconflict nature of the dispatch and its goal of restoring international sea-­lanes of communication in the Persian Gulf, officials in regional capitals expressed ­little opposition, except for ­those in Beijing, who asked that the dispatch be handled “cautiously” given “the extreme sensitivity” of SDF overseas dispatch. The Philippines said it could support the deployment so long as it did not “affect the wonderful image that Japan has nurtured in Asia u ­ nder its peace constitution.”52 During the Gulf War, Japan thus found itself whipsawed by conflicting American and Asian demands. The Americans demanded a Japa­nese contribution of personnel to the US-­led multilateral force in the Gulf, while a number of Asian countries wanted Japan to maintain its traditional policy of not deploying the SDF overseas. In the wake of the Gulf War, Japan realized that it would have to expand its role in international and regional security, albeit a noncombat security role. It realized that a larger security role, including even modest steps such as SDF participation in UN Peacekeeping operations, would require extensive reassurance of Asian countries. At first, Japan responded with l­ittle more than reaffirmations of the Fukuda Doctrine. During a visit to Southeast Asia in May 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu acknowledged that Japan’s overseas deployments would produce angst, but sought to reassure East Asians: Japan has very recently de­cided to send minesweepers to the [­Middle East]. This action does not mean that Japan is assuming a military role in the international community and does not represent any change in Japan’s basic defense policy. . . . ​I am well aware that the course which Japa­nese policy might take could well spark concerns among some of our Asian neighbors that Japan might once more be embarking on a path to a military power. . . . ​Since the war, Japan has dedicated itself to a purely defensive posture u ­ nder our peace constitution and vowed never again to become a military power such as might pose a threat to other countries.53

Nonetheless, Japa­nese diplomats ­were already coming to realize that Tokyo would need a broader framework for reassuring Asian countries. This provided a motivation to promote security multilateralism.54 In the same speech, Kaifu dropped what in retrospect can appear as a tantalizing hint of the Nakayama proposal that was to come ten weeks l­ ater when he argued that Japan and ASEAN should “look seriously at what we can do for Asia-­Pacific peace,” and that, through “long years of dialogue between

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Japan and ASEAN, we are now able to speak frankly to each other. . . . ​Along with continuing to work to create a climate conductive to candid dialogue in all areas, I intend to make a concerted effort for greater cooperation in all fields.”55

Emerging Competition for Leadership By 1990, with the Cold War ending, a clear competition had emerged over how and by whom a regional multilateral security forum would be developed.56 Its origins trace back to 1986, when Gorbachev revived and significantly recast old Soviet proposals for creating a regional security forum. His proposal for a CSCE-­type pro­cess of cooperative security helped inspire two Western allies, Australia and Canada, to make parallel proposals for a CSCA at the July 1990 PMC, where both ­were members. Australian foreign minister Evans proposed a CSCA based on subregional building blocs,57 whereas Canadian foreign minister Joe Clark proposed a regional multilateral security forum beginning in the North Pacific and Northeast Asia. Clark also called for discussing regional security issues in the PMC, a proposal remarkably similar to part of the Nakayama proposal made at the 1991 PMC.58 The clearly defined and l­imited geographic scope of the Australian and especially the Canadian proposals was a major difference from Gorbachev’s proposals. The Australian and Canadian proposals both opposed making the settlement of existing bilateral disputes, including territorial disputes, a prerequisite for establishing a CSCA and rather presented a multilateral security forum as a means for settling such disputes. Other­wise, the Australian and Canadian proposals w ­ ere largely compatible with the Soviet proposals. All three countries defined their proposals as CSCE-­like regimes of cooperative security. Evans was explicit about this inspiration: “It is not unreasonable to hope and expect that new Europe-­style patterns of cooperation between old adversaries ­will find their echo in this part of the world.” Clark also acknowledged the similarity of his proposal to e­ arlier Soviet proposals, but argued that the end of the Cold War merited revisiting t­hese proposals: “In the 1980s, the Soviet Union made numerous proposals. . . . ​Most ­were ­either propaganda or a search for unilateral strategic advantage. But given the transformation in East-­West relations, perhaps it is time to return to the charge, to identify t­ hose proposals that have serious merit and to make serious counter-­proposals.”59 ­These new Australian and Canadian proposals in turn inspired a new Soviet proposal five weeks ­later, when Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze made a speech in Vladivostok. This was the third Soviet CSCA proposal since Gorbachev assumed power, and the most enthusiastic and detailed proposal of all. Crucially, he suggested that territorial and other bilateral disputes would not have to be resolved as a precondition for establishing a CSCA, and that such a multilateral forum should be harmonized with existing institutions, implicitly signaling ac­cep­tance of the US



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regional hub-­and-­spokes alliance framework. Shevardnadze, whose proposal was significantly more inclusive and concrete in the details for creating a CSCA than Gorbachev’s ­earlier proposals had been, called for a meeting of Asia-­Pacific foreign ministers in the fall of 1993, to be followed by an Asian summit, where the details of a CSCA forum could be de­cided. As an initial step, he called for a preliminary meeting of Asian foreign ministers at the 1990 opening of the UN General Assembly in New York a few weeks ­after his Vladivostok speech. A dinner meeting did in fact take place, controversial though it proved to be for Japan (see the discussion ­later in this chapter).60 Meanwhile, another US ally was also warming to regional security multilateralism, albeit mostly for Northeast Asia. A month ­after Gorbachev’s 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech, in a speech before the UN General Assembly, South Korean president Roh Tae-­Woo proposed a six-­nation “consultative conference for Northeast Asia” that would focus on arms reduction. In December 1990, on his way to Moscow, and referring to Soviet proposals for “multilateral consultation for the security of the Asian-­Pacific region,” Roh again proposed a “consultative conference for peace in Northeast Asia” that would be attended by interested countries, including the Soviet Union, and that would “discuss the introduction of a structure of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.”61 Roh’s proposals reflected the belief that a “regional multilateral framework” could be a good way to enhance regional stability, and they ­were part of Seoul’s Nord politique of pursuing relations with the Soviet Union. Roh’s specific proposals ­were in response to Gorbachev’s proposals. According to a se­nior Korean diplomat, “Roh’s proposals ­were a rejoinder to Gorbachev’s Vladivostok and Kransoyarsk speeches. Our proposals ­were designed to ‘put our fin­ger in the ­water and check the temperature.’ We ­were probing to see if the Soviets ­were talking about the same ­thing we ­were.”62 In this way, Gorbachev’s and then Australia’s and Canada’s proposals created regional momentum to which ­others without a strong position in opposition to regional security multilateralism then responded. The idea was also gaining traction among Korean elites more generally. Chung Ku-­Chong, a se­nior editor at Dong-­A Ilbo, a major South Korean newspaper, endorsed “the establishment of a multilateral security system of the Eu­ro­pean type, or an Asian version of CSCE.” However, Chung saw constraining Japa­nese military power as a major reason for establishing a CSCA.63 Similarly, an arms control expert at K ­ orea’s Research Institute for National Reunification supported the creation of a regional multilateral framework for the sake of constraining Japan: “Even though the US is against an Asian multilateral military relationship, we have to figure out a way to restrain Japan. . . . ​The best way is to include Japan in a military framework so that it can be controlled.”64 The growing number of multilateral security initiatives from other countries encouraged, if not pressured, Japan to change course. Gorbachev’s revival of Soviet

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multilateral security initiatives in Vladivostok in July 1986, as discussed ­earlier, was seen as posing a potential threat to Japan’s alliance with the US; the US forward military presence, including regional naval and air dominance; and Tokyo’s claim to the Northern Territories. Australian, Canadian, South Korean, and Mongolian initiatives in 1990 further pressured Japan, since Tokyo feared that they might be used by the Soviets as vehicles to undermine the regional US military presence. Indeed, Japa­nese diplomats worried that Australian and Canadian proposals, like Soviet proposals, ­were “biased t­ oward a Eu­ro­pean approach” based on CSCE.65 A common denominator of all three countries’ proposals was their inclusion of the Soviet Union. Japan’s traditional opposition to regional security multilateralism, based on the Fukuda Doctrine pledge not to become a military power, its security isolationism from its neighbors, and its opposition to Soviet multilateral security proposals it dismissed as self-­serving and endangering the US-­Japan alliance, was thus coming ­under pressure from several directions. Japan’s resurging reputational prob­lem as the Cold War ended, growing worries about the continued US commitment to Japa­nese and regional security, and a growing competition for leadership66 in designing a regional multilateral security framework encouraged Japan to rethink its opposition to regional security multilateralism.

Quiet MOFA Rethinking ­ ehind the public facade of consistent opposition to regional security multilateralism, B the proliferation of new proposals for multilateral security frameworks from various actors, as well as criticism and pressure, both international and domestic, was starting to have an impact on thinking within MOFA about the continued viability of just saying no. Larger global events, not least of all the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the winding down of the Cold War, also created pressure for sweeping policy change. One early catalyst for MOFA’s reassessment of security multilateralism was a post–­Berlin Wall internal study that articulated a desire to escape from Japan’s traditional regional po­liti­cal role, which had ranged from negative to passive, and a regional security role that was essentially isolationist. ­There had been growing frustration within MOFA about Japan always being cast as “Mr. No” regarding security multilateralism.67 At the same time, ­there was frustration that Japan’s role as the second (soon to be largest) donor of foreign aid was not translating into influence. Fi­nally, t­here was frustration that the US, and especially Secretary of State Baker, was dismissive of Japan’s role and had excluded it from negotiations over Cambodia. This frustration was now translating into a growing appetite to demonstrate regional leadership, especially in the Asian Bureau. 68 According to one defense intellectual with close connections to MOFA, they “wanted to play a more active role” and “wanted to show that they could take the initiative on something.”69



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The twin goals of playing a more active po­liti­cal and security, if not military, role while reassuring Asian countries ­were emphasized by an internal MOFA task force or­ga­nized by then–­vice foreign minister Kuriyama Takakazu in 1989 and consisting of the directors (kyōkuchō) of five bureaus: the United Nations, Treaty, Asian Affairs, North Amer­i­ca, and Research and Analy­sis Bureaus.70 ­These two goals w ­ ere stressed in a widely discussed May 1990 article Kuriyama published in Gaikō Forum (a foreign affairs journal linked to the Foreign Ministry). Th ­ ere, he emphasized that Japan did not wish to create the image of an emerging military ­great power. In his words, Japan would pursue a diplomacy of “a ­great power without a ­great power image.”71 In words echoing the Fukuda Doctrine pledge, Kuriyama explained that “even as a g­ reat power, having sworn to never become a g­ reat military power, Japan’s international contribution is ­limited to a non-­military character.” Insisting that Japan would nonetheless begin playing a direct role for maintaining international security, Kuriyama claimed that “outside the framework of the Japan-­US security system,” Japan’s contribution to international security would be through exclusively “non-­military means.”72 Kuriyama argued that a larger and more active po­liti­cal role for Japan would be predicated on the reassurance value of the US alliance: “Regionally, the security system builds international trust in Japan’s fundamental position that it ­will never become a military ­great power. The security system makes it easy for neighboring countries to accept a large po­liti­cal and economic role from Japan.”73 ­Later, in an oral history, Kuriyama recalled that, at the time, he thought Japan’s security policy needed to become “a bit more diversified,” and that ASEAN would be the “natu­ral partner” for that diversification.74 Kuriyama’s 1989 reassessment task force had also been given responsibility for devising a response to Soviet proposals for creating a CSCA, and for CBMs in the Asia-­Pacific region, proposals made in advance of Shevardnadze’s planned visit to Japan in September 1990 and Gorbachev’s planned visit in the spring of the following year. In par­tic­u­lar, the aim was to find ways to respond to ­these Soviet proposals beyond just saying no.75 It was in this context that another major catalyst for the transformation of Japan’s policy on regional security multilateralism arrived, in the person of Satoh Yukio, a ­career diplomat who was appointed director general of the Research and Analy­sis Bureau76 in January 1990. He was well positioned to lead the way in rethinking Japan’s policy, as he was familiar with scholars and think tanks specializing in security, having spent time in 1980–81 as a research associate at the London-­based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).77 He remained a member of the IISS and maintained the network of contacts he had established ­there years a­ fter his position ended. This exposure to academic security research gave Satoh impor­tant contacts and experience he would use to exchange ideas, test concepts, and build consensus for Japa­nese initiatives with academic and diplomatic interlocutors. Highly articulate in En­glish,

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Satoh wrote and published prolifically in the language during the period when he and Japan ­were rethinking their position on regional security multilateralism. Upon becoming director general of the Research and Analy­sis Bureau, Satoh was handed a large report compiled ­under his pre­de­ces­sor, Yamashita Shintarō, which was one part of the work of Kuriyama’s task force, and assigned to helping the Eu­ ro­pean Division figure out how to respond to Soviet multilateral security and CBM proposals. A ­ fter reading the report over the weekend, Satoh rejected the findings of this study, believing that they w ­ ere too reactive to Soviet proposals. Rather, he thought that Japan should consider Asian security first. Nonetheless, as MOFA assigned him the task of “responding to Soviet proposals,” Satoh’s task thus ended up being an exercise in “non-­reactive reaction.” Over the course of several months, Satoh came to believe “it strategically better for Japan to take the initiative in promoting regional security dialogue than to react to Soviet proposals.”78 This account also acknowledges the catalytic influence that Soviet proposals ultimately had on Japa­nese policy, including the radical transformation in policy that was to become the Nakayama proposal. This influence was magnified by Australian and Canadian proposals for establishing a CSCA. Satoh did not like t­ hese proposals and thought they ­were based on a Eu­ro­pean model that was inappropriate for the Asia-­Pacific region.79 Rather than simply reacting to Soviet, Australian, Canadian, and other proposals, Satoh proved to be creative in conceptualizing, and even theorizing about, regional security. His thinking took two main lines that ­were a direct, if also innovative, response to Soviet proposals: a c­ ounter to Soviet CBM proposals and a ­counter to their multilateral security initiatives. Conceptualizing Mutual Reassurance Mea­sures. Satoh’s response to Soviet CBM proposals is far less well known: in place of CBMs, he proposed mutual reassurance mea­sures (MRMs).80 He argued that CBMs are too narrow a concept and are only valid for reducing “military tension” between adversaries. As such, Satoh asserted that CBMs ­were not relevant in the Asia-­Pacific as a ­whole, where, with the exception of the Korean Peninsula81 and perhaps across the Taiwan Strait, ­there ­were no clear ­enemy dyads. CBMs w ­ ere thus too Eu­ro­pean focused and designed for the e­ nemy dyad between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.82 Ironically, in an article about tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula, Satoh himself, while advocating for the relevance of CBMs for the North-­South confrontation, nonetheless somewhat contradicted his own argument that CBMs are exclusively military in nature when he called for “po­liti­cal confidence building” between the two ­Koreas.83 By contrast, Satoh conceptualized of MRMs as broader mea­sures taken between countries who are not enemies: “ ‘Mutual reassurance’ could mean, I thought, reducing such anxiety and concerns that even friendly nations might hold ­toward one another.”84 He argued that MRMs ­were an impor­tant means to help improve Japan’s



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relations with Asian nations, and he worried that Japan might label itself as an “­enemy” if it proposed CBMs with Asian nations.85 Yet in order to play a regional po­liti­cal role, Japan “had to improve Asian perceptions of Japan and address their mistrust,” which “derived from their memories of the past.”86 Satoh developed the concept of MRMs in a paper he drafted in the first half of 1991 that he eventually presented at a conference in Manila (see Chapter 4). By his own admission, he also developed the MRM concept in part to avoid using the term confidence-­building mea­sure,87 which the Soviets favored. Although Satoh claims credit for developing the MRM concept, he gives credit to James Steinberg, a fellow IISS alum with whom he discussed the concept, and who was a ­future head of policy planning at the State Department (1994–96), for coining the acronym MRM.88 Unfortunately for Satoh’s ambition to promote the MRM concept, MOFA mistranslated the term in the En­glish version of the Nakayama proposal it distributed in July 1991: “sense of mutual reassurance” was mistranslated as “sense of security.” Although a major address that Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi gave a year ­later about regional security multilateralism used the term sense of mutual reassurance in En­glish (see Chapter 6), and although MOFA promoted the term mutual reassurance mea­sure for several years, Satoh l­ater recognized that his attempt to coin a new concept had failed: “The conceptual distinction between enhancement of mutual reassurance and confidence-­building was not appreciated in policy debates in the region, where the words ‘confidence-­building’ ­were used in a much broader context than in Eu­rope.”89 Conceptualizing a Regional Security Dialogue. Satoh’s other task was to ­counter Soviet proposals for a multilateral security forum, a CSCA that was modeled, excessively in his view, on Eu­ro­pean models, especially CSCE. He started rethinking Japan’s traditional wholesale rejection of a region-­wide security forum. Satoh claims that he engaged in intense consultations with his American counter­parts and reached a consensus not only to reject Soviet CBM and CSCE-­type proposals but also “that an incremental approach of expanding gradually the role of existing regional mechanisms, such as ASEAN-­PMC and APEC [the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation] would be preferable to creating a new organ­ization.”90 The first semipublic indication of Satoh’s new thinking came in a paper he presented in early September 1990 and published in Survival, a journal of the IISS, in winter 1990–91. This paper was approved by the ministry,91 and thus can be considered to reflect the direction of MOFA’s thinking as well. ­There he wrote about the need for a regional multilateral forum to address regional stability, if not security issues. In his pre­sen­ta­tion at the Thirty-­Second Annual Conference of the IISS, held in Warm Springs, ­Virginia, on September 6–9, 1990, Satoh opened by arguing that a CSCE-­type arrangement would not be appropriate for the Asia-­Pacific ­because of the very dif­fer­ent geopo­liti­cal realities in the two regions. Reflecting the perception

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that Soviet military power did not ­matter so much in the region, Satoh observed that the resolution of the Cambodian and Korean conflicts “would do more for regional stability than CBMs taken with the Soviet Union.”92 Instead of a CSCE-­type institution, Satoh argued, “existing organ­izations, such as ASEAN PMC, and APEC,” w ­ ill “make valuable contributions to the evolution of a mechanism for regional stability.”93 This was the first time a Japa­nese diplomat publicly endorsed the utility of a regional multilateral security dialogue.94 In the same paper, Satoh also discussed Asian worries about a pos­si­ble change in Japa­nese policy “to one of dispatching armed forces abroad,” especially “combat forces.” Echoing Kuriyama’s Gaikō Forum article, Satoh argued that the US-Japan alliance played a key reassurance role in reinforcing the Fukuda Doctrine’s pledge “of not becoming a major military power. The policy of maintaining an exclusively defensive force posture in terms of both weapons systems and scope of operations is reassuring to countries in this region. The key condition permitting Japan to pursue this policy is the alliance with the United States.”95 Satoh did not yet link a regional multilateral security dialogue to regional concerns about Japan deploying the SDF overseas, or the general trajectory of Japa­nese defense policy. In a second paper Satoh started drafting at approximately the same time, he presented a Japa­nese view on how to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. He was more out­spoken in rejecting Soviet proposals for a CSCA and for CBMs, arguing that ­these proposals had “overtones of their own strategic interests . . . ​to attain a position of leadership in this region and . . . ​engage the United States and its allies into a pro­cess of naval arms control.” Satoh was just as emphatic regarding Soviet CBM proposals: “The Soviets’ interests in naval arms control are underscored by their repeated emphasis on the need to exercise confidence-­building mea­sures in naval areas.” Satoh even slammed Soviet regional knowledge, faulting their excessively Eu­ro­pean approach: “The Soviets might need to refer to the Eu­ro­pean pro­cess ­because they have no other experience. . . . ​[­These proposals] appear to reflect their ignorance of the differences between Eu­ro­pean geopo­liti­cal conditions and t­ hose of the Asia and Pacific Region.”96 Nonetheless, Satoh added, “Neither is ­there any doubt that broader forums for regional cooperation are impor­tant for the Asia and Pacific region.” He then echoed more emphatically the point he made in his Warm Springs paper: “It is far more ­effective and pragmatic to use the existing forums and pro­cesses . . . ​[to address] questions of reduction of tension, enhancement of po­liti­cal stability and arms control and security.” This was a step beyond the Warm Spring paper in that it identified security issues, including arms control and tension reduction, as issues that could be discussed in a regional dialogue.97



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­These two papers illustrate the quiet rethinking that MOFA was engaged in regarding regional security cooperation, and they w ­ ere to prove influential, as the dramatic change in Japa­nese policy that unfolded in 1991 largely followed the general direction they laid out. Nonetheless, Satoh’s and MOFA’s thinking was still vague and not yet fully developed.

From New Thinking to Incipient Policy Change The first vis­i­ble sign that official Japan was beginning to rethink its opposition to multilateral security cooperation appeared in September 1990. A few weeks a­ fter the August 1990 Irkutsk ministerial meeting at which Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze and US secretary of state Baker jointly declared the Cold War over in Asia, and shortly ­after the Australian and Canadian CSCA proposals, Shevardnadze made a new CSCA proposal that was far more developed and included a call for a consultative meeting of Asian-­Pacific foreign ministers at the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly in September (see the discussion e­ arlier in this chapter).98 In response, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas agreed to cosponsor a dinner meeting and invited Japan’s foreign minister Nakayama to be the other cosponsor. As the dinner was seen as a first step ­toward promoting a regional multilateral security dialogue, many c­ areer diplomats in MOFA viewed cosponsorship as a threat to Japan’s long-­standing opposition to Soviet CSCA proposals and regional security multilateralism in general. In an interview I conducted, Nakayama claimed that for this reason, his intention to cosponsor the meeting was opposed by the director of the North American Bureau in the Foreign Ministry, Matsuura Kōichirō, although it was supported by the director of the Asian Bureau, Tanino Sakutarō. Nakayama ignored the opposition of the North American director and proceeded to cosponsor the dinner with Alatas.99 Nakayama told me that his cosponsorship of the UN dinner and Shevardnadze’s September 1990 speech advocating an Asian multilateral security forum w ­ ere impor­tant intellectual inspirations for his subsequent initiative, the Nakayama proposal.100 Prominent Japa­nese defense intellectual Nishihara Masashi noted that in form and membership, the UN dinner anticipated the formation of the ARF less than three years ­later.101 In the same month, Shevardnadze visited Japan. Satoh had been leading the effort to respond to Soviet CSCA and CBM proposals, and his Warm Springs paper can be considered a draft response. In fact, the Soviets hardly mentioned ­these proposals during Shevardnadze’s visit in September 1990. On the other hand, Tokyo and Moscow agreed to commence an annual bilateral dialogue on security. The first meeting, held in Moscow in December 1990, represented the first time that postwar Japan held a security dialogue with a potential adversary or country in East Asia.102

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Satoh, holding the portfolio of policy planning, led the Japa­nese del­e­ga­tion in t­ hese groundbreaking talks. In the talks with his Soviet counterpart, Sergei Tarasenko, Satoh learned that Moscow was no longer placing high priority on its CSCA and CBM proposals.103 This allowed Satoh to shift the emphasis away from reacting to and rejecting Soviet proposals and ­toward thinking proactively about what Japan could do to create a regional multilateral framework better suited to its national interests, with less concern that the Soviets would try to hijack such a proposal for their own ends.104 Satoh circulated a draft of his Warm Springs paper within MOFA to build consensus among the vari­ous bureaus that had responsibility for Asia-­Pacific security issues. According to Satoh, “Although the paper did not arouse much attention at that time, this exercise no doubt helped create among the officials concerned a common perspective on the issue, thus paving the way for ­later approval of Foreign Minister Nakayama’s January 1991 foreign policy speech to the Diet,” which Satoh’s bureau drafted.105 A ­whole range of other antecedents, from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unfolding Gulf crisis to Kuriyama’s internal policy review, and especially domestic and international proposals for regional security multilateralism, undoubtedly contributed as well. Nakayama’s foreign policy Diet address thus became the first authoritative sign that Japan was reconsidering its policy on regional security multilateralism. Echoing Satoh’s arguments from his Warm Springs paper about the geopo­liti­cal differences between Eu­rope and the Asia-­Pacific, and rejecting a CSCE-­like multilateral pro­cess, Nakayama issued a call for giving “serious consideration to how to ensure long-­term stability in the Asia-­Pacific region.” He advocated expanding “dialogue and co-­operation on vari­ous po­liti­cal and economic questions in the region, making full use of existing fora,” such as the PMC and APEC. He then boldly proposed, “Based on this position, Japan proposes to promote dialogue with interlocutors of the Asia-­Pacific region for the purpose of forming an international consensus on how to achieve long-­term stability in this region.”106 Satoh arranged to have portions of Nakayama’s Diet speech published in the documentation section of the IISS’s journal, Survival, two months l­ater, excerpts that introduced the key changes in Japa­nese policy regarding security multilateralism (no other portions of Nakayama’s speech w ­ ere included).107 Satoh considered this publication an “effective” way to signal to Western policy elites108 regarding Japan’s changing views on regional security multilateralism.109 He also circulated another paper to his MOFA colleagues on how to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula that he considered relevant. Satoh asserts t­ hese actions helped lay “the groundwork for the next phase of policy-­making[,] . . . ​preparation of the Nakayama proposal.”110



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Catalysts: A Declining Soviet Threat, New Ideas, and Preventing US Abandonment The Kuriyama reassessment and the Gulf War ­were indirect results of the collapse of the Cold War international po­liti­cal structure. The decline of the Soviet threat and Gorbachev’s reassurance diplomacy ­toward East Asia ­were another result of the end of the Cold War that exerted a strong influence on Japan’s position ­toward regional security multilateralism. As mentioned e­ arlier, Japan and the Soviet Union initiated an annual security dialogue at the level of the policy-­planning chiefs of their respective foreign ministries in December 1990. This dialogue with Moscow not only subsequently served as the model for the series of bilateral dialogues Japan initiated with China and South ­Korea111 but also may have encouraged MOFA to separate the concept of a security dialogue from more encompassing, and implicitly threatening, concepts, such as arms control and collective security. Japan’s first concrete experience of a security dialogue with a potential adversary may thus have encouraged policy makers to experiment with a new concept of security multilateralism—­multilateral dialogues—­and with cooperative security more generally. Gary J. Smith argues that Australia and Canada “provided the intellectual spark and determination which helped launch the ARF,” ­because of ­those countries’ “high comfort level with multilateralism” and common security more generally. Japan had ­little direct experience with ­either, and the security dialogue launched in late 1990 with the Soviet Union, an actor similarly experienced in security multilateralism, provided an experiential benchmark for Japa­nese diplomats.112 Building on this dialogue, Moscow and Tokyo concluded an agreement initiating bilateral consultations on regional issues in Asia during Gorbachev’s visit to Japan.113 ­These agreements, and Gorbachev’s visit itself, helped overcome Soviet-­inspired fears in Tokyo that security multilateralism would undermine the US-­Japan alliance. During his visit to Japan, Gorbachev emphasized that the Soviet Union no longer opposed the US-­Japan alliance: “We have no subversive intentions whatsoever in relation to the military-­political structures that have come about in this region.”114 One indicator of the influence of Gorbachev’s visit on MOFA’s willingness to contemplate regional security multilateralism was that in the same month as his visit, the ministry asked the Japan Institute of International Affairs, its subsidiary think tank, to initiate a study on multilateral security cooperation in East Asia.115 Although the announced changes in Soviet intentions, combined with declining Soviet power, ­were a third ­factor encouraging Japan’s change of course regarding regional security multilateralism in spring 1991, the shift was not a direct consequence of improving Japanese-­Soviet relations. Indeed, throughout this period, and for nearly

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two years ­after the Nakayama proposal, Japan continued to oppose inviting the Soviets (or the Chinese) into a regional security forum. Rather, the declining Soviet threat put at risk the US-­Japan alliance. Two se­nior diplomats in the Security Policy Division told me that “the possibility of the US military’s withdrawal” from East Asia was a growing concern for Japan, and that this motivated Tokyo to promote regional security multilateralism as a means for keeping the US in the region.116 Similarly, Nishihara told me, “­There was a real fear in Tokyo that the US might be withdrawing from this region, or at least significantly reducing its presence, especially since the Rus­sian threat was declining. . . . ​ Japan wanted to keep the US in this region by creating a multilateral framework.”117 Likewise, Satoh noted in retrospect the importance of concerns at the time about “how far . . . ​the United States [would] reduce its presence” in East Asia.118 Although Tokyo had seen a Soviet-­sponsored Helsinki pro­cess as a threat to the US military presence, by 1991 Japan was beginning to see a carefully crafted multilateral forum of American-­aligned states as encouraging a continued American presence, thus reducing the risk of abandonment, while si­mul­ta­neously reassuring Japan’s Asian neighbors.

ASEAN Spurs Japan into Action Perhaps the most impor­tant ­factor prompting Japan to act was that by 1990 it had become clear that many of ASEAN’s most influential defense intellectuals ­were beginning to consider the possibility that ASEAN should or­ga­nize “new inter-­ governmental mea­sures for region wide conflict-­resolution and cooperation.”119 In a December 1990 paper, Jusuf Wanandi, chairman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia and a founder of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-­ISIS), ­after mentioning the Australian and Canadian proposals for a CSCA, warned that ASEAN “must” make “preparations” for a dialogue that he saw as coming.120 Because Japan had promoted a special relationship with ASEAN and “ASEAN centrality” since the Fukuda Doctrine, ASEAN’s willingness to consider security multilateralism represented both a threat and an opportunity for Tokyo. ASEAN’s flirtation with this concept could become a threat if it led to security structures that undermined the US-­Japan alliance or Japan’s Soviet policy. Conversely, ­because of the very close diplomatic relationship that had developed between Japan and ASEAN since the late 1970s, ASEAN was the best potential partner for cosponsoring a new security regime; Japan was comfortable dealing with ASEAN.121 Indeed, the primary architect of the Nakayama proposal l­ater suggested that the proposal reflected Tokyo’s intention that Japan and ASEAN together should form the core co­ali­tion for regional consensus building on security multilateralism.122 The combined diplomatic weight of ASEAN and Japan could largely ensure the realization of any forum they crafted, even in the face of American reluctance. Given



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that the Soviet Union and China w ­ ere not members of the PMC (that is, dialogue partners), the prospects for crafting a multilateral forum that excluded the Socialist powers seemed promising. Consequently, Japa­nese diplomats started sounding out the foreign policy intellectuals of ASEAN-­ISIS regarding a pos­si­ble regional multilateral security forum, and t­ hese intellectuals came to play a crucial role in the early stages of formulating the Nakayama proposal. It is to t­ hese early stages that we turn at the beginning of the next chapter, which explains how the Nakayama proposal was formulated.

Conclusion As this chapter has shown, Satoh and some ­others, most notably Nishihara, ­were prominent as policy entrepreneurs pushing MOFA to rethink its traditional opposition to regional security multilateralism. However, the changing position of ASEAN was also beginning to exert a direct impact even on the Asian Bureau and its Regional Policy Division within MOFA. In an initial evaluation of the July 1990 PMC, the Regional Policy Division reported that despite “ASEAN’s caution t­oward a CSCE type arrangement,” an Asia-­Pacific po­liti­cal and security dialogue was likely to be “activated” in the near f­ uture in view of the large changes taking place in international politics. Just as other countries would respond based on their own interests, Japan needed to consider how to adequately respond to this debate about establishing a po­liti­cal and security dialogue. It added that for the time being, Foreign Minister Nakayama would maintain the “line that the Asia-­Pacific is fundamentally dif­fer­ ent from Eu­rope in terms of regional conditions.” In the next paragraph, this PMC evaluation document noted that Japan, as the overwhelming regional economic ­great power, could not escape large regional concerns about its ­future regional role, and it noted that Malaysia had explic­itly raised this issue at the meeting. The paragraph concluded that Japan needed to work to build a more positive regional image of its role in the region and respond appropriately to regional unease about it. One page ­earlier, the document cited regional unease about “Japan becoming a military ­great power” and argued that, in response, Japan needed to better explain its basic policies. 123 This memo in many ways can be seen as having created a road map for what would subsequently become the Nakayama proposal, identifying two key challenges for Japan: first, the growing movement ­toward a regional security dialogue, and second, growing unease about what kind of regional role Japan would assume as the overwhelming regional economic power, including ­whether this would involve Japan beginning to play a direct role in regional and global security. In the next chapter, we ­will see how Satoh and o­ thers wove a policy that linked and addressed t­ hese two policy challenges together.

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PART II

The Pivot ­Toward Regional Security Multilateralism

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4

The Making of the Nakayama Proposal

Japan’s Interest in Regional Security Multilateralism By 1991 Japan had concluded that Soviet CSCA proposals no longer posed a significant threat to the American military presence in East Asia. Instead, the winding down of the Cold War itself had become the threat. A multilateral security forum went from being a threat to the American presence to a means for ensuring its continuation. Perhaps most decisively, expectations of a declining US presence and commitment, along with an already declining Soviet presence, increased Japan’s ­actual and potential regional military weight. Even without a complete American drawdown, Japan faced an incentive, articulated by American demands during the Gulf War, to step into what was then seen as a widening security vacuum. Hence, Japan could use the creation of a multilateral security structure as a means for reassuring East Asian countries and potentially as a framework for channeling its emergence as an actor in regional security. Tokyo also saw security multilateralism as a potential way to limit the anticipated US drawdown and keep the US militarily engaged in the region. This configuration of interests led Japan t­ oward a proactive multilateral strategy with three goals: (1) promote a like-­minded security forum excluding the Socialist powers (China and the Soviet Union), (2) propose a security forum designed to keep the US regionally engaged, and (3) advocate a security forum designed for discussion of regional concerns about Japa­nese rearmament and Japan’s security policy. Th ­ ese last two goals ­were not only goals but also justifications for Japan to take the initiative and abandon the Fukuda Doctrine’s taboo on Tokyo talking about and participating in regional security.

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­After Mikhail Gorbachev’s April visit, Satoh Yukio prepared a paper for a planned sojourn in Southeast Asia that would start at the beginning of June. ASEAN had been the starting point for Japan’s foray into playing an in­de­pen­dent regional po­liti­cal role back in 1977, when Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo had presented his famous doctrine. Now, ASEAN seemed like the logical partner for building support for Japan’s first postwar security initiative, and a network of ASEAN security and foreign policy intellectuals whom Satoh had cultivated ties with emerged as his key interlocutors.

ASEAN-­ISIS as an Epistemic Community, Entrepreneur, and Competitor By spring 1991 ASEAN-­ISIS directors’ thinking about regional security multilateralism was maturing and becoming ambitious. Specifically, they had ambitions to fashion an Asia-­Pacific po­liti­cal and security dialogue. Like Japan, they saw an opportunity to assume regional leadership and feared that ASEAN’s interests would be left b­ ehind if they ­were not involved from the beginning.1 Like Japan, ASEAN opposed CSCE-­ like concepts,2 and it did not want to repeat its bad experience with APEC. When APEC was formed, the ASEAN states ­were reluctant to join, fearing that APEC would weaken ASEAN’s unity and influence.3 The best way to ensure that the APEC experience would not be duplicated in the security realm would be for ASEAN to create the regional forum itself. A Western diplomat found in June 1991 a “sense of fear that ASEAN interests w ­ ill be left b­ ehind if pro­cess or institution building takes place without their involvement at the ground level.”4 Reflecting this angst, in a December 1990 paper, Jusuf Wanandi, a founder of ASEAN-­ISIS and, like Satoh, an IISS alum, citing multiple proposals for a multilateral security dialogue, warned that ASEAN “must” begin making “preparations” for a regional multilateral dialogue that he saw as coming.5 ASEAN-­ISIS Origins. The beginnings of ASEAN-­ISIS can be traced back to 1974, when CSIS Indonesia sponsored “what may [have been] the first regional conference of Southeast Asians on the developments of ASEAN.”6 CSIS followed up with two more conferences in 1977 and 1980 that included scholars, journalists, and officials from the Japan, the US, Australia, and ­Korea.7 A year ­later, in November 1981, CSIS Indonesia cosponsored a US-­ASEAN conference in Bali with the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, ­under the leadership of Professor Robert Scalapino. At a follow-up conference in May 1983 at UC Berkeley,8 the idea of establishing a network of ASEAN policy research institutes emerged during a conversation between Donald Emmerson, a prominent US scholar of ASEAN, and Wanandi.9 The idea apparently originated with Emmerson.10 According to several prominent ASEAN-­ISIS scholars, it was this “series of the US-­ASEAN conferences . . . ​ that led to the creation of an ASEAN informal group of individuals,” which became



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ASEAN-­ISIS. This was apparently the first ASEAN-­wide scholarly network focusing on regional politics, security, and economics.11 At the same time, the network was gradually growing through personal connections. Carolina Hernandez, who essentially represented the Philippines through her person, was recruited to the informal network through a chance meeting with Dr. Hadi Sosastro at an academic institute in Mexico in April 1982.12 She was recruited to write a chapter on the Philippines for the 1984 volume. Joining Scalapino and Emmerson, the main Japa­nese participant in this quadrilateral proj­ect was Satō Seizaburō, and Han San Joo was the main South Korean participant.13 Inspired by Emmerson’s suggestion, Wanandi had CSIS or­ga­nize the first meeting of ASEAN institutes of international politics and strategic studies (the constituent members of what ­later became ASEAN-­ISIS) in September 1984 in Bali. Th ­ ere, the network was informally established, with five founding institutions representing their respective countries: CSIS representing Indonesia in the person of Wanandi, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia through Noordin Sopiee, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs through Lau Teik Soon, Thailand ISIS through Kusuma Snitwongse, and the Department of Po­liti­cal Science at the University of the Philippines through Hernandez.14 At the Bali meeting it was agreed to hold annual meetings and to consider establishing a more formal network and a newsletter. A second meeting, entitled “Regional Development and Security: The Ties That Bind,” was held in Kuala Lumpur in February 1986, sponsored by ISIS Malaysia, and the third annual meeting was held in Manila in June 1987.15 At the fourth annual meeting, in June 1988 in Singapore, the group de­cided to launch itself as a formal organ­ization. The founding leaders, Wanandi, Sopiee, Hernandez, Lau, and Kusuma, signed the “Statutes of ASEAN ISIS,” and immediately ­after this meeting ASEAN-­ISIS registered with the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta as an ASEAN-­wide organ­ization.16 By this time the number of conferences and dialogues that ASEAN-­ISIS and its members participated in had grown and become relatively institutionalized. ISIS Malaysia began sponsoring the annual Asia-­Pacific Roundtable in 1987, focusing on regional politics and security. The year 1989 marked the Third Asia-­Pacific Roundtable, the Fifth US-­ASEAN Conference, and the Second ASEAN-­ Japan Conference, among ­others.17 The 1990 annual ASEAN-­ISIS meeting, held in Bangkok and entitled “Superpower Military Presence and the Security of Southeast Asia: Prob­lems, Prospects and Policy Recommendations,” represented, as the last part of the title suggests, a turning point for ASEAN-­ISIS, as its first attempt to produce policy recommendations for member governments. Its policy recommendations included (1) creating a framework for regional order, (2) promoting ASEAN cooperation through mea­sures to strengthen ASEAN pro­cesses and by promoting defense cooperation, and (3) taking mea­sures

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aimed at specific countries, including the US, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, India, and Vietnam.18 This meeting, in turn, set the stage for a bigger turning point in 1991, when the annual ASEAN-­ISIS meeting in Jakarta produced specific policy recommendations for the Fourth ASEAN Summit in February 1992 on establishing an Asia-­Pacific multi­ lateral po­liti­cal and security dialogue, a concrete step ­toward realizing the previous year’s call for creating a framework for regional order, as well as Wanandi’s emerging concept of engaging all the major powers. A founding member of ASEAN-­ISIS described the importance of the June 1991 meeting to me: “I remember that meeting very, very well. ISIS Thailand scholar Dr. Kusuma and I ­were about to leave for an Austrian meeting, and Jusuf [Wanandi] said you give up that meeting ­because this is impor­tant. So we went to Jakarta.”19

The Jakarta ASEAN-­ISIS Meeting By 1991 ASEAN-­ISIS’s growing influence as a group of policy entrepreneurs that generated new ideas for policy makers, including through track-­one diplomacy, was based not only on its growing contacts with ASEAN governments but also on its growing contacts with academics and diplomats from outside ASEAN. For Satoh, ASEAN-­ISIS, and especially Wanandi, proved to be the key interlocutor. ­Because Tokyo was not then engaged in policy-­planning talks with ASEAN foreign ministries, ties with ASEAN-­ISIS scholars, and especially Wanandi, took on ­great importance. According to Satoh, in spring 1991 Wanandi, “whom I had known since 1980[,] was almost the only interlocutor with whom I could consult over Japan’s evolving views on Asia-­Pacific security.”20 Wanandi, like Satoh, was also an IISS alum. Satoh’s and Wanandi’s thinking was in many ways parallel, although, as ­will become evident, they also diverged in some key re­spects. ASEAN-­ISIS’s ideas on how to create a regional security forum became clear at its sixth annual directors’ meeting, held in Jakarta on June 2–3, 1991, although, as discussed ­earlier, they had already begun considering this issue at the fifth annual directors’ meeting in Bangkok in May 1990. One ASEAN-­ISIS founder who participated in the Jakarta meeting summarized it as follows: “We discussed the question of the end of the Cold War, and what ­were we ­going to do now.” The founder continued, “Jusuf [Wanandi] said we need to get all the strategic players in the region involved in the ASEAN pro­cess. So, we de­cided a political-­security dialogue mechanism ­after the PMC to engage all the strategic players. ­Because we are ASEAN, we need to talk, right? . . . ​The idea was to have another day ­after the PMC.”21 Wanandi’s conceptualization, which was based on ASEAN’s, and especially Indonesia’s, long-­standing conception of ZOPFAN, saw ASEAN nations as essentially neutral or nonaligned, rather than being a de facto extension of the Western alliance, and



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hence interested in engaging all the g­ reat powers, not just Western nations. According to Wanandi, an impor­tant aspect of ZOPFAN “is the development of a structure or relations between ASEAN and the major powers. In this connection, it is in ASEAN’s primary interest that the region not be dominated or come u­ nder the hegemony of any major power, although the legitimate presence of the major powers is recognized.”22 In his Jakarta meeting paper, Wanandi argued that the US regional military presence “played a stabilizing role,” not least of all b­ ecause it discouraged Japan from playing a larger military role.23 Nonetheless, Wanandi argued that ASEAN’s goal should be to seek “a balanced presence of all the major powers in the region,” and that this could be attained through the establishment of a “po­liti­cal and security dialogue.” He identified the PMC as “an initial vehicle for such a dialogue.”24 This logic is therefore arguably the intellectual origin of the ARF, as well as the ASEAN strategy that Evelyn Goh l­ ater labeled “omni-­enmeshment.”25 Although the paper Wanandi wrote for the meeting advocated for the PMC as the “initial” vehicle for a region-­wide po­liti­cal dialogue, ASEAN-­ISIS Memorandum 1, which this meeting produced, instead advocated for the creation of a new forum for a regional multilateral security dialogue.26 Significantly, Satoh was invited to the Jakarta meeting by Wanandi as a guest speaker and observer. ­There, the ASEAN-­ISIS directors, led by Wanandi, and Satoh agreed that the time was ripe for establishing an Asia-­Pacific regional security dialogue. Satoh ­later claimed that “ASEAN-­ISIS participants and I w ­ ere in total agreement on the need for a security dialogue in the Asia-­Pacific region and, more importantly, on the forum to do so.”27 Nonetheless, t­ here w ­ ere two significant disagreements. Not surprisingly, Satoh and his ASEAN-­ISIS interlocutors disagreed on the issue of including the Socialist countries. The ASEAN-­ISIS participants, based on Wanandi’s “omni-­enmeshment” logic, reached a consensus on including the Socialist countries.28 Satoh, on the other hand, was cautious about including the Socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. He proposed a precondition for Soviet participation: agreement to enter negotiations for returning the Northern Territories to Japan.29 Moreover, he suggested that membership for the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries should be delayed three to five years.30 ­Later, Satoh characterized his position this way: “First, I thought we should create a forum among ourselves, and then invite the Socialist countries afterward.”31 The ASEAN participants wanted to locate this dialogue in an extension of the PMC, such as an “ASEAN PMC-­initiated conference.”32 Satoh suggested using the PMC itself. He also supported APEC as an appropriate venue. Although Satoh subsequently characterized what happened in Jakarta as “a meeting of the minds” between him and the ASEAN-­ISIS directors,33 according to Wanandi, the driving force ­behind ASEAN-­ISIS Memorandum 1 that emerged from the Jakarta meeting, the intellectual influence was unidirectional: Satoh was influenced but did

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not influence.34 Rather, according to Wanandi, the results of the Jakarta meeting, including Memorandum 1, w ­ ere hammered out immediately before the Jakarta meeting at an ­earlier ASEAN-­ISIS meeting, on May 31–­June 1, and contained in Memorandum 1.35 As discussed ­later, the Nakayama proposal and the Jakarta declaration differed as regards membership (­whether to include the Socialist countries) and venue (a PMC-­ sponsored conference versus the PMC itself ).

Manila and Kuala Lumpur Meetings The day ­after the ASEAN-­ISIS meeting closed in Jakarta, on June 5, another ASEAN-­ sponsored conference, “ASEAN and the Asia-­Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s,” opened in Manila. This meeting was more official, sponsored as it was by the Philippine and Thai Foreign Ministries, and was charged with reporting its findings to the Kuala Lumpur AMM in July. Several other Jakarta conference participants, including Satoh and Wanandi, attended the Manila meeting. ­There, a consensus emerged, supported even by participating American officials, to the effect that an ASEAN Asia-­Pacific security dialogue was an idea whose time has come. Desaix Anderson, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, who represented the US at the Manila meeting, insisted that the US was interested in discussing regional security cooperation. However, according to Anderson, the proposals made up to that time had not proved convincing.36 Soviet participation, and a statement by Ambassador Vladimir Fedotov asserting that the Soviet Union accepted the regional American military presence as stabilizing, as well as Amer­i­ca’s bilateral security pacts with regional countries,37 may have encouraged this consensus.38 In his Manila conference paper, Satoh emphasized Japan’s priority interest in ensuring a continued US military presence in the region, and stressed Japan’s responsibility to repair the damage done to the bilateral alliance by the Gulf War. Satoh advocated expanding the PMC’s (or APEC’s) agenda to include security issues. One major purpose would be to help ensure a continued American military presence in the region.39 However, he added a new ele­ment, stressing Japan’s need to reassure its neighbors, a point he had not emphasized at the ASEAN-­ISIS meeting. Satoh stated that Japan would play a larger and more active role in Asia-­Pacific security and politics, and that this larger role necessitated that Japan use a multilateral security framework to reassure its neighbors.40 According to Satoh, “Po­liti­cally, Japan has been keeping a low profile. ­Behind this has been a concern that a high po­liti­cal posture on the Japa­nese part might arouse skepticism and concern among Asian ­people, who still remember the Japa­nese attempt to dominate them by force, let alone the horrendous conduct by the invading Japa­nese.” He emphasized, “Participation of the SDF, if any, ­will be l­imited to the areas of non-­combat operation. . . . ​In the coming years, Japan



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­ ill engage herself more positively than before in the pro­cess to enhance po­liti­cal w stability and security in the Asia and Pacific region. . . . ​Yet, anxiety on the part of many Asian countries about the possibility of Japan becoming a “military power” ­will persist u ­ nless . . . ​[ Japan involves] herself in the pro­cess of regional dialogue on this question.41 Satoh noted that at the 1990 PMC, Malaysia had raised the hitherto delicate question of Asian fears about the f­uture course of Japa­nese security policy, signifying, in Satoh’s view, that the Japan-­ASEAN dialogue and the PMC had matured enough to be used as a forum for a security dialogue, and for Japan to reassure its partners about its security intentions.42 Satoh then implicitly modified Japan’s Fukuda Doctrine pledge to not be a military power: “It is impor­tant for Japan to commit herself to the policy of not becoming a ‘military power.’ But it is equally impor­tant for Japan to place herself in multilateral venues, wherein the countries which are worried about the ­future direction of Japa­nese defense policy can express their concern.”43 The brilliance of Satoh’s conceptualization of the Nakayama proposal is that he took what had been a reason for Japan not to be involved in regional security, its aggressive reputation stemming from East Asian memories of its war­time be­hav­ior, and flipped this into a justification for Japan to engage in security dialogue with its neighbors, so it could address ­these fears. Satoh’s overture was enthusiastically accepted by all the ASEAN representatives at the Manila conference; they invited Japan to become more involved in regional security dialogue and to discuss Japa­nese defense and national security policies as they evolve.44 This very positive response may have contributed to Satoh’s and MOFA’s belief that ASEAN would support a multilateral security initiative from Japan. Given Satoh’s emphasis on reassurance in his Manila paper, it is intriguing that MOFA chose to include it, along with a collection of speeches by other se­nior diplomats, in a booklet entitled Japan’s Post Gulf International Initiatives. The inclusion of Satoh’s paper suggests that at least some in MOFA saw it as part of their overall effort to respond to (if not recover from) Japan’s Gulf War experience. Although the focus of this booklet is on repairing the damage done to Japan’s alliance with the US by, among other t­ hings, promising to play a more active security role, the inclusion of Satoh’s paper suggests an attempt to prepare for this role by reassuring Asian countries.45 ­After Manila, Satoh continued on to Kuala Lumpur, where he attended the Fifth Asia-­Pacific Roundtable sponsored by ISIS Malaysia. ­There he was interviewed by ISIS Focus, a limited-­circulation publication of ISIS Malaysia. During the interview, Satoh clearly stated his “personal opinion” that the PMC should be used for a regional po­liti­cal dialogue on security issues, although he did not give any indication that he wanted Japan to take the initiative on this issue. He indicated that two issues stood

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at the top of the regional security agenda: “how far the United States is ­going to withdraw and how far Japan w ­ ill expand her po­liti­cal and military role in this region.” Pointing to a dialogue as key for promoting “mutual assurance,” Satoh acknowledged that, regionally, “anxiety about the possibility of Japan becoming a big military power still persists. ­Behind it t­ here are ­bitter memories of the past.” Therefore, it is Japan’s “responsibility . . . ​to expose ourselves to the expression of concern about Japan.”46 Satoh also linked regional concerns about Japan’s emerging security role to Tokyo’s response to the Gulf War and especially its dispatch of minesweepers: Japan “should not arouse concern among Asian countries. We should not change our policy of not sending forces abroad for combat purposes.”47

From Sojourn to Initiative: Motivations and Pro­cess The Satoh Briefing. Freshly returned from his travels to security conferences in three Southeast Asian capitals, Satoh gave a briefing on June 18 to the Asia Bureau’s Regional Policy Division chief Imai Tadashi and subordinates regarding his discussions with ASEAN scholars and officials. As seen in a previously top-­secret written rec­ord of this sweeping pre­sen­ta­tion produced by Imai’s division, Satoh emphasized five points. First, he found that his interlocutors w ­ ere preoccupied with two regional security concerns: first, they ­were concerned by how the US regional presence was changing, and second, they ­were described as “painfully aware” (tsūkan)48 of the possibility that Japan might play a regional security role from then on. By contrast, ASEAN officials ­were described as not very concerned about potential threats from the Soviet Union or China.49 Second, in a transparent critique of official Japa­nese policy up to that point, Satoh emphasized that Japan should not have the attitude that t­ here o­ ught to be no security dialogue. Rather, it should proactively promote such a dialogue. He claimed that the idea of making a proposal to establish one at that year’s PMC had gained widespread support from participants of the conferences he had attended.50 Third, Satoh argued that ­there should be two conditions for making an initiative to promote a dialogue u ­ nder ASEAN’s aegis: for now, the Soviet Union and China should not be included, with participating countries ­limited to ­those who clearly understood the importance of the US presence. Fourth, Satoh introduced his concept of “multiplex mechanisms” as a comprehensive approach using multiple venues for region-­wide security dialogue. This would include using the PMC now and APEC in the f­uture. In Northeast Asia this would include two-­plus-­four talks51 regarding the Korean Peninsula; trilateral talks between Japan, the US, and South ­Korea; and, in the ­future, a forum including Japan, the US, China, and the Soviet Union for managing ­great power relations. Fi­nally, Satoh offered to prepare a position paper by the end of June for a Japa­nese proposal to create a dialogue on Asia-­Pacific security within the PMC.52



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Satoh thus boldly told his MOFA colleagues that the time had come for Japan to end its regional security isolationism and rejection of regional security multilateralism, and take the initiative by proposing a regional security dialogue. This would be Japan’s first regional security initiative since the end of World War II. Rather than seeing regional suspicions about Japan’s regional role as a military power as a reason for Japan to continue avoiding any regional security role, he pointed precisely to t­ hese concerns, along with concerns about a US withdrawal from the region, as reasons for Japan to take the initiative in proposing a regional security dialogue, and as topics that this dialogue should tackle. The dialogue would thus be a venue for Japan to reassure other East Asian countries about its security policy and allow the country to play a greater security role. At the same time, Satoh argued for keeping the Soviet Union and China out of the regional security dialogue for the time being. On the one hand, he appeared to be more interested in including t­ hese two powers, even the Soviet Union, than MOFA as a ­whole was, and on the other hand, he was less willing to see China and the Soviet Union join from the beginning than was indicated by Wanandi’s concept of achieving a balanced engagement of all the major powers, or “omni-­enmeshment.” In the end he argued for a minilateral or like-­minded multilateral dialogue of US allies and reasonably pro-­Western states that appreciated the regional US military presence. In this way Satoh wanted the security dialogue to encourage the US to remain in the region, not alienate it. Fi­nally, Satoh was thinking about how to harmonize diverse multilateral platforms for security cooperation through his multiplex concept,53 and he was even looking forward to a Northeast Asian regional forum at some point in the ­future. Satoh’s Position Paper. Exactly a week ­after Satoh’s briefing, he followed up with a secret position paper addressed to the Regional Policy Division of the Asia Bureau and entitled “Using Multiplex (Multiple) Mechanisms for Ensuring Stability in the Asia Pacific.” Th ­ ere Satoh emphasized that Soviet president Gorbachev’s decision not to repeat his call for applying Eu­ro­pean pro­cesses such as CSCE to the Asia-­ Pacific during his April visit to Tokyo presented Japan with an opportunity to build a ­regional consensus b­ ehind its contention that Eu­ro­pean models cannot be applied to Asia-­Pacific security. He referred to the achievement of this consensus as “the end of the first act.”54 Satoh then identified the task for Japa­nese diplomacy of assuming the “core role” of building a consensus regarding regional security cooperation among “regional countries,” a pro­cess he referred to as “the second act.” He then presented his personal opinion that Japan should propose establishing a place for security dialogue during Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō’s speech to the PMC the following month. He prefaced this proposal by emphasizing that it should be separated from Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus

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(EAEC), which had provoked much opposition from the US. By so ­doing, Satoh appeared concerned that the EAEC, if not fully separated, could sink the impending Nakayama proposal. Satoh advocated harmonizing existing structures and forms of cooperation, invoking his concept of “multiplexing” and claiming that this would be the most effective and realistic.55 ­After reviewing eco­nom­ically focused cooperation forums; frameworks for dealing with conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, Cambodia, and the South China Sea; and traditional defense cooperation frameworks among US allies and the Socialist countries, Satoh identified the establishment of a regional po­liti­cal dialogue as the new task. The immediate agenda for this new forum would be to address fears about a pos­si­ble withdrawal of the US from its regional security role, as well as fears about Japan’s po­liti­cal role and the possibility of Tokyo projecting its military into the region. Worries about how Japan and the US could maintain friendly relations ­were identified as a third area of concern. Looking at its track rec­ord and “range of participating countries,” Satoh identified the PMC as the location where this dialogue should start. He added that in the f­ uture, regional po­liti­cal dialogue could be held through APEC, with China participating. No mention was made of pos­si­ble Soviet participation at this point.56 He thus promoted a like-­minded cooperative security multilateralism instead of an un-­like-­minded common security structure. Satoh emphasized that in order to play a regional po­liti­cal role and actively promote a multilateral security dialogue, Japan must show that it is listening to the voices of other regional states. He asked that Foreign Minister Nakayama, in his speech to the PMC in July, make this proposal and entitle it “Establishing a Place for Frank Dialogue on Asia-­Pacific Stability and Security in the ASEAN PMC.” Before this speech, Satoh called for consensus-­building consultations with ASEAN, the US, Canada, Australia, and South K ­ orea. Fi­nally, he called including China and the Soviet Union in the dialogue a “task for the f­uture.”57 He seemed to place China ahead of the Soviet Union as a candidate participant, noting that China was already a member of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and a candidate to join APEC, as well as a guest at the AMM, whereas the Soviet Union was only a candidate to join the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and a guest at the AMM.58 He added that China and the Soviet Union could only participate in the PMC with the agreement of the existing members, thereby indicating that Japan effectively had a veto over their membership, an assumption that ­later proved false.59 In an appendix to the memo, Satoh separated the proposed regional security dialogue from nuclear arms control and efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as from demands that China, India, and the Soviet Union reduce their “excessive armaments.” He tied this separation to rejecting proposals made by President Gorbachev while in Japan for establishing trilateral Japan-­US-­Soviet



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and five-­power Japan-­US-­China-­India-­Soviet frameworks for arms control. Satoh described t­ hese frameworks as unsuited to the Asia-­Pacific region. Fi­nally, he insisted that while a Northeast Asian multilateral consultative forum for ensuring stability, and centered on the Korean Peninsula, might be worth considering in the f­uture, a great-­power-­led approach such as the Soviet proposal is inappropriate for the Asia-­ Pacific region. Thus, he appeared to embrace the ASEAN approach of bottom-up multilateralism as the norm for the region.60 The Asia Bureau Takes Charge. ­After Satoh’s position paper, formulation of the Nakayama proposal shifted to the Asia Bureau, especially its Regional Policy Division. On July 3, eight days a­ fter Satoh issued his position paper, the Asia Bureau produced a memo proposing the creation of a Se­nior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) on security within the framework of the PMC, a proposal that was to be included in Nakayama’s statement to the PMC ­later that month.61 This proposal was entirely absent from Satoh’s briefing and position paper. The director of the Regional Policy Division, Imai, wrote Nakayama’s speech and was the originator of the idea of adding the SOM to the proposal.62 The first bullet in the Regional Policy Division memo notes that final approval for the Nakayama statement is still pending, but then it pre­sents a passage for inclusion in the speech that calls for establishing the SOM to support regional dialogue about “po­liti­cal and security issues”;63 a slightly edited version of this passage and the first draft of the speech itself w ­ ere circulated on the same day (see the discussion l­ater in the chapter). The proposed passage stresses the importance of deepening po­liti­ cal dialogue regarding security issues among the “friendly countries” that have “the same ideology/system [shugi/taisei],” who are members of the PMC, but that such dialogue has not occurred to date. From this viewpoint the draft asserts the necessity of establishing a “se­nior working level meeting for security,” or security SOM, ­under the PMC to provide feedback to the PMC itself. Section 2 provides four justifications for the initiative. First, the PMC is the right venue ­because it brings together “western friendly nations” with “the same ideology/ system,” thus facilitating effective communication of views. The second reason is redacted. The discussion of the third reason acknowledges Japan’s traditional passivity and calls for switching to a proactive approach: “The initiative not only does not contradict the reasons for ‘our country’s’ traditionally passive approach to security dialogue, but Japan can appeal to ­others by adopting the position of pro-­actively working to promote regional peace and wellbeing.” The fourth reason is that a security dialogue would give Japan “a chance to explain our security policy as a ‘peace state,’ ”64 as well as the importance of the US and the US-­Japan alliance to the pro-­Western states of the Asia-­Pacific region. In short, the fourth reason is the opportunity for reassurance and the regularization of the Fukuda Doctrine’s diplomatic tactic of promising not to

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become a military power. Added in parenthesis is the assertion that as this dialogue is being tried for the first time, the discussion should not “suddenly” (ikinari) be opened; rather, it would be more appropriate to have a SOM to provide feedback. Section 3 outlines the status quo regarding a security dialogue. It starts by acknowledging that Japan’s “traditional” response to “­every type of proposal” for creating a security dialogue in the Asia-­Pacific has been negative. It then lists two reasons for this negativity: Eu­rope, which created CSCE, and the Asia-­Pacific are geo­graph­i­cally dif­fer­ent in many re­spects, so simply adopting a Eu­ro­pean approach is not appropriate. The second reason is redacted. The document then outlines the prospects for gaining approval of Japan’s initiative. Based on Satoh’s experience at recent seminars in Southeast Asia, the document claims that the trend, including China and Rus­sia, and even ASEAN, which is shifting from its traditionally “passive” approach to the management of regional security issues, is ­toward creating a place for security dialogue. PMC member countries Australia and Canada, countries that Japan and the US had e­ arlier criticized for their multilateral security proposals, ­were seen as likely to view the Nakayama proposal as similar to their own proposals, and hence likely to support it. The document adds that opposition to Tokyo’s proposal would be especially unlikely if Japan made it together with the US. This was the only indication in declassified MOFA documents that I saw that MOFA thought it might be able to persuade the US to cosponsor the contents of the Nakayama proposal for creating a security dialogue within the PMC. On the other hand, the sentence that follows predicts that ­because the Nakayama proposal only promoted exchanging views among “friendly countries with the same ideology and po­liti­cal systems,” it would be hard for the US to oppose it. With Japa­nese diplomatic missions lobbying for the initiative ­after it is de­cided on, the document predicts that the chance that all PMC members would support the initiative was very high. Fi­nally, this document notes that the biggest security concerns for Asia-­Pacific states are about how US influence in the region ­will change and the ­future course of Japan’s regional role. As such, it states that it is “exceptionally impor­tant for Japan to actively consider and demonstrate that it is participating in the construction of a new regional order.”65 Overall, the Asia Bureau document displays four key characteristics. First, it almost entirely adopts Satoh’s critique of previous Japa­nese policy ­toward security multilateralism as “passive,” reactive, and “negative,” as well as his proposal for creating a security dialogue in the PMC. Second, it also recognizes the importance of keeping the US engaged in regional security and reassuring PMC members about Japan’s ­future security role in the region. Third, unlike Satoh, the Regional Policy Division calls for the creation of a security SOM ­under the PMC, citing the need to support the ministerial-­level dialogue with “feedback” from professional bureau-



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crats.66 A diplomat closely involved in writing the Nakayama speech cited the same reason for adding the SOM to the proposal in an interview I conducted.67 One can also speculate that the bureaucratic interests of the Asia Bureau, and perhaps distrust of ministers by the professional bureaucrats in MOFA, especially of the politicians who are parachuted into the foreign minister’s chair from the Diet, ­were additional motivating ­factors.68 Fi­nally, despite adding the SOM as a new ele­ment not mentioned by Satoh, the Asia Bureau’s analy­sis was nonetheless notably optimistic about the prospect of other PMC members approving the Nakayama proposal. In hindsight, the document suggests the Asian Bureau did not anticipate the objections that emerged: that the proposal came from Japan instead of from ASEAN itself. For many ASEAN states, and for the ASEAN-­ISIS directors, the only proper way to modify the PMC was through ASEAN’s own initiative. The possibility that the addition of a security SOM to the previously eco­nom­ically and po­liti­cally focused PMC could thereby divert the PMC away from ­these two issue areas, perhaps even creating a proto alliance, emerged as the other major objection that the Regional Policy Division did not anticipate.69 On the same day that the Regional Policy Division produced this memo requesting that the SOM proposal be included in the Nakayama speech, a similar memo with the same title and making the same request was circulated together with a cover sheet, also dated July 3, and entitled “Kessaisho”70 (approval form). Originating with the Regional Policy Division, the form sought approval for the SOM proposal. The form includes approval initials from bureaucrats of MOFA with primary jurisdiction—­ namely, the Asia Bureau director, Tanino; the deputy bureau director; and the head of the Regional Policy Division, Imai. From the office of the Foreign Minister, several initials are hard to read, but Vice Foreign Minister Owada Hisashi’s handwritten name and acknowl­edgment of understanding (the Kanji satoru)71 are clear. In the bottom section of the form, entitled “consulting entities,” other parts of the Asia Bureau, including the Northeast Asia, China Desk, and First and Second Southeast Asia Division chiefs, signaled their understanding with a single satoru approval mark. The North American Bureau and the Security Division also initialed their understanding, as did the Disarmament Division and the Planning Division. Most significantly, the Soviet Desk within the Eu­ro­pean Division, then headed by Togo, gave his understanding, and the Information and Analy­sis Bureau director Satoh signed off on it as well. Although Satoh was widely reported to have opposed the SOM proposal, and has subsequently confirmed this position, at this stage he gave his approval, or at least did not try to stop it.72 Likewise, Soviet Desk’s reservations over the Nakayama proposal itself, which reportedly surfaced about ten days ­later during the G-7 summit in London (see the discussion ­later), did not stop the Soviet Desk chief from signing off on the SOM proposal at this stage.

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The memo attached to this approval sheet was an abbreviated version of the other July 3 memo discussed e­ arlier. This memo also included the passage for proposing the SOM, although with some minor differences in language.73 It also referred to PMC members as sharing the same ideology and “system.”74 First Draft of the Nakayama Proposal. The first draft of the full speech was issued on the same day. This draft had some striking differences from Satoh’s position paper from a ­little more than a week ­earlier. First, the concept of MRMs was missing altogether, as was a critique of CBMs; t­ here was only a single reference to the PMC creating “trust.” Also, even while calling for the creation of a region-­wide security dialogue through the PMC, this first draft was missing Satoh’s contention that two major purposes of the security dialogue ­were, first, to reassure East Asian states worried about Japan again becoming a military power and using military power overseas and, second, to address fears about a declining US commitment to regional security. Nonetheless, the speech draft referred to “one section of Asian nations” expressing concern about Japan becoming a military power and threat. Rather than suggesting a reassurance dialogue as a way to address t­ hese concerns, the draft itself offered reassurance: “Japan as a demo­cratic country de­cided 45 years ago not to repeat the past” and, “having most deeply recognized the lessons of history,” ­will not send the SDF “overseas for the purpose of using force.”75 The draft also emphasized the crucial role that the forward US military presence in East Asia plays in maintaining stability, 76 but it did not suggest that the new multilateral security dialogue it was proposing through the PMC should address this concern. This first draft, like the excerpt discussed ­earlier, called for creating “a security related SOM” and referred to PMC members as “pro-­western” and as sharing the same ideology and “system.” Coming in conjunction with ideology, this appeared to refer to the same “po­liti­cal and economic system,” or at least to emphasize that all members ­were non-­Communist nations.77 Overall, this first draft was missing three key characteristics of what would become the Nakayama proposal. First, the MRM concept was entirely missing. Second, East Asian concerns about Japan as a military power that uses force overseas and the potential for a US military withdrawal from the region ­were not identified as major purposes for the regional multilateral security dialogue Nakayama was to propose. Fi­nally, t­here was no explicit rejection of CSCE and CBMs as Eu­ro­pean models inapplicable for East Asia. The fact that both ­these ele­ments appeared in the final proposal (see the next chapter) indicates not only that t­ here was a significant rewriting of this first draft but also that Satoh’s unmistakable influence played a major role in this rewriting, especially as regards the MRM concept, the rejection of CSCE and CBMs as applicable to East Asia, and Japan’s aim of using multilateral dialogue to reassure its Asian neighbors.



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Debate Time in London Several se­nior diplomats, including several bureau directors, debated the contents of the draft Nakayama proposal and ­whether to go forward with it in London during the 1991 G-7 summit, nearly a week before the PMC meeting (July 15–17). Th ­ ere the Soren-ka (Soviet Desk) expressed reservations, fearing that the Nakayama proposal would look too much like Soviet CSCA proposals, thereby discrediting Japan’s opposition to the latter. This would allow the Soviets to resurrect their CSCA proposals, possibly even paving the way for a regional consensus accepting them, with all the feared negative implications for Japan’s territorial claim to the Northern Territories, if not for American naval dominance in the Pacific. By contrast, the head of the Eu­ro­pean Bureau was relatively more open to moving forward with the Nakayama proposal, the North American Bureau was neutral, and the Asian Bureau was the most enthusiastic supporter of the initiative that it had recrafted.78 Satoh, as director general of the Information and Analy­sis Bureau, still supported the proposal, but was more ambivalent by this time.79 This stemmed from a separate debate over the contents of the proposal—­namely, w ­ hether to include the SOM proposal. Satoh, who had not mentioned the SOM in his briefing or position paper, opposed this provision, whereas the Asian Bureau, which had drafted the proposal, supported it. Although he had signed off on the proposal in early July, when he saw the proposed SOM in the draft Nakayama statement in London, Satoh became alarmed and called Tokyo (perhaps Imai) to suggest dropping the proposal, but changed his mind ­after being assured that ASEAN would be shown a draft of the proposal in advance.80 In the end, the Asian Bureau’s position triumphed, and the SOM was included. Yet this last-­minute debate complicated efforts to brief ASEAN and other PMC dialogue partners about the contents of the Nakayama proposal. Most notable was the failure of Japa­nese diplomats to brief Baker at the London G-7 summit, which occurred just before the PMC meeting. In London Satoh briefed Baker aide Dennis Ross, head of policy planning, on the Nakayama proposal, but he then discovered that Ross would not accompany Baker to Kuala Lumpur. He was not sure ­whether Desaix Anderson had briefed Baker.81 In a diplomatic cable sent from Japan’s London embassy on July 17, 1991, that arrived at MOFA on July 18 (a mere four days before Nakayama was scheduled to deliver his proposal), entitled “ASEAN PMC (Japan-­US Coordination)” and marked “top secret” and “urgent,” alarm was expressed regarding how the US was reacting to the initial briefings about the Nakayama proposal and ­whether ­these briefings ­were adequate.82 The fax started by recounting a phone conversation between administrative Vice Minister Owada Hisashi (the top ­career diplomat) and a redacted American

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counterpart on July 17 (the last day of the G-7 summit). Following a large redaction, Owada’s counterpart stated that Nakayama effectively told Baker that “China and the Soviet Union would soon be participating” in the envisaged PMC-­located security dialogue and SOM. In response, Owada told his US counterpart that Japan was not considering allowing Chinese and Soviet participation in this pro­cess. He also stated that the envisaged Nakayama proposal had “nothing whatsoever” to do with Nakayama’s cosponsorship of an Asian foreign ministers’ dinner at the UN General Assembly the previous year.83 The US counterpart was described as being “reassured” by Owada’s explanation. The same cable stated that before the Owada call, Satoh had briefed another American official (name redacted) regarding the same points; Satoh told me this was Ross.84 It mentions that Satoh did not attend the Baker Nakayama ministerial and therefore does not know what was said. His American briefing partner reported being just as much in the dark. A faxed outline of Nakayama’s proposal and a copy of Satoh’s Manila paper w ­ ere presented to this American diplomat as a form of explanation. The US diplomat responded that he basically supported the contents of the envisaged Nakayama proposal, but expressed his personal concern that if this proposal proceeded, the Soviet Union, China, and the Communist Indochinese states would inevitably enter the PMC. Satoh’s response—­that as existing members of the PMC, the US and Japan could block ­these countries from joining the PMC—­reportedly reassured this US diplomat, who expressed a forward-­looking view of the proposal.85 Satoh’s outline of the envisaged Nakayama initiative, although written in Japa­nese, was clearly aimed at US diplomats (and was apparently handed to Ross)86 and was designed mostly to provide talking points for Japa­nese diplomats. The outline requests that the reader convince “your Secretary” to support the proposal, a clear reference to Secretary Baker.87 The proposal requests understanding and support for a regional “po­liti­cal dialogue,” rather than a “security” or a “po­liti­cal security” dialogue. It contains one tepid mention of the SOM proposal, stating, “For this purpose it would be a good idea to maintain a working level meeting.” The document then emphasizes the significance of the fact that the Soviets have ceased their CSCE-­type proposals for the Asia-­Pacific region. The next two long sections emphasize the importance of MRMs, specifically of having a reassurance dialogue, or what the document describes in En­ glish as a “pro­cess of reassuring.” It states that this dialogue is needed to address the unease that many friendly countries feel about “Japan’s f­ uture and American policy.” It emphasizes that this pro­cess is dif­fer­ent from that of establishing CBMs among “adversaries,” b­ ecause the pro­cess aims to reassure friends. This emphasis on a clear adversary-­versus-­friend dichotomy appears to have been designed to convince US diplomats, although it suggests another reason why Satoh opposed the use of the term confidence-­building mea­sure: the danger that, by calling for CBMs to build confidence



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with other PMC members, Japan would be labeling itself as an e­ nemy.88 Fi­nally, the outline calls for “starting” a region-­wide po­liti­cal dialogue ­limited to only the friendly countries, and it is notably optimistic that b­ ecause “we” (presumably Japan and the US) have a voice in the PMC, we “have control” over the expansion of the PMC.89 The July 17 cable with the attached outline, triangulated with interview sources, paint a picture of debate over the contents, and a rushed and chaotic pro­cess of consultations regarding the contents of the Nakayama proposal at the G-7 summit in London. This pro­cess apparently continued up to the day Nakayama delivered his speech. The cable shows US unease with the proposal, and Nakayama’s comment to Baker about soon letting China and Rus­sia into the PMC, although not reflecting MOFA’s ­actual policy, may have contributed to Baker’s rather negative reaction to the initiative several days ­later at the PMC. ­There, the US continued to oppose creating a CSCE-­like common security multilateral forum in East Asia, so much so that it remained essentially opposed to any form of regional security multilateralism. Japan, on the other hand, had come to embrace a cooperative security and like-­minded multilateral forum among “friends,” despite lingering internal concerns that this would devolve into a CSCA-­type common security multilateral forum involving China and the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, this issue emerged front and center in the reaction to the Nakayama proposal, albeit in ways unanticipated by Japan’s diplomats. This is what we turn to in the next chapter.

5

Delivering and Defending the Nakayama Proposal

what has become known as the Nakayama proposal was delivered by Japa­nese foreign minister Nakayama Tarō to the annual PMC in Kuala Lumpur on July 22, 1991.1 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, key aspects of the Nakayama proposal emerged from Satoh Yukio’s participation in the Jakarta and Manila conferences. In an oblique reference to his own “behind-­the-­scenes” role in formulating the Nakayama proposal, Satoh ­later claimed that ­after Nakayama’s speech, a participant from the Jakarta conference approached him and exclaimed that the “ideas of ASEAN researchers have passed through the Japa­nese Foreign Minister’s mouth and onto the governmental level.”2 Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, ASEAN-­ISIS’s proposal differed significantly from Satoh’s ideas. Moreover, the Regional Policy Division of the Asia Bureau significantly modified Satoh’s formulation by adding the proposal to institutionalize a security-­focused SOM.

The Proposal In his speech at the PMC, before making the proposal, Nakayama prefaced it with three points. First, he reiterated the importance of the US military presence and Japan’s efforts to help maintain this presence. Unlike the first speech draft, however, this version ­limited the US role in maintaining regional stability to “the region around us,” which appeared in context to imply the region around Japan rather than Southeast Asia.3 The final speech was thus less Southeast Asia–­focused than the first draft, which referred to the US role in “this region.”4 This apparently reflected a desire not to assert the US security role in Southeast Asia too strongly so as not to offend some



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ASEAN members, most notably nonaligned Indonesia, or to too openly challenge the ZOPFAN concept. Second, Nakayama repeated the Fukuda Doctrine pledge to not become a military power, including by maintaining Japan’s doctrine of defensive defense (senshu bōei). Third, he then set up the proposal by noting Japan’s growing po­liti­cal and security role as a result of its post–­Gulf War initiatives and its involvement in the settlement of the Cambodia conflict, which would lead to Japan dispatching troops overseas for the first time in the postwar era less than fourteen months ­after Nakayama’s speech. He noted that this expanding role was creating concern in the region about how far Japan’s international and regional role would expand.5 Turning to his initiative, Nakayama proposed creating a regional multilateral po­liti­cal dialogue among PMC members. He further proposed using this po­liti­cal dialogue as a means for Japan to reassure its neighbors by addressing their concerns. This passage in Nakayama’s speech is similar to Satoh’s statement from six weeks ­earlier in his Manila conference paper. This idea was also reflected in Satoh’s secret briefing and especially his position paper that circulated within MOFA in late June. Notably, however, this passage is missing from the Asia Regional Policy Division documents of July 3, and from the first draft of Nakayama’s speech from that time.6 ­After mentioning Japan’s intention to participate in UN Peacekeeping operations, Nakayama stated, “This expansion of the Japa­nese po­liti­cal role in the Asia Pacific region has caused anxiety and concern among other countries, as to how far our role would expand and ­whether or not it would take on military dimensions.” He then linked this with his proposal for creating “a forum for po­liti­cal dialogue where friendly countries in this region could engage in frank exchanges of opinion on ­matters of mutual interest. I think, for example, that the aforementioned concerns and apprehensions about the f­ uture direction of Japa­nese foreign policy are a worthy topic for such types of po­liti­cal dialogues.”7 This passage was the biggest difference from the first draft of the Nakayama speech, and it indicates that Satoh influenced a significant rewrite of that first draft in order to return the focus to reassurance. A few months ­later, Satoh told a Thai scholar, “Japan’s main purpose is to use this forum [the PMC security dialogue] to reassure that Japan ­will not become a military power and to allay any suspicions or doubts.”8 Another similarity between Satoh’s Jakarta pre­sen­ta­tion and the Nakayama proposal, and difference from the first draft of the proposal, is that the first two both reject the concept of “confidence-­building mea­sures,” a rejection that comes just before the mutual reassurance dialogue concept is introduced. B ­ ecause Japan, ASEAN, and the PMC dialogue partners w ­ ere ostensibly friends, Satoh, as discussed in the previous two chapters, worried that advocacy of CBMs might cause Japan to label itself as an “­enemy.” To avoid this danger, the Nakayama proposal ­adopted a version of Satoh’s concept applicable among “friends”: mutual reassurance mea­sures (sōgō anshinkan

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wo takameru sochi).9 Thus, Nakayama proposed a mutual reassurance dialogue (sōgō anshinkan wo takameru diarogu).10 However, MOFA’s provisional En­glish translation of the Nakayama speech mistranslated the original Japa­nese as a “sense of security dialogue.” Satoh ­later blamed this mistranslation for ruining the rollout of his MRM concept and, by extension, for preventing that concept from replacing the concept of CBMs.11 Another key characteristic of the Nakayama proposal is that it excluded the Socialist countries. However, it went further than Satoh’s writings and position paper, or his secret briefing. Using the language in the Regional Policy Division’s July 3 memo and the first draft of the Nakayama speech, it explic­itly asserted that the PMC security dialogue should be restricted to “the friendly countries,” “us.”12 Although conventional wisdom holds that Satoh and MOFA patterned the Nakayama proposal on the ASEAN-­ISIS Jakarta declaration,13 in three impor­tant re­spects the two differed. First, the ASEAN-­ISIS Jakarta declaration advocated the creation of a separate “ASEAN PMC-­initiated conference on security,” to be called the Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia Pacific. Second, the Jakarta declaration included the Socialist countries: China, the Soviet Union, North ­Korea, and Vietnam. The Nakayama proposal, by contrast, was deliberately designed to exclude them. The desire to exclude the Soviet Union clearly influenced the decision to propose the PMC itself, rather than a separate PMC-­sponsored conference, as the venue for the security dialogue.14 Satoh and MOFA consistently emphasized using “existing fora.” This was apparently a strategy formulated in response to the fear that it would be harder to exclude the Soviet Union from a new venue.15 Indeed, when the ARF was created two years ­later, very much along the lines suggested by the ASEAN-­ISIS Jakarta declaration, this proved to be the case. Although China has since become a (if not the) leading priority for Japa­nese diplomacy, the low priority of China and MOFA’s China Desk in 1991 is illustrated by the Nakayama proposal: MOFA officials I interviewed claimed that the China Desk wanted to include China. However, ­because China’s membership was seen as inseparable from the Soviet Union’s, the Soviet Desk desired to exclude the Soviet Union, and its preference prevailed.16 Thus, Japan’s China policy was subordinated to its Soviet policy.17 Fi­nally, Nakayama proposed creating a security-­focused SOM to support PMC discussions about regional security. This differed from the ASEAN-­ISIS declaration in that the latter did not raise the issue of a SOM, and in any case proposed to create a separate forum, the Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia Pacific, to discuss security. Nakayama’s speech watered down the linkage to security by calling the region-­ wide dialogue a “po­liti­cal” dialogue, whereas the first draft and the Asia Regional Policy Division internal documents referred to a “security” or a “political-­security”



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dialogue.18 Nonetheless, this softening and broadening of the dialogue definition had ­little impact on the way the proposal was seen. Rather, this linking of the PMC to an institutionalized and security-­focused SOM, in contrast to the widely accepted idea that security discussions be made an official and permanent part of the PMC agenda, proved to be the most controversial aspect of the Nakayama proposal.

Reactions to the Nakayama Proposal Overall, the reactions to the Nakayama proposal w ­ ere mixed, with US and ASEAN reactions ranging from cool to negative. On the other hand, as MOFA diplomats had predicted, Canada and Australia, which had made CSCA-­type un-­like-­minded common security proposals the previous year, welcomed the Nakayama proposal.19 According to Japa­nese diplomats I interviewed, the haste with which Japan made the Nakayama proposal was a major reason for the negative reactions by ASEAN and the US. Although Satoh’s ideas ­were positively received in Jakarta and Manila in June, he gave no indication that he intended to turn ­these ideas into a Japa­nese initiative at the Kuala Lumpur PMC the following month.20 ASEAN-­ISIS’s time frame was far slower: the 1991 Jakarta ASEAN-­ISIS declaration was intended for the Fourth ASEAN Summit, to be held in Singapore in February 1992.21 The Nakayama proposal caught ASEAN and the US almost totally off guard, in part ­because ASEAN was informed only two days ahead of time, and the US was briefed only five days in advance. Also, Japa­nese diplomats mistakenly briefed US officials who ­were not attending the PMC, instead of briefing ­those who ­were (see Chapter 4). Moreover, the contents of the proposal leaked in the Japa­nese media two days before Nakayama gave the proposal (see the discussion ­later in this chapter), a fact that some ASEAN members found particularly objectionable.22 Satoh himself had urged in both his internal briefing and his position paper that Japan make the proposal at the PMC in July 1991, six months before the ASEAN summit. He did not explain the timing in detail, except to claim that ASEAN would welcome an initiative from Japan then. Apparently, for Satoh and MOFA, t­ here was a fear that if Japan let the opportunity of the 1991 PMC pass it by, it might be preempted by another country, or possibly by ASEAN itself at its February 1992 summit. Preemption would not only mean losing a chance to prove that Japan could take the initiative in the wake of its very reactive response to the Gulf War but also create the more concrete risk that ASEAN might publicly propose a forum including the Soviet Union, China, and the other Socialist countries, a possibility Japan wanted to head off. The haste with which the Nakayama proposal was made also apparently stemmed in part from the impending introduction of new legislation in the Japa­nese Diet two months ­later, in September 1991, authorizing the dispatch of the SDF overseas, this time l­imited to UN Peacekeeping operations. This emphasis was reflected in

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Nakayama’s speech, when he mentioned Japan’s efforts “to make changes in its ­legal framework in order to cooperate in UN peacekeeping operations, which is also a step ­toward making domestic preparations to shoulder more responsibility in the international community.” A ­ fter this, he mentioned Japan’s intention to play a role in Cambodia, then raised Asian concerns about Japa­nese remilitarization and proposed a regional po­liti­cal dialogue for addressing ­these fears.23 Japan was hence hoping to use the new PMC-­based security dialogue to reassure Asian countries, thereby preventing a repeat of the very negative reaction it received during the Gulf crisis on sending troops to the ­Middle East. Japan had reason to expect a particularly negative reaction since it had set its sights on Cambodia in 1992 as the first destination for SDF peacekeepers. By March 1991, Japan was already sounding out Southeast Asian nations on w ­ hether they could accept Japa­nese participation in UN Peacekeeping operations.24 On the other hand, Japan’s delay in consulting with ASEAN and the US reflected a debate within the Japa­nese Foreign Ministry over ­whether to go forward with the proposal and over its contents, as discussed in the previous chapter. US Reaction. The US del­e­ga­tion at the PMC, led by Secretary of State James Baker, reacted negatively to the Nakayama proposal. Crediting the existing network of “tried and tested” US-­centric bilateral alliances with having created “a remarkable degree of stability,” Baker said, “We ­ought to be careful about changing ­those arrangements and discarding them for something ­else ­unless w ­ e’re absolutely certain that the something 25 ­else is better and ­will work.” The reaction of the US del­e­ga­tion was thus the most negative, as it essentially rejected the very idea of regional security multilateralism. This reaction came as a shock to Satoh, who had spent much of the previous year discussing regional security multilateralism with American colleagues in vari­ous forms.26 One reason for the negative US reaction is that the Nakayama proposal, and indeed regional security multilateralism, had gained l­ittle attention from the State Department, especially from Baker.27 A de­cade ­later, a se­nior US diplomat with responsibility for East Asia policy, and with whom Satoh had consulted about the contents of the Nakayama proposal, told me he could not recall the Nakayama proposal or what it was about.28 Baker, in his memoirs, fails to mention the proposal or even Nakayama Tarō, then the foreign minister of world’s second-­largest, and apparently most successful, economy. Baker hardly even mentions the PMC, even though he attended its annual meetings multiple times.29 As discussed in the previous chapter, the failure of c­ areer MOFA diplomats to brief Baker personally,30 or to brief his top aides who ­were attending the PMC, combined with Washington’s chronic attention deficit to East Asian regional security beyond crises or its own alliance system, as well as its contentment with the status quo, explain the initial negative US reaction.



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ASEAN’s Reaction. On July 21, the day before Nakayama’s speech, at a “special” meeting, the six ASEAN nations considered Japan’s pending proposal and concluded that “the time is not yet ripe for this proposal.”31 As just noted, Japa­nese diplomats widely blamed their failure to brief ASEAN sufficiently in advance as a decisive reason for ASEAN’s initially negative reaction.32 Some also blamed the fact that the Japa­ nese media scooped the proposal and leaked it two days before Nakayama’s speech.33 Nonetheless, substantive differences between the Nakayama proposal and what ASEAN was considering, along with doubts about Japan’s role in making such a proposal, largely explain ASEAN’s initially cool to negative reaction. In terms of substantive differences, first, although the ASEAN states all supported the idea of formally adding security to the agenda of the PMC, they feared that creating a SOM to prepare for this dialogue might weigh down the PMC, causing it to lose its broad po­liti­cal and economic focus and to end up as a narrowly defined security forum by default. Malaysian foreign minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi clearly expressed this fear: he stated that the PMC “should not be constrained to discuss security only” and claimed that the PMC “does not need” a SOM.34 Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas echoed Badawi’s concern. Referring to the SOM proposal, he claimed, “We cannot not establish a working group on security. ­People ­will have a wrong impression as if the PMC is becoming a security forum. It should be a general forum and we have no prob­lem with security talked (along with other issues). You see the difference.” Singapore’s foreign minister supported Nakayama’s proposal to formally add security to the PMC agenda but expressed caution about the SOM idea. The Thai foreign minister also expressed caution. The Philippines, on the other hand, “evaluated highly,” if vaguely, the Nakayama proposal.35 Second, related to the concern that the PMC might become a security-­only dialogue was the concern that the PMC would come to be seen as a new military bloc, one that would provoke the very Socialist nations ASEAN was trying to build ties with. This fear may have been further stoked by the proposal’s limitation to “the friendly countries,” “us.” In this vein, Badawi warned, “The creation of a military bloc would invite the establishment of a ­counter bloc.”36 Indonesia, ZOPFAN, and Wanandi. Third, another miscalculation that MOFA, and even Satoh, made was assuming that ASEAN would accept a regional security dialogue through the PMC that did not include all the g­ reat powers—­specifically, China and the Soviet Union. This reflected a perception gap between MOFA’s tendency to see ASEAN as aligned with the West de facto and ASEAN’s tendency to see itself as more nonaligned and even neutral,37 a self-­perception especially strong for Indonesia, a founding member of the nonaligned movement, and, to a lesser extent, for Malaysia. Although often dismissed in the US and even Japan, Indonesia’s 1971 proposal for making Southeast Asia a ZOPFAN, which was officially ­adopted by ASEAN in 1972,

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arguably institutionalized ASEAN’s self-­perception of being essentially nonaligned, although the strength of this perception has varied by country. It was weaker among ASEAN members who had security alliance relations with the US or hosted US bases, most notably in the case of the Philippines. This perception of nonalignment or neutrality also underpinned Jusuf Wanandi’s emerging concept of what Goh ­later called “omni-­enmeshment”38—­namely, involving all the ­great powers and establishing a balance of engagement and interest. Japan’s attempt to exclude the Socialist countries directly clashed with this concept. Alatas, at a Jakarta airport press conference, fresh off his return flight from the 1991 PMC in Kuala Lumpur, claimed that it was premature to institutionalize talks on security issues between ASEAN and its dialogue partners, especially in the form of the SOM proposal, as long as all the ­great powers ­were not included. ­After stating his preference for using ZOPFAN as the concept for conducting “relations between ASEAN and the major powers,” he continued by asserting “that if a security dialogue should be pursued outside of ZOPFAN, ‘all countries in the Asia-­Pacific region should be reckoned with or invited to take part.’ ”39 The Jakarta Post, an Indonesian English-­ language newspaper that covered Alatas’s press conference, interpreted Nakayama’s proposal as creating a “security dialogue forum” that “would serve to ward off what he [Nakayama] saw as the Soviet threat” that “continued to haunt Japan.” Alatas’s statement was thus taken as “the clearest indication” that Indonesia “would not agree with the apparent Japa­nese move to exclude the Soviet Union from any novel security setting in the region.”40 Significantly, Japan’s embassy in Tokyo took this Jakarta Post article as an authoritative indicator of Indonesia’s reaction, although it described it as a reaction to the SOM proposal, rather than to the Nakayama proposal overall.41 Nearly a month ­later, on August 21, Japa­nese diplomats stationed in Indonesia visited Wanandi to exchange views with him about the Nakayama proposal. The meeting notes ­were written up and sent to Tokyo in a cable marked “secret.” Reflecting ASEAN-­ISIS’s Jakarta declaration, and foreshadowing the structure the ARF was to assume two years ­later, Wanandi expressed the view that the appropriate way to hold a regional dialogue was by holding a meeting a­ fter the PMC that included the ASEAN countries, their PMC dialogue partners, and other countries, especially China and the Soviet Union. A ­ fter noting that the structure of the PMC itself needed to be reformed, Wanandi explained that while discussing security within the PMC was not a prob­lem, Indonesia’s opposition to the SOM proposal stemmed from the fact that as a nonaligned country, it opposed having formal security consultations only with Western nations.42 In response, Japan’s ambassador to Indonesia, Kunihiro Michihiko, claimed that as security had already been discussed at the PMC of the previous year, just proposing to discuss security would not be a new development.43 He asserted that just having



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general discussions about security among the ministers would not prove fruitful, and therefore it was necessary to have a SOM to support the dialogue. He added that such a PMC SOM structure would be superior to a “CSCA type structure,” ­because the latter was inappropriate for the Asia-­Pacific region. This Japa­nese diplomat also expressed the opinion that Foreign Minister Alatas had misunderstood Nakayama’s proposed SOM as being a venue where only security would be discussed. He blamed media reports just before the PMC that inaccurately claimed Nakayama was ­going to propose establishing a new organ­ization. Fi­nally, this diplomat apparently thought that Wanandi’s call for including China and the Soviet Union in a security dialogue and reforming the PMC meant inviting t­ hese two countries to join the PMC itself, and he argued against allowing them to join, as this would make the PMC too big, like the UN. This reason, while faithful to MOFA’s true position on excluding both countries, appears to have been l­ittle more than an excuse meant to conceal the depth of Japan’s opposition to admitting China and especially the Soviet Union to the PMC for more basic ideological and national interest reasons that w ­ ere expressed during internal MOFA discussions (see Chapter 4). This excuse allowed the diplomat to avoid MOFA’s characterization of Indonesia and other ASEAN countries as essentially “Western countries,” a characterization Indonesia rejected.44 Wanandi was not convinced by the diplomat’s argument for effectively excluding China and the Soviet Union, and he emphasized that a regional security dialogue could not be meaningful if they w ­ ere not included. Fi­nally, Wanandi noted that his institute, CSIS Indonesia, had a strong interest in the ­future direction of Japan in regional security, and in that context, he welcomed the Nakayama proposal’s offer to discuss Tokyo’s own security policy and seek the opinions of neighboring countries. He expressed the hope that Japan would follow through with this part of the Nakayama proposal.45 Japan’s Reputation. Last but not least, the cool reaction also reflected fears about Japan assuming a leadership role in regional security. Above all, t­ here was suspicion that Japan would use its sponsorship of the PMC security proposal to usurp control of the dialogue from ASEAN, ultimately establishing a non-­ASEAN-­based forum. Wanandi, one of the principal architects of the ASEAN-­ISIS Jakarta declaration, claimed that ASEAN was negative ­toward the Nakayama proposal “­because the Japa­ nese proposal means an institutional change from an ASEAN or­ga­nized one, namely the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference or ASEAN PMC, to something dif­fer­ent.”46 One ASEAN diplomat echoed this view, arguing that ASEAN, not Japan, should “decide on the framework of such a forum.”47 Japa­nese diplomats I interviewed generally agreed that suspicion of Japan’s motives was a major reason why ASEAN’s reaction to the Nakayama proposal was negative. According to a then recently retired diplomat with expertise in security, the Nakayama

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proposal raised doubts about Japan’s “true intentions.”48 Similarly, an editorial in the right-­of-­center Yomiuri Shimbun noted that ASEAN reacted “warily” to the Nakayama proposal ­because it represented an attempt to assert Japa­nese leadership in regional security.49 Lending further credence to this view, an ASEAN diplomat suggested that one reason b­ ehind ASEAN’s wary reaction to the Nakayama proposal was “mixed feelings” about Japan’s expected growing influence in Southeast Asia as the US reduced its military presence.50 Asian and Western officials pre­sent at the 1991 PMC suggested that the basic outlines of the Nakayama proposal would prove acceptable to ASEAN eventually, but only when presented in a way that reduced Japan’s “security profile.”51 A Yomiuri Shimbun editorial claimed that “as Japan’s po­liti­cal role expands, this gives rise to unease and fears that this role could expand into the military sphere,” which the editorial claimed was a major rationale for Nakayama proposing a “mutual reassurance” dialogue.52 Another Yomiuri Shimbun article suggested that this dialogue could be a useful way to gain understanding from ASEAN states of Japan’s then-­pending UN Peacekeeping operations bill and plans to participate in UN Peacekeeping. 53 Foreign Minister Nakayama himself apparently gained a similar impression from his ASEAN and Asian colleagues. Newly returned from his trip to Southeast Asia, he told the LDP’s Karuizawa Seminar that “­every country in Asia is deeply concerned” about “­whether Japan ­will become a military ­great power.” He claimed this was the background to his proposal to the PMC for establishing a security dialogue.54 The Economist’s Tokyo correspondent offered a similar interpretation, claiming that Nakayama had failed to reckon with “memories still alive in some of Japan’s once-­occupied territories. The idea of Japan seeking a greater security role in the region was enough to ring alarms all over the Pacific.” The correspondent added that Asians “would prefer Japan to carry on sending them banks and businessmen rather than battleships, even friendly ones that might be used for shooing away unwelcome interlopers.”55 Thus, the Nakayama proposal, sudden as it was, and considering J­ apan’s lingering bad reputation, proved to be more disturbing than it was reassuring.

Japan’s Per­sis­tence in Promoting the Nakayama Proposal In keeping with their desire to assume a leadership role, Japa­nese diplomats ­were surprisingly undeterred by the negative reaction they received from ASEAN and the US.56 The day a­ fter presenting his initiative, Nakayama told Japa­nese reporters at an informal gathering that he thought he had obtained ASEAN’s “understanding” of his proposal, and he said that Japan would press ASEAN to convene his proposed SOM before the July 1992 PMC,57 a goal that was not achieved. At the same time, however, he sought to reassure ASEAN that Japan continued to see the US military presence as central to Asia’s security. Japa­nese Foreign Ministry spokesman Yamanaka Makoto



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also reiterated Japan’s intention to press forward despite ASEAN’s tepid reaction, stating, “What we’d like to see is to have expanded, deepened discussion on po­liti­cal and security ­matters,” and adding that Japan would like to see its concept accepted before the July 1992 PMC.58 An “initial evaluation” of the PMC produced by the Regional Policy Division just ­after Nakayama’s speech for internal use within MOFA judged as a success Nakayama’s proposal to establish a po­liti­cal dialogue for “mutual reassurance” within the PMC, in part to “reintroduce” Japan’s “basic policies on regional peace and stability.”59 It also claimed that Japan’s proactive posture earned “general support from ­every PMC foreign minister.” However, the document went on to note that the reaction to the SOM proposal was less favorable, especially from Indonesia and Malaysia, who ­were described as having a “cautious tone in reaction,” and that it was de­cided to entrust the proposal to ­future deliberation. Other countries, such as the Philippines and Australia, made statements that appeared to be positive, while the US was notable for its silence on the issue.60 The document added that when the US had been briefed during the preparatory (nemawashi) stage, Secretary of State Baker had not expressed any significant objections. This last point was not only defensive but also a bit misleading, as Nakayama’s mischaracterization of the proposal to Baker in London had not gone over well, and Japa­nese diplomats briefed the wrong set of Baker aides (­those who ­were not accompanying Baker to the PMC).61 The document went on to blame a lack of sufficient time to brief and lobby ASEAN and “misleading” Japa­nese media reports published just before the speech as reasons for creating a mistaken impression that Japan was seeking to turn the PMC into a “security only forum.” It especially blamed some “sensational” foreign media reports about Japan trying to grab leadership on issues of East Asian politics and security. On the other hand, it noted that most of the Japa­nese press had reacted positively in the wake of the initiative, although it observed that one portion of the press had blamed MOFA for not anticipating ASEAN’s reaction. This document stated that ASEAN had seriously considered Japan’s proposal, and it emphasized that “follow-up” was key, thereby indicating MOFA’s determination to push ahead with the proposal. ­After noting that the Nakayama proposal (the version leaked by the media) had been rejected at a closed-­door meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers just before the ­actual proposal was presented, the document concluded that the most impor­tant ele­ment of the follow-up would be explaining that the Nakayama proposal was not creating a “new Asian security consultative organ­ization.”62 Clearly, this last impression, and the idea that Nakayama’s proposed SOM would cause the PMC to be seen as a security-­only forum or as a proto-­military bloc, was simply not anticipated by MOFA. Model answers for press questions prepared by MOFA do not contain any model questions reflecting ­these concerns.63

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Attached to the “initial evaluation” document was a document “for briefing the prime minister.” Dated two days a­ fter Nakayama’s proposal, July 24, this document briefly outlined the proposal with several bullet points and sentences, suggesting that Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki was being informed about the proposal for the first time. The briefing noted that in view of the rapidly changing international environment, the PMC had begun openly discussing security issues from the previous year, thereby indicating that the nature of the forum was changing. This sentence confirms the importance of the 1990 PMC, including the Australian and Canadian proposals made ­there to establish a regional security dialogue, in motivating Japan to act in 1991. The briefing for Kaifu ended by claiming that the Nakayama proposal won “uniform approval” from the ASEAN countries, and that they intended to consider it further, a claim that arguably obscured the negative and cautious reactions from several ASEAN countries to the SOM proposal.64 This appears to have been a defensive reaction to the negative press the proposal generated.65 The August 3 Assessment. Nearly two weeks ­after the Nakayama proposal, the Regional Policy Division produced a “secret” document on PMC member reactions to the Nakayama proposal, a document that appears to have been intended to update and replace the “initial reactions document” produced approximately ten days ­earlier. This document singles out Indonesia as the ASEAN country most “cautious” about the SOM proposal, although the description of that country’s reaction is redacted from the document.66 However, the document appears to be at least partially based on several cables sent from the Japa­nese embassy in Jakarta to MOFA. Th ­ ese include a copy of the Jakarta Post article (discussed e­ arlier) where Alatas was quoted as objecting to the SOM proposal b­ ecause ­there should not be any new security institutions formed that do not include all Asia-­Pacific countries, including the Soviet Union and China.67 Similarly, a secret cable recounts Japa­nese ambassador Kunihiro Michihiko’s phone call with Alatas, where Kunihiro observes that the Indonesian foreign minister expressed a “reservation” about, but not a “rejection” of, Nakayama’s SOM proposal. This was ­because, according to Alatas, having a security-­only SOM would “invite misunderstanding about the nature of the PMC.”68 Beyond Indonesia, an August 3 summary of PMC member reactions prepared in MOFA has Singapore’s Bureau Chief of ASEAN Affairs Toh quoted as telling Japan’s minister in Singapore that PMC member countries welcome the Nakayama proposal as timely, but ­whether they ­will support the SOM proposal remains unclear. Thailand’s foreign minister was quoted in the Bangkok Post the day a­ fter the Nakayama proposal as saying that he did not think the SOM was needed and that it certainly was not an urgent issue.69 Baker is quoted as saying at a US-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting in London on July 18, four days before the Nakayama proposal, “I think Japan’s proposal is good.”



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The document cites a much more cautious stance by Baker ­after Nakayama’s speech, carry­ing a quote from the July 23 edition of the Financial Times in which he states that the US “must study Japan’s initiative,” continuing, “I am not prepared to say anything beyond that.” US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, Richard Solomon, is quoted on July 22, the day of the speech, as telling Nakayama that “the US can support Japan’s proposal.” However, several lines before this quote have been redacted.70 The reactions document quotes Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans as saying that Australia welcomes and supports Japan’s initiative for a regional security dialogue; another top Australian official is also quoted as expressing Australia’s “full support.” However, Evans also related Japan’s proposal to Australia’s own CSCA proposal, a comment that could not have been welcome in MOFA. South ­Korea’s foreign minister is quoted as telling Nakayama on July 23 that South K ­ orea would study the proposal with an open mind. Perhaps the most insightful listed reaction was from a deputy foreign minister of New Zealand who is quoted as telling Japan’s ambassador to Auckland that despite Japan’s efforts to create a SOM, ASEAN jealously guards its autonomy, suggesting that the organ­ization believes the initiative regarding ASEAN institutions should come from ASEAN itself.71 Medium-­Term Follow-­Up. Based on the August 3 assessment, Japa­nese diplomats entered a new phase of follow-up, one that focused on two recalcitrant PMC members, the US and Indonesia, and a potential ally in gaining ac­cep­tance for the Nakayama proposal, Singapore. Continuing efforts to persuade the US can be seen in a cable sent to the Japa­nese embassy in Washington on August 28 from the Asia Regional Policy Division that included a full copy of Nakayama’s speech and hand-­edited copies of talking points to explain the speech. A major preoccupation of the talking points was to insist that Nakayama’s proposal had nothing to do with creating a CSCE pro­cess in Eu­rope, borrowing Eu­ro­pean models, or implementing CBMs in East Asia. The other major focus of this cable was on explaining the reassurance security dialogue and clarifying that it offered the US as well as Japan an opportunity to explain their security policies to regional partners who ­were concerned about the ­future direction of ­these policies. ­There was only a very brief explanation of the controversial SOM proposal. This fax appears to have been heavi­ly influenced by Satoh’s perspective, emphasizing his MRM concept and deemphasizing the Asia Bureau’s SOM proposal. Satoh’s initial S appears on the document’s approval coversheet. This document indicates that MOFA was still struggling to explain the Nakayama proposal to American counter­parts over a month ­after Nakayama spoke.72 An August 7 cable recounted a meeting between the acting Asia-­Pacific Bureau director of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and a Japa­nese diplomat named Tarui on August 6. Tarui reported that although his Indonesian counterpart indicated that

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Jakarta supported Nakayama’s proposal overall, it remained cautious about the SOM proposal. Significantly, like Alatas two weeks e­ arlier, this Indonesian diplomat linked the issue of creating a SOM to expanding the membership of the PMC, and he went further by stressing that bringing new members into the PMC for a security dialogue was a “main point” for Indonesia.73 As discussed ­earlier, Japa­nese diplomats also visited Wanandi to exchange views and try to convince him to accept the contents of the Nakayama proposal, but they likewise found that he supported expanding the PMC to include China and the Soviet Union. In addition to lobbying the two leading recalcitrant states, the US and Indonesia, MOFA reached out to Singapore for intelligence and help convincing ASEAN to accept the contents of the Nakayama proposal in time for the January 1992 ASEAN summit, which Singapore would be hosting. This strategy was reflected in three diplomatic cables from the Japa­nese embassy in Singapore back to the ministry. The Singaporean Foreign Ministry’s ASEAN Bureau director was an impor­tant interlocutor for Japa­nese diplomats following up on the Nakayama proposal. In an August 5 cable, this Singaporean diplomat told two Japa­nese diplomats (identified as Ueno and Nishioka) that the January 1992 ASEAN summit agenda would be based on the AMM held just before the PMC where Nakayama made his proposal. He further indicated that ASEAN members all supported the contents of the Japa­nese proposal and did not have any reservations about them. At the same time, this Singaporean diplomat indicated that ­there was a desire to create a new security order in Southeast Asia, one that would be based on ZOPFAN, a Southeast Asian nuclear-­free zone, and the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, suggesting a desire for more change in the regional status quo than Japan was seeking. Fi­nally, the Singaporean diplomat told his Japa­nese interlocutors that while some ASEAN countries thought it was fine to have an ASEAN-­Japan discussion about the Nakayama proposal, Singapore felt it would be better to hold a dialogue on establishing and institutionalizing a po­ liti­cal and security dialogue among all dialogue partners, not only with Japan. This comment indicates that Japa­nese diplomats ­were trying to pursue a Japan-­ASEAN dialogue on this topic, one that did not involve other dialogue partners, not even the US. This strategy appears to reflect Japan’s policy of seeking and maintaining a special relationship with ASEAN that allowed Japan to become ASEAN’s closest major-­power partner. Although Singapore appeared ready to work with Japan to promote much of the Nakayama proposal, it favored a larger dialogue on the topic.74 In the second Japa­nese diplomatic cable from Singapore, dated September 7, Japa­ nese diplomats Ueno and Nishioka again met with a Singaporean counterpart, this time Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Ho. Ho assured them that Singapore supported Japan’s initiative to begin a po­liti­cal and security dialogue in the PMC, and especially a “reassurance dialogue.” Significantly, Ho also suggested that it would take a year or



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two for the “seed” of Japan’s thought to take concrete form, a prescient prediction, as it took nearly two years to transition from the Nakayama proposal to the creation of the ARF, a transition that involved a significant change—­namely, the admission of China, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist countries. Ho also said that the preparatory committee for the January 1992 ASEAN summit was considering Japan’s proposal, among other ­things, and that the results would be reported at the summit. Overall, Ho showed support for the basic ideas of the Nakayama proposal, while hinting that ASEAN’s position would evolve and refusing to commit to the proposal as a ­whole.75 A final cable, from November 11, recounted a second discussion with the Singaporean Foreign Ministry’s ASEAN Bureau director. Entitled “The Singaporean Foreign Ministry’s View of the [Upcoming] ASEAN Summit,” point 4 of the discussion dealt with the Nakayama proposal. In the discussion, which was largely an exercise in reassurance, the Singaporean diplomat tells his Japa­nese counter­parts that his understanding is that “basically, including even the point about opening the SOM, ASEAN has no prob­lem with Foreign Minister Nakayama’s security related proposal.” However, the Singaporean diplomat also noted that some ASEAN countries ­were ambivalent, in part ­because of Japan’s lack of adequate preparation and “extreme short-­notice” in making the Nakayama proposal. A redaction of several lines follows, with a final sentence that urges the Japa­nese diplomats to follow up on the issue with Jakarta, an indicator that Indonesia was still opposed to aspects of the Nakayama proposal. Based on Indonesia’s previous statements, this appears to have been Jakarta’s proposal for expanding the dialogue beyond PMC members to include China, the Soviet Union, and ­others, a position that ASEAN in fact came to embrace.76 At the same time, Japan was taking other steps to reassure ASEAN nations about Japan’s disposition as a military power, as well as to build greater trust. In September 1991 Japa­nese emperor Akihito “paid the first royal visit to the region,” visiting Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Sueo Sudo describes t­hese three as “carefully selected target countries.”77 During the visit, the emperor repeatedly stated, “Japan is [a] peace-­loving country and would never repeat the horrors of that most unfortunate war.”78 According to Sudo, “By repeatedly showing sincere remorse and repentance over its [Japan’s] past misdeeds, the Emperor and Empress left the impression that Japan’s intention was to begin a new era of trust and mutual cooperation with South East Asia.”79

Reactions to Japan’s Follow-­Up Japan’s efforts to lobby the US to accept the Nakayama proposal, and regional security multilateralism in East Asia more generally, appeared to bear some fruit in November 1991, when Secretary of State Baker paid a visit to Japan, his third as secretary of state At a speech at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, a version of

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which was subsequently published in Foreign Affairs, Baker signaled a new openness to regional security multilateralism. According to him, “In the post-­Cold War world, the enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends—­and new security challenges—­require adjustments in our force structure, defense activities and in the means of sustaining regional stability. Asian security increasingly is derived from a flexible, ad hoc set of po­liti­cal and defense interactions. Multilateral approaches to security are slowly emerging.” He went on to cautiously endorse ­these approaches: “We should be attentive to the possibilities for such multilateral action without locking ourselves in to an overly structured approach. In the Asia-­Pacific community, form should follow function.”80 This new view of regional security multilateralism was a significant evolution away from Baker’s position in Kuala Lumpur, and that of the George H. W. Bush administration up to that point, which had essentially been that regional security multilateralism proposals ­were “solutions in search of prob­lems”81 and that if the regional security architecture ­isn’t broke, ­don’t fix it. While Baker signaled that the US remained skeptical of CSCA-­type proposals that had been promoted by the Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, Australia and Canada, the Nakayama proposal, which built on preexisting institutions, appeared well within the ambit of what Baker was signaling his support for. Confirmation of this new US position came at the US-­Japan summit in January 1992, which endorsed promoting “po­liti­cal dialogue among Asia-­Pacific countries through ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference.”82 For Japan this statement represented significant pro­gress t­oward persuading the US to engage in East Asian security multilateralism.83 As Satoh l­ater boasted, “Tokyo played a significant role in impressing upon Washington the importance of multilateral security dialogue for the Asia-­Pacific region, when Washington was skeptical about a multilateral approach.”84 Even more impor­tant than the reaction from Baker and the US was that of ASEAN, as it was the locus of authority for the PMC. At the Fourth ASEAN Summit, in January 1992, the ASEAN heads of state de­cided to add a regional security dialogue to the PMC, seemingly a significant victory for Japan and the Nakayama proposal. The Singapore Declaration issued at the end of the summit stated, “ASEAN could use established fora to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region. . . . ​ To enhance this effort, ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in po­liti­cal and security ­matters by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC).”85 On the surface, this appeared to be a victory for the Nakayama proposal, and it was taken as such by MOFA. However, this statement only endorsed the idea of a security dialogue through the PMC, the least controversial aspect of the Nakayama proposal. It did not endorse the SOM proposal or any other form of institutionalized support for this dialogue. Nonetheless, formally launching a security dialogue within the PMC itself can be seen as a significant victory for MOFA, as this meant that Rus­ sia, China, and other un-­like-­minded countries would be excluded. However, b­ ehind



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this proposal, and at the summit itself, ­there was significant discussion of creating an expanded security dialogue along the lines laid out by Wanandi and ASEAN-­ISIS and advocated by Indonesia. Wanandi, who was an invited guest at the summit, subsequently indicated that this was the direction ASEAN was moving.86 One hint of this direction was the summit declaration’s statement that “ASEAN ­will seek to realize the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).”87 Although largely ignored by MOFA and other outside observers, this appears to have been a nod to Indonesia’s and Wanandi’s new conception of realizing ZOPFAN by engaging all the major powers, the origin of “omni-­enmeshment” and the ARF. Another indicator of the movement in this direction is that both China and the Soviet Union had been invited as guests to observe the AMM just before the July 1991 PMC.88

6

The Miyazawa Initiatives and Japan’s Leadership in Creating the ASEAN Regional Forum

following the fourth asean Summit of February 1992, another consequence of the Nakayama proposal played out in the series of initiatives delivered by then–­ prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi during 1992 and 1993. Emboldened by its success in persuading the US, and its apparent success in persuading ASEAN, to endorse some of the ele­ments of the Nakayama proposal, Japan actively promoted security multilateralism publicly, as well as ­behind the scenes, ­until the final stages of negotiations for the formation of a regional multilateral security forum. Japan continued to play a far more active and high-­profile leadership role than did the US in promoting security multilateralism. The period from January 1992 through May 1993 was a crucial one for laying the foundations for the ARF. Critical negotiations occurred over its formation, as Japan and ASEAN debated intensely over its composition and nature. Prime Minister Miyazawa made three significant speeches promoting security multilateralism: an address to the National Press Club in Washington in July 1992, a speech to the CSIS councilors’ meeting in Tokyo in October 1992, and a major policy address in Bangkok in January 1993. Fi­nally, he established an advisory panel on Japan’s relationship with East Asia that included multilateral security cooperation as a main topic. The rest of this chapter analyzes t­hese speeches and initiatives and their role in moving Japan and the region from a security dialogue embedded within the PMC t­oward the establishment of the ARF. The rest of this chapter consists of five sections. The first two sections examine the Washington and CSIS speeches, respectively, while the third section considers



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Miyazawa’s advisory panel that was entitled “Council on Japan and the Asia-­Pacific Region for the 21st ­Century.” The fourth section analyzes Miyazawa’s Bangkok speech, and the final section traces the negotiations between Japan, ASEAN, and eventually the US and ­others, leading to the creation of the ARF in July 1993.

Washington Speech The decision to deliver a speech on Asia-­Pacific security multilateralism during Miyazawa’s July 1992 trip to Washington, DC, was a bold move, given that Tokyo had only recently persuaded Washington to accept adding a politico-­security dialogue to the PMC agenda. The initiative was even bolder given that Miyazawa went well beyond the Nakayama proposal. Satoh Yukio, the initiator and the brains ­behind much of the Nakayama proposal as the director of the Information and Analy­sis Bureau in 1991, in 1992, as the director of the North American Bureau, again was the primary brains ­behind much of the Miyazawa speech. The speech was written in En­glish, according to Miyazawa’s instructions, and he insisted on participating in drafting the speech.1 Satoh, as head of the North American Bureau by then, was naturally in charge of writing the speech, and he focused it on Asia-­Pacific security from the beginning. According to Satoh, at first the Asian Bureau was surprised by the speech draft, asking him, “Why did you change your position on including Rus­sia?” Satoh answered, “During the Cold War I thought we should be careful about including the Soviet Union. Rus­sian democ­ratization was a big issue. I think excluding Rus­sia for the sole reason of the Northern Territories was counter-­productive.”2 The Asia Bureau came to support Satoh’s draft speech. Satoh thought it was very impor­tant to keep pressing the US to expand its engagement in regional security multilateralism.3 In June 1992, during the last phases of writing the Washington speech, Tanino Sakutarō, who had been MOFA’s Asia Bureau director during the Nakayama proposal, was transferred to the prime minister’s office to help run Miyazawa’s consultative committee on Japan’s strategy ­toward Asia. He also had some influence on the Washington speech, as did the Asia Bureau that he had been heading.4 At his July 1992 address to the National Press Club in Washington, DC, Miyazawa began by repeating Japan’s by-­now-­familiar “two-­track approach” to regional security cooperation that Satoh had formulated by early 1991: subregional multilateral cooperation to ­settle specific disputes, such as stabilization of the Korean Peninsula or Cambodia, combined with “a region-­wide framework for po­liti­cal dialogue encompassing a broader spectrum of countries.” Consistent with the perceived need to reassure its Asian neighbors, the purpose of such a region-­wide dialogue would be “to enhance the sense of mutual reassurance.”5 However, g­ oing beyond the Nakayama proposal, Miyazawa explic­itly held out the possibility of including China and Rus­sia in the new dialogue at some point. According to the prime minister, “The task remains for

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the ­future to involve China and Rus­sia in such pro­cess of dialogue and cooperation as constructive participants.”6 Miyazawa argued that the PMC, which did not include China or Rus­sia at that time, “may, for now, most usefully serve this purpose.” Nonetheless, Miyazawa’s decision to explic­itly mention the possibility of including China and Rus­sia in a regional dialogue marked an impor­tant departure for Japa­nese diplomacy, and his wording suggested that the inclusion of China and Rus­sia might not lay so far in the ­future. By this time, Satoh no longer considered including Rus­sia in a regional security dialogue to be a prob­lem, in view of the collapse of Communism and the incipient emergence of democracy t­ here. He claims he did not encounter any opposition within MOFA about including China and Rus­sia in a regional security dialogue in the “­future.”7 Nonetheless, Miyazawa’s proposal for possibly including China and Rus­sia created controversy within Japa­nese policy-­making circles. A Foreign Ministry official subsequently denied that Miyazawa had proposed including China and Rus­sia anytime in the near f­ uture. Another “government source” even claimed that Miyazawa had been laboring u ­ nder a “misunderstanding” by thinking that an Asian version of CSCE, a CSCA, was needed for Asia.8 Vice Foreign Minister Kakizawa Koji, in an address to the 1992 PMC a few weeks a­ fter Miyazawa’s speech, appeared to contradict the prime minister’s suggestion that the PMC was only the temporary home of a regional dialogue when he claimed, “Existing fora should be used for region-­wide po­liti­cal dialogue. . . . ​We consider using the Post Ministerial Conferences as the most suitable forum for this dialogue.” At the same time, Kakizawa argued that ASEAN’s decision to add security to the agenda of the PMC “corresponds with the proposal made last year at t­ hese conferences by then Japa­nese Foreign Minister Nakayama”9 concerning the creation of a “mutual reassurance dialogue.” Like Nakayama Tarō had before him, Kakizawa implicitly linked this dialogue with Asian concerns about Japan’s decision to dispatch troops to Cambodia to participate in UN Peacekeeping operations ­there.10 Some ASEAN countries also understood Miyazawa’s speech as a move ­toward broadening the PMC security dialogue to include China and Rus­sia. Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry, an advocate of such an expanded security dialogue, apparently thought so, and a­ fter Miyazawa’s speech Japa­nese diplomats took pains to explain to them that this was not the case.11 The Rus­sia Desk in the Foreign Ministry continued to want to hold Rus­sian participation in a region-­wide security dialogue hostage to the resolution of the Northern Territories issue. Miyazawa himself appeared to hint at this in his July 2 speech when he insisted that the Northern Territories issue “is not merely a bilateral issue between Japan and Rus­sia” and that resolution of the issue “­will test Rus­sia’s readiness to shed its Stalinist vestige and become a truly constructive member of the international community.”12



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A broader and deeper concern about Miyazawa’s call for possibly including China and Rus­sia was that this would undercut Japan’s other fundamental policy goal—­ namely, keeping the US militarily engaged in East Asia and preventing American abandonment of Japan. Miyazawa himself emphasized the importance of this goal in his speech: “It is earnestly desired that the United States w ­ ill maintain its forward deployment in the region.” Highlighting Japan’s unparalleled host-­nation support of US forces, then projected to reach 70 ­percent of nonsalary costs by 1995, Miyazawa even pledged “further improvement of its host nation support.”13 Nonetheless, domestic critics of Miyazawa ­were not convinced, with one suggesting that Miyazawa’s own proposal for an Asian security framework would be seen in Washington as a shift t­ oward “anti-­Americanism.” This same critic suggested that if Japan doubted Amer­i­ca’s military commitment and wanted to study a multilateral alternative for the long run, this should be done in private within the confines of the government or a think tank.14 Although ­there is ­little indication that ­these concerns in any way reflected Washington’s thinking in the latter days of the George H. W. Bush administration, this criticism in many ways anticipated concerns that arose two years ­later with the Higuchi report’s recommendations regarding Japan’s new NDPO, when some US policy experts came to see Japan’s embrace of regional security multilateralism as a potential threat to the US-­Japan alliance (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, Miyazawa’s call for establishing an expanded regional multilateral security forum resonated among LDP politicians and defense elites. Several days ­after Miyazawa’s speech, the LDP’s policy think tank, ­under the leadership of Mori Yoshirō, issued a report on Japan’s foreign policy ­toward the Asia-­Pacific that proposed creating an Asian version of CSCE, a CSCA, a multilateral forum on regional security that would include China and Rus­sia.15 The report also called for CBMs in order to wipe away Asian countries’ mistrust of Japan, including historical reassurance mea­sures such as joint research with China on the Nanjing Massacre, a joint war and peace museum, and a textbook-­writing commission jointly operated by Japan and Asia-­Pacific nations.16 Similarly, Nishihiro Seiki, former administrative vice minister of defense and president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, speaking at a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue workshop in August 1992, called for creating a CSCAP: “Efforts [are required] among the regional powers to dissolve mutual distrust and to build mutual confidence. Th ­ ere already exists CSCE in Eu­rope. I believe that such a forum to discuss security prob­lems is required in the Asia-­Pacific region as well.”17

CSIS Speech In view of the controversy that Miyazawa’s July 1992 initiative generated within Japan, it is not surprising that his next speech on this topic avoided explic­itly calling for

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including China and Rus­sia in a regional dialogue in the ­future. Addressing a CSIS councillors’ meeting in Tokyo in October 1992, Miyazawa emphasized the importance of making a high-­profile commitment to building an Asia-­Pacific region-­wide cooperative security framework. Referring to his July speech before the National Press Club in Washington, Miyazawa inserted a new urgency into his call for a new multilateral security framework: “I believe that it is about time for Japan, the United States and other Asia-­Pacific countries to further contemplate a framework of such Asia-­Pacific regional cooperation.” Again, the primary purpose of this framework would be to promote “a region-­wide po­liti­cal dialogue promoting mutual reassurance.” And, as in his e­ arlier speech, Miyazawa coupled this initiative with a reaffirmation of the centrality of Japan’s security arrangement with the US; his proposed framework would not replace the US-­Japan security alliance.18 Although he did not openly broach the issue of including China and Rus­sia in a regional security dialogue, Miyazawa’s emphasis on contemplating a regional framework for such a dialogue clearly signaled dissatisfaction with the PMC as the vehicle for this dialogue. Strikingly, Satoh was not involved in drafting this speech, a fact that appears to reflect a shift in the locus of initiative and even interest in promoting a new regional multilateral security forum from Satoh and MOFA and t­ oward Miyazawa and his personal brain trust.19

Miyazawa’s Advisory Council ­ ehind Miyazawa’s initiatives, including his controversial call for creating a region-­ B wide framework for dialogue, was an informal advisory panel (kondankai) he or­ga­ nized that was entitled “Japan and the Asia-­Pacific Region for the 21st ­Century.”20 Announced in April 1992 as Miyazawa’s first advisory council, established in May, with the president of Keio University and scholar of modern Chinese history, Ishikawa Tadao, as its head, the panel consisted of eigh­teen prominent scholars and business leaders. The scholars included Nishihara Masashi, who, as discussed in previous chapters, was one of the security intellectuals and policy entrepreneurs promoting Japan’s decision to abandon security isolationism and embrace regional security multilateralism. Watanabe Akio of the Tokyo Institute of Technology, another policy entrepreneur who strongly advocated for regional security multilateralism, was also a member, as was Yamakage Susumu, an expert on ASEAN, who functioned as the group’s press spokesman. Kitaoka Shinichi was one of the more hawkish po­liti­cal scientists to serve on the consultative committee.21 MOFA was represented at the main meetings by the Asia Bureau director general or his deputy. This presence was sometimes supplemented by that of the deputy vice foreign minister and the head of the Asia Regional Policy Division. Although they w ­ ere not officially part of the committee, their presence meant that MOFA could keep an eye on the proceedings and presumably offer



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input.22 The Asia Bureau was the most sympathetic to the orientation of Miyazawa and his consultative group, especially in comparison with the hard-­line Rus­sia Desk. Moreover, the Asian Bureau director general when Miyazawa’s council was launched in May, Tanino, transferred to the Cabinet Office a month ­later to become the officer in charge of external consultations (Naikaku gaisei shingi shitsuchō), a position from which he could help manage Miyazawa’s Asia council, and from which he could work with his Asia Bureau successor at MOFA. This consultative committee was or­ga­nized into three dif­fer­ent working groups: po­liti­cal, economic, and cultural and history. Nishihara, Watanabe, Yamakage, and Kitaoka ­were all placed in the po­liti­cal group, which considered regional security multilateralism.23 By mandate, Miyazawa’s consultative group raised the issue of w ­ hether a new regional po­liti­cal and security framework was needed in the Asia-­Pacific, thereby suggesting that the PMC was not necessarily the best, or a long-­lasting, framework.24 The work of Miyazawa’s consultative committee was influenced by guest lectures given by Henry Kissinger and especially by Singaporean se­nior statesman Lee Kuan Yew. In his pre­sen­ta­tion, Lee pointed to Japan’s Cold War–­era regional security isolationism, arguing that Japan “had no regional strategy ­because she was haunted by the failure of the Greater East-­Asia Co-­Prosperity” sphere.25 For Tokyo to play a regional po­liti­cal and security role, it needed to build confidence with East Asian nations. According to Lee, “One hindrance to the development of this confidence and trust between Japan and her neighbours is the past, and how history is treated in Japan.”26 He argued that this ­limited Japan’s ability to play a regional security role. For example, he supported Japan’s decision to begin dispatching the SDF overseas to participate in UN Peacekeeping operations, and Japan was then preparing to send them to Cambodia. Lee argued, “Japan should be ready to send personnel u ­ nder UN command on peacekeeping operations. Fears that remain b­ ecause of past history need not be unnecessarily aroused if such personnel perform ‘tail’ or non-­combat, and not ‘teeth’ or combat functions.”27 However, he added, “­Whether Japan can go further without alarming her neighbours depends on the openness and sincerity of Japan which can change their [neighbors’] perceptions of Japan. Japan’s neighbours have deep memories of their experiences in the Second World War and it does no good, least of all to Japan, to deny this fact.”28 Lee added that “Japan’s reluctance to face up to and exorcize the ­mistakes of World War II, leaves her neighbours with some suspicion and distrust about Japan’s ­future intentions.”29 For Lee, building trust was all about historical reassurance, especially educating Japa­nese youths about Japan’s war­time be­hav­ior. “If Japan becomes more open about the past, confidence ­will increase and ­will lead to trust.”30 The strong statement on historical reassurance, including improving Japan’s history textbooks and education, which was made in the history working group’s report and

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included in a somewhat watered-­down form in the final report, parallels, and perhaps was even influenced by, Lee’s pre­sen­ta­tion and discussion.31 The need for Japan to reassure its East Asian neighbors b­ ecause of its conduct during the first half of the twentieth c­ entury was thus a prominent theme of the design of this consultative committee and its interim working-­group reports. Most notable was the cultural and historical working group, which was blisteringly critical of Japan’s historical reassurance mea­sures. It argued that “viewed from Asia,” “Japan cannot be trusted,” and “Japan hides b­ ehind the US.” This group’s working outline even argued that Japan is “more distant from Asia than is the US,” and pointed to far closer cultural relations between China and the US than exist between China and Japan. It argued that postwar generations “know nothing” about “Japan’s colonial policy” or the Yasukuni controversy.32 It noted that Japan’s apologies up to that point had been “unsatisfying” for Asian countries, and argued that Japan needed to make clear what it was apologizing for: crimes against humanity and culture, violations of international law, large-­scale killings, or imperialist aggression? It argued that tailoring apologies to specific situations or needs, which it labeled situationalism, would not work. It argued for showing remorse through deeds and the accumulation of small mea­sures; it also advocated drafting textbooks jointly with Asian nations.33 Strikingly, at the press conference following the consultative group’s sixth meeting, where the working group’s findings ­were presented, spokesman Yamakage watered down much of ­those findings. For example, the extensive discussion of apologies was omitted from the press conference.34 Surprisingly, the po­liti­cal working group’s interim report hardly touched on the issue of what form regional security multilateralism should take, beyond saying it should not take the form of a European-­style CSCE or CSCA, which it (still) described as “collective security.”35 The working group’s first meeting did mention the possibility of a regional multilateral security institution, while saying this should not be a CSCA.36 The group’s final report focused instead on why Japan could not play a regional military role, a role the first meeting described as “impossible.”37 The report stated that mistrust from Asian nations was a major reason, along with domestic and US opposition, why Japan could not become a major military power. It also considered the possibility of the US withdrawing its forward military presence from the region, as well as the difficulty Japan would face in responding in any way but through nonmilitary means, lest this create fears about Japan’s remilitarization. Reflecting perhaps the influence of Lee’s speech to the larger council, the po­liti­cal working group argued that ­because of Asians’ remaining war memories, Japan could not play a major role in UN Peacekeeping operations involving the use of force (known in Japan as PKF).38 Likewise, Yamakage, when discussing the po­liti­cal working group’s final report at a press conference in mid-­October, made a point of emphasizing the need to “balance”



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Japan’s “active contributions” to international society with “past history.” L ­ ater in the press conference, he elaborated that t­ hese two issues could not be separated.39 This consultative committee’s early findings had some influence on Miyazawa’s July 1992 speech in Washington, and the prime minister was clearly very engaged in the committee’s work.40 Miyazawa attended nine out of this council’s ten meetings.41 Miyazawa himself, in a significant departure from MOFA’s position, and influenced by his advisory council, started thinking ambitiously about a region-­wide security framework with some pos­si­ble comparison with CSCE. At a press conference following the reshuffling of his cabinet in December 1992, and just before the release of the council’s report, Miyazawa was asked about his advisory council. He answered, “Po­liti­cally, or in terms of security, I want to hear the Asian advisory council’s discussions, conscious of the issue of w ­ hether Asia can have a common umbrella like CSCE (Council on Security Cooperation in Eu­rope).”42 The fact that Miyazawa was considering the pos­si­ble relevance of a CSCE-­type arrangement for East Asia, effectively a CSCA, ran very much ­counter to MOFA’s established position. This advisory panel’s final report, issued on Christmas Day 1992, echoed Miyazawa’s call for a region-­wide dialogue. It suggested that this dialogue would be useful for explaining policy, promoting transparency, engaging in reassurance, and building confidence. ­Going beyond even Miyazawa’s Washington speech, but perhaps matching the urgency of his CSIS speech, the panel advised that it is “impor­tant to actively consider how to ensure the participation of China and Rus­sia in this dialogue.”43 Beyond the need for a regional dialogue for the sake of reassurance, the report also reaffirmed the need to keep the US militarily engaged in the Asia-­Pacific region. Strikingly, the report linked ­these two objectives by noting that American military engagement in East Asia strengthens “confidence in Japan’s fundamental position” that, in words echoing the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan “­will not become a military g­ reat power capable of threatening other nations.” More generally, the report claimed that the US military presence helps to “stabilize” relations between Japan and the nations of the Asia-­Pacific.44 Another notable aspect of the advisory panel’s report was its stress on promoting historical reassurance as well as politico-­military reassurance. The report devoted an entire section to discussing the need for Japan to further improve the quality of its history textbooks and education, and to even consider compensation for individual victims of the Pacific War.45 Nonetheless, t­ hese recommendations, although clear-­throated, and one of the strongest ever issued by a group affiliated with the Japa­nese government, ­were significantly watered down in comparison with the history and culture working group’s report to the council. Strikingly, the release of the prime minister’s advisory report was followed a few weeks ­later by the release of a similar report by the Keizai Dōyūkai, one of the most influential peak associations of business leaders in Japan. The Keizai Dōyūkai report

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also called for Japan to take the initiative in promoting a regional po­liti­cal and security dialogue, what it called a “Comprehensive Security Forum.” It also recommended the formation of a related se­nior officials’ meeting and the eventual holding of an Asia-­Pacific Comprehensive Security Summit. However, the Keizai Dōyūkai appeared to ­favor a relatively restrictive membership, since it suggested placing the Comprehensive Security Forum within the context of APEC, which at the time did not include China or Rus­sia, or the proposed EAEC, which would exclude Rus­sia, the US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It is even more striking that it considered the highly controversial, and by then significantly discredited, EAEC at all. However, the Keizai Dōyūkai report mirrored the Miyazawa advisory council’s in calling for a region-­wide po­liti­cal dialogue designed to promote mutual confidence and stressing the importance of strengthening awareness of historical facts and dealing with prob­ lems left over from the end of the Pacific War.46 The participation of the influential chairman of Fuji-­Xerox, Kobayashi Yōtarō, on the Miyazawa advisory panel, as well as the influential role he played as head of the Keizai Dōyūkai, may explain why Keizai Dōyūkai issued a report largely supporting the findings of the prime minister’s advisory panel. The intention, and arguably the effect, of this parallel report was to build domestic support in Japan for an expanded regional security dialogue, especially among business elites. Indeed, the Keizai Dōyūkai’s report was one manifestation of the way in which Miyazawa’s consultative council placed the topic of regional security multilateralism and Japan’s reassurance imperative ­toward its Asian neighbors clearly on Japan’s domestic po­liti­cal agenda. Two weeks ­after the council’s report, even former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, up to that point Japan’s most hawkish prime minister, endorsed impor­tant aspects of Miyazawa’s council’s report. Asserting, “I firmly believe Japan w ­ ill never become a big military power,” Nakasone went on to argue that the US-­Japan alliance was no longer sufficient to reassure Asian nations of this. Implicitly claiming that the Fukuda Doctrine’s promise that Japan would no longer attempt to become a military power was no longer sufficient, Nakasone endorsed the Nakayama corollary: “If, however, Japan adheres only to bilateral military ties ­under the Japan-­US security treaty, its neighbors w ­ ill feel uneasy about Japan’s intentions and strength, and harbor suspicions.” The way to solve this prob­lem was to embrace regional security multilateralism: “Whenever Japan wants to promote international contributions, it should do so within the multinational framework aimed at dialogue and cooperation and should maintain a forum of discussion to remove misunderstanding and suspicions.”47 Attempts to build a more comprehensive and regional multilateral security architecture and engage in historical reassurance of the rest of Asia continued to feature prominently during the rest of the year, including in efforts to deal with the so-­called ianfu issue and extend apologies to Asian nations.48



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Bangkok Speech Despite the advice of his advisory panel, in his third and final speech on the topic in Bangkok in January 1993, Miyazawa backed away from explic­itly promoting the inclusion of China and Rus­sia in a region-­wide dialogue, as he had in his Washington speech, or giving clear, implicit backing to this idea, as he had in his CSIS councillors’ speech.49 Although Miyazawa’s address to the CSIS councillors’ meeting in October 1992 was relatively low key, his third speech was built up to be a major diplomatic initiative. Touted by some as “the Miyazawa Doctrine,”50 Miyazawa’s speech in Bangkok was in fact not as bold as his National Press Club speech of the previous July had been. Miyazawa shied away from explic­itly calling for the inclusion of China and Rus­sia in a ­future regional security dialogue. He also significantly softened the implication of his Washington and CSIS speeches that the PMC was only the temporary home of a regional security dialogue. Rather, he evaluated as “highly significant” “the po­ liti­cal and security dialogue which has been actively u ­ nder way in the ASEAN Post-­ Ministerial Conference since last year.” He argued that this dialogue is impor­tant for enhancing “transparency” and, echoing Satoh’s MRM concept, argued that it was also crucial for enhancing the “sense of mutual reassurance” among the countries of the Asia-­Pacific.51 Nonetheless, the prime minister hinted that he did not regard the status quo—­that is, the PMC dialogue in its pre­sent form—as adequate. According to Miyazawa, the countries of the Asia-­Pacific region need to promote a “po­liti­cal and security dialogue among the countries of the region to strengthen Asia-­Pacific peace and stability, and to think seriously about the ­future vision of the region’s security.”52 A MOFA official responsible for regional policy making told me that t­ here ­were “two schools” of thought, and that many in MOFA did not want to take too proactive a position regarding the evolution of a regional security dialogue. He claimed that the Bangkok speech’s lack of specificity compared with his previous speeches reflected this view, the ASEAN venue, and the fact that Miyazawa had to cover many other issues.53 However, Miyazawa was careful to reaffirm the importance of the US military presence and asserted the absence of a contradiction between this presence and a region-­wide security dialogue: “Japan w ­ ill actively take part [in a regional security dialogue] . . . ​with the belief that the presence and engagement of the United States . . . ​ ­will continue to play an impor­tant role in the f­uture as a stabilizing f­actor for the region.”54 Paralleling his advisory council’s report, Miyazawa again reaffirmed the Fukuda Doctrine’s reassurance promise that Japan would not again become a military power and linked this with efforts to promote historical reassurance. The intention to avoid becoming a military power “is the strong w ­ ill of the Japa­nese ­people based on their remorse over Japa­nese past actions,” Miyazawa stated, adding, “I intend to

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take further care to improve education in Japan so that the lessons of history ­will be reflected in the daily conduct of the Japa­nese ­people.”55

Negotiations Leading to the Creation of the ARF During the Miyazawa initiatives, Japan and ASEAN, especially Singapore, w ­ ere starting to engage in behind-­the-­scenes talks about the shape a regional security dialogue would take. Both publicly and ­behind the scenes, ­until the very end of the pro­cess, Japan played a far more impor­tant role than did the US, which largely abstained from discussions about the contours of a regional security dialogue. The period from January 1992 u ­ ntil May 1993 was crucial for negotiating the contours of the ARF, and the critical negotiations occurred between Japan and ASEAN. Prime Minister Miyazawa’s initiatives w ­ ere the public side of Japan’s attempts to influence this pro­cess. However, clearly t­ here was division between the prime minister and at least some in MOFA, such as Satoh, regarding the exclusivity of the security dialogue. MOFA, yielding to the concerns of the Roshiya-ka, ­adopted the position that it did not want to include Rus­sia in a new security dialogue; for this reason, China and other Socialist countries also had to be excluded, even though Rus­sia was now only a former Socialist country. Moreover, many in the Foreign Ministry feared that building a broader regional forum that included non-­US allies might alienate the US and undermine the second goal of Japan’s newfound multilateralism—­namely, keeping the US militarily engaged in the Asia-­Pacific region. Criticism in a Chūō Kōron article appeared to be a public voicing of t­hese concerns. A se­nior Japa­nese diplomat with responsibility for security policy planning told me that MOFA was “reluctant” to include China and Rus­sia and that it showed “some hesitation” when ASEAN proposed including them in a regional security dialogue.56 Prime Minister Miyazawa and Satoh, on the other hand, as we have seen, w ­ ere much more open to including China and Rus­sia in such a dialogue. Miyazawa also showed more willingness to consider conducting this dialogue outside an ASEAN framework. Even within MOFA, some supported a more encompassing framework that included China and Rus­sia and that was modeled on CSCE. Miyamoto Yuji, a former head of the China Desk, openly challenged MOFA policy by publishing an article in Gaikō Fora-­mu in May 1993 calling CSCE a v­ iable model for East Asia. He further argued that such a mechanism was needed, as continued US military engagement in East Asia could not be counted on.57 In this re­spect, Miyamoto’s article was the mirror opposite of Tomiyama’s Chūō Kōron article from the year before: Tomiyama was arguing that discussing regional security multilateralism would undermine the US commitment to Japan’s security, whereas Miyamoto was arguing that it was imperative to discuss such a mechanism precisely b­ ecause a continued US commitment could not be counted on.



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Nonetheless, MOFA stuck to its time-­honored strategy of building a diplomatic co­ali­tion with ASEAN. It tried to build an institutional basis for this co­ali­tion by proposing at the 1992 PMC that the ASEAN-­Japan Forum add po­liti­cal and security issues to its agenda; previously the forum had focused on economic and social issues. ASEAN replied with “understanding.” At the AMM SOM in January 1993, ASEAN agreed to accept Japan’s proposal to add po­liti­cal and security issues to the agenda of the ASEAN-­Japan Forum from their next meeting the following month. The AMM SOM also agreed to convene a security-­focused PMC for the first time in May 1993, thereby seemingly signaling at last complete ac­cep­tance of the Nakayama proposal. However, as became clear at this SOM, ASEAN saw this as a one-­time meeting designed primarily to prepare a new and broader un-­like-­minded security forum, the ARF.58 At the ASEAN-­Japan Forum in February 1993, Matsuura Kōichirō, deputy minister of foreign affairs, emphasized the significance of this meeting since it addressed security issues for the first time. It therefore “marked a point of departure from previous Forum Meetings in its organ­ization and structure.”59 He also expressed Japan’s “intention to enhance its contribution to regional security” and “repeated its resolve to never become a military power again.” In response ASEAN “expressed appreciation.”60 Overall MOFA, given its desire to keep China and especially Rus­sia out of a security dialogue, and its desire to maintain ASEAN support, was essentially supporting the 1992 status quo—­that is, a security dialogue within the PMC, which would mean the continued de facto exclusion of China and Rus­sia. This view appears to have been strongest in the Rus­sia Desk, which did not support Rus­sian participation in any regional institutions ­until the bilateral territorial dispute had been addressed, and weakest in the Asian bureau. Satoh, then the head of the North American Bureau, like Miyazawa, was more open to including Rus­sia and China. Both calculated, correctly as it turned out, that the US would accept their inclusion.61 ASEAN for its part had far grander plans, sharing Miyazawa’s desire for a truly region-­wide security dialogue, one that would include all Asia-­Pacific states. Already by April 1993 ASEAN was signaling that it wanted to include China and Rus­sia in a broader regional security dialogue that went beyond the PMC.62 The issue came to a head at the PMC SOM held on May 20–21, 1993. For MOFA this was the realization of the final unimplemented plank of the Nakayama proposal. However, this ended up being a one-­time PMC SOM, not an institutionalization of security dialogue through the PMC. Vari­ous security issues ­were discussed, some that highlighted both the value of a like-­minded regional security multilateralism, and ­others that suggested the value of a wider, un-­like-­minded multilateral forum. Members w ­ ere able to discuss China’s naval modernization, its position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and other aspects of Chinese foreign policy without

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China being in the room. While MOFA found this potentially useful for coordinating policies ­toward China, and for speaking frankly about China without sparking a diplomatic incident, for many ASEAN members and other participants, the centrality of China in the SOM discussions also highlighted the need to include China in the dialogue in order to meaningfully fulfill the functions of a cooperative or common security forum. MOFA, as it stressed in its briefing book for the meeting, “found the status-­quo structure of the PMC to be appropriate, with no changes needed.”63 The internal MOFA meeting report on the PMC SOM largely avoided the issue of including China and Rus­sia in a regional security dialogue in some way. One passage notes vaguely that “­there was no discussion about creating a new regional security framework,” a not very insightful observation given that a new region-­wide security dialogue was created less than two months ­later. In the context of the South China Sea issue, the summary notes that many countries argued that China needed to be included in a regional po­liti­cal security dialogue, along with other nonparticipating countries, and that ­there was “una­nim­i­ty” on this point. The report also noted that participants discussed China’s po­liti­cal, economic, and military developments. Significantly, while the topic of China, including how to bring it into a regional security dialogue, was mentioned, t­ here was no mention of Rus­sia or including it in the security dialogue.64 Vice Foreign Minister for Po­liti­cal ­Matters Saitō Kunihiko, who represented Japan at the meeting, gave a press briefing to Japa­nese journalists in Singapore following the end of the SOM on May 21. Strikingly, Saitō’s press conference appears to have been more forthcoming than the internal meeting write-up, in that he admitted that the issue of including China and Rus­sia was debated. In his opening statement, Saitō noted that “meaningful discussions ­were held about how to include non-­PMC members China, Rus­sia and Vietnam in the dialogue.” However, he was less than forthcoming when he implicitly denied the emerging consensus by other participants for including China and Rus­sia. In answer to a press question, Saitō admitted that “many countries argued that it was better to expand the scope of membership to include countries such as China, Rus­sia, and Vietnam. But that does not mean that an agreement on this point was reached.”65 In answer to another question, Saitō also noted that “for ASEAN it can be considered that China is of greater concern” than Rus­sia. When asked about a means for expanding membership, he admitted that vari­ous ideas ­were floated but denied that a membership committee would be established and said the issue could be handled by ordinary diplomatic channels. When asked w ­ hether the PMC SOM might reconvene in July, just before the PMC, to consider the ­matter, Saitō denied that this would happen, although in fact the AMM SOM would be convened then to s­ ettle the m ­ atter. He then added, “However, t­ here is a hy­po­thet­i­cal possibility that sometime around fall China might fi­nally be admitted.”66



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This last statement appears to have been a remarkable admission, or a departure from policy. Interestingly, Asahi Shimbun’s coverage of Saitō’s remarks did not include this striking statement, perhaps indicating that the paper was subsequently told it did not represent policy.67 In any case, overall, the impression that emerges is that Saitō clearly signaled that Japan was more open to including China than it was to including Rus­sia. Asahi Shimbun’s article quotes Saitō as saying, “China is an indispensable ­factor when considering Asia-­Pacific regional prob­lems, and on a case-­by-­case basis it would be meaningful to be able to directly express concerns to China.” The inclusion of the term case-­by-­case (baai ni yotte) implies, however, that Japan was still thinking or hoping that China might only participate on an ad hoc basis.68 Although vari­ous regional security issues w ­ ere discussed, including suspected North Korean nuclear proliferation, Japan’s defense posture, and China’s naval buildup and policy ­toward the South China Sea, the focus was on crafting a region-­wide security forum. Indeed, the very idea of establishing a separate security-­only regional dialogue was proposed at the SOM, a proposal that echoed the ASEAN-­ISIS declaration from 1991,69 but Japan’s opposition prevented a consensus from emerging.70 Moreover, neither Saitō nor MOFA’s internal outline of this meeting mentioned the agreement reached at the meeting to invite China, Rus­sia, and Vietnam to a “special meeting on security issues in late July” between the AMM and the PMC,71 a meeting that ­later became a dinner that launched the creation of the ARF (see the discussion ­later in this section). For MOFA, ­these developments ­were unwelcome, as it continued to cling to the line of only having a like-­minded forum that excluded China and especially Rus­sia, and expressed its opposition at the meeting. However, Winston Lord, representing the recently inaugurated Clinton administration, expressed support for including China and Rus­sia.72 Indeed, a se­nior US diplomat attending the meeting told the media, “­We’re very comfortable with integrating key players like China and Rus­sia in this so it is made clear that this is not a grouping directed at any country.”73 This significantly undermined Japan’s opposition. As a Japa­nese diplomat with a se­nior security portfolio told me, “I remember that when ASEAN made a very clear proposal to have a dialogue involving China and Rus­sia, some hesitations we had. But soon ­after that we totally accepted, b­ ecause even the United States endorsed or supported [the proposal].”74 Nonetheless, despite support by other dialogue partners, Japan’s lone opposition for the time being caused the SOM not to make a formal decision on the issue.75 Instead, another AMM SOM was held on July 21 in Singapore, just before the AMM and the PMC. ­There the ASEAN countries de­cided to create a new security dialogue to be held just ­after the 1994 AMM, one that would include China, Rus­ sia, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, and to call this dialogue the ASEAN

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Regional Forum (ARF). The AMM on July 24 ratified the SOM’s decision, and on the eve­ning of July 25 an informal dinner was held for the seventeen invited members of the new ARF.76 In this way, ASEAN was able to overcome Japan’s refusal to join the consensus on allowing ­these new members into the security dialogue. However, Japan’s opposition had been weakening anyway, with MOFA’s opposition essentially driven by the Rus­sia Desk, while Prime Minister Miyazawa, his consultative council of experts, and Satoh, the main brain b­ ehind the Nakayama proposal, supported their inclusion. ASEAN’s solution, creating a separate organ­ization, temporarily solved the issue of ­whether to allow China and Rus­sia into the PMC, a move Japan was much more opposed to. Thus, ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF, a decision that essentially implemented ASEAN-­ISIS’s call for a stand-­alone un-­like-­minded regional security dialogue separated from the PMC, also proved acceptable to Japan and even MOFA as a ­whole. Already by early 1995, a Japa­nese diplomat with a se­nior regional security portfolio in MOFA told me, “We cannot imagine the ARF without China.”77

Conclusion Overall, the result of Miyazawa’s high-­profile initiatives, the behind-­the-­scenes negotiations between ASEAN and Japan, the May 1993 PMC SOM, and the last-­minute AMM SOM was an ASEAN-­brokered compromise to keep China and Rus­sia out of the PMC for the time being, but to include them and several ­others in a new ASEAN-­ sponsored security-­focused forum, the ARF. This result largely tracks with ASEAN-­ ISIS’s June 1991 Jakarta declaration. It also reflected softening Japa­nese opposition to including China and Rus­sia, especially as the US had come out in support of their inclusion. By the spring of 1993, China’s importance in Japa­nese policy making was rising. The aim of using a regional security forum to reassure and manage China was gradually overcoming the stubborn opposition of the Roshiya-ka to including Rus­sia in a regional security dialogue.78 The Miyazawa initiatives and the behind-­the-­scenes diplomacy that accompanied them reveal that Japa­nese policy makers continued to see a regional security dialogue as primarily a means to reassure US-­friendly East Asian states about Japan’s security policy and expanding military role, as well as to keep the US regionally engaged. A broader reassurance dialogue, the need for which was brought home by the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, was seen as an impor­tant means for ensuring Asian ac­cep­tance of an expanding security role, including the deployment of the Japa­nese military to Cambodia and other overseas destinations to participate in UN Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The other goal of a regional security dialogue was to ensure continued US military engagement in East Asia.79 ­These two goals appeared to come into conflict with each other regarding the inclusion of China and Rus­sia in the dialogue.



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MOFA apparently feared that including t­ hese two nonallies would signal a desire to move away from the US-­Japan alliance, if not offend the US.80 However, ASEAN’s insistence on including the two, the growing importance of China in the eyes of Japa­ nese policy makers, Miyazawa’s initiatives and ­those of other domestic actors, and, fi­nally, growing American receptivity to including China and Rus­sia combined to overcome MOFA’s reluctance about including China and especially Rus­sia.

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PART III

Japan’s Role in Regional Security Multilateralism

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7

Japan and Regional Security Multilateralism, 1994–2000

as the previous three chapt ers have shown, Japan assumed a leadership role for the first time in regional security in July 1991 with the Nakayama proposal, in which it proposed creating a regional multilateral security forum. It followed up the Nakayama proposal with a series of initiatives by then–­prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi, coupled with behind-­the-­scenes diplomatic effort. ­These Japa­nese initiatives, in cooperation with Singapore and ASEAN-­ISIS, culminated in the creation of the ARF in 1993. Although the ARF was quite dif­fer­ent from the like-­minded multilateral body Nakayama had proposed in July 1991, Japan is the only non-­ASEAN member that can be considered as a cofounder of the forum. This chapter and the next examine how Japan has used regional multilateralism since the inauguration of the ARF in 1994 for several goals. First, Tokyo used the ARF to reassure its neighbors that it would not again threaten their security even as it began playing a direct role in regional and international security and sent its military overseas for the first time since 1945. Second, Japan used it to ameliorate potential security threats through cooperative security mechanisms. Third, it used it to help keep the US regionally engaged and to ameliorate its alliance security dilemma by reducing the risks of abandonment and entrapment. Fourth, Japan used it as a platform to build consensus for new security utilities that it could not achieve on its own or through the US-Japan alliance. Fi­nally, Japan used the ARF as a venue for po­liti­cal competition with China, both to try to build co­ali­tions to pressure Beijing and, defensively, to prevent China from ­doing the same to Japan and its US ally. This chapter also shows that Japan even promoted regional multilateral security and

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especially po­liti­cal forums on several occasions that have excluded the US, such as through the Hashimoto Doctrine, the APT Forum, and its promotion of NEA 3 cooperation, even in the face of US anxiety that Japan’s focus on multilateral cooperation would drain Japan’s attention and resources away from the alliance and become a de facto hedging strategy. This chapter consists of seven sections. The first section examines Japan’s early participation in the ARF from 1994 through 1996, as well as Japan’s initial expectations of the new forum. The second section considers Japan’s perseverance in actively participating in the ARF despite indications of growing US anxiety about the priority of regional security multilateralism in Japan’s security policy. The third section considers the PMC versus the ARF for Japan’s regional security strategy, as well as Japan’s desire to maintain the PMC as a like-­minded multilateral security forum. The fourth section considers the Hashimoto Doctrine as Japan’s attempt to reestablish a special relationship with ASEAN following the admission of China and Rus­sia into the PMC, and the fifth considers Japan’s new embrace of regional multilateralism excluding the US, most notably through the APT and ASEM. The sixth section briefly diverges from this book’s focus on regional security and po­liti­cal multilateralism to examine Japan’s attempt to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), an example of an in­de­pen­dent regional economic multilateralism that provides some side evidence and context on Japan’s regional security multilateralism and its changing balance of concern between entrapment versus abandonment by the US. The final section considers Japan’s promotion of Northeast Asian regional security multilateralism.

Japan’s Early Participation in the ARF Japan was an energetic participant in the ARF from the beginning, with Japa­nese diplomats proudly seeing the ARF as an impor­tant fruit of Japan’s post–­Gulf War burst of leadership for promoting regional security multilateralism, beginning with the Nakayama proposal of July 1991. Japan became the first cochair of the ARF’s Inter-­sessional Group (ISG) on CBMs, together with Indonesia, and made several influential CBM initiatives, most notably the proposal for all members to publish defense white papers. Japan was also active in the CSCAP, the track-­two organ­ization established to advise the ARF.1 Nonetheless, some accounts of Japan’s policy ­toward the ARF in the early years suggest a growing pessimism about its prospects from the late 1990s, in no small part ­because of a growing frustration with China’s role. In short, policy makers are said to have come to realize that the ARF was a “mere” dialogue venue that “could only make a modest contribution to the regional balance of power by performing certain ­limited functions.”2 They also doubted ­whether the ARF “had the potential to be a useful diplomatic channel for gathering collective criticism against China” or for “constraining China.”3 Yet t­ here is



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l­ ittle indication that MOFA officials expected the ARF to directly “contribute” to the regional balance of power in the first place, certainly not in anything but the longest of long-­term scenarios. Indeed, ­doing so would mean ­going beyond the consensus among ARF members, including Japan, that the ARF would be a cooperative security forum rather than becoming a traditional alliance or collective security mechanism. Reversing its e­ arlier opposition to Chinese as well as Rus­sian participation,4 Japan welcomed China’s and Rus­sia’s involvement in the ARF by 1995, despite the recognition that China’s participation in par­tic­u­lar might slow down the pace of pro­gress. A se­nior official in the Security Policy Division of MOFA, and a China expert, had come by early 1995, contrary to Japan’s ­earlier position during negotiations on the formation of the ARF, to view China’s participation as vitally impor­tant: “We cannot imagine the ARF without China.”5 At the same time, this official had a balanced and, as subsequent events revealed, accurate view of China’s participation in the ARF: “The next step of how to develop the ARF system or pro­cess in the ­future, we just started with three hours in Bangkok. . . . ​It seems to me that China is a ­little reluctant to run fast, to push this pro­cess very fast. But I d ­ on’t think China is g­ oing to oppose any movement of taking some exact mea­sures such as CBMs, or transparency, ­etc.”6 Indeed, several months l­ater, by July 1995 and the second ARF meeting in Brunei, China had come to accept several CBMs, most notably Japan’s proposal that each ARF member regularly publish a defense white paper.7 This official’s comment also made clear that MOFA policy makers ­were not expecting that the ARF would quickly institutionalize or develop into a conflict-­resolution mechanism. Indeed, this official added, “I ­don’t think we could have, or in the ­future have, whole-­region institutions or a very solid security structure in the Asia-­Pacific region. It is unlikely.” Consequently, this official emphasized that the underpinning of Japan’s security policy remained the US-­Japan security alliance.8 Nonetheless, this se­nior security policy official expressed enthusiasm about the role of security dialogue itself: “The po­liti­cal and security prob­lems should be discussed repeatedly. . . . ​They are worth discussing ­these m ­ atters on ­every occasion.” He defined the ARF as “the dialogue in which every­one gets together and enhances some sort of mutual trust and mutual understanding. So, this is also ­going to make some contributions to solving or easing some tensions in this region in the ­future.” Again, emphasizing that the ARF’s value should not be exaggerated and mostly lies in the long term, this official stated, “The ARF is not a panacea. We d ­ on’t expect very quick answers from the ARF, but the ARF is a sort of device to establish some sort of basis for ­future discussions.”9 Similarly, a top official in the Regional Policy Division of the Asia Bureau told me in an interview in fall 1994, ­after emphasizing the centrality of the alliance with the US for Japa­nese security, that the PMC and ARF primarily play a reassurance and

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confidence-­building role: “The PMC and the ASEAN Regional Forum can contribute to the enhancement of the security situation in this region by exchanging impor­tant information, data among the members, also by enhancing mutual reassurance among the members.”10 This official went on to list information sharing, most notably through the publication by all participants of defense white papers; personnel exchanges; and the holding of a PKO seminar as Japan’s near-­term goals for the ARF.11 Notably, the MOFA officials interviewed emphasized the importance for Japan of using the ARF reassurance for several ARF members beyond China. Japan was able to make significant pro­gress ­toward ­these goals during the first several years of the ARF. The final communiqué of the first ARF meeting, in Bangkok in July 1994, endorsed “Eu­ro­pean type” security-­building concepts that could make “significant contributions to efforts ­towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy.” At the same time, the final communiqué also endorsed the ASEAN Way’s own distinctive security-­building approaches, which fostered “constructive dialogue and consultations,” and most importantly it endorsed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as “a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic tool for regional confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and po­liti­cal and security cooperation.”12 At the ARF SOM in May 1994, Australia and Canada proposed establishing a working group on CBMs “similar to t­hose of the CSCE” in order to develop concrete CBM proposals. China and ASEAN w ­ ere reluctant to go along.13 China, effectively borrowing a policy line Japan had used during the Cold War to oppose CBMs, argued that they might effectively ratify the territorial status quo, thereby undermining its territorial claims. Already by the next year, at the second ARF meeting in Brunei, however, China had been convinced, as had Japan, that at least some CBMs could be implemented without ratifying the territorial status quo, and the ARF agreed to set up a working group on CBMs. Japan’s CBM proposals, especially regarding the publication of defense white papers, ­were successful. China agreed at this meeting, for the first time, to publish its own defense white paper.14 Japan’s success in promoting regional CBMs, and overcoming China’s opposition on the same grounds that Japan had ­until only recently opposed them, was ironic, especially given that MOFA, u ­ nder Satoh Yukio’s leadership, from 1991 through at least spring 1994, promoted MRMs as a superior alternative to CBMs that would be less Eu­ro­pean and more appropriate for Asia, as a region characterized by a greater diversity of culture and values than was the case in Eu­rope. Given subsequent criticism of China for supposedly seeking to avoid “hard military” CBMs, it is ironic that as late as May 1994, Japa­nese diplomats w ­ ere still arguing that European-­style CBMs ­were inappropriate for East Asia and that MRMs encompassing a broader range of po­liti­cal, economic, and cultural mea­sures would be more appropriate.15



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MOFA highly evaluated the outcome of the second ARF meeting in Brunei. In par­tic­u­lar, it praised both the establishment of the ISG on CBMs and the pro­gress made ­toward gaining ac­cep­tance by all members of the recommendation to issue white papers. It also positively evaluated the open and frank discussion of regional security issues, especially the ARF’s ability to discuss South China Sea disputes despite China’s reluctance to do so.16 In addition, at the third ARF meeting, in Jakarta in 1996, Japan found the ARF to be a valuable venue for reassuring neighboring Asian nations, including China, about the Clinton-­Hashimoto declaration reaffirming the US-­Japan alliance and the negotiations regarding revised US-­Japan defense guidelines.17 Japan again attempted to reassure not only China but also South K ­ orea and ASEAN at the fourth ARF ministerial meeting, in Malaysia in July 1997, that the draft revised US-­Japan defense guidelines, which had been published in June 1997, would not pose a threat, in part ­because “the defense guidelines ­will remain within the limitations set by the [Japa­nese] Constitution.”18 Similarly, at the ARF SOM on May 19–20, 1997, in Malaysia, Japan used the opportunity of this multilateral security dialogue to reassure its neighbors that the new defense guidelines would conform to “Japan’s constitutional framework.”19 Further pro­gress involving China was evident from the third ARF meeting, in Jakarta in July 1996, when Beijing volunteered to cochair and host the ISG on CBMs in 1997.20 As Togo Kazuhiko, a former se­nior Japa­nese diplomat, notes, since 1996, “China has become a much more active participant in the ARF dialogue.”21 According to Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya, “­After the first few meetings of the ARF, China was reassured that the ARF would not develop into an anti-­China bandwagon, nor would the United States be able to influence its course so decisively as to undermine Chinese strategic interests in the region.”22 As even ASEAN skeptic Jeannie Henderson observes, “Beijing is increasingly comfortable with confidence-­building concepts, demonstrating its growing commitment to, and appreciation of, the multilateral security dialogue.”23 China came to recognize the value of cooperative and common security cooperation for its own security. According to Bates Gill, while “Beijing throughout most of the 1990s remained a reluctant player within the ARF itself[,] . . . ​gradually China’s approaches began to change as it was able to see in its participation a number of opportunities to achieve Chinese interests, including possibly constraining the role of Japan and the United States in the region, reassuring and establishing improved relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors, and helping to foster a more stable regional environment.”24 ­Others agree that Beijing came to see the ARF as a forum useful for balancing and constraining the US and Japan,25 and to reassure ­others that China would not become a threat. According to Goh and Acharya, the ARF “has told leaders in Beijing how the outside world looks at China,” and this “helps China to develop more sensitive policies.”26

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Leading Japa­nese foreign policy intellectuals continued to see the ARF as a very successful organ­ization even as it completed its first de­cade. Looking back at the ARF in 2004, Satoh, the main architect of the Nakayama and Miyazawa proposals, and by then president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, argued that the ARF had had an impressive first ten years. Pointing to the fact that thirteen ARF members had begun publishing outlines of their defense policies, defense white papers, ­because of the ARF, and noting the annual ministerial and se­nior officials’ dialogues, Satoh claimed that the ARF had been effective in increasing mutual trust among members, something he termed a “big accomplishment.”27 Similarly, Togo, formerly an internal MOFA skeptic of the Nakayama proposal at the time it was made, argued that in the ARF “the first phase of confidence building has proceeded with certain success as exemplified by the publication of defense ‘White Papers’ by each of the member countries. Through accumulated dialogue in the ARF framework, member countries have prob­ably less misgivings and suspicions when facing the security issues of other countries in the region.”28 Satoh further argued that as the ARF has begun to tackle preventive diplomacy, it could be expected to make a contribution to combating Islamic extremist terrorism and North ­Korea’s production and export of missiles.29 ­After noting US and Australian “dissatisfaction” with the ARF’s consensus rule, Satoh responded that the ARF had realized gradual but sure-­footed pro­gress over the course of ten years. Satoh was thus suggesting that the ASEAN Way of gradual pro­gress through building consensus and avoiding acrimonious debate was more promising than Western observers realized. In view of Japan’s role in helping to establish the ARF, therefore, the success of the ARF, for Satoh, also represents a success for Japan’s post–­Cold War foreign policy.30

New US Misgivings over Japan’s Leadership Reflecting Japan’s shift from security isolationism to championing regional security multilateralism at the end of the Cold War, Japan began preparing a new NDPO to replace the first one issued in 1976. Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro or­ga­nized a study group to debate the contents of the new NDPO, which issued what came to be known as the Higuchi report, named ­after committee chairman Higuchi Hirotarō, president of Asahi Beer. The Higuchi report emphasized the importance of security multilateralism for Japan’s security and discussed this before discussing the US-­Japan alliance. This created alarm among some Japan-­hands in Washington, most notably Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, who, in response, wrote an influential paper warning about the dangers of Japan’s engagement with security multilateralism for the alliance.31 According to Cronin and Green, the Higuchi report signaled that “momentum and energy in Japa­nese policy planning are flowing away from the alliance.”32 The two identified a zero-­sum trade-­off between the alliance and multilateralism, asserting,



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“Bureaucrats in the Japan Defense Agency ( JDA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are increasingly distracted from alliance concerns by other ­matters. In the 1980s, the best and the brightest worked on the alliance; now they work on peacekeeping, Asian relations.”33 They characterized multilateralism as “a distraction (in terms of po­liti­cal and financial resources) from bilateral defense cooperation” and pointed to UN Peacekeeping, the ARF, and even the nongovernmental CSCAP as the causes of this distraction.34 ­Here we see, in its most direct and articulate form, American angst that Japan’s promotion of regional security multilateralism could come at the expense of resources and attention being diverted from the US-Japan alliance, causing the latter to atrophy.35 Cronin and Green saw Japan’s new focus on multilateralism as a “hedge” against “pos­si­ble U.S. withdrawal or fatigue” or “waning U.S. commitments to the alliance.”36 They also warned that the Higuchi report was advocating the acquisition of greater autonomous capabilities, capabilities that might prove “redundant” with US capabilities. They pointed to greater multilateral engagement as the major justification, if not driver, of this trend, such as the report’s recommendation that Japan develop greater autonomous airlift capabilities to support SDF participation in UN Peacekeeping.37 Nonetheless, Cronin and Green concluded that Japan’s pursuit of regional multilateralism could be made acceptable if it takes place through the US: “We want Japan to play a more active role in partnership with the United States.”38 Strikingly, they insisted that Japan’s activism within the ARF should only take place through bilateral coordination with the US, “coordinating regional multilateral security initiatives (at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), e­ tc.) before presenting them to the rest of the region.”39 One can see the Cronin and Green paper as an attempt to adjust to Japan’s new in­de­pen­dent championing of security multilateralism by ensuring that Japan’s new initiatives only operated through bilateral coordination with the US, or at least that the US had a say in how they developed. This reaction to the Higuchi report resurfaced latent US sensitivity to Japan’s abandonment of its previous strategy of regional security isolationism and reactive support for the US security strategy, as well as to Japan’s embrace of greater policy in­de­pen­dence and championing of regional security multilateralism. Takao Sebata claims the Cronin and Green paper showed that “the real objective of the Security Treaty from the United States viewpoint . . . ​[is] to prevent the growth of Japan’s power projection capabilities[,] known as the so-­called ‘Cork in the ­Bottle’ argument,” and to calm the fear “that Japan might become a country which is beyond the control of the United States.”40 Although criticized in both Japan and the US,41 Cronin and Green’s paper proved to be influential, as even some Japa­nese policy elites ­were also concerned about the Higuchi report. Nishihiro Seiki, a leading member of the Higuchi panel, told Green

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over a cup of coffee at the Capitol ­Hotel in Tokyo that he believed discussing multilateralism before the US alliance in the Higuchi report was “meaningful” and a m ­ istake.42 Similarly, Satoh argues that the Higuchi report’s conception of security multilateralism was very dif­fer­ent from that contained in the Nakayama proposal, ­because the former foresaw Japan relying on security multilateralism more than the alliance. He also claims that the Higuchi report was “too idealistic” and “incoherent” and would not have become the basis for the 1996 NDPO “even without Washington’s pressure.”43 Cronin and Green’s message of alarm was arguably a decisive f­ actor b­ ehind the 1995 Nye report. Joseph S. Nye shared many of the same concerns, claiming that without a new institutional framework, Japan might rearm, achieve a “ ‘normal’ ­great power status,” and “act unilaterally in ways contrary to American interests.”44 The Nye report called for strengthening and redefining the US-­Japan alliance to deal with new post–­ Cold War contingencies in East Asia. This, in turn, contributed to the April 1996 Clinton-­Hashimoto joint declaration reaffirming the importance of the bilateral alliance, and to the revised US-­Japan defense guidelines of 1997. Above all, ­these reactions revealed US worries about ­whether the alliance and regional security multilateralism ­were ­really complements, as Japan claimed, rather than competitors. The US reaction also revealed Washington’s continued influence over Japa­nese policy. While the Higuchi report emphasized regional security multilateralism and discussed it before discussing the US alliance, the 1996 NDPO mentioned the alliance thirteen times (versus only three times in the 1976 NDPO) and only mentioned multilateral security cooperation twice. Echoing Cronin and Green’s recommendation, the 1996 NDPO stated that the US alliance “facilitates Japa­nese . . . ​promotion of regional multilateral security dialogues and cooperation.”45 The Higuchi report was written at a time when Japan was shifting from a predominant fear of abandonment to worrying more about entrapment, although the report still mostly reflected abandonment fears. Watanabe Akio, an influential scholar and member of the Higuchi panel, claims its report reflected greater concern about US abandonment,46 a line of thinking echoing that presented in Miyamoto Yuji’s 1993 Gaikō Forum article (see Chapter 6). The panel worried that as a result of bilateral trade tensions, the Clinton administration was reevaluating its commitment to the alliance.47 Watanabe insists, “­There was no significance to the fact the report discussed multilateral security before the US-­Japan alliance.”48 However, he argues t­ here was a belief that the US-­Japan alliance had to be “redefined” to also become “an essential tool of cooperative security” to deal with nontraditional threats, “such as ethnic conflicts, spread of weapons of mass destruction ­etc,”49 a view that suggests a need to build closer cooperation between the alliance and multilateral cooperative security frameworks such as the ARF. Nonetheless, Watanabe identifies regional security multilateralism’s first role as “confidence building.”50



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Watanabe claims the Higuchi report pushed the US to abandon its focus on trade frictions and refocus on redefining the security treaty.51 This, in turn, prompted Japan to shift from focusing on abandonment to focusing on the danger of entrapment. According to Watanabe, the 1996 NDPO was designed to act as a brake on becoming entrapped in US conflicts not in Japan’s interest.52 Growing concerns about entrapment ­were reflected in some prominent LDP politicians’ calls for the gradual withdrawal of US presence from Japan.53 During the May–­June 1994 crisis over North K ­ orea’s development of nuclear weapons, Japan was reluctant to strongly support the US and potentially get entrapped in a military conflict. Japan was also interested in pursuing new ave­nues for diplomatic in­de­pen­dence, as became clear two years ­later with the Hashimoto Doctrine.

The PMC Versus the ARF During the first two years ­after the launch of the ARF, a key issue for Japan, and more generally for ASEAN and its PMC dialogue partners, was ­whether the PMC would continue the function it acquired from July 1992—­namely, that of a like-­minded multilateral security forum, one that included the non-­Communist ASEAN states and their Western partners but crucially did not include China and Rus­sia.54 This was exactly what the Nakayama proposal of July 1991 had been intended to create, a forum where all members shared the same ideology and even po­liti­cal system. Given Japan’s objections to including China and Rus­sia ­until the final negotiations to create the ARF, it is not surprising that Japan was e­ ager to see the PMC maintain its like-­ minded security forum function. A top official in MOFA’s Security Policy Division told me in early 1995, “My private feeling is that the PMC should continue to discuss security m ­ atters also, even though it may make the pro­cess duplicated. . . . ​Still the PMC is a like-­minded countries gathering, so we should better make use of this as much as pos­si­ble.” He also noted that one significant feature of the PMC security dialogue in 1994 was evaluating the first ARF meeting. Not surprisingly, this official asserted, “The prob­lem of [including] China and Rus­sia involved the ASEAN Regional Forum, not the PMC, ­because, nobody now wants to discuss any possibility of involving China and Rus­sia into the PMC itself.” Looking ahead, this official argued, “If we see some smooth development of the ARF system in the f­uture, t­here might be another opinion, another position. So far, I think we’d better continue to have PMC security talks.”55 A se­nior official from the Regional Policy Division of the Asia Bureau concurred, telling me that the status quo of the PMC and ARF should be maintained at least for a few years.56 Although the se­nior official from the Security Policy Division added that Japan’s “basic position” about PMC membership decisions was that it “depends on the decisions of ASEAN first, b­ ecause this is ­really an organ­ization which was created by ASEAN,”57 in fact, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, in internal MOFA documents

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related to the Nakayama proposal and in follow-up proposals, Japa­nese diplomats expressed confidence in the consensual rule that adding new PMC members required the agreement of all existing members, thereby giving Tokyo an effective veto over the entry of China and Rus­sia into that body. Similarly, a leading Japa­nese defense intellectual outside MOFA who had participated as a scholar in some of the meetings that eventually led to the creation of the ARF told me, “I think Gaimusho [MOFA] sees the PMC as insurance against the failure of the ARF. Gaimusho ­doesn’t trust the ARF as much as the PMC. If dialogues with Rus­sia and China break down, they can go back to the PMC.” Arguing that “the PMC is supposed to function as a like-­minded security forum,” this intellectual noted that it could step in if the ARF failed to do its job. As an example, he stated, “I can foresee the PMC dealing with the South China Sea issue if the ARF fails to do so.”58 Nonetheless, ASEAN had de­cided by the August 1995 PMC, less than a year a­ fter my interviews with t­ hese MOFA diplomats in fall 1994 and early 1995, to admit both China and Rus­sia into the PMC beginning in 1996, along with India. This decision thus reflected an ASEAN consensus that overrode Japan’s objections. A leading Japa­ nese defense intellectual told me in August 1996 that China and Rus­sia should have been kept out of the PMC and that the PMC could thereby have stood up to ­these two powers if needed.59 This ASEAN decision deprived Japan, and arguably the US-­aligned dialogue partners, of a like-­minded regional security forum, rendering the PMC’s security dialogue largely redundant with that of the ARF.60 Even more importantly from Japan’s perspective, the decision changed the PMC from essentially a like-­minded to an un-­like-­minded multilateral forum in economics and politics as well, effectively ending the special relationship Japan had nurtured with ASEAN since the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine and since Japan became the first dialogue partner of ASEAN in the PMC in 1978. Although the US, Australia, South ­Korea, and other Western and US allied states had long participated in the PMC, Japan’s unique combination of ­great economic power and ­great interest in the PMC and ASEAN had been the basis for this special relationship and Japan’s influence.61 China’s admission to the PMC marked the end of Japan’s special relationship with ASEAN and meant that Japan would now have to compete with a power that, with a wide spectrum of power capabilities, was already nearly an equal of Japan in terms of its ability to wield influence while matching Japan in terms of interest in ASEAN. ASEAN’s decision to admit China and Rus­sia into the PMC in 1996 thus forced MOFA to confront two pressing questions: First, could it find a way to re-­create a special relationship between ASEAN and Japan that would reprivilege Japan-­ASEAN relations above China-­ASEAN relations? Second, could Japan si­mul­ta­neously reassert an in­de­pen­dent diplomacy and identity in Southeast Asia vis-­à-­vis the US? Th ­ ese questions became a key background for the January 1997 Hashimoto Doctrine.



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The Hashimoto Doctrine Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s visit to Southeast Asia in January 1997 was the first by an LDP prime minister since Miyazawa’s visit four years ­earlier.62 Like Miyazawa, Hashimoto used the occasion to make a high-­level diplomatic initiative that, like Miyazawa’s, was dubbed a “doctrine.” However, the Hashimoto Doctrine proved to be both more ambitious and more controversial than the Miyazawa Doctrine. Hashimoto proposed institutionalizing an annual Japan-­ASEAN summit.63 In a proposal reminiscent of the Nakayama proposal of more than five years e­ arlier, MOFA, in a follow-up elaboration, even suggested establishing an annual se­nior officials’ meeting to prepare for ­these summits.64 Hashimoto also proposed discussing Asia-­Pacific security with ASEAN nations on a bilateral basis, avoiding openly proposing Japan-­ ASEAN talks on security.65 ­Later, however, MOFA, in a low-­key way, elaborated on the Hashimoto Doctrine by proposing that Japan-­ASEAN talks on “regional security,” along with coordination of their responses to the then emerging Asian financial crisis, ­were a priority.66 As Michael Green argues, this was a transparent attempt “to build a more explicit strategic relationship with ASEAN.”67 Yuzawa Takeshi asserts that the Hashimoto Doctrine “envisaged a broader and more profound po­liti­cal and security relationship between Japan and ASEAN beyond mere economic cooperation. The main driving force ­behind the Hashimoto proposal was the desire to counterbalance growing Chinese power in East Asia with ASEAN support.”68 Hashimoto was building on Tokyo’s time-­honored strategy of increasing its diplomatic leverage by building a tight diplomatic co­ali­tion with the ASEAN states. This initiative revealed a desire to increase Japan’s regional influence and to manage, if not balance against, Chinese influence. Green reports that a se­nior Asian Affairs Bureau diplomat recounted that “1996 was a watershed year as officials focused on how to use ASEAN as a ‘balancer’ in the increasingly complex ‘U.S.-­Japan-­China triangle.’ ”69 At the same time, the Hashimoto Doctrine also revealed reduced angst about US abandonment, in sharp contrast to Japan’s preoccupation with abandonment at the time of the Nakayama proposal of five years e­ arlier. It was an in­de­pen­dent initiative that contained no new US role, would create a multilateral forum excluding the US, and came on the heels of ASEM’s creation, which also excluded the US and anticipated the APT, another forum excluding the US. Rather, the Hashimoto Doctrine suggested a desire to avoid entrapment by American policy in Southeast Asia. As Green notes, “when Prime Minister Hashimoto traveled throughout ASEAN in January 1997 to propose broader strategic relations with the region,” “the key for Hashimoto was to maintain a balance between Japan’s alliance with the United States and sympathy for ASEAN’s position.”70 With the new doctrine and forums, but also through policies that differed from Washington’s on Cambodia and Burma, among other issues, Japan

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demonstrated a growing appetite for an in­de­pen­dent diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Sueo Sudo claims that the Hashimoto Doctrine effectively broke a “deadlock” in Japan’s ASEAN policy as a result of “the lingering after-­effects of the East Asian Economic Caucus Debate.”71 Nonetheless, the Hashimoto Doctrine reaffirmed Japan’s core position that the US forward military presence and the US-­Japan alliance ­were crucial for East Asian security. Overall, the Hashimoto Doctrine represented an attempt to reestablish a special relationship with ASEAN, and secondarily between ASEAN and Japan’s Western allies, a relationship that had apparently weakened since 1995 as ASEAN de­cided to expand the membership of the PMC beyond ASEAN members and Western nations for the first time by admitting China, India, and Rus­sia. The Hashimoto Doctrine implicitly asserted a special role for Japan as ASEAN’s closest economic and even po­liti­cal partner. At the same time, it also reaffirmed the special role the US played as the regional provider of military security, even while attempting to establish a security dialogue between Japan and ASEAN. The implicit hierarchy in this vision of regional order was made clear by the definition of China as a country just emerging into international society, one that needed guidance to ensure that this emerging engagement would be constructive.72 The proposal thus attempted to preserve or re-­create a regional hierarchy, with special roles for Japan and the US, while placing China in a semioutsider and ju­nior role. MOFA proclaimed the Hashimoto Doctrine a success based on the ASEAN decision to hold an informal summit meeting with Japan in December of the same year during cele­brations marking the thirtieth anniversary of the association’s founding.73 The real­ity, however, was dif­fer­ent, as ASEAN effectively brushed aside Hashimoto’s attempt to reestablish a special Japan-­ASEAN relationship, reflecting Wanandi’s “omni-­ enmeshment” concept74 of maintaining equidistant relations with all the g­ reat powers.75 As Teo Poh Keng observes, “Japan is not the only big power operating in Southeast Asia. The other powers like China and the US may won­der why Japan should be the only country to have the regular summit with ASEAN and not China or the US.”76

The APT ASEAN moved to broaden Hashimoto’s initiative for an annual ASEAN-­Japan summit into a proposal that would include China and South K ­ orea as well, revealing in the pro­cess, however, that excluding the US was not a concern. ­Because of the relatively low level of US attention to the region, and ­because this summit was not wrapped up in a rhetorical package of pan-­Asianism, as Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s EAEC proposal of eight years ­earlier had been, the US did not object, did not press for an annual summit with ASEAN, and paid ­little attention to this new forum.



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Jeannie Henderson rightly refers to ASEAN’s decision to add China and South ­ orea as a “reinterpretation” of Hashimoto’s proposal.77 As early as February 1997, K Malaysia discussed what was to become the APT summit with other ASEAN members.78 In late March, Mahathir paid an official visit to Japan and during the summit told Hashimoto, “Not only Malaysia, but all of ASEAN welcomes the proposal to hold regular summit meetings with Japan.” However, during a subsequent press conference, Mahathir expanded this idea by suggesting a summit meeting of ASEAN, Japan, China, and South K ­ orea a­ fter the ASEAN summit.79 At an informal AMM on the sidelines of a nonaligned nations meeting in New Delhi in early April, a consensus was reached in ­favor of this idea.80 In mid-­May 1997 Malaysian foreign minister Abdullah Badawi visited Japan, and during a meeting with Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko he reported that ASEAN members had by consensus agreed to Hashimoto’s proposal for holding annual summits with Japan. He added that this consensus extended beyond Japan to embrace institutionalizing an annual summit dialogue not only with Japan but also with China and South ­Korea. Ikeda, in response, indicated his basic agreement. In late May a special AMM was convened, followed by an official meeting that included the foreign ministers of Japan, China, and South K ­ orea, where the final decision was reached to establish the APT.81 Although the APT, with a regular Japan-­ASEAN summit as one part, undoubtedly served Japan’s national interest,82 it also represented a polite and creative ASEAN rejection of Japan’s bid to reestablish a special ASEAN-­Japan relationship. As Green notes, “Though not exactly what Tokyo had in mind, Japan nevertheless joined the first official ASEAN Plus Three meeting in late 1997.”83 While many observers argued that ASEAN was mostly concerned about China’s reaction,84 a more accurate conclusion would be that ASEAN was no longer interested in having a special relationship with Japan that was closer than its relationship with China. Again, we can see ASEAN’s omni-­enmeshment logic at work, as Japan sought to involve all the g­ reat powers and their multilateral structures in a relatively equidistant fashion. Indeed, by 2010, ASEAN members had long been leery about having anything other than a largely equidistant relationship with the ­great powers. According to a se­ nior Philippine foreign policy intellectual, ASEAN wants “an equidistant relationship with all the big powers” and “ASEAN ­doesn’t want to get involved with initiatives that come from the outside, ­unless ­there is a good reason for it.” Nonetheless, this longtime observer acknowledged that during the Cold War, ASEAN was “tilted t­ oward the West” and Japan, and the observer characterized the relationship between Japan and ASEAN as “very very good” at the beginning of the 1990s ­because of Japa­nese aid and investment, and b­ ecause ­there was “a compatibility between the ASEAN concept of security and Japan’s concept of security.” However, with the “decline of Japan” and the rise of China, this had changed by the mid-1990s. “The rise of China

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has provided an alternative source of economic benefits, including trade, but not aid. Japan is still impor­tant ­there.” Noting that “ASEAN is an opportunistic actor,” this expert questioned why it would want to partner with a “Japan on the decline . . . ​ when one has two substantive relations with two o­ thers, and t­ hese two ­others are rising.”85 A Singapore-­based analyst was even blunter, arguing that by 1997–98, “Japan was already being dismissed as helpless and hopeless.”86 Thus, ASEAN transformed the Hashimoto Doctrine by inviting China and South ­Korea to join an annual summit with ASEAN and Japa­nese leaders, giving birth to the annual APT summit. The membership of this multilateral body was especially significant, ­because it exactly matched the proposed membership of the EAEC. This made the exclusion of the US, the only major Asia-­Pacific power (­unless one counts Rus­sia) not to be included in the APT, even more glaring.87 Japan’s willingness to embrace a forum with this membership stands in sharp contrast with its opposition to EAEC in the early 1990s, and with its earlier aversion to promoting any multilateral forum that might potentially alienate the US. This suggests that Japan’s fear of abandonment and its motivation to use multilateralism as a method for keeping the US militarily engaged in East Asia had clearly declined. It indicates that other priorities, such as competing with China for influence in ASEAN, had become more impor­tant. On the other hand, Japan’s ac­cep­tance of the APT summit framework might also suggest an emerging motivation to create a multilateral framework for dialogue, if not policy coordination, with its principal East Asian partners absent the United States. The trilateral summit involving China and South ­Korea that preceded the APT suggested a similar motivation concerning Northeast Asia (see the discussion l­ater in this chapter). Even before the launch of the APT, another multilateral diplomatic initiative suggested Japan’s growing interest in developing multilateral po­liti­cal, if not security, venues that did not include the US. This initiative stemmed from the EU’s concerns about being “slow in cultivating the necessary relations with a rapidly developing Asia.” Promulgated in July 1994, the Eu­ro­pean Commission’s “New Asian Strategy,” building on the concern that Eu­rope was being left b­ ehind in forming ties to an increasingly dynamic Asia, made several proposals for strengthening relations. This strategy was discussed at the EU-­ASEAN ministerial meeting held in September 1994 in Karlsruhe.88 Responding to Eu­ro­pean overtures, Singaporean prime minister Goh Chok Tong called for “Eu­rope and East Asia to engage in a dialogue at the highest level to forge the third link in the tripolar world.”89 ­After additional advocacy by Goh, the SOM meeting, held on March 18, 1995, endorsed the ASEM proposal and de­cided to hold the first summit during the first half of 1996 in Bangkok.90 Although Japan lobbied to include Australia and New Zealand, it did not try to include the US. Moreover, it bowed to opposition from Malaysia, which insisted that Australia and New Zealand “do not share our Asian values.”91 At the end of



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February 1996, heads of governments from Asian members of ASEM held a pre-­ ASEM meeting, marking, as Akihiko Tanaka claims, “the first meeting of the heads of government in East Asia,” at least since the war­time Greater East Asia C ­ o-­prosperity 92 Sphere. ASEM thus brought together Asian and Eu­ro­pean countries in a diplomatic forum that excludes the US. Strikingly, the Asian membership exactly reproduced the membership of Mahathir’s rejected EAEC, with the Asian and Eu­ro­pean sides meeting in two separate groups before the twenty-­six Asian and Eu­ro­pean countries met together as a group. As a result of the ASEM pro­cess, the leaders whom Malaysia had tried to gather for the EAEC met for the first time in history, although the term EAEC was not used and ASEM had a broader agenda than economics, including cultural, social, political, and security issues.93 Although Japan did not take the initiative in this case, its willingness to accept this formula again suggests at the very least that it no longer feared that po­liti­cal multilateralism excluding the US could provoke an American military withdrawal from Asia.94 At most, Japan’s enthusiastic support for ASEM suggests a willingness to explore regional po­liti­cal, if not security, multilateralism sans US participation.

Japan’s AMF Proposal Japan’s new willingness to explore regional po­liti­cal multilateralism in­de­pen­dently, absent the US, in 1996–97, as indicated by the Hashimoto Doctrine, and its willingness to join both ASEM and the APT, two bodies that excluded the US and reproduced the membership of the EAEC, which Washington had strongly opposed, emerged as Japan was preparing for a major political-­economic initiative that challenged American leadership more directly than any Japa­nese proposal in the postwar era. During the summer of 1997, with the Asian financial crisis just beginning to break out in Thailand, Japa­nese officials from the Ministry of Finance proposed the creation of an AMF. The proposal consisted of a $100 billion fund that would provide emergency liquidity for Asian economies facing balance-­of-­payment prob­lems. The AMF would administer this fund without necessarily being constrained by International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality on the recipient states. Japan’s Ministry of Finance believed that IMF conditionality was often too harsh and implemented without regard for national differences, thereby hindering efforts to effectively address the Asian financial crisis. As a se­nior foreign policy intellectual from the Philippines put it, “ASEAN together with Northeast Asians felt that global institutions dominated by the West and the US ­were not able to address the financial crisis.”95 The effect of the AMF proposal would be to reduce the ability of the US-­dominated IMF to influence the economic policies of Asian nations, at least in time of crisis.96 Japan began pushing the proposal by discussing it at first with ASEAN states only, again

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using ASEAN as a platform for building a regional consensus. A ­ fter winning their support, Finance Minister Miyazawa officially introduced the idea during a World Bank–­IMF meeting in Hong Kong in September 1997. ­Because the AMF would effectively reduce American influence over Asian finance and economics and, in the words of US officials, divide the region right down the Pacific, leaving the US as an outlier,97 Washington vigorously opposed Japan’s initiative. The US was also motivated by a desire to see the IMF continue to push its ideas and free-­market ideology to nations in the Asia-­Pacific region. To defeat a perceived challenge to American leadership, then–­deputy Trea­sury secretary Lawrence Summers went so far as to raise the threatening specter of regional domination by a Japan not unlike the militarist Japan of the past. According to Summers, without continued American leadership, East Asia would again experience “a descent into the kind of regionalism and protectionism that we saw in the periods between the first and second world wars,” a transparent reference to Japan’s pre-1945 militarism.98 Using the fear of renewed Japa­nese domination, the US successfully mobilized Chinese opposition to the AMF proposal, ensuring its defeat. In the wake of this defeat, Tokyo remained surprisingly undeterred. However, it repackaged its proposal, dropping the idea of establishing an institutionalized AMF, scaling back the size of the proposed fund, and pursuing it in a more low-­key fashion. Japan’s per­sis­tence paid off, as Tokyo eventually achieved some of the goals ­behind the AMF. The “New Miyazawa Initiative” of October 1998 won regional support. ­Under a program entitled the New Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis, Japan pledged $30 billion to finance short-­and long-­term capital needs in East Asia. The long-­term capital fund, the Resource Mobilization Plan for Asia, was established in May 1999, and the short-­term fund, the New Miyazawa Initiative Short-­Term Financing Fa­cil­i­ty, was established in July 1999.99 ­These funds w ­ ere used to recapitalize ailing banks and corporations in recipient countries, strengthening them against hostile takeovers. The New Miyazawa Initiative loan fa­cil­i­ty offered softer conditionality than IMF funds and entirely avoided corporate governance and market opening conditionality.100 Indeed, Japa­nese leaders openly claimed that Miyazawa funds would be disbursed before IMF funds, arguing that “harsh conditionality” produces protracted negotiations, thereby ensuring that IMF funding is too late to head off a crisis.101 In 1998–99, a number of Asian states received funding from the New Miyazawa Initiative (Indonesia, $2.4 billion; K ­ orea, $5 billion; Malaysia, $2.2 billion; the Philippines, $1.6 billion; and Thailand, $1.9 billion). Japan also issued up to $22.5 billion in export credits to promote intraregional exports, thereby helping to sustain its regional production networks.102 New Miyazawa Initiative and other crisis-­related assistance from Japan eventually totaled $80 billion.103



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Japa­nese funding for recapitalizing troubled Asian companies helped Asian nations resist US and IMF pressure. For example, Japa­nese funding prob­ably contributed to what Summers claimed was Indonesian “foot-­dragging” over liquidating failed companies.104 Malaysia was a primary, and indeed the first, beneficiary of Japa­nese funding. Tokyo generously assisted Kuala Lumpur despite the latter’s open challenge to the US and the IMF by imposing capital controls. Japan started pumping funds into Malaysia almost immediately a­ fter Kuala Lumpur imposed t­ hese controls, despite Washington’s opposition.105 The use of New Miyazawa funding to help Malaysia is also the clearest example of delinkage from IMF conditionality. The eventual success of Malaysia’s capital controls advertised the promise of Japa­nese regional leadership for helping Asian nations reestablish a degree of financial autonomy. In May 2000 Japan took a further step ­toward creating the functions of the AMF with the adoption of the Chiang Mai Initiative. This initiative brought a substantial expansion of existing bilateral currency swap and currency repurchase fa­cil­i­ty agreements. Essentially a system of multiple bilateralisms, the initiative provides de facto regional multilateral funding to help members fight off speculative attacks on national currencies.106 It thus indicates the ways in which the APT helped, in tandem with the New Miyazawa funds, to bring back the AMF, albeit in a quieter and more subtle form. Indeed, the parallels with the EAEC and its supposed quiet resurrection through the APT and ASEM are striking. As Anthony L. Smith notes, Japan and ASEAN “revived the idea of the AMF with the creation of ” the APT.107 Similarly, former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas called for the APT to create an AMF and stated that “the APT’s main achievement to date is the Chiang Mai Initiative of May 2000.”108 Although clearly outside Japan’s promotion of regional security multilateralism, which is focus of this book, or even its promotion of regional po­liti­cal multilateralism, its promotion of the AMF, and its subsequent and quiet resurrection of key features of the AMF ­after the proposal had been defeated, provides impor­tant side evidence that sheds light on Japan’s promotion of regional security multilateralism. First, its promotion of the AMF even in the face of US opposition reveals less Japa­nese concern about US abandonment during this period, and even reduced concern about the kind of negative reaction that Washington had to the EAEC in the early 1990s. Second, the AMF case reveals greater Japa­nese fear of entrapment in US policies, albeit in this case US political-­economic policies. Third, it reveals a greater willingness to stand up to the US and an appetite for in­de­pen­dent regional policies. Fi­nally, the AMF case reveals Japan’s growing confidence as a result of confidence building, specifically the belief that at least among ASEAN states, Japan’s reputational prob­lem stemming from history was being supplanted by growing confidence in Japan’s disposition, a confidence that created greater space for Japan to assume regional leadership, at least over economic issues. However, that confidence did not

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reflect the real­ity of Northeast Asia, where Japan still suffered from a significant reputational prob­lem. Japan’s promotion of po­liti­cal and even security multilateralism in Northeast Asia represented an attempt to reassure its neighbors and build confidence ­there as well.

A Northeast Asian Security Forum Northeast Asian nations, especially ­Korea and Japan, have at times seen the ARF as being too Southeast Asia focused and have striven to establish a Northeast Asian dialogue.109 In July 1990 Canada proposed a track-­two North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue that would include participants from Canada, China, Japan, Mongolia, North ­Korea, South ­Korea, Rus­sia, and the US. From April 1991 to March 1993, seven North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue conferences and workshops ­were held, covering regional CBMs, nontraditional security issues, and the role of culture and history in regional cooperative security. Canadian funding for this dialogue ended in March 1993.110 Following up on the dialogue, the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, San Diego, u­ nder the leadership of the institute’s director, Professor Susan Shirk, held a planning meeting in July 1993 to establish a track-­ two Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) with the same membership as the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, except for Canada and Mongolia, which ­were excluded. The first NEACD meeting was held in October 1993 in La Jolla, California. North ­Korea participated in the planning meeting and the first dialogue meeting in La Jolla but did not attend subsequent sessions.111 The second NEACD was held in May 1994 at the Shinjuku Keio Plaza H ­ otel in Tokyo. The National Institute for Research Advancement was the local sponsor, and I, then a part-­time editorial assistant at the institute, served as the conference rapporteur. During the dialogue, Nogami Yoshiji, deputy director of the Foreign Policy Bureau in MOFA, presented Japan’s then-­current concept of MRMs, a broader and less militarily focused concept that Japan considered more appropriate than CBMs for the Asia-­Pacific and Northeast Asia, a position originally developed by Satoh (see Chapter 3). Based largely on the strength of Nogami’s pre­sen­ta­tion, the meeting de­cided to establish a study group on MRMs.112 The NEACD was a forum where countries could and did frankly express their concerns about the policies of o­ thers. Thus, South K ­ orea expressed its concern about Japan’s post–­Cold War decision to move a significant portion of the Ground Self-­ Defense Force troops stationed in Hokkaido during the Cold War south to Kyushu, and consequently closer to South ­Korea as well as to China. Similarly, Japan and South ­Korea expressed concerns about the drawdown of US forces in the Asia-­Pacific. In response, an American diplomat claimed that the Clinton administration was actually



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strengthening the US military presence in the Asia-­Pacific. ­After the George H. W. Bush administration’s drawdowns and the removal of US bases from the Philippines, the US military presence in the western Pacific was essentially stable, while US military strength on the West Coast of the US was being built up as US troops ­were withdrawn from Germany.113 Although ostensibly a track 2 dialogue, in real­ity the NEACD was thus a track 1.5 dialogue with diplomats and even defense officials pre­sent and effectively representing their governments’ positions, even though they w ­ ere in theory participating in their private capacities. Th ­ ere was also discussion about raising this dialogue to track 1 level so that it would become an official intergovernmental dialogue. However, China objected to ­doing so before North ­Korea agreed to join, and a consensus emerged not to raise this dialogue to track 1 ­until North ­Korea de­cided to join.114 Subsequent NEASCD meetings w ­ ere held in Moscow in April 1995, Beijing in January 1996, New York in April 1997, and again in Tokyo in December 1997.115 The second NEASCD, in May 1994, agreed to establish a standing group on MRMs,116 a development that paralleled the ARF’s establishment of the ISG on CBMs the following year, although again the use of the term mutual reassurance mea­sure reflected Japan’s preference for this concept over that of CBMs. At the fourth ARF meeting, in 1997, Japa­nese foreign minister Ikeda proposed transforming the NEACD into a track-­one forum. He envisaged that this forum would supplement the work of the ARF in Northeast Asia. Ikeda’s proposal received scant attention from other ARF participants, with the partial exception of South ­Korea, which floated its own proposal. China did not support either proposal ­because of North ­Korea’s refusal to participate in NEACD.117 A Northeast Asian multilateral dialogue, ­after several failed starts and proposals,118 fi­nally began to gain traction b­ ecause of the APT, which linked ASEAN with the three Northeast Asian states (minus North ­Korea). Then–­prime minister Obuchi Keizō “surprised every­body” by proposing a breakfast meeting of China, South ­Korea, and Japan at the third APT summit in 1999 in Manila. Beginning in 2000, summit meetings of the three became a regular feature on the sidelines of the APT.119 Obuchi’s initiative and Japan’s follow-on support for the development of Northeast Asian po­liti­cal multilateralism reflected Tokyo’s greater willingness by the turn of the c­ entury to pursue an in­de­pen­dent strategy of promoting regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism relatively unencumbered by fears of American abandonment. This set the stage for the development of Northeast Asian tripartite multilateralism ­after the turn of the ­century, as discussed in the next chapter.

8

Japan and Widening Regional Security Multilateralism

Japan: Still Interested? By the turn of the c­ entury, according to some, Japan’s ebullient enthusiasm for the ARF had waned.1 Nonetheless, this chapter argues that this supposed ebbing revealed not an under­lying lack of interest but rather a quiet, patient, and long-­term interest in the ARF as a useful means to achieve three goals. First, the ARF and similar multilateral security structures remained useful for reassuring ­others with lingering suspicions of Japan’s disposition as a military power. Second, t­ hese regional multilateral structures w ­ ere a valuable means for mitigating Tokyo’s alliance security dilemma of entrapment versus abandonment vis-­à-­vis the US. They helped to keep the US engaged in regional security, prompting US security elites to visit the region regularly for multilateral security meetings. Fi­nally, the ARF and other regional multilateral security structures ­were useful for promoting several new security utilities derived from common security, most notably HaDR and counterpiracy. Another utility they provided was CBMs, useful for reducing the chance of accidental conflict through misperception, the essence of common security. Such mea­sures included defense white paper transparency, a mea­sure Japan championed; security dialogue; and joint military exercises (often related to HaDR). For t­hese reasons, Japan continued to support and champion regional security multilateralism. As Togo Kazuhiko observes, “Japan has not taken a notable leadership role, but continued to be a stable supporter” of multilateralism in the ARF and Northeast Asia.2 As this chapter shows, Japan has indeed been a consistent supporter, and at times it has even exercised leadership in championing regional security multilateralism, usually through ASEAN.



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Some optimistically continued to see the ARF as potentially helping to create a broader security community based on common norms in the very long term.3 Even in the most pessimistic realist assessment, the ARF and other ASEAN-­based forums remained an impor­tant arena for po­liti­cal competition with China, a place to build ad hoc and quiet co­ali­tions to counterbalance Beijing and prevent it from building co­ali­tions with ASEAN. In this sense, rather than saying that Japan lost interest in the ARF, it would be more accurate to observe that Japan came to realize that it could not necessarily always hold the diplomatic initiative or offensive in the ARF against a reactive and reluctant China. Rather, Japan realized that it might sometimes find itself on the defensive in the ARF and other multilateral security forums as ASEAN and Chinese interests w ­ ere sometimes closer, and China seized the initiative. Even when on the defensive, however, Japan could not allow its level of engagement or interest in the ARF to wane, for to do so would risk isolation and a growth of Chinese influence. In other words, regional security multilateralism, beginning with the ARF, was impor­tant for Japan not only as a forum for making gains but also as a forum for avoiding losses. Despite claims about Japan losing interest in regional security multilateralism in general, and the ARF in par­tic­u­lar, a statement of Japan’s policy circulated in an internal MOFA document in May 2001 clearly stated that while the US alliance and US military presence ­were central for Japa­nese and East Asian security and stability, this was “complemented” by multilateral security dialogues and cooperation like the ARF that ­were useful for building confidence with ­every country.4 More generally, the three functions that the ARF served for Japan’s security policy, as identified by a leading Japa­nese security intellectual in spring 1995, still appeared to be valid: First, it provides us with a good opportunity to explain our defense policy to other Asian countries and to further increase the transparency of our military. It also gives us a forum for promotion regional transparency, we are a leader in this area. Second, it provides us with an opportunity to meet Rus­sia and China in a larger regional framework—­which has advantages over a bilateral security dialogue. For example, it is easier for us to talk with China about the South China Sea in a multilateral framework than in a bilateral one. In a bilateral framework, the Chinese say that the South China Sea is none of Japan’s business. Third, the ARF is a means to help keep the US in this region.5

At the same time, Japan’s interest in promoting regional security multilateralism reflects a dynamic evident in the previous chapter: a desire not only to exert leadership but also to foster regional institutions. Sheila Smith points to “the continued resonance in the Asia-­Pacific of the notion of regional institutions crafted and led by the countries of Asia. This vision has deep historical roots, and ­there continues to be a strong desire for regional institutions that reflect regional aspirations. . . . ​The

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aim of creating a multilateral institution designed by Asian states and responsive to Asia’s needs, was a goal that was widely embraced by the countries of the region.” 6 This regional consensus includes Japan to a significant extent, meaning that even as it continues and even reaffirms the US-­Japan alliance, Japan feels compelled to continue promoting regional security multilateralism as a complement. At the same time, Japan, despite its previously “special relationship with ASEAN, found competing with China for influence in the ARF to be challenging. In many re­ spects ASEAN and China w ­ ere united by common norms as embodied in the ASEAN Way, norms that set them apart from the US and Eu­rope, and to a lesser degree from Japan. Chief among t­ hese w ­ ere noninterference in the domestic affairs of o­ thers, an appreciation of avoiding loss of face in conflict resolution,7 and a go-­slow approach to any preventive diplomacy mechanisms that might impinge on state sovereignty. Writing in 2004, Thai journalist and commentator Kavi Chongkittavorn observed that China’s security multilateralism “is anchored with ASEAN’s conservative global security outlook. For the time being, China and ASEAN identify with one another at the ARF.” For example, both “want the ARF to proceed at a snail’s pace—­a long-­term security insurance of sorts—­and stick to the confidence-­building mea­sures for the time being.” Thus, “within Asia, China ­will maintain strategic edge over other powers ­because it has the trust of ASEAN.”8 Strikingly, Malaysian po­liti­cal elites, including Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, ­were skeptical about a Chinese threat and appeared more concern about a US threat that “imposes t­hings on ­others,” including values.9 Chongkittavorn stated, “At this juncture, nobody knows if the China-­ASEAN convergence of strategic interests can be sustained over time.”10 With renewed tensions with China over the South China Sea, by 2010 ASEAN began looking to the US and Japan for support. Nonetheless, as long as ASEAN continues to share a base of common norms with Beijing, the China-­ASEAN relationship ­will likely prove robust in the face of periodic tensions, necessitating that Japan work harder to compete with China for influence within ASEAN-­sponsored institutions such as the ARF and the PMC.

The APT, an East Asian Community, and the EAS’s Emergence Although the APT was not a result of the Asian financial crisis per se, the crisis accelerated its development. An APT Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and SOM ­were quickly established, with an APT Directors-­General Meeting institutionalized from 2002.11 Po­liti­cal issues w ­ ere on the agenda from day one, although economic and financial cooperation dominated in the beginning. As the Asian financial crisis gradually abated, po­liti­cal and security issues became more prominent. At the fourth APT in 2000, Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō proposed beginning a “comprehensive” dialogue and cooperation regarding po­liti­cal and security issues.12 Although security was thus



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formally added to the agenda, not much happened at the APT during the following eigh­teen years regarding security. Moreover, a pos­si­ble division of ­labor between the ARF and APT remained unspecified. Within ASEAN itself, Japan, especially former vice foreign minister Owada Hisashi, played a major role in ASEAN’s Vision 2020, which was parallel to the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG). According to one participant in Vision 2020, “Owada played a very critical role, ­because he partnered with ASEAN-­ISIS to draft specific recommendations on how to help implement the plan of action.”13 Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, in a January 2002 speech in Singapore, endorsed the creation of an East Asian Community in the ­future, one “founded upon the Japan-­ASEAN relationship.”14 As early as 2000, the APT summit itself had discussed the possibility of transforming the APT into an EAS. The APT de­cided to set up an East Asia Study Group (EASG) of government officials to “explore practical ways and means to deepen and expand the existing cooperation” in the APT, “explore the implications of an East Asian Summit,” and assess the EAVG’s recommendations.15 At the 2002 APT summit, the EASG favorably evaluated the EAVG report. Tanaka Akihiko notes that the EASG report “was the first substantive government-­level policy agreement reached within the ASEAN+3 pro­cess.”16 The EASG called for seventeen of the EAVG’s recommendations to be implemented in the short term but called for a further nine recommendations to be studied further for pos­si­ble implementation in the medium to long term. The EAS idea was deemed to be a desirable long-­term objective that should be part of an “evolutionary step-­by-­step pro­cess,” a conclusion that Japan played a large role in crafting, as the EAVG gave Japan and Singapore joint responsibility for drafting the EAVG’s position on an EAS.17 The EAS thus remained tabled ­until 2004, when ASEAN’s interest renewed in the run-up to the Eighth APT Summit in November. ASEAN had been encouraging other East Asian nations to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. China became the first to sign in 2003, but it was quickly followed by India. Japan did not sign ­until 2004, and ­there was apparently some puzzlement on ASEAN’s part about why it took Japan so long. Concern about not contradicting the US-­Japan alliance was apparently a major reason. L ­ ater, ASEAN set signing the treaty as a condition for participating in the EAS.18 MOFA circulated “issue papers” in June 2004 that raised questions about how to differentiate between the APT summit and an EAS, especially while maintaining ASEAN centrality, and implied that more time was needed to work out what an EAS would be. Nonetheless, at the November 2004 APT summit, ASEAN ultimately de­ cided to establish the first EAS in 2005, reflecting a strong push from Malaysia. Japan was reluctant, but it eventually went along with ASEAN’s decision. Strikingly, China was initially not pleased ­either.19

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However, in early 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi, in his policy speech to the Diet, gave Tokyo’s strongest statement of support for the East Asian Community (EAC), declaring that Japan would “play an active role in the creation” of one, although he placed this in a trade liberalization context.20 In April 2005 Sino-­Japanese tensions ­rose with large anti-­Japanese demonstrations in China, “dooming Japan-­China cooperation” on such a community.21 Tokyo pushed to expand the membership of the EAS to include Australia, India, and New Zealand, establishing it as separate from the APT summit. Tokyo persuaded the ASEAN states, and t­ hese three nations ­were issued invitations to join the EAS ­after the Sixth APT Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, in late July 2005. China responded by elevating the APT as the primary vehicle for promoting an East Asia community.22 The communiqués from the EAS and APT summits in Malaysia in December 2005 emphasized that the APT would “continue to be the main vehicle in achieving” an East Asian Community, while the EAS “could play a significant role in community building in this region.”23 A Philippine foreign policy intellectual saw a distinction between the two forums: EAS was intended to be for “strategic dialogue,” and for such a dialogue it was necessary to involve participants beyond Northeast and Southeast Asia.24 Fulfilling the EAVG’s vision,25 the EAS launched an annual foreign ministers’ meeting in 2010 that offered an additional venue for regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism.26 Even as Japan shifted from 2005 to greater wariness about regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism that might enhance China’s regional dominance, it nonetheless continued to champion regional multilateralism that it believed could help check China’s power as well as allow Japan to defend its regional-­security interests without acting unilaterally and without being simply dependent on the US. Even u ­ nder hawkish Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, Japan continued promoting ASEAN’s centrality in regional multilateral institution building. Speaking in Indonesia in August 2007, near the end of his first stint as prime minister, Abe argued, “It ­will be critical that ASEAN continue to sit in the driver’s seat in the East Asia Summit and other regional cooperation frameworks that are expanding and overlapping, being both the hub and the driving force of East Asian cooperation.” Abe further pledged that “Japan w ­ ill continue to be unsparing in providing help” to maintain ASEAN’s centrality in the EAS and other frameworks.27 Thus, rather than turning away from ASEAN-­centric regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism, Japan continued promoting it as a complement to the US-­Japan alliance. Tokyo ultimately helped persuade ASEAN to invite the US to join the EAS in 2010 and helped persuade the US to accept the invitation. Japan did, however, turn away from an East Asian APT focus and increasingly t­oward a broad Asia-­Pacific,



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and even Indo-­Pacific, definition of the region, a definition that was better captured by the EAS and the ARF.

Northeast Asian Multilateralism Despite Japan’s turn away from the APT-­based multilateralism, the APT played a crucial role in jump-­starting Northeast Asian multilateralism. With summit meetings among China, Japan, and South ­Korea a regular feature on the sidelines of the APT meetings from 1999, tripartite governmental cooperation began in 2002. On the sidelines of the Bali APT meeting in October 2003, the three issued a “Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation,” which Togo identifies as “the first agreement among just ­those three countries.” He further asserts that the agreement’s “focus only on future-­oriented relations without reference to history was amazing.”28 The declaration explic­itly called for po­liti­cal and security cooperation: “The three countries ­will strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation among the defense or military personnel of the three countries,” with an exchange of views and strengthened cooperation to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthen export controls.29 Following the Bali Declaration, multilateral cooperation among the NEA 3 in a variety of areas developed rapidly. The first NEA 3 trilateral summit not tethered to the APT was launched in Dazaifu, Japan, in 2008. While this was established as an annual summit mechanism apart from the APT, po­liti­cal conflicts, generally over historical memory pitting China and South ­Korea against Japan but also including a dispute between Seoul and Beijing over the former’s deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in 2016–17, have often disrupted summitry.30 In the first de­cade of NEA 3 summitry, seven summits ­were held (not including one on the sidelines of the APT summit in Hanoi in October 2010), with the longest gaps coming between 2012 and 2015, and between 2015 and 2018, but APT summits occurred even when NEA 3 summits did not.31 At the 2009 trilateral summit, the NEA 3 de­cided to establish the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat and base it in Seoul.32 Despite po­liti­cal differences, cooperation has grown rapidly, even po­liti­cal and security cooperation, although most of it in nontraditional security areas. In the first ten years of the NEA 3, seven foreign ministers’ meetings w ­ ere held, along with more than a dozen ministerial, SOM, director general, and working-­level meetings on disaster management and relief (including a tabletop exercise), nuclear safety, cyber security, counterterrorism, and police cooperation. Since 2013 the NEA 3 has held an annual Joint Emergency Drill to prepare for nuclear accidents. Since 2016 it has initiated an annual SOM on Arctic policy and has held director general meetings to

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coordinate policy on Latin Amer­i­ca and Africa, while foreign ministers have exchanged views on regional po­liti­cal and security developments.33 Despite Japan’s turn away from APT cooperation in 2005, NEA 3 cooperation has experienced remarkable growth since it was first launched in 2008. Although they face frequent disruption resulting from po­liti­cal disputes, even trilateral summits “offer a diplomatic option that avoids diplomatic sensitivities and circumvents many of the nationalistic domestic pressures thwarting more robust po­liti­cal relations.”34 Japan has shown a willingness to promote and sustain regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism in a forum that excludes the US but includes China, a geopo­liti­cal rival of both the US and Japan.

­Toward a Regional Defense Ministers’ Dialogue While Japan continued to support and often take relatively low-­key initiatives within the ARF itself, it also continued to take multilateral security initiatives outside the ARF, especially as regards counterpiracy, creating a defense ministers’ dialogue and a regional maritime forum. In June 2002 Japa­nese defense minister Nakatani Gen proposed creating an annual intergovernmental-­level Asia-­Pacific defense ministers’ forum. A new framework was needed, Nakatani claimed, ­because the participation of defense officials in the ARF is “­limited.” Nakatani envisioned this forum, starting with dialogue and an exchange of information, ­and then expanding to include “concrete cooperation” on peacekeeping, maritime safety, large-­scale disaster relief, and policies for countering terrorism, piracy, and drug trafficking.35 Togo claims this was “a proposal from Japan that had not been heard since Nakayama’s ill-­fated initiative in 1991.”36 Unlike the Nakayama proposal, however, the Nakatani proposal did not propose an ASEAN venue for this dialogue. This difference reflected ASEAN’s by then well-­known reluctance to have a non-­ASEAN country propose an entirely new ASEAN-­sponsored body, and perhaps a desire to create a non-­ASEAN forum that would be less centered on Southeast Asia. Nakatani’s proposal was thus a departure from MOFA’s long-­standing support for ASEAN-­centric regional security multilateralism, and it did not produce any tangible results. Nakatani made his proposal at the first meeting of the so-­called Shangri-­La Dialogue in 2002, an unofficial defense officials dialogue sponsored by the IISS.37 Nakatani was thus implicitly arguing that this dialogue, b­ ecause it was not an official track-­one dialogue, and hence unable to conclude binding agreements or even nonbinding joint policy statements among participating countries, was inadequate. When the Shangri-­La Dialogue was started, it was, according to Chongkittavorn, “touted as the ‘the real’ regional forum” that could replace the ARF. However, sponsored as it was by Britain’s IISS, and reflecting therefore “a preponderance of Western-­led security think-­tanks” and their perceived hostility t­ oward “China’s strategic outlook,”



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this was never a realistic possibility.38 Moreover, given the regional desire discussed ­earlier for Asian institutions built by Asians, Shangri-­La tended to be seen by many, including in Japan, as an extraregional import. As Sheila Smith notes, “The aim of creating a multilateral institution designed by Asian states and responsive to Asia’s needs” has been “a goal widely embraced by the countries of the region”39 and is reflected in the EAVG and EASG reports. China was thus also motivated to propose a better venue. It de­cided to try to return the locus of defense ministry–­centric dialogue to the ARF framework, and at the June 2003 ARF meeting it proposed establishing the ARF Se­nior Policy Conference (ASPC), a regular conference composed of se­nior defense policy officials at the permanent secretary level and uniformed military personnel.40 The ASPC would thus essentially parallel the ARF SOM, which is composed of se­nior policy officials from foreign ministries. ARF members, “especially the US,” supported China’s initiative “right away.”41 The first meeting was held in November 2004 in Beijing, a­ fter which meetings ­were held back-­to-­back with the ARF SOM.42 However, the ARF ASPC fell short of a regional defense ministers’ dialogue since it was held at the se­nior officials’ level. Nonetheless, China’s initiative in proposing the ASPC was seen as marking a major departure for it, demonstrating a new activism and making the country a significant architect of regional security multilateralism for the first time. A former head of the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat told me, “I was personally surprised when they proposed [the ASPC] . . . ​that they had that confidence.”43 China was not alone in its dissatisfaction with the Shangri-­La Dialogue, however. Satoh Yukio, one of the primary architects ­behind the Nakayama and Miyazawa proposals, argued in February 2004 that although the ARF had already established the foundations of mutual trust among members, it had a significant weakness ­because it lacked a defense ministers’ dialogue. Like Nakatani, he argued that the Shangri-­La Dialogue, ­because it was not at the intergovernmental level, could not be as effective. Consequently, Satoh urged Japan to again take the initiative, ten years ­after the establishment of the ARF, by proposing the establishment of a defense ministers’ dialogue as an extension of the ARF.44 ­Others shared the concern that the ARF was too centered on national foreign ministries and diplomats, and that defense ministry and uniformed officers, although increasingly involved ­after 1995, and especially a­ fter November 2004, nonetheless continued to have only a modest role in the ARF.45 Over the course of the first de­cade of the twenty-­first ­century, ASEAN moved to develop the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM). In May 2004 the ASEAN Special SOM, composed of ASEAN Defense and Foreign Ministry officials, asked the ASEAN Secretariat to draw up a concept paper for the ADMM. This was envisioned to be a step t­ oward realizing the creation of an ASEAN Security Community, a goal set by the ASEAN Concord II of

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October 2003.46 The Second ADMM de­cided in princi­ple to move ­toward establishing an expanded defense ministers’ dialogue involving the ASEAN defense ministers plus their core dialogue partners. By 2010 a consensus was reached to supplement the ADMM with the ADMM-­Plus, which consisted of the ASEAN ten plus eight partners, thus coinciding with the membership of the EAS but significantly smaller than the ARF membership.47 Although the ADMM meets annually, the ADMM-­Plus was set up to meet only once ­every three years. The first ADMM-­Plus was held in Vietnam in October 2010, with the second meeting held in Brunei in 2013. From then on meetings switched to a slightly more frequent, biannual basis, with the third ADMM-­Plus held in ­Malaysia in 2015, and the fourth meeting held in the Philippines in October 2017. The ADMM-­Plus represented the culmination of efforts by Nakatani, Satoh, and above all ASEAN to fully establish a regional defense ministers’ dialogue, thereby deepening regional security dialogue. Consistent with Satoh’s proposal, but unlike Nakatani’s, what emerged was another ASEAN-­centric cooperative security institution, once again reinforcing ASEAN’s centrality. China also appears to have been an impor­tant inspiration. According to the former head of the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat, China’s ASPC proposal of 2003 “was a catalyst for ASEAN start the ADMM-­Plus.”48 The initial paucity of the ADMM-­Plus raised concern about the ability of the forum to maintain momentum.49 However, this limitation was partially mitigated by the creation of the ASEAN Defence Se­nior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM-­Plus) to support the ADMM-­Plus. The first ADMM-­Plus communiqué specified that the first ADSOM-­Plus Working Group meeting would be held in Vietnam in December 2010, with Indonesia indicating that another ADSOM-­Plus would be held during its chairmanship in 2011.50 The switch to biannual meetings in 2015 eased concern about momentum. Besides the ADSOM-­Plus, the ADMM-­Plus also established several expert working groups covering maritime security, counterterrorism, HaDR, peacekeeping operations, and military medicine. In 2012 ADMM-­Plus began holding military exercises designed to bolster cooperation in nontraditional security. In July 2012 the expert working group on military medicine conducted a tabletop exercise, with the maritime security expert working group holding a tabletop exercise in September. In 2013 ADMM-­Plus member states held several live on-­the-­ground exercises related to HaDR, military medicine, and counterterrorism. This pace of exercises continued during 2014–16.51 Another challenge for this new forum was the large overlap between its initial agenda and the ARF. With both focusing significantly on HaDR, counterterrorism, maritime security, and peacekeeping, it was not clear when, if ever, the ADMM-­Plus could carve out a distinctive role.52 As one Singapore-­based expert on regional security multilateralism put it, “How do you reconcile the ARF with the ADMM-­Plus?



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ASEAN has not answered this question.” At the same time, this analyst claimed that the ADMM-­Plus is “ASEAN’s own riposte to its own institutional prob­lems.”53 In the meantime, over the course of the first de­cade of the twenty-­first ­century the ARF itself had shifted its focus to some extent from hard-­security issues and t­ oward nontraditional security issues, especially maritime security, antiterrorism (particularly ­after 9/11), and migration issues.54 A Philippines-­based analyst further observed, “It is not very good for analysts, especially ASEAN analysts to continue talking about the ARF as a talk shop. ­Because it suggests that they have not been watching the movements from talk-­shop to action.”55 As alluded to e­ arlier, a new major focus was military-­to-­military cooperation in HaDR operations. The latter even resulted in ARF-­sponsored small-­scale military exercises that demonstrated the capacities of member states’ militaries to engage in and cooperate in disaster relief operations. A Thai diplomat I interviewed claimed that not only would the ARF’s disaster relief management “be very effective,” but it would be even “more effective than ASEAN’s own disaster management.”56 According to a Singapore-­based specialist, with HaDR, the ARF “can go beyond CBMs” and into concrete military cooperation. He also noted that China has assumed a leadership role in promoting HaDR cooperation and had proposed that ARF members come up with an inventory of military equipment available for disaster relief.57 This shift in the ARF’s focus ­toward HaDR also illustrates that China’s and Japan’s interests in regional security multilateralism are by no means always incompatible, as this shift has also been well suited to Japan’s interests and limitations, enabling Tokyo to expand its role and activism in the ARF. As a leading Philippine defense intellectual noted, Japan’s military contributions to the ARF ­were in noncombat areas where Japan can help and comfortably contribute, not in military areas.58 This is especially evident in HaDR, given Japan’s role as a global pioneer in the large-­scale use of military organ­izations for HaDR beginning in the 1950s.59

Multilateral Counterpiracy Cooperation and ReCAAP Counterpiracy is a “nontraditional” security area where Japan has also taken the initiative in promoting regional security multilateralism to provide a utility that is not offered by the US-­Japan alliance and that Japan could not provide unilaterally. Tokyo took the initiative in establishing the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum at the end of 2000, a forum that brings together the heads of the coast guards of Canada, China, Japan, Rus­sia, South K ­ orea, and the United States. The forum focuses on cooperation to manage sustainable fisheries, suppress drug and ­human trafficking, conduct maritime policing, and promote joint operations and information exchange through working groups that are each sponsored by a dif­fer­ent member. A ­ fter several years of CBMs, it held joint exercises and exchanges on “fisheries enforcement” and

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maritime law enforcement.60 Japan also promoted the creation of a Maritime Specialist Officials Meeting in 1998, in connection with the ARF ISG on CBMs, to address Tokyo’s broad concerns about maritime security, including piracy.61 Combating piracy has long been a Japa­nese concern in Southeast Asia, where it has vital sea-­lanes of communication. This issue started to become a priority ­after a spike in piracy t­here in the late 1990s. Japan raised the issue of combating piracy at the ARF for the first time in July 1999, and Tokyo’s position was reflected in the chairman’s statement of the Sixth ARF Meeting, which recognized “the prob­lem of piracy in the region” and the “need for cooperative approaches to deal with this prob­ lem.”62 Rather than promote specific cooperation on counterpiracy through the ARF, Tokyo used this statement to help focus attention and build legitimacy for multilateral cooperation through other venues. Promoting multilateral counterpiracy cooperation became more urgent a­ fter the Japanese-­owned and Japan-­bound Alondra Rainbow was hijacked in October 1999 shortly ­after leaving port in Indonesia. Its Filipino and Japa­nese crew was eventually rescued from a raft off Thailand. In response, Japan resisted unilateral action and instead proposed l­imited minilateral or bilateral cooperation in the form of joint “anti-­piracy patrols.” ASEAN did not agree and suggested a multilateral mechanism for sharing data and “coordinating” national patrols.63 A major barrier was that the Malacca Strait’s littoral states, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, ­were cautious about foreign involvement in patrolling in or near territorial w ­ aters.64 Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō responded at the ASEAN-­Japan summit in November 1999 by offering to host a conference of regional coast guards to discuss how to enhance counterpiracy cooperation. In April 2000 Tokyo in fact hosted the Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, the first multilateral counterpiracy conference ever held. The conference focused medium-­ and long-­term regional cooperation on counterpiracy, and specifically on building communication networks between national authorities to deal with transnational maritime crimes.65 Japan continued to use the ARF as one ave­nue for addressing maritime security, especially counterpiracy efforts. It facilitated the Seventh ARF Ministerial Meeting’s call for the establishment of the ARF Regional Maritime Information Center and a subsequent declaration issued by the Tenth ARF Ministerial Meeting of June 2003, “Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security.” This statement called for ARF members to cooperate in (1) providing technical assistance and capacity building, (2) providing training and equipment to enhance the ability of ARF countries to share information, (3) instituting regional ARF cooperation and training in antipiracy and security, and (4) establishing a ­legal framework for regional cooperation in this field.66



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Japan thus used the ARF to help build legitimacy consensus on the basic direction to take on counterpiracy, and perhaps even “brewed a norm or two”67 related to counterpiracy cooperation. However, when it came to deciding the specifics of counterpiracy cooperation, Japan shifted its focus away from the ARF and ­toward building other, more narrowly and functionally focused multilateral institutions for promoting counterpiracy cooperation, most notably ReCAAP. Building on its e­ arlier initiatives beginning with Prime Minister Obuchi, in November 2001 Prime Minister Koizumi proposed the establishment of an information-­sharing center in Southeast Asia to better coordinate antipiracy patrols around the Malacca Strait. Negotiations began, “­under Japan’s leadership,” with a governmental experts working group meeting in July 2002, and then a two-­day conference of Asian coast guard heads in Tokyo in June 2003, including ASEAN, Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, South ­Korea, and Sri Lanka; no non-­Asian nations participated.68 Sixteen nations participated in negotiating the agreement, which came to be known as the agreement on Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). This agreement was concluded in November 2004, with fourteen nations signing. However, Indonesia and Malaysia, two of the three most impor­tant littoral states, did not sign the agreement. Although Norway did not negotiate the agreement, in August 2009 it became the first non-­Asian nation to sign, thereby making ReCAAP a fifteen-­nation agreement. The Netherlands and Denmark became the next two non-­Asian nations to join.69 Japan has been the second-­largest funder of ReCAAP a­ fter the host, Singapore, but well ahead of the third-­largest funder, Norway.70 With the agreement coming into force in September 2006, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) was established in Singapore in November 2006.71 A Singapore-­based security expert and watcher of ReCAAP described Japan as “the driving force” ­behind the agreement.72 From its inception through to the pre­sent (2018), the heads of the ISC have been Japa­nese.73 Another Southeast Asian security expert also saw ReCAAP as “very Japa­nese driven” as well as funded, and observed that the ISC works very closely with the Singaporean navy’s “naval fusion center” at Changi, which monitors regional maritime traffic. Not surprisingly, the ISC’s primary role is information provision to member countries.74 Capacity building is an impor­tant secondary role, with ReCAAP engaging in such activities not only in Southeast Asia but more recently with relevant national authorities in East Africa.75 In Southeast Asia the ISC cooperates closely with the Japan Coast Guard, with the two cosponsoring a regular counterpiracy policy seminar in Southeast Asia.76 ReCAAP illustrates how Japan has promoted its security interests through narrow functional regional security multilateralism and thereby avoided having to play a direct military role in Southeast Asia while reassuring regional states about its intentions and

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be­hav­ior. This is especially impor­tant given that since the turn of the c­ entury, Japan has become a major foreign user of Singapore’s Changi naval base. Nonetheless, the Japan Coast Guard presence in the region has been more significant,77 with many of the Maritime Self-­Defense Force ships merely passing through on their way to the Indian Ocean. Japan’s leadership in promoting multilateral counterpiracy in the Malacca Strait is also part of an attempt to increase its regional influence. As David Fouse and Yoichiro Sato put it, Japan’s support of counterpiracy efforts in Southeast Asia is “part of a wider strategy for enhancing its po­liti­cal and security profile in the region.”78

The EAMF Several years ­later, in 2011, as maritime tensions grew surrounding unresolved territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, Japan again turned to regional security multilateralism to try to safeguard its interests and promote conflict resolution. At the 2011 Bali EAS in November 2011, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko proposed expanding the ASEAN Maritime Forum into a region-­wide forum to be called the East Asian Maritime Forum, which would include the same membership as the ADMM-­Plus and the EAS: ASEAN’s members plus its eight core dialogue partners. ­Behind this proposal lay three interrelated concerns. First, the Philippines’ proposal for a zone of peace and stability in the South China Sea raised concern in Tokyo that this might end up limiting freedom of navigation t­ here, especially naval and intelligence-­gathering operations.79 Second, regarding the South China Sea code of conduct ­under negotiation between ASEAN and China (­either si­mul­ta­neously or ­after ASEAN members have negotiated among themselves),80 the Noda administration wanted to safeguard Japan’s interests by broadening this pro­cess into an EAS framework that would include Japan, the US, and other partners. Third, the Noda administration worried that if norms regarding territorial conflict in the South China Sea end up favoring China’s claims, ­those could migrate into the East China Sea, undermining Japan’s claim to the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and its exclusive economic zone claims in the East China Sea. As one Noda administration official put it, “If China’s advance in the South China Sea becomes an established fact this cannot help but have an effect in the East China Sea.”81 Similarly, a “key” member of Noda’s cabinet told Asahi Shimbun that if “China’s argument that islands in the sea are within its jurisdiction, despite a lack of clear basis of international law, gains support in the international community . . . ​it ­will be ‘certain to affect’ Japan’s standing regarding the Senkaku Islands.”82 Initially, ASEAN did not fully endorse Noda’s proposal, in part ­because of opposition from China and concerns within ASEAN about consolidating the ASEAN Maritime Forum first. As with the ADMM-­Plus, ASEAN often prioritizes institu-



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tionalizing intra-­ASEAN fora first before considering the formation of parallel fora that include dialogue partners. An ASEAN diplomat reportedly claimed that ASEAN members “­were of the view that the ASEAN maritime security forum must be consolidated before discussions can begin on expanding it.”83 Although China did not officially oppose Noda’s proposal for a regional maritime forum at the EAS meeting in Bali, it subsequently lobbied against it. In reaction to this proposal and Japan’s growing involvement in the South China Sea dispute, Chinese vice foreign minister Cui Tiankai issued a strong warning: “Japan should think comparatively what w ­ ill truly serve Japan’s national interests.” A journalist with close ties to the Chinese foreign policy establishment elaborated on Cui’s remarks: “Japan would find it annoying if China got involved in a row between Japan and South K ­ orea over the issue of the Takeshima islets and backs Seoul at an international meeting. . . . ​Parties not in the dispute should remain quiet.”84 Despite t­hese initial obstacles, the chairman’s statement at the end of the 2011 EAS endorsed in princi­ple the idea of expanding regional dialogue on maritime issues based on the ASEAN Maritime Forum. According to the statement, “We encouraged dialogue involving EAS participating countries to utilize opportunities and address common challenges on maritime issues building upon the existing of ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF). We also noted positively the proposal of convening an expanded AMF, back-­to-­back with the f­uture meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the wider East Asia region.”85 In 2012 ASEAN created the EAMF, which includes all the members of the EAS. Its first meeting was held in Manila in October 2012.86 This was arguably Japan’s most successful initiative promoting regional security cooperation since the Nakayama proposal of 1991.

Whither Japan’s Leadership ­Under Abe? Abe made an unlikely return to power in December 2012, having served a brief and difficult stint as prime minister in 2006–7. Abe is a defense hawk, especially regarding China, and he has supported deepening Japan’s dependence on its US ally. Consequently, has Japan continued to champion regional security multilateralism, or has it moved away from regional security multilateralism and more ­toward minilateralist and US-­Japan alliance–­centric approaches to East Asian regional security? ­Under Abe, Japan has continued and expanded the pivot away from East Asian multilateralism, as embodied in the APT, that Koizumi initially made in 2005. In 2009 Demo­cratic Party of Japan prime minister Hatoyama Yukio tried to resurrect Koizumi’s early embrace of the EAC, albeit in the context of also building a more “equal” US-­Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Hatoyama eventually abandoned his proposal, even ­after making clear that the US should be included, and his Demo­cratic Party of Japan successors buried the idea. Abe has gone further, building on an idea implicit

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in the Koizumi administration’s successful effort to widen the EAS beyond East Asia to include Australia, India, and New Zealand: he has proposed broadening the region not just from East Asia to the Asia-­Pacific but farther, to the Indo-­Pacific, and in 2016 he formalized this in the policy of creating a ­Free and Open Indo-­Pacific (FOIP). Abe foreshadowed FOIP during his first stint as prime minister in 2007 through an address to the Indian Parliament: “We are now at a point at which the Confluence of Two Seas is coming into being. The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity. A broader Asia that broke away geo­graph­i­cal bound­aries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.”87 Abe linked this broader definition of the region to Japan’s promotion of an Arc of Freedom, where India was identified as “pivotal,” and more specifically to building a strategic alignment with India. ­Later in the speech, Abe claimed Japan has “rediscovered India as a partner that shares the same values and interests and also as a friend that ­will work alongside us to enrich the seas of freedom and prosperity, which ­will be open and transparent to all.”88 The under­lying concept was to enhance efforts to balance against China by expanding the Asia-­Pacific to the Indo-­Pacific in order to include India. Abe further developed this broader geo­graph­i­cal focus in Japan’s security strategy by promoting minilateral security cooperation, specifically the Australia-­Japan-­US Trilateral Security Dialogue and the India-­Japan-­US Trilateral Meeting, which w ­ ere 89 built on strategic partnerships and the Australia–­New Zealand–­US alliance. In the case of India-­Japan-­US trilateral cooperation, this also took the form of Japan joining the annual bilateral India-­US Malabar naval exercises for the first time in 2007.90 Abe’s expanded balancing concept culminated in his proposal for the minilateral Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in January 2007 that would include Australia, India, Japan, and the US. The inaugural meeting of the Quad took place in Manila in May 2007 on the sidelines of an ARF security policy meeting.91 Following Abe’s sudden resignation in September 2007 ­after a historic electoral loss in Japan’s Upper House, his successor, Fukuda Yasuo, abandoned the Arc of Freedom and the nascent FOIP concept in ­favor of confidence building with China.92 Prime Minister Hatoyama also emphasized improving relations with China, but following his return to power in late 2012, Abe began to reconstruct the FOIP concept. Abe rolled out FOIP during a speech in ­Kenya in 2016, and MOFA officially ­adopted the concept in 2017.93 This resurrected policy culminated in the resurrection of the minilateral Quad, with its second meeting being held in November 2017, on the sidelines of the 2017 EAS.94 Despite Abe’s focus on the Indo-­Pacific, balancing China, and minilateralism, Japan continued to be a leader in promoting regional security multilateralism even ­after he returned to power in 2012. First, Abe’s FOIP concept, which seeks to link the Indian and Pacific Oceans, has reinforced ASEAN centrality as being the very fulcrum



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of this region. Indeed, during his first eigh­teen months in office, Abe made a point of visiting e­ very ASEAN country.95 Second, FOIP has even enhanced the importance of the ARF, which has been criticized for having too many members from South Asia that have ­little relevance for East Asian security, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The redefinition of the region as the Indo-­Pacific turned this liability into an asset. Similarly, the EAS framework, which includes India as a core ASEAN dialogue partner in the EAS, the ADMM-­Plus, and the EAMF, and which Japan played a large role in helping to establish in 2005, fits perfectly with the Indo-­Pacific concept and may even be considered an impor­tant origin of FOIP. Third, the very minilateralism that Abe has promoted has often been facilitated by regional security multilateralism. For example, all Quad meetings to date have been held on the sidelines of multilateral meetings, specifically an ARF meeting in 2007 and the 2017 EAS, and Quad members have been stressing the centrality of ASEAN to the Quad.96 Fi­nally, despite his support for minilateralism, Abe has also continued Japan’s leadership in championing regional security multilateralism. During his May 2014 address to the Shangri-­La Dialogue, he proposed “enhancement of the East Asia Summit, as the premier forum taking up regional politics and security.” Specifically, he proposed creating “a permanent committee comprised of permanent representatives to ASEAN from the member countries . . . ​while also making the Summit along with the ARF and the ADMM+ function in a multi-­layered fashion.”97 Building on Japan’s leadership in promoting defense white paper transparency, Abe proposed that the first ­thing this multilayered multilateral institution should tackle is public disclosure of military bud­gets in a “step-­by-­step” pro­cess “that enables us to cross-­check each other,” “a system that we should seek to establish as we extend the scope of the East Asia Summit.”98 At the EAS’s tenth anniversary summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2015, some of the ideas Abe proposed w ­ ere realized. The EAS Kuala Lumpur Declaration established a mechanism for “regular engagement between the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN and the non-­ASEAN Ambassadors of East Asia Summit participating countries in Jakarta to discuss implementation of Leaders’ decisions as well as exchange information on . . . ​security policies and initiatives.” The declaration also mandated the creation of a dedicated unit within the ASEAN Secretariat “focusing on the East Asia Summit.”99

Conclusion As this chapter and the previous one have shown, since the establishment of the ARF in 1994, Japan has consistently promoted regional security multilateralism in vari­ ous forms. It has used regional security multilateralism, as predicted, to reassure its neighbors about its disposition as a military power, as well as to reduce the threat of

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war through misperception. Throughout the post-1993 period, Galia Press-­Barnathan’s observation continued to hold: regional security multilateralism allowed “Japan to play a more active regional role without generating as much fear or resentment as if it acted alone. This, for example, appears to be an impor­tant advantage of the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF[,] . . . ​through which Japan is able to make any security related initiatives without appearing threatening.”100 Japan also used the ARF to reduce the risk of misperception when the revised US-­Japan defense guidelines ­were negotiated and issued in 1996–97. Within the alliance, Japan also used regional security multilateralism to mitigate its alliance security dilemma of entrapment and abandonment, at times using it to pursue policies more in­de­pen­dent of the US, and at other times using t­ hese structures to help keep the US engaged in regional security. Fi­nally, Japan has used regional security multilateralism, starting with the ARF, to build new functional utilities, most notably in counterpiracy, HaDR, and counterterrorism. Although the initial surface exuberance following Japan’s success in helping to establish the ARF receded a­ fter a few years, what was revealed under­neath was a consistent, long-­term, and patient commitment to making incremental pro­gress in promoting cooperative security through regional security multilateralism, starting with the ARF, thereby promoting reassurance and reducing the threat of conflict through misperception. Even when the ARF has appeared to work more to China’s advantage than Japan’s, most notably when China and ASEAN have taken similar positions, this has not reduced Japan’s interest in the ARF, but rather has reduced its expectations about using the ARF to make po­liti­cal gains while si­mul­ta­neously increasing MOFA’s prioritization of using the ARF defensively to prevent or reduce Chinese gains that come at Japan’s expense. It would thus be a ­mistake to suggest that Japan turned back ­toward the US alliance ­because of disillusionment with the ARF, not only ­because claims of disillusionment are exaggerated but also b­ ecause Japan never saw the ARF as a substitute for the alliance in the first place. On the other hand, Japan saw like-­minded multilateralism through the PMC as a way to help maintain US interest in keeping its forward military deployments and network of alliances in East Asia. However, during the mid-1990s, especially ­after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Clinton-­Hashimoto declaration reaffirming the US-Japan alliance, Japan’s fear of US abandonment declined while its fear of entrapment, po­liti­cally as well as militarily, started to become more prominent. Japan attempted, with the 1997 Hashimoto Doctrine, to rebuild a special Japan-­ ASEAN relationship and a pro-­Western like-­minded multilateralism with ASEAN, one that would embrace security dialogue and cooperation. This was an attempt to rebuild the like-­minded multilateralism that ended when the PMC was expanded in 1996 to include China and Rus­sia. When ASEAN effectively rejected this aim of the



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Hashimoto proposal and recast it as the APT, Japan supported the APT, both ­because of its support for ASEAN and ­because of a fear of being left out. Moreover, with Japan’s declining concern about US abandonment, it became more willing to participate in multilateral forums that excluded the US, most notably the APT and ASEM. This also coincided with Japa­nese efforts to carve out a policy ­toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN that was more in­de­pen­dent of the US. Indeed, not only Japan’s embrace of the APT but also its promotion of Northeast Asian trilateralism represented the emergence of a new equilibrium in Japan’s regional multilateralism and policy, which is now more in­de­pen­dent of the US. Strikingly, Japan even took the lead in proposing security dialogue and cooperation as areas the APT should cover. When growing bilateral tensions and Japa­nese perceptions of a Chinese threat became pronounced from 2005 u ­ nder Koizumi, causing Japan to again worry more about abandonment and to strengthen its alliance with the US, Japan nonetheless resisted calls from the George W. Bush administration to abandon its support for EAS. Instead, Japan attempted to make the EAS more of an Asia-­Pacific body by pushing to include US allies and leaning countries such as Australia and India. Japan, especially u ­ nder Abe, also promoted minilateralism with Australia and India, including trilaterals and the Quad. Nonetheless, Japan maintained its participation in and support for the EAS and for Northeast Asian cooperation. Despite Japan’s consistent track rec­ord of championing regional security multilateralism, t­ here have occasionally been voices of worry within ASEAN about Japan’s continued commitment and support. This was especially evident during the period from 2005 ­until 2010, when growing Japa­nese concern about China from 2005 began raising worry within ASEAN about Japan’s reliability as a partner in regional cooperation. Se­nior Indonesian strategic thinker and ASEAN-­ISIS leader Jusuf Wanandi, who greatly influenced the Nakayama proposal and especially the establishment of the ARF, was arguing by 2007 that “ASEAN feels that Japan has started to show some hesitation about her commitment for East Asia institution building since she is too worried about China’s role in the ­future, especially in the APT.” Wanandi added that “Japan’s excessive concern with China is worrying for ASEAN as this ­will prevent Japan from playing a constructive role in the region.”101 Numerous analysts I interviewed claimed that Japan, in the words of one of Wanandi’s Indonesian colleagues, “always follows the US and is not in­de­pen­dent,”102 while a retired member of the ASEAN Secretariat who specialized in the ARF observed that Japan is “seen to be too close to the US.”103 Similarly, a retired Thai diplomat noted that the ASEAN perception is that “Japan follows in US footsteps and is not in­de­pen­dent.”104 Nonetheless, Japan’s initiative in 2011 to establish an East Asian Maritime Forum, and its 2014 proposal to strengthen the EAS, helped to mitigate t­ hese perceptions, especially that Japan was no longer interested in supporting and building regional multilateral security institutions.

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Although Japan has at times tried to mitigate ASEAN’s influence to some extent by calling, unsuccessfully, for the creation of an ARF secretariat separate from the ASEAN Secretariat and proposing the creation of a non-­ASEAN-­centric defense ministers’ dialogue in 2002, Japan has nonetheless generally been supportive of the extension of ASEAN-­centric multilateralism, functionally through the APT, as well as by supporting the ADMM-­Plus when it was created in 2010. Indeed, since the early 1990s, and even the late 1970s, Japan’s support has been crucial for cementing ASEAN centrality in regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism. Beyond using ASEAN-­centric multilateralism to reassure ­others about Japan’s intentions and military role, Japan has also used narrower functional security multi­ lateralism to promote its security interests while avoiding stimulating the threat perceptions of ­others. The most notable example of this use of regional security multilateralism has been Japan’s leadership in promoting multilateral cooperation to combat piracy in Southeast Asian ­waters, leadership that eventually led to the establishment of ReCAAP and the ISC. A second notable example has been Japan’s leadership in championing the expansion of the ASEAN Maritime Forum into the EAMF. This illustrates how Japan has promoted its security interests through regional security multilateralism and thereby avoided having to play a direct military role in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.

Conclusion

Three Puzzles Answered This book began by identifying three wide-­ranging puzzles regarding Japan’s regional security strategy. First, why, during the Cold War, did Japan pursue a regional strategy of security isolationism, rejecting regional security multilateralism? Second, why, on the cusp of the Cold War’s end, did Japan suddenly pivot from years of steadfast opposition to regional security multilateralism and propose East Asia’s first region-­wide multilateral security forum? Third, why has Japan continued to champion regional security multilateralism since 1991? This work then traced Japan’s regional security strategy since regaining in­de­pen­ dence in 1952, including its security isolationism and opposition to regional security multilateralism during the Cold War, as well as its sudden pivot to championing regional security multilateralism in 1991 with the Nakayama proposal. It analyzed Japan’s follow-up with the Miyazawa initiatives and MOFA’s negotiations with ASEAN, follow-up that created a dual structure of like-­and un-­like-­minded regional security forums. This book examined how Japan responded to the disappearance of the PMC as a like-­minded multilateral security forum, including Japan’s unsuccessful attempts to compensate by creating a security forum with ASEAN and re-­creating a special relationship with ASEAN. Fi­nally, this book traced Japan’s efforts since the late 1990s to build out further regional security multilateralism, in part by using the ARF as a platform, and the contributions Tokyo made to the establishment of the NEA 3, the EAS, and the ADMM-­Plus and its leadership in establishing ReCAAP and the EAMF.

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Three ­Causes for Japan’s Leadership This book identifies the reassurance imperative as the overarching motivation for Japan to pursue security isolationism during the Cold War, but also as the motivation for it to suddenly reverse course at the end of the Cold War. By then security isolation was no longer seen as sufficient for reassuring East Asian nations at a time when Japan had become the overwhelming regional economic hegemon, and was increasingly incentivized by the end of the Cold War and US pressure to begin playing a security role beyond its borders. This changed environment meant Japan needed a broader military reassurance framework beyond the US alliance to reassure Asian neighbors as Japan began playing a direct security role beyond its territory. In short, Japan had outgrown the reassurance framework of regional security isolationism and containment within the US alliance. The same reassurance incentive explains why Japan has continued to champion regional security multilateralism since 1991 as a means for maintaining regional security and stability in a way that other countries would not find threatening. By containing itself in the US-­Japan alliance during the Cold War, Japan realized impor­tant third-­party reassurance effects, specifically t­ oward Asian nations that worried less about Japan’s potential remilitarization ­because it was contained, if not constrained, by the US. With the end of the Cold War, the alliance, although still vitally impor­tant for providing this reassurance, was no longer sufficient and needed to be augmented with regional security multilateralism, especially as Japan began sending its military overseas for the first time. A secondary motivation for Japan’s opposition to security multilateralism ­until 1991, and then its championing of it since 1991, was to help mitigate its alliance security dilemma vis-­à-­vis the US, specifically the dangers of entrapment and abandonment. Up to 1991 Japan feared that embracing like-­minded security multilateralism risked entrapment in US conflicts, while embracing un-­like-­minded security multilateralism risked abandonment, as this would anger its ally the US and might even entrap it, constraining its strategic freedom of action in East Asia. Nonetheless, by 1991 Japan had come to see security multilateralism as an impor­tant means to help ensure that the US remained pre­sent and involved in East Asian security, although this motivation, too, in part derived from the reassurance imperative, as Japan could not even consider replacing the regional US military role without provoking the threat perceptions and counterbalancing of its neighbors. On the other hand, Japan at times, most notably during the 1997–2004 period, and again from 2009 to 2010, found regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism a useful means for it to avoid entrapment in US policies and to facilitate a more in­de­pen­dent regional security policy that involved direct security cooperation with its neighbors, instead of indirectly through the US.1

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Fi­nally, this book finds that regional security multilateralism has also served Japan’s national interest by providing vari­ous utilities not provided, or only suboptimally provided, by the US-­Japan alliance, notably effective responses to nontraditional threats such as piracy, terrorism, ­human and drug smuggling, and natu­ral disasters. ReCAAP and the EAMF are examples of regional multilateral security institutions for counterpiracy and maritime security that Japan took the lead in establishing, while ARF and ADMM-­Plus HaDR regional exercises are utilities facilitating greater interoperability and capacity building that benefit Japan and its neighbors.

Review of Findings Chapter 1 presented the explanatory framework for understanding the reasons b­ ehind the rise of regional security multilateralism in East Asia in comparative perspective, as well as for understanding Japan’s sharp reversal from opposing regional security multilateralism to becoming its leading champion. It explained the utility of regional security multilateralism for states, especially common and cooperative security, and the motivations for states to promote this form of multilateralism, especially the reassurance imperative. Chapter 2 explained the emergence of security isolation in Japan’s regional security strategy at the outset of the Cold War as a response to its neighbors’ distrust, with both Japan and t­hese neighboring countries citing this mistrust as the major reason for rejecting a Pacific Pact multilateral alliance. The remainder of that chapter analyzed the evolution of Japan’s security isolationism ­after it regained in­de­pen­dence, culminating in the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977, which formalized this isolationist strategy yet at the same time attempted to open a way for Japan to play a non-­security-­connected po­liti­cal role. Chapter 3 traced Japan’s rethinking of its strategy of regional security isolation, its opposition to multilateral security cooperation, and the policy entrepreneurs who pioneered new ideas in response to this changed environment, thereby creating the intellectual background to the Nakayama proposal. It found that with the end of the Cold War, Soviet collapse and growing questions about the continued US military presence in the region, and growing pressure on Japan to begin playing a direct role in regional and global security, Japan’s reputational predicament again reemerged, forcing the country to look for new means to reassure the region beyond repeating the Fukuda Doctrine’s promise not to become a military power and continued self-­ containment within the US-­Japan alliance. Chapter 4 explained the pro­cess of formulating the Nakayama proposal as a reassurance response to Japan’s resurgent reputational predicament and identified the crucial role played by ASEAN security intellectuals through ASEAN-­ISIS in helping to formulate the contents of Japan’s proposal and its focus on the PMC as the venue for launching the region’s first ever regional security dialogue. Chapter 5 examined the

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delivery and contents of the Nakayama proposal itself, reactions to the proposal from other members of the PMC, and MOFA’s per­sis­tence in defending and promoting the initiative in response to adverse reactions. It also evaluated the partial success of the Nakayama proposal at the 1992 ASEAN Singapore summit. Chapter 6 traced the follow-on initiatives to the Nakayama proposal made by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, including several speeches and his influential research council, and the negotiation pro­cess between Japan and ASEAN, and with other ASEAN dialogue partners, which led to the decision to create the ARF, East Asia’s first regional multilateral security forum, in 1993. Chapters 7 and 8 analyzed Japan’s track rec­ord of support and leadership within the ARF and its continued leadership in promoting new regional multilateral security institutions by building on the ARF and l­ater the APT and EAS. Japan’s continued leadership in promoting regional security multilateralism reflected the continued, if gradually ebbing, prioritization of reassurance in Japa­nese policy. It also demonstrated other motivations in Japa­nese policy: managing its alliance security dilemma with the US, sometimes using regional security multilateralism to keep the US regionally engaged, and at other times using it to try to avoid entrapment in US policy and to forge more in­de­pen­dent regional security policies.

Competing Explanations This book identified four competing explanations2 for Japan’s promotion of regional security multilateralism. First, t­ here is the liberal or Asian-­autonomist argument that Japan attempted to use regional security multilateralism to build an inclusive and un-­like-­minded community to distance itself from the US alliance and overcome regional balance-­of-­power dynamics. An extreme variant of this argument sees Japan as attempting to replace the US alliance with regional security multilateralism. A second competing explanation claims that ­there is an inevitable zero-­sum trade-­off between security bilateralism and multilateralism. Third, ­there is a realist-­inspired explanation that Japan’s main aim was to build a multilateral co­ali­tion of like-­minded countries to ­counter China and perhaps eventually even build a NATO-­like military alliance. Fi­nally, it has been claimed that Japan has swung between extreme exuberance and skepticism about the value of security multilateralism. This book does not confirm any of ­these competing explanations. Refuting the first alternative explanation, as we saw in Chapters 5 through 7, Japan initially attempted to build an exclusive and like-­minded security multilateral forum, one that excluded the Socialist (or, in the case of Rus­sia from 1992, ex-­Socialist) countries. Rather than attempting to use security multilateralism to distance itself from the US alliance, Japan from the beginning used it to try to keep the US regionally engaged. Despite its failure to build an enduring like-­minded regional multilateral security forum

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over the course of more than a quarter of a c­ entury, Japan proved to be unexpectedly successful in realizing its goal as ARF and ­later ADMM-­Plus and EAS meetings became impor­tant anchors for bringing US secretaries of state, secretaries of defense, and presidents to East Asia–­centric po­liti­cal and security meetings.3 Moreover, no diplomat or minister ever advocated, ­either publicly or privately, in the vast array of declassified documents on Japan’s policy ­toward regional security multilateralism that I analyzed in this book, using regional security multilateralism to replace the US alliance or saw regional security multilateralism as a way to overcome regional security competition.4 This study also refutes the second competing argument that ­there is an inevitable zero-­sum trade-­off between security bilateralism and multilateralism. It has not uncovered evidence that Japa­nese policy elites have seen a necessary trade-­off between regional security multilateralism and the US-­Japan alliance. Even Abe Shinzō, a strong advocate of strengthening the US-­Japan alliance and promoting security cooperation among US allies and leaning states through minilateralism, has continued to support and lead in promoting un-­like-­minded regional security multilateralism. Moreover, few US policy makers or policy experts have seen a trade-­off between Japan’s promotion of regional security multilateralism and its adherence to the US-­Japan alliance.5 According to one retired US diplomat with extensive experience in Japan who was stationed ­there in the early 1990s, “Regional security multilateralism has a value for playing a supplementary role to the US-­Japan and other US alliances in the region.”6 One serving State Department official, when asked about a potential trade-­off between the alliance and regional security multilateralism, answered, “When Hatoyama was Prime Minister, his East Asia Community Proposal seemed to leave the US out. That was a real concern. Other­wise, this has never been a big concern.”7 A former top Obama administration Defense Department official with responsibility for East Asia similarly answered, “A trade-­off? I’ve never ­really picked up on that.”8 Another former Obama administration Pentagon official added, “It is easier for Japan to promote security multilateralism than it is for US to do this. Japan has a finer grained understanding of the East Asian region. I think we should be very grateful for Japan’s leadership.”9 A third realist-­inspired competing explanation states that, on the contrary, Japan attempted to use regional security multilateralism to try to build a tight-­knit, like-­ minded, exclusive multilateral institution, if not a NATO-­type alliance. Certainly, many ASEAN states initially suspected as much upon hearing the Nakayama proposal’s call for creating a security dialogue among the “friendly states,” “us.” It is true that at the time it began promoting regional security multilateralism in 1991, Japan, especially MOFA, preferred like-­minded cooperative security multilateralism, which would only include ASEAN, Japan, the US, and other ASEAN PMC dialogue partners, states it regarded as at least loosely aligned with the US (including some who did not

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regard themselves as US aligned, most notably Indonesia) and was not interested in including China and the Soviet Union (­later Rus­sia). Nonetheless, as Chapters 5 and 6 showed, MOFA never had any intention of creating anything remotely resembling a military alliance. While it is true that MOFA initially tried to avoid creating an inclusive un-­like-­minded regional multilateral security forum, ­there ­were dissenting voices within Japan’s po­liti­cal elite, most notably ­those of Prime Minister Miyazawa, his research council, and some diplomats within MOFA, such as Satoh Yukio, who by 1992 supported creating a broader un-­like-­ minded multilateral security forum for promoting cooperative security. Consequently, when presented with ASEAN’s preference for inclusive un-­like-­minded security multilateralism, a preference backed by the US, Japan shifted its position and embraced this form of security multilateralism, even though it had not been Japan’s first choice. Although Japan was the last holdout against ASEAN’s attempt to create an un-­ like-­minded regional multilateral security forum, in the end Japan embraced the ARF and became a champion of it and other forms of inclusive and un-­like-­minded regional security multilateralism, including the ADMM-­Plus, the APT, the NEA 3, the EAS, ReCAAP, and the EAMF. Indeed, Japan played a significant leadership role in promoting the creation of the ADMM-­Plus, the APT, the NEA 3, the EAS, and the EAMF, and it assumed singular leadership in establishing ReCAAP, even though all t­ hese have been un-­like-­minded and inclusive regional multilateral security forums. Fi­nally, this book has rebutted claims that Japan has oscillated between extremes, initially being enraptured with enthusiasm for regional security multilateralism but then becoming pessimistic and skeptical. This study demonstrates that from the ARF’s launch in 1994, Japa­nese policy makers a­ dopted a cautious and long-­term perspective ­toward its prospects and benefits and have maintained steady interest in, and support for, this forum, as well as for promoting other forms of regional security multilateralism ever since.

Contributions This book makes six broad contributions to knowledge creation. First, it helps us understand the evolution and dynamics of East Asian regional security multilateralism. Specifically, it shows how Japan played a key role in building ASEAN’s centrality in East Asian po­liti­cal and security multilateralism. Indeed, as long ago as the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, this had been one of Tokyo’s prime objectives. As Sumio Edamura, one of the architects of that doctrine, has claimed, Japan de­cided to “support the concerted efforts of ASEAN as a regional organ­ization to fill the power vacuum (created by the US withdrawal from Vietnam).” Tokyo, “by recognizing ASEAN as a v­ iable regional organ­ization and by consciously supporting its efforts for greater solidarity and collaboration,” “might be able to help ASEAN become the heart of stability in

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Southeast Asia.”10 Given the difficulty of building po­liti­cal and security multilateralism in Northeast Asia, this help in securing ASEAN’s po­liti­cal centrality in Southeast Asia provided ASEAN with the means to then become the central platform for building po­liti­cal and security multilateralism in Northeast Asia as well, with no other v­ iable multilateral structures emerging t­ here ­until the ASEAN-­centric APT gave rise to the free-­standing NEA 3 around the turn of the ­century. Japan, through the Nakayama proposal in par­tic­u­lar, as well as the Miyazawa initiatives, played a key role in building legitimacy and support for ASEAN centrality not just in Southeast Asian security multilateralism but also in East Asian and even Asia-­Pacific security multilateralism. Second, this book has presented an especially rich case study of Japa­nese foreign policy making in Part II, showing the motivations and policy-­making pro­cess ­behind the Nakayama proposal and subsequent Miyazawa initiatives. It has drawn on an almost unparalleled range of declassified documents from MOFA and the Cabinet Office, as well as interviews with officials and academics involved in this policy-­making pro­cess over more than a quarter of a century to process-­trace in rich detail the causal chain by which dramatic changes in Japan’s regional environment, together with the ideas of policy entrepreneurs, combined to produce the single largest change in Japan’s regional security strategy since the country regained its in­de­pen­dence in 1952. Third, this book has revealed the lasting impact of Japan’s leadership in promoting East Asian security multilateralism. It has traced the impact of Japan’s early promotion of ASEAN centrality, and ­later of Tokyo’s championing of the ARF and other multilateral security fora on regional security and the development of regional security multilateralism (see ­Table 1). Not least of all, this book has highlighted the lasting impact that Japan’s leadership in promoting the creation of the ARF has had on Japan’s foreign policy t­ oward East Asia, its role in the region, and the willingness of Asian nations to accept a Japa­nese leadership role. It has shown that Japa­nese leadership in promoting security multilateralism both has paved the way to and indicates greater East Asian ac­cep­tance of Japan assuming a regional security leadership role. Other East Asian states have increasingly looked to Japan for leadership in balancing China, but also for help moderating Sino-­US power competition, leadership Japan has often exercised through regional security multilateralism. Fourth, the findings of this book have significance for international relations theory as well. Japan is an impor­tant case of a major power with an aggressive reputation. Building on a security-­dilemma sensibility, Japan’s reassurance response offers a replicable example of how a state can overcome an aggressive reputation. Using this example, this book has helped develop the reassurance logic inherent in balance-­of-­ threat theory.11 Fifth, this book also extends our understanding of regional security multilateralism not just as useful for preventing war and preventive diplomacy but as a structure

168 Co nclus io n tab le  1 . Multilateral Po­liti­cal and Security Structures in East Asia and Japan’s Role St ru ct ure

Ye a r E stab li she d (A bol ishe d )

Security Role

Japan’s Role

Southeast Asian Treaty Organ­ization

1954 (1977)

1954

None

ASPAC

1966 (1973)

1966

Member

PMC

1978

1992

Co-­initiator

ASEAN-­Japan Forum

1978

1993

Initiator

ARF

1994

1994

Co-­initiator

APT

1997

2000

Co-­initiator

NEA 3

1999

2003

Initiator

ReCAAP

2004

2004

Initiator

EAS

2005

2005

Co-­initiator

EAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

2010

2010

Member

ADMM Plus

2010

2010

Co-­initiator

EAMF

2012

2012

Initiator

Xiangshan Forum

2006/14

2006/14

Member

s ource : Author created.

that can also be useful as a soft balancing forum, thereby diverting energy from riskier, harder forms of balancing. It can be used to build co­ali­tions, to politic, and as a platform for building new security utilities. Regional security multilateralism can also be a useful vehicle for keeping major external powers regionally engaged, including a global hegemon with a short attention span that often lacks fine-­grained regional knowledge.

The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs This book’s sixth and final contribution to knowledge has been to show how at periods of crisis, policy entrepreneurs, including politicians and diplomats, often with close ties to domestic and especially international networks of po­liti­cal scientists and policy researchers, have played a key role in altering Japa­nese foreign policy. The first policy entrepreneur highlighted in this book is former prime minister Fukuda Takeo. As finance minister in the mid-1960s, Fukuda’s efforts to ensure that the then-­to-­be-­established ADB would be headquartered in Tokyo ended in defeat, a defeat he attributed to lingering Asian mistrust of Japan. This prompted him to start

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thinking about ways to reassure East Asians and build trust in Japan’s disposition as a benign power. By the time he became foreign minister several years l­ater, Fukuda was promoting the idea of Japan as unique among g­ reat economic powers in history in that it was not converting its g­ reat economic power into g­ reat military power. He also saw cultural exchanges as a way to build trust, a ­factor ­behind his championing of the Japan Foundation, which was established in 1972. After Japan’s economics-­first Southeast Asian policy collapsed ­under the weight of the 1974 anti-­Japanese Tanaka riots, Fukuda, when he became prime minister, played a decisive role in formulating the doctrine that bears his name, which sought to reassure East Asians by proclaiming that Japan would not become a military power, a declaration that quickly became a staple of Japan’s diplomacy ­toward East Asia. A second group of entrepreneurs emerged around the end of the Cold War. Perhaps the earliest one was Nishihara Masashi, a prominent Japa­nese defense scholar, who was one of the first to suggest the utility of like-­minded security multilateralism for Japan and US allies, as well as its value for Japan in reassuring ­these countries about its disposition as a military power. Most prominent among this group was Satoh Yukio, a Japa­nese diplomat with deep ties to security policy research networks in the UK and US through IISS and in Southeast Asia through ASEAN-­ISIS. Through interactions with t­ hese networks, Satoh developed the central ideas of what became the Nakayama proposal, especially the idea of establishing a like-­minded security forum where Japan could reassure its neighbors about its disposition as a military power even as it began playing a direct security role beyond its borders for the first time. In so d ­ oing, Satoh turned the Fukuda Doctrine on its head, turning mistrust of Japan as a military power from a reason not to discuss regional security with East Asian neighbors into a reason to establish just such a dialogue. Satoh also played an entrepreneurial role in trying to modify common security concepts developed in Eu­rope, in order to make them more appropriate for the East Asian po­liti­cal environment and more congenial for Japan’s national interests. In par­tic­ul­ar, he developed MRMs as a broader concept than CBMs, one that could apply among friendly states as well as among adversaries. As revealed in Chapter 6, then–­prime minister Miyazawa also emerges as a central policy entrepreneur during this crucial period of the early 1990s. Miyazawa collaborated with Satoh on his Washington initiative for creating a more comprehensive framework for regional security multilateralism than the PMC. More importantly, this prime minister convened a high-­powered research council on Japan’s relationship with East Asia in the twenty-­first ­century, a council that focused on how to develop a more comprehensive regional multilateral security framework for East Asia and how Japan could reassure East Asian countries about its current disposition as a military power (military reassurance) and about its understanding of its past aggression (historical reassurance).12 The ideas from this council, which found their way into Miyazawa’s

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speeches during this period, and which created a lively domestic debate within Japan about regional security multilateralism, played a major part in shifting Japan’s policy and its role in eventually promoting the establishment of the ARF. Another group of policy entrepreneurs ­were Australians and especially Canadians who helped to spread new ideas in Japan and East Asia about common and cooperative security and identify the differences between ­these types of security multilateralism and collective security, a distinction that was still not evident in Japa­nese expert discourse on security at the beginning of the 1990s when they came to Japan to begin promoting cooperative and common security concepts. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Canadians especially had firsthand experience with common security and its major concepts, such as CBMs, through their country’s membership in the CSCE and NATO, experience other US-­friendly advocates of regional security multilateralism in East Asia lacked. Thanks in no small part to their influence, Japa­nese policy makers and entrepreneurs ­were able to start envisioning regional security multilateralism that was not collective security and did not involve a regional multilateral alliance ­either. A final group of policy entrepreneurs who played a crucial role w ­ ere the directors of ASEAN-­ISIS, including Carolina Hernandez and especially Jusuf Wanandi. ASEAN-­ ISIS developed the idea that ASEAN should become the sponsor of a region-­wide un-­like-­minded multilateral security dialogue, one that included all the major powers. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, ASEAN-­ISIS, where Wanandi was a, if not the, leading figure, played a key role in helping to convince ASEAN governments to take the initiative, although they w ­ ere also aided and prodded by Japan’s Nakayama proposal. Wanandi was responsible for the basic concept under­lying the ARF and ASEAN’s subsequent regional multilateral security initiatives. He appears to have derived this concept from the 1970s Indonesian and ASEAN policy concept of ZOPFAN. He essentially turned ZOPFAN on its head, transitioning from a concept that called for excluding the ­great powers from Southeast Asia to one that called for engaging them all. This is what Evelyn Goh subsequently labeled “omni-­enmeshment”—­namely, the idea of bringing in all the major powers to try to establish a balance of engagement and interest so that the g­ reat powers would essentially cancel each other out, allowing ASEAN to develop ­free from the excessive influence of any one ­great power.

Does Reassurance Still ­Matter? Does the reassurance imperative still ­matter for Japan, especially with the rise of China? It certainly does not ­matter as much as it did at the beginning of the 1990s, when Japan was the regional economic hegemon, with a gross domestic product larger than ­those of all other Asian nations, including China, combined. Moreover, as recently as the early 1990s, Japan still lacked a benign track rec­ord of security, and especially military, engagement with its neighbors (or any direct post-1945 security engagement

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at all), and the most recent memories of Japan sending its military overseas w ­ ere from 1945. The shifting balance of threat, with the dramatic shift in the distribution of capabilities ­toward China and what some see as more aggressive be­hav­ior on China’s part, naturally reduces the need for Japan to reassure ­others, as China looms relatively larger as a potential threat. Reassurance also m ­ atters less t­ oday ­because Japan’s post-1990 regional reassurance strategy has been successful. Nonetheless, for Japan, reassurance still ­matters for several reasons. First, reassurance is not only about demonstrating that Japan is a more benign actor than China. It is also about showing that Japan is at least as benign an actor as the US. Indeed, since 1945 the implicit question for the region has not been, Would we prefer that American aircraft carriers and marines ­were replaced by Chinese ones? It has been, Would we prefer to see US aircraft carriers and marines be replaced by Japa­nese ones?13 Although China’s rise has rendered this latter question less urgent, it has not rendered it moot. Certainly, in some East Asian nations, and even among US allies, mistrust of Japan as a military power remains. As one former US Defense Department official with experience in the region put it, Japan’s history of expansionism remains “in the background.”14 Another former Pentagon official referred to continued “bone-­deep” mistrust of Japan in South ­Korea.15 South ­Korea is undoubtedly the leading example of this mistrust as a country that continues to almost entirely reject any direct military cooperation with Japan.16 Even in Southeast Asia, where perceptions of Japan as a military power are much more benign than in Northeast Asia, growing trust and security cooperation have not led to invitations for direct SDF military involvement or deployments in the region,17 at least not yet. Second, as David Kang has argued, East Asian countries have a long history of experience with a regionally dominant China and found ­those periods to be more profitable eco­nom­ically than threatening to their survival. A similar view was articulated in 1993 by Philippine senator Anna Dominique Coseteng, who claimed that although the Chinese “have been around the Philippines for 3,000 years, [they] have not shown any signs of wanting to control government policies or interfere in our affairs.”18 Although perceptions of a Chinese threat have been growing in the region since Kang published his argument in 2007 in China Rising,19 ­these perceptions remain far from fixed in many East Asian countries. The relative ease with which the Philippines shifted from a confrontational stance ­toward China to a more conciliatory posture ­under President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 is an indicator that perceptions of China remain relatively fluid. Again, an even clearer example is South K ­ orea, where opinion polls and other indicators suggest that threat perceptions of Japan, despite its being a fellow democracy, have often outstripped threat perceptions ­toward China. ­There is also a debate about w ­ hether China has actually become more aggressive in its foreign policy be­hav­ior.20 While the regional discourse about strategic intentions

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t­oday is overwhelmingly focused on China and w ­ hether, or to what degree, it has aggressive intentions, and ­there is ­little discussion about Japan in the same context, it nevertheless benefits Japan to continue to reassure its neighbors about its benign disposition as a military power by avoiding unilateral military actions and working through regional security multilateralism, regional minilateralism, and the US alliance. Fi­nally, even when Japan does fully overcome the reputational hangover of its pre-1945 be­hav­ior, as a power­ful regional actor it would still have an incentive to continue reassuring o­ thers about its benign intentions, as this is a general incentive that applies to all major powers, if not all states, ­under the anarchical international system in which they reside. ­Others’ beliefs in the state’s benign intentions are an asset that discourages ­others from counterbalancing the state while si­mul­ta­neously, along with other attributes, making the state appear as an attractive security partner.21 By building ­others’ trust in the benign nature of one’s intentions, the state can largely escape the security dilemma. Japan, with its strong security-­dilemma sensibility derived from the ashes of its defeat in the Pacific War and its long postwar effort to overcome its aggressive reputation in East Asia, has as keener understanding of this than does any other major power in East Asia or globally. China, Rus­sia, and the US (especially since the turn of the c­ entury) ­ought to learn from Japan’s example and be more conscious of the benefits of maintaining a benign reputation and not appearing aggressive.

Whither Japa­nese Leadership in Security Multilateralism? All indications point to Japan continuing to champion regional security multilateralism, even as the post–­Cold War environment of unipolarity is now giving rise to a new bi­polar­ity. Tokyo is likely to continue stressing Asia-­Pacific, and now especially Indo-­Pacific, regional security multilateralism and regional security minilateralism, most notably the Quad framework between Japan, the US, Australia, and India. All ­these forms are, at least for Japan, centered on East Asia. Moreover, Japan w ­ ill continue to participate in and even champion some narrower East Asian forms of regional po­ liti­cal and security multilateralism, most notably among the NEA 3, although security cooperation within this framework ­will likely remain ­limited mostly to nontraditional security for now. Japan is the best-­positioned power to continue championing broad regional security multilateralism. ­After China, it remains the most power­ful regional actor, and the pole around which countries that worry about China are likely to gravitate. Moreover, the US, with the notable exception of President Bill Clinton’s APEC summit initiative of 1993, has not been a leader in promoting regional po­liti­cal, and especially security, multilateralism. This appears unlikely to change. As even some Washington Asia hands observe, the US lacks sufficient interest and suffers from a ­limited or short attention span, and “Japan has a finer grained understanding of East Asian region,” with top

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po­liti­cal attention still more focused on Eu­rope and the ­Middle East.22 Indeed, this is why regional security multilateralism has been so impor­tant for keeping the US regionally engaged. The Shangri-­La Dialogue and the ADMM-­Plus ensure regular visits to East Asia by the US secretary of defense, while the ARF and PMC usually ensure at least an annual visit to the region by the secretary of state, and the EAS often attracts the participation of the president.23 ­These deficiencies in US leadership have only worsened u ­ nder the Trump administration, which lacks a coherent vision or policy ­toward the region beyond domestic trade concerns, and which failed long a­ fter taking office even to appoint many top Asia-­related positions at the State Department and at regional embassies. Overall, multilateral and regional engagement have not been priorities. Consequently, Japan ­will continue to be the key leader in regional security and po­liti­cal multilateralism. Its main competitor has been, and ­will likely remain, ASEAN, as ASEAN centrality in regional multilateralism persists, a centrality that Japan itself has done much to build. Nonetheless, ASEAN has become more divided in recent years, as views of regional security have become more polarized between ­those with a more or less skeptical view of China. This negatively affects ASEAN leadership and leaves more of an opening for Japa­nese leadership. China itself might be emerging as a competitor for leadership in promoting regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism. It has already taken over from Japan in leading narrower East Asian multilateralism, especially through the APT. Beijing has been promoting the APT as the main form of regional multilateralism, whereas Japan has been deemphasizing the APT since 2005. China has already assumed a leadership role in promoting regional economic multilateralism, arguably filling a vacuum left in the wake of the successful US-­led effort to defeat Japan’s 1997 AMF proposal. Beijing has filled this void by successfully launching the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the related B ­ elt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has also successfully established a regional multilateral po­liti­cal institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, covering Central Asia, together with Rus­sia. Beijing has also been exercising its own leadership in promoting regional security multilateralism. The earliest proposals, as discussed in Chapter 8, date back to the turn of the c­ entury when China proposed expanding the ARF to allow for a greater role for uniformed military officials. More recently, China has been proposing changing the regional security architecture in ways that are consistent with its Five Princi­ples of Peaceful Coexistence, most notably including noninterference in the internal affairs of o­ thers, and with the ASEAN Way. Beijing calls for the replacement of regional Cold War alliances with partnerships. China, while often bowing to, if not promoting, continued ASEAN centrality in East Asian regional security multilateralism, has been advocating for a new regional security architecture that is less dependent on the US-­centered hub-­and-­spokes structure,

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arguing that Asians should be responsible for their own security.24 This is reflected in President Xi Jinping’s 2014 statement that “security prob­lems in Asia should be solved by Asians themselves through cooperation,” a clear reference to replacing the US-­centered structure with a more Asian-­centered system.25 Concretely, China has been promoting a regional defense-­ministry-­centric dialogue, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, an annual track 1.5 dialogue, as a competitor to the Shangri-­La Dialogue,26 if not eventually to the ADMM-­Plus. While China’s regional economic multilateral initiatives, and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, have realized some success, its regional multilateral security proposals have so far made l­ittle headway, in part b­ ecause of concern that they, like the Xiangshan Forum, might actually not be ASEAN-­centric, and ­because of larger fears that they would lock in excessive Chinese dominance. Indeed, t­hose concerns ­will likely ensure the continued dominance of ASEAN-­centric regional security and po­liti­cal multilateralism and cause many, if not most, Asian nations to look to Japan for leadership in regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism. Another reason why Japan is well positioned to continue to exert leadership in regional security through regional security multilateralism is that the US provides backing for that leadership. Despite claims that the US is suspicious of Japan’s leadership in promoting regional security multilateralism, and even dubious of regional security multilateralism such as the ARF or the ADMM-­Plus as potentially threatening the continuation of the US-­Japan alliance or undermining the hub-­and-­spokes architecture, in fact the US has been very supportive of Japan’s leadership in regional security multilateralism. One former Department of Defense official from the Obama administration, when asked about Japan’s leadership in promoting regional security multilateralism, replied, “All for it! Bring it on! I love Japa­nese leadership on t­hese ­things! They are a real partner. We have no concern with them taking the lead.”27 As discussed e­ arlier, US officials have agreed with their Japa­nese counter­parts that the ARF, the ADMM-­Plus, the EAS, and other regional multilateral security and po­liti­cal forums complement the US-­Japan alliance rather than compete with it.28 According to a former high-­ranking Pentagon official, “I see no trade off with the bilateral alliance. The US no longer needs to be the hub for the spokes. This is all about gathering like-­minded states versus the PRC [­People’s Republic of China]. . . . ​It’s the co­ali­tion that ­matters.”29 US officials thus see regional security multilateralism, including the ARF, as an impor­tant arena for balancing against China’s influence in the region.30 As early as 2001, commander in chief of the US Pacific Command Admiral Dennis C. Blair publicly argued in ­favor of abandoning the “hub-­and-­spoke” structure of US-­centered bilateral security ties in f­ avor of building “a more open web of security relations” through “extended patterns of dialogue and cooperation.”31

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According to one former official with close ties to the Obama administration, it was the George W. Bush administration that first began to take the ARF seriously, seeing it as a valuable forum for combating Islamic extremist terrorism in Southeast Asia in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Other US officials see the ADMM-­Plus as being more impor­tant than the ARF, viewing the ARF not as being hamstrung by consensus rules (as is the ADMM-­Plus) but rather as simply being too big.32 Ironically, the Abe administration’s development and championing of the Indo-­Pacific concept enhances the importance of the ARF, negating previous criticism of it for containing too many South Asian states with ­little relevance for East Asian security, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Although the Trump administration has been very negative t­ oward regional economic multilateralism, it has nonetheless been positive t­ oward regional security multilateralism.33 Nonetheless, in the wake of the Trump administration’s lack of leadership in the region, and its exacerbated attention and resource deficits, Japan has become more active in regional security multilateralism. According to one former US defense official, “Japan is rushing to fill the gap left by the current lack of US leadership.”34 In the current favorable environment, with a lack of US regional leadership, coupled with support for Japan’s leadership role championing regional security multilateralism, a role that dates back to its 1991 Nakayama proposal and pivot away from regional security isolationism, Japan’s leadership in East Asian security multilateralism looks set to continue, if not expand.

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Notes

in trod u cti on 1.  ASEAN at that time consisted of six nations: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. From the mid-1990s ASEAN expanded to include four more states: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. 2.  Japa­nese MOFA diplomat, interview with author, July 1991. The Fukuda Doctrine can be considered a security initiative only in the negative sense that it promised that Japan would play no regional security role. It did not even envisage Japan discussing security with its neighbors. 3.  The Nakayama proposal and most, although not all, of Japan’s subsequent multilateral security initiatives w ­ ere aimed at creating or expanding ASEAN institutions to deal with security issues in East Asia. This reflects the centrality of ASEAN in East Asian security multilateralism. This centrality, and Japan’s role in helping to create and sustain it, is discussed at length in this book’s subsequent chapters. 4.  Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Subregional Security and Defence Linkages with ASEAN, South ­Korea and China in the 1990s,” Pacific Review 9, no. 2 (1996): 232. 5.  John King Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 6.  Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Prince­ ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2016); Kuniko Ashizawa, “Japan’s Approach ­Toward Asian Regional Security: From ‘Hub-­and-­Spoke’ Bilateralism to ‘Multi-­Tiered,’ ” Pacific Review 16, no. 3 (September 2003): 361–382; John S. Duffield, “Why Is ­There No APTO? Why Is ­There No OSCAP? Asia-­Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective,” Con­temporary Security Policy 22, no. 2 (August 2001): 69–95; Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is ­There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organ­ization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575–607. See Chapter 3 for a description of this early Cold War evolution from multilateral security proposals t­ oward the hub-­and-­spokes structure. 7.  David Youtz and Paul Midford, A Northeast Asian Security Regime: Prospects A ­ fter the Cold War (New York: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1992). Also see Chapter 4 of this book. 8.  A track 1 dialogue is an official dialogue among states, with government officials participating in their official capacities and representing their respective governments. A track 2 dialogue includes government officials participating in their private capacities (not as official representatives of their governments), along with scholars, journalists, businesspeople, and ­others. A track 1.5 dialogue is essentially a track 1 dialogue masquerading as a track 2

178

Not es to Introdu ct io n

dialogue, where, in theory, government officials participate in their private capacities but are representing their governments de facto. Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance,” Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 367–397; Hiro Katsumata, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a ‘Talking Shop’ or a ‘Norm Brewery’?,” Pacific Review 19, no. 2 ( June 2006): 181–198; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Neither Skepticism Nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-­Pacific Assurance Game,” Pacific Review 19, no. 2 ( June 2006): 219–237. 9.  Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role”; Yukio Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte: Ajia-­taiheyō chiiki no anzen hoshō,” Gaikō Forum 64 ( January 1994): 12–18; Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheyō chiiki to takokukan anzen hoshō kyōryoku no wakugumi: ASEAN chiiki forumu wo chūshin ni,” Kokusai Mondai 415 (October 1994): 60–68; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in Japa­nese Security Policy: The Case of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Pacific Review 10, no. 4 (1997): 480–503. 10.  Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role.” 11.  Regarding Japan’s overall reassurance strategy, see Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s ­Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 1–43. Regarding the ARF and (re)assurance generally, see Kawasaki, “Neither Skepticism Nor Romanticism.” 12. ­After Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role,” Takeshi Yuzawa’s 2007 book dedicates ­seventeen pages to discussing the Nakayama proposal and eleven pages to Japan’s subsequent initiatives leading to the establishment of the ARF; see Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2007). In her 2013 book, Kuniko Ashizawa spends thirty-­six pages discussing the Nakayama proposal and follow-up initiatives. See Ashizawa, Japan, the US, and Regional Institution-­Building in the New Asia: When Identity ­Matters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 123–159. The pre­sent book makes use of extensive archival and interview sources that neither Yuzawa nor Ashizawa used. 13.  Alexis Dudden, Troubled Apologies Among Japan, ­Korea, and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); George Hicks, Japan’s Memories: Amnesia or Concealment (New York: Routledge, 1997); Thomas U. Berger, “The Construction of Antagonism: The History Prob­lem in Japan’s Foreign Relations,” in Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-­Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 63–84; Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Prob­lem of Memory,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November 1998): 37–49; Joshua Keating, “How Bad Is Japan’s Historical Amnesia?,” Foreign Policy, June 11, 2013, https://­foreignpolicy​.­com​/­2013​/­06​/­11​/­how​-­bad​ -­is​-­japans​-­historical​-­amnesia​/­. 14.  See Chapter 1 for the distinction between historical and military reassurance. 15.  NEA 3 refers to the trilateral pro­cess between China, Japan, and South K ­ orea that emerged around the turn of the c­ entury. This is also known as the Trilateral Cooperation, and features a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, but ­because of the opaque nature of ­these labels, this book refers to this trilateral cooperation pro­cess as the Northeast Asian 3 (NEA 3). For more on this, see Chapter 8. 16.  For ­earlier studies making this point, see Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role”; and Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Multilateralism,” in East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 168–198.



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17. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 7–9. 18.  Ibid., 171–173; Patrick Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994), 21–60; Christopher W. Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, “U.S.-­Japan Security Relations: ­Toward Bilateralism Plus?,” in Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-­Japan Relations in the New Asia-­Pacific, ed. Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 55–86, at 78, 80. 19.  This view found its clearest expression in ASEAN’s initial reaction to the Nakayama proposal. See Chapter 5. For a review of alternative competing explanations, see Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 5–10. 20. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 150–157; Takeshi Yuzawa, “Japan’s Changing Conception of the ASEAN Regional Forum: From an Optimistic Liberal to a Pessimistic Realist Perspective,” Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (December 2005): 463–497. 21. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 8. Yuzawa also dismisses the importance of Japan reassuring its neighbors, ibid., 168. 22.  Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japa­nese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992); Hidekazu Wakatsugi, “Zenhōi gaikō” no jidai: Reisen henyōki no Nihon to Ajia 1971–1980 nen (Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2006); Lam Peng Er, ed., Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013). 23.  See Chapter 6. 24.  On conducting “intrinsic case studies,” see Robert Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (London: Sage, 1995). This can also be described as a disciplined configurative study, which involves using established theories to explain a case. See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 75. 25.  Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Po­liti­cal Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64–65; Andrew Bennett, “Pro­cess Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 207–220. 26.  Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Pro­cess Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices,” in Pro­cess Tracing: From Meta­phor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 6, quoting George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 6. Bennett and Checkel demur that this definition may be inadequate in ­those cases where intermediate variables do not add to, subtract from, or alter the causal force of the in­de­pen­dent variable, and argue that in such cases they rather constitute “diagnostic evidence.” The pre­sent book prefers the term causally neutral intervening variables. Bennett and Checkel, “Pro­cess Tracing,” 6–7. 27.  Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, 337–338; Jonathon W. Moses and Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Po­liti­cal Research (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 97–106. 28.  Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, 356; Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-­Qualitative Divide,” in Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, 108. 29.  Layna Mosley, “Introduction: ‘Just Talk to P ­ eople’? Interviews in Con­temporary Po­liti­ cal Science,” in Interview Research in Po­liti­cal Science, ed. Layna Mosley (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 31–44; Cathie Jo Martin, “Crafting Interviews to Capture Cause and Effect,” in Mosley, Interview Research in Po­liti­cal Science, 109–124.

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cha pt er  1 1.  Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 731–764, at 731, 732. 2.  Keohane labels Ruggie’s definition of multilateralism as “supralateralism” and cites Ruggie himself as acknowledging that this definition is an “extremely demanding” definition “requiring more self-­abnegation than typically found in international regimes.” Ibid., 732n2. 3.  See John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism Maters: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in Multilateralism ­Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3–49. 4.  Ibid.; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 163; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Neither Skepticism Nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-­Pacific Assurance Game,” Pacific Review 19, no. 2 ( June 2006): 219–237, at 221, 228–229. To the extent that ­there is nondiscrimination among members, one might claim that ­there is a degree of indivisibility within the functional range covered by the multilateral institution. This definition allows for only a very ­limited degree of diffuse reciprocity, except to the extent that members vary in the speed with which they meet expectations set by the multilateral institution. 5.  J. Martin Rochester, “Global Policy and the ­Future of the United Nations,” Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 2 (1990): 143. 6.  Kuniko Ashizawa, “Australia-­Japan-­US Trilateral Security Dialogue and the ARF: Extended Bilateralism or a New Minilateral Option?” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 2008), 4. On the often indistinct border between minilateralism and multilateralism, including inside multilateral forums, see Miles Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” International Organ­ization 46, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 681–708. For similar definitions with specific application to East Asian security, see Sheila A. Smith, “Beyond the ‘Post–­Cold War’? U.S.-­Japan Alliance and the ­Future of Asia-­Pacific Security,” in Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-­Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 117, 123–124; and in the same volume, Victor D. Cha, “Multilateral Security in Asia and the U.S.-­Japan Alliance,” 153–154. 7.  United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-­Pacific Region 1998 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of lnternational Security Affairs, 1998), 43, as quoted in Cha, “Multilateral Security,” 153. 8.  Regarding this example of trilateral minilateralism, see Ashizawa, “Australia-­Japan-­US,” 4. Regarding the Quad, see Chapter 8. 9.  David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994): 1–15, at 5; Matake Kamiya, “Alliance Reform and Regional Reactions,” in Ikenberry and Inoguchi, Reinventing the Alliance, 103. 10.  Inis L. Claude Jr., “Collective Security as an Approach to Peace,” in Swords into Plowshares: The Prob­lems and Pro­gress of International Organ­ization (New York: McGraw Hill, 1984), 353–364; Stephen M. Walt, “Multilateral Collective Security Arrangements,” in Security Studies for the 1990s, ed. Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993), 245. 11.  The concept of “common security” dates to 1980s Cold War Eu­rope, and especially the Palme Commission. See In­de­pen­dent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 7–11. 12.  Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive,” 4–5; Kamiya, “Alliance Reform,” 102–103; Ashton B. Car­ter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security,



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Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); Takako Ueta, “Kyocho-­teki anzenhosho toha nani ka,” Sekai, August 1995, 258; Sugio Takahashi, “Redefinition of Cooperative Security and ‘Regional’ Security in the Asia-­Pacific,” NIDS Security Reports 1 (March 2000): 101–115, at 106. 13.  Takahashi, “Redefinition of Cooperative Security,” 106. 14.  Kawasaki, “Neither Skepticism Nor Romanticism,” 221, 228–229. 15.  Kamiya, “Alliance Reform,” 102–103; Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive,” 5. 16.  Representative works of neoliberal institutionalism include Ruggie, Multilateralism ­Matters; Robert O. Keohane, ­After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Po­liti­cal Economy (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1984); and Keohane, International Institutions. 17.  Major defensive realist works include Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and Stephen Van Evera, ­Causes of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). 18.  Although postclassical realism does not focus on international institutions, and does not see them as changing state be­hav­ior, it is open to the use of institutions for providing information that can reduce the probability of war resulting from the security dilemma. See Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japa­nese Security Policy,” Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 221–240, at 223–224. See Stephen Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organ­ization 51, no. 3 (1997): 445–478, at 446, 456, 462, where Brooks argues that postclassical realism recognizes the role of economic institutions in reducing transaction costs. He also notes that postclassical realism and neoliberal institutionalism are potentially complementary, as they may contribute “dif­fer­ent ele­ments of the answers to certain questions” (470). 19.  Yuzawa overstates the skepticism of realism ­toward common security multilateralism. First, he equates realism with offensive realism, its most pessimistic variant. In fact, other variants, such as defensive realism and neoclassical realism, see a greater role for security multi­ lateralism. Moreover, it is hard to describe Japa­nese security policy as offensive realist. See Eivind Lande, “Between Offensive and Defense Realism—­The Abe Government’s Security Policy ­Toward China,” Asian Security 14, no. 2 (2018): 172–192. Second, Yuzawa argues that multilateral security institutions “basically have no effect” on state be­hav­ior or avoiding war, ­because such institutions fail to deflect state “calculations of self-­interest based on international distribution of power.” Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2007), 8. This is essentially a strawman, as theories of common security, and neoliberal institutionalism, do not claim that such institutions ­will override the balance of power. This characterization also ignores the crucial role that institutions are hypothesized to play: providing information about the security environment that can help states avoid misperceptions and miscalculations, similar to the role that traditional diplomacy plays, though at its best, security multilateralism may be significantly more efficient at providing information than traditional diplomacy. Even offensive realism recognizes institutions as an “intervening variable” affecting the chances of war, as well as that states “sometimes operate through institutions.” John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995): 13. 20.  Takahashi, “Redefinition of Cooperative Security,” 106. Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive,” 7, suggests that Canada largely developed the concept of cooperative security as a concept applicable to the Asia-­Pacific region at the end of the Cold War. 21.  Kamiya, “Alliance Reform,” 102–103. 22.  Ibid., 104.

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23.  Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive,” 9. Takahashi, “Redefinition of Cooperative Security,” 107, suggests that even economic development is included in cooperative security. 24.  On the other hand, Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive,” 7–8, claims that cooperative security can be less institutionalized and more focused on dialogue than a well-­institutionalized structure such as CSCE/OSCE. 25.  Several former and current US policy makers and analysts in the State and Defense Departments with responsibility for East Asian security told me that the ARF and ADMM-­Plus ­were useful for enhancing the efficiency of counterbalancing efforts against China. Based on interviews conducted in Washington, DC, November 14, 15, 17, 2017. See Chapter 8. 26.  While acknowledging this role in a backhanded way, Yuzawa oddly implies that realists dismiss the power implications of security multilateralism. Such institutions are “mere tools for maintaining or expanding their own national interests” (emphasis added). Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 8. In fact, realism, especially offensive realism, naturally holds that states w ­ ill value ­every power tool at their disposal. 27.  Hiro Katsumata, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a ‘Talking Shop’ or a ‘Norm Brewery’?,” Pacific Review 19, no. 2 ( June 2006): 181–198. 28.  Smith, “Beyond the ‘Post–­Cold War’?,” 123. 29.  Major constructivist works include Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organ­ization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425; and Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 88, no. 2 ( June 1994): 384–396. Regarding security communities, see Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Prob­lem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001). 30.  See Timo Kivimaki, “East Asian Relative Peace and the ASEAN Way,” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 57–85, at 62–68. Also see Mikael Weissmann, The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 31.  Evelyn Goh, “­Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/8): 113–157, at 120–121. For a similar constructivist interpretation of ASEAN’s aims in establishing the ARF, see Katsumata, “Establishment.” 32.  Goh, “­Great Powers,” 123. 33. Ibid. 34.  Regarding this dilemma and Japa­nese foreign policy, see Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s G ­ rand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 1–43. This can also be thought of as an exacerbated form of a reassurance versus deterrence or balancing dilemma. 35.  Regarding the alliance dilemma, see Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). 36.  Regarding po­liti­cal and economic entrapment, see Galia Press-­Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon: NATO ­Under Unipolarity,” Security Studies 15, no. 2 (April–­June 2006): 271–309, at 280–281. 37. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, largely overlooks the importance of this forum for Japan in reassuring Southeast Asian nations and attempting to attract ­these states ­toward it and the US and away from China. 38. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, when looking at how MOFA evaluates and uses the ARF, only examines the potential for Japan to make gains through the ARF (such as by promoting



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preventive diplomacy or more stringent CBMs) and largely omits consideration of how Japa­nese diplomats use the ARF to avoid losses—­for example, by preventing Sino-­ASEAN cooperation on issues such as US-Japan missile defense plans. 39.  Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” International Organ­ization 41, no. 1 (1987): 27–60; Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S. Soviet Relations During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Midford, “Logic of Reassurance.” 40. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 27. 41. Tang, Theory of Security Strategy, 132. 42.  Midford, “Logic of Reassurance,” 36–40. Also see Chapters 2–8 of this book. 43.  Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 7. The security dilemma, in brief, is the situation when “the existence of weapons in the hands of one state can provoke at least uncertainty and possibly real fear in o­ thers even when t­ hose weapons are not intended to be used except for self-­protection (following an attack, or in the event of a threat of an attack)” (ibid., 1; emphasis in the original). For the classic statement on the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation ­Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 ( January 1978): 167–214. 44.  Reassurance policies can result from two sources: an awareness of the security dilemma from whence security dilemma sensibility stems, and the recognition that states generally balance against ­those perceived to harbor aggressive intentions, as spelled out in Walt’s balance of threat theory (see the discussion in this chapter). 45.  Paul Midford, “Historical Memory Versus Demo­cratic Reassurance: The Security Relationship Between Japan and South K ­ orea,” in Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Japan-­South ­Korea Relations, ed. Marie Söderberg (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010), 77–98, at 79. 46.  Ibid. Apologies and attempts to devise history textbooks and history museums that portray a common understanding of history are examples of historical reassurance mea­sures. Regarding apologies, see Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). 47.  Thomas U. Berger was the first scholar to distinguish between pacifism and what he calls Japan’s antimilitarist culture of distrusting the military and civilian control thereof. See Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-­militarism,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–150. Nonetheless, the public’s antimilitarism has not prevented it from embracing the postwar SDF and their missions of disaster relief and territorial defense, at least since the 1960s. See Paul Midford, “The GSDF’s Quest for Public Ac­cep­tance and the ‘Allergy’ Myth,” in The Japa­nese Ground Self-­Defense Forces: Search for Legitimacy, ed. Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford (New York: Palgrave, 2017): 297–346. The lesson the Japa­nese public drew from its war­time experiences is that military power may have utility for territorial defense, but not as a foreign policy tool or in offensive uses overseas, attitudes that can be called defensive realist. See Paul Midford, Rethinking Japa­nese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 48.  Kenichi Itō, “Futatsu no shōgeki” to nihon: “shōsha naki heiwa” no “shinsekai, chitsujo” wo motomete (Tokyo: PHP, 1991), 117–118. Besides meaning “aggressor,” the term kagaisha (加害者) could also be translated as “assailant” or “perpetrator.” 49.  Walt breaks down material capabilities into vari­ous components, including offensive military capabilities, and geo­graph­i­cal location. For the purposes of this study, t­ hese are combined into aggregate material capabilities. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 22–25. Walt does not say which ­matters more, perceived aggressiveness or the distribution of capabilities. A revised version

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of balance-­of-­threat theory, balance-­of-­malevolence theory, argues that perceived aggressiveness ­matters more. See Paul Midford, “China Views the Revised US-­Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?,” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 4 (2004): 113–145. 50.  David M. Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of ­Great Powers,” Security Studies 12, no. 1 (Autumn 2002): 1–40, at 3. Similarly, Robert Jervis defines “basic intentions” as a goal and the “willingness to run risks and make sacrifices to further this goal.” See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1976), 50. 51.  Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty,” 3. 52.  On the latter point, see Lee Ross and Craig Anderson, “Shortcomings in the Attribution Pro­cess: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments,” in Judgment ­Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 129–152. On how states get dispositional reputations, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 7. For several examples of this phenomenon in the context of international politics, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 68, 164–165. 53.  See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 35–44; and Svenn Lindskold, “Trust Development, the GRIT Proposal, and the Effects of Conciliatory Acts on Conflict and Cooperation,” Psychological Bulletin 85 (1978): 772–793, at 774. 54.  Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,” Journal of Personality and Social Psy­chol­ogy 37, no. 11 (1979): 2098–2109. Also see Ross and Anderson, “Shortcomings.” 55.  Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New ­Great Powers ­Will Rise,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5–51. 56. Tang, Theory of Security Strategy, 129. 57. ­These characteristics of effective reassurance are derived from the social-­psychological strategy known as graduated reciprocation in tension reduction, or GRIT. See Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Osgood, “Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, no. 4 (December 1959): 295–325; Lindskold, “Trust Development,” 774; and Larson, “Crisis Prevention,” 33. 58.  Joseph M. Grieco develops a realist theory of “self-­binding” based on a compatible logic by which a power­ful state may choose to bind itself to a multilateral institution, acting through that institution rather than unilaterally to elicit greater cooperation from o­ thers. See Grieco, “Understanding the Prob­lem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the ­Future of Realist Theory,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Con­ temporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 338. 59. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 307. 60.  Ibid., 160. Also see Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-­ Korea-­Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 38. 61. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 308. 62. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 39. 63. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181. 64.  Ibid., 315. 65.  Press-­Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” 280; Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 486–489. 66.  Press-­Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” 280.



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67.  Examples of Japa­nese economic entrapment include its inability to support Malaysia’s proposed EAEG b­ ecause of US opposition, and the fact that it felt compelled to heavi­ly underwrite the US Gulf War effort. 68.  Press-­Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” 280–281. 69. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 313. 70.  Ibid., 315. 71.  Similarly, Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 46, finds that two states in alliance with a larger power but not with each other nonetheless have an incentive to increase their level of bilateral cooperation when facing a symmetrical fear of abandonment by their common ally. 72.  Press-­Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” 285–286. 73.  In the mid-1980s Nishihara Masashi proposed a multilateral forum of US allies in the western Pacific to cooperate in bearing the costs of continued forward deployment of US military forces in East Asia, thereby taking the issue outside a strictly bilateral context where it often became linked to bilateral economic conflicts. Masashi Nishihara, Senraku kenkyū no shikaku (Tokyo: Ningen no kagakusha, 1988), 274–275. 74.  A former se­nior US Defense Department official who attended ADMM-­Plus meetings argued, “ADMM Plus is good for US defense leaders, ­because it offers us one-­stop shopping. Besides the ADMM Plus meeting itself, where we get exposed to regional views and the collective dynamics of ASEAN and its dialogue partners, we can have a series of bilateral and trilateral meetings with the ten ASEAN states, and even with some of the dialogue partners.” He argued further that the ADMM-­Plus meeting, along with the Shangri-­La Dialogue in Singapore, “helped anchor se­nior US officials to regional security: both meetings justify the very long trip from Washington.” Former se­nior US Defense Department official, interview with author, November 15, 2017. 75. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 308, 313. 76.  Snyder identifies a normative “halo” effect of alliances that expands their influence on the members of that alliance. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 350–364. On “Gulliver” incentives for promoting multilateralism as a way to tie down an ally, see Cha, “Multilateral Security in Asia,” 151–152; and Ellis S. Krauss, “Japan, the US, and the Emergence of Multilateralism in Asia,” Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 483–484. 77.  Cha, “Multilateral Security in Asia,” 151. 78.  Arguably this reflected the Demo­cratic Party of Japan’s differing international outlook compared with the previously ruling Liberal Demo­cratic Party (LDP) and was foreshadowed by the Demo­cratic Party of Japan’s use of its control of the upper ­house to temporarily disrupt the SDF’s ongoing deployment to the Indian Ocean to refuel US and allied naval vessels “involved” in combat operations in Af­ghan­i­stan. 79.  See the Conclusion for further discussion of this point. 80.  Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Layering Institutions: The Logic of Japan’s Institutional Strategy for Regional Security,” in The Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 78. 81.  Cha, “Multilateral Security in Asia,” 147. 82.  See Beatrice Heuser and Harold Simpson, “The Missing Po­liti­cal Dimension of Military Exercises,” RUSI Journal 162, no. 2 (2017): 1–9. According to Chiyuki Aoi, “Japan tries to send the message of deterrence through engagement to t­hose deemed adversarial in certain contexts (such as, most notably, in the China Seas), by accentuating partnerships by that Japan has cultivated.” See Aoi, “Japa­nese Strategic Communication: Its Significance as a Po­liti­cal Tool,” Defense Strategic Communications 3 (Autumn 2017): 88 (emphasis in the original).

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83.  Kamiya, “Alliance Reform,” 107. 84.  Ashizawa, “Australia-­Japan-­US.” 85.  Australia, India, Japan, and the US. See Ankit Panda, “US, Japan India, and Australia Hold Working-­Level Quadrilateral Meeting on Regional Cooperation,” Diplomat, November 13, 2017, https://­thediplomat​.­com​/­2017​/­11​/­us​-­japan​-­india​-­and​-­australia​-­hold​-­working​-­level​ -­quadrilateral​-­meeting​-­on​-­regional​-­cooperation​/­. 86.  Yukio Satoh, “The ­Future Nature of US Influence in Western Eu­rope and North-­East Asia: A View from the Asia-­Pacific Region,” in Adelphi Paper 256: Amer­i­ca’s Role in a Changing World, Part 1 (London: IISS, 1990/91), 43. See also Chapters 3–5 for Satoh’s multiplex concept. However, this concept remains underdeveloped, as it is l­ittle more than a descriptor for the multiplicity of multilateral frameworks. 87.  Christopher W. Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, “U.S.-­Japan Security Relations: ­Toward Bilateralism Plus?,” in Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-­Japan Relations in the New Asia-­Pacific, ed. Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 55–86, at 78, 80. 88.  Ibid., 79. 89. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 168. 90.  Ibid., 171. 91.  MOFA, “Japan-­US Joint Declaration on Security-­Alliance for the 21st ­Century,” April 17, 1996, 2, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­region​/­n​-­america​/­us​/­security​/­security​.­html; and MOFA, “National Defense Program Outline in and ­after FY1996,” 1–3, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­policy​ /­security​/­defense96​/­. 92.  Patrick Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994), 2. 93. Ibid. 94.  Ibid., 9. 95.  Kawasaki, “Layering Institutions,” 78. 96.  Ibid., 79. 97.  Cha, “Multilateral Security in Asia,” 147. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100.  Ibid. Cha, ibid., notes an explicit statement by US secretary of state Madeleine Albright in 1999 that endorsed using East Asian security multilateralism to tackle maritime piracy, transnational crime, and h ­ uman trafficking. During nearly a dozen interviews with former and current US policy makers and analysts in November 2017, I could not find anyone who thought regional security multilateralism and the US-­Japan alliance ­were in any way incompatible. A former adviser to Barack Obama credited the George W. Bush administration with recognizing “the ARF as the place to go to address real issues, like counterterrorism, and for starting the policy of sending high level administration officials to ARF meetings.” Former adviser to Barack Obama, interview with author, November 17, 2017. 101.  Kawasaki, “Layering Institutions,” 78. 102.  Ibid., 96. 103.  Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Po­liti­cal Change: Soviet/Rus­sian Be­hav­ior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), xii. 104.  Ibid., 11. 105.  Ibid., 12. 106.  Ibid., 11. 107.  Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2015), 1.



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108.  Moreover, the US developed a hub-­and-­spokes system of regional bilateral alliances with itself as the hub, both to contain Communist bloc expansionism and to reassure East Asian states over concerns about a renewed Japa­nese threat. See the next chapter. 109.  Midford, “China Views.” This function parallels Itō’s conception of constitutional self-­constraints on Japan’s defense (which he labels as passive pacifism) as means to prevent Japan from again becoming an “aggressor.” Itō, “Futatsu no shōgeki” to nihon, 117–118. Regarding the use of an alliance to constrain a partner, or a pacta de contrahendo, see Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Historical Dimensions of National Security Prob­lems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 227–262; and Patricia A. Weitsman, “Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 156–192. 110.  The combination of ­these two forms of constraint on Japan’s military is sometimes referred to in Japa­nese as the kyūjō-­anpo taisei, or the Article 9 Security Alliance system. See Tetsuya Sakai, “ ‘Kyūjō-­anpo taisei’ no shūen—­sengo nihon gaikō to seitō seiji,” Kokusai Mondai 372 (March 1991): 32–45. cha pt er  2 1.  For classic studies of Japan’s passive Cold War–­era defense posture, see Martin E. Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 1947–1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Post-­war American Alliance System (London: Athlone, 1988). 2.  ODA is aid that ostensibly complies with the standards laid down by the Development Aid Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD). On Japan’s ODA during the Cold War, see Robert Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 3.  The non-­Communist Southeast Asian nations, except for Indonesia, ­were in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organ­ization (SEATO), and Malaysia and Singapore are in the Five Power Defense Arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. South ­Korea not only sent troops to South Vietnam but also tried to form a multilateral military alliance in the mid-1960s through the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) (see the discussion ­later in this chapter). 4.  On Japan’s reputational prob­lem during the Cold War, see Barry Buzan, “Japan’s ­Future: Old History Versus New Roles,” International Affairs 64, no. 4 (1988): 557–573; Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japa­nese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992); Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s G ­ rand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 1–43; and Masashi Nishihara, “Japan, a Power Misperceived in Southeast Asia,” in Po­liti­cal and Security Cooperation: A New Dimension in ASEAN-­Japan Relations, ed. Frances Fung, Wai Lai, and Charles E. Morrison (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1987), 85–101. 5.  See Chapter 1 for discussion of this point. 6.  See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the security dilemma. 7. Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 49, 50–51; Michael M. Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 53–54; Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2016), 123, 183–184, 207; Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 59–61. 8. Pyle, The Japa­nese Question, 23–24, 53–54. 9.  Regarding the third-­party reassurance effects of a bilateral alliance, see Chapter 1 and Paul Midford, “China Views the Revised US-­Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?,” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 4 (2004): 113–145. “­Bottle logic” refers to a famous

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statement by the commander of the US Marines in Japan in 1990, who suggested that US troops should remain in Japan to prevent a return of Japa­nese militarism: “No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So we are a cap in the b­ ottle, if you w ­ ill.” Fred Hiatt, “Marine General: U.S. Troops Must Stay in Japan,” Washington Post, March 27, 1990. 10.  Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 1945–1952: The Occupation and the Peace Treaty (London: Athlone, 1990), chaps. 7 and 8, esp. 161–162; John M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 159–160. Also see “Notes on Conversation Among Ambassador Dulles, Ministers of External Affairs of Australia and New Zealand, and Staffs,” February 17, 1951, Canberra, Department of State Central Files, 790.5/21751, National Archives II, as cited in Galia Press-­Barnathan, “The United States and Regional Security Cooperation in Asia and Eu­rope,” Security Studies 10, no. 2 (Winter 2000/2001): 49–97, at 81. In addition to the third-­party reassurance impact of the then-­envisaged US-­Japan alliance, Dulles ­later offered more direct reassurance by agreeing to conclude a trilateral alliance with Australia and New Zealand, what came to be known as the ANZUS (Australia–­New Zealand–­US) Treaty, ­after the Pacific Pact proposal had been abandoned. 11.  The State Department had concluded that regional states would agree to join, despite concerns about Japan. “Position of the Department of State on United States Policy ­Toward a Japa­nese Peace and Security Settlement,” March 9, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific, ed. Neal H. Petersen et al. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1149. On the strength and per­sis­tence of threat perceptions ­toward Japan, also see John S. Duffield, “Why Is ­There No APTO? Why Is ­There No OSCAP? Asia-­Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective,” Con­temporary Security Policy 22, no. 2 (August 2001): 69–95, at 77, 81. By April 1951, the State Department had realized that regional threat perceptions t­ oward Japan had become a key obstacle to the Pacific Pact proposal. Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense [Marshall], April 5, 1951, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific, pt. 1, ed. Paul Claussen et al. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), 183–185. Also see Victor Cha, Powerplay, 123. 12. Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 161–162. Also see “Notes on Conversation,” February 17, 1951, as cited in Press-­Barnathan, “United States,” 81. 13.  John Foster Dulles, “Security in the Pacific,” Foreign Affairs 30, no. 2 (Spring 1952): 175– 187, at 182, 184. Regarding threat perceptions of Japan in Australia, see Robert Gordon Menzies, “The Pacific Settlement Seen from Australia,” Foreign Affairs 30, no. 2 ( January 1952): 188–196. 14.  Dulles, “Security in the Pacific,” 184. More generally, see Cha, Powerplay, 164–166. 15.  Testimony before the Japa­nese National Diet, July 9, 1946, as quoted in Shin Shimizu, Chikujō nihonoku kenpō shingiroku dainikan (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1962), 81, 87. 16.  Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs (London: Heinemann, 1961), 274. Also see Chihiro Hosoya, “Japan’s Response to U.S. Policy on the Japa­nese Peace Treaty,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 10 (1981): 18. Yoshida also argued that Japan’s economic condition prevented rearmament in the short run. 17.  Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 351. 18.  John W. Dower, “Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia,” in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 398. 19. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 157. 20. Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 90, 92, 103–106; John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japa­nese Experience, 1978–1954 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 388–389.



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21.  Frank Kowalski, An Inoffensive Rearmament: The Making of the Postwar Japa­nese Army (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 180, originally published in Japa­nese as Nihon saigunbi (Tokyo: Simul, 1969). Yoshida’s fears ­were well founded: the US drew up plans early in 1950 to have a reconstituted Japa­nese army dispatched to the Korean Peninsula in case of hostilities. However, this plan, drawn up by officials totally ignorant of Japan’s reputational prob­lem, was quickly abandoned. See Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 91. 22.  Eiji Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: Continuum, 2003), 506. 23.  Hideo Ōtake, “Defense Controversies and One-­Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany,” in Uncommon Democracies: The One-­Party Dominant Regimes, ed. T. J. Pempel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 128–161, at 139. On this point, also see Pyle, The Japa­nese Question, 24; and Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 90. 24. Takemae, Allied Occupation of Japan, 506. 25.  Press-­Barnathan, “United States,” 79. 26. Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 49, 50–51; Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 59–61; Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 430, 431, 466–467; Yoshitsu, Japan, 53–54; Press-­Barnathan, “United States,” 79, 81; Duffield, “Why Is ­There No APTO?,” 81. 27. Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 430, 431, 466–467. 28.  Tetsuya Kataoka, The Price of a Constitution (New York: Crane Russak, 1991), 190–192, 194–195, 200–201. 29.  For a case study of this dynamic at work in one of Japan’s most difficult relationships—­ with South ­Korea—­see Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-­Korea-­ Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). Also see Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 91–93, 200–210; and Chong-­Sik Lee, Japan and K ­ orea: The Po­liti­cal Dimension (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 23–67. 30. Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 430, 431, 466–467. 31.  Duffield, “Why Is ­There No APTO?,” 81; Henry W. Brands Jr., “From ANZUS to SEATO: US Strategic Policy ­Towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952–1954,” International History Review 9, no. 2 (May 1987): 250–270, at 268. 32.  MOFA released the draft treaty, dated July 27, 1955, along with other ministry documents more than thirty years old, in late July 2010. See “Bold 1955 Treaty Offer to the U.S. Revealed,” Daily Yomiuri, July 28, 2010, http://­www​.­yomiuri​.­co​.­jp​/­dy​/­national​/­T100727005413​.­htm. 33. Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 78–79; Kataoka, Price of a Constitution, 190–192, 194–195, 200–201. 34.  See Chapter 1. 35.  Economic counterbalancing was the primary short-­term concern, but military counterbalancing, including by realigning with hostile Communist nations or provoking the latter to build up their military capabilities, was also a concern, especially in the longer term. 36.  See Chapter 1. 37.  Press-­Barnathan, “United States,” 81. 38.  Ibid., 88; Duffield, “Why Is ­There No APTO?,” 79–80; A. W. Deporte, Eu­rope Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987); Paul Midford, “Making the Best of a Bad Reputation: Japa­nese and Rus­sian ­Grand Strategies in East Asia” (PhD diss., Columbia University, Department of Po­liti­cal Science, 2001), chap. 3. 39.  Japan secretly considered developing nuclear weapons in the late 1960s with France as a model but de­cided against d ­ oing so, in part b ­ ecause of the anticipated backlash from neighboring states, including the Soviet Union and the United States. See Yuri Kase, “The

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Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/1970 Internal Report,” Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 2 (Summer, 2001): 59, 62. 40.  Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō” (MA thesis, University of Tokyo, Department of Public Policy, 2004), 9; Akihiko Tanaka, Anzenhoshō: Sengo 50 nen no mosaku (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1997), 236; Hiroshi Nakanishi, “Jiritsuteki kyōchō no mosaku—1970 nendai no nihon gaikō,” in Sengo nihon no gaikōshi, ed. Makoto Iokibe (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1999), 152. In En­glish, see Hiroshi Nakanishi, “Overcoming the Crises: Japa­nese Diplomacy of the 1970s,” in The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, ed. Makoto Iokibe (London: Routledge, 2010), 114. 41.  Satoh played a pivotal entrepreneurial role in Japan’s turn ­toward championing regional security multilateralism. See Chapters 4–7. 42.  Yukio Satoh, “Asian Pacific Pro­cess for Stability and Security” (paper presented at “ASEAN and the Asia-­Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s,” conference sponsored by the Foreign Ministries of Philippines and Thailand, Manila, June 5–7, 1991), 23. For a slightly edited version of Satoh’s paper that was subsequently published by MOFA, see Yukio Satoh, “Asian Pacific Pro­cess for Stability and Security,” in Japan’s Post Gulf International Initiatives, ed. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991), 34–45. 43.  See “Rimupakku 94: Kokusai jōsei samagawari minaoshi hitsuyō, shūdanteki shikisai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 1, 1994, 21. For a discussion, see L. William Heinrich Jr., “Seeking an Honored Place: The Japa­nese Self-­Defense Forces and the Use of Armed Force Abroad” (PhD diss., Columbia University, Department of Po­liti­cal Science, 1997), 81. This changed in 1994, when Japan began exercising directly with other participants in RIMPAC. 44.  Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japa­nese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), 32, 54; “The History of Colombo Plan,” Colombo Plan, accessed October 17, 2019, http://­colombo​-­plan​.­org​/­colombo​-­plan​-­history​/­. Japan also proposed establishing an Organ­ization for Asian Economic Cooperation, an Asian analogue to the Organisation for Eu­ro­pean Co-­operation and Development (when Japan joined the OECD in 1964, the E changed from “Eu­ro­pean” to “Economic”). See Hiroyuki Hoshiro, Ajia chiikishugi gaikō no yukue: 1952–1966 (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2008), 184–194. ­Later, Japan played a leading role in establishing the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1968 and the Pacific Economic Cooperation (PECC) Council in 1980. Akihiko Tanaka, “The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework,” in Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007), 52–73, at 53. 45. Hoshiro, Ajia chiikishugi gaikō no yukue, 212. The name in Japa­nese was 西太平洋友好帯 (Nishi taiheiyō yūkō tai). This could be literally translated as the Western Pacific Region of Friendship. As such, the structure was unclear in the Japa­nese original. Hoshiro argues that the US State Department interpreted this as an “organ­ization,” which implied institutionalization, while the original conception was prob­ably closer to a “council.” 46.  Ibid., 223–224. Ikeda was personally motivated by what Hoshiro calls “post-­war Asianism.” Ibid., 226–227. 47.  Ibid., 214–215, 341. Hoshiro uses the term “confidence building mea­sures” (shinrai jyōsei sochi, 信頼醸成措置) anachronistically, as the term was not yet in common use in 1963–64. Takashi Inoguchi et al., eds., Seiji jiten (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 2000), 540. Hoshiro provides no evidence that Japa­nese policy makers ­were using the term. 48. Hoshiro, Ajia chiikishugi gaikō no yukue, 214–215. 49.  Ibid., 247–248. James Llewelyn also examines how Japan tried to promote a multi­ lateral po­liti­cal dialogue between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to resolve the



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­ orneo conflict and related territorial disputes with Manila. Japan tried to involve Australia, B New Zealand, and ­Great Britain. See Llewelyn, “Japan’s Diplomatic Response to Indonesia’s Policy of Confronting Malaysia (Konfrontasi) 1963–1966,” Kobe University Law Review, no. 39 (2004): 39–68. I am grateful to Eivind Lande for introducing me to Llewelyn’s article. For background, also see Masashi Nishihara, The Japa­nese and Sukarno’s Indonesia, Tokyo-­Jakarta Relations, 1951–1966 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975). 50.  New York Times, June 15, 1966, 1, and New York Times, June 17, 1966, 8, as cited in “Asian and Pacific Council,” International Organ­ization 20, no. 4 (Fall 1966): 845; Joseph A. Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia-­Pacific Order (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003), 60; Tanaka, “Development,” 53; Cha, Powerplay, 13; Joonseok Yang, “Analyzing Dissolution ­Factors for Asian and Pacific Council” (paper presented at the International Studies Association International Conference, Hong Kong University, June 15–17, 2017), 4–6, http://­web​.­isanet​.o­ rg​ /­Web​/­Conferences​/­HKU2017​-­s​/­Archive​/­57077dfc​-­fd12​-­4c5e​-­8765​-­2bfbe1b6a340​.­pdf. 51.  Sudo describes Japan as “grudgingly” joining ASPAC. Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 54. 52.  Tanaka, “Development,” 53; Yang, “Analyzing Dissolution ­Factors,” 8–12. 53.  David Youtz and Paul Midford, A Northeast Asian Security Regime: Prospects A ­ fter the Cold War (New York: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1992), 5–6; Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki to takokukan anzenhoshō kyōroku no wakugumi: ASEAN chiiki fōramu wo chūshin ni,” Kokusai Mondai 415 (October 1994): 62; Yukio Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte: Ajia-­taiheyō chiki no anzenhoshō,” Gaikō Forum 64 ( January 1994): 12; Elizabeth Wishnick, “Soviet Asian Collective Security Policy from Brezhnev to Gorbachev,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 7, no. 3 (1988): 3–28. 54.  On wedge strategies, see Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing E ­ nemy Co­ali­tions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 155–189. 55.  Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan’s Policy ­Towards Southeast Asia: Anatomy of ‘Autonomous Diplomacy’ and the American ­Factor,” in China, India, Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 99–100. 56.  Yūichi Satō, Fukuda Takeo, Seiji rosen to sono jinmyaku (Tokyo: Jūtaku Shinpōsha, 1976), 84–87; Ochi Takao, grand­son of former prime minister Fukuda Takeo, interview with author, May 20, 2005. Fukuda also was apparently a witness to the Nanjing Massacre. 57.  Fukuda arguably belonged to a group of postwar leaders who can be identified as “conservative doves”: LDP politicians who w ­ ere eco­nom­ically and socially conservative but worried about Japan’s ability to maintain civilian control, w ­ ere skeptical about large-­scale rearmament, and ­were opposed to Japan playing a military role overseas. Prime Minister Yoshida was the archetypal conservative dove. Other prominent members included Satō Eisaku, Miki Takeo, Miyazawa Kiichi, Gotōda Masaharu, and Kōno Yōhei. 58.  Critics would argue that even eco­nom­ically, Japan pursued isolationism by engaging in protectionism of its domestic market, which had very l­imited import penetration, especially manufactures, and even less penetration from foreign direct investment. Fukuda was keenly aware of this critique and warned about the danger that foreign perceptions of Japan as an “economic animal” posed. Takeo Fukuda and Hiroshi Tanaka, Hoshu kakumei ni kakeru (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1974), 132; Michio Ochi, Chichi Fukuda Takeo (Tokyo: Sankei bijinesu, 1973), 106; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 11–12. 59.  The ADB, like other forms of economic multilateralism, excluded the Communist countries. 60.  As quoted by Fukuda’s son-­in-­law, Michio Ochi, Chichi Fukuda Takeo, 98–99, and more generally 99–106. Also see Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 11. Dennis T.

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Yasutomo, Japan and the Asian Development Bank (New York: Praeger, 1983), 66–90, esp. 87, analyzes Asian suspicions that Japan was trying to “dominate” the new ADB, although he also examines Manila’s tactics for outmaneuvering Tokyo. The focus ­here is on the lessons that Fukuda drew from Tokyo’s defeat. 61. Yasutomo, Japan, 187. 62.  Fukuda and Tanaka, Hoshu kakumei ni kakeru, 108, 111. The document is dated April 25, 1970. On p. 102, the beginning of the same chapter is identified as an opinion piece (kaisetsu) ­under the title “ ‘Shōwa genroku’ no jidai.” Also see Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 9. According to Ochi Takao, this document was originally written for publication in a Fukuda kōenkai (candidate supporters’) newsletter. Ochi Takao, grand­son of former prime minister Fukuda, interview with the author, May 20, 2005. Ochi conducted extensive research on the origins of the Fukuda doctrine for his MA thesis, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō.” 63.  Fukuda and Tanaka, Hoshu kakumei ni kakeru, 145–146; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 10. This speech was given before Naigai jōsei chōsakai, a nonprofit public policy debate forum established by Jiji Press in 1954. See Ippan shadan hōjin Naigai jyōsei chōsakai, “Naigai jyōsei chōsakai to ha,” accessed October 17, 2019, http://­www​.­naijyo​.­or​.­jp​/­about​/­. 64.  “Kokuritsu kokkai toshokan, sangiin gaimuiinkai 1972 nen, 3 gatsu, 14 nichi” (House of Counselors’ Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, March 14, 1972), as cited in Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 10. 65.  Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no nihon gaikō,” 10. 66.  Takeo Fukuda, “Heiwa taikoku nihon no kadai,” Jiyū 18, no. 8 (1972): 122; Fukuda and Tanaka, Hoshu kakumei ni kakeru, 163; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 10. 67.  Fukuda and Tanaka, Hoshu kakumei ni kakeru, 166; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 12. 68.  外聞. 69.  As quoted in Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 12. Citing Japan’s distinct culture and language as “barriers,” Fukuda had observed two years ­earlier that “pipes for exchange are exceptionally small” and that this was a major cause of growing “misperceptions and emotional opposition” to Japan that threatened to become a vicious circle. Michio Ochi, Chichi Fukuda Takeo, 102–103; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 12. 70.  Takeo Fukuda, “Mono yori kokoro no kōryū wo-­Kokusai kōryū kikin no sutāto,” in Fukuda and Tanaka, Hoshu kakumei ni kakeru, 134–137; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 12. For background, see Masaya ­Inoue, “Fukuda Takeo,” in Sengo nihon shushō no gaikō shisō: Yoshida Shigeru kara Koizumi Jun’ichirō made, ed. Hiroshi Masuda (Tokyo: Mineruva shobō, 2016), 252; and Michio Ochi, Chichi Fukuda Takeo, 105–106. Cultural and ­human exchanges ­were precisely what the Japan Foundation was established to promote. 71.  Michio Ochi, Chichi Fukuda Takeo, 105–106. 72.  Japan, in large part thanks to American pressure, did not maintain economic or other relationships with Communist regimes in Asia, especially China. See Cha, Powerplay, 149–151. 73.  Soeya, “Japan’s Policy,” 99–100. 74.  Hidekazu Wakatsuki, “Reisen kōzō no ryūdōka to nihon no mosaku—1970 nendai,” in Sengo nihon no ajia gaikō, ed. Taizō Miyagi (Tokyo: Mineruva, 2014), 152; Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 71–72; ­Inoue, “Fukuda Takeo,” 259; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 13. 75.  Indonesia, especially, had experienced growing suspicion and mistrust t­oward Japan. A year before Tanaka’s visit, in 1973, an Indonesian movie depicting Japa­nese military vio­lence ­toward the “Rommusha,” or Indonesians forced to work for the Japa­nese military government of Indonesia, was banned by the Suharto government at the request of the Japa­nese embassy and



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businesses, so as not to exacerbate anti-­Japanese sentiments. However, the ban backfired and became an impor­tant catalyst for the anti-­Japan riots a year ­later. See “Kurazawa Aiko sensei, 20 nenkan no shūtaisei,” Jakarta Shimbun, December 2, 2011, 1; and Aiko Kurazawa, Sengo nihon-­ indoneshia kankeishi (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2011), 253–267, 303–323. Regarding differing historical memories about Indonesian forced l­abor, forced military conscription, and the induction of Indonesian “comfort ­women” for the Japa­nese military, see Kurazawa, Sengo nihon-­indonesia kankeishi, 355–372; and Masanori Satō, “Indoneshia no rekishi kyōkasho ni okeru “rommashya” ni tsuite,” Tōnan ajia kenkyū 32, no. 4 (March 1995): 495–522. More generally, see William Frederick, “Reflections in a Moving Stream: Indonesian Memories of the War and the Japa­nese,” in Representing the Japa­nese Occupation of Indonesia: Personal Testimonies and Public Images in Indonesia, Japan, and the Netherlands, ed. Remco Raben (Amsterdam: Waanders, 1999), 16–25. 76.  On the anti-­Tanaka riots, see Kurazawa, Sengo nihon-­indoneshia kankeishi, 253–267; Raul Manglapus, Japan in Southeast Asia: A Collision Course (New York: Car­ne­gie Endowment for International Peace, 1976); and Akihiko Tanaka, Ajia no naka no nihon (Tokyo: NTT ­shuppan, 2007), 14. Kikuchi Kiyoaki minimizes the impact of the Tanaka riots on Japan’s policy in Southeast Asia and claims that the student demonstrations w ­ ere directed at local governments as much as or more than they ­were directed at Japan. See “Ambassador Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oral Interview, Conducted by Akihiko Tanaka, Makoto Iokibe and Koji Murata,” July 15, 1996, 5, George Washington University National Security Archives, http://­www​.­gwu​.­edu​/­~nsarchiv​ /­japan​/­kikuchiohinterview​.­htm. 77.  Sumio Edamura, “The Fukuda Doctrine: Diplomacy with a Vision,” in Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond, ed. Lam Peng Er (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 24–25. 78.  Masahide Shibusawa, Japan and the Asian Pacific Region (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 75. 79. ­Inoue, “Fukuda Takeo,” 259. 80.  Sueo Sudo, International Relations of Japan and South East Asia: Forging a New Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2002), 36. Also see Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 157. 81.  Edamura, “Fukuda Doctrine,” 25. Also see ­Inoue, “Fukuda Takeo,” 259. 82.  Edamura, “Fukuda Doctrine,” 30. 83. Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 103, 169–170. 84.  MOFA diplomat in charge of policy t­ oward ASEAN, interview with author, September 29, 1994; Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 169. 85. Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 155. 86.  Tōnan ajia dai ni kachō, “Sōri no tōnan ajia rekihō: Wagakuni no tōnan ajia seisaku no hyōmei ni tsuite,” July 5, 1977, MOFA Diplomatic Archives, CD 6, document 02-916-1; also contained in CD 17, document 04-722. This first draft was handwritten by Tanino Sakutarō, who served as the director of the Second Southeast Asia Division. 87.  Ajia kyoku, “Fukuda sōri no manira ni okeru supīchi (dai 3 kō),” July 22, 1977, MOFA Diplomatic Archives, CD 20, document 04-1131-1. Foreign Minister Hatoyama was not pre­sent at the meeting where this new draft was considered and approved. Gaimusho, “Sōri tōnan ajia hōmon kankei benkyō kai,” July 22, 1977, MOFA Diplomatic Archives, CD 20, document 04-1131-3. Also based on Ochi Takao, interview with author, May 20, 2005. On Fukuda’s role in inserting this clause, see Hidekazu Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi gaikō” no jidai: Reisen henyōki no Nihon to Ajia 1971–1980 nen (Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2006), 167–169. 88. Tanaka, Ajia no naka no nihon, 14; Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 153, 180n3; Sudo, International Relations, 36. Taking a contrasting view, Hideo Ōtake “guesses” that Chief Cabinet Secretary Sonoda Sunao strongly influenced the Fukuda Doctrine, b­ ecause Ōtake

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identifies Fukuda as a “hawk” within the LDP and Sonoda as a dove whose presence in the Fukuda Cabinet acted as a “deterrent to ‘militarization.’ ” See Ōtake Hideo, Nihon no bōei to kokunai seiji—­Detanto kara gunkaku he (Tokyo: Sanichi shobō, 1983), 160–161, 388n3. In a contemporaneous account, Ochi Michio, Fukuda’s son-­in-­law, notes that one part of the domestic media labeled Fukuda a “hawk,” a characterization Ochi challenges. See Michio Ochi, Chichi Fukuda Takeo, 96–97. Apart from Ōtake’s impressionistic account, the other sources cited ­here, including Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, which is the most comprehensive account, agree, however, that Sonoda had ­little influence over this doctrine. The clear parallels between passages in the Fukuda Doctrine and his ­earlier statements as foreign minister that Ochi Takao traces are telling. See the discussion ­earlier in this chapter. 89.  Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi gaikō” no jidai, 167–169. 90.  National Gradu­ate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), “Speech by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (Fukuda Doctrine Spreech),” 5, worldjpn​.­grips​.­ac​.­jp​/­documents​/­texts​/­docs​ /­19770818​.­S1E​.­html October 17, 2019. Also see Gaimusho, Waga gaikō no kinkyō Shōwa 53 (Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1978), 326–330. 91.  GRIPS, “Speech,” 2. 92. ­Inoue, “Fukuda Takeo,” 260, also credits Fukuda with developing this concept, as does Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 153. 93.  GRIPS, “Speech,” 5. 94.  See “Ambassador Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oral Interview,” 7–8. 95.  Edamura, “Fukuda Doctrine,” 28. Supporting this claim is the fact that this phrase appears in the handwritten document that Tanino composed of the six princi­ples that formed the first known outline of the doctrine. Tōnan ajia dai ni kachō, “Sōri no tōnan ajia rekihō.” 96. ­Inoue also credits Fukuda with coming up with the phrase and concept. ­Inoue, “Fukuda Takeo,” 260. However, a similar phrase, kokoro no fureai kyōchō, was used by Prime Minister Ikeda during a visit to Indonesia thirteen years ­earlier. See Hoshiro, Ajia chiikishugi gaikō no yukue, 241. For the original speech, see Yomiuri Shimbun, September 27, 1963, chōkan, as cited in Hoshiro, Ajia chiikishugi, 241. 97.  Edamura, “Fukuda Doctrine,” 27. 98.  See Tanaka, Ajia no naka no nihon, 14; Sudo, International Relations, 36; and Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 55, who claims that Fukuda’s goal in issuing the doctrine was proclaiming ­these two pillars, while MOFA was more focused on the third pillar, that of economic assistance. 99.  Takeo Fukuda, Korekara Nihon-­Ajia-­taiheiyō jidai ni mukau (Tokyo: Asahiya shuppan, 1985), 289–290; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 56. 100. Fukuda, Korekara, 289–290. 101.  Takeo Fukuda, Kaiko kyūjyū nen (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), 280; Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” 56. 102.  Takao Ochi, “Detantoki no Nihon gaikō,” chap. 4, esp. 57. 103.  Hisashi Owada, “Trilateralism: A Japa­nese Perspective,” International Security 5, no. 3 (Winter 1980/81): 14–24, at 24. 104.  Edamura, “Fukuda Doctrine,” 28. 105.  Ibid., 25. 106. Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 156. 107.  Ibid., 187–188. 108.  Ibid., 191. 109.  Ibid., 209. The AMM was established in 1967.



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110.  Tanaka, “Development,” 53. 111. Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 207. 112.  Ibid., 207; Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “ASEAN: Reaction to the Nakasone Visit,” June 23, 1983 (report declassified July 21, 2010), accessed October 10, 2019, https://­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­readingroom​/­docs​/­CIA​-­RDP85T00287R000401150001-​ ­2​ .­pdf. This CIA report concluded, “In the longer term, we believe the Japa­nese defense build-up ­will continue to be accepted by the ASEAN states as long as Tokyo does not acquire offensive systems, pre­sent constitutional restrictions are preserved, and a US military presence in the region is maintained” (6). 113.  Kei Koga, “Explaining the Transformation of ASEAN’s Security Functions in East Asia: The Cases of ARF and ASEAN+3” (RSIS Working Paper 234, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2012), 7, https://­www​ .­rsis​.­edu​.­sg​/­rsis​-­publication​/­idss​/­234​-­wp234​-­the​-­process​-­of​-­asean​/­#​.­Wv1SYZdUvIU; Rodney Tasker, “Diplomacy: No Call to Arms: Takeshita Assures ASEAN That Japan ­Will Not Become Military Power,” Far Eastern Economic Review 138, no. 53 (December 31, 1987): 26. 114.  “Statement by H.E. Mr. Sosuke Uno, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the Meeting Between ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners, Bangkok, 7–9 July 1988,” in 21st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conferences with Dialogue Partners ( Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1988), 92–93. cha pt er  3 1.  MOFA diplomat, interview with author, July 1991. The Fukuda Doctrine can be considered a security initiative only in the negative sense that it promised that Japan would play no regional security role. It did not even envisage Japan discussing security with its neighbors. 2.  See Chapter 2. 3.  In the mid-1990s, CSCE was renamed the Organ­ization for Security and Co-­operation in Eu­rope (OSCE). 4.  Hiroshi Momose and Takako Ueta, eds., Ōshū anzen hoshō kyōryoku kaigi (CSCE) 1975–1992 (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūjo, 1992). 5.  Ibid., 6. For the text of Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech, see Pravda, July 29, 1986, 1. Gorbachev reiterated many of the ele­ments of his Vladivostok speech during an interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka. See Pravda, July 23, 1987, 1–2. Also see Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki to takokukan anzen hoshō kyōryoku no wakugumi ASEAN chiiki forumu wo chūshin ni,” Kokusai Mondai 415 (October 1994): 60–68, at 62. 6.  Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 6. For the text of Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk speech, see Pravda, September 18, 1988, 1. 7.  David Youtz and Paul Midford, A Northeast Asian Security Regime: Prospects A ­ fter the Cold War (New York: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1992), 6–7. 8.  On wedge strategies, see Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing E ­ nemy Co­ali­tions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 155–189. 9.  Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 18–20; Takako Ueda, “Anzen hoshō (Dai ichi basuketto),” in Momose and Ueta, Ōshū anzen hoshō kyōryoku kaigi, 19–49; Trevor Findlay and Andrew Mack, “Stockholm on the Mekong? CBMs for Asia/Pacific,” Pacific Review 3, no. 1 ( January 1990): 58–59. For the text of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Eu­rope, which mandated large, asymmetrical cuts in Soviet conventional land forces, see “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Eu­rope,” OSCE, accessed July 2, 2017, http://­www​ .­osce​.­org​/­library​/­14087​?­download​=­true.

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10.  Richard H. Solomon, “Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics; Diversity in Defense” (address to the Gradu­ate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, October 30, 1990), 5–6, as excerpted in Pacific Research 4, no. 1 (February 1991): 20; Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 18. 11.  Solomon expressed opposition using much the same language during a press conference in Canberra on August 17, 1991. Pacific Research 4, no. 4 (November 1991): 26. 12.  This letter was leaked to, and subsequently published in, the Australian Financial Review on May 2, 1991. See Pauline Kerr, Andrew Mack, and Paul M. Evans, “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-­Pacific,” in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes, ed. Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 233–255, at 237. 13.  On the Soren-ka and its traditional hard-­line policy ­toward the Soviet Union, see Gilbert Rozman, Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985–1991: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1992), 30–31. 14.  Based on author’s interviews with two middle-­ranked MOFA diplomats, one on March 20 and March 28, 1994, the other on March 10, 1994; an interview with an individual who was a top official at the Soviet Desk in the early 1990s on July 7, 2011; and an interview with a retired diplomat on August 19, 1994. Also see Yukio Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte: Ajia-­taiheyō chiiki no anzen hoshō,” Gaikō Forum 64 ( January 1994): 12–18, at 13; Yukio Satoh, “Reduction of Tension on the Korean Peninsula: A Japa­nese View,” Korean Journal of Defense Analy­sis 3, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 103; Masahiko Asada, “Confidence-­Building Mea­sures in East Asia,” Asian Survey 28, no. 5 (May 1988): 496; and Findlay and Mack, “Stockholm on the Mekong?,” 59–60. Also see the discussion of MOFA’s internal debate about the Nakayama proposal in Chapter 5. 15.  Se­nior diplomat from the Security Policy Division, interview with author, October 14, 1994. 16.  Yukio Satoh, “The Japa­nese Role,” in Asian-­Pacific Security ­After the Cold War, ed. T. B. Millar and James Walter (London: University of London, 1992), 65; Satoh, “Reduction of Tension,” 104. 17.  One partial exception was the convening of bilateral security consultations in May 1983 with Indonesia, at Jakarta’s request, following a visit by Prime Minister Nakasone. Nakasone, moreover, was the one post-­Fukuda prime minister who, during his visit to Southeast Asia, did not reaffirm the Fukuda Doctrine promise to not become a military power. See Sueo Sudo, International Relations of Japan and South East Asia: Forging a New Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2002), 38. Although the contents of t­ hese talks ­were kept confidential, they appear to have been ­limited to the Indonesian side asking for intelligence sharing, nonlethal weapons sales, and the transfer of technology. See Richard Nations, “Japan’s ‘Omni-­direction’ Is Now Dead and Gone,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 20, 1984, 28. 18.  On ­these proposals, see the discussion ­later in this chapter. 19.  “Speech by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in Manila,” Japan Times August 13–19, 1990, 2, weekly international edition. 20.  See a speech by Hiroshi Kitamura, Japan’s ambassador to Canada, at Queen’s University, October 10, 1990, as quoted in David B. Dewitt and Paul M. Evans, “The Changing Dynamics of Asia Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective” (NPCSD Working Paper 3, North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, York University, North York, Ontario, 1999), 8–9. 21.  Masashi Nishihara, Senryaku kenkyū no shikaku (Tokyo: Ningen no kagakusha, 1988), 273. Nonetheless, he also advocated CBMs within the context of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, most notably by demilitarizing the Northern Territories (ibid., 269).



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22.  Masashi Nishihara, “Japan, a Power Misperceived in Southeast Asia,” in Po­liti­cal and Security Cooperation: A New Dimension in ASEAN-­Japan Relations, ed. Frances Fung, Wai Lai, and Charles E. Morrison (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1987), 85–101. 23. Nishihara, Senryaku kenkyū no shikaku, 273. 24.  Ibid., 269. 25.  Ibid., 273. 26. Ibid. 27.  Ibid., 274–275. 28.  Japan Forum on International Relations, Long-­Term Po­liti­cal Vision for Stabilization and Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Tokyo: Japan Forum on International Relations, March 1989). Participants in the study included former foreign minister Ōkita Saburō and professor of Tokyo University Satō Seizaburō, a top adviser to former prime minister Nakasone. 29.  Ibid., 11–12. The Japa­nese version uses the term “building mutual confidence” (sōgo no shinraikan wo jyōsei suru) and thus describes a concept that is linguistically closer to confidence-­ building mea­sures (sōgo shinrai jyōsei sochi) than to mutual reassurance mea­sures, which are discussed l­ ater. See Nihon Kokusai fōramu, Tōhoku ajia no chyōkiteki antei to kyōryoku no bijyon (Tokyo, Nihon Kokusai fōramu, March 1989), 9. For another early (brief and tentative) Japa­nese proposal for regional multilateral security cooperation, see Yasusuke Murakami, “From the Editor,” Japan Echo 17, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 5. 30.  Japan Forum on International Relations, Long-­Term Po­liti­cal Vision, 17–18. 31.  Japan Forum on International Relations, Long-­Term Po­liti­cal Vision, 24–25. 32.  Ibid, 17–18, 24–25. 33.  Canadian scholar, interview with author, September 17, 1994. 34.  Satoh Yukio wrote “that a new architecture for collective security must be explored for the sake of regional stability in the post-­Cold War era. Collective security is not a new issue in the Asian-­Pacific region. The Soviets once advocated the need to convene an Asian-­Pacific security conference modelled on CSCE.” Satoh, “Japa­nese Role,” 65. Satoh similarly appears to conflate the two in “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte,” 12–13. While the term cooperative security, of which CSCE is the leading example, was not so common at that time, CSCE has always stood in clear counterdistinction to collective security, which is an alliance of all against a would-be aggressor. See Chapter 1. 35.  Nishihara linked Brezhnev’s collective security proposal of 1969 with the CSCE model, even though the latter was not an example of collective security and CSCE would not be developed u ­ ntil six years ­later, in 1975 (the earliest negotiations only date back to 1972). Understandably, Nishihara argued that Gorbachev’s Vladivostok proposal was modeled on CSCE, but then he linked this back to Brezhnev’s collective proposal. See Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 62–63. A bit ­later in the same article, Nishihara brings up the concepts of “cooperative security” and “common security” (kyōchōteki anzenhoshō and kyōtsū anzen hoshō) when discussing the Canadian proposal for a CSCE in the North Pacific (ibid., 63). Regarding the early history of CSCE, see “History,” OSCE, accessed August 26, 2019, http://­www​.­osce​.o­ rg​/­who​/­87. 36.  Sueo Sudo, “­Towards the Pacific C ­ entury,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 31, 1991, 16. 37.  Sueo Sudo, “Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review 4, no. 4 (April 1991): 342. Also see Sudo, “­Towards the Pacific ­Century,” 17. More generally, see Sueo Sudo, Southeast Asia in Japa­nese Security Policy, Pacific Strategic Paper 3 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991). 38.  Okazaki Hisahiko, a prominent defense hawk, while critical of the reassurance promise contained in the Fukuda Doctrine, proclaimed the Soviet threat as an alternative form of

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reassurance: “­Every postwar prime minister who has visited Southeast Asia has loudly declared that Japan w ­ ill never again become a militaristic nation. What they should have said, as I’ve been saying for twenty years, is that ‘Japan is contributing to Asia’s security by holding off the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, but our military power c­ an’t be used for anything e­ lse.’ ” The decline of the Soviet threat directly undermined this form of reassurance. “Nihon wa kokusaiteki sekinin wo dō hatasu no ka,” Gaikō Forum, October 1990, 12. For the En­glish version, see “Japan’s Choice in the Gulf: Participation or Isolation,” Japan Echo 18, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 25. 39.  Fred Hiatt, “Marine General: U.S. Troops Must Stay in Japan,” Washington Post, March 27, 1990. 40.  Sudo, “­Towards the Pacific C ­ entury,” 16–17; Fred Hiatt, “Thai Plan for Joint Military Training with Japan Raises Concern in Region,” Washington Post, May 10, 1990, A34. 41.  Sudo, “­Towards the Pacific ­Century,” 16–17; Fred Hiatt, “Thai Plan for Joint Military Training with Japan Raises Concern in Region,” Washington Post, May 10, 1990, A34. Ishikawa responded to his Thai hosts that b­ ecause of constitutional restraints, Japan could not play a regional military role. His mission was reportedly only a “fact-­finding mission” to assess how regional security was changing with the ending of the Cold War. He did not come to propose specific forms of cooperation. Sudo, International Relations, 83. 42.  Quoted in Hiatt, “Thai Plan.” The Straits Times went on to argue, “It must not be forgotten that while Thailand escaped occupation by the Japa­nese army during World War II [sic], the rest of Southeast Asia was not so lucky and suffered grievously from that occupation. Memories of the atrocities committed by Japa­nese soldiers have not totally faded. Some are still fearful of a resurgence of Japa­nese militarism.” 43.  Straits Times, May 11, 1990, as quoted in Sudo, International Relations, 83. 44. Ibid. 45.  The Nation, May 5, 1990, as quoted in Sudo, International Relations, 83. 46.  Satoh, “Reduction of Tension,” 105. 47.  Takeshi Uemura, “Nakayama: SDF No Asian Threat,” Daily Yomiuri, September 28, 1990, 1. 48.  Regarding ­these reactions, see Sandra Burton, “Prisoners of Memory: Despite Japan’s Yen Diplomacy, Its Neighbors Remain Uneasy,” Time, October 29, 1990, 12; “Sending SDF Troops to Gulf Would Be a ­Mistake: Beijing,” Japan Times, October 22, 1990, 1; “Nihon wa doko ni iku no ka,” Toa Ilbo, October 24, 1990, as translated in Fujie Nakamura et al., Ajia no shimbun ga hōjita Jieitai no “kaigai hahei” (Tokyo: Nashinokisha, 1991); Liu Jiangyong, “Japan’s Role in Gulf War,” Shijie Zhishi, no. 4 (February 16, 1991): 4–5, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—­China (henceforth FBIS-­CHI), March 12, 1991, 12–14; Yuzhe Jiang, “News Analy­sis: Japan’s Attempt at Power Diplomacy” [in Chinese], Xin­hua Domestic Ser­vice, October 9, 1990, translated in FBIS-­CHI, October 11, 1990, 12–13; Feng Chen, “Japan Is Attempting to Change Its Positive National Policy That Forbids Sending Armed Forces Overseas” [in Mandarin], Beijing International Ser­vice, October 18, 1990, translated in FBIS-­ CHI, October 19, 1990, 8; Ming Dong, “Reaction to Japan’s Intention of Dispatching Troops Abroad,” Renmin Ribao, October 24, 1990, 6, translated in FBIS-­CHI, October 25, 1990, 5–6; and Pinghua Sun, Beijing International Ser­vice to Japan (radio broadcast), November 4, 1990, translated in FBIS-­CHI, November 5, 1990, 2. 49.  Overall, see Burton, “Prisoners of Memory.” On reactions in the Philippines, see Nakamura et al., “Kaigai hahei,” 102–104; “­Will Japan Send a Military Force?,” Manila Bulletin, September 15, 1990; and Blas F. Ople, “Dai Nippon in the Gulf?,” Manila Bulletin, October 30, 1990. On reactions in Singapore, see Nakamura, “Kaigai hahei,” 102–104; and Pei-­chun Lu,



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“Ajia kara mita ‘kaigai hahei’ mondai,” in Wangan Sensō to Kaigai Hahei, ed. Nobuo Miyajima, Kazumi Kenmochi, and Akio Yamakawa (Tokyo: Ryokufu, 1991), 128–129. Former Singaporean prime minister Lee Kwan Yew reportedly claimed during the Gulf War, “It was a very short-­ sighted policy for the US to try to persuade Japan to participate. If the power of Japa­nese militarism should again arise, it ­will prob­ably be uncontrollable.” Lianhe Zaobao, February 1, 1992, as quoted in Pei-­chun Lu, Ajia kara Mita Nihon no “Kokusai Kōken” (Tokyo: Rodohko Junbousya, 1993), 45. Regarding reactions in Indonesia and Malaysia, see Lan Beng Goh, “Marēshia kara no chokugen: Nihon to tōnan ajia no kankei,” in Nihon no yakuwari—­Tōnan ajia rokkakoku kuni kara no chokugen, ed. Renato Constantino (Tokyo: Kankōsha, 1992), 29–62; and Mochtar Lubis, “Indonesia kara no chokugen: Tachikirenu kenen,” in Constantino, Nihon no yakuwari, 1–28. Thailand, which had arguably the least brutal occupation experience of all, was relatively quiet on SDF overseas dispatch. On Thailand, see Nakamura et al., “Kaigai hahei,” 83–84, 172–177; and Gwen Robinson, “Tacit Approval for SDF’s Gulf Role,” Nikkei, February 9, 1991, 1. This overall pattern is consistent with the correspondent-­inference hypothesis of social-­psychology discussed in Chapter 1: ­those who suffered significantly at the hands of the Japa­nese occupation ­were more inclined to attribute malevolence to the country. 50.  Paul Midford, Rethinking Japa­nese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), chap. 5. Vocal Asian opposition to the bill might have reinforced the opposition of the Japa­nese public. 51.  Yukio Satoh, “The ­Future Nature of US Influence in Western Eu­rope and North-­East Asia: A View from the Asia-­Pacific Region,” in Amer­i­ca’s Role in a Changing World, pt. 1, Adelphi Papers 256 (Oxford: Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990/91), 42, 47. 52.  Asian Regional Policy Division, “Jieitai sōkaitei no perushya wan haken (tai ajia setsumei),” document originally marked “top secret,” April 23, 1991, 1–2, MOFA archives. This document includes several redactions. 53.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991: Japan’s Diplomatic Activities (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991), 432. Sudo claims that in the same speech Kaifu “went one step beyond his pre­de­ces­sors in apologizing for Japan’s conduct in World War II.” Sudo, International Relations, 40. In ­doing so Kaifu thereby combined historical reassurance with military reassurance in his address. 54.  A retired MOFA official specializing in security emphasized the importance of the shock of the Gulf War as a motivating f­ actor ­behind the Nakayama proposal. Interview with author, August 19, 1994. 55.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 432. This appears to reflect Kuriyama Takakazu’s view that ASEAN was a “natu­ral” partner for Japan to turn to in expanding its regional security role. See the discussion ­later in this chapter. 56.  This section draws on Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance,” Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 367–397. 57.  Gareth Evans, address to the opening session of the ASEAN Post-­Ministerial Conference, Jakarta, July 27, 1990; Gareth Evans, “Australia’s Asian F ­ uture” (address to launch the Institute for Con­temporary Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, July 19, 1990). Transcripts of both addresses w ­ ere obtained from the Australian Consulate, New York City. Also see Gareth Evans, “What Asia Needs Is a Europe-­Style CSCA,” International Herald Tribune, July 27, 1990, 26; Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 11–12; and Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 63. US secretary of state Baker subsequently reacted very negatively to this proposal. See the discussion ­earlier in this chapter.

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58.  Joe Clark, “Canada and Asia Pacific in the 1990s” (speech delivered to the Victoria Chamber of Commerce, Victoria, British Columbia, July 17, 1990; transcript obtained from the Canadian Department of External Affairs and International Trade); Jusuf Wanandi, ASEAN and Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia, International Institute for Global Peace Special Report No. 57E (Tokyo: International Institute for Global Peace, March 1991), 1; Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 63. Clark initially delivered this initiative ten days before the 1990 PMC in Jakarta. 59.  Clark, “Canada and Asia Pacific”; Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 11–12. 60.  TASS in En­glish, September 4, 1990; Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 8–9. 61.  Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 13. 62.  Se­nior Korean diplomat, interview with author, December 18, 2006. 63.  Chung Ku-­Chong, “Security in the New Asia-­Pacific Age and Japan’s Role,” in Japan and the World in the Post-­Cold War Era, ed. Foreign Press Center Japan (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1990), 27–29. 64.  Catherine Manegold, “The Military Question,” Newsweek, November 25, 1991, 45. 65.  Se­nior diplomat in the Security Policy Division of MOFA, interview with author, October 14, 1994. 66.  Even Mongolia joined the competition by proposing a multilateral security forum for Northeast Asia that would include itself, the Soviet Union, the US, China, Japan, Canada, and the two ­Koreas. See Trevor Findlay and Andrew Mack, “Confidence-­Building Mea­sures: The Idea Spreads,” Pacific Review 3, no. 2 (1990): 21; and Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 14. 67.  Two se­nior diplomats of the Security Policy Division interviewed over three years a­ fter the Nakayama proposal still displayed defensiveness about having been overly negative concerning regional security multilateralism. One stated, “I d ­ on’t think it is a very dramatic change. Even before Nakayama’s proposal, we did not categorically deny the possibility of multilateralism.” The other claimed the Nakayama proposal “was not a very sharp change in Japa­nese policy.” This same official claimed that it was the US that had changed its position and that “frankly speaking that was mainly due to the Japa­nese government’s initiatives.” Interviews with author, October 14, 1994, and January 12, 1995, respectively. 68.  According to Michael Green, within MOFA, “Baker was notorious for his dismissive view of Japa­nese diplomats and politicians as small thinkers, and his focus on the ­great powers left Japan out of the key deliberations.” Green continues, “Baker’s demotion of Japan humiliated MOFA and sparked a bottom-up rethinking of Japa­nese diplomacy . . . ​beginning in the Asian Affairs Bureau and spreading eventually to the se­nior leadership of the government and the LDP.” Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 173. 69.  Defense intellectual, interview with author, April 27, 1995. 70.  Based on author’s interview with a retired Foreign Ministry official, August 19, 1994, Tokyo. Also see Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte,” 13. Reducing the risk of war with the Soviet Union through CBMs was an additional reason, and it explains the bilateral mea­sures that ­were agreed to in fall 1991, as discussed ­later. 71.  Takakazu Kuriyama, “Gekidō no 90 nendai to Nihon gaikō no shintenkai: Atarashii kokusai chitsujyo kōchiku e no sekkyokuteki kōken no tame ni,” Gaikō Forum, May 1990, 17. 72.  Ibid., 18. 73.  Ibid., 20.



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74.  C.O.E. Oraru: Seisaku kenkyū purojekuto, Kuriyama Takakazu (Moto chūbei taishi), Oraru Hisutori: Tenkanki no nichibei kankei (Tokyo: Seisaku kenkyū daigakuin daigaku, 2005), 41. 75.  Based on author’s interviews with a middle-­ranked Foreign Ministry official, March 10, 1994, and a retired Foreign Ministry official, August 19, 1994, Tokyo. 76.  In Japa­nese this bureau was called Jōhō chōsa kyoku, or the Research and Analy­sis Bureau. Although “policy planning” was not in the Japa­nese title, it was nonetheless an impor­tant responsibility, and one that Satoh repeatedly fulfilled while director general. Before assuming this position, Satoh had been the consul general in Hong Kong, a position that had made it difficult for him to influence internal MOFA policy deliberations. Satoh joined MOFA in 1961 and almost immediately was sent to the University of Edinburgh to study history for two years. “Yukio Satoh,” Japan Institute of International Affairs, accessed September 27, 2016, https://­www2​.­jiia​.­or​.­jp​/­en​/­cv​/­index​.­php​?­People%2FSatoh. 77.  Shortly a­ fter his tenure, Satoh published The Evolution of Japa­nese Security Policy, Adelphi Paper 178 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982). 78.  Yukio Satoh, interview with author, February 20, 2004; Yukio Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” in The Inclusive Regionalist: A Festschrift Dedicated to Jusuf Wanandi, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Clara Joewono ( Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 97. 79.  Satoh, interview with author, February 20, 2004. 80.  In Japa­nese, “confidence-­building mea­sures” is translated as shinrai jōsei sochi, literally “confidence-­brewing mea­sures,” whereas “mutual reassurance mea­sures” is translated as sōgō anshinkan wo takameru sochi (総合安心感を高める措置), literally “mutual feeling of assurance–­ raising mea­sures.” It is in­ter­est­ing to note that whereas in En­glish ­there is a methodical and planned meta­phor of “building,” in Japa­nese confidence is “brewed” (醸成する), like sake or beer, and is perhaps therefore perceived as less a science than an art. One can also speculate that this implies an association between consuming alcohol together and brewing trust. 81.  In an article published in summer 1991, Satoh recommended CBMs for the Korean Peninsula. See Satoh, “Reduction of Tension,” 111, 112. 82.  Satoh, interview with author, February 20, 2004; Yukio Satoh, interview with author, July 9, 2008; Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 101. 83.  Satoh, “Reduction of Tension,” 111. 84.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 101. 85.  Paul Evans, interview with author, September 19, 1994. 86. Ibid. 87.  Satoh, interviews with author, February 20, 2004, and July 9, 2008. 88.  Satoh, interview with author, July 9, 2008; Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 101. Steinberg and Satoh had a connection through the IISS. 89.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 101. Regarding Satoh’s and MOFA’s subsequent promotion of the MRM concept, see Chapters 4–7. Satoh claims that by the time of Prime Minister Miyazawa’s 1992 speech (see Chapter 6), the MRM concept “had lost its clarity and distinction,” indicating that he blamed the mistranslation in the Nakayama speech for the failure of the concept to be accepted in the region. Although Satoh may be justified in claiming that the concept of CBMs was more loosely used in the Asia-­Pacific than in Eu­rope (even occasionally by himself ), he never engaged the more careful academic analysts of CBMs or their claims that CBMs could be applicable in East Asia. See Findlay and Mack, “Confidence-­ Building Mea­sures,” and Findlay and Mack, “Stockholm on the Mekong?” 90.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 98.

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91.  Ibid., 103. Nonetheless, Satoh’s paper was not an official expression of policy. 92.  Ibid., 98. 93.  Satoh, “­Future Nature,” 43. 94.  Six years ­later, Satoh claimed he understood at the time that “the absence of any multilateral venue for security dialogue had been a worrying feature of the region.” Yukio Satoh, Policy Coordination for Asia-­Pacific Security and Stability, Working Paper No. 305 (Canberra: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996), 2. 95.  Satoh, “­Future Nature,” 46–47. Regarding the resemblance to a passage in Kuriyama’s Gaikō Forum article, see the discussion of that article e­ arlier in the chapter. L ­ ater, Satoh would restate this more emphatically: “No country in Asia would want to deal with a Japan that was severed from the US.” As quoted in Eugene Brown, “The Debate over Japan’s Strategic ­Future,” Asian Survey 33 ( June 1993): 556. 96.  Satoh, “Reduction of Tension,” 104–105. Strikingly, years l­ater Satoh would instead refer to CSCE proposals from the late 1980s and early 1990s as merely “premature,” language he did not use at the time. See Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 98. 97.  Satoh, “Reduction of Tension,” 105. Satoh was circulating drafts of this paper within MOFA from late 1990 ­until sometime in early 1991. It was published in July 1991, significantly ­later than the Warm Springs paper, and thus the stronger language might reflect the subsequent evolution of Satoh’s thinking. 98.  TASS, September 4, 1990; Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 8–9; Satoh, “Reduction of Tension,” 104. 99.  Nakayama Tarō, interview with author, June 18, 1998. A press report also noted that some MOFA diplomats ­were “horrified” by Nakayama’s cosponsorship. Also see Charles Smith, “Cold War Worriers: Japan Reluctant to Face Changing Security Order,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 13, 1990, 27–28. However, Nakayama’s cosponsorship of this dinner became a source of misunderstanding when representatives from MOFA w ­ ere briefing their American counter­parts about the Nakayama proposal in mid-­July 1991, as the Americans thought the Nakayama proposal was linked to this Asian foreign ministers’ dinner, and hence to Shevardnadze’s multilateral security proposal. See Chapter 4. 100.  Nakayama, interview with author. However, as discussed in the rest of this chapter and the next, the balance of evidence indicates that in most re­spects Nakayama played l­ittle role in formulating the proposal that bears his name. 101.  Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 65n4. 102.  Charles Smith, “Cold War Worriers.” As mentioned e­ arlier, the Indonesian talks may be a partial exception. Interestingly, MOFA has not acknowledged that t­ hese talks ­were proposed by Shevardnadze, and instead credited itself. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 316. 103.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 99. 104.  However, as discussed ­later, the Soviet Desk worried as late as July 1991 that the Nakayama initiative would give the Soviets just such an opportunity. 105.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 99. 106.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 391–392. 107.  “Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama’s Speech to the Diet (Excerpts), 25 January 1991, Source: Japa­nese Embassy,” Survival 33, no. 2 (March/April 1991): 184–185. 108.  However, US diplomats responsible for East Asian security remained unaware of this change in Japa­nese policy. Desaix Anderson, interview with author, April 5, 2005. 109.  Nonetheless, as keen an observer as Nishihara apparently did not notice the change, and as late as 1994 he wrote that Nakayama had expressed a “cautious stance” t­ oward a regional



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multilateral security dialogue. Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 63. For comparison, see Satoh’s description of Nakayama’s speech in a contemporaneous article, Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte,” 13. 110.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 99; Satoh, “Reduction of Tension.” 111.  Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Subregional Security and Defence Linkages with ASEAN, South K ­ orea and China in the 1990s,” Pacific Review 9, no. 2 (1996): 229–250. Satoh told me that he built on the Soviet talks by proposing similar policy planning talks with China and South ­Korea, and that China quickly agreed, while South ­Korea was initially reluctant. Satoh, personal communication to author, May 17, 2019. 112.  Gary J. Smith, “Multilateralism and Regional Security in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC’s Geopo­liti­cal Value” (working paper 97-2, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, February 1997), 7. 113.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 316–317. 114.  Izvestia, April 18, 1991, 5, as cited by Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 10. Contrary to claims made by the Japa­nese Foreign Ministry, Gorbachev did repeat, albeit in an altered form, his proposal for establishing a regional multilateral security forum. See Youtz and Midford, Northeast Asian Security Regime, 10; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 316–317. 115.  Diplomat of the Security Policy Division, interview with author, October 14, 1994. The study group was headed by Watanabe Akio, a professor at Tokyo University. The diplomat interviewed added, “What I can say is that it is true that we ­were studying how we could get into multilateralism.” 116.  Se­nior diplomats in the Security Policy Division, interviews with author, October 14, 1994, and January 12, 1995. Both diplomats also noted that other East Asian nations shared this concern, as well as motivation for promoting regional security multilateralism. One diplomat commented that the background of the growth of regional security multilateralism “was the growing welcoming mood for the US military presence by a growing number of countries.” 117.  Masashi Nishihara, interview with author, April 27, 1995. 118.  Yukio Satoh, “Emerging Trends in Asia-­Pacific Security: The Role of Japan,” Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995): 268. 119.  ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit ( Jakarta: ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, 1991), 19. 120. Wanandi, ASEAN and Security Cooperation, 1. 121.  Based on author’s interviews with retired and current Foreign Ministry diplomats on August 19, 1994, and March 28, 1994, respectively. Kuriyama also made this point years l­ater in an oral history, claiming that ASEAN was the “natu­ral” partner. C.O.E. Oraru: Seisaku kenkyū purojekuto, Kuriyama Takakazu, 41. 122.  Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte,” 12. 123.  Ajia kyoku chiiki seisaku ka, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi (toriaizu no hyōka),” July 31, 1990, 4 (document marked “secret” obtained by the author through a Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] request). cha pt er  4 1.  Indeed, according to Jusuf Wanandi, ASEAN feared that the Nakayama proposal itself was an attempt to steal regional multilateral leadership from ASEAN. Personal communication to author, March 10, 1995.

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2.  ASEAN-­ISIS founding member, interview with author, September 24, 2010. Th ­ ere ­were a few exceptions among ASEAN policy elites, including Rudolfo Severino, then serving in the Philippines Foreign Ministry and ­later secretary general of ASEAN, who wrote an opinion article calling for a “Helsinki East,” or a CSCA. See Severino, The ASEAN Regional Forum (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 7; and Rudolfo Severino, interview with author, September 27, 2010. 3.  The night before the opening meeting, the ASEAN participants met in an informal and heated session to decide ­whether the opportunity of joining APEC was worth the perceived risk to ASEAN solidarity. Based on a personal communication with a former MOFA translator pre­sent at the first APEC meeting, May 30, 1995. 4.  Western diplomat, personal communication to author, October 13, 1994. 5.  Jusuf Wanandi, ASEAN and Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia, International Institute for Global Peace Special Report No. 57E (Tokyo: International Institute for Global Peace, March 1991), 1. The paper header indicates that it was written in December 1990, three months before publication. 6.  Hadi Soesastro, Clara Joewono, and Carolina G. Hernandez, eds., Twenty Two Years of ASEAN ISIS: Origin, Evolution, and Challenges of Track Two Diplomacy (Jakarta: CSIS Indonesia for ASEAN ISIS, 2006), 3. 7.  The 1977 conference was entitled “Southeast Asia and the World of Tomorrow”; a conference anthology was published ­under the same title by CSIS Indonesia. The 1980 conference was entitled “Asia-­Pacific in the 1980s: ­Towards Greater Symmetry in Economic Interdependence” and was published by CSIS Indonesia u­ nder the same title in the same year. Soesastro, Joewono, and Hernandez, Twenty Two Years, 3n3. 8.  The results of ­these two conferences ­were published by the Institute of East Asian Studies as Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., Economic, Po­liti­cal and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s, IEAS Research and Policy Studies No. 7 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1982); and Karl D. Jackson and Hadi Soesastro, eds., ASEAN Security and Economic Development, IEAS Research and Policy Studies No. 11 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984). Following the establishment of ASEAN-­ISIS, other US-­ASEAN conferences ­were held in 1985, 1987, and 1989. Soesastro, Joewono, and Hernandez, Twenty Two Years, 3. 9.  Soesastro, Joewono, and Hernandez, Twenty Two Years, 3. 10.  Ibid., 4. 11. Ibid. 12.  Interview with author, September 24, 2010. 13. Ibid. 14.  An equivalent institute did not exist in the Philippines at that time. Hernandez arranged for the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies to be established in 1992, and the institute has represented the Philippines in ASEAN-­ISIS since that time. Soesastro, Joewono, and Hernandez, Twenty Two Years, 4; interview with author, September 24, 2010. Also see Carolina G. Hernandez, Track Two Diplomacy, Philippine Foreign Policy, and Regional Politics (Quezon City: U.P. Center for Integrative and Development Studies, and the University of the Philippines Press, 1994), 15. 15.  Soesastro, Joewono, and Hernandez, Twenty Two Years, 5–6. 16.  Ibid., 6; Kao Kim Hourn, Whispering in the Ears of Power: The Role of ASEAN Track Two Diplomacy (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute of Cooperation and Peace, 1997). Also see Hernandez, Track Two Diplomacy, 15.



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17.  Soesastro, Joewono, and Hernandez, Twenty Two Years, 7. 18.  Ibid., 8. 19.  Interview with author, September 24, 2010. 20.  Yukio Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” in The Inclusive Regionalist: A Festschrift Dedicated to Jusuf Wanandi, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Clara Joewono ( Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 100. Wanandi had invited Satoh to attend the June 1991 ASEAN-­ISIS meeting during “a casual conversation” in Washington in fall 1990, and he invited him to attend a subsequent meeting on the same topic in Manila just ­after the Jakarta conference. 21.  Interview with author, September 24, 2010. 22. Wanandi, ASEAN and Security Cooperation, 14. 23.  Jusuf Wanandi, “Peace and Security in Southeast Asia” (paper presented at the ASEAN-­ ISIS 1991 Meeting, Jakarta, June 2–4, 1991), 25. However, Wanandi argued, “In the long term the region cannot rely on the US military presence, and therefore steps need to be taken to prepare for such eventuality.” Wanandi suggested the “long-­term” was beyond ten years. Ibid., 19–20. This paper was contained in a meeting archive, “ASEAN-­ISIS Meeting (1991: Jakarta), June 2–4, 1991,” that I found in the library of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, in September 2010. The archive had been deposited in the library on June 20, 1991. 24.  Wanandi, “Peace and Security,” 25. 25.  Ibid.; Evelyn Goh, “­Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/8): 113–157, at 120–121. 26.  ASEAN-­ISIS Memorandum 1 was ­later published as ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit ( Jakarta: ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, 1991). 27.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 100. 28.  More than a de­cade ­later, when asked about why ASEAN had been more e­ ager to include China and Rus­sia (the Soviet Union) in regional security multilateralism, Satoh recognized ASEAN’s omni-­enmeshment logic: “ASEAN likes including ­others to neutralize outsiders.” Interview with author, November 18, 2004. 29.  Paul Evans, an observer at the ASEAN-­ISIS Jakarta conference, interview with author, September 17, 1994. According to him, Satoh was relatively “soft” on Soviet participation and indicated that his views had changed over the previous six months. Although ­there was some disagreement among the ASEAN participants about including Rus­sia and China initially, during a closed-­door meeting that excluded the non-­ASEAN-­ISIS observers, a consensus was apparently reached. The meeting declaration advocated including both China and Rus­sia. 30.  Jakarta meeting observer, personal communication to author, October 13, 1994. 31.  Yukio Satoh, interview with author, February 20, 2004. 32.  ASEAN-­ISIS, A Time for Initiative. 33.  Yukio Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte: Ajia-­taiheyō chiiki no anzen hoshō,” Gaikō Forum 64 ( January 1994): 12–18, at 15. Adopting a defensive tone in this article in the course of attempting to show that he had done his due diligence in preparing the ground for the Nakayama initiative, Satoh denies any disagreements with his ASEAN-­ISIS interlocutors about the shape of the proposed multilateral security dialogue. 34.  Jusuf Wanandi, personal communication to author, March 10, 1995. However, an observer pre­sent at the meeting claims that Satoh “decisively altered the direction of the meeting” by convincing the ASEAN-­ISIS directors that subregional and region-­wide dialogues ­were not

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incompatible. According to this observer, when Satoh made this point, “a penny dropped,” and the “eyes of the ASEAN participants lit up.” He also described Satoh as a “[George] Kennan-­like presence” at the meeting. Paul Evans, interview with author, September 17, 1994. 35.  Based on a personal communication to author, March 10, 1995. This meeting was first disclosed in Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance,” Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 367–397, at 380. 36.  Based on the meeting notes of a Manila meeting participant that w ­ ere shared with the author in a personal communication of October 13, 1994. Satoh told me that he called Anderson and urged him to accept the invitation to attend this meeting. In addition to Anderson, Satoh also claimed he briefed several other US diplomats on Japan’s new thinking regarding regional security multilateralism, including Jim Prystup and Bob Manning. Yukio Satoh, interview with author, July 9, 2008. 37.  Personal communication to author, October 13, 1994. 38.  A participant at the Manila meeting characterized as “acute” Japan’s “re­sis­tance” to involving the Socialist countries in a regional security dialogue. Personal communication to author, October 13, 1994. 39.  Yukio Satoh, “Asian Pacific Pro­cess for Stability and Security” (paper prepared for “ASEAN and the Asia-­Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s,” conference sponsored by the Philippines and Thai Foreign Ministries, June 6–7, 1991), 11, 14. A slightly modified version of this paper was subsequently printed as Yukio Satoh, “Asian Pacific Pro­cess for Stability and Security,” in Japan’s Post Gulf International Initiatives, ed. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991), 34–45. 40.  Based on the meeting notes of a Manila conference participant that ­were shared with the author in a personal communication of October 13, 1995. Satoh told me that he circulated his Manila paper at the Jakarta conference as well, so this ele­ment was not in fact “new.” Satoh, email communication to author, May 17, 2019. Although not “new” relative to the Jakarta meeting, it is a point that had not appeared in Satoh’s writings before Jakarta. 41.  Satoh, “Asian Pacific Pro­cess” (paper prepared for “ASEAN and the Asia-­Pacific Region”), 24, 25, 26. 42.  Ibid., 24. 43.  Ibid., 26. 44.  Based on the meeting notes of a Manila conference participant that ­were shared with the author in a personal communication of October 13, 1995. 45.  The booklet’s foreword described it as an “anthology of some of the more representative speeches . . . ​since the end of the Gulf War.” It also contains a speech by then–­vice foreign minister Owada Hisashi, delivered in Singapore, on Japan’s intention to begin playing a more active role in UN Peacekeeping. In an interview, Satoh objected to my e­ arlier characterization of this booklet as demonstrating that the Nakayama proposal had become part of MOFA’s post–­Gulf War recovery strategy. He argued that he crafted the Nakayama proposal as part of a longer-­term strategy for Japan, rather than in response to such a short-­term consideration as recovering from the Gulf War. When I suggested that the Nakayama initiative could si­mul­ta­ neously have long-­and short-­term objectives, he agreed that it was pos­si­ble but stated that this was not what was driving his thinking at the time. When I asked ­whether ­others in MOFA might have been thinking along ­these lines, he demurred. He claimed that the inclusion of his Manila paper in this booklet was “unusual” in his view, and he suggested that it mostly reflected the thinking of a single individual, Watanabe Taizō, who was then director general for press and public relations in MOFA. Yukio Satoh, interview with author, August 7, 2008.



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For the original passage Satoh objected to, see Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role,” 382. While it is obviously impossible for me to know what Satoh was thinking at the time, it is evident from MOFA documents and Satoh’s writings and interviews from 1991 that are presented in this book that it was only a­ fter the Gulf War that he linked Japan’s plans to begin sending the SDF overseas to Cambodia and elsewhere to participate in UN Peacekeeping to the need to reassure East Asian nations about Japan’s ­future security role beyond its borders, and that this necessitated creating a regional multilateral security dialogue. 46.  Zarina Zainuddin, “A Conversation with Yukio Satoh,” ISIS Focus, July 1991, 18–19. Satoh’s participation and statements during ­these three meetings in Southeast Asia contradict claims that, in 1991, MOFA was not worried about e­ ither reassuring Asian nations or facing US withdrawal. See Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2007), 37–41. 47.  Zainuddin, “Conversation with Yukio Satoh,” 17. 48.  痛感. 49.  See Chiiki seikaku ka, “Satō jyōhō chōsa kyokuchō buriffu gaiyō,” June 18, 1991, MOFA Diplomatic Archives. Although marked “top secret,” when declassified t­here w ­ ere no redactions to this document. 50.  Ibid. As discussed ­earlier, the ASEAN-­ISIS directors made their own proposal directly to ASEAN governments in June for consideration by the Fourth ASEAN Summit, scheduled for early 1992 in Singapore. They did not anticipate a proposal about this being made at the PMC, especially not from a non-­ASEAN member. In interviews with ASEAN-­ISIS scholars and other participants in ­these conferences, I have not found anyone who heard Satoh suggest the idea of Japan making a proposal to the July 1991 PMC. Satoh himself confirmed in an interview that he did not discuss this idea with anyone during his Southeast Asian sojourn. Interview with author, July 9, 2008. Another Japa­nese participant at the Manila meeting told me that he has no recollection of Satoh discussing this possibility. Interview with author, April 27, 1995. 51.  Two plus four talks refers to talks among the two ­Koreas plus the four major powers in Northeast Asia: China, Japan, the Soviet Union (Rus­sia), and the United States. 52.  Chiiki seikaku ka, “Satō . . . ​buriffu gaiyō.” 53.  Satoh appeared to use the term multiplex to mean “many” or “multiple.” In a subsequent document, he spelled out multiplex in Katakana and translated it into Chinese characters as fukugōteki (複合的), which simply means “multiple.” 54.  Jōhō chōsa kyokuchō, “Ajia taiheiyō chiiki no antei kakuho to anzenhoshō ni tsuite—­ fukugōteki (maruchipurekkusu) mekanizumu no unyō,” June 25, 1991, MOFA Diplomatic Archives, 1. Paragraph 2 of this memo, consisting of four lines, was redacted. 55.  Ibid., 1–2. 56.  Ibid., 3. 57.  This phrase was used publicly by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, in a speech drafted by Satoh, the following year regarding China’s and Rus­sia’s involvement. See Chapter 6. 58.  The decision to put China ahead of the Soviet Union as a candidate member in this memo might have in part reflected knowledge about the Soviet Desk’s (Soren-­ka’s) strong opposition to including the Soviet Union. See the discussion ­later in this chapter. 59.  In 1995 Japan would be surprised when the ASEAN members of the PMC, acting on their own, invited China, Rus­sia, and India to join the PMC. 60.  Ibid., 4. 61.  The memo itself had this title: “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi ni okeru ‘Anzen hoshō ni kansuru kōkyū jimu reberu kyōgi’ secchi teian ni tsuite” (About a proposal for establishing a

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“se­nior working level meeting for security” in the ASEAN PMC) (July 3, 1991; document obtained by the author from MOFA through a FOIA request). Authored by the Regional Policy Division of the Asia Bureau, this document was marked “top secret.” It was declassified with five redactions of several lines each. 62.  Interview with author, April 15 and May 20, 2005. 63.  Regional Policy Division, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi ni okeru,” 1. 64.  The original Japa­nese placed the term peace state (heiwakokka) in quotation marks. 65.  A redaction began in the ­middle of this sentence. 66.  Besides the absence of the SOM proposal from Satoh’s internal MOFA briefing and position paper, another Japa­nese participant at the Manila conference reported that Satoh told him that he did not mention the SOM idea to his MOFA colleagues. Interview with author, April 27, 1995. In an interview, Satoh claimed that he neither proposed nor supported the SOM proposal. Interview with author, July 9, 2008. He emphasized this point subsequently in his own published recollections: “I immediately rang Tokyo [from the London G-7 meeting] to suggest they drop the SOM proposal, arguing that w ­ hether to create a SOM or not should be a ­matter for ASEAN countries to decide.” Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 102. However, as discussed l­ater, Satoh signed off on the SOM proposal in a July 3 decision document. 67.  Diplomat, interview with the author, May 20, 2005. 68.  As discussed in Chapter 5, Japa­nese diplomats, when defending the Nakayama proposal ­after it was made, argued that just proposing the formal addition of security to the PMC agenda was not a very significant change from the status quo. 69.  Several ASEAN members, especially Indonesia, ­were sensitive to changes in the PMC that suggested that they leaned to one side in the East-­West divide. 70.  決裁書. The sheet was originally marked “top secret in­def­initely” but was ­later downgraded to “secret in­def­initely,” before being declassified in 2011 in response to my FOIA. Strikingly, this document was not included in the FOIA documents I received regarding the Nakayama proposal but rather was provided in response to another FOIA request for documents related to a special PMC SOM called in spring 1993 to design the ARF (see Chapter 6). 71.  了. 72.  It is not clear why Satoh agreed, and he told me that he does not remember why he signed at this point but that the SOM proposal should be left up to ASEAN. See the discussion ­later in the chapter. Email to author, May 17, 2019. Moreover, differences between the July 3 draft and the final version of the speech show Satoh’s unmistakable influence in other re­spects, and perhaps he thought he could persuade the Regional Policy Division to drop the SOM proposal during his discussions with them. Satoh, interview with author, February 20, 2004. 73.  Ajia kyoku, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi ni okeru ‘anzen hoshō ni kansuru kōkyū reberu kyōgi’ secchi teian ni tsuite,” July 3, 1991, 1 (document marked “secret,” obtained by the author through a FOIA request). 74.  Ibid., 1. This appears to be an obvious reference to having the same po­liti­cal and economic system, or at least being “non-­Communist.” 75.  Ibid., 9. 76.  Ibid., 5. 77.  Ibid., 3, 5, 6. 78.  The head of the Soviet Desk within MOFA at that time, Togo Kazuhiko, told me that at the London G-7 summit in July 1991, he expressed concern to Satoh about Japan proposing a multilateral security framework for East Asia, b­ ecause he especially wanted to keep the Soviets



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out. Interview with author, July 7, 2011. Also based on author’s interview with a retired MOFA diplomat, August 19, 1994. The Soviet Desk’s fear about the Nakayama proposal was endorsed by an Economist article that asked, “Why then should Amer­i­ca welcome an Asian equivalent of the Conference on Security and Co-­operation in Eu­rope (CSCE)?” “A Hesitant Patroller of the Pacific,” Economist, July 27, 1991, 23. 79.  Interviews with author, August 19, 1994, and July 7, 2011. Similar points emerged from author’s interviews with a midlevel MOFA official, March 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994. 80.  Satoh Yukio, email to author, May 17, 2019. 81.  Interviews with author, February 20, 2004, and November 18, 2004. 82.  Eikoku hatsu, honshō chaku, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi (Nichibeikan no uchi awase)” (cable), Denshinsha Dai 3872 gō, yūsenshori, July 17, 1991. 83.  Ibid. Regarding this dinner, see Chapter 3. 84.  Eikoku hatsu, honshō chaku, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi”; Satoh Yukio, email to author, May 17, 2019. 85.  Eikoku hatsu, honshō chaku, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi.” However, Japan eventually proved unable to block the admission of China and Rus­sia in the ARF, and ­later in the PMC. See Chapters 7 and 8. 86.  One won­ders ­whether a full En­glish translation of this outline was made by a Japa­nese diplomat, or ­whether it was assumed that Ross would have it translated. 87.  “ASEAN-­PMC ni okeru seiji taiwa ni tsuite” (cable), ōden dai 3872 gōbetsu FAX shin, LD0891. The document uses the term chōkan (長官), a term used to refer to US cabinet secretaries, distinct from the term used for “cabinet minister” (daijin, 大臣). This passage could also be read as saying, “[We] think even your Secretary can be persuaded,” and is specifically aimed at Satoh’s MRM proposal. 88.  Ibid. When, as a gradu­ate student in the mid-1990s, I discussed the Nakayama proposal with a former Japa­nese diplomat who was ­running an international relations think tank, the diplomat essentially denied the very possibility of the Nakayama initiative and accused me of having been misled by media reports. According to him, for Japan to call for other countries to discuss their fears about Japan reemerging as a military power would be tantamount to “Japan placing itself in the criminal’s chair.” The distinction that Satoh was drawing between MRMs and CBMs can be seen as an attempt to prevent such (mis)attributions, although Satoh does not recall such a motivation. Satoh Yukio, email to author, May 17, 2019. 89.  “ASEAN-­PMC.” cha pt er  5 1.  For a brief description of the proposal by Nakayama himself, see Tarō Nakayama, Futatsu no haisen kokka: Nihon to doitsu no goju nen (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbun Sha, 1995), 143–144. 2.  Yukio Satoh, “1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte: Ajia-­taiheyō chiiki no anzen hoshō,” Gaikō Forum 64 ( January 1994): 12–18, at 15. For the conventional view of Satoh’s role, see Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheyō chiiki to takokukan anzen hoshō kyōroku no wakugumi: ASEAN chiiki forumu wo chūshin ni,” Kokusai Mondai 415 (October 1994): 60–68, at 64–65. As discussed in Chapter 4, Nakayama himself has claimed credit for formulating the contents of the proposal. When I asked Nakayama w ­ hether anybody in the Foreign Ministry contributed significantly to the intellectual content of the proposal, he said no. When asked about Satoh’s role, Nakayama denied even knowing who he was. Tarō Nakayama, interview with author, June 18, 1998. 3.  The Japa­nese original of Nakayama’s speech referred specifically to “Japan’s region” (nihon shūhen).

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4.  Ajia chiiki seisaku ka, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi: Zentai kaigi Nakayama gaimu daijin sutettomento (dai-­ichi kō),” July 3, 1991, 4 (document obtained through the author’s FOIA request to MOFA). 5.  This was abbreviated from the first draft of the speech, where it was claimed, in response to concerns from “one part of Asia” that Japan might reemerge as a “military ­great power” and a “threat to Asia,” that Japan “as a democracy” was “the most cognizant of history’s lessons” and vowed forty-­five years ago not to repeat its past be­hav­ior, including the “deployment of SDF overseas for the purpose of using force.” Ajia chiiki seisaku ka, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi,” 8. The removal of the reference to Japan as a democracy from the final speech might reflect a fear that it could alienate some ASEAN members who had authoritarian governments (e.g., Indonesia), and it is consistent with other deletions from the first draft and e­ arlier Asia Bureau memo references to the PMC members as sharing the same ideology and po­liti­cal system. 6.  The fact that Japa­nese diplomats w ­ ere circulating Satoh’s Manila paper as a form of explanation for the Nakayama proposal in advance briefings just before Nakayama’s speech (see Chapter 4) also indicates the influence that paper had in the final revision pro­cess. 7.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991: Japan’s Diplomatic Activities (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991), 469–470. 8.  The quotation is Prasert Chittiwatanapong’s summary of Satoh’s description provided during an interview at the ­Grand Hyatt Erawan ­Hotel, Bangkok, November 6, 1991, in Chittiwatanapong, “Japan’s Roles in the Posthegemonic World: Perspectives from Southeast Asia,” in Japan in the Posthegemonic World, ed. Frank Langdon and Tsuneo Akaha (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 228. 9.  Paul Evans, an observer at the Jakarta meeting, interview with author, September 19, 1994. According to this observer, Satoh linked his concern about CBMs to Japan’s regional reputational prob­lem, which he dates back to the 1920s. Also see Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 23. 10.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 469, 470. 11.  Yukio Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” in The Inclusive Regionalist: A Festschrift Dedicated to Jusuf Wanandi, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Clara Joewono ( Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 101. Satoh noted that “partial corrections w ­ ere made ­later” to the En­glish translation, and that Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s regional multilateral security initiative made a year ­later in Washington, which Satoh was responsible for drafting, used the “mutual reassurance” concept. “By then, however, the concept had lost its clarity and distinction” (101). 12.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 470. 13.  Akiko Fukushima, Japa­nese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (London: Macmillan, 1999), 143. 14.  Satoh’s and the Regional Policy Division’s secret documents discussed in the last chapter make this point clear. 15.  Internal MOFA documents discussed in the last chapter exuded confidence that Japan could effectively hold a veto over admitting new members to the PMC, a confidence that proved to be misplaced in 1995. See Chapter 7. 16.  Based on interviews with two MOFA diplomats on March 10, 1994, and April 4, 1994, respectively, and with a retired MOFA diplomat, August 19, 1994. This willingness to exclude China for the sake of excluding Rus­sia continued ­until spring 1993. 17.  Togo Kazuhiko, who at the time of the Nakayama proposal was the head of MOFA’s Soviet Desk and had inside knowledge about the debate surrounding the Nakayama proposal,



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commenting on the argument I presented in my 2000 article, wrote that this article “pre­sents a convincing argument that this omission was due to Japan’s reluctance to include the Soviet Union.” Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Multilateralism,” in East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 190n9. Regarding the original version of my argument that he was reacting to, see Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance,” Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 367–397, at 376–378. 18.  Regarding the first draft of the speech, see Ajia chiiki seisaku ka, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi,” 4, and the Asian Regional Policy Division memos discussed in the previous chapter. 19.  “Nakayama teian ni shinchōron taisei, ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi—­anpo kyōgi ni keikaishin,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 28, 1991, 11. Japan’s exclusion of the Socialist countries did not provoke public opposition from ­these countries. 20.  Another Japa­nese participant at the Manila conference who spoke extensively with Satoh ­there said the latter did not say anything about Japan taking the initiative to propose adding security to the PMC agenda. Interview with author, April 27, 1995. Satoh told me that he had not discussed the possibility that Japan would take the initiative at the July 1991 PMC and propose a security dialogue during his discussions with ASEAN-­ISIS academics in Jakarta. Interview with author, July 9, 2008. 21.  Jusuf Wanandi, personal communication to author, March 10, 1995. 22.  Interview with author, April 27, 1995; Satoh Yukio, interview with author, July 9, 2008. 23.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, 468–469. 24.  In my interviews with Satoh, he consistently denied a link between what was widely perceived as Japan’s Gulf War debacle and the Nakayama proposal, especially in his own thinking. He also claimed that the same held true for other MOFA officials. Interviews with author, July 9, 2008, and August 7, 2008. See the discussion on this point in Chapter 4. 25.  Michael Richardson, “Seen as Harmful to Direct Alliances: US Wary of Japa­nese Plan Pacific Security Idea,” New York Times, July 23, 1991, A4; Peter Kandiah, “ASEAN Hammers Out Brass-­Tack Plans,” Nikkei Weekly, August 3, 1991, 19; “Shin kyōgi kikan ni bei shinchō, gentaisei no kōryoku: ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 25, 1991, 1, morning edition. 26.  Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2007), 187n60. 27.  Allied proposals for creating a CSCA-­type structure that seemed very similar to the structure outlined in Soviet CSCA proposals w ­ ere an exception. See Chapter 4. The Nakayama proposal, on the other hand, was dif­fer­ent enough that it did not attract this kind of concern from Washington, but ­because it did not appear threatening in this way, it also tended to get overlooked. 28.  Desaix Anderson, interview with author, March 7, 2005. At the time of the Nakayama proposal, Anderson served as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific. Satoh claimed that he talked with Anderson “all the time” in the lead-up to the Nakayama proposal, and that Anderson was his “primary contact person in Washington on this issue.” Interviews with author, February 20, 2004, and November 18, 2004. Nonetheless, when I ­later told Satoh that Anderson did not recall the Nakayama proposal or what it was about, Satoh professed not to be surprised: “That’s not surprising, since he had so many other ­things to focus on.” Interview with author, July 9, 2008. 29.  Baker’s memoirs contain only a single, implicit, and passing reference to any of the PMC meetings he attended as secretary of state—­namely, the one in 1991, where Nakayama made his proposal: “For the next week, I turned my attention to an ASEAN conference in Malaysia,

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a quick return trip to Mongolia . . . ​and the President’s Moscow summit with Gorbachev beginning on July 30.” James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 494. ­There is no discussion of the PMC or regional security multilateralism anywhere in his memoir, although t­ here is lengthy discussion of his support for transpacific economic multilateralism, APEC, and regional mistrust of Japan within APEC. Ibid., 44–45, 610. Regarding Baker’s “notorious” reputation for being dismissive of Japa­nese diplomats and politicians, see Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 173. 30.  On the other hand, Foreign Minister Nakayama’s apparent mischaracterization of the proposal during a personal meeting with Baker apparently added to Baker’s suspicions of it. 31.  “ASEAN 6 ka koku gaishō, ‘Nakayama teian’ ni nanshoku—­Nihon shudō wo keikai,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 23, 1991, 2. 32. ­Every MOFA diplomat I interviewed cited this as a reason. 33.  Asahi Shimbun leaked the speech on July 20. See “Seiji taiwa kyōka wo, Nakayama gaishō ga uttae he, ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi,” Asahi Shimbun, July 20, 1991, 2, yūkan. Nihon Keizai Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun reported this leak the next morning. See “ASEAN asu 22 nichi kara kakudai gaishō kaigi, Nakayama gaishō ga anpo takokukan kyōgi teishou he,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 21, 1991, 3, chōkan; “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi, Ajia anpo de seiji taiwa kyōka—­Nakayama gaishō, hyōmei he,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 21, 1991, 2, chōkan; and Nobuo Asami and Tetsuya Tsuruhara, “Nakayama to Offer Asia-­Pacific Security Forum,” Daily Yomiuri, July 22, 1991, 1. 34.  Kyodo Tsushin, July 23, 1991, as carried by Foreign Broadcast Information Service—­East Asia (henceforth FBIS-­EA), July 24, 1991, 2; “ASEAN 6 ka koku gaishō,” 2. 35.  “Nakayama teian ni shinchōron taisei,” 11; “Kakudai kaigi no Nakayama gaishō teian ni ASEAN wa shinchō shisei,” Asahi Shimbun, July 23, 1991, 2; “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi ‘seiji taiwa no ba’ kentō he, Nakayama teian wo shiji,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 24, 1991, 3; Kyodo Tsushin, July 22, 1991, as carried by FBIS-­EA, July 22, 1991, 10. 36.  Bernama, July 22, 1991, as carried by FBIS-­EA, July 22, 1991, 11. Also see Bangkok Post, July 23, 1991, 1; Michael Richardson, “Wary Reaction to Japa­nese Plan,” Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1991, 33; and “ASEAN Wary of Japan’s Plan to Add Security to Its Agenda,” Japan Times, July 23, 1991, 1. 37.  A Yomiuri editorial regarding the Nakayama proposal questioned w ­ hether ASEAN’s self-­conception of “neutrality” still had any meaning “in an era when the East-­West conflict is dissolving.” “ ‘Shasetsu’ Reisengo ni torikumu ASEAN,” editorial, Yomiuri Shimbun, July 25, 1991, 3, chōkan. 38.  Evelyn Goh, “­Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/8): 123. Also see Chapter 4. 39.  “RI Reacts to Japan’s Plan on Security,” Jakarta Post, July 25, 1991, 1. Double quotation marks denote quotations from the article, while single quotation marks are from Atalas directly. 40. Ibid. 41. This Jakarta Post article was sent by secure fax from the Jakarta embassy to the Asia Policy Bureau within MOFA. The fax described the article as “Indonesia’s reaction to the ‘PMC Se­ nior Officials Meeting related to security.’ ” Indoneshiya hatsu, honshō achisei chyaku, “PMC (Anzen hoshō ni kansuru kōkyū reberu kyōgi: ‘I’ no hanō),” July 25, 1991, Fax sōshin DJ5087-01 (document obtained from the Foreign Ministry through the author’s FOIA request). 42.  Indoneshiya hatsu, honshō achisei chyaku, “ASEAN (anzen hoshō ni kansuru kōkyū jimu reberu kyōgi),” August 23, 1991, denshinsha dai 1660 gō, Fax sōshin DJ5306-05, 2–4 (document obtained through the author’s FOIA request to MOFA).



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43.  Ibid., 4. In internal MOFA documents I saw, this point did not come up, but it seems plausible that diplomats from the Asian Bureau might have felt insecure about making a major proposal that did not have some significant novelty to it. 44.  Ibid., 5. MOFA’s expressed opposition to allowing China and the Soviet Union into the PMC anticipated the opposition that it would continue to assert ­toward allowing them to do so even ­after the ARF was formed, ­until ASEAN suddenly and unilaterally de­cided in 1995 to admit both countries, along with India. See Chapter 7. 45.  Indoneshiya hatsu, honshō achisei chyaku, “ASEAN,” 5–6. 46.  Jusuf Wanandi, personal communication to author, March 10, 1995, 2. 47.  Raphael Pura, “ASEAN Moves Security Issues to Forefront,” Asian Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1991, 1, 13. 48.  Retired diplomat, interview with author, August 19, 1995. Similar views w ­ ere offered by two midlevel diplomats interviewed on March 10, 1994, and April 4, 1994, respectively. Also see S. Javed Maswood, “Japan and Regional Security,” in Japan’s Military Re­nais­sance?, ed. Ron Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 95. 49.  “ ‘Shasetsu’ Reisengo ni torikumu ASEAN.” 50.  Pura, “ASEAN Moves Security Issues,” 1, 13. 51.  Richardson, “Wary Reaction to Japa­nese Plan.” 52.  “ ‘Shasetsu’ Reisengo ni torikumu ASEAN.” In En­glish, see “ASEAN’s Quest for New Regional Order,” editorial, Daily Yomiuri, July 25, 1991, 6. 53.  “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi heimaku, nihon no yakuwari ni ashigakari, seiji taiwa no gutaika ga kadai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 25, 1991, 3, chōkan. 54.  “Nihon no gunji taikokuka wo ajia shokoku ga kennen, Jimintō Kurizawa semina-de Nakayama gaishō hyōmei,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 29, 1991, 3. 55.  “A Hesitant Patroller of the Pacific,” Economist, July 27, 1991, 23. For a similar interpretation, see Pura, “ASEAN Moves Security Issues,” 1, 13. 56. The Daily Yomiuri warned that “Japan should not become obsessed” with the SOM part of the Nakayama proposal in light of ASEAN’s cautious reaction, advice that MOFA decisively ignored. See “ASEAN’s Quest,” 6. Although this editorial was largely a translation of the one that appeared in Yomiuri Shimbun on the same day on the same subject, this passage did not appear in the Japa­nese original. Compare with “ ‘Shasetsu’ Reisengo ni torikumu ASEAN.” 57.  “Nakayama gaishō, ‘rikai erareta,’ ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 24, 1991, 2. 58.  Kyodo Tsushin, July 23, 1991, as carried by FBIS-­EA, July 24, 1991, 3; Bernama, July 24, 1991, as carried by FBIS-­EA, July 24, 1991, 3; Pura, “ASEAN Moves Security Issues,” 1. 59.  This phrase appears to characterize the speech’s proposal that the reassurance dialogue provide an opportunity for PMC members worried about the direction of Japan’s security policy to express t­ hose concerns, and for Japan to respond with an explanation of its security policies—in other words, the reassurance value for Japan of the dialogue. Chiiki seisaku ka, “1991 PMC toriaezu no hyōka” (undated document obtained through the author’s FOIA request). This document was attached to a briefing paper for the prime minister, and that document was dated July 24, 1991, suggesting this document was produced on the same date. 60. Ibid. 61.  See the last chapter for details. 62.  Chiiki seisaku ka, “1991 PMC toriaezu no hyōka.” The document ended with a multi­ line redaction. 63.  This conclusion is based on a nine-­page excerpt of what appears to be a briefing book prepared for the July 1991 PMC, an excerpt that is subtitled “Po­liti­cal Dialogue,” and includes

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eight model press questions and answers on the Nakayama proposal. This excerpt was obtained by the author as part of a FOIA request but does not contain any information on the document of which it is an excerpt. This excerpt has a FOIA release number of 2010-00440-0011-01-01. It also contains a summary of the Nakayama proposal and notes that, “happily,” the ideas of the Nakayama proposal “earned ASEAN’s understanding,” and ­will be carried forward for consideration from now, indicating that MOFA was preparing to spin the proposal as a success. 64.  “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi” (tai sōri buri-fu yōshiryō), July 24, 1991. This briefing is attached to Chiiki seisaku ka, “1991 PMC toriaezu no hyōka.” It ends with a multiline redaction. 65.  One MOFA diplomat told me that some in the LDP ­were unhappy to read about some negative reactions to the proposal and had asked MOFA for an explanation. Interview with author, March 10, 1994. 66.  Chiiki seisaku ka, “PMC ni okeru waga kuni teian ni taisuru sanka kuni no hannō,” August 3, 1991 (document obtained by the author through a 2010 FOIA request). 67.  Kunihiro Taishi, “(I) no hannō” (Indoneshiya hatsu, honshō chyaku, shukan Ajisei), July 25, 1991, Fax sōshin DJ5087-01 (document obtained by the author through a 2010 FOIA request). The analy­sis of Indonesia’s position is also based on another urgent cable sent the same day, and with the same title. See Indoneshiya hatsu, honshō achisei chyaku, “PMC (Anzen hoshō ni kansuru kōkyū reberu kyōgi: ‘I’ no hanō),” July 25, 1991, dai 1447 gō. 68.  Kunihiro Taishi, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi (Aratasu gaishō no hannō)” (Indoneshiya hatsu, honshō chyaku, shukan Ajisei), July 29, 1991, denshinsha dai 1464 gō (document marked “secret” and “urgent,” obtained by the author through a 2010 FOIA request). 69.  Chiiki seisaku ka, “PMC ni okeru waga kuni teian.” 70.  Ibid. From the context, it appears that Solomon was explaining why Baker was personally cool to the proposal, even while the US was supporting it. 71.  Ibid. Reactions from Canada and the EU ­were redacted. 72.  Achisei, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi (hon daijin ensetsu no sanshō),” cable to Japan’s US embassy, August 28, 1991, 1–3 (document obtained through the author’s 2010 FOIA request). 73.  Kunihiro Taishi, “ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi (seiji Mondai ni kansuru waga kata teian),” August 7, 1991, shashinsha dai 1526 gō (secret cable obtained by author through a FOIA request). 74.  Togō taishi, “ASEAN nō kaigi,” August 5, 1991, shashinsha dai 778 gō (secret cable obtained by author through a FOIA request). 75.  Togō taishi, “ASEAN nō kaigi (‘Shi’ gaimushō suji no mikai),” September 7, 1991, shashinsha dai 912 gō (secret cable obtained by author through a freedom of information request). 76.  Togō taishi, “ASEAN samitto (‘Shi’ gaimushō suji no mikata),” November 11, 1991, denshinsha dai 1148 gō (secret cable obtained by author through a freedom of information request). 77.  Sueo Sudo, International Relations of Japan and South East Asia: Forging a New Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2002), 40. 78.  Bangkok Post, October 6, 1991, as quoted in Sudo, International Relations, 40. 79. Sudo, International Relations, 40. 80.  James A. Baker III, “Amer­i­ca in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (1991): 1–18, at 5–6. 81.  Richard H. Solomon, “US Relations with East Asia and the Pacific: A New Era, Statement Before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 17, 1991,” US Department of State Dispatch 1, no. 21 (1991): 387. 82.  “The Tokyo Declaration on the US-­Japan Joint Partnership,” January 9, 1992, https://­tcc​ .­export​.­gov​/­Trade​_­Agreements​/­All​_­Trade​_­Agreements​/­exp​_­005589​.­asp.



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83.  Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 104. 84.  Yukio Satoh, “Emerging Trends in Asia-­Pacific Security: The Role of Japan,” Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995): 273. 85.  “Singapore Declaration of 1992 Singapore, 28 January 1992,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, May 14, 2012, http://­asean​.­org​/­​?­static​_­post​=­singapore​-­declaration​-­of​-­1992​ -­singapore​-­28​-­january​-­1992. 86.  Jusuf Wanandi, interview with author, September 24, 2010. 87.  “Singapore Declaration of 1992.” 88.  An Indonesian diplomat l­ater observed that Japan, along with the US, had been unenthusiastic about this decision by ASEAN. Kunihiro taishi, “Sōri hōbei (NPC supecchi),” July 4, 1991, denshinsha dai 1289 gō (secret cable obtained by author through a FOIA request). cha pt er  6 1.  Yukio Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” in The Inclusive Regionalist: A Festschrift Dedicated to Jusuf Wanandi, ed. Hadi Soesastro and Clara Joewono ( Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 101; Kiichi Miyazawa, interview with author, April 15, 2005, and Satoh Yukio, interview with author, November 18, 2004. 2.  Yukio Satoh, interview with author, February 20, 2004. 3.  Yukio Satoh, interview with author, November 18, 2004. 4.  Interview with Miyazawa Kiichi, April 15, 2005. 5.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1992: Japan’s Diplomatic Activities (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991), 430–431. This time Satoh made sure that his MRM concept, sōgo anshinkan wo takameru sochi (相互安心感を高める措置), or dialogue (taiwa), was translated correctly into En­glish. He claims that Miyazawa was exceptional among Japa­nese prime ministers for thinking conceptually, and he believes that Miyazawa wanted to deliver a speech laying out several impor­tant long-­term concepts in Japan’s thinking on regional security. Satoh, interview with author, November 18, 2004; Satoh, “Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal,” 101. Nearly thirteen years ­after delivering the Washington speech, Miyazawa did not have a strong memory of the term mutual reassurance mea­sure, but he did emphasize the importance in his mind of using multilateral dialogue to reassure East Asian states that Japan would not again emerge as a military threat to them. Miyazawa, interview with author, April 15, 2005. 6.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1992, 430–431; “Miyazawa Outlines Views to Uphold Asia’s Security,” Japan Times, July 4, 1992, 5; and “Asian Security Needs Outlined: Miyazawa Calls for Two-­Track Approach,” Mainichi Daily News, July 3, 1992, 1. 7.  Satoh, interview with author, November 18, 2004. 8.  Yasushi Tomiyama, “Miyazawa shushō no teishō—­Ajia Anpo—­Kōsō ni gimon ari,” Chūō Kōron 107, no. 1288 (November 1992): 78–79, at 78. As I was not able to find any indication that this author had published on any other foreign policy issues, I would speculate that this article was published u ­ nder a pseudonym, and that the author was perhaps a MOFA diplomat opposed to aspects of Miyazawa’s Washington speech. 9.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1992, 417–418. A consistent theme r­ unning throughout MOFA documents on responses to the Nakayama proposal, and in the writings of Satoh and ­others, is a bias ­toward seeing the Nakayama proposal as successful. More than a useful tool for Japa­nese diplomacy, as originally conceived, the Nakayama proposal, once made, effectively became an issue of face for MOFA and its diplomats. 10.  Just before mentioning the importance of a regional multilateral mutual reassurance dialogue, Kakizawa emphasized that Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping “­will be made only

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in response to UN resolutions or requests . . . ​we cannot and ­will not conduct such cooperation of our own accord. In making such contribution in personnel, we are determined to take into account the lessons of the past based on a full and accurate grasp of history, to firmly uphold our peace constitution, to never embark again on the road ­toward a military power, and we would like our friends in Asian countries to understand our resolve to continue to abide by ­these basic princi­ples.” Ibid., 417. 11.  A Japa­nese diplomat, while admitting to a “few points of re­orientation” in Japa­nese policy, including that of “involving China and Rus­sia as constructive partners in the f­ uture,” explained to his Indonesian counterpart that Japan was not seeking to include ­these two countries in the PMC dialogue. Kunihiro taishi, “Sōri hōbei (NPC supecchi),” July 4, 1991, denshinsha dai 1289 gō (secret diplomatic cable, obtained by the author through a FOIA request). 12.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1992, 432. 13.  Ibid., 428. 14.  Tomiyama, “Miyazawa shushō,” 79. Ironically, Miyazawa was ­doing just that, holding a consultative committee that was examining regional security multilateralism, albeit without assuming that the US military commitment was in doubt. See the discussion l­ater in this chapter. 15.  Sōgōseisaku Kenkūjo, “Nihon no Ajia-­Taiheiyō Gaikō nikansuru teigen (yōshi),” Shūkan jimintō jōhō sa-­bisu, July 2, 1992, dai 318 gō, 3, 4, 10, 16. Also see “Ajia ban CSCE, Jimin no kenkūjo ga teigen,” Asahi Shimbun, July 7, 1992, 4, chōkan. 16.  “Ajia ban CSCE.” 17.  Seiki Nishihiro, “The Ending of the Cold War and the ­Future of Security in the Pacific Region” (luncheon speech at the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue: Workshop on Changing Perceptions of National Military Security, Yokohama, Japan, August 28, 1992), 1. I was then a visiting researcher at the Research Institute for Peace and Security, and the rapporteur for this workshop. 18.  “Senryaku kokusai mondai kenkyūjyo (CSIS) kokusai hyōgiin kaigō (10/22) ni okeru Miyazawa sōri kōen Nihon no kokusaiteki yakuwari—­Atarashii kyōryoku kankei no wakugumi wo motomete,” text received from MOFA. Also see “Miyazawa Bids Asia-­Pacific Weigh Security ‘Framework,’ ” Japan Times, October 23, 1992, 2. 19.  Satoh told me that he was not involved in, and had l­ittle knowledge of, the CSIS speech, and that a­ fter Miyazawa’s Washington speech his personal involvement ended. Satoh, interview with author, November 18, 2004. 20.  Although ostensibly informal, this advisory panel was supported by the resources of the Cabinet Office. Documents from the panel w ­ ere stored ­there, and retrieved by the author through a FOIA request. 21.  Nobuo Ishihara, “21 seki no ajia-­taiheyō to nihon wo kangaeru kondankai no sanka ni tsuite,” Heisei 4 nen kakugai shingi 143 gō, May 1, 1993, 5–6 (document obtained by the author through a FOIA request). 22.  My review of this council’s ten-­meeting attendance lists shows that Satoh was not pre­sent at any of them. Imai, head of the Asia Regional Policy Division, who drafted the Nakayama proposal, was pre­sent at several meetings. 23.  “Dai 2 kai 21 seki no ajia-­taiheyou to nihon wo kangaeru kondankai,” June 22, 1993, shiryō 1, “Kondankai bunkakai menba (an),” 6 (document obtained by the author through a FOIA request). 24.  Ishihara, “21 seki no ajia-­taiheyō to nihon,” 6. 25.  “Pre­sen­ta­tion by Se­nior Minister for Prime Minister Miyazawa’s Roundtable on Asia Pacific Region in the 21st ­Century on 22 June 1992,” 6, as obtained by the author in a 2011



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FOIA request to MOFA, along with a Japanese-­language cover memo authored by the Regional Policy Division of the Asian Bureau, FOIA document 2011-00054-0003-01-01. 26.  “Pre­sen­ta­tion by Se­nior Minister,” 13. 27.  Ibid., 21. 28.  Ibid., 22 29.  Ibid., 14. 30.  Ibid., 13–14. 31.  Miyazawa, interview with author, April 15, 2005. Strikingly, at the consultative group’s press conference following Lee’s closed-­door speech, Council press spokesman Yamakage falsely denied that Lee expressed any caution on SDF participation in UN Peacekeeping operations. “Yamakage iin kara kisha kaiken gaiyō, dai 2 kai 21 seki no ajia-­taiheyō to nihon wo kangaeru kondankai ni tsuite,” June 22, 1992 (document obtained through the author’s 2011 FOIA request to the Cabinet Office). 32.  As mentioned in the Introduction, the Yasukuni controversy refers to the debate about ­whether Japa­nese prime ministers and other cabinet ministers should pay re­spects to Japan’s war dead at the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, where the spirits of Japan’s war dead, from the end of the 1860s ­until the end of World War II plus executed class A war criminals (convicted at the Tokyo Tribunal in the late in 1940s), are enshrined. For more on Yasukuni, see Akiko Takenaka, Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015). 33.  “Rekishi-­bunka bunkakai tōgi no gaiyō,” November 11, 1992 (document obtained through the author’s FOIA request). 34.  “Yamakage iin kara no kisha kaiken gaiyō: Dai 6 kai 21 seiki no ajia-­taiheiyō to nihon wo kangaeru kondankai ni tsuite,” November 11, 1992 (document, marked for committee members only, obtained by the author through a 2011 FOIA request to the Cabinet Office). 35.  “Seiji bukakai chukan hōkoku (an),” document attached to Naikaku gaisei shingi shitsu, “21 seiki no ajia-­taiheiyō to nihon wo kangaeru kondankai seiji bukakai (dai 2 kai),” September 16, 1992, 4 (obtained through the author’s 2011 FOIA request to the Cabinet Office). 36.  “Dai 1 kai seiji bukakai tōgi yōroku,” 2 (undated document obtained from the Cabinet Office through the author’s 2011 FOIA request). 37.  “Seiji bukakai chukan hōkoku (an),” 2–4; “Dai 1 kai seiji bukakai tōgi yōroku,” 2. 38.  “Seiji bukakai chukan hōkoku (an),” 3–4. PKF is an acronym used only in Japan that refers to “Peacekeeping Forces,” and is meant to distinguish peacekeeping operations that involve the use of force or combat from ­those that do not, which are referred to as PKO, for Peacekeeping Operations. The po­liti­cal working group, unlike the history and culture working group, dealt with the po­liti­cally explosive ianfu issue (sexual enslavement of Asian ­women to serve the Japa­nese military during World War II). At the press conference about this working group’s report, Council press spokesman Yamakage falsely stated that the ianfu issue had not been discussed. “Seiji bukakai chukan hōkoku (an),” 6; “Yamakage iin kara no kisha kaiken gaiyō, dai 4 kai 21 seiki no ajia-­taiheiyō to nihon wo kangaeru kondankai ni tsuite,” October 19, 1992, 4 (obtained through the author’s 2011 FOIA request to the Cabinet Office). 39.  “Yamakage iin kara no kisha kaiken gaiyō,” October 19, 1992, 2, 3–4. 40.  Miyazawa, interview with author, April 15, 2005. While Satoh has claimed primary authorship of Miyazawa’s Washington speech, even he recognizes Miyazawa’s active involvement in writing this speech. Satoh, interview with author, November 18, 2004. Also see “Shushō hyōmei, shiteki kondankai wo secchi he,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 22, 1992, 1, yūkan. 41.  “ ‘Ajia anpo’ wo kangaeru mae ni (shasetsu),” Asahi Shimbun, December 26, 1992, 2, chōkan.

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42.  “Miyazawa shushō no kaiken (yōshi),” Asahi Shimbun, December 13, 1992, 4, chōkan. 43.  21 seiki no Ajia-­taiheyō to Nihon wo kangaeru kondankai, “21 seiki no Ajia-­taiheyō to Nihon—­kaihōsei no suishin to tayōsei no sonchyō” [Japan and the Asia-­Pacific in the 21st ­century: Promoting openness and respecting diversity], December 25, 1992, 15. Also see “Prime Minister’s Council Calls for Active Asian Role,” Japan Times, December 26, 1992, 1. Although this call was in many ways consistent with Satoh’s own thinking, its strength might have reflected the influence of the kondankai. However, the call did contradict the position of MOFA at that time. 44.  21 seiki no Ajia-­taiheyō to Nihon wo kangaeru kondankai, 21 seiki no Ajia-­taiheyō to Nihon, 7. 45.  Ibid., 12–14. Subsequently, Japan did l­ittle to compensate victims, with the partial exception of the so-­called ianfu (comfort ­women). 46.  Keizai Dōyūkai, 1990 nendai no kokusai kankei ni okeru Nihon no tachiba to yakuwari [Japan’s position and role in the context of the international politics of the 1990s], report no. 1992-11 ( January 1993), 4–6. This council’s report did not stress the importance of historical reassurance as much as Miyazawa’s kondankai had. 47.  Yasuhiro Nakasone, “On Building a ‘Common House’ for Asian Region,” Daily Yomiuri, January 8, 1993, 2. For the Japa­nese version, see “Hōkatsu-­teki kikō o shinsetsu seyo,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 11, 1993, 1, chōkan. 48.  The Miyazawa administration attempted to deal with the ianfu issue during its last days in office, while the successor Hosokawa administration issued Japan’s first explicit apology for colonialism and aggression. 49.  This despite reporting that the advisory panel’s report formed the basis for Miyazawa’s Bangkok speech. “Sengo shori sugurete kokunai mondai,” Asahi Shimbun, December 25, 1992, 1, yūkan. 50.  James W. Morley, Japan and the Asia-­Pacific: Defining a New Role, Asian Updates (New York: Asia Society, May 1993), 3. 51.  Kiichi Miyazawa, “The New Era of the Asia-­Pacific and Japan-­ASEAN Cooperation,” provisional translation, as reprinted in ibid., 16. For the Japa­nese version, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaikō seisho: Heisei 4 nenban (Tokyo: Ōkurasho insatsukyoku, 1993), 404–410. Also see “Seiji-­anpo no taiwa wo shokushin Miyazawa shushō, tōnan ajia seisaku de ensetsu,” Asahi Shimbun, January 17, 1993, 1, chōkan. 52. Morley, Japan and the Asia-­Pacific, 19. 53.  MOFA official, interview with author, September 29, 1994. Another reason for Miyazawa’s reluctance to promote more specific ideas was that ASEAN had already agreed to Japan’s proposal to add po­liti­cal and security issues to the agenda of the bilateral ASEAN-­Japan Forum. As this forum was meeting the following month, it may have been considered more prudent to air Japan’s ideas then, rather than have Miyazawa air them publicly in his speech. It was also in January that ASEAN agreed to hold a security-­centric PMC SOM, as recommended in the Nakayama proposal, although for ASEAN this was a one-­time SOM, not the permanent SOM Japan had proposed. See the discussion ­later in this chapter. 54. Morley, Japan and the Asia-­Pacific, 17. 55.  Ibid., 19. 56.  Se­nior Japa­nese diplomat, interview with author, January 12, 1995. 57.  Yuji Miyamoto, “Ajia-­taiheyō no anzen hoshō no wakugumi kenchiku he mukete,” Gaikō Fora-­mu, May 1993, 13–21, at 13, 18–19.



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58.  Chiiki Seisaku ka, “Nichi-­ASEAN Fo-­ramu to PMC-­SOM ichi tsuke,” secret document, January 27, 1993 (obtained by the author through a FOIA request); retired MOFA diplomat, interview with author, September 24, 1994. 59.  “Thirteenth Meeting of the Japan-­ASEAN Forum,” Tokyo, February 16–17, 1993, in ASEAN Documents Series 1992–1994 ( Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1994), 80. 60.  Ibid., 81. 61.  Miyazawa, interview with author, April 15, 2005; Satoh, interview with author, November 18, 2004. 62.  Michael Richardson cited ASEAN officials as saying that membership in the security dialogue “could be broadened within a year or two to include China, Rus­sia, and Vietnam.” Richardson, “Asian Nations, in Shift, Look to Japan to Help Shape Defense Order,” International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1993, 7. This article also indicated that ASEAN had “recently started to work closely with Tokyo to shape a post-­Cold War order for the area,” which was a reference to the regional security dialogue (ibid., 1). 63.  Ajia kyoku, “ASEAN-­PMC-­SOM taisho hōshin hatsugen, ōtō yōryō sankō shiryō,” May 1993, 2 (document obtained through the author’s FOIA request). The pages about how to deal with the issue of Chinese and Rus­sian membership w ­ ere redacted when this document was released to me, apparently reflecting the continued sensitivity of Japan’s opposition to their membership more than seventeen years ­later. 64.  “Dai-­ikkai ASEAN kakudai gaishō kaigi kōkyu jimu reberu kaigi” (undated summary of PMC SOM of May 20–21, 1993; unclassified document obtained by the author in 2011 through FOIA request 2011-00055-0001-01-01). 65.  Togō, “ASEAN-­PMC-­SOM (Saitō gaishin kisha buriffu),” denshinsha dai 585 gō, with attachment ouden 575 gou, May 21, 1993, 2. Asahi Shimbun, describing the Saitō briefing and the meeting, put this in stronger terms: “It has become clear that including China and Rus­sia has become the trend of opinion” in the SOM. “ ‘ChuRo kuwae anpo rongi wo’ no iken taisei ni ASEAN kakudai jimu reberu kyōgi,” Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 1993, 2, chōkan. 66.  Togō, “ASEAN-­PMC-­SOM,” 3. 67.  None of the internal MOFA documents I obtained contained any such statements or indications that Japan was willing to publicly lean t­oward including China over Rus­sia, although this direction in policy does make sense given the thrust of Japa­nese policy since 1991. However, the briefing book for the SOM meeting, as indicated e­ arlier, had redacted from it Japan’s position on including China and Rus­sia, so it is pos­si­ble that Saitō’s statement reflected what was written ­there. 68.  “ ‘ChuRo kuwae anpo rongi wo.’ ” 69.  Kyodo, “ASEAN Agrees on a Mechanism for Security Talks,” Japan Times, July 23, 1993, 4. 70.  Singaporean diplomat, interview with author, November 30, 2011. 71.  Michael Richardson, “Pacific Nations Widen Security Talks,” International Herald Tribune, May 22–23, 1993, 5. 72.  Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki to takokukan anzen hoshō kyōryoku wakugumi: ASEAN chiiki forumu wo chūshin ni,” Kokusai Mondai 415 (October 1994): 60–68, at 65–66; “ ‘ChuRo kuwae anpo rongi wo’ ”; Peter Bohan, “ASEAN Begins Spinning Its Security Web,” Japan Times, May 27, 1993, 19; Japa­nese diplomat, interview with author, January 12, 1995; Singaporean diplomat, interview with author, November 30, 2011. 73.  Bohan, “ASEAN Begins Spinning.”

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74.  Japa­nese diplomat, interview with author, January 12, 1995. 75.  Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 65–66; “ ‘ChuRo kuwae anpo rongi wo’ ”; Bohan, “ASEAN Begins Spinning”; Japa­nese diplomat, interview with author, January 12, 1995; Singaporean diplomat, interview with author, November 30, 2011. 76.  Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-­taiheiyō chiiki,” 66; “ChuRo nado kuwae aratana wakugumi-­ ASEAN ga chiiki anpo de hōshin,” Asahi Shimbun, July 22, 1993, 2, chōkan; Kyodo, “ASEAN Agrees on a Mechanism,” 4; Japa­nese diplomat, interview with author, January 12, 1995. 77.  Japa­nese diplomat, interview with author, January 12, 1995. 78.  On emerging Sinocentric motivations for Japan’s ARF policy, see Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in Japa­nese Security Policy: The Case of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Pacific Review 10, no. 4 (1997): 480–503. 79.  For an argument by a former MOFA official specializing in security m ­ atters (who subsequently became a defense minister) that the primary purposes of a regional multilateral security dialogue should be to maintain the US military presence in Asia and promote confidence building, see Morimoto Satoshi, “Ajia anzen hoshō no kadai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 5, 1993. 80.  For an expression of this view, see Tomiyama, “Miyazawa shushō,” 79. cha pt er  7 1.  Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, homepage, accessed August 29, 2019, http://­www​.­cscap​.­org​/­. 2.  Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2007), 158. Also see Kuniko Ashizawa, “Australia-­Japan-­US Trilateral Security Dialogue and the ARF: Extended Bilateralism or a New Minilateral Option?” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 2008). 3. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 109, 114. 4.  A se­nior official in the same Security Policy Division told me that Rus­sia was coming to play a more positive role in regional security: “Rus­sia has also been changing . . . ​and they have been coming to understand more and more what is the Asia-­Pacific region in terms of security.” Interview with author, October 14, 1994. 5.  Se­nior official in the Security Policy Division, interview with author, January 12, 1995. 6. Ibid. 7.  Some observers have criticized the Chinese white papers that have resulted as being of low quality, and hence they view China’s compliance as being of ­limited significance. See Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 73. However, an analy­sis found that China’s white papers, although not as transparent as ­those of South K ­ orea and Japan, have gradually but steadily improved and match t­hose of India and most ASEAN members. See Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, Assessing Chinese Military Transparency, Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives, no. 1 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, June 2010), 1. 8. Ibid. 9.  Ibid. The ARF proved useful for Japa­nese policy makers when promoting norms and cooperation on counterpiracy. See the next chapter. 10.  Top official in the Regional Policy Division, interview with author, September 27, 1994. 11. Ibid. 12.  See “Chairman’s Statement: The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Bangkok, July 25, 1994, ASEAN Regional Forum, http://­worldjpn​.­grips​.­ac​.­jp​/­documents​/­texts​/­arf​ /­19940725​.­O1E​.­html. On the first meeting, also see Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional



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Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 33–35. 13. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 65. 14.  “Chugoku, kokubō hakusho kōhyō he, Qian gaishō kyō happyō, ASEAN chiiki For a-mu,” Asahi Shimbun, August 1, 1995, 2; Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 70. 15.  As late as May 1994, I observed a Japa­nese diplomat, Nogami Yoshiji, promote the MRM concept at the NEACD meeting in Tokyo, where I served as the rapporteur. Nogami subsequently wrote a “secret” report on this meeting for MOFA. Sōgō gaikō seisaku kyoku, Anzenhoshō seisaku ka, “Hokutō ajia kyōryoku taiwa (keii to gaiyō),” May 24, 1994, with a “Hōkoku/Kyōran” cover sheet dated May 26, 1994, MOFA Diplomatic Rec­ords Archive; see ibid., 1–2, for discussion of MRMs versus CBMs. Based on Nogami’s pre­sen­ta­tion, it was de­ cided to set up an MRM working group within the NEACD, although this working group did not lead to the widespread adoption of the MRM concept. An internal MOFA outline and evaluation of the first ARF SOM a few days a­ fter the NEACD meeting shows Japa­nese diplomats again questioning the appropriateness of the CBM concept. The source of this argument is redacted in the document, but it very closely matches Japan’s long-­held position and Nogami’s critique of only a few days ­earlier. See Ajia kyoku, Chiiki seisaku ka, “Dai ikkai ASEAN chiiki fōramu kyōkū jimu reberu kaigo (gaiyō to hyōka),” May 27, 1994, MOFA Diplomatic Rec­ords Archive. Yuzawa also notes that Japan presented its argument in ­favor of MRMs over CBMs to the first ARF SOM, although he incorrectly claims that it did so simply to assuage China and other nations and overlooks Japan’s own long-­term opposition to CBMs, an opposition developed by Satoh that long predated the ARF (see Chapters 3–4). Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 66–69. 16.  Anzen hoshō seisaku ka, “Dai 2-­kai ASEAN chiiki fo-­ramu no gaiyō to hyōka,” August 4, 1995, MOFA Diplomatic Rec­ords Archive; Ōden sōsaku 17356 gō betsu den, diplomatic cable, August 7, 1995, MOFA Diplomatic Rec­ords Archive. Also see Leifer, ASEAN Regional Forum, 34. 17.  “Nicchu gaishō kaidan, 4 ka koku kyōgi kyōryoku yōkyū: Ikeda gaishō, Nichibei anpō no igi kyōchō,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 23, 1996, 1. 18. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 114–116. 19.  Anzen hoshō Seisaku-ka, “Dai 4 kai ARF kōkyu jimu reberu kaigo (SOM)-­hyōka to gaiyō,” May 26, 1997, annex 2, p. 4, MOFA Diplomatic Rec­ords Archive. 20.  Akiko Fukushima, Japa­nese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (London: Macmillan, 1999), 146–147. 21.  Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Multilateralism,” in East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 171. 22.  Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Security Regionalism: Comparing Chinese and American Positions,” in Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007), 98. 23.  Jeannie Henderson, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper 328 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), 70. 24.  Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 32. 25. Fukushima, Japa­nese Foreign Policy, 146. 26.  Goh and Acharya, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” 100. 27.  Yukio Satoh, “ARF ni kokubō daijin no sanka wo,” Seikai Shuhō, February 10, 2004, 3. Gill also notes that ARF engagement “likely contributed to the issuance” of China’s “first white

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paper on defense and arms control ­matters in November 1995 and the subsequent publication of four more defense white papers” through 2004. Gill, Rising Star, 32–33. 28.  Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2009: The Quest for a Proactive Policy, 3rd extended ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 212. 29.  Satoh, “ARF ni kokubō daijin no sanka wo,” 3. Togo notes, however, that the question of developing preventive diplomacy has been “strained.” Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 212. 30.  Satoh, “ARF ni kokubō daijin no sanka wo,” 3. 31.  Patrick Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994), 21–60. Also see Takao Sebata, Japan’s Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976–2007 (Lanham, MD: University Press of Amer­i­ca, 2010), 261–266. 32.  Cronin and Green, Redefining the Alliance, 2. 33. Ibid. 34.  Ibid., 9. 35.  The Cronin and Green paper arguably was the realization of the danger that Tomiyama had warned about in his November 1992 Chūō Kōron article. See Chapter 6. 36.  Cronin and Green, Redefining the Alliance, 2, 9. This is what Miyamoto proposed in 1993, albeit without any ac­cep­tance from MOFA. See Chapter 6. 37.  See Advisory Group on Defense Issues, “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st ­Century,” report submitted to the prime minister of Japan, August 12, 1994, reproduced in Cronin and Green, Redefining the Alliance, 52; and M. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 148. 38.  Cronin and Green, Redefining the Alliance, 14 (emphasis in the original). 39.  Ibid., 16 (emphasis in the original). 40.  Ibid.; Sebata, Japan’s Defense Policy, 263. 41.  “Watanabe Akio shi (anpo wo tō zoku ‘saiteigi’ wo dō miruka,” Asahi Shimbun, June 14, 1996, 7, chōkan. In the US the Cronin and Green report was criticized as an overreaction of inexperienced dilettantes, and the State Department pushed back against their conclusions. See Chal­mers Johnson, “The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia” ( JPRI Working Paper No. 16, Japan Policy Research Institute, Oakland, CA, February 1996), http://­www​.­jpri​.­org​/­publications​/­workingpapers​/­wp16​.­html. 42.  US academic, interview with author, November 15, 2017. 43.  Yukio Satoh, email to author, May 19, 2019. 44.  J. S. Nye Jr., “Coping with Japan,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992/93): 32–33, 37. 45.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “National Defense Program Outline in and A ­ fter FY 1996,” accessed August 29, 2019, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­region​/­n​-­america​/­us​/­q&a​/­ref​/­6a​ .­html; Sebata, Japan’s Defense Policy, 280. 46.  Akio Watanabe, email to author, May 9, 2019. On the role of regional security multilateralism in Japan’s security strategy, the Higuchi panel “became a b­ attle of Watanabe versus Nishihiro.” Interview with author, November 15, 2017. 47.  “Watanabe Akio shi.” 48. Ibid. 49.  Akio Watanabe, email to author, May 10, 2019. 50.  “Watanabe Akio shi.” 51. Ibid. 52.  Akio Watanabe, “Nichibei anzen hoshō kankei no shintenkai,” Kokusai Mondai 456 (March 1998): 20–36, at 24–25, 28, 35.



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53.  Ministry of International Trade and Industry (more generally known by its abbreviation, MITI) minister, and ­later prime minister, Hashimoto Ryūtarō and LDP Diet member Ishihara Shintarō, ­later governor of Tokyo, submitted a paper to the LDP leadership calling for the eventual removal of US bases from Japan. Similarly, Ito Kōsuke, deputy chairman of the LDP’s Foreign Affairs Research Council, stated, “The time has come for us to review the existence of all t­ hese [US] bases.” Cronin and Green, Redefining the Alliance, 11, 19; J. Sterngold, “Some Leaders in Japan Begin to Question U.S. Bases,” New York Times, August 28, 1994, 4. 54.  Vietnam was also not a member, but it was an observer, and t­here was a consensus in ASEAN about admitting the Communist country into ASEAN soon, which would automatically make it a PMC member. 55.  Top official in the Security Policy Division, interview with author, January 12, 1995. 56.  Se­nior official in the Regional Policy Division, interview with author, September 27, 1994. 57.  Se­nior official in the Security Policy Division, interview with author, January 12, 1995. This same official added the opinion that Rus­sia’s admission to the PMC would come ­after China’s. He justified this by noting that China was already planning a large role in the regional economy. 58.  Japa­nese defense intellectual, interview with author, April 27, 1995. 59.  Japa­nese defense intellectual, interview with author, August 25, 1996. 60.  Ibid. However, given the still smaller membership of the PMC, it could arguably have been a more effective security forum. Over time, the extremely large and diverse membership of the ARF proved to be its main weakness in the eyes of many participants. Some smaller and more distant ARF members, such as Papua New Guinea and Pakistan, ­were not admitted to the PMC. However, with the PMC also discussing economic and po­liti­cal issues, the PMC did not have as much time to discuss security and lacked dedicated working groups dealing with it. 61.  By contrast, the US remained eco­nom­ically power­ful and much more power­ful militarily but had a relatively low attention and interest level in ASEAN and the PMC, while Australia and South K ­ orea had a greater interest and attention level than the US but paled next to Japan eco­nom­ically and as a provider of aid. 62.  However, Socialist prime minister Murayama Tomiichi visited the region in August 1994. 63.  “Shingapo-ru rekuchya ni okeru Hashimoto sōri enzetsu ‘Nichi-­ASEAN shinjidai he no kaikaku-­yori hirogaku yori fukai pa-­tona-­shippu,’ ” in Gaikō Seisho 1998, Dai 1 bu (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1998), 186–193, at 189. Sudo places this proposal in the context of Hashimoto’s visits to several ASEAN countries rather than just the context of his Singapore speech. See Sueo Sudo, “Japan’s ASEAN Policy: Reactive or Proactive in the Face of a Rising China in East Asia?,” Asian Perspective 33, no. 1 (2009): 139. 64.  This suggestion was made in an anonymous sidebar article published in Gaikō Forum, the ministry’s unofficial mouthpiece, in November 1997: “ ‘Fukuda dokutorin’ kara ‘Hashimoto dokutorin’ made,” Gaikō Forum 11 (1997): 15. 65.  “ ‘Nichi-­ASEAN shinjidai he,’ ” 189. 66.  “ ‘Fukuda dokutorin,’ ” 15. As in his Singapore speech, during each of his stops in ASEAN capitals, Hashimoto reiterated his proposal for a regular summit and wider dialogue between Japan and ASEAN. See Akihiko Tanaka, “The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework,” in Curley and Thomas, Advancing East Asian Regionalism, 52–73, at 59. 67.  Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 171. 68. Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 113. For a similar argument, see “Hashimoto Designs a Grander Foreign Policy: Changing Balance of Power in Asia Has Led to a More Active Development of Regional Links,” Financial Times, January 14, 1997.

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69. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, who cites an interview with a MOFA official, January 10, 2000. 70. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 181. 71.  Sudo, “Japan’s ASEAN Policy,” 139; Sueo Sudo, International Relations of Japan and South East Asia: Forging a New Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2002), chap. 3. 72.  “ ‘Nichi-­ASEAN shinjidai he,’ ” 192. 73.  “ ‘Fukuda dokutorin.’ ” ASEAN informed Japan of this decision in early May 1997. See “Nihon to ASEAN, 12 gatsu ni mo shunō kaigi,” Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 1997, 2, chōkan. Interestingly, this Asahi Shimbun article did not mention Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal to have a trilateral summit with China, South K ­ orea, and ASEAN as well as the Japan-­ASEAN summit. 74.  The concept was Wanandi’s, but the term is Evelyn Goh’s. See Chapters 1 and 4. 75.  One might see a parallel with ASEAN’s decision to expand the annual ASEAN-­Japan foreign ministers’ meeting of 1978 to include other Western partners in 1979, thereby creating the PMC. However, that expansion did not undermine the special Japan-­ASEAN relationship, as Japan was the only major partner combining large economic resources with ­great interest in and attention to ASEAN. 76.  Teo Poh Keng, “ ‘Hashimoto Doctrine’ Takes Japan Step Closer to ASEAN,” Nikkei Weekly, January 20, 1997. 77. Henderson, Reassessing ASEAN, 64. 78.  “Summit Between ASEAN, Japan, China, S. ­Korea Proposed,” Japan Economic Newswire, February 20, 1997. 79.  “Marēshia shushō kaiken, ‘EAEC’ kaigi ni iyoku,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 28, 1997, 8, chōkan; Sueo Sudo, “ASEAN ni yoru higashi ajia chiikishugi seisaku: Shin chiikishugi keisei ni itaru taigai kōdō no setsumei,” Akademia 88 ( January 2009): 165. 80.  “ASEAN to Make Final Decision on New Membership May 31,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 7, 1997. 81.  “ASEAN to teiki shunō kyōgi,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 22, 1997, 2, chōkan; Sudo, “ASEAN ni yoru higashi ajia chiikishugi seisaku,” 165, where Sudo notes that the APT had already effectively become a real­ity through the creation of ASEM. 82.  Additionally, as Tanaka Akihiko argues, from the perspective of Malaysia’s campaign to realize the EAEC, the APT undermined Japan’s negative position on the EAEC: “From the viewpoint of Dr. Mahathir, Hashimoto’s proposal provided a very good pretext to make a counter-­offer ­towards realizing a virtual form of the EAEC Summit, about which Japan might be regarded as the least enthusiastic.” Tanaka, “Development,” 60. Referring to the formation of the APT, Mahathir claimed, “This is EAEC though we do not call it as such.” As quoted in Sudo, International Relations, 104. 83. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 171. 84.  Akihiko Tanaka, “The International Context of U.S.-­Japan Relations in the 1990s,” in New Perspectives on U.S.-­Japan Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 282–284; Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 171; Barry Buzan, “How and to Whom Does China ­Matter?,” in Does China ­Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal, ed. Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot (London: Routledge, 2004), 143–164, at 152, where Buzan notes, “An attempt by Japan in 1996 to bolster the security dimension of its relationship with ASEAN got a cool response, as ASEAN proved unwilling to provoke China with any hint of an anti-­China alliance.” 85.  Se­nior Philippine foreign policy intellectual, interview with author, September 24, 2010. The other rising power being referred to was India. Anthony L. Smith makes a similar point.



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See Smith, “Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Strong S­ ilent Type,” in Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 191: “The Hashimoto administration also promoted a separate ASEAN-­Japan summit, but had to be content with ASEAN’s desire not to afford Japan special treatment at the time.” 86.  Singapore-­based analyst, interview with author, September 28, 2010. In 2009, Singaporean diplomat Tommy Koh was quoted by a se­nior US official as describing Japan as “the big fat loser” b ­ ecause of improving ties between ASEAN and China, a quote from a secret diplomatic cable that was made public through WikiLeaks. See Kyodo, “Singapore Discounts WikiLeaks Slips,” Japan Times, December 14, 2010, https://­www​.­japantimes​.­co​.­jp​/­news​/­2010​ /­12​/­14​/­national​/­singapore​-­discounts​-­wikileaks​-­slips​/­. 87.  Singapore-­based analyst, interview with author, September 28, 2010. 88.  Tanaka, “Development,” 57. 89.  Bertha Henson, “PM: Time to Forge Europe-­E.Asia Link,” Straits Times, October 20, 1994, 1. 90.  Tanaka, “Development,” 57; Le Siew Hua, “Thailand Agrees to Hold First Europe-­Asia Summit,” Straits Times, March 10, 1995, 2. 91.  Irene Ngoo and Tan Kin Song, “Japan Wants NZ, Aussies in Asia-­EU Summit,” Straits Times, July 25, 1995, 3; Zulkifli Othman, “Australia, NZ Fail to Get Meet Invitation,” Business Times, August 1, 1995, 4. 92.  Tanaka, “Development,” 58. 93. Ibid. 94.  Similarly, Tanaka notes that a­ fter the ASEM membership was de­cided, “Japan became less reluctant to the grouping of ASEAN, China, Japan, and South K ­ orea.” Ibid. 95.  Se­nior foreign policy intellectual from the Philippines, interview with author, September 24, 2010. 96.  Akitoshi Miyashita, “Japa­nese Foreign Policy: The International-­Domestic Nexus,” in Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Be­ hav­ior, First Edition, ed. Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, Michael T. Snarr (Washington, DC: CQ Press), 144–169. 97.  Jennifer Holt Dwyer, “US-­Japan Financial-­Market Relations in an Era of Global Finance,” in Curtis, New Perspectives, 47. 98.  David Wessel and Bob Davis, “Global Crisis Is a Match for Crack US Economists,” Wall Street Journal, September 25–26, 1998, 8. 99.  Dwyer, “US-­Japan Financial-­Market,” 120n31. 100.  Although Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 230, 254–257, claimed that New Miyazawa funding was tied to IMF conditionality, more recent accounts refute this. See Dwyer, “US-­ Japan Financial-­Market,” 98, 120n31; Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, “Japan and the East Asian Financial Crisis: Patterns, Motivations, and Instrumentalisation of Japa­nese Regional Economic Diplomacy,” Eu­ro­pean Journal of East Asian Studies 1, no. 2 (2002): 177–197; and Christopher W. Hughes, “Japa­nese Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis: Abject Defeat or Quiet Victory?” Review of International Po­liti­cal Economy 7, no. 2 (2000): 219–253. In a personal communication with the author on April 4, 2004, Christopher W. Hughes confirmed that New Miyazawa funding was given on softer, or no, conditionality, observing that ­there ­were no formal memoranda or publicly announced conditions for the dispersal of ­these funds. The most distinctive characteristic of New Miyazawa funding was its virtually impenetrable lack of transparency.

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101.  “Shin Miyazawa kōsō wo kakudai, Ōkurashō, Vietonamu ni tekiyō-­IMF nado ni senkōshi shien mo,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 3, 1999, 3, chōkan. 102.  Hook et al., “Japan,” 185. 103.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Asian Economic Crisis and Japan’s Contribution,” October 2000, http://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­policy​/­economy​/­asia​/­crisis0010​.­html. By October 2000 $70 billion had been distributed, with another $10 billion in the implementation stage. 104.  On ­these complaints, see Lawrence Summers, “Indonesia and the Challenge of Lasting Recovery,” Jakarta, Indonesia, January 24, 2000, accessed at https://­www​.­treasury​.­gov​/­press​ -­center​/­press​-­releases​/­Pages​/­ls348​.­aspx. To the extent that Miyazawa funding did mitigate “fire sale FDI,” this accorded not only with the national interests of Japan and its Asian partners but even with neoliberal economic theory, highlighting, as Jonathan Kirshner argues, that US and IMF policies during the financial crisis ­were anything but po­liti­cally neutral. Kirshner, “Globalization and National Security,” in Globalization and National Security, ed. Jonathan Kirshner (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5, 12–14. See the observations of prominent neoliberal economist Jagdish Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 9; and Paul Bowles, “Asia’s Post-­crisis Regionalism: Bringing the State Back In, Keeping the (United) States Out,” Review of International Po­liti­cal Economy 9, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 230–256, at 237–238. 105.  “Seifu, Ajia yūshi ni bōeki hoken, minkan shikin wo katsuyō—­Mare-­shia ni mazu 700 oku en,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 23, 1998, 1, chōkan; “Tai marēshia kinyū shien keikaku, seifu, keizai gaikō no shisei tenkan (kaisetsu),” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 23, 1998, 4, chōkan; “Bei-­zaimuchōkan, shihon idō kisei ni hantai,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 31, 1998, 1, yūkan. 106.  “Tsuka suwappu kyōka gōi chugoku fukme kyōtei kakujyū,” Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 2000, chōkan, 1; “ASEAN nichūkan kurashyō, Gaika yūtsu de gōi-­tsuka kiki saihatsu wo bōshi,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 7, 2000, 1, chōkan; “Gaika yūtsu gōi, shin miyazawa kōsō no jisseki haikei ni,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 7, 2000, 1, chōkan; Hook et al., “Japan,” 185–187. 107.  Smith, “Japan’s Relations,” 193. 108.  As quoted by ibid. 109.  Indeed, Japa­nese diplomats, including Satoh, had discussed the possibility of eventually forming a Northeast Asian security dialogue as far back as 1990. See Chapters 3 and 4. 110. Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 213; Fukushima, Japa­nese Foreign Policy, 155. 111. Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 213; Fukushima, Japa­nese Foreign Policy, 155–156. 112.  I served as the rapporteur for the second NEACD. This account is based on my notes plus Nogami’s write-up of the meeting. See Sōgō gaikō seisaku kyoku, Anzenhoshō seisaku ka, “Hokutō ajia kyōryoku taiwa,” with the discussion of MRMs versus CBMs on 1–2. 113.  Nogami’s account did not include ­these points, except for briefly mentioning that ­there was a widespread recognition that the regional US military presence was a ­factor for stability. Ibid., 1. 114. ­There was also discussion of Canada’s strong desire to join. Nogami’s write-up notes that not only Canada but also Australia wished to join. Ibid., 2. 115. Fukushima, Japa­nese Foreign Policy, 156. 116.  Fukushima, ibid., reports that a working group on MRMs was created in April 1995. In fact the agreement to create a standing group was de­cided in Tokyo in 1994. This decision is confirmed in my notes and Nogami’s report. See Sōgō gaikō seisaku kyoku, Anzenhoshō seisaku ka, “Hokutō ajia kyōryoku taiwa,” 2. Paralleling NEACD, a North Pacific Working Group of CSCAP was established in 1994 and held its first meeting in Tokyo in April 1995. Fukushima, Japa­nese Foreign Policy, 156.



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117.  Makoto Matsuda, “ARF no chūchōkiteki arikata,” in Aijia taiheiyō no anzenhoshō heisei 8 nendo jishu kenkyu hōkokusho, ed. Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo, March 1997), 37–38; Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 115. 118.  Several proposals w ­ ere also made to turn the multination talks on denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula into a Northeast Asian multilateral security forum, including the most recent iteration, the Six-­Party Talks. However, as this never happened, and ­these multilateral talks remained focused on the Korean Peninsula, it is beyond the scope of this book to cover ­these proposals. 119. Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 212, where Togo also notes that Korean president Kim Young-­ sam attempted to hold a summit meeting among the Northeast Asian three during his tenure as president, 1992–97, but that this did not materialize. Also see Tanaka, “Development,” 64. cha pt er  8 1.  The claim that Japan’s enthusiasm for the ARF had ebbed is largely based on a passage from an internal MOFA document evaluating the ARF SOM of May 20–21, 1999. See Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2007), 97. According to this document, it was difficult to think that t­ here was much hope for significant pro­gress in institutionalizing and building an ARF organ­ization ­because China had a cautious, go-­slow approach. Anzenhoshō Seisaku-ka, “ARF-­SOM (Gaiyō to hyōka),” May 24, 1999, 2, MOFA Diplomatic Rec­ords Archive. Yet this was an evaluation of a single meeting, and it was soon mooted by China’s own activism in promoting the institutionalization of the ARF (see the discussion l­ater in this chapter). By 2001 an internal report on Asian security was painting a more optimistic view of the ARF’s promotion of confidence building, and it indicated that pro­gress had even been made on preventive diplomacy. See Ajia kyoku chiiki seisaku ka, “Ajia ni okeru anzenhoshō,” May 18, 2001, 5, MOFA Diplomatic Rec­ords Archive. 2.  Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2009: The Quest for a Proactive Policy, 3rd extended ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 212. 3.  For this view, see Hiro Katsumata, ASEAN’s Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Also see Sheila A. Smith, “Beyond the ‘Post–­Cold War’? U.S.-­Japan Alliance and the F ­ uture of Asia-­Pacific Security,” in Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-­Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 123. 4.  Ajia kyoku chiiki seisaku ka, “Ajia ni okeru anzenhoshō.” 5.  Japa­nese security intellectual, interview with author, April 27, 1995. 6.  Sheila Smith, “Beyond the ‘Post–­Cold War’?,” 125. 7.  On the importance of avoiding loss of face in the ASEAN Way of conflict management, see Mikael Weissmann, The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 34, 99. 8.  Kavi Chongkittavorn, “China Takes the Lead in Pushing Asian Security Dialogue,” Nation, July 19, 2004, 10A. A concrete example of ASEAN-­Chinese convergence even relative to Japan came just ­after 2000, when Japan proposed creating an ARF secretariat separate from the ASEAN Secretariat, but China and ASEAN opposed, preferring the ARF secretariat to be ­housed within the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. Retired ASEAN Secretariat official who handled ARF m ­ atters, interview with author, October 5, 2010. On the consensus of Malaysia and other ASEAN states in f­ avor of a slow and evolutionary approach to the development of ASEAN, see Amitav Acharya, “Containment, Engagement or Counter-­dominance: Malaysia’s

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Response to the Rise of Chinese Power,” in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 141. 9.  Acharya, “Containment, Engagement or Counter-­dominance,” 131, 140–143. Quotation from “I Am Still H ­ ere: Asiaweek’s Complete Interview with Mahathir Mohamad,” Asiaweek, May 9, 1997, 34. In comparison to its cautious stance regarding US military engagement in the region, Malaysia stood out among ASEAN states in being more welcoming of a Japa­nese military presence. 10.  Chongkittavorn, “China Takes the Lead,” 10A. 11.  East Asia Study Group, Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, presented at the ASEAN+3 Summit, Phnom Penh, November 4, 2002, 19. The director-­general of each APT member state’s foreign ministry participates in the latter meeting. 12.  “Prime Minister Mori’s Statement at the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting in Singapore,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 24, 2000, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­region​/­asia​ -­paci​/­asean​/­conference​/­asean3​/­state0011​.­html; Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Multilateralism,” in East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 173; Akihiko Tanaka, “The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework,” in Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007), 66. 13.  Vision 2020 participant, interview with author, September 24, 2010. 14.  “Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi: Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership,” Singapore, January 14, 2002, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, https://­japan​.­kantei​.­go​.­jp​/­koizumispeech​/­2002​/­01​/­14speech​_­e.​ ­html. Koizumi also proposed that Australia and New Zealand be core members of this community, although Japan subsequently endorsed an APT consensus in f­ avor of limiting the community to just the APT members. Japan upheld that consensus ­until spring 2005. See the discussion ­later in this chapter. 15.  Tanaka, “Development,” 65, 67; East Asia Study Group, Final Report, 3. 16.  Tanaka, “Development,” 67. 17.  East Asia Study Group, Final Report, 4–6, 8, 59. 18.  “Issue Papers Prepared by the Government of Japan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 25, 2004, http://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­region​/­asia​-­paci​/­issue​.­pdf; Anthony L. Smith, “Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Strong ­Silent Type,” in Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 194; Togo, “Japan,” 176. The US itself remained hesitant to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation ­until the Obama administration de­cided to sign in 2010. See Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of Amer­i­ca’s Asia Strategy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 96. 19.  Togo, “Japan,” 175; leading Filipino foreign policy intellectual, interview with author, September 24, 2010. This official stated that Malaysia’s EAS initiative “angered” China. 20.  “General Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 162nd Session of the Diet,” January 21, 2000, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, http://­japan​.­kantei​.­go​ .­jp​/­koizumispeech​/­2005​/­01​/­21sisei​_­e​.­html; Togo, “Japan,” 175. 21.  Togo, “Japan,” 175. 22.  Qianqian Liu, Regional Cooperation and China’s Strategy ­Towards East Asia (Beijing: Paths International, 2012), 127–128, 130–131; Togo, “Japan,” 176. 23.  Togo, “Japan,” 176, 179, who notes that Japan also appears to have pressed, unsuccessfully, for also including Rus­sia and the US in the first EAS. Also see Seth Mydans, “New Group for ‘Asian ­Century’ Shuns U.S.,” International Herald Tribune, December 13, 2005. 24.  Philippine foreign policy intellectual, interview with author, September 24, 2010.



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25.  East Asia Vision Group, “­Towards an East Asian Community” (unpublished report), 17, https://­www​.­asean​.­org​/­wp​-­content​/­uploads​/­images​/­archive​/­pdf​/­east​_­asia​_­vision​.­pdf. 26.  As of August 2017, ­there had been seven EAS foreign ministers’ meetings. See “Chairman’s Statement of the 7th East Asian Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” August 7, 2017, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://­asean​.­org​/­chairmans​-­statement​-­7th​-­east​-­asia​ -­summit​-­foreign​-­ministers​-­meeting​/­. It is beyond the scope of this book to examine all the offshoots of the burgeoning ASEAN-­centric regional po­liti­cal and security multilateralism that emerged in the second de­cade of the twenty-­first ­century. This book confines itself to showing how all t­hese offshoots originate from Japan’s and ASEAN’s activism in promoting regional security multilateralism during 1991–93. 27.  “Japan and One ASEAN That Care and Share at the Heart of Dynamic Asia: Policy Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan on the Occasion of His Official Visit to Indonesia,” August 20, 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­region​ /­asia​-­paci​/­pmv0708​/­speech​.­html. 28.  Togo, “Japan,” 174. 29.  “Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation Among the ­People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of ­Korea,” Bali, Indonesia, October 7, 2003, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, https://­asean​.­org​/?­​ ­static​_­post​=­joint-​ ­declaration-​ ­on-​ ­the-​ ­promotion​ -­of​-­tripartite​-­cooperation​-­among​-­the​-­people​-­s​-­republic​-­of​-­china​-­japan​-­and​-­the​-­republic​-­of​ -­korea​-­bali​-­indonesia​-­october​-­7th​-­2003. 30.  Zhang Muhui, “Fraught but Promising: The China-­Japan-­South ­Korea Trilateral Summit,” Global Asia 13, no. 4 (December 2018): 60–61. 31.  It is a tribute to the centrality and convening power of ASEAN that they w ­ ere able to bring the NEA 3 leaders together for meetings even when the three w ­ ere other­wise refusing to meet each other. 32.  Data from the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, accessed August 30, 2019, http://­www​ .­tcs​-­asia​.­org. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat has been studying the Nordic Council of Ministers as a model for NEA 3 cooperation. Former director of the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, personal communication to author, April 6, 2016. 33.  Data from the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat. 34.  Muhui, “Fraught but Promising,” 61. 35.  “Ajia taiheiyō shokoku no kokubōsho kaigi wo teshō-­anpō kaigi de Nakatani chōkan,” Asahi Shimbun, June 3, 2002, 1, chōkan; “Japan Proposes Asia-­Pacific Defense Chief Forum,” Japan Times, June 3, 2002; Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 212, who cites Saga Shimbun. 36. Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 212. 37.  Regarding the Shangri-­La Dialogue, see “The IISS Shangri-­La Dialogue 2019,” IISS, accessed October 28, 2019, https://­www​.­iiss​.­org​/­events​/­shangri​-­la​-­dialogue​/­shangri​-­la​-­dialogue​ -­2019. 38.  Chongkittavorn, “China Takes the Lead.” 39.  Sheila Smith, “Beyond the ‘Post–­Cold War’?,” 125. 40.  ARF technical officer, Security Cooperation Department, ASEAN Secretariat, interview with author, September 30, 2010. A few years e­ arlier, China had taken a similar initiative by sponsoring a meeting of defense college presidents from ARF member nations. Singapore-­based analyst, interview with author, September 27, 2010. Also see Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 33–34. 41.  ARF technical officer, Security Cooperation Department, ASEAN Secretariat, interview with author, September 30, 2010; and Singapore-­based analyst, interview with author, September 27, 2010.

230

Note s to Cha pte r 8

42.  ARF technical officer, Security Cooperation Department, ASEAN Secretariat, interview with author, September 30, 2010; Togo, “Japan,” 171; “Chairman’s Statement of the Twelfth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Vientiane, 29 July 2005,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, October 12, 2012, https://­asean​.­org​/­​?­static​_­post​=­chairman​-­s​-­statement​-­of​ -­the​-­twelfth​-­meeting​-­of​-­the​-­asean​-­regional​-­forum​-­arf​-­vientiane​-­29​-­july​-­2005​-­2. 43.  Former head of the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat, interview with author, October 5, 2010. 44.  Yukio Satoh, “ARF ni Kokubō daijin no sanka wo,” Seikai Shuhō, February 10, 2004, 3. 45.  The so-­called ASEAN Special Se­nior Officials’ Meeting, started in 1996, brought together ASEAN diplomats and defense officials, especially in the Working Group on Security Cooperation. “Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed September 30, 2019, https://­asean​.­org​/­​?­static​ _­post​=­concept-​ ­paper-​ ­for-​ ­the-​ ­establishment-​ ­of-​ ­an-​ ­asean-​ ­defence-​ ­ministers-​ ­meeting-​ ­2. Another milestone in ASEAN defense cooperation was the holding of a “golf day” for ASEAN defense ministers in 1997. On the latter, see Jeannie Hendersen, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper 328 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), 82n28. 46.  See “Concept Paper.” 47.  ASEAN, “About the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM Plus),” February 6, 2017, https://­admm​.­asean​.­org​/­index​.­php​/­about​-­admm​/­about​-­admm​-­plus​.­html. 48.  Former head of the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat, interview with author, October 5, 2010. 49.  David Capie and Brendan Taylor, “Two Cheers for ADMM+,” PacNet, no. 51, October 20, 2010. 50.  “First ADMM+ Chairman’s Statement,” VietnamPlus, October 13, 2010, http://­en​ .­vietnamplus​.­vn​/­Home​/­First​-­ADMM​-­Chairmans​-­Statement​/­201010​/­13026​.­vnplus. 51.  “Concept Paper.” 52.  Capie and Taylor, “Two Cheers for ADMM+.” 53.  Singapore-­based expert on regional security multilateralism, interview with author, September 28, 2010. The ARF had established an Intersessional Meeting on Counter-­Terrorism and Transnational Crime. East Asia Study Group, Final Report, 38. 54.  Philippines-­based analyst, interview with author, September 24, 2010. 55.  Philippines-­based analyst, interview with author, September 24, 2010. 56.  Thai diplomat, interview with author, October 4, 2010. 57.  Singapore-­based analyst, interview with author, September 28, 2010. 58.  Philippines-­based analyst, interview with author, September 24, 2010. 59.  See Tomoaki Murakami, “The GSDF and Disaster Relief Dispatches,” in The Japa­nese Ground Self-­Defense Force: Search for Legitimacy, ed. Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 265–296. 60.  Richard J. Samuels, “New Fighting Power! Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 84–112, at 104; “Fushinsen tsuiseki, Takoku rireī, Nicchukanrobeika, asu kara kunren,” Asahi Shimbun, May 26, 2006, 3, chōkan; “6 ka koku gōdō no fushinsen tsuiseki kunren, Chukan, Chokuzen ni fusanka,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 30, 2006, 2, chōkan. 61.  Philippines-­based security intellectual, interview with author, September 24, 2010. Also see Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 196. The first meeting was held in Honolulu in November 1998.



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231

62.  ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement of the 6th Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July  1999,” ASEAN Regional Forum, accessed October  28, 2019, http://­ aseanregionalforum​.­asean​.­org​/­category​/­newsroom​/­arf​-­chairmans​-­statements​/­page​/­3​/­. 63.  Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 189; Kwang Wen Kin, “Asian Governments Not Keen on Joint Piracy Patrols,” Straits Times, May 4, 2000. 64.  Singapore-­based analyst, interview with author, September 27, 2010. 65.  East Asia Study Group, Final Report, 38; Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 196n93; “Asian Nations Cooperate in Piracy ­Battle,” Japan Times, April 27, 2000; “Kaizoku taisaku ni junshitei teikyō seifu, ODA de indoneshia,” Asahi Shimbun, March 16, 2005, 1, chōkan. 66.  “ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, June 17, 2003, http://­asean​.­org​/­arf​-­statement​-­on​ -­cooperation​-­against​-­piracy​-­and​-­other​-­threats​-­to​-­security​/­. 67.  Hiro Katsumata, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a ‘Talking Shop’ or a ‘Norm Brewery’?,” Pacific Review 19, no. 2 ( June 2006): 181–198, at 195. 68.  East Asia Study Group, Final Report, 38; “Ajia kaizoku taisaku chiiki kyōryoku kyōtei,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2010, http://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­mofaj​/­gaiko​/­kaiyo​ /­kaizoku​_­gai​.­html; Samuels, “New Fighting Power!,” 104. 69. See ReCAAP ISC Newsletter, accessed October 28, 2019, http://­www​.­recaap​.­org​/­resources​/­ck​/­files​/­news​/­2010​/­Issue%201​-­10​.­pdf. 70.  Anonymous, interview with author, November 30, 2011. The UK, and then Australia and the US, joined. 71.  Ibid. According to regional defense experts I interviewed, Indonesia and Malaysia ­were angered by the decision to place the ISC in Singapore. Interview with author, September 27, 2010. 72.  Singapore-­based security expert, interview with author, September 27, 2010. 73.  Anonymous, interview with author, November 30, 2011. 74.  Southeast Asian security expert, interview with author, September 28, 2010. 75.  Anonymous, interview with author, November 30, 2011. 76.  Kaijyō hoan repouto 2011, chap. 1, sec. 5, pp. 53–54, http://­www​.­kaiho​.­mlit​.­go​.­jp​/­info​ /­books​/­report2011​/­html​/­honpen​/­p053​_­01​_­05​.­html. 77.  Singapore regional security analyst, interview with author, September 27, 2010. 78.  David Fouse and Yoichiro Sato, “Enhancing Basic Governance: Japan’s Comprehensive Counterterrorism Assistance to Southeast Asia” (paper written for Asia-­Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2006), 9. 79.  Retired Japa­nese naval officer, interview with author, January 11, 2012. 80.  Member of the ASEAN Secretariat, interview with author, December 1, 2011. Also see Sanchita Basu Das, “ASEAN: A United Front to Tackle the South China Sea Issue,” East Asia Forum, May 13, 2012, http://­www​.­eastasiaforum​.­org​/­2012​/­05​/­13​/­asean​-­a​-­united​-­front​-­to​-­tackle​ -­the​-­south​-­china​-­sea​-­issue​/­#more​-­26286. 81.  “Nichi, Firipin, Kaijyō bōei de teiki kyōgi, shyunō kaigi de gōi he,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 25, 2011. 82.  Takashi Ōshima and Koichi Furuya, “Nicchu kōbō, Minami shinakai Nihon, Senkaku he no eikyō wo keikai wakugumi shidō sagaru,” Asahi Shimbun, November 6, 2011, 4, chōkan. 83.  Kyodo, “Japan Eyes ASEAN Maritime Security Forum Expansion,” Japan Times, October 27, 2011; May Masangkay, “Impact May Be Minimal as Maritime Issue Evolves into China-­U.S. Spat,” Japan Times, November 21, 2011.

232

Note s to Cha pte r 8

84.  Ōshima and Furuya, “Nicchu kōbō,” 4. 85.  “Chairman’s Statement of the 6th East Asia Summit, Bali, Indonesia, 19 November 2011,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, point 35, accessed October 28, 2019, https://­asean​.­org​ /­asean​/­external​-­relations​/­east​-­asia​-­summit​-­eas​/­. 86.  “Chairman’s Statement, 1st Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum Manila,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, October 9, 2012, https://­asean​.­org​/­1st​-­expanded​-­asean​-­maritime​ -­forum​-­manila​/­. The fifth EAMF was held in Jakarta in December 2017. See “The Fifth Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 8, 2017, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­press​/­release​/­press4e​_­001833​.­html. 87.  “ ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’: Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” August 22, 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­region​/­asia​-­paci​/­pmv0708​/­speech​-­2​.­html. 88. Ibid. 89.  Thomas Wilkins, “­After a De­cade of Strategic Partnership: Japan and Australia ‘Decentering’ from the US Alliance?,” Pacific Review 31, no. 4 (2018): 502; “Japan-­Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” March 13, 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­region​/­asia​-­paci​/­australia​/­joint0703​.­html; Akiko Fukushima, “Japan’s Perspective on Asian Regionalism,” in Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community, ed. Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 119. 90.  Mahendra Ved, “Indian Navy’s Malabar and Other Exercises,” India Strategic, September 2007, http://­www​.­indiastrategic​.­in​/­topstories45​.­htm. 91.  Siddharth Varadarajan, “Four-­Power Meeting Drew Chinese Demarche,” The Hindu, June  14, 2007, https://­svaradarajan​.­com​/­2007​/­06​/­14​/­four​-­power​-­meeting​-­drew​-­chinese​ -­demarche​/­. India argued that the Quad was just an extension of the ARF. According to an Indian official, “Just as the ARF is ASEAN-­plus, the Quad is an ARF-­plus arrangement. For example, anything we do on the maritime security front, or humanitarian front like tsunami relief, would have to involve the ASEAN countries.” Varadarajan, “Four-­Power Meeting.” 92.  Paul Midford, “Balancing Between a Hegemon and a Would-­Be Hegemon,” in Japan’s Politics and Economy: Perspectives on Change, ed. Marie Söderberg and Patricia A. Nelson (London: Routledge, 2010), 60. 93.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2017 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2017), 26–27. 94.  Bhagyashree Garekar, “Quad Leaders Stress ASEAN’s Centrality in Their Indo-­Pacific Visions,” Straits Times, November 17, 2018, https://­www​.­straitstimes​.­com​/­singapore​/­quad​ -­leaders​-­stress​-­aseans​-­centrality​-­in​-­their​-­indo​-­pacific​-­visions. 95.  “The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit—­The Shangri-­La Dialogue—­Keynote Address by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister, Japan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 30, 2014, https://­www​.­mofa​.­go​.­jp​/­fp​/­nsp​/­page4e​_­000086​.­html. 96.  Garekar, “Quad Leaders Stress,” who notes that the Quad has failed to issue any joint statements ­after four meetings, indicating differing views within the group. 97.  “13th IISS Asian Security Summit.” 98.  Ibid. Abe also proposed implementing a bilateral CBM with China, specifically a 2007 agreement Abe had concluded with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to create a maritime and airspace hotline to deal with incidents between the two countries’ militaries. 99.  “Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Tenth Anniversary of the East Asia Summit,” November 22, 2015, 2, East Asia Summit, http://­eastasiasummit​.­asean​.­org​/­wp​-­content​/­uploads​ /­2018​/­02​/­Kuala​-­Lumpur​-­Declaration​-­on​-­The​-­Tenth​-­Anniversary​-­of​-­The​-­East​-­Asia​-­Summit​.­pdf.



Not es to Cha pte r 8 and co nclus ion

233

100.  Galia Press-­Barnathan, “The United States and Regional Security Cooperation in Asia and Eu­rope,” Security Studies 10, no. 2 (Winter 2000/2001): 49–97, at 93. For a similar argument by Susumu Yamakage, who was part of Miyazawa’s brain trust promoting regional security multilateralism in 1992 (see Chapter 6 for details), see Yamakage, “Japan’s National Security,” in Network Power: Japan and Asia, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 302. 101.  Jusuf Wanandi, “Japan and ASEAN Relationship: Past and ­Future,” Kokusai Mondai, no. 566 (December 2007): 48–49. 102.  Interview with author, September 30, 2010. 103.  Retired member of the ASEAN Secretariat who specialized in the ARF, interview with author, October 5, 2010. 104.  Retired Thai diplomat, interview with author, September 27, 2010. con clus io n 1.  Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Layering Institutions: The Logic of Japan’s Institutional Strategy for Regional Security,” in The Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 78. 2.  For citations, see the introduction. 3.  Although t­hese meetings are considered Asia-­Pacific, and more recently Indo-­Pacific, meetings, they are nonetheless centered on East Asia as the heartland of this region. 4.  As discussed in Chapter 7, even the Higuchi report, which listed regional security multilateralism before the US-­Japan alliance, advocated maintaining the alliance and said nothing about privileging security multilateralism over the alliance. 5.  For a partial exception, see the Cronin-­Green reaction to the 1994 Higuchi report in Chapter 7. 6.  Retired US diplomat, interview with author, November 13, 2017. This official added that US concerns about Japan’s promotion of regional security multilateralism could mostly be traced back to Secretary of State James Baker and his entourage. Describing Baker’s reaction as “twitchy” and as reflecting a “lack of confidence in Japan” and a “lack of high-­level attention to this issue,” this retired diplomat noted that “at the embassy we thought t­ hose worries ­were overblown.” 7.  State Department official, interview with author, November 14, 2017. 8.  Former top Obama administration Defense Department official, interview with author, November 15, 2017. 9.  Former Obama administration Pentagon official, interview with author, November 13, 2017. 10.  Sumio Edamura, “The Fukuda Doctrine: Diplomacy with a Vision,” in Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond, ed. Lam Peng Er (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 24–25, at 26. 11.  For the relationship between reassurance theory and balance-­of-­threat theory, see Chapter 1. 12.  See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this distinction. 13.  This paraphrases a related point Thomas Christensen made in 1996. See Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75 (September/October 1996): 37–52, at 41. However, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the Trump administration’s be­hav­ior have undermined trust in benign US intentions. 14.  Former US Defense Department official, interview with author, November 15, 2017. 15.  Former Obama administration Pentagon official, interview with author, November 13, 2017.

234

Not es to Conclu s io n

16.  See Paul Midford, “Historical Memory Versus Demo­cratic Reassurance: The Security Relationship Between Japan and South ­Korea,” in Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Japan-­South ­Korea Relations, ed. Marie Söderberg (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010), 77–98. South Korean public opinion polls show that Japan is viewed more unfavorably than China. See Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Challenges and Opportunities for Korea-­Japan Relations in 2014 (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2014). 17.  Security cooperation has advanced furthest with the Philippines, and then with Vietnam. However, this cooperation mostly involves coast guard capacity building, including the supplying of some vessels, plus the provision of used Maritime Self-­Defense Force trainer planes for surveillance purposes. Bilateral war game exercises and contingency planning have not taken place. While Japan’s barriers to such cooperation remain significant, they have weakened during the Abe administration. Yet ­there has not been a clamor for a direct military role by Japan in Southeast Asia, even from US-­aligned states such as the Philippines. For background, see “Japan’s Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (May/ June 2015): 525–547. 18.  “A Colossus Stirs,” Asiaweek, January 27, 1993, 25, as quoted in Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 155. This statement was made two years before China stealthily seized Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands from the Philippines, and before laying claim to Scarborough Reef, actions that hardened perceptions ­toward Beijing. A leading Philippine security intellectual claims that ­these two actions created significant suspicion of Beijing’s intentions for the first time. Interview with author, September 24, 2010. 19.  David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 20.  Fangyin Zhou, “Between Assertiveness and Self-­Restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea Policy,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): 869–890; Björn Jérden, “The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 1 (March 2014): 47–88. 21.  See Chapter 1 for the development of this point. 22.  Former US official, interview with author, November 13, 2017. For example, many of the East Asia specialists I interviewed in Washington in November 2017 knew l­ittle about ReCAAP, with one expert confusing it with an organ­ization that fights digital piracy. 23.  Interviews with author, November 13, 15, 17, 2017. One former se­nior US defense official described the Shangri-­La Dialogue and the ADMM-­Plus as two “anchors” that get the US secretary of defense to the region, while another former defense official said, “Both meetings justify the very long trip from Washington.” 24.  See Prashanth Parameswaran, “Can China Reshape Asia’s Security Architecture?,” Diplomat, October 16, 2016, https://­thediplomat​.­com​/­2016​/­10​/­can​-­china​-­shape​-­asias​-­security​ -­architecture​/­. 25.  See “China Focus: China’s Xi Proposes Security Concept for Asia,” Gov.cn, May 21, 2014, http://­www​.­gov​.­cn​/­english​/­2014​-­05​/­21​/­content​_­2684270​.­htm. 26.  http://­www​.­xiangshanforum​.­cn​/­; Parameswaran, “Can China Reshape?”; Tuan N. Pham, “­Will the Revamped Xiangshan Forum Displace the Shangri-­La Dialogue?,” Center for International Maritime Security, October 23, 2018, http://­cimsec​.­org​/­will​-­the​-­revamped​-­xiangshan​ -­forum​-­displace​-­the​-­shangri​-­la​-­dialogue. 27.  Former Department of Defense official from the Obama administration, interview with author, November 17, 2017.



Note s to Co nclu s io n

235

28.  Interview with author, November 13, 2017. 29.  Former high-­ranking Pentagon official, interview with author, November 17, 2017. 30.  State Department official, interviews with author, November 14, 15, 2017; former Obama transition official, interview with author, November 17, 2017. 31.  Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-­ Pacific Security Arrangements,” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 7–17, at 7, 11. They suggest the APT as one pos­si­ble base for forming a security “web.” 32.  Two se­nior former Obama administration Department of Defense officials, interview with author, November 15, 17, 2017. One Department of Defense official, who was very enthusiastic about the ADMM-­Plus, said of the ARF, “The ARF was an impor­tant step, but has failed to live up to its potential. It’s an institutional vestige that could be replaced by the EAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. On the other hand, the ADMM-­Plus is very useful for practical cooperation and dialogue. It helps to clarify strategic intentions.” This person added, “Also, it is led by Foreign Ministries. Perhaps I am biased as I worked at the Pentagon.” Interview with author, November 17, 2017. Another se­nior Obama administration defense official added, “The ARF is similarly an impor­tant forum, although for the Pentagon the ADMM-­Plus is more impor­tant.” Interview with author, November 15, 2017. I found that former and current officials with closer links to the State Department tended to have a more positive view of the ARF. 33.  State Department official, interview with author, November 14, 2017; former Defense Department official, interview with author, November 13, 2017. Making the same observation about the Trump administration was a former se­nior defense official from the Obama administration. Interview with author, November 15, 2017. 34.  Former defense official, interview with author, November 15, 2017.

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Index

abandonment, 20–23, 107, 130, 133, 158, 159, 162, 185n71 Abe Shinzō, 146, 155–157, 165, 175, 232n98 Acharya, Amitav, 127 ADMM-Plus, 150–151, 166, 174, 175, 185n74, 234n23, 235n32 ADSOM-Plus Working Group, 150 Alatas, Ali, 63, 93, 94, 98, 139 Albright, Madeleine, 186n100 alliance security dilemma, 11, 12, 20–23. See also abandonment; entrapment Allison, John M., 30 Alondra Rainbow, 152 anchor and adjustment hypothesis, 19 Anderson, Desaix, 76, 85, 206n36, 211n28 Aoi, Chiyuki, 185n82 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), 112 apologies, 42, 43, 218n46 ARF. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) ARF Senior Policy Conference (ASPC), 149 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) “ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s,” 76–78 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), 149–150. See also ADMM-Plus ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM-Plus), 150 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM), 44–45 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM), 115, 117–118 ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS): and formulation of Nakayama proposal, 67, 72–74; Jakarta meeting and declaration, 74–76, 90, 91, 93, 205–206nn29, 33–34; Memorandum 1,

75–76; origins of, 72–74, 204nn7–8; policy entrepreneurs in, 170 ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum 1, 75–76 ASEAN-Japan Forum, 40, 224n75 ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), 154–155, 160 ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 134–137, 139, 144–148, 159, 166, 173, 228n14 ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), 43–45; versus ARF for Japan’s regional security strategy, 131–132; as example of noninclusive like-minded multilateralism, 13; and exclusion of Socialist countries from Nakayama proposal, 90, 213n44; and first draft of Nakayama proposal, 84; and formulation of Nakayama proposal, 75, 77, 81, 82–83; initial evaluation of, 67; in Nakayama proposal, 89; reactions to Nakayama proposal, 97–99; and Senior Officials’ Meeting in Nakayama proposal, 93, 95 ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting, 230n45 ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), 5, 133, 136–137, 139, 159, 225n94 Ashizawa, Kuniko, 13, 178n12 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 5, 133, 136–137, 139, 159, 225n94 Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), 36 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 35, 38–39 Asian financial crisis, 133, 137, 144 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), 137–140 Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Security Summit, 112 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 72, 112 “Asia-Pacific in the 1980s: Towards Greater Symmetry in Economic Interdependence,” 204nn7–8 ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council), 36, 168, 187n3, 191n51

238 Ind ex Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): in Abe’s FOIP concept, 156–157; and acceptance for Nakayama proposal, 100, 102; ASEAN-Chinese convergence, 227n8; as competitor for leadership in promotion of regional security multilateralism, 173; end of Japan’s special relationship with, 132; as example of socializing security community, 16; Fourth ASEAN Summit (January 1992), 102–103, 207n50; Hashimoto Doctrine as attempt to reestablish special relationship with, 133–134, 158–159; Japanese support for, 42–43, 159, 160, 166–167; and Japan’s rethinking about regional security multilateralism, 66–67; Manila and Kuala Lumpur meetings, 76–78, 206n36; and negotiations leading to creation of ARF, 115; 1992 summit, 100; omni-enmeshment logic of, 205n28; reaction to Nakayama proposal, 91, 93–94, 95–97, 203n1; US versus Australian and Korean interest in, 223n61; Vietnam’s admission into, 223n54; Vision 2020, 145 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF): and Abe’s FOIP concept, 157; agenda of, 15–16; catalysts for, 65; as complement to US-Japan alliance, 174–175; and counterpiracy cooperation, 152–153; creation of, 1, 104–105, 118–119, 123; in emerging security system, 23–24; functions of, in Japan’s security policy, 143; issues addressed by, 186n100; “Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region for the 21st Century” advisory panel and creation of, 108–112; Japan’s early participation in, 124–128; Japan’s embracing of, 166; Japan’s interest in, 142–144, 158, 227n1; Japan’s use of, 158, 182–183n38; membership of, 223n60; Miyazawa’s Bangkok speech and creation of, 113–114; Miyazawa’s CSIS speech and creation of, 107–108; Miyazawa’s Washington speech and creation of, 105–107, 111; negotiations leading to creation of, 114–118; versus PMC for Japan’s regional security strategy, 131–132; proposal for ARF secretariat separate from ASEAN Secretariat, 227n8; Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as extension of, 232n91; seen as coequal complement to the US-Japan alliance, 5–6; Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM), 126, 127, 149; shifts focus to humanitarian and disaster relief, 151; US anxiety over Japan’s participation in, 128–131, 158; US views on ADMM-Plus versus, 235n32; as venue of political competition between China and Japan, 123 attribution theory, 19

Australia: anticipated support of, for Nakayama proposal, 82; and East Asian Summit, 146; interest in ASEAN and PMC, 223n61; and launching of ARF, 65; as member of APT, 228n14; policy entrepreneurs from, 170; proposal for regional multilateral security forum, 56, 58, 60; proposes ARF working group on CBMs, 126; reaction to Nakayama proposal, 91, 99 Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad, 93, 135 Baker, James: and acceptance for Nakayama proposal, 101–102; on CSCA-type institution, 49; and debates on Nakayama proposal, 85–86, 87, 212n30; as dismissive of Japan’s political role, 58, 200n68; Nakayama proposal in memoirs of, 211–212n29; and US concerns about Japan’s promotion of regional security multilateralism, 233n6; and US reaction to Nakayama proposal, 92, 97, 98–99 balance-of-threat realism, 18–20 balance-of-threat theory, 18–19, 167, 183–184n49 Bali Declaration, 147 Bennett, Andrew, 179n26 Berger, Thomas U., 183n47 Berlin Wall, fall of, 53–54 bilateral alliances, 12, 31–33, 174, 185n71, 187n108 Blair, Dennis C., 174 Booth, Ken, 18 bottle logic, 29, 187–188n9 Brezhnev, Leonid, 36, 48 Brooks, Stephen, 181n18 Bush, George H. W., 102 Bush, George W., 159, 175 Buzan, Barry, 224n84 Canada: anticipated support of, for Nakayama proposal, 82; and launching of ARF, 65; policy entrepreneurs from, 170; proposal for regional multilateral security forum, 56, 58, 60; proposes ARF working group on CBMs, 126; proposes North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, 140; reaction to Nakayama proposal, 91 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 72, 73, 107–108 Cha, Victor, 22, 23, 25, 185n71, 186n100 Chatichai, Choonhavan, 53–54 Checkel, Jeffrey, 25–26, 179n26 Chiang Mai Initiative, 139 China: ARF as venue of political competition with, 123; ASEAN-Chinese convergence, 227n8; and ASEAN concerns over Japan’s reliability, 159; and ASEAN Plus Three, 134–136; competes with Japan for

Ind e x influence in ARF, 144; as competitor for leadership in promotion of regional security multilateralism, 173–174; defense white papers of, 125, 126, 220n7, 221–222n27; excluded in Nakayama proposal, 90, 95; inclusion in regional security dialogue, 75, 79, 80, 205n29, 216n11, 219nn62–63, 67; membership in ARF, 124–125, 126, 127, 131; membership in PMC, 131, 132, 213n44; in Miyazawa’s Bangkok speech, 113; in Miyazawa’s Washington speech, 105–107; and NEA 3, 178n15; in negotiations leading to creation of ARF, 114, 116–119; perception of, as threat, 171–172, 234n18; proposed bilateral confidence building measures with, 232n98; proposes ARF Senior Policy Conference, 149 Chongkittavorn, Kavi, 144, 148 Chung Ku-Chong, 57 Clark, Joe, 56 Cold War, end of, 63, 65, 71 collective security, 14, 52 common security, 14 Comprehensive Security Forum, 112 Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia Pacific, 90 confidence building measures (CBMs): advocated in Japan Forum on International Relations report, 52, 53; ARF implementation of, 124, 126; Inter-sessional Group (ISG) on, 124, 127; versus mutual reassurance measures, 201n80, 209n88, 221n15; in Nakayama proposal first draft, 84; proposal for ARF working group on, 126; proposed bilateral, with China, 232n98; provided by regional multilateral security structures, 142; Satoh on, 60–61, 62, 86–87, 209n88 cooperative security, 14–15 correspondent-inference hypothesis, 19 Coseteng, Anna Dominique, 171 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), 124 Council on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), 48–50, 56–58, 60–63, 87, 107, 110, 111 Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 14, 48, 52, 56, 84, 114, 197n35 counterpiracy, 151–154. See also ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia) Cronin, Patrick, 24–25, 128–130, 222n41 CSCA (Council on Security and Cooperation in Asia), 48–50, 56–58, 60–63, 87, 107, 110, 111 CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), 124

239

CSCE (Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe), 14, 48, 52, 56, 84, 114, 197n35 CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), 72, 73, 107–108 Cui Tiankai, 155 defense ministers’ dialogue, 148–151 defense white paper transparency, 125, 126, 127, 128, 220n7, 221–222n27 Diaoyu Islands. See Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dulles, John Foster, 29, 30, 32, 188n10 EAC (East Asian Community), 145–147, 155 EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus), 79–80, 112, 136, 137, 224n82 EAMF (East Asian Maritime Forum), 154–155, 157, 159, 160, 166 EAS (East Asian Summit), 145–147, 157, 159, 166, 174 EASG (East Asia Study Group), 145 EAS Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 157 East Asian Community (EAC), 145–147, 155 East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 79–80, 112, 136, 137, 224n82 East Asian Maritime Forum (EAMF), 154–155, 157, 159, 160 East Asian Summit (EAS), 145–147, 157, 159, 166, 174 East Asia Study Group (EASG), 145 East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), 145, 146 economic abandonment, 21 economic entrapment, 21, 185n67 economic multilateralism, 35, 38, 124, 173, 175 Edamura, Sumio, 39–40, 42–43, 166–167 Edelstein, David M., 19 Emmerson, Donald, 72 entrapment, 20–23, 48, 130, 158, 162, 185n67. See also alliance security dilemma European Commission, 136 Evans, Gareth, 56, 99 Evans, Paul, 205n29 Fedotov, Vladimir, 76 Fifth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 77–78 Fourth ASEAN Summit (January 1992), 102–103, 207n50 Fouse, David, 154 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), 156–157 From the Perspective of Strategic Studies (Senryaku kenkyū no shikaku), 50–51 Fukuda Doctrine, 2, 4, 37–45, 177n2, 193–194n88, 195n1 Fukuda Takeo, 37–38, 40–43, 45, 168–169, 191nn57–58, 192n69

240 Ind ex Fukuda Yasuo, 156 Fukushima, Akiko, 24 Gill, Bates, 127 Goh, Evelyn, 16, 75, 94, 127, 170 Goh Chok Tong, 136 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 48, 56, 57–58, 65, 203n114 Green, Michael, 24–25, 128–130, 133, 135, 200n68, 222n41 Grieco, Joseph M., 184n58 Gulf War, 54–56, 65, 77, 78, 199n49, 211n24 Han San Joo, 73 Hashimoto Doctrine, 133–134, 135, 136, 158–159 Hashimoto Ryūtarō, 133, 223n53, 223n66 Hatoyama Ichirō, 32 Hatoyama Iichirō, 40, 193n87 Hatoyama Yukio, 22, 155, 156, 165 Helsinki process, 48, 49 Henderson, Jeannie, 127, 135 Hernandez, Carolina, 73, 170, 204n14 Higuchi report, 107, 128–131, 221n46, 233n4 historical reassurance, 18 Ho, Deputy Vice Foreign Minister, 100–101 Hoshiro, Hiroyuki, 190nn45–47 Hosokawa administration, 218n48 Hosokawa Morihiro, 128 hub-and-spokes structure of regional bilateral alliances, 31–32, 174, 187n108 Hughes, Christopher W., 2, 24, 225n100 humanitarian and disaster relief (HaDR), 142, 150, 151 ianfu, 217n38, 218nn45, 48 Ikeda Hayato, 35, 36, 190n46, 194n96 Ikeda Yukihiko, 135, 141 Imai Tadashi, 78, 81, 83 inclusive multilateralism, 13, 14, 15, 17, 166 India, 146 Indonesia, 93–95, 98, 192–193n75 Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, 204n14 Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 73, 77 Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 140 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 137, 138, 139 Inter-sessional Group (ISG) on CBMs, 124, 127 Ishihara Shintarō, 223n53 Ishikawa Tadao, 108, 198n41 Ishikawa Yōzō, 53–54 isolationism. See regional security isolationism Ito, Kenichi, 187n109 Ito Kōsuke, 223n53

Jakarta ASEAN-ISIS meeting and declaration, 74–76, 90, 91, 205–206nn29, 33–34 Jakarta Post, 94, 98, 212n41 “Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region for the 21st Century” advisory panel, 108–112 Japan Forum on International Relations report, 51–52 Japan’s Post Gulf International Initiatives, 77, 206–207n45 Jervis, Robert, 184n50 “Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation,” 147 Kaifu Toshiki, 54, 55–56, 98, 199n53 Kakizawa Koji, 106, 215–216n10 Kamiya, Matake, 15, 23, 24 Kang, David, 171 Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi, 25 Keizai Dōyūkai report, 111–112 Keohane, Robert O., 12, 180n2 “Kessaisho,” 83 Kikuchi Kiyoaki, 41–42, 193n76 Kim Young-sam, 227n119 Kirshner, Jonathan, 226n104 Kishi Nobusuke, 32 Kissinger, Henry, 109 Kitaoka Shinichi, 108, 109 Kobayashi Yōtarō, 112 Koh, Tommy, 225n86 Koizumi Jun’ichirō, 145, 146, 153, 155–156, 228n14 Kowalski, Frank, 31 Kuala Lumpur ASEAN meeting, 77–78 Kunihiro Michihiko, 94–95, 98 Kuriyama Takakazu, 59, 199n55 Kusuma, Snitwongse, 73, 74 Lau Teik Soon, 73 Lee Kuan Yew, 109, 199n49 Llewelyn, James, 190–191n49 Lord, Winston, 117 Mahathir Mohamad, 79–80, 134, 135, 224n82 Malaysia, 139, 224n82, 228n9 malign dispositions, perceived, 19 Manila ASEAN meeting, 76–77, 206n36 maritime law enforcement, 151–152. See also counterpiracy Matsuura Kōichirō, 63, 115 military reassurance, 5, 18 minilateral security structures, 12–14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA): and ARF versus PMC for Japan’s regional security strategy, 132; and East Asian Summit, 145; foreign policy making dominated by, 26; and Hashimoto Doctrine, 133; and

Ind e x “Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region for the 21st Century” advisory panel, 108–109; and Japan’s early participation in ARF, 125–127; and Japan’s rethinking about regional security multilateralism, 166; and negotiations leading to creation of ARF, 114–118, 119; rethinks regional security multilateralism, 58–63 Mischief Reef, 234n18 Miyamoto Yuji, 114, 130, 222n36 Miyazawa Doctrine, 113–114, 133 Miyazawa Kiichi: Bangkok speech of, 113–114, 133; and creation of ARF, 1, 104, 118; CSIS speech of, 107–108, 216n19; introduces AMF proposal, 138; and “Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region for the 21st Century” advisory panel, 108–112; and negotiations leading to creation of ARF, 114; as policy entrepreneur, 169–170; Washington speech of, 105–107, 111, 215n5, 217n40 MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Mori Yoshirō, 107, 144 multilateral security structures: confidence building measures provided by, 142; defined, 12–14, 180nn2, 4; impact on state behavior and avoiding war, 181n19; in Nakayama proposal draft, 86. See also regional security multilateralism museums (history, peace), 107, 183n46 mutual reassurance measures (MRMs): versus confidence building measures, 201n80, 209n88, 221n15; creation of working group on, 226n116; in Nakayama proposal, 61, 89–90, 201n80, 210n11; and Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, 140, 141; Satoh promotes, 60–61, 201n89 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 34, 44, 112, 196n17 Nakatani, Gen, 148, 149, 150 Nakayama proposal (1991): aim of, 177n3; ASEAN-ISIS foreign policy intellectuals’ role in formulation of, 67, 72–74; Asia Bureau’s role in formulation of, 81–84; Baker’s suspicions of, 212n30; content of, 88–91, 209n2; definition of ASEAN states under, 13; as example of military reassurance, 18; first draft of, 84, 89, 210n5; G-7 summit debates on, 85–87; impact of, 2; initial evaluation of PMC as roadmap for, 67; Jakarta ASEAN-ISIS meeting and formulation of, 74–76, 205–206nn29, 33–34; as Japan’s first independent international security initiative, 1, 2, 47; Japan’s persistence in promoting, 96–101; and Japan’s stake in regional security multilateralism,

241

71–72, 200n67; Manila and Kuala Lumpur ASEAN meetings and formulation of, 76–78, 206n36; mistranslation of mutual reassurance measures in, 61, 201n80, 210n11; as modification of Fukuda Doctrine, 4; objective of, 131; perceived as unthreatening, 211n24; PMC’s initial evaluation of, 97–98; politicians’ recollections of, 211nn228–29; reactions to, 91–96, 98–99, 203n1, 209n78, 215n9; reactions to Japan’s follow-up regarding, 101–103; Satoh’s briefing and formulation of, 78–79; Satoh’s position paper and formulation of, 79–81; Satoh’s role in, 169; Wanandi on, 94, 95, 203n1 Nakayama Tarō, 54, 63, 64, 88, 95, 96, 202–203nn99, 109, 209n2 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), 107, 128, 130, 131 National Press Club, Miyazawa’s address to, 105–107 NDPO (National Defense Program Outline), 107, 128, 130, 131 NEACD (Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue), 221n15 “New Asian Strategy” of European Commission, 136 New Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis, 138 New Miyazawa Initiative Short-Term Financing Facility, 138, 225n100, 226n104 New Zealand, 99, 146, 228n14 Nishihara Masashi: on fear of US withdrawal from East Asia, 66; and Japan’s rethinking about regional security multilateralism, 50–51, 67; as member of Miyazawa’s advisory council, 108, 109; on Nakayama’s position on regional security multilateralism, 202–203n109; as policy entrepreneur, 169; proposes multilateral forum of US allies, 185n73; on Russian collective security proposals, 197n35; on UN dinner (1990), 63 Nishihiro Seiki, 107, 129–130, 216n17, 222n46 Nishioka (Japanese diplomat), 100 Noda Yoshihiko, 154–155 Nogami Yoshiji, 140, 221n15 noninclusive multilateralism, 13, 17 Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), 140–141, 221n15 Northeast Asian Three (NEA 3), 147–148, 166, 178n15 North Korea, 90, 131 North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, 151–152 North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, 140 nuclear weapons, 38–39, 41, 80, 189n39

242 Ind ex Nye, Joseph S., 130 Nye report, 130 Obama, Barack, 228n18 Obuchi Keizō, 141, 152, 153 Ochi Michio, 191n60, 192n70, 194n88 Ochi Takao, xii, 39, 42, 190n40, 191n56, 191n58, 191n60, 192nn62–67, 192nn69–70, 192n74, 193n87, 194nn98–99, 194nn101–102 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 28, 187n2 Ōhira Masayoshi, 35 Okazaki Hisahiko, 197–198n38 omni-enmeshment, 16, 75, 79, 94, 134, 135, 170, 205n28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 187n2 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 3, 15 Ōtake, Hideo, 31, 193–194n88 Owada Hisashi, 40–41, 42, 83, 85–86, 145, 194n103, 206n45 Pacific Common Security Fund, 51 Pacific Pact, 3, 29–34, 48 pacifism, 183n47 perceived malign dispositions, 19 Philippines, 171, 234n18 piracy, 151–154. See also ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia) PKF (Peacekeeping Forces), 217n38 PKO (Peacekeeping Operations), 217n38 PMC. See ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) PMC Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM), 95, 115–117, 118, 208n70, 218n53 policy entrepreneurs, 26, 168–170. See also Fukuda Takeo; Hernandez, Carolina; Miyazawa Kiichi; Nishihara Masashi; Satoh Yukio; Wanandi, Jusuf political abandonment, 21 political entrapment, 21, 36 postclassical realism, 14, 181n18 Press-Barnathan, Galia, 21, 31, 158 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, 156, 157, 232nn91, 96 realism: balance-of-threat, 18–20; postclassical, 14, 181n18; skepticism of, toward common security multilateralism, 181n19, 182n26 rearmament, 30–31, 33, 71, 191n57 reassurance: balance-of-threat realism and, 18–20; and building trust for Japan, 109–111, 113–114,

115, 123, 171–172, 198n42, 199n49, 234n17; forms and definition of, 18; historical, 5, 18, 107, 109, 112, 113, 169, 183n46, 199n53, 218n46; and Japan’s support for regional security multilateralism, 162; military, 5, 18, 37, 111, 162, 169, 199n53; regional security isolationism as form of, 34–37, 45, 162; sources of policies, 183n44; Soviet threat as alternative form of, 197–198n38; and US Pacific Pact proposal, 29 reassurance hypothesis, 6, 11–12 reassurance imperative, 11, 12; contemporary importance of, 170–172; and Fukuda Doctrine, 37–45; resurgence of, 53–56 ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia), 153–154, 166, 234n22 ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), 153 Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 152 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 153–154, 166, 234n22 regional defense ministers’ dialogue, 148–151 Regional Policy Division, August 3 Assessment produced by, 98–99 regional security isolationism: and foreign perceptions of Japan, 191n58; as form of reassurance, 34–37, 45, 162; Japan’s engagement in, during Cold War, 11, 26–29 regional security multilateralism: ASEAN and Japan’s rethinking about, 66–67; benefits of, for Japan, 50–51; catalysts for Japan’s rethinking about, 65–66; in East Asia, 2–4; emerging competition for leadership in Japan’s rethinking about, 56–58; first signs of Japan’s rethinking about, 63–64; formulation of Nakayama proposal and Japan’s stake in, 71–72; goals realized through, 4; impact of Japan’s leadership in promoting, 167; interest in, 5; Japan’s continued leadership in promotion of, 172–175; Japan’s embracing of, without US, 134–137, 158–159; Japan’s emerging thinking about, 50–53; Japan’s goals for, 71; Japan’s leadership in promoting, 1–2, 4; Japan’s motivations for promoting, 5–6, 16–26, 164–166; Japan’s promotion of, 140–141, 142–143, 146, 157–158, 162; Japan’s public promotion of, 104; Japan’s role in developing, 167, 168t; Japan’s skepticism about, 48–50, 162; Japan’s use of, 123–124, 158, 165–166; and mitigation of alliance security dilemma, 11; MOFA’s quiet rethinking of, 58–63; resurgence of reassurance imperative in Japan’s rethinking about, 53–56; as soft

Ind e x balancing forum, 167–168; Soviet support for, 48; US-Japan alliance and promotion of, 165. See also multilateral security structures reputation, 19, 95–96, 109–111, 113–114, 192–193n75. See also reassurance Resource Mobilization Plan for Asia, 138 Richardson, Michael, 219n62 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multilateral naval exercise, 34–35 Rochester, J. Martin, 13 Roh Tae-Woo, 57 Ross, Dennis, 85, 86 Ruggie, John, 12–13, 180n2 Russia: changing role in regional security, 220n4; inclusion in regional security dialogue, 205n29, 216n11, 219nn62–63, 67; membership in ARF, 125, 131; membership in PMC, 131, 132; in Miyazawa’s Bangkok speech, 113; in Miyazawa’s Washington speech, 105–107; in negotiations leading to creation of ARF, 114, 116–119. See also Soviet Union Saitō Kunihiko, 116–117 Sato, Yoichiro 154, 225n85, 228n18, 231n78 Satō Seizaburō, xii, 73, 197 Satoh Yukio: on acceptance of Nakayama proposal, 102; on Anderson’s recollection of Nakayama proposal, 211n28; on ARF, 128; on ASEAN’s omni-enmeshment logic, 205n28; briefings on security conferences, 78–79; on concerns over US presence in East Asia, 66; on cooperative and collective security, 194n34; and debates on Nakayama proposal, 85, 86–87; as director general of Research and Analysis Bureau, 59, 201n76; and formulation of Nakayama proposal, 72, 88, 209n2; on Higuchi report, 130; invited to June 1991 ASEAN-ISIS meeting, 205n20; invites Anderson to Manila ASEAN meeting, 206n36; Jakarta ASEAN-ISIS presentation of, 75–76, 89–90, 205–206n34; and Japan’s rethinking about regional security multilateralism, 59–63, 67; on Japan’s security and political isolationism, 34; and Kuala Lumpur ASEAN meeting, 77–78; on lack of multilateral security venue, 202n94; on link between Gulf War debacle and Nakayama proposal, 211n24; Manila paper, 76–77, 210n5; on mistranslation of mutual reassurance measures in Nakayama proposal, 210n11; on Miyazawa’s CSIS speech, 216n19; and Miyazawa’s Washington speech, 105, 106, 215n5, 217n40; on mutual reassurance measures concept, 201n89, 209n88; on Nakayama proposal, 206–207n45; and

243

Nakayama proposal content, 89–90; and negotiations leading to creation of ARF, 114, 115; as policy entrepreneur, 169; position paper to Regional Policy Division of the Asia Bureau, 79–81; and reactions to Nakayama proposal, 91, 92; on regional security architecture, 24; on Shangri-Law Dialogue, 149; signs off on Senior Officials’ Meeting proposal, 83; on Soviet inclusion in regional security dialogue, 205n29; and Soviet-Japanese dialogue on security, 63–64; on Wanandi, 74; Warm Springs paper, 61–62, 63, 64 Scalapino, Robert, 72 Scarborough Reef, 234n18 Sebata, Takao 129 security, defined, 12 security bilateralism, zero-sum trade-off between security multilateralism and, 165. See also bilateral alliances security dilemma sensibility, 18, 183nn43–44 security isolationism. See regional security isolationism security multilateralism: defined, 13; in fighting maritime piracy, transnational crime, and human trafficking, 186n100; interest in, 5; as reassurance vehicle, 20; skepticism of realism toward, 181n19, 182n26; types of, 14–16; US rejection of, 49; zero-sum trade-off between security bilateralism and, 165. See also regional security multilateralism security structures, types of, 12–13 “self-binding,” realist theory of, 184n58 Self-Defense Forces (SDF, Japan), 34, 51, 54, 55, 217n31 Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM), 81, 82–83, 85, 90–91, 93, 95, 98, 99 Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 22, 154 Severino, Rudolfo, 204 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 174 Shangri-Law Dialogue, 148–149, 157, 185n74, 234n23 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 56–57, 63 Shibusawa, Masahide, 40 Shirk, Susan, 140 Singapore, 100–101, 102 “Singaporean Foreign Ministry’s View of the [Upcoming] ASEAN Summit, The,” 101 Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 73 Smith, Anthony L., 139, 224–225n85 Smith, Gary J., 65 Smith, Sheila, 15–16, 143–144, 149 Snyder, Glenn, 20–21, 185n76 socializing security community, 15–16 Solomon, Richard H., 49, 99 Sonoda Sunao, 43, 193–194n88

244 Ind ex Sopiee, Noordin, 54, 73 Sosastro, Hadi, 73 “Southeast Asia and the World of Tomorrow” conference, 204nn7–8 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), 32 South Korea: and ASEAN Plus Three, 134–135, 136; interest in ASEAN and PMC, 223n61; mistrust toward Japan, 171, 234n16; and NEA 3, 178n15; and Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, 140; proposal for regional multilateral security forum, 57; reaction to Nakayama proposal, 99 Soviet Union: annual security dialogue with Japan, 63–64, 65; as catalyst for Japan’s rethinking about regional security multilateralism, 65–66; and debates on Nakayama proposal, 85; dissolution of, 53; excluded in Nakayama proposal, 90, 95; inclusion in regional security dialogue, 75, 79, 80; and Japanese skepticism about regional security multilateralism, 48, 49, 57–58; membership in PMC, 213n44; as military threat, 33, 34, 45, 65, 197–198n38; proposal for regional multilateral security forum, 56–57, 60, 62, 63. See also Russia Spratly Islands, 234n18 Stackpole, Henry C. III, 53 “Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security,” 152 Steinberg, James, 61 Sudo, Sueo, 40, 43, 52–53, 101, 134, 199n53 Summers, Lawrence, 138, 139 “Superpower Military Presence and the Security of Southeast Asia: Problems, Prospects and Policy Recommendations,” 73–74 Suzuki, Zenko, 44 Takahashi, Sugio, 14 Takeshita, Noboru, 44 Tanaka, Akihiko, 44, 137, 145, 224n82, 225n94 Tanaka riots (1974), 39–40, 193n76 Tang, Shiping, 18, 19 Tanino Sakutarō, 42, 63, 83, 105, 109 Tarasenko, Sergei, 64 Tarui (Japanese diplomat), 99–100 textbooks (history), 4, 107, 109, 110, 183n46 Thailand, 198n42 Thailand ISIS, 73 Togo Kazuhiko, xii, 83, 127, 128, 142, 147, 148, 208–209n78, 210–211n17 Tomiyama, Yasushi, 114, 215n8 track 1, track 1.5, and track 2 dialogues, 141, 177–178n8 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 126, 228n18

Trilateral Cooperation (NEA 3). See Northeast Asian Three (NEA 3) Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, 147, 178n15, 229n32 Trump, Donald, 173, 175, 233n13 Ueno (Japanese diplomat), 100 UN dinner, cosponsored by Japan and Indonesia, 63, 202n99 unilateral arming strategy, 12 United States: and acceptance for Nakayama proposal, 99, 100, 101–102; anxiety over regional security multilateralism in Japan’s security policy, 128–131; and ASEAN concerns over Japan’s reliability, 159; call for removal of bases of, from Japan, 223n53; and East Asian Summit, 146; and formulation of Nakayama proposal, 71; and Hashimoto Doctrine, 134; interest in ASEAN and PMC, 223n61; in “Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region for the 21st Century” advisory panel report, 111; Japan’s embracing of regional security multilateralism without, 134–137, 158–159; and Japan’s rethinking about regional security multilateralism, 65–66; and Japan’s skepticism about regional security multilateralism, 48–49, 162; in Miyazawa’s Bangkok speech, 113; in Miyazawa’s Washington speech, 107; in Nakayama proposal, 88–89; and Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, 140–141; opposes Asian Monetary Fund proposal, 138; promotion of regional security multilateralism and alliance with, 165; reaction to Nakayama proposal, 92, 97, 98–99; regional engagement of, 123, 173; regional multilateral security and political forums as complement to Japan’s alliance with, 174–175; views on ARF and ADMM-Plus, 235n32; Wanandi on reliance on military presence of, 205n20. See also abandonment; entrapment Uno Sōsuke, 44 “Using Multiplex (Multiple) Mechanisms for Ensuring Stability in the Asia Pacific,” 79–81 US-Japan summit (January 1992), 102 Vietnam, 90, 117, 118, 219nn62–63, 223n54 Vietnam War, 48 Vision 2020, 145 Walt, Stephen, 18–19, 183–184n49 Wanandi, Jusuf: on ASEAN’s preparations for security dialogue, 66; on ASEAN’s reaction to Nakayama proposal, 95; and formulation of Nakayama proposal, 74–75; and influence

Ind e x of ASEAN-ISIS, 74; invites Satoh to June 1991 ASEAN-ISIS meeting, 205n20; on Japan’s reliability, 159; on Nakayama proposal, 94, 95, 203n1; and origins of ASEAN-ISIS, 72, 73, 74; as policy entrepreneur, 170; on realization of ZOPFAN, 103; redefines ZOPFAN’s concept of neutrality, 16; on reliance on US military presence, 205n20 Warm Springs paper (Satoh), 61–62, 63, 64 Watanabe Akio, 108, 109, 130–131 Western Pacific Council proposal, 35–36 West Germany, 33, 34 Wheeler, Nicholas J., 18

Xi Jinping, 174 Yamakage Susumu, 108, 109, 110–111, 217n31, 217n38, 233n100 Yamanaka Makoto, 96–97 Yamashita Shintarō, 60 Yasukuni controversy, 4, 110, 217n32 Yasutomo, Dennis, 38 Yoshida Shigeru, 29, 30, 31, 189n21 Yuzawa, Takeshi, xi, 24, 133, 178n12, 179n17, 181n19, 182–183nn26, 37–38, 221n15 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), 16, 74–75, 93–94, 103, 170

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Studies in Asian Security amitav acharya, chief editor, american university david leheny, chief editor, waseda university These Islands Are Ours: The Social Construction of Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia Alexander Bukh, 2020 Asia’s Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific ­Century Andrew Yeo, 2019 Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order Xiaoyu Pu, 2019 The Reputational Imperative: Nehru’s India in Territorial Conflict Mahesh Shankar, 2018 The Indonesian Way: ASEAN, Eu­ro­pe­anization, and Foreign Policy Debates in a New Democracy Jürgen Rüland, 2018 Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North ­Korea Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, 2017 The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances Tongfi Kim, 2016 Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits Yuko Kawato, 2015 How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics Itty Abraham, 2014 Wronged by Empire: Post-­Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China Manjari Chatterjee Miller, 2013 Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia Steve Chan, 2012

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