Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century 9780773569256

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ORTHODOXY AND ENLIGHTENMENT

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McGill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Ideas

1 Problems of Cartesianism Edited by Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas, and John W. Davis 2 The Development of the Idea of History in Antiquity Gerald A. Press 3 Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid Two Common-Sense Philosophers Louise Marcil-Lacoste 4 Schiller, Hegel, and Marx State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece Philip J. Kain

9 The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics G.W.F. Hegel Translation edited by John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni Introduction and notes by H.S. Harris 10 Consent, Coercion, and Limit The Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy Arthur P. Monahan 11 Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800 A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy Manfred Kuehn

5 John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England Charles B. Schmitt

12 Paine and Cobbett The Transatlantic Connection David A. Wilson

6 Beyond Liberty and Property The Process of SelfRecognition in EighteenthCentury Political Thought J.A.W. Gunn

13 Descartes and the Enlightenment Peter A. Schouls

7 John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind Stephen H. Daniel 8 Coleridge and the Inspired Word Anthony John Harding

14 Greek Scepticism Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient Thought Leo Groarke 15 The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought Donald Wiebe

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16 Form and Transformation A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus Frederic M. Schroeder 17 From Personal Duties towards Personal Rights Late Medieval and Early Modern Political Thought, 1300–1600 Arthur P. Monahan 18 The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi Translated and edited by George di Giovanni 19 Kierkegaard as Humanist Discovering My Self Arnold B. Come 20 Durkheim, Morals, and Modernity W. Watts Miller 21 The Career of Toleration John Locke, Jonas Proast, and After Richard Vernon 22 Dialectic of Love Platonism in Schiller’s Aesthetics David Pugh 23 History and Memory in Ancient Greece Gordon Shrimpton

24 Kierkegaard as Theologian Recovering My Self Arnold B. Come 25 An Enlightenment Tory in Victorian Scotland The Career of Sir Archibald Alison Michael Michie 26 The Road to Egdon Heath The Aesthetics of the Great in Nature Richard Bevis 27 Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation of Jakob Böhme Theosophy – Hagiography – Literature Paolo Mayer 28 Enlightenment and Community Lessing, Abbt, Herder, and the Quest for a German Public Benjamin W. Redekop 29 Jacob Burckhardt and the Crisis of Modernity John R. Hinde 30 The Distant Relation Time and Identity in Spanish American Fiction Eoin S. Thomson

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31 Mr Simson’s Knotty Case Divinity, Politics, and Due Process in Early Eighteenth-Century Scotland Anne Skoczylas

32 Orthodoxy and Enlightenment George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century Jeffrey M. Suderman

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ORTHODOXY AND ENLIGHTENMENT George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

Jeffrey M. Suderman

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001 isbn 0-7735-2190-9 Legal deposit third quarter 2001 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (bpidp) for its activities. It also acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for its publishing program.

National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data Suderman, Jeffrey M. (Jeffrey Mark), 1965– Orthodoxy and enlightenment: George Campbell in the eighteenth century (McGill-Queen’s studies in the history of ideas; 32) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-7735-2190-9 1. Campbell, George, 1719–1796. 2. Theologians – Scotland – Biography. 3. Philosophers – Scotland – Biography. I. Title. II. Series. b1409.c344s83 2001 230′.5233′092 c2001-900145-2

This book was typeset by Dynagram Inc. in 10/12 Baskerville.

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For my mother

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Contents

List of Figures

x

Abbreviations Used in the Notes Preface

xi

xiii

Introduction

3

A Note on Terms

7

part 1 george campbell: life and works 1 The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771)

9 11

2 The Years of Achievement (1771–1790) 31 3 The Height of Reputation (from 1790)

52

part ii natural knowledge: the enlightened campbell 4 Philosophy in Theory

71

5 Philosophy in Practice

121

6 The Limits of Enlightenment

69

159

part iii revealed knowledge: the religious campbell 7 Campbell’s Theology

181

8 Religious Problems and Controversies 9 The Limits of Moderatism

236

208

179

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x

Contents Conclusion

254

Appendix 1: Schedule of Divinity Lectures Given by George Campbell and Alexander Gerard 263 Appendix 2: Campbell’s Creed

267

Appendix 3: A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence

268

George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century: A Bibliographical Essay 273 Index

290

figures Figure 1: Campbell’s lecturing scheme (with related publications) Figure 2: Campbell’s theory of evidence

93

64

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Abbreviations Used in the Notes

archives and libraries aca aul bl eul ncl nls sca sro

Aberdeen City Archives Aberdeen University Library British Library Edinburgh University Library New College Library, Edinburgh National Library of Scotland Sheffield City Archives Scottish Record Office (National Archives of Scotland) writings by george campbell

cmg The Character of a Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern (Aberdeen: James Chalmers, 1752). dm A Dissertation on Miracles (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1762). fg The Four Gospels, 2 vols, 7th ed. (London: T. Tegg, 1834). leh Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, 2 vols, 2nd ed. (Aberdeen: A. Brown; London: T. Hamilton; Edinburgh: Oliphant, Waugh, and Innes, 1815). lpc Lectures on the Pastoral Character, ed. James Fraser (London: Black, Parry, and Kingsbury, 1811). lstpe Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1807). pr The Philosophy of Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer, 2nd ed. (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988). st A Dissertation on Miracles … To Which Are Added Sermons and Tracts, 2 vols, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, and W. Creech; London; T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1797).

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Preface

In such a general and introductory work as this (and this is indeed the first published monograph devoted entirely to Campbell), the easy and obvious thing to do would be to write a series of topical chapters, each devoted to some separate aspect of Campbell’s life and thought: a background chapter on his Scottish context, a brief survey of his life, then a chapter each on his rhetoric, treatment of miracles, history, biblical criticism and theology. Foolishly, perhaps, I have not done this. Instead I have structured this work to reflect my interpretation of the structure of Campbell’s thought. I have argued that the way in which the various parts of Campbell’s thought fit together is as important as the individual parts themselves, and as revealing as a close reading of his texts. Not everyone will agree with this approach, but I hope at least that my historical treatment will provoke some new discussion both about Campbell and his intentions, and about the context of ideas in which Scottish moderates such as Campbell worked. Most of what has been published on Campbell has been concerned strictly with his rhetorical theory, and so I have said little about this aspect of his thought except as it relates to the larger patterns of his life and work. Nevertheless, I hope that modern rhetoricians will find something useful here concerning Campbell’s life and wider interests. Also, since Campbell will be new to most students of the Scottish Enlightenment as well as to students of Scottish church history, I have quoted liberally from both his printed and his manuscript works to give a sense of his language and style. I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a doctoral fellowship that allowed me to do essential archival research in Scotland, and to the Department of History at the University of Western Ontario for awarding me the Ivie Cornish Memorial

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xiv

Preface

Fellowship, which gave me time to finish the first drafts. Most of the manuscript materials used here are housed in the Special Libraries and Archives at the University of Aberdeen; for extraordinary assistance and for permission to quote from these materials, I am grateful to the Historic Collections, to the Senior Curator, Dr Iain Beavan, and to Captain C.A. Farquharson of Whitehouse. For assistance in finding additional materials and for permission to quote from manuscripts in their possession, I am pleased to acknowledge the Aberdeen City Council, the National Archives of Scotland (formerly the Scottish Record Office), The Trustees of the National Library of Scotland, the British Library, and finally the Head of Leisure Services of the Sheffield City Council, the Sheffield Archives, and the Trustees of the Rt Hon Olive Countess Fitzwilliams Chattels Settlement for Edmund Burke’s Papers. I am grateful for the personal assistance of numerous librarians and archivists, particularly Colin McLaren, Judith Cripps, Murray Simpson, Patrick Cadell, Jean Archibald, Christine Johnson, Walter Zimmerman, and David Murphy. Many scholars have generously shared ideas, information and timely encouragements along the way. I would like to thank especially Lloyd Bitzer, Lewis Ulman, Derek Brookes, Kurtis Kitagawa, Mark Spencer, and Richard Sher. Earlier versions of this work were read in whole or in part by Ian Steele, Lorne Falkenstein, Doug Long, Joseph M. Levine, Paul Wood, and two anonymous readers for the McGill-Queen’s University Press; their suggestions have made this work much stronger than it could otherwise have been. My deepest thanks go to Professor Fred Dreyer for providing much-needed inspiration and encouragement, and to Professor Roger L. Emerson for not only suggesting this project more than a decade ago but also encouraging and improving it at every stage of its development. I must also thank my editor, Ruth Pincoe, for labouring to correct my infelicities without harming my style. Without the help of these many friends, scholars, and teachers, this work would be much the poorer, though the opinions and errors remaining are of course my own. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and family for their unfailing support, and my wife Heidi for correcting numerous drafts and demonstrating exemplary patience with my pursuits.

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ORTHODOXY AND ENLIGHTENMENT

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Introduction In him, the polite scholar was eminently joined with the deep and liberal divine. William Laurence Brown

Who belonged to the Enlightenment, and to whom did the Enlightenment belong? We know the infidels and the sceptics, the Voltaires, Humes, Diderots, d’Holbachs, and Gibbons. We know their programs and pogroms, their wars against religion and the ancien régime, their determination to écraser l’infâme. But did these famous few speak for the eighteenth century? Did they compel their contemporaries to choose between enlightenment and orthodoxy? What of the many who catalogued nature, joined convivial societies, preached toleration, and uncovered the anatomy of human nature without ever abandoning church and traditional social loyalties? There were many such in England, America, Germany – and France as well. In Scotland, for a time, they dominated the established church, the universities, and polite society. But the enlightened and moderate Christians of the eighteenth century have generally been forgotten in proportion to their numbers. George Campbell’s modern reputation could hardly be more different from the one he enjoyed in his own lifetime. Brown’s funeral sermon, from which the above epigraph is taken, gives only a limited sense of the esteem in which Campbell was held at the time of his death. To his contemporaries he was Principal Campbell of Marischal College in Aberdeen, an influential divinity teacher, a persuasive pulpit orator, an erudite scholar, a church leader, and a Christian apologist who had silenced the infidel David Hume on the question of miracles. A Dissertation on Miracles (1762) was probably his best-known work in the eighteenth-century republic of letters, and was reprinted more than twenty times and translated into several continental languages. Contemporaries, however, recognized the “Preliminary Dissertations” to his critical translation of The Four Gospels (1789) as his scholarly masterpiece.

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4

Introduction

As the lead article in the Scots Magazine said at the time of his death, “His reputation as a writer, is as extensive as the present intercourse of letters; not confined to his own country, but spread through every civilized nation.”1 John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, the chronicler of eighteenthcentury Scotland, remarked that, “Dr Campbell was long reputed the most eloquent, if not the most learned, professor of divinity in his time.”2 Even into the next generation, Campbell was remembered as “the greatest man of whom [the Church of Scotland] can boast, and the man who, of all her ministers, has done most by his writings for the cause of the Christian religion.”3 Today Campbell is known only to a few specialists. Modern rhetoricians agree that his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) pointed the way to the “new country,” in which the study of human nature would become the foundation of the oratorical arts. A leading historian of British rhetoric has called this work the most important rhetorical text to emerge from the eighteenth century,4 and a considerable number of dissertations and articles in specialized journals have eked out the details of Campbell’s contribution to modern rhetorical theory. Beyond the rhetorical focus of modern Campbell studies, a few scholars remember him as the ablest of the many respondents to David Hume’s attack on miracles, or as a peripheral adherent of the Moderate party in the Church of Scotland. Otherwise, he is merely one among a myriad of Scots to come tumbling into the light during the recent renaissance of eighteenth-century Scottish studies. How do we account for this disparity between Campbell’s contemporary and modern reputations? How does a man who was once celebrated for his defence of Christianity become sidelined to a field of scholarship that seldom attempts to do more than gauge his progress from classical to modern conceptions of rhetoric, or trace the influence of his rules of persuasive discourse on the subsequent generation of novelists? In his own lifetime, The Philosophy of Rhetoric was among the lesser-known of Campbell’s works, and it was not even reprinted in English until the nineteenth century. Interpretive problems must necessar1 Scots Magazine 58 (July 1796): 439. 2 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:485. 3 James Bruce, Lives of Eminent Men of Aberdeen (Aberdeen: L. Smith, 1841), 323. 4 Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 602. The term “new country,” often cited by scholars, is Campbell’s own (PR, lxxv).

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Introduction

5

ily arise when modern scholars assume that this was his only work of importance. We cannot hope even to understand the place of Campbell’s rhetoric within the context of his work as a whole, or within prevailing eighteenth-century concerns, without a broader appreciation of his life and thought. One of the best Campbell scholars has expressed surprise “that Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric failed to treat God’s revelations and designs and failed also to describe the whole territory of what can be known through natural and supernatural means.”5 If The Philosophy of Rhetoric failed to do so much, it is only because this secular work was never meant to stand in isolation from its more obviously pious siblings. Campbell’s entire body of work, as this study will attempt to show, was governed by a unified purpose that sought to join the realm of natural knowledge with that of Christian revelation. The structure of his thought and the direction of his apology epitomized a widely-accepted model of Christian argument, one that sought not to divide natural inquiry from religious belief, as Bacon had done, but to show how the realms of sense and of faith ultimately supported one another. The assumptions upon which this model was based, however, diverge significantly from those that have become typical of Western thought since the eighteenth century. The disparity between Campbell’s presuppositions and those of a later age largely explains the disparity between his contemporary and modern reputations. This disparity may also cast light on the historical decline of some characteristically enlightened ways of thinking. The two problems are ultimately bound together. Campbell’s enlightened system of Christian apology is represented in the structure of the present study, particularly in parts II and III. Like many religious apologists of his time, he employed both natural evidences and revealed truths to defend the reasonableness and necessity of the Christian religion. The order of procedure, though implicit, was easily recognized by readers familiar with John Locke and Joseph Butler. First came a theory of knowledge, an empirical model of the workings of the human mind that described both the powers and the limitations of man’s natural faculties. This epistemology, reconstructed in chapter 4, paid special attention to the natural evidences of God and of revelation, but also emphasized man’s need of a common sense faculty to ground his moral nature. Despite this theoretical foundation, for the most part set out in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell was a practical philosopher who scorned system-building. “Valuable knowledge,” he wrote, “… always 5 Lloyd F. Bitzer, “Editor’s Introduction,” in pr, li.

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6

Introduction

leads to some practical skill, and is perfected in it.”6 Consequently, his writings tended to focus on specific problems in the realm of natural knowledge: the value of testimonial evidences concerning unusual events such as miracles, the historical nature of the Christian church, and the proper criticism of ancient texts. These are the subjects of chapter 5. Upon this solid base of natural knowledge could be constructed an enduring religious edifice. The results of historical investigation and literary criticism helped distinguish the essential parts of revelation from the human innovations, revealing a moderate, pious, practical, and improving Christianity. Campbell’s theology is the subject of chapter 7, the religious implications of miracles, church history and scriptural criticism the focus of chapter 8, and Campbell’s moderatism the subject of chapter 9. But before we can consider the structure of Campbell’s natural and religious apologia, we must review his biography in the context of eighteenth-century Scottish events. Part I offers a narrative reconstruction of his life and works that is based, wherever possible, on hitherto neglected archival and primary sources. Why does a neglected, middleweight figure such as Campbell merit this attention? The reason must be historical. Despite the broadening of Enlightenment studies in the last three decades, modern scholarship is still in danger of equating the Enlightenment with the thought of a few spectacular and controversial figures such as Voltaire and Hume. Although eighteenth-century Scottish readers were certainly familiar with Hume’s writings, particularly his essays and historical works, they did not usually identify with the sceptical undertones of his philosophy. Yet today, Hume’s sceptical, forward-looking philosophy receives a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention. Less-studied figures such as Campbell not only wrote popular and convincing books that were read throughout Europe and America, but also preached every week to the congregations of Scotland’s cities, ensuring the wide dissemination of their enlightened, moderate views. This study attempts to reconstruct the George Campbell that eighteenth-century audiences knew, and to find what was representative in his thought. It is more concerned to seek the broad trends and internal consistencies of his apologetic system than to align his thought with modern conceptions of philosophy, rhetoric or religion. Campbell’s thought belongs to the eighteenth-century, not to the modern world. In order to show the distinctness of his thought from 6 PR, lxix.

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Introduction

7

modern assumptions, the final sections of chapters 5, 6, and 9 describe some of the ways in which Campbell’s thought has failed to keep up with the modern world and why, as a consequence, his reputation has been so transformed. Not so long ago, scholars were accustomed to describing a Scottish Enlightenment that seemed no larger than the city of Edinburgh. Recent scholarship has gone far to redress this geographical bias, but has not gone nearly far enough in giving the Scottish Enlightenment its proper religious colouring. A careful study of George Campbell and his fellow Aberdonians adds much to our understanding of how the Scottish Enlightenment manifested itself beyond the pale of Edinburgh. But more importantly, it helps restore religious thought to its rightful place at the very centre of eighteenth-century Scottish concern.

a note on terms It is difficult to find terms adequate to describe Campbell’s kind of Christianity. Campbell himself sometimes used the term “rational Christian” to distance himself from those who he thought adhered to an unreasoning and bigoted faith.7 For the purpose of historical analysis, however, this study will use the terms “moderate Christianity” and “Christian moderatism” to describe his Christianity – these terms properly suggest the values of moderation, reasonableness, tolerance, doctrinal caution, scholarly precision, and moral earnestness that Campbell shared with many of his age. These terms should be kept distinct from the capitalized terms “Moderate party” and “Moderatism” (a nineteenth-century invention), which describe a faction within the Scottish church during the second half of the eighteenth century. Although Campbell did indeed have ties with this ecclesiastical party, we should not assume that this small group of ministers, centred in Edinburgh, held a monopoly on eighteenth-century Christian “moderatism.” The term “Popular party” will be used to describe the Scottish ecclesiastical faction that generally opposed the Moderate party within the church courts, while the term “High-flyer” will be applied to those who placed greater emphasis on creeds (that is, the high points of doctrine) than did Campbell and his cohorts. The term “Evangelical” will 7 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page.

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8

Introduction

be reserved for those who, beginning in the 1730s, paid renewed attention to the conversion experience, the activity of the Holy Spirit, and the primacy of missionary activity.8 Campbell’s thought helps to illustrate the unique character of the “Aberdeen Enlightenment,” which here refers to the thought and activities of a small group of professors and professional men (hereafter referred to as “Aberdonians”) comprising the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, of which Campbell was a leading spirit. The members of this group made up nearly the whole of the first generation of Scottish Common Sense philosophers. Alexander Gerard (whose relationship to Common Sense is uncertain) was professor of divinity at King’s College in Old Aberdeen at the same time that Campbell held the corresponding chair at Marischal College in the New Town. Although Gerard was Campbell’s chief personal rival, he was at the same time most like Campbell in overall thought, and therefore provides a useful point of comparison. Thomas Reid, traditionally considered the father of Common Sense philosophy, is also useful in judging the degree of Campbell’s philosophical adherence to the Aberdeen standard. James Beattie, famed eighteenth-century poet, apologist and professor of moral philosophy at Marischal, was Campbell’s closest friend in Aberdeen, and although he claimed to agree with Campbell in all important matters, his thought constitutes the most significant obstacle to a modern reconstruction of the Aberdonian mindset. Despite this difficulty, “Common Sense” (capitalized) will be used to describe the collective, formal philosophy of the Aberdonians, and to distinguish it from the more common meanings of “common sense,” as well as from the faculty in human nature that the Common Sense philosophers believed was responsible for common sense judgments.

8 See D.W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

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part i George Campbell: Life and Works

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1

The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771)

back groun d a nd educ ation On 22 January 1765, the Aberdeen Philosophical Society debated a question posed by George Campbell, “Whether the manner of living of parents affects the genius or intellectual abilities of the children.”1 Perhaps Campbell had reason to wonder. His father, Colin Campbell, from the little we know of him, was quite unlike his son in temperament and outlook. This is not surprising when one considers Scotland’s turbulent transition into the eighteenth century. Colin Campbell was born in 1678, at the height of the government oppression of the Covenanters, adherents of the Presbyterian form of church government. He was the son of George Campbell, Esq., of Westhall in Aberdeenshire, who, according to Campbell’s first biographer, “had originally come from Moray, and was a descendant of Campbell of Moy, and a Cadet of the family of Argyle.”2 We know nothing of the family’s religious sympathies before Scotland’s rejection of Episcopal government in 1690, nor in the decade or so following. Colin Campbell received his m.a. from Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1699, and, like many of his 1 The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 194. 2 George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Campbell” (1800), leh, 1:vi. Westhall is located in the parish of Oyne, approximately 20 miles northwest of the city of Aberdeen. Westhall was owned by a John Campbell of Moye between 1654 and 1674; see The Jacobite Cess Roll for the County of Aberdeen in 1715, ed. Alistair and Henrietta Tayler (Aberdeen: Third Spalding Club, 1932), 83. John Campbell was probably Colin Campbell’s grandfather. I have not been able to trace Campbell’s lineage back to the west of Scotland.

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George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

generation, went to Leiden for theological training.3 Leiden, the leading university in the Protestant Netherlands and one of the most forwardlooking institutions in Europe, was known for its religious toleration and liberalism, and was to become a model for Scottish university reform in the eighteenth century. Colin Campbell would certainly have been exposed to a great many new ideas, borne by religious refugees from France and dissenters from England, though we do not know the degree to which he embraced them. We can, however, learn a little more about his religious mind after his return to Aberdeen, for he began a spiritual journal at the time of his establishment in the First Charge (St. Nicholas’ West Church). “On thursday [the] 29 of April 1703,” the document begins, “poor, insignificant I was ordained by [the] laying on of hands of the presbtry, to preach the gospel in this city (Aberdeen).” The journal reveals a man desperately aware of his own sinful nature and continually cognizant of a direct and intervening providence. Colin Campbell’s God was both terrible and merciful, abandoning his servant in the midst of his sermons, but always reminding him of the superior wisdom of divine guidance in every detail of his life. The journal also reveals the considerable opposition which Colin Campbell encountered from his own parishioners, though it is unclear whether his enemies objected to him personally or to the re-established Presbyterian church that he represented in a largely Episcopalian part of the country.4 Colin Campbell came to be known for his peculiar preaching style (though what this was, our sources do not say), but also for his orthodoxy. He was loyal to the new Hanoverian government, supporting it during the abortive Jacobite rising in 1715 when Aberdeen and most of its ministers and professors favoured the Pretender.5 Scottish Calvinists such as Colin Campbell despised popish rituals and holidays, and so it is unlikely that he attached much significance to the 3 Peter John Anderson, ed., Fasti Academiae Mariscallanae Aberdonensis, 3 vols (Aberdeen: New Spalding Club, 1889–98), 2: 272; Hew Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae, 7 vols, new ed. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1915–28), 6:38. 4 The single sheet of manuscript, attributed to Colin Campbell, minister of St. Nicholas’ Church in Aberdeen, is entitled “Some Memorandu’ms”, and is found in the National Library of Scotland, MS 1704, fol. 5. 5 Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae, 6:38. After the ‘15, Colin Campbell was one of Ilay’s chief friends and supporters in Aberdeen politics; see Roger L. Emerson, Professors, Patronage and Politics: The Aberdeen Universities in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1992), 45.

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The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771)

13

fact that his youngest son, George, was born on 25 December, in the year 1719. Nor did the elder Campbell have long to train his youngest son in the militant spirituality of his generation, for he died suddenly on 27 August 1728, leaving his family in somewhat difficult circumstances. Colin Campbell was survived by his wife Margaret Walker (daughter of Alexander Walker, Esq., a merchant and provost of Aberdeen) and, according to the estate inventory, five children besides George.6 Colin Campbell departed this world while it was in the midst of momentous changes. The political union of Scotland with England, though accomplished two decades before, was only now beginning to bear economic fruits. The city of Aberdeen was slowly recovering from a population low of about 6,000 at the beginning of the century.7 Its small size was offset by its importance as the capital of the Northeast, a region with unique cultural and intellectual traditions and a character that set it apart from the rest of the Scottish lowlands. The Northeast had long been the preserve of a liberal Episcopalianism which opposed the covenanting tradition of the Southwest. The distinctness of the Northeast, however, came to be tempered in the years after the 1715 rebellion by the influx into Marischal College of a group of young professors and regents with modern ideas of education. This group included the mathematician Colin Maclaurin, the moral philosopher George Turnbull, and others eager to teach the likes of Shaftesbury and Newton. They reflected the trends in education that were simultaneously transforming the universities in the south of Scotland. This rising generation, of whom Francis Hutcheson at Glasgow was the most famous and influential, was concerned more with polite and virtuous learning than with polemical dispute, more with the general providential economy than with 6 sro CC1/6/9, dated 26 September 1728. The children listed are Jean (probably christened 29 January 1706), Colin (christened 28 January 1711; died September 1763, sro CC1/6/40), Margaret (christened 30 Sept, 1716), Anna (christened 19 January 1718), George (christened 27 December 1719), and Marjorie (probably christened 7 May 1721); International Genealogical Index. Colin Campbell the younger’s will of 1765 lists sisters Ann, Marjory, and Margaret (Milne), but no other siblings (sro CC1/6/40). Keith (“Account of George Campbell,” vi) mentions that Colin Campbell the elder had a small estate near Aberdeen, though there is no other evidence of this. 7 William Robbie, Aberdeen: Its Traditions and History (Aberdeen: D. Wyllie, 1893), 259. This figure undoubtedly excludes the Old Town of Aberdeen, which lay outside the city proper. The combined population reached about 15,000 by mid-century and 25,000 by the end of the century; see John Sinclair, The Statistical Account of Scotland 1791–1799, ed. Donald Withrington and Ian R. Grant, 20 vols (East Ardsley, Wakefield: EP Publishing, 1982–83), 14:285–6.

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the acts of particular providence. They were well-acquainted with the Newtonian and Lockean philosophies that Calvinistic scholasticism had once scorned. George Campbell’s education reflected the liberalizing trends in Scottish pedagogy that had become entrenched by the 1730s. Campbell attended the Aberdeen Grammar School from 1729 to 1734, but it is probable that he had already become proficient in reading and writing English at one of the other burgh schools. He studied under Alexander Malcolm (author of a philosophical work on mathematics) and presumably also under the rector John Milne and the under-master James Dun (who was later to become both a friend of Campbell and the father-in-law of James Beattie). The Grammar School maintained a high reputation for the teaching of Latin, which included a review of classical logic and rhetoric as well as the standard eighteenthcentury canon of ancient authors. The school also ensured that the boys were well-versed in The Westminster Shorter Catechism (1647), which contained the basic creed of Scottish Calvinism together with its scriptural proof-texts. Campbell would have learned by memory that “Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever,” and that God “hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass.” He would also have discovered that the proper interpretation of the fifth commandment, “Honour thy father and mother,” was to do the duties of one’s particular rank and station. Likewise, the eighth commandment, “Thou shalt not steal,” required “the lawful procuring and furthering the wealth and outward estate of ourselves and others.”8 In his fifteenth year (1734), Campbell turned his steps towards Marischal College, the University at the heart of the New Town. Marischal College, like its sister college in the Old Town, still operated according to the regenting system, whereby one teacher guided a class of boys for several years through all of the required subjects, with the exception of mathematics and of a first year devoted to the classical languages. The regents were expected to teach a standard curriculum which included (in order) logic, metaphysics, pneumatology (the philosophy of mind or spirit), ethics, and natural philosophy. The presentation of these subjects may well have been transformed by the fact that during the 1730s English replaced Latin as the language of instruction. Campbell learned mathematics from Professor John Stewart, who was 8 The Westminster Shorter Catechism, in The Creeds of Christendom, ed. Philip Schaff and David S. Schaff, 3 vols, 6th ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1931), 3:676, 677, 690, and 692.

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later one of his associates in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. Stewart taught Newtonianism and the practical applications of mathematics, but he also stressed the moral and mental utility of the discipline.9 Thomas Blackwell the younger, professor of Greek and later principal, lectured on the history and culture of ancient Greece in his first-year Greek course. His published works, like his lectures, presented polite, contextual examinations of classical literary works and languages, as well as naturalistic explanations of ancient mythologies, undoubtedly laying an early foundation for Campbell’s scholarly career. Unfortunately, Campbell’s regent, William Duff (later a historian of minor note), was an unpleasant man little interested in teaching his charges. He spent most of his time away from the college, for which negligence he was eventually deposed (January 1738). Campbell was one of the senior boys who gave testimony against Duff. Alexander Innes, an able but unremarkable man, was appointed regent in Duff’s place, having already substituted during his many absences. Campbell may also have come to know Thomas Reid, who was until 1736 the college’s librarian. Campbell graduated m.a. in 1738.10 As with most young men of his social background, Campbell knew that his best hope for advancement was through one of the three major professions. His elder brother Colin being already destined for the ministry, Campbell moved to Edinburgh to become apprenticed to George Turnbull, a writer to the signet. Writers to the signet were not as socially prestigious as advocates, but they earned good livings by providing commercial services in the area of Scots law, and they were to become even wealthier over the course of the eighteenth century through the business of consolidating and managing Scotland’s landed estates.11 We know almost nothing of Campbell’s three years as an apprentice, but we do know that he abandoned a secure albeit dull profession (and an expensive education) in about 1741 when his interests gravitated towards theology. It was perhaps during this time that Campbell became friends with Hugh Blair, then a tutor in Edinburgh, whose preaching Campbell

9 Paul B. Wood, The Aberdeen Enlightenment: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1993), 22. 10 Anderson, Fasti Academiae Mariscallanae Aberdonensis, 2:29. For Campbell’s testimony before the rectorial court, see aul ms M 387/9/2/2/6. 11 John Stuart Shaw, The Management of Scottish Society 1707–1764: Power, Nobles, Lawyers, Edinburgh Agents and English Influences (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983), 32–5; Anand C. Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 77.

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supposedly admired.12 Campbell may also have associated with other future Moderates, and almost certainly visited or joined various convivial societies. In any case, he began attending the divinity lectures of John Gowdie at Edinburgh University, and was sufficiently fascinated to move back to Aberdeen (probably late in 1741) to enroll as a full-time divinity student. Aberdeen divinity students, whether enrolled at King’s or Marischal, customarily attended the lectures of both divinity professors. The King’s professor was John Lumsden, a respected and learned teacher who specialized in controversial divinity and church history. Lumsden’s reading list is of particular interest. Despite his supposedly conservative reputation in matters of doctrine, he recommended such English divines as Stillingfleet, Chillingworth, Tillotson, Whiston, Clarke, Sherlock, and Butler, as well as Hugo Grotius and a list of controversialists who wrote against atheists, Socinians, papists, and Jews.13 The Marischal professor James Chalmers died in 1744 and was succeeded in 1745 by Robert Pollock, who was known for his teaching of practical theology, which included preaching and pastoral care. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre remarked that Pollock’s expertise lay in Hebrew literature, which he advised should be read in the original rather than in translation,14 a suggestion that Campbell certainly took to heart. Campbell’s theological education was not confined to the classroom. Student societies had become an important part of a young Scot’s education, providing opportunities for public speaking as well as conversation and debate. Campbell must have retained a strong impression of the burgeoning club scene in Edinburgh, where well-known societies such as the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh were merely the most visible examples of an improving tradition that stretched back to the seventeenth century. It was only natural that in January 1742, not long after the beginning of the college session in Aberdeen, Campbell formed 12 James Bruce, Lives of Eminent Men of Aberdeen (Aberdeen: L. Smith, 1841), 322. Blair’s life is covered in Robert Morell Schmitz, Hugh Blair (Morningside Heights, N.Y.: King’s Crown Press, 1948). Blair, who was only licensed to preach in October 1741, was certainly not yet a minister of the Canongate church, as has been claimed elsewhere. Campbell may have heard Blair preach in one of the student societies. H. Lewis Ulman states that Campbell was introduced to Blair by John Farquhar, which suggests a later date (Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 35). 13 G.D. Henderson, Aberdeen Divines: Being a History of the Chair of Divinity in King’s College, Aberdeen (aul Special Collections typescript, n.d.), 292A. 14 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:469.

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the Theological Club with John Glennie and James McKail. The club was designed to combine “the pleasures of conversation with the pursuit of sacred literature.”15 It was, in other words, to be both polite and Christian. The members of the club created fourteen regulations to promote individual improvement in all things related to the study of divinity, particularly the practical aspects of the pastoral office. Campbell later recalled this little club with great fondness, recommending the formation of such societies to his own divinity students as an effectual means of improvement, a central theme in all of Campbell’s thought. Moreover, the modern scholar can cite the Theological Club as the venue in which Campbell first discussed and formulated his rules of literary composition.16 The early 1740s was an eventful time in Scottish history that left a profound and lasting impression upon the minds of the young divinity students who would later form the Moderate party within the Church of Scotland. Ambitious young men were well aware of the battles between the Argathelians and Squadrone for control of Scottish politics. The supremacy of the duke of Argyll, chief of the Campbell clan, was as yet far from certain. The young Edinburgh Moderates noted the Scottish church’s excessive dependence on secular political factions and would eventually seek to make the church independent of such outside interests. At the same time, the future Moderates could observe the dangers of popular religious enthusiasm to church order and discipline. The Cambuslang Revival, known as the “Great Wark,” began in 1742, and drew crowds of up to thirty thousand to hear popular preachers such as George Whitefield.17 The young Moderates generally scorned such events, regarding as mere enthusiasm what others claimed was the outpouring of divine grace. We do not know Campbell’s opinion of Cambuslang, though his later strictures on 15 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” viii. Keith’s biography of Campbell appears to be the only notable source of information concerning this society. Keith received his information from John Glennie. Later members included Alexander Gerard, James Trail (later Bishop of Down and Connor and an honourary member of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society), and possibly John Skinner of Linshart (Episcopalian minister, poet and father of the Episcopal bishop of the same name). Thomas Reid was not a member, as is sometimes suggested. 16 lstpe, 48 and 349. 17 Andrew L. Drummond and James Bulloch, The Scottish Church 1688–1843: The Age of the Moderates (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1973), 55; Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 31–2.

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enthusiasm generally and on Whitefield specifically suggest that it may have affected him deeply. The year 1745 was even more memorable: Prince Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Pretender, began a bold attempt to reclaim the throne for his family, an affair which ended unhappily for him, and tragically for so many Scots. Again, we have no account of Campbell’s activities during the ‘45, when the Edinburgh Moderates vigorously defended the Hanoverian government, but he may well have been involved; Aberdeen was captured by the Highland force on 25 September, a week after the surrender of Edinburgh, and Campbell’s divinity examinations appear to have been delayed until the following year. In any case, his feelings towards a Jacobite revival were even colder than those of the now rather unsympathetic Aberdonian gentry. Nor did the Aberdonian elite have reason to regret their lack of enthusiasm for the Stuarts, for by all accounts Aberdeen and the whole of Scotland prospered considerably during the expansion of empire that followed the defeat of the last major Jacobite threat in April 1746. Campbell received his licence to preach from the Presbytery of Aberdeen on 11 June 1746, having subscribed the confession of faith and successfully completed a series of trials before that body, including the preparation of a popular sermon on a specified text and a historical discourse on a matter of early church history, the explication of a text in Greek and Hebrew, and the handling of questions on doctrine and history.18 Campbell was a probationary preacher for less than a year before being called to the ministry at Fordoun, a call which turned into a contest between the heritors and the heads of families in the parish. The issue was resolved by the 1747 General Assembly in favour of the other candidate, William Forbes, a friend of Campbell’s from the Theological Club.19 Campbell was more successful on his next call, which came in October 1747 from Robert Burnett of Leys on behalf of his father, Sir Alexander Burnett, fourth baronet of Leys, the patron of the parish of Banchory Ternan in Kincardineshire. The call engendered some confusion between George, of whose reputation the heritors had heard, and his elder brother Colin, 18 Register of the Presbytery of Aberdeen, sro CH2/1/8, pp. 67–70. 19 [Nathaniel Morren, ed.], Annals of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland: From the Final Succession in 1739, to The Origin of the Relief in 1752, (Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1838), 99. There was a great increase in the number of such disputes in the Church of Scotland during the 1740s (Sher, Church and University, 50).

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who mistakenly received the initial invitation. The congregation ultimately approved the younger brother, who was ordained on 2 June 1748.20 The genesis of Campbell’s scholarly career can be traced to his nine years in this quiet country parish. His vigorous program of self-improvement began with a conscientious desire to improve his ability to understand and communicate the plain and simple truths of Scripture, and eventually culminated in his two greatest works, The Philosophy of Rhetoric and The Four Gospels. But he also pursued polite interests, composing among other things a piece called “Of wit, humour, and ridicule,” a wideranging literary essay that would eventually become the second chapter of The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Of more immediate importance, however, Campbell began to establish a reputation as a preacher of the first order, an achievement that did not come easily to him. Campbell later told his divinity students that at this time he had been too concerned with memorizing his sermons (in accordance with the regulations of the Scottish Kirk) and not concerned enough with composition, which, he came to believe, was the real key to effective preaching.21 He also learned the practical aspects of Scottish church government, and was voted moderator of the October 1751 meeting of the Synod of Aberdeen. As was customary, Campbell delivered the opening sermon of the following synod meeting in April 1752. This sermon, entitled “The Character of a Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern,” became his first publication. It reflects the pastoral concerns that occupied his mind in these early years, being at once a synopsis of his later Lectures on the Pastoral Character and a summary of his Christian creed. Campbell vigorously upheld the importance of progress in knowledge, considering this to be the foundation of true philosophy and religion, yet he argued that it was a minister’s first duty to show that true progress in knowledge must be founded upon piety and practical virtue. This judicious balance of arguments ensured Campbell’s first publication a good reception in the Monthly Review.22 20 Register of the Presbytery of Kincairden Oneal [Kincardine O’Neill], sro CH2/ 602/3, pp. 25, 29 and 34. John R. McIntosh and H.R. Sefton claim that Campbell was a leader of the 1749 movement for augmentation of the ministerial stipend until the government threatened to take away his royal chaplaincy; see the article on Campbell in the Dictionary of Scottish Church History and Theology, ed. N. Cameron (Downer’s Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity, 1993), 128. There is no supporting evidence for this unlikely claim, and it is doubtful that a first-year country minister would have had a royal chaplaincy. 21 lpc, 247. 22 Monthly Review 8 (April 1753): 32.

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Campbell’s growing reputation must have impressed the magistrates of the city of Aberdeen, for he was called home in 1757 and would remain there for the rest of his life. He returned to Aberdeen not only with a considerable stock of learning, which would become the foundation of a lifetime of scholarship, but with a life companion as well. He married Grace Farquharson on 26 June 1755 in Glenmuick parish in Aberdeenshire. The Farquharsons were an old established family of the Northeast, long known as Episcopalians and Jacobites. Grace’s father, Harry Farquharson of Whitehouse Mill in the parish of Logie-Coldstone, died in April 1746 at Culloden, leading the Mar men for the Young Pretender. It appears that the aftermath of the ‘45 left his widow Barbara Gordon and seven children in some difficulty; Harry Farquharson’s estate was not settled until 1766, and then only with George Campbell’s signature.23 Grace was, by all accounts, a spirited woman and a fine companion. There is no record of any children from their union.

principal of marischal college On 19 January 1757, the Aberdeen Town Council elected George Campbell to be a minister of the city, whereto he was translated on 23 June 1757.24 The translation was very much a return home, for he took the Second Charge (St. Nicholas’ East Church) that shared the ancient cathedral with his father’s former charge, where he had worshipped as a boy. The transition was not entirely smooth, however; Campbell had inherited the parish of the late John Bisset (1692– 1756), a popular preacher and outspoken foe of church patronage. This same John Bisset had been responsible for the popular outcry at 23 Hew Scott refers to Harry Farquharson’s wife as “Mary Ross.” James McCosh’s account of Grace Campbell’s character in The Scottish Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1875), 244, based on a letter from Campbell to his niece, is actually about Grace’s mother. The settlement of the Farquharson estate can be found in sro CC1/6/40 (30 January 1766). It appears that, because he died in battle, his family estate was not in danger of forfeit. The Farquharsons were probably one of the many families in the Northeast that gave up Jacobitism and converted (at least superficially) to Presbyterianism in the years after the ‘45. The current “Whitehouse” owned by the Farquharsons in Tough near Alford is a different estate purchased by Campbell’s nephew Peter Farquharson. 24 aca Council Register 62, fol. 156. The minister’s annual salary at the time was 100 pounds sterling plus a chalder of coals; see William Kennedy, Annals of Aberdeen, 2 vols (Aberdeen: A. Brown, 1818), 2:50. Aberdeen ministers were not provided with manses.

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Thomas Reid’s call to New Machar in 1737. Bisset was a “puritan of the old school” and the instigator of the secession church in Aberdeen, the first congregation of which was formed from his own parish after his death – that is, upon Campbell’s arrival. Bisset had apparently advised his parishioners in advance that they were unlikely to receive a replacement who could minister to their expectations.25 It is likely that the parish would have been prejudiced against any new candidate that had the town’s patronage, rather than against Campbell personally. Nevertheless, Campbell, if he was not already, was henceforth unfriendly to would-be separatists. Campbell’s move to Aberdeen put him back at the centre of the vibrant intellectual life of the Northeast. Within two years he was again immersed in university affairs, this time as principal of Marischal College and University. How he got the appointment is not entirely clear. The office was in the gift of the crown (the estates and patronage of the earls of Marischal having been forfeited after the ‘15), and was thus administered by Scotland’s political manager Archibald Campbell, Lord Ilay, now the third duke of Argyll. Keith states that when Principal Robert Pollock died, Campbell was initially disinclined to apply for the post, but was eventually persuaded to write Ilay directly, claiming family connection. It appears that he had little local support for the position, whereas the other two candidates – professor of natural philosophy William Duncan and professor of natural and civil history Francis Skene – had the support of the magistrates and the local landed interests respectively. Nevertheless, Campbell was presented to the office in August 1759. Ilay was undoubtedly impressed by Campbell’s reputation as an outstanding pulpit lecturer (quite appropriate to a principal’s duties), his legal training, his political reliability, his moderate character, and perhaps even his scientific and improving interests.26 Principal 25 Scots Magazine 58 (July 1796): 437; James Stark, The Lights of the North (Aberdeen: D. Wyllie, 1896), 211. Part of Bisset’s congregation seceded after not being allowed to call a successor, applied to the Burgher-Associate Synod for a pastor, and in 1758 received Alexander Dick; see Robert Wilson, An Historical Account and Delineation of Aberdeen (Aberdeen: James Johnston, 1822), 140. 26 Ilay, a trained lawyer, an improver, and a botanist, was known for promoting people like himself; Roger L. Emerson, “The Scottish Scientific and Medical Patronage of Archibald Campbell, 3d Duke of Argyll 1723–1761” (unpublished typescript, n.d.). I can find no trace of the letter Campbell supposedly wrote to Ilay, but undoubtedly he stressed his father’s loyalty to Ilay’s brother, the second duke.

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Campbell was soon awarded a doctor of divinity degree, an honour more respectable for having come from King’s College rather than Marischal.27 The principal’s duties were important but not onerous. The number of students in the college was probably approaching 200 at this time.28 The principal administered the college, recruited students, chaired faculty meetings, conferred degrees, and disciplined the boys. He addressed the assembled students every Friday, and may also have led daily chapels. Although the college’s original constitution required the principal to do a considerable amount of teaching (including languages and astronomy), it is likely that most of these requirements had become obsolete by the eighteenth century.29 Campbell still had sufficient time to attend to his pastoral duties, as well as his private studies. Campbell took the helm of the university soon after it had gone through some remarkable changes. Marischal, unlike its neighbour King’s, had abandoned the regenting system in 1753, and entirely reordered its curriculum to match modern and enlightened conceptions of science, education, and human psychology. Edinburgh, Glasgow, and St Andrews had made comparable changes earlier in the century. The Scots Magazine of December 1752 described Marischal’s new order of teaching. First year students would attend the professor of Greek, as they always had. Second year students would now take civil and natural history as well as elementary mathematics. Third year students would concentrate on natural philosophy and advanced mathematics. Moral philosophy and logic would be taught only in the fourth and final year. 27 The degree, according to Peter J. Anderson, Officers and Graduates of the University and King’s College, Aberdeen, 1495–1860 (Aberdeen: New Spalding Club, 1893), 101, was given on 1 October 1761 (along with one to Alexander Gerard), but in Fasti Academiae Mariscallanae Aberdonensis, 2:29, Anderson gives the year as 1764 (as do most other biographers). The earlier date is probably correct, since, by November 1761, Campbell was being called “Dr” in the minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. If this is the case, the recognition preceded the publication of A Dissertation on Miracles (1762), but followed its delivery as a synod sermon. Scottish university principals were generally expected to possess or be awarded doctorates. 28 See Chitnis, Scottish Enlightenment, 134, for student numbers at the Scottish universities during the Eighteenth Century, and 148, for the costs of education, which were very low by European standards. 29 See Sinclair, Statistical Account of Scotland, 1:303, for the principal’s duties specified in Marischal’s founding charter. The principal’s salary, more than 100 pounds sterling per year, came out of the former bishop of Aberdeen’s rents that had been transferred to the college.

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Alexander Gerard (1728–95), the new professor of moral philosophy and logic, was chosen by his colleagues to defend the new arrangements with a publication entitled, Plan of Education in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen, with the Reasons of It (1755). The Plan of Education was a thoroughly enlightened document, reflecting the Baconian view that “the only basis of Philosophy is now acknowledged to be an accurate and extensive history of nature, exhibiting an exact view of the various phænomena for which Philosophy is to account, and on which it is to found its reasonings.” The new teaching order, argued Gerard, better accommodated the “gradual openings of the human mind,” and thus more easily convinced the understanding of the truth of its evidences. There was also a strong hint of Hume’s empirical approach to human nature: “The constitution of man, and his several active powers must be explained, before his business, his duty, and his happiness can be discovered.”30 Faculty appointments during Campbell’s tenure highlighted the college’s new enthusiasm for mathematics and science: Patrick Copland took the professorship of natural philosophy in 1775 (though he nominally held the mathematics chair), the civic improver Robert Hamilton won the professorship of mathematics in 1779 (though he held the natural philosophy chair), and George French gained the newly created chair of chemistry in 1793. Also in 1793, William Livingston inherited the post of mediciner, and was the first in a long time to treat the job as something more than a sinecure.31 Copland in particular pleased the New Town with popular lectures and public works projects, spearheading the erection of a fine astronomical observatory. It may safely be assumed that Campbell was a significant player in transforming Scotland’s youngest university into the growing and thriving institution of the Northeast. So too was the third earl of Bute, Marischal’s chancellor after the death of his uncle Lord Ilay and an enthusiast of science and medicine. The changes within Marischal College reflected an evolving notion of education, in which human knowledge was increasingly regarded as dynamic, contingent, and specialized. Campbell, in keeping with this trend, placed much more emphasis on the proper method than on the precise content of learning. In other words, he taught his students to teach themselves. This pedagogy was appropriate to the flourishing, 30 [Alexander Gerard], Plan of Education in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen, with the Reasons of It (Aberdeen: James Chalmers, 1755), 5, 7, 14, and 23. 31 Wood, Aberdeen Enlightenment, 81.

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bustling New Town and its college, where specialization and cosmopolitanism had become the prevailing ideological realities. Nevertheless, the moral welfare of the boys remained one of the chief concerns of Marischal College’s principal, as evidenced by a letter to the magistrates of the city in which Campbell recommended that the town council prevent acting companies from staging plays during the college term and thus tempting students away from their classes.32 Meanwhile, King’s College in the Old Town retained the regenting system and perhaps also a more traditional conception of education. In any case, their student numbers remained far behind Marischal’s throughout the eighteenth century. This disparity, together with more mundane concerns for property and influence, may explain the misfortunes of the various eighteenth-century proposals for uniting the two colleges. Most of the Marischal men and a few isolated individuals at King’s sought to join the two independent institutions in order to promote more efficient teaching, establish functional professional schools, and thus raise Aberdeen’s academic reputation. As Alexander Carlyle noted during a visit to Aberdeen in August 1769, “It is very absurd to have two Colleges so near one another, so ill endow’d, so ruinous, and attended by so small a number of Students, when their Union would rectify all these Evils, and make one very flourishing University.”33 Unfortunately, proprietary and legal obstacles were not so easily overcome. John Chalmers, Campbell’s opposite number at King’s College, along with most of the King’s professors, consistently blocked the various union attempts. Their introverted and nepotistic interests would certainly have been endangered by a union, though it is worth remembering that the educational arguments used to promote union may not have impressed the King’s men. The first of two union attempts during Campbell’s tenure came in 1770. A second, more involved attempt, which occured during the mid 1780s, was especially unpleasant and generated a significant pamphlet war. A large part of the ill-feeling was focused on William Ogilvie, the King’s humanist who had repeatedly alienated his colleagues by calling public attention to their peculations and to their refusal to reform King’s educational short-comings or remedy its administrative abuses. But the union was probably doomed 32 “Principal and Professors to the Magistrates of Aberdeen” (17 February, 1787), aca Letterbook 13, 217. See also Wood, Aberdeen Enlightenment, 69. 33 Alexander Carlyle, Journal of a Tour to the North of Scotland, ed. Richard B. Sher (Aberdeen: Centre for Scottish Studies, 1981), 16. Carlyle recognized that it would take a special act of parliament to bring about a union, but he did not see the difficulty of arranging this.

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regardless, for the sides could not agree on either the location of a united university or its new faculty arrangements. Campbell contributed a pamphlet to the debate entitled Defence of the Conduct of Marischal College, in Relation to the Present Scheme of Union, Against the Attack Made on It by the Principal and Six Professors of King’s College. In a Letter to a Friend. By a Member of Marischal College (October 1786).34 The apologetic title suggests that relations between the two sides had already broken down, and that the purpose of the work was rather to save face than to argue the benefits of union. Campbell’s passions were directed primarily against his chief antagonist in the debate, Alexander Gerard. Their relationship, perhaps born of a friendly rivalry in the early years of Campbell’s return to Aberdeen, appears to have cooled markedly after Gerard was translated from Marischal to King’s in the early 1770s.35 This rivalry may even have played a part in the decline of that most fertile of enlightened institutions, the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.

the aberdeen philosophical society The “Wise Club,” as the Society was popularly known, was undoubtedly the most historically significant influence on Campbell’s intellectual development. The Society was formally established in January 1758 and survived until 1773. Campbell was one of six original members, and was the only one who belonged to the Society for its entire recorded existence.36 The Society’s membership was virtually indistinguishable from the Aberdeen literati. Thomas Reid (1710–96) is generally considered 34 This pamphlet (attributed to Campbell) defended Marischal from accusations made in the King’s College pamphlet Memorial from the University and King’s College of Aberdeen (August 1786, attributed to Alexander Gerard and Thomas Gordon), which was itself a rebuff of William Ogilvie’s Outlines of a Plan for Uniting the King’s and Marischal Universities (July 1786). 35 There are cryptic references to strained relations between the two in several sources, particularly in Ramsay of Ochtertyre’s Scotland and Scotsmen, though none provides a timeframe. Gerard’s hostility to the 1786 union attempt is almost unaccountable, considering that he had actively backed earlier union proposals while at Marischal (see, for example, aul ms M 387/16/2, 1–8). 36 See Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society for details of membership and participation. Table A-2 shows that Campbell attended 195 of 248 meetings; only Gerard and Thomas Gordon attended more (215 and 209 respectively). In March 1773, the date when the Society’s records suddenly break off, Campbell was the only surviving original member still in Aberdeen. It is likely that the Society folded because individual members were committed to too many other things.

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the moving force behind the Society’s inception, because he had belonged to a “philosophical club” in Aberdeen in 1736–37, although Campbell’s experience in Edinburgh and with the Theological Club may have been just as important. The other original members were the mediciner John Gregory (1724–73), the gifted physician and naturalist David Skene (1731–70), the mathematician John Stewart (ca. 1708– 66), and the minister Robert Traill (1720–75). Subsequently elected members included Alexander Gerard (1728–1795), James Beattie (1735–1803), William Ogilvie (1736–1819), James Dunbar (1742–98) and John Farquhar (1732–68).37 This group of literati, like the Moderates in Edinburgh, were or would become firmly established in both church and university. Many of them were to achieve considerable fame in the coming decades. Campbell and Gerard were the most faithful participants in the Society, and may have been responsible for the fact that such a small club survived as long as it did. The Aberdeen Philosophical Society was formed in the same year as the correctly-predicted return of Halley’s comet, an event that dramatically vindicated the powers of Newtonian science and human reason. But it was perhaps Bacon who gave the Wise Club its purpose, wellencapsulated in the society’s seventeenth and final rule: The Subject of the Discourses and Questions shall be Philosophical, all Grammatical Historical and [Philological] Discussions being conceived to be forreign to the Design of this Society. And Philosophical Matters are understood to comprehend, Every Principle of Science which may be deduced by Just and Lawfull Induction from the Phænomena either of the human Mind or of the material World; All [Observations] & Experiments that may furnish Materials for such Induction; The Examination of False Schemes of Philosophy & false Methods of Philosophizing; The Subserviency of Philosophy to Arts, the Principles they borrow from it and the Means of carrying them to their Perfection.38

The Society gave considerable attention to experimental science and methodology, though it was not as purely scientific as the Edinburgh Philosophical Society. Nor was it as focused on practical economic, social, and political issues as the Select Society in Edinburgh. The Wise 37 After Farquhar’s death, Campbell and Gerard collected and edited his Sermons on Various Subjects, published in two volumes in 1772. These were quite popular, especially in London, and went through several editions. Campbell recommended them to his divinity students (lstpe, 274). 38 Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 78.

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Club explored a wide range of subjects, from scientific observations and philosophical issues to problems of education and social reform. The Society’s constitution allowed its members to work individually (by reading discourses) as well as corporately (by discussing questions recorded in advance). The questions that Campbell posed for the Society’s consideration form a window into his personal interests as well as those of his age. His first recorded question – “What is the Cause of that Pleasure we have from Representations or Objects which excite Pity or other painfull Feelings?” – was the subject not only of a discussion, but ultimately of an important chapter in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. The question conjoined aesthetics with the philosophy of the human mind, both of which were leading concerns among the members of the Wise Club. Another question posed by Campbell – “Can the Generation of Worms in the Bodies of Animals be accounted for on the common Principles of Generation?” – highlighted an important contemporary scientific issue which became a matter of particular interest to the naturalist David Skene.39 Campbell’s third question – “Whether Matter has a Separate and permanent Existence” – was crossed out in the Society’s records in favour of a question concerning “The Nature of Contrariety.” It would be of considerable philosophical interest to know why the Society chose not to debate the original question, which had been central to Berkeley’s philosophy. Campbell was in turn influenced by the questions posed by other members. The group’s discussion of David Skene’s question concerning the nature of enthusiasm and superstition was reflected in one of Campbell’s later sermons, and also touched on the problem of belief in miracles.40 The Wise Club provided a venue in which Campbell could explore his scientific interests. Not only did he contribute discussion questions concerning the colour of the heavens and the nature of diseases in animals, but he also devoted considerable time to the collection and classification of botanical specimens. A rare letter from this period details Campbell’s expeditions into a remote corner of Aberdeenshire, where he examined geological phenomena and identified plant species with more than mere

39 See Skene’s abstract of the discussion (which includes a compelling example of his bibliographic knowledge of the topic), aul ms 37, fol. 188r–v, and a discourse by him on the same topic, aul ms 475, fols 284–9. 40 aul ms 37, fols. 186r–7v.

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amateurish skill.41 The recipient of the letter, David Skene, was one of the many correspondents of the Swedish taxonomist Linnaeus; this linked Campbell, along with thousands of other amateur botanists, into the most important network of eighteenth-century naturalists. James Beattie later wrote, “The Principal, who was once a great botanist, though he has now given over the study, has made him [his son, James Hay Beattie] a present of a very great collection of dried plants.”42 Samples from this same collection now constitute the oldest specimens in the Aberdeen University Herbarium. Campbell’s interest in natural history, particularly in the systematic classification of nature, suggests that he shared with Reid and with many thinkers of the Enlightenment a rather taxonomic view of the whole of creation, including the human mind. Their notion that human classificatory systems represented a purposeful organizational scheme built into the natural world by the Creator had significant religious and apologetic undertones. The Aberdeen Philosophical Society is most often remembered for its philosophical publications, notably Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770), and Gerard’s Essay on Genius (1774). Campbell’s own discourses appeared later in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, a work very much influenced by the members of the Wise Club. Campbell’s attempt to employ the universal rules of rhetoric to uncover the principles of human nature may have been encouraged by the specific subject-rules of the Society. Likewise, the doctrine of evidence in A Dissertation on Miracles was heavily influenced by a philosophy of Common Sense that was, to a large degree, worked out in Society meetings. This common interest in fundamental problems of knowledge suggests that the Wise Club, having been created for, among other things, “the Examination of False Schemes of Philosophy & false Methods of Philosophizing,” was deeply concerned to meet the sceptical challenges of David Hume. Although the Society’s interest in Hume is well known, the nature and complexity of its relationship with the sceptic is not as well understood. This relationship, as we shall see, is better characterized as a dialogue than as a simple refutation. The Wise Club members were certainly concerned to vindicate science and reli41 Campbell to Skene, 1 August 1770 (ncl MS THO 2, fols 53–4). See aul ms 482, p. 45, for an example of Campbell’s contributions to Skene’s work in natural history. See also chapter 6, below. 42 Beattie to Miss Valentine (his niece), 22 May 1787 (aul ms 30/1/266). Campbell used botanical analogies in several of his published works.

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gion from the implications of Hume’s scepticism, but they also consistently used Hume’s philosophy of human nature as a foundation for their own moral philosophy. Virtually all the members of the Society took up some part of Hume’s thought, often in print, as in the works of Campbell, Reid, Beattie, and Gerard, but also within the confines of the Society, as in a discourse by John Farquhar entitled, “On the nature [and] operations of the imagination, in which Mr Humes theory of this faculty is particularly considered.”43 Campbell’s major contribution to the Society’s philosophical dialogue with Hume was also his only publication during this period. A Dissertation on Miracles, published in 1762, was based on a synod sermon preached in October 1760, and was directed against Hume’s famous attack on miracles, found in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Campbell’s Dissertation took issue both with Hume’s philosophical strictures on the possibility of believing testimony concerning miraculous events, and with his historical considerations of various miracle claims, ultimately vindicating the Protestant view of miracles. Between the preaching of the initial sermon and the publication of the first edition, Campbell entered into a correspondence with Hume himself, mediated by their mutual friend Hugh Blair, who had shown Campbell’s manuscript to Hume. In a letter to Blair, probably written in the autumn of 1761, Hume spoke highly of the manuscript, though he objected to its controversial tone, claiming Campbell was “a little too zealous for a philosopher.”44 Campbell obligingly toned down the personal nature of the attack, enough that Hume wrote him a friendly letter soon after the publication of the Dissertation. In this well-known epistle, Hume praised Campbell’s philosophical abilities, and especially the affable tone in which Campbell had ultimately conducted the controversy. “I own to you,” he claimed, “that I never felt so violent an Inclination to defend myself as at present when I am thus fairly challeng’d by you,” but nevertheless he cited his famous maxim never to answer an adversary in print.45 Campbell’s reply was equally obliging, praising Hume’s abilities as a writer and the generosity he had shown in taking notice of his work. 43 aul ms 3107/1/3, pp. 35–7. In this discourse, Farquhar seems more often to agree than disagree with Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Similar references to Hume’s philosophy appear in David Skene’s papers as well. 44 The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1:351. There do not seem to be any other surviving portions of this particular exchange of letters. 45 aul ms 3214/7.

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He admitted that Hume’s friendly letter had even forced him to love and honour a man so different in religious and moral principles.46 Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the two ever corresponded again, though it is quite possible that they met subsequently in Edinburgh. Campbell’s Dissertation was even better received by the critics. An anonymous writer in the Critical Review thought Campbell’s reasoning so acute, “that we may venture to pronounce Mr. Hume, with all his subtilty, will not be able to elude the force of the critic’s argument.”47 William Rose, writing in the Monthly Review, praised Campbell’s work as the most regular and methodical treatment of the topic to date.48 A Dissertation on Miracles went through many English editions, and in translation became Campbell’s best-known work on the continent. For a considerable time after its first publication, it was considered to be the definitive refutation of Hume’s impious attack on the miracles of the Christian religion. Campbell’s reputation as a writer and Christian apologist was firmly established.

46 nls ms 23154, n. 11. 47 Critical Review 14 (August 1762): 84. 48 Monthly Review 26 (1762): 499.

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professor of divinity In an often-repeated story, Marischal College’s professor of divinity Alexander Gerard supposedly said that his successor George Campbell was indolent, a remark that, when repeated to Campbell, roused him to a hitherto unknown diligence.1 Though the justness of the accusation, and perhaps also the anecdote itself, seem doubtful, we can be certain that the charge of indolence was impossible to sustain after Campbell added the duties of professor of divinity to his other activities. John Lumsden, Campbell’s former divinity professor at King’s, died in July 1770. Alexander Gerard, who had already held Marischal’s divinity post for a decade, was translated to the corresponding chair in the Old Town’s college. Campbell’s candidacy for the Marischal vacancy seems to have had the support of most of his colleagues, though David Skene, Campbell’s friend in science and dean of faculty at Marischal, took the additional precaution of writing to Lord Kames for help in securing the place for him. The divinity chair, one of two Marischal chairs in the gift of the Town Council, was voted to Campbell on 26 June 1771, after the council had satisfied itself as to Campbell’s “Ability piety Literature, 1 G.D. Henderson, Aberdeen Divines: Being a History of the Chair of Divinity in King’s College, Aberdeen (aul Special Collections typescript, n.d.), 324; James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1875), 239. This unflattering anecdote does not appear in George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Campbell” (1800), in leh, l:v–lix.

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Christian life and Conversation.”2 The new position was of no great material benefit to Campbell, adding only twenty pounds per year to his principal’s and minister’s salaries. He was, however, translated from St. Nicholas’ to Greyfriars, a ministerial position in the college chapel that was traditionally attached to the divinity chair, but carried no fixed duties beyond a weekly sermon in one of the city’s churches.3 This reduction in parochial obligations allowed Campbell to focus entirely on lecturing and publishing. We are fortunate that many of Campbell’s divinity lectures have been published. They provide important insights into the structure of Campbell’s thought and the range of his scholarly activities. They also betray the fact that he and Gerard, his opposite number at King’s, had broken the long-standing tradition of dividing the teaching duties between the two chairs. Individual students continued to attend both lecturers, but they now observed a great deal more overlap and less specialization than before.4 They probably could not have helped noticing some coldness between the two professors, despite the remarkable similarities of their religious thought. The college term in Aberdeen ran from the beginning of November to early April, but the divinity course did not begin until mid or late December. Campbell increased his own workload by doubling the number of lectures normally delivered in a term. He lectured on Tuesdays and Thursdays, while Gerard lectured on Mondays and 2 aca Council Register 63, fol. 183. Skene’s letter to Kames (26 September 1770) is found in aul ms 38, no.175. G.D. Henderson says Campbell only narrowly won over his old friend John Glennie (Aberdeen Divines, 324). 3 The twenty pounds sterling salary (from the crown) is cited in the letter from Skene to Kames. Divinity students in Scotland did not pay class fees. At the time of his retirement in 1795, the divinity chair and Greyfriars (which belonged to the city rather than the college) were together worth 160 pounds sterling per year; Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” liii. This gave him a total income of more than 260 pounds sterling per year. Again, the divinity professor’s salary, primarily made up of his ministerial income, would have come out of land rents and feu duties, such as the rents of Torie (aul ms M 94, p. 53), formerly belonging to the bishop or abbot of Greyfriars. 4 Robert Eden Scott attended and preserved notes on the lectures of both professors during the 1786–87 term. These notes can be found in Aberdeen University Library, ms M 190 (Campbell’s lectures) and ms K 174 (Gerard’s lectures). See appendix 1 for a list of the lecture topics from that term. Both professors lectured on aspects of biblical criticism during that school year, confirming the lack of lecture coordination. Each professor, in effect, had to do the work of a whole divinity faculty, except for the teaching of Hebrew. The Hebrew classes, which divinity students were strongly urged to attend, were given twice a day, five days a week, by the professor of oriental languages.

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Fridays. Because divinity students did not take degrees, often lived out of town, and frequently supported themselves by teaching or tutoring, regular attendance at divinity lectures was a perennial concern. Campbell did his best to regularize his course, and kept attendance records for each class so that he could provide a fair and accurate report of each student’s diligence for the presbytery at the time of a prospective minister’s licensing examinations.5 Since prospective ministers were expected to take at least four years of divinity studies, Campbell lectured according to a four-year schedule. A student entering at any stage of the cycle could expect to hear the entire course of lectures during his four years of study. Campbell further claimed that each year he would intersperse lectures on theoretical divinity with lectures on practical pastoral duties.6 Both Campbell and Gerard lectured extensively on biblical criticism, but spent little time on systematic theology. Both emphasized the practical duties of the pastoral office. As Marischal College did not have a chair of ecclesiastical history, Campbell devoted a considerable portion of his theology course to this subject. He lectured in English, but expected his students to be sufficiently proficient in Latin to follow extensive quotations without translation. In addition to the two weekly lectures, Campbell spent Saturdays listening to student discourses. Since both Campbell and Gerard held high reputations as preachers, the populations of Old and New Aberdeen, along with the matriculated members of these communities, would have been familiar with the professors’ preaching, and thus with the practical bent of their theologies. 5 aul ms M 191, p. 44. The trials that Campbell used with his students were probably also preparatory for the licensing examinations (see aul ms M 192, p. 5). According to John Sinclair’s Statistical Account of Scotland 1791–1799, ed. Donald Withrington and Ian R. Grant, 20 vols (East Ardsley, Wakefield: EP Publishing, 1982–3), 1:319, the two Aberdeen divinity professors had sixty to eighty students between them at any one time, though only a third attended regularly. On Campbell’s teaching style, see Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” lxxvii. aul ms M 192, p. 5 provides details on the various discourses, homilies, and sermons that Campbell expected to hear from his students. aul ms K 174, pp. 140, 201, and 333 suggest that Gerard’s student exercises were practical in nature, appropriate to the pastoral duty lectures he was giving at that time. 6 According to a portion of his introductory lectures not included with the printed Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, Campbell devoted the Tuesday lectures to the science of theology and the Thursday lectures to the pastoral function (aul ms M 191, p. 40). However, according to Scott’s lecture notes for 1786–87 (see appendix 1), Campbell lectured only on biblical criticism that year; Gerard did in fact intersperse lectures on criticism among his lectures on pastoral duties.

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As principal and professor of divinity in one of Scotland’s five universities, Campbell was an important and influential person within the Church of Scotland. Although we do not know much about his ecclesiastical politicking, we do know that he was heavily involved in the various layers of Scottish church government. He would have regularly attended local kirksessions and the meetings of the presbytery of Aberdeen, as well as the biannual meetings of the provincial Synod of Aberdeen, of which he was moderator on several occasions. Despite his frequent attendance, Campbell was never moderator of the General Assembly, an odd fact considering the respect in which he was held by all parties within the church. He consistently refused to be considered for the moderator’s position, claiming that he did not have the character of a politician and wished only to convince his fellow assembly members by argument and persuasion.7 Indeed, the church courts were the major remaining venue for public oratory in Scotland after the Union, and Campbell did not lose these opportunities to practice his chosen art. According to Thomas Somerville, There was not any member of the General Assembly who was listened to with more attention, or who, as a speaker, was more successful in producing conviction than Principal Campbell of Aberdeen. The closeness, the force, the condensed precision of his reasoning, exceed the power of description. Not a single superfluous word was used – no weak or doubtful argument introduced. Like a mathematical demonstration, every topic produced accumulation of proof, and prepared his audience for the more complete assent to the conclusion drawn from it. His person and manner indicated such simplicity of character, such indifference either to personal consequence or the interests of party, that it was impossible to deny him as much credit for the purity of his heart as for the transcendent excellence of his understanding. Although he coincided with Dr. Robertson in every case relative to presentations and the settlement of vacant parishes, yet I remember that in some questions of considerable moment, he divided with the minority, which, from the power of his arguments, was, on such occasions, more considerable than in most other cases decided by calling the votes of the members.8 7 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” xli. 8 Thomas Somerville, My Own Life and Times 1741–1814 (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1861), 95–6. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre suggests that Campbell seldom spoke in the General Assembly and did not enter much into party debates; see Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:493. According to Sher, Campbell attended the General Assembly eight times between 1751 and 1785, while Gerard was there fourteen times in the same period; see Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Englightenment: the Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 128.

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We should not conclude from this that Campbell was entirely free of the entanglements of church politics. He may have played a small part in the Moderate party’s victory when the “Drysdale bustle” came before the 1764 General Assembly.9 But it is as yet too soon in this study to consider the extent of Campbell’s relations with the Moderate party. Campbell, by virtue of his offices, was also an important figure in Aberdeen city life. In 1783, for example, he was elected tenth patron of the Incorporated Trades of Aberdeen, an honourary lifetime position that he seems to have held until he resigned his divinity chair in 1795. The patron, usually one of the ministers of St. Nicholas’, was responsible for providing continuity at the society’s elections, and presiding at other official functions.

the spirit of the gospel Campbell’s literary career would prove to be highly controversial, though seldom in the ways that he anticipated. His already well-known Dissertation on Miracles had established him as a significant European figure in Christian apologetics. Campbell believed that all attacks upon Christianity took one of two forms, impugning either its character or its positive evidences.10 A Dissertation on Miracles defended the external evidences of Christianity from the strictures of an infidel. In his next publication, Campbell attempted to defend the character of Christianity (that is, its worthiness of God) not only against attacks from outside the church, but also against the dangers of misguided Christians within. In April 1771, Campbell preached a sermon before the Synod of Aberdeen that was published the same year as The Spirit of the Gospel A Spirit Neither of Superstition Nor of Enthusiasm. Campbell argued, against the critics of religion, that true Christianity is characterized neither by fearful superstition nor by intemperate enthusiasm. True Christianity, he said, breathes the spirit of charity, reforming power, and soundness of 9 See Richard B. Sher, “Moderates, Managers and Popular Politics in Mid-EighteenthCentury Edinburgh: The Drysdale ‘Bustle’ of the 1760s,” in New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland, ed. John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander Murdoch (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1981), 198. In 1764, the Edinburgh Moderate John Jardine represented Marischal College at the General Assembly; this probably could not have happened without the approval of Campbell and Gerard. In his closing speech Gerard, who was the moderator that year, defended patronage and the rule of law; see Gerard’s speech in Nathaniel Morren, ed., Annals of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 1752–66 (Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1840), 405–9. 10 lstpe, 90; st, 1:307.

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mind, rather than the spirit of mystery, ritual, intolerance, and sectarian zeal. Few in the enlightened eighteenth century could have objected to this standard theme – that Christianity is intrinsically beautiful and worthy of the God revealed in nature – for it embraced moderatism while rejecting irreligion. The Critical Review noted that the sermon “contains the genuine dictates of a sound mind, and breathes throughout the evangelical spirit which it so accurately and elegantly describes.”11 But others were less pleased, particularly those adherents of Scottish churches outside the Presbyterian fold who thought that Campbell’s sermon challenged their very legitimacy. Indeed, Campbell’s latitudinarian and antisectarian stance placed more emphasis on the heart of the individual than on the ceremonies and legalities that High Church dissenters claimed were necessary to salvation. William Abernethy Drummond, a minister of the nonjuring Scottish Episcopal Church, answered with a pamphlet entitled Remarks Upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon (1771), in which he objected to Campbell’s scant regard for the external observances of religious worship and for the correct structure of church government, both of which he felt were essential to salvation.12 But Drummond’s tone was not hostile, unlike that of Campbell’s other major critic. The second attack, entitled A Detection of the Dangerous Tendency, Both for Christianity and Protestancy, of a Sermon, said to be preached before an Assembly of Divines (1771), appeared under the moniker, “Staurophilus, A Member of the Aletheian Club.” This pamphlet was in reality the first publication of the Roman Catholic priest George Hay, who was later to become head of the Catholic church in Scotland. The author’s identity was apparently unknown to Campbell, who nevertheless guessed the sectarian adherence of his opponent. Hay brutally characterized Campbell’s sermon as “fraught with the grossest calumnies and most unjust misrepresentations.”13 He dismissed Campbell’s implied charges that the Catholic church had historically promoted ignorance in its adherents, corrupted 11 Critical Review 32 (November 1771): 396. 12 Other Scottish Episcopalians felt more threatened by Campbell. John Allan wrote to John Alexander: “I’m informed the Sermon is doing some hurt in the North; & no wonder: for the Author’s Principles will be readily adopted by this fashionable Age” (2 October 1771, sro CH12/23/1422). See other letters of Scottish Episcopalians, sro CH12/23/ 1416–1430, and CH12/24/138 and 140. 13 George Hay, A Detection of the Dangerous Tendency (London: Printed for the Aletheian Club, 1771), 9. Alexander Geddes, another Scottish Catholic priest, wrote satirical verses on what must have been Campbell’s sermon; see Reginald C. Fuller, Alexander Geddes 1737– 1802: Pioneer of Biblical Criticism (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1984), 24.

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Christian morals, and sacrificed virtue for the advancement of the papal hierarchy. Campbell was taken aback by the vicious nature of Hay’s attack, no doubt because he had never directly implicated the contemporary Roman Catholic church. Although Campbell did eventually prepare a rebuttal, it was never printed.14 However, the issues raised in this controversy were to become important themes of his later writings, particularly his divinity lectures. For the present, Campbell had unwittingly made himself a leading enemy of Scots outside the established church.

the philosophy of rhetoric In the late spring of 1775, Campbell undertook the long journey to London to find a publisher for The Philosophy of Rhetoric, a work begun in a quiet country parish twenty-five years earlier. Clearly Campbell had high hopes for the manuscript, for he sought help in the best literary circles. The well-connected critic William Rose wrote to James Beattie that he was in the process of helping Campbell sell the manuscript to the famous Scottish-born publisher and King’s Printer William Strahan.15 Beattie, who had himself been in London only the week before, recorded the following entry in his journal: “[Principal Campbell’s] manuscript is now given to Strachan who has put it in the hands of Adam Smith. I advise the Principal not to meddle himself in the disposal of it, but to leave that matter to Mr. Rose and others of his friends, who will probably get more money for it than he would be inclined to ask … I have again and again recommended it to Strachan in the strongest terms, yet no more than it deserves.”16 Strahan did indeed publish the work in the following year, but we do not know the price or conditions of the manuscript sale. Adam Smith, whose Wealth of Nations had just been published, gave Strahan a mixed opinion: “There is good sense, and learning, and philosophy in Campbells Book: But it is so unfashioned that I am afraid you 14 John Allan, in another letter to John Alexander (20 November 1771), stated that “Campbel has been insinuating his Intention of making a Reply soon. He is very angry at the Author of the Detection to whom, I imagine, his Answer will be principally addressed” (sro CH12/23/1429). In an unpublished manuscript, Campbell mentioned that there were two other minor attacks on his sermon in addition to these two (aul ms 651, p. 25), but I have not been able to find them. In a later letter to Bishop John Douglas (30 December 1790), Campbell mentioned three attacks altogether, the third being by “a Scotch methodist” (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 16). 15 Rose to Beattie, 26 June 1775: aul ms 30/2/232a. 16 Entry for 19 June 1775, quoted in Margaret Forbes, Beattie and His Friends (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1904), 123.

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will not be a great gainer by it.”17 The critics were kinder, if not always less confused about the structure of the work. The anonymous reviewer for the Critical Review had nothing but praise, noting in particular Campbell’s philosophical abilities.18 William Enfield, reviewing for the Monthly Review, was almost equally lavish, though he seemed to think that additional volumes would appear so as to complete Campbell’s explicit plan.19 Indeed, Campbell had named perspicuity, vivacity, elegance, animation, and music as the “five simple and original qualities of style,” but had addressed only the first two.20 Eighteenth-century sales did nothing to contradict Smith’s original assessment. The two major purposes evident in The Philosophy of Rhetoric both reveal a man of the Enlightenment. The first purpose was to set out rules of correct English usage, a matter of common concern to eighteenth-century English and particularly Scottish authors. Campbell displayed a genuine talent for systematically exposing the stylistic flaws of English authors, using the best writers as examples. He did not wish to promote novel standards of usage, arguing that customary usage is the only rule of correct style. Nor did he wish to argue any new principles of persuasion. The rules of effective communication, that is, of raising appropriate emotions in one’s audience or of persuading by means of argument, had been definitively outlined by the ancients, notably Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero. Nevertheless, the foundation of these universal rhetorical principles in human nature was only beginning to be explored in Campbell’s time. Campbell’s second major purpose was to employ the study of rhetoric to discover the inner workings and secret springs of the human mind, 17 Smith to Strahan, 6 July 1776: The Correspondence of Adam Smith, ed. E.C. Mossner and I.S. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 1987), 202–3. Smith was not entirely disinterested, for his own “Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres” was in potential competition with Campbell’s book. 18 Critical Review 42 (July, August and September 1776): 1–11, 111–18 and 182–7. 19 Monthly Review 55 (October and November 1776): 286–95 and 374–83. For a full account of the critical reaction to this work see H. Lewis Ulman, “Discerning Readers: British Reviewers’ Responses to Campbell’s Rhetoric and Related Works,” Rhetorica 8 (1990): 65–90. 20 pr, 216. Campbell himself offered no explanation for this apparent incompleteness. There are no manuscript remains of any additional parts. Perhaps the slow sales of the first edition prevented Campbell from publishing more. The existing portion includes all of the discourses delivered to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society; see The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 26. The structure of The Philosophy of Rhetoric might have looked more conventional if not for the specific rules of the Wise Club.

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and thereby contribute to the burgeoning science of man that had become the particular concern of the Scottish Enlightenment. The practical art of rhetoric was to lead the philosopher, in inductive or Baconian fashion, to the theoretical science of the mind. Campbell aligned the newlyexplored faculties of the mind with the classical ends of persuasive discourse, and found that the ends of speaking could be reduced to the following: “to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will.”21 These faculty-associated ends were then connected with those qualities of style (notably perspicuity and vivacity) that most effectively encouraged belief and ultimately action. Campbell even employed the Scottish notion of “sympathy” to account for the effectiveness of the communicative arts. He described sympathy as “the common tie of human souls,” which included a natural tendency to believe the testimony of others.22 The Philosophy of Rhetoric contained the most complete (though perhaps not entirely systematic) expression of Campbell’s philosophy of mind, which grappled with some of the most fundamental issues of eighteenth-century epistemology, not the least of which was the sceptical philosophy of David Hume. We can imagine, then, that Campbell’s book made particularly pleasurable reading for Hume as he lay on his deathbed.23

t h e wa r w i t h a m e r i c a The year 1776, which marked the formal outbreak of hostilities between Britain and most of her American colonies, was also a turning point for the British people, who seemed utterly surprised and baffled by an event that prompted a drawn-out crisis of national confidence. The king proclaimed several national fast-days, which in turn generated a large number of fast-day sermons, many of which were published. Campbell’s fast-day sermon, entitled The Nature, Extent, and Importance, of the Duty of Allegiance, was preached on 12 December 1776, and published early in the following year. It argued that rebellion is unreasonable and without scriptural warrant, and that true liberty can only be found within the rule of law. The proud and haughty Americans, by placing their hopes in republicanism and abstract notions of right, had 21 pr, 1. 22 pr, 15 and 96. 23 James Boswell reports that Hume was reading The Philosophy of Rhetoric at the time of their last meeting; see Boswell in Extremes 1776–1778, ed. Charles McC. Weis and Frederick A. Pottle (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 11.

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made themselves ungovernable, thus imperilling their existing constitutional liberties. Moreover, they were spreading their dangerous and misleading republican notions back to the British Isles. Nevertheless, Campbell concluded that the Americans ought to be allowed their independence if they were determined to delude themselves. He maintained this unusual opinion even as the war progressed. In a letter to Edmund Burke, written 12 June 1779, he declared, “I should have had no objection to their total independence, if any minister could have adopted that measure with safety. But such a real independence as they wanted, along with a nominal subordination, appeared to serve only as a foundation for eternal quarreling … I am strongly inclined to think (and it was my opinion from the beginning) that Great Britain might be much more benefited by an equitable alliance and treaty of commerce with that people, than even by the connection that heretofor subsisted between us.”24 Campbell’s moderation, pragmatism, and willingness to give up the pride of empire set him apart from the two predominant extremes of Scottish opinion. Though he rejected the republicanism and proAmericanism of Popular party adherents such as John Erskine, his confidence in British moral right combined with his conciliatory attitude towards the mistaken colonists set him apart from most Moderates. Hugh Blair, Alexander Carlyle, and Adam Ferguson all favoured suppressing the rebels by force. Alexander Gerard’s fast-day sermon of 1778, Liberty the Cloke of Maliciousness, Both in The American Rebellion, and in The Manners of the Times, saw dire consequences for both Americans and Britons if they did not begin a moral reformation and repudiate the sin and licentiousness that had brought war as God’s punishment. William Robertson, in another fast-day sermon of the same year, remained belligerent in his sense of British moral superiority, reproving doom-sayers such as Gerard while remaining mindful of the need for renewed piety and patriotism.25 Campbell’s sermon seems to have been accorded greater respect in the reviews than most of the myriad of fast-day sermons that appeared at the same time.26 Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester, whose political opinions were much like Campbell’s and who had also alien24 sca WWM Bk. 1/1172. 25 Manuscript notes on Robertson’s sermon are preserved in nls 5003, fols 92–3v. 26 In the Monthly Review 56 (April 1777): 315–17, Campbell’s sermon is counted as number 29 of the fast-day sermons reviewed.

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ated himself from popular opinion by advocating that Britain abandon her colonies before their anarchical principles endanger the delicate balance of the British parliamentary system,27 made efforts to have quantities of Campbell’s sermon sent to America for distribution. It is not known whether the sermon made the crossing at this time, though an announcement shortly after the peace of 1783 declared that one thousand copies of the sermon were to be given away, both to domestic employers and to sea-captains venturing to the remaining British colonies in America, as antidotes to unconstitutional republicanism.28

two sermons Campbell published two more sermons in the turbulent years following the outbreak of war with the colonies. The first of these, entitled The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel a Proof of Its Truth (1777), returned Campbell to familiar territory – the external evidences of the Christian religion. It was preached before the annual meeting of the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, an association particularly concerned with converting Scottish Roman Catholics of the highlands and islands. The sermon argued that the situation of the world during the first era of the Christian church was so inhospitable to the Gospel message that the church could not have prospered by natural means alone. The doctrines of Christ must have appeared foolish to that age, especially when preached by lowly, illiterate Jewish fishermen. The historical fact of the Gospel’s rapid and unparalleled success, therefore, can only be explained by supernatural means. In other words, the early Christian church must necessarily have had the particular blessing of heaven. Campbell thought it obvious that the Roman Catholic church had enjoyed no comparable divine favour, a historical-providential argument common among eighteenth-century moderate Protestants. William Robertson’s only published sermon, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s Appearance, and Its Connexion with the Success of His Religion, Considered (1755), likewise claimed that historical evidences show the early church to have had the unique support of providence. 27 Tucker’s views on the American situation, which Campbell cited, were published in Four Tracts on Political and Commercial Subjects (1774). On Tucker’s unique perspective on the American conflict, see J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 85–6, 119–21, 157–91. 28 See the handwritten version of this announcement, bl Add. MS 33498, fol. 40.

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Whereas The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel is typical of Campbell’s calm and measured apologetic tone, the second sermon of this period, entitled The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society (1779), seems strangely out of character. The argument itself was common enough in the eighteenth century: that Christianity is by its very nature and spirit beneficial to the interests of civil society, contrary to the claims of “libertines” that religion is a political invention for the purpose of social control. Campbell argued that religion is necessary for civil order and happiness because it provides moral sanctions that political laws cannot. The libertines’ attempt to undermine religion could only lead to the collapse of civil society. But Campbell’s sermon seems to imply further that arguments favourable to the Christian establishment can be made entirely apart from the historical truth of Christianity’s claims – an unusual argument from an apologist known for his evidential defence of Christian belief. Campbell generally argued that Christianity ought to be believed because of its morally certain evidences, not because of its accidental benefits. The argument that seems to lurk beneath the surface of the Happy Influence sermon – that civil society should endorse Christianity regardless of its historical truth – challenged his usual assertion that the factual truth of a claim ought to stand independently of the supposed benefits of belief in that claim.29 The civil consequences of Christian belief, however wellfounded, ought to have been superfluous to his argument, for the best way to ensure those beneficial effects was to defend the evidential justness of the underlying belief. Although such philosophical ambiguity was unusual for Campbell, the argument itself was not uncommon among moderate Christian (and even non-Christian) apologists in the eighteenth century. In The Influence of Piety on the Public Good (1761), Gerard argued that irreligion is destructive to civil society because it unleashes the viciousness of human nature ordinarily kept in check by the prescripts of religion, true or otherwise. He claimed that, “the mischiefs of irreligion are incomparably greater, and more destructive to society, than all the bad effects which can be charged on false religion.”30 29 aul ms 650, section ii. See also st, 2:71, where Campbell (like Hume) claimed that “a good end will never sanctify bad means,” which for Campbell ought to have included encouraging known falsehoods. 30 Gerard, The Influence of Piety on the Public Good (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1761), 13 (Gerard’s emphasis). It seems that few in the eighteenth century believed Pierre Bayle’s claim that a society of atheists was possible. Even in Diderot’s Encyclopedia, the Abbé Yvon attacked Bayle, arguing that religion is necessary for the survival of civil society; see the article “Atheists” in Stephen J. Gendzier, ed., The Encyclopedia: Selections (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 67–72.

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Although the defensive and fearful tone evident in Campbell’s Happy Influence sermon cannot be easily reconciled with his usual preaching style, it can perhaps be explained by the turmoil of events that surrounded its composition. The British national mood only worsened with the progress of the American war, and the situation complicated by events of 1778–79 that have come to be known as the “No-Popery” affair.

the no-popery affair Roman Catholics in Scotland continued to cling to their religion throughout the eighteenth century despite the best efforts of the Reformed church. Unlike their English counterparts, however, Scottish Catholics were poor, few in number, and politically insignificant. Their civil status had become especially precarious since the Glorious Revolution, and they continued to suffer popular resentment even though the laws against them were not strictly enforced. However, the increasingly tolerant mood of enlightened society caused some in high places to think that the time had come to begin lifting these civil disabilities. The need to raise more troops for use in the American war provided a more immediate political motivation. On 14 May 1778, Henry Dundas, Scotland’s Lord Advocate and the rising star of Scottish political management, announced that a bill for the relief of Catholics in Scotland would likely be introduced into the House of Commons following the successful passage of a similar piece of legislation for England and Ireland. The announcement caused immediate panic among delegates to the Scottish General Assembly, which happened to meet later that same month, and provoked intense debate concerning the threat of Catholic relief to Protestant interests in Scotland. Campbell, who attended the 1778 General Assembly, spoke in favour of the relief act, downplaying the dangers of Catholic emancipation. But no amount of assuagement could calm the general hysteria that soon infected the Scottish population, who likely believed that Catholic relief in a time of providential war was an additional affront against God. In January and February of 1779, Edinburgh and Glasgow fell victim to No-Popery riots, which destroyed considerable Catholic property. William Robertson, a leading voice in favour of relief, had his house attacked by the Edinburgh mob and received a number of anonymous death-threats. Scotland’s abashed political managers decided in February to drop the relief effort, a gesture which barely eased the public tension. A considerable pamphlet war erupted around the emancipation issue. The first major volley was fired by Campbell’s Episcopalian rival,

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William Abernethy Drummond, in a piece called The Lawfulness of Breaking Faith with Heretics Proved to be An Established Doctrine of the Church of Rome, in a Letter to Mr. G.H. (September 1778). Drummond’s pamphlet was actually a belated response to George Hay’s polemical piece, A Detection of the Dangerous Tendency, which was itself an attack on Campbell’s sermon The Spirit of the Gospel. As an Episcopalian High Churchman, Drummond was perhaps more threatened by the Romanist Hay than by Campbell, and thus he defended Campbell’s implied charges concerning the intolerant nature of the Roman Catholic church. As the title of his pamphlet suggests, Drummond argued that the Catholic church still upheld the doctrine of the lawfulness of breaking faith with heretics.31 Campbell, however, was less concerned with the likes of Drummond and Hay than with controversialists within his own church. He was particularly worried about an inflammatory piece by the advocate John Dickson (on behalf of the “Friends of the Protestant Interest”) entitled A Short View of the Statutes at Present in Force in Scotland against Popery (1778). It claimed that the proposed relief act was really “an act for promoting the growth of Popery,” and as such was both unconstitutional and a threat to national security.32 Furthermore, argued Dickson, Catholics were fundamentally anti-Christian, blasphemous, untrustworthy, and intolerant, and therefore unworthy of being tolerated. They would, if unchecked, take over the property of the whole kingdom. These claims, as Campbell well knew, were calculated to inflame the prevailing prejudices of Scottish popular opinion. Campbell published An Address to the People of Scotland, Upon the Alarms that Have Been Raised in Regard to Popery in April 1779. It was a masterful piece of enlightened Christian argument, demonstrating from both Scripture and reason that persecution in all its forms is both wrong and ineffective. It demolished Dickson’s claims that Catholics threatened national security or sought to overrun the kingdom. But the Address’s arguments were perhaps too enlightened to prevail against either popular opinion or the more learned prejudices of his fellow Protestant ministers, many of whom were still wary of regarding Jesus as (merely) an example of moral conduct.33 In fact, Campbell’s was probably the only 31 George Hay responded to Drummond’s attack with An Answer to Mr. W.A.D.’s letter to G.H. (1778). Drummond answered with A Second Letter to Mr. G.H. (1778). 32 Dickson, A Short View, 2d ed., in Scotland’s Opposition to the Popish Bill (Edinburgh: David Paterson, 1780), 321. In this second edition, Dickson attacked Campbell personally, calling him “the apologist of Popery” (335n.). 33 Robert Kent Donovan, No Popery and Radicalism: Opposition to Roman Catholic Relief in Scotland, 1778–1782 (New York: Garland, 1987), 102.

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pamphlet to appear in Scotland in favour of relief. As he later reflected in a letter to the Anglican bishop John Douglas, the Address aroused “all the zealous and intolerant protestants of every denomination, episcopalian and presbyterian, juror and nonjuror, seceders, independents &c.”34 One pamphlet, purportedly “By a Lady,” entitled Observations on P[rincipal] C[ampbe]ll’s Conduct, with Regard to the R. Catholic Bill (1781), accused Campbell himself of inciting the contemporary hatred of Catholics with his 1771 sermon The Spirit of the Gospel. Though the anonymous author claimed to be Protestant, the pamphlet’s systematic defence of Catholic doctrine made its sectarian authorship plain, and thus allowed it to be easily ignored. A more typically Protestant piece, entitled A Vindication of the Opposition to the Late Intended Bill for the Relief of Roman Catholics in Scotland (1780), argued that the Church of Rome was the Antichrist, and that Protestant opposition to the relief measure was therefore most reasonable, as suppressing dangerous Popish pedagogical and political agendas. These sentiments were probably shared by John Erskine, the leader of the Popular party in the Scottish Church, and a declared admirer of Campbell. He gently rebuked Campbell for insinuating that the Scottish clergy was responsible for whipping up popular hostility against relief. Like the author of the Vindication, he thought the present disabilities were reasonable because of the danger Catholics posed to civil society, rather than because of their religion per se.35 Campbell’s arguments could hardly prevail against long-standing Calvinist prejudices that seemed on the surface to mirror arguments found elsewhere in his own writings. In recognition of his efforts on behalf of Roman Catholics, he was supposedly dubbed “Pope Campbell” and had his windows smashed by a mob.36 Much of this debate took place long after the relief measure had been discarded in Westminster and condemned in the May 1779 meeting of the General Assembly. The reaction to the proposed bill came from the bottom up. Popular agitation inspired the Aberdeen Town Council to resolve “by every legal and Constitutional Method to Endeavour to prevent the said Bill from being brought into Parliament,” 34 Campbell to Douglas, 30 December 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 16v). 35 John Erskine, ed., A Narrative of the Debate in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, May 25 1779. Occasioned by Apprehensions of an Intended Repeal of the Penal Statutes against PAPISTS (Edinburgh: W. Gray, 1780), v. 36 James Bruce, Lives of Eminent Men of Aberdeen (Aberdeen: L. Smith, 1841), 342–3; James Valentine, “An Aberdeen Principal of Last Century,” The Aberdeen Journal (3 April 1896): 5. Donovan says there was a minor disturbance in Aberdeen in late 1778 (No Popery and Radicalism, 27n.).

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and for that purpose to hire legal counsel in London.37 Likewise, on 1 February 1779, the Presbytery of Aberdeen voted by a margin of thirty-three to two (Campbell being one of the dissenters) that the proposed relief bill would “be highly prejudicial to the interests of religion, and perhaps to the civil interests of Society too.”38 But the opponents of relief were even more active in the Southwest, particularly in the Synod of Glasgow and Ayr. By the time of the May General Assembly, the formerly confident Moderates were on the defensive, and were ultimately forced to concede that present measures for Catholic relief were inexpedient. Campbell, who seems not to have taken part in the 1779 debates in the General Assembly, was nevertheless considered the leader of the relief forces, evidenced by the fact that Erskine addressed his account of the debates of that session directly to him.39 Campbell maintained a low view of his clerical opponents, as expressed in a letter to Edmund Burke: “You will be surprized to be informed, but it is a certain fact, that they are the most unfriendly to true and rational liberty of any in the country, the most bigoted, the most intolerant, the most fanatical, and in one word, the most like the Bostonians of the last century. They are the very men who have had a principal hand in raising the present flame against papists.”40 The loss of this battle was a major defeat for the Moderates, and may have encouraged Robertson’s retirement from active church politics. It may also account for Campbell’s relative quiet in the following years. Despite moderate hopes, the General Assembly’s resolution had somewhat more finality than James Beattie realized when he wrote to Forbes: “I am quite out of temper with our General Assembly, and almost the whole of the Scotch ministers. Dr Campbell is the only man among them, who has had the courage to speak and publish the words of Christianity, which are always the 37 aca Council Register 64, fol. 154 (29 January 1779). 38 sro CH2/1/10, p. 226. Nevertheless, the declaration of the Presbytery of Aberdeen against Catholic relief, reprinted in Scotland’s Opposition to the Popish Bill, sounds considerably more moderate than declarations printed by groups in the Southwest of Scotland. 39 There is some mystery as to Campbell’s whereabouts at this time. The records of the 1779 General Assembly suggest that he was a delegate, and that he was serving on committees. Yet his Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society sermon was supposedly preached in Aberdeen on the Sunday that fell in the midst of the General Assembly meetings. In his admiring review of Campbell’s Address to the People of Scotland, William Rose suggested that this pamphlet was published because Campbell could not attend the General Assembly; see Monthly Review 62 (February 1780): 149. Perhaps Campbell decided at the last moment to stay away because of his close involvement in the affair. 40 Campbell to Burke, 12 June 1779 (sca WWM Bk. 1/1172).

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words of truth and soberness. You must have seen his excellent pamphlet. As matters now stand, there is a grevious stigma upon the name of Presbyterian; but I hope a new assembly may wipe it off, as nothing is more unsteady than the resolution of a popular meeting.”41

the four gospels Campbell’s public withdrawal after the defeat of the Catholic relief proposal was not a sign of inactivity. These were the years in which he completed his scholarly masterpiece, The Four Gospels, Translated from the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations, and Notes Critical and Explanatory. Like The Philosophy of Rhetoric, this work was begun in his earliest pastoral days. The Greek word studies that form the basis of the translation are evident throughout his writings. The genesis of the work may perhaps be discovered in the daily devotions of his childhood, when he took note of the King James Version’s particular rendering of certain idiomatic expressions. “I remember,” Campbell wrote, “that when I first observed this distinction of character in the English Bible, being then a schoolboy, I asked my elder brother, who had been at college, the reason of the difference.”42 Obviously unsatisfied with the explanation he received, Campbell sought to rework the standard translation using the new critical methods of the Enlightenment. Campbell was not alone in this attempt; as he himself observed, “there has been of late, both abroad and at home, a profusion of criticisms on the sacred text; and many new versions have been attempted, especially in France and England.”43 The work was the most scholarly of his career, and particularly required the honing of his language skills. In addition to Latin and the various Hebrew and Greek dialects with which he was already familiar, Campbell improved his reading knowledge of French and Italian, and learned German in order to study Luther’s Bible. He also believed that the work demanded a detailed examination of the history and culture of the peoples who had produced the Gospels, and for this purpose enlisted the critical eye of the judge and antiquarian scholar David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes. The Four Gospels was intended to be not just a translation, but a model of translation. The greater part of its 1500 pages was taken up with critical 41 Beattie to Forbes, 12 June 1779 (aul ms 30/1/171). 42 fg, 1:474. 43 fg, 1:486.

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dissertations on the problems of translating and interpreting ancient texts, and with critical notes on the translations themselves. This immense quantity of work was, however, no guarantee of an easy publication. The publisher William Creech warned Beattie that a work even of such high literary merit would have difficulty making money for a publisher, and reminded him that The Philosophy of Rhetoric had yet to see a second edition.44 Nevertheless, Campbell, manuscript in hand, travelled to London in the summer of 1787 to find a publisher. He had the help not only of his travelling companion James Beattie, by now an important figure in the English publishing world, but also of the expatriate Scot John Douglas, bishop of Carlisle (to whom the work was dedicated). Douglas was not optimistic concerning the price they would get for the manuscript, reminding Campbell that even the most valuable sacred works were seldom the most popular literature.45 Thomas Cadell agreed to print a first edition of 750 copies, but declined to purchase the property of the manuscript outright. Though Campbell would have made little or nothing by this agreement, he was relieved to have the work in press. Campbell’s trip was memorable in other ways as well. Through Douglas he was introduced to the king and queen at Windsor, and enjoyed several audiences with them.46 In London, however, he had less to do. The ageing Aberdonian was unable to keep up with Beattie’s relentless social schedule, and it is also possible that he found the heat and oppression of the metropolis difficult to manage. Consequently he left London prematurely, though he seemed to regret his hasty decision – his subsequent sea-voyage to Berwick was so unpleasant that he would not consider another trip south thereafter.47 The Four Gospels did not appear in print until early 1789. As Campbell feared, the price of two guineas for the two substantial quarto volumes proved prohibitive to popular sales. The critics were suitably impressed, though more with the critical dissertations in the first volume than with the actual translations in the second.48 Ramsay of Ochtertyre’s opinion 44 Creech to Beattie, 17 May 1787 (aul ms 30/2/545). 45 Douglas to Campbell, 8 July 1787 (aul ms 3214/17). 46 See Campbell’s letter to his niece Ann Farquharson, 25 July 1787 (aul ms 3214/ 14). George III, like Campbell, was both a pious man and an enthusiastic naturalist. 47 Beattie recalls the story to Williamson, Campbell’s London host, some years later (22 November 1789, aul ms 30/1/302). 48 See the Critical Review 67 (June 1789): 401–9; and 68 (October 1789): 268–76; and the Monthly Review 2 (June, July, and August 1790): 121–38, 249–65, and 404–12. The bestknow portrait of Campbell, which still hangs in Trinity Hall, shows him holding a copy of The Four Gospels. (This portrait, painted by Archibald Robertson, has also been reproduced in stained glass in the Marischal College chapel.)

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was perhaps representative: “All the learning and ingenuity of principal Campbell did not enable him to make a better translation of the gospels; for one hole he mended, like the bakers, he made two or three.”49 Campbell was especially bothered by the criticisms of his translations, and defended their accuracy and justness, if not their attractiveness to an English-speaking audience accustomed to the idiom of the King James Version. It was in fact the inaccuracies in the common version that had first prompted Campbell to use the critical tools of his age to produce a better translation. Bishop Douglas assured him that, despite the reservations of the reviewers, the translation was well-received by his own peers. Josiah Tucker intimated that the bishop of Gloucester expected the English Prayer Book would soon be revised with Campbell’s criticisms in mind. Dr. William Heberden, a physician and respected classical scholar, was especially impressed with the translation and encouraged him to consider undertaking the rest of the New Testament.50 Campbell pleaded age and declined. Nevertheless, his Gospel translation was used, along with various other translations, in several popular nineteenth-century editions of the New Testament.51 Campbell’s new publication invited fresh attacks from his old nemesis William Abernethy Drummond, now a Scottish Episcopal bishop. Drummond renewed his strictures against Campbell’s low-church views in two pamphlets – A Friendly Address (1789), and Reasons for the Scotch Episcopal Clergy Submitting to the Royal Family of Hanover (1792). Drummond particularly objected to Campbell’s claim, in the “Preliminary Dissertations,” that the early church had used the term “heresy” quite differently from its modern sectarian signification. But such criticisms were merely convenient excuses for Drummond to restate his own views on the necessary order and discipline of church government against Campbell’s 49 Letters of John Ramsay of Ochtertyre 1799–1812, ed. Barbara L.H. Horn (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1966), 5. Ramsay likewise criticized the translations of Alexander Geddes and Bishop Robert Lowth, the most advanced British biblical critics of the time. Ramsay elsewhere suggested that Campbell’s Greek scholarship was considered superficial by many English scholars (Scotland and Scotsmen, 1:495). 50 Campbell to Douglas, 22 Sept. 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fols 12–15); Douglas to Campbell, 19 June 1789 (aul ms 3214/9); Tucker to Campbell, 24 Oct. 1790 (aul ms 3214/3); Heberden to Campbell, 23 Dec. 1789 (aul ms 3214/1). 51 Campbell’s translation of the Gospels was combined with other translations by Philip Doddridge and James Macknight under the title The New Testament (1826), and frequently reprinted. Archibald Alexander, at Princeton Theological Semninary, used Campbell’s Four Gospels in his divinity teaching; see Lefferts A. Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment and Pietism: Archibald Alexander and the Founding of Princeton Theological Seminary (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 155.

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supposed latitudinarianism. Moreover, the pamphlets represented attempts to heal the breach that had developed among Episcopalians in Scotland during the eighteenth century. Campbell was to become deeply involved with this proposed reconciliation.

the scottish episcopalians A century after the establishment of the Presbyterian form of government in the Church of Scotland, remnants of the old Episcopal order remained, particularly in the Northeast. The 1712 Act of Toleration gave legal recognition to Episcopalians who abjured the Stuarts and took an oath of allegiance to Queen Anne and her Hanoverian successors. Those who accepted these terms were provided with English-ordained Episcopal clergy and followed the English model of worship. Those who refused (including most of the Episcopal clergy and all of the bishops) remained Jacobites and faced persecution throughout the eighteenth century, particularly in the aftermath of the ‘45. These two Episcopalian bodies, one legal and one not, grew increasingly apart through the eighteenth century, each fundamentally suspicious of the other. The decisive change for the nonjuring Episcopalians came in 1788 when Bonnie Prince Charlie, the last of the exiled Stuart pretenders, died in Rome. John Skinner (1744–1816), bishop of Aberdeen and primus of the Scottish Episcopalian church (and the son and namesake of Campbell’s class-mate), took this opportunity to lead his church back into favour with the Hanoverian government. He and Bishop William Abernethy Drummond began making overtures to Westminster for repeal of the disabilities against them. They enlisted the help of Campbell, a personal acquaintance of Skinner, who wrote of the situation to Bishop John Douglas in London. Douglas passed along Campbell’s encouragements and those of other leading Moderates to the Anglican bishops.52 The only remaining obstacle to the removal of the disabilities against the Scottish Episcopalians was the presence in Scotland of the English-ordained Episcopalians, who feared that relief measures would force their clergy and property under the jurisdiction of the Scottish bishops. Campbell was familiar with Episcopalians on both sides of this issue. His wife’s family had been dissenting Episcopalians who had 52 John Skinner (son of the primus), Annals of Scottish Episcopacy (Edinburgh: A. Brown, 1818), 175–6 and 184.

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fought for the Young Pretender. His friend James Beattie was intimate with the English-ordained Episcopalian clergy of the Northeast.53 Campbell knew that their differences, not the least of which was the extreme High Church stance maintained by the harried dissenting bishops, engendered fear and mistrust on both sides. Abernethy Drummond’s pamphlets against Campbell were, at bottom, attempts to assert the right of jurisdiction of Scottish Episcopal bishops over their anglicized brethren and to assuage their fears concerning the consequences. Until the 1790s, the government in Westminster was more inclined to protect the existing interests of the English-ordained Episcopalians, and so blocked repeated parliamentary attempts to provide relief for the dissenters. But the persistent applications of the Scottish Moderates finally broke their resistance and convinced the Anglican bench of bishops that the Presbyterian Church of Scotland had no particular objections to relief for dissenting Episcopalians. The bill that was finally passed in June 1792 required the Scottish Episcopal clergy to assent to the Thirty-Nine Articles, but placed the English Episcopal clergy in Scotland under their jurisdiction. This and the eventual relief of Scottish Catholics in 1793 were significant victories for Campbell’s enlightened principles of toleration. His efforts drew a fond regard from his old adversary William Abernethy Drummond; “Dr Campbell has behaved like himself: for he is one of the sweetest blooded, & best hearted men in the world, & the friend of mankind. ‘Tis a great pity that he is so loose in Church principles, for were He a sincere Episcopalian, he would be of great use to us as he is now, on account of his learning, a great ornament to the Presbyterians.”54

53 One such acquaintance had been James Riddoch, an English-ordained minister in Aberdeen. In 1779 Riddoch’s widow (who was James Boswell’s cousin) approached Beattie and Campbell to edit her late husband’s sermons, pleading financial difficulty. The two agreed, not knowing that the huge mass of sermons was not only unprepared for publication but also almost unreadable in manuscript form. We know from Beattie’s letters that he went on to transcribe and edit some of the sermons, but it is unclear whether or not Campbell was able to continue with the project. Riddoch’s Sermons were published in two volumes in 1782, but no credit was given to either Campbell or Beattie. The story can be found in Beattie’s letters to Sir William Forbes: 10 April 1779 (aul ms 30/1/166); 28 April 1779 (nls Acc 4796, box 94); and 11 April 1780 (aul ms 30/1/180). The last letter makes no mention of Campbell’s continued involvement. 54 Abernethy Drummond to John Douglas, 27 April 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 7r).

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last years In the midst of his efforts for the relief of Scottish Episcopalians, Campbell was nearly brought to his own end. The illness struck quickly in January 1791. A cold became a violent asthma and fever, and soon those around him were resigned to his imminent death. Grace Campbell was so distraught at her husband’s suffering that she thought him better at rest. Campbell even spoke what he thought were the dying words of a Christian man. Within days, those around him began the flurry of letters concerning the distribution of his offices after his death. Campbell intimated to Beattie that he hoped he would succeed him as principal. But this was not to be. By 31 January Campbell had passed through the worst of his ailment, and the doctors became confident of his recovery. By early March he was again attending to his duties at the college.1 But he no longer enjoyed his former vigour, and was forced to drop many of his public duties, particularly those involving the church courts. This loss of robustness was slight, however, compared to the loss of his wife in February

1 Beattie to Laing, 21 Jan. 1791, to Forbes, 31 Jan. 1791, and to the Duchess of Gordon, 7 March 1791 (nls Acc 4796, box 92); Beattie to Arbuthnot, 24 Jan. 1791 (aul ms 30/ 1/317); Beattie to Montagu, 24 Jan. 1791 (aul ms 30/1/318). The Rev. Dr. David Cruden’s account of what he thought would be his last conversation with Campbell (23 Jan. 1791) is reprinted in George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Campbell” (1800), in leh, 1:l–li.

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1793.2 Campbell was thereafter attended by his niece Ann Farquharson, who had lived with the Campbells for many years and had become as a daughter to them. Campbell devoted his remaining energies to the preparation of his final publications. Foremost in his mind were questions concerning the nature of the true church, which had arisen from his historical researches into the character and structure of the early church. In addition to preparing his ecclesiastical history lectures for publication, he began to consider a belated response to some of his earlier critics. Campbell had never answered the attacks made against his sermon The Spirit of the Gospel twenty years ago.3 He decided to compose additional apologetic tracts for a new edition of his Dissertation on Miracles, which was also to include previously-published sermons in order to help buoy up sales of The Four Gospels. In a letter to his printer William Creech of 14 September 1793,4 Campbell described four tracts: one on implicit faith, a second on Christian temperance and self-denial, a third on the unfavourable effects of superstition on morality, and a fourth on the difference between the form and power of religion. All four concerned abuses that Campbell believed had infected the true church and had become most apparent in Roman Catholicism. All but the fourth tract survive in some form. The first tract, “Of implicit faith,” was never published, but exists in a manuscript version ready for the press.5 It was directed primarily against Bishop George Hay’s Detection of the Dangerous Tendency, and upheld Campbell’s earlier implicit charge that the Roman church had historically promoted a faith based on ignorance rather than knowledge. The second and third tracts became essays 2 Though Grace Campbell’s death is usually given as 16 February 1792 (first in Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” xiii), 1793 seems more likely. In a letter to William Forbes, dated 23 February 1793, James Beattie noted that Mrs. Campbell had died a few days before (nls Acc 4796, box 94). Also, Campbell’s will dates Grace’s will (which I have not found) as 5 February 1793 (sro CC1/6/60). The Aberdeen Magazine states that Grace died about three years before Campbell; see “Memoirs of the late Dr. Campbell,” (June 1796): 47. The 1793 date makes doubtful the traditional story that Grace’s death was hastened by her assiduous attention to her husband’s health in 1791. 3 Besides the attacks by Hay and Drummond, Campbell suggested that there had been two other attacks made against The Spirit of the Gospel, “one probably by a presbyterian, the other by a Roman Catholic” (aul ms 651, p. 25). Of these I can find no trace. 4 Campbell to Creech, 14 Sept. 1793 (The William Creech letterbooks, Dalguise Muniments, sro W. Reg. House, microfilm RH4/26/1). See also Campbell to Douglas, 30 Dec. 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 16). 5 aul ms 649.

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within a lengthy manuscript entitled, “Defence of the doctrine contained in the foregoing sermon against the attacks made upon it, by one under the signature of Staurophilus and an anonymous remarker,” which, as the title suggests, was the very tract intended to defend the republished Spirit of the Gospel sermon.6 The “Defence” manuscript contains three essays: “The doctrine of some priests has encouraged ignorance,” “Of christian temperance and self-denial,” and “Superstition unfavourable to morality.” A portion of the second essay was published at the end of the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History. The “Defence” manuscript was a substantial piece of controversial writing and, if published, would have run to approximately 750 octavo pages – more than five times the length of the sermon it was intended to vindicate. This scholarly bulk reflects Campbell’s intention to answer fully Hay’s challenge to produce evidence that the Roman Catholic church had in fact followed a policy of breaking faith with heretics. His evidence included many of the same historical examples that had been used by Protestants for two centuries (such as the case of Jan Huss), but he also cited eighteenth-century examples to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Protestant mistrust. In addition to these strictures on Roman Catholic abuses, Campbell went after some potentially dangerous abuses within Protestant Christianity. The unfinished “Strictures on Dodwell’s Paraenesis [in five sections]”7 attacked the common ecclesiastical tendency of placing too much authority in human hands. The antagonist in question was Henry Dodwell the elder (1641–1711), a learned apologist of English nonjurors, whose De nupero schismate Anglicano paraenesis (1704) advocated an extreme High Church view of ecclesiastical authority. Campbell denounced Dodwell’s Episcopal view of ecclesiastical history on the grounds that it “corrupts the mind from the simplicity that is in Christ.”8 His concern to combat High Church ecclesiology is also evident in 6 aul mss 651–655. It is not clear how the “Defence” manuscript and the “Implicit faith” manuscript are related to one another. Both are responses to the published attacks on The Spirit of the Gospel. Both contain prefaces that suggest that they were to answer Hay’s attack. In addition, it is clear that the “Implicit faith” tract was originally intended to be the first of a series of tracts. But there do not seem to be any structural or organizational parallels between the two manuscripts, suggesting that one was ultimately meant to supersede the other. 7 aul ms 650. The unpublished manuscript mysteriously breaks off in the early part of section iv, suggesting that Campbell may have been working on it at the time of his last illness. 8 aul ms 650, section iv.

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another lengthy attack on Dodwell, found in the published Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, in a section that Campbell added to the manuscript in the final years of his life.9 Campbell’s scorn for Dodwell may reflect an increasing trepidation concerning the authoritarianism apparent in Protestant churches (and states) in the years following the outbreak of the French Revolution. He said little about the situation in France itself, but in a letter to Douglas in 1790, he made a grave allusion to the unthinking mob of Paris.10 All the while Campbell continued his administrative duties in the university, including the management of several student bursaries. A small scandal erupted in Aberdeen in 1794 over a bursary established by the will of a John Paterson. Campbell was charged by an Aberdeen shoemaker, Alexander Paterson, with failing to observe the terms of the will, which, Paterson thought, ought to have favoured his own son. Campbell responded to the charge with a pamphlet entitled Remarks on Dr. Paterson’s Will (n.d., probably 1794), which, while admitting that the wording of the bequest led to confusion, argued that he had settled that year’s bursary correctly. Though Campbell claimed strict compliance with the terms of the will, it is clear that the rewarding of academic excellence was uppermost in his mind. The details of the dispute are unimportant, but the dispute itself, which involved a significant branch of the Incorporated Trades (of which Campbell was patron), occasioned bitter feelings in the town and may have convinced Campbell that it was time to consider retiring from formal duties. Campbell’s wish to retire was tempered by a desire to be succeeded by a worthy candidate. He made his first overture to the Town Council, which held the gift of the divinity chair, in October 1794, only weeks before the beginning of the college term.11 Campbell offered to resign the divinity chair immediately on the condition that it go to one of three potential candidates: his close friend David Cruden, minister of Nigg; James Shirrefs, minister of St. Nicholas’ West in Aberdeen; or his future editor James Fraser of Drumoak. The council, for reasons unknown, declined Campbell’s offer, and he was forced to teach another winter. It may well have been a difficult term. On 11 June 1795, Campbell wrote unconditional letters of resignation to both the Presbytery of Aberdeen 9 See aul ms m 193. 10 Campbell to Douglas, 22 Sept. 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fols 12–15). 11 There is a transcription of the letter in aca Council Register 67, fol. 41v. The original letter does not appear in the council’s letterbook.

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and the Town Council.12 Campbell cited failing health rather than a decline in will to serve Christ. But the choice of successor was no longer at issue, for by that time one had already been found. The position went to William Laurence Brown, who, before fleeing from the French army, had ministered to an English-speaking congregation in the Netherlands, and had been professor of moral philosophy and ecclesiastical history in the University of Utrecht.13 Though the Town Council held the gift of the divinity chair, it appears that the appointment was manoeuvered by Henry Dundas in London, and may have reflected political rather than academic concerns.14 Nevertheless, Campbell seemed quite pleased with his successor. In July 1795 Campbell resigned the principalship to Brown as well. He must have negotiated a retirement from this post some time earlier, for it seems that he had been promised a pension from the government no later than spring of 1795.15 The pension, worth 300 pounds sterling per annum, more or less covered the income from Campbell’s various offices. Campbell was pleased with the arrangement, though, as he confessed to the college chancellor, Lord Mansfield, “It is to me a real self-denial … to be no longer a member of Marischal College.”16 Campbell did not have long to enjoy either his pension or his leisure. He fell ill at the end of March 1796, “seized with a stroke of palsy,” and died on April 6.17 Campbell’s final illness was not as memorably pious as the one of five years earlier; he quickly lost all power of speech and writing, and was soon reduced to insensibility. His friends preferred to 12 The letter to the Presbytery appears in the Presbytery of Aberdeen court records, sro CH2/1/11, and is reprinted, though somewhat incorrectly, in Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” liii–lv; there is a transcription of the letter to the Town Council in aca Council Register 67, fols 69v–70r. 13 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” liii. 14 Roger L. Emerson, Professors, Patronage and Politics (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1992), 92–3. Campbell’s letter (22 July 1795) to the earl of Mansfield, Marischal’s chancellor since 1793, suggests that Campbell had agreed to Brown’s appointment before he resigned the chair (aul ms M 96). 15 A letter to Campbell from John Moore, archbishop of Canterbury, via W.L. Brown, dated 12 May 1795, was already apologizing for the lateness of the government pension for the intended resignation of his offices (aul ms 3214/4). A letter from Campbell to John Spottiswoode (14 January 1796) suggests that he had finally received his pension (nls ms 2618, fols 57–8). 16 Campbell to Lord Mansfield, 22 July 1795 (aul ms M 96). 17 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” lvii. See Keith for details of his last illness. Beattie provides a few additional details in a letter to Laing, 10 April 1796 (nls Acc 4796, box 92).

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remember Campbell’s last days as those of his earlier illness. Campbell was buried on April 17 in St Nicholas’ churchyard. William Laurence Brown preached the funeral sermon.18 Campbell’s will named his nephew-by-marriage Peter Farquharson, an Aberdeen advocate, as his executor. Peter’s sister Ann Farquharson, the niece who had lived with the Campbells for so many years, was the main beneficiary of the estate. The estate itself was not negligible, for Campbell was able to disperse monies in the amount of 1550 pounds sterling, mostly to his female relatives. Ann received his English books, which were probably the same ones listed in A Catalogue of a Valuable Collection of Books (Aberdeen, 1799).19 The only material portions of Campbell’s estate remaining today are to be found at Whitehouse, near Alford, the residence of Peter Farquharson’s descendants. On the question of Campbell’s personal character, we are generally at the mercy of his eulogists, particularly Keith and Brown. Beattie spoke most highly of his friend’s character, and likely viewed Campbell’s death as the perfect Christian foil to the famous and controversial death scene of the despised arch-infidel David Hume.20 The limited evidence we have clearly suggests that Campbell was held in the highest regard as a preacher, orator, and teacher, and that friends and foes alike spoke of his sweetness, patience, and generosity of character. 18 The funeral sermon was published as The Death of the Righteous Precious in the Sight of God: A Sermon Preached in the West Church, Aberdeen, April 17th, 1796. On Occasion of the Death of the Very Reverend Dr. George Campbell, Late Principal and Professor of Divinity in Marischal College (Aberdeen: A. Brown, 1796). Campbell himself did not hold a high opinion of funeral sermons (lstpe, 498). The inscription on Campbell’s tombstone has become entirely obscured; for the Latin inscription and location of the tomb, see James Valentine, “An Aberdeen Principal of Last Century,” The Aberdeen Journal (3 April 1896): 5. 19 Campbell’s will is found in the Scottish Record Office, CCI/6/60. Since the auction catalogue contains the libraries of several others as well, it is impossible to identify accurately Campbell’s own books. 20 See, for example, Beattie to Laing, 10 April 1796 (nls Acc 4796, box 92), and particularly Beattie to Forbes, 31 January 1791 (nls Acc 4796, box 92); the latter contains an implied comparison with Hume. Beattie was almost certainly battling Hume’s posthumous reputation, particularly the account of Hume’s stoical character given by Adam Smith shortly after the philosopher’s death. Beattie had long despised Hume, and seemed particularly offended by his death scene, the calmness of which Beattie apparently thought should be reserved as the ultimate evidence of Christian truth. In a letter to Elizabeth Montagu, written 7 December 1776, Beattie indicated that he was offended by Hume’s levity during his last illness, a levity unbecoming one devoid of hope (aul ms 30/1/118).

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p os th um ou s p ubl ic atio ns Campbell’s publications did not cease with his death. The two-volume edition of A Dissertation on Miracles that appeared in 1797 included all of Campbell’s previously published sermons (except The Character of a Minister) but not the additional tracts that he had intended to add. More important – both to Campbell’s reputation and to our understanding of the structure of his thought – was the posthumous publication of his divinity lectures, first composed in the early 1770s but continually revised until the 1790s. Lectures on Ecclesiastical History (1800), the first part of Campbell’s divinity course to be published, was also the most controversial. Campbell intended these particular lectures for the press, no doubt because they concerned the nature and form of the Christian church – matters that dominated his thought in the last years of his life. The lectures were published by his literary executors, who also asked George Skene Keith, a long-time friend of Campbell’s, to contribute the life that has hitherto been the main source of biographical information about Campbell. The lectures went to press virtually unedited.21 Campbell’s ecclesiastical history lectures are less a narrative history of the church than a series of topical arguments designed to illustrate certain historical tendencies in the development of the church, particularly the growth and domination of the hierarchical form of ecclesiastical government. He traced the means by which a collection of small, independent, and egalitarian congregations were transformed into a multi-layered, hierarchical, and elitist government that was ultimately subjugated to the bishop of Rome. There was nothing particularly new in Campbell’s analysis, except perhaps his use of psychological explanations and his latitudinarian conclusion. Presbyterian historians had long argued that Episcopal government was a human corruption, and much of the theological controversy in Scotland during the seventeenth century had covered the same historical territory. A considerable number of Campbell’s lectures were devoted to the question of whether the primitive bishops had been of equal or superior rank to the presbyters. His conclusion – that early bishops were nothing more than congregational ministers – implicitly challenged the foundation of the Scottish Episcopal church. Even more typical of Campbell’s gen21 There is little difference between the manuscript and published versions. In a letter to the Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine 9 (July 1801): 249n, Keith claimed not to be the editor.

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eral thesis, however, was his characterization of the Roman Catholic church, an organization that he believed was entirely devoted to selfaggrandizement. This latter theme was augmented by the anti-monastic “Essay on Christian Temperance and Self-Denial,” which the publishers extracted from Campbell’s manuscripts and added to the lectures. Predictably, this essay argued that many Catholic spiritual practices were superficial and devoid of moral benefit. The reactions of Campbell’s contemporaries to these lectures provide insight into the tensions that existed in British society during the last decade of the eighteenth century. Both the Critical Review and the Monthly Review received Campbell’s arguments favourably, suggesting that much of the English establishment felt unthreatened by Campbell’s strictures on the necessity of the Episcopal form of church government. The anonymous reviewer in the Tory Critical Review called them, “the most important lectures on church history that have ever fallen under our inspection; in which such is the assemblage of good qualities, that we know not which most to admire: – the erudition, the labour, the impartiality, the ease, the skill, the arrangement of the lecturer, are every-where conspicuous, and every-where correct.”22 Stephen Jones, in the Monthly Review (which by this time had become a vehicle for radical ideas), also considered Campbell’s account impartial, but warned that some in England would think Campbell too much a latitudinarian, and too condemning of the controversies within the early church. Jones suggested that the times were not favourable for an impartial and critical account of such a politicallycharged topic.23 Indeed, Campbell would gain new enemies for treating so lightly the necessary form of early church government. The lectures were attacked through six issues of the Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine from an extreme High Church position. George Gleig, who apparently wrote this review with help from William Abernethy Drummond, charged Campbell not only with maligning the original church with false assumptions and shoddy scholarship, and with subverting the Christ-authorized form of the Anglican church, but also with supplying arms to the rabble to use against the contemporary church.24 Clearly, Campbell’s tolerant and latitudinarian views of primitive and contemporary Christianity were not everywhere welcome in an age of revolution. 22 Critical Review 33 (October 1801): 205. 23 Monthly Review 35 (July and August 1801): 262 and 398. 24 Anti-Jacobin 8 (Feb., March, and April 1801), and 9 (May, June, and July 1801). Drummond refers to Gleig’s authorship in a letter to Bishop Alexander Jolly, 22 Dec. 1801 (sro CH12/30/78/2).

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Book-length attacks soon followed. Campbell had long been an irritant to the Scottish Episcopal church, but the Scottish Episcopalians, having recently received legal recognition with Campbell’s help, now felt dismayed and even betrayed by the publication of the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History.25 Some Episcopalians were simply hostile. Andrew Macfarlane, the bishop of Ross, who claimed that he had always held Campbell in contempt, called the lectures “a farrago of impertinent, petulant rancorous stuff – as must turn a person of taste’s stomach,” and little wondered that, “the disciples of Campbell should all be loose – and many of them Infidels.”26 Charles Daubeny, later archdeacon of Salisbury, agreed with his Scottish brethren, and, in a letter to Bishop John Skinner, called Campbell’s publication, “the most hostile, the most illiberal, and the most unsupported attack that has perhaps ever been made on the Episcopacy of the church of Christ!”27 Daubeny publicly attacked Campbell’s lectures in a lengthy preface to his Eight Discourses on the Connection between the Old and New Testament Considered as Two Parts of the Same Divine Revelation (1802). As the title suggests, Daubeny believed that the Old and New Testaments together constitute a single eternal revelation, and that the church likewise has only one legitimate and eternal form, specifically that of the apostolic-sanctioned Episcopal church. Daubeny appealed to Skinner to publish a Scottish answer to Campbell. Skinner obliged with a substantial tome entitled Primitive Truth and Order Vindicated from Modern Misrepresentation (1803). Skinner’s central argument was virtually identical to Daubeny’s, stressing the importance of continuity and legitimacy to proper church order and ultimately to the salvation of the individual. Skinner added arguments defending the exclusive legitimacy of the Scottish Episcopal church in his native country. Many of Skinner’s arguments were derived from the review in the AntiJacobin, though they did not exhibit the extreme hostility that characterized other responses to Campbell. Skinner treated his adversary with respect, but implicitly regretted that Campbell’s mistaken views would prevent them from meeting in glory. The final two publications of Campbell’s literary career did not generate any significant controversy, but unlike the Lectures on Ecclesiastical 25 John Skinner (the younger), Annals of Scottish Episcopacy (Edinburgh: A. Brown, 1818), 314. 26 Macfarlane to Bishop Jolly, 2 July 1800 (sro CH12/30/71). 27 Daubeny to Skinner, 19 August 1801; quoted in Skinner, Annals of Scottish Episcopacy, 315.

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History, they had not been intended for the press. The first of these, the Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence (1807), was transcribed from Campbell’s manuscripts and corrected by his old friend James Fraser of Drumoak.28 This volume contained four “Introductory Discourses” (described below), six lectures on systematic theology, and twelve lectures on pulpit eloquence. The “Systematic Theology” lectures were perhaps misleadingly titled, for Campbell explicitly repudiated doctrinal systems. They were not a systematic overview of Campbell’s religious tenets, but were rather a systematic method for studying Scripture and the evidences of religion, and for forming a system of Christian morality. Their purpose was in fact to prevent divinity students from too quickly accepting a fixed view of Christian teaching. The lectures on pulpit eloquence complemented The Philosophy of Rhetoric by seeking “only to apply to the pulpit, as far as they are applicable, the general rules laid down by the ancients.”29 They examined the major types of pulpit oratory, giving particular attention to the ways in which these various sermons could be most effectively employed to highlight and recommend Christian knowledge and practice. James Fraser received formal credit as the editor of Campbell’s final posthumous publication, Lectures on the Pastoral Character, which appeared in 1811. The lectures were practical in nature, giving advice to prospective ministers, especially those in the Church of Scotland, on particular virtues to cultivate and vices to avoid. These themes returned Campbell to the earliest concerns of his pastoral and publishing career, as exemplified in his 1752 sermon The Character of a Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern. The lectures also gave renewed attention to the controversial opinions of Campbell’s old adversary David Hume – specifically Hume’s disparaging remarks on the pastoral character.30 Campbell’s defensiveness suggests that Hume had once again pierced the very heart of Campbell’s world-view, just as 28 Fraser’s name does not appear in the volume, but his editorship is clearly implied in a letter to Campbell’s niece Ann Farquharson concerning the task of preparing the work for publication; Fraser to Ann Farquharson, 23 April 1805 (aul ms 3214/12). Unfortunately, we do not have the manuscript of this or the final volume of Campbell’s lectures against which to check the scope and nature of Fraser’s editing. Fraser may have kept the manuscripts, but I have not been able to find them. 29 lstpe, 505. 30 lpc, 146–9. Campbell was primarily concerned with Hume’s infamous essay “Of National Characters,” which suggested that the ministerial office itself corrupted the character of its occupant.

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the sceptic had done long ago with his excoriation of Christian evidences. To the end of his career, Campbell was concerned with the same issues that had occupied his mind in the earliest days of his Christian ministry, foremost of which was the defence and practical realization of the Christian religion.

campbell’s lecturing scheme Having reviewed all of Campbell’s known publications, we can now make a preliminary sketch of the place of his individual works within the context of his thought as a whole. Campbell’s divinity lectures provide the key to mapping out his intellectual system and to understanding the greater purposes of his body of work. His lecturing scheme demonstrates not only the scope of his science of divinity, but also the unity of his publications, including such secular works as The Philosophy of Rhetoric. We have several sources from which to reconstruct the original form of Campbell’s lecturing scheme. The main sources are Campbell’s printed lectures together with their manuscript originals, and the student notes of Robert Eden Scott. Campbell’s explicit lecturing plan appears in the “Introductory Discourses,” and can be augmented by Keith’s “General View of Dr. Campbell’s Prelections in Theology.”31 Campbell’s three posthumous publications contain fifty-nine lectures, listed under five headings: four “Introductory Discourses,” six lectures on “Systematic Theology,” twelve lectures on “Pulpit Eloquence,” twenty-eight lectures on “Ecclesiastical History,” and nine lectures on the “Pastoral Character.” Do these represent Campbell’s entire divinity course? Campbell supposedly lectured according to a four-year cycle. The college term ran approximately sixteen weeks each year, from late December to early April. Since Campbell and Gerard both lectured twice a week, they would have each delivered approximately thirty-two lectures per year, giving a total of 128 lectures over a four-year 31 leh, 1:lx–lxxviii. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre claimed that the “Theology” article in the “Edinburgh Encyclopedia” provides a good overview of Campbell’s manner of teaching divinity; see Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:486. Ramsay’s meaning is a mystery. The “Theology” article in David Brewster’s Edinburgh Encyclopedia (which appeared in 1830, considerably after Ramsay’s death) does not sound like Campbell at all. If Ramsay was referring to an edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica (it could only be the first or the second), I can find no evidence that Campbell wrote or was cited in either of these.

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course.32 It appears, then, that fewer than half of Campbell’s lectures were published. There are a number of ways to account for the difference. James Fraser, the editor of the Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, indicates that at least one of the pulpit eloquence lectures had been excluded because it was identical to a chapter in The Philosophy of Rhetoric.33 Campbell himself intimated that he would repeat his four “Introductory Discourses” each year for the benefit of incoming students. With this, we have enough material (including that represented in Scott’s student notes) to account for three full years of Campbell’s divinity course. What then of the remaining year? The answer may lie in Campbell’s own account of his lecturing scheme, found in the “Introductory Discourses.” Here we discover that much of Campbell’s divinity teaching can be found in his other publications. Campbell divided his divinity course into two major parts: the theoretical and the practical. “The first regards purely the science of theology, the second the application of that science to the purposes of the christian pastor.”34 The theoretical side encompassed three fields: ecclesiastical history, biblical criticism, and systematic or polemical divinity. Systematic divinity was subdivided into two parts: the “Christian System” and “Theological Controversy.” The practical side of the course was divided into two major areas: “Instructing” and “Governing.” Figure 1 correlates this course structure with Campbell’s known publications. Campbell subdivided the first major section of the theoretical science of divinity – ecclesiastical (or sacred) history – into “Ancient History” and “Church History.” The latter corresponds to the published Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, which surveys the church from its primitive beginnings to modern times, and fills up exactly one year of instruction. Campbell also treated aspects of ecclesiastical history in his unpublished manuscripts, notably his “Strictures on Dodwell” and his “Defence” of The Spirit of the Gospel sermon. Since “Ancient” or “Jewish History” was taught by the professor of oriental languages as part of his daily Hebrew 32 This is supported by Robert Eden Scott’s student notes, aul ms M 190 (Campbell’s lectures) and aul ms K 174 (Gerard’s lectures). Scott attended both professors during the 1786–87 college term, and apparently did not miss any lectures. He records thirty-one lectures for each professor. The topics of Scott’s lecture notes are summarized in appendix 1. 33 pr, book 1, chapter 10 corresponds with the second eloquence lecture (lstpe, 274n.). Fraser also intimated in the Lectures on the Pastoral Character (67n.) that a particular illustration already found in The Four Gospels was removed from the printed lecture. 34 lstpe, 4.

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Figure 1: Campbell’s lecturing scheme (with related publications) I . THE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY

(Theory)

1. Sacred History i. Ancient (Jewish) ii. Ecclesiastical

Lectures on Ecclesiastical History “Strictures on Dodwell” MS

2. Biblical Criticism

“Preliminary Dissertations” to The Four Gospels

3. Systematic or Polemical Divinity i. The Christian System ii. Theological Controversy a. Against Infidels

b. Against Misinformed Christians

II . THE PASTORAL OFFICE

Lectures on Systematic Theology A Dissertation on Miracles The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society The Spirit of the Gospel “Defence” MS “Of implicit faith” MS An Address to the People of Scotland

(Practice)

1. Instructing The Character of a Minister i. By Example (Propriety of Lectures on the Pastoral Character Character) ii. By Teaching (Christian Eloquence) Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence The Philosophy of Rhetoric 2. Governing i. Church Discipline ii. Ordination

class (which divinity students were expected to attend) Campbell only provided brief instructions on how to study Jewish antiquities. Campbell’s lecture notes for the second major area of theoretical divinity, biblical criticism, do not appear to have survived, yet they clearly formed the basis of the “Preliminary Dissertations” which appeared with his translation of The Four Gospels. Scott’s lecture notes, recorded during the 1786–87 term (as Campbell was putting the final touches on his Four Gospels manuscript), and summarized in appendix 1, correspond closely to the “Preliminary Dissertations,” suggesting that Campbell was reading from that very manuscript. Campbell’s lectures on biblical criticism filled up another full year of his divinity course. Campbell did not care for abstract theological questions or disputes, which is perhaps why we have only six published lectures on systematic

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theology. All of these provide practical instruction on a method of study rather than on the “Christian System” itself, which Campbell thought divinity students should derive from their own Bible studies (hence the importance of criticism). No lectures survive on the second aspect of polemical divinity, that concerned with theological controversy. This does not mean that Campbell had nothing to say on the matter. He subdivided the subject of theological controversy into two parts, each representing a major danger from which Christianity had to defend itself. The first part treated the attacks on Christianity made by infidels, while the second considered the dangers posed by misinformed Christians. Eighteenth-century writers, particularly British moderates, routinely defended the necessity of revelation against infidels and deists. As Campbell said to his class, “The first controversy that claims our attention is the deistical, as this strikes directly at the foundation of all.” He advised his students to become familiar with infidels’ attacks upon Christianity’s external and internal evidences.35 Campbell’s own published writings reflect this apologetic concern. A Dissertation on Miracles is a particularly good example of the defence of Christianity’s testimonial evidences. Likewise, The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel highlights Christianity’s historical evidences. The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society justifies Christianity’s moral character against the taunts of libertines. Divinity students in Aberdeen would certainly have been familiar with Campbell’s apologetic works, as well as those of other eighteenth-century apologists such as Alexander Gerard, whose The Influence of the Pastoral Office on the Character (1760) was directed against Hume. Campbell’s Christian apologia was at least as much concerned with the dangers posed by misinformed Christians as by infidels. His Spirit of the Gospel sermon, directed against the twin evils of superstition and enthusiasm, ultimately involved him in considerable inter-denominational controversy. Misguided Christians (in this case Roman Catholics) loomed large in two unpublished manuscripts: “Of implicit faith” and the “Defence” of the Spirit of the Gospel sermon. Protestant High Churchmanship was the target of the manuscript “Strictures on Dodwell.” In addition, Campbell’s Address to the People of Scotland was directed against the enthusiastic and intolerant members of his own church. We do not know if Campbell treated all of these subjects in his lecture course, but it is likely that he at least provided his students with directed readings; it is also possible, considering the volume of apologetic material that 35 lstpe, 221.

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Campbell had to work with, that the subject of “Theological Controversy” filled up all or most of a year of instruction. Campbell divided the second half of his divinity course – the practical application of the science of theology to the pastoral office – into “Instructing” and “Governing.” Because ministers taught their parishioners both by direct instruction and by example, Campbell subdivided the instructing category into “Christian or Pulpit Eloquence” and “Propriety of Character.” The latter corresponded to the Lectures on the Pastoral Character, which was itself a reworking of Campbell’s first publication, The Character of a Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern.36 The published Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence obviously addressed the topic of Christian rhetoric. That eloquence was of long-standing importance to Campbell’s way of thinking is evidenced by its centrality in the Theological Club of his student days. Also, like all classical-Christian schemes of rhetoric, The Philosophy of Rhetoric considered the pulpit to be a major medium for the art of public speaking. Preaching was certainly the most pervasive form of oratory in eighteenth-century Scotland, and was probably the initial spur to Campbell’s interest in rhetoric. He maintained that a minister must use every rhetorical device to communicate religious truth.37 Effective communication, in the pulpit as elsewhere, demanded a familiarity not only with the classical rules of discourse, but also with the powers of the human mind and the types of evidence that made the classical rules compelling. Thus, even the secular Philosophy of Rhetoric was closely tied to Campbell’s pedagogically-oriented structure of thought. Nearly all of Campbell’s writings were subsumed within his general scheme of education. The only area of his divinity course that is not reflected in either his known lectures or his other published works is the second part of the practical side of the pastoral office, concerned with “Governing.” This he divided into “Church Discipline” and “Ordination.” Campbell himself stated that he would not discourse copiously on the topics of discipline, ordination, and civil rights.38 Keith, however, notes that Campbell “delivered several useful lectures on christian duty 36 Gerard also gave considerable attention to the topic of pastoral care; see Scott’s lecture-note topics, summarized in appendix 1, and Gerard’s own posthumously-published The Pastoral Care, ed. Gilbert Gerard (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies; Aberdeen: A. Brown, 1799). 37 aul ms M 190, p. 288, shows Campbell chastising his students for failing to suit their discourses to their intended audiences. 38 lstpe, 63–4.

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and christian practice, and on the duties which we owe to God, our neighbour, and ourselves. It does not appear, that he ever wrote any thing on the conduct of ministers, when attending the Church courts of the Scotch establishment.”39 Campbell certainly did not lack experience in this area, but perhaps he believed that experience itself was the only practical teacher in the political and disciplinary duties of the pastoral office. In any case we have no indication that this formed a significant part of his lecturing scheme. Campbell’s literary career was clearly dominated by pedagogical and pastoral concerns. Thus a comprehensive view of his lecturing scheme provides insight into the structure of his thought, and clarifies the direction of his Christian apology. But it is equally clear that Campbell’s religious mind was deeply imbued with the values of the Enlightenment. This can be seen in his emphasis on methodology before doctrine, on critical inquiry before judgment, and on the practical realization of the Christian values of tolerance, moderation and improvement. A considerable portion of the clergy of the Scottish Northeast and highlands was thus inculcated with the values of the enlightened, moderate Christian. The values of Campbell’s enlightened age did not long outlive him; as the world changed, so did his reputation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Campbell was considered one of Scotland’s foremost religious minds, but this reputation did not survive the evangelical revival and mid nineteenth-century disruption within the Scottish church. Neither his biblical criticism nor his historical scholarship could withstand the nineteenth-century methodological upheavals in those fields. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Campbell’s religious works were no longer being reprinted. But The Philosophy of Rhetoric, which was little read in Campbell’s time, found new life in the nineteenth century; it was reprinted at least forty-five times, and became a standard textbook in the field, particularly in the American college curriculum, where only the rhetorical texts of Hugh Blair and Lord Kames were more frequently read. The Philosophy of Rheforic continues to be reprinted to this day and is now regarded as one of the most important contributions to eighteenth-century rhetorical theory. The only other Campbell publication to survive (marginally) into the twentieth-century is A Dissertation on Miracles, due primarily to the twentieth-century renaissance in Hume 39 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” lxxv. Gerard dealt briefly with the pastor’s public duties.

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studies. But here again, a work that was thought by eighteenth-century minds to have refuted Hume’s unreasonable scepticism has now been eclipsed by modern fascination with the opinions of the sceptic himself. The fact that Campbell’s modern reputation bears little resemblance to his eighteenth-century reputation is not an unusual historical phenomenon. To understand this disparity is to understand some of the differences between the characteristic thought-patterns of the eighteenth century and those of our own world. The remainder of this study will attempt to rebuild the structure of George Campbell’s thought in order to appreciate the significance of his ideas in the context of his age. Such an attempt may also shed light on the ways in which Western thought has changed in the last two centuries.

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part ii Natural Knowledge: The Enlightened Campbell

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the philosophical context George Campbell was not alone among eighteenth-century philosophers in striving to align his philosophical activities with Christian ends. But what were these Christian ends, and how were they to be realized? What kind of Christian was Campbell? John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, that inveterate observer of eighteenth-century Scottish personalities, characterized Campbell’s theology as perfectly orthodox in the manner of late seventeenth-century Anglican divines.1 Indeed, Campbell’s defence of Christian truth bore a striking resemblance to the apologetic works of those English churchmen who have come to be known as latitudinarians. William Chillingworth, Edward Stillingfleet, and John Tillotson, like Campbell, all countenanced a basic orthodoxy, avoided doctrinal subtleties, preached Christian morals, and advocated some form of religious toleration. More importantly, their apologetic works, like Campbell’s, were the products of an underlying concern to discover the boundaries of religious knowledge.2 1 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:486. 2 The Aberdonians had a high regard for these three figures. Campbell recommended the “excellent Chillingworth” to his students, claiming that his work was an “admirable specimen of just and acute reasoning” (lstpe, 206). He often used Tillotson as an example of preaching style (for example lstpe, 305), and, in a footnote to the third edition of A Dissertation on Miracles, he denied Hume’s claim that Tillotson’s argument against transubstantiation was akin to Hume’s argument against miracles (st, 1:60–3n.). In his Pastoral Care Gerard cited Stillingfleet more often than any other source.

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Late seventeenth-century philosophy, as well as the philosophy of the Enlightenment, was dominated by fundamental questions concerning how the human mind can know or be sure of anything. Critics of religion such as Hobbes and Spinoza were intent on bringing these basic epistemological problems into the religious realm as well, and wondered whether reliable religious knowledge was at all attainable. The latitudinarian divines, like the Scottish Moderates of the next century, were not only apologists but also church leaders determined to unify the diverse elements within the Anglican community, while still upholding the vitality of the Christian faith. They wished to avoid the extremes of Roman dogma on the one side and of radical scepticism on the other. In pursuit of a middle way, the latitudinarian divines formulated a theory of probabilistic knowledge wherein belief was to be proportioned to the available evidence. Absolute certainty, they argued, was in the mind of God alone and therefore beyond the scope of religious apology. But the Anglican divines did not draw either sceptical or fideistic conclusions from the limitations of human knowledge. They believed that the human mind was capable of reaching various degrees of probable knowledge, ranging from mere opinion to moral certainty, the highest degree of assurance attainable in the moral realm. Moral certainty, according to Stillingfleet, was “a sufficient foundation for an undoubted assent,” and was founded on arguments “strong enough to convince an unbiased mind.”3 This degree of certainty could be reached or nearly reached in the most fundamental religious matters, which is to say that the empirical evidences in favour of the Christian religion were sufficient to convince any impartial enquirer. Nevertheless, the human inability to know the mind of God with absolute certainty necessitated the practice of religious moderation and toleration. It also allowed room for, and indeed made necessary, religious faith. “Therefore as God has set some Things in broad day-light …” said Locke, “So in the greatest part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of Probability, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day’s Experience be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness 3 Cited in Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late SeventeenthCentury England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 48.

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to Error.”4 Although our knowledge can reach only the “neighbourhood of Certainty,”5 we need not assume that knowledge and religious faith must be strictly divided. As a modern student of the Anglican divines has remarked, “Reason and revelation – the terms frequently used to discuss the divines’ allegiances – remain distinct, but they are distinct inside a structure that allows for intercommunication on common grounds of evidence.”6 The probabilistic approach to Christian apology, which may be termed “Christian empiricism,” dominated the British Enlightenment and found its greatest eighteenth-century champion in Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752). Butler’s The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature (1736) encapsulated the methodological and structural approach of Christian empiricism. The first part of the work described the extent of religious knowledge that could be gained solely by man’s natural abilities. Using analogical reasoning, Butler argued from the moral certainty of God’s government in the natural realm to the corresponding probability of his government in the moral realm. He essayed to show the overwhelming probability of doctrines such as the survival of our minds and identities after death and the existence of rewards and punishments in the next life. The human capacity for improvement was an additional indication that this life was but a probationary state for the next life. Butler thought it unlikely that God would act as a moral governor if he had not given us free wills. Our natural reason, therefore, indicates that our earthly life is merely a part of a larger providential plan. Natural religion cannot itself discover this plan, but it can teach us to anticipate the revelation that will complete God’s communication to men. Having established the overwhelming probability of the essential doctrines of natural religion, Butler then argued, in the second part of his Analogy, that the Christian religion most successfully addresses the religious concerns raised by our natural enquiries. Christianity contains all that nature leads us to expect in a true 4 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 652. The religious origins and Christian apologetic purposes of Locke’s Essay have been excellently argued by Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy,” in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 194–223. 5 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 655. 6 Reedy, The Bible and Reason, 32.

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revelation, including an unimpeachable moral character and sufficient positive evidences (prophecies and miracles) to convince us of its divine origin. Christianity, in other words, is a reasonable and necessary religion – it appeals to both our natural moral sense and our critical understanding. Butler’s probabilistic approach to problems of religious knowledge was widely imitated through the eighteenth century and seems to have been especially compelling to those who came of age in the 1730s. It remained the standard model of Christian apology until the middle of the nineteenth century. William Paley (1743–1805), the most influential of the late eighteenth-century Christian apologists, followed this standard apologetic trend by declaring that the evidences of natural theology ought to be studied before the positive evidences of the Christian religion.7 The Scottish moderates were particularly impressed by Butler’s order of procedure and division of Christian evidences into natural and revealed components. Thomas Reid, while a young man, took extensive and detailed notes on The Analogy of Religion.8 Campbell acknowledged that this work had “shown us how useful [the analogical] mode of reasoning may be rendered, by the application he hath so successfully made of it for refuting the cavils of infidelity.”9 Butler was credited by his contemporaries with having decisively refuted the early-eighteenthcentury deistical challenge to the latitudinarian defence of the Christian evidences. Although he, like Locke and the latitudinarians, emphasized the natural limits of the human understanding, his underlying argument – that we can hardly get through the ordinary course of our daily lives without believing in God’s providential governance – proved congenial to the Aberdonians’ way of thought.10 The Aberdonians were particularly drawn to Butler’s method of argument. First, they supported the concept and necessity of probabilistic reasoning. As Campbell said, “provided the facts upon which it is founded be sufficiently numerous, the conclusion is said to be morally 7 The Works of William Paley, D.D. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1842), 434. 8 These twenty cramped pages of summary notes may be seen in aul ms 3061/10. See also The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton, 2 vols, 7th ed. (Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewartk, 1872), 1:237. 9 pr, 54n. Campbell highly recommended Butler to his students (lstpe, 91–2); for other favorable comments see, lstpe, 427, and dm, 30 and 276. For Campbell’s borrowing of the concept of the “analogy of nature,” see fg, 1:6. 10 See Basil Mitchell, “Butler as a Christian Apologist,” in Joseph Butler’s Moral and Religious Thought, ed. Christopher Cunliffe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 97–116.

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certain.”11 Alexander Gerard, in his aptly-titled Dissertations on Subjects Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity (1766), claimed that, “the evidence of Christianity is of the probable kind; and in every probable argument, the strength of the evidence depends not only on the strength of each separate probability, but also on the number of probabilities.”12 Thomas Reid likewise argued that the strength of probable reasoning depends upon the united force of several arguments which, by themselves, might be unconvincing.13 Second, the Aberdonians supported the structure and direction of Butler’s reasoning. Concerning “the order in which our theological enquiries ought to be conducted,” Campbell instructed his divinity students that, “religion hath been often and not unaptly divided into natural and revealed.” Natural religion, he said, subdivided into two parts: “namely what concerns the nature and providence of God [natural theology], and what concerns the duties and prospects of man [ethics].” Even Scripture presupposed that “the knowledge of divine attributes and of human obligations are discoverable by the light of nature.” These subjects, he continued, do not “fall within my province as a teacher of christian theology. They are in fact preliminary studies, and constitute a part of the philosophic course.”14 Campbell assumed that his divinity students, in the fourth year of their arts degree, had received philosophical instruction concerning the nature and attributes of God, and the consequent moral duties of man. The theologian, he maintained, must begin as a philosopher. Late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemological theories were generally inspired by problems of religious knowledge. This was the case not only for the latitudinarians, but also for Locke, Berkeley, and Butler. It was also true for Campbell and his Aberdeen associates. But the Aberdonians faced an additional problem not encountered by their Anglican predecessors, a difficulty that arose directly from the earlier attempts to establish an empirical epistemology. The problem was David Hume. Hume highlighted the potential scepticism embedded in the new empirical theory of knowledge. Butler’s accumulation of evidences was, for him, an accumulation of uncertainties. The Aberdonians, unlike many of their contemporaries, recognized the importance of Hume’s challenge, and devoted considerable energies to saving empirical philosophy and 11 pr, 50. See also aul ms 652, p. 107. 12 Alexander Gerard, Dissertations on Subjects Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1766), 405. 13 Works of Thomas Reid, 1:482. 14 lstpe, 84–6.

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religion from the perceived ravages of his scepticism. Hume’s influence on the Aberdonians’ philosophy was extraordinarily pervasive and complex. It began with a theory of human nature.

t h e s c i e n c e o f h u m a n n at u r e Although it is not a formal treatise on epistemology, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, written over the course of twenty-five years, contains the bulk of Campbell’s philosophy of human nature and theory of knowledge. Its purpose, according to Campbell, was to investigate those principles in human nature which account for the efficacy of the established rules of rhetoric, for it is “in the human mind that we must investigate the source of some of the useful arts.”15 The Rhetoric was intended to present not “a correct map, but a tolerable sketch of the human mind; and, aided by the lights which the Poet and the Orator so amply furnish, to disclose its secret movements, tracing its principal channels of perception and action, as near as possible, to their source: and, on the other hand, from the science of human nature, to ascertain with greater precision, the radical principles of that art, whose object it is, by the use of language, to operate on the soul of the hearer, in the way of informing, convincing, pleasing, moving, or persuading.”16 Clearly the practical and theoretical aspects of rhetoric were meant to shed light on one another. “Besides, this study, properly conducted, leads directly to an acquaintance with ourselves; it not only traces the operations of the intellect and imagination, but discloses the lurking springs of action in the heart. In this view it is perhaps the surest and the shortest, as well as the pleasantest way of arriving at the science of the human mind.”17 Campbell later explained his purpose with a peculiarly Scottish analogy: The art of the rhetorician, like that of the philosopher, is analytical; the art of the orator is synthetical. The former acts the part of the skilful anatomist, who, by removing the teguments, and nicely separating the parts, presents us with views at once naked, distinct, and hideous, now of the structure of the bones, now of the muscles and tendons, now of the arteries and veins, now of the bowels, now of the brain and nervous system. The latter imitates Nature in the constructing of her work, who, with wonderful symmetry, unites the various organs, 15 pr, lxxiii. 16 pr, lxvii. 17 pr, lxxiv.

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adapts them to their respective uses, and covers all with a decent veil, the skin. This, though she hide entirely the more minute and the interior parts, and show not to equal advantage even the articulations of the limbs, and the adjustment of the larger members, adds inexpressible beauty, and strength, and energy to the whole.18

The anatomical analogy is remarkably like that found in the conclusion of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature and in his famous letter to Francis Hutcheson, where Hume argued that a moral philosopher can study human nature either as a painter, highlighting moral excellence, or as an anatomist, systematically exposing the real workings of the human mind, though he cannot do both at the same time.19 Campbell may not have agreed with Hume concerning the impossibility of joining the two methods of inquiry, but he nevertheless placed his own rhetorical work on the anatomist side of this analogy. Even to his divinity students Campbell said, “It is the business of the orator to accommodate himself to men, such as he sees they are, and not such as he imagines they should be.”20 Thomas Gordon, the King’s humanist, likewise told his undergraduates that “the only way prior to revelation, by which we can discover the proper business or duty of man is to consider what is the real constitution of his nature; and from what it leads him to, to deduce what he was designed for.”21 Alexander Gerard’s best-known works similarly employed the phenomena of taste and genius to investigate human nature. The Aberdonians (with the clear exception of Beattie) emulated Hume’s anatomical approach to human nature, and claimed to investigate human nature by empirical means. But unlike Hume, they thought that this approach was the surest means of strengthening virtue and religion, because it demonstrated their foundation in human nature. 18 pr, 92n. 19 Hume to Hutcheson, 17 September 1739: in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1:32–4. The remarkable concluding passage of David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 620–1, has clear rhetorical implications for Campbell. 20 lstpe, 299. 21 Cited in Paul Wood, “Science and the Pursuit of Virtue in the Aberdeen Enlightenment,” in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 144. Wood’s paper explores the question of how the Aberdonians, particularly the earlier generation of Turnbull and Fordyce, dealt with the anatomist/ painter distinction. Wood argues that, unlike the Edinburgh professors, they thought they could join the two methods of inquiry.

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Campbell, like most philosophers of the Enlightenment, believed in a universal human nature. In fact, he thought that a philosophy of rhetoric was possible only because the “general principles [of taste] are the same in every people.” Even figures of speech, “are so far from being the inventions of art, that, on the contrary, they result from the original and essential principles of the human mind.”22 The task of the empirical philosopher of human nature, then, was to explicate these “original and essential principles.” But this was no easy task, for, “Whatever regards the analysis of the operations of the mind, which is quicker than lightning in all her energies, must in a great measure be abstruse and dark.”23 Campbell freely borrowed epistemological concepts from his contemporaries, which helps us to understand these concepts in the context of his time but at the same time obscures his own particular understanding of them. Eighteenth-century philosophers generally assumed that the contents (or “clear and distinct” ideas) of the human mind are in plain view, and that human motivations are transparent to the unbiased philosopher. “The properties of our clear and adequate ideas,” said Campbell, “can be no other than what the mind clearly perceives them to be.”24 Like Locke and the ideal philosophers after him (but in surprising contrast to Reid), Campbell held that “the mind is passive. It does not act, but is acted upon.”25 The mind cannot generate its own simple ideas, though it can combine simple ideas into novel combinations. Campbell assumed that all of our ideas are particular, thus following the atomistic conception of mental contents current in the eighteenth century, but he also argued that we have the inborn ability to abstract general or universal truths from particular facts by recognizing that the words or signs of individual things may represent “an infinity of others, resembling in one circumstance, though totally dissimilar in every other.”26 Thus we come not only to communicate by arbitrary signs but to think by them as well. Campbell’s epistemology was framed as his rhetorical philosophy required. He said frustratingly little about the particular contents of the mind, and what he did say is not always easy to reconcile with a consistent 22 pr, 411 and 316. 23 pr, 265. 24 pr, 36. Cf. Hume: “The essence and composition of external bodies are … obscure … [but] the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known” (Treatise of Human Nature, 366). In a similar vein, Locke argued that there is no thought without consciousness (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 109). 25 aul ms 655, un-numbered page. See also pr, 49. 26 pr, 260.

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theory of the mind. “Perception,” he explained early in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, “is employed alike to denote every immediate object of thought, or whatever is apprehended by the mind, our sensations themselves, and those qualities in body suggested by our sensations, the ideas of these upon reflection, whether remembered or imagined, together with those called general notions, or abstract ideas. It is only the last of these kinds which are considered as peculiarly the object of the understanding, and which, therefore, require to be distinguished by a peculiar name.”27 Campbell applied the term “intellection” to this latter ability of the mind to handle general or abstract notions, simultaneously chastising Locke for promiscuously using the term “idea” to indicate such different things as perceptions of the senses, traces of memory, creations of the imagination, and conceptions of the intellect.28 Here Campbell seemed intent on keeping the operations of the senses and of the understanding strictly apart. Sense perceptions ought never to be confused with ideas proper. Although Campbell, contrary to Reid, sometimes suggested that the mind is only a passive receiver of whatever objects happen to come before it, he joined Reid in criticizing the ideal philosophers for confusing the distinct actions or powers of the mind. Should Campbell, then, be classed among the Common Sense realists as an opponent of the ideal system or “way of ideas” that followed upon John Locke’s revolutionary epistemology? This is perhaps the most difficult question in Campbell studies. Campbell scholars have variously attributed the inspiration of his underlying epistemology to John Locke, Thomas Reid, and David Hume.29 The eminent Campbell scholar Lloyd F. Bitzer has undertaken the most rigorous comparison of epistemological concepts, arguing that 27 pr, 35–6n. 28 pr, 261–3. 29 Campbell’s indebtedness to Locke was suggested more than fifty years ago by Clarence W. Edney, “George Campbell’s Theory of Logical Truth,” Speech Monographs 15 (1948): 19–32. In 1962, Lloyd F. Bitzer defended a dissertation that argued in detail not only that Campbell’s greatest intellectual debt was to Hume, but also that Campbell’s philosophy was nearly identical to Hume’s, even in its use of scepticism; see “The Lively Idea: A Study of Hume’s Influence on George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric” (Ph.D. diss., State University of Iowa, 1962). Bitzer has defended this position in “Hume’s Philosophy in George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 3, no. 2 (Summer 1969): 139–66, and in the introduction to his standard edition of Campbell’s The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Despite his textual support for this thesis, Bitzer’s claim has not been accepted without question. Dennis R. Bormann, for example, found the argument of Campbell’s likeness to Hume prima facie unbelievable; see “Some ‘Common Sense’ about Campbell, Hume, and Reid: The Extrinsic Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 71, 4 (1985): 395–421. See also the bibliographical essay below, pp. 276–7.

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Campbell’s greatest intellectual debts are to Hume, at the expense of Locke and Reid. And indeed, Campbell seemed to distance himself from Reid in many significant ways, particularly in his extensive borrowing of Hume’s principles of association, which Hume himself thought was his most original contribution to philosophy.30 Hume had argued that the ideas and impressions in our minds do not assemble or follow one another randomly, but adhere to certain universal principles of association, analogous to the universal principles of motion and of attraction that Newton had discovered inductively in the natural world. According to Hume, we know the laws of nature only by observing their universal effects, or more properly the associations that consistently occur in our minds, rather than by perceiving directly their ultimate causes. The most important of Hume’s associating principles were resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and especially cause and effect. Campbell (as well as Gerard) also gave considerable attention to “the tendency of the mind to associate ideas under the notion of causes, effects, or adjuncts.”31 In fact, Campbell argued that experience owes its very existence to the habitual association of like ideas retained in memory and generalized. “There is a variety of relations to be found in things,” he said, “by which they are connected. Such are, among several others, resemblance, identity, equality, contrariety, cause and effect, concomitancy, vicinity in time or place. These we become acquainted with by experience; and they prove, by means of association, the source of various combinations of ideas.”32 In our use of language too, we “contract a habit of associating the sign with the thing signified, insomuch that either, being presented to the mind, frequently introduces or occasions the apprehension of the other,” so that by custom we come to associate certain arbitrary sounds with the ideas of particular things.33 Campbell even reminded his divinity students to pay due regard to “the laws of association in our ideas” when considering the problems of sermon composition.34 Nevertheless, he seemed more willing than Hume to believe that the relations between things themselves exist objectively in the external world, and are learned and imitated by the mind. If so, this differentiated his associational psychology from that of Hume, who 30 This at least is the view of the young Hume in the Abstract (1740); see Treatise of Human Nature, 661. 31 pr, 50. 32 pr, 258. 33 pr, 258. 34 lstpe, 399–400.

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could make no claims concerning the reality represented by habitual mental constructs. Although this may at first seem a minor quibble (in that it still allows them both to be “associationists”), it will prove to be a difference of considerable philosophic import. Hume’s principles of association are undeniably important in Campbell’s theory of the mind, but they cannot account for the whole of Campbell’s explanation of human nature, as they must in Hume’s philosophy. The principles of association help to explain the confusion and strife over words that complicate the art of rhetoric, but they cannot justify the pervasive human belief in the reality of the external world and of the existence of objective truth. For this, Campbell invoked the innate powers of the mind – called faculties – a significant non-Humean concept. The mental faculties were important for Campbell not only in explaining the efficacy of the classical rules of rhetoric, but also in justifying our confident ability to judge evidence and truth, including the truth of the Christian religion. But here we must be cautious. To invoke the faculties of the mind does not necessarily make one a faculty psychologist in Reid’s sense – that is, a believer in the fundamental and irreducible powers of the mind which form a bulwark of Common Sense philosophy. Seventeenth– and eighteenth–century philosophers routinely invoked the “faculties” or “powers” of the mind, often as no more than a convenient literary fiction, and sometimes merely to distinguish men from brute animals. This seems to be the case with Locke’s use of the faculties, and it may also explain Hume’s occasional use of such concepts. But did Campbell employ the faculties of the mind in a similarly loose manner? Professor Bitzer argues that Campbell’s “implied view of distinct mental faculties breaks down” towards the end of the first book of The Philosophy of Rhetoric.35 Indeed, Bitzer may be correct that Campbell’s conception of the scope of the faculties is not consistently held, even in regard to purely rhetorical matters. But before we can decide the issue, we must take a closer look at Campbell’s account of the powers of the human mind. 35 pr, xxi. Campbell’s view of the faculties may not have been consistent over time. By Campbell’s own account, the first chapter of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, which introduces the concept of the four faculties, was written in 1750, while he was minister in the isolated country parish of Banchory Ternan. Most of the other chapters of book I seem to have been written while he was in Aberdeen, and read before the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, whose Common Sense members would have taken an interest in his views on the powers of the mind.

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the faculties of the mind Although Hume, like most eighteenth-century philosophers, sometimes invoked the mental faculties, they were fundamentally foreign to his epistemology. His insistence that the only demonstrable difference between sensations, memories and imaginings is their relative degree of vivacity made the concept of distinct faculties redundant. Reid, in contrast, constructed his entire epistemology on the premise that there are distinct, original, though inexplicable faculties or powers in the human mind. His list of the mind’s constitutional powers included perception (which encompasses sensation), consciousness, memory, conception (which includes imagination), abstraction, judgment, reasoning and taste.36 These irreducible powers supported his notion of an active and self-willing mind, while Hume’s associational principles were consistent with his notion of a passive mind whose basic operating principles are beyond the influence of the will. Campbell’s own position was more ambiguous. Sometimes, like Hume, he seems to have differentiated the mental powers only by their degree of vivacity: “A passion is most strongly excited by sensation … Next to the influence of sense is that of memory, the effect of which upon passion, if the fact be recent, and remembered distinctly and circumstantially, is almost equal. Next to the influence of memory is that of imagination; by which is here solely meant the faculty of apprehending what is neither perceived by the senses, nor remembered.”37 Campbell agreed with Hume that, “sense invariably makes a stronger impression than memory, and memory a stronger than imagination.”38 Yet he seemed unwilling to make vivacity the sole means of distinguishing between the mental powers. Campbell explicitly repudiated Hume’s notion that belief is nothing more than a lively idea.39 Moreover his rhetor36 Nearly every essay in Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man accounted for a different irreducible power or faculty of the human mind. Reid defined the faculties as “those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make a part of the constitution of the mind” (Works of Thomas Reid, 1:221). Though Reid’s “train of thought” (1:379– 88) bore some resemblance to the theory of the association of ideas, he insisted on seeing even this as the product of an active, rather than of a passive, mind (see 1:388). 37 pr, 81. 38 pr, 137. 39 pr, 73. Campbell here cited Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense (1764). The Aberdonians consistently denied Hume’s equation of belief with vivacity; see, for example, Works of Thomas Reid, 1:183. Within the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, John Farquhar chastised Hume for not seeing the fundamental differences between such mental activities as sense perception, memory, and imagination (aul ms 3107/ 1/3, pp. 35–7).

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ical philosophy appealed to the different faculties of the mind to explain the efficacy of the various types of classical discourse.40 There are “principles in our nature,” said Campbell, before discussing each of the faculties in turn, “which, when properly addressed and managed, give no inconsiderable aid to reason in promoting belief.”41 This has obvious significance for the orator, but, on a more fundamental level, it suggests that Campbell’s notion of belief was closely linked with his notion of the constitutional powers of the mind. How many mental faculties did Campbell identify? The Philosophy of Rhetoric begins with the declaration that “All the ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech being intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will.”42 This enumeration of the faculties was made with purely rhetorical ends in mind and need not be taken as complete, for it obviously excluded memory, which Campbell regarded as a subordinate faculty in the realm of persuasion. Yet later in book I of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell dealt extensively with four faculties: memory, imagination, the understanding, and the passions. Here memory takes the place of the will, but since the will (or the “heart”) is the final arbiter of action, and as such is influenced by the other faculties, it need not be a major topic of rhetorical concern in itself. In addition, Campbell seems to have considered the senses (external and internal) to be original faculties, and there are occasional hints that he regarded taste as an original power of the mind.43 The imagination (known also as the “fancy” or the “creative faculty”) received the most attention in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. According to Campbell, the imagination has virtually unlimited powers to combine and shape ideas from sense or memory, and is most effectively influenced by the principle of vivacity – that is, “by exhibiting to it a lively

40 pr, 1, and lxxiii. See also pr, book 1, chapter vii, and lstpe, 374. Gerard also argued that the purpose of oratory is to convince the understanding, please the imagination, move the passions, and persuade the will (aul ms k 174, p. 181). 41 pr, 71. 42 pr, 1. Bacon’s standard account of the faculties (taken over, for example, in Diderot’s Encyclopedia) cited memory, reason, and imagination, which he associated with history, philosophy and poesy respectively. 43 pr, 356 and 411. Campbell includes “admiration” as one of “those original feelings of the mind, which are denominated by some the reflex senses, being of the same class with a taste for beauty, an ear for music, or our moral sentiments” (pr, 3). It is difficult to know what to make of this, or of his singular references to the “moral powers of the mind” (pr, 80) or the “power of speech” as a “useful faculty” (pr, lxxiii).

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and beautiful representation of a suitable object.”44 Although its rhetorical end is pleasure, it can also enliven arguments addressed to the understanding, thus maintaining the attention of the audience. Campbell believed that strong and lively ideas are essential to Christian persuasion, for, like Hume, he was convinced that ideas alone are ineffective when not directed to the appropriate passions. “If it is the fancy,” said Campbell, “which bestows brilliancy on our ideas, if it is memory which gives them stability, passion doth more, it animates them.”45 The passions, then, like the fancy, should not fall beneath the notice even of the Christian orator. “When persuasion is the end,” said Campbell, “passion also must be engaged.”46 Pride, hope, self-love, patriotism, and compassion are among those passions that most effectively moved an audience to action. But though the passions are indispensable tools of pastoral influence, Campbell knew that they are capable of great mischief if not properly guided. The orator has to take care to satisfy his audience “that there is a connexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites.”47 Campbell, like his contemporaries, was profoundly interested in working out the proper relationship between the passions and the understanding, or what was commonly called reason. Campbell did not always clearly distinguish the understanding from reason and judgment. Reid defined judgment as a simple power of recognizing self-evident premises, thereby making it equivalent to common sense perception. Reasoning, he said, is the ability to “draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are.”48 Campbell likewise tended to assume that reason works only from established premises or foundations, and that its primary task is to consider the weight and validity of evidence. The Aberdonians generally applied the term “understanding” to all of these powers together – that is, to the whole power of thinking – and indeed to all of the mental powers besides sense, memory, imagination, passion and the will. For Campbell then, the understanding was the same as the power of intellection, which handled all abstract ideas and general notions. Nevertheless, he sometimes used the term “reason” to signify this comprehensive sense, rather than confining it to its properly narrow sphere. 44 45 46 47 48

pr, 3. pr, 77. pr, 77. pr, 77–8. Works of Thomas Reid, 1:423 and 425.

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Reason (in the broad sense) had traditionally been sovereign of the mental realm, though eighteenth-century empiricists tended to reduce the relative importance of reason in most human activities, and to circumscribe its meaning. Hume placed severe limits on the ability of reason (in any sense) to discover knowledge and moral values. Campbell, as an anatomist of the human mind, was likewise aware that reason, in either its broad or its narrow sense, was not itself a source of knowledge. He declared that “the far greater part of the natural knowledge with which a man of science is acquainted, he neither did derive, nor by any exertion whatever could derive, from his mental powers; but that he has gotten it by information from without; and that the only legitimate application of the intellectual faculty was, to enable him to apprehend the facts, and canvass the evidence.”49 He contrasted this empirical account of reason with that of the so-called rationalists: “With them, reason is held the standard of truth; whereas it is, primarily, no more than the test or the touchstone of evidence, and in a secondary sense only the standard of truth. Now the difference between these two, however little it may appear on a superficial view, is very great.”50 Here Campbell was beginning to use reason in its narrower signification. He denied that reason, even in its broadest sense, can be an adequate source of knowledge. He also denied that reason can or even ought to determine the ends of action. Like Hume, he argued that a strong passion can be overcome only by another strong passion, or by the destruction of the belief that originally excited the passion.51 Hume might have summed up his views on reason and the passions thus: “passion is the mover to action, reason is the guide.” The words, in fact, are Campbell’s.52 As he explained to his divinity students, “To make me believe, it is enough to shew me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to shew that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me, which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. In order to persuade, it is always necessary to move the passions. Passion is the mover to action, reason is the guide. Good is the object of the will, truth is the object of the understanding. It is only through the passions, affections and sentiments of the heart, that the will is to be reached.”53 The philosopher of human 49 st, 1:343. 50 fg, 1:2–3. Campbell immediately went on to say that reason is necessary to apprehend the evidence provided by God to prove his revelation. 51 dm, 249; pr, 93. 52 pr, 78. 53 lstpe, 530–1. Most of this passage is lifted from The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 77–8.

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nature must recognize that “mens [sic] conduct is influenced more by passion than by cool reflection,” and that “the bulk of mankind are more influenced by their passions, in forming their opinions, than by reason.”54 But Campbell, unlike Hume, did not have to depend exclusively on a narrowly-defined reason to stand against the desires of the passions. His broader conception of the understanding (which Hume did not seem to share) included a power of judging the validity of fundamental moral and metaphysical propositions. Despite the limitations that he placed on the narrowly-defined power of reason, Campbell believed that the understanding (which includes reason as one of its components) is the chief safeguard against the dangerous influences of the passions. He warned his readers that “the understanding is too generally the dupe of the passions.”55 Virtue, he thought, is too important to be considered a mere passion, and must be subject to the superior decisions of the understanding. “This prerogative the intellect has above all the other faculties, that whether it be or be not immediately addressed by the speaker, it must be regarded by him either ultimately or subordinately; ultimately, when the direct purpose of the discourse is information or conviction; subordinately, when the end is pleasure, emotion, or persuasion.”56 Belief, upon which passions themselves are often founded, is primarily swayed by information and argument, which belong to the realm of the understanding. Understanding, to bring about conviction, must be enlivened by imagination, memory and the passions, but, “these are not the supplanters of reason [in the broader sense], or even rivals in her sway; they are her handmaids, by whose ministry she is enabled to usher truth into the heart, and procure it there a favourable reception.”57 This passage may have been meant to stand in opposition to Hume’s famous dictum that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”58 Campbell agreed with Hume that the passions are absolutely necessary to motivate the will, and that the intellect is powerless to direct activity towards desirable ends without their aid. Nevertheless, he had considerably more faith than did Hume in the ability of the intellect to discover desirable ends and reveal them to the passions. The passions are not to be 54 55 56 57 58

st, 2:292 and 314. st, 1:392. pr, 216. pr, 72. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 415.

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conquered, but rather directed to higher purposes by the God-given intellectual faculty. The passions and the understanding (known also as “the head”) combine to influence the will (or “the heart”); the object of the understanding is truth, and that of the will is the good. Thus is civilization born of the triumph of reason over the passions.59 Memory, at first glance, seems to play only a minor role in Campbell’s account of the faculties. The ultimate end of speaking, he says, “may be at one time to inform or convince the understanding, at another to delight the imagination, at a third to agitate the passions, and at a fourth to determine the will. But it is never the ultimate end of speaking to be remembered, when what is spoken tends neither to instruct, to please, to move, nor to persuade.”60 In a purely rhetorical context, memory must be subordinate to the other faculties. Campbell often reminded his readers that memory is fallible, and that some memories are so faint or lacking in vivacity as to be no better than opinions.61 But if we look beyond these seeming slights, and indeed beyond the purely rhetorical context, we discover that memory receives an inordinate amount of attention over the course of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, and is almost invariably tied to Campbell’s dealings with his friendly adversary, David Hume. In the same years that he was composing the bulk of the chapters that would become the first book of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell was also attempting to distance himself from Hume on the matters of experience, testimony and memory. Early in A Dissertation on Miracles he argued that Hume had misrepresented the vital role played by testimony in our acquisition of knowledge, and that our faith in the representations of others is original, unaccountable, and founded in our very nature. He then challenged Hume to give a reasonable account of his faith in the clearest informations of his memory, which he will find it alike impossible either to doubt, or to explain. Indeed memory bears nearly the same relation to experience, that testimony does. Certain it is that the defects and misrepresentations of memory are often corrected by experience. Yet should any person hence infer, that memory derives all its evidence from experience, he would fall into a manifest absurdity. On the contrary, experience derives its origin solely from memory, and is nothing else but 59 pr, 80 and 77; aul ms 653, part iii, unnumbered page. 60 pr, 76. 61 pr, 41, 54, 58, 60.

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the general maxims or conclusions, we have form’d, from the comparison of particular facts remember’d. If we had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been able to acquire experience.62

Only memory can address the defects of memory, which is to say that the more lively representations of memory will correct the more confused and indistinct ones. But in no case can experience claim an authority above, or even exist apart from, the unaccountable and original authority of memory. This passage in the Dissertation on Miracles helps explain Campbell’s rather odd treatment of memory in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Although he counts memory as a subordinate faculty in the rhetorical context, he does not regard it as in any way inferior in the logical context – that is, in the handling of evidence and in the search for truth. Memory shows up in many unexpected places in the first book of the Rhetoric. At the beginning of a section entitled “The nature and origin of Experience,” Campbell considers the two “sources in our nature which give being to experience,” namely sense and memory. The senses are the “original inlets of perception” but they operate only in the present moment, whereupon memory “becomes the sole repository of the knowledge received from sense; knowledge which, without this repository, would be as instantaneously lost as it is gotten.” Memory is therefore “the only original voucher extant of those past realities for which we had once the evidence of sense.”63 A few pages later, Campbell returns to the problem of testimony, and again links its authority to that of memory: “But that testimony, antecedently to experience, hath a natural influence on belief, is undeniable. In this it resembles memory; for though the defects and misrepresentations of memory are corrected by experience, yet that this faculty hath an innate evidence of its own we know from this, that if we had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been able to acquire experience.”64 And again, in a section entitled, “The superiority of Scientific Evidence re-examined,” Campbell seems strangely concerned to highlight the uncertain reliability of this faculty; “It was observed of memory, that as it instantly succeeds sensation, it is the repository of all the stores from which our experience is collected, and that without an implicit faith in the clear representations of that faculty, 62 dm, 17–18. 63 pr, 47. 64 pr, 54.

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we could not advance a step in the acquisition of experimental knowledge. Yet we know that memory is not infallible: nor can we pretend that in any case there is not a physical possibility of her making a false report. Here, it may be said, is an irremediable imbecility in the very foundation of moral reasoning.”65 But Campbell makes no attempt to resolve the dilemma. Instead, he asks whether mathematical reasoning has any better foundation in certainty? The answer is firmly negative. Even mathematical reasoning, which seems to be incontrovertible, depends upon a gradual series of proofs held in memory. We do not see an entire mathematical demonstration at once, but have only the strong impressions of memory to vouch for the validity of each part, so that ultimately “the whole evidence is reduced to the testimony of memory.” “In spite of the pride of mathesis,” he continues in rather Humean language, “no demonstration whatever can produce, or reasonably ought to produce, a higher degree of certainty than that which results from the vivid representations of memory, on which the other is obliged to lean.”66 But Campbell has no interest in drawing sceptical conclusions from this unpromising state of affairs. He merely insists on the absolute dependence of all knowledge upon the indefensible and unaccountable authority of memory. Even the geometrician, who comes closest to absolute certainty, will find it impossible, “by any efforts, to shake off his dependence on the accuracy of his attention and fidelity of his memory.”67 Thus, throughout the first book of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell repeatedly gives memory a place where one does not expect to find it, and an importance far out of proportion to its role in public address. Campbell’s incessant concern for memory might be unaccountable if his concerns were simply rhetorical. But it was no coincidence that the spectre of Hume haunted these pages as it had the Dissertation on Miracles. In both works Campbell was concerned to establish the proper epistemological foundation of belief, for which the faculty of memory was the cornerstone. Hume had treated memory as different from sense perception and imagination in nothing but degree – that is, in the liveliness of the experience. Belief was likewise no more than the vivacity with which we perceive an object. Hume declared that “we must not be contented with saying, that the vividness of the idea produces the belief: We must maintain that they are individually the 65 pr, 58. 66 pr, 59. 67 pr, 59.

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same.”68 In Hume’s system, belief could not be philosophically differentiated from mere feeling. Campbell, like the other Aberdonians, took exception to this, not because he thought that the veracity of memory or of belief could be rationally demonstrated, but because he understood that moral reasoning and its conclusions depend entirely upon the irreducible authority of our mental powers. Could such an important edifice as moral and scientific knowledge rest securely upon a mere degree of vivacity? In Campbell’s view Hume had not done nearly enough to safeguard memory as the foundation of our empirical knowledge, and ultimately of our belief. Experience without memory is meaningless. So too is belief that cannot be distinguished from feeling. “I will not say with a late subtle metaphysician,” declared Campbell, “that ‘Belief consisteth in the liveliness of our ideas.’ That this doctrine is erroneous, it would be quite foreign to my purpose to attempt here to evince.”69 Since Reid had successfully refuted this doctrine, Campbell was content to agree with Hume “that belief commonly enlivens our ideas; and that lively ideas have a stronger influence than faint ideas to induce belief. But so far are these two from being coincident, that even this connexion between them, though common, is not necessary. Vivacity of ideas is not always accompanied with faith, nor is faith always able to produce vivacity.”70 Belief, then, was influenced by vivacity, but it was not the same as vivacity. And so Campbell set himself apart from Hume to stand with his Common Sense associates, to whom these chapters of The Philosophy of Rhetoric were originally read. Like Reid, he thought that the importance of memory transcended the ability of moral philosophers to prove that it is well founded. Memory is compelling by its own unaccountable and irresistible authority, and is therefore to be accounted an irreducible faculty of the human mind. 68 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 116. 69 pr, 73. See similar statements in James Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1776), 58, and Works of Thomas Reid, 1:107 and 358. 70 pr, 73. Bitzer’s claim that vivacity was the main component of Campbell’s conception of belief is at best misleading; see “Hume’s Philosophy in George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” 150. Though Campbell did borrow some of Hume’s language of vivacity, his account of memory (about which Hume had little to say) and of belief was ultimately closer to Reid’s view. For a clear, concise summary of Reid’s account of memory (which he too invariably linked with belief) see Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid (London: Routledge, 1989), 118–24.

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Campbell’s treatment of memory in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, far out of proportion to his strictly rhetorical concerns, suggests that he regarded this faculty as much more than a convenient fiction. Moreover, he seemed to introduce the topic whenever he was answering Hume on such matters as testimony and experience, suggesting that Campbell thought he was correcting a fundamental shortcoming in the sceptic’s account of human knowledge. There is certainly nothing in Hume equivalent to Campbell’s triple insistence that memory is fundamental to all knowledge, absolutely unaccountable in its reliability, and yet unquestionable in its authority.71 Though no other power of the mind received a similarly compulsive treatment, Campbell’s review of the faculties in chapter VII of The Philosophy of Rhetoric suggests that he regarded the imagination, the understanding, and the passions as coequal in authority with memory. In the later “Defence” manuscript, he named memory, judgment and imagination as mental faculties that, like one’s opinions, can never be forfeited or alienated.72 Campbell thus followed Reid in regarding the faculties as real constitutional powers of the mind, and as important original sources of evidence and belief. Campbell thought that Hume had misunderstood the psychology of belief. Hume had underestimated the crucial role played by the irreducible powers of the human mind in establishing belief and influencing the will. Although the passions are the primary movers of the will, they are directionless and therefore impotent without the investigating power of the understanding, the enlivening ability of the imagination, and the verifying authority of the memory. The Aberdonians were certainly not the first to appeal to the faculties of the mind – they had been standard linguistic tools in English philosophy since Bacon – but they were perhaps the first to give a consistent authority to the faculties in vouching for the reliability of human knowledge. Unlike Hume, Campbell was a faculty psychologist. He certainly argued (not unlike Hume) that we cannot rationally control our belief or lack of belief in abstract propositions such 71 In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume gives little attention to memory (which may help to account for Campbell’s own detailed though scattered treatment), and he never distinguishes memory from a degree of vivacity or a feeling (for example, 85, 153). Unlike Campbell, Hume seems to think that memory is the source of personal identity (261). In his dissertation (“The Lively Idea”), Bitzer appears to argue that Campbell was no different from Hume on the matter of memory, but in Bitzer’s earlier essay, “A Re-evaluation of Campbell’s Doctrine of Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 46 (1960): 135–40, there are hints of how important memory was to Campbell. 72 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page.

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as religious doctrines,73 which is to say that we cannot will our belief. In this sense, belief is indeed a feeling and beyond the control of reason, and as such demands toleration from other minds. But Campbell also argued that we have considerable freedom to decide, by means of our reasoning powers, what information to gather and present at the bar of belief. Reason, though it cannot act as a judge, has all the powers of an advocate. It can properly be said, therefore, that “probability results from evidence, and begets belief. Belief invigorates our ideas. Belief raised to the highest becomes certainty. Certainty flows … from the force of the evidence, real or apparent, that is produced.”74 Inasmuch as belief falls within the realm of reason, so also is it a problem of evidence.

campbell’s theory of evidence The Aberdonians were all deeply interested in problems of evidence. John Stewart, the Marischal professor of mathematics, devoted most of his Wise Club discourses to exploring the nature and types of evidence. Thomas Reid said, “To believe without evidence is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid … Nor is it in a man’s power to believe anything longer than he thinks he has evidence.”75 Campbell devoted a considerable chapter of the first book of The Philosophy of Rhetoric to detailing the nature, types, and sources of evidence. He believed that in order to move an audience, a rhetorician must appreciate the relationship between evidence and human nature. Thus he was determined to heal the classical breach between logic and rhetoric. He also treated the problem of evidence in his apologetic works, most notably in A Dissertation on Miracles. Although his delineation of the types of evidence was not strikingly original (except, as we shall see, in the matter of testimony), it nicely encapsulated a typically eighteenth-century understanding of the subject. This encapsulation is schematically represented in figure 2. Campbell divided evidence into two major types, intuitive and deductive, which he distinguished by the following criteria: “Logical truth consisteth in the conformity of our conceptions to their archetypes in the nature of things. This conformity is perceived by the mind, either immediately on a bare attention to the ideas under review, or mediately by a comparison of these with other related ideas. Evidence of the former 73 Campbell addressed this problem most fully in the last part of his “Defence” manuscript, aul ms 655. 74 pr, 81. 75 Works of Thomas Reid, 1:328.

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Figure 2: Campbell’s Theory of Evidence I . INTUITIVE EVIDENCE

natural, original and unaccountable immediately perceived not subject to reasoning

1. Pure Intellection

concerns “metaphysical” truths mathematical axioms and definitions

2. Consciousness

concerns “physical” truths present feelings and sensations knowledge of self-existence

3. Common Sense

concerns self-evident “moral” truths foundation of moral reasoning (including the veracity of memory)

II . DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE

mediately perceived by a comparison of ideas subject to reasoning

1. Demonstrative (Scientific) invariable relations of general ideas simple and absolute proofs (no contrary proofs possible) 2. Moral

i. Experience ii. Analogy iii. Testimony iv. Calculation of Chances

contingent relations of particular facts complex and probable evidences (contrary proofs likely) province of rhetoric customary/habitual associations of ideas probability related to uniformity of experience indirect experience weakens in proportion to remoteness of resemblance often antecedent to personal experience primary source of particular/historical facts mixture of demonstrative (mathematical) and moral evidence

kind is called intuitive; of the latter, deductive.”76 Intuitive evidence is convincing by its mere appearance. Its effect on the mind’s power of judgment is “natural, original, and unaccountable,” which is to say that 76 pr, 35. Campbell’s division is akin to Reid’s distinction between “intuitive judgments” (i.e., common sense judgments) and “discursive judgments,” the second of which divides into demonstrative and probable reasoning (Works of Thomas Reid, 1:475–6). Locke also divides knowledge between intuitive and demonstrative (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 531). In section iv of his first Enquiry, Hume divides “the objects of human reason” into “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”, the second of which corresponds to Campbell’s moral evidence, and the first of which corresponds largely to Campbell’s demonstrative evidence, but seems also to include some elements of intuitive evidence; see David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 25.

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no additional evidences of any kind can make it any more compelling. Campbell subdivided intuitive evidence according to its three sources: intellection, consciousness, and common sense. These three irreducible sources of evidence are responsible for our apprehension of metaphysical, physical, and moral truths respectively.77 Pure intellection allows us immediately to recognize the necessary and universal relations that exist among abstract ideas, by which Campbell meant such fundamental mathematical axioms and definitions as “one and four make five” and “the whole is greater than a part.”78 Evidence from consciousness, which includes our present feelings, sensations and passions, allows us to have sure knowledge of our existence and of the operations of our own minds. This source of evidence appears to have some correspondence with the faculty of judgment, the task of which is to judge the resemblance or disparity between various objects that come before the mind. It is also the seat of our intuitive pronouncements concerning “beauty or deformity, harmony or discord, the elegant or the ridiculous.”79 Finally, evidence from common sense assures us of the reliability of such fundamental moral principles as causation, the continuity of nature, and the reliability of memory. These principles allow us to make sense of the variable and uncertain experiences of our everyday lives. “All reasoning,” said Campbell, “necessarily supposes that there are certain principles in which we must acquiesce, and beyond which we cannot go – principles clearly discernible by their own light, which can derive no additional evidence from any thing besides.”80 These common sense axioms “are as essential to moral reasoning, to all deductions concerning life and existence, as those of the first kind are to the sciences of arithmetic and geometry. Perhaps it will appear afterwards that, without the aid of some of them, these sciences themselves would be utterly inaccessible to us.”81 Denial of such “primary truths” does not, as with the evidence from intellection, imply a manifest contradiction, only insanity.82 Deductive evidence, unlike intuitive evidence, cannot be immediately perceived, but must be demonstrated either logically or factually. Such 77 pr, 42. 78 pr, 35–6. 79 pr, 38. Here Campbell sounds not only like Reid, but also like the Moral Sense philosopher, Francis Hutcheson. 80 pr, 42. 81 pr, 42. 82 pr, 41–2. Campbell is here quoting from the French philosopher Claude Buffier.

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evidence falls within the realm of reason because it is not concerned with fundamental premises – convincing instead by a comparison of ideas. “All rational or deductive evidence,” said Campbell, “is derived from one or other of these two sources: from the invariable properties or relations of general ideas; or from the actual, though perhaps variable connexions subsisting among things.”83 Campbell called the first of these subtypes demonstrative and the second moral. Demonstrative evidence concerns the abstract and invariable relations of ideas. It “is built on pure intellection, and consisteth in an uninterrupted series of axioms,” and is therefore capable of absolute proof in that the opposite of such a proof is inconceivable. It “is solely conversant about number and extension, and about those other qualities which are measurable by these. Such are duration, velocity, and weight.”84 Although the conclusions of demonstrative evidence are absolute, its authority is limited to mathematical and geometrical demonstrations. Moral evidence (which Reid called probable evidence) is concerned only with matters of fact – that is, with the actual but contingent relations among things. Moral reasoning is “founded on the principles we have from consciousness and common sense, improved by experience; and as it proceeds on this general presumption or moral axiom, that the course of nature in time to come will be similar to what it hath been hitherto, it decides, in regard to particulars, concerning the future from the past, and concerning things unknown from things familiar to us.”85 Like his latitudinarian predecessors, Campbell understood that even in the highest reaches of moral certainty there always remains the physical possibility that the conclusion drawn may be false. Moral reasoning, therefore, concerns things that are probably but not necessarily true, things whose opposites are conceivable. Yet the importance of moral evidence is not thereby diminished, for though “all the truths which constitute science, which give exercise to reason, and are discovered by philosophy, are general; all our ideas, in the strictest sense of the word, are particular. All the particular truths about which we are conversant, are properly historical, and compose the furniture of memory.”86 Campbell illustrated the nature of moral evidence with such examples as ‹Cæsar overcame Pompey› and ‹The sun will rise to-morrow›;87 both statements are accepted 83 84 85 86 87

pr, 43. pr, 43. pr, 43. pr, 260. pr, 44.

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among the best-attested kinds of evidence, but neither is so absolutely certain as to exclude all other possibilities. These examples are remarkably similar to ones employed by Locke88 and by Hume in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume had divided human knowledge into two kinds – “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact” – the first being demonstratively certain mathematical relations and the second being exemplified by the following: “That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.”89 Clearly Campbell’s “moral evidence” corresponded closely to Hume’s “matters of fact,” which both philosophers considered to be, despite inferior certainty, more important than demonstrative evidence in the realm of everyday life.90 Hume would certainly have agreed with Campbell that “the proper province of rhetoric is the second, or moral evidence; for to the second belong all decisions concerning fact, and things without us.”91 Although Hume gave little formal attention to the category of intuitive evidence, he broadly agreed with Campbell concerning the structure and purpose of deductive evidence. And though they also agreed that moral evidence is only highly probable at best, Campbell was much less willing than Hume to draw sceptical conclusions, particularly concerning the historical matters of fact upon which the truths of Christianity are founded. “In moral reasoning,” he said, “we ascend from possibility, by an insensible gradation, to probability, and thence, in the same manner, to the summit of moral certainty. On this summit, or on any of the steps leading to it, the conclusion of the argument may rest.”92 Moral evidence was therefore not only the most important part of Campbell’s evidential theory, but also the most laden with difficulties. Whereas demonstrative evidence allows no contrary proofs and no degrees of probability, “the case is far otherwise with moral evidence, which is of a complex nature, which admits 88 “That there is such a City in Italy as Rome: That about 1700 years ago, there lived in it a Man, called Julius Cæsar; that he was a General, and that he won a Battel against another called Pompey,” are particular facts related by historians of credit which must therefore be believed (Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 662). 89 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 25–6. 90 pr, 46. 91 pr, 43. 92 pr, 44. Campbell criticizes syllogistic logic for being unable to deal with the degrees of probability inherent in this fundamental source of evidence (pr, 62).

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degrees, which is almost always combated by opposite proofs, and these, though perhaps lower in degree, as truly of the nature of proof and evidence as those whereby they are opposed. The probability, on the whole … lies in the proportion which the contrary proofs, upon comparison, bear to one another; a proportion which, in complicated cases, it is often difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to ascertain. The speakers, therefore, on the opposite sides have each real evidence to insist on.”93 Campbell was not naïve concerning the problems endemic to moral evidence, upon which his world view and apologetic system rested. That is why, in his practical philosophy, he both agreed with Hume that the empirical apologist will encounter considerable obstacles, but also denied that these obstacles are rationally insurmountable. Campbell divided moral evidence into three major types, according to the sources from which it is derived – experience, analogy, and testimony – plus a derivative category called the calculation of chances.94 Experience, the first category of moral evidence, “is the foundation of philosophy; which consists in a collection of general truths, systematically digested.”95 Like Hume, Campbell equated experience with the observed uniformity of cause and effect in nature, and, like Hume, he described it as equivalent to the habitual associations of ideas in the mind.96 The highest moral certainty is equivalent to the most uniform experience. Campbell considered experience to be, “if not the foundation, at least the criterion of all moral reasoning whatever,” including natural history, natural theology and psychology.97 Even in the matter of interpreting Scripture, he claimed, we must keep it as a rule, that “in every question relating to fact, where experience may be had, our safest recourse is to experience.”98 But unlike Hume, Campbell gave special emphasis to the role of memory in vouching for the authority of experience. Analogy, the second source of moral evidence, is a weaker form of experience, and constitutes the human habit of reasoning from that 93 pr, 276. 94 Campbell considered the calculation of chances, which includes such things as mortality tables and the rolling of dice, to be an application of demonstrative or mathematical evidence to problems of moral evidence. 95 pr, 54. 96 pr, 50–1. Campbell also noted that in this operation, the mind is entirely passive (pr, 49). 97 pr, 52. 98 fg, 1:22. See also st, 1:343.

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which is known to that which is unknown. Campbell was careful in arguing that the evidence from analogy is reliable only in proportion to the likeness between the two things being compared, though this reliability is greatly strengthened by the number of similarities observed.99 Although he was clearly mindful of the abuses to which this form of evidence had too often been subjected, he was equally unwilling to dismiss such an important form of moral argument, as is evidenced by his praise of Bishop Butler’s analogical defence of the truths of the Christian revelation. Testimony, the third source of moral evidence, was of even greater importance to Campbell’s apologetic system, and may justly be considered his most original contribution to the standard eighteenth-century conception of evidence. In A Dissertation on Miracles, Campbell declared that Hume’s whole argument against the testimony of miracles was “built upon a false hypothesis. That the evidence of testimony is derived solely from experience, which seems to be an axiom of this writer, is at least not so incontestable a truth, as he supposes it; that, on the contrary, testimony hath a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent to experience, will, I imagine, easily be evinced.”100 Contrary to Hume, Campbell argued that faith in testimony is part of human nature and antecedent to all personal experience, rather than the consequence of experience. He claimed that his disagreement with Hume on this point “is by no means so inconsiderable, as to a careless view it may appear. According to his philosophy, the presumption lies against the testimony, or (which amounts to the same thing) there is not the smallest presumption in its favour, till properly supported by experience. According to [Campbell’s theory] … there lies the strongest presumption in favour of the testimony, till properly refuted by experience.”101 Campbell carried this argument over into The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Testimony, which he defined as “a serious intimation from another, of any fact or observation, as being what he remembers to have seen or heard or experienced,”102 is a necessary supplement to and even foundation of the general truths derived from our personal experience, for testimony gives us information concerning any number of particular facts which we ourselves have not experienced. He further defied Hume by giving testimony a special status compared to experience. 99 pr, 53. Compare this to Reid’s similar description of analogy (Works of Thomas Reid, 1:236–8). 100 dm, 14. 101 dm, 15–16. 102 pr, 55.

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He argued that a single reliable piece of testimony (such as a miracle claim) can overturn even a uniform body of experience to the contrary, and carries greater weight concerning any particular fact than the general conclusions of experience, which “may serve in confutation, but can never serve in proof of particular or historical facts. Sufficient testimony, and that only, will answer here.”103 Thus, “when experience is applied to the discovery of the truth in a particular incident, we call the evidence presumptive; ample testimony is accounted a positive proof of the fact.”104 But Campbell was implicitly arguing something more, with which Hume could not readily agree: that the natural influence of testimony on belief is a consequence of the Creator’s benevolent design. To this source of knowledge, “when we have no positive reasons of mistrust or doubt, we are, by an original principle of our nature (analogous to that which compels our faith in memory), led to give an unlimited assent. As on memory alone is founded the merely personal experience of the individual, so on testimony in concurrence with memory is founded the much more extensive experience which is not originally our own, but derived from others.”105 Campbell was arguing from human nature, in which he saw both a natural inclination to tell the truth and a principle of sympathy which supported the natural reliability of testimony. Perhaps Campbell thought that, in this particular instance, Hume had overlooked the empiricallyobserved operation of sympathy in human relations, which had nevertheless found a place in his moral theory. Hume had also failed to appreciate the sheer inadequacy of personal experience uninformed by the enlarged 103 pr, 84; see also 55. 104 pr, 55. Campbell conceded that there is some value to Hume’s sceptical argument, but said, “the utmost in regard to [it] … that can be affirmed with truth, is that the evidence of testimony is to be considered as strictly logical, no further than human veracity in general, or the veracity of witnesses of such a character, and in such circumstances in particular, is supported, or perhaps more properly, hath not been refuted, by experience. But that testimony, antecedently to experience, hath a natural influence on belief, is undeniable” (pr, 54). A little further down, Campbell added the standard Lockean reservations: “we are taught to consider many attendant circumstances, which serve either to corroborate or to invalidate its evidence. The reputation of the attester, his manner of address, the nature of the fact attested, the occasion of giving the testimony, the possible or probable design in giving it, the disposition of the hearers to whom it was given, and several other circumstances, have all considerable influence in fixing the degree of credibility” (pr, 55). In The Four Gospels, Campbell noted that a man’s known prejudices will either detract from or add to the reliability of his testimony depending on whether they are favourable or unfavourable to the claim under consideration (fg, 1:507). None of these considerations, however, invalidate the essential believability of human testimony. 105 pr, 55.

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views of testimony, for much of what Hume classified as experience was actually based not on personal observation but on the attested observations of others.106 We can no more reject the testimony of reliable witnesses concerning particular facts than we can the myriad individual testimonies that have combined to establish the laws of nature in the first place. Campbell surely believed that he had defeated Hume at his own game, by suggesting that a single positive testimonial claim is inherently more believable than the universal laws of nature themselves, which, according to the sceptic, are merely constructions of the human mind. Campbell assumed that reliable testimony, like memory, is fundamental to human knowledge, but is nevertheless beyond the scope of empirical demonstration. He held that human nature is designed implicitly to believe testimony, and that it learns to doubt only with time and experience. This is not merely the observed condition of the human species, but also the beneficent design of providence. Hume’s scepticism concerning the believability of any testimony regarding miracles had reversed the natural order of belief, and had thus imperilled all historical testimony and all moral reasoning. To avoid the unacceptable consequences of Hume’s scepticism, Campbell was obliged to posit a mechanism in human nature capable of equating our natural propensity to believe testimony with our need for metaphysical and moral truth. Humanity, he implicitly argued, is obliged to believe that the Creator does not deceive his creatures concerning their fundamental sources of knowledge.107 His theory of knowledge and of evidence repeatedly highlighted the mechanisms in human psychology that compel people to trust their experience, their memory, and the testimony of others. The reliability of these mechanisms cannot be guaranteed by experience, for they are the very sources of experience. How then did Campbell propose to guarantee their veracity? His solution, which brought him closer to his Aberdeen colleagues as it distanced him from Hume, was the philosophy of Common Sense.

campbell’s common sense philosophy “George Campbell would count as a member of Reid’s school,” opined S.A. Grave in 1960, “if his concern with the philosophy of Common Sense had been less marginal.”108 This pronouncement by an influential 106 dm, 37–46; pr, 56. 107 See st, 1:371–2, where Campbell argues that God would never use false means to achieve his ends, for “God cannot contradict himself.” 108 S.A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 5.

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modern scholar has perhaps prevented others from carefully examining Campbell’s relationship to Common Sense philosophy. Yet the Aberdonians themselves valued Campbell’s contribution to their stand against the abuses of empirical philosophy. Beattie prefaced the 1776 edition of his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism with this acknowledgment: “It is with great pleasure I take this opportunity to declare, that the best Theory of Evidence I have ever seen, is delivered by my excellent Friend Dr Campbell, in that most ingenious and learned performance, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. His principles and mine, though they differ somewhat in the arrangement, (in which I am inclined to think that his have the advantage), will not be found to differ in any thing material.”109 In his Aberdeen logic class of 1763, Reid taught a theory of testimony almost identical to that used by Campbell in A Dissertation on Miracles. The same account of testimony appears again in Reid’s Intellectual Powers (1785), though the brevity of his remarks suggests that he deferred to Campbell’s treatment in The Philosophy of Rhetoric.110 Campbell’s theory of evidence was thus closely tied to the larger Aberdeen project, casting doubt on the notion that Campbell’s contribution to Common Sense philosophy was marginal. Campbell in turn defended the Common Sense philosophy of his associates. In The Philosophy of Rhetoric he attacked Joseph Priestley’s attempted refutation of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald,111 which surely indicates that he thought his own position implicitly threatened by Priestley’s criticisms of Common Sense. Campbell made deferential references to his “learned and ingenious friend Dr. Reid,”112 and declared that the doctrine of common sense “hath lately, in our own country, been set in the clearest light, and supported by invincible force of argument, by two very able writers in the science of man, Dr. Reid … and 109 Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, x. 110 eul ms Dk.3.2, pp. 47–8; Works of Thomas Reid, 1:482. Reid acknowledged the similarity of Campbell’s thought to his own, but declined to specify any intellectual debts (1:468). Gerard also believed that Campbell was the last word on the subject of testimony; See An Essay on Genius, ed. Bernhard Fabian (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1966), 297–8. 111 Joseph Priestley’s An Examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Dr. Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and Dr. Oswald’s Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion (London: J. Johnson, 1774), was not a defence of Hume, but rather a defence of the Lockean experimental philosophy tradition that he thought was most successfully carried forward by David Hartley. Priestley accused the Common Sense philosophers of advocating ignorance by multiplying tautological “original principles,” of being dissatisfied with reasonable degrees of evidence, and of reducing philosophical inquiry to subjective feeling. 112 pr, 81n.

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Dr. Beattie … I beg leave to remark in this place, that, though for distinction’s sake, I use the term common sense in a more limited signification than either of the authors last mentioned, there appears to be no real difference in our sentiments of the thing itself.”113 This declaration warrants a brief review of the works of Aberdeen’s leading Common Sense philosophers, Reid and Beattie, in order to identify those tenets which Campbell claimed to support. Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), was published just before he left King’s College to occupy Adam Smith’s vacated moral philosophy chair at Glasgow. It immediately set itself against the “ideal system” or “theory of ideas,” which Reid claimed had come to prominence in Descartes and Locke, but had only displayed its full sceptical potential in the works of Berkeley and Hume. Reid believed that philosophy had strayed onto an inevitably sceptical path when it assumed that “ideas” stand between external objects and the human understanding. In the first stage of his defence of epistemological realism, Reid argued that we perceive things in themselves, and not by means of mediatory ideas. His Common Sense theory of perception denied Locke’s and Hume’s assumption that the mind is merely a passive receiver of sense impressions. He argued that an “idea” is properly an act rather than an object, which means that the perception of an external body is substantially more than a mere sensation or feeling in the mind. In the second stage of his apology, Reid countered Hume’s extreme metaphysical scepticism by giving a special status to those fundamental beliefs that we necessarily hold despite a lack of rational warrant: “If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them – these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.”114 Reid argued that the axioms of common sense are universal principles of human nature, which give us the ability intuitively and actively to recognize necessary metaphysical truths, in the same way that Moral Sense philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson had claimed we recognize moral and aesthetic absolutes. Reid agreed with 113 pr, 38n. Campbell also acknowledged his debt to the French philosopher Claude Buffier, whose own version of “Common Sense” in his Traité des premières vérités (1714) evidenced an “uncommon degree of acuteness in matters of abstraction” (PR, 38n) and predated that of the Aberdonians. 114 Works of Thomas Reid, 1:108.

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Hume that reason is powerless to justify even the most fundamental and necessary metaphysical beliefs, such as the objective reality of the self, other minds, the material and spiritual worlds, and causation.115 He argued, therefore, that philosophers must give up the attempt to ground everything on reason, and admit that even reason itself is founded on self-evident and unprovable principles. “The evidence of sense,” he said, “the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded on our constitution: none of them depends upon, or can be resolved into another. To reason against any of these kinds of evidence, is absurd; nay, to reason for them is absurd. They are first principles; and such fall not within the province of reason, but of common sense.”116 Likewise belief, “which accompanies sensation and memory, is a simple act of the mind, which cannot be defined.”117 Our nature compels us to pass judgments, including the inexplicable judgment of belief, on the things we perceive. Such original and natural judgments are … a part of that furniture which Nature hath given to the human understanding. They are the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are a part of our constitution; and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of mankind; and, what is manifestly contrary to any of these first principles, is what we call absurd. The strength of them is good sense, which is often found in those who are not acute in reasoning.118

Reid’s assertions ultimately rested on an assumption of providential design that Hume was unwilling to accept. “Common Sense and Reason have both one author,” said Reid; “that Almighty Author in all whose other works we observe a consistency, uniformity, and beauty which charm and delight the understanding: there must, therefore, be some order and consistency in the human faculties, as well as in other parts of his workmanship.”119 Despite such providential assumptions, Reid’s 115 See Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), essay vi, chapters v and vi, for a list of his first principles of common sense. 116 Works of Thomas Reid, 1:108. 117 Ibid., 1:108. 118 Ibid., 1:209. 119 Ibid., 1:127.

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philosophy of Common Sense was grounded on a rigorous theory of perception that has retained the critical admiration of modern scholars. The absence of a similar careful and philosophic foundation has prevented James Beattie’s version of Common Sense from finding a modern audience. Beattie intended his philosophy of Common Sense to have greater popular appeal than Reid’s academic treatment. Whereas Reid criticized a philosophical tradition and largely spared the personal reputation of Hume, Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770) attacked Hume’s very character. Beattie’s Common Sense philosophy was more concerned to defend moral and metaphysical absolutes than a theory of perceptual realism, and was therefore more polemical than Reid’s. “I account That to be truth,” said Beattie, “which the constitution of our nature determines us to believe, and That to be falsehood which the constitution of our nature determines us to disbelieve.”120 Common sense is simply “that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous and instinctive impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently on our will, whenever its object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore not improperly called Sense; and acting in a similar manner upon all mankind, and therefore properly called Common Sense.”121 Our common sense assures us of the existence of the soul, the self, God, and human free will. These truths are not subject to the test of reason because “all just reasoning does ultimately terminate in the principles of common sense; that is, in principles which must be admitted as certain, or as probable, upon their own authority, without evidence, or at least without proof.”122 Finally, Beattie assumed “that truth is something fixed and determinate, depending not upon man, but upon the Author of nature.”123 Beattie’s audience was delighted, both with his undisguised hatred of Hume’s sceptical dilemmas and with the bold and unapologetic manner in which he stated the utterly simple truths in which they had always believed. George Campbell wrote no systematic work on Common Sense philosophy. Even his use of the term “common sense” was usually less 120 121 122 123

Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, 19. Ibid., 26–7. Ibid., 239. Ibid., 89.

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formal than that of his associates, often signifying nothing more than “reasonableness” or “common wisdom,” and sometimes standing in place of reason itself. Such loose employments of the term are not philosophically precise, but neither do they contradict the Aberdonians’ more formal understanding of the concept. In whatever sense he used the term elsewhere, “common sense” remained an important subsection of Campbell’s category of intuitive evidence, and thus an implicit rejection or correction of Hume’s extreme empiricism. In his treatment of evidence in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell defined common sense as “an original source of knowledge common to all mankind.”124 Common sense differs from other forms of intuitive evidence in that it gives us sure knowledge of the existence of persons and substances beyond our own minds. By it we are assured of the truth of such fundamental propositions as these: ‹Whatever has a beginning has a cause’ – ‘When there is in the effect a manifest adjustment of the several parts to a certain end, there is intelligence in the cause.’ ‘The course of nature will be the same to-morrow that it is to-day; or, the future will resemble the past’ – ‘There is such a thing as body; or, there are material substances independent of the mind’s conceptions’ – ‘There are other intelligent beings in the universe besides me’ – ‘The clear representations of my memory, in regard to past events, are indubitably true.›125 These truths, “and a great many more of the same kind,” cannot be known by reason, yet “it is equally impossible, without a full conviction of them, to advance a single step in the acquisition of knowledge.”126 Campbell thought it sufficient proof against Hume’s scepticism that it is impossible “for a rational creature to withhold his assent” from such fundamental and universally acknowledged premises.127 Even experience is impossible without antecedent guiding principles. Campbell recognized that common sense truths are not of the kind whose denial would imply a contradiction, which is to say that it is conceivable that 124 pr, 38–9. 125 pr, 40. This list does not include an assurance of our own existence, which Campbell included under the evidence of consciousness (pr, 37), and which he considered to precede even the evidence of common sense. Reid’s list of the first principles of common sense includes the six mentioned by Campbell, plus many more. Campbell’s claim that his was but a partial list suggests that he may have agreed with Reid’s other first principles. It is difficult to say how far Campbell followed Reid on the first principles of free will, taste, and morals. He did refer to the “reflex senses” which included a taste for beauty and for moral sentiments (pr, 3). 126 pr, 40. 127 pr, 40.

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they might be false, and suggested that they be called instinctive rather than intuitive. But he was not much concerned with the possibility of these truths being proved wrong, for “such instincts are no other than the oracles of eternal wisdom.”128 Reason itself can hardly pretend to undermine such fundamental notions as that of causation, which “is from the very frame of our nature, suggested, necessarily suggested, and often instantaneously suggested; but still it is suggested and not perceived.”129 Campbell thus agreed with Hume that belief in causation cannot be rationally justified. Yet we are not without a reason for believing that the future will resemble the past: “By reason we often mean, not an argument, or medium of proving, but a ground in human nature on which a particular judgment is founded. Nay further, as no progress in reasoning can be made where there is no foundation, (and first principles are here the sole foundation,) I should readily admit, that the man who does not believe such propositions, if it were possible to find such a man, is perfectly irrational, and consequently not to be argued with.”130 In the brief section on “common sense” in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell again gave particular emphasis to the problem of memory; in fact, he gave it considerably more attention than the other five axioms listed. He argued that our faith in memory is considerably different from our faith in our present feelings (subsumed under evidence from consciousness), for “there is a reference in the ideas of memory to former sensible impressions, to which there is nothing analogous in sensation.”131 Our faith in memory is not derived from consciousness, and therefore cannot depend upon the mere vivacity of our feelings. “Some may imagine,” said Campbell, “that it is from experience we come to know what faith in every case is due to memory. But it will ap128 pr, 42. 129 pr, 366. The power of causation “is conceived by the understanding, and not perceived by the senses, as the causes and the effects themselves often are” (pr, 367). Elsewhere, Campbell argued that reason cannot take an infinite number of steps to prove something, and must therefore terminate in self-evident axioms (aul ms 654, un-numbered page). 130 pr, 71n. For example, Campbell objected to the scholastic form of syllogistic disputation because it allowed its adherents to “defend any position whatsoever, how contradictory soever to common sense, and to the clearest discoveries of reason and experience” (pr, 271). He chastised the philosophic pride it had engendered, “which will not permit us to think that we believe any thing, even a self-evident principle, without a previous reason or argument” (pr, 70). In the footnote following, Campbell cited Hume’s Treatise as an example of the futility of trying to prove what is self-evident, which was no doubt a contemporary form of syllogism. 131 pr, 41.

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pear more fully afterwards, that unless we had implicitly relied on the distinct and vivid informations of that faculty, we could not have moved a step towards the acquisition of experience.”132 If Campbell was speaking to Hume, as he almost certainly was, he was suggesting that even the sceptic himself had not been sufficiently sceptical of memory as a source of knowledge. If memory is not in fact a fainter copy of a sense impression (as Hume claimed it was), then it must be a mental phenomenon sufficiently different to constitute an irreducible faculty of its own. As such it requires its own mechanism for bringing about belief. This mechanism assures us not only that we remember a specific thing happening but that what we remember really did happen. We neither perceive nor understand this mechanism, yet we cannot deny its operation. In his repeated claim that the reliability of memory must be subsumed under the authority of common sense,133 Campbell, it seems, was determined that his notion of memory should not be confused with Hume’s. Besides the six common sense axioms listed above, Campbell suggested that there are “a great many more of the same kind,”134 but declined to list them. Nevertheless, we have indications as to what they might be. In an early passage from the Dissertation on Miracles, Campbell distanced himself from Hume by giving testimony equal standing with memory as a fundamental source of knowledge. Here the reliability of memory and of testimony were put on the same level with such fundamental metaphysical propositions as “similar causes always produce similar effects” and “the course of nature will be the same to-morrow, that it was yesterday, and is today.”135 Neither experience nor reason can guarantee the general reliability of testimony, yet we are unable to disbelieve such an important source of knowledge. Without it there is neither history nor science. Our faith in testimony, and thus our faith in all knowledge beyond the range of our personal experience, must be grounded elsewhere. We believe it by virtue of our common sense. In 132 pr, 41. 133 pr, 61. 134 pr, 40. Lloyd F. Bitzer, in his introduction to The Philosophy of Rhetoric (xxxvii) and elsewhere, seems curiously unwilling to give much credence to Campbell’s claim that there are more common sense axioms besides these six. Nevertheless, Campbell’s specific statement that there are “many more” such truths, together with his general deference to Reid on the subject of common sense, suggest that he was much closer to the other Common Sense philosophers than Bitzer will allow. 135 dm, 16.

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light of this, it is not difficult to understand why Campbell’s treatment of testimony was taken as definitive by the other Aberdonian Common Sense philosophers. There are indications from elsewhere in his writings that Campbell’s common sense axioms, like Reid’s, included moral and religious imperatives. Campbell assumed, as did most eighteenth-century philosophers, that God can neither mislead us nor contradict himself.136 This assumption allowed him to give divine sanction to the pleadings of conscience: “The laws which prohibit murder, adultery, theft, false testimony have the manifest stamp of divine authority; there is no difference of opinion about their meaning; the light of nature, or, if you please to call it common sense is sufficient to satisfy all who are neither fools nor mad that they are binding on all human beings.”137 In his religious writings, Campbell often linked “the dictates of conscience” with “the common sense of mankind.”138 He assured his divinity students that, in matters of conduct, God does not leave our most important duties to be discovered by reason, “but has in our consciences given such clear intimations of what is right and amiable in conduct, that where there have been no prejudices to occupy the mind, and pervert the natural sense of things, it commands an immediate and instinctive approbation.”139 Thus the obligation of promises is fundamental to our nature, and not derived from laws.140 And even when conscience must make a difficult choice, it is “a principle of common sense, that a less evil should be born to prevent a greater.”141 Campbell confidently assumed that religion cannot contradict common sense, for the latter, like conscience, always coincides with the purest spirit of the Gospel.142 Common sense may in fact be used to judge when religion has strayed from its true path. Liturgies written in a language other than that of the common people are obviously repugnant to common sense.143 Campbell thought it a self-evident axiom, as clear as the axioms of geometry, that belief cannot be compelled, and that common sense demands religious toleration.144 136 st, 1:371–2. 137 aul ms 650, section iii. Common sense also provides exceptions to the above laws, such as the right to kill in self-defence (aul ms 652, part ii). 138 fg, 1:89. 139 lstpe, 182. 140 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. 141 st, 2:146. 142 st, 2:203. 143 leh, 2:242. 144 aul ms 654, un-numbered page.

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Our common sense may even oblige us to defy laws that seek to compel belief and promote intolerance, for “by the common sense of mankind, undebauched by superstition, fanaticism, or party-spirit, virtue is acknowledged to be on the side of disobedience, and the meritorious character is he who in defiance of all its terrors dares to transgress an iniquitous statute.”145 Campbell’s strictures on certain religious practices, particularly those of the Roman Catholic church, suggest that common sense and custom do not always coincide. Bad customs often develop slowly and insensibly in the context of ignorance and superstition, and undermine the dictates of common sense.146 Nevertheless, nature has given us rational powers to correct these abuses. It seems then that Campbell’s catalogue of common sense truths was considerably more extensive than the tidy six-item list that appears in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, and that it included moral as well as metaphysical axioms. These truths pervaded his philosophy and underpinned the entire structure of his apologetic system. “That miracles are capable of proof from testimony,” he said at the end of the Dissertation on Miracles, “and that there is a full proof of this kind, for those said to have been wrought in support of Christianity; that whoever is moved, by Mr Hume’s ingenious argument, to assert, that no testimony can give sufficient evidence of miracles, admits, tho’ perhaps unconscious, in place of reason, a mere subtilty, which subverts the evidence of testimony, of history, and even of experience itself, giving him a determination to deny, what the common sense of mankind, founded in the primary principles of the understanding, would lead him to believe.”147 Though this sense of common sense may be considerably less rigorous than traditional readings of Campbell’s philosophy would prefer, it also brings Campbell closer to the intentions of his Aberdeen associates, particularly their concern to defeat the implications of Hume’s scepticism for all classes of knowledge, whether scientific, historical, or religious. Campbell usually upheld the epistemological realism of Common Sense philosophy – that is, the belief in our irreducible knowledge of the objective existence of bodies, minds, and metaphysical and moral truths. His occasional references to 145 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. In the same manuscript, Campbell argued that the civil penalties against Irish Catholics were without moral validity. He claimed that certain moral and social obligations (such as the obligation to honour promises) antedate all civil contracts, powers and obligations; civil laws, therefore, cannot suspend these natural obligations. 146 aul ms 652, p. 87. 147 dm, 288.

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the “regular and analogical make” of all languages148 even suggest that he agreed with Reid’s notion that the universal constants in the structure of human languages are founded in human nature itself. Nevertheless, there are notable differences between Campbell’s Common Sense philosophy and the philosophies of Reid and Beattie. First of all, Campbell’s list of common sense axioms was somewhat more cautious and carefully circumscribed than theirs. Despite some tantalizing hints, we simply do not know how extensive Campbell’s list of common sense axioms would have been had he chosen to treat the topic in a systematic manner. That he did not do so suggests either that he trusted Reid’s enumeration or that, in Newtonian fashion, he wished to claim no more of common sense than was necessary for his immediate epistemological and religious needs. It may even indicate that he gave more weight to Hume’s sceptical reservations than did Reid. Secondly, Campbell seems to have held a notion of perception that was occasionally at odds with the perceptual theory that Reid made fundamental to his own notion of Common Sense. Campbell tended to agree with Hume (and Locke) that the human mind is a passive receiver of sensory data. In his discussion of religious faith and persecution, he argued that “belief … is the necessary, not the voluntary consequence of the evidence; and strictly speaking, there is no more merit in the faith consequent upon the clear manifestation of the truth to the understanding … than there would be in the sight of a visible object set in broad daylight before a man who has the perfect use of his eyes. The reason is the same in both. The mind is passive. It does not act, but is acted upon.”149 Reid, of course, objected to the ideal system’s tendency to view the mind as passive. He argued that “the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being.”150 Campbell was much less willing than Reid to see any influence of the will upon perception and belief.151 Nevertheless, without more textual evidence it is difficult to determine how different Campbell and Reid were on this matter. Neither Beattie nor Campbell were as concerned with perceptual theory as was Reid, so it is not clear whether Campbell’s views on the passivity of the mind constitute a significant departure from the more commonly-accepted version of Common Sense. 148 149 150 151

pr, 259. aul ms 655, un-numbered page. Works of Thomas Reid, 1:221. aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page.

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Finally, and most perplexing, is Campbell’s relationship to Common Sense philosophy’s most popular champion, James Beattie. Beattie claimed that he and Campbell thought alike on all important matters.152 Yet Beattie’s belligerent misunderstanding of Hume’s philosophy (a philosophy for which Campbell had a deep understanding and sympathy) makes this claim problematic. Campbell read and corrected the manuscripts of all of Beattie’s philosophical publications, yet allowed Beattie’s misreadings and personal abuse of Hume to go to press. While Campbell may have believed that Beattie’s “masterly pen”153 and polemical liberties were suited to a popular audience, it is difficult to judge his relative sympathy for Hume’s philosophy as opposed to Beattie’s virulent antiscepticism. Neither Reid nor Campbell allowed themselves to indulge in Beattie’s type of ad hominem argument against Hume, nor would they dismiss the useful parts of Hume’s sceptical philosophy for fear of their moral implications, as Beattie was prone to do.154 Perhaps Campbell’s love for Beattie as a friend and his admiration for him as a moral teacher allowed the elder principal to forgive or overlook his younger associate’s shortcomings as a philosopher. Campbell’s purpose in writing was quite removed from that of his better-known Common Sense associates. Unlike Reid, he did not attempt to explicate the philosophy of Common Sense in a comprehensive manner. And unlike Beattie, he did not try to influence or reassure a popular audience. But there can be little question that Campbell was indebted to the Common Sense philosophy of his associates, particularly Reid with whom he was in close contact for seven crucial years. The similarity of their Common Sense philosophies indicates common origins. But this merely begs the question of who influenced whom. It seems likely that the currents of influence flowed in more than one direction, and involved all active members of the Wise Club.155 Campbell’s theory 152 See Beattie to William Creech, 28 October 1789 (aul ms 30/1/299). Campbell’s support of Beattie’s work can also be seen in fg, 1:429n. and 452. 153 fg, 1:453n. 154 For more on the Beattie problem, particularly Beattie’s distinctness from the other Aberdonians, see Paul B. Wood’s “Science and the Pursuit of Virtue in the Aberdeen Enlightenment.” 155 Reid, for example, took notes on “An Argument to prove that the Identity of a person does not consist in Consciousness against Mr Locke by Mr[r] G Campbel [sic],” an argument which later appeared in his own writings as the story of the brave officer who, as a boy, had robbed an orchard (cited in Charles Stewart-Robertson, “Thomas Reid and Pneumatology: The Text of the Old, The Tradition of the New,” in The Philosophy of Thomas Reid, ed. Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989], 397; the manuscript

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of persuasion and evidence constituted an important bridge between Common Sense philosophy and the philosophy of the Wise Club’s friendly adversary, David Hume. In fact, Campbell’s good-natured attack on Hume’s theory of testimony in A Dissertation on Miracles (1762) may have been the first printed expression of Aberdonian Common Sense. It reinforces the notion that the Aberdonians’ weapons against scepticism were often borrowed from the sceptic’s own forge. Of course, a case could be made that Hume himself drew Common Sense conclusions long before the Aberdonians did. In a sentiment almost perfectly reproduced later in Reid, Hume argued that “nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.”156 Furthermore, “’Tis happy … that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding,” for, “the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho’ he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason.”157 And, as if to confute his future opponents, Hume declared that “Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render’d unavoidable.”158 Nevertheless, Hume and the Aberdonians drew very different conclusions concerning the philosophical authority of our natural beliefs. Although Hume recognized that nature has imposed certain beliefs upon us, he held that we can claim nothing more of cause and effect than what custom teaches, and certainly nothing concerning ultimate causes or objective reality. Custom leads us to infer necessary connections in the world, but, “upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects.”159 He doggedly maintained “that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence notes are found in aul 6/3/5, fol. 3). Lloyd Bitzer counts citations in The Philosophy of Rhetoric to prove that Hume had a greater influence on Campbell than did Reid; see “Hume’s Philosophy in George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” 161. It is unclear what this quantitative argument can actually prove, for it does not say enough about how Campbell used Hume (Campbell often brought up Hume merely to disagree with him), and it does not take into account the personal (and thus largely undocumented) relationship between Campbell and Reid. 156 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 183. 157 Ibid., 187. 158 Ibid., 183. 159 Ibid., 165.

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shou’d be attended with [a cause].”160 Hume ultimately refused to acquiesce in the vulgar view of the world, though he understood that nature prevents us from being able to disown it. “’Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses … Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy.”161 Hume recognized the practical necessity of giving in to the demands of common sense in matters of moral philosophy, but he refused to do so in his speculative philosophy. The Aberdonians, in contrast, demanded a complete surrender to common sense both in moral and in metaphysical matters.162 The major difference, then, between Hume and the Aberdonians was their respective attitudes towards the possibility of recognizing metaphysical truth. Beattie’s zealous concern for the triumph of truth over doubt may seem extreme to modern readers, but it also endeared him to Campbell. Campbell claimed that “the sole and ultimate end of logic is the eviction of truth,” and that “logical truth consisteth in the conformity of our conceptions to their archetypes in the nature of things.”163 His rhetorical theory may have been grounded in human nature, but its purpose was directed towards something higher, for “as the soul is of heavenly extraction and the body of earthly, so the sense of the discourse ought to have its source in the invariable nature of truth and right, whereas the expression can derive its energy only from the arbitrary conventions of men, sources as unlike, or rather as widely different, as the breath of the Almighty and the dust of the earth.”164 Campbell clearly believed that there is such a thing as “universal truth,” and that we can discover it. This truth cannot be relative, for “the way of truth is one, the ways of error are infinite.”165 The Aberdonians further held that the propositions that nature obliges us to believe are not only binding upon us, but true as well. Hume would acknowledge only that they are binding. The Aberdonians, unlike Hume, were willing to make truth claims about ultimate causes – that is, about God. Not any kind of 160 Ibid., 172. 161 Ibid., 218. 162 David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 201. See also M.A. Stewart’s account of the differences between Hume and the Common Sense philosophers in “The Scottish Enlightenment,” in British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, ed. Stuart Brown (London: Routledge, 1996), 289. 163 pr, 33 and 35. 164 pr, 34. 165 pr, 271; see also lstpe, 229.

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God would do, however. The Aberdonians required a God with certain qualities, for it was not the mere existence of God that guaranteed the reliability of common sense dictates, but the moral qualities that they believed God must necessarily possess. A benevolent providence was as fundamental to their philosophy as it was to their religion. The Common Sense philosophers, like the Anglican divines before them, assumed that God does not deceive us in our natural beliefs, and that as a consequence we can have morally certain knowledge of God’s existence and moral nature through our natural lights. Hume, of course, would have viewed these assumptions as hopelessly circular. The Aberdonian common sense position, in contrast to Hume’s, was founded on the premises of natural religion.

natu ral r elig ion “Reason is natural Revelation,” said Locke, “whereby the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural Faculties.”166 This view held sway throughout the eighteenth century. Campbell’s assumptions about the being and attributes of God and about man’s ability to know God were shared by most eighteenthcentury British moderates. Natural religion did not belong to the deists alone, but was considered fundamental to Christianity itself. As Gerard said to his divinity students, “Natural religion is the foundation of revealed; its principles & the doctrines of morality are all advanced illustrated & improved in the Christian system.”167 Campbell taught his divinity students that As it is the same God (for there is no other) who is the author of nature and the author of revelation, who speaks to us in the one by his works, and in the other by his spirit, it becomes his creatures reverently to hearken to his voice, in whatever manner he is pleased to address them. Now the philosopher is by profession the interpreter of nature, that is of the language of God’s works, as the christian divine is the interpreter of scripture, that is of the language of God’s spirit. Nor do I mean to signify, that there is not in many things a coincidence in the discoveries made in these two different ways. The conclusions may be the same, though deduced, and justly deduced, from different premises. The result 166 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 698. 167 aul ms k 174, p. 317.

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may be one, when the methods of investigation are widely different. There is even a considerable utility in pursuing both methods, as what is clear in the one may serve to enlighten what is obscure in the other.168

What methods of investigation are appropriate to the philosopher of natural religion? “He argues from the effect to the cause, the only way in which we can argue intelligibly concerning the divine attributes.”169 Campbell was concerned, as ever, with the proper method of studying the being and works of God. This method had been learned from the natural philosopher, for “Spirit, which here comprises only the Supreme Being and the human soul, is surely as much included under the notion of natural object as body is, and is knowable to the philosopher purely in the same way, by observation and experience.”170 Such a method is appropriate because “the natural evidences of true theism are among the simplest, and at the same time the clearest deductions from the effect to the cause.”171 Eighteenth-century scientists and religious apologists, like their latitudinarian predecessors, believed that natural philosophy and religion were bound together by a common providential purpose. The great Newton himself had encouraged his followers to apply the methods of natural philosophy to the study of moral philosophy, “For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of Nature.”172 Natural knowledge and revealed knowledge were commonly held to be two parts of the same divine communication. Campbell likewise viewed natural religion and natural philosophy as aspects of the same providential economy. Campbell and his contemporaries agreed that God, by his very nature, provides human beings with sufficient knowledge about himself for their well-being. But eighteenth-century polemicists could not agree whether natural knowledge of God was by itself sufficient for human needs. Deists claimed that it was, whereas Christians (including moderate ones) maintained that a more specific revelation was required to supplement the general declarations of nature. The deists were certainly in the minority, but they had provoked a great many apologists, 168 169 170 171 172

lstpe, 86–7. pr, 378. pr, 53. lstpe, 88–9. Isaac Newton, Opticks (New York: Dover, 1952, 1979), 405.

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such as Bishop Butler, to seek detailed evidences of the foundations of Christianity in nature. The Aberdonians, like the Anglican divines before them, argued that the natural world itself proclaims the need for a saving revelation and that it provides hints as to what this revelation must contain in order to be authentic. Campbell maintained that nature reveals much about the character of God. The sublime majesty and wonder of the created world tells us that we ought to reverence and fear God.173 It also confirms that God is economical in his works, neither contradicting nor repeating himself unnecessarily.174 The good order of the natural world is reflected even in our moral nature, that is, in our constitutional common sense, which shows us our duties towards God, ourselves, and others, for “the cause of God can be no other than the cause of piety and virtue.”175 The law of nature, which is “engraven on the tables of the human heart by the finger of the Creator,”176 allows us to recognize that the teachings of Christ corroborate and strengthen the obligations of natural religion, a clear mark of their authenticity as revelation. Campbell argued, however, that no revelation can give us more information about our natural rights than nature itself does, nor can revelation oppose those natural rights.177 The moral obligations described by Cicero, for example, take precedence before all other human conventions and governments, though they are ultimately the same as those espoused by Scripture.178 Most of Campbell’s remarks on natural religion are derived from his discussion of our natural moral duties, particularly those concerning religious toleration. But we should not conclude from his lack of systematic treatment that natural religion was otherwise unimportant to him. Natural theology simply did not fall within the scope of his publications or lectures. Campbell explained to his divinity students that natural religion was properly the subject of their moral philosophy course, which they had taken in the final year of their arts degree. He assumed that his students were sufficiently grounded in moral philosophy that his own 173 st, 1:324. 174 st, 1:372. Eighteenth-century natural philosophers generally held to the principle of “least action” – that God’s creation is always as efficient as possible; see Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 30. 175 aul ms 652, part i, un-numbered page. 176 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. 177 aul ms 654, part iv, un-numbered page. 178 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page.

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teaching could presuppose the premises of natural religion without having to make them continually explicit. How then can we reconstruct this important part of Campbell’s thought without direct textual evidence? We can turn to the texts of his professorial associates, who taught natural religion to Scottish undergraduates. James Beattie, one of Campbell’s closest friends, lectured on natural religion as part of his moral philosophy course at Marischal. His lectures were published in the early 1790s as the Elements of Moral Science. Beattie taught his students that the Christian revelation rests on the proofs of natural religion, for “we do not prove from Scripture, that God exists.”179 Only after we have determined, by means of rational proofs, the being and attributes of God, can we judge the truth or falsehood of any purported revelation. The proofs of the existence of God, said Beattie, are not difficult to discover. He recommended a combination of a priori and a posteriori arguments that, upon examination, would easily recommend themselves to common sense. The proofs of God’s existence also suggest some of his necessary attributes, including his spiritual nature, self-existence, oneness, omnipotence, unchangingness, infinite wisdom, goodness, and justice.180 Beattie warned his students of the dangers of forgetting these truths, because “atheism is utterly subversive of morality, and consequently of happiness.”181 Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology, also delivered to undergraduates, painted a similar picture. Like Beattie and Campbell, he argued that much of our knowledge of God is derived analogically from our understanding of the human mind.182 He stressed the importance of this kind of knowledge, for “there can be no rational piety without just notions of the perfections and providence of God. It is no doubt true that Revelation exhibits all the truths of Natural Religion, but it is no less true that reason must be employed to judge of that revelation; whether it comes from God.”183 “That Man is surely best prepared for the study of revealed Religion,” he maintained, “who has just and Rational Sentiments 179 James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, 2 vols, 3d ed. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and John Fairbairn, 1817), 1:279. 180 Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, 1:292–8. Beattie also maintained that Scripture is necessary to correct and improve our views concerning God’s nature (1:293). 181 Ibid., 1:278–82 and 292–8. 182 Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology, ed. Elmer H. Duncan (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), 2. 183 Reid, Natural Theology, 1.

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of natural Religion.”184 Reid argued that the existence of God is proclaimed by heaven and earth, as well as by the structure of our minds, and therefore requires no additional proofs, though he nevertheless provided a series of a priori and a posteriori arguments. He divided God’s naturallyknown attributes into two categories: natural and moral. Thus we can have certain knowledge of God’s necessary existence, eternity, immensity, unlimited powers, perfect knowledge and wisdom, spirituality, unity, and immutable happiness. In addition, we can be sure of his moral veracity, love of virtue, and justice. Reid argued that without natural and rational religion, Revelation would degenerate into one or the other of the eighteenth century’s leading evils, that is, superstition or wild enthusiasm. Natural religion is also essential for meeting basic human needs, for without religion mankind would be plunged into anarchy and despair.185 The natural religion of Reid and Beattie was entirely compatible with prevailing eighteenth-century views. And since their lectures were the very ones that Campbell recommended to his divinity students as foundations of their Christian studies,186 we may safely infer that Campbell’s view of natural religion would have been very much the same. Natural religion provided a necessary foundation for the Aberdonians’ Common Sense philosophy. Although the axioms of common sense are known by instinct rather than by reason, they are not arbitrary, for they have been implanted by the benevolent Creator. The fact that these principles of common sense can be empirically verified – that is, observed a posteriori to exist in human nature – suggests that they provide us with an eternal moral standard without obstructing our free will. In the eyes of Campbell, these natural dictates agreed with the purest teachings of the Gospel. Like Butler, the Aberdonians were convinced that they could reasonably demonstrate the truth of Christianity by showing its conformity with what natural religion leads us to expect from an authentic revelation. Campbell’s thought fit very well into the eighteenth century. He struggled with the same problems of knowledge, particularly of religious 184 Thomas Reid, Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and Papers on Natural Religion, SelfGovernment, Natural Jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 109. 185 Reid, Natural Theology, 2, 8, 10–16, 63–89. 186 lstpe, 84–7. “Now the philosopher is by profession the interpreter of nature, that is of the language of God’s works, as the christian divine is the interpreter of scripture, that is of the language of God’s spirit … The result may be one, when the methods of investigation are widely different” (87).

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knowledge, that had motivated seventeenth-century Anglican divines (as well as John Locke) to develop an empirical approach to natural and religious evidences. Campbell’s solutions were much like theirs. His philosophies of human nature, of evidence, of Common Sense, and of natural religion were all consistent with the central concerns of the Enlightenment. But the same problems of knowledge that had encouraged the latitudinarian divines to develop their probabilistic theory of evidence had also encouraged the deists to challenge the Christian evidences and wage war over miracles. Campbell was still fighting that war nearly a century later, and his greatest adversary, David Hume, was as much an heir of the late seventeenth-century debate concerning the limits of human knowledge as was Campbell. Campbell’s relationship to Hume was remarkably complex. He was completely familiar with all of Hume’s writings, and frequently cited them as authoritative sources, even on matters of religion.187 Although he called Hume’s treatment of miracles “one of the most dangerous attacks that have been made on our religion,” he wrote, “The piece itself, like every other work of Mr Hume, is ingenious; but its merit is more of the oratorical kind than of the philosophical. The merit of the author, I acknowledge, is great. The many useful volumes he hath published of history, and on criticism, politics, and trade, have justly procur’d him, with all persons of taste and discernment, the highest reputation as a writer. What pity it is, that this reputation should have been sullied by attempts to undermine the foundations both of natural religion, and of reveal’d!”188 Still, Campbell had a good sense of his personal debt to Hume: “For my own part, I think it a piece of justice in me, to acknowledge the obligations I owe the author, before I enter on the propos’d examination. I have not only been much entertain’d and instructed by his works; but, if I am possess’d of any talent in abstract reasoning, I am not a little indebted to what he hath written on human nature, for the improvement of that talent. If therefore, in this tract, I have refuted Mr Hume’s Essay, the greater share of the merit is perhaps to be ascrib’d to Mr Hume himself.”189 Campbell certainly believed that it 187 See, for example, st, 1:325, where Campbell used Hume’s Natural History of Religion approvingly. Campbell cited virtually all of Hume’s works in the course of his writings. 188 dm, v–vi. 189 dm, vi–vii. Campbell expressed similar sentiments in his only known letter to Hume (25 June 1762), where he not only demonstrated a very intimate knowledge of Hume’s works but admitted he had the highest opinion of his adversary and had even been forced to admire Hume’s character despite their very different principles (nls ms 23154, n. 11).

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was necessary to oppose the moral and religious implications of Hume’s scepticism, but this does not mean that he was fundamentally hostile to Hume. It does not even mean that he was hostile to Hume’s scepticism – just the degree of it. In Campbell’s eyes, Hume’s failing was his refusal to see the natural limits of scepticism in light of the dictates of common sense and the probabilistic evidences available in the moral realm. Hume’s scepticism was otherwise a very useful instrument, and Hume a skillful wielder of it. Campbell paid tribute to his philosophical master by sometimes turning that scepticism against the sceptic himself, as in the matters of memory and testimony.190 Campbell and his Aberdeen associates (with the exception of Beattie) were at once deeply influenced by Hume’s philosophy and yet opposed to its extreme consequences. Campbell regarded Hume’s philosophy as dangerous precisely because it was, in so many ways, like his own. Hume’s genius and the profound competence of his methodology made his departures from the true path all the more seductive. The Aberdeen Philosophical Society’s intense interest in Hume suggests that he effectively challenged their most deeply-held assumptions concerning the nature of the knowable. At the same time he provided a methodology and analysis of human nature that, because of its comprehensiveness, insightfulness, and cleverness, they (apart from Beattie) could not do without.191 Hume was simply too important to ignore. This was to become painfully apparent when Hume applied his metaphysical scepticism to the practical evidences of the Christian religion.

190 Some of this tension is also evident in the mind of Alexander Gerard, the man who most resembled Campbell. In one of his sermons, Gerard used Hume’s premise, that “all arguments concerning matter of fact are ultimately founded on experience,” to reject Hume’s historical characterization of the pastoral office; see Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 2:344. Gerard added that Hume’s “infidelity will probably rob him of some part of the attention and regard, which his philosophical genius and taste would have otherwise commanded from the curious and intelligent” (2:438). 191 Lewis Ulman comes to similar conclusions concerning the ambiguity of the Wise Club’s attitude towards Hume; see The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758– 1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 51.

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5

Philosophy in Practice

George Campbell intended his philosophy to be practical rather than theoretical. He dealt with problems that were very much in the eighteenth-century mainstream, such as the nature of effective communication, the possibility of belief in testimony concerning miracles, the standards of historical proofs and explanations, and the uses of biblical criticism. But as we have seen, all of these practical problems were grounded in a well-reasoned, though not fully explicated, theory of human nature and of evidence. Testimony was of particular philosophic concern for Campbell, because “to this species of evidence … we are first immediately indebted for all the branches of philology, such as, history, civil, ecclesiastic, and literary; grammar, languages, jurisprudence, and criticism; to which I may add revealed religion, as far as it is to be considered as a subject of historical and critical inquiry, and so discoverable by natural means.”1 Campbell believed that critical philosophy was the beginning of Christian wisdom. He and his moderate Christian associates held that, in an age of enlightenment and of growing infidelity, religious belief was obliged to answer its critics by grounding itself in evidences and empirical probabilities. Natural knowledge had to precede revealed knowledge, in order of time if not of importance. “Testimony,” said James Beattie in summary, “is the grand external evidence of Christianity.”2 David Hume’s strictures on the Christian evidences pierced the very heart of the Aberdonians’ Christian apology, and could not be safely 1 pr, 56. 2 James Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1776), 84–5.

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ignored. Alexander Gerard argued that “there is a credulous, and there is a sceptical temper; they are founded in opposite turns of understanding: but these opposite turns generally imply the same intellectual weakness, an incapacity of perceiving the force of evidence quickly and precisely.”3 The natural proofs of Christianity, he continued, are as clear as a Euclidian demonstration. He therefore placed the burden of disproving Christianity’s obvious evidences upon unbelievers: “all men are obliged, before they can reasonably disbelieve the gospel, to go through an inquiry which will put it in their power to decide with understanding, concerning the fact upon which our present argument depends.”4 Consequent failure to be impressed by Christianity’s ample evidences implied a weakness of philosophical understanding, or perhaps of ordinary common sense. The Aberdonian philosophers, with the exception of Beattie, recognized Hume’s uncommon philosophical abilities. Hume’s attacks on the Christian evidences were, therefore, all the more unaccountable. His failure to believe seemed to challenge the Aberdonians’ claim that our inborn common sense provides a universal standard for judging evidence. How then did the Aberdonians deal with Hume? They sought to demonstrate that the evidences in favour of Christianity are of the same kind as the evidences for any historical claim. “Now as the miracles,” said Campbell, “which were wrought in support of our religion, with us stand on the evidence of testimony conveyed in history, and as the fulfilment of most of the prophecies urged in support of the same cause, are vouched to us in the same manner, the argument with regard to miracles is entirely, and with regard to prophecy is in a great measure of the historical kind … Whereas therefore with regard to the performance of such a miracle, there can be only one question, and a mere question of fact.”5 Campbell accounted for Hume’s unaccountable unbelief by claiming that he was mistaken, first and foremost, in matters of fact. This was a compelling strategy as far as most eighteenth-century minds were concerned, though, as we shall see, it did not entirely penetrate to the heart of their differences.

3 Alexander Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 1:226. 4 Alexander Gerard, Dissertations on Subjects Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1766), 467. 5 lstpe, 93–4.

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the problem of believing miracles Miracles were the cornerstone of the empirical structure of eighteenthcentury Christian apology. They were the basis of scriptural authority (that is, of Revelation) and as such constituted perhaps the most important battleground in the Enlightenment’s war over religion. Christian moderates responded to the taunts of their deistical and sceptical contemporaries by arguing that the miracles upon which the Christian religion was originally founded were not merely objects of faith, but also unimpeachable historical facts. The triumph of Newtonian science at the end of the seventeenth century made respectable the notion that most events in the world happen according to fixed and uniform natural laws. Rather than account for the particular intentions of God, natural philosophers preferred to elucidate the general expressions of God’s will embodied in the natural universe. This, however, created new problems for the majority of natural philosophers who remained convinced Christians. Miracles and other acts of particular providence had always been important supports of Christian belief, and had even provided causal explanations of the inexplicable events of everyday life. But now that acts of particular providence had been removed from ordinary life,6 what was to be their status in the realm of Christian belief? Christian philosophers such as John Locke took upon themselves the apologetic task of reintegrating biblical miracles into their mechanistic world-view, an effort which helped to ignite the eighteenth-century deistical war over miracles. The miracles controversy brought together the major philosophical issues of the day: problems concerning the nature of knowledge, evidence and belief, the religious implications of the scientific world-view, and the proper boundaries between general and particular providence. The probabilistic approach to natural and religious evidences, which had been developed by seventeenth-century Anglican divines, was severely tested on this eighteenth-century battleground. By the middle of the eighteenth century the miracles debate had already passed its zenith, though controversial pamphlets continued to be published in great numbers. Virtually every major enlightened figure, and 6 For Protestants, the exclusion of miracles from everyday life included the denial of transubstantiation (as in Tillotson’s famous discourse) and the erection of lightning rods against what many still considered to be acts of particular providence.

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a host of minor ones, had something to say on the matter. When David Hume belatedly entered the lists against belief in miracles, it was not because he had discovered some new argument against miracles themselves, but because he realized that his novel theories concerning our knowledge of cause and effect and of the laws of nature had undermined the foundation of the moderate Christians’ evidential belief in miracles. Hume’s essay “Of Miracles” appeared as a two-part section in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which was originally published in 1748 under the title Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. In his only known letter to Campbell, Hume explained the origin of the essay’s central argument: I was walking in the Cloysters of the Jesuites College of La Fleche (a Town in which I pass’d two Years of my Youth) and was engag’d in conversation with a Jesuit of some Parts & Learning, who was relating to me & urging some nonsensical Miracle perform’d lately in their Convent; when I was tempted to dispute against him, and as my Head was full of the Topics of my Treatise of Human Nature, which I was at that time composing, this Argument immediately occur’d to me, and I thought it very much gravell’d my Companion. But at last he observ’d to me, that it was impossible for that Argument to have any Solidity because it operated equally against the Gospel as the catholic Miracles: Which Observation I thought proper to admit as a sufficient Answer.7

“This Argument,” concerning the balancing of experience against the claims of testimony, developed out of the larger argument of the Enquiry, which was itself a popular reworking of the more detailed Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40). Hume’s main contention in these works was that our understanding of the world – that is, our understanding of such notions as cause and effect – is the product not of reason or of intuition but of personal experience. Having observed the constant conjunction of two ideas in the past, we form a habit of expecting them to be so conjoined in the future. “All reasonings concerning matter of fact,” said Hume, “seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses.”8 Thus our belief in any matter of fact, even concerning an event 7 aul ms 3214/7. 8 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 26.

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beyond the range of our personal experience, must depend upon its conformity with our customary expectations of the course of nature. “Though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages, yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions.”9 We believe a particular testimonial claim only in proportion to its conformity with our experience of the world. A purported event which contradicts our experience is properly held in suspicion, which is to say that it does not become an object of belief, since “a wise man … proportions his belief to the evidence.”10 The question of miracles, as with all testimonial claims, is merely a question of probability, of balancing our general experience of nature against the likelihood of the testimony being credible. Hume implicitly argued that the reality of miracles is not at issue, for we cannot perceive ultimate causes. At issue is the believability of purported events that contradict our experience of nature. A miracle, according to Hume, is an event that necessarily violates this uniform experience, and is therefore as unbelievable an event as can be imagined.11 The body of experience that has established the laws of nature is the only measure by which we can judge the believability of particular testimonial claims, including those which seek to contradict this uniform experience.12 Hume maintained, as a maxim of good philosophy, that we must always reject the less probable of two opposing evidences, for “a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger.”13 In the case of miracles, we must believe either that the testimony is true or that the claimant is deceived or lying. Such a contest between our experience of nature and our experience of the reliability of witnesses is not of long duration, for “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.”14 Every miracle claim is necessarily “opposed by an infinite number of witnesses,”15 which overwhelm the probability of the individual claim. The ontological possibility of miracles aside, Hume 9 Ibid., 45. 10 Ibid., 110. 11 Ibid., 114. 12 Ibid., 127. 13 Ibid., 109. 14 Ibid., 115–16. 15 Ibid., 121.

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asserted that there never has been sufficient evidence for believing any miracle.16 The remainder of Hume’s essay sought to justify this claim with historical and satirical arguments. Campbell’s objections to Hume’s miracles argument mirrored his objections to Hume’s epistemology. Like the Common Sense realists, Campbell claimed that the relations between ideas in our understanding reflect the real relations that subsist between external things. In other words, cause and effect relationships are real and independent of the mind that perceives them. Campbell rejected Hume’s peculiar notion of experience. In his haste to dethrone reason in favour of experience, Hume had forgotten that even personal experience depends upon the veracity of memory, the reliability of which has no guarantor but our common sense. Thus even Hume’s argument from experience must be meaningless without the authority of common sense. Hume had altogether misjudged the source from which we gain our understanding of the uniform course of nature. He had supposed that this understanding derives from our personal experience, when in fact our individual acquaintance with the course of nature is extremely limited. We depend upon the testimony of others for our understanding of the world long before we have experienced even the smallest part of its operations for ourselves.17 Our experience of the uniform course of nature, therefore, depends upon a source whose veracity, like that of memory, cannot be empirically demonstrated. Campbell thought that Hume had fundamentally misunderstood the psychology of belief. The sceptic had assumed that testimony must be disbelieved until the weight of probability tips in its favour. In sceptical (or perhaps legal) fashion, Hume had suggested that the burden of proof must always rest upon those who testify in favour of such an unlikely event as a miracle. Campbell reversed this premise, arguing that one must always presume the truth of testimony, including testimony for miracles, unless one can find sufficient cause for doubt.18 He claimed that this presumption is founded in human nature itself, since the Aberdonians considered faith in testimony to be a necessary precondition of all human knowledge. Hume had supposed that human minds begin their quest for knowledge by being sceptical of the testimony of 16 Ibid., 116. 17 dm, 39. 18 dm, 15–16. We may recall that both Hume and Campbell received some legal training.

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others, and only gradually come to believe testimonial claims as they gain experience of the world. Campbell argued that Hume had got things the wrong way round. Human beings are in fact naturally credulous. Children believe whatever they are told, and only learn to doubt certain testimonial claims as they gain experience. Hume’s assumptions about the nature of belief contradicted not only the observed facts of human nature, but also the benevolent design evident in God’s creation. Campbell’s summary of Hume’s “Of Miracles” argument early in A Dissertation on Miracles suggests that he objected particularly to Hume’s notion that belief is determined by subtracting one kind of experience from an opposing one – that is, by deducting the testimony concerning a particular event from our general experience of nature and proportioning our belief to the remainder. This arithmetical notion of evidence was repugnant not only to the Common Sense notion of testimony, but to the moderate Christian conception of moral argument, which placed great weight on the character and disinterestedness of individual witnesses. Campbell argued that a few credible witnesses are worth more than a multitude of doubtful or prejudiced ones.19 He thought Hume’s balance of probabilities argument led him to be unfairly hard on testimony regarding miracles, for he made demands of such testimony that he would not make of testimony concerning events, however rare, that fall within the scope of human experience. Campbell denied Hume’s notion that testimony and experience are directly opposing forms of evidence and that one could be neatly subtracted from the other. On the contrary, “A general conclusion from experience is … but presumptive and indirect; sufficient testimony for a particular fact is direct and positive evidence.”20 “In what regards single facts,” said Campbell in summary, “testimony is more adequate evidence than any conclusions from experience.”21 19 fg, 1:454. 20 dm, 46; cf. pr, 82 and 84. Hume was unconvinced. In a letter to Edward Gibbon of 18 March 1776, he wrote, “Where a Supposition is so contrary to common Sense, any positive Evidence of it ought never to be regarded” (The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932], 2:310–11). 21 pr, 54; see also dm, 35–6. Hume seems to have anticipated this. He argued that incredible testimony actually destroys itself. Our usual belief in testimony causes us to reject the incredible testimony that would imperil the ordinary testimony upon which our knowledge depends (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 121).

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Hume and Campbell agreed that the problem of miracles was really a problem of evidence, an attitude that tied them both to the major concerns of the Enlightenment. They further agreed that the issue must take into account certain epistemological – or perhaps psychological – considerations, such as the observed nature of human belief. Why then did they disagree as to the reasonable possibility of belief in miracles? Obviously, the question of miracles was for them considerably more than an abstract problem – miracles symbolized their deep-seated religious differences. But without looking this far ahead, we may also observe that they were not arguing about precisely the same thing. Although each disputant put forward compelling arguments and found weaknesses in the other, they did not establish a common definition of the object in dispute. Hume claimed (and Campbell agreed) that, “the chief obstacle … to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms.”22 Yet neither contestant really addressed the problem of semantics, even though their central arguments depended on definition. We must, therefore, consider their distinct conceptions of miracles in order to understand why they failed to agree.

the problem of defining miracles The meaning of the term “miracle” was as ambiguous in the eighteenth century as it is today. In modern popular usage, “miracle” often signifies no more than a wonderful or remarkable event. The eighteenth-century understanding of the term had considerably wider signification, but it also had to bear the weight of new scientific and probabilistic conceptions of natural providence. In order to provide a context for the eighteenth-century miracles debate, we must consider the normative eighteenth-century meaning of the term before we examine Hume’s and Campbell’s particular concepts. Nathan Bailey’s early eighteenth-century Dictionarium Britannicum (1730) defined miracles as “works effected in a manner unusual or different from the common and regular method of the Almighty Providence, by the Interposition either of himself, or of some intelligent Agent, superior to Man, for the Evidence and proving of some particular Doctrine, or in Attestation to the Authority of some particular 22 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 61.

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Person or Persons,”23 a definition lifted almost verbatim from Samuel Clarke’s enormously influential Boyle Lecture of 1705. Samuel Johnson considered a miracle to be “a wonder; something above human power;” or “an effect above human or natural power, performed in attestation of some truth.”24 Eighteenth-century miracle definitions included three common but distinct elements: (1) reference to an event contrary to the ordinary course of nature, and (2) ascription of agency to some supernatural power, (3) for the purpose of proving a divine truth or favour. Most eighteenth-century men of letters would have agreed to a definition of miracles that included some combination of these three elements. Nevertheless, eighteenth-century treatments of miracles differed from one another according to the weight that the disputants chose to put on the various components of the definition. The Newtonian emphasis on the uniformity of general providence made the first element of the definition much more compelling than it had traditionally been, but also raised the standard of proof. Even moderate Christian apologists agreed that acts of particular providence were the rarest of events, done only for the greatest of purposes. The second element of the definition was probably the oldest, and certainly remained current in the eighteenth century, though eighteenth-century Christian apologists tended not to accept a supernatural claim unless it was accompanied with compelling evidence that the ordinary course of nature had in fact been interrupted. The significant exception were Evangelicals (called “enthusiasts” by the moderates), who claimed inner or private miracles and revelations that were not subject to verification, and were thus held in suspicion by most moderate Christians.25 The third element of the definition – that miracles must attest some significant point of religion – was given particular emphasis by moderate Christians who believed that it would minimize the violations of general providence, and preserve the evidential character of miracles from the violence done by enthusiasts to objective truth. 23 Nathan Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969). The definition given in the first edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, 3:251, closely followed Bailey’s definition. 24 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London: W. Strahan, 1755). 25 See, for example, the abstract of a Wise Club discussion in which the members debated whether belief in the interruption of the fixed course of nature by the deity, especially for the purpose of a personal revelation, makes one an enthusiast; AUL MS 37, fol. 186.

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Hume placed the burden upon the first element of the definition – that a purported miracle, to be worthy of regard, must clearly violate the ordinary course of providence. This, according to his philosophical premises, was the only aspect of the definition of miracles that could possibly fall within the realm of human observation. However, he was not content to follow Samuel Clarke and other eighteenth-century apologists in defining a miracle as an event that was merely unusual or different from ordinary providence. Hume defined a miracle as “a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.”26 Hume in effect argued that the very definition of a miracle (assuming the definition hinges on an extreme interpretation of the first element) is the best proof against a miracle claim. If an event falls within the ordinary scope of human experience, it cannot be a miracle, for, “nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature.”27 Again, “there must … be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation.”28 The second and third elements of the definition of a miracle are therefore irrelevant unless the first is clearly established, and the first element virtually negates the possibility of rational belief in miracles. Even supposing that the fact of a miracle were established, it would be a singular effect with which the mind would be unable to associate a cause. In any case, the sceptical enquirer could proceed no further. This was enough to satisfy Hume the epistemologist that miracle claims are inherently unworthy of critical consideration, but it was not enough to satisfy the philosopher of human nature concerning the psychological or sociological significance of miracle claims. Hume was not oblivious to the religious importance of the other components of the definition. “A miracle,” he said, “may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.”29 He completed the definition as follows: “Every miracle … pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions 26 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 114. For the significance of Clarke’s definition of miracles, see Ezio Vailati, Leibniz & Clarke: A Study of Their Correspondence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 140ff. 27 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 115. 28 Ibid., 115. 29 Ibid., 115n.

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(and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system.”30 The latter part of this statement highlights another common eighteenth-century assumption: that evidence for one religion simultaneously constitutes evidence against all other religions. “If a miracle,” said Hume, “proves a doctrine to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as incompatible as the doctrines.”31 Hume was as aware as his Christian opponents of the significance of miracles to exclusive religious claims. But more than the moderate Christians, he also saw the significance of miracles to the philosophy of human nature. Miracles highlight certain aspects of human psychology, such as the compelling human need to assign causes even to events that have not occurred with sufficient frequency for the associative principles of the mind to create their own causal connections. “It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature.”32 Only philosophers understand that the ultimate causes of such prodigies are as unknowable as the ultimate causes of everyday events. However serious Hume’s intentions may have been, he used a great deal of his characteristically subtle humour to achieve his purpose. He often used the term “miracle” in an intentionally loose manner: for example, “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.”33 Undoubtedly, Hume’s loose employment of the term was meant to parody the very notion of miracles. Campbell was fully aware of Hume’s devices, and took him gently to task: “The style, we find, is figurative, and the author is all the while amusing both his readers and himself with an unusual application of a familiar term.”34 Campbell criticized Hume for sometimes using the term “miraculous” as a synonym for “improbable,” so as to always reject the more improbable event. But if miracles 30 Ibid., 121. 31 Letters of David Hume, 1:350–1. In the same letter, Hume stated, “I never read of a miracle in my life, that was not meant to establish some new point of religion” (350). 32 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 69. 33 Ibid., 115–16. 34 dm, 101.

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are merely improbable events, Campbell suggested, then miracles must happen all the time, for history is full of improbabilities.35 Campbell’s conception of miracles was, in point of emphasis, very different from Hume’s. Whereas Hume focused his attention primarily on the first element of the definition, Campbell (like other moderate Christians) gave considerable attention to the second and particularly the third elements. As we have seen, Campbell did not consider the first element of the definition to be an insurmountable barrier to belief. He objected to Hume’s arbitrary distinction between what is contrary to experience and what is merely not conformable to it (that is, what has not been observed or recorded before). He suggested that, as far as experience goes, there is no meaningful difference between the terms, and that as a consequence there is no inherently greater presumption against believing testimony concerning the miraculous than believing testimony concerning the merely extraordinary or unfamiliar.36 Campbell was reluctant to agree with Hume that miracles were really violations of the laws of nature, rather than instances of the over-riding of ordinary laws by hitherto unknown natural laws.37 But the difference between Hume and Campbell on this point was more than a matter of terminology. Hume believed that we cannot observe the laws of nature directly; we can observe only constant conjunctions. We habitually come to expect the same conjunctions in the future, and thus construct the laws of nature in our minds. Any knowledge we have of God as a causal principle must come from the uniform effects of nature.38 Any break in the constant conjunctions merely destroys the mental construct. Thus a miracle, even if demonstrated, could reveal nothing about God. Campbell, in contrast, believed that we have sure knowledge of external causal relationships by means of our common sense, that they exist independently of our minds, and that they are in no danger of collapse if occasionally suspended for higher providential purposes. Though we discover universal laws by experience, we also 35 dm, 99–101. 36 dm, 47–52. On Campbell’s objection to Hume’s argument that a miracle is contrary to experience, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The ‘Indian Prince’ in Miracle Arguments of Hume and His Predecessors and Early Critics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 31, no. 3 (1998), 212–18. 37 aul ms 651, pp. 10–11. In a note to the third edition of A Dissertation on Miracles, Campbell suggested that the spiritual world is governed by laws with which we are not familiar, laws which might account for occasional suspensions of the inferior laws of the material universe (st, 1:86n.). 38 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 129.

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intuitively recognize that the laws of nature stand whether or not they are in every case observed. Campbell did not believe that purposeful departures from the otherwise uniform laws of nature detracted from the dignity or reliability of those laws. Campbell and other moderates did what Hume found philosophically unacceptable – they fell back on a conception of God that assumed his mastery over both general and particular providences. They assumed, like Locke, that the believability of miracles is tied to the great purposes for which they are supposedly wrought. In fact, Campbell objected to Hume’s central argument – that the greater of two miracles ought always to be rejected – on the grounds that a greater miracle is a clearer indication of a great and noble purpose, and therefore of an event worthy of God.39 Hume, who could have no reliable knowledge of the nature or perhaps even the existence of God, could never prefer a supernatural explanation to a natural one. The merely improbable still falls within the realm of experience, whereas belief in the miraculous would seem to require knowledge or faith from without the realm of experience. Campbell, in contrast, believed that we can know much about the nature and intentions of God by means of natural knowledge in conjunction with common sense. Like the seventeenth-century latitudinarians, Campbell and the moderates expected to find limited examples of particular providence in support of a necessary revelation.40 Campbell’s definition of a miracle was thus necessarily pointed at a supernatural element. A miracle, he said, “implies the interposal of an invisible agent, which is not implied in [a merely extraordinary event].”41 We may already observe a significant lapse in parity between Hume’s and Campbell’s definitions, for Hume would not even allow such an implication. Hume’s theory of knowledge does not permit speculation concerning the cause of a unique event. A contradiction of the ordinary course of nature can imply no more than the forfeiture of a natural law. Campbell was more predisposed to consider the divine meaning of an event, “for if the interposal of the Deity be the proper solution of the phenomenon, why recur to natural causes?”42 Unlike Hume, he could not think of a miracle without 39 dm, 95. 40 Locke, for example, argued that the third element of the definition of a miracle actually makes the existence of miracles more believable, because it leads us to anticipate them; see An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 667. 41 dm, 51. 42 dm, 60n.

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considering all three elements of the definition. Campbell’s natural religion demonstrated that natural knowledge about God is insufficient for human purposes. He therefore expected that God would reveal his divine purpose for humanity in a great and unmistakable historical event. This assumption made the second and third elements of the miracle definition indispensable, and the first part a considerably less formidable obstacle to belief. According to moderate Christians, the first element of the definition can be vindicated by natural (that is, historical) evidences, while the second element is virtually self-evident. It is the third element of the definition – that a miracle is meant to support a divine communication – that requires the most careful attention. This is apparent from the epigraph that Campbell placed on the title-page of his Dissertation, which quotes John 10:25: “The works that I do in my Father’s name, they bear witness of me.” In Campbell’s mind, belief in a miracle, once gained, must necessarily carry with it belief in a corresponding supernatural communication. Campbell’s natural theology assumed that God never interrupts the course of nature in vain – that is, without attesting some divine truth that could not be communicated in any other manner. He also agreed with Hume that a new religion would be difficult, if not impossible, to accept without such a divine mark of favour. Campbell assumed that since God must reveal his will to mankind with the support of appropriate miracles, a critical philosopher’s chief task is to decide which among the historical miracle-claims is most believable. Once the authenticity of a miracle, or set of miracles, has been verified, one can and must accept the revelation that accompanies the miracle. Christianity, argued Campbell, is most probable in its evidences and most conformable in character to the expectations of nature as determined by experience and common sense. It is the only religion in human history (having superseded the Hebrew religion) whose claims have been founded on well-attested miracles.43 It stands in stark contrast to the obviously false claims of Mahomet and the Roman Catholic church. Christianity, therefore, ought to be followed in its simplest and purest form without unreasonable expectation of further divine signs or proofs, for once a revelation has been well-founded, ordinary providence is sufficient for daily life. 43 dm, 124 and 159.

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Hume and Campbell’s debate over miracles was about much more than just miracles. They were contesting the nature of religious belief itself. Hume was implicitly willing to abandon revealed religion if satisfactory evidences could not be found. Campbell assumed that a satisfactory answer is necessarily within the grasp of the rational mind. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Hume placed the burden of proving a miracle on the believer, while Campbell placed the burden of disproving Christian miracles on the unbeliever. Campbell went so far as to declare that his greatest advantage over Hume was being on the side of truth, while Hume’s only advantage was his native ingenuity.44 His fundamental premise was that “God has neither in natural nor reveal’d religion, left himself without a witness; but has in both given moral and external evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence the gainsayer, and to render the atheist and the unbeliever without excuse. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to examine.”45 Campbell assumed that the Christian evidences demand investigation, while Hume, working from the premise that miracles are inherently unbelievable, felt no compulsion to examine every (or any) miracle claim. In defiance of Hume, Campbell confidently declared that testing Christianity’s claims in the stark light of reason only demonstrates their strength and consistency.46 He was certainly right in assuming that the vast majority of his readers would be sympathetic to his own presuppositions and to his manner of defining miracles. Hume, on the other hand, had to do all the work of convincing Christian readers to disregard their native prejudices concerning the possibility of believing miracles. Hume not only rejected the moderates’ assumptions concerning natural religion, but wondered what a proven contradiction of the observed laws of nature could possibly signify. The moderates, using epistemological and empirical criteria less rigid than Hume’s, believed that the fact of a miracle can be known with moral certainty, and solely by means of natural knowledge. The significance of such an event, however, can only be understood with knowledge from outside of nature. We must, therefore, leave consideration of the religious significance of miracles to the final part of this study. 44 dm, 6. It is unclear what motives Campbell was implicitly attributing to Hume. 45 dm, 3–4. 46 dm, 284.

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the philosophical historian The historical evidences concerning the miracles of Jesus and of the Apostles not only constituted a cornerstone of the moderates’ religious belief, but also revealed a great deal about the original constitution of the Christian church. “A considerable portion of the Christian faith,” said Campbell, “consists in points of an historic nature.”47 Historical evidences were useful in discriminating among the various and conflicting claims within Christianity. Eighteenth-century Scots of competing denominations agreed that the form, structure, and beliefs of the early church would determine which among the contemporary claims of Christianity were authentic and which were merely the illegitimate offspring of human invention. Campbell therefore taught his divinity students the critical uses of history. The leading British historians of the eighteenth century, most notably David Hume and Edward Gibbon, re-invented their discipline by bringing the concerns of the critical philosopher to a field of study that had traditionally been dominated by dull annalists or politically and religiously motivated polemicists. The philosophical historians rejected traditional party debates, displayed a philosophical concern for method, applied critical and probabilistic reasoning to historical sources and questions of human motivation, employed an enlightened and empirical theory of human nature, and, most importantly, focused their critical attention on natural and causal explanations.48 Campbell was a philosophical historian of this kind, despite the fact that he was mainly concerned with the history of the Christian church. His historical interests are evident not only in his ecclesiastical history lectures, but also in A Dissertation on Miracles, The Four Gospels, and some of his sermons. His unpublished manuscripts show that historical disputes were the chief preoccupation of his later years, while his systematic treatment of evidence suggests that history and its proofs had always been fundamental to his system of thought. Campbell and other eighteenth-century thinkers were as much concerned with the uses of the past as were nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers, though their theory of human nature prevented them from using history in 47 leh, 1:3. 48 David Wootton has provided the best short summary of this new philosophical approach to history in “Narrative, Irony, and Faith in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall,” History and Theory 33 (1994): 77–105.

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ways to which we have become accustomed. It is important, therefore, to reconstruct Campbell’s general view of history before examining his treatment of specific historical problems. The enlightened historians’ concern for impartiality and their critical attitude towards sources allowed them both to reject partisan historical claims and to be tolerant of the differentness of past cultures. They were, by turns, systematically judgmental and surprisingly sympathetic in their historical pronouncements. “Wonderful are the differences in manners and opinions,” said Campbell, “which prevail in different countries, and even in the same country, at different periods.”49 He recognized the difficulties of entering into the sentiments of the early Christian age, and argued that one cannot understand a past language without understanding the character of the people who spoke it. Even more remarkable in light of common eighteenth-century prejudices, he often restrained himself from lumping all Roman Catholics into categorical judgments.50 However, Campbell’s attempts at historical sensitivity are not always convincing, especially when they are followed by harsh, judgmental comments on the views of literary opponents. He considered it a matter of historical fact that the Roman Catholic church had always been concerned more with power than with doctrine. His account of the successes of the early church betrays his enlightened inclination to assign universal motives to the actions of past peoples: “Now the nature of things, my brethren, was the same then that it is at present, and means which we perceive now to be perfectly inadequate must have been always so.”51 These hard judgments become more comprehensible in light of the purpose for which philosophical historians studied the past. Like their humanist predecessors, enlightened historians viewed the study of history as a moral enterprise. History was meant to be didactic, not merely in the narrow sense of communicating moral lessons or teaching by example, but also in the broader sense of providing an understanding of human nature itself. Campbell intended his divinity lectures “to convey some notion of the nature and origin and essential parts of this species of history, to trace as briefly as possible the latent springs of the principle changes, with which the ecclesiastical history in particular presents us; and … to offer suitable advices to the student, 49 aul ms 654, un-numbered page. 50 st, 2:21 and 2:308–10; fg 1:54. 51 st, 2:31.

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first as to the order in which he ought to proceed in the acquisition of this necessary branch of knowledge; secondly as to the books and assistances which he ought to use.”52 Two things are here evident. The first is that Campbell intended to teach a method of historical study so that his students could embark on a lifetime of competent self-instruction. He continually made this philosophy of education plain to his students: So far from allowing yourselves to lose any thing of what ye have already acquired, ye ought to be daily improving your stock of knowledge. Of some branches of study, young men, after finishing their philosophical course, often have the acquisition to begin. Of this sort is civil history, which, especially the ancient oriental, as well as Greek and Roman histories, are of considerable importance here, inasmuch as they have a pretty close connection and are in some particulars closely interwoven with the scriptural and ecclesiastic histories; and these ye know make a principal branch of your subject. Sacred history and profane serve reciprocally to throw light on each other. I may add that historical knowledge is of immense use in criticism, from the acquaintance to which it introduces us, with ancient manners, laws, rites and idioms.53

The second point that Campbell wished to convey is that the study of history ought to be concerned primarily with moral causes – that is, with the hidden springs or motives of human nature. As he explained in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, a minister must know human nature in order to communicate effectively with his parishioners. History, as a branch of moral philosophy, was meant to uncover the real causes of historical events and thus effectively to display the motives and consequences of moral action and ultimately the universal nature of man. Campbell’s enlightened interest in uncovering human nature as manifested in the history of the Christian church allowed him to treat religious conflicts and controversies as failings of human character rather than as shortcomings of theological knowledge. His historical explanations often cited the universal weaknesses of human nature, such as a tendency to be irrationally swayed by wealth and splendour, names and titles, and a veneration for antiquity. Campbell took it for historical truth that, “exorbitant wealth annexed to offices may be said universally to produce two effects … arrogance and laziness.”54 He explained the 52 lstpe, 54–5. 53 lstpe, 78. 54 leh, 2:218. See also fg, 1:229; leh, 2:110, 2:149, and 1:405.

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continued veneration of Latin in the church thus: “though it arise in them all from a silly prejudice, which manifestly shows, that the form of religion has supplanted the power; yet I can easily, without recurring to authority or foreign influence, especially in the decline of all literature and science, account for it from the weakness incident to human nature.”55 Like Hume, Campbell believed that any customary observance, however unofficial, always comes in time to be considered a positive right. “Custom rules the world,” said Campbell, “and is the principle foundation of obedience in all the governments that are, and ever were, upon the earth.”56 Here he intended the term “custom” to signify something more than its ordinary meaning, and indeed to suggest a larger philosophical or conjectural view of the course of history. Conjectural history was one of the most remarkable products of the Scottish Enlightenment’s concern to understand the past in a philosophical manner. Conjectural historians tended to explain history in its broadest terms, by drawing upon a probabilistic theory of human nature and motivation. They wrote the history of institutions and movements rather than of individuals – thus Lord Kames explained the origins of British law, while Adam Smith traced the history of the sciences, and Hume examined the cycles of religious belief.57 Campbell did the same for the Christian church. The Lectures on Ecclesiastical History may be read as a psychological reconstruction of church history that combines traditional historical evidences with an enlightened understanding of the universal principles of human nature. Campbell’s declared goal “in these discourses, is not to give a narrative of facts, but from known facts, with their attendant circumstances, by comparing one with another, to deduce principles and causes.”58 He sought the “springs of action” that were not immediately apparent to the historical reader. “As some of the largest and loftiest trees spring from very small seeds, so the most extensive and wonderful effects sometimes arise from very inconsiderable causes.”59 Campbell paid little attention to individual historical actors, except insofar as they illustrated general trends. His historical analyses, like those of other conjectural historians, focused on the unintended 55 leh, 2:254. 56 leh, 2:53. Like Hume, Campbell argued that custom can eventually reconcile men to any historical development (pr, 402). 57 These themes are covered in Kames’ Historical Law-Tracts, Smith’s “History of Astronomy” and its companion pieces, and Hume’s Natural History of Religion. 58 leh, 2:108. 59 leh, 2:143.

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consequences of a great number of uncoordinated individual actions. The development of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, for example, was as much the unplanned product of certain human tendencies as it was the explicit policy of church leaders. Christian persecution grew without deliberate planning over a long period of time. The conspiracy of the priesthood, apparent in the writings of Campbell and of most Enlightenment figures, was likewise an undesigned conspiracy. Campbell’s explanations may not have paid much regard to the intentions of individual historical actors, but they appealed to a few causal principles and thus had philosophical coherence, in keeping with the expectations of his enlightened audience. The novelty of Campbell’s approach to church history (an intensely-cultivated historical field) was his concern for broad philosophical explanations rather than minute controversial details. Enlightened historians sought the most broadly-applicable explanations of historical events and trends, and consequently viewed the past in its broadest terms. This helps account for the readiness with which they judged the past. Campbell, like his contemporaries, held a low opinion of the “middle ages” between antiquity and his own reformed and enlightened age. The end of these “dark ages” was signified by “a second dawn of reason, and the return of thought, after a long night of barbarity and ignorance.”60 Like Hume and Robertson, Campbell chronicled the decline of literature, arts, and learning that accompanied the medieval rise of superstition and priestcraft, which was itself a secondary cause in Satan’s historical plan.61 The decline of the Roman Empire and the rise of ecclesiastical dominion was a matter of wonder to the modern reader, “when the sun of science was now set, and the night of ignorance, superstition and barbarism, was fast advancing; that out of the ruins of every thing great and venerable, there should spring a new species of despotism, never heard of, or imagined before, whose means of conquest and defence were neither swords nor spears, fortifications nor warlike engines, but definitions and canons, sophisms and imprecations; and that by such weapons, as by a kind of magic, there should actually be reared a second universal monarchy, the most formi60 leh, 2:265. 61 leh, 2:50–2. Similar views are found in William Robertson’s The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, 2 vols, new ed. (Dublin: J. Stockdale, 1804), 1: 56; cf. Hume’s The History of England, foreword by William B. Todd, 6 vols (Indianapolis: LibertyFund, 1983), 1:4 and 2:518–19.

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dable the world ever knew.”62 Despite his disagreement with Hume over the evidential possibility of miracles, Campbell, like Hume, had no difficulty attributing the age’s myriad of false miracles to a gross and ignorant people. He accused the medieval pope Gregory I of using his office purely for political gain, of being interested more in converts than in good Christians, and of pursuing a form of zeal that was hostile to true Christian tolerance. “That Gregory had, through the misfortune and error of the times, thoroughly imbibed … these principles, will never be doubted by any person, who, with judgment and impartiality, reads his history.”63 Even while defending Roman Catholics against popular Protestant hostility in his Address to the People of Scotland, Campbell equated modern Catholic irrationality with the church’s rise to power in dark and ignorant ages. His characterization of the Middle Ages as an extended moral lapse in the history of human nature was little removed from the opinions of Hume or Voltaire. His description of “priestcraft” could easily be attributed to either of these authors. Campbell even cited Voltaire approvingly in his divinity lectures.64 The historical source for his discussion of the Council of Trent was Paolo Sarpi, whose antipathy to Rome was famous. Campbell clearly believed that one did not have to be a Protestant historian to see that historical scholarship was demonstrably unfavourable to the claims of Rome.65 Campbell’s view of the rise of the modern era and of the Protestant Reformation also corresponded to the views of his compatriots, with the exception of Hume. Although Campbell, Robertson, and Hume agreed that the modern age broke like morning light over the dark ruins of corrupted civilization, Hume implicitly denied a connection between the reformed religion and the new learning. Campbell agreed with Hume that the invention of printing played a significant role in the triumph of modern learning, but like Robertson, he also highlighted the key role played by the learned Martin Luther.66 It is not difficult to see how these historical judgments concerning the nature of 62 leh, 2:19. 63 leh, 2:75. 64 leh, 2:135 and 313–14. Campbell quoted from what is probably the Essai sur les moeurs, and, very interestingly, from the Dictionnaire philosophique. 65 leh, 2:94; lstpe, 206. 66 Compare leh, lecture 28, with Robertson, who emphasizes the classical learning of the reformers (Charles V, 1:422); compare also leh, 2:265 and 330–2 with Hume, History of England, 3:140 and Robertson, Charles V, 1:421.

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the medieval church and the character of the Reformation became inextricably intertwined with the eighteenth-century British view of the contemporary Roman Catholic church. Such a sweeping view of human history was easily translated into a theory of progress. Campbell argued that the changes evident in mankind over the last three thousand years were no less than the transformation of a child into an adult.67 The most dramatic change had been in the arts and sciences; as Thomas Reid wrote, “Nature intended man to improve in Knowledge and the usefull arts.”68 Campbell saw progress in knowledge reflected in the development of language: “Things sensible first had names in every language: The names were afterward extended to things conceivable and intellectual. This is according to the natural progress of knowledge.”69 Campbell seems to have believed that recent advances in general learning had made it virtually impossible for darkness and ignorance to again triumph as they had in the Middle Ages. His theory of toleration was based partly on the historical supposition that “the progressive state of all human knowledge and art, will ever be unfriendly to the adoption of any measure which seems to fix a barrier against improvement.”70 The most interesting expression of Campbell’s view of progress, however, is found in a letter to Bishop John Douglas. Here Campbell argued that humanity is advancing towards a state of perfection predicted in Isaiah’s prophecy, “they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks.” “I am strongly of opinion,” wrote Campbell, “that this prophecy will be one day literally accomplished: tho’ we are many centuries too early here to see it. The advancement of knowledge is the sure foundation of improvement of every kind, both in morals and in civil policy.”71 This enlightened and optimistic view of progress is made all the more fascinating by its complete lack of secular intent, as if the triumph of the Enlightenment itself was the fulfillment of God’s plan for man on earth. It further suggests that Campbell’s view of the structure of history was firmly providential, and his view of the future eschatological. 67 dm, 251. 68 Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology, ed. Elmer H. Duncan (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), 46. 69 fg, 1:206. 70 fg, 1:29. 71 Campbell to Douglas, 22 July 1790 (BL Egerton MS 2186, fols 10v–11r). The scriptural reference is to Isaiah 2:4.

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t h e n at u r e o f t h e e a r ly c h u r c h Campbell’s historiography was unquestionably enlightened, though it partook of older traditions as well, as when he appealed to Genesis to account for the necessarily miraculous origin of the world.72 But Campbell tended to focus his historical energies on the early Christian church. Like most of his contemporaries, he believed that the model of the early church was the proper standard by which to measure all subsequent manifestations of the church. The prescriptive authority of the early church was a religious concern, and as such will be considered later. The historical nature of the early church, however, remained a problem of natural knowledge, since the post-apostolic church was left “to force its way in the world by its own intrinsic and external evidence.”73 The controversial details of ecclesiastical history came to dominate Campbell’s attention only in his last years, as evidenced in his unpublished manuscripts. The “Strictures on Dodwell” employed a wide range of historical sources to demonstrate that the apostolic succession was neither a fact nor a doctrine of the early church. Like Presbyterian historians since the Reformation, Campbell argued that historical evidences contradicted the doctrine of the primitive rule of bishops. Dodwell’s shoddy scholarship, he suggested, bred a false and dangerous ecclesiology. Campbell was even harder on his anonymous antagonist “Staurophilus” (the Roman Catholic bishop George Hay), whose confessional adherence he easily identified. In the lengthy “Defence” of his Spirit of the Gospel sermon, Campbell surveyed the frightening legacy of Catholic church policies, from the early days of institutionalized Christian intolerance, to the betrayal of Jan Huss, and finally to the claims of papal infallibility still being made in the eighteenth century. Campbell cited such unnatural moral practices as monasticism and the breaking of faith with heretics to demonstrate that the corruption of the church was a matter of historical fact. His sources were eclectic, including such pre-Christian authorities as Cicero, Horace, and Caesar, as well as his own contemporaries Voltaire, Helvétius, Montesquieu, and Gibbon. He appealed to Protestant churchmen and historians (such as Mosheim), but mostly to the 72 dm, part II, section VI. 73 leh, 1:4.

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church fathers and to modern Roman Catholic historians (in particular Claude Fleury’s massive Histoire ecclésiastique) so as to make his case all the more convincing to his antagonists. Campbell’s most comprehensive and philosophical treatment of church history, however, is found in his divinity lectures. The Lectures on Ecclesiastical History may be described as a history of the corruption of the Christian church. Campbell believed that the New Testament did not prescribe any specific ecclesiastical polity, but rather provided only examples of Christian love and community.74 This primitive equality of Christians was transformed, with the progress of time and the addition of vast numbers of adherents, into an increasingly hierarchical and sacerdotal institution. The Roman papacy was merely the last logical stage of a spiritual despotism built from layer upon layer of authoritarian claims, and solidified by the slow but irresistible force of custom. The first and most significant step in this process, argued Campbell, was the transformation of bishops from congregational ministers into spiritual and administrative authorities. The bishops, who had originally been equal in rank and office to the presbyters (an old Protestant argument), began to arbitrate disputes among other pastors and lay Christians, a practice which soon became a customary right. This process was entrenched by the Christianization of the Roman Empire, when the authority of bishops was confirmed by law and extended to great numbers of new adherents. Here, the novelty of Campbell’s philosophical approach to the history of the church becomes most apparent. He explained these historical processes with reference to the universal propensities of human nature, arguing that time and custom always transform duties into privileges, and spiritual claims into material ambitions. But though this process was natural and inevitable, it was still a corruption of the pastoral office. Human nature merely accounted for the ease with which spiritual mandates were forgotten when mixed with magisterial powers. Campbell was well aware that the primitive rights of bishops had been a fundamental matter of debate in the Scottish church since the Reformation. He therefore devoted a substantial number of his history lectures to describing and accounting for this first significant corruption. Subsequent lectures detailed the inevitable development of metropolitans, patriarchs, and church courts. The rise of the Roman See was the last stage of the transformation of the Christian church into a worldly 74 leh, 1:99.

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hierarchy. Campbell devoted the bulk of his remaining lectures to this great symbol of human corruption, whose sole objective was the perfection of its worldly power. He argued that Rome acquired its right of doctrinal arbitration by consistently deciding claims in favour of appellants, thereby encouraging more appeals.75 Rome confirmed its power by its acquisition of dazzling wealth and by its skillful and opportunistic manipulation of events to suit its authoritarian policies. But Rome’s good fortune could not last. Campbell implicitly believed that the recovery of learning was inevitable and necessarily fatal to Roman claims. The Reformation was the direct result of Rome’s inability to keep its charges in perpetual ignorance. Campbell believed that his historical claims were grounded in objective fact, rather than merely the required declarations of a Presbyterian churchman and teacher. He even found support for these claims in Edward Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Campbell read the first volume (that is, the first sixteen chapters) of The Decline and Fall soon after its publication in 1776, and immediately wrote a letter to their mutual publisher William Strahan, of which the following extract, dated 26 June 1776, survives: I have lately read over one of your last winter’s publications, with very great pleasure and I hope some instruction. My expectations were indeed high when I began it, but I assure you the entertainment I received greatly exceeded them. What made me fall to it with the greater avidity, was, that it had in part a pretty close connection with a subject I had occasion to treat sometimes in my Theological lectures; to wit the rise and progress of the Hierarchy. And you will believe I was not the less pleased to discover in an Historian of so much learning and penetration so great a coincidence with my own sentiments in relation to some obscure points in the Christian Antiquities. I suppose I need not inform you that the book I mean is Gibbon’s History of the fall of the Roman Empire; which in respect of the style and manner as well as the matter is a most masterly performance.76

This extract suggests that the main argument of Campbell’s ecclesiastical history lectures was well established by 1776. It further suggests that Campbell did not at this time notice any irreligious tendencies in Gibbon’s work. 75 leh, 2:41. 76 bl Add. MS 34886, fol. 78. These are Gibbon papers, which suggests that this extract was copied by Strahan for Gibbon.

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His subsequent citations of Gibbon continued to be favourable. The printed Lectures on Ecclesiastical History contain a lengthy quotation from chapter forty-six of The Decline and Fall, indicating that Campbell kept up with the various volumes of Gibbon’s work as they were published.77 Like Campbell, Gibbon argued that the early Christian church did not establish a definitive form of ecclesiastical government, for “the apostles declined the office of legislation, and rather chose to endure some partial scandals and divisions than to exclude the Christians of a future age from the liberty of varying their forms of ecclesiastical government according to the changes of times and circumstances.”78 Gibbon also claimed that the offices of bishop and of presbyter were originally the same, and that the term “bishop” only later came to be applied to the presidents of the presbyterian assemblies. A primitive bishop, in other words, was originally no more than a first among equals. Only gradually did the growth of the church lead to the formation of a hierarchy, as bishops began to assume ascendancy over their fellow presbyters, and metropolitan prelates subsequently claimed rights over bishops.79 Gibbon thus reproduced the leading arguments of Campbell’s lectures, against which Campbell’s Episcopalian opponents took such exception. At the end of his infamous chapter fifteen, Gibbon remarked that the humble status of the early Christians ought to increase our regard for the successes of the primitive church.80 This sentiment, though without the possibility of ironic intent, was at the heart of Campbell’s 1777 sermon, The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel a Proof of Its Truth. Gibbon appealed to the universal principles of human nature to account for the rise of monasticism, claiming that the particular value system of the early church allowed its adherents to easily confuse resistance to ordinary pleasures with spiritual merit, which in turn allowed pride of spirit to triumph over physical comfort.81 This kind of explanation would undoubtedly have appealed to Campbell. 77 This chapter on Gregory i appeared in the fourth volume of the work, first published in 1788. See also fg, 1:506n., where Campbell, in a long footnote, considered a historical question posed by Gibbon. Campbell eventually became aware of Gibbon’s infidelity, probably through Hailes, and called him “that able but prejudiced author”; see Campbell to Hailes, 1 March 1783 (NLS MS 25303, fols 177–8). 78 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury, 7 vols, 2d ed. (London: Methuen, 1909–14), 2:43. 79 Ibid., 2:43–8. 80 Ibid., 2:72. 81 Ibid., 2:37–40. Compare Gibbon’s explanation to Campbell’s “Essay on Christian Temperance and Self-Denial,” in his Lectures on Ecclesiastical History.

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Campbell’s philosophical treatment of the early church was, at least superficially, very much like Gibbon’s. Gibbon argued that impartial historians must appeal exclusively to natural and human explanations, yet the sceptical direction of his own narrative suggests that he was neither as pious nor as impartial as he claimed. He declared that ancient peoples would have embraced any pagan superstition “if, in the decisive moment, the wisdom of Providence had not interposed a genuine revelation.”82 This passage can suggest entirely contradictory interpretations depending upon one’s view of Gibbon’s literary intentions. But all this must be read into Gibbon’s style, for his infidelity is not apparent at the literal level. It is nevertheless remarkable that Gibbon’s explicit historical arguments were largely compatible with the enlightened Reformed tradition. It is also noteworthy that Gibbon and Campbell, working independently, but with many of the same philosophical intentions, came to virtually the same conclusions about controversial matters of church history. We must, however, defer consideration of the religious implications of these historical conclusions to another chapter and perspective.

the critical uses of the gospel Campbell’s philosophical history was closely tied to another field of practical scholarship that occupied much of his attention: biblical criticism. His great scholarly achievement was the 1789 publication of The Four Gospels, Translated from the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations, and Notes Critical and Explanatory. The translation of the four canonical Gospels was a practical working out of the philosophical and rhetorical principles found in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, though the addition of twelve substantial dissertations, as well as extensive notes on the translations, made it an original work of critical philosophy in itself. The “Preliminary Dissertations” examined, among other things, the language, style, and idiom of the New Testament writers, the historical origins of their particular style, the proper signification of certain terms and titles, and the critical rules for examining and translating Scripture. Campbell’s contemporaries were particularly impressed by his remarks on the original meaning and subsequent corruption of such terms as “mystery,” “blasphemy,” “schism,” and “heresy.”83 The misuse 82 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, 2:59. 83 fg, dissertation ix.

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of these terms had had profoundly negative effects on the development and perceived mandate of the Christian church. Campbell believed that practical criticism was vitally important for modern Christians. As he explained to his students in an introductory lecture to his divinity course: “To lay down … proper canons of sacred criticism, to arrange them according to their comparative merit, so that we may readily apprehend the way in which they are to be applied, must be a very useful labour to all in general, but of particular consequence to the young student. It is the more so, because could we once arrive at being adepts in the critical science, the help of the commentator would be much more rarely needed; we should serve as commentators to ourselves.”84 Two major purposes are evident in The Four Gospels. First and foremost, Campbell meant his scholarship to be useful to ordinary Christians – that is, to provide them with an accurate and unambiguous translation for the purposes of practical devotion. To Lord Hailes he wrote “It is not the business of the teacher of religion to make men linguists, or critics, or antiquaries, but to make them good Christians … In short, as I write to the people of the eighteenth century, I choose to speak the language of the eighteenth century, and not that of the fifteenth or sixteenth.”85 To this end, he argued, a translation must be free of darkness, obscurity, and unfamiliar or obsolete words, and it must faithfully reproduce any colloquial usage in the original. The sense of the original passage is everything in a translation, and that sense must therefore be reflected in the standard usage of the translator’s own day. As in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell argued that a living language is subject to change over time, and that meanings must be accurately conveyed by contemporary usage. In the employment of a word, utility always takes precedence over pedigree. Campbell had no qualms about criticizing the standard King James Version of the Bible, despite the veneration in which it was commonly held, because a translation is only as good as its ability to capture the sense of the original.86 The second major purpose of The Four Gospels was critical. Campbell wished to establish comprehensive rules of translation, and to demonstrate in notes how these rules were to be applied to the actual problems 84 lstpe, 57. 85 Campbell to Hailes, 24 June 1789 (NLS MS 25305, fols 13–14). 86 fg, 1:409–10; Campbell to Hailes, 23 Nov. 1789 (NLS MS 25305, fols 16–22); Campbell to Hailes [Autumn 1789?], (NLS MS 25305, fols. 27–30). The majority of criticisms of The Four Gospels concerned the colloquial nature of the translation.

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of Gospel translation. Consequently, his claims to accuracy were made on rational rather than inspirational grounds, and appealed to a critical tradition of biblical scholarship stretching back to Erasmus’ groundbreaking edition of the Greek New Testament in 1516. From the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, following in the wake of the more dramatic events of the Reformation, there was a long, quiet revolution in biblical criticism. Campbell’s work was very much a part of this tradition. The first quarter of the sixteenth century witnessed a scholarly rediscovery of the ancient languages in which the original texts of the Bible had been written. The uncovering of ancient Hebrew, Greek, and Latin manuscripts allowed Christian humanists to develop a new confidence in their ability not only to understand the intentions of ancient authors but also to bring about a spiritual renewal in the Church by rescuing the historical and literal meanings of the scriptural texts from the technical and allegorical accretions of medieval scholarship. Throughout the sixteenth century linguists and grammarians painstakingly collated the ancient manuscripts upon which the new breed of scholar-printers based their critical editions. The humanists also established trilingual colleges in order to train new generations of competent biblical scholars. Philologists cleared away medieval additions to the Latin language, while Greek specialists learned to distinguish the Semitic idioms that underlay New Testament Greek from the Greek of the secular classics, and Hebrew scholars strove to overcome their prejudices against Judaism to master this very foreign and difficult language. Vernacular translations began to appear in unprecedented numbers, from Luther’s German Bible to the English Geneva Bible of 1560. However, the hoped-for renewal in biblical studies was largely sidelined by the dogmatic preoccupations of the Reformed and Tridentine Churches.87 But the steady accumulation of linguistic and critical competencies continued throughout the seventeenth century with little of obviously revolutionary implication until the work of the French Oratorian priest, Richard Simon (1638–1712). Simon’s supremely competent and detailed critical researches into the origin and authorship of the Mosaic books threatened traditional Protestant assumptions concerning the plain and simple authority of Scripture. Campbell’s latitudinarian 87 The preceding is largely based on Basil Hall, “Biblical Scholarship: Editions and Commentaries,” in The Cambridge History of the Bible: [Volume 3] The West from the Reformation to the Present Day, ed. S.L. Greenslade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 38–93.

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predecessors (as well as many orthodox Catholics) labored to deny a priori that Simon’s brilliant speculations about the compilation of the Pentateuch from earlier sources could be correct, but they largely overlooked the French priest’s potentially revolutionary methodology.88 Campbell was keenly aware of this long progress of textual scholarship. In the tenth and eleventh dissertations of The Four Gospels, he provided a history and commentary of the various editions and translations of the Bible since the sixteenth century. He shared with his predecessors an implicit confidence that the major problems of biblical criticism and translation had been solved, and that the work of three centuries of steady linguistic and critical development was nearing its completion. Campbell’s own translation was based on the Greek texts of John Mills and the Dutch Remonstrant J.J. Wettstein; since both of these included scholarly apparatus and variant readings, Campbell was able to concentrate on the practical task of rendering the Gospels into contemporary English without having to worry about the authority of the Greek originals. Bishop Brian Walton’s weighty Biblia Sacra Polyglotta (1655–57), known as the “London Polyglot”, was an additional source that made accessible a century of critical developments and gave English scholars a sense of confidence that they possessed an authentic and reliable version of the Word of God.89 Campbell was also familiar with the leading edge of contemporary biblical scholarship, including the works of J.D. Michaelis and Alexander Geddes, who were generating novel mythical interpretations of the literary intentions of biblical authors. He knew and even applauded (with certain reservations) the critical work of Richard Simon, returning to it again and again in the “Preliminary Dissertations” as an example of the beneficial effects of free enquiry, without ever viewing it as a threat to his Protestant belief in the fundamental authority and reliability of Scripture.90 Though he knew that no single translation was or could be perfect, Campbell nevertheless shared with three centuries of critical scholars a firm belief that free enquiry, public debate, and critical methodology were together capable of solving all important questions concerning the intentions and reliability of the scriptural authors. He was confident that just 88 See Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), chapter 5. 89 Reedy, The Bible and Reason, 8. 90 fg, 1:121. Campbell’s extensive comments on Simon can be found in fg, dissertations iii and xi, part i, and leh, 1:30–3. He thought that Simon was extremely sensible when not blinded by confessional attachment, and recommended him to his students.

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as the Reformation had sprung inevitably from the revival of learning, so too would the continued refinement of biblical criticism complete the work of the Reformation. Campbell believed that his two major objectives – popular utility and critical rigour – were compatible and even complementary. His desire to unite these two enlightened ends into a single work was exceptionally optimistic, and suggests that The Four Gospels, more than any other work, reflected his lifelong ambition to unite the ideals of the Enlightenment with the purposes of Christianity. But this marriage of popular translation and scholarly criticism (in two massive volumes) did not produce the hoped-for offspring. Campbell’s scholarly audience appreciated his critical apparatus much more than his translation, while his popular audience embraced the translation only when it was divorced from the massive scholarship that had created and supported it. His pedagogical ambition to make a work of enlightened scholarship available to ordinary Christians was hardly realized. Campbell’s faith in the ability of critical scholarship to vindicate cherished beliefs was not uncommon in eighteenth-century Scotland. Campbell’s friend, the moderate minister Hugh Blair, had similarly championed the authenticity of the “rediscovered” Ossianic poems, which painted a heroic image of Scotland’s past while conveniently vindicating the projections of Scottish conjectural historians. The Scottish public embraced the epic poems, considering them to be, like the Bible, a national treasure.91 Later critics, who were able to show that these poems had been largely fabricated by their “discoverer” James Macpherson, wondered why Ossian’s scholarly supporters failed to suspect the poems’ too-convenient likeness with their own vision of the past. In Blair’s mind, the historical integrity of Ossian, like Campbell’s Jesus, depended upon the literal veracity of supposedly ancient texts, and on the assumption that literary criticism would vindicate common-sense interpretations of ancient motives. The same theory of universal human nature that allowed Scottish philosophical historians to confidently organize and judge the past likewise allowed Christian moderates such as Blair and Campbell to judge the reliability and intentions of ancient texts and authors. Earlier in the century, ancients and moderns had fought the “Battle of the Books” over the 91 James Macpherson’s “Ossianic” Fingal (1762) and Temora (1763) were hailed at the time as authentic ancient Scottish epics on a level with the Homeric epics. But not only Scots were captivated by the forgery; see, for example, Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther.

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legitimacy of new methods of textual criticism, which sometimes challenged the canon of classical authors. Like the Scots, William Temple had been confident of his ability to judge the authenticity of classical works by his general experience of human affairs.92 But by the second half of the eighteenth century, classical texts had irrevocably become the objects of philological analysis and even literary dissection. Could the moderates imagine the same process overwhelming biblical studies? Campbell certainly believed that the critical and historical problems affecting ancient secular texts also applied to ancient Christian documents. His confidence, however, that the grammatical and critical arts had been largely perfected and that critical analysis would only augment the authority of Scripture, shows the degree to which his conception of biblical criticism differs from our own. Literary criticism was in fact still a young discipline. Eighteenth-century scholars did not yet have the quantitative body of comparative manuscripts that would allow later generations of scholars to fundamentally reinterpret ancient literary intentions and to challenge popular conceptions of the meaning and uses of ancient texts. The invention of higher criticism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was to a significant degree responsible for the decline of Campbell’s posthumous reputation.

the road to higher criticism? Campbell belonged to a critical tradition firmly embedded in the early modern period. But his own textual work, coming at the very end of the Enlightenment, has been eclipsed by the nineteenth-century revolution in critical studies that has come to be known as higher criticism. Although higher criticism had its roots in the Enlightenment, it belonged to a post-Enlightenment world. It is clearly unfair to judge Campbell’s work by scholarly developments since his time. Nevertheless, a comparison of his biblical criticism with that of the following age highlights the magnitude of post-Enlightenment changes in scholarly assumptions and values, and as such merits historical attention. Enlightenment scholars were not less learned or able than later scholars, but they did lack many of the texts used by later critics. More importantly, however, Enlighten92 Joseph M. Levine, Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 163.

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ment scholars made certain assumptions concerning human psychology and motivation that prevented them from drawing conclusions that modern minds have taken as natural and obvious. Textual or lower criticism is concerned with the recovery, verification, and establishment of reliable texts. It attempts to resolve differences between manuscripts in order to determine the best possible version of a text. Literary or higher criticism is concerned with the authorship, style, origins, structure, and literary history of a particular text. It employs a historical and empirical methodology to uncover the human origins and meaning of a text, without concern for its exegetical application. Thus lower criticism tries to establish what the Gospel texts actually said about Jesus, while higher criticism seeks to uncover what the Gospel writers meant by these claims, and, possibly, what these claims tell us about the historical Jesus. Techniques of literary criticism had been applied to classical literature since the late seventeenth century, most successfully in the work of Richard Bentley. By the eighteenth century, classicists had begun to employ “mythical” interpretations to explain the literary intentions of their ancient secular authors. These critics considered ancient myths to be not deliberate fictions but rather poetical and philosophical explanations of semi-historical events. Campbell’s teacher Thomas Blackwell claimed that ancient mythologies were neither literal relations of fact nor devoid of religious meaning, but were rather the natural first expressions of philosophy and religion.93 It was perhaps inevitable that scholars would come to apply such explanations first to the Hebrew and then to the early Christian documents. In mid eighteenth-century France, the royal physician and Catholic scholar Jean Astruc helped to lay the foundation of modern higher criticism by highlighting stylistic variations in Genesis that suggested this book was a combination of several distinct, older documents. In England, Bishop Robert Lowth made the rather novel proposal that the Old Testament prophets were speaking to their own people rather than to modern Christians.94 Campbell’s Roman Catholic friend Alexander Geddes, who was also working on a new Scripture translation with explanatory notes, compared the Hebrew historians of the Old Testament to Homer and Herodotus, and suggested mythical interpretations 93 Thomas Blackwell, Letters concerning Mythology (London: n.p., 1748), 10. Blackwell seems to have implied that some of these mythical interpretations could be applied to Scripture as well (286). 94 W. Neil, “The Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700–1950,” in The Cambridge History of the Bible, 270–2.

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of the Garden of Eden and Noah’s deluge. The creation stories were to be taken not as literally true but as philosophical poems designed to promote faith.95 Like Richard Simon before him, Geddes succeeded only in offending Protestant and Catholic orthodoxy alike. The German philosopher J.G. Hamann went much further, describing the Bible as God’s poetry, where religious truth is found in the language itself rather than in some universal truth merely represented by language.96 Campbell was fully aware of these early experiments in literary criticism. But was he likewise inclined to a mythical interpretation of the New Testament texts, comparable to Geddes’ and Lowth’s treatment of the ancient Hebrew texts, or to D.F. Strauss’ revolutionary handling of the Gospels less than half a century later? There is some evidence that Campbell was able to conceive of Scripture as simply a collection of literary texts. He knew that his understanding of ancient documents was improved by familiarity with the particular historical customs and contexts in which they were written. He argued that, “it is of real consequence to scriptural criticism, not to confound the language of the sacred penmen with that of the writers of the fourth, or any subsequent century.”97 He knew that the original authors had very distinctive styles that were usually masked in translation.98 His word-studies often demonstrate the kind of critical thinking that would become common in the nineteenth century, such as his disassociation of the word “devil” from “Satan,” or his history of the development of the term “Christ.”99 It is also clear from the sheer scale of The Four Gospels that his conception of translation involved more than just language skills. Accurate translation requires a historical appreciation of subtle changes in language and thought over time. Furthermore, Campbell considered some comparative problems between the Gospel texts. He noted that “the evangelists have been thought, by many, so much to coincide in their narratives, as to give scope for suspecting that some of those who wrote more lately copied those who wrote before them. Though it must be owned that there is often a coincidence, both in matter and in expression, it will not be found 95 Reginald C. Fuller, Alexander Geddes 1737–1802: Pioneer of Biblical Criticism (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1984), 6, 46, and 92. 96 Terence J. German, Hamann on Language and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 66 and 107. Hamann’s views of religious dogma as changeable and nonobjective clearly went against Common Sense notions of language and eternal truth. 97 fg, 1:364. 98 fg, 1:48–9. 99 fg, 1:152–68 and 143–51.

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so great in the original, nor so frequent, as perhaps in all translations ancient and modern.”100 Higher critics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries pursued this same question at greater length and with many more sources, arriving at very different conclusions concerning the nonliterary origins of the received Gospel texts. This suggests that the differences between eighteenth-century critical scholarship and higher criticism can be partially explained by the sheer bulk of comparative data that has accumulated since the eighteenth century.101 Campbell was, at the very least, beginning to ask the questions that would characterize the work of the higher critics. In his divinity lectures, he noted the great variety of writings within the Bible, posed historical questions concerning the origins of its books, and wondered about the many other biographical accounts of Christ that must have existed.102 In a preliminary dissertation entitled “Observations on the right Method of proceeding in the critical Examination of the Books of the New Testament,” Campbell recommended careful consideration of the individual styles and backgrounds of the various New Testament authors, the purpose and design of each of the works, and the changing uses of literary devices such as metaphors. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, who was generally critical of the liberality with which Campbell taught raw divinity students, stated that, “He directed them to read the Bible in the order in which the books were written – only as a history of ancient facts and opinions – in order to discover what it treated of, without giving themselves the trouble to ascertain its truth or falsehood, or even its precise meaning.”103 Yet despite this critical open-mindedness, it is clear that Campbell was not moving in the direction of nineteenth-century higher criticism. 100 fg, 1:422. It is evident that Campbell was able to look at the individual Gospels as discrete texts: “It would be absurd to suppose, that the pronouns and relatives in one Gospel refer to antecedents in another. Every one of the Gospels does, indeed, give additional information; and, in various ways, serves to throw light upon the rest. But every Gospel must be a consistent history by itself; otherwise an attempt at explanation would be in vain” (fg, 2:215). Nevertheless, he does not seem to have considered that each Gospel itself might be a collection of distinct fragments. 101 Joseph M. Levine uses this argument (rather than a revolution in methodology) to account for the increased competence with which nineteenth-century classical scholars were able to solve problems that had plagued their eighteenth-century predecessors; See Dr. Woodward’s Shield: History, Science, and Satire in Augustan England, paperback ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, 1991), 291–2. 102 leh, 1:23–8. 103 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:486–7.

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Though he occasionally treated scriptural texts as if they were like other ancient texts, his continual use of terms such as “holy writ” and “divine oracles” suggests clear limits to his willingness to do so. His biblical criticism was applied less to the original writings of the “sacred penmen” than to the ways in which men have subsequently treated or interpreted the fixed body of Scripture.104 So far from viewing the Old Testament as a product of Jewish history and culture, Campbell asserted that the very incongruity between the “barbarous” ancient Hebrews and their wondrous Scriptures is the best evidence that the latter could not have been of mere human origin.105 Despite this low view of the ancient Hebrew people, Campbell assumed that their writings constituted the only reliable history of ancient events, and that pagan histories can be summarily dismissed.106 At no time did he consider applying a mythical interpretation to the Gospel narratives, but always assumed that they were literal relations of fact. He deduced, from the apparent simplicity of the narratives, that the Gospel writers recorded only what they witnessed and heard and never intruded with personal commentary,107 a claim entirely at odds with the trends of modern biblical scholarship. He assumed that ancient Christians were pure in their beliefs and unencumbered by dogma, an assumption which today’s higher critics cannot afford to make. Campbell declared that “the grand question, to adopt the scripture idiom, is no other than this, Is the doctrine which Jesus Christ preached, from heaven, or of men? That it is from heaven, is the avowed belief of all his disciples; that it is of men, is on the contrary the declared opinion of Jews and pagans.108 Campbell’s assumption that the statements attributed to Jesus are faithful records of his actual words is in keeping with his Common Sense views concerning the inherent believability of testimonial evidence. Moreover, he believed that he could 104 fg, 1:469. 105 dm, 263–6. He argued that in all other aspects of learning, the Hebrews were as children, but that in their religious notions they were entirely mature. In all non-religious matters, Campbell thought that the Pentateuch suited the style of an ancient barbarous people. 106 leh, 1:2 and 18. 107 fg, 1:90 and 477. Despite a suggestion that the Gospel of John reflected the currents of opinion of the times in which it was written (aul ms M 190, p. 352), Campbell claimed that the “artless simplicity” evident in this Gospel is the best evidence of its trustworthiness (fg, 2:409–10). Modern scholars, in contrast, tend to see John’s Gospel as the one most influenced by doctrinal innovations in the early church. 108 lstpe, 89.

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derive from the whole of Scripture a single, unified, and historically accurate character-sketch of Jesus. The only remaining question for critics, then, was whether to accept or reject the entirety of the Gospels’ claims concerning the Messianic nature of Christ. Unlike modern critics, Campbell did not consider that the Gospels may be collections of earlier fragments, some of which were more likely than others to be the actual teachings of the historical Jesus. In other words, he assumed that the Gospel accounts of Jesus must be all of one kind – literally true or an utter fabrication.109 Campbell was either unwilling or unable to do what modern higher critics believe is essential to their task, that is, give up or at least suspend the assumptions that Scripture is fundamentally different from other ancient writings and that it is necessarily of one piece, single and inviolable. Higher critics have implicitly abandoned the notion that the various texts which make up the Bible were the products of one mind working for a single explicit end, and that these texts are therefore necessarily free of internal contradiction.110 Higher critics have given up the idea that the devotional and religious value of Scripture is directly dependent upon its historical accuracy. Eighteenth-century empirical Christians could do no such thing. They believed that Scripture is a uniformly-inspired body of writings, that its authority is founded on the veracity of the miracles with which it was historically associated, and that the only matter of controversy concerns the nature of the universal truths it represents. Campbell implicitly assumed that failure to understand Scripture is the fault of modern readers, and not the consequence of ambiguities in the literary sources themselves. He was aware that the Gospel stories may not have followed precise chronological order, but he argued that this was no more than the effect of a memorial style of 109 Campbell was extremely critical of the non-canonical accounts of Jesus and the early church, considering them to be easily-identifiable forgeries and calling them the “basest frauds” (aul ms 652, pp. 98 and 100–1). 110 See fg, 2:408–9, for Campbell’s explanation of how the singularity of John’s account of the raising of Lazarus actually makes the story more believable than if other Gospel writers had recorded it too. Modern critics tend to argue that the last twelve verses of the Gospel of Mark were added by later Christians to bring that Gospel into line with later stories of Jesus’ post-resurrection appearances. Campbell was aware that some manuscript versions of Mark did not contain the last twelve verses, but argued that these verses were authentic because he could think of no plausible reason why they would be added if they were not there originally (fg, 2:237). Clearly, Campbell did not consider that the doctrines of the early church could have evolved over time.

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writing, and had no impact on the literal veracity of Gospel claims.111 Higher critics, in contrast, tend to view ancient documents as like the peoples and cultures that created them – subject to change over time. The Gospels represent not a single-minded declaration of doctrine but the evolving needs, hopes, and beliefs of the early Christian community. Consequently, higher critics recognize that there may not even be a single “correct” version of a scriptural text. Eighteenth-century critics, on the other hand, assumed that sufficient scholarly attention can determine the correct interpretation of any textual problem. As has been suggested, they did not yet have the critical mass of comparative texts with which to develop theories characteristic of higher criticism. But what most effectively cut off eighteenth-century scholars from higher criticism was the want of a psychology able to account for the non-rational human needs that, even in the case of seemingly sophisticated early Christians, produce “mythical” texts. The limits of Campbell’s biblical criticism were the limits of the Enlightenment.

111 fg, 1:511. Although Campbell did have a relatively dynamic view of linguistic change, he does not seem to have held a dynamic view of the mental constructs that languages represent. Truths remain eternal, even as languages change.

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The Limits of Enlightenment

the enlightened man In the eyes of Christian moderates, the Enlightenment was a powerful ally of truth. Campbell employed an enlightened theory of evidence to defeat Hume’s sceptical attacks on testimony concerning miracles. He opened The Four Gospels with a thoroughly enlightened declaration of intellectual independence: “I have always laid it down as a rule in my researches, to divest myself as much as possible of an excessive deference to the judgment of men.”1 He believed that the extreme claims of the papacy were being checked not because his age was unusually honest but because his age possessed more historical knowledge: “This is one great victory which knowledge has already gained over the triple alliance of ignorance, superstition and priestcraft.”2 Campbell’s hostility to superstition was no less than that of any Enlightenment figure. Although he criticized the irreligious tendencies of his day, he suggested that even more enlightenment was needed to defeat irreligion and libertinism.3 Campbell believed that the Enlightenment belonged to Christian moderates like himself. But how representative was his thought of the age? Does he deserve to be called an Enlightened man of letters, along with such luminaries as Montesquieu, Voltaire, d’Alembert, Helvétius, 1 fg, 1:2. 2 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page. 3 cmg, 61. Campbell assumed that critical thinking can only unmask false religion; see leh, 2:266.

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Hume, and Gibbon?4 Or was he merely a traditional divine masquerading as a secular philosopher? Such questions demand that we consider the fundamental values and concerns of the Enlightenment itself. I will suggest that it is the breadth of Campbell’s interests, united by an encyclopedic theory of knowledge, that marks him as a man of the Enlightenment. This breadth of concern is apparent not only in his major areas of specialization – epistemology, rhetoric, history and criticism – but in a host of other areas as well. Campbell and his moderate Christian associates held views of religion that often seem little removed from those of the “pagan” Enlightenment. Hume and Voltaire tended to portray the clergy as duplicitous, self-interested power-seekers, whose ministrations constituted a conspiracy for control of the ignorant masses. In his essay “Of National Characters,” Hume attacked what he took to be the universal character of the priest by contrasting it with the “candid, honest, and undesigning” character of the soldier.5 He suggested that clergymen typically feign more piety than they possess, advance their own interests by promoting ignorance and superstition in their charges, and protect their priestly society with persecution and revenge. It is hardly surprising that Scottish ministers took offence at this characterization, though only as it applied to the clergy of their own church. With regard to Roman Catholic priests, the Scottish moderates were quite willing to uphold Hume’s strictures. Campbell consistently portrayed the Roman Catholic hierarchy as the product of a deliberate quest for power. “That the great enemy which superstition has to overcome is knowledge,” said Campbell of the Roman See, “was early perceived by those, who found their account in supporting her throne. Nor were they slack in taking measures for stifling this dangerous foe.”6 Spiritual tyrannies always depend upon ignorance and credulity. To this end, “Superstition, especially when formed into a politic system, like the Romish, is never deficient in expedients for conjuring down that terror, and rendering it subservient to the invariable aim, priestly dominion.”7 Campbell’s manuscript “Of implicit faith” accused the Roman church of deliberately promoting ignorance in its adherents. His “Defence” manuscript catalogued the criminal history of the 4 All of these figures were cited in Campbell’s religious writings, and almost always as respectable authorities. 5 David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller, rev. ed. (Indianapolis: LibertyFund, 1985, 1987), 199. 6 leh, 2:239. 7 leh, 2:238.

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Roman hierarchy. That the degeneration of the true Christian religion happened over many ages and with unintended design does not seem to have lessened Rome’s culpability in Campbell’s eyes. “Does any one claim or exercise a dominion over the faith of others?” he asked. “That man is a priest in the most odious sense the word bears.”8 “Priestcraft” was alike repugnant to “common sense, morality, and all rational religion, natural and revealed.”9 William Robertson’s History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V likewise attributed uniformly base motives to the clerics of the Roman faith. Enlightened unbelievers merely extended these strictures to all clerics, whether pagan, Roman, or Reformed. Like Voltaire and Hume, Protestant writers had difficulty believing that Roman Catholic prelates could possess a genuine concern for the spiritual welfare of their charges while they advanced the worldly policies of Rome. The Enlightenment’s belief in a conspiracy of the priesthood may have been comforting to eighteenth-century minds. It helped account for the almost inevitable corruption that enlightened moderates could not overlook in their ideal institution, the Christian church. It also helped to explain why so many in an age of enlightenment failed to be convinced by the clear and rational evidences of true religion. Despite the evils of false religion, Christian moderates assumed that religion itself was essential to the security and well-being of society, just as Voltaire thought that belief in an avenging deity was necessary to prevent his servants from cutting his throat.10 Campbell’s sermon, The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society, hinted that false religion might be preferable to no religion for the sake of social stability, though its stated purpose was to deny the claims of libertines that religion is merely a political invention for the purpose of social control. This denial sits uneasily with Campbell’s underlying belief in a conspiracy of the priesthood, but it says much about his assumptions concerning human motivations. The sermon seems to assume that religious adherence and civil obedience are the consequences of prudent calculations concerning reward and punishment. On the one hand, this parallels Campbell’s enlightened belief that the mental processes driving human action are plain and open to inspection. On the other hand, it implies that human nature is naturally inclined to evil unless checked by clear penalties. This latter 8 st, 1:429. 9 aul ms 654, un-numbered page. 10 Arthur M. Wilson, Diderot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 1972), 101. See also James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 121.

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implication seems to conflict with the Common Sense view that human beings have a natural “propensity to speak truth.”11 Yet Campbell seemed genuinely concerned that society would crumble but for the support of convincing Christian evidences. This apparent inconsistency in Campbell’s view of human nature will be addressed again as a religious problem in the next chapter, but the underlying question of human motivation is a matter of Enlightenment psychology which concerns enlightened infidels and Christians alike. Here, the common eighteenthcentury belief in transparent psychological motives may be enough to explain the widespread theory of a priestly conspiracy, for only a clear and powerful motive, such as personal aggrandizement, could account for the deliberate actions of Roman Catholic prelates that ran counter to the obvious evidences and obligations of natural religion. Perhaps the Enlightenment’s uncertainty about human motivations also helps to explain its pervasive demand for religious toleration. Locke and the latitudinarian divines had agreed that toleration is the necessary consequence of the extremely limited human capacity to attain certain knowledge. Campbell’s unyielding demand for religious toleration was likewise grounded in his epistemological theory. He claimed that “a man’s right to his opinions may be truly said to be both natural and unalienable. As they depend not on his will, it is not in his power to alter them. And no law is obligatory which commands a man to lie. Religious toleration therefore may justly be considered as a natural right.”12 Campbell’s views on toleration were little removed from Hume’s. According to Campbell, all men believe that their opinions conform to nature and to reason. All men think that their apprehension of truth is stronger than that of others. But natural reason also shows us that we are not capable of uncovering the secret springs of another person’s heart. We can judge only the actions, not the opinions, of others.13 Wrong-thinking is at worst a misfortune, but never a crime. Persecution does not destroy false beliefs but only morality, for the object of all persecuting laws, “without exception, is to produce and to reward the guilt of lying, cowardice, and hypocrisy, to destroy and to punish the virtues of veracity, fortitude and integrity.”14 Thus Campbell 11 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton, 2 vols, 7th ed. (Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1872), 1:196. “Lying,” continued Reid, “… is doing violence to our nature.” 12 st, 2:144. 13 leh, 2:288–9; aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page. 14 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. Diderot uses virtually the same argument in his article on “Intolerance” in the Encyclopédie.

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could argue, against prevailing British opinion, that disabilities against Irish Catholics were inhuman and devoid of moral authority. Campbell went well beyond Locke by suggesting that freedom of religion should be extended even to the adversaries of religion.15 Intolerance, however wellmeant for the security of society, breeds only party-spirit, thus destroying the natural bonds of sympathy and producing a prejudice which “even the divinest eloquence will not surmount.”16 And as a final incentive, Campbell reminded his audience that toleration is the glory of the British nation.17 That Campbell should appeal to the Glorious Revolution as the foundation of religious tolerance is not surprising, since his politics, like the politics of most British moderates, was committed to the spirit of compromise that followed the 1688 revolution. The re-establishment of Presbyterian government in the Scottish church had happily combined Protestant freedoms with a disciplined kirk, leaving behind the covenanting spirit that had made the seventeenth-century Scottish church intolerant and ungovernable. Since the moderates were deeply committed to the contemporary political and religious settlement, their politics, though open to reform within the existing constitution, tended to resist any trend or movement that threatened to upset the delicate constitutional balance established in the wake of the Glorious Revolution.18 For Campbell, the leading threat to enlightened political stability was the “wild schemes of our political visionaries,” chiefly those of the American republicans and their British supporters, such as the dissenting minister and radical Whig Richard Price.19 In his sermon on The Duty of Allegiance, Campbell considered the colonial rebellion to be a civil war that threatened not only the colonies but also the British nation itself. He cautioned his fellow Scots, many of whom he knew were sympathetic to the Americans, that the rebels’ “loose and republican principles”20 15 dm, 284. Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration had stopped short of tolerating Roman Catholics (enemies of the state) and atheists (enemies of natural religion). 16 pr, 97. 17 aul ms 649, p. 8. 18 William Robertson’s unpublished centenary sermon of 1788 praises the Glorious Revolution for establishing political liberties and religious rights, setting Britain apart from all other nations; see nls ms 3979, fols 11–27. See also Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 327. 19 st, 2:124. Campbell identifies Dr. Price as one of his targets in his letter to Burke of 12 June 1779; sca WWM Bk. 1/1172. 20 st, 2:123.

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struck not only at the British Parliament but at the very foundation of government itself, undermining the basic principles of authority and obedience. The “ringleaders” in the American Congress21 had confused republicanism with liberty, and so mistook their own groundless rebellion for a just resistance to despotic government. Campbell did not mean to advocate a slavish obedience to established government, but rather a principled obedience based on the realization that the “ignorant and credulous” multitude was as capable of tyranny as powerful men.22 He argued that there could be no such thing as perfect freedom in a civil society. The only true freedom was freedom within the law, which demanded the sacrifice of some personal liberty for protection and security. Campbell had little sympathy for Locke’s political philosophy, calling the original compact “one of the hackneyed topics of writers on politics.”23 Like Hume, Campbell believed that government is really founded on opinion.24 Since right is established not in abstract principle but in immemorial custom, the Americans could not justly claim the right to be taxed only by their direct representatives, because few British citizens in England and Scotland enjoyed that privilege.25 Campbell was in favour of allowing the colonies some seats in the House of Commons and of taxing Britons at a proportionately higher rate than Americans.26 But the colonists’ refusal to consider any of these solutions only confirmed their pride and ungovernableness. Campbell’s political views were certainly hostile to republicanism and indeed to any fundamental shift in the political balance established after the Glorious Revolution. But few eighteenth-century minds saw any necessary connection between love of liberty and republicanism.27 Most enlightened thinkers seemed content to leave republicanism where they had found it, in the classical texts of their youth. Campbell was certainly with the majority of his countrymen in opposing American innovations in the ancient constitution. Though his unspoken fears con21 st, 2:206. 22 st, 2:180. 23 st, 2:153. 24 leh, 2:234. 25 st, 2:208–9. 26 st, 2:211. 27 Hume, for example, rejected republican arguments even as he supported American independence; see Donald W. Livingston, “Hume, English Barbarism and American Independence,” in Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment, ed. Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 133–47.

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cerning republican anarchy did not come to pass in America, they certainly seemed to be realized in the France of the 1790s, as Campbell lived out his last days. He was also undoubtedly justified in criticizing American slave-holding, as well as the revolutionary leaders’ refusal to grant women the same freedoms that they had demanded for themselves. By the Americans’ own principles, argued Campbell, women would have to be considered slaves if not represented in the American legislative system.28 Like the majority of his contemporaries, Campbell also believed that his conservative political principles were consistent with Scripture, which commanded men to fear “the LORD and the king: and meddle not with them that are given to change.”29 The Gospel does not inhibit regular and constitutional change, he contended, but it does forbid us to remove “the ancient landmarks of the constitution.”30 The addition of such scriptural imperatives in support of the British constitution would hardly have detracted from their enlightened authority in the eyes of most of Campbell’s countrymen.31 Campbell’s guarded and typically enlightened pessimism concerning man’s ability to manage his political affairs by abstract principle alone was balanced by his enlightened optimism concerning man’s ability to uncover nature. The study of nature was the duty and the joy of enlightened men, whether Christian or not, and most were motivated by a genuine desire to uncover the general providence of the Creator, particularly through the study of natural history.32 In their investigation of the book of creation, the practitioners of Enlightenment were all the children of Francis Bacon, who was the guiding spirit of the Royal Society and of the many scientific societies to follow. Bacon’s system of knowledge played no small part in shaping the greatest of Enlightenment accomplishments – Diderot’s Encyclopedia – as is evidenced by 28 st, 2:177n. 29 This is Proverbs 24:21, the proof-text of Campbell’s Duty of Allegiance sermon. 30 st, 2:134 and 204. 31 Cf. J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chapters 4 and 9. 32 See Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 115–17. E.C. Spary explains the eighteenth-century mania for classifying nature as a mark of personal enlightenment: “One made the transition from natural (the brute) to social (member of polite society) by recapitulating the Adamic process of generating order from an initial perceptual chaos” (“The ‘Nature’ of Enlightenment,” in The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, ed. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999], 295). This explanation nicely combines enlightened motives and Christian motives for the study of nature.

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d’Alembert’s laudatory notice of the English philosopher in the “Preliminary Discourse.” Campbell, like Reid, Hume, and most eighteenthcentury Scots, was also profoundly indebted to Bacon; Campbell described him as “perhaps the most comprehensive genius in philosophy that has appeared in modern times.”33 The Latin epigraph that appears on the title-page of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, taken from Bacon’s De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), may be translated as “Let men be assured that the solid and true arts of invention grow and increase as inventions themselves increase.”34 In this context, Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric was a work of “invention” or discovery – that is, an attempt to realize the Baconian dictum that “All art is founded in science, and the science is of little value which does not serve as a foundation to some beneficial art.”35 “Valuable knowledge,” continued Campbell, “always leads to some practical skill, and is perfected in it.”36 This search for useful knowledge applied to phenomena not only of the external world but also of the internal world, for “it is also in the human mind that we must investigate the source of some of the useful arts.”37 By the proper application of these arts, which are founded on experiment and observation, we “rise from the individual to the species, from the species to the genus, and thence to the most extensive orders and classes,” and finally arrive at general truths.38 This is the “New Country,” the study of rhetoric turned into a science of man, where the investigator may survey the most extensive principles of human knowledge after carefully gathering his observations of human behavior, classifying them, and thereby establishing the rules of rhetorical efficacy.39 Thus even Campbell’s most original contribution to rhetorical theory, his attempt to align the classical ends of speaking with the recently-explored faculties of the mind, derived from Bacon’s attempt to survey the whole structure and purpose of knowledge. The introduction to The Philosophy of Rhetoric, which includes all of these Baconian phrases as well as a rather Baconian overview of the entirety of knowledge, was probably written in the mid 1770s, just prior to 33 pr, lxxiii. 34 Quoted in Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 596, which uses Spedding’s edition of Bacon’s works. 35 pr, lxix. 36 pr, lxix. 37 pr, lxxiii. 38 pr, lxx. 39 pr, lxxiv-lxxv.

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publication. It reflects not only the Baconian ideal of the practical ends of knowledge, which suffused the entire Enlightenment, but also the ideal of cooperative scientific investigation that had given rise to the Wise Club. The influence of “Lord Bacon”40 is evident throughout the productions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, beginning with the founding rule that the subjects of the Society’s researches would include “Every Principle of Science which may be deduced by Just and Lawfull Induction from the Phænomena either of the human Mind or of the material World.” This method would encompass observations and experiments, as well as the examination of “False Schemes of Philosophy,” and would uphold “The Subserviency of Philosophy to Arts.”41 Bacon’s influence is also apparent in the taxonomic nature of the society’s interests, particularly in David Skene’s defence of classificatory schemes as necessary for bringing the profusion of nature within manageable bounds. Skene upheld the legitimacy and usefulness of Linnaeus’ classificatory system against critics such as Buffon, and enlisted Campbell’s help in gathering field samples for inclusion within the Linnaean system. In 1765, Skene made a list of plants he had received from Campbell which were gathered on Mount Morven, an 870 meter peak located in the southwest corner of Aberdeenshire, not far from Grace Farquharson’s childhood home.42 In August 1770, Campbell was still doing field-work for Skene around Mount Morven, describing in some technical detail what he considered to be new or rare plant specimens, and taking notes on the geographical and mineralogical features of the area.43 Skene’s premature death at the end of that year must have been a severe blow to Campbell and to the Wise Club; Skene was the preeminent naturalist among them, and his classificatory expertise was immensely useful to the Aberdonians’ science of man. Skene believed that systematic classification was applicable not only to the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, but also to the structure and faculties of the human mind. The subjects of his discourses indicate that he considered the study of the natural world and the study of the human mind to be parts of the same natural history. Thus it is no accident that Campbell 40 This is Thomas Gordon’s phrase from his discourse “Of the Philosophy of Language & Grammar” (aul ms 3107/3/4, p. 399), cited in The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 48. 41 Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 78. 42 aul ms 482, p. 45. 43 Campbell to Skene; ncl THO 2, fols 53–4.

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frequently employed horticultural and taxonomic analogies in The Philosophy of Rhetoric.44 Nor were classificatory schemes regarded as merely human constructions imposed upon nature; according to Thomas Reid, the classes, genera, and species that we discover in the natural world by means of our innate mental faculties reflect the real and purposeful order of God’s benevolent creation.45 The division of knowledge derived from Bacon was ultimately a representation of the unity of knowledge. Science and the application of scientific method to moral subjects pervaded the work of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. This is evident not only in Reid’s report on the transit of Venus in 1761, and in the society’s frequent discussion of such topics as optics, agriculture, chemistry, and mathematics, but also in Campbell’s question, “How far human laws can justly make alterations in what seems to be founded on the principles of the law of nature?”46 This, together with Gerard’s question, “Whether national characters depend upon physical or moral causes, or whether they are influenced by both?”47 suggests that the Wise Club was very much interested in the attempts of innovative thinkers such as Montesquieu to apply scientific and classificatory schemes to human society. Unfortunately we know too little about the Wise Club’s debates on these questions, but it is nevertheless interesting that, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the application of Bacon’s inductive methodology to such moral topics as ethics, natural religion, social structures, manners, population, language, justice, and education still 44 For example, see pr, lxix, 51 and 53, where Campbell uses botanical details to make rhetorical points. Throughout The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell mixes scientific and literary analogies without embarrassment, suggesting that this may have been common in the meetings of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. 45 This paragraph is indebted to Paul B. Wood, “Buffon’s Reception in Scotland: The Aberdeen Connection,” Annals of Science 44 (1987): 169–90. See also Bernhard Fabian’s catalogue of David Skene’s Wise Club papers in “David Skene and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society,” The Bibliotheck 5 (1968): 81–99. On eighteenth-century classificatory schemes as reflections of general providence, see Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment, 115–17; James L. Larson, Interpreting Nature: The Science of Living Form from Linnaeus to Kant (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 28–9; and Richard Drayton, “Knowledge and Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume II: The Eighteenth Century, ed. P.J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 231–52, which wonderfully describes the long eighteenth-century “tradition of missionary and vicarage naturalism” (234). 46 Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 193. 47 Ibid., 198.

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had an air of novelty. These diverse topics of enlightened interest were subject to the same spirit of scientific or critical inquiry, and all were bound together within the same providential scheme of creation. In the world of the Christian moderates, all knowledge was ultimately about God, his creation, and his intentions for humankind. This is evident even in the titles of the most popular and influential works of natural history of the British Enlightenment, such as John Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation and William Derham’s PhysicoTheology, or a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God from His Works of Creation. As a recent historian of the Aberdeen Enlightenment has justly concluded, “scientific knowledge was presented within a natural theological framework, and, while its practical applications were by no means overlooked, science was chiefly valued as a resource for the defence of religious orthodoxy.”48 The Enlightenment was perhaps the last age in which a man like Campbell could competently participate in such a wide range of intellectual activities and dare to survey the whole expanse of human knowledge. But the Enlightenment’s very ability to collect, organize, and classify information may have been the cause of its own demise. By the middle of the nineteenth century, scholarly fields such as history, philology, criticism, botany, and even philosophy and the social sciences had become so specialized and so rich in comparative information that few could hope to become masters of even one branch of knowledge. Campbell’s passing marked the end of an age in which a polite scholar could maintain a wide competence in the republic of letters and a polymathic view of the whole range of human knowledge. The loss of this breadth of inquiry and of the Baconian unity of knowledge49 heralded the breakdown of the psychological premises upon which Campbell’s world-view was constructed. The rise of new forms of psychological, biological, and historical explanation help to account for the precipitous decline of Campbell’s reputation within fifty years of his death. As we shall see, the transformation of Campbell’s posthumous reputation is not only an interesting historical problem in itself, but a microcosm of the fate of the Enlightenment. 48 Paul B. Wood, “Science and the Aberdeen Enlightenment,” in Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988), 49. 49 On the economy and unity of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment, see especially section viii of Roger L. Emerson’s important paper, “Science and the Origins and Concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment,” History Of Science 26 (1988): 333–66.

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the limits of the enlightened mind Campbell’s conception of evidence and belief, and therefore his view of all natural knowledge, was based on a cluster of assumptions concerning human psychology. He generally assumed that the operations of the mind are open to easy inspection. He assumed that human beings act according to clear and obvious motives. He assumed that reliable testifiers are always fully aware of the operations of their own minds. Finally, he assumed that these aspects of human nature remain constant throughout history, and that standards of evidence and belief are therefore universal and unchanging. These assumptions dominated the British Enlightenment’s empirical notion of defensible religious belief. The philosophy of Common Sense was merely the most determined statement of the enlightened consensus concerning a universal human nature. Common Sense philosophy claimed that all human minds are so constituted as to perceive and judge evidence (such as testimony) in a uniform manner, and that God is of such a nature that he places necessary and saving truths within reach of human minds. These standard Enlightenment assumptions concerning human psychology and its application to religious evidences, already apparent in Locke and in the work of the seventeenth-century latitudinarian divines, are nowhere more clearly and systematically expressed than in William Paley’s View of the Evidences of Christianity (1794). Like the Common Sense philosophers before him, Paley was motivated by Hume’s challenges to rational Christian belief. Paley openly assumed that the claims of the first Christians must have been either deliberate forgeries or literal relations of historical fact. Since the early Christians demonstrably suffered for their claims, and for no other apparent reason than their belief in the literal truth of those claims, they must have been telling the truth. Paley had no means of explaining why sane men and women would suffer and die for the sake of religious claims that they did not believe in an absolutely literal and historical manner. He assumed that the early Christians observed the miracles and weighed the claims of Jesus in the manner of an eighteenth-century empirical philosopher, and consequently arrived at morally certain conclusions. Campbell likewise assumed that Christianity must be either “a divine communication to mankind, or a mere human figment.”50 He thought it impossible that the first Christians could have sanely preached the 50 lstpe, 105.

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Gospel story unless it was a historical relation of facts that they themselves had witnessed.51 Why, he wondered in a sermon preached before a Scottish missionary society, would these daring witnesses risk their lives for something they did not believe to be literally true?52 He argued that the writers of the Gospels were clearly too calm to be fanatics or imposters, and that their literary style made their testimony prima facie believable.53 History demonstrates that the Apostles were virtuous and trustworthy men. Moreover, any explanation of the Christian claims as a conspiracy presents insurmountable difficulties, whereas “the Christian’s hypothesis, that they spoke the truth, and were under the influence of the divine Spirit, removes at once all difficulties, and in my judgment, (for I have long and often revolved the subject), is the only hypothesis which ever will, or ever can remove them.”54 Early Christians had no earthly motive for clinging to belief in the face of persecution, “indeed no motive whatever but faith and a good conscience. If they had these, their conduct was perfectly rational; their counterpoise to all worldly considerations was more than sufficient. Whereas, if they were liars in the profession which they made, and had not the internal supports of faith and the testimony of conscience, I will take the liberty to say that their conduct was, on all principles of persuasion, utterly inexplicable.”55 Furthermore, we can trust the historical veracity of the Gospel-writers because they were in the best position to know the truth of what they related, and because they had “no conceivable temptation to misrepresent.”56 Campbell here followed his own Common Sense maxim that we are obliged to believe testimony unless we have a compelling reason not to. The Aberdonians generally ignored the possibility of inexplicable motives. Alexander Gerard assumed that a deceitful persona and an honest one are equally transparent. He could thereby detect the deliberate lies of Mahomet.57 Campbell likewise thought it plain that the Koran was the 51 st, 2:62. 52 st, 2:31–2. 53 dm, 110. 54 fg, 1:96–7. 55 aul ms 654, un-numbered page. 56 fg, 2:241. 57 Alexander Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 1:365. So too could he determine that Jesus’ methods were not the methods of an imposter, for Jesus was obviously concerned with providing clear evidences of his claims; see Gerard, Dissertations on Subjects Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1766), 77.

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work of men whereas the Bible’s teachings were superior to human sentiments.58 Beattie defended the New Testament writers with the presumption that they either believed or disbelieved what they wrote, and, therefore, that their accounts must be taken as literally true or as gross forgeries. He then essayed to show that they were men of virtue who could not possibly have disbelieved what they claimed, and that their claims must therefore be accepted as true.59 Campbell’s Roman Catholic opponent George Hay likewise assumed that we must believe the testimony of others if they believe it themselves and relate it honestly. He explicitly declared what Campbell implicitly believed, that to doubt honestly-related testimony would undermine all history and all religion, and bring about universal scepticism.60 Even Hume, the sceptic in question, generally assumed that human motives are open to conscious inspection. Campbell suggested, quite rightly, that critics of religion had difficulty explaining the faith of martyrs, for what possible motive could there be for defending a lie in the face of death?61 Either they were correct in their beliefs or pitiably self-deceived. Campbell agreed with his non-Christian opponents that, in either case, their beliefs deserved toleration. But though he was determined to tolerate adherents of different faiths, he felt no obligation to concede to them any measure of truth whatsoever, for “what things in nature are more contrary, than one religion is to another religion? They are just as contrary as light and darkness, truth and error.”62 Thus the best witnesses of religious truth are those who were initially hostile to a new faith, but who thereafter converted upon witnessing miracles.63 Campbell believed he had found many such witnesses in the early church. His deistical and sceptical opponents, who had no use for a supernatural revelation based on miracles and prophecies, were obliged to discredit such witnesses. Nevertheless, Campbell and his opponents tended to agree that the Gospel must be either a truthful relation of

58 st, 1:152–7n. 59 James Beattie, Evidences of the Christian Religion; Briefly and Plainly Stated, new ed. (Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1787), 53–75. 60 George Hay, The Scripture Doctrine of Miracles Displayed, ed. Bishop Strain, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1873), 2:10 and 90. 61 aul ms 655, part iv, un-numbered page. 62 dm, 84. 63 dm, 86–7.

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literal fact or “a villanous imposition on the world.”64 The eighteenthcentury war between Christian moderatism and deism was waged from opposite poles of the same assumption. Eighteenth-century writers tended to explain human motivation in an “either this or that” manner. They were very confident of the universality of human nature and in their ability to uncover fundamental human motivations. This helps to account for the ease with which Enlightenment historians judged the past. Campbell assumed that different religious faiths are fundamentally opposed to one another, that what is true in one necessarily demonstrates the falsity of the other. Thus, it was obvious to Campbell that the Old Testament related history while ancient pagan texts retailed myths.65 Nineteenth- and twentieth-century proponents of historicism have often charged their enlightened predecessors with having little sympathy for the differentness of other times and cultures, and with judging the past by the standards of their present. Although these charges have sometimes been exaggerated to make the eighteenth century appear fundamentally ahistorical, they correctly suggest that enlightened historians believed that they could understand any past or foreign culture if they could only uncover the universal principles of human nature that determine its cultural expressions. Enlightened minds tended to assume that the diversity apparent in the moral universe masks a hidden uniformity, just as the natural world appeared chaotic until its universal laws were uncovered by the great Newton. The Enlightenment’s notion of “truth” was universal, and so, therefore, were its standards of judgment. And truth, for enlightened minds, was invariably bound to the literal veracity of historical claims. The Enlightenment’s notions of historical truth were undercut by nineteenth-century philosophical developments in the German-speaking parts of Europe. Whereas the eighteenth century tended to see both natural and moral evidences as subject to similar laws of probability, the nineteenth century abandoned this attempt to apply quantitative or mathematical notions of evidence to moral subjects.66 Butler’s and 64 dm, 118. Like the English deists, German critics such as Reimarus came to the conclusion that the Christian religion was a fraud perpetrated after Jesus’ death by his disciples; see Henry E. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 48–9. 65 leh, 1:2. 66 Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 369.

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Paley’s empiricism, which focused on the weight and quantity of evidence, was a casualty of the nineteenth-century rejection of moral probabilism. The Enlightenment viewed human nature as constant, impervious to the changes of history, and thus subject to general laws. The nineteenth century tended to see human nature as part of history and as inseparable from the specific cultures in which it manifested itself, just as the emerging science of biology tended to see the natural order itself as subject to change over time.67 Herder rejected the Enlightenment’s belief that one can understand another culture by discovering the common ties of human nature. Nineteenth-century relativism and nationalism displaced the enlightened values of universalism and cosmopolitanism. The Hegelians rejected the Enlightenment’s “either this or that” conception of competing religious or cultural claims with a more flexible “both this and that” conception of cultural mores. New notions of psychological explanation evolved to match these relativistic values. Whereas Lockean psychology tended to consider only readily-observable mental processes, the nineteenth century discovered the unconscious and applied it to problems of human motivation, until Freud was emboldened to remove the last barriers separating formal religious beliefs from individual neuroses.68 Just as the neurotic Viennese were among the most civilized people in the world, so too were seemingly rational cultures capable of inventing religious belief for reasons not apparent to the empirical philosopher. All of these trends were hostile to Common Sense conceptions of human nature, and all conspired to make Campbell’s theory of testimony unworkable, especially as applied to foreign cultures. Nineteenth-century innovations in human psychology were felt in many areas of scholarship, particularly in the new field of higher criticism. David Friedrich Strauss’s influential The Life Of Jesus Critically Examined (1835) was one of the first applications of Hegelian history and myth to New Testament documents. Herder had argued that myths are the ultimate expression of the spirit of a people. Strauss likewise explained the writings and doctrines of the early Christian church as manifestations of a myth-making process – that is, as products of the Christian community’s unconscious hopes and beliefs. The Gospel of Jesus was historically conditioned, developing through many generations of the 67 See James L. Larson, Interpreting Nature, chapter iv, for an account of the eighteenthcentury static view of nature and of species, in which Campbell’s botanical pursuits were perfectly at home. 68 See, for example, Freud’s “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices” (1907) and Totem and Taboo (1913).

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Church. Strauss did not employ this myth-making concept in a negative manner, as eighteenth-century empirical Christians would have, but instead viewed myths as indispensable components of all storytelling, historical or otherwise. Too often, he said, myths “are confounded with fables, premeditated fictions, and wilful falsehoods, instead of being recognised as the necessary vehicle of expression for the first efforts of the human mind.”69 Strauss granted that it is difficult for modern minds to conceive of a time when the imagination was so powerful that its creations were as literally believed as historical facts, but such was the differentness of primitive thought.70 Strauss’s historical Jesus was ultimately an ambiguous figure – neither the literal Son of God nor an impostor. The significance of Jesus, however, is found in the “universal idea” that his life represents. Strauss firmly separated philosophical and religious truth from historical fact. The dogmatic (or rather dialectical) significance of Jesus’ life remains unaffected by the mythical nature of the Gospel accounts.71 In fact, the eternal truths of the Gospels can only be discovered and preserved if they are rigidly excised from the mass of absurd and contradictory historical claims that surround them.72 Campbell would have found Strauss’s account of the Gospels inconceivable. He could not have imagined a Christianity divorced from its literal and historical evidences, and removed from objective proofs such as historically-verifiable miracles. Nor could he conceive the religious value of the Gospel texts apart from their literal and factual claims. Nevertheless, Strauss’s kind of thinking has permeated modern interpretations of Scripture. William Robertson Smith, a late nineteenthcentury Aberdonian biblical critic, shocked the Scottish religious community by introducing the findings of German higher criticism to English-speaking audiences. Like Strauss and Kierkegaard, Smith separated his personal faith from the consequences of biblical criticism. By the end of the nineteenth century, most British scholars had done the same, so that virtually all the assumptions underlying Campbell’s great 69 Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. George Eliot (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 52. 70 Strauss, Life of Jesus, 83. 71 Strauss, Life of Jesus, lii. 72 John Edward Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805–1841 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 165–75, and 255–87. Toews emphasizes that for Strauss, historical fact could never be sufficient to support a saving religion (262). Only through the “Hegelian rehabilitation” of Christianity, by means of a “negative moment” of uninhibited criticism, could its eternal philosophical truths be recovered (258).

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work, The Four Gospels, were quietly discarded. At the end of the eighteenth century virtually all Christian denominations assumed that the Bible contained timeless propositions directly inspired by the Holy Spirit, that all parts of the Bible were equally inspired and therefore equally relevant, and that the Bible spoke directly to modern Christians; by the end of the nineteenth century only a few sects that were unaware of developments in the historical understanding of the origins of Scripture could facilely accept these notions.73 Campbell’s lifetime of biblical scholarship was rendered obsolete. A recent historian has plausibly suggested that the nineteenth-century surrender of the notions of scriptural infallibility and of the objective verifiability of Christian evidences was nothing short of a major paradigm shift in Christian thought.74 Nineteenth-century developments in historiography paralleled these changes in psychology and biblical criticism. By eighteenth-century standards, Campbell had a good sense of historical change. “It happens in a tract of ages,” he said, “through the gradual alterations which take place in laws, manners, rites and customs, that words come, as it were, along with these, by imperceptible degrees, to vary considerably from their primitive signification.”75 Nevertheless, the Dissertation on Miracles assumed that contemporaries of the early Church treated miracles and other religious claims with a critical eye, in the same manner as eighteenth-century philosophers.76 Nineteenth-century historicism demanded a more flexible account of historical evidence than that allowed by the enlightened static view of history, demonstrating that even the most fundamental Christian doctrines had been historically conditioned.77 Just as eighteenth-century critical historiography had begun to expose the Whiggish myths supporting the contemporary British identity,78 so also did subsequent scholars attack historical claims supporting cherished notions of the Christian past. 73 Alan Richardson, “The Rise of Modern Biblical Scholarship and Recent Discussion of the Authority of the Bible,” in The Cambridge History of the Bible: [Volume 3] The West from the Reformation to the Present Day, ed. S.L. Greenslade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 294–338. 74 Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Biblical Higher Criticism and the Defense of Infallibilism in 19th Century Britain (Lewiston and Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), 4 and 226. 75 fg, 1:216. 76 dm, 106. 77 Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 307. 78 See Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c.1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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This undermined the moderate Christian assumption that the essential truths of Christianity, like the essential features of human nature, were beyond the reach of temporal change. The end of the Enlightenment corresponded to the collapse of this uniform conception of history and of human nature in favour of a more flexible and dynamic world view, but one which could not be grasped in its entirety by a single human mind. Modern scholars must appreciate the premises that both shaped and limited Campbell’s thought, and recognize that if Campbell did not do higher criticism it was only because it was not for him a conceptual possibility. Like the seventeenth-century Anglican divines, he had come to defend his religious beliefs with a probabilist theory of evidence. Eighteenth-century minds, whether orthodox or deist, assumed that the disproving of Christianity’s historical claims must necessarily lead to disbelief in the Christian religion. Nineteenthand twentieth-century critics have silently abandoned this imperative. Campbell’s “either this or that” conception of religious proof reveals not so much the limits of his religious mind as the limits of his enlightened mind. It was the Enlightenment that seemed unable to deal with the complexities, irrationalities, and hidden motives of human behaviour. We cannot hope to understand eighteenth-century thought, or the thought of one of its more typical figures, without appreciating the psychological distance that separates us. This distance helps to explain the considerable disparity between Campbell’s eighteenth-century reputation and his modern one. His scholarship appears unimpressive to a modern mind accustomed to scholarly standards that, while not necessarily better than Campbell’s, are based on a wider range of comparative sources as well as a very different conception of evidence and of human motivation. Just as Victorian churchmen were forced to abandon Butler’s probabilistic Analogy of Religion while retaining his epistemological sermons, so we have forgotten the apologetic works that made Campbell famous in his time in favor of a secular rhetoric and epistemology that was all but unread in the eighteenth century. George Campbell’s conception of Christian apology was ultimately dependent upon a unity of natural and religious knowledge that was made unworkable by subsequent scholarly innovations. The nineteenthcentury abandonment of scriptural infallibility broke the connection between critical scholarship and religious faith. Faith was henceforth to be a subjective and internal matter – as it was for William Robertson Smith and Albert Schweitzer. But in Campbell’s world, the bridge from natural

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knowledge to faith stood firm. We have reached the borders of the realm of eighteenth-century natural enquiry, and though this realm has yielded a great deal of knowledge concerning God and his intentions for humanity, this knowledge is not in itself sufficient to show human beings the way from this life to the next. The very findings of natural enquiry point towards the realm of grace.

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part iii Revealed Knowledge: The Religious Campbell

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mystery and faith Christianity, declared Campbell, cannot convince by rational argument alone. “No arguments unaccompanied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, can convert the soul from sin to God.”1 The human mind is incapable of discovering all the necessary principles of true religion solely by its natural abilities. Natural religion is the basis but not the sum of the Christian religion. Natural religion carries within itself the evidence of its own insufficiency. It also indicates that the God of nature will provide for his creatures’ needs with a particular revelation. This revelation, by its very nature, must contain information that cannot be anticipated or grasped by limited human understanding. It must, in other words, contain mysteries. Natural knowledge gives way to revealed knowledge at the point where natural evidences prove that Christian claims are morally certain. But natural evidences are only highly probable at best, and natural belief must correspond to the strength of those evidences. Religious faith, on the other hand, is not based upon degrees of probability. It must be whole and complete, without reservation. Faith, said Locke, “which … absolutely determines our Minds, and … perfectly excludes all wavering … leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation.”2 Campbell 1 dm, 1. 2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 667. Locke argued that faith has its foundation in good reason (687), but also that faith is ultimately different from reason; our assent to a proposition of faith is based upon our reasoned assurance that it comes from God (689 and 698). On Locke’s various uses of the concepts of faith, knowledge, and opinion, see the excellent

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argued that true faith, as opposed to implicit or ignorant faith, is founded upon knowledge, both of the propositions of Christian belief and of their evidences.3 But the certainty of Christian faith, like the certainty of our belief in the metaphysical truths of common sense, must ultimately transcend the limits of the natural evidences upon which Christian belief is rationally established, and it must embrace the whole of Revelation.4 Unlike Hume, the Scottish moderates believed that although the natural evidences of Christianity are not absolutely certain, one must make an absolute commitment of faith, a faith that will be recognized and strengthened by God. The efficacy of Christian faith is itself a mystery, a sure sign of the inner working of the Spirit of God. Campbell gave little public attention to the mysteries of the Christian faith. He found scant virtue in dwelling on those things that are by their nature unknowable.5 Those who advertise their unusual acquaintance with the mysteries of religion only demonstrate their ignorance.6 Campbell believed, as did his deistical contemporaries, that too much attention to mystery promotes superstition and spiritual tyranny. The absurdities found in some translations of Scripture, he said, have proved “a fund of materials to the visionary, out of which his imagination frames a thousand mysteries.”7 He thought it ridiculous to retain obscure and ambiguous phrases in a translation, even though they had become sanctified by tradition. He cautioned his divinity students not to treat the Christian mysteries as sacred rituals. The term “mystery” originally signified only something “not yet discovered.”8 The relationship between God’s omniscience and human free will has never been understood by the rational mind, continued Campbell, and yet it is a mystery central even to natural religion. He implicitly suggested that such a nec-

essay by Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy,” in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 194–223. 3 aul ms 649, pp. 22–3. Here Campbell was arguing against what he took to be the Catholic view of faith – that one can be saved by a proxy faith based on the spiritual authority of other men. 4 fg, 1:6. 5 In The Four Gospels, however, Campbell noted that the original scriptural meaning of “mystery” was not “unknowable” but “unknown,” though many parts of Revelation still surpass human comprehension (fg, 1:282 and 285). 6 st, 1:364. 7 fg, 1:336. 8 aul ms M 190, p. 246.

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essary mystery must be accepted, but not ruminated upon with an attention unbecoming to the present state of human knowledge. Hugh Blair, in a sermon entitled “On our Imperfect Knowledge of a Future State,” argued that our current condition fits us for concentrating on this life, rather than speculating on the next.9 Campbell and the moderates believed, as Calvinists always had, that it is not the business of Christians to know the mind of God. It is their business only to believe and to obey the clear dictates of Christian revelation. Eighteenth-century Christian moderates accepted the necessity of mystery without allowing it to dominate their public ministry. They agreed that belief in Christianity entails belief in certain doctrines beyond the reach of natural knowledge. Yet they would also have agreed with the late eighteenth-century moderate divine George Hill that faith is primarily, though not exclusively, an exercise of the understanding.10 Revelation posed no overwhelming conceptual problem to these enlightened minds. Its authenticity and importance could be confirmed by natural means. Campbell said, “the christian scheme … will be found, it is hoped, exactly conformable to the purest dictates of the unprejudiced mind.”11 Or, as Campbell’s colleague Alexander Gerard said, “Christianity includes all the principles of natural religion, and superadds the revelation of a stupendous dispensation of Providence, for the redemption and reformation of an apostate world, by Jesus Christ.”12 James Beattie, who taught natural religion to undergraduates, summed up the implications of this notion: “When we have, from the purity of its doctrine, and the external evidence of miracles, prophecy, and human testimony, satisfied ourselves of the truth of the Christian revelation, it becomes us to believe even such parts of it as could never have been found out by human reason.”13 How then is Christianity (including its mysteries) to be believed, how are its essential doctrines to be discovered, and how are these doctrines to be put into practice? These questions constituted the essence of Campbell’s intellectual journey. We have seen, in the structure of his 9 Hugh Blair, Sermons, 4 vols, 19th ed. (London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1794), 1:85–114. 10 Donald P. McCallum, “George Hill, D.D.: Moderate or Evangelical Erastian?” (M.A. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1989), 46–8. 11 lstpe, 182. 12 Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 2:388. 13 Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, 2 vols, 3d ed. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and John Fairbairn, 1817), 1:279.

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lecturing scheme, that virtually all the parts of his scholarly and pedagogical work were connected, and even bound together for a common end – which was the practical realization of the Christian religion. Campbell taught Scotland’s future ministers that practical religion ought to inform every aspect of the Christian’s earthly journey. “On the most sublime of all sciences, theology and ethics,” said Campbell, “is built the most important of all arts, the art of living.”14 Politeness and true religion seek the same end, for impiety “does not more clearly betray a total want of religion, than a total want of good manners.”15 “I would have, in the minister of religion,” said Campbell to his divinity students, “the politeness of the gentleman grafted on the virtue of the Christian.”16 He cautioned his charges that religion is a powerful tool, with the capacity to bring out the worst as well as the best in human nature. “Remember,” he said, “that the whole of our business and duty in life may be said to consist in the right application of our talents, by the proper use of our opportunities.”17 Utility and piety ought ideally to be joined in the life of the enlightened Christian. Campbell’s practical religion, like his practical philosophy, required a theoretical base. But his formal religious doctrine, like his theoretical philosophy, is not easy to uncover. He chose not to express this part of his thought systematically. Systematization always conjured up the spectre of “orthodoxy.” “Now to know the truths of religion,” he said, “which you call orthodox, is the very end of my enquiries, and am I to begin these enquiries on the presumption, that without any enquiry I know it already?”18 Campbell thought the term “orthodoxy” was too often used by priests as a weapon to intimidate the unthinking. Orthodoxy should not be considered a starting principle, for then it would already hold universal approbation and require no proof. Orthodoxy, if it meant anything to Campbell, was not a standard but a goal – that is, the end of much questioning and uncertainty. It was this Calvinistic spirit of enquiry and striving that Campbell wished to implant in the minds of his students. The nature of Campbell’s writings also makes it difficult to uncover his doctrinal beliefs. The divinity lectures were purposefully kept free of doctrine, so as to allow his students to discover scriptural doctrine for 14 15 16 17 18

pr, lxix. lpc, 25. lpc, 118–19. lpc, 257. lstpe, 113.

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themselves. Campbell’s surviving sermons were occasional pieces, meant to address specific issues or themes, and cannot be taken as typical of Campbell’s weekly sermons in either content or style. Only the first of Campbell’s published sermons – The Character of a Minister – contains an explicit creed. The typical sermons that Campbell delivered each week from Aberdeen’s pulpits have not survived, and indeed may never have been written out in full. He was famous in his time as an expositor of Scripture, and he was recognized particularly for his ability to explicate difficult passages in the Pauline epistles and the major prophetic books of the Old Testament, as well as for his concern to draw practical lessons from his textual commentary.19 We must keep in mind that we have only a partial record of Campbell’s religious doctrine when we compare his sermons to the somewhat more typical collections left behind by such contemporaries as Alexander Gerard and Hugh Blair. In re-creating Campbell’s doctrine, therefore, we are limited to the topics that can be found in his writings. This means that some topics of great interest to eighteenth-century Scots – the nature of Christ’s atonement, for example – cannot be included simply because they do not fall within the scope of Campbell’s surviving works. Other more practical questions – such as the nature of Christ’s moral example – can be examined at length. Although the following review will allow us to better understand Campbell’s religious mind, it will not allow us to judge the completeness or incompleteness of his doctrine. There is simply not enough evidence to make a systematic theologian out of Campbell. But we must begin somewhere. We may start, then, with the creed that Campbell endorsed at the time of his ordination.

the westminster confession and the scottish church The official standard of Christian doctrine for ministers of the Church of Scotland was the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647). While this confession was the required test of orthodoxy, it could not, by its own standards, be taken as the very word of God. Its central premise was that Scripture alone constitutes God’s revelation to humanity, a claim supported by its frequent citations of the Bible. The Westminster Confession acknowledged the importance of human reason and betrayed a 19 See George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Campbell” (1800), in leh, 1:xii and xxxv; and The Aberdeen Magazine (June 1796): 49–50.

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distinct distaste for mystery, yet recognized the necessity of mystery as a consequence of the unsearchableness of God’s nature and the limits of human reason. It allowed a limited place for natural theology, arguing that the light of nature demonstrates the benevolence and omnipotence of God, but quickly added that the light of nature also exposes our sinful state. Only Revelation can exhibit the means of our salvation and the proper manner of worshipping God. Theologically, the Westminster Confession focused on the majesty and sovereignty of God. It argued the absolute determination of all things by God and the absolute dependence of man on divine mercy. That man is also free and responsible for his condition was an acknowledged mystery of the Christian faith. The confession held that man, in contrast to God, is utterly depraved and powerless, and cannot be saved even by his own faith, for the justifying faith of righteousness is itself given by God. Apart from divine grace, the works of a degenerate man, no matter how admirable or useful, are of no value and count only as additional sin. The confession argued that the body of chosen saints, known as the universal church, is invisible and distinct from the visible church. It nevertheless maintained the necessity of adhering to the discipline and sacraments of the correctly-established visible church. Finally, the confession stressed the endless striving of the Christian elect.20 The Westminster Confession and its attendant catechisms were adopted as the official creed of the Church of Scotland upon the reestablishment of the Presbyterian form of church government in 1690. As we have seen, Campbell was early trained in the Westminster Shorter Catechism, and was of course completely familiar with the Westminster Confession itself. He was required to subscribe to the latter in order to be ordained in the established church, though we know neither his opinion of the creed nor if he held any mental reservations upon subscribing. We also do not know if Campbell noticed that the Westminster Confession gave relatively little emphasis to the doctrine of Christ or to the mysteries of the Trinity. The moderates themselves would later be criticized for their lack of attention to these same matters. Campbell did refer to the Westminster Confession in his divinity course, though not often, and we do not know if he reviewed it systematically with his 20 The Humble Advice of the Assembly of Divines (hereafter, Westminster Confession), in The Creeds of Christendom, ed. Philip Schaff and David S. Schaff, 3 vols, 6th ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1931), 3:598–673.

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students. Considering both his dislike for systems and his emphasis on individual discovery of Christian theology through self-directed Bible study, it is probable that he did not. Campbell was well aware that the recent history of his own church was shaped by controversies concerning the degree of strictness with which the official creed was to be imposed upon its ministers and teachers. In the first half of the eighteenth century the term “heresy” was frequently used, precisely because the church now had a clear standard of orthodoxy.21 Several professors of divinity were charged in the General Assembly with teaching heretical opinions to Scotland’s future ministers. John Simson (1668–1740), professor of divinity at Glasgow, came before the Scottish church’s highest court on two separate occasions – charged first with promoting Arminianism and later with teaching Arianism. Whether or not Simson actually held these doctrines, he certainly taught his students natural theology and the art of critical thinking. His implicit suggestion that Christian knowledge is capable of improvement by the employment of human reason was anathema to the creedalists of his time, but nevertheless, Simson paved the way for a more enlightened standard of teaching in the next generation.22 The orthodoxy of Archibald Campbell (1691–1756), a St Andrews professor of divinity, was also seriously questioned in the General Assembly. His The Apostles No Enthusiasts made the Apostles into rational believers of Christ, which, according to his opponents, gave too much credit to corrupted human faculties. The fact that Archibald Campbell was not convicted suggests either that secular politicians were conspiring to mitigate the enthusiasms of strict creedalists, or that the forces of creedalism were declining within the established church.23 We do not know George Campbell’s opinion of these highly-publicized trials of Scotland’s divinity teachers, but we may surmise that they encouraged him to guard his own expressions in the divinity hall and to question the justness of representing the spirit of Christianity in terms of strict adherence to abstract propositions. 21 Gordon Donaldson, The Faith of the Scots (London: B.T. Batsford, 1990), 103. 22 The Simson case has finally been examined in scholarly detail by Anne Skoczylas, Mr Simson’s Knotty Case: Divinity, Politics, and Due Process in Early Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001). 23 James K. Cameron, “Theological Controversy: A Factor in the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. R.H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), 128.

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Increasingly, Scottish Presbyterians who were dissatisfied with the established church’s commitment to creedal orthodoxy chose secession, beginning with Ebenezer Erskine’s formation of the Associate Presbytery in 1733. Thereafter the number of seceding congregations grew rapidly; in 1750, there were forty-five, and by the end of the century there were more than three hundred,24 though many of these congregations had little interest in strict intellectual creedalism. The Evangelical revivalism that arose in the 1730s on both sides of the Atlantic encouraged many Scots to seek a religion of the heart rather than of the head. Evangelicals were unfriendly to both the exclusivity of the seceding creedalists and the conservatism and rational empiricism of the rising moderates; instead they supported popular revivals such as those at Cambuslang in the 1740s. Some Evangelicals who remained within the established church, such as John Erskine, became leaders of the Popular party, which opposed the Moderate party in the Scottish church courts. William Robertson’s Moderates, who first gained influence in the 1750s and had Campbell’s general support, thrived because of their high degree of organization and the patronage they received from social elites. They clashed with the Popular party over such issues as lay patronage and the morality of stage plays (also an Enlightenment debate), though these issues may have masked more fundamental differences in Christian values. Campbell was highly sensitive to these developments within the eighteenth-century Scottish church, but he was most concerned with the rise of party spirit itself. Party attachment, the bane of enlightened historians, was for Campbell a symptom of the disunity and decline that inevitably infected and corrupted the Christian church in all of its manifestations. The controversies that both shaped the eighteenth-century Scottish church and troubled the mind of George Campbell revolved around a few characteristic issues: the necessity of strict adherence to established creeds; the merits of doctrinal purity as opposed to ecclesiastical unity; the relative value of a religion of the head as opposed to one of the heart; and finally, the source of Christian knowledge itself, that is, the degree to which the human understanding is capable of searching out Christian truth. This last issue was the starting point of Campbell’s own religious doctrine. 24 Richard B. Sher and Alexander Murdoch, “Patronage and Party in the Church of Scotland, 1750–1800,” in Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408–1929, ed. Norman Macdougall (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983), 201.

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campbell’s theory of religious knowledge “Knowledge,” said Campbell early in his career, “is truly the ground-work of every moral and spiritual attainment.”25 Knowledge was a powerful instrument, susceptible to abuse by the wicked, though more likely to promote the good. Campbell’s theory of Christian knowledge was not far removed from his secular epistemology. Like his seventeenth-century Anglican predecessors, he developed a theory of knowledge equally suited to religious and secular applications. He saw little discontinuity between the two realms, since the law of nature, which was the law of God, was inscribed on human hearts.26 It is therefore no surprise that Campbell’s theory of religious knowledge was an extension of his natural epistemology. Campbell’s religious epistemology, like its secular counterpart, devoted considerable attention to methodology. Revealed knowledge, like natural knowledge, is gained by experience rather than by means of an innate reasoning power. The light which informs our reason in spiritual matters comes “from without, and consists chiefly in testimony, human or divine.”27 Thus Campbell’s theory of evidence applies equally to revealed religion, “as far as it is to be considered as a subject of historical and critical inquiry, and so discoverable by natural means.”28 The most important tool of the experimental theologian is a critical attitude, for “when we have no principles of critical knowledge, we have no rule by which to chuse.”29 Therefore Campbell taught his divinity students the enlightened doctrine that they must think and judge for themselves. Campbell was optimistic concerning the ability of critical methodology to solve religious problems. Knowledge, he held, is the bane of spiritual despotism, and allows true virtue and piety to throw off the fetters of harmful superstition. The sixteenth-century revival of learning had 25 cmg, 7. 26 aul MS 653, part II, un-numbered page. Lloyd F. Bitzer has, mistakenly I think, found a substantial break between Campbell’s secular theory of knowledge and his religious epistemology, arguing that “the empiricism announced in the Rhetoric cannot be successfully sustained; Campbell abandons his classical empiricism when he makes provision for revealed truths”; PR, li. This is a very twentieth-century view. Campbell, like most of his moderate contemporaries, believed that his faith in revelation was founded on and justified by historical, testimonial, and critical evidences. He scorned the kind of radical division between knowledge and faith that Bitzer seems to be implying. 27 fg, 1:4. 28 pr, 56. 29 lstpe, 121.

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prepared men’s minds to receive a true reform of religion. But, he cautioned, modern Christians must not depend on the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, for the age of miracles and of direct inspiration has passed.30 God expects Christians to prosper by natural means. True revelation can never contradict the findings of natural reason because both come from the same divine source.31 Our intellectual powers tell us, for example, that authentic revelation must be morally unassailable. The neglect of our natural powers can bring on only “the terrors of superstition, or the arrogance of fanaticism.”32 The accumulation of empirical knowledge, therefore, is the best means of solving difficulties of scriptural interpretation, for “in every question relating to fact, where experience may be had, our safest recourse is to experience.”33 A minister’s task is to progress in his understanding of the Christian evidences, and to communicate these evidences to his parishioners with the aid of the rhetorical arts. Campbell thus gave considerably more credit than did the Westminster Confession to man’s natural ability to know God, but this enlightened empiricism did not lessen his commitment to the core doctrines of Protestantism. In fact, his emphatic support of the authority of Scripture was based on a rational appreciation of its singular divine character. “Now,” said Campbell, “for supporting and enforcing the suggestions of reason and conscience, I know no auxiliary so powerful as the precepts of the gospel, which are the result of the most enlarged views of human nature, and which breathe the most liberal benevolence to the whole creation of God.”34 Although our natural reason can successfully answer the “grand question … Is the doctrine which Jesus Christ preached, from heaven, or of men?”35 it can say little more about the particular intentions of God. So having recognized with moral certainty the true heaven-born revelation, we must submit ourselves to its teaching. Campbell instructed his divinity students that 30 leh, 2:236–7 and 265–6; lstpe, 263–6. 31 lstpe, 86–7. “God, in the economy of grace, as in the economy of nature, supplies man with all the materials necessary for his support and well being, but at the same time requires the exercise of those faculties with which he hath endowed him, for turning those materials to the best account” (lstpe, 110). 32 st, 1:341–2; see also cmg, 11, leh, 1:101, fg, 1:7. 33 fg, 1:22. 34 aul MS 653, part III, un-numbered page. Campbell argued that Jesus’ teaching was authoritative because he was able to convince his hearers that his teachings conformed to nature, conscience, and common sense (fg, 1:89). 35 lstpe, 89.

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while they may include arguments from nature and from history in their sermons, they must argue primarily from Scripture.36 Scripture is clearly the primary source of Christian knowledge, but the meaning of Scripture is not always unambiguous or impervious to misunderstanding. Christians must approach Scripture in the proper spirit. First, said Campbell, they must seek the simple meaning of a text rather than an obscure or difficult one, for revealed truths must be accessible to all believers.37 The transparency of Christ’s character demands a corresponding belief in the simplicity of his teaching. This assumption allowed Campbell to think of the Christian Scriptures as a unified body of doctrine with a simple, central message. Thus, “Scripture will ever be found its own best interpreter.”38 Natural reason, however, suggests that not every part of Scripture is of equal doctrinal importance. In the hierarchy of Christian knowledge, Campbell gave particular emphasis to the record of Christ’s exemplary life as found in the Gospels. The Four Gospels was a thoroughly Protestant attempt to provide ordinary Christians with an accurate and accessible translation of the very heart of God’s revelation to humanity. Campbell was not alone among moderates in his commitment to the necessary simplicity and unity of Christian knowledge. He heartily recommended to his readers a sermon by his colleague Alexander Gerard entitled “The Nature of Sound Doctrine,” which argued that true scriptural doctrine, as opposed to the divisive complexity of human systems, is known by its clarity and simplicity. Sound doctrine always has a moral tendency, and is concerned with practical conduct rather than with the subtleties of correct thinking. “Let us attend to the great end of all Christian doctrine,” concluded Gerard, “namely, holiness of heart and life, our purification from vice, and our improvement in virtue.”39 Gerard and Campbell agreed that the term “heretic” properly denotes one who prefers divisiveness to the simple truth of Gospel morality. Campbell worried that, even among Protestants, the sufficiency of Scripture had been subverted by the monopolistic interpretive claims of parties and factions.40 Thus his regard for Scripture explains his antipathy to both ecclesiastical party conflict and the tyranny of creeds. 36 37 38 39 40

lstpe, 481. leh, 1:101. fg, 1:358. See also lstpe, 57. Gerard, Sermons, 2:163. lstpe, 242.

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Campbell’s theory of religious knowledge, in sum, united the values of the Enlightenment with traditional Protestant orthodoxy. Scripture provided the Christian with all the knowledge necessary for salvation, but its authenticity was discovered by natural means. Christians had to depend upon themselves to read and interpret Scripture, and had to beware of putting too much faith in teachers. The liberty given by Christ to all believers – a liberty too often usurped by priests – was the foundation of enlightenment in this world and of salvation in the next. The moderates tended to view the Reformation and the Enlightenment as aspects of a single historical development. Like Robertson, Campbell suggested that the modern age began “when the light of the reformation broke forth, and people awoke out of that lethargy into which ignorance and sacerdotal tyranny had lulled them, when they began to be sensible that God had not more certainly given men eyes to see with, and ears to hear with, and feet to walk with, than he had given them reason to assist in the discovery of truth, and conscience to indicate the path of duty.”41

campbell’s doctrine Campbell’s pedagogical strategy of teaching a method of religious enquiry rather than Christian doctrine itself may have been profitable to his students, but it makes more difficult the modern historian’s task of uncovering his personal doctrinal beliefs. Nevertheless, it is time to attempt a reconstruction of what Campbell called, in his own brief creed, “the genuine uncorrupted truths of christianity.”42 Campbell’s secular epistemology, as we have seen, was closely related to his philosophy of human nature. Similarly, his religious epistemology was tied to his doctrine of man. Traditional Calvinists had viewed human beings as utterly depraved and worthless, incapable of contributing anything to their own redemption, and presumably unable to discover saving truth for themselves. Campbell acknowledged the “universal depravation” into which man had fallen as a consequence of sin, and allowed that man had “become obnoxious to perdition.”43 He seems to have upheld a more or less traditional Calvinist conception of the four stages of human corruption and salvation, claiming that the science of religion teaches “the origin of man, his primitive dignity, the source of 41 aul MS 649, p. 43. 42 cmg, 16. This short creed is reprinted in appendix 2, pp. 267. 43 cmg, 26 and 16.

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his degeneracy, the means of his recovery, the eternal happiness that awaits the good, and the future misery of the impenitent.”44 He accounted for the inevitable corruption of the church with the observation that “what God makes upright, man always corrupts by his inventions.”45 Divisions within the church “are universally admitted to be evils, though unavoidable in the present lapsed condition of human nature.”46 These scattered excerpts suggest that Campbell believed in the fallenness of human nature, but his writings contain little other direct evidence on the matter. Indirect evidence, however, suggests that Campbell did not subscribe to the full measure of the Calvinist view of human depravity. His belief in the progressive nature of religious knowledge would have been untenable if man’s natural faculties had become entirely corrupted by the fall. He held that “none of the appetites or affections belonging to human nature are evil in themselves.”47 If they were intrinsically evil, what faith could the Aberdonians have placed in the natural instincts or common sense of humankind? Thomas Boston, whose Human Nature in its Fourfold State (1720) represents a more traditional Scottish Calvinist theology, asserted that the fall had corrupted our natural faculties to the degree that we had become hostile to goodness itself, and had acquired “a natural proneness to lies and falsehood.”48 Such a view seems incompatible with the Common Sense account of human nature, which was quite consistent with the general trends of the Enlightenment.49 Reid claimed that human beings are naturally inclined to tell the truth.50 John Farquhar preached that despite our fallen condition, we have a natural abhorrence of evil and an inborn sympathy for the sufferings of others.51 The Aberdonians were thus ambiguous on the 44 pr, 105. 45 leh, 1:46. 46 leh, 1:48. 47 st, 1:321. 48 Select Works of the Late Rev. Thomas Boston, ed. Alexander S. Patterson (Edinburgh: A. Fullarton, 1844), 34. 49 Ernst Cassirer argued, “The concept of original sin is the common opponent against which all the different trends of the philosophy of the Enlightenment join forces”; see The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 141. 50 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton. 2 vols, 7th ed. (Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1872), 1:196. 51 John Farquhar, Sermons on Various Subjects, ed. George Campbell and Alexander Gerard, 2 vols, 3d ed. (London: T. Cadell, 1778), 1:59.

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effects of original sin. Campbell suggested that man is sufficiently corrupted to make it impracticable for him to discover true religion by natural means.52 “The weakness and the corruption of our nature,” agreed Gerard, “render the assistance of God absolutely necessary for our practicing holiness.”53 Nevertheless, the moderates’ focus on moral preaching and reformation (as opposed to states of grace) suggests that human beings have some capacity to understand good and to act for their own betterment. Campbell and his fellows seem to have believed that human nature falls somewhere between natural goodness and sinful corruption. Human beings are not sufficiently fallen to lose all hope of desiring and seeking the will of God and of improving themselves. Yet they are not sufficiently pure to avoid the necessity of seeking God’s revealed plan of salvation. It is difficult to say whether this ambiguity represents the moderates’ sincere position or rather a convenient sop to the surviving creedalists in their church. In any case, this crucial equivocation paves the way for the more important parts of the moderates’ theology. As Campbell said, concerning the purpose of man’s existence, “The light of nature, as well as revelation, points to this great end, the perfecting of his nature by effecting a conformity to the will of God, the highest felicity of which a man is susceptible.”54 The traditional Calvinistic focus on the absolute depravity of human nature was meant to contradistinguish and highlight the absolute power, goodness, and otherness of God. By the same measure, the eighteenth-century moderates’ more positive reading of human nature allowed them to mitigate the extreme Calvinistic emphasis on the absoluteness of God’s will. The Christian moderates wished to attribute to man an effective freedom of choice compatible with a benevolent divine providence. After all, God had created the natural world for man’s benefit and improvement. Campbell argued that the proper method of discovering God’s nature is to reason from the effects evident in creation to their cause,55 a position which implicitly credited man with a considerable power of discovering God’s nature for himself. Campbell therefore sought a God who reveals himself. “God has not, in respect of revealed, any more than in respect of natural religion, left himself without a witness. Sufficient evidence has been and will be 52 53 54 55

cmg, 10. Gerard, Sermons, 1:301. leh, 2:372. pr, 378.

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always given.”56 Campbell’s brief creed described God in terms recognizable to a natural philosopher: “there is one only GOD, a spirit, eternal and omnipresent, infinitely powerful, wise and good, the maker and the ruler of the world.”57 This description is conspicuously devoid of reference to God’s vengefulness and absolute intolerance of sin, for only in a superstitious religion does “the divine being [appear] to the worshippers as a capricious and tyrannical master to his wretched slaves.”58 Campbell assumed that an authentic religion must resemble its author: “Whatever therefore tends to exhibit our religion as amiable, is, in fact, an intrinsic evidence of its truth.”59 Campbell’s God is a God of love and mercy, understanding of human failures, and desirous of man’s improvement by both natural and spiritual means. The whole of nature declares that God has not abandoned his creatures to misery, but has provided them with the means and the evidences to desire and know God’s benevolent plan for humanity. By removing some of the distance between God’s absolute holiness and man’s absolute corruption, Campbell managed to avoid the unanswerable question that had plagued Scottish Calvinists for generations – the question of how an omnipotent, infallible, and just God can permit sin without being responsible for it. The gulf between the holiness of God and the fallenness of man had traditionally been filled by the person of Jesus Christ, the saving mediator who partook fully of both the human and the divine natures. If the moderates indeed held a mitigated view of the corruption of human nature, it seems to follow that their christology would focus less on the atoning nature of Christ’s sacrifice and more on the moral example of Jesus’ life. This is certainly the sense of their extant sermons. But this does not necessarily mean that they dismissed the traditional doctrine of Christ. Christology is the touchstone of orthodoxy. The doctrine of the Trinity, for example, is so closely tied to the doctrine of Christ, that to clarify the one will largely clarify the other. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the orthodox doctrines of Christ and of the Trinity, which had formerly been agreed upon by Catholics and Protestants alike, came under intense critical scrutiny from biblical scholars and church historians. They increasingly found these doctrines to be dependent not upon Scripture but upon historical developments in the early 56 57 58 59

st, 2:63. cmg, 16. st, 1:331. st, 1:308.

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church.60 Modern scholars have usually assumed that eighteenthcentury Scottish moderatism was part of this critical trend and have therefore equated it with Socinianism – the belief that Christ was not truly or fully divine.61 This has merely exacerbated the judgment of nineteenth-century churchmen that the moderates ignored the saving work of Christ and were therefore heterodox. By the standards of strict creedalists, Campbell indeed failed to give sufficient public attention to the nature of Christ and of his atonement. But before we judge Campbell on what he did not say, we should be clear on what he did say. Campbell’s view of Christ was constructed with care from textual and historical evidences. Dissertation vii of The Four Gospels, for example, considers the historical signification of the term “Messiah.” Campbell argued that the ancient meaning of the term was quite different from the modern meaning. In Jesus’ time, not even the few who believed that he was the Messiah thought of him as more than human. The title “lord” was meant only as a mark of respect to a superior. Nevertheless, Campbell did not draw heterodox conclusions from this claim. “It was plainly our Saviour’s intention to insinuate, that there was in this character, as delineated by the Prophets and suggested by the royal Psalmist, something superior to human, which they were not aware of. And though he does not, in express words, give the solution, he leaves no person who reflects at a loss to infer it.”62 Campbell argued that the confusion over these terms is a good example of the tendency of modern readers to impose their own meanings on ancient words, and he accused contemporary paraphrasers of making the Gospel Jesus into their own party man.63 This helps to explain Campbell’s reluctance to discuss the nature of Christ in his own writings. He thought that the true Christ is to be found in the Gospels rather than in modern commentaries. The Christ of the Gospels is the very opposite of a party man. Nevertheless, there are enough scattered clues in Campbell’s writings to suggest that his view of Christ was largely orthodox. In his “Defence” manuscript, Campbell advocated the simple creed that had been 60 Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 88–101 and 193–4. 61 Socinianism actually had more than one meaning to its enemies, and could signify, besides the denial of Christ’s divinity, a methodology that put too much emphasis on human reason; see Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 119–20. 62 fg, 1:237. 63 fg, 1:236–42; pr, 351.

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enough for the early Christians: “I believe Jesus is the messiah the son of God.”64 Like Locke, he added that “we must possess the love as well as the belief of the truth, if we would be saved by it.”65 He asserted that Christ is the Son of God, was born of a virgin, lived a perfect life, rose from the dead, and purchased eternal happiness for those who repent and obey the Gospel. These claims, in fact, take up the bulk of his formal creed.66 He taught his divinity students that their study of scriptural doctrine must include consideration of the Messiah’s “pre-existence and divinity, his state of suffering including his incarnation, his character, his ministry on earth, his death and burial, and … his succeeding state of glory, including his resurrection, ascension, exaltation, and second coming, together with the purposes which the several particulars were intended to answer.”67 This suggests that Campbell guarded his doctrinal expressions merely to prevent his students from neglecting their own researches. But he explicitly rejected Unitarianism (perhaps the natural consequence of Socinianism) in a friendly letter to the Unitarian sympathizer Alexander Christie.68 A more complete christology appears near the end of the “Defence” manuscript: “no created excellency is worthy to be compared with that of the only begotten son of God, the brightness of the father’s glory and the express image of his person; we are certain that no human virtue, however splendid, will bear to be compared with his in whom dwelt all the fulness of the godhead bodily, who did no sin, and in whose mouth no guile was ever found; whose whole life and death and doctrine are incontestable evidences of the insuperable zeal whereby he was actuated for the advancement of the honour of God and the felicity of men.”69 Though this passage would not satisfy a strict creedalist, there is enough material here to uphold a more or less traditional christology. Campbell declared that Christ was the Son of God, in whom resided the completeness of God, that he was fully human and perfect, and that he died for the salvation of men. A similar christology can be found in the writings of other moderates, though the references are infrequent. Alexander Gerard’s series of sermons “The First Promise of the Redeemer,” describes the miraculous conception of Christ and the role of Christ as the primary instrument of 64 65 66 67 68 69

aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page. st, 1:309. cmg, 17. lstpe, 158. Campbell to Christie, 20 May 1790 (NLS MS 3703, fols 65v–70). aul ms 655, un-numbered page.

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mankind’s salvation.70 John Farquhar saw Jesus not only as “the greatest person that ever trod the earth,” but as a deity, the eternal Son of God.71 Hugh Blair’s sermons clearly proclaim the death and resurrection of Christ for the sake of man’s salvation, and the present role of Christ as the Great High Priest. Moreover, his equation of Christ with God is so strongly implied as to be unmistakable, though the equality of Christ with the Father is less clear.72 George Hill, the most systematic of the eighteenth-century Scottish moderates, held a doctrine of Christ that was unimpeachable by any orthodox standard.73 If the moderates’ view of Christ was largely orthodox, why did they not preach it more frequently or distinctly in their surviving sermons? It is probable that they viewed the atoning nature of Christ’s mission as a mystery, a doctrine to be believed rather than understood. An overzealous desire to dwell on the details of such mysteries leads to enthusiasm and to strife within the church, which are, in Campbell’s eyes, contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. Within Campbell’s lifetime, such controversies had rent the unity of the Church of Scotland. Like other moderates, Campbell believed that Christians ought to concentrate on matters within their grasp. Thus he chose to highlight the reforming power of the exemplary moral life of Jesus rather than the inscrutable ontological status of Christ. This he considered no abrogation of his ministerial duty, for to divide the church over abstract questions (as invariably happens) was to violate the very core of Christ’s teaching. As George Skene Keith wrote, “though satisfied, in his own mind, of the truth of the essential doctrines of Christianity, he also disapproved of certain abstruse questions concerning the trinity, the nature of Christ’s satisfaction, and such like controversies.”74 Campbell did occasionally advertise his orthodoxy, as in a reference to the “Holy Ghost, the third of the sacred Three in whose name we are by baptism initiated into the Christian communion.”75 But his orthodoxy usually manifested itself in a subtler form, particularly in his tendency to read into the nature of the divine what he found characteristic in the life of Jesus. This may have been his way of demonstrating the unity of Christ with the being of God. 70 Gerard, Sermons, 1:119 and 139. 71 Farquhar, Sermons on Various Subjects, 2:243, 194 and 198. 72 Blair, Sermons, 1:48–9, 116–7, 121, 197 and 153. 73 McCallum, “George Hill,” 40–4. 74 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” xliii–xliv. 75 st, 1:314. This may be his only substantial reference to the place of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity.

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Campbell’s doctrine of salvation corresponded to his christology, which is to say that he made no firm commitment to either side of the long-standing Scottish debate over the relative value of faith and works in the economy of salvation. Sometimes Campbell seemed to uphold the traditional Calvinist doctrine that man has been corrupted to such a degree that he cannot even will to believe in saving grace. The doctrine of unmerited grace he called an “important evangelical truth.”76 In illustrating a particular preaching style, he used the doctrine of redemption by unmerited grace through the mediation of Christ and the operation of the Spirit.77 But Campbell’s views sometimes took him far afield of traditional Calvinism. The text for his sermon The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society, Proverbs 14:34, reads, “Righteousness exalteth a nation: but sin is a reproach to any people.” Campbell interpreted “righteousness” in this passage to mean “true and practical religion,”78 an interpretation which placed considerably more emphasis on the moral practice of Christians than on the unmerited grace of God. Campbell’s doctrine of salvation can be better understood in relation to one that it opposed. He attacked the elder Dodwell for taking the keys of salvation from Christ and giving them exclusively to bishops. In contrast to this rather arbitrary means of salvation, Campbell preferred a more traditional notion: “as we are repeatedly assured in the New Testament, the purpose, rule or law of the Almighty, when he should come at last to judgment, was to render to every man according to his deeds.”79 Campbell clearly subscribed to a doctrine of works, in defiance of Calvinist tradition. He credited human beings with a considerable capacity for achieving their own redemption. Moreover, he thought that people who reform themselves inspire others to seek their own salvation.80 Gerard similarly argued that “genuine religion is wholly practical: grace is but the principle of virtue and good works. Your religion can be of no value, I should rather say, you have no real religion, if it do not enter into life with you, if it do not pervade and animate all your actions.”81 Gerard 76 lstpe, 453. 77 lstpe, 447–8. 78 st, 2:82. 79 aul ms 650, section ii. Campbell cited Revelation 22: 12, “And, behold, I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be.” 80 aul ms 652, part i, un-numbered page. 81 Gerard, Sermons, 1:11. Gerard further suggested that the diligent practice of one’s calling promotes one’s salvation (1:342).

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went so far as to tell his students that, “every person must work out his own salvation & depend only upon his own labours for it,” thus preferring to emphasize the process of regeneration over the various states of grace.82 Although Campbell and the moderates preached the value of works, even in regard to salvation, they did not believe that man has the capacity to seek his own salvation apart from divine grace. But should the moderates nevertheless be labelled Arminians? Did they reject Calvinist predestination by claiming that Jesus died for all willing to receive him? On the one hand, the Common Sense philosophers (especially Reid) insisted that our will must be free in some effective sense, and that we must be able to determine our own will. Though this was directed primarily against Hume’s naturalistic kind of determinism, it may also have been implicitly directed against the determinism inherent in extreme Calvinism. On the other hand, the moderates seem to have upheld a more traditional Scottish notion of providential determinism. Reid taught his students that “the firm perswasion that nothing befalls us but by the appointment or permission of our Father in Heaven, is the truest Source of Consolation to a pious Mind.”83 Campbell’s own position conforms neither to predestinarianism nor to Arminianism. He said that “God does not force the wills of his creatures; but he makes both their errors and their vices conduce to effect his wise and gracious purposes.”84 Divine foreknowledge does not appear to be deterministic in the Calvinist sense. Yet Campbell, like Locke and Diderot, based his toleration argument on the premise that human beings cannot will their own belief. Belief in abstract propositions is rather the irresistible consequence of viewing the available evidence.85 It seems, therefore, that Campbell believed there are natural limits to human free will, quite apart from theological arguments. It appears that he was less committed to free will than were his Common Sense associates. Campbell had reason to be circumspect on the matter, for he was clearly hostile to the antinomian tendencies of his own church. He argued that no spiritual attainment can free us from our natural duties and obligations, since God is the author of nature as well as of revelation.86 Although 82 aul ms K 174, p. 7. 83 Thomas Reid, Practical Ethics, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 120. 84 fg, 1:440. 85 See aul ms 655. 86 aul ms 654, part IV, un-numbered page.

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Campbell’s thought does closely resemble the thought of seventeenthcentury Dutch Remonstrants or Arminians,87 the label of “Arminian” is neither helpful nor accurate by itself. It does not convey either the complexity or the ambiguity of his position. Campbell certainly believed that Christ’s atonement is indispensable to human salvation, and that the grace of God is necessary to discover it. But he also claimed that “the grace of the HOLY SPIRIT of God is tender’d to every one, who sincerely and assiduously seeks it.”88 This ambiguity is further evident in his assertion that neither reason nor faith is by itself sufficient for the Christian.89 If pressed, Campbell would surely have argued that salvation is the business of God, whereas the fulfillment of God’s natural and revealed commands is the business of men, and their only legitimate concern. Thus he held fast to the traditional Calvinist idea that this life is one of endless striving. But he also believed that our striving need not be blind to our fate. Ultimately, reason and grace are cooperative partners in the work of salvation. What then are men fated for? Campbell was much less willing than previous generations to speculate on the nature of the next life. He supported the minimal view that “the wicked shall go into everlasting punishment, and the righteous into life eternal.”90 But his treatment of the term “hell”, both in The Four Gospels and in the lecture hall, discarded much of the popular fire-and-brimstone understanding of the concept. The New Testament writers, in their accounts of the state of the soul after death, were inclined to use a range of common, contemporary metaphors which cannot be unambiguously rendered by a single modern, theologically-weighted term such as “hell.”91 Campbell even seems to have upset James Boswell’s supper by suggesting that annihilation would not be such an undesirable fate.92 87 See Rosalie L. Colie, Light and Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); Colie demonstrates both the likeness and the direct ties between the Dutch Remonstrants (who rejected extreme Calvinism) and the English Platonists as well as the latitudinarian divines. 88 cmg, 17. 89 fg, 1:3–4. 90 cmg, 17. 91 fg, Dissertation vi, part ii. 92 See Boswell’s brief journal entry for 7 June 1777; Boswell in Extremes 1776–1778, ed. Charles McC. Weis and Frederick A. Pottle (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 129. Boswell had probably been describing to Campbell his last interview with Hume (at which time Hume had been reading Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric), and Campbell had likely opined that Hume’s notion of annihilation after death was not inherently repugnant.

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Campbell and the moderates did not consider the institutional church to be necessary for the salvation of the individual. Campbell’s page-long creed includes no mention of the church in any form. He declared that Christ has no temporal kingdom.93 He would have agreed with Calvin that the Church Triumphant is invisible, though he would have disagreed with the extreme Calvinists’ sectarian conception of the visible church. Nevertheless, he upheld the traditional belief that the true church is “the spouse of Jesus Christ, for the love of whom he died.”94 Campbell emphasized Christ’s role as sole mediator between man and God in the Christian economy. A minister, therefore, can only claim the role of mediator or priest in a loose sense.95 Campbell’s hostility to the human usurpation of Christ’s priesthood runs as a theme throughout the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History. His unmistakable antipathy to the Roman Catholic hierarchy derived from his general dislike of any clerical superiority within the church. He believed that emphasis on rites and ceremonies is positively harmful to the Christian life if it distracts from simple Gospel truths.96 He even considered the rite of baptism useless in itself, suggesting the relative unimportance of the sacraments to salvation. Campbell was largely indifferent to the form of ecclesiastical order. The probabilist theory of knowledge that he inherited from the seventeenthcentury latitudinarians encouraged him to favour an inclusive view of the visible church. His explicit ecclesiological claims were largely negative. He worried primarily about the dangers posed to personal religion by particular forms of the church, and consequently highlighted the alarming historical consequences of sectarian claims. It is not surprising that he viewed the visible church as a voluntary society, united by common principles of belief. In the “Defence” manuscript, the main target of which was the Roman Catholic notion of hierarchical authority, Campbell described the ideal church as a “society” whose “members” had come together by means of an “original compact”97 – terms all borrowed from contemporary political theory. Campbell’s concern for ecclesiological abuses natu93 st, 1:397. 94 aul ms 652, part i, un-numbered page. 95 leh, 1:310–11. 96 cmg, 11. 97 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page; also leh, 1:4. Robertson’s political Moderates used the notion of a voluntary church to support their call for greater discipline within their own church. See Robertson’s “Reasons of dissent” (often called the “Manifesto of the Moderate Party”), reproduced in The Scots Magazine 14 (April 1752): 191–7.

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rally led him to insist on the separation of church and state powers. He argued that the purpose of the Christian religion is to influence the heart, not to establish a temporal kingdom.98 Campbell applied the same concerns to his own church. He advocated neither its disestablishment nor a return to the covenanting tradition of the past. He was rather ambivalent as to whether the Scottish people would be held accountable for their collective degree of faithfulness to God. His sermon The Nature, Extent, and Importance, of the Duty of Allegiance strongly implied that the American war was a divine punishment for national sin. In every war, said Campbell, there is “some immorality or guilt which is the direct cause. The superintendency of Providence is doubtless to be acknowledged in this, as in every other event.”99 Nevertheless, his use of the passive voice throughout this passage suggests that he could not be sure of God’s intentions. He was more sure, however, of the appropriate human response to acts of providence: “affliction of every kind ought to excite us to self-examination, prayer, and repentance.”100 Campbell’s hesitancy concerning the possibility of a Scottish or British jeremiad may be contrasted with the certainty evident in Gerard’s own fast-day sermon: “[we must] humble ourselves in sincere repentance for those sins by which we have provoked God to visit us with this calamity, and which, persisted in, may justly provoke him to prolong it, or to blast our success and our national prosperity.”101 The Americans, continued Gerard, “have stirred up war: and war is one of the fiercest fiends which the Almighty turneth loose for the punishment of nations by whom he hath been long provoked.”102 But neither Campbell nor Gerard adhered to a view of divine visitation comparable to that held by John Bisset, Campbell’s High-flying predecessor in Aberdeen’s Second Charge. Bisset’s sermon on the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 argued that “national sins, without national repentance, will certainly bring on national judgments.”103 The Lisbon 98 leh, 1:40–1. 99 st, 2:127. 100 st, 2:128. 101 Alexander Gerard, Liberty the Cloke of Maliciousness (Aberdeen: J. Chalmers, 1778), 3. 102 Ibid., 13. 103 John Bisset, Discourses on Several Important Subjects (Edinburgh: John Bruce, 1763), 55. On the context of eighteenth-century Scottish jeremiads, see Richard B. Sher, “Witherspoon’s Dominion of Providence and the Scottish Jeremiad Tradition,” in Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment, ed. Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 46–64.

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earthquake was a divine call for the repentance of the Scottish people, lest they receive a similar visitation. Clearly, Bisset, like most traditional Calvinists, held a very immediate sense of providence, which was fundamentally incompatible with Campbell’s probabilist theory of knowledge and of Christian evidences. Campbell believed in divine rewards and punishments for virtues and crimes, but seems to have been unwilling to make claims about how these were manifested in the present life. Although the moderates’ conception of providence appears to have included an element of divine visitation, they agreed that God generally accomplishes his designs through natural means. But in keeping with their more traditional Christian heritage, they tended to interpret human history according to a Christian model. Campbell argued, in A Dissertation on Miracles, that the origins of the world would be inexplicable without reference to particular acts of providence (miracles), and that the beginning of history would be unknowable without Revelation.104 Sometimes, however, the moderates’ views of historical providence were not entirely complementary. William Robertson’s sermon, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s Appearance, and Its Connexion with the Success of His Religion, argued that the success of the early church can be explained entirely in terms of God’s general providence, which is to say that the church could not have prospered outside of the particular historical context that God prepared for it by natural means. However, in The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel a Proof of Its Truth, Campbell asserted that the early church could not possibly have prospered by natural means in the hostile situation of the time, and therefore must have had the miraculous assistance of particular providence. Although these arguments seem to contradict one another, their incompatibility, if noticed at the time, would have appeared merely as additional proofs that, one way or another, the early church enjoyed the patronage of heaven.

campbell’s christianity This overview of Campbell’s theology demonstrates that he was not notably heterodox. His departures from traditional Scottish Calvinism are best explained by the tempering effects of eighteenth-century natural religion. In other words, Campbell was a mitigated Calvinist, and was perhaps influenced by the more tolerant Episcopalian traditions of the Northeast. But to judge Campbell’s theology merely by the standards of 104 dm, part ii, section vi.

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the Calvinist past or the Evangelical future is to miss the originality of his Christianity. Furthermore, such judgments tend to perpetuate the mistaken notion that the moderates’ commitment to Christianity was limp and superficial. We ought, therefore, to consider Campbell’s Christianity in its own terms. Campbell’s Christianity was centred on the concept of a personal and practical reformation of life and character. His notion of reformation encompassed improvement in both knowledge and morals. “As in religion,” said Campbell, “the ultimate end both of knowledge and faith is practice, or, in other words, the real improvement of the heart and life, so every doctrine whatever is of use, either as a direction in the performance of duty, or as a motive to it. And the knowledge and belief of hearers are no farther salutary to them, than this great end is reached. On the contrary, where it is not reached, where the heart is not bettered and the life reformed, they prove only the means of aggravating their guilt and heightening their condemnation.”105 Campbell’s reluctance to proclaim a comprehensive and dogmatic theology does not indicate indifference to Christian truth, but rather highlights his sincere pedagogical belief that every Christian must discover God’s revelation for himself. Although Campbell believed that “religion is a thing purely personal,”106 he was no fideist. He assumed that the strongest Christian faith is built on the bedrock of empirical investigation.107 Faith based on ignorance is worthy only of scorn. But Campbell also believed that mere acknowledgement of the moral certainty of Christianity’s claims is insufficient. Belief must give way to the transforming certainty of faith. Christians convicted by the Spirit of God must not merely repent but ceaselessly reform their lives and characters. Campbell believed that moral reform is that “to which every other [part] in this [Christian] economy points, as to its ultimate end.”108 “The reformation of mankind,” he taught his students, “is the great and ultimate end of the whole ministerial function.”109 Or as his friend John Farquhar said, “the great design of religion is to make us better men.”110 Gerard likewise declared that the end of the pastoral office

105 lstpe, 466–7. 106 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. 107 st, 2:42. 108 lstpe, 169. 109 lstpe, 355. “The primary intention of preaching is the reformation of mankind,” though it is of all the purposes of persuasion the most difficult to achieve (pr, 107). 110 Farquhar, Sermons on Various Subjects, 1:239.

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is “the improvement and salvation of mankind.”111 The Aberdonians’ notion of the Christian life and system, therefore, is best summarized as a work of reformation. This reformation, thought Campbell, should be founded upon the “spirit of the Gospel.” He used this phrase to capture the character and style of Christ’s ministry, which was always benevolent, moral, and practical. Christ was not only a saviour, but “the very pattern in the conduct of providence presented for our imitation.”112 A profession of Christianity is worthless without a striving to become like Christ. The spirit of the Gospel, said Campbell, is the “internal signature of genuine Christianity.”113 He contrasted this spirit of Christ to the blind zeal of dogmatism. Dogmatic disputes, he told his students, always lead away from the charity and virtue that constitute the true heart of religion. The authentic fruit of Christianity is moral reformation rather than vain disputation.114 Protestantism’s most characteristic failing is its tendency to become overly concerned with metaphysical reasoning, which leads only to dogmatism and consequently disharmony. Campbell approved Gerard’s argument that controversy and division within the church is the very opposite of “sound doctrine,” which, in its proper scriptural signification, means healthfulness and healing. Sound doctrine necessarily excludes any teaching without a practical, moral tendency.115 Campbell thought it better to accept a measure of doctrinal uncertainty than to live apart from the spirit of the Gospel, whose only absolute requirement is benevolent unity. William Laurence Brown’s posthumous summary of Campbell’s teaching was strikingly apt: He placed the essence of religion, where our Saviour himself placed it, in the unfeigned love of God, and of mankind, and actions were, in his opinion, virtuous only as far as they flowed from one or other of these sources, or tended to establish or enlarge these principles in the hearts of men. To him it appeared highly detrimental to pure and vital christianity to make it consist wholly in certain external modes of worship, in the maintenance of certain systems of speculation, or in any of those little peculiarities by which sects and parties are 111 Alexander Gerard, The Pastoral Care, ed. Gilbert Gerard (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1799), 403. 112 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. 113 st, 1:317. 114 cmg, 15–16. 115 Gerard, Sermons, 2:142.

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commonly distinguished … Bigotry he regarded as having a fatal tendency to sour the temper, and to harden the heart. Laxity of principle he considered as cutting the sinews of christianity. Lukewarmness was, in his opinion, incompatible with conviction of the truth of religion; fanaticism was subversive of all its blessed effects.116

Practical piety was, for Campbell, the very end and purpose of the Christian life. Piety he defined as the respectful recognition of God’s benevolent mastery in the universe.117 Practical religion is the self-conscious pursuit of virtue in the present life. Campbell’s improving religion was never far removed from the practical spirit of the Enlightenment, just as his piety owed much to the Enlightenment’s conception of natural religion. The moderatism of Campbell and of his associates is best understood in this light. But before turning to a final examination of Campbell’s moderatism, we must examine some of the practical and controversial implications of his Christianity.

116 William Laurence Brown, The Death of the Righteous Precious in the Sight of God (Aberdeen: A. Brown, 1796), 26–7. 117 See lpc, 24. Campbell here equated impiety with treason against God’s supreme authority.

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8

Religious Problems and Controversies

George Campbell’s religion, like his philosophy, was meant to be practical. The religious problems that occupied his attention were hotlydebated issues in his day, and their solution required the use of both natural and revealed sources of knowledge. Campbell believed that there are certain things we can know about the nature of miracles, Scripture, and the Christian church by means of our natural understanding alone. Thus he could argue with Hume concerning the philosophical possibility and merit of miraculous claims without invoking revelation or divine inspiration. So too could he invoke the authority of the Roman Catholic critic Richard Simon concerning the reliability of scriptural texts. Finally, he could engage in historical debate over the nature of the early church with such diverse figures as the High Church apologist Henry Dodwell or the infidel Edward Gibbon. In all of these cases Campbell the philosopher was confident that he could arrive at highly probable empirical conclusions, allowing him to believe the veracity of Christian claims with moral certainty. Probabilistic conclusions, however compelling to the rational mind, were not in themselves teleologically satisfying to the believer. True and practical Christianity demanded a faith that was oblivious to degrees of moral evidence. A believer must ponder the religious implications of the Christian evidences, and realize the consequences of belief with practical commitment. Even natural religion proclaims the need to move beyond natural knowledge. Campbell thought it clear that the successes of the early church could not be explained by natural means alone, as is evident in his sermon The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel a Proof of Its Truth. Our natural researches, therefore, compel us to consider the significance of the religious claims of a small band of be-

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lievers who clearly enjoyed the favour of God’s particular providence. The empirical certainty of miracles in the early church constitutes an unmistakable sign of the revelation of God’s particular will to mankind.

th e r e l i g i o u s i m p l i c at i o n s o f m i r ac l e s Campbell employed an enlightened theory of knowledge to defend the historical veracity of miracles against the Enlightenment’s greatest sceptic. His reason for defending miracles, however, cannot be explained by a secular teleology. “My primary intention in undertaking an answer to [Hume’s “Miracles”] … hath invariably been, to contribute all in my power, to the defence of a religion, which I esteem the greatest blessing conferred by Heaven on the sons of men.”1 When we left the subject of miracles, Campbell had established, by natural arguments, not only that miracles are possible, but also that they are the expected consequence of God’s moral nature. Furthermore, he had demonstrated that the historical claims in favour of the miracles of the early church were not only highly probable but morally certain. This means, according to the third element of our earlier definition, that the doctrine that accompanies these miracles must constitute a special revelation from God. The most obvious religious implication of this is that anyone who can successfully prove the fact of a miracle can also claim a corresponding point of doctrine. Campbell thought it historically plain that the only believable miracles are those recorded in Scripture for the purpose of authenticating scriptural doctrine. After the initial verification of the Christian claims, “it pleased heaven to withdraw those supernatural aids,” so that modern Christians “have no ground to look for miraculous assistance.”2 Miracles form the bridge between God’s natural providence and his revealed will. Having crossed that bridge, Campbell’s argument concerning miracles shifted away from Hume and toward Christian rivals such as the Roman Catholic apologist George Hay, who had an interest in finding miracles in every age since the early church. The remaining discussion of miracles, therefore, must consider the significance rather than the ontological possibility of miracles. Campbell was not, however, entirely done with Hume. Even the sceptic had recognized that the question of miracles was interesting primarily because of its religious implications. “If the spirit of religion join 1 dm, 5. 2 leh, 1:4; st, 2:349.

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itself to the love of wonder,” said Hume, “there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority.”3 Hume understood that most people neither believe nor disbelieve miracle claims for philosophical reasons, but that their belief in miracles generally follows their religious commitments. According to his Natural History of Religion, religious belief can be adequately explained by a secular philosophy of human nature without reference to metaphysical arguments. The superstitious tendency evident in human nature, along with the love of wonder, easily accounts for popular belief in miracles. Thus a particularly superstitious religion, such as Roman Catholicism, naturally has a corresponding legion of miracle claims. In the second half of his “Miracles” essay, Hume derived devious pleasure from pointing out the multitude of witnesses attesting to modern Catholic miracles. He implicitly suggested that their testimony was as good as, if not better than, the testimony of the witnesses for early Christian miracles. Hume may simply have intended to perplex conscientious Protestant readers, who necessarily believed the Gospel miracles without accepting Roman Catholic ones. He concluded his “Miracles” essay with an ironic shot aimed directly at the empirical Christian apologists of his age. His strategy, he claimed, was to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure … upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.4

If Hume’s purpose was to bait moderate Scottish divines, then he accomplished his end with particular success. Perhaps nothing better 3 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 117. 4 Ibid., 129–31.

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identifies Campbell as an eighteenth-century empirical Christian than his compulsion to answer Hume’s ironic charge. Campbell took great pains to discount the testimonies that Hume playfully asserted in favour of contemporary Roman Catholic miracles. In fact, his attempt to directly answer the historical details of Hume’s ironic argument most clearly betrays his empirical mindset. Campbell argued that Christianity was first established in an environment inherently hostile to its message. Its first witnesses, therefore, could not have been predisposed to believe its miracle claims. The testimony supporting the Gospel miracles could have survived only if the miracles were true and therefore unassailable by Christianity’s many enemies. Thus the rapid growth of the early church constitutes a conclusive demonstration that the Gospel miracles were believed even by those who were originally hostile to the Christian message. Roman Catholic miracle claims, in contrast, are advanced by those who are predisposed to believe them, in an environment that encourages such claims.5 All eighteenth-century philosophers and historians knew that the testimony of interested parties is inherently suspect. Thus the myriad Catholic miracle claims can be dismissed on purely natural grounds. Despite his Common Sense defence of testimony, Campbell had no difficulty disbelieving testimony concerning Catholic prodigies. He advanced the typical eighteenth-century Protestant belief that Popery is a “fruitful source of lying wonders,” and predictably concluded that the reliability of Catholic witnesses is in no way equal to that of the Gospel testifiers.6 Catholic miracles, unlike the Gospel miracles, cannot be rationally believed. Campbell’s rejection of Roman Catholic miracles required the use of detailed historical arguments even apart from Hume’s taunts. The Catholic apologist Bishop George Hay agreed that Hume’s impieties could be easily dismissed, but he allowed no such treatment of his own claims. His arguments were perhaps even more dangerous to Campbell’s apologetic system than were Hume’s. Though the number of Catholics in Scotland was small, Catholicism still held considerably more sway than did scepticism. Hay, like Campbell, considered miracles to be the “highly-prized prerogative of revelation.”7 Miracles were to be regarded 5 dm, 86–7 and 221. 6 dm, 211 and 244. In “The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel,” Campbell even suggests that the Roman hierarchy knows its miracles are poorly founded, but used them anyhow to buttress its shaky claims to spiritual authority (st, 2:45). 7 George Hay, The Scripture Doctrine of Miracles Displayed, ed. Bishop Strain, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1873), 1:vii.

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as absolute proofs of a divine communication. In fact, argued Hay, the Protestant Reformation could be rejected on the grounds that it wrought no miracles to prove the legitimacy of its innovations. God would never sanction such a departure from tradition without incontrovertible evidence.8 Though Hay’s Scripture Doctrine of Miracles Displayed (1775) was published some time after Campbell’s Dissertation on Miracles, it nevertheless represents an important category among Campbell’s ideological opponents. Hay’s argument concerning miracles proceeded in an entirely different direction than Campbell’s. Although Hay discussed the historical evidences of miracles, he did so only in the second volume of his work, thus assuming the reality of miracles from the outset. He did not even attempt to engage Hume directly, because the philosophical aspects of belief in miracles were of no interest to him. Hay claimed that “since revelation assures us of the fact, it is most unphilosophical to pretend from reason to argue against it.”9 Hay made no attempt to persuade infidels or deists that miracles are possible or historically demonstrable. His arguments were directed at Protestant moderates who already believed in the possibility as well as the fact of miracles. He argued that if any Christian miracles are worthy of belief then Roman Catholic miracles must be among them, for why should the establishment of the original Gospel be the only legitimate function of miracles?10 Hay claimed, undoubtedly with Campbell in mind, that the Common Sense presumption of the veracity of testifiers must apply as well to Catholic witnesses as to any other. Catholic testimony is no more self-interested than Protestant claims, for does not Protestantism predispose its adherents to limit miracles to the first Christian age?11 Hay had only to demonstrate that there is no good reason to believe that the age of miracles had ended to accomplish his main purpose, which was, he said, to decide the whole issue between Catholicism and Protestantism.12 If he could merely show that the age of miracles had not in fact ended, then Campbell would have to acknowledge the continuity and authority of the Roman Catholic church. Campbell, of course, would admit none of this. Although he did not engage Hay directly on this matter, he implicitly disagreed with him 8 Ibid., 1:286. 9 Ibid., 1:31. 10 Ibid., 1:65. 11 Ibid., 2:85 and 2:48. 12 Ibid., 2:87.

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concerning the premises of their debate. Campbell started from the common eighteenth-century assumption that God accomplishes his purposes in the most efficient manner possible – that is, with the fewest interruptions of the natural course of providence. Critical philosophers must seek not only the most believable miracles but also the most economical set of miracle claims. Biblical miracles are the best-attested in human history, and for that reason Christianity (which has superseded Judaism) is the only well-founded religion. Christian revelation was convincingly and completely established in its first age, requiring no further examples of particular providence to support it.13 Roman Catholic miracles are simply superfluous. Campbell consistently assumed that Christianity ought to be followed in its simplest and purest form, without unreasonable expectation of further signs and proofs. In fact, he suggested that miracle claims are illegitimate if unaccompanied by a corresponding doctrinal claim.14 After God had communicated the fullness of his saving plan to humanity, he intended natural providence to suffice for daily life. The Protestant Reformation required no miracles because it merely re-established the spirit and doctrine of the early church. Campbell further rejected Roman Catholicism for advancing its way by force rather than by testimony and persuasion, a historical fact that gave it the character of Mahomet rather than of Christ.15 Campbell’s Protestant stance was not without its difficulties. He acknowledged that “the intrusion of mistakes into the [scriptural] manuscripts, and thence into printed editions, was, without a chain of miracles, absolutely unavoidable.”16 Since he wished to avoid any miraculous claims concerning the historical transmission of Scripture, his Protestantism was forced to rely upon the merits of textual criticism, one of the natural means by which God intends modern Christians to prosper. He knew that similar conclusions, mixed with a little more scepticism, had permitted Richard Simon to reject the Protestant principle of sola scriptura as inherently unreliable. But Campbell was optimistic concerning the critical powers given by God to man. In the end, he 13 Campbell’s argument is undoubtedly a bit circular. He argued, a priori, that since Gospel revelation is sufficient for human needs, miracles must have ended in the early church, and that subsequent claims can be automatically discounted. But he also argued, a posteriori, that since the age of miracles has in fact ended, God must have deemed primitive Christianity sufficiently evidenced to convince Christians of all subsequent ages (leh, 1:4). 14 lpc, 135. 15 st, 2:42–3. 16 fg, 1:447.

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treated Roman Catholic miracles as Hume had treated all miracles, assuming a priori that they were unreliable, without feeling an obligation to consider the individual pieces of testimony. He boldly concluded that not even a miracle could justify false or immoral methods of advancement. “There are doctrines,” he said in his Spirit of the Gospel sermon, “which, though an apostle of Christ, or an angel from heaven, should preach to us, we ought not to receive.”17 Campbell assumed, in other words, that authentic doctrine must not only be supported by miracles, but must also be inherently consistent with reason and natural virtue. His opponents undoubtedly objected to this elevation of human reason above the explicit commands of God. They might also have complained that Campbell could use this criterion against virtually any doctrine he pleased, and that he had the Roman Catholic church in mind when he established it. Hay, who had a particular dislike for this sermon, would not have failed to notice this. Apart from his disagreement with Hume, Campbell applied most of his efforts to minimizing the place of miracles within the Christian economy. He argued that one ought not to call a miracle that which can be explained by ordinary providence or by natural or human causes. Scriptural prophecies, for example, can be fulfilled by secondary causes without the assistance of miracles.18 Campbell’s position on particular providence – situated somewhere between Hume’s rigid agnosticism and Hay’s Catholic fideism – highlights the inherent difficulties of Christian moderatism. Campbell was forced to make certain assumptions about what constitutes a reliable witness, though he could convince neither Hume that there are reliable witnesses for any miracles, nor Hay that the Gospel testifiers are more reliable than Catholic ones. He also needed to convince his various opponents that the successes of the early church constitute proof of God’s particular favour, while the apparent successes of the Roman Catholic church do not. Campbell undoubtedly believed that his hostility to Roman claims was based on historical evidence rather than on prejudice – an assumption that found more sympathy in the eighteenth-century world than it does in the modern world. Campbell’s miracles argument may ultimately have proved more effective against Hume than against Hay. If Hay’s argument formed part of a larger providential view of the world, then he may have been 17 st, 1:375. 18 Campbell to Hailes, 24 June 1789 (nls ms 25305, fols 10–16).

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closer than Campbell to Calvinist High-flyers such as Bisset or Evangelicals such as Wesley, who believed in the direct hand of God in contemporary history. Campbell’s attempt to navigate between Hume’s empirically-founded scepticism and Hay’s or Wesley’s practical negation of the distinction between general and particular providence put him in an extremely vulnerable position. The moderates held a very specific and narrow view of what constituted reliable evidence. Both Hume and Hay, from very different perspectives, rejected the moderate criteria. Yet the moderate position nevertheless remained more typical of the Enlightenment.

the inter pretation o f sc riptur e The authority of the Gospel revelation, as Campbell well knew, was founded upon the authenticity of the miracles recorded in it. He saw no problem in the notion that Scripture is fundamentally self-authenticating. But Scripture, once received as the word of God, presented its own unique problems. Campbell specifically rejected the notion that the integrity of Scripture had been maintained through the ages by miraculous supports. Yet he also rejected the Roman Catholic position that the church could guarantee the continuity of true doctrine. Campbell upheld the Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura, but grounded this belief in the competency of the critical arts which he himself practised. He was committed to the authority of Scripture, but not to any indiscriminate use of Scripture. He knew that sectarians routinely abuse Scripture in order to find their favourite doctrines. But God had provided an antidote. He had given us critical powers so that we can know something of the nature and attributes of God, more about the nature of man, and a great deal about the historical and critical uses of scriptural texts. We therefore have a rational and empirical basis for interpreting Scripture and understanding the divine truths that are not found in nature. Campbell’s Protestant faith was not set in opposition to reason, but was built upon the accomplishments of rational enquiry. “Every thing … here,” he said, “is subjected to the test of Scripture and sound criticism.”19 Campbell believed that one of the most important tasks of critical reason is to mitigate the potentially dangerous effects of popular and sectarian interpretations of Scripture. He told his divinity students 19 fg, 1:31.

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never to believe a tenet “in opposition to reason and to common sense.”20 Scripture ought not to be followed in a slavishly literal manner. Though it enjoins us to obey our rulers, there are times when resistance to government or parents is lawful, and when killing is necessary.21 Therefore, “It is by common use, and not by scholastic quibbles, that the language of the sacred writers ought to be interpreted.”22 The enemy of true understanding is party spirit. Campbell encapsulated the sectarian philosophy thus: “You are to try our doctrine by the Scripture only: But then you are to be very careful that you explain the Scripture solely by our doctrine.”23 He believed that the legitimate purpose of scriptural study is to formulate doctrine rather than to reinforce pre-formed doctrines. As Alexander Gerard said, “New means of elucidating scripture are every day discovered and employed: there is a very general disposition among protestants to examine with impartiality what it really teaches.”24 Campbell even seemed to believe that solving the linguistic problems of Scripture by means of historical scholarship and textual criticism had the potential to eliminate most controversy and confusion from the church. “In these matters we ought all to be determined by the impartial principles of sound criticism, and not by our own prepossessions.”25 The health and unity of the church, he suggested, is directly dependent upon the practical progress of natural knowledge. Campbell’s intentions for his textual criticism are best understood in light of this Christian teleology. But Campbell must have known that reason had not always definitively clarified doctrinal disputes and had sometimes created new ones. John Locke had intended to elucidate the fundamental principles of Christianity by means of “an attentive and unbiased search” of the Scriptures alone,26 but was surprised to find himself charged with undermining the faith by giving too little regard to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, one of the most notorious casualties of biblical criticism between the time of Erasmus and the time of Richard Bentley was the 20 lstpe, 148. 21 st, 2:135–7. 22 fg, 1:340. 23 fg, 1:106. 24 Alexander Gerard, The Corruptions of Christianity Considered as Affecting Its Truth (Edinburgh: Mundell and Son, 1792), 41. 25 fg, 1:278. 26 John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. George W. Ewing (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1965), xxvii.

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Protestant certainty that Trinitarian orthodoxy could rest safely on the authority of Scripture rather than on the authority of Church tradition. Nor could critical scrutiny of Scripture resolve the old Reformation debate concerning what actually happened during the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. By the eighteenth century, doctrinal tradition was increasingly coming into conflict with rational and especially historical inquiry.27 Campbell himself was little inclined to worry about such abstract theological disputes. He considered his translation of the Gospels to be not an exercise in scholastic pedantry, but rather a means of promoting the practical improvement of Christian knowledge. “The worst consequences,” he said, “which the blunders of transcribers have occasioned, are their hurting sometimes the perspicuity, sometimes the credibility of holy writ, affording a handle to the objections of infidels, and thereby weakening the evidences of religion.”28 Campbell nevertheless argued that a multiplicity of critical translations actually affirms rather than obscures the most important truths of Scripture, and secures the reputation of Christ against the infidels.29 This seemed to him the best argument for freedom of enquiry and publication in religious matters. Unlike Richard Simon, Campbell believed that the critical method of scriptural enquiry is sufficient for Christian needs, and considerably more reliable than Simon’s conception of church tradition. What then were the practical consequences of Campbell’s biblical criticism? How did he actually apply his principles to the problems of translation and interpretation? Campbell took seriously his own injunction in The Philosophy of Rhetoric that usage and custom is of primary importance in communication. In his translation of the Gospels, he generally adopted the King James Version (the standard English translation) as his base text, recognizing that the language of this particular translation had become the standard medium of religious expression in the English-speaking world. His own translation was, for the most part, a correction of the common text rather than an original production, and he admitted in the translation notes that he often chose to retain the 27 Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 6; on the problem of Scripture and the doctrine of the Trinity, see 91–2. On the problem of the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, see Pelikan’s earlier volume, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300–1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 202–3. 28 fg, 1:455. 29 fg, 1:18–20.

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common reading rather than to make a linguistic innovation. “It is a good rule in translating,” he said, “always to prefer the usual signification, unless it would imply something absurd, or at least unsuitable to the scope of the place.”30 This further supports the notion, advanced in a previous chapter, that Campbell’s biblical criticism was inherently conservative. Campbell did not, however, always retain the familiar flavour of a passage. His translation of a particularly controversial text – Matthew 16:18–19 – may have shocked many of his Protestant readers. The King James Version reads: And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

Campbell’s version is considerably more abrupt: I tell thee likewise, Thou art named Rock; and on this rock I will build my church, over which the gates of hades shall not prevail. Moreover, I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: whatever thou shalt bind upon the earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatever thou shalt loose upon the earth, shall be loosed in heaven.31

Apart from its inelegance, Campbell’s choice of “Rock” in place of “Peter” may have bothered many Protestants who preferred to keep the Apostle Peter distinct from the foundation of the church. But in his notes Campbell argued that Jesus specifically intended to associate the name of Peter with the rock of the church’s establishment and, furthermore, that the keys of the kingdom were in this instance given specifically to Peter.32 As if to remove all ambiguity, Campbell elsewhere confirmed that the powers of binding and loosing were at this time given to Peter alone, and only later given to the rest of the disciples. Peter was therefore to be considered as the first among equals in the 30 fg, 2:80. 31 fg, 1:536. 32 fg, 2:95 and 100.

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apostolic circle. But Campbell quickly added – so as not to give satisfaction to Roman Catholic pretensions – that Peter’s position, though special, was not hereditary, and that this singular status died with him.33 He emphasized that, although his critical reading of the passage contradicts the traditional Protestant interpretation, the same critical insight demonstrates that Peter himself never claimed the powers that the Roman church eventually ascribed to him. Campbell supplemented his interpretation with a psychological or conjectural reconstruction of how the Roman church came, step by step and century by century, to mistake Peter’s unique office for a position of supremacy and ultimately of despotism over the church.34 Campbell therefore used his critical talents both to disabuse the Roman church of its illusions concerning the status of Peter, and to correct the mistaken Protestant reading of the same passage. Campbell claimed that the right use of reason can prevent dangerous interpretative errors, as in the case of the “parable of the supper” (Luke 14:23). His translation, which is similar to the King James Version, reads: “The master answered, ‘Go out into the highways, and along the hedges, and compel people to come, that my house may be filled.›35 This passage had often been interpreted as a divine command to force unbelievers into the church – that is, as a warrant for persecution. Campbell, however, argued that “usages such as this, of expressing great urgency of solicitation by terms which, in strictness, imply force and compulsion, are common in every tongue.”36 In other words, the term “compel” is merely a figure of speech, and “doth not authorize persecution or force in matters of religion.”37 The passage does, however, provide a useful example for ministers that there is sometimes an apparent inconsistency between the literal meaning of a text and “the principles of right reason.”38 The inconsistency can be resolved only by means of critical and historical study that places the usage in its appropriate context. The same rule applies to other frequently misunderstood scriptural terms. What was often translated as “devil” or “Satan” in the King James Version – and hence taken to be a proper name – carried no 33 34 35 36 37 38

leh, 1:161–6 and 369–70. leh, 2:95–101. fg, 2:276. fg, 2:401. lstpe, 388. lstpe, 386.

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such signification in the original Greek. For example, in the King James Version, Matthew 16:23 reads: But he turned, and said unto Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence unto me: for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of man.

The same passage was rendered thus by Campbell: But he turning, said to Peter, Get thee hence, adversary, thou art an obstacle in my way; for thou relishest not the things of God, but the things of men.39

The significance of Campbell’s changes is obvious. He based his interpretation partly on the linguistic conventions of the Gospel writers, but also on his understanding of the character of Jesus, who he assumed had spoken the original words. Jesus, he argued, would not have used such a harsh appellation as “Satan” when he meant no more than “adversary” or “obstacle,” for “this would be but ill adapted to the patience, the meekness, and the humility of his character.”40 The same applies to John 6:70, the passage concerning Judas Iscariot, which in the King James Version reads: Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?

Campbell translated the same passage, as: Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve? yet one of you is a spy.41

Campbell claimed that distinguishing character descriptions from proper names requires an appreciation of such minute matters as the use or omission of an article in the original Hebrew-inflected Greek.42 Campbell admitted that some passages of Scripture cannot be definitively clarified. For example in the King James Version Matthew 26:29 39 fg, 1:536. 40 fg, 1:155. Campbell clearly believed that he could interpret Scripture according to what he believed Jesus must have been like. These beliefs were based on further assumptions concerning the unity of intent and historical literalness of the various Gospel texts. In other words, the character of Jesus was based on an interpretation of Scripture while at the same time, the interpretation of Scripture was based on the character of Jesus. 41 fg, 2:421. 42 fg, 1:154.

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reads: “But I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father’s kingdom.” This passage, said Campbell, has caused much speculation as to the nature of heaven, and specifically whether the immortal require sustenance. He made no attempt to answer the question, but merely used the passage to show that such a possibility exists. The common assumption that the immortal saints will need no sustenance is without scriptural support. The lesson to be learned is that “difficulties in Scripture arise often from a contradiction neither to reason nor to experience; but to the presumptions we have rashly taken up, in matters whereof we have no knowledge.”43 Campbell held that the critical arts are useful in uprooting notions that have no necessary place in Christian belief, and in demonstrating that Christians need not have dogmatic assurance about every speculative point of doctrine. The best interpreter of Scripture, Campbell consistently argued, is Scripture itself. This old Protestant maxim had some important implications, as demonstrated in one of the most interesting passages in Campbell’s “Preliminary Dissertations.” Referring to Ephesians 5:32, which compares the union of Christ and his church to the institution of marriage, Campbell remarked, “the apostle alluded not to any fiction, but to an historical fact, the formation of Eve out of the body of Adam her husband. For, though there is no necessity that the story which supplies us with the body of the parable or allegory (if I may so express myself) be literally true, there is, on the other hand, no necessity that it be false. Passages of true history are sometimes allegorized by the sacred penmen. Witness the story of Abraham and his two sons, Isaac by his wife Sarah and Ishmael by his bond-woman Hagar, of which the apostle has made an allegory for representing the comparative natures of the Mosaic dispensation and the Christian.”44 Campbell’s point was that a general familiarity with Scripture often makes clear the literary intentions of particular scriptural authors. But he also seems to have implied that the divine truth of Scripture might conceivably stand apart from the literal truth of the biblical stories. Though he certainly did not mean by this what D.F. Strauss would mean a half-century later, it is interesting to note that long exposure to ancient literary genres had perhaps planted the seed of higher criticism in Campbell’s mind. 43 fg, 2:133. 44 fg, 1:287.

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For the most part, however, Campbell adhered to the assumption that Scripture is a single entity rather than a collection of literary texts. He assumed that Scripture was the product of one mind rather than of many.45 As the final point of his scriptural inquiry, he asked the questions that modern critics tend to ask at the beginning, namely, “first what is scripture, secondly, what is its authority.”46 He claimed in The Four Gospels that critics cannot take the same liberties with a scriptural text that they can with a secular one, thereby assuming a qualitative difference between the two. He argued that a critic ought not to court novelty in translation, even though he elsewhere warned against searching Scripture merely to find pre-formed interpretations.47 Despite his critical innovations, and despite his use of the tools of the Enlightenment, Campbell never strayed far from his orthodox Protestant roots. Campbell believed that there are no ideal solutions to the problems inherent in textual work. Nevertheless, he maintained that critical scholarship can discover adequate solutions. His rational optimism suggests that he was able to reconcile, to his own satisfaction, the Protestant tradition of sola scriptura with the enlightened ideal of progress in knowledge. Campbell’s critical scholarship assured him that, apart from a few localized problems, God’s message to humanity is clearly evident in the grand unity of Revelation: “And whatever in any degree corroborates our faith, contributes in the same degree to strengthen our hope, to enhance our love, and to give additional weight to all the motives with which our religion supplies us, to a pious and virtuous life.”48

t h e n at u r e o f t h e c h u r c h Campbell’s historical scholarship helped him decide difficult questions concerning the interpretation of scriptural texts and the validity of miracle claims. Likewise, his researches into ecclesiastical history influenced his views on the structure, order, and authority of the church. Campbell and his ecclesiological opponents agreed that contemporary 45 fg, 1:42. At one point, Campbell addressed this problem by asking, “How is this diversity in the diction of the sacred penmen reconcilable with the idea of inspiration?” (fg, 1:50). The terms he used suggest his answer. They imply that it is the words rather than the sentiments of Scripture that are open to criticism (fg, 1:52). The truth of Scripture is found in its ideas rather than in its expressions. 46 lstpe, 159. 47 fg, 1:455, 1:11, and 1:71. 48 fg, 1:86.

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controversies over church order depend directly upon the historical nature of the early church. “The practice of the apostolic age,” said Campbell, “which has the best title to the denomination of primitive, is the surest commentary on this precept of our Lord.”49 Since the fundamental issue in the Scottish church since the Reformation had been the legitimacy of the Episcopal as opposed to the Presbyterian form of church government, Scottish historians had long and vigorously debated whether Christianity had ever prospered in Scotland without the guidance of bishops, and whether the rule of bishops was of earthly or of heavenly origin.50 As a professor of church history, Campbell could hardly avoid such historical disputes, however divisive he thought they were. He therefore taught his students “the utility of the study of church history, when entered on (as is too rarely the case) by a mind free from prejudices, and superior to the injustice which is almost invariably consequent on all party-attractions whatsoever.”51 Campbell and his antagonists, however, derived very different lessons from their historical studies. First of all, they disagreed over the necessity of a specific church order for the salvation of the individual Christian. Campbell’s historical investigations convinced him that the form of ecclesiastical order had not been of particular importance in the early church. He further undercut his Episcopal opponents by declaring that “the early belief of a particular tenet is not a sufficient proof of its truth, and that the early adoption of a particular custom is not a full vindication of its rectitude.”52 Campbell believed that the primitive church had been a free, voluntary, and humble body which respected the laws and independence of the civil magistrate. The apostolic church had even tolerated diverse views and sentiments in order to avoid dispute.53 The term “church,” said Campbell, had originally denoted either a single congregation or the whole body of believing Christians, but never a denomination or political entity.54 Campbell warned his students to keep in mind the corruptive powers of “time, the greatest of all innovators, 49 leh, 1:55. Protestants and Catholics had always agreed that there can be no development of doctrine, and that true doctrine is continuous with apostolic revelation; see Pelikan, Reformation, 334–5. 50 David Allan, Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), 47–8. 51 aul ms 650, section iii, un-numbered page. 52 aul ms 650, section iii, un-numbered page. 53 leh, 1:41–5; aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page. 54 aul ms 652, part i, un-numbered page.

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though, when it operates by slow degrees, the least observable.”55 The true apostolic church was of very short duration, and the corruptions of the following ages cannot be taken as authoritative models. Campbell believed that a proper historical reading of the post-apostolic church demonstrates how quickly it had lost sight of its original mandate. If Christ’s kingdom was a spiritual kingdom, as it surely was, then the church’s worldly successes after its official establishment by Constantine were really hindrances to its true mission, rather than signs of divine favour.56 Critical inquiry shows that the bulk of church history has been little more than strife over words. Campbell believed that examples of ecclesiastical tyranny are not confined to the past, and that spiritual despotism remains a constant threat to the spirit of Christ. Like many of his contemporaries, he assumed that Roman Catholic countries such as Spain were merely puppets of a foreign ecclesiastical power.57 Campbell’s historical belief in the corruption of the church was supported by his critical work with early Christian texts. His discussions of the terms “schism” and “heresy” in the “Preliminary Dissertations” nicely summarize his conception of the original and ideal character of the church, as opposed to its subsequent manifestations. “Schism,” he argued, originally meant “an alienation of the heart,” while “heretic” properly signified a person of sectarian or factious temperament.58 The real evil implied by these concepts is alienation not from God or truth but from one’s Christian brethren, “for it is in the union of affection among Christians, that the spirit, the life, and the power of religion, are principally placed.”59 Dogma, suggested Campbell, is unimportant compared to Christian unity in its primitive sense. “We are to remember,” he said, “that ‘as the kingdom of God is not meat and drink,’ so neither is it logical acuteness in distinction, or grammatical accuracy of expression.”60 These studies convinced Campbell that true Christianity ought to be primarily concerned with achieving a disposition of heart appropriate to the spirit that Christ brought into the world. The visible 55 leh, 1:59. Gerard also argued that all religions, authentic or not, become corrupted with the passage of time; see his Corruptions of Christianity, 32. 56 fg, 2:219–20. 57 leh, 2:319. 58 fg, 1:306, 310 and 317. Alexander Gerard likewise argued that a heretic is properly one who disputes with his brethren; see his Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780– 82), 2:149. 59 fg, 1:306. 60 fg, 1:307.

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church, therefore, is not a saving institution, but rather the context in which the spirit of Christ is to be exercised to transform lives and hearts. Outward church forms have a legitimate function, but are no more valuable than their ability to facilitate the reformation of Christian lives by the spirit of the Gospel. “Heresy” and “schism” signify not heterodox thought but the disunity of spirit which almost inevitably divides and corrupts the body of Christ’s people. Clearly then, an “orthodox” church is as liable to these evils as any sect. Campbell’s hostility to certain ecclesiastical doctrines was derived from his conviction that visible forms of church order had too often interrupted the true work of the Gospel. Campbell’s reading of church history, together with his understanding of the spirit of the Gospel, rendered it impossible for him to support the exclusive claims of any contemporary church institution, even his own. Scottish Calvinists had traditionally been inclined to see the immediate hand of God in history, and were quick to interpret particular events within a providential and indeed deterministic framework.61 But Campbell, despite his belief in the wisdom of providence, was determined to resist the militant implications of extreme Calvinist ecclesiology, which held that God communicates to the elect only within the context of an exclusive covenant.62 The great error in the history of the church, he claimed, “has been an attempt to render it in effect a temporal kingdom, and to support and extend it by earthly means.”63 In The Spirit of the Gospel, Campbell plainly declared that Christ has no temporal kingdom. He even said that the apostles themselves were “Latitudinarian” since they did not separate from the synagogue.64 Established religious forms were largely irrelevant to Christianity’s legitimate concerns. Despite these claims, or rather because of them, Campbell’s ecclesiology became the subject of heated controversy, though he did not live to see the final stages of this controversy. His only purposeful contributions to this debate, besides The Spirit of the Gospel, were his unpublished manuscripts, particularly the “Strictures on Dodwell” and the “Defence.” Campbell’s latitudinarian tendencies, evident particularly in his sermon The Spirit of the Gospel, outraged his opponents in Scotland’s nonjuring churches. The Roman Catholic bishop George Hay, writing 61 62 63 64

See Allan, Virtue, Learning, particularly 119–25. Pelikan, Reformation, 367. fg, 1:30. st, 1:397 and 412. “Latitudinarian” is Campbell’s term.

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under the pseudonym “Staurophilus,” claimed that “the sacramental rites are the infallible means, on the part of God, for bringing the grace of justification, as well as the actual grace by which we are enabled to persevere, to the soul of the worthy receiver.”65 This was no more than the traditional Catholic position that saving grace is communicated through the correctly-administered sacraments by a properly-ordained priest. Campbell’s objections to this position were based on his historical understanding of the Roman Catholic church, whose atrocities filled up scores of pages of the unpublished “Defence.” His lack of agreement with Hay on the church’s role in the scheme of salvation may indicate a more fundamental disagreement concerning the proper perspective from which to view ecclesiastical history. Is the Christian past, they implicitly debated, to be interpreted by the dictates of Catholic church tradition or by the spirit of critical historical inquiry? Campbell’s more significant ecclesiological adversary, at least in the context of recent Scottish history, was William Abernethy Drummond, bishop in the Scottish Episcopal church. Drummond followed Campbell’s career like a critical shadow. In 1771 he chided Campbell for suggesting that external observances are of no value, arguing that one who willfully spurns Christ’s ordinances cannot hope for salvation.66 Later he objected to Campbell’s definition of “schism” in The Four Gospels, agreeing that the term indicated an alienation of heart, but contending that it more significantly suggested a contempt for lawful authority. “Heresy,” likewise, could indeed refer to erroneous doctrine, since unity of belief is essential in the true church.67 Even after Campbell’s death, Drummond helped write a lengthy attack on the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History in the Anti-Jacobin Review. He and George Gleig argued that Campbell had prejudiced the question of legitimate church order by assuming the inevitable corruption of the post-apostolic church. They further charged Campbell with supporting a notion of popular church government which, because of its contempt for legitimately-established hierarchies, could lead only to anarchy.68 65 George Hay, A Detection of the Dangerous Tendency (London: Printed for the Aletheian Club, 1771), 92. 66 William Abernethy Drummond, Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon (Edinburgh: John Wilson, 1771), 12. 67 William Abernethy Drummond, A Friendly Address (Edinburgh: n.p., 1789), 13 and 16. 68 Anti-Jacobin 8 (March 1801), 279; 9 (June 1801), 127; and (July 1801), 241–2 and 250.

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Campbell’s church history lectures also provoked more considered and systematic replies that cannot be dismissed merely as the rhetorical extremes of a revolutionary age. Bishop John Skinner, primus of the Scottish Episcopal church, argued from the premise of God’s unchanging nature that there can be only one legitimate ecclesiastical order for all time. The Old Testament Hebrew synagogue and the subsequent Christian church are expressions of a single divinely-sanctioned model of ecclesiastical government. Legitimacy, argued Skinner, is indispensable to salvation, and is found only in those bishops ordained in the tradition of the apostolic succession. Thus Campbell’s ecclesiastical history must necessarily be wrong, even apart from factual arguments, for there is but one saving church, which in Scotland is the Episcopal. On matters as important as salvation, concluded Skinner, the true church cannot be too intolerant of schism.69 Campbell was forced to disagree, for despite his loathing of schism, he thought intolerance was worse – the cause rather than the effect of schism. He had no particular desire to unseat Skinner, challenging only the necessity rather than the legitimacy of the Episcopal order. To Skinner and his brethren it was all the same. They believed the greatest contemporary threat to Christianity was church leaders, like Campbell, who held liberal and generous views of distinctions among sects.70 Campbell’s ecclesiological opponents maintained a rigid and legalistic conception of salvation, considering it unattainable without adherence to certain technical requirements. Drummond assumed that there could be no true church without spiritual jurisdiction based on lawful apostolic ordination. Where there is no true visible church, there is no salvation, for legitimacy simply does not reside in the heart. “Since there is in Scotland a regular Episcopacy,” concluded Drummond, “you must either be members of the Church of Scotland, or of no church.”71 Campbell’s moderatism rejected such ultimatums as contrary to the true spirit of the Gospel. But the Episcopalians also believed that their arguments had historical justification, and that the apostolic succession was empirically verifiable. Unsurprisingly, Campbell held that it was impossible to verify a perfect 69 John Skinner, Primitive Truth and Order Vindicated from Modern Misrepresentation, 1st American ed. (New York: T. and J. Swords, 1808). Despite his gratitude to Campbell for his help in legalizing the Scottish Episcopal church, Skinner must have realized that he could not have done the same for Campbell if their positions had been reversed. 70 Charles Daubeny, Eight Discourses on the Connection Between the Old and New Testament Considered as Two Parts of the Same Divine Revelation (London: J. Hatchard, 1802), 457–8. 71 Drummond, Friendly Address, 20; see also his Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon, 46.

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lineal descent of ordination from the Apostles.72 In the “Strictures on Dodwell” manuscript, he argued that the office of apostle was limited to the first generation of the church. The Apostles’ powers of binding and loosing did not descend to later generations. By attributing to the early bishops God’s own power of judging the souls of men, Dodwell the elder had given more power to priests than the Roman Catholic church ever had. Dodwell had in fact so misread church history as to propose a spiritual despotism, and thus the most miserable form of slavery imaginable. “I have never heard of a scheme,” said Campbell, “which combines so closely all the evils of atheism and despotism with those of superstition and idolatry.”73 History shows not only that such extreme High Church arguments are in error, but that virtually all Christian sects and denominations become tainted with time. Drummond pointed out that Campbell’s arguments implicitly gave up the divine right of the Presbyterian form of church government.74 Campbell agreed, and there was nothing left to argue. What then were the implications of Campbell’s historical and biblical studies for his contemporary situation? On the one hand, Campbell firmly adhered to the necessity of a separation of church and state powers. As the spiritual realm is entirely removed from the civil, so also must the church be kept free of the powers of physical or legal coercion. The weapons of the magistrate are inappropriate to the work of the minister, whose only legitimate power is persuasion.75 On the other hand, Campbell did not oppose an official state church. He thought the present Church of Scotland was well-adapted to the needs of its members, for the civil magistrate could not interfere with the ecclesiastical courts, nor could the church use excommunication as a political weapon. The church’s inability to impose civil penalties made its rulings cautious and respectable.76 The appropriate function of the church, said Campbell, is the discipline of its own members, particularly its ministers – a discipline which he believed was too relaxed in the Scotland of his day.77 Campbell had no 72 leh, 1:104. 73 aul ms 650, section ii, un-numbered page. 74 Drummond, Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon, 31. 75 aul MS 654, part IV, un-numbered page. 76 leh, 1:74–5. This sentiment was meaningful in a country where it was relatively easy to leave the established church for another one of similar beliefs. 77 lpc, 235. In this matter, he was very much in agreement with the political Moderates of his day. He thought that the Church of England, whose ecclesiastical laws were more lax, was particularly prone to ministerial sloth (lpc, 230).

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absolute objections to the Episcopal model of church government; his close friend James Beattie actually preferred it. But Campbell’s ecclesiology focused on the practical needs of Christians rather than on the uncertain issue of legitimacy. Church order mattered most to the fringe groups, such as the Scottish Episcopalians, whose very existence (they thought) depended upon the exclusivity of their ecclesiological claims.

superstition and enthusiasm Campbell’s concern for church order was less governed by regard for the next life than by regard for the present life. The business of the visible church was not to save souls but to provide leadership and stability in matters of religious doctrine, worship, and discipline. Campbell’s intense commitment to freedom of thought and expression did not permit him to interfere with the worship of other Christian bodies. His concern for the good order of society, however, caused him to worry about two typically eighteenth-century religious problems. Superstition and enthusiasm, as embodied in Roman Catholicism and Evangelicalism respectively, were to eighteenth-century moderates the chief obstacles to religious enlightenment. Campbell was deeply mistrustful of the Roman Catholic church, despite his pleas for Catholic emancipation. Like many of his age, he assumed that the Roman priesthood conspired to keep its charges in perpetual ignorance and dependence. “Certain it is,” said Campbell, “that [the Romish religion] … succedes [sic] best where ignorance and barbarity with their inseparable attendant superstition most abound.”78 Priestcraft, he argued, is the inevitable consequence of joining the offices of cleric and magistrate. All religious sects are guilty to some degree of superstition, but the Roman Catholic church is the veritable embodiment of this unfortunate tendency of human nature.79 Campbell’s hostility to the Roman Catholic church was partly derived from his Presbyterian heritage. Nothing had united Scottish Protestants of the previous two centuries more than their common hatred of papists. The Westminster Confession was packed with anti-papal sentiments, and explicitly identified the pope with antichrist. Robert Wodrow’s History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland implicitly bound Presbyterianism, Hanoverian loyalty, and civil liberty together 78 aul ms 649, p. 41. 79 aul ms 654, part iv, un-numbered page; aul ms 652, pp. 93–4.

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with antipathy to Romish tyranny and persecution. William Dunlop, a professor of ecclesiastical history at Edinburgh, demonstrated the unity of Protestant belief by contrasting it with Catholic superstition.80 Even seventeenth-century Anglican divines developed their probabilist theory of knowledge against the absolutist claims of their Roman Catholic opponents. Thomas Reid similarly argued that the papal claim of infallibility is the greatest obstacle to the advancement of religious knowledge.81 Alexander Gerard, who took great offence at Hume’s ungenerous characterization of the ministerial character, was quite willing to uphold Hume’s charges against the Roman clergy.82 Campbell’s own hostility to the Catholic church had much in common with this heritage, yet it was also more nuanced and carefully reasoned than the common Protestant prejudice. He directed his energies against the documented claims of Roman Catholic apologists. Bishop George Hay, the vicar apostolic of the Scottish Catholic community, maintained an ecclesiology similar to that of his Episcopalian rivals. Like them, he held that salvation is unattainable outside of the one true visible church. The true church, said Hay, “is always Holy, always Catholic, always a visible body … always one, always apostolical, always infallible in what she teaches.”83 It follows, then, that “the Church of Christ is the only road to salvation,” though Hay of course denied true church status to the Church of England or to any other non-Roman Episcopal church.84 Hay directed “An Inquiry, Whether Salvation Can Be Had Without True Faith, and Out of the Communion of the Church of Christ” against Campbell and other latitudinarians. Hay explicitly rejected the liberal view – prevalent, he thought, in the contemporary world – that a man can be saved in any religion provided that he live a moral life according to his own conscience.85 Whether Campbell actually held such a view is questionable, but it is noteworthy that Hay characterized his moderate opponents in the same way that Presbyterian High-flyers did. 80 William Dunlop, A Preface to an Addition to the Westminster Confession, (London: T. Cox, 1720), 42. 81 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton, 2 vols, 7th ed. (Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1872), 1:268. 82 Gerard, Sermons, 2:407. 83 George Hay, The Sincere Christian, in Works of the Right Rev. Bishop Hay of Edinburgh, ed. Bishop Strain, 5 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1871), 1:175. 84 Hay, Works, 1:195 and 1:211–14. 85 Hay, Works, 2:262.

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Campbell’s objections to the Roman Catholic church were derived partly from his notion of the true spirit of the Gospel, which he thought opposed the extreme claims of apologists such as Hay, and partly from his enlightened scholarship. His work on the Gospels showed him that the Roman church’s “secret reason, both for preserving the consecrated terms and for translating only from the Vulgate, is no other than to avoid, as much as possible, whatever might suggest to the people that the Spirit says one thing and the church another.”86 Familiarity with church history demonstrated that the spirit of the modern Catholic church was antithetical to the spirit of the primitive church. Campbell’s “Defence” manuscript supported this claim with a catalogue of Catholic crimes and abuses throughout the ages. The actions of prelates and popes in the “advancement of sacerdotal despotism” had illustrated their disregard both for God’s natural law and for his revealed commands. Though the breaking of faith with heretics was never an established doctrine, it was sufficiently practised to warrant Protestant mistrust of Catholic promises. Most of all, Campbell objected to “priestly dominion, the summum bonum in Rome’s theology.”87 He did not believe that the majority of modern Roman Catholic adherents was corrupt. In fact, most Roman Catholics detested the inquisition. Yet, How they should have the inconsistency, notwithstanding this, to acknowledge a power as from God, which has found it necessary to recur to expedients so manifestly from hell, so subversive of every principle of sound morality and religion, can be regarded only as one of those contradictions, for which human characters, both in individuals and in nations, are often so remarkable. That the policy of Rome bears the marks, not of the wisdom which is from above, which is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and of good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy; but of that which flows from a very different source, and is earthly, sensual, devilish, is so manifest, that the person who needs to be convinced of it, seems to be beyond the power of argument and reason.88

Campbell had himself clearly passed the bounds of reasonable discourse, but his passion on the matter is telling. As much as he objected to the Roman Catholic church’s legacy of intolerance and tyranny, he 86 fg, 1:401. 87 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page. 88 leh, 2:320–1.

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objected even more to its subversion of the true spirit of the Gospel. Roman claims of spiritual superiority and infallibility were the chief obstacles to the flourishing of a charitable and voluntary Christian society.89 Christian unity ought to be not the product of ignorance and fear in its adherents, but rather the spontaneous consequence of the gathering of like-minded individuals who have discovered Christian truth by means of personal Scripture-reading. Campbell’s treatment of the Roman church was subtle in that his notion of Christian charity allowed him to simultaneously condemn the spirit of Popery and tolerate the practice of the Catholic religion. He believed that he was being consistent, though it is not difficult to understand why he confused many of his fellow Presbyterians – particularly those who clung to a traditional covenanting and militant view of their confession. Campbell’s presuppositions concerning the true spirit of the Gospel were fundamentally incompatible with the claims of Roman Catholics such as George Hay. Both Catholic and Episcopalian High Churchmen assumed that there can be only one divinely-sanctioned church order, though they disagreed over the identity of the true apostolic church. Campbell, who believed that church order is largely irrelevant to the question of salvation, was concerned only to discover which form of church government best supported the practice of the Christian life. His historical studies had convinced him that none of the contemporary churches corresponded exactly to the apostolic model, and that perhaps it was not essential that they do so. In fact, he conceded that different forms of church government might be suitable to different climates and conditions, as was the case with civil government.90 The enlightened pedigree of this idea is unmistakable. Campbell opposed any form of church government that placed its own good above that of the individual Christian. Coercion had no place in matters of the heart. The authoritarian nature of the Roman hierarchy was therefore incompatible with the true Gospel. Did this mean that there was no place for church discipline? Was the heart the only authority for the individual Christian? Eighteenth-century moderates were forced to address this issue by those who elevated individual Christian experience above all temporal authority – those whom we historically label “Evangelicals.” Eighteenth-century Evangelicals, whether Calvinist or Arminian, gave priority to the activity of the Holy Spirit and to the 89 lstpe, 127. 90 leh, 1:92.

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internal evidences of the Christian religion – that is, to the vivid and personal experience of saving grace. Eighteenth-century empirical Christians like Campbell tended to call these people “enthusiasts.”91 Nevertheless, the Aberdonians were friendlier to the travelling Methodists than were many Scots in the southern lowlands. John Wesley and George Whitefield visited the capital of the Northeast more than a dozen times each, and were cordially received into its established churches – even into the chapel of Marischal College. Evangelicalism horrified those who gave priority to church order. William Abernethy Drummond, answering Campbell’s The Spirit of the Gospel in 1771, categorically denied the legitimacy of the inward call.92 Bishop Skinner argued that “enthusiasm” (by which he clearly meant Evangelicalism) was the logical consequence of rejecting the apostolic succession.93 Campbell and other moderates tended to have somewhat different reasons for objecting to the Evangelical spirit. They agreed with the High Churchmen that popular religious activities promoted disorder within the church. Gerard advised his divinity students that lay fellowship meetings at the parochial level were not necessarily bad, but were usually so ill-managed that they promoted more enthusiasm, superstition, and hypocrisy than genuine piety. For that reason, they had to be carefully monitored and controlled.94 But eighteenth-century Christian moderates usually objected to Evangelicalism because it implicitly rejected the notion of objective and demonstrable truth in religious matters. Campbell believed that religious truth, to be of any value, must not only be discoverable by the individual mind but also empirically verifiable – that is, subject to scrutiny by other minds. The empirical conception of defensible religious belief underlay the whole structure of Campbell’s apologetic system, from his secular notion of evidence and his philosophy of suasive discourse, to his detailed examination of the natural evidences of the Christian religion. Campbell believed that Christianity can answer infidelity and deism only on its own terms – that is, on the basis of the historical verifiability of Christian claims. Evangelicalism merely abandoned the evidential field to Christianity’s most dangerous opponents. Campbell objected to the Evangelical emphasis on Christian feeling and passion for 91 Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (London: W. Strahan, 1755) defined an enthusiast as, “One who vainly imagines a private revelation; one who has a vain confidence of his intercourse with God.” 92 Drummond, Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon, 34. 93 Skinner, Primitive Truth, 18. 94 aul ms K 174, pp. 193–5.

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much the same reason that he objected to Hume’s under-appreciation of the natural and Christian evidences. Hume and the Evangelicals each failed to appreciate the Creator’s gift of critical faculties capable of uncovering the natural evidences of divine truth. Campbell’s objection to enthusiasm (which could mean creedalists as well as Evangelicals) was rooted in his notion of the true spirit of Gospel charity. “The fanatic,” he said, “considers himself as Heaven’s favourite; and believes this to be either his peculiar prerogative, or, at least, a privilege he enjoys in common with a few.”95 He noted that “in some popular systems of religion, the zeal of the people is principally exerted in support of certain favourite phrases, and a kind of technical and idiomatical dialect to which their ears have been long inured, and which they consequently imagine they understand, but in which often there is nothing to be understood.”96 Such errors, characteristic of certain parties within the Church of Scotland, are difficult to detect when the subject is abstract. Campbell cautioned his students to avoid “superstitious or enthusiastical notions in regard to religion.”97 The spirit of false religion takes different forms in different individuals; “In the apprehensive and timorous, the effect is Superstition; in the arrogant and daring, it is Enthusiasm. Ignorance is the mother of both by different fathers.”98 Campbell thought that his own church was subject more to the latter abuse. Violence is the natural consequence of an enthusiast’s conviction that he has found special favour in the sight of God.99 In The Philosophy of Rhetoric Campbell pointed out the evils of fanaticism resulting from the misuse of rhetoric. Popular hatred, he warned, is easily inflamed, but only the sensitive rhetorician can move an audience to love.100 Thus the study of rhetoric must be an essential component of the training of an effective minister. Campbell gave particular attention to the dangers of enthusiasm inherent in the Presbyterian church. In his divinity lectures, he wondered aloud why some enthusiastic Scottish preachers criticized their brethren for preaching a “dry and heathen morality” when they themselves 95 st, 1:337. 96 pr, 270. 97 lpc, 162. Superstition he defined as that “which instigates only to a blind tenaciousness of absurdities in theory, and the most contemptible mummeries in practice, as a full compensation for every defect in virtue, and an atonement for every vice” (lpc, 162). 98 st, 1:334. 99 st, 1:337. 100 pr, 108–9.

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courted popularity by attacking the sins of the wealthy.101 He inveighed against popular preachers who noisily attacked the shortcomings of their fellow ministers but succeeded only in promoting the very schisms and “methodisms” that had rent the Scottish church.102 He objected not to pious zeal, but to sectarian zeal. Ultimately, said Campbell to his divinity students, there must be order and discipline even within a voluntary body such as the church because it contains as many opinions as it does adherents.103 Opinions are not worth dividing the body of Christ’s believers, for division itself is the great enemy of the Gospel. Campbell’s rejection of salvation by external observances or visible institutions meant that the true cost of salvation is borne inwardly, by means of self-discipline and personal reformation. Enthusiasm is the outward sign that an individual has not grasped this central Christian truth. Campbell had no particular quarrel with contemporary Evangelicals (who were not sectarian), and certainly not with warmth in the cause of religion. He feared only the dangers to which the enthusiastic mindset exposed the practical realization of the authentic spirit of the Gospel. True religion is of the heart, though only the head can decide if the heart has not deceived itself. “That we may reflect light on others,” Campbell told his Christian audience, “we must ourselves be previously enlightened.” To this end we must have experienced the spirit of the Gospel in our own hearts.104 Those who impose their private experiences and imagined revelations upon others have not experienced the true Gospel. Those who indulge in the excesses of enthusiasm have forgotten their God-given reason. It has long been assumed that the Evangelical spirit was the particular enemy of the Moderate party within the eighteenth-century Church of Scotland. Campbell, like his Moderate brethren, did indeed advocate order and discipline within the Scottish church. But the point of this discipline was not to crush Christian zeal or selfdetermination, nor to promote authoritarian power in the church (which Campbell feared more than enthusiasm), but to prevent the needless divisions that destroyed Christian charity. It is time now to undertake a final examination of Campbell’s moderatism and of his relationship with the much-maligned Moderates. 101 102 103 104

lpc, 192–3. lpc, 211. Campbell here meant not Methodists but seceders and sectarians. lpc, 207. st, 1:312.

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The Limits of Moderatism

m o d e r at i s m a n d t h e m o d e r at e pa rt y “In all great questions,” said George Skene Keith of Campbell, “he belonged to what is called the moderate party in the church; and generally supported the laws of the state with respect to patronage.”1 Campbell was acknowledged by his contemporaries to be a Moderate in the narrow, political sense of the term. From what we have already seen, he was certainly a moderate in the broader sense of the term. He was politically conservative, though he defended the Glorious Revolution settlement and advocated freedom of religion and expression. He was a latitudinarian, though he preferred the Presbyterian discipline of his own voluntary church. He was rational and empirical in his treatment of Christian evidences, though he allowed for the usual Christian mysteries. He trained his divinity students to cultivate politeness and critical thinking, but not at the expense of piety. He valued natural religion, but emphasized that it was merely the first step towards discovering the saving truths of revealed religion. These values were largely shared by those who formed the Moderate party within the eighteenth-century Church of Scotland. This wellorganized group of ministers and laymen should, however, be kept distinct from the broader climate of values and beliefs that constituted enlightened moderatism. The Moderate party first rose to prominence under William Robertson’s leadership in the early 1750s. It advocated order and discipline according to the law and to the Presbyterian 1 George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Campbell” (1800), in leh, 1:xl–xli.

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model of church government, and employed skillful ecclesiastical management to bring enlightened values into the Scottish church. Campbell generally supported the goals and strategies of the Moderate party, though his ideological aversion to party spirit, not to mention his distance from Edinburgh, prevented him from being one of its leading political figures. His only surviving letter to Alexander Carlyle demonstrates that he was intimate with the Moderate party leadership but at the same time hostile to the personal attachments that were evidently taking priority over the merits of particular policies and cases in the General Assembly.2 Campbell’s co-leadership with Robertson during the time of the No-Popery affair (1778–79) marked the height of his political involvement with the Moderate party. The reputations of Scottish moderatism and of the Moderate party have suffered greatly since the rise of the latter in the 1750s. Moderates were first made the subject of popular abuse in John Witherspoon’s satirical Ecclesiastical Characteristics (1753). He cleverly accused “the moderate man” of neglecting Scripture, courting heresy, despising religious learning, and favouring social accomplishments and politeness above pastoral duties. Witherspoon’s characterization was taken at face value by later critics and has remained popular among churchmen and polemicists for two centuries. Many twentieth-century secular scholars have continued to assume that the Scottish moderates valued polite morality above scriptural doctrine, placed worldly values before religious ones, and bowed to the dictates of secular politics and fashionable society. Recent scholarship has begun to revive the reputation of the Scottish moderates by demonstrating that they were genuinely concerned for the welfare of the Scottish church and for the spiritual lives of its people, and that they were not as doctrinally distinct from their “orthodox” opponents as has been supposed. Nevertheless, this same scholarship continues to pay meagre respect to the religious and pious aspects of moderate Christian thought.3 We have already observed that, although he downplayed the necessity of dogmatic certainty on speculative points of doctrine, Campbell was not notably heterodox. We have seen that labels such as “Arminianism” and “rationalism” cannot account for the subtlety of his religious thought. Furthermore, we have noted that he placed the highest value on Christian reformation and practical piety. It is absurd, therefore, to charge Campbell with maintaining a shallow, 2 Campbell to Carlyle, 19 November 1785: eul Dc.4.41/116. 3 See the paragraph on the moderates in the bibliographical essay pp. 285–6.

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unsophisticated, or insincere form of Christianity. His religious body of thought provides a valuable means of re-examining the ideological tenets, real or imagined, of eighteenth-century Scottish moderatism. It gives substance to the Christian temperament of an overlooked group of social and religious philosophers.

t he mod erate ideol ogy “Let your moderation be known unto all men,” said the Apostle.4 Moderation was the pre-eminent value of eighteenth-century moderatism, combining the foregoing scriptural imperative with contemporary notions of politeness. Gerard maintained that “every excellence is a middle between two extremes.”5 Campbell likewise told his divinity students that “truth is most commonly to be found in the middle between … two extremes.”6 In his first published sermon, he advised his fellow ministers to be examples of moderation and temperateness in all things.7 Moderation sought the happy median between too much regard for doctrine and too little, between extreme legalism and too little respect for lawful authority, and between solemnity and levity in worship. Moderation meant avoiding the extremes of superstition and enthusiasm, both of which corrupted the true spirit of the Gospel. Authentic Christianity was by its very nature moderate, avoiding both ignorant faith and overzealous action. Moderation also meant avoiding the extremes of self-indulgence and self-denial. Campbell argued that there is no Christian virtue in suffering for the sake of suffering. Selfdenial in the name of Christianity, particularly in the form of monasticism, is a corruption of legitimate self-discipline.8 Finally, moderation meant tempering religious passion with reason. A religious faith informed only by passion is the enemy of moderation, as demonstrated by the lawless mob.9 Religious truth, said Campbell, can never be discovered while passions hold sway in the mind, a notion supported as much by his secular theory of human nature as by his Christian ideals.10 4 Philippians 4:5. 5 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste, 3d ed. (Edinburgh: J. Bell and W. Creech; London: T. Cadell, 1780), 122. 6 lpc, 137–8. 7 cmg, 59. 8 leh, 2:379. 9 st, 2:341–4. 10 aul ms 655, un-numbered page.

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Campbell’s notion of moderation rejected traditional conceptions of religious controversy. Though he realized that “by this moderation, I gain nobody,”11 he believed that seeking adherents is itself contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. “In the search of truth,” he said, “… I disclaim all party or sect.”12 A central tenet of his moderatism, then, was the rejection of the sectarian or partisan spirit, as well as those things that engender this spirit, notably controversy over abstract doctrine. Campbell argued that “nothing blinds the understanding more effectually than the spirit of party, and no kind of party-spirit more than bigotry, under the assumed character of religious zeal.”13 Perhaps with his own church in mind, he noted that “the more insignificant, the more inconceivable, nay the more nonsensical the question is, the greater will be the heat, the more unrelenting the zeal, and the less flexible the dogmatism with which it is agitated.”14 Campbell counted as evil any controversy that distracts the Christian from his charitable duty. “Have our polemic divines, by their abstruse researches and metaphysical refinements, contributed to the advancement of charity, love to God, and love to man? Yet this is, in religion, the great end of all; for charity is the end of the commandment, and the bond of perfectness.”15 Campbell taught that proper Christian zeal, as opposed to sectarian zeal, is concerned only with purity of heart, and is guided by knowledge and charity. The Scottish moderates had a high regard for ecclesiastical order, which for them included respect for social subordination. Campbell may have rejected party spirit in matters of doctrine, but he nevertheless supported the Moderate party in matters of church order and discipline. In the eighteenth-century Scottish church, this meant the enforcement of lay patronage – the legal right of traditional landed patrons and town councils (rather than a slightly broader group of heritors and church elders) to select their parochial ministers.16 The Moderate party has been frequently disparaged for its conservative views of social order, although recent scholarship has demonstrated that the 11 aul ms 652, part ii, un-numbered page. 12 aul ms 652, part ii, un-numbered page. 13 fg, 1:101. 14 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page. 15 fg, 1:482. 16 See Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24 and 47–8. The enemies of lay patronage argued that the 1712 patronage law contravened the 1707 Treaty of Union.

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eighteenth-century opponents of the Moderate party seldom advocated democratic notions of church government.17 The Moderates may have believed that patronage was the necessary price for keeping great landowners friendly to the Presbyterian form of church government. Robertson’s Moderate party was created explicitly to promote order and discipline within the Church of Scotland. Its policy paper – published in 1752 and since dubbed the “Manifesto of the Moderate Party” – argued that discipline and subordination are necessary for the survival of any society, particularly a voluntary society such as the Church of Scotland.18 This meant that the issue of lay patronage was of secondary importance to the more central problem of law and order. Campbell’s views were fully in line with those of the Moderate party. “All government,” he said, “all subordination, all order, is overturned at once, if every man shall think himself entitled to rail and clamour, whenever he disapproves, or is dissatisfied.”19 Although Campbell did argue that Christians are obligated to the dictates of their own consciences – that is, to the laws of God before those of men20 – it is likely that he meant only private matters of belief, and not the right of a congregation to choose its minister. This does not mean that he was simply a reactionary conservative, for “neither length of time, nor extent of territory, nor number of suffrages can invest error with the prerogatives of truth, or make evil good, and good evil.”21 We have seen that Campbell associated the history of the church with the almost inevitable and insensible rise of abuses over time, which suggests that he supported the Moderate party because it promoted the practical interests of Christianity in Scotland rather than because it was simply conservative. The unusual respect that he commanded in the General Assembly suggests that he was often successful 17 Richard Sher and Alexander Murdoch argue that the Popular party was not “popular” at all. Most opponents of lay patronage wanted to place control of ministerial appointments into the hands of lesser heritors or of ministers themselves, rather than into the hands of the people; see “Patronage and Party in the Church of Scotland, 1750–1800,” in Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408–1929, ed. Norman Macdougall (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983), 197–220. 18 “Reasons of dissent from the judgment and resolution of the commission,” reprinted in The Scots Magazine 14 (April 1752): 191–7. The Moderates were perfectly aware that Scottish Presbyterians could and did leave the established church for other Presbyterian churches more to their liking. In fact, the Moderates may have wished to force these extreme elements out of the established church. 19 lpc, 206. 20 aul ms 654, part iv, un-numbered page. 21 aul ms 652, p. 85.

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in his attempts to convince his fellow ministers to consider each ecclesiastical issue according to its individual merits, rather than according to a predetermined party line. His commitment to social order in no way implies disdain or insensitivity towards his common parishioners. In any case, the social conservatism generally evident in the Moderate party (as well as in the Popular party of the time) was more typical of the age than any democratic notion of popular rights. Moderates have most often been accused of a thinly-disguised secularism and of a disdain for religious truth and piety. This is a much more serious charge than that of social conservatism. The fact that the Moderates’ religion sometimes appears secular indicates that they wished to bring religion into the realm of daily life. As Gerard said, “The shop, the exchange, the occupations of active life, form the only theatre on which the virtues of justice, fidelity, and honesty can be practised; and without constantly practising these, you can have no religion.”22 This attitude was rooted in the traditional Christian notion that the present life is “a state of discipline for eternity.”23 Campbell characterized the religious fanatic as one who valued “what tended only to make men resigned to Heaven, and useless to mankind; what tended but to promote rational piety, temperance, justice, and beneficence, was in no estimation at all.”24 “That doctrine is the soundest,” he contrarily suggested, “which has the happiest influence on the temper and lives of those who receive it; which operates most powerfully by love to God, and love to man.”25 Although moderate preachers such as Hugh Blair implicitly identified the interests of Christianity with those of politeness, they also maintained that the triumph of true Christianity was responsible for the contemporary revolution in manners.26 Robertson claimed that the mildness and humanity of modern European manners, as well as Europe’s superiority in the arts and sciences, were largely the consequence of the Protestant Reformation.27 Thus the moderates assumed that polite culture was the consequence of Christian reform, rather than the catalyst of a secularized religion as their critics have suggested. They saw politeness as part of God’s plan for the Christian enlightenment of humanity. 22 Alexander Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 1:18. 23 Gerard, Sermons, 1:46. 24 st, 1:365–6. 25 st, 1:442. 26 Hugh Blair, Sermons, 4 vols, 19th ed. (London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1794), vol. 1, sermon vi, “Of Gentleness.” 27 William Robertson, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s Appearance, in The Works of William Robertson, 12 vols (Edinburgh: Stirling and Slade, 1822), 1:cxxx–cxxxii.

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The Scottish moderates naturally translated their notions of Christian politeness into their sermons. Their critics have misinterpreted this as the preaching of mere secular morality. There can be little doubt that the moderates preached morals in preference to doctrine. That their sermons nevertheless contained orthodox doctrine was not enough to satisfy the traditional sensibilities of their High-flying opponents, who believed that every sermon ought to proclaim the high points of Christian doctrine, including the depravity of human nature, the omnipotence of God, the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, and the irresistible gift of grace given to the elect. The fact that formal theology constitutes but a small portion of the Scottish moderates’ surviving discourse does not necessarily indicate an ignorance or distaste of theology. Campbell was perfectly familiar with the creeds of his church, and expected his divinity students to preach the traditional Calvinist doctrines.28 Why then did he not continually reinforce these doctrines as previous generations had? The answer lies partly in the methodological emphasis of his educational philosophy. Campbell wished to teach his students and parishioners to be their own teachers. His style cannot be understood apart from the pedagogical purpose that pervades his work. And as Jesus himself had said, a teacher is to be judged by his practical fruits – that is, by his moral example.29 Other leading Scottish moderates, many of whom were university professors, were likely motivated by similar pedagogical concerns. To understand the Scottish moderates’ moral preaching style, we must consider their own explicit claims. Gerard thought that moral preaching best reflects the heart of the Gospel message: “A very great part of that conduct by which your eternal happiness may be promoted, consists in transacting your ordinary business in a proper and virtuous manner.”30 A Christian faith that does not give priority to moral duties, he said, is nothing more than superstitious veneration of forms and observances.31 The moderates tended to equate virtue itself with true religion. In Gerard’s mind there was no difference between wickedness and contempt for religion. The denial of one’s moral duty must lead inevitably to denial of the religious truth that commands virtue. Thus Gerard confidently excluded from sound doctrine anything that did not have a 28 29 30 31

See pr, 105. aul ms 655, un-numbered page. Gerard, Sermons, 1:11. Ibid., 1:310.

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practical, moral tendency.32 Campbell likewise taught his divinity students that to preach the whole Christian system in every sermon is to accomplish nothing at all, for such a strategy allows no time to inculcate the practical and useful Christian duties.33 The moderates did not ignore doctrine in their moral preaching, but instead applied it in the only way they thought proper. They believed that any doctrine devoid of practical application could lead only to superstition and popery. A heretic is one who disrupts the unity of the church by overturning this Gospel priority of conduct before doctrine. The moderates intended their preaching to be practical and moral, but no less Christian for all that. Campbell believed that Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount was the very heart of Christian ethics.34 Hugh Blair argued that our concern for the next life ought to inspire our efforts to moral improvement in this life, for, “in this conflict, the souls of good men are tried, improved, and strengthened.”35 The pursuit of virtue in the present life is the surest means of benefiting our eternal souls, for there can be no other means of gaining divine favour. Moral improvement, insisted Campbell, is the only absolutely indispensable part of the Christian life. No special dispensation of grace can alter this divine imperative.36 The preaching of moral improvement was the practical consequence of Campbell’s emphasis on Christian reformation and the spirit of the Gospel. For some moderates, personal reformation was also linked with a more traditional covenanting notion of national reformation. As Gerard said, “It is only the reformation of each particular person, that can reform the nation.”37 The Scottish moderates’ emphasis on moral reformation sheds light on the nature of their theology. Their christology, for example, focused on the character and actions of Jesus, rather than on the ontological status of Christ. The moderates thought that undue attention to the mysteries of the Christian faith could only pervert the simple and unmistakable moral imperatives of the Gospel. The true spirit of the Gospel is found in the life and teachings of Christ and the Apostles rather than in the doctrinal systems of later interpreters.38 Campbell’s 32 Ibid., 2:3, 82, and 142. 33 lstpe, 444. 34 cmg, 4. 35 Blair, Sermons, 1:98. 36 aul ms 655, un-numbered page. 37 Alexander Gerard, National Blessings an Argument for Reformation (Aberdeen: J. Chalmers, 1759), 25. 38 st, 1:330.

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decision to translate only the Gospels highlights his belief that knowledge of Christ’s actions and teachings is more relevant to the life of the Christian than knowledge of his divine status. The moderates undoubtedly questioned the value of proclaiming human sinfulness if it did not lead to practical moral improvement. Their moral preaching further suggests that their doctrine of God was strongly influenced by contemporary developments in natural philosophy and natural religion. Their emphasis on the virtue of benevolence, for example, indicates that they had discovered in nature a benevolent deity. Moral preaching, therefore, was the natural consequence of an enlightened generation’s discovery of God’s love for his creatures reflected in the natural and moral order of the universe. This divine love for humanity included the gift of a capacity for self-improvement. Alexander Gerard imagined a future time when Christianity would again become, “as it truly is in the New Testament, not a system of nice speculations and contentious subtleties, but a series of plain principles, evidently founded in scripture, unmixt with the arbitrary explications, and precarious conclusions of fallible men, all naturally touching the heart, commanding congruous affections, and, by their joint force, directly inculcating piety and virtue, and promoting the reformation and happiness of mankind.”39

t he mo derate pro gra m The practical bent of Scottish moderate theology had several important implications. The moderates meant to reform not only the lives of individual Christians but also the world in which they lived. To this end they promoted religious toleration and improved pastoral care. These goals are particularly evident in Campbell’s life and writings. We have already seen that Campbell devoted a considerable portion of his works and public ministry to the characteristically enlightened cause of religious toleration. But most of his arguments for toleration were grounded in his conception of Christianity. He declared that “religion and coercion of any kind are utterly incompatible.”40 “True religion,” he believed, “is of too delicate a nature to be compelled … by the coarse implements of human authority and worldly sanctions.”41 39 Alexander Gerard, Dissertations on Subjects Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1766), 418. 40 fg, 1:27. 41 leh, 1:73.

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Religious coercion is not only ineffectual, but contrary to the ideal spirit of the ministerial office. Toleration, in contrast, is found both in the Gospels and in the practice of the apostolic church. In fact, any evidence that the Gospel advocated punishment for wrong-thinking would only disprove its divine origin.42 Campbell claimed that to destroy freedom of conscience by means of coercion is to destroy religion itself, for true Christianity is more concerned with purity of heart than correctness of opinion.43 At best, compulsion turns a man of mistaken judgment into a hypocrite. Campbell argued that no claims of truth can justify religious persecution, for “the true definition of persecution is to distress men, or harass them with penalties of any kind, on account of an avowed difference in opinion or religious profession.”44 This definition suggests that a man cannot be justly persecuted for spreading his views either. In fact, Campbell wished to defend “freedom of opinion in its utmost extent. This, in my judgment, gives a much fairer chance for the discovery of truth, as well as for promoting the interests of humanity and equity in mens [sic] treatment of one another, than all the artifices which have been devised by a crooked policy, for either bribing or frightening the mind into a decision which is not founded in cool reflection. I am so little a partisan in regard to any of the sects concerned in this question, that, tho’ I am myself a firm protestant, I would make no distinction here between protestant and catholic.”45 He further challenged the prevailing assumptions of most of his contemporaries, including some in the Moderate party, by insisting that persecution cannot be justified even for the protection of the community.46 Campbell’s strong opinions were derived from his belief that religious truth is most often subverted by the imposition of arbitrary bounds of inquiry. Scripture, he claimed, is not meant to make men omniscient in matters of religion. Still, the critical arts and a wealth of translations have actually brought Christians closer to scriptural truth.47 “The due consideration of the progressive state of all human knowledge and art,” he

42 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. 43 Campbell to Hailes, 24 June 1789 (nls ms 25305, fols. 10–16); aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page. Gerard made virtually the same argument at the close of his Dissertations. 44 st, 2:249; aul ms 654, part iv. 45 Campbell to Douglas, 11 March 1790: (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 5v). 46 aul ms 655, un-numbered page. 47 st, 1:361; fg, 1:19.

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asserted, “will ever be unfriendly to the adoption of any measure which seems to fix a barrier against improvement.”48 Toleration was not only right, argued Campbell, but practical as well. He believed that the tempers of the Scottish Episcopalians had been soured by their exclusion from national life. Their extreme High Church stance was merely a natural reaction against the perceived threat to their existence. Consequently, legal toleration would almost certainly moderate their temperaments, so that “their sentiments will breath [sic] more of humanity, and more of common sense.”49 Campbell suggested that to treat the Scottish dissenters as friends instead of enemies would eventually make them so.50 His attitude may have reflected the situation in the Northeast of Scotland, where Episcopalians and Presbyterians, as well as Jacobites and Hanoverians, had coexisted more readily than had similar groups in the south of Scotland. Campbell’s marriage into a prominent Episcopalian and Jacobite family certainly demonstrated the practical benefits of friendly understanding. His firm but extremely unpopular stance during the No-Popery affair likewise reflected his belief that his own church was often less than an ideal model of the true spirit of Christianity. He chastised his countrymen for their intolerance toward Catholics, arguing that their illiberal spirit was no different than that which made the spirit of popery itself so reprehensible.51 Intolerance, he suggested, indicates only a lack of faith in the effectiveness of providential protection.52 Campbell’s theory of toleration was as advanced as that of any nonChristian philosopher of his time, and may have reached an audience that was unfamiliar with the works of Locke and Voltaire. He advocated full freedom of inquiry and expression, and argued the corresponding necessity of removing powers of civil coercion from ecclesiastical offices. To combine the offices of magistrate and minister, he said, “is to attempt to form a hideous monster at the best … The weapons of [the minister’s] warfare are not carnal: he forbears threatening, and does not employ the arm of flesh: his weapons are the soft powers of persuasion, 48 fg, 1:29. 49 Campbell to Douglas, 4 July 1789 (bl Egerton ms 2185, fol. 192r). 50 Campbell to Douglas, 22 July 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fols 10–11). Campbell argued in a direction opposite to most of his countrymen. They claimed that Catholics and Episcopalians could not be tolerated because they were dangerous to civil society. Campbell argued that they were dangerous to civil society because they were not tolerated. 51 st, 2:240 and 261. 52 cmg, 58.

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animated by tenderness and love. In vain it is pretended, that the [coercive] ecclesiastical jurisdiction … is not of the nature of dominion, like the secular. Where is the difference that can be called material?”53 Campbell taught his young charges that a minister must not form a poor opinion of those who think differently than they do,54 for he was well aware that a large share of contemporary intolerance could be traced to the example of ministers. One of his major pedagogical aims, therefore, was to instill a spirit of toleration into the future moral and spiritual leaders of the Scottish community. In fact, he devoted an entire discourse near the end of his history lectures to defending the benefits of toleration – an appropriate end to a course whose theme was the gradual corruption of the church. Campbell’s concern to instill in his divinity students a sense of the true spirit of Christian charity helps to dispel the common notion that the Scottish moderates were unconcerned with the duties of the pastoral office. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that moderates such as Alexander Carlyle and William Robertson were deeply concerned with pastoral duties. Gerard’s divinity lectures devoted considerable space to the daily obligations of the parochial minister. He described to his students the aims and requirements of the pastoral office: “The spirit of your profession is a warm ambition to accomplish the salvation & improvement of men; an active & ardent love of God & of Christ; benevolence towards men; a love of truth & of religion.”55 He told them that the ministerial office requires a full-time commitment, and is incompatible with absenteeism and secular occupations.56 Although we know little about Campbell’s actual performance as a minister, it is clear from his writings that he was deeply concerned with the office itself. From the beginning of his career, Campbell equated the ministerial office with enlightenment – that is, with improvement in both understanding and virtue. His first published sermon, The Character of a Minister of the Gospel, criticized “these enlightened days” for their growing unconcern with the duties of religion.57 Campbell was critical not of the Enlightenment itself, but of its abuses. He thought it contradictory to pursue virtue and yet neglect religion. More enlightenment, not less, was the antidote for the ills of his age. Rhetoric was just one of the enlightened arts that 53 54 55 56 57

leh, 1:67. lstpe, 18. aul ms K 174, p. 65. See appendix 1 for a list of Gerard’s lecture topics. aul ms K 174, pp. 197–9. cmg, 61.

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could be effectively employed to battle popular errors.58 The Philosophy of Rhetoric itself was begun at the time of Campbell’s first pastoral placement at Banchory Ternan. Along with The Four Gospels, it was meant to address his early concerns about the best means of interpreting and communicating Gospel truths to God’s people. In other words, the purposes of these works were conceived within the context of Campbell’s larger pastoral and pedagogical concerns. Campbell’s Lectures on the Pastoral Character outline his views of the ideal nature of the ministerial office. He contrasted the characteristic virtues of the minister – meekness, fortitude, and temperance – with the particular vices to which a minister is most susceptible – namely hypocrisy, love of popularity, schism, and sloth. In his earlier work, The Character of a Minister of the Gospel, he cautioned his fellow ministers against intemperance and impiety. Campbell argued that worship ought to be solemn, and that gravity is most becoming in the ministerial character.59 His first biographer suggests that he was quite sincere in his recommendations, practising a style of public prayer that was simple and humble, and that avoided pompous and controversial expressions.60 Campbell believed that the administration of the sacraments and other external observances are only a small part of the minister’s duties: “To inculcate the truths and duties of religion, to give seasonable advice and consolation, make also a part of that important charge: if I should even say, the principal part, I should not speak without warrant.”61 Only the perversions of priestcraft, he thought, put rites and observances in place of true moral piety.

the limits of the mod erate min d The moderatism of Campbell and of his associates was a more carefullyconstructed and complex system of thought than has been generally realized. It was also more earnestly and sincerely Christian than has been commonly assumed. Too many critics have confused moderatism’s methodological care and aversion to dogmatism with coolness towards Christian truth. Campbell’s system of thought was truly a system in that its components could not be isolated from one another. Each individual 58 59 60 61

cmg, 49. cmg, 39–45; pr, 26. Keith, “Account of George Campbell” xxxix–xl. aul ms 655, un-numbered page.

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part of that system depended on the viability of the other parts, and on the structure of the whole. Campbell’s position on miracles, for example, was inseparable from both his larger Christian apology and his theory of evidence. Likewise, his rhetorical philosophy was inseparable from the religious purposes of his larger work. The structural unity of his thought depended upon acceptance of certain notions of human psychology, as well as agreement concerning the nature and uses of evidence. Thus the enlightened parts of his thought were bound together with the religious parts. There were certain advantages to such a unity of thought. Campbell’s expertise in ecclesiastical history, for example, lent authority to both his treatment of miracles and his defence of religious toleration. Eighteenthcentury minds craved the kind of detailed historical examples that Campbell brought to his examination of the early church. Campbell’s familiarity with epistemological theory contributed to his triumph over Hume in contemporary opinion. His theory of evidence made his Christian apologia all the more convincing to an empirical age. His biblical criticism allowed his Protestant emphasis on the sole authority of Scripture to appear more secure. But if Campbell’s Christian system worked so well in the context of the Enlightenment, what became of it thereafter? Why did the moderate ideology and program not survive into the modern world? The fate of Campbell’s apologetic system is typical of the fate of any system of thought that is rooted in a very specific historical context. Campbell’s arguments were compelling so long as his audience accepted the premises from which he argued. Eighteenth-century audiences were drawn to his style of argument and particularly to the evidential and psychological premises from which he worked. But subsequent generations have silently abandoned many of the key premises that formed the foundation of his argument. Without this solid foundation, the remaining structure of his thought verges towards collapse.62 A Dissertation on Miracles, for example, argues the nature of testimony and of belief rather than the nature of miracles themselves. If one rethinks the nature of historical and testimonial evidences – as nineteenthcentury historians did – then Campbell’s position on miracles becomes 62 Gerard Reedy finds something similar in the structure of the thought of his late seventeenth-century Anglican divines. Their rational faith was founded upon an “interdependent unity of arguments,” scriptural and natural arguments each assuming the truth of the other, so that the whole system stands or falls together; see The Bible and Reason (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 62.

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considerably less tenable. If one begins to handle Christian texts in a radically new manner – as the higher critics did – then the use of the Gospels as simple historical narratives becomes problematic. If the evidences of Christian miracles and revelation are re-evaluted, then so must the conclusions of empirical Christian belief. Moderate Christianity depended upon the critical historiography and textual scholarship developed during the age of Enlightenment. Just as the Enlightenment sowed the seeds of its own demise by creating the critical tools and uncovering the wealth of information that later generations would use to question the Enlightenment’s underlying views of human nature and of universal truth, so also did the demise of the Enlightenment entail the demise of a form of Christianity that was dependent upon enlightened proofs. Campbell, like his age, believed in the existence of objective truth – that is, the notion that truth is “either this or that.” Yet his theory of toleration was based on the epistemological premise that the human mind is incapable of attaining certain knowledge. Indeed, the most bigoted and ignorant sectarians are generally the most sure of their grasp of truth, and are thus the most intolerant. Campbell saw no contradiction between his belief in objective truth and his support of a toleration policy that was based on the relativity of human knowledge of truth. This may represent a religious version of Newton’s rules of philosophical reasoning, which held that we do not perceive the universal laws of nature directly, but that our belief in the truth of such laws is contingent upon future experience of phenomena conformable to them.63 The journey towards truth can never be completed in this world. Seventeenthcentury Anglican divines had similarly believed that truth is absolute even though our knowledge of it is not. Upon this premise they constructed their probabilist theory of knowledge, which Campbell remade into his own. Campbell believed that religious and moral knowledge is based upon experience, the cumulative effect of which amounts to moral certainty. Moral certainties, according to Campbell’s philosophy of evidence, can be as reliable as mathematical certainties, even though their “truth” depends upon the continued support of verifiably similar experiences. Eighteenth-century moderatism was friendly neither to Hume’s unreasonable scepticism nor to the Evangelical fondness for private religious experiences and revelations. It was also unfriendly to the 63 See especially rule iv of Newton’s “Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy” at the beginning of book iii of the Principia.

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dogmatic and exclusive religious claims made by extreme Episcopalians and Roman Catholics, as well as by some Presbyterian sects. The moderates could live comfortably with the limitations inherent in the notion of probabilist knowledge, including a degree of uncertainty about religion and Scripture. They could do so with the confidence that their method of inquiry was most likely to lead them closest to the truth. This confidence allowed them to believe that their Christian faith, which demanded a commitment oblivious to degrees of probability, was wellfounded. But the moderates’ enlightened views concerning the empirical nature of the human understanding also made necessary the practice of philosophical and religious toleration. The moderates’ philosophical caution may have been reasonable in its time, but it was much too subtle to be popular, which helps to explain the demise of moderatism in the early nineteenth century. The moderates’ emphasis on balance between extremes meant a balance between ignorant belief on the one hand and unreasonable scepticism on the other, between religious certainty and methodological caution, between evidence and faith, and between orthodoxy and freedom of enquiry. Campbell and the other moderates had continuously to maintain a middling position between the opposing pulls of fideism and scepticism, ecclesiastical authoritarianism and spiritual enthusiasm, religious conservatism and radicalism. They were challenged on the one side by legalistic sects, such as Scottish Episcopalians and Roman Catholics, who made exclusive claims about salvation based on their understanding of history and tradition. On the opposite side, they were challenged by Evangelicals who based their religious claims on private experiences rather than on historical evidences. Moderate Christians had to weigh their desire to challenge these claims with critical arguments against their desire to maintain a vital and charitable Christianity. They also had to prevent their own religious scepticism from becoming as unreasonable as the scepticism of Hume and Gibbon. Moderate Christian scholars who adopted the critical tools of their age bore the novel burden of defending not only their own sectarian claims but the validity of religious belief itself.64 The Scottish Moderates had to do all this while sustaining their political viability. Maintaining such a reasonable, middling position is difficult enough in times of political, social, and ideological stability. It is impossible 64 Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 108.

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when external pressures become as unbearable as they did in Britain and Europe after the 1780s. By the early nineteenth century, the moderates’ position was being pulled apart from every side. The political and intellectual atmosphere in Britain during the wars with revolutionary France became particularly unfriendly to those considered liberal in their thought.65 The British establishment feared a social conflagration, and demanded firmer allegiance to orthodox and conservative values. The ultra-conservative journal that was founded during this time, the Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine, was decidedly unfriendly to Campbell’s latitudinarianism. The Moderate party in the Church of Scotland became more conservative and reactionary, implicitly abandoning some of its moderatism. These pressures made it virtually impossible to maintain the kind of ideological balance and cautious intellectual optimism that eighteenth-century moderates desired. By attempting to maintain an intellectual position reasonable to all, the moderates’ position became acceptable to none. The climate of the nineteenth century was as unsuited to the social and intellectual values of moderatism as it was to the values of the Enlightenment. Just as the nineteenth century swept away many of the enlightened premises upon which Campbell’s thought was constructed, so also did it sweep away many of the premises of Christian moderatism. Eighteenth-century moderates defended their formal beliefs with what they took to be objective historical facts. Higher critics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, tended to divorce their religious faith from both traditional orthodoxy and historical enquiry. They cultivated a Christian faith that was well removed from the evidences (which they themselves had gathered) that cast doubt on the literal veracity of traditional claims about Jesus. The moderates were traditional enough to consider it absurd to believe in one who did not historically do all that was claimed of him – that is, one who did not assert that he was the divine Son of God and who did not perform miracles to prove that he was. The moderates also adhered to enlightened views of human nature. They assumed (along with some notable infidels of their time) that 65 For an account of how Reid’s reputation was manipulated during this period because of political considerations, see Paul B. Wood, “Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher: A Study of Science and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment” (Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 1984). Roy Porter sees the social stability and values of the Enlightenment in England being repudiated from many sides during the time of the French Revolution; see “The Enlightenment in England,” in The Enlightenment in National Context, ed. Roy Porter and Mikulás Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 16–17.

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society would crumble without the support of religious moral sanctions. Nineteenth and twentieth-century innovations in psychology and sociology have discarded such assumptions and eroded their emotional impact. The limits of the moderate mind were intimately related to the limits of the enlightened mind. The fall of the Enlightenment entailed the fall of Christian moderatism. Campbell, of course, foresaw no such limits to his system of thought. His was not an age of crisis. He saw no incompatibility between the religious mind and the enlightened mind. He thought that his world was progressively – if fitfully – advancing towards a state of perfection. In the coming age, he argued, swords will be beaten into plowshares, as foretold in Scripture: “I am strongly of opinion that this prophecy will be one day literally accomplished: tho’ we are many centuries too early here to see it.” In Campbell’s imagination, the ideals of an enlightened utopia merged with those of primitive Christianity. But he did not think that his own age had yet come close to realizing such ideals. “To me it is not improbable,” he said late in his life, “that we shall be deemed little better than savages, by our Successors, two centuries hence.”66

66 Campbell to Douglas, 22 July 1790 (bl Egerton MS 2186, fols 10v–11r). Campbell was here speaking of the folly of the slave trade, which the Aberdonians hoped to abolish.

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Conclusion For what concerns natural religion, to the light of nature, and the light of conscience which Solomon justly calls the candle of the Lord; and for what concerns revealed religion, to the light of God’s word, interpreted by the best application I can make of the understanding which God has given me to be employed in his service, I will assiduously and attentively look for direction. In this exercise I have ground to think that I shall not prove unsuccessful. I am persuaded that to them who use aright what they have, more shall be given: whatever is necessary, God will not withhold. If we seek the truth, in the love of truth, we shall find it. George Campbell1

“That we may reflect light on others,” said Campbell to his fellow ministers, “we must ourselves be previously enlightened.”2 George Campbell was thoroughly a man of the Enlightenment. This is not to say that he was enlightened because, like David Hume, he developed a systematic theory of evidence and grounded the rhetorical arts in the study of human nature. Nor is it to say that he was enlightened because he produced a critical history of the Christian church that looked much like Edward Gibbon’s, or exposed the conspiracy of the priesthood in the manner of Voltaire. Campbell needs no comparison to the great infidels of the age to earn his enlightened credentials. The eighteenth century had many more enlightened Christians like Campbell, moderate and practical, than it had enlightened pagans. These enlightened Christians did not flee the critical assaults of their sceptical counterparts, but instead attempted to answer the critics of religion on their own terms. 1 aul ms 652, part ii, un-numbered page. 2 st, 1:312. Campbell may also be reflecting the more traditional Calvinist notion that “in regeneration the mind is savingly enlightened”; see Select Works of the Late Rev. Thomas Boston, ed. Alexander S. Patterson (Edinburgh: A. Fullarton, 1844), 88.

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Their appeal to natural evidences was part of the culture of thought shared by all enlightened minds, whether Christian or pagan. Campbell believed that the Enlightenment was the ally of a moderate, rational, and practical Christianity, rather than a threat to his Christian heritage. His body of work encapsulates the major concerns of enlightened British divines throughout the eighteenth century, and highlights the direction of their apology, which proceeded methodically from natural evidences to Christian faith. This is not to say that Campbell’s personal faith was built workmanlike from a series of natural evidences and probabilist conclusions. He did not advise his divinity students to suspend their Christian faith until they had worked through its natural evidences with care and impartiality. In fact, he recommended that his students become thoroughly familiar with “sacred writ and sacred history” before examining the works of the deistical controversy, so as to avoid being “misled and imposed on.”3 He advised them that inquiring into the authority of Scripture ought to be the last point of their study of “the revealed word.”4 In other words, he assumed the truth and goodness of the Christian revelation from the beginning of his course, and only later provided natural evidences to support it. He believed that the truth of Christianity had been sufficiently vindicated that it could be taught with absolute confidence. But in matters of formal apology, Campbell depended upon a structure of argument that gave order and coherence to virtually everything that he taught and wrote. “Let it be observed,” said Campbell to his divinity students, that all the articles of our faith may be divided into three classes. Some may not improperly be denominated philosophical, some historical, and some prophetical. Of the first kind, the philosophical, are those which concern the divine nature and perfections; those also which concern human nature, its capacities and duties: of the second kind, the historical, are those which relate to the creation, the fall, the deluge, the Mosaic dispensation, the promises, the incarnation of the Messiah, his life, his death, his resurrection, his ascension, the descent of the Holy Spirit, the mission of the apostles, and the several purposes which, by these means, it pleased the divine Providence to effectuate: of the third, or the prophetical kind, are those which regard events yet future, such as the second coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, the resurrection of the human race, the general 3 lstpe, 221–2. 4 lstpe, 159.

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judgment, eternity, heaven and hell. As therefore a considerable portion of the Christian faith consists in points of an historic nature, it must be of consequence for elucidating these, to be acquainted with those collateral events, if I may so express myself, which happen to be connected with any of them by the circumstances of time and place.5

What is notable here is that the saving truths of the Christian religion are blended almost seamlessly with the kinds of natural and historical evidences that formed the foundation of Campbell’s philosophy. In Campbell’s mind, there was no evident break in the structure and unity of knowledge. His faith required enlightened evidences to be complete, and his enlightened thought required faith to give it purpose. No part of this study, then, has been unrelated to Campbell’s religious mind. Nevertheless, it is all too easy for moderns to misunderstand the nature of Campbell’s career. Both George Campbell and Alexander Gerard began their literary professions with indisputably secular works on such typically enlightened topics as rhetoric, taste, and genius – works born of enlightened societies and founded in the larger Scottish project of delineating human nature by exploring its various manifestations. Both Campbell and Gerard, however, increasingly devoted the energies of their mature years to more obviously Christian concerns. They trained Scotland’s future ministers, delivered popular sermons, and influenced the direction of the Scottish church through their participation in the General Assembly and the Synod and Presbytery of Aberdeen. But despite this apparent trend from secular to religious concerns, their careers demonstrate a remarkable continuity of thought and purpose. They were as concerned with the practical realization of the Christian religion at the beginning of their careers as they were at the end. Though their methodology was enlightened, their teleology was unmistakably Christian. Everything that they did pointed towards the practical and the pious. Nevertheless, modern scholars and students have concentrated on their secular writings to the exclusion of their religious works. Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric and Gerard’s Essay on Taste and Essay on Genius are reprinted and read today while the sermons and religious dissertations are systematically ignored. The disparity between Campbell’s eighteenth-century reputation and his modern one is the direct consequence of this arbitrary division. If we wish to gain a more his5 leh, 1:2–3.

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torically-nuanced understanding of Campbell’s intentions, and of the thought of the age which his work represents, we must repair this violent breach. We may begin by recognizing that Campbell was not a divided person. The same man who wrote The Philosophy of Rhetoric over the course of twenty-five years also laboured for forty years to produce a translation of the Gospels for the purpose of Christian edification. The scholarly tools and critical attitudes that he employed in these works were largely the same. Can the purposes, then, that guided these works be kept strictly apart? Was the man who sought the principles of rhetoric in human nature not the same man who searched out the intentions of God in the natural world? These different activities were bound together by a common Baconian purpose. When the Aberdonians battled Hume, they did so to save not only their religion from scepticism, but their science as well.6 The Wise Club’s study of natural history and natural philosophy, like that of most eighteenth-century philosophers, was highly teleological. Philosophers and theologians alike deduced the existence and nature of God from the apparent design of his universe, which included the constitution of human nature that gave meaning to the principles of rhetoric. The more examples of design they found – that is, the greater their scientific understanding of human nature and of the natural order – the more they knew of God and of his intentions. William Paley’s Natural Theology overwhelmed its readers with quantity of detail from the natural world in order to demonstrate the nature and intentions of God. Campbell’s arguments concerning the historical nature of the early church and the superior validity of the apostolic over the Roman Catholic miracles were of the same kind. In disregarding this sheer quantity of argument, Hume was out of step with his age, both in his treatment of miracles and in his disdain of the natural evidences employed by Christian moderates and deists alike to illustrate the beneficent design of the universe. And being out of step with his age, Hume appears to us as a prophet of modern philosophy. Campbell’s mind was not ahead of its time. His thought was sufficiently representative of the eighteenth century that his reputation could not easily survive the demise of the values and assumptions of his age. He did not push the frontiers of Western thought towards their 6 Paul B. Wood, The Aberdeen Enlightenment: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1993), 163.

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typically modern forms. Despite even the continuing popularity of his rhetorical philosophy, Campbell’s thought does not belong to the modern world. Perhaps, then, his system of thought deserves to fall into neglect, to succumb to the natural selection of historical memory. But the historian might also argue that Campbell better represents the thought of his age than one whose philosophy appeals to our own time. Although we recognize in retrospect that David Hume offered important challenges to eighteenth-century thought – challenges which Campbell and Reid took seriously – we must also recognize that most eighteenthcentury minds found Hume’s premises, arguments, and conclusions unconvincing. If we choose to dismiss eighteenth-century Christian moderates for not fully appreciating the philosophy of one who has found such favour in the modern world, we deliberately misunderstand the more characteristic thought-patterns of Hume’s world. Modern students of the eighteenth century have nevertheless chosen to concentrate on unrepresentative figures such as Hume. As a consequence, we have come to interpret the Enlightenment as we have usually interpreted Hume – that is, as fundamentally hostile to religion. Peter Gay, perhaps the most influential of modern interpreters of the Enlightenment, recognized that some eighteenth-century Christian scholars had attempted to construct a bridge between religion and philosophy. He nevertheless concluded that the image of the bridge “fails to evoke the essential hostility between eighteenth-century religion and eighteenth-century secularism: the philosophes rudely treated the Christian past rather as Voltaire treated the plays of Shakespeare – as a dunghill strewn with diamonds.”7 Gay invariably termed the men of the Enlightenment philosophes, and philosophes, as everyone knows, were fundamentally critical of all the manifestations of revealed religion. Thus the Enlightenment too must have been hostile to religion. But eighteenth-century Scots, with the exception of Hume, will not bear to be called philosophes. The Aberdeen Enlightenment, of which Campbell was a leading figure, cannot be interpreted as pagan. Can it therefore properly be called an Enlightenment? The Aberdonians were certainly learned scholars, thoughtful philosophers, and respected writers within the international republic of letters, but they used their learning to 7 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. [Volume I:] The Rise of Modern Paganism (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1966), 322–3. “Christianity made a substantial contribution to the philosophes’ education,” continues Gay, “but of the definition of the Enlightenment it forms no part.”

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uphold a more or less orthodox Christianity. In fact, the Aberdeen moderates, and probably their Edinburgh brethren, were more earnestly Christian than even their sympathetic modern biographers would suggest. So what do we do with them? The structure and details of Campbell’s apologetic system suggest how one eighteenth-century Scot managed, at least to his own satisfaction, to reconcile the interests of religion with those of the Enlightenment. If we wish to maintain some kind of unified Enlightenment, then we must think of the eighteenth-century culture of thought as neither religious nor secular in itself, but as something employed by both Christians and “modern pagans” for their own purposes. The Enlightenment may have been an age of secularization, but it was not yet a secular age. It was united by a common set of concerns and critical attitudes rather than by a common creed. In the context of the Scottish Enlightenment Hume was exceptional, both in his attempt to use the critical tools of the Enlightenment against Christianity and in the appeal of his thought to a later age. It might be argued, however, that Hume’s critical tools were as much a Calvinistic legacy as those employed by George Campbell, John Witherspoon, or Jonathan Edwards. The fact that scepticism would ultimately be used to undermine Christianity itself (and not just other versions of it) does not lessen the Christian intentions of its typical users. Just as classical scholarship had, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, undermined the popular veneration of classical authors (much against the intentions of the classicists),8 so also did the critical tools of Christian apology contain the potential to overturn traditional, historically-based ideas of Christian truth. Only in hindsight can we perceive the natural progression from textual criticism to higher criticism, and the ultimate divorce of faith from history. Campbell’s career was a microcosm of the Christian Enlightenment’s attempt to use all available tools to defend Christian belief, and to navigate between the extremes of Catholic mystery and Calvinistic scepticism. Christian moderates asserted the value and necessity of natural knowledge, though they carefully contained the uses of this knowledge within the framework of revealed religion. Perhaps the Enlightenment was the last age to keep the warfare between reason and revelation within manageable bounds. But the notion of a war between science and religion is the creation of historians. It is the kind of mental construct or fiction that Campbell and Hume laboured to expose. Reconciling the enlightened Campbell with the religious Campbell is our problem, not his. 8 Joseph M. Levine, The Battle of the Books (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2 and 46.

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Appendices

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Appendix 1: Schedule of Divinity Lectures Given by George Campbell and Alexander Gerard during the 1786–87 Term Descriptions of Campbell’s and Gerard’s lecture courses for the 1786–87 term come from the student notebooks of Robert Eden Scott.1 Campbell lectured on Tuesdays and Thursdays, while Gerard lectured on Mondays and Fridays, so that Aberdeen divinity students could attend both professors. It appears that Scott missed no classes for the year. Campbell’s lecture for March 29 was cancelled due to the graduation ceremonies at King’s College. Campbell

Gerard

(1) Dec 19 1st introductory lecture2 (2) Dec 21 2nd introductory lecture (1) Dec 25 Nature of the pastoral office (pc, introduction)3 (3) Dec 26 3rd introductory lecture (4) Dec 29 4th introductory lecture

(2) Dec 29 Scriptural criticism (3) Jan 1 Proper idea of pastoral office (pc, I:i, 1–3)

1 The manuscripts, both located in the Aberdeen University Library’s special collections, are numbered M 190 and K 174 respectively. 2 Campbell’s four introductory lectures correspond to the first four introductory discourses found in his Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence or in his manuscript aul MS M 191 and 192. 3 The abbreviation pc indicates Gerard’s The Pastoral Care, ed. Gilbert Gerard (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1799). The Roman numerals following indicate the part and chapter. The Arabic numerals indicate the section and (where applicable), the article.

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Appendices

Campbell

Gerard

(5) Jan 2 Language and idiom of Scripture (fg, I:i)4 (6) Jan 4 Varieties of style in Scripture (fg, I:ii) (4) Jan 5 Scriptural criticism: the Hebrew idiom (5) Jan 8 Dignity of the pastoral office (pc, I:i, 4) (7) Jan 9 Difficulties of translation (fg, II:ii and iii) (8) Jan 11 Perspicuity of Scripture (fg: III) (6) Jan 12 Scriptural criticism: phrases and clauses (7) Jan 15 Difficulty of the pastoral office (pc, I:ii, 1–2) (9) Jan 16 Simplicity of design in Scripture (fg: III) (10) Jan 18 Method of examining Scripture (fg, IV) (8) Jan 19 Scriptural criticism: punctuation (9) Jan 22 Spirit of the pastoral office (pc, I:ii, 3) (11) Jan 23 Difficulties of etymology (fg, IV) (12) Jan 25 Word meanings in New Testament (fg, V:i, ii) (10) Jan 26 Scriptural criticism: grammatical figures (11) Jan 29 Pastoral duties: private duties (pc, II:i) (13) Jan 30 Word meanings in New Testament (fg, V:iii, iv) (14) Feb 1 Commonly mistranslated terms: “devil” (fg, VI:i)

4 The abbreviation fg indicates Campbell’s The Four Gospels, which match the lectures quite closely. The first Roman numeral refers to the dissertation number; the second, lower case numeral (where applicable) refers to the part number.

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Divinity Lectures Given by Campbell and Gerard Campbell

265

Gerard (12) Feb 2 Scriptural criticism: grammatical figures (13) Feb 5 Pastoral duties: private instruction (pc, II:i, 2)

(15) Feb 6 Mistranslated terms: “hell” (fg, VI:ii) (16) Feb 8 Mistranslated terms: “hell” and “heaven” (fg, VI:ii) (14) Feb 9 Scriptural criticism: grammatical figures (15) Feb 12 Pastoral duties: exhortation (pc, II:i, 3) (17) Feb 13 Mistranslated terms: “to repent” (fg, VI:iii) (18) Feb 15 Mistranslated terms: “holy” and “saint” (fg, VI:iv) (16) Feb 16 Scriptural criticism: rhetorical figures (17) Feb 19 Pastoral duties: visiting the sick (pc, II:i, 5) (19) Feb 20 Translating titles of honour (fg, VII) (20) Feb 22 Translating titles of honour (fg, VII) (18) Feb 23 Scriptural criticism: rhetorical figures (19) Feb 26 Pastoral duties: reproving and rebuking, reconciling, care of the poor (pc, II:i, 6–9) (21) Feb 27 Terms not directly translatable (fg, VIII) (22) Mar 1 Terms not directly translatable (fg, VIII) (20) Mar 2 Pastoral duties: preaching (pc, II:iii, 1) (21) Mar 5 Pastoral duties: visitation of families, catechizing, marriage (pc, II:ii) (23) Mar 6 Problem terms: “mystery” (fg, IX:i)

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Appendices

Campbell

Gerard

(24) Mar 8 Problem terms: “blasphemy” (fg, IX:ii) (22) Mar 9 Preaching: explanatory discourse (pc, II:iii, 1, [1]) (23) Mar 12 Preaching: explanatory discourse (pc, ibid.) (25) Mar 13 Problem terms: “schism” and “heresy” (fg, IX:iii, iv) (26) Mar 15 Problem terms: “sect” and “heresy” (fg, IX:iv) (24) Mar 16 Preaching: probatory discourse (pc, II:iii, 1, [2]) (25) Mar 19 Preaching: suasory discourse (pc, II:iii, 1, [4]) (27) Mar 20 Methods of the various translators (fg, X:i) (28) Mar 22 The Vulgate; Castalio (fg, X:iii, iv) (26) Mar 23 Preaching: invention (pc, II:iii, 1, [5]) (27) Mar 26 Preaching: disposition, elocution, memory, pronunciation, occasional sermons (pc, II:iii, 1, [6–9]) (29) Mar 27 Beza (fg, X:v) (28) Mar 30 Pastoral duties: other public duties (pc, II:iii, 2) (29) Apr 2 Pastoral duties: public discipline (pc, II:iv) (30) Apr 3 The Gospel authors: Matthew5 (31) Apr 5 Mark, Luke, and John (30) Apr 6 Qualifications for the pastoral office (pc, III:i) (31) Apr 9 Preparations for the pastoral office (pc, III:ii)

5 Each of the translated Gospels is individually prefaced in The Four Gospels.

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Appendix 2: Campbell’s Creed

Such, to wit plain and practical, the genuine uncorrupted truths of christianity … are in reality neither many nor complicated … Thence we learn, ‘That there is one only GOD, a spirit, eternal and omnipresent, infinitely powerful, wise and good, the maker and the ruler of the world: – That man having apostatiz’d from him, and so become obnoxious to perdition, it pleas’d the universal Lord, for our recovery, to send into the world his ONLY SON: – That this glorious personage assum’d our nature, was born of a virgin, and so usher’d into these terrestrial abodes in a way suitable to the dignity of his source: – That he reveal’d the will of heaven to man, was by profession a preacher of righteousness, of which in his life he exhibited a perfect pattern: – That under the form of civil justice, he suffered a most unjust, cruel and ignominious death: – That he rose again the third day, an irrefragable evidence of his mission: – That he afterwards ascended into heaven: – That by the merit of his obedience and suffering, he purchased for his people eternal felicity: – That this purchase is ascertained to all who repent and obey the gospel, and offer’d on these terms: – That to assist in performing this condition, the grace of the HOLY SPIRIT of God is tender’d to every one, who sincerely and assiduously seeks it: – That there is an appointed time of general resurrection, when all the dead wheresoever scatter’d, shall arise: – That thereafter comes the final judgment, when every individual shall be judged by Jesus the Son of God, according to the actions done in the body, whether good or bad: – That finally in consequence of the irrevocable sentence, which will be then pronounced, the wicked shall go into everlasting punishment, and the righteous into life eternal, the two last states of retribution (The Character of a Minister of the Gospel, 16–17).

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Appendix 3: A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence

The following list includes eighty-three letters: sixty-nine written by Campbell, and fourteen addressed to Campbell. Only extant letters are listed; known but lost letters have been excluded. Correspondence about Campbell has also been excluded. Date

Correspondent

MS Location

21 Feb. 1761

to the Lord Provost of Aberdeen

aca Letterbook 12, 119.

11 Jan. 1762

to Aberdeen Town Council

aca Letterbook 12, 209.

7 June 1762

from David Hume

aul 3214/7.

25 June 1762

to David Hume

nls 23154, n. 11.

30 Sept. 1762

to [John Stuart], third earl of Bute aul M 370.

22 Feb. 1770

to [David Steuart Erskine], eleventh earl of Buchan

eul La. II, 588.

1 Aug. 1770

to David Skene

ncl THO 2, fols 53–4.

11 May 1771

to Alexander Kincaid

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.6

22 May 1771

to Alexander Kincaid

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

30 May 1771

to Alexander Kincaid

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

[4 Sept. 1771]

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/62.7

5 Aug. 1773

from James Beattie

MS?8

6 The William Creech letterbooks are part of the Dalguise Muniments, copied on microfilm at West Register House in Edinburgh, RH4/26/1. 7 This note from Campbell to Beattie is copied into a letter from James Dun to Beattie. The date is taken from the Dun letter, not from Campbell’s original note. 8 The source used is James Beattie’s Day-Book 1773–1798, ed. Ralph S. Walker (Aberdeen: Third Spalding Club, 1948). I cannot find the original manuscript of the letter.

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A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence

269

Date

Correspondent

MS Location

13 Apr. 1776

to William Strahan

nls 2618, fol. 55.

2 May 1776

to Ann Farquharson

aul 3214/5.

26 June 1776

to William Strahan

bl Add. 34886, fol. 78.9

27 June 1776

to Ann Farquharson

aul 3214/6 [and 3214/8?].

3 Dec. 1776

to Ann Farquharson

aul 3214/16.

15 May 1779

to William Creech

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

18 May 1779

to Edmund Burke

sca WWM Bk. 1/240.10

12 June 1779

to Edmund Burke

sca WWM Bk. 1/1172.

[25 June 1779]

to James Beattie

aul 30/1/173.11

2 July 1779

to William Creech

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

24 May 1780

from John Erskine

[No MS.]12

31 Aug. 1781

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/361.

30 Mar 1782

to William Creech

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

5 June 1782

to [William Petty] second earl of Shelburne

Clements Library, Shelburne MSS., v. 115, pp. 215–16.

10 Oct. 1782

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/386.

16 Nov. 1782

to Lord Hailes

nls 25303, fol. 161.

18 Dec. 1782

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/393.

[1 Mar. 1783?]

to Lord Hailes

nls 25303, fols 177–8.

24 Mar. 1783

to Lord Hailes

nls 25303. fol. 179.

7 July 1783

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/417.

27 Mar. 1784

to Lord Hailes

nls 25304, fols 1–2.

22 May 1784

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/454.

4 June [1784?]

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/478.

25 Sept. 1784

to Lord Hailes

nls 25304, fol. 3.

[Summer 1785?] to Lord Bute

aul M 387/16/4/7.

19 Nov. 1785

eul Dc.4.41/116.

to Alexander Carlyle

9 This is an extract of a letter to the publisher William Strahan, found among the Gibbon papers. 10 This letter was misdated by Campbell as 1769, an error repeated in the Sheffield archives. 11 This is an extract from a letter to Beattie that was copied by Beattie into a letter to Elizabeth Montagu. I cannot find Campbell’s original letter. The date given is that of the Beattie letter, not of the original Campbell letter. 12 This open letter appears as a preface to John Erskine’s A Narrative of the Debate in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh: W. Gray, 1780).

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270

Appendices

Date

Correspondent

MS Location

29 Dec. 1785

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/494.

6 May 1786

to William Creech

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

17 June 1786

to Lord Hailes

nls 25304, fols 54–5.

12 July 1786

to Lord Buchan

[Source of MS?]

17 July 1786

to [Anthony Fletcher], fifth earl of Kintore

aul 2954.

6 Sept. 1786

to Henry Dundas

aul U 557.

17 Feb. 1787

to the Aberdeen Magistrates

aca Letterbook 13, 217.

8 July 1787

from Bishop John Douglas

aul 3214/17.

25 July 1787

to Ann Farquharson

aul 3214/14.

9 Aug. 1787

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/548.

16 Apr. 1788

to William Creech

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

5 May [1788?]

to Lord Hailes

nls 25305, fols 22–3.

10 June 1788

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/568.

30 Aug. 1788

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/574.

1 Oct. 1788

from Bishop John Douglas

aul 3214/11.

7 May 1789

to Thomas Brydson

eul La.II.110.13

19 June 1789

from Bishop John Douglas

aul 3214/9.

24 June 1789

to Lord Hailes

nls 25305, fols 10–16.

4 July 1789

to Bishop John Douglas

bl Egerton 2185, fols 191–2.

26 Sept. 1789

to Bishop John Douglas

bl Egerton 2185, fols 194–5.

30 Oct. 1789

from Bishop John Douglas

aul 3214/10.

[Autumn 1789?]

to Lord Hailes

nls 25305, fols 27–30.

23 Nov. 1789

to Lord Hailes

nls 25305, fols 16–22.

23 Dec. 1789

from William Heberden

aul 3214/1.

11 Mar. 1790

to Bishop John Douglas

bl Egerton 2186, fols 5–6.

20 May 1790

to Alexander Christie

nls 3703, fols 66–7.

[24?] May 1790

from Alexander Christie

nls 3703, fols 68–70.

22 July 1790

to G.J. Thorkelin

eul La.III.379/146.

22 July 1790

to Bishop John Douglas

bl Egerton 2186, fols 10–11.

22 Sept. 1790

to Bishop John Douglas

bl Egerton 2186, fols 12–15.

18 Oct. 1790

from Bishop John Douglas

aul 3214/2.

24 Oct. [1790?]

from Josiah Tucker

aul 3214/3.

13 This letter also includes notes from James Beattie and Patrick Copland to Brydson.

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A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence Date

271

Correspondent

MS Location

9 Nov. 1790

to William Creech

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

30 Dec. 1790

to Bishop John Douglas

bl Egerton 2186, fol. 16.

1 Apr. 1791

to Bishop John Douglas

bl Egerton 2186, fol. 27.

14 Sept. 1793

to William Creech

sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

4 July 1794

to James Beattie

aul 30/2/719.

10 Oct. 1794

to John Abercrombie (Lord Provost of Aberdeen)

aca Council Register 67, fol. 41v.14

12 May 1795

from [John Moore], archbishop of Canterbury

aul 3214/4.15

11 June 1795

to the moderator of the Presbytery sro CH2/1/11, pp. 53–4. of Aberdeen

11 June 1795

to the Lord Provost of Aberdeen

aca Council Register 67, fols 69v-70r.

22 July 1795

to [David Murray], second earl of Mansfield

aul M 96.

14 Jan. 1796

to John Spottiswoode

nls 2618, fols. 57–8.

12 March [yr?]

from James Beattie

aul 3214/15.

n.d.

from [William Heberden?]

aul 3214/13.16

14 This is a transcription; the original does not appear in the Council’s letterbook. 15 The message from the archbishop is in William Laurence Brown’s hand. 16 This contains unsigned but friendly comments on Campbell’s Four Gospels; thus the date is no earlier than 1789. The attribution of authorship to Heberden is my own best guess based on Campbell’s other correspondence of that time.

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George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century: A Bibliographical Essay

manuscripts and archives The life of Campbell presented here has been pieced together primarily from manuscript sources, many of them previously unnoticed. The most important Campbell holdings are found in the Aberdeen University Library (aul), Department of Special Collections and Archives at King’s College, which contains virtually all of his unpublished manuscripts (mss 649–655) and lectures (mss m 191–201). R.E. Scott’s notes on Campbell’s and Gerard’s lectures are located under ms m 190 and ms k 174 respectively. Many of Reid’s and Beattie’s papers and letters are also found here, as are the manuscripts of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (particularly mss 37, 539 and 3107), a crucial source for the Aberdeen Enlightenment and for Enlightenment studies at large. The archives also hold transcriptions (ms 3214) of seventeen letters that are in the possession of Captain Farquharson of Whitehouse. The Aberdeen City Archives (aca) has scattered material on Campbell’s appointments in its registers and letterbooks. The Edinburgh University Library (eul) has several Campbell letters as well as a bound proof-copy of the first edition of The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Dh5. 150–151). The New College Library (ncl) in Edinburgh has Campbell’s botanical letter to David Skene (ms tho 2, fols. 53–4). The National Library of Scotland (nls) has ten letters from Campbell to Lord Hailes on The Four Gospels (mss 25303–25305, New Hailes collection), and Campbell’s only known letter to Hume (ms 23154, no. 11). The Fettercairn papers (mss Acc. 4796) contain the uncut originals of Beattie’s letters to Sir William Forbes of Pitsligo included in Forbes’ life of Beattie, with many references to Campbell. The nls also holds Colin

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Campbell’s “Some Memorandu’ms” (ms 1704, fol. 5). The Scottish Record Office (sro, now the National Archives of Scotland) has a copy of Campbell’s will (cc1/6/60) and, at West Register House, microfilm copies of Campbell’s letters to the booksellers Alexander Kincaid and William Creech (rh4/26/1). The sro also has a wealth of church records: ch1 covers the General Assembly, ch2 contains the registers of the Presbytery and Synod of Aberdeen, and ch12 has some fascinating material concerning the Scottish Episcopal Church. The Scottish Catholic Archives in Edinburgh has a great deal of material relevant to the moderates’ relations with Catholic church leaders that is waiting to be explored. The British Library (bl) has letters from Campbell (and other moderates) to Bishop John Douglas (Egerton mss 2185 and 2186) and an extract from a letter from Campbell to Strahan concerning Gibbon’s Decline and Fall (Add. ms 34886, fols 78–9). The Sheffield City Archives (sca) has two important letters from Campbell to Edmund Burke (ms wwm Bk. 1/240 and 1172). The William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan has one letter from Campbell to the second earl of Shelburne (Shelburne mss, v. 115, pp. 215–16).

printed primary sources In addition to the manuscript sources listed above, there are a number of contemporary and modern printed sources that have proved invaluable to this study. H. Lewis Ulman’s edition of The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–1773 (Aberdeen University Press, 1990) is essential to any study of the Aberdonians, and contains an extensive and valuable introduction. The eighteenth-century Scots Magazine contains many articles on contemporary institutions such as the universities of Edinburgh and Aberdeen, and running accounts of the debates in the General Assembly that are not found in official church records. John Sinclair’s Statistical Account of Scotland 1791–1799, nicely reprinted and edited by Donald J. Withrington and Ian R. Grant in 20 vols (EP Publishing, 1982–3), has much helpful information on parishes and local institutions. Alexander Carlyle’s Anecdotes and Characters of the Times, ed. James Kingsley (Oxford University Press, 1973), provides a good sense of how the Edinburgh Moderates came to be in the context of the 1730s to 1750s. Other contemporary memoirs of importance are John Ramsay of Ochtertyre’s Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, and Thomas Somerville’s My Own Life and Times 1741– 1814. The printed sermons of the Aberdonians, though hard to find,

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are too easily neglected. They provide a good sense of how sincerely Christian the moderates were; see, in particular, Alexander Gerard’s Sermons (2 vols) and John Farquhar’s Sermons on Various Subjects (2 vols), the latter posthumously edited by Campbell and Gerard. The printing history of Campbell’s works highlights the varying fortunes of his posthumous reputation. A Dissertation on Miracles, for example, was reprinted at least twenty-three times between 1762 and 1841 (including several translations), but then fell out of print until 1983, when the first edition was reproduced as part of Garland’s series of works relating to David Hume. The Four Gospels was reprinted or abridged at least twenty-two times up to 1848, when its publishing life ended abruptly. Campbell’s other religious works, particularly the lectures, were occasionally reprinted during the first part of the nineteenth century, but not after the 1840s. The Philosophy of Rhetoric appeared only once in the eighteenth century, apart from a German translation in 1791, but was reprinted with increasing frequency throughout the nineteenth century, expanding its reputation precisely as the religious works were falling into neglect. Harper and Brothers (now Harper and Row) of New York alone reprinted the work at least twenty-two times between 1841 and 1887 (see Lloyd Bitzer’s list of editions, PR, liii–lv). After this it was reprinted only infrequently in a condensed or abridged form, together with other works on effective speaking (that is, without the philosophical components). The Philosophy of Rhetoric has recently appeared in several scholarly facsimiles – most notably Bitzer’s edition in the Landmarks in Rhetoric and Public Address series published by the Southern Illinois University Press – and has become a standard text in every history of modern rhetoric.

secondary sources c a m p b e l l ’ s r h e t o r i c a n d p h i l o s o p h y Almost all of the modern secondary material on George Campbell is concerned with his rhetoric – and less with his rhetoric in the context of the eighteenth century than with his rhetorical theory in the context of modern rhetorical concerns. As this body of literature is far removed from my own purposes (and largely incomprehensible to non-specialists), I will not attempt to engage it as a whole. Howard Lewis Ulman has reviewed the rhetorical literature in “Thought and Language in George Campbell’s The Philosophy of Rhetoric,” (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University,

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1985). Ulman has also nicely summarized the contents of The Philosophy of Rhetoric in chapter 3 of Things, Thoughts, Words, and Actions: The Problem of Language in Late Eighteenth-Century British Rhetorical Theory (Southern Illinois University Press, 1994). One recent but not easily accessible article that attempts to tie Campbell’s rhetoric to the larger intellectual concerns of the eighteenth century is Lloyd F. Bitzer, “Religious and Scientific Foundations of 18th-Century Theories of Rhetoric,” (The Van Zelst Lecture in Communication 11 May 1995, published by Northwestern University, 1996). Douglas Ehninger was one of the first scholars to recognize the philosophical implications of Campbell’s rhetorical theory in an article that helped ignite modern Campbell studies: “George Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional Theory,” Southern Speech Journal 15 (May 1950): 270–6. A number of scholars have tried to get at the philosophical roots of Campbell’s rhetoric. Clarence W. Edney early suggested the importance of Locke’s influence (“George Campbell’s Theory of Logical Truth,” Speech Monographs 15 [1948]: 19–32), which is convincing as far as it goes, but hardly sets Campbell apart from the majority of his countrymen or shows the extent to which many of Locke’s rationalistic assumptions were being silently discarded during the eighteenth century. Vincent M. Bevilacqua focused on the Baconian influence (“Philosophical Origins of George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” Speech Monographs 32 [March 1965]: 1–12), as did Wilbur Samuel Howell in an impressive survey, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton University Press, 1971). Again, the comparison is important, but we should not conclude that this Baconian influence sets Campbell apart from his British or even his French contemporaries. Lloyd F. Bitzer has more provocatively pointed towards Hume, using extensive textual comparisons between The Philosophy of Rhetoric and Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature to show that Campbell borrowed much of his associational psychology – and consequenty his rhetorical innovations – directly from the sceptic; see “The Lively Idea: A Study of Hume’s Influence on George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” (Ph.D. diss., State University of Iowa, 1962), and “Hume’s Philosophy in George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 3, no. 2 (Summer 1969): 139–66. To my mind, Bitzer significantly overworks Campbell’s likeness to Hume, and underestimates Campbell’s important criticisms of and departures from Hume’s philosophy (particularly on the matters of memory, testimony, and belief). Nevertheless, Bitzer’s fundamental comparison remains compelling, though it has provoked

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much controversy. Karen Rasmussen appears to accept Bitzer’s argument, but maintains that Campbell was thereby forced to hold an untenable position between Hume’s rigid empiricism and Reid’s intuitive recognition of Common Sense truths (“Inconsistency in Campbell’s Rhetoric: Explanation and Implications,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 60 [1974]: 190–200). I suspect that Rasmussen’s argument is really with Common Sense in general and perhaps with the larger trends of eighteenth-century philosophy, and that she has undervalued Campbell’s own awareness and solution of this problem. Dennis R. Bormann has prima facie rejected Bitzer’s considerable body of textual evidence (apparently without even reading his dissertation) and has argued, with very little evidence, that because of his Common Sense commitments Campbell simply could not have been influenced by Hume (“Some ‘Common Sense’ about Campbell, Hume, and Reid: The Extrinsic Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 71 [1985]: 395–421). Bormann has failed to consider the possibility that Campbell could have borrowed from Hume even while he disagreed with him on fundamental matters, and has dismissed Campbell’s own claims of Hume’s influence. Bormann’s conclusions are profoundly misguided and misleading, though they do highlight the difficulty of establishing Beattie’s place in Aberdonian thought. Bormann is not alone, however; the influential but often-wrong Hugh Trevor-Roper has likewise suggested that Hume and Common Sense could not belong to the same Enlightenment (“The Scottish Enlightenment,” Blackwood’s Magazine 322 [1977]: 371–88). Little has been published on Campbell’s general life and works apart from this specialized body of literature. The most important life has traditionally been George Skene Keith’s “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Campbell” (1800), which prefaces the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History but is not otherwise available to modern readers. A few later remembrances, such as those found in James Bruce, Lives of Eminent Men of Aberdeen (1841), and James Valentine, “An Aberdeen Principal of Last Century,” The Aberdeen Journal (3 April 1896), provide some interesting biographical details not found (or supported) in other sources. The six or seven pages of James McCosh’s The Scottish Philosophy (1875) devoted to Campbell contain a number of factual errors, some of which have been reproduced in the potted biographies available in general reference works. The best modern account to date is Lloyd F. Bitzer’s scholarly preface to his reprint edition of Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric, revised ed. (Southern Illinois University Press, 1988).

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e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s c o t l a n d For social and economic background on Scotland during the eighteenth century, see Rosalind Mitchison, Lordship to Patronage: Scotland 1603–1745 (Edinburgh University Press, 1983), and Bruce Lenman, Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialization: Scotland 1746–1832 (University of Toronto Press, 1981). There are few if any modern histories of Aberdeen – one must turn to older works such as William Robbie, Aberdeen: Its Traditions and History (1893). Eighteenth-century Scots were well aware of the distinctiveness of the Northeast, of which Aberdeen is the capital. James McCosh gave some account of this in The Scottish Philosophy. Modern scholars have recently begun to appreciate the particular intellectual flavour of the region, as in Roger L. Emerson, “The Enlightenment and Social Structures,” in City and Society in the 18th Century, ed. Paul Fritz and David Williams, (Hakkert, 1973). Stephen A. Conrad, in Citizenship and Common Sense: The Problem of Authority in the Social Background and Social Philosophy of the Wise Club of Aberdeen (Garland, 1987), gives a good account of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society’s social discourse, though it is questionable whether this is what made Aberdeen distinctive. The most important recent work on Aberdeen is Paul Wood’s wonderful The Aberdeen Enlightenment: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen University Press, 1993), which describes the college curricula but also says much about the broader concerns of the Aberdeen Enlightenment. Roger Emerson’s Professors, Patronage and Politics: The Aberdeen Universities in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen University Press, 1992) maps out the political context of college business in the tightly-bred little world of the Northeast. See also the hit-and-miss collection of essays, Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, ed. Jennifer J. Carter and Joan H. Pittock (Aberdeen University Press, 1987). On Aberdeen primary education see H.F. Morland Simpson, ed., Bon Record: Records and Reminiscences of Aberdeen Grammar School from the Earliest Times by Many Writers (1906). On the divinity course see G.D. Henderson’s unpublished typescript Aberdeen Divines (2 vols, n.d.) in the Aberdeen University Library Special Collections. On the major eighteenth-century attempt to unite the Aberdeen universities, see the helpful but politically incomplete account by Walter Robson Humphries, William Ogilvie and the Projected Union of the Colleges 1786–1787 (Aberdeen University Press, 1940). On the Scottish club scene, start with Davis D. McElroy, Scotland’s Age of Improvement: A Survey of Eighteenth-Century Literary Clubs and Societies (Washington State University Press, 1969). Further reading should

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include Roger L. Emerson, “The Social Composition of Enlightened Scotland: The Select Society of Edinburgh, 1754–1764,” Studies On Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 114 (1973): 291–329, as well as a series of papers by Emerson on the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh in The British Journal for the History of Science (1979, 1981, and 1985). Besides Ulman’s essential edition of The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society and Conrad’s Citizenship and Common Sense, see Bernhard Fabian, “David Skene and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society,” The Bibliotheck 5 (1968): 81–99, and Walter Robson Humphries, “The First Aberdeen Philosophical Society,” Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 5 (1931–38): 203–38. On the philosophical and religious significance of the society’s taxonomic activities, see Paul B. Wood, “Buffon’s Reception in Scotland: The Aberdeen Connection,” Annals of Science 44 (1987): 169–90. See also Wood’s “Science and the Pursuit of Virtue in the Aberdeen Enlightenment,” in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford University Press, 1990). On eighteenthcentury taxonomic schemes in general (unfortunately, with little British content) see James L. Larson, Interpreting Nature: The Science of Living Form from Linnaeus to Kant (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). Alice H. Sommerville provides a little information on Campbell’s botanical specimens in “Aberdeen University Herbarium,” Aberdeen University Review (Autumn, 1979): 200–203. For a sense of the Enlightenment’s pervasive use of science to construct a natural theology, see the collection of essays edited by William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer, The Sciences in Enlightened Europe (University of Chicago Press, 1999), particularly the afterword by Lorraine Daston. In the last decade or two eighteenth-century British Jacobitism has become a significant field of scholarship, recently reviewed by Murray G.H. Pittock, Jacobitism (St. Martin’s Press, 1998). Pittock demonstrates that Jacobitism was more than just a dynastic struggle – it was the symbol of Scotland’s widespread opposition to the Union. For what happened to Jacobitism after the ’45, see Colin Kidd, “The Rehabilitation of Scottish Jacobitism,” Scottish Historical Review 77 (April 1998): 58–76. Context for Campbell’s views on the war with America can be found in Dalphy I. Fogerstrom, “Scottish Opinion and the American Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly 11 (1954): 252–75, and Andrew Hook, Scotland and America: A Study of Cultural Relations 1750–1835 (Blackie, 1975). The excellent collection of essays edited by Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten, Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment (Edinburgh University Press, 1990) gives a cross-Atlantic context for

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many of Campbell’s religious and political views. On the “No-Popery” affair, see Robert Kent Donovan’s essay in the foregoing collection, as well as his excellent No Popery and Radicalism: Opposition to Roman Catholic Relief in Scotland, 1778–1782 (Garland, 1987), and his condensed “Voices of Distrust: The Expression of Anti-Catholic Feeling in Scotland, 1778– 1781,” Innes Review 30 (1979): 62–76. For the Catholic side, see Mark Goldie, “The Scottish Catholic Enlightenment,” Journal of British Studies 30 (January 1991): 20–62. For contemporary accounts of the arguments in the General Assembly, see volume 41 of the Scots Magazine (May through September, 1779). t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t The context for Campbell’s epistemology (which, for eighteenth-century minds, was the foundation of philosophy) is the same as for all eighteenth-century British figures, so no special account of Campbell’s rhetorical concerns need be taken here. Most eighteenth-century figures were well aware of the importance of rhetoric in the economy of ideas. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to find a good general treatment of the common set of problems and concerns faced by all eighteenth-century British epistemologists, though individual philosophers (such as the venerable trio of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) are well served. Late seventeenth-century English latitudinarianism demonstrates striking parallels with the thought of the Aberdonians; for comparison, see John Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and Religion: The Age of Enlightenment in England 1660– 1750 (Thames and Hudson, 1976); Henning Graf Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World, trans. John Bowden (Fortress Press, 1984); and especially Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth-Century England (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985). The religious significance of Locke’s epistemology has been deftly argued by John W. Yolton in John Locke and the Way of Ideas (Oxford University Press, 1956). The development of the seventeenth-century probabilistic theory of knowledge is described in several excellent studies: Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630–1690 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1963); and Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton University Press, 1983). Lorraine Daston convincingly demonstrates how the Enlightenment’s theory of knowledge and quantifiable notion of evidence was overthrown by the 1840s (Classical Probability in the Enlightenment [Princeton University Press, 1988]), precisely when Campbell’s apologetic works ceased to be printed. On Bishop Butler, see the

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collection edited by Christopher Cunliffe, Joseph Butler’s Moral and Religious Thought (Oxford University Press, 1992), particularly the essay by Basil Mitchell. For Campbell’s unsurprising likeness to Paley, see D.L. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Paley (University of Nebraska Press, 1976). The theory of the association of ideas was a relatively new concept in the eighteenth century (having been dismissed by Locke as an obstacle to sound reasoning), but has received little treatment from modern scholars, apart from its use by individual thinkers such as Hume, Gerard, or in a different vein, Hartley and Priestley. For a general but limited treatment, see Martin Kallich, The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth-Century England (Mouton, 1970). See also chapter 15 of John H. Randall’s, The Career of Philosophy from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment (Columbia University Press, 1962). Campbell’s theory of evidence was crucial to the collective Aberdonian philosophy, and has received insufficient attention in that context. C.A.J. Coady has credited Reid with a theory of testimony that properly belongs, at least in order of priority, to Campbell (“Reid on Testimony,” in The Philosophy of Thomas Reid, ed. Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews [Kluwer, 1989]). c o m m o n s e n s e S.A. Grave has written the standard work on Aberdonian Common Sense Philosophy – The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford University Press, 1960) – though he has taken a strictly philosophical and textual view, and overlooked Campbell’s essential contributions. David Fate Norton has argued that Reid’s Common Sense and Hutcheson’s theory of Moral Sense were parts of a larger movement that he has called “Scottish realism”; see “From Moral Sense to Common Sense: An Essay on the Development of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy, 1700–1765” (Ph.D. diss, University of California, San Diego, 1966). These arguments have been developed in Norton’s rewarding David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton University Press, 1982). Reid studies have flourished of late, and a new critical edition of his works is beginning to appear. One remarkable volume – Knud Haakonssen’s edition of Reid’s Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and Papers on Natural Religion, Self-Government, Natural Jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations (Princeton University Press, 1990) – contains an extensive introduction and an exhaustive commentary on Reid’s moral philosophy and natural religion. On Campbell and Priestley, see Vincent M. Bevilacqua, “Campbell, Priestley, and the Controversy concerning Common Sense,” Southern Speech Journal 30 (1964): 79–98.

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m i r a c l e s For a modern assessment of the long eighteenth-century controversy over miracles, see Robert M. Burns, The Great Debate on Miracles (Bucknell University Press, 1981), which shows that most of the arguments, with the dramatic exception of Hume’s, had been exhausted by the 1730s. For an account of Hume’s argument in the context of late seventeenth-century debates over probability and testimony, see M.A. Stewart, “Hume’s Historical View of Miracles,” in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, ed. M.A. Stewart and John P. Wright (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). For a review of one aspect of the miracles debate, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The ‘Indian Prince’ in Miracle Arguments of Hume and His Predecessors and Early Critics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 31, 3 (1998): 175–230. Still very much worth reading on this subject, as well as on the whole deistical controversy, is Leslie Stephen’s classic History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols, 3d ed. (reprinted Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962); it wonderfully highlights the religious premises and implications of the innumerable eighteenth-century disputants, and has influenced many of my own views on eighteenthcentury religious thought. Similar debates were going on at the same time in France. R.R. Palmer, in Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France (1939), demonstrates that French Jesuits grappled with many of the same concerns as their moderate Presbyterian counterparts in Scotland – including the problems of reconciling reason with faith in the matter of miracles, and sincere religion with temporal authority, not least in their battles with the more enthusiastic and Calvinistic Jansenists. eighteenth-century views of history and criticism Modern scholars must be wary of the common nineteenth- and twentieth-century claim that the Enlightenment was fundamentally ahistorical. The eighteenth-century’s particular (and sometimes obsessive) concern with the past was different but no less sincere than ours. Concerning eighteenth-century conceptions of critical history, see Joseph M. Levine, Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography (Cornell University Press, 1987), and an important article by David Wootton, “Narrative, Irony, and Faith in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall,” History and Theory 33 (1994): 77–105. Wootton argues that critical history in its modern cast was invented by David Hume and developed by Edward Gibbon. Gibbon’s philosophical history and veiled irony is nicely described in David Womersley’s The Transformation of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Cambridge University Press, 1988), which makes

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many other important arguments beyond the range of the present study. On the historical theory of “unintended consequences,” which was so popular with eighteenth-century Scots, see Ronald Hamowy, “The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Monograph Series (1987). On the idea of progress in all its many contexts, religious and secular, see David Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Yale University Press, 1990). David Allan has described two centuries of the Scottish debate over the historical nature of the church in Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas of Scholarship in Early Modern History (Edinburgh University Press, 1993). Campbell did not defend Presbyterianism with appeals to ancient Scottish history, as did many of his predecessors; for a stimulating account of the subversion of this and many other cherished Scottish historical myths (including the Ossianic), see Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c.1830 (Cambridge University Press, 1993). On the Scottish context of the Ossianic controversy, which has some parallels to Campbell’s textual criticism, see Richard B. Sher, ‹Those Scotch Imposters and Their Cabal’: Ossian and the Scottish Enlightenment,” in Proceedings of the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies 1 (1982): 55–63. See also the collection edited by Howard Gaskill, Ossian Revisited (Edinburgh University Press, 1991), particularly the introductory essay, which puts the debate into a sensible perspective. On earlier English controversies over ancient texts, see the wonderfully readable Joseph M. Levine, The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the Augustan Age (Cornell University Press, 1991). On contemporary theories of ancient texts and myth-making, see: J.W. Rogerson, Myth in Old Testament Interpretation (Walter de Gruyter, 1974); John Drury, ed. Critics of the Bible 1724–1873 (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Reginald C. Fuller’s excellent Alexander Geddes 1737–1802: Pioneer of Biblical Criticism (Almond Press, 1984); and Nigel M. de S. Cameron’s thoughtprovoking Biblical Higher Criticism and the Defense of Infallibilism in 19th Century Britain (Edwin Mellen, 1987). See also the collection of studies edited by S.L. Greenslade in the older but still very useful Cambridge History of the Bible: [vol. 3] The West from the Reformation to the Present Day (Cambridge University Press, 1963). On nineteenth-century developments in history and higher criticism, see: Christopher J. Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); John Edward Toews, Hegelianism: The Path toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805–1841

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(Cambridge University Press, 1980); and Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (University of Chicago Press, 1989). t h e c h u r c h a n d r e l i g i o u s t h o u g h t The only substantial treatment of Campbell’s religious thought to date is a dissertation by Arthur Raymond McKay, “George Campbell (1719–1796), His Life and Thought” (Ph.D. diss., Edinburgh University, 1951). McKay’s assessment of Campbell’s orthodoxy from a modern evangelical perspective, together with his failure to discover the relevant Campbell manuscripts in Aberdeen, largely explains why he found Campbell’s theology wanting. Douglas A. Sonheim’s more recent examination of Campbell’s pulpit rhetoric, “George Campbell’s Theory of Pulpit Discourse” (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, Columbia, 1993) does not move beyond the rhetorical texts or a strictly rhetorical interpretation of Campbell’s religious intentions. Modern treatments of the religious thought of other Scottish moderates tend to be superficial and unconvincing. I think it is rather dismissive, though all too tempting, to summarize their religious beliefs with such facile labels as “Arminianism,” as in Jeffrey Smitten, “The Shaping of Moderatism: William Robertson and Arminianism,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 22 (1992): 281–300, and Nicholas J. Griffin, “Possible Theological Perspectives in Thomas Reid’s Common Sense Philosophy,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 41 (1990): 425–42. Some moderates (including Campbell) may indeed have been Arminians on the narrow question of salvation, but this does not say nearly enough about their subtle and earnest theology. There are no satisfactory general treatments of the eighteenthcentury Scottish Church. Andrew L. Drummond and James Bulloch’s The Scottish Church 1688–1843: The Age of the Moderates (Saint Andrew Press, 1973), is patchy in its research and unreliable in its judgments. Gordon Donaldson, The Faith of the Scots (B.T. Batsford, 1990), is better but rather thin. In an older but influential work, The Theology and Theologians of Scotland Chiefly of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 2nd ed. (1888), James Walker argued (mistakenly, I think) that the notion of a personal Jesus had always been central to covenanting theology – an evangelical assumption that makes it easy to dismiss the moderates’ christology. See also James K. Cameron, “Theological Controversy: A Factor in the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. R.H. Campbell and Andrew S.

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Skinner (John Donald, 1982), 116–30. There is also a very good but brief treatment of the Scottish Church (among other things) in M.A. Stewart, “The Scottish Enlightenment,” in British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, ed. Stuart Brown (Routledge, 1996). On the long history of controversy within the Calvinistic churches at large, see John T. McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism (Oxford University Press, 1954). The eighteenth-century Church of England, like the Church of Scotland, has usually been dismissed as arid and unconcerned with its parochial duties, despite Norman Sykes’ Church and State in England in the XVIIIth Century (1934). On the rise of Evangelicalism in the eighteenth century and its distinctiveness from the established churches, see D.W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain (Unwin Hyman, 1989), and the very sensible and balanced life of Wesley by Henry D. Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast: John Wesley and the Rise of Methodism (Trinity Press International, 1989). t h e s c o t t i s h m o d e r a t e s Eighteenth-century Scottish moderates have been unsympathetically treated for more than two centuries. Critics, evangelical and otherwise, have been content to take Witherspoon’s satirical attack on his political opponents at face value. Even into the twentieth century, churchmen such as John Macleod have swallowed Witherspoon’s characterization in its entirety, accusing the moderates of Pelagianism, Socinianism, hostility to the Gospel, and friendliness to the deistical and worldly fashions of the day; see Macleod’s Scottish Theology in Relation to Church History Since the Reformation 2nd ed. (Knox Press, 1946). Even the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper (see p. 277 above) has not troubled himself to see them as anything more than closet Socinians. Ian D.L. Clark was the first not only to write sympathetically about the moderates but also to distinguish “moderatism” as a widespread eighteenth-century mood or attitude apart from the Moderate party in the Church of Scotland, which did not come into being until the 1750s; see his “Moderatism and the Moderate Party in the Church of Scotland 1752–1805” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1963). Clark took a generous view of moderate preaching, and denied that moderates ignored either the person or the work of Christ. His outstanding and regrettably unpublished dissertation was epitomized in “From Protest to Reaction: The Moderate Regime in the Church of Scotland, 1752–1805,” in Scotland in the Age of Improvement, ed. Nicholas T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitcheson (Edinburgh University Press,

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1970). Unfortunately, even modern scholars who defend the literature and politics of the moderates often show little concern for their religion. In John Dwyer’s Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (John Donald, 1987), the Edinburgh moderates are hardly removed from deists. Dwyer has argued that the proper context for these divines is polite rather than religious, as if the two are incompatible; see “The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Moderate Divines,” in New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland, ed. John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander Murdoch (John Donald, 1981). Richard B. Sher’s exemplary study of the Edinburgh Moderates, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton University Press, 1985), is much more convincing and well-rounded; Sher describes the collective experiences of Robertson, Blair, Carlyle, Ferguson, and John Home, but nevertheless provides few details concerning their religious commitments. He summarizes the values of Moderatism under six heads: “Presbyterianism, Scottish nationalism, Stoicism, civic humanism, conservatism, and enlightenment” (324). It is telling of modern interests that five of these six heads are explicitly secular. Sher has partly made up for this imbalance in his very useful essay about eighteenth-century notions of Providence, “Witherspoon’s Dominion of Providence and the Scottish Jeremiad Tradition,” in the above-noted Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment. On the related problem of reconciling the religious and the secular in one world view, see Ned Landsman’s “Witherspoon and the Problem of Provincial Identity in Scottish Evangelical Culture,” in the same collection. t h e e n l i g h t e n m e n t The debate over the nature of moderatism cannot be separated from the larger debate concerning the fundamental nature of the Enlightenment. One’s characterization of the Enlightenment largely depends upon whom one takes to be most representative of the Enlightenment. Twentieth-century interpreters have generally focused on the anti-religious elements of enlightened thought. Perhaps more than any other general interpreter, the maddeningly prolific Peter Gay has swayed the last and present generation of scholars with his militantly secular view, particularly in his still-standard textbook, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols (Alfred A Knopf: 1966 and 1969). Gay has elegantly captured the Enlightenment’s sense of self-confidence and optimism, but has determined to see it as a single

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movement, unified in its opposition to Christian tradition. He has consistently labeled the men of the Enlightenment as “philosophes,” thus cunningly excluding the many who do not fit the uniform of the soldier in the war against religion. Consequently, Gay’s Enlightenment belonged to Voltaire and Hume. Since the 1960s, Enlightenment scholarship has tended to focus on national, regional, and popular versions of the Enlightenment, and has shown the Enlightenment to be neither as pagan nor as unified as Gay supposed. The collection of essays edited by Roy Porter and Mikulás Teich, The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge University Press, 1981), is a prime example of how different kinds of Enlightenment could emerge in different contexts – some, like the English, with few religious axes to grind. Henry F. May, by choosing to give more weight to minor works and unpublished letters than to formal discourses, has discovered several distinct and somewhat incompatible enlightenments in Europe and America, and has implied that the Enlightenment in America went hand in hand with developments in Protestant thought (The Enlightenment in America [Oxford University Press, 1976]). Robert Darnton has led the way in offering surprising glimpses into what ordinary eighteenth-century readers were actually reading: mainly crude and sometimes scandalous popularizations of Enlightenment thought by hack-writers whose names we have never heard before; see particularly Darnton’s Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Harvard University Press, 1982). A few scholars have begun to take a general look at religiosity in the Enlightenment. For example, James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant (Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), points out the Enlightenment’s diversity and internal conflicts. Roy Porter highlights both the diversity and the religiosity of the Enlightenment, and he poses a series of excellent historiographical questions in The Enlightenment (Humanities Press International, 1990); his little book nevertheless demonstrates how difficult it has become to write a textbook on the Enlightenment that is both comprehensive and accessible to beginning students. Gay’s version of the Enlightenment has survived in undergraduate courses because it is readable and because there is little to oppose it. The field of Enlightenment studies has fragmented so much in recent decades that, although scholars have successfully challenged the details of Gay’s arguments, no one has been able to produce a textbook to rival the boldness and scope of his grand interpretation. It is time for a major new interpretation that considers not only the wits and the iconoclasts,

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but also the many less spectacular manifestations of the Enlightenment. It must include both the great names and the forgotten ones, the magnificent folio volumes and the illegal chapbooks, the great political treatises and the weekly journals, the revolutionaries as well as the ordinary members of the scientific societies, most of whom were content to balance the new ideas with a more traditional faith in the God of Scripture and of Nature.

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Index

Aberdeen, 13, 18 Aberdeen, Presbytery of, 46, 55 Aberdeen, Synod of, 19, 34 Aberdeen Enlightenment, 8, 169, 258–9 Aberdeen Grammar School, 14 Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 8, 11, 25–9, 81n, 167–9, 257 Aberdeen Town Council, 20, 24, 31, 45–6, 55–6 Aberdonians, 8, 74–6, 77, 84, 92, 112–14, 120, 193–4, 206, 257 abstract ideas, 78, 79 d’Alembert, Jean le Rond, 159 America, war with (American Revolution), 39–41, 43, 163–5 analogy, 97–8 Anglican divines, See latitudinarian divines Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine, 59, 60, 226, 252 Argyll, Archibald Campbell, first earl of Ilay, third duke of, 17, 21, 23 Arminianism, 200–1, 237 association of ideas, 80–1 Astruc, Jean, 153

Bacon, Francis, 5, 23, 26, 83n, 165–8 Banchory Ternan (Kincardineshire), 18–19 baptism, See sacraments Beattie, James, 8, 37, 46–7, 48, 51, 52, 57, 172, 229; and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 26, 28; “Beattie problem,” 8, 77, 111; and common sense, 101–2, 104, 110–11, 113; and natural religion, 117, 183; and testimony, 121 Beattie, James Hay, 28 belief, 82–3, 86, 89–92, 126–7 Bentley, Richard, 153, 216 Berkeley, George, 27 biblical criticism, 47–9, 64, 147–58, 215–22, 245–6 Bisset, John, 20–1, 203–4, 215 Bitzer, Lloyd F., 5, 79–80, 81 Blackwell, Thomas, the younger, 15, 153 Blair, Hugh, 15–16, 29, 40, 67, 151, 198 Boston, Thomas, 193 Boswell, James, 201 Brown, William Laurence, 3, 56, 57, 206–7 Burke, Edmund, 40, 46

Burnett, Sir Alexander, fourth baronet of Leys, 18 Burnett, Robert, of Leys, 18 Bute, John Stuart, third earl of, 23 Butler, Joseph, 16, 73–4, 98, 116, 177 Cadell, Thomas, 48 calculation of chances, 97 Cambuslang revival, 17, 188 Campbell, (Professor) Archibald, 187 Campbell, Colin (father), 11–13 Campbell, Colin (brother), 13n, 18–19 Campbell, George: Address to the People of Scotland, 44–5, 46n, 141; apologetic system, 35, 65, 177–8, 233, 248–51, 255–6, 259; character, 51, 57; Character of a Minister, 19, 61, 185, 247–8; “Defence of the Conduct of Marischal College,” 25; “Defence” MS, 54, 65, 143–4, 202; Dissertation on Miracles, 3, 28–30, 35, 53, 65, 67, 87–8, 112, 127, 134,

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290 149–50; Duty of Allegiance, 39–41, 163–5, 203; Four Gospels, 3, 19, 47–9, 53, 147–8, 150–1, 217–18; Happy Influence of Religion, 42–3, 46n, 65, 161, 199; “Implicit Faith” MS, 53, 65; Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, 58–60, 144–5, 202; Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, 61, 66; Lectures on the Pastoral Character, 19, 61, 66, 248; lecturing scheme, 32–3, 62–7; “Of wit, humour, and ridicule,” 19; pedagogical theory, 23– 4, 55, 66–7, 242; Philosophy of Rhetoric, 19, 28, 37–9, 66, 67, 76, 81n, 83, 87–9, 166, 248; political thought, 39–41, 42, 163–5; Spirit of the Gospel, 35–7, 53, 65, 214; “Strictures on Dodwell’s Parænesis” MS, 54, 65, 143, 228; Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel, 41–2, 65, 204, 208 Campbell, George, of Westhall, 11 Campbell, Grace, See Farquharson, Grace Carlyle, Alexander, 24, 40, 237, 247 Chalmers, James, 16 Chalmers, John, 24 Chillingworth, William, 16, 71 Christ, doctrine of, 186, 195–8, 243–4 Christian empiricism, 73 Christian moderatism, 7 Church, doctrine of the, 186, 202–3, 222–9 Church, history of the, See ecclesiastical history

Index Cicero, 38, 116 Clarke, Samuel, 16, 129 Common Sense: evidence from, 93–4, 105–6; philosophy of, 8, 100–14, 170, 193, 200 conjectural history, 139–40 consciousness, evidence from, 93–4 conspiracy of the priesthood, 140, 160–2, 229, 231, 248 Copland, Patrick, 23 Creech, William, 48, 53 Cruden, David, 55 Daubeny, Charles, 60 deductive evidence, 92–3, 94–100 deism, 65, 114, 115, 119, 172–3, 233 demonstrative evidence, 93, 95 Derham, William, 169 Dickson, John, 44 Diderot, Denis, 165, 200 Dodwell, Henry, the elder, 54–5, 143, 199, 228 Douglas, John, 48–9, 50 Drummond, William Abernethy, 36, 43–4, 49– 51, 59, 226, 227, 228, 233 “Drysdale bustle,” 35 Duff, William, 15 Dun, James, 14 Dunbar, James, 26 Duncan, William, 21 Dundas, Henry, 43, 56 Dunlop, William, 230 ecclesiastical history, 53–5, 58–9, 63–4, 143–7, 224, 232 Edinburgh, 7, 43 Edinburgh Philosophical Society, 26 Edwards, Jonathan, 259

Enfield, William, 38 English Episcopalians (in Scotland), 50–1 Enlightenment, 6, 192, 247–8, 250, 252, 253, 254–5, 258–9; Aberdeen Enlightenment, 8, 169, 258–9 enthusiasm, 129, 229, 232– 5 episcopalianism, 50–1, 54– 5, 58, 60, 223–4, 226–9, 232 epistemology, 72–3, 78–81, 189–92 Erasmus, Desiderius, 149, 216 Erskine, Ebenezer, 188 Erskine, John, 40, 45, 188 Evangelicals, 7–8, 129, 188, 229, 232–5 evidence, theory of, 92– 100, 121–2, 250 experience, 87–90, 97, 98– 100, 189 faculties of the mind, 39, 81–92 faith, 181–3, 186, 251, 256 Farquhar, John, 26, 29, 193, 198, 205 Farquharson, Ann, 53, 57 Farquharson, Grace, 20, 52–3 Farquharson, Harry, of Whitehouse, 20 Farquharson, Peter, 57 Ferguson, Adam, 40 ‘15, the (Jacobite uprising), 12 Fleury, Claude, 144 Forbes, William, 18 ‘45, the (Jacobite uprising), 18, 50 Fraser, James, of Drumoak, 55, 61, 63 free will, 182, 186, 200 French, George, 23

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Index French Revolution, 55, 165, 252 Freud, Sigmund, 174 Gay, Peter, 258 Geddes, Alexander, 150, 153–4 General Assembly (of the Church of Scotland), 34– 5, 43, 46, 240–1 George iii (king of England), 48 Gerard, Alexander, 8, 17n, 256; and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 25, 26, 28; anatomist of human nature, 77, 171; and Campbell, 25, 31, 32; christology, 197–8; and the Church of Scotland, 34n, 35n; and Hume, 65, 120n, 122; moral preaching, 241, 242–4; on natural religion, 114, 183; pastoral theory, 66n; pedagogy, 23, 33, 247; political thought, 40, 42; on probable reasoning, 75; on providence, 203; on Roman Catholicism, 230; on salvation, 199–200; on sound doctrine, 191, 206 Gibbon, Edward, 136, 145–7 Glasgow, 43, 46 Gleig, George, 59, 226 Glennie, John, 17 Glorious Revolution, 163, 164, 236 God, doctrine of, 113–14, 115–17, 186, 194–5, 244 Gordon, Barbara, 20 Gordon, Thomas, 36n, 77 Gowdie, John, 16 Grave, S.A., 100–1 Gregory, John, 26 Gregory i, Pope, 141 Greyfriars chapel, 32

Hailes, Sir David Dalrymple, Lord, 47, 146n Hamann, J.G., 154 Hamilton, Robert, 23 Hay, George, 36–7, 44, 53– 4, 209, 210–15, 225–6, 230 Heberden, William, 49 hell, doctrine of, 201 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 174 heresy, 187, 191, 224–5 High Church doctrine, See episcopalianism higher criticism, 152–8, 174–6, 221, 252 High-flyers, 7, 215, 230, 242 Hill, George, 198 history, philosophy of, 136– 42, 173, 176–7 Hobbes, Thomas, 72 Holy Spirit, 181, 190, 198, 201 human nature: doctrine of, 186, 192–4, 242; theory of, 29, 76–8, 81, 136–9, 151, 161–2, 170, 174, 177, 252, 257 Hume, David, 6, 23, 39, 57; and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 28–9, 119–20, 121–2; anatomist of human nature, 77; on the association of ideas, 80–1; and common sense, 112–14; and the Enlightenment, 257–9; on evidence, 96–7, 215; on the faculties, 82; on history, 136, 139; on memory and belief, 87, 89, 90–1, 107; on miracles, 29–30, 67–8, 100, 119, 124–8, 130–5, 209– 11, 214; on the pastoral office, 61–2, 160; on reason and the passions, 85–

6; and scepticism, 75–6, 102, 104, 234; on testimony, 98–100, 109 Huss, Jan, 54, 143 Hutcheson, Francis, 13, 77, 102 ideal system, 102, 110 imagination, 83–4 Incorporated Trades of Aberdeen, 35, 55 Innes, Alexander, 15 intellection: evidence from, 93–4; as a faculty (equivalent to understanding), 79, 84; See also understanding, faculty of intuitive evidence, 92–4 Jacobites, 12, 18, 50 jeremiads, 203 Johnson, Samuel, 129, 233n Jones, Stephen, 59 judgment, 84, 94 Kames, Henry Home, Lord, 31, 67, 139 Keith, George Skene, 58, 66–7 King’s College, Aberdeen, 14, 22; proposals for union with Marischal 24–5 latitudinarian divines, 71–3, 119, 250 lay patronage, 239–41 Leiden, 12 Linnaeus, Carolus (Carl von Linné), 28 Livingston, William, 23 Locke, John: on biblical criticism, 216; epistemology, 72–3, 79, 96, 102; on faith, 181, 197; on miracles, 123, 133; on natural religion, 114;

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292 political philosophy, 164; on toleration 162–3 Lord’s Supper, See sacraments Lowth, Robert, 153 Lumsden, John, 16, 31 Luther, Martin, 47, 141 Macfarlane, Andrew, 60 McKail, James, 17 Maclaurin, Colin, 13 Macpherson, James, 151 Malcolm, Alexander, 14 Mansfield, David Murray, second earl of, 56 Marischal College, Aberdeen, 14–15, 21–5; proposals for union with King’s, 24–5 memory, 87–91, 97, 106–7 Michaelis, J.D., 150 Middle Ages, 140–1 Mills, John, 150 Milne, John, 14 miracles, 29–30, 100, 122– 36, 209–15, 249–50 Moderate party, 7, 17, 34–5, 188, 235, 236–8, 239–41, 252 moderatism, 7, 238–53 monasticism, 238 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de, 159, 168 moral certainty, 72, 95–6 moral evidence, 95–100 Morven, Mount, 167 mystery, 181–3, 186 natural history, 165–9 natural religion, 73, 75, 114–18, 181 “new country,” 4, 166 Newton, Isaac, 80, 115, 173, 250 No-Popery affair, 43–7, 237, 246

Index Northeast (of Scotland), 13, 50–1, 246 Ogilvie, William, 24, 26 orthodoxy, 184, 225, 242 Ossian, 151 Paley, William, 74, 170, 257 party-spirit, 188, 216, 239 passions, 84–7 pastoral office, 17, 61–2, 66, 247–8 Paterson bursary, 55 perception, 79, 110 Peter (apostle), 218–19 politeness, 184, 241–2 Pollock, Robert, 16, 21 popery, See Roman Catholicism Popular party, 7, 188, 241 Price, Richard, 163 Priestley, Joseph, 101 probable knowledge, 72–5, 173–4, 208, 249–50, 257 progress, 142, 253 providence, 99–100, 115, 123, 203–4 Ramsay, John, of Ochtertyre, 4, 48–9, 62n, 71, 155 Ray, John, 169 reason, 84–7, 106 “reformation of life and character,” 205–7 Reid, Thomas, 8, 15, 17n, 21, 142, 168; and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 25–6, 28; and Butler, 74; and Campbell, 78, 80, 110–11; and common sense, 90, 101, 102– 4, 110–12, 193; epistemology, 79, 84; on evidence, 92, 95; on the faculties, 81, 82, 84; on free will, 200; on natural religion, 117–18; on

probable reasoning, 75; on Roman Catholicism, 230 religious knowledge, 189–92 republicanism, 39–41, 163–5 rhetoric, 82–3, 92, 96, 166– 7, 234, 247–8 Riddoch, James, 51n Robertson, William: on history, 140, 141, 241; and the Moderate party, 236– 7; and the No-Popery affair, 43, 46; on the pastoral office, 247; on providence, 41, 204; on the war with America, 40 Roman Catholicism, 43–5, 53–4, 58–9, 109, 140–1, 143–5, 160–1, 210–14, 219, 229–32 Rose, William, 30, 37 sacraments, 202, 217, 248 salvation, doctrine of, 199– 201 Sarpi, Paolo, 141 Scotland, Church of, 34–5, 187–8, 203, 225, 228, 229–30, 234–5, 236–7, 239–41 Scott, Robert Eden, 32n, 62 Scottish Episcopal Church, 50–1, 60, 246; See also episcopalianism Select Society, 26 Shirrefs, James, 55 Simon, Richard, 149–50, 213, 217 Simson, John, 187 Skene, David, 26, 27, 31, 167 Skene, Francis, 21 Skinner, John, 50, 60, 227, 233 slavery, 165, 253n Smith, Adam, 37–8, 57n, 139, 175

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Index Smith, William Robertson, 175 Socinianism, 196 Somerville, Thomas, 34 Spinoza, Baruch, 72 “spirit of the Gospel,” 35–6, 198, 206–7, 231–2, 235, 238, 243 Stewart, John, 14–15, 26, 92 Stillingfleet, Edward, 16, 71, 72 Strahan, William, 37, 145 Strauss, David Friedrich, 154, 174–5, 221 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 18, 50 superstition, 182, 229–32, 234 sympathy, 39, 99, 193 taste, 83 taxonomy, 28, 166–9

Temple, William, 152 testimony, 87, 88, 98–100, 107–8, 125–7 Theological Club, 16–17, 26, 66 Tillotson, John, 16, 71 toleration, 50–1, 108–9, 162–3, 219, 228, 244–7 Traill, Robert, 26 Trinity, doctrine of the, 186, 195, 198, 216–17 Tucker, Josiah, 40–1, 49 Turnbull, George (moral philosopher), 13 Turnbull, George (writer to the signet), 15 understanding, faculty of, 79, 84–7; See also intellection Union of 1707, 13 Unitarianism, 197

293 vivacity of ideas, 82, 89–90 Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), 6, 141, 159, 161 Walker, Alexander, 13 Walker, Margaret, 13 Walton, Brian, 150 Wesley, John, 215, 233 Westminster Confession of Faith, 18, 185–6, 229 Westminster Shorter Catechism, 14, 186 Wettstein, J.J., 150 Whitefield, George, 17, 233 will, faculty of the, 83, 87 Wise Club, See Aberdeen Philosophical Society Witherspoon, John, 237, 259 Wodrow, Robert, 229–30

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