Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949 (Seminar Studies) [5 ed.] 0367858363, 9780367858360

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‘Martin McCauley delivers the masterful review of the origins of the Cold War you would expect from such a fine historian. For students with or without a previous knowledge of the international history of these tumultuous years this is a very suitable text and the inclusion of documents is a reflection of how history of this period should be taught. This is a very nicely framed piece of scholarship.’ Martin Thornton, University of Leeds, UK ‘Martin McCauley’s Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1949 is an excellent choice for those embarking on study of this complex period of international history. The inclusion of an excellent selection of source material and useful introductions to key concepts and characters make this an excellent book for those new to this topic. Its contents should spark stimulating seminar discussions, and would be of great use to those taking A-Levels on modern history, and introductory undergraduate courses on the Cold War.’ Mark Hurst, University of Kent, UK

Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949

Now in its fifth edition, Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949 covers the formative years of the momentous struggle that developed between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This accessible text explains how the Cold War originated and developed between 1941 and 1949 and involved the entire globe, with proxy wars being fought much to the detriment of the developing world. The fifth edition is revised, updated and expanded to include new material on topics such as the efforts of the Soviet Union, the UK and France to prevent the outbreak of World War II; the reasons behind the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact; atomic diplomacy and the role played by Soviet spies in the West; the culture wars and propaganda; Churchill’s efforts to entice the US into the war against Germany; the role of Hollywood in promoting intervention; the US’s insouciance concerning the danger of a Japanese attack; the astonishing success of the Soviet Union in recruiting high level American officials to provide invaluable information on politics, science, engineering and avionics; and more. Incorporating the most recent scholarship, Martin McCauley provides students with an invaluable introduction to a fascinating period that shaped today’s world. The book is an important staple for courses on modern global history and international affairs. Martin McCauley is a prolific author and broadcaster who has had a wealth of experience in Russian and international affairs. He taught at the University of London for over 30 years, and his recent publications include Stalin and Stalinism 3rd edition (2018) and The Cold War 1949–2016 (2017).

Seminar Studies

History is the narrative constructed by historians from traces left by the past. Historical enquiry is often driven by contemporary issues and, in consequence, historical narratives are constantly reconsidered, reconstructed and reshaped. The fact that different historians have different perspectives on issues means that there is often controversy and no universally agreed version of past events. Seminar Studies was designed to bridge the gap between current research and debate, and the broad, popular general surveys that often date rapidly. The volumes in the series are written by historians who are not only familiar with the latest research and current debates concerning their topic, but who have themselves contributed to our understanding of the subject. The books are intended to provide the reader with a clear introduction to a major topic in history. They provide both a narrative of events and a critical analysis of contemporary interpretations. They include the kinds of tools generally omitted from specialist monographs: a chronology of events, a glossary of terms and brief biographies of ‘who’s who’. They also include bibliographical essays in order to guide students to the literature on various aspects of the subject. Students and teachers alike will find that the selection of documents will stimulate the discussion and offer insight into the raw materials used by historians in their attempt to understand the past. Clive Emsley and Gordon Martel Series Editors

Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949 Fifth edition

Martin McCauley

Fifth edition published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Martin McCauley The right of Martin McCauley to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Longman Publishing Group 1983 Fourth edition published by Routledge 2016 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: McCauley, Martin, author. Title: Origins of the Cold War 1941-1949 / Martin McCauley. Description: Fifth edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, [2021] | Series: Seminar studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021001010 (print) | LCCN 2021001011 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367858360 (paperback) | ISBN 9780367858384 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003015338 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Europe–Foreign relations–1918-1945. | Europe–Foreign relations–1945- | United States–Foreign relations–Soviet Union. | Soviet Union–Foreign relations–United States. | World War, 1939-1945–Diplomatic history. | World War, 1939-1945–Influence. | Cold War. Classification: LCC D727 .M38 2021 (print) | LCC D727 (ebook) | DDC 327.4009/044–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021001010 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021001011 ISBN: 978-0-367-85838-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-85836-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-01533-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338 Typeset in Sabon by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

List of illustrations Preface Chronology Who’s who Maps

xi xii xiv xxiii xxix

PART I

The background 1 The background Socialism before 1917 3 Rus to Russia 4 The United States of America before 1914 5 Europe 5 The United States of America after 1914 6 Russia 6 President Woodrow Wilson 7 The Marxists 7 The October Revolution and Lenin’s Revolution from above 8 The impact of the October Revolution on Europe and the rest of the world 8 Stalin emerges as the leader, then autocrat and then despot 10 The United States and the Soviet Union before 1941 11 The United Kingdom’s relations with the Soviet Union 15 Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s 18 Was there an alternative to the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact? 25 Operation Barbarossa (Red Beard), 22 June 1941 33

1 3

viii

Contents

PART II

Descriptive analysis 2 Conflict

39 41

The Second Front 41 Poland 48 3 Operation Unthinkable and Operation Pincher: World War III?

52

Could the Soviet Union have occupied Western and Southern Europe in 1945? 61 4 Atomic diplomacy

63

5 Eastern Europe

69

Poland 72 Hungary 74 East Germany (German Democratic Republic) 76 Czechoslovakia 81 Romania 86 Bulgaria 88 Yugoslavia 92 Albania 94 British policy in the Balkans 96 Greece 100 US policy in the region 103 6 The Middle East

105

Turkey 105 Iran 116 7 East Asia and Indo-China

125

China 125 Korea 135 Vietnam 140 Laos 143 Malaya 145 8 Bretton Woods, the IMF and the World Bank US capital for the Soviet Union? 148

147

Contents 9 Conflict over Germany and the Soviet Union in a new light

ix 150

The Soviet Union in a new light 151 10 Decisions which led to division

155

Containment 155 11 The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

159

12 The Soviet response

163

The Cominform 164 Tito expelled 165 The Berlin Blockade 166 13 Espionage

170

Political 170 Military and industrial 177 14 Culture wars

180

Hollywood and the fear of the Reds 182 Germany East and West 185 Propaganda 188 Enticing the US into war with Germany 191 Churchill, Korda and the power of Hollywood 196 15 Who was responsible for the Cold War?

198

The orthodox or traditional view 198 The revisionist view 200 The post-revisionist interpretation 201 Post 1991 205 16 The United Nations and the concept of collective security The Iran crisis 209 The Palestinian crisis 209 The Berlin Blockade 209

208

x

Contents

PART III

Assessment

211

17 Was it all inevitable?

213

PART IV

Documents Further reading References Index

223 261 267 271

Illustrations

Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 3.1 12.1 14.1

George F. Kennan in 1947 Franklin D. Roosevelt Winston Churchill in 1941 Joseph Stalin, c.1942 General George Marshall in 1944 Ernest Bevin An American aircraft drops food and supplies near a crowd of Berliners during the blockade of Berlin. Hedy Lamarr, c. 1942

12 13 19 42 45 58 167 184

Maps 1 2

Soviet territorial gains in Europe 1939–49 Europe 1945–8

xxvii xxviii

Preface

The era of the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union is gone and been replaced by another superpower contest between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. A conflict between a rising power and an established power can result in war but the American–Soviet confrontation did not – mainly due to the skill both sides exhibited in managing their nuclear arsenals. There were many narrow escapes and the world was spared a nuclear war. Soviet Marxism failed due to its inability to satisfy the desire of the population for higher living standards and the failure to permit the population to achieve its full potential due to initiative and innovation being restricted. The arms race devoured too much of the Gross National Product and attempts to introduce some market or capitalist reforms in a planned economy failed. The period under study, 1941–49, saw the Soviet Union secure a leading role in the world, backed by the most powerful military machine. No country on earth could have defeated the Soviet Army – providing only conventional (non-nuclear weapons) were deployed. The Great Fatherland War (for western and eastern Europe, World War II started on 1 September 1939; for the US it started on 7 December 1941 but for the Soviet Union it started on 22 June 1941 and is always referred to as the Great Fatherland War in Russian) was not a war of conquest but a Vernichtungkrieg (war of extermination) as Germany sought to destroy the Soviet Union. The Soviets were aware that if they lost, they would cease to be a state and a nation. Victory, they believed, granted them the moral right to ensure that they would never again be attacked in the west. Stalin was a Marxist imperialist, but also an Imperial Russian imperialist, attempting to take over neighbours such as Turkey and Iran, against which Imperial Russia had waged many wars. He practised the old adage: the more territory one occupies the more secure one becomes. Hence security was his primary objective, first and foremost his personal security, followed by Soviet national security. These are the seeds which gave rise to the Cold War and this study traces the attempts of the two superpowers to find a common language which would ensure peace between them, but they failed because of competing ideologies: communism and capitalism. The People’s Republic of China is a hybrid: politically Marxist but economically capitalist – as is Vietnam – and, at present, the competition between the US and the Middle Kingdom is economic, and as long as it remains so the

Preface

xiii

danger of war is minimal. In 1945, the United States overestimated its own power and underestimated Soviet power. At present, Washington does not underestimate Chinese power and must respect it and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the period under review. There are other lessons from our study: understand your adversary and attempt to see the world as they do, and arrive at a compromise which ensures that neither side loses face. Martin McCauley November 2020

Chronology

1939 23 August

Molotov and von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, sign in Moscow the German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, having already signed a trade and credit agreement (19 August). In a secret protocol the two sides divide up East-central Europe. The Soviet Union acquires Finland, the Baltic States (except Lithuania), eastern Poland and Bessarabia. On 28 September 1939 another agreement gave Moscow Lithuania. (The existence of this secret protocol was denied by Moscow until the late Gorbachev era.) 1 September Germany attacks Poland and penetrates up to the line agreed in the secret protocol and the Second World War begins. 3 September Britain and France declare war on Germany. 17 September Soviet troops begin their march into eastern Poland (as agreed by the secret protocol). Lvov falls to them on 21–22 September. 28 September Molotov and von Ribbentrop sign in Moscow a new German–Soviet border and friendship treaty which lays down a new demarcation line on Bug, on the river Vistula. Lithuania becomes part of the Soviet zone of influence. 30 November–12 The Soviet–Finnish (or Winter) war begins with an air raid March 1940 over Helsinki and the march of Soviet troops into Karelia. A Finnish People’s Government, composed of Finnish émigré communists, headed by Otto Kuusinen, is announced by Molotov. Had Finland fallen, this government would have taken over the country. 14 December The League of Nations rules that the Soviet Union was the aggressor in the war with Finland and excludes it from the League.

Chronology

xv

1940 11–12 March

Finland concedes Soviet demands at peace negotiations in Moscow. Finland gives up Vyborg and a part of Karelia. Hangö is rented as a military base to the Soviet Union for 30 years. 26 June The Soviet government demands that Romania secede Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to it. When Romania does not concur, Red Army units occupy both regions on 28 June. 21 July Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, commander-in-chief of the army, is ordered by Hitler to begin preparing for war against the Soviet Union. Hitler envisages a five-month campaign in the spring of 1941. 12–13 November Molotov arrives in Berlin for negotiations concerning the division of the world. Moscow wants Finland, Romania and Bulgaria. 18 December Hitler signs instruction no. 21, Operation Barbarossa, which envisages all preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union to be finished by 15 May 1941. 1941 11 March 13 April

30 April 22 June

23 June

26 June 27 June 30 June 3 July

The United States begins Lend-Lease economic and military aid to Britain (to the USSR on 7 November). The Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Matsuoka, returning to Tokyo, breaks his journey in Moscow (8 April) and signs a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union which recognises existing territory and borders and in the case of war with third parties the signatories will remain neutral. Japan also recognises the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Operation Barbarossa is postponed from 15 May to 22 June. German units attack the Soviet Union across a broad front without a declaration of war. Churchill offers Stalin help as does Roosevelt (23 June); Molotov, not Stalin, announces to the Soviet people that Germany has invaded. Hungary breaks off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Slovakia declares war on Moscow and provides Germany with two divisions. Finland declares war on the Soviet Union. Hungary declares war on the Soviet Union. The State Committee for Defence (GKO) is set up and Stalin becomes its head (1 July). Stalin, in a radio broadcast, proclaims the Great Patriotic (Fatherland) War and orders that no territory shall be conceded to the enemy.

xvi

Chronology

12 July

Great Britain and the Soviet Union sign an agreement on mutual aid against Germany. Unilateral peace negotiations or armistices are ruled out. 29 July–1 August Roosevelt sends Harry Hopkins to Moscow to assess the political and military situation in the Soviet Union. August–September British and Soviet forces occupy Iran, required by the western Allies as a supply route to the Soviet Union. 11 August After meeting at sea off the coast of Newfoundland, Roosevelt and Churchill agree on the Atlantic Charter, promising the restoration of independence to occupied states. 30 September–20 Battle for Moscow; Hitler calls it Operation Typhoon and it April 1942 is code-named Moscow Cannae (the battle of 216 BC in southeastern Italy where the Roman legions were destroyed by Hannibal). The German offensive comes to a stop in December and on 5 December a Soviet counter-offensive forces the Germans back. 7 December Japanese forces attack Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, bringing the US into the war. 15–18 December Anthony Eden (later Lord Avon) visits Moscow to meet Stalin and is informed that the Soviet Union wishes to retain its territorial gains of 1939–40. 1942 1 January

11 April 26 May 29 May–1 June

11 June

12–15 August

12 December

In Washington, 26 states, including the Soviet Union, sign the United Nations Pact (also called the Washington Pact), which recognises the Atlantic Charter as the joint programme of objectives and principles. Roosevelt cables Stalin that the Americans are planning an offensive to relieve the Russians. In London, Molotov signs an Anglo–Soviet alliance and friendship treaty for 20 years. Molotov holds talks in Washington on a second front in western Europe (Britain had already agreed to this on 26 May) and economic aid. The foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States sign, in Washington, a treaty on the principles of mutual aid in the struggle against German aggression and on cooperation in the post-war world. Churchill and Averell Harriman, for Roosevelt, hold talks in Moscow with Stalin on measures against Germany and its allies. Soviet–Czechoslovak alliance signed in Moscow, indicating desire of Czechoslovaks to collaborate with the Russians after the war.

Chronology 1943 31 January–2 February

14 April

25 April

6 May

15 May

19–30 October

28 November–1 December

1944 6 June 1–22 July

21 July

xvii

The southern part of the German army at Stalingrad surrenders on 31 January (Field Marshal Paulus) and the northern part on 2 February (General Strecker). The Russians lose 1.1 million men and the Germans 800,000. Stalin’s son, Yakov, a prisoner-of-war in the German Sachsenhausen concentration camp, deliberately seeks death by entering a prohibited zone and is shot dead. (The Germans apparently offered to exchange him for Field Marshal Paulus but Stalin refused.) The Soviet Union breaks diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile over the latter’s demand for an international inquiry into the Katyn affair. The communist Union of Polish Patriots (a forerunner of the Lublin committee), set up on 1 March but only reported on 8 May, requests that Stalin permit the establishment of a Polish division in the Soviet Union to be called the Tadeusz Kosciusko division. Stalin grants permission on 9 May. Stalin dissolves the Cominform to demonstrate that the Soviet Union has no expansionary aims; the functions of the Cominform are taken over by the central committee secretariat and a department of international affairs is set up. Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. Molotov, Eden and Cordell Hull (United States) agree, inter alia, that Austria be reconstituted in its 1937 frontiers and that East Prussia be removed from Germany. At Tehran Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt agree, in principle, on the partition of Germany. The Curzon line is to be the Polish–Soviet frontier. Stalin requests Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia.

D-Day landing of Allied troops in Normandy, code-named Operation Overlord. Bretton Woods conference of 44 states on finance and economic affairs after the war. It agrees to establish the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be concerned with macroeconomic problems such as currency rates and fiscal and monetary policy, and to set up the World Bank to be concerned with micro-economic affairs such as funding of capital projects. The Soviet Union declines to join. The Polish Committee for National Liberation is set up in Cholm after its liberation by Soviet troops. It then moves to Lublin on 25 July (the Lublin committee).

xviii

Chronology

26 July

1 August–10 October 23 August 4 September 5 September 8–9 September

12 September

19 September

7 October

9–18 October

10 December

1945 1 January

20 January 4–11 February

A treaty of friendship and alliance is signed by the Soviet government and the Lublin committee in Moscow. Diplomatic relations are established on 2 September. Warsaw uprising, led by General Bor-Komorowski. Soviet troops refuse to come to their aid and the Poles surrender on 10 October. Romania changes sides and declares war on Germany. Finnish troops cease hostilities and a Finnish delegation is sent on 6 September to Moscow to negotiate a peace treaty. The Soviet Union declares war on Bulgaria and invades it on 8 September. Coup d’état in Bulgaria by the communists and officers to establish a democratic government of the patriotic front, led by Georgiev (pro-Soviet). Moscow declares the war over on 9 September. London protocol, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, on future occupation zones in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin. A ceasefire is agreed by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and Finland in Moscow. Finland is to withdraw to the 1940 frontiers. It concedes Petsamo to the Soviet Union and has to pay reparations. At Dumbarton Oaks, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China agree to establish the United Nations (and a draft UN charter) as the successor organisation to the League of Nations. Stalin and Churchill meet in Moscow and negotiate on a post-war settlement, especially on eastern Europe. Stalin agrees in principle to Churchill’s ‘percentages’ deal, apportioning zones of influence in the Balkans. General de Gaulle signs a Soviet–French alliance treaty against Germany for 20 years. De Gaulle declines to recognise the Lublin committee and Stalin declines to recognise the separation of the Rhineland and Ruhr from Germany. The Lublin committee is renamed the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Government establishes diplomatic relations with it on 5 January. The United States and Britain refuse to recognise it. Hungary, a German ally, signs an armistice with the Soviet Union. Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt discuss future military operations and the post-war world at Yalta.

Chronology 3 March

xix

Under Soviet pressure Finland declares war on Germany (effective from 19 September 1944). 11 April Soviet–Yugoslav treaty of mutual assistance signed. Similar treaties are signed with the other east and southeast European states. 12 April Roosevelt dies and Vice President Harry Truman becomes president. 23 April President Truman warns Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, in a brusque fashion, that Moscow must keep to the Yalta agreements. Molotov ripostes that he has never been spoken to in this manner in his life. 25 April Soviet and US troops meet on Torgau, on the Elbe. 2 May Berlin capitulates to the Red Army. 7 May The general capitulation of the Wehrmacht is signed by Colonel General Jodl at the headquarters of General Eisenhower in Reims, France. It is to be effective at 0.10 on 9 May. 8 May General Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral von Friedeburg and Colonel General Stumpff sign the unconditional surrender of German forces at the Soviet headquarters at Berlin Karlshorst. The document is dated 8 May but it is signed at 0.16 on 9 May. 12 May Churchill uses the term ‘Iron Curtain’ for the first time, in a telegram to President Truman. 24 May At a victory reception in the Georgevsky Hall in the Kremlin for over a thousand officers, Stalin lauds the Russian nation and places it above all other nations in the Soviet Union. 26 June In San Francisco, the charter of the United Nations is signed by 50 states. 4 July An Allied Commission for Austria is agreed by the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France. 16 July The US tests successfully the first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico. 17 July–2 August The United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain agree on the political and economic goals of their occupation policy in Germany at the Potsdam conference. 6 August The United States drops an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. 8 August The Soviet Union declares war on Japan. 9 August The United States drops an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. 14 August The Soviet Union and China (Chiang Kai-shek) sign a treaty of friendship and alliance which confirms Soviet use of Port Arthur and Dairen, the confirmation of the status quo in the Mongolian People’s Republic and Soviet influence in

xx

Chronology

15 August 21 August 23 August 2 September 11 September–2 October

24 October 16–26 December

29 December 1946 22 January

northern Manchuria. The Chinese Eastern Railway, sold to the government of Manchukuo in 1935, reverts to joint Soviet–Chinese administration. Japan surrenders on the understanding that Hirohito will remain emperor. Japanese troops capitulate to the Red Army, including over 600,000 prisoners. The United States ends the Lend-Lease programme. Japan surrenders to the Allies on board USS Missouri (V-J Day). London conference of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France and China finds agreement difficult. Discussions on peace treaties for defeated states and reparations for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, Belorussia and Ukraine join the UN as founding members. Foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow sets up a Far East Commission and Molotov and Byrnes (US) discuss the withdrawal of Soviet troops from China and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of China. On Korea, Molotov proposes a Soviet–American commission to unite the two parts of Korea, politically and economically. The commission adjourns in May 1946 without achieving anything. Soviet–French trade treaty but little agreement on compensation for French property in Soviet-occupied regions.

Carpatho-Ukraine is separated from Czechoslovakia and becomes the Transcarpathian oblast, in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 25 February The Red Army is renamed the Soviet Army. 5 March Churchill’s speech at Fulton, Missouri, speaks of an ‘Iron Curtain’ descending in Europe from Stettin (Szczecin) in the north to Trieste in the south. He calls for an Anglo–American alliance. Stalin sharply criticises the speech on 13 March. 15 March USSR Sovnarkom becomes the USSR Council of Ministers. People’s Commissariats are renamed Ministries. 25 April–15 May; The second conference of the four powers (the USSR, the 15 June–12 July United States, Great Britain and France) discusses European security and Germany, the Trieste problem and a peace treaty with Austria.

Chronology 4 November– 12 December

xxi

At the third conference of foreign ministers, Molotov refuses to accept proposals on Germany and Austria.

1947 10 February

The foreign ministers of the victorious powers sign peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. 10 March–24 Molotov, at the fourth foreign ministers’ conference, in April Moscow, rejects Western proposals for a federal Germany and also the Marshall Plan. Reparations are agreed at $20 billion, with the Soviet Union receiving half. 12 March President Truman proclaims the Truman Doctrine which promises US help to countries threatened by communism. 5 June General George Marshall, US secretary of state, announces the Marshall Plan, the European recovery programme. 27 June–1 July At the foreign ministers’ conference in Paris, Molotov rejects the supranational organisation necessary to implement the Marshall Plan. 22–27 September An information bureau of communist and workers’ parties (Cominform) is set up in Szklarska Poreba, Poland, by communist and workers’ parties from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and Yugoslavia (until 1948). Its headquarters are in Belgrade, and in Bucharest from 1948. 25 November–16 Council of Foreign Ministers meets in London but again December fails to make progress on German and Austrian peace treaties. The United States, Britain and France begin considering the establishment of a West German state. 1948 19–25 February 23 February

20 March 2 April 6 April 23 June

The communists take power in Czechoslovakia. The United States, Britain and France begin discussions in London to establish the future Federal Republic of Germany. The Allied Control Commission in Berlin is paralysed by the withdrawal of Marshal Sokolovsky. The US Congress approves Marshall Aid and an economic cooperation administration is set up to run it. In Moscow, a treaty of friendship and mutual aid for ten years is signed by Finland and the Soviet Union. After the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in the Western zones of Germany and West Berlin (20 June), a currency reform is also announced for the Soviet occupied zone and all Berlin. The Western Allies refuse to accept the Soviet reform, and the Soviet military administration (SMAD) then

xxii

Chronology

24 June–12 May 1949 28 June

1949 25 January 4 April 4 May 23 May–20 June

25 September 1 October

1–2 October 7 October

blockades completely the three Western sectors of Berlin (the Berlin Blockade). Berlin Blockade: all land and waterways to West Berlin and East Germany are blocked. Berlin is supplied by air lift from 26 June 1948 to 29 June 1949. The Communist party of Yugoslavia is expelled from the Cominform at a conference in Bucharest and Cominform’s headquarters are moved to Bucharest. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA) is set up by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. NATO is set up in Washington. Four-power agreement in New York on the ending of the Berlin Blockade to be effective on 12 May. Foreign ministers’ conference in Paris fails to reach agreement as the Soviet Union rejects the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) announced for the three Western zones on 23 May. Tass reports on the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Soviet note on the German question. The Western powers are held solely responsible for the division of Germany after the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany on 20 September 1949. The Soviet Union is the first state to recognise the People’s Republic of China. The German Democratic Republic (DDR) is established.

Who’s who

Acheson, Dean (1893–1971): A dapper lawyer, he was a major influence in shaping US policy during the early Cold War era. His memoirs were appropriately entitled Present at the Creation. His acerbic tongue made him enemies. As assistant secretary of state in 1941 he helped with Lend-Lease and was head of the state department delegation to the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. He changed his views on Stalin after the latter consolidated his hold on Eastern Europe and supported Kennan’s containment policy. As such he was one of the architects of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO. He was secretary of state from 1949 until January 1953. He was a particular target of Joseph McCarthy and was attacked for ‘losing’ China. McCarthy dubbed him a ‘pompous diplomat in striped pants’. Attlee, Clement (1883–1967): Took over from Churchill at Potsdam after the sweeping victory of the Labour party, in July 1945. Dry, unemotional and an academic socialist, Attlee was the antithesis of the mercurial, bon-vivant Churchill. He left dealing with Stalin to Ernest Bevin, his Foreign Secretary. Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953): Political gangster who was kind to his family. A fellow Georgian, he was Stalin’s butcher in the Caucasus and succeeded Ezhov in 1939. He headed the Soviet atomic programme. He lost out to Khrushchev and others after Stalin’s death and was executed. Bevin, Ernest (1881–1951): Trade union leader who had to devote much time to outmanoeuvring communists. This gave him a natural aversion to Molotov and the Soviet communists. He strongly supported the US presence in Europe as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. His other main concern was promoting de-colonisation and consigning the British Empire to the past. Byrnes, James F. (1879–1972): Important politician during the war and a Supreme Court judge. He stood down in favour of Truman as vice president in January 1945. Truman made him his secretary of state and he was a strong defender of US interests. Churchill, Winston Spencer (1874–1965): Great wartime British prime minister who was a master of the spoken word but always played second fiddle to the

xxiv

Who’s who

Americans. He was also aware that the Red Army was the strongest in Europe. His friendship with Roosevelt was very important for the war effort. Stalin and Churchill respected one another but the Soviet dictator won on points. One has to bear in mind that Churchill often had a weak hand to play. He began at Potsdam but was replaced by Clement Attlee, his wartime deputy prime minister, and leader of the Labour party, which won a landslide victory at the 1945 general election. Clay, General Lucius (1898–1978): He will always be remembered in Berlin and Germany as the architect of the Berlin airlift during the Blockade. He was General Eisenhower’s deputy in 1945 and became deputy military governor of Germany in 1946. From 1947 to1949 he was Commander-in-Chief of US forces in Europe and military governor of the US zone. He retired in May 1949 shortly after the Blockade ended. He made controversial decisions commuting death sentences of Nazis in order to improve relations with the German population. James Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech in September 1946 owed much to Clay’s input. Clay argued against the Morgenthau plan to pastoralise Germany and instead proposed the economic development of the Western zones. He never regarded the Soviets as a military threat and wanted tanks to breach the barriers on the autobahn to Berlin. de Gaulle, General Charles (1890–1970): After France’s defeat in 1940, he moved to London to head the Free French resistance and returned in 1944. He was head of the Provisional Government of the Fourth Republic from 1944 to 1946 and ran a dirigiste economy which involved state control of much of the capitalist economy. He resigned in frustration at the factionalism of French politics. Eden, Anthony (Lord Avon) (1897–1977): Churchill’s foreign secretary during most of the war. He was a man of principle who often found negotiations with the Russians difficult. He agreed a 20-year Anglo–Soviet alliance, in 1942. He was against making concessions to Stalin in Eastern Europe. Churchill regarded him as his natural successor. Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich (1909–89): Grim Grom (he always looked as if he had toothache) and Mr Nyet (No), Gromyko learnt his craft under Stalin. He was ambassador in Washington in 1943 and was present at Yalta and Potsdam. He headed the Soviet mission to the UN, 1946–8, and then became a deputy foreign minister. He had the best command of Russian among Soviet leaders and never revealed his acute sense of humour in public (Stalin liked his representatives to be serious). Harriman, Averell (1891–1986): A leading figure in American society and politics for several decades. He was close to the Roosevelt family and was appointed special envoy to Europe in 1941 and worked on Lend Lease. He was in Moscow in 1942 to talk to Stalin and was ambassador between October 1943 and January 1946. He served as ambassador to the Court of St

Who’s who

xxv

James from April 1946 to October 1946. Recalled to Washington by Truman, he became secretary of commerce until April 1948. He moved effortlessly from post to post and became a hardliner in dealing with Stalin. Kennan, George F. (1904–2005): Best known for the containment policy; he became well known to the general public after his Mr X article. A fluent Russian speaker who also commanded other languages such as German, he served in Riga, Latvia and then moved to Moscow when diplomatic relations began. He was there during the purges and saw many of his contacts murdered. He did not regard the Soviet Union as a military but as a political threat. His Long Telegram led to his recall to Washington by James Forrester, the Secretary of the Navy who favoured a more confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union. Kennan always claimed that his Mr X article was misunderstood. He advocated the withdrawal of US forces from Europe in a bid to allay Stalin’s suspicions about US intentions in Eastern Europe. Truman and Acheson dismissed this proposal and concentrated on limiting Soviet expansion. He lamented the fact that the US chose the military option in dealing with Moscow. Even in 1948 he thought that Stalin was amenable to a deal. Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971): Rumbustious, intelligent but uneducated party official who was entranced by Stalin. The spell was only broken after Stalin’s death and he demolished his reputation in 1956. Khrushchev was party leader in Ukraine and Moscow and enthusiastically participated in the purges. Kim II Sung (1912–94): Supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) from 1948 to his death. He thought that he could take over the whole of Korea but Stalin held him back until 1950. Saved by the Chinese military intervention from total defeat. Lenin, Vladimir Ilich (1870–1924): One of the great political actors of the twentieth century in world politics. Inspired by the Enlightenment vision of a just, harmonious society, he brooked no opposition in his quest for revolution. Stalin was a key aide in 1917 and afterwards Lenin tried to smooth the acrimonious relationship between Stalin and Trotsky. In his Testament he warned the party against Stalin’s inclination to abuse power. Stalin’s associates rallied to his cause after Lenin’s death and Trotsky fluffed his lines. Stalin never looked back and repaid his opponents with death. Maisky, Ivan Mikhailovich (1884–1975): ‘Pussy Face’ Maisky was a very popular Soviet ambassador to the Court of St James, 1932–43. His main task in London was to press for a second front. He then became a deputy foreign minister. He was present at Yalta and Potsdam. Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich (1902–88): Skilled administrator, he played a key role during the war as a member of GKO. He was elected to the Politburo in 1946 and was also deputy prime minister. Stalin poked fun at his excess flab.

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Mao Zedong (1893–1976): One of the great political figures of the 20th century who led the Communist Party of China to power on 1 October 1949. Called the Great Helmsman, he developed Marxism-Leninism into Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. His revolution was based on the peasantry and the Red Army (later People’s Army or PLA). Stalin was sceptical about his Marxism and not keen to provide military aid until Mao was in the ascendancy against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. His requests to visit Moscow were turned down until he arrived in December 1949 to negotiate the Sino– Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Marshall, General George (1880–1959): Appointed chief of staff of the US Army at the outbreak of war, in 1939, and only had 200,000 men. He was made chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee after Pearl Harbor to advise the President on strategy, a post he held throughout the war. The President kept him in Washington because he was so valuable to him. He accompanied Roosevelt to most international conferences. He became secretary of the state under Truman and drafted the Marshall Plan. He was almost unknowable (President Truman was not permitted to address him as George) but had a fine, impartial mind. Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich (1890–1986): Ever faithful to Stalin, ‘bootface’ Molotov played a major role in foreign affairs and was greatly disliked in the West. His memoirs are somewhat disappointing and reveal little of Stalin’s real thinking. He found the Khrushchev era soft because it was not Bolshevik enough, meaning not enough coercion was being used to mould the new society. Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano (1882–1945): Roosevelt had been president for nine years before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. He had concentrated mainly on leading the US out of recession (the New Deal). He was aware that Americans were opposed to involvement in the European war, 1939–41, but felt that it was in the US strategic interest that Britain and the Allies be saved from defeat. Lend-Lease was the result. He shared many of the war aims of Winston Churchill. The first fruit of this friendship was the Atlantic Charter. Despite the war in the Pacific he thought that Germany should be defeated first and Britain protected from defeat at all costs. Roosevelt, crippled by polio, appeared unfit to be a war leader but his fine intellect and resolve saw him through. He thought he understood Stalin but died before the war ended, leaving the difficult task of dealing with the Soviet leader to his successor, Harry Truman. Stalin, Iosef Vissarionovich (1878–1953): Brilliant but flawed politician who was one of the most important leaders of the twentieth century. He revealed matchless skill at political tactics and had a superb memory. He never forgot a slight. He relentlessly pursued the goal of making Soviet society socialist and the Soviet Union the leading country in the world. Although a Georgian he became an assimilated Great Russian and remorselessly suppressed non-

Who’s who

xxvii

Russian nationalism. He was willing to sacrifice anyone in the pursuit of moral-political unity (a harmonious society). Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980): The architect of the post-war Yugoslav state which crumbled after his death. He was the youngest sergeant-major in the Austro-Hungarian army but was captured by the Russians. He participated in the Bolshevik October Revolution and returned to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia a communist. Led the Partisans during the war and became the dominant politician after the war. A natty dresser, he made himself a marshal and was an authoritarian leader who manged to subdue nationalism in the various Yugoslav republics. Although an admirer of Stalin, he wanted to develop his own national communism. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in June 1948 and survived thanks, in part, to American aid. Truman, President Harry S. (1884–1972): Senator from Missouri at the outbreak of the Second World War and saved the country millions of dollars with astute management of the defence programme. He was made vice president in January 1945 but was not drawn into decision making, even though Roosevelt knew he was dying. He continued Roosevelt’s policies towards the Soviet Union but spoke bluntly to Molotov. He sought an understanding with Stalin but is seen as a Cold War president, giving his name to the Truman Doctrine, which promised aid to all countries under threat from communism. Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuarevich (1883–1954): Venomous, merciless state prosecutor who gained worldwide notoriety for his courtroom behaviour during the great show trials. A former Menshevik, he always had to prove his loyalty to Stalin. He came out with the famous line, in closing for the prosecution during the first great show trial: ‘I demand that these mad dogs be shot, every last one of them!’. He was deputy commissar for foreign affairs, 1940, and deputy chair of Sovnarkom, 1939–44. In 1949, he replaced Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs (he was reputed to have reported to Stalin over Molotov’s head) and was permanent Soviet representative at the United Nations. He turned his venom on the United States, especially during the Korean War, 1950–3. In a memorable phrase, Leonard Schapiro described him as the nearest thing to a human rat he had ever seen! Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich (1896–1948): Guardian of Stalinist cultural orthodoxy, from socialist realism to the xenophobia of the late 1940s, known as the Zhdanovshchina, he became a member of the Politburo in 1939. In 1934, he laid down the rules for writers: socialist realism; all published work was to be didactic and optimistic. He led the defence of Leningrad, 1941–4. The leading light at the founding of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) at Szklarska Poreba, Poland, in September 1947. He died suddenly in 1948, probably naturally – he was a heavy drinker. Malenkov and Beria seized the opportunity to settle scores with the Leningrad leadership in

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what became known as the Leningrad Affair. This resulted in many officials being executed and many hundreds being dismissed. Zhukov, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich (1896–1974): Most prominent and successful Red Army commander during the Great Fatherland War. He defeated the Japanese at Khaikin-Gol, Mongolia, 1939. He was made Chief of the General Staff and deputy commissar for defence, January–July 1941. In October 1941, he replaced Voroshilov as commander of the northern sector and was personally responsible for the defence of Leningrad. He then moved to Moscow and became commander-in-chief of the entire western front. He was responsible for the defence of Stalingrad. He participated in the battle of Kursk and became commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, November 1944. His troops reached Berlin in April 1945. He then became commander of Soviet occupation forces in Germany. Stalin was wary of his popularity and in April 1946 demoted him to commander of the Odessa military district. After Stalin’s death, he returned to Moscow as deputy USSR minister of defence. A brilliant but rude and abrasive man, he was undoubtedly the leading military man of his generation.

Maps

Map 1 Soviet territorial gains in Europe 1939–49 Source: Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949, 4th edition, xxvii.

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Maps

Map 2 Europe 1945–8 Source: Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949, 4th edition, xxviii.

Part I

The background

1

The background

Socialism before 1917 The Industrial Revolution first appeared in Great Britain in the second half of the 18th century and had matured by the 1840s. It was spread to France and Germany in the first half of the 19th century and afterwards to the United States and other parts of the world by immigrants from Europe. Russia came late to industrialisation, in the 1880s, meeting fierce resistance from those who favoured a traditional society based on the rural commune. One of the most powerful objections was it greatly expanded inequality in society. The economic base which promoted industrialisation was called capitalism. It transformed society by drawing peasants from the countryside to become labourers and skilled workers in towns, and it broke down barriers between regions and nationalities and eventually attracted immigrants from abroad. In The Communist Manifesto, published in February 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels regarded capitalism as a positive phenomenon, a necessary stage in the evolution of human society. Primitive capitalism would morph into developed capitalism not only in the rest of Europe but eventually the whole world. The capitalist, in order to prosper and expand would pay labour less than the value of the goods it produced. Hence labour was exploited, and wages were kept low by a constant influx of labour from the countryside and abroad. There were two classes: the entrepreneurs or industrialists, called capitalists, and workers. Workers, collectively the proletariat or those who sell their labour for money, produced the wealth of the country but reaped meagre rewards. As the domestic market was too small to consume all the goods produced, foreign markets had to be found and they were also a source of vital raw materials. The need to secure these markets led to the expansion of imperialism and colonialism. Hence capitalism, by its very nature, is imperialist, defined as occupying foreign territories for the benefit of the home country. Cut throat competition among capitalists led to some accumulating great wealth and, in turn, political influence. Marx saw developed capitalism as state monopoly capitalism where the barons of industry run the state in their own interests, and he predicted that in doing so they were digging their own graves. Marx saw capitalism developing to a point where there would be a small number of huge enterprises, a mass army of the unemployed, and the internal DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-2

4

The background

contradictions of capitalism (the need to force down wages, thus reducing the purchasing power of the population and the imperative to find more foreign markets) would permit the proletariat eventually to strike and take power, consigning capitalists to the rubbish bin of history. Workers would take over factories and land and run them in the interests, not of the few, but of everyone. The new society would be socialist where the means of production, distribution and exchange would be run by the proletariat. All private property would become communal property and there would be no need for a police or military force. Crime was viewed as originating in private property and with the elimination of the latter crime would fade away. There would be no need for government as all communities would be self-administered. All a person’s needs would be met, social justice would prevail and there would be no discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnic identity or ability. Everybody would eventually become equal. It would be paradise on earth. The above would be the second or higher stage of development: the first, or lower stage, being socialism where everyone would be rewarded according to their contribution to society. It follows there would be inequality under socialism. As the economy expanded, the higher stage would follow. No wonder the above vision was wildly popular the more exploited, down trodden and miserable one felt. It was like a Hollywood movie come true. Those on the margins of society could look forward to becoming a member of the elite. And, into the bargain, it was international, one big, harmonious, happy family. Middle-class rebels could also join and saw themselves as qualified to lead the proletariat to the Promised Land. Socialism had its origins in the French Revolution, and the first socialist experiment was the Paris Commune of 1871. It was put down in rivers of blood by the French state and such was the bloodletting that it was difficult to find a plumber in Paris afterwards. Baron Hausmann subsequently rebuilt Paris with very wide boulevards to ensure that barricades could not easily be built. The conclusion which Marx drew from the debacle was that it was a premature revolution because a class-conscious proletariat had not emerged but had cleared the path for a harsh bourgeois dictatorship to emerge, leaving the proletariat worse off than before. The first great downturn of capitalism occurred in Europe in the 1890s and led to two strands of socialism emerging. One, now called social democracy, accepted the capitalist state and sought to improve the life of workers within it. This was gradualism. The other advocated revolution and the overthrow of the bourgeois state and argued that the bourgeoisie (the capitalist class which owns most of society’s wealth and means of production) would never weaken its hold on the state unless it was wrestled violently from it and capitalism thereby abolished. These were later called communists.

Rus to Russia Rus’s first capital was Kiev but then the Mongol invasion forced the rulers and much of the population to move north; the Grand Principality of Moscow

The background

5

emerged as the strongest entity. What the Russians call the ‘Mongol-Tatar yoke’ lasted from 1240 to 1480 with the Prince repairing to the Mongol capital yearly to report on his administration, pay tribute and receive a yarlik to reign for another year. If the Great Khan did not like what he heard, the Prince did not return. Afterwards Muscovy was strong enough to expand, and Ivan IV was crowned in 1547, acquiring the title of Tsar, and the Tsardom of Russia was proclaimed. Russia eventually reached the Pacific Ocean and concluded its first treaty with China, the Treaty of Nerchinsk, in 1689, and moved into the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 19th century. It thus became an empire, holding sway over many different nationalities, and was the largest country in the world.

The United States of America before 1914 The United States expanded rapidly after securing independence from Great Britain in 1776, taking over territory previously held by France and Spain, and later bought Alaska from Russia. After its defeat in the Spanish–American war of 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines but a year later local forces tried to regain independence but were again defeated with the Americans losing over 4,000 men and the Filipinos five times that number. Over 200,000 civilians also died during the brutal conflict which ended in 1902. Thereby, America acquired a colonial empire that encompassed the former Spanish Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico and Cuba. Many Americans were unhappy that the United States was following in the footsteps of Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Russia and Japan, and engaging in imperialism and colonialism. One argument was that if the United States did not do so, other powers would take over. A more convincing argument was that it opened up opportunities for American business, and there was the view that the locals were incapable of ruling themselves, thus ignoring the fact that they had been ruling themselves for centuries.

Europe In Europe, before 1914, the way to resolve a conflict was to go to war. Germany became very concerned about the economic and military advance of Russia and Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, thought that if this continued for several years, Russia could not be defeated militarily. A war in the near future was therefore desirable but Russia must be seen as the aggressor. Russia made the mistake of mobilising first, in July 1914, and set in train events which led to the First World War. Some military commentators judge that if the war had started in 1917, Russia would not have been defeated. The Russian High Command even believed, in 1914, that Germany could be beaten, a catastrophic misjudgement. The tragedy was that Germany did not need to go to war to secure primacy in Europe as it was the leading scientific, technological and industrial power, not only in Europe but in the world. Was Russia a military threat to

6

The background

Germany in 1914? No. Russia had only intervened outside its borders in the past as a member of a military coalition – it occupied Berlin, in 1760, during the Seven Years’ War and Paris, in 1815, to defeat Napoleon. The outbreak of the First World War has been intensely studied as it appeared to be an ‘accidental’ war. Historians are frustrated by the fact that the most valuable German documents relating to the month of July 1914 were destroyed and it is therefore impossible to work out precisely why war broke out in August 1914.

The United States of America after 1914 In 1914, the United States was already a world power but was in two minds about how to exercise that power. Should it intervene abroad to promote the values of American life: democracy, free markets and the rule of law? In order for the US economy to expand foreign markets were needed. Would foreign countries welcome American investment and the new industrial technologies which were proving so successful at home? Would dynamic American capitalism not undermine the ruling elites in those countries? Surely, they would resist American encroachment and draw the US into military conflicts. Was the grand vision of a world full of states imitating the US worth the candle? The other view was that, as most of the ruling economic and political elites were of European origin, America should not become involved in the squabbles of a continent which the immigrants had gratefully left behind. Isolationism was the more sensible policy. The US should stand apart from other countries’ wars, wait for them to end and then benefit from the results, and it did not need to waste resources on a large land army as there was no threat in the north from Canada and the US could and indeed did intervene in Mexico to protect the nation’s interests. There was no need for a blue water navy as the Pacific and Atlantic oceans provided a cordon sanitaire.

Russia Russia, in 1914, was experiencing rapid economic growth and a flowering of culture which embraced literature, art, music and ballet. The first airplane appeared as did the first submarine, and French and German influence was growing. However, the Tsar and his ministers were not keeping pace with these rapid changes in the minds of the educated and less well educated. The Tsar still regarded himself as an autocratic ruler who, before God, was responsible for everything and everybody in the Russian empire. The 1905 revolution, which included defeat by Japan, had forced him to issue a Manifesto promising a parliament – a Duma – and some civil liberties. Afterwards his ministers gradually strangled the Duma and attempted to suppress dissent. No wonder there was a general feeling among educated society that an explosion was coming. The Russian Social Democratic and Labour Party was set up in Minsk, in 1898, the result of a merger of various Marxist organisations and the Jewish

The background

7

Bund, but it split, in 1903, into Bolsheviks (the majority faction) and Mensheviks (the minority). They fell out over who should be a member, with the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, maintaining that it should only be a party of professional activists and the Mensheviks taking the normal European social democratic view that anyone who supported the party manifesto could be a member. The Okhrana (secret police) ensured that most Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were forced abroad or incarcerated in Russia. Given that Russia was only just industrialising, the working class was very small.

President Woodrow Wilson When war broke out, President Wilson immediately sided with the Entente powers (led by Great Britain, France and Russia) against the Central Powers (headed by Germany and Austria-Hungary) (his family was descended from Ulster Protestants). He also believed the US had a mission to solve the problems of the world. However, most Americans had no desire to become embroiled in a European civil war, but Germany provided the pretext for US involvement by its attacks on Allied shipping crossing the Atlantic. Wilson thought that white Americans and West Europeans were best suited to solving the world’s problems and East Europeans, Russians, Latin Americans, Asians and Africans could be tutored and led to accept that his vision was not only in America’s interest but also in everyone else’s worldwide. The League of Nations, based in neutral Switzerland, would be the institution which would legitimise this vision. Koreans asked for a clause in the League’s charter to include the statement that all races were equal, but this was rejected. Wilson suffered a catastrophic blow when, in November 1919, a Republican dominated Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles which Wilson had played a key role in drafting and had signed. This meant that it rejected the League of Nations as well. Even more embarrassing for Wilson, the US declined to become a member on the basis that the Treaty infringed US sovereignty. In other words, America might be prevented from acting in its own national interest in the future. The refusal of the US to join fatally weakened the League because it never had the military power to enforce the implementation of its decisions. After the League had failed to counter Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, a diplomat, at a reception amid the sound of popping champagne corks, commented wryly: ‘Listen to the artillery of the League of Nations!’

The Marxists The war deepened the divide among Marxists with the moderate left – social democrats – reluctantly siding with their national governments but the radical left – Bolsheviks and others in Germany, France and Italy – condemning it as an ‘imperialist war, a war of capitalist domination of world markets and for the political domination of important colonies in the interests of industrial and financial capital’. These are the words of Karl Liebknecht who became, with

8

The background

Rosa Luxemburg, the founders of the KPD (Communist Party of Germany), in December 1918. The Mensheviks concluded that it was the lesser of two evils to defend the motherland against foreign aggression (called defensism) despite the fact that Russia had begun the war by attacking Germany in East Prussia and had suffered a humiliating defeat. Lenin believed that the defeat of Russia would result in the downfall of the tsarist autocracy and usher in a bourgeois revolution. This is what happened, in February 1917. One of those who enthusiastically welcomed it was President Wilson. Berlin provided the Bolsheviks with finance to promote their anti-war cause and helped Lenin to return to Petrograd (the new name of St Petersburg which sounded too German but was actually Dutch), in April 1917.

The October Revolution and Lenin’s Revolution from above The new Russian government decided to continue the war, but a disastrous June 1917 offensive discredited it and the Bolshevik slogan of peace, land and bread eventually swept them to power in the October Revolution. The moderate socialists and their allies foolishly left the Second Congress of Soviets (in which they had a majority) in protest against the Bolshevik use of violence to secure primacy. The grateful Bolsheviks passed a land decree which abolished private property and distributed the landed estates among the peasantry, and a peace decree which declared an end to the war, and formed a government. Civil war descended on the country in the summer of 1918 (the Bolsheviks were the Reds and their opponents the Whites) and lasted until 1920. Trotsky was the brilliant organiser of the Red Army and deployed brutal tactics to overcome the Whites. Stalin was even more violent than Trotsky as they competed for Lenin’s support. A cluster of countries, including Great Britain and the United States, intervened on the side of the Whites but to no avail.

The impact of the October Revolution on Europe and the rest of the world The Bolshevik Revolution terrified European ruling elites as the Bolsheviks preached violent revolution throughout Europe. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires had expired as well as the Russian empire. Gross Domestic Product had declined in France by about 40 per cent and in Germany by over 75 per cent. Lenin did not believe that the Bolsheviks could retain power in Russia unless there were socialist revolutions elsewhere in Europe, with the key country being Germany, and he expected Berlin to become the socialist capital of Europe. The German comrades would then help to industrialise Russia. The Polish defeat of the Red Army, dubbed the ‘miracle of the Vistula’, in 1920, during the Polish–Soviet war of 1919–21, halted the communist advance. Had the Red Army taken Poland, the door to Berlin would have been open. The Bolsheviks had called on Polish workers and peasants to join them, but the Poles viewed them as imperialist aggressors.

The background

9

Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were assassinated in January 1919 by Freikorps officers during a communist (Spartacus League) uprising, and this severely weakened the communists. Communists did seize power in Munich and proclaim the Bavarian Soviet Republic, in April 1919, but it was put down in blood the following month (Hitler sided with them but changed sides after their defeat) and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, set up in March 1919, was quashed by Romanian troops in August 1919. There were uprisings in Bremen, the Ruhr, Rhineland, Saxony, Hamburg and Thuringia but were quickly suppressed and it was only in 1923 that the spectre of communism faded away. Rosa Luxemburg had been a sharp critic of Lenin’s seizure of power which she saw not as a dictatorship of the proletariat but as a dictatorship of a political elite. This was an important point as Marx had warned against a premature revolution, meaning an attempt to seize power before a class-conscious proletariat had emerged, which could only occur in a heavily industrialised state. Lenin’s argument in October was that the Bolsheviks could seize power in Russia even though it was a predominantly agrarian state and socialism could be introduced from above by the Communist Party acting as the vanguard of the proletariat. Only the Bolshevik elite understood the iron laws of history and could lead the country forward to socialism and finally to communism. Without guidance, the proletariat would be seduced by bourgeois propaganda. People in devastated Europe tried to find a rational explanation for their misery and found solace in nationalism and blamed Jews, communists and other minorities for their plight. The Jews were exploiting the poor and thereby enriching themselves and the communists wanted to take all private property away and impose their dictatorship. This fear of one’s neighbour even crossed the Atlantic and there was a Red Scare in 1919–20 – The Communist Party of the USA was set up in May 1919 – with suspected radicals and communists arrested and deported for un-American activities. Strikes were blamed on Bolshevik influence and employers helped to smash them. Tribunes blamed all the ills facing America on the communists whose true loyalty, it was claimed, was to Soviet Russia. This fear of communism abated as the economy took off during the 1920s but reared its head again during the Great Depression. Why was there such a fear of communism in the most developed and successful economy in the world? It revealed that capitalism was fragile and the Great Depression, the worst economic crisis in US history, led many to think about an alternative form of economic activity. The man who saved capitalism was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who became president in 1933, when unemployment reached 25 per cent and the average household had seen a 40 per cent drop in its income between 1929 and 1932. His New Deal restructured the banking, energy and welfare systems and huge state funded projects boosted the economy. He used the state to strengthen capitalism and this led to the accusation that he was introducing socialism. Unemployment was still about 15 per cent in 1940, but the economy boomed between 1941 and 1945. Roosevelt was very impressed by Hitler’s plans for the revival of the German economy and invited him to the White House but the visit never materialised.

10

The background

Joseph Goebbels, minister of propaganda, commented: ‘I am very interested in developments in America. I believe that President Roosevelt has chosen the right path. We are dealing with the greatest social problems ever known’. America discriminated against Jews, African Americans and other minorities, and when a member of the Ministry of Propaganda visited Harvard in 1934 he was greeted with acclaim. The mood swiftly changed. Hitler now referred to America as a ‘half Judaised and Negrified society’ and Goebbels wrote that Roosevelt was not really running America. He was merely a mouthpiece for the ‘pious nonsense of the Jewish led plutocracy’. He had not been weakened by polio but by syphilis and was being sucked dry by Jews around him (Bodanis 2020: 232). The experience of the Soviet Union was in marked contrast to that of the US during the 1930s. Soviet propaganda exaggerated economic growth and bragged that unemployment had been abolished. No wonder many young Americans were attracted to Soviet communism, seeing it as a more successful model than capitalism. The fear that communism could supplant capitalism was present in the minds of ruling elites in the capitalist world. Indeed, it was only in the late 1970s that capitalists lost their fear of communism taking over the world due to the beginning of the decline of the Soviet economy.

Stalin emerges as the leader, then autocrat and then despot The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), consisting of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republics and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) was proclaimed in December 1922, an extraordinary achievement given that the Bolsheviks had been only a small minority in February 1917, and revealed the power of their propaganda and organisational skill. The essence of Bolshevik propaganda was simplicity and repetition. So successful was it that Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s silver tongued propagandist, was sufficiently impressed to adopt some of its techniques. Seizing power was one thing but transforming the USSR into a modern, industrial state would be an even greater challenge. It was the only socialist state on the planet and would have to build up a powerful military to protect the country, but this would only be possible if there was a strong industrial base. They would have to achieve this with their own resources as they could not expect the capitalist world to help them. Stalin made the outrageous claim that socialism could be built in one country – the Soviet Union. There were many, including Trotsky, who doubted that socialism could be built in one country, the Soviet Union, as there had to be revolution abroad to make this possible. Stalin saw this as his opportunity during the struggle to succeed Lenin, who had died in January 1924. The country would lead the world forward to a better, more just world. This resonated with many citizens and they could be proud that the Soviet Union was fashioning a better world. Stalin brilliantly outmanoeuvred Trotsky, mainly because he was a rationalist and concentrated on accumulating power whereas Trotsky’s thinking was

The background

11

guided by ideology, neglecting the minutiae of government (Lenin regarded Trotsky as his natural successor) and by 1928 Stalin was top dog. He was only the leader but by 1932 he was the autocrat and in 1937 became a despot capable of deciding whether a comrade lived or died. He was an extraordinary risk taker but almost always had luck on his side. The launch of the first Five Year Plan (1928– 32) was daring in the extreme. Rapid industrialisation at a pace never before achieved by a capitalist state and the brutal collectivisation of the peasantry which saw the most capable farmers, the kulaks, eliminated and the rest herded into collective farms, were breath taking. He needed to feed the cities and the building sites as well as the Red Army, and collectivisation was the only option open to him, he reasoned. Capitalism and the market economy were swallowed up in this new way of modernising an economy which the world had never seen before. The Great Depression, beginning in 1929, was another slice of luck and led to a stream of capitalists, with Henry Ford to the fore, building state of the art enterprises on green field sites throughout the Soviet Union. Stalin’s colleagues never realised, until it was too late, what his end game was as he always appeared a moderate, seeking to find a compromise amid opposing views. A brilliant strategist and judge of a comrade, he built up a coterie of loyal followers who remained with him until his dying day even though he often treated them harshly. The skills he acquired during his rise and retention of power served him well when he confronted Roosevelt and Churchill during the wartime conferences. By 1945 he was the clear victor.

The United States and the Soviet Union before 1941 The Bolshevik revolution was the first decisive rejection of President Wilson’s vision. It was collectivist in that through democratic centralism it subordinated party members to their leaders and the population as a whole to the party. It sought to establish a socialist economy which meant the elimination of the market economy – capitalism. It placed the interests of the Soviet Union ahead of any person or group of persons; hence national self-determination, despite its espousal by Lenin, was unlikely to be high among its list of priorities. The Soviet state was based on the rule of one class, the working class (tactically allied to the poorer strata of the peasantry) to the exclusion of other classes, and the bourgeoisie and capitalist ethic were vilified. It proclaimed its unremitting hostility to the world capitalist system and international economy, foretelling doom for them both. This said, the Bolsheviks were not adverse to trading with the capitalists of the world and as Lenin once commented, this would provide the capitalists with the rope to hang themselves – meaning they would thereby be strengthening Soviet socialism. Wilsonian idealists and the American business community were appalled by the October Revolution but both groups comforted themselves with the conviction that such an un-American form of government and economy could not survive very long. The American economy was based on the belief that only democracy, free markets and the rule of law could ensure rapid economic growth.

12

The background

There was another group which took a jaundiced view of the turn of events in Petrograd and Moscow; namely, the American diplomats who specialised in Russia and Eastern Europe. Some of them had known and relished service in Imperial Russia and one of them, Joseph Grew, found the fact that Western diplomats negotiated with their ‘red’ counterparts at Genoa and Rapallo in 1922 ‘profoundly disgusting’. The United States declined to recognise the new Soviet state, but in order to acquaint itself with its thinking the Division of Russian Affairs was established in the State Department. A key centre for research on the Soviet Union was Riga, capital of Latvia, which had been part of Russia until the October Revolution, but was now an independent republic and a haven for many middle- and upper-class Russian exiles. The views and attitudes developed in Riga had a profound influence on the policy formulations drawn up by the Division of Russian Affairs in Washington, which Yergin dubs the ‘Riga axioms’ (Yergin 1980: 17). Great stress was laid, in these, on the world revolutionary goals and practices of Soviet leaders, and the advice emanating from Riga took the Soviet ‘threat’ very seriously and warned the United States to be on its guard. Charles Bohlen and George Kennan (Figure 1.1) were

Figure 1.1 George F. Kennan in 1947 Source: Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, photograph by Harris and Ewing, LC-H261–112729.

The background

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two of the brightest stars in the Riga firmament. Immersed in Russian language and cultural studies, they consciously and unconsciously acquired the thought patterns of the highly civilised, non-radical elite of Imperial Russia, now in exile. Kennan, not surprisingly, had very explicit views about the value of an alliance with the USSR. ‘Never’, he declared, ‘neither then nor at any later date did I consider the Soviet Union a fit ally or associate, actual or potential, for this country’. As the 1920s passed it became palpably clear that the Soviet Union had come to stay, and with the Great Depression undermining confidence in the capacity of the market economy to regulate itself and the Soviet Union bounding ahead industrially, the latter became more attractive. The American business community, led by Henry Ford, began to contribute to Soviet industrialisation. American diplomatic attitudes began to change after Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which boded ill for China, an area of special concern to the United States. The realisation that the Soviet Union might be of some use in restraining Japanese imperialism led to formal diplomatic recognition in 1933, with the USSR promising not to interfere in internal American politics and the United States talking about a loan if Moscow acknowledged the debts run up by the Provisional Government. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Figure 1.2) chose William Bullitt as the first US ambassador to Moscow. He was no stranger to the Soviet capital, for in 1919 he had negotiated a modus vivendi between Soviet Russia and the West which had subsequently been rejected by the British and US governments.

Figure 1.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt Source: Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LCUSZ62–117121.

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The background

The new honeymoon lasted just under a year. Even George Kennan was caught up in the general enthusiasm, as a special relationship with the Soviet Union appeared to be within reach. However, internal Soviet events had a decisive impact on relations. The murder of Sergei Kirov, in December 1934, marked a major step forward in Stalin’s mastery over the party, government and political police. This was to be completed in 1936. The Soviet Union turned more and more inward as it paid off its external debts, cut back on industrial imports from the capitalist world and made a determined bid for autarky. The reasons behind the purges are still not clear, but they affected mainly those in middle and senior positions in the party and state bureaucracies, industrial management, the military and the creative and technical intelligentsia. It was as if the Stalin leadership wanted to proletarianise the bureaucracy and other key positions in the state. This change in the political climate chilled the Americans to the bone. They were appalled by the trials and the executions of many Soviet officials whom they had known personally. Gradually almost all those whom they knew disappeared, leaving them with a profound sense of loss; the Soviet world they knew was fast vanishing and they had great difficulty in comprehending the new one coming into being. Their sense of isolation was increased by vituperative abuse which was hurled at them from all sides. Kennan thought that the Soviets were out to create the impression that they, the Americans, were devils, evil and dangerous. As such, no Soviet citizen would voluntarily approach them. Bullitt became disillusioned and longed to escape from the place. When he left in mid-1936 he had become a ‘hardliner’, who believed that the advance of Bolshevism in Europe had to be stopped and that a rapprochement between France and Germany might be one way in which to do this. The brief Moscow spring of 1933–4 had raised such high hopes that the dashing of them led to the opposite extreme – an almost unquestioning acceptance of the ‘Riga axioms’. These events were to have a lasting impact on the formation of US policy towards the Soviet Union, for many of the key Americans involved in policy making in the 1940s had earlier seen service in Moscow and Riga. The Soviet state presented the Western analyst with peculiar problems. To what extent did ideology determine Soviet foreign policy? Marxism-Leninism claimed universal validity, and regarded the final victory of socialism as inevitable. On the one hand this seemed to imply that the Soviet Union did not need to conduct an aggressive foreign policy since events were bound to move in its favour. But it could also be argued that Soviet intervention might speed up the revolutionary transformation of the world. Just what was the relationship between Soviet internal and external policy? Would Stalin’s aggressive domestic policy inevitably produce a thrustful foreign policy? Would Stalin follow in Hitler’s footsteps? The conventional wisdom of American specialists on the Soviet Union was that Marxism–Leninism made the USSR potentially and actually an expansionist, aggressive force, hence the United States must constantly be on its guard and maintain a state of constant vigilance. Someone who did not share these views, much to the chagrin of the professionals, was Joseph Davies, US ambassador from 1936 to 1938, a corporate

The background

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lawyer and a loyal friend to President Roosevelt. His task was to improve US– Soviet relations, evaluate the strength of the Red Army, government and industry, and to find out which side the Soviet Union would support in the coming war. He believed that the inherent contradictions of communism doomed it to oblivion and regarded the planned economy as state socialism. He perceived the emergence of a new upper class and this led him to conclude that the Soviet Union was returning to economic orthodoxy. The progressive social policy had done much to improve the lot of the ordinary person and as for the international communist organisation, the Comintern, it was not to be feared as it was long on rhetoric but short on influence, especially in the US. Davies’s many reports to Washington were devoid of criticism of Stalin and after attending a Show Trial, the 21, he concluded the guilty verdicts were justified. Among his pronouncements were: ‘Communism holds no serious threat for the US. Friendly relations in the future may be of great general value’ and ‘Communism is protecting the Christian world and free men and Christians should embrace the Soviet Union’. Charles Bohlen, a member of his staff, wryly commented that Davies believed everything the Soviets told him and ignored the contradictory opinions of his own diplomatic staff. One explanation for his views was that he was seeking to ingratiate himself with those surrounding President Roosevelt. If this is accurate, it indicates that he was aware that there were many pro-Soviet officials in Washington. Davies’s views (he did not speak Russian) underlined the gulf between the perceptions of the professional Soviet watchers and domestic politicians in the United States – one which was to appear many times in the succeeding years. He later published an account of his times in the Soviet Union, Mission to Moscow, which contains many of his reports. It was very popular and went through 65 editions between 1941 and 2017, and was translated into ten foreign languages. A film followed but was not as popular. This underlined the US public’s predilection for a rosy view of Soviet reality. Davies’s successor, Laurence Steinhardt, reverted to a more traditional line, saying that in his experience the Soviets only responded to force, and if force could not be applied, ‘oriental bartering or trading methods’ were in order.

The United Kingdom’s relations with the Soviet Union The Anglo–Russian Convention, signed on 31 August 1907, relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, ended the longstanding rivalry in Central Asia and promised to outflank Germany, which was planning a railway from Berlin to Baghdad which might lead to the Ottoman Empire siding with Germany. The UK promised to stay out of northern Persia and Russia recognised southern Persia as a British sphere of interest; Russia also promised not to intervene in Afghanistan and Tibet. This agreement led to the formation of the Triple Entente which linked Russia, the UK and France, and there were also agreements with Japan and Portugal. All in all, these agreements counterbalanced the powerful Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

16

The background

The February 1917 Revolution was welcomed by many in the UK, but how was it going to affect Russia’s war against Germany and Austria-Hungary? The Provisional Government’s involvement in the war became less and less popular and the Bolshevik slogans of peace and land gained more and more traction, but the October Revolution raised the fear that Russia would withdraw from the war. This occurred at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in March 1918, when Russia ceded huge swathes of the Empire to Germany. What was to happen to the large supplies of war matériel which had been delivered to Russia? There was a risk that they would fall into the hands of the Germans or even worse, the Bolsheviks. There was also the problem of the Czechoslovak Legion, of about 40,000 men, who were volunteers but later included Czech and Slovak prisoners of war from the AustroHungarian army who had fought as part of the Russian army. They were on their way to Vladivostok to be shipped eventually to the western front. Would it also be possible to help anti-Bolshevik forces to defeat the Reds? Winston Churchill, as secretary of state for war and air, favoured an Allied intervention in northern Russia, and this began in November 1918. Other countries which supplied troops were France, Canada, Australia, India, South Africa, Greece, Estonia, Serbia, Italy, Poland and Romania. The US and Japan intervened in Siberia to facilitate the transfer of the Czechoslovak Legion to Vladivostok, which was finally evacuated in September 1920, and on its return to Czechoslovakia (founded on 28 October 1918) formed the core of the Czechoslovak army. Most states left Soviet Russia in 1919, but the UK withdrew in 1920, as did the US. Japan left Siberia in 1922, but remained in the northern half of Sakhalin until 1925. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was founded on 31 July 1920 by a merging of disparate Marxist parties, and it joined the Comintern and faithfully followed the Soviet line. In July 1920, the British government announced that it would send military matériel to Poland to help Polish forces resisting the Red Army’s advance. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Labour Party declared that this was to prepare a war between the Allied Powers and Soviet Russia which would be an ‘intolerable crime against humanity’. The TUC and the Labour Party threatened a national strike and set up Councils of Action to prevent the transfer of arms or military personnel to Poland. The Polish Socialist Party appealed in vain for help from British workers to fight ‘Soviet imperialism’. The Anglo–Soviet Trade Agreement, signed on 16 March 1921 by the UK and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was a significant breakthrough for the Bolsheviks and in the words of Ivan Maisky (later Soviet ambassador to the Court of St James from 1932 to 1943), ‘it gave the RSFSR de facto recognition by the most powerful capitalist state in Europe’. The UK formally recognised the USSR on 1 February 1924, but there was considerable distrust on both sides. The first Labour government was formed in January 1924, with Ramsey MacDonald as prime minister and foreign secretary. A key foreign policy goal was to normalise relations with the Soviet Union by drafting two Anglo–Soviet treaties. The government was labelled ‘Red’ and under the control of the

The background

17

Communist Party, and this contributed to its collapse. A new election was called for October 1924 but shortly beforehand the Daily Mail published a letter from Grigory Zinoviev, head of the Comintern, which the paper claimed revealed a ‘great Bolshevik plot to paralyse the British Army and Navy and plunge the country into civil war’, and it further argued that the Communist Party were the ‘masters of Mr Ramsey MacDonald’s government’. It later turned out that the letter was a forgery, but it cost the Labour government the election. The Conservatives were returned to power and the draft Anglo–Soviet treaties were dropped. In 1924, the TUC attended the Congress of the AllRussian Central Council of Trades Unions, and the Anglo–Russian Joint Advisory Council (ARJAC) was set up to attempt to improve relations. The TUC refused to accept financial aid from Soviet trade unions during the General Strike of May 1926, and the ending of the strike before its goals had been met led to bitter conflicts within the ARJAC, and it collapsed in 1927. In May 1927 British police raided the offices of the Soviet trade delegation and ARCOS (the All-Russian Co-operative Society) in London, looking for secret documents which had been stolen from the War Office. This was a breach of the 1921 treaty which afforded diplomatic immunity to Soviet trade offices. Diplomatic relations were broken off, the 1921 trade treaty was cancelled and fears that war would break out increased. Stalin commented that the ‘British Tory government’ was definitely planning a war against the Soviet Union. The Labour Party won the 1929 general election and re-established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but the show trial in January 1933 of six British Metropolitan-Vickers engineers accused of wrecking and sabotage, caused a furore in the UK and led to a total embargo on trade with the Soviet Union. One engineer was sentenced to three years, another to two years, another acquitted and the other three deported. The united front tactics (proposing a coalition of non-Marxist socialists, middle-class parties and communists to combat the rise of fascism), adopted at the 7th Comintern Congress in 1935, had little impact in the UK where working-class loyalties belonged to the Labour Party. Labour leaders were a constant target of abuse and this hardened attitudes towards Marxism. (Clement Attlee, deputy prime minister to Churchill during the war and prime minister from 1945 to 1951, once commented that the Labour Party owed more to Methodism than Marxism.) It was quite a different story in the public schools, Oxford, Cambridge and other universities where Marxism was all the rage. Giles Udy (2017), in a penetrating study, carefully analyses the attitude of the British left to Stalinism in the 1930s. George Bernard Shaw, a celebrated Irish playwright, was a leading member of the Fabian Society, along with Sidney and Beatrice Webb and Virginia Woolf, to name only a few. Fabians were socialists but not Marxists. Shaw visited the Soviet Union, in 1931, and afterwards, asked if he thought that revolution attracted degenerate types, commented: On the contrary, it has attracted superior types all the world over to an extraordinary extent wherever it has been understood. But the top of the

18

The background ladder is a very trying place for old revolutionists who have had no administrative experience, who have had no financial experience, who have been trained as penniless hunted fugitives with Karl Marx on the brain and not as statesmen. They often have to be pushed off the ladder with a rope around their necks.

On another occasion he wrote: ‘What we are confronted with now is that if we desire a certain type pf civilisation and culture, we must exterminate the sort of people who do not fit into it’. To him, mass executions were justified as merely ‘weeding the garden’. In 1933, he commented: ‘the power to exterminate is too grave to be left in any hands but those of a thoroughly Communist government’. Thousands of politicians and officials had been assassinated in Tsarist Russia before 1914 – ‘autocracy tempered by assassination’, was his comment, so it appeared this was the Russian way of forcing change. The Webbs deliberately distorted information about the purges and regarded it as an understandable price to pay for a ‘new civilisation’. They penned Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? in 1935, painting a glowing portrait of Stalin, whitewashing the deportation and murder of kulaks, and denying the reality of the famines in Ukraine and elsewhere. Pro-Soviet sympathisers in Parliament and the Foreign Office obfuscated the abundant evidence of repression and murder. H. G. Wells, well known for his The War of the Worlds (1897), wrote of Stalin: ‘I have never met a man more fair, candid and honest’. Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald, in 1930, penned a lengthy rebuke to the Archbishop of Canterbury for organising a day of prayer when a million Christians interceded for persecuted Soviet believers. The day of prayer horrified MacDonald and the whole Labour government. G. D. H. Cole, a leading Fabian, and Sir Stafford Cripps advocated the replacement of parliament with the dictatorship of the proletariat. In 1942, Cole wrote: ‘Much better to be ruled by Stalin than by a pack of half-hearted and half-witted Social Democrats’. The part of the left which saw Stalin in a negative light were the Trotskyites, but there were others, such as George Orwell, who wrote: ‘All people who are morally sound have known that since about 1931 the Russian regime stinks’. Just as direct contact with the Soviet Union disillusioned some Americans, so it did Sir Stafford Cripps. His fervent advocacy of the popular front in 1938 led to his expulsion from the Labour Party, but in May 1940 he became Britain’s ambassador to Moscow. He quickly changed his mind but remained as ambassador until January 1942. On the right, politicians such as Winston Churchill (Figure 1.3) were never in two minds about the eventual goals of the USSR. However, Churchill was a realist, and perceived early that Germany posed a more immediate threat to European security.

Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, and this naturally alarmed Moscow. Stalin wrote to Ordzhonikidze ‘the Japanese are certainly (certainly!) preparing for

The background

19

Figure 1.3 Winston Churchill in 1941 Source: Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LCUSZ62–64419.

war against the USSR, and we have to be ready (we must!) for anything’. The rise of fascism was completely misinterpreted by Moscow, where it was assumed to be the most predatory face of finance capitalism, with only a limited capacity to endure, if it ever came to power. The Comintern concluded that the German National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) was claiming to do the impossible as they promised to put German industry back on its feet, implying that big business would do very well, while at the same time canvassing the votes of small businessmen, shopkeepers and farmers while claiming unemployment would end and everyone would live better. From a communist point of view, the Nazis (from Nationalsozialistisch or national socialist) were promising the impossible. A fatal weakness was that communists did not understand nationalism, regarded it as a ploy by the ruling class to fool workers. Italian fascism was not deemed a threat to the Soviet Union, so why should German fascism be any different? The social democrats (SPD) were regarded as the main enemy and labelled ‘social fascists’ because the SPD was the main

20

The background

supporter of the Weimar Republic and it was assumed, in Moscow, that the destruction of the SPD would topple the republic. Communist animus against the social democrats was based on the fact that the latter supported capitalism and sought to redistribute income within it. The breath-taking ease with which Hitler and the NSDAP swept the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) off the political stage, and the pusillanimity of the other political parties rudely awakened Moscow. In December 1933, the Politburo adopted a secret resolution concerning the Soviet Union’s possible entry into the League of Nations and a mutual defence pact with the European powers, including France and Poland, to contain Germany. The USSR joined the League of Nations in 1934, and supported the French proposal to sign an Eastern Pact which would gather all the countries of Eastern and Central Europe together, but it was rejected by Hitler, strongly supported by Poland. On 26 January 1934, Poland and Germany signed a non-aggression pact which was to last for ten years. This protected Germany from an attack in the east and led to Hitler occupying the Rhineland (1936) and agreeing the Anschluss with Austria (1938). To allay fears that Poland and Germany were planning an attack on the Soviet Union, Poland renewed the Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact, first signed on 25 July 1932, on 5 May 1934 and it was extended to 31 December 1945. This revealed that Warsaw had rejected Hitler’s proposal of a German–Polish alliance against the USSR. The Soviet Union did conclude a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France, in 1935, the aim of which was to contain Germany. The Comintern, at its 7th and final Congress, in August 1935, appealed for the formation of popular fronts in capitalist countries. Western governments were slow to respond but a popular front government was formed in France. In 1936, the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the signing of the AntiComintern pact by Germany and Japan, soon to be also joined by Italy, Finland, Denmark, Spain and eight other countries, and the onset of the Spanish Civil War (1936–9) with the Soviet Union as the main defender of the Spanish Republic, boded ill for the USSR. In the same year Hitler launched a four-year plan to prepare for war. The main target was the USSR and Stalin was aware of this. To buy time Stalin hoped to forge a new German–Soviet pact along the lines of the one which had existed until 1933. Negotiations began, in 1937, to revive Soviet–German trade but they failed because Hitler would not tolerate a political dimension. In July 1937, Japan invaded China, and, on 21 August, the USSR and China signed a non-aggression pact and this led to the Soviets delivering aircraft and munitions to the Guomindang as well as military advisers. In March 1938, Germany annexed Austria, the Anschluss, an unwelcome surprise for Italy as it now shared a common frontier with the Reich. The UK’s reaction was to seek a closer relationship with Italy, in April 1938 (this led to the resignation of Anthony Eden as foreign secretary and Lord Halifax succeeding him). The UK recognised Italy’s annexation of Abyssinia. The British ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson, proposed to Hitler that Germany could acquire colonies in Central Africa with all existing colonies

The background

21

being brought together and redistributed. Hitler showed no interest and warned the UK not to meddle in the family relations between Germany and Austria and if it did, Germany would declare war. Hitler always exhibited a strong anti-Czech animus, and at the mention of President Beneš or the Sudetenland (part of Austria-Hungary until 1918, a predominantly German-populated part of Czechoslovakia), he flew into a rage. This puzzled Paul Schmidt, his French and English interpreter, and he eventually concluded this was due to the fact that Czech blood coursed through his veins, which he found acutely embarrassing. The Führer demanded the immediate transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany and if this was not agreed he would go to war. He was furious that Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had concluded a treaty of mutual assistance in 1935 which brought the USSR into Central Europe – to him this was completely unacceptable. On 11 September 1938, the UK informed Hitler that it was willing to come militarily to the help of Czechoslovakia, but on 14 September Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, told Hitler that he was willing to fly to Germany to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Sudetenland problem. They met in Berchtesgaden and Chamberlain fixed his brown eyes intently on Hitler’s blue eyes, but the meeting was not a success, with Hitler demanding the immediate cession of the Sudetenland. Irritated, Chamberlain replied: ‘If I understand you correctly, you have decided to attack Czechoslovakia. If that is your intention why have you invited me to come to Berchtesgaden? I might as well leave immediately’. The Führer backtracked and commented: ‘When you recognise the right of self-determination then we can discuss that’. The British prime minister responded: ‘Organising a referendum in the Sudetenland would be very difficult’, and suggested the discussion be terminated to permit him to return to London to discuss the proposition with his colleagues. In the meanwhile, Hitler promised not to attack Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain returned on 22 September and he and the Führer met in Godesberg, on the Rhine. Chamberlain had brought a solution with him. The UK, France and Czechoslovakia had agreed to cede the Sudetenland to Germany and the latter was to sign a non-aggression pact with Czechoslovakia, but Hitler tuned the proposal down as it involved too long a transition period and the Reich would never sign a non-aggression pact with Prague. The Führer simply reiterated his demand for the immediate transfer of the Sudetenland, but Chamberlain simply rejected it and proposed further negotiations. Then the news arrived that President Beneš had ordered the mobilisation of the army, and Hitler demanded that the Sudetenland be transferred by 2 p.m. on 28 September. On 26 September, Chamberlain informed Hitler that the Czechoslovak government had rejected his ultimatum and the Führer vented his spleen in an almost uncontrollable outburst. Chamberlain also made clear that if France met its obligations to Czechoslovakia (Treaty of Alliance and Friendship signed on 25 January 1924), the UK would follow suit. Hitler’s response was that if France and the UK wanted war, they could have it. The French ambassador, François-Poncet, was the first to speak to Hitler on the morning of 28 September. He spoke fluent German

22

The background

with a slight French accent, and deploying great diplomatic skill and logic calmed the Führer down and stated that whereas Hitler believed that Germany would be the victor, François-Poncet was certain that ‘we can defeat you’. ‘Why take this risk when you can achieve your main objectives without war?’ The ambassador also produced a map clearly indicating the stages of the evacuation. Then the Italian ambassador, Attolico, red faced, burst into the room with an urgent message from the Duce. London had proposed that Italy play a role in resolving the crisis and Mussolini was all in favour of it. Hitler agreed and the next day, 29 September, Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, the French prime minister, and Mussolini met, and the famous Munich conference began and ended the following morning just before 3 a.m. France reneged on its obligations to Czechoslovakia and the UK also lost prestige. Czechoslovakia was not permitted to attend the discussions and then informed of the dismemberment of the country and warned that if it engaged in armed resistance, it would not be supported by the UK and France. The Soviet Union offered aid but as it had no common frontier with Czechoslovakia (it would have to cross Polish or Romanian territory to reach it) this did not seem feasible. Moscow also did not want to be the only power countering German aggression. Mussolini pronounced afterwards that ‘what had happened at Munich was the end of Bolshevism in Europe, the end of any Russian influence on our continent’. Chamberlain concluded that the UK and Germany were the ‘two pillars of European peace and buttresses against communism’. Chamberlain was treated by the people of Munich as a hero and the man who had saved the peace. (Berliners affectionally referred to Halifax as Lord Halilafax.) This pained Hitler as it revealed that Germans preferred peace rather than his desire for war. An appendix to the agreement concerned Polish and Hungarian claims on Czechoslovakia, and the four signatories of the agreement were to act as arbiters but the UK and France declined, leaving Hitler to decide as he wished. On 30 September, Poland delivered an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government to vacate Tesinsko (the Cieszyn region and Zaolie) on 30 September 1938 and gave Prague until the following day to achieve this. At 11.45 a.m. on 1 October, the Czechoslovak embassy phoned the Polish ambassador in Prague and informed him Poland could take all it wanted. It occupied an area of 801.5 km2 with a population of 227,399 which constituted, as a result, 41 per cent of Poland’s cast iron and 47 per cent of steel production. Warsaw also took four Slovak Carpathian villages. The result was that Poland was strongly condemned in Paris and London, with Winston Churchill calling the Poles ‘hyenas’ scavenging on the weak Czechoslovak body politic. Stephen King-Hall, a well known journalist, wrote: ‘If Hitler attacks Poland, I’ll shout ‘Sieg Heil’. Moscow’s reading of the demarche was that it had occurred with Germany’s tacit agreement (Schmidt 1983: 407–19). Two groups opposed Hitler’s desire for war in 1938. One wanted only to bring him to his senses but the other, the Oster Conspiracy, consisting of Abwehr and Wehrmacht officers, planned to arrest or assassinate him if war broke out. They believed that Germany was ill prepared for war at that time. Chamberlain’s diplomacy denied them the opportunity to act.

The background

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The first Vienna award of 2 November 1938 ‘awarded’ Magyar populated territories in southern Slovakia and southern Carpathian Rus to Hungary, and it thus regained territories which had been lost in the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Ribbentrop, favouring Slovakia, and Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son in law and foreign minister, favouring Hungary, had competed with one another in drawing thick lines in coloured pencil on a map. In March 1939, Hitler permitted Hungary to occupy the rest of Carpatho-Ukraine right up to the Polish border. (After its defeat, this permitted the Polish government, together with the nation’s gold and thousands of troops, to escape to France and Syria via Hungary and continue the war against Germany in the west.) Slovakia declared autonomy from Czechoslovakia on 6 October 1938 and independence on 14 March 1939, and thereby Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. The Slovak president, Josef Tiso, was a short, rotund Roman Catholic priest and once confided to Paul Schmidt that he would sign a pact with the devil if it helped Slovakia. Without realising it, he did just that. He was executed in 1947 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. President Roosevelt, alarmed by events sent personal messages to Hitler and Mussolini about the fact that three nations in Europe and Africa had lost their independence [Austria, Czechoslovakia and Abyssinia (Ethiopia)]. A large part of another state in the Far East [China] had also been occupied by a neighbouring state. ‘Information, which we hope is not accurate, reveals further planned aggression against another independent people [Poland]. Are you [Hitler and Mussolini] prepared to promise the following countries that you will not attack them?’ Roosevelt then listed 30 countries in Europe and elsewhere. ‘These promises of non-aggression should last for 10 to 25 years’. The American president then offered to mediate to resolve European difficulties around a conference table. Hitler’s response was negative and at times rude (Schmidt 1983: 434–5). In January 1939, the German and Polish foreign ministers met in Warsaw and Ribbentrop dangled the prospect of Poland acquiring part of Soviet Ukraine and gaining access to the Black Sea. On 15 March 1939, Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech Lands, and declared them a protectorate. Slovakia was to join Germany in attacking Poland on 1 September 1939 and also joined the Wehrmacht in the attack on the Soviet Union. Germany also annexed Memel from Lithuania. The UK and France reacted with words and not actions. In March 1939, Berlin demanded that Danzig, a free city which had previously been part of the German Reich, be ceded to Germany and an extraterritorial railway and Autobahn be constructed between Danzig and Königsberg, in East Prussia. Poland categorically rejected this ultimatum on 25 March and the following day Lipski, the Polish ambassador in Berlin, told Ribbentrop: ‘A continuation of the plans to take Danzig means war with Poland’ (Schmidt 1983: 433). Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, made it clear that any attack on Danzig would lead to the UK rendering Poland all the aid it needed to repel such an attack and stated that the French government had

24

The background

authorised him to say that it would act likewise. On 27 April, Great Britain (Northern Ireland was excluded) introduced national service for all able men between 18 and 41, and single men would be called up first ahead of married men. On 22 May, Ribbentrop for Germany and Galeazzo Ciano for Italy signed the ‘Pact of Steel’ in Berlin. It committed Italy to join Germany in any offensive action with all its land, sea, and air forces. Neither side was to conclude a unilateral peace without consulting the other. Ciano hoped for three years of peace to develop Italy’s military strength. Europe was girding itself for war. Then came a bolt from the blue. Moscow contacted Berlin and invited Ribbentrop to visit to consider a rapprochement between the two countries. Newsreels of a smiling Stalin were included and greatly impressed the Führer. ‘What a fine fellow he is’, he commented. The sensational news exploded like a bombshell throughout Europe. On 22 August, Ribbentrop and officials took off for Moscow at 9 p.m. and landed just before midnight in Königsberg where they spent the night. Nobody slept as Ribbentrop filled pages with notes and telephoned Berlin and Berchtesgaden. The next morning, the delegation took off at 7 a.m. and landed in Moscow four hours later. The hammer and sickle and the swastika swayed side by side in the wind at the airport. They were met by Potemkin, first deputy commissar for foreign affairs. After breakfast, Ribbentrop immediately went to see Molotov and later Stalin in the Kremlin. He talked enthusiastically about the discussions to Paul Schmidt and expected agreement to be reached that night. This turned out to be correct and a pact was signed in the early hours of 24 August. Schmidt was able to peruse the secret protocol about the division of spheres of influence in Europe. Finland, Estonia and Latvia were to fall within the Soviet sphere of interest. The demarcation line in Poland was roughly to be along the Narew, Vistula and San. A decision would be taken later if an independent Polish state should remain. In Southeast Europe, Soviet interest in Bessarabia was stressed and Germany expressed no interest there. After the signing, Stalin raised his glass to Hitler: ‘I know how much the German people love their Führer. I would like to drink to his health!’ Stalin remarked on British military weakness but despite this thought it would fight tenaciously. He regarded the French military as stronger than Ribbentrop thought and wondered if the Italian annexation of Albania presaged an attack on Greece. As regards Japan, Stalin was circumspect, and Ribbentrop offered to act as a mediator, and this was not rejected. ‘I know the Asiatics better and now and then one must hit them hard’, he added. Ribbentrop appeared in the German embassy with the non-aggression pact signed by him and Molotov looking like a child opening a Christmas present. Article 1 stated that the USSR and Germany agreed not to go to war with one another. Chamberlain’s reaction, in the House of Commons on 25 August, was to state that the non-aggression pact had come as an unwelcome surprise. Germany was celebrating it as a great diplomatic victory which had saved the peace so that the UK and France would no longer be bound by their commitments to

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Poland. Hitler summoned Neville Henderson, the British ambassador, to the Reich Chancellery and berated him with a long list of complaints about Polish behaviour and demanded that the Danzig and railway and Autobahn problem had to be resolved to Germany’s satisfaction. He claimed that the outcome of Chamberlain’s speech can only be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and the UK. Germany will no longer have to fight on two fronts as the pact with the Soviet Union has changed German foreign policy for the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union and Germany will never take up arms against one another. Then Hitler offered the UK Germany’s military support in the colonial world, disarmament and frontier guarantees in Western Europe (Schmidt 1983: 441–6, 449–50). The German–Soviet Frontier Treaty was signed on 28 September 1939 by Molotov and Ribbentrop, superseding the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact of 23 August 1939 and spelling out the spheres of influence of the two countries. A third protocol was signed on 10 January 1941 by Friedrich Werner von Schulenburg and Molotov, and Germany thereby renounced its claims to portions of Lithuania.

Was there an alternative to the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact? On 6 April 1939 Jósef Beck, the Polish foreign minister, visited London in order to secure guarantees confirming Polish independence and the inviolability of its border. Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, agreed verbally and mentioned a future military alliance. Simultaneously Poland concluded an agreement with Romania which stated that if either were attacked, the other would come to its aid. The USSR viewed this agreement as anti-Soviet. As Poland and Romania shared a common border there was now an anti-Soviet front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Moscow’s fear was that Poland and Romania would be drawn into the German sphere of influence. Soviet intelligence picked up a rumour that Latvia and Estonia, under certain circumstances would agree to become a German protectorate. London and Warsaw began to consider seizing the Latvian port of Liepaja to prevent it falling into German hands. On 7 April, Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador, looking straight into Halifax’s eyes, asked if he and Beck had discussed seizing Liepaja. The foreign secretary denied this, but his demeanour led Maisky to conclude that they had discussed it. Beck had also sounded Halifax out about the possibility of moving Polish Jews to British colonial possessions in Africa, for instance, Uganda. On 9 April, Maksim Litvinov, the commissar for foreign affairs, forwarded a memorandum to Stalin recommending that the Soviet Union should not enter into any unilateral agreement with an East European country but should seek a multilateral agreement with the UK and France. A unilateral agreement risked the Soviet Union being exposed to German aggression alone while the UK and

26

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France deliberated about how to come to its aid. There was also the problem that Paris was only going through the motions of discussing security with the Soviet Union just to demonstrate to the French population that discussions were under way. Litvinov put forward four points which included the Soviet Union, the UK and France agreeing to come to each other’s aid if attacked and agreeing not to negotiate a separate peace (Moscow feared another Munich deal). Turkey was to be encouraged to join them. Stalin and the Politburo debated the proposals for days and expanded the four points into eight, and the final version was ready on 17 April. 1 2

3 4

5

6 7 8

The Soviet Union, the UK and France conclude an agreement for 5–10 years and each would come to the military aid of the other if attacked. They are obliged to offer military assistance to East European nations situated between the Baltic and the Black Sea which share a common border with the USSR in the case of military aggression against them. The three states are to agree on the nature of the military aid to the East European states. The British government is requested to clarify what aid has been promised Poland in the Anglo–Polish agreement. (Soviet intelligence had acquired a copy and discovered that the word Germany did not appear in it. There was a vague allusion to some European states which Moscow thought could be interpreted as anti-Soviet.) The existing alliance between Poland and Romania could remain functional or in the case that it was directed against the Soviet Union should be annulled. The three countries agree that after military hostilities have begun, no separate peace treaty will be signed with the aggressor. The agreement shall be signed by all three parties. The three states are to enter into discussions with Turkey on matters of mutual assistance.

The Soviet ambassadors in Paris and London were to deliver the proposal personally to the respective governments. The French foreign minister, on 19 April, reacted very positively to the proposal. Litvinov thought Halifax naïve in believing this would cast a security net over Eastern Europe to protect it from a German attack. There was the problem of Poland, which was viscerally anti-Soviet and claimed it was a ‘neutral’ state between the Soviet Union and Germany. It was also Poland’s declared policy not to permit a single Red Army soldier to set foot on Polish soil. A German diplomatic offensive was pulling Estonia and Latvia into the German camp. Hungary was obsessed with recovering Transylvania from Romania, and hence the danger that it would side with Germany if Berlin promised to help it recover its lost territory. Halifax, influenced by Maisky, did not reveal the whole text to Warsaw and the Poles found out four of the points from Soviet radio. On 22 April, the

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Polish ambassador to Moscow met Litvinov to convey to him the response of the Polish foreign minister Beck. Litvinov, based on the answers which the ambassador gave to his detailed questioning, began to wonder if Poland was conducting separate negotiations with Germany behind the back of the USSR and even behind the backs of the UK and France. Such negotiations could lead to the fourth partition of Poland or even to Poland passing into the German camp with a formal preservation of independence. Neither the Soviet Foreign Office nor Soviet intelligence possessed any information on such negotiations, if in fact they were being conducted at all. If it turned out that Warsaw and Berlin were in talks it would render the Soviet proposals a dead letter (Johnson’s Russia List, no. 139 (2020): 145, 147 and 148). In April 1939, talks were to begin in Moscow but neither the British nor French leader would meet Stalin personally. The British and French delegations took a boat to Leningrad and the train to Moscow and the French general could discuss and negotiate but Britain’s Admiral Drax had little power to do so. A sticking point was that Poland would not countenance the passage of the Red Army across its territory. ‘It will be Poles, not Germans, who will charge deep into Germany in the very first days of the war’, exclaimed a Polish ambassador. Stalin’s decimation of the top echelons of the Soviet military during the purges and the execution of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the modernising brain of the Red Army, led to the view that the defences of the Soviet Union had been gravely weakened and hence there was little military advantage in an alliance with Moscow. Stalin informed Churchill, in August 1942, that during the unsuccessful negotiations which dragged on into August, the ‘Soviets had concluded that the UK and France had decided not to go to war but hoped that a diplomatic front consisting of the USSR, the UK and France would frighten Hitler off but we were convinced that he could not be frightened off’ (Schmidt 1983: 446). Afterwards, the Foreign Office, in an unpublished White Paper, sought to blame the abortive negotiations on the Soviet Union. France opposed the publication of the White Paper, which however carefully phrased, revealed that the Soviets had made serious alliance proposals with precise, reciprocal undertakings which the British government was reluctant to entertain. The French were all the more annoyed because the White Paper omitted to underline that they had been much more receptive to Soviet proposals. (Carley 2019) On 28 April 1939, Hitler annulled the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact. The Locarno treaty, in 1925, guaranteed Germany’s frontiers in the west but not in the east. This suggested that Germany could expand there. The UK and France signed non-aggression pacts with Germany, in 1938, and with Romania, Lithuania, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia, in 1939. All this indicated to Stalin that Germany was being given free rein to move eastwards. His

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nightmare was a two front war, one in Europe and the other in Asia, which would spell certain defeat for the Soviet Union. Japan attacked at Lake Khasan, near the borders of China and Korea, in July 1938, and the Red Army came off better. Despite this, the military were held by Stalin to have conducted themselves poorly and Marshal Vasily Blyukher was arrested, tortured and died soon afterwards in prison. Stalin, as usual, assumed that military reverses were due to treachery. An even more important battle began, on 11 May 1939, at Khalkin Gol, on the Soviet–Mongolian border. Stalin chose General (later Marshal) Georgy Zhukov as commander with 112,000 troops under his command. The Red Army lost 10,000 soldiers, the Mongolians about 1,000 and the Japanese over 60,000. The tactics deployed by Zhukov were similar to those he was to use to such devastating effect at Stalingrad, Kursk and elsewhere. It was the first time that mechanised warfare had been unleashed: a combined arms assault with massed infantry and artillery head on and powerful armoured formations enveloping the enemy’s flanks, encircling and eventually annihilating them. The fighting took place during the negotiations with Joachim von Ribbentrop to conclude a Soviet– German non-aggression pact. Stalin had to conclude a pact with Germany as Japan was attacking in the east. Molotov, addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet, commented: ‘We were left with no other option’. Germany favoured Japan attacking the Soviet Union in the east while it attacked in the west but the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact was regarded by the Japanese military and government as treachery and the entire anti-Soviet government resigned five days later. On 26 March 1941, the Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka, short, with a small dark moustache and gold rimmed glasses, arrived in Berlin to discuss the international situation with Hitler. He had spent several years in the US and had an adequate command of English. The next day Matsuoka met Hitler, but the Führer interrupted the proceedings because of the Yugoslav coup d’état which removed the pro-German government in Belgrade. Matsuoka was left with Ribbentrop who proposed that Japan attack British possessions in East Asia, especially Singapore. He also stated that relations with the Soviet Union were not really friendly. Germany had suggested that the Soviet Union should join the Tripartite Pact, but Moscow had replied with unacceptable demands. Germany was to sacrifice its interests in Finland and afford the Soviets a decisive role in the Balkans and grant military bases in the Dardanelles. ‘These demands are quite unacceptable to the Führer’. Matsuoka maintained a fixed expression which did not betray what he made of these statements. Hitler and Ribbentrop were openly critical of Soviet behaviour and the Soviet discussions with the new British ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps. Ribbentrop then informed the Japanese foreign minister: ‘If in the future the Soviet Union adopts a position which constitutes a threat to Germany, the Führer will smash Russia!’ This took Matsuoka completely by surprise, as his eyes indicated. Ribbentrop continued: ‘A war with the Soviet Union will end with a complete victory of German arms and a total annihilation of the Russian army and

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Russian state’. Hitler pointed out that England’s hopes rested on the United States or the Soviet Union coming to its aid. Göring entertained Matsuoka at Carinhall, his luxury residence outside Berlin, and enthusiastically showed him his model train set which covered 100 square metres. Matsuoka then travelled to Rome to meet Mussolini and then again back to Berlin where Hitler advocated a Japanese attack on the UK. Leaving, Hitler told Matsuoka to report to Tokyo and that a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union could not be ruled out. Schmidt repeated the translation to ensure that Matsuoka fully grasped what Hitler had said. On his way back to Tokyo, he stopped in Moscow and signed, on 13 April 1941, a five-year non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The momentous decision had been taken not to continue the conflict with the USSR. This saved the Soviet Union, as Moscow conceded it could not win a two front war against Germany and Japan. It would also have ended the era of communism. Stalin saw the foreign minister off at the railway station and then put his arm around the shoulder of the German ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, and said: ‘We must remain friends and you must do everything to ensure this!’ A few minutes later, Stalin turned to the aide of the German military attaché, Colonel Krebs, and commented: ‘We will remain friends with your country – come what may!’ While in Moscow, Matsuoka was handed a letter from Churchill warning Japan not to join Germany and Italy in going to war. If it did, the UK and the US would attack Japan. They produced 90 million tons of steel a year while the Axis powers produced less than half of that and Japan barely 10 per cent. While Matsuoka was in Europe the Americans attempted to prise Japan away from the Axis powers. The US was willing to act as a mediator between Japan and China and to recognise the independence of Manchukuo (Manchuria), draw a line under this affair and accept Japanese wishes (Schmidt 1983: 525–37). Japan was a resource-poor country and needed to secure access to raw materials, fuel, etc. Victorious in East Asia, they then took the decision to attack Pearl Harbor, believing that the US would not be in a position to challenge them in the Pacific for some considerable time. US naval intelligence had broken Japanese codes, called Magic, and had 70 minutes warning of the attack but the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, only received this information six hours after the attack began. He was not even aware of Magic until after the war. This led Kimmel and others to assume that Roosevelt deliberately allowed the attack on Pearl Harbor in order to bring the US into the war. There is no evidence that this was the case. Churchill wrote in his diary: ‘The US is like a gigantic boiler. Once the fire is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate. I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and the thankful’. After Pearl Harbor, Germany declared war on the US and thereby saved the UK. Had there been no declaration of war, the US would have concentrated exclusively on the Pacific theatre. The Japanese decision to discontinue hostilities against the Soviet Union saved it from certain defeat. Another aspect is

30

The background

that if Japan had attacked the Soviet Union, it would not have waged war against the United States. Germany and Japan would have established hegemony over Europe, Asia and probably elsewhere. Hence the declaration of war by Germany against the US was a major turning point in world history. Others who condemned the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact were thousands of Soviet citizens who wrote furious letters to local and central newspapers. Led to believe that Germany was the devil incarnate, they were now being told it was the Archangel Gabriel. It took time before they swallowed this. When Neville Chamberlain was informed that Moscow and Berlin had agreed a pact, he stated that he could not believe such a thing. Fall Weiss (Case White), the German High Command’s operational orders to attack Poland, was finalised on 15 June 1939, and predicated on the assumption that the UK and France would not declare war on Germany. On 11 August, Mussolini sent Ciano to meet Hitler in Salzburg and Attolico, the Italian ambassador, confided to Paul Schmidt that he was absolutely convinced that the UK and France would declare war on Germany if it attacked Poland. ‘That is the message Mussolini has given Ciano to present, using all his eloquence, to Hitler’. Ciano first met Ribbentrop, who ignored everything he said and, in Schmidt’s words, was like a hunting dog straining at the leash to be let loose on Poland. When he met the Führer, Ciano energetically made his case that war was ‘madness’. Repeatedly he stated that the war against Poland would not be restricted to that country but would draw in the UK and France. Italy, into the bargain, was weak and ill prepared for war. He concluded by offering a draft communiqué proposing international discussions to resolve the crisis. Hitler gave his response the following day. ‘I am absolutely convinced that neither the UK nor France will become involved in a general war’. Ciano thereby folded like a pocket knife and declared: ‘You have so often been right when we have had diverging opinions that I think it is quite possible that this time you see things more correctly than we do’. This U-turn shocked Attolico and the Italian delegation. Italy would join Germany in going to war. In his diary, Ciano confided: ‘I return to Rome disgusted with Germany, its Führer and the way he negotiates’. On 25 August, Hitler sent a message to Mussolini stating that he was about to attack Poland and asking for his understanding. He informed Neville Henderson, who sometimes chose to speak German although he lacked a perfect command of the language and whom Schmidt held in high regard, that he had decided to go to war against Poland despite the risk of war with the UK and France. The French ambassador declared that the French army would fight shoulder to shoulder with the Poles and the UK also reported it would do so. On 28 August, Chamberlain proposed direct negotiations between Germany and Poland and Hitler agreed and demanded the appearance of a Polish representative with full negotiating powers in Berlin on 30 August. Attolico informed Hitler that Mussolini was thinking of an international conference to resolve the crisis. Henderson phoned the Foreign Ministry just before midnight on 30 August, just before the ultimatum ran out, and met Ribbentrop to state that it

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was impossible for the Poles to send someone to Berlin at only 24 hours’ notice. Ribbentrop, vain as a peacock (his colleagues called him a fool behind his back), was very agitated and Henderson, red faced and with trembling hands, shouted at him and the two almost came to blows so great was the tension. The Polish ambassador, Lipski, appeared the following day, 31 August, with a message for Ribbentrop that his government accepted the British proposal of direct negotiations. Ribbentrop asked: ‘Have you complete authority to negotiate?’ Lipski answered in the negative. ‘Then there is no point in continuing this conversation’, said Ribbentrop, thereby ending the interview. The invasion began on 1 September. The British and French ambassadors wanted to meet Ribbentrop together, but he declined and arranged for Henderson to meet at 9.30 p.m. and Coulondre at 10 p.m. Both informed him that they would meet their treaty obligations to aid Poland and requested Germany to halt the offensive. The next day both countries mobilised. On Sunday 3 September, Henderson appeared in the Foreign Ministry at 9 a.m. and was received not by Ribbentrop but by Schmidt. They shook hands. ‘Unfortunately, my government has instructed me to deliver an ultimatum to the German government. The warning of 1 September has been ignored and the offensive intensified. If His Majesty’s government does not receive satisfactory assurances before 11 a.m. that the German offensive has been halted and troops are beginning to withdraw from the country, then Great Britain and Germany will be at war’. Schmidt then took the document to the Reich Chancellery where Hitler and most government ministers and top Nazi officials were gathered with bated breath to hear what it contained. In a separate room Hitler sat at a desk while Ribbentrop stood by a window. Schmidt, standing, translated slowly and with due emphasis to ensure that the Führer fully grasped what London was saying. Hitler was stunned and sat motionless in his chair. After a while, which appeared an eternity, he turned towards Ribbentrop with a fierce glint in his eye and asked: ‘What now?’ It was clear that the foreign minister’s advice on British intentions had turned out to be catastrophically and tragically wrong. Schmidt then went into another room where the others were waiting and informed them that in two hours Great Britain and Germany would be at war. Again, there was stunned silence which was broken eventually by Göring, who turned to Schmidt and said: ‘If we lose this war, may heaven have mercy on us!’ Goebbels sat transfixed, looking like a half-drowned poodle. At 5 p.m. Coulondre informed Ribbentrop that France was now at war with Germany (Schmidt 1983: 451–64). Why did Hitler not believe Chamberlain, who time and again stated that an attack on Poland would mean war with Germany? Militarily, the UK and France had not reacted when Hitler occupied the Rhineland, Austria and the Czech Lands (Bohemia and Moravia) so why should they go to war over Poland? The Führer was a gambler (German uses the French card term va banque) and every time he had gambled he had won. A gambler’s luck always runs out, and the tragedy was that it led to a world war. Western Poland had been part of Prussia and then the German Reich from 1772 to 1918, encompassing about 20 per cent of the country and 23 per cent of

32

The background

the population. Many Germans regarded the invasion as a police action to recoup former German territory. The Wehrmacht was brutal and committed many atrocities, with the mayor and thousands of educated citizens in Warsaw being shot when the city surrendered on 27 September, as Slavs were regarded as Untermenschen (sub-humans) and the Führer commented that all Poles were to be exterminated. The Soviet Union invaded in the east on 17 September and, significantly, it was one day after a Soviet–Japanese ceasefire at Khalkin Gol had come into effect. Polish resistance ended on 6 October. The UK and France did not come to the aid of Poland and did not declare war on the Soviet Union, and Churchill commented: ‘The Russian armies should stand on this line as was clearly necessitated for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace’. The Commander in Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces, Carl Mannerheim, concluded: ‘I must admit that the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was clever’. With Finland within its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union pressed the Finns to concede a frontier farther away from Leningrad and naval bases. Finland refused and the Red Army attacked on 30 November 1939, but the Winter War highlighted its deficiencies and of the million troops deployed casualties may have been high as 400,000; but it should be pointed out that elite troops were not involved. The Red Army was hastily withdrawn, in March 1940, when Stalin learned from a spy in the Foreign Office that the UK and France were preparing to come to the aid of the Finns. The Finnish debacle ended the ‘cult of the Civil War’, Stalin’s words, in military thinking. Kliment Voroshilov, commissar for defence, was sacked and replaced by Marshal Timoshenko. He began a huge increase in tank and and aircraft production and trained many more officers, while over 80 per cent of the officers arrested in the purges were reinstated. He also brought back the old uniforms, promoted over a thousand to the rank of general or admiral, decreed that junior officers could no longer criticise superior officers, and began work on fortifying the new border with Germany. Molotov arrived with a Soviet delegation in Berlin on 12 November 1940, and beforehand there had been some discussion about whether the Soviet national anthem, the same as the Internationale, should be played. A wit mentioned that many Berliners would sing along using the German words. Ribbentrop greeted Molotov, of medium build, in a very friendly manner but the Soviet foreign minister only managed a frosty smile on his ‘intelligent, chess player face with his intelligent eyes behind his pince nez’. His ‘presentations were mathematically precise and relentlessly logical’. He revealed some irritation at the sweeping generalities of Hitler and Ribbentrop. Germany’s relationship with Japan was praised warmly, and this was in stark contrast to the meeting with Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka four months later, in March 1941. Ribbentrop talked about Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union expanding southwards and the latter to the open sea. Molotov interjected: ‘Which sea have you in mind?’ Ribbentrop answered, to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. After the war, a new order would be established in Europe and Asia. Molotov wanted to know what role the Soviet Union would play, especially in the

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Balkans, the Black Sea and Turkey. Hitler replied that the Tripartite Pact, signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in September 1940, and later joined by Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Slovakia, would arrange everything according to the interests of the European states. The US will be excluded from Europe, Asia and Africa. Would the Soviet Union join the Tripartite Pact? ‘If we are treated as a partner and not as an object, we can join the Tripartite Pact, but the goals and purpose of the Pact need to be more precisely defined’, replied Molotov. At that moment, the RAF began bombing Berlin and the participants had to repair to a bunker. Molotov requested a long term lease agreement for naval and military bases in the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and if Turkey did not agree the necessary military and diplomatic measures would be taken. Another air raid warning interrupted the reception in the Soviet embassy and Molotov and Ribbentrop had again to repair to the bunker. Schmidt records that the exchanges between Molotov and Hitler were even sharper than those between the Führer and Chamberlain over the Sudetenland. He concluded that the decision to attack the Soviet Union was taken after these encounters (Schmidt 1983: 515–24). The Soviet government sent a revised version of the pact to Berlin in late November. The Germans did not accept the political proposals but did accept the very favourable economic proposals, and an agreement was signed in January 1941. Soviet exports – almost all for developing the military economy – continued until June 1941. Documents reveal that Stalin’s main aim was to agree a new pact defining spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Everything else would be a bonus. In retrospect, Molotov handled the negotiations with Hitler with a lack of diplomatic skill, interjecting with sharp questions and requiring precise answers to his questions. Hitler at times was lost for an answer because he was a generalist, used to making sweeping statements and always thin on details. This was bound to irritate the Führer and Molotov knew this. However, the tactics adopted would have been worked out in detail with Stalin in advance, with Molotov being given little room for manoeuvre. Hitler changed from regarding Stalin as a ‘fine fellow’ in August 1939 to an enemy who had to be crushed in November 1940. Stalin, on the other hand, did not change his view of Hitler treating him as a trusted partner. Soviet–German relations between August 1939 and June 1941 were extensive. There were parades; intelligence cooperation; many German communist exiles were handed over and the Gestapo liquidated them; there was considerable economic cooperation; and even joint naval exercises.

Operation Barbarossa (Red Beard), 22 June 1941 Germany attacked at 3.15 a.m. At 3.25 am Stalin was awakened by Zhukov and told of the attack. Breathing deeply, Stalin did not respond for several minutes. Zhukov enquired if he had understood him and he then responded: ‘This is a German provocation. Do not return fire so as not to provoke greater chaos’.

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The background

The Bolshevik Central Committee met soon afterwards and Stalin repeated that the attack was a German provocation. Molotov was despatched to ask the German ambassador whether Hitler had issued the order. Count von der Schulenburg confirmed that he had and Molotov plaintively asked: ‘What have we done to deserve this?’ At 6.08 a.m. Stalin issued the order to return fire. The only person who was surprised by the German attack was Stalin. Multiple intelligence sources, including spies in the German High Command and Luftwaffe, Richard Sorge in Tokyo, Churchill and even Count von der Schulenburg, had informed him of the impending attack. He treated all these warnings as disinformation. Why? He may have believed that Germany would not attack the Soviet Union before it had defeated the UK, and late June was too late for an offensive in the east. Berlin informed him that the build-up of German forces in Poland was to protect them from British bombing! Between January and May 1941, there had been 157 German reconnaissance flights up to 200 km into Soviet territory and between 1 and 10 April, 47 incursions of fighters and bombers between 90 km and 200 km. Why he believed that he could trust Hitler not to attack still remains a mystery. The Wehrmacht attacked with 3.8 million personnel, 3,500 tanks (tank drivers were given crystal meth, which allowed them to go without sleep for three days and gave other troops suicidal confidence. By 1944, Hitler maintained his confidence with six injections a day but increasingly it was combinations of heroin and methamphetamine) and about 5,000 aircraft. The Red Army counted 2.9 million personnel, 11,000 tanks and over 7,000 aircraft. Soviet personnel were given liberal libations of vodka before battle. What the Germans were unaware of was that the Soviet Union had 22,000 tanks, more than the rest of the world combined. In 1930, a Soviet delegation had visited England and bought the Vickers 6-ton tank and other tanks, cars and tractors. Aleksandr Morozov fashioned the T26 tank from the Vickers model and developed it into the T34, the most formidable tank on the eastern front. Finland joined Barbarossa on 25 June 1941 and the UK declared war on Finland on 5 December 1941 (as well as Hungary and Romania) but the Finns never advanced farther than the territory they had lost in the Winter War. They also declined to cut off food supplies to besieged Leningrad. As well as Romania and Hungary, units from Italy, Croatia, Slovakia and Spain joined the invasion. For Hitler, Barbarossa was not a war of conquest but a Vernichtunskrieg or war of annihilation and envisaged the elimination of all educated Soviet citizens. The Barbarossa Decree, signed on 13 May 1941, permitted soldiers to execute civilians, judged to have committed offences, on the spot. The German High Command issued a Kommissarbefehl (commissar order). on 6 June 1941, which instructed the Wehrmacht to execute any Soviet political commissar and all those prisoners who had been ‘thoroughly bolshevised’ or were Party members or supporters of its ideology. The High Command was quite aware that this order contravened international law and was a war crime. German soldiers were told that the Red Army was composed of Untermenschen (sub-humans) and Asiatic savages, commanded by evil Jewish commissars. A

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Wehrmacht soldier told me that his unit was so sickened by having to execute unarmed Jews, communists and civilians that they decided not to take any prisoners in future. Einsatzgruppen followed the Wehrmacht and the SS and killed every Jew and communist the army had missed. The order stiffened Red Army resistance and after appeals from the military, Hitler cancelled it on 6 May 1942. Soviet losses between June and December 1941 were appalling – 566,000 killed in action; 236,000 dead from non-combat causes; 2.84 million captured; 21,200 aircraft lost and 20,500 tanks destroyed. German losses were also high: 187,000 killed in action; 656,000 wounded; 2,800 aircraft and 2,700 tanks destroyed`. Also 85 per cent of aircraft plant and nine tank factories were overrun and half of all steel production was lost. Stalin ordered the dismantling and transfer to the east of 1,500 factories, and Chelyabinsk and the Urals became great military engineering centres. Sixteen million people were also moved. Morozov supervised the reassembly of these enterprises and they began production once again. It was an astonishing achievement. During the war 3,500 new factories were added. In 1942, the Germans produced 6,200 tanks but the Soviets turned out 24,400. In Nizhny Tagil, the aviation factory produced 15,000 Ilyushin 10 fighters or 10 per cent of Soviet war production. Altogether the USSR produced 20,000 more aircraft and 300,000 more machine guns than Germany. Over 500 engineering enterprises had been built by foreign companies during the 1930s, with the Stalingrad Tractor Plant one of the most famous. The machinery was fabricated in the US, dismantled and reassembled in Stalingrad by US engineers. These enterprises formed the basis of the Soviet war economy. One day Stalingrad produced tractors, the next tanks and artillery. When US engineers suggested innovations to improve efficiency, Stalin rejected them as he was more concerned with power than efficiency. The death toll in World War II topped 70 million, with up to 20 million soldiers on the eastern front and less than 5 million on the western front. The Soviet Union suffered the highest number of casualties: about 27 million, of whom 9 million were military personnel; Germany lost about 5 million military personnel with 7.3 million wounded, and 2 million civilians; Japan 2.3 million military personnel; the US 407,000; the UK 384,000 military and 62,000 civilians; Poland 240,000 military and 5.8 million civilians (of whom about 3 million were Jews). The death toll among the Soviet military was high partly because military discipline was severe. If a soldier did not fire his weapon during an attack he was shot, and more soldiers were executed for various reasons than the total number of US casualties. The Soviets produced 90 per cent of their war matériel and Lend-Lease made up the rest. Of the total $146.5 billion, the US provided $140.6 billion and the UK $32.4 billion. Soviet factories received 1 million machines, 6 million tons of steel and ferrous metal, 1 million miles of telegraph wire, 2.6 million tons of oil and 4 million tons of foodstuffs. The speed of advance by the Red Army was

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The background

facilitated by 400,000 jeeps and trucks and 35,000 motorcycles. The UK supplied, among other things, Hurricanes, Spitfires, medical supplies and 50 million pairs of boots. The Germans pressed the Japanese to attack Siberia after their invasion of the Soviet Union. The Kwantung Army and Foreign Minister Togo were in favour, but the Cabinet stated that the Germans had first to take Stalingrad. The Cabinet preferred the ‘naval school’ of thought which favoured the consolidation of the occupied areas of the Southwest Pacific. On the night of Thursday 4 December 1941, German sentries began to hear an ominous noise. Unbeknownst to them, the Soviets had moved 18 divisions from Siberia wearing winter clothing camouflaged in white, backed by tanks, heavy artillery and aircraft. The Red Army attacked during the night and broke through the Wehrmacht lines (Bodanis 2020: 257). On Sunday 7 December 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor. Then on 11 December 1941 Germany declared war on the United States. In one week, Germany had gone from imminent victory to certain eventual defeat. The battle of Moscow cost the Red Army about a million casualties but it was the critical turning point of the war. Stalingrad (August 1942–February 1943) was the largest and most ferocious battle of the war and led to the destruction of the Wehrmacht’s Sixth Army. Up to 2 million were killed and wounded and 91,000 surrendered, of whom only 6,000 returned to Germany. The weakness of the Sixth Army was that its flanks were protected by Romanian, Hungarian and Italian troops. Their morale was low and one Italian artillery lieutenant, appalled by the way Germans treated women before they killed them, commented that ‘this disqualified them from membership of the human family’. An Italian general wrote that 99 per cent of his men expected to lose the war, but fervently hoped to do so as swiftly as possible. ‘We ceased to be an army and I was no longer with soldiers, but with creatures obedient to a single animal instinct: self-preservation’, commented another officer. The Romanians collapsed: deserting when they could and surrendering en masse when they could not. The Hungarians and Italians fell apart, and this left the German flanks exposed (Bodanis 2020: 264). In the months after the disaster, there were over 2,000 cases of suicide among Wehrmacht soldiers, twice as many as during the first three years of the war. Kursk (July–August 1943) was the greatest ever tank battle, and cost the Soviets 254,000 killed or captured and 609,000 wounded, over 6,000 tanks and more than 1,600 aircraft. The Germans lost 111,000 soldiers killed and over 1,000 tanks. Despite these losses the Soviets regarded it as a victory because afterwards the Wehrmacht never advanced again and thus their slow retreat to Berlin began. The battle of Berlin began on 16 April and ended on 2 May 1945, and the Red Army counted 2.3 million soldiers, but the Wehrmacht now had only 767,000 plus police and other forces. The Soviets had a four to one advantage in tanks and over three to one in aircraft. The Red Army lost 81,000 dead, 281,000 wounded, almost 2,000 tanks and 917 aircraft while German casualties were about 100,000 dead, 220,000 wounded and 480,000 captured.

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Germany surrendered on 8 May (9 May in Moscow). When the Red Army moved into Germany there was one question which puzzled soldiers. Gazing at well kept two- or three-storeyed houses with beautiful lawns, at the excellent roads and industrial infrastructure and the high standard of living, they asked themselves: ‘What did they want from us?’ They never found an answer.

Part II

Descriptive analysis

2

Conflict

The Second Front Germany and the Soviet Union were now locked in a fight to the death. Whichever side won would dominate Europe. Should the UK and the US stand on the side lines or intervene? Harry Truman, the future vice-president and president, expressed himself very forcibly: ‘If we see Germany is winning the war, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we should help Germany and, in that way, let them kill as many as possible.’ However, Truman added he did not want Hitler to win under any circumstances. This presumed that Germany was the stronger power. What if the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were more or less equal? Would it be advisable not to intervene and allow the dictatorships to exhaust one another? Churchill was in no doubt about which policy to adopt. ‘We shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people’, he declared in a radio broadcast at 9 o’clock on the evening of the invasion. ‘This is not a class war, but a war in which the whole British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations is engaged, without distinction of race, creed or party’. Churchill’s loathing and fear of Hitler was summed up in a famous quotation: ‘If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.’ President Roosevelt expressed himself in like vein to Joseph Davies: ‘I can’t take communism nor can you, but to cross this bridge I would hold hands with the Devil’. (In theological terms, the Devil is a cunning, powerful adversary, someone with whom one avoids confrontation. Roosevelt was notoriously unwilling to confront Stalin.) Harry Hopkins was dispatched to meet Stalin in Moscow and on 30 July 1941 he briefed journalists and stated that he had informed Stalin of the US’s resolve to support the USSR with supplies. A proposal by Roosevelt and Churchill for a conference in Moscow was accepted by Stalin and Averell Harriman represented the US, Lord Beaverbrook, the UK and Molotov, the USSR. The conference began on 29 September. Six committees were to be set up to decide what the Soviet Union needed. An agreement was signed on 1 October and promised the Soviet Union 400 aircraft, 500 tanks and 10,000 trucks a month in addition to other supplies. On 6 November 1941, Stalin stated that the US and Great Britain had decided to supply tanks and aircraft but, in addition, DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-4

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Descriptive analysis

Britain had agreed to send aluminium, lead, tin, nickel and rubber. The US had granted a loan of $1 billion. Fine words but the US chiefs of staff, in common with the British, were reluctant to ship weapons to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt pointed out that the Soviets felt they were being promised much and given little. By late September, only $29 million worth of supplies had been delivered. Churchill was the exception and pressed for a landing in northern Norway to link up with the Red Army and deliver every tank and aircraft available, but it was a non-starter as it could not be given air cover. The British establishment and military were cool towards the Soviet Union, but the British people became extraordinarily pro-Soviet. Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, made a speech in which he ruled out a Second Front, and this annoyed Churchill and infuriated Stalin who accused the British government of helping the Nazis and wanting to weaken the Soviet Union. Lord Beaverbrook, minister of supply, and a delegation which included Averell Harriman, set sail for the USSR in September and were told by Stalin

Figure 2.1 Joseph Stalin, c.1942 Source: Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection, LC-USW33–019081-C.

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that the limited supply of war matériel meant that the UK wanted to see his country defeated. Beaverbrook established quite a rapport with Stalin and promised 200 aircraft and 250 tanks a month (which the UK was quite incapable of delivering) and Harriman did the same. Beaverbrook, through his newspapers, became an enthusiastic advocate of a Second Front much to the embarrassment of Churchill. Vyacheslav Molotov visited London, in May 1942, and the Twenty Year Mutual Assistance Agreement between the UK and USSR or Anglo–Soviet Treaty established a political and military alliance during the war and for 20 years afterwards. The Soviets hoped to regain the territories which had been lost during Barbarossa, thereby regaining Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine and Belarus. The UK would receive land and rights to naval bases and the right to pass through the English Channel and the North and Baltic Seas. Molotov then moved on to Washington, pleading for a Second Front, and said that at least 40 German divisions should be confronted on the western front. Roosevelt explained that this would not be logistically possible but that he was trying to convince the generals to land six to ten divisions in France, but it could be another Dunkirk and the loss of 100,000–120,000 men. Sacrifices had to be made to help in 1942 and Molotov pointed out that Germany could be much stronger in 1943. Back in London, Molotov informed Churchill about American proposals for the post-war world which included trusteeships for the Dutch and French empires in Asia and the disarming of all states except Great Britain. Molotov stressed once again that it might be more difficult to launch a cross-Channel attack in 1943 than in 1942 but Churchill would not countenance another Dunkirk and the senseless sacrifice of so many men. In retirement, Molotov conceded that Stalin never believed in a Second Front, in 1942, but his objective was to squeeze as much as possible out of the British and Americans. The Anglo–Soviet Treaty was of great political importance as it cheered people up and meant a lot to them. Pravda trumpeted the fact that a Second Front was being planned and this would create insurmountable problems for the Germans on the eastern front. All this was untrue, but the goal was to boost morale. On the other hand, if the Second Front did not materialise, the British and Americans could be accused of bad faith. In June 1942, Churchill visited Roosevelt at his home, Hyde Park, and told him that the plans for a landing in France were going ahead, something which was quite untrue, but this was what the President wanted to hear. During the meeting, Churchill was informed that Tobruk, in North Africa, had surrendered with the loss of 33,000 men, 2,000 vehicles, 5,000 tons of supplies and 1,400 tons of fuel. Here was the savage reality of fighting the Wehrmacht. In order to help, Roosevelt sent 300 Sherman tanks and 100 self-propelled guns and they played a critical part later in the victory at El Alamein (Hastings 2009, 283–314). In June 1943, Stalin recalled Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador, to Moscow much to the disappointment of Churchill who had struck up a solid working relationship with him. Maisky had made himself ‘much too busy trying to

44

Descriptive analysis

justify the English who are sabotaging the opening of the Second Front’. He was succeeded by Fedor Gusev, who lacked the linguistic skills and demeanour of Maisky and at their first meeting, Churchill stuck a letter which he had received from Stalin bitterly criticising the slow shipment of British supplies, into the envoy’s hand and informed him that he refused to accept such an insulting missive. Gusev had to wait another six months before Churchill would receive him again. The second Moscow conference took place between 12 and 17 August 1942 and was attended by Stalin, Churchill and Averell Harriman. Stalin commented that the military situation was sombre and turned his attention to the Second Front, but Churchill had to disappoint him by saying that after a detailed Anglo-American study the Western Allies were not in a position to launch an attack across the English Channel, in September 1942. Nevertheless, preparations were being made to land 48 divisions in 1943. News about Operation Torch, the planned Anglo–American landings in French North Africa, cheered Stalin up. The Soviet leader then said: ‘May God help this enterprise to succeed’ and he assured Churchill there would be no separate peace with Germany. The next day, Stalin strongly criticised the failure to launch a Second Front in 1942. ‘You British are afraid of fighting. You should not think the Germans are supermen. You will have to fight sooner or later. You cannot win a war without fighting’ (Hastings 2009: 325). Churchill responded by saying he understood the pain of ‘our Russian friends’ that there would be no Second Front in 1942. The British chiefs of staff had ruled it out in December 1941, arguing that Germany had first to be weakened by heavy bombing. The Americans were very generous in promising aid – 8 million tons in 1942– 3 – but delivering it all was not possible. The Soviets complained that the aircraft being delivered by the UK were reconditioned rather than new. On 3 April 1942, Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins and General George Marshall to London and told Churchill that ‘your people and mine demand the establishment of a Second Front to draw off pressure from the Russians … Go to it!’ The British were offered two plans: one an invasion, in 1943, of 30 US and 18 British divisions to take and hold Antwerp: the second would be a September 1942 invasion by mainly British forces supported by 2.5 US divisions. Marshall conceded that it might be difficult to hold territory, but it would be worth the exercise to draw Wehrmacht divisions from the eastern front. However, the British military took a dim of view of sacrificing men in a venture which was certain to fail. Marshall held the view that it was worth paying any price to keep the Soviet Union in the war. General (promoted Field Marshal in 1944) Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, was wary of Marshall, regarding him as a potentially dangerous man but the cold, undemonstrative Marshall gradually came to respect the highly gifted Brooke, who was bilingual in English and French and also spoke German, Persian and Urdu. Undiplomatic and blunt, he spoke rapidly, and the Americans often found it difficult to understand him. His passion was ornithology, but this talented soldier hated war. The idea of a suicidal mission to France was not very appealing. That was the reality, but Churchill

Conflict

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Figure 2.2 General George Marshall in 1944 Source: Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LCUSZ62–61397.

played the politician and waxed eloquently about the prospect of invading France even though he was aware it was not feasible. He maintained this approach right up to D-Day, in June 1944. If the Americans were keen on a Second Front so was the British public and huge demonstrations demanded action. Vice-President Henry Wallace wrote that the ruling class in England did not want to sacrifice too many British men and favoured waiting until the American armies had been trained and losses would then be fifty-fifty. On 20 June 1942, Churchill cabled Roosevelt that plans were being drawn up to land six or eight divisions on the northern French coast, but this was pure fiction. Hopkins and Marshall came again, in July 1942, and pressed for a Second Front. Frustrated, Marshall told Brooke that one cannot win a war by defensive action, but the Cabinet agreed there would be no Second Front in 1942 and instead Marshall agreed to Operation Torch, to begin in November 1942.

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Descriptive analysis

Stalin was informed of the discussions about the Second Front by his British spies. Lavrenty Beria, head of the NKVD (secret police), was a sexual predator with a gargantuan appetite who killed some of his girls during a sexual frenzy, and whose soft hands and cold fishlike eyes behind his pince nez struck Andrei Sakharov at their first meeting. He could have been a gifted scientist but instead preferred to act as Stalin’s hitman. Beria reported on the meetings of Churchill, Marshall and others and their fierce arguments. Marshall had warned the British that if they did not launch an attack in 1942, the US might have to reconsider sending forces to Great Britain and focus its attention on the Pacific. Soviet intelligence often reported falsely that negotiations between the Western Allies and Germany were taking place and this must have increased Stalin’s lack of trust about Allied intentions. One thing Soviet intelligence reported correctly was that Churchill’s opposition to the Second Front was not due to anti-Soviet hostility but was based on military analyses. The Second Front, in 1943, was a non-starter because of the lack of landing craft (Hastings 2009: 321–2). On 13 August 1942, Churchill and Harry Hopkins informed Stalin that there would be no Second Front in 1942, but plans were afoot to launch one in 1943. Stalin disconcerted Churchill by staring at the wall or the floor and never looking his interlocuter in the eye. ‘You British are afraid of fighting. You should not think the Germans are supermen. You will have to fight sooner or later. You cannot win a war without fighting’. Churchill was downcast: ‘Stalin lay back puffing at his pipe, with his eyes half closed, emitting streams of insults’. At a banquet afterwards, Churchill asked Stalin if he was forgiven for his opposition to the Bolsheviks after 1917. ‘It is not for me to forgive. It is for God to forgive’. In Russian this amounted to: ‘I don’t forgive you’. Churchill was struck how often Stalin invoked God, as if he were still a Georgian Orthodox seminarian. On the Second Front, he commented: ‘May God prosper this undertaking’. Churchill relieved his frustration by drinking large amounts of alcohol, but Stalin only drank water. George Kennan, deputy head of the US mission in Moscow, describes what a meeting with Stalin was like. The vozhd never looked anyone in the eye and held his head on one side, giving the impression that he was suspicious of his interlocutor. At conferences he was affable and reasonable and gave the impression that he was a great leader. The other side of Stalin was revealed at Potsdam when an assistant did or said something he did not approve of: he would turn on them with his yellowish eyes and terrify them. British, Canadian, US, Free French, Polish and Czechoslovak forces, about 10,500 strong, launched a raid on Dieppe, France, on 19 August 1942 with air and naval support. Initial losses were so high that the whole operation was abandoned after six hours, and of the 6,086 men who made it ashore, 3,623 were killed, wounded or captured. The Royal Air Force lost 106 aircraft, but the Luftwaffe only 48 and the Royal Navy lost 33 landing craft and one destroyer. Dieppe was the stark reality of what happened when confronting German military might. On the eastern front, in 1943, over 2 million Red Army

Conflict

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soldiers and millions of civilians died but only 70,000 British and US troops and aircrew were lost. Stalin and Roosevelt wanted a Second Front and Churchill was forced to accept it at the Tehran conference (28 November–1 December 1943). Afterwards he had to conceal his reluctance and support the cross-Channel invasion but he had the jitters all the time. Ever since the 18th century Britain, a small island nation, had always preferred a ‘peripheral strategy’. This involved the Royal Navy wearing down a numerically superior opponent, especially in the Mediterranean, before tackling its armies on the European mainland with coalition warfare. The Americans, on the other hand, believed in a ‘continental strategy’ – a massive clash of land forces to destroy the enemy head on. Churchill would have preferred an advance into Central Europe to pre-empt a Soviet occupation of it. General Sir Alan Brooke wrote in his diary on 5 June: ‘I am very uneasy about the whole operation. At the best, it will come far short of the expectations of the bulk of the people … At its worst, it may well be the most ghastly disaster of the whole war’. Churchill expressed himself very graphically when commenting on his relationship with Stalin: Trying to maintain good relations with a communist is like wooing a crocodile, you do not know whether to tickle it under the chin or beat it on the head. When it opens its mouth, you cannot tell if it is trying to smile or preparing to eat you. He was acutely aware of his weak position: There I sat with the great Russian bear (Ursus major) on one side of me, with paws outstretched, and on the other side the great American buffalo, and between the two sat the poor little English donkey who was the only one … who knew the right way home. (Hastings 2009: 435) Anthony Eden found Stalin creepy and chilling. He never wasted a word. He never stormed, he was seldom even irritated … calm, never raising his voice, he avoided the repeated negatives of Molotov which were so exasperating to listen to. By more subtle methods, he got what he wanted without having seemed so obdurate. (Hastings 2009: 432) A master diplomat. Eden was unaware that Stalin had detailed intelligence of British and American military disputes and political tactics as well as eavesdropping on their conversations both inside and outside the conference rooms and bedrooms.

48

Descriptive analysis

Operation Overlord, the most ambitious military operation the world had ever seen, began on 6 June 1944, D-Day, with 7,700 ships and 12,000 aircraft and about 156,000 troops landing in France under the supreme commander General Eisenhower. Between 6 June and 30 August, the Allies suffered 209,000 casualties and the Germans 216,000. A major problem was battle shock or combat fatigue – there were 30,000 cases in the US 1st Army alone. There were very few casualties on the German side as battle fatigue was not recognised and if a soldier shot himself in the foot or hand he was shot. A vital contribution to the success of D-Day was the Allies’ command of the sea, which enabled them to transfer vast resources of men and matériel to Europe, almost uninterrupted. Germany was a land power, but the UK and US were sea powers (Mawdsley 2019: 164). Stalin, on hearing of the planned invasion, mocked the Allies: Yes, there’ll be a landing, if there is no fog. Until now there was always something that interfered. I suspect that tomorrow it will be something else. Maybe they’ll meet up with some Germans! What if they meet up with some Germans? Maybe there won’t be a landing then, but just promises as usual. (Hastings 2009: 486–7)

Poland Russia and Poland have experienced a fractious relationship over the centuries. The countries were at war between 1605 and 1618, and in 1610 Polish forces entered Moscow. This resulted in Prince Władysław of Poland being elected Tsar but in the following year Kuzma Minin, a butcher in Nizhny Novgorod, and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky formed a volunteer army to rid the country of the Poles and they were driven out of Moscow, in 1612. Mikhail Romanov was elected Tsar of Russia in 1613, thus beginning the Romanov dynasty which remained in power until 1917. One of the goals of the Poles had been to convert Russians from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism, which Russians found especially repugnant. There were three partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795 by Prussia, Austria and Russia, and the final one saw the disappearance of the Polish state. About 10,000 Poles joined Napoleon’s Grande Armée in its invasion of Russia in 1812. The Republic of Poland was founded on 11 November 1918, the date of the armistice which ended World War I, and defeated the Red Army in 1920, in the battle of Warsaw. The UK had gone to war because of Poland but there was no way that it could come to the aid of the suffering nation. Poles were and still feel bewildered by being abandoned in their hour of greatest peril. Churchill even commented that the Red Army should stay in eastern Poland. In March 1942, he wrote to Roosevelt that the Allies should concede Soviet demands for the recognition of their 1941 frontiers. This was something he had vehemently rejected a year earlier. One of the reasons for this was the fear that the Soviet Union might seek a separate peace with Germany.

Conflict

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In April 1943, the Germans announced the discovery of the bodies of 22,000 Polish military and police officers and members of the intelligentsia, murdered by the NKVD in April and May 1940, at Katyn, near Smolensk. Lavrenty Beria, on 5 March 1940, had proposed that all captured Polish officers be shot and this was confirmed by the Communist Party Politburo. Churchill conceded to General Sikorski, the Polish military leader in London, that the allegations were probably true. He wanted the matter hushed up for fear of angering the Soviets but the Polish government in exile in London was incensed and demanded an independent enquiry by the International Red Cross. Stalin responded by severing relations with the London Polish government in exile and began setting up a pro-communist Polish government. Churchill thereafter expended great energy and time in trying to avoid Poland falling into the Soviet ambit, but geography was not on his side. Imperial Russia had ruled part of Poland until 1917 and Moscow was mindful that Warsaw had sided often with Germany before 1939. One of the goals of the Soviet Union, when invited to sign the Tripartite Pact in 1940, had been to ensure that Eastern Europe fell within its zone of influence as control of Poland was indispensable for Soviet security needs. Churchill was also aware that Russia regarded itself as the ‘mother country’ entrusted with the security of all Slav states there (Romania, Hungary and Albania are not Slav states, but Romania is also an Orthodox country). Marxism reinforced this goal. Joseph Davies, in 1941–3, played an unofficial role as the personal liaison between the White House and the Soviet embassy in Washington and served as a direct channel through which representatives of the Soviet Union could express their views to the President and the President and the administration could explain their policies to the Soviets. The President sent Joseph Davies on a second mission to Moscow, in May 1943, as he wanted to discuss matters with Stalin face to face. Stalin agreed a meeting in Fairbanks, Alaska, on 15 July or 15 August 1943 but it never materialised. This was fortunate for Churchill as Roosevelt and Stalin would have discussed the future shape of the world and reached decisions inimical to Churchill’s interests. The President once told Churchill that he could personally handle Stalin better than either the Foreign Office or the US State Department. The US chiefs of state did not concur and in private conceded that no one in the West really knew which direction Soviet policy would take. Churchill wanted the Polish 2nd Army Corps to help in the invasion of Italy, in September 1943, but General Anders, commander of Polish forces, was deeply worried about the whereabouts of the 15,000 Polish troops captured by the Red Army in September 1939. Churchill informed Anders that he had received categoric assurances from Stalin that they were alive and well despite knowing this to be untrue. When the full horror of the fate of these soldiers became known, Churchill never apologised for misleading Anders, an omission resented by the Polish government in exile and which still rankles today. At the Tehran conference, Churchill was dismayed by Roosevelt’s seeming indifference to Poland and Eastern Europe and his willingness to endorse almost

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Descriptive analysis

everything Stalin proposed. Sergo Beria, Lavrenty’s son, was in charge of bugging the meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt. When Churchill complained that Stalin was preparing to install a pro-communist government in Poland, Roosevelt replied that he could not object because Churchill was trying to install a pro-Western government there. The Polish government in exile strongly rejected the moving of the frontiers to the west and kept on arguing for something to be done about the Katyn massacre, but British public opinion was against them. Their hostility to the Soviet Union was self-defeating. The attempt by the Polish Home Army to take Warsaw before the Red Army reached it, which began on 1 August 1944, lasted 63 days and reduced almost all of the city to rubble, was a disastrous failure. With the Red Army on the outskirts of Warsaw, the Home Army deemed it feasible to take the city as German troops were withdrawing. Soviet documents reveal that Stalin ordered the Red Army to halt its offensive and not to provide any help to the Home Army, whereupon the Wehrmacht returned to Warsaw. Churchill implored Stalin to come to their aid but he assumed that the uprising had been promoted by London in order to set up a pro-Western Polish government. There was even a plan floated to fly in a Polish parachute brigade from England. Aircraft from Italian and British bases, suffering considerable losses when flying over German controlled territory, did deliver munitions, money, gold and food to the insurgents but perhaps 90 per cent fell into German hands. The Soviets did relent in September and permitted their airfields to be used but by then it was too late. Polish resistance suffered a devastating loss and smoothed the way for a communist takeover. At the Fourth Moscow conference, in October 1944, Churchill produced his ‘naughty document’, later known as the Percentages Agreement. He recognised Soviet interests in Poland; in Romania, the Soviets would control 90 per cent and 75 per cent of Hungary and Bulgaria. The West would have 90 per cent of Greece and Yugoslavia would be split 50–50. Stalin put a large tick on it. The Americans were not present and not even informed, which infuriated Roosevelt and he gave Churchill a dressing down on Romania. To him, it was another example of Churchill’s desire for bilateral agreements and the Americans did not confirm the agreement. The reason why Churchill embarked on slicing up the region (Poland was not included) was that he had learnt that the Germans were preparing to evacuate Athens and he was determined that Greece should not fall into communist hands. The Polish Provisional Government (dubbed the Lublin Poles by the Allies) and the Polish government in exile were present but kept apart. The London Poles irritated Churchill as they would not accept the movement of the frontiers and were hostile to Soviet plans. To him, they were playing into Stalin’s hands as the Red Army was physically in control of Poland. Stalin suggested a few portfolios for the London Poles, but real power remained with the communists. So the London Poles rejected the offer. Churchill did not mince words when reporting to King George VI: ‘Our lot, from London … are a decent but feeble lot of fools, but the delegation from Lublin seem to be the greatest villains

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imaginable’. Anthony Eden later conceded that ‘there is nothing we can do for the poor Poles’. At the Yalta conference, in February 1945, the Allies accepted the Curzon line (1941 frontier in the east) and as this involved a substantial loss of territory, Poland’s western border was moved to the Oder-Neisse line at the expense of Germany. Where exactly the border should be was not agreed but by the time the Big Three assembled at Potsdam, in July–August 1945, the Red Army had occupied the eastern part of Germany and had installed a pro-Soviet provisional government. This was accepted by the Allies, but the northern part of East Prussia passed to the Soviet Union as part of the Russian Federation. Its residents had been forbidden by Hitler to flee and a Wehrmacht soldier told me the East Prussians, predominantly Lutheran, were 105 per cent Nazi. (Contrast this with Aachen, a Roman Catholic city near the borders of Belgium and the Netherlands, where traditional support for the Nazis was low. Hitler ordered their evacuation because he feared they would welcome the Allies as liberators.) A future peace conference was to decide on the precise border between Poland and Germany. Ethnic Germans were to be deported from the lands occupied by Poland, but a small minority still remains to the present day. In treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, in 1970, the Federal Republic of Germany recognised the Oder-Neisse line as the legal frontier. This was reconfirmed during negotiations which led to the unification of Germany (the German Democratic Republic was subsumed in the Federal Republic of Germany) in 1990. At Yalta, free elections in Poland were agreed but this aim was never honoured. Stalin commented to Marshal Zhukov: Churchill wants a bourgeois Poland to be the USSR’s neighbour, a Poland that would be hostile to us. We want to ensure a friendly Poland once and for all, and that is what the Polish people want as well. Sixteen members of the Polish resistance had been invited for talks by the Soviets but were immediately arrested, with General Okulicki dying in the Lubyanka in Moscow. Churchill was enraged about what was going on in Poland, which was a flagrant breach of the Yalta agreement. He drafted a stinging telegram to Stalin about the reports of deportations, liquidations and other oppressive measures which ‘were being put into practice on a wide scale by the Warsaw administration against those likely to disagree with them’. Roosevelt rejected the tone of the message and proposed a ‘political truce’ with Moscow. All Churchill’s entreaties for a firm stand against Moscow were rejected as was his view that the Yalta agreement was not being honoured (Hastings 2009, 556–8).

3

Operation Unthinkable and Operation Pincher: World War III?

Victory imbued the Soviet Union with a conviction that it could achieve anything through sacrifice and it could not be defeated militarily, something which Churchill found utterly alarming. As diplomacy had failed to prevent the Soviet juggernaut from acting as it thought fit, the only way to turn the Red Army back to its own frontier was by military force. On 12 May 1945, he cabled President Truman that an iron curtain had descended on territory occupied by the Red Army and the ‘Muscovite advance into central Europe was taking place. In a very short period of time, if the Russians choose, they can advance to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic’. Out of this fear, Operation Unthinkable was conceived. Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke held that the Soviet Union could not fail to become the main threat in 15 years’ time. The Foreign Office disagreed and believed that a future Soviet threat could easily be contained by the West. It held that Stalin would seek an accommodation with the West for another ten years to repair the immense damage the country had suffered during the war. Countries which bordered on the Soviet Union would be friendly, but Stalin would not insist on their having communist governments. Poland could become genuinely independent and have close, friendly relations with the USSR. Churchill, in a conversation with Sir Arthur Harris, commander in chief, Bomber Command, mused about what would lie between the white snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover, now that German cities lay in ruins. Harris wondered whether the Soviets would advance and conquer Europe in a way the Mongols had never done. ‘Who can say?’, Churchill replied, ‘they may not want to. But there is an unspoken fear in people’s hearts’. Churchill failed to attend President Roosevelt’s funeral, possibly out of pique that the President consistently failed to support him against Stalin. He was aware that the new president was more critical of the Soviet leader than his predecessor and had remarked that neither he nor Hitler honoured their pledged word. The Red Army took Vienna, on 13 April, and occupied the eastern part of Austria. With US and British forces in western Austria it was agreed there would be a four-power occupation as in Germany. Vienna was divided into four sectors, Soviet, American, British and French as in Berlin. Stalin set up a provisional government in Austria headed by the socialist Karl DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-5

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Renner and including some moderates but mainly staffed by local communists. Allied representatives were denied access to Vienna to help with the delineation of the sectors and Allied forces were not granted access to the Soviet zone. Churchill asked his chiefs of staff, chaired by Field Marshal Brooke, to ‘assess Britain’s potential ability to exert pressure on Russia by the threat or use of force’. Their task was to calculate the likelihood of success of a pre-emptive strike by British and US forces against the Soviet Union within two months of the end of the war. The goal was to recover Polish territory and then penetrate the USSR. The defeat of the Red Army would permit the Western Allies to reshape post-war Europe. The date chosen was 1 July 1945 on the assumption that Germany would surrender on 30 June. The planners considered it a ‘hazardous undertaking’ and offered two hypotheses: one a swift military success achieved by forces from the British Empire, the US, Poland and Germany, and the second, based on failure to achieve a rapid success, would result in ‘total war’ which would continue until the Soviet Union was defeated. The element of surprise would be limited as Soviet agents would be able to observe the preparations for an offensive in northern Europe. it was assumed that the Czech army would fight with the Soviets. The US, British and Polish air forces counted 6,714 tactical or fighter aircraft but the Red Air Force had 16,500 aircraft and excluding the US, only 47 divisions would be available, ten of which would be German. There were about 3 million US officers and men in the European theatre. Facing them were 6 million Soviet forces and an additional 600,000 NKVD (secret police) troops available. The odds were two to one in armour and four to one in infantry in favour of the Soviets. A massive tank battle, perhaps eclipsing Kursk, was expected in Poland (Walker 2013: 55–6). If a swift military success eluded the Allies, total war would be inevitable. What plan should they follow – Barbarossa Mark II? The Soviets would attack Finland and Norway and also Turkey and Greece. Iran and Iraq could be taken quickly. President Truman was not as accommodating to the Soviets as his predecessor. If they did not turn up in San Francisco to discuss the formation of the United Nations, he said, ‘they can go to hell’. Molotov could not be moved on Poland and he described his brief as expanding the borders of the Motherland. The wartime alliance with the West was expedient but he and many in the Soviet leadership thought war in the future was inevitable. A British diplomat remarked ruefully that he had the ‘grace and conciliation of a totem pole’. There were 46 states represented at San Francisco, but Poland was not invited as the West still recognised the Polish government in exile as the legitimate government and an invitation could annoy Stalin. The secretary general of the conference was the American diplomat Alger Hiss, who was a Soviet agent. Decrypted messages revealed that Hiss, involved in preparations for the Yalta conference, had been a member of a Soviet spy ring at the conference. Meanwhile Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin lamenting the lack of progress in forming a more democratic government for Poland. He also enquired about the 16-member Polish underground delegation which the Soviets had invited for

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talks, but no reply was forthcoming. He also complained that events in Yugoslavia did not reflect the 50–50 agreement which had been agreed in Moscow. William Joyce, dubbed ‘Lord Haw Haw’, the British traitor who had been broadcasting from Germany, in his last message, prophesised that the end of the war in Germany would result in Europe being defenceless against Stalin ‘without the help of the German legions’. On 3 May, in San Francisco, Molotov remarked to Edward Stettinius, the US secretary of state, ‘By the way, Mr Stettinius, about those sixteen Poles; they have all been arrested by the Red Army’ and then walked away. Stalin then informed Churchill that the Poles had engaged in subversive activities behind Soviet lines and had illegal radio transmitters which was prohibited. General Okulicki was dubbed an ‘odious character’ by Polish media. The threat of the Red Army advancing into Denmark alarmed Churchill as Soviet parachutists had already been dropped near Copenhagen. Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces were ordered to prevent Soviet access to the Danish peninsula and managed to get to Lübeck 12 hours ahead of the Red Army. Admiral Karl Dönitz, Hitler’s chosen successor, surrendered to the Americans at Reims, France, and the surrender officially came into effect on 8 May, dubbed VE Day, which permitted Churchill to proclaim that the war was over. Stalin insisted that there should be another ‘unconditional surrender’ in Berlin to the Red Army. Shortly before 1 a.m. on 9 May, Marshal Zhukov, in the presence of the British and US commanders, accepted the surrender of Field Marshal Keitel. Defeat had a devastating impact on the Wehrmacht as 53 of its 554 generals and 11 of the 53 admirals of the Kriegsmarine committed suicide. The same occurred among civilians and in one town north of Berlin about a thousand out of a population of 15,000 killed themselves. Many of those who had committed crimes did not wait for retribution while completely innocent people lost the will to live. Joseph Goebbels, in 1943, had declared that the German people could be made aware of what was happening to Jews. Military personnel in the Soviet Union sent home huge amounts of film and photos to be developed in Germany and this revealed to those who saw the material the brutality and illegality of what was happening in the east. Colonel General Friedrich Fromm, the head of armaments supply to the Wehrmacht, in September 1942 laid out in great detail why Germany could not now achieve victory and why, unless Hitler procured a peace, Germany faced total destruction. Clearly, if Fromm said it many military and supply men knew it. In March 1945, Dönitz refused to contemplate surrender – he had already lost two submariner sons. ‘Above all’, he wrote, ‘our honour demands we fight to the last. Our pride rebels against crawling before a people like the Russians or the sanctimony, arrogance and lack of culture of the Anglo-Saxons’. After the failure of the Ardennes offensive, Hitler informed his entourage: ‘We will not capitulate ever. We may go down, but we will take the world down with us’. Why did the top military leadership not assassinate Hitler and negotiate an end to the war when they knew they could not win? Because many of them shared Hitler’s view of the world.

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Dönitz had sacked prominent Nazis and cobbled together an administration which he hoped would be acceptable to the British and Americans and Churchill made use of it, under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, in the chaos which followed defeat. Poland did not celebrate. Between 1939 and 1946, its population declined from 35 million to 24 million and its territory by 25 per cent. The mood in Moscow was one of jubilation and John F. Kennedy, a young naval officer who was involved in the Pacific war, wrote that ‘Russia needs peace more than anything else and no government which is hostile to Russia will be permitted in the countries along her borders’. Kennedy believed the Soviets felt they had earned the right to security and that they would achieve it, come what may (Walker 2013: 93). The US now regarded the USSR as a more important ally than the UK, and Truman confided to his wife that he found Churchill as ‘exasperating’ as the Soviets. A British report concluded that the danger of a resurgent Germany meant that the Soviet Union’s occupation of Eastern Europe would be permanent unless the West maintained a foothold in Poland, Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia. Churchill warned Truman that if matters were not settled with the Soviet Union before the withdrawal of US troops from Europe, there would be no chance of a satisfactory solution to the Polish and other problems and little to prevent World War III. A meeting of the Big Three in Germany was urgently needed. Churchill cabled Truman that an iron curtain had already been drawn on the Soviet front and, if the Red Army chose, it could advance to the North Sea and the Atlantic. Tito was keen to expand Yugoslav frontiers into Italy, Austria, Hungary and Greece, and the moment had come for the US and the UK to stop him, if necessary, by force. Field Marshal Brooke got the impression Churchill wanted another war, even one involving Russia! The strong headed General George Patton declared that the Allied Third Army could thrash the Red Army and it would be advisable to take on the Soviet Union immediately as casualties would be smaller than in the future. However, the average GI did not agree and estimated that in a fight the Allies would come off second best. The Red Army would be willing to sacrifice many men and there were few GIs who would be willing to sacrifice their lives. On 14 May, Field Marshal Montgomery, bereft of ‘people skills’, came to see Churchill at 10 Downing Street and was ordered not to destroy the weapons of the 2 million Germans who had surrendered on 4 May. Everything had to be kept, as ‘we might have to fight the Russians with German help. This is Himmler’s view’. Churchill also requested General Eisenhower to preserve captured weapons in his zone and he concurred stating that such destruction would be against the Act of Surrender. The Dönitz government was becoming an embarrassment as other top Nazis were being taken into custody. As a result, on 23 May, they were all arrested, and Himmler committed suicide in Allied custody. Even the mild mannered deputy prime minister Clement Attlee complained that the Soviets were acting in a ‘perfectly bloody way’ and setting up puppet governments as far west as they could. Truman’s advisers, James F. Byrnes, his secretary of state, and Joseph Davies, counselled a softer line and

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Harry Hopkins was to go to Moscow to tell Stalin in diplomatic language that the US would carry out its Yalta obligations and expected the Soviet Union to do the same. If Stalin was obdurate, Hopkins could use a ‘baseball bat if he thought that was a proper approach to Mr Stalin’. This was totally against Hopkins’s style as he had always behaved as a gentleman when meeting the vozhd. Indeed, so close was the relationship that some in Washington regarded him as a Soviet spy. The British coalition government collapsed on 23 May, a general election was scheduled for 5 July and the results declared three weeks later. While Attlee and his close associates were in favour of Operation Unthinkable, the vast majority of Labour members of parliament would have been totally against it. The planners delivered their report on 24 May, and after perusing it Brooke thought the whole idea fantastic and the chances of success quite impossible. The gloomy conclusion was that from now onwards ‘Russia is all powerful in Europe’. On 6 June, Hopkins was back and reported on his meeting with Stalin, who had suggested four London Poles travel to Moscow for discussions and the 16 Polish underground leaders would now only be charged with operating illegal radio transmitters. On Poland, Stalin had stated that the Soviet Union wanted a friendly Poland, but Great Britain wanted to resurrect a cordon sanitaire on Soviet borders. Stalin maintained that London did not favour a Poland friendly to the Soviet Union, but Hopkins responded by saying the US favoured friendly countries all along the Soviet borders. From Truman’s point of view, it was now up to the British, Soviets and Poles to agree on a government. London had a European policy and the US did not wish to be drawn into it. Joseph Davies, regarded as anti-British, was sent to tell Churchill that the US would not permit the UK to draw upon American manpower and resources to re-establish its position in Europe. Eden thought Davies a ‘vain amateur’ and represented an anti-imperialist faction in Washington which would gladly have given the Soviet Union Europe so that the US could stay out of its squabbles (Walker 2013: 105). The final report on Unthinkable landed on Churchill’s desk on 8 June; the numbers of Allied forces had grown from 47 divisions to 103 (64 US, 35 British and 4 Polish) and the Red Army’s strength from 170 to 264 divisions. The Soviets would enjoy air superiority, but although the Allies would be masters of the sea this meant the Allies could not achieve a swift success. Truman withdrew US forces to their zones and declined to use them as a bargaining chip to solve other problems. Even worse for Churchill, Montgomery, tired of guarding captured German ordnance, ordered its destruction. Combined Staff Planners (US and UK) calculated that 1.6 million US troops and 396,000 British troops would be moved from Europe to the Pacific in the six months after VE Day. If Unthinkable were launched, these troop movements would have to be halted and less emphasis placed on defeating Japan. Churchill finally got three London Poles to join the Polish provisional government (there were 20 ministers) but they occupied minor portfolios. On 18 June, the day of the first meeting of the new Polish government, the trial of the

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16 underground Poles began in Moscow, and it was a show trial. All but three were imprisoned, and several, including General Okulicki, would die in prison. Montgomery was warned not to communicate to the Poles that the Allies were preparing to recognise the new Polish provisional government. President Truman unwillingly sailed across the Atlantic to meet Stalin at Potsdam, just outside Berlin, and rejected Churchill’s invitation to drop in for a chat before the final meeting of the Big Three as it might give Stalin the idea the British and Americans were ganging up on him. A British general remarked that since he had seen Stalin at Tehran, 18 months previously, his hair had turned as white as his tunic (Walker 2013: 126). He also suffered a mild heart attack and the conference could only start on 17 July. He made a good impression on Truman at his first meeting: ‘I can deal with Stalin. He is honest – but smart as hell’. There were constant interruptions as delegates made for the toilets, plagued by diarrhoea. At 5.29 a.m. on 16 July, ‘Fat Man’, a plutonium bomb, was exploded in the New Mexico desert and initiated the atomic age. Trinity was a success and as Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, observed, quoting the Bhagavad Gita, the world would henceforth never be the same: ‘Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds’. On 18 July, Truman informed Churchill about Trinity but Stalin would not be informed until 24 July. When Truman informed Stalin, he remarked that he was glad to hear of it and hoped the Americans would make good use of it against the Japanese, but of course he was being well informed about the progress of the Manhattan Project from his atomic spies. Truman was stunned by Stalin’s lack of reaction. Churchill agreed with him the bomb should be used against Japan. Stalin later commented: ‘They slay the Japanese and bully us. Once more everything is done in secret’. The Soviet military were horrified and the General Staff had their heads in their hands, according to Andrei Gromyko in his memoirs. After an existential struggle against Germany, the Soviet Union again faced the nightmare of an attack which could wipe out cities and industries. Mistrust of the Allies mounted. The bomb lifted the clouds of gloom which enveloped Churchill and the feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union disappeared. Brooke thought he got carried away and talked about blotting out Moscow, Stalingrad, Kiev, Kuibyshev, Kharkov and Sebastopol. The military were doubtful about the effect of nuclear bombs, but Churchill was more perceptive and saw that they changed the balance of power. The British general election resulted in Clement Attlee becoming prime minister and Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary. Compared to Churchill and Eden they were chalk and cheese. Attlee, a major in World War I and the product of a public school, looked like a provincial bank manager. As such, he was the master of detail. Bevin, a former trade union leader who had spent his career battling communists, was blunt to the point of rudeness and quite the opposite of the suave, patrician Eden. After visiting the US for the first time, Bevin was asked for his impressions and replied that the newspapers were too large and

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lavatory paper too small! He was pro-American, a supporter of the British Empire, a shrewd judge of Soviet aspirations in Europe and beyond, an enthusiastic supporter of military power and the atomic bomb, and wanted the UK to have its own with the ‘bloody Union Jack flying on top of it’. As such he encountered much opposition within the Labour Party, many of whom wanted to steer a middle course between the Soviet Union and the US. The prospect of having to invade Japan was daunting for the Americans. Okinawa had cost 49,000 casualties of whom 12,520 were killed. The kamikaze attacks sank 36 ships, including 12 destroyers, and cost another 4,900 sailors killed or drowned, and 763 aircraft were lost. The Japanese losses were greater; about 110,000 soldiers died and it was the bloodiest battle of the Pacific war and the second bloodiest of World War II after the Battle of the Bulge for the Americans. There were an estimated 2 million troops in mainland Japan and fire bombing of Japanese cities had caused horrendous casualties but had no

Figure 3.1 Ernest Bevin Source: © Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy.

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impact on Japanese military morale. The US calculated that only an invasion would force the Japanese to surrender. Former president Herbert Hoover warned Truman that an invasion would cost between half a million and a million lives. The Americans had broken the Japanese codes and knew they were massing on Kyushu beaches for a possible US assault. The codebreakers could detect no mood of pessimism and the conclusion was that the Japanese would fight to the bitter end and take as many Americans as they could with them. The decision to drop the bomb was taken while Truman was at Potsdam, and it was to be dropped after 3 August. The President was happy to hand control to the military. Washington was aware of tentative attempts by some civilian officials in Tokyo to request the Soviet Union to mediate. They were seeking terms which did not involve surrender, occupation or any change in the Imperial system, but these terms were completely unacceptable to the Allies. The Potsdam declaration had called for immediate and unconditional surrender, but the Japanese prime minister concluded that ‘if we hold firm, then they will yield before us’ (Miscamble 2011: 80). The Japanese military believed that the huge casualties the Americans would suffer would result in the population growing weary of war and agreeing terms. On 6 August, the ‘Little Boy’ uranium bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, but Oppenheimer questioned the morality of using such a weapon. Truman called him a ‘cry baby’ but on his deathbed was still seeking confirmation that he had been right in doing so. When the foreign minister visited Emperor Hirohito on 8 August, he advocated an end to the war. The emperor agreed because of the destructive power of the atomic bomb which had devastated Hiroshima on 6 August. He took this decision the day before the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and attacked, and this revealed that it was the bomb which convinced him to give up. On 9 August, the Americans dropped a powerful plutonium bomb on Nagasaki. The emperor declared the war over on 2 September, but did not concede defeat. The problem was that the military resolutely opposed surrender, but the emperor overruled them. However, some military officers targeted the prime minister and others, and tried to seize and destroy the recordings of the emperor’s broadcast. Other troops occupied the Imperial Palace grounds and killed a top general. Officers loyal to the emperor suppressed the attempted coup but it was a close-run thing (Miscamble 2011: 105). Troops in the Filipino capital Manila refused to surrender and engaged in fighting which devastated the beautiful Spanish colonial city. The bombs killed an estimated 180,000 Japanese but the actions saved the lives of the 144,000 Allied prisoners in Japanese hands. They were informed that if the Americans invaded they would all be shot and many of them had already been obliged to dig their own graves. How did the Soviets react to the dropping of the atomic bombs? Molotov regarded the dropping of the first bomb as a warning to the Soviet Union and the second one as a warning not to invade Japan. Yuly Khariton, a nuclear

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scientist, also saw the Hiroshima bomb as nuclear blackmail and a threat to unleash a terrible, destructive war (Walker 2013: 128). Stalin’s suspicions of British imperialist ambitions after the war were increased by a copy of a secret document on the security of the British Empire, dated 29 June 1945, procured by one of his spies in the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) or the Foreign Office. It was not as stark as Operation Unthinkable, the US was not enlisted, but revealed the country’s imperialist ambitions. Stalin was informed about the telegrams between Churchill and Truman and became aware of their tactics over Poland. During the autumn of 1945, various US planners began to think about postwar American military strategy. There was no liaison with their British counterparts because as Harry Hopkins put it, one would have thought that the main potential enemy was the British but by the end of 1945, cooperation was becoming the norm. The Americans concluded that the Red Army could easily overrun Western Europe and the Middle East at any time before 1948. The only way to counter this conventional superiority was to deploy nuclear bombs, and 20 Soviet cities were chosen for obliteration. In November 1945, the US Department of State discovered that Red Army soldiers, in civilian clothes, were aiding Azeri rebels whose goal was secession from Iran and uniting with the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. This led to planning of a conventional war with the Soviet Union. On 2 March 1946, the US Joint War Plans Committee produced a draft of Operation Pincher. Whereas Operation Unthinkable singled out Poland as the main target, Pincher targeted the Middle East. This was due to the recognition that the Soviet Union had established its cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe but would now seek to penetrate countries on its southern periphery. The two key countries were Turkey and Iran and a confrontation there could lead to World War III. A war was expected between 1946 and 1949 but as tensions rose in 1946, it was assumed it could break out at any time. The threat of a Soviet invasion of Turkey was real to the US planners in 1946, and it is possible that because Soviet spies provided Stalin with the evidence that such an invasion would be met with US military force, that he desisted and the tension dissipated. Truman called Soviet behaviour in Poland outrageous and the Foreign Office changed tack and saw Turkey, the Mediterranean and Iran vulnerable. In March 1946, the US planners delivered the final version of Operation Pincher. The Soviets had 51 divisions in Germany and Austria, 50 in the Middle East, and 20 in Hungary and Yugoslavia. These troops were reinforced by a reserve of 152 divisions in the Soviet Union and 87 divisions in pro-Soviet Eastern European states. This force could reach the Channel ports within a month and US troops would have to retreat to Spain or Italy to avoid colossal losses. The Strait of Gibraltar would obviously be a target as it controlled access to the western Mediterranean and in this eventuality US troops would have to be evacuated to the UK. In Asia, South Korea and Manchuria would also fall. Allied forces would need to be sent to the Middle East, and the planners concluded that Stalin’s objective was to dominate the world.

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The threat of conflict with Tito in Venezia Giulia, northeast Italy, brought British and American military planners together for the first time in August 1946, and the British revealed details of Operation Unthinkable for the first time and the Americans likewise of Operation Pincher. The Americans regarded a conflict with the Soviet Union as imminent. The deployment of atomic bombs was not integrated into plans. Anyway, by late 1946 the US only possessed nine atomic bombs (Walker 2013: 141). In 1949, Operation Dropshot was the contingency plan of the US Department of Defense for a possible conventional and nuclear war with the Soviet Union in order to counter the anticipated Soviet takeover of Western Europe, the Middle East and parts of Asia, expected to begin in 1957. Three hundred atomic bombs and 20,000 high explosive bombs would devastate 100 Soviet cities and wipe out 85 per cent of the Soviet industrial potential. NSC-68 was drafted in 1950, approved by the President in 1951 and established a framework for US defence which lasted for most of the Cold War. The language was dramatic. The ‘issues that face us are momentous involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of the Republic but civilization itself’. It called for a great increase in defence spending to contain the expansionary policies of the Soviet Union. The goal was to build a coalition of the willing nations to halt the expansion of communism and if this did not happen, the USSR could develop to the point where no coalition of the willing could oppose it. The beginning of the Korean War provided the necessary impetus. Defence spending was 5 per cent of GDP in 1950 but climbed to 14.2 per cent in 1953. Operations Unthinkable, Pincher and Dropshot were the grandfathers of NSC68 and the latter ignited the nuclear arms race.

Could the Soviet Union have occupied Western and Southern Europe in 1945? Based on the analysis above it is clear that the Allies did not believe they could prevent the Soviet occupation of the rest of Europe. When Truman congratulated Stalin on reaching Berlin, he replied that Tsar Alexander I had reached Paris. Did this mean that he had a similar ambition? Knowing that his military could take over Europe, Stalin decided not to give the order. Why? Georgi Dimitrov, head of the Comintern until it was dissolved in 1943, once asked Stalin why he had not proceeded farther in Europe. The vozhd gave a non-committal reply. If the Red Army had attacked, it would have faced several logistical problems such as the supply of fuel, repair facilities for tanks and vehicles and food supply. Would the Red Army have faced hostility from the local population as they advanced? How strong were the communist parties in key countries? The middle classes, the bourgeoisie, after 1945 feared communist revolution everywhere. In France, many joined the PCF, the communist party, as they envisaged a communist takeover. The communists had built up strength in the underground against the Germans and had hidden caches of weapons in various

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locations. There was one major problem: they did not have enough ammunition. In Belgium, British troops were put on the streets of Brussels after liberation in case the communists launched a coup. In Italy, the PCI, the communist party, was numerous and influential. In the UK, pro-Soviet sentiment was widespread. In Greece, the communists most likely would have taken power had it not been for the British army. Even then, some soldiers were reluctant to attack comrades who had jointly been opposing the Germans. Stalin, according to Dimitrov, did not think the communists could take power and he prevented the Yugoslavs coming to the aid of the communists. A communist takeover would have exacerbated relations with Churchill. In Spain, the anarchists and communists would have sided with the Red Army to remove General Franco. The only country in Europe where hostility was profound was Poland and it was already occupied. Would British and American soldiers have been willing to fight the Red Army? The UK army was a citizens’ army and the men wanted to return to civvy street. Why should Americans die for Europe? One can surmise that Stalin considered that better opportunities existed in the Middle East and East Asia. With the Cold War beginning, Stalin instructed communist parties not to attempt to seize power as such behaviour could ignite World War III. Another possible reason is that he was aware the Americans had three atomic bombs, in July 1945, and that the third one might be used against the Soviet Union.

4

Atomic diplomacy

In September 2019, the Kurchatov Institute, in Moscow, held a press conference to present previously secret documents about the atomic age. The Soviet Union did not steal nuclear weapons in the 1940s because it had the necessary scientific base to make use of the information it procured. To underline this, the country produced the first nuclear power station, in 1954, the first nuclear submarine, in 1958, and the first nuclear powered ice breaker, in 1959. Fundamental research, backed by foreign intelligence data, provided critical interaction and foreign intelligence acted as a navigator in a stormy sea. For the Soviet Union, the nuclear age began in 1946 with the construction of the first nuclear reactor, F1. It was built piece by piece by the ‘joint efforts of scientists and foreign intelligence’. Of course, the American participants in the Soviet project understood whom they were working for. They ‘transmitted this data to us completely free of charge because they believed that one country, and one country alone, should not have nuclear weapons’. In June 1946, the secret state order to build the first atomic bomb was issued. The three-page document instructed the director of Construction Bureau No. 11 (CB-11), Pavel Zernov, to create jet engine C (RDS) in two versions with the use of heavy fuel (C-1) and light fuel (C-2) under the supervision of Laboratory no. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Jet engine C meant the atomic bomb, with heavy fuel (C-1) and light fuel (C-2) weapon grade plutonium and weapon grade uranium, respectively. The scientists, who were to report to the government monthly on the progress of the bomb, were only mentioned with the first letters of their names and surnames in the document. Those letters were added in by hand in the typewritten instructions. The atomic bomb (RDS-1 or Pervaya Molniya or First Lightning) was tested successfully at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, on 29 August 1949. The Soviet Union had created a network of spies that ‘systematically supplied us with valuable information and valuable technical materials’. The agents persuaded the elite of American science to cooperate, and this cooperation still continues. The foreign intelligence operation, Operation Innomus, was supervised by Lavrenty Beria and in characteristic fashion he informed the scientists that if they failed, they could not count on continuing breathing. Stalin was less threatening: ‘Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been broken. Build the bomb – it will remove a great danger from us’ (Zubok and DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-6

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Pleshakov 1996: 40; Holloway 1996: 41). Igor Kurchatov posed scientific questions and intelligence agents set about getting the answers. ‘Obtaining the material was of immense, invaluable importance for our state and science’. The scientists received many awards and the foreign intelligence agents received their awards in a special decree in 1995–6. In 1933, Leo Szilard, a Hungarian refugee physicist, was standing at a traffic light in Russell Square, London, watching the lights change, and it suddenly occurred to him that humankind might be able to effect a nuclear chain reaction which would release enough energy to create an atomic blast. On reflection, he imagined the future use of such a weapon could produce a dystopian world and the end of civilisation. In 1938, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, German scientists, discovered that an atom of uranium could be broken into two or three pieces, thereby releasing energy and this process is called nuclear fission, since the centre of the atom is called its nucleus. The first scientist to split the atom was Ernest Rutherford, a New Zealander working in Manchester, but this was not acknowledged at the time (he was called a ‘second Newton’ by Einstein). The uranium 235 atom (discovered by Arthur Jeffrey Dempster in 1935) was split, creating a new discipline, sub-atomic physics. In August 1939, Leo Szilard, Edward Teller and Eugene Wigner, all refugee Jewish physicists, met Albert Einstein and told him it might be possible to build an atomic bomb, and would he inform President Roosevelt of this? Einstein immediately signed the letter they had drafted which predicted the ‘almost infinite power of atomic energy’. What if Germany built an atomic bomb first? Roosevelt set up an advisory committee on uranium, but little came of this as it was thought a bomb would be so heavy it would have to be transported by boat. Enrico Fermi, an Italian Nobel laureate, established that the bombardment of uranium with neutrons might lead to the controlled release of nuclear energy. The breakthrough was made by Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch, both German Jewish refugees, who had calculated that the energy released by a 5kg bomb of uranium 235 (U235) would be equivalent to that of several thousand tons of dynamite. This made it possible to build a bomb which could be dropped from an aircraft. The British government immediately set up a research and development programme, called MAUD, which developed into an industrial project called Tube Alloys, in September 1941. Peierls invited Klaus Fuchs, a brilliant mathematician at the University of Bristol and the quintessential geek, who declined to talk about his background and only conversed when a member of a group, eschewing one to one private encounters, which could betray that he was a spy, to join his team. Peierls was unaware that Fuchs was a member of the KPD, the Communist Party of Germany, who had made contact with Jürgen Kuczynski, a Soviet agent. In recruiting him, Peierls was setting in motion a chain of events which would have momentous consequences. Fuchs immediately proved his worth demonstrating how to ensure that when a gas passes through a diffusion plant, uranium isotopes are filtered out rather than those of other elements. Fuchs passed this information on to the Soviets. Churchill desperately wanted the US to join the war against Germany and, in July 1940, sent scientists to reveal some of the greatest secrets of atomic

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research which could aid the US military. British scientists had found that it was possible to extract fissile U235 from naturally occurring uranium, which made an atomic bomb not possible but inevitable. When the Americans learned of this, they were very surprised and sent two scientists involved in uranium research to England to learn about it. Some British scientists were keen on cooperation, others not. On 11 October, Roosevelt suggested that atomic research be coordinated or even conducted jointly. Churchill visited him in December 1941 after the declaration of war against Japan and Germany, and discussed strategy. However, the atomic bomb was not mentioned, and the President got the impression it was not all that important. On 19 January 1942, however, he approved a secret proposal to build an atomic bomb. The heads of Tube Alloys quickly realised that building the bomb could not be done by the British alone and American help was needed. The UK was ahead in the theory of nuclear weapons, but the US was far ahead experimentally. The British scientists were surprised that the Americans were experimenting with the newly discovered element, plutonium. Making plutonium from uranium required neutrons much more powerful than the UK could produce. Fermi was building a nuclear reactor, and this was achieved in December 1942. It was clear that the Americans were way ahead in developing a nuclear weapon (Close 2019: 17–25, 88–9). Major Leslie Groves, a large, ambitious man who would have preferred a combat mission, was chosen to head security during the building of the atomic bomb – the Manhattan Project – in September 1942, and promoted Brigadier General. A daunting task, but Groves proved he was the right person for the job which involved driving everyone to achieve the almost impossible. The plan was that by March 1943 a nuclear reactor needed to be built to breed plutonium and for three plants to separate U235 by centrifuges, by electromagnetic methods and by gaseous diffusion. Groves thought it was not feasible, but his task was to make it feasible. He tried to ensure that names such as Los Alamos did not appear in the media (Close 2019: 17–25, 88–9, 101–3). Despite the secrecy, the Soviets worked out what was going on by simply going through the open physics publications and noting that research on fission was no longer being published and the leading nuclear physicists were no longer publishing. The conclusion reached was that leading scientists were now working on fission which was secret. In January 1943, the Americans again proposed collaboration but, unlike 1941, the US was now in the ascendancy. Knowledge would flow to the US, but the UK would not obtain any information about nuclear weapons or the production of plutonium. The British would also not be permitted to translate the knowledge into commercial and industrial development after the war. The British, shortsightedly, rejected the offer. At Quebec, in August 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Quebec Agreement which saw the US collaborating again on the bomb, and in December 1943, 23 British scientists joined the Manhattan Project, including Klaus Fuchs (Close 2019: 96–7).

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Some British politicians thought that an atomic bomb would be built in 1943 and dropped on Berlin, after which the infantry could be sent in. This revealed they were completely unaware of the effect of radiation. At Quebec, Churchill had accepted Roosevelt’s veto on the development of nuclear power after the war. It was critically important for British scientists to learn as much as possible about nuclear research at Los Alamos because the UK’s ambition was to build its own atomic bomb. Fuchs was of great value, and thoughts about his communist sympathies were not passed on to General Groves. By mid-1944, the British concluded the Americans were restricting access to information so as to ensure they had a post-war nuclear monopoly. The UK would concentrate on producing a plutonium bomb for which a diffusion plant would be needed. This angered the Americans as it was a breach of the Quebec Agreement. The British could accept being excluded from uranium technology as long as they could produce plutonium. Rudolf Peierls moved to Los Alamos in June 1944, and one of his goals was to place British scientists in key positions to learn about nuclear technology as he was aware that the US intended to monopolise nuclear energy after the war. Plutonium, which does not occur naturally, would be made in nuclear reactors in the US and transported to Los Alamos for assembly and become known as the Trinity bomb. Fuchs, because of his great mathematical ability, could be invaluable in solving the problem of implosion for a plutonium bomb. The Soviets, at this stage, were unaware that a plutonium bomb was the American goal. Peierls and Fuchs were judged later to have made up two thirds of the team which solved the problem of implosion (Close 2019: 128–30). Fuchs informed his Soviet contact that the concept of a hydrogen bomb which would be vastly more destructive than a uranium or plutonium bomb was being discussed and the idea had originated with Enrico Fermi in 1942. The information about Trinity, a virtual blueprint, was sent to Moscow on 13 June. By the end of the Potsdam conference the Americans had two bombs, but Fuchs ensured that the Soviets knew that as well (Close 2019: 136–7). The uranium 235 bomb was expensive, and the cheaper alternative was to breed plutonium in nuclear reactors. The limit of a fission bomb, uranium or plutonium, is about a megaton of TNT and the fission bombs which were dropped on Japan amounted to about 20 kilotons. The hydrogen bomb has almost limitless destructive power. For the first time in human history, man (one cannot blame women) had the capacity to destroy the earth. Edward Teller was the lead designer. In August 1945, Enrico Fermi delivered the first of six lectures on the hydrogen or super bomb and Fuchs took detailed notes and passed them to the Soviets who immediately started their own hydrogen bomb project (Close 2019: 136–7, 144–6). After Fuchs left Los Alamos, he began work at Harwell, the UK’s new Atomic Energy Research Establishment, in June 1946. The UK only detonated its atomic bomb in October 1952, but Fuchs continued sending information to Moscow until he confessed to espionage in January 1950. Curtis LeMay, the US Air Force chief of staff, advocated pre-emptive strikes against the Soviet Union

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so as to establish US nuclear hegemony. Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia and a man whose vanity knew no bounds, considered an atomic bomb dropped near Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East would stop Stalin in his tracks. Bertrand Russell, the famous British mathematician, advocated a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union in October 1946, and by 1948 was proposing a preventive war to eliminate an anticipated Soviet nuclear threat. John von Neumann, the founder of game theory, in 1950, said: ‘If you say bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at five o’clock, I say why not one o’clock’. George Kennan, in 1950, commented that a war with the Soviet Union before it had built up its nuclear arsenal might, in the long term ‘be the best solution for us’. However, Rudolf Peierls, in 1940, conceived of the atomic bomb as a deterrent and eventually this became policy. US policy after the war was to build up an arsenal of nuclear weapons which would enhance security and could be used to threaten other states. The UK did not have the resources to compete and instead concentrated on nuclear power. An experimental nuclear reactor had been built in Canada but had been penetrated by Soviet agents. Nevertheless, the Attlee government decided that the UK had to have its own bomb and a committee was set up to examine how this could be achieved. On 1 August 1946, Congress passed the McMahon Act which prohibited the transfer of information on nuclear power or weapons from the US to any foreign power, including the UK, punishable by death or life imprisonment. There were two reasons for the US move. They mistrusted British security and the British were capable of building a bomb by themselves, which was to be prevented. Ernest Bevin expressed himself in his inimical way: ‘We’ve got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs … we’ve got to have a bloody Union Jack flying on top of it’. It took five years to develop the hydrogen bomb and Fuchs and von Neumann achieved the breakthrough at Los Alamos, leading to the development of the British hydrogen bomb in the 1950s. When Fuchs returned to Harwell, he brought with him all the American information on the hydrogen bomb. The Soviet hydrogen bomb owed much to Fuchs’s work which, of course, he passed on to Moscow. The goal of Harwell was to produce energy for industry and electricity for the population, but there was a second, secret objective which was to develop a specialised reactor which could transform uranium into plutonium. In September 1947, Fuchs informed Moscow of the British decision to build independently an atomic bomb, to which end a small experimental reactor was being constructed at Harwell and a larger one, to breed plutonium, at Windscale, Cumbria; and he passed on documents on plutonium production, including those he had been able to acquire while in the US. Because of the McMahon Act, Fuchs was of critical importance for the development of the British bomb, as his prodigious memory was a goldmine. Fuchs used his visits to the US to gather information on deuterium and tritium fusion, and he enjoyed the confidence of Edward Teller who, inadvertently, passed on vital information. The Soviets were surprised by his ability to winkle out the latest information from

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US scientists, which they confirmed was ‘highly valuable’. Theodore Hall, a brilliant American physicist and a Soviet spy, passed information on tritium and deuterium that Andrei Sakharov, the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, considered to be a key breakthrough in its production. Hall had worked at Los Alamos and had provided the Soviets with detailed information on Fat Boy and the production of plutonium. Lavrenty Beria then set a target date of June 1949 for the Soviet hydrogen bomb, which was totally unrealistic (Close 2019: 196). Albert Einstein mounted a campaign against the atomic bomb on realising its terrible potential after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In October 1946, he invited Cleveland E. Dodge, a wealthy philanthropist, to a conference at Princeton University to agree a programme of ‘education for survival’ to be presented to the American public. Einstein wrote: ‘I don’t hesitate to call on you to share in the sacrifice which time and events have laid upon all thinking men and women. At stake is the fate of our civilisation. We are mindful that we are faced with a tremendous educational project which must be completed in months rather than years or decades’. The scientist was seeking funding for the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, which he had set up, in 1946, to oppose the atomic bomb’s future deployment. In another letter on 28 January 1947, he wrote: ‘The task is great, but we must succeed, for only in this way can any of us go back to the quiet and secure life which we had before these fateful bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. May we all understand and work together to prevent such tragedies in the future’. The Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists was active for four years and was then gradually wound down. Einstein commented, in 1954, a year before he died, that his support for the development of the bomb had been the greatest mistake of his life.

5

Eastern Europe

The eight countries which the Soviets dominated are collectively known as Eastern Europe and this term is political and not geographical. They are Poland, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (the Soviet Occupied Zone from 1945 to 1949), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. From an ethnic, religious and linguistic point of view they are very diverse. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslav are Slav and speak Slav languages; the GDR speaks German; Hungarians speak a Finno-Ugrian language; Romania a Romance language and Albania Albanian. Poland is predominantly Roman Catholic; the GDR Protestant and Roman Catholic; the Czech part of Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia) is Roman Catholic and Protestant while Slovakia is Roman Catholic; Hungary mainly Roman Catholic; Romania Orthodox as is Bulgaria; Yugoslavia mainly Orthodox (also a Muslim minority) but Croatia and Slovenia are mainly Roman Catholic and Albania mainly Muslim. There were also Jews and Roma, but most Eastern European Jews perished in the Holocaust as did many Roma. The region included formerly democratic Czechoslovakia, fascist East Germany and monarchies (Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania) and autocracies. Poland was Russophobic while Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were Russophile. In 1945, Stalin was not sure if the Soviets could remain in Germany and Eastern Europe and it is not clear if he was aware of the details of Operation Unthinkable, but his spies informed him about the proposals of military commanders such as General Patton to continue the offensive until it reached Moscow. He also knew of American plans, armed with nuclear weapons, to establish a word wide hegemony. Stalin gave top priority to his own personal security; next came the security of the Soviet Union; and third the security of the territories the Red Army had occupied. The security of the last was important as it provided a cordon sanitaire for the Soviet frontiers, but it must not provoke a casus belli with his former allies. Poland was the most important country as it was the transit route to the Soviet zone of Germany, which became the German Democratic Republic, in October 1949. In discussions with Georgi Dimitrov, Stalin expressed his views on the future of the region. He regarded the Soviet Union as being different from countries in DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-7

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the region. Soviet Russia had gone through four years of civil war and Allied intervention and there was no history of parliamentarianism as workers had obtained nothing from the Duma. On the other hand, many workers in the region still adhered to parliamentarianism but they had to be shown that a parliament had no value for the working class. There was no need for a revolution against the bourgeoisie because most of it had fled but workers were still hankering after democratic reforms. Soviet socialism was the best, but it should not be applied everywhere as there were other forms of socialism: a democratic republic (as in East Germany) or even a constitutional monarchy (as in Romania). The great advantage of the Soviet system was that it solved problems quickly – by shedding blood. In Bulgaria, the transition to socialism could occur without the dictatorship of the proletariat and Dimitrov, a Bulgarian, was warned not to follow Soviet experience. The same could happen elsewhere because of the strength of the Communist Party and the presence of the USSR. A people’s republic could perform the role of the dictatorship both in terms of abolishing classes and in building socialism. As the Comintern had been dissolved – its functions were taken over by the department of international relations of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) – which later became the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – local Communist Parties would now play a national role. This reveals that, in 1945, there was no clear Soviet model for the region and the eventual Sovietisation was a response to the developing Cold War. The Stalin or Soviet model had been refined in the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s and hence Soviet cadres transferred their Soviet experience to Eastern Europe. The state was all powerful and there was nothing outside the state or nothing permitted to oppose the state. The building of socialism, under Stalin’s guidance, was all powerful and all consuming. The speed at which the regime was Sovietised was breath taking, testifying to the ruthless efficiency of the Stalinist model. The main role was played by the NKVD, later renamed the KGB, which had experience of Sovietising the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and eastern Poland from September 1939 to June 1941. The process in Eastern Europe went through three phases: bourgeois parties were co-opted, in 1944–5, and the semblance of democracy prevailed; then the bourgeois ministers were gradually marginalised, in 1945–6; and then a complete takeover followed, in 1947–8. The Potsdam agreement called for the repatriation of ethnic Germans to Germany of those still remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Soviets had already transported 70,000 Germans from Romania to the Soviet Union, in January 1945. The moving of Poland’s frontiers westwards implied the transfer of millions of Poles to Poland and Ukrainians from Poland to Ukraine. Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and Slovaks from Hungary were deported without international sanction. Among the Germans deported were communists and anti-fascists and the fact that they were German sealed their fate. Among these were the estimated million Germans who had moved into German occupied territories during the war (100,000 in Łódź, Poland, for

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example). By the end of 1947, about 7.6 million Germans had left Poland. Over 400,000 died fleeing and others in Polish detention camps where they were treated the same way as Germans had mistreated Poles. Another 2.5 million left Czechoslovakia and 200,000 left Hungary. I took a group of English students to West Germany in the 1960s and the headmaster of the school which hosted us said when a Hungarian sports group had visited his town, he sat behind them just to hear Hungarian spoken. He would have loved to speak Hungarian again but was not permitted to approach them. Other Germans left Ukraine, Yugoslavia and the Baltic States. An estimated 12 million moved to Allied controlled Germany and Austria and altogether about 31 million people moved out between 1944 and 1948. The Red Army dealt brutally with the fleeing German refugees, sometimes using tanks to squash columns of women and children, and others drowned in the Baltic when their ships were sunk by Allied bombing, which was a mirror image of German behaviour in the Soviet Union. Stalin understood war as an agent of national homogenisation and an effective tool of ethnic cleansing. By 1946, over 812,000 Poles had left Soviet Ukraine and almost 690,000 had departed from Lithuania and Belarus to Poland, and many of them headed for the newly acquired territories in western Poland. Ukrainians in southeastern Poland linked up with resistance groups to oppose communist control and the government responded by deporting about 140,000 Ukrainians to northern and western Poland. There was a rule that Ukrainians could not account for more than 10 per cent of the population of any town. In this way, Ukrainians gradually lost their national culture and language. In Czechoslovakia, the government deprived Hungarians in Slovakia of their citizenship, the right to use their language in official places and to attend Mass in Hungarian. About 89,000 Hungarians were moved to the Sudetenland to replace departing Germans or to Hungary itself, and around 70,000 Slovaks moved back to Slovakia from Hungary. About 100,000 Hungarians had to leave Romania, 50,000 Ukrainians moved from Czechoslovakia to Ukraine and 42,000 Czechs and Slovaks returned from Ukraine to Czechoslovakia. All in all, the multi-ethnic tapestry of Eastern Europe had all but disappeared by 1950. Stalin supported the creation of Israel as he expected it to become communist and, in 1947, the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments opened training camps for the Haganah, the Jewish paramilitary formation which later became the Israeli Defence Force. The Hungarians trained about 1,500 Hungarian Jews and 7,000 Polish Jews were instructed by the Soviet Army and the Polish military. They were cheered by the local populace when they left for Palestine and the communists among them were asked to become informers. In 1948, Orbis, the Polish travel agency organised trips to Israel and, by 1955, only 80,000 Jews remained. The story was the same elsewhere: 50 per cent of Romanian Jews departed; 58 per cent of Czechoslovak Jews; 90 per cent of Bulgarian Jews and a third of Hungarian Jews. Many of the Jews who remained were communists and some rose to high positions; one estimate is that 30 per cent of the secret police leadership in

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Poland were Jews. In Hungary, all the leading communists, Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő and József Révai were Jews, as were many in the secret police and Ministry of the Interior (Applebaum 2013: 124–54).

Poland In Poland, there was no general conscription between May 1945 and 1950. The Polish army was small and the Soviet military presence large, and this meant that external security depended largely on the Soviets. This was even more important in the new territories in the west which needed protection from possible German revanchism. About 6 million or one in five of the pre-war population died and over 3 million were deported by the Germans and Soviets. For the first time in history, Poland was ethnically homogeneous and predominantly Roman Catholic. The Armia Krajowa (AK) or Home Army counted about 300,000 armed partisans and was the largest partisan army outside Yugoslavia; it was expected to play a leading role in the country after liberation and had orders not to fire on the Red Army. In March 1944, the AK fought under Red Army command and liberated some villages. In July, the AK commander in chief said they would continue fighting with the Red Army but would not recognise the Polish provisional government set up in Lublin (the Lublin Poles) and with that all cooperation ended. The AK division was surrounded, and many were sent to labour camps and others to prison, which the AK regarded as a betrayal and engendered much bitterness. Lavrenty Beria reported to Stalin that the AK was collaborating with the Germans, which was ludicrous, and the Soviets began to invite them, especially officers, to receive training and weapons, whereupon they were promptly arrested. The Soviets were keen that the AK join the Polish army fighting with the Red Army but the AK demurred and the NKVD arrested more and more fighters, so the AK decided against any future cooperation with the Red Army. In desperation, on 1 August 1944, the AK launched the Warsaw uprising in an attempt to take the city before the Red Army arrived. The hopes of non-communists playing a leading role in post-war Poland died in the rubble of the capital city which was a metaphor for the future. Soviet commanders, aided by the newly formed Polish secret police, were ordered to do battle with AK members wherever they could be found, so the AK’s commander in chief dissolved the partisan army. The Allies ended their recognition of the Polish government in exile in London, in July 1945, and therefore the best they could hope for was to play a role in a future Polish government. Economically, the country was a vast scene of destruction with a few oases of prosperity. All parties agreed that reconstruction involved nationalisation of industrial assets and agrarian reform. The old intelligentsia and aristocracy had been decimated and this allowed communists to occupy the vacuum of ideas. The Soviets took reparations which included the completely electrified system of the Silesian (formerly German) railways. The Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) was founded on 22 July 1944, and had central and local responsibility for the demoralised and wrecked

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country. Władysław Gomułka had set up the National Homeland Council in January 1944, without Moscow’s permission. The PKWN was composed mainly of communists but Stalin had the last word on who should occupy the key ministries and what policy should be. The PKWN was recognised, in January 1945, as a Provisional Government. When Stanisław Mikołajczyk arrived from London in July 1945 to assume his position as deputy prime minister, he was surprised to discover that his ministry was guarded only by Russian speakers. He fled Poland in October 1947. A conflict soon broke out between the Soviet security forces and the armed resistance and continued for about three years in the countryside. Local officials appointed by the Soviets were often murdered or subjected to reprisals and there were even bandits until 1947. The mountains of rubble in the cities were removed mainly by women and children, and volunteers buried the thousands of corpses. The Communist Party of Poland (PPR) was too weak to rule on its own and therefore had to co-opt other parties. As in other occupied countries, a Democratic Bloc was the chosen vehicle and membership rose to about 1 million, in 1948. The word communist was avoided and salami tactics – splitting opposition parties – were deployed as elsewhere in the region, and this even extended to the Roman Catholic Church when a national Catholic Church was set up. Gomułka talked about the Polish road to socialism and this went down well with many non-communists. The Nationalisation Law of January 1946 and the Three Year Plan for 1947–9 were predominantly the work of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). All enterprises employing over 50 workers were nationalised and this left only 10 per cent in private hands. Elections in January 1947 saw the Democratic Bloc harvest 80 per cent of the vote – a blatant exaggeration – but this permitted the PPR to become the dominant party in the Sejm, the parliament and henceforth all legislation became legal. Józef Cyrankiewicz, the PPS leader, became prime minister. A new constitution was adopted in February and a new Council of State was granted special powers. This effectively ended the role of the bourgeois parties. The People’s Republic of Poland now emerged. Communists now took revenge on their opponents: Mikołajczyk was dubbed a foreign spy and collaborator and a court found some socialist leaders guilty of treason. What was left of the anti-communist opposition was eliminated. A campaign was launched to increase the number of workers whom it was supposed would support the communists whereas private industry and retail would never do so. Price regulation was strict and no private business could function without a licence; the manager had to prove he or she was professionally qualified, and could only employ a certain number. The ‘war on trade’, between 1947 and 1949, reduced the number of private firms by half but the state sector could not compensate for the loss. The result was predictable: the mushrooming of clandestine black markets and chronic shortages of practically everything. Businessmen adapted and became craftsmen and ran their workshops so as not to be labelled capitalists (Applebaum 2013: 247–9). Cyrankiewicz met Stalin in Moscow, in March 1948, and the concept of the Polish United Workers’ Party emerged and was set up, in December 1948, with

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Bolesław Bierut as president. The harvest failed in 1947, and concessions had to be made to the peasants to feed the nation; this also ensured there would be no collectivisation in the near term. Indeed, the communists never attempted collectivisation, an exception in the region. The state achieved a monopoly of wholesale trade in 1948, and the retail trade was increasingly socialised. In order to compensate for the rejection of Marshall Plan aid, Moscow promised 2 billion roubles over four years. Many letters were sent to the planners objecting to the rapid rate of nationalisation and pointing out that small and medium sized businesses were more efficient than nationalised ones since management could react faster to demand. The view was that large enterprises were less efficient than smaller ones (Applebaum 2013: 257). Marx disagreed, believing that large factories enjoyed economies of scale. In the Soviet Union the bigger the better was the maxim and Eastern Europe had to follow suit. As the Central Planning Office was run by socialists, many of whom were Western-trained, their days were numbered, and the Office was abolished and replaced by a copy of the Soviet Planning Commission. Gomułka and his Polish road to socialism were brushed aside and forced to engage in a mea culpa, with his erstwhile comrades showering abuse on him. Among the sobriquets used were ‘rightist nationalist deviationist’, meaning he did not follow the Moscow line. He was never put on trial and re-emerged as the natural leader of the communists in 1956 when the party reasserted its independence (Davies in McCauley 1977: 39– 55). It is worth mentioning that Gomułka never deluded himself that he had wide public support, being aware that most Poles had a natural aversion to Marxism-Leninism. How then did the communists run Poland? By not being Soviet communists.

Hungary In Hungary, in November 1944, three ‘Moscow comrades’, Mihály Farkas, Ernő Gerő and Imre Nagy landed in Szeged, in eastern Hungary, which had just been liberated. Mátyás Rákosi arrived in Debrecen, in January 1945, from Moscow and his instructions were to set up a provisional government. A Provisional National Assembly was formed and it elected a Provisional National Government which would last until elections could be held. It was a coalition of communists (MKP), social democrats (SDP), the National Peasant Party (NPP) and the Smallholders’ Party (KGP). The MKP was a miniscule party and illegal since 1919, but soon its membership increased at an extraordinary pace and it was granted a third of the seats in the Provisional Assembly and key portfolios, including the Ministry of the Interior in the provisional government. An armistice was signed in Moscow, in January 1945, and at the Allied Control Commission (ACC) Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, the Red Army commander, took the key decisions and ignored the British and Americans. Hungary was an ally of Germany in the war against the Soviet Union and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty ordered it to pay $300 million war reparations to the Soviet Union and $100 million to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

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Mátyás Rákosi, the MKP leader, outlined in 1952 how the communists achieved their monopoly of power – the famous salami tactics. In the early stages, the chief task of communists was to persuade politicians of other parties to revive political activity. Local affairs were run by the same four-party government model and political life sprouted in the spring and summer of 1945. The Budapest National Council elections, in October 1945, were the first indication of voters’ loyalty with the Workers’ Unity Front (MKP and SDP) polling 42.8 per cent of the votes, but the KGP came top with 50.5 per cent. A general election was held in November 1945, and the KGP emerged as the main winner with 57 per cent of the vote; the SDP came second with 17.4 per cent and the MKP third with 17 per cent. The KGP was embarrassed by its success and as the local joke went, the party’s leader, Zoltán Tildy, had won a lion in a lottery but did not dare take it home. The party was a coalition as the ACC would only permit one right-wing party. Mátyás Rákosi set about pulling it apart. Every success of the government was down to the MKP, but every failure became the fault of the KGP. The MKP regained control of the Ministry of the Interior and the political police, aided by an intervention by the ACC. Ministers regarded their portfolios as party offices and thus their main loyalty was to their party and not parliament. The system of having the government and the opposition within the coalition led the communists, in March 1946, to set up the Left Bloc consisting of the MKP, SDP and NPP, and its first tactic was to attack the right wing of the KGP which eventually resulted in its removal. This was an important precedent because it demonstrated that the KGP could be gradually broken up by using salami tactics. The next crisis, which proved decisive, occurred in December 1946, when members of a group, some of them deputies, were arrested and accused of belonging to a counter-revolutionary organisation. Some confessed under torture and the leader of the KGP was arrested and accused of being involved in an attack on the Soviet Army. It was effectively the end of the KGP and the frameup was also intended as a warning to the social democrats. The communists also moved against the right wing in other parties with some success. Ferenc Nagy, the prime minister, made the fateful mistake of going on holiday to Switzerland and Rákosi immediately accused him of conspiracy and forced him to resign (his small son was held hostage by the communists until he did so). The nationalisation of retail trade proceeded slowly, in 1945 and 1946, because the communists did not have a large enough majority in parliament to control every aspect of economic policy. The MKP conducted a war on trade through its propaganda organs and police. The invective against businessmen, small traders and street markets was as shrill as against fascists. The Budapest police boss declared he would liberate workers from the ‘hyenas’ of the black market and about 1,500 ‘black marketeers’ were arrested. The police raided cafés, bars and restaurants in the capital. Bribery kept some open but, by June 1946, ten ‘luxury’ restaurants had been shut down because they were serving the most expensive food to the chosen few. Tipping was bourgeois and tailcoats, the traditional garb of waiters, were ridiculed. The Baghdad Café was shut

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down because it was deemed immoral for displaying, among other things, paintings of ladies in erotic poses with their thighs exposed. Restaurants appealed to be nationalised with the owner continuing as manager. Waiters and tips vanished and people’s cafés and pubs took over. Industry suffered from Soviet dismantling but, in 1948, reparation demands dropped 50 per cent. Nationalisation proceeded in stages: first the coal mines, then the large industrial enterprises and then the banks. In March 1948, all factories employing over 100 workers were nationalised and this accounted for 90 per cent of heavy industry and 75 per cent of light industry. Inflation and hyperinflation were a constant problem and, in the summer of 1946, one gram of gold was worth 200 billion pengö and a dollar sold for 170 billion (Applebaum 2013: 255). New elections were held in August 1947, and during the campaign the social democrats were the main target of abuse. The MKP came out on top with 22.3 per cent of the vote, with the KGP on 15.4 per cent, the SDP on 14.9 per cent and the NPP on 8.3 per cent. This revealed that the coalition had obtained a clear majority, but the communists had still a hill to climb to become the leading party. After the election, one of the opposition parties was dissolved – a clear warning to others. New elections were held, in May 1949, and a new constitution followed. A fusion of the communists and social democrats was now judged opportune and this took place on 12 June 1948 with the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) entering the political stage. A purge followed and social democrats and ‘opportunists’ were discarded. Salami tactics were deployed against members who had remained in Hungary, the locals, and anyone with a Western background. Other parties gradually ceased to exist. When they felt strong enough and, under the guidance of the Soviets, the communists eliminated them. The HSWP was the MKP in disguise. The People’s Republic of Hungary was proclaimed on 20 August 1949. In industry, enterprise councils, mostly controlled by communists, had been set up and this afforded the MKP considerable influence in the way the industrial economy was run. A kind of mob rule was instigated by the communists against their opponents and was calculated to serve as a warning against anyone who came out overtly against them. Many had feared a communist takeover in 1945, but this did not materialise, possibly due to the percentages agreement which divided Hungary 50–50 between east and west. Another reason was that the MKP was very weak in 1945 and hence lacked the personnel to carry through a revolution (Schöpflin in McCauley 1977: 95–103).

East Germany (German Democratic Republic) On 30 April 1945, Walter Ulbricht and other KPD members, the ‘Ulbricht Group’, were flown to the outskirts of Berlin and a few days later Anton Ackermann and another group of KPD members, the ‘Ackermann Group’, joined up with the Red Army south of Berlin. There was no provisional government as

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the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) ran the Soviet Occupied Zone until the establishment of the GDR on 7 October 1949. A bureaucracy was gradually formed and, in June 1947, was given the name of the German Economic Committee with communists playing the leading role. It coalesced into the government of the GDR in 1949. An inter-Allied military Kommandatura responsible for Berlin took office on 11 July. The Allied Control Council (ACC) had the overall responsibility and, at Potsdam, it had been agreed that a few important German administrative departments: finance, transport and traffic, foreign trade and industry should be established. The fly in the ointment of this agreement was that France, which was not present at Potsdam, was a full member of the ACC. It used its veto to block the formation of an all-German administration in an attempt to further its claim on the Saar and to participate in the control of the Ruhr. During the Potsdam conference, the Soviets set up German Central Administrations in their zone and fully expected pan-German administrations to be set up after Potsdam. The Soviets believed that the French were stalking horses for the Americans and went ahead rapidly with major reforms in their zone. The Soviets, by order no. 2, permitted the formation of political parties. The first to appear was the KPD, on 11 June, and the formation of a parliamentary democratic republic was its goal. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) made its appearance on 15 June. The Christian Democratic Union of Germany was set up on 26 June, and supported the rule of law and private property with the goal of Christian socialism. The Liberal Democratic Party of Germany came into being on 5 July, and favoured private property and a free market. The four parties formed an anti-fascist bloc with five representatives from each party. The SPD was more Marxist than it had been during the Weimar republic and called for a socialist economy immediately. SMAD, the executive arm of the Soviet Army, held the keys of political power under the direction of its astute head, Colonel S. I. Tyulpanov, and he also supervised the administrative system confirming all appointed heads of central and local government. Ulbricht had direct access to him which put the other parties at a decided disadvantage. During the autumn, fundamental reforms were carried out in education, economic, legal and administrative spheres and this changed the constellation of political power radically. SMAD, on 18 April 1945, issued an order for the immediate internment, without prior investigation, of ‘spies, saboteurs, terrorists, activists of the Nazi party’ as well as those who had ‘illegal’ print and radio devices, people with weapons and former members of the German civil administration. The Western zones also interrogated Nazis on a massive scale but the difference was that in the Soviet zone almost anyone who had held any position of authority, be they Nazi or not, could be arrested. Policemen, mayors and business people and farmers all qualified on the grounds that no one could be successful unless they had collaborated with the national socialist regime. At Potsdam, this was widened to include all those who ‘could be dangerous to the occupation or its objectives’. People’s courts were set up and operated under Soviet not German

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law. Confessions were sometimes beaten out of those arrested and some teenagers were sent to prison for ‘counterrevolutionary’ activities. Former concentration camps, such as Sachsenhausen, were again used. About 120,000 Germans and 30,000 Soviets were incarcerated in NKVD camps between 1945 and 1953 and about a third died from starvation and illness (Applebaum 2013: 112–15). In mitigation, there was famine in the Soviet Union, from July 1946 to August 1947, as drought had reduced the 1946 grain harvest by 40 per cent, but the Soviet Union continued to export food to the Soviet zone, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A Ukrainian communist told me his family only survived by secreting away black beans. The Western Allies introduced a new currency which could be exchanged for the Reichsmark (one to one) and the Soviets followed suit and printed 17.5 billion M-Marks between February and April 1946, which forced the Western Allies to introduce a currency reform to stave off hyperinflation. Eventually, the Allies concluded that the only way to kickstart the economy was to introduce a new currency, the Deutsche Mark, on 20 June 1948, when each citizen was given DM40. Ludwig Erhard, responsible for the economy of the Western zones, is usually regarded as the driving force behind the reform but that honour goes to Edward A. Tenenbaum, a brilliant American economist, who insisted that Erhard’s exchange rate of 10 per cent for the Reichsmark be cut to 5 per cent, but it was then raised to 6.5 per cent later in 1948. Tenenbaum argued that the higher the exchange rate, the higher the risk of inflation. Everyone was aware that a similar currency reform in Japan, in 1946, had failed. Hence it was high risk, but it was a resounding success and goods magically appeared in the shops, and it applied to the Western zones and West Berlin. The printing plates were offered to the Soviets, but they rejected them. On reflection, this was not an astute move as the plates could have printed an unlimited number of DM with which could have purchased West German goods. The Soviets introduced the DM Ost (East) in their zone. The Soviets were aware they had to win over German youth and this was no easy task given that the Hitler Youth had taught them to regard the Soviets as Untermenschen (sub-humans) and that Germans were racially and culturally superior. Hans Modrow, the last prime minister of the German Democratic Republic, recounts his reactions to the end of the war as a 17-year-old. The Weltanschauung (world view) which he knew had been shattered by defeat and he was utterly bereft. He became a Red Army captain’s driver; the captain asked him about the German poet, Heinrich Heine, of whom he had never heard (Heine was Jewish). He was embarrassed to discover that a Russian knew more about German culture than he did. He was sent to an anti-fascist school and eagerly imbibed Marxism-Leninism as a new faith which promoted optimism about the future and provided him with a new identity. His life now had direction and he was extremely grateful to the Soviets. No longer did he need to feel shame for Germany’s defeat or feel responsible for it (Applebaum 2013: 18–19). Modrow was only one of the many communists recruited and trained in the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) or Free German Youth, set up in

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March 1946 as the only youth movement and headed by Erich Honecker. The FDJ slogan was: ‘Those who own the youth, own the future’. Economically, the Soviets were entitled to reparations and they immediately seized enterprises, claiming they had belonged to Nazis. In 1946, a further 213 companies, due for dismantling, were transformed into Soviet limited companies and their output credited to the Soviet account. Communists were dismayed as they regarded these enterprises as potentially the basis of a planned economy. The land reform, enacted in Saxony in August 1945 and rapidly applied throughout the zone, saw the seizure of all property of war criminals and Nazis and estates of over 100 hectares. This affected 7,000 large estates and two thirds of the acreage went to half a million landless farm labourers, unemployed city inhabitants and refugees. The parcels of land were not large enough to make a good living from, and this was quite deliberate as the goal was the collectivisation of agriculture. This reform was taken in the full knowledge that it would cut the food supply, but politically it paid dividends as the elections of October 1946 demonstrated. Peasants made up 18 per cent of the population and it was important to cement an alliance between workers and peasants – Lenin’s tactic in Russia in 1917. However, the leaders of the CDU opposed the confiscation of the land without compensation and this led to their dismissal by Tyulpanov, in December 1945. SPD members, in the summer of 1945, wanted an immediate merger with the KPD but Ulbricht demurred as he needed to establish his authority in the party. Their numbers increased more rapidly than those of the KPD and fed on the resentment of workers seeing their factories dismantled, and they would have preferred nationalised land being transferred to state farms instead of being parcelled up among small peasants. This meant that over time, fewer and fewer social democrats favoured fusion. To counter this, Anton Ackermann penned an article in Einheit, the party’s theoretical organ in which he argued that since the majority of the population were workers, unlike Russia in 1917, it followed that Germany could pave its own road to socialism. Many in the SPD enthusiastically welcomed this statement and it smoothed the path to a fusion but the German road to socialism was abandoned in 1948. Opposition to the merger resulted in at least 20,000 social democrats being disciplined, imprisoned and even killed between December 1945 and the founding of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) on 22 April 1946. The Free German Trades Union (FDGB) was also formed and brought together communist, social democratic, Christian and liberal trade unionists, and for the first time in German labour history the communists dominated. The CDU and LDPD gradually lost influence as they were consistently outvoted in the bloc. The SED felt confident enough to hold elections, in September and October 1946, but in local elections only gained a majority in Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, predominantly rural areas. The CDU and LDPD had a majority in all Land (province) capitals. Elections for the Berlin city parliament were a disaster for the SED, the SPD polling 48.7 per cent and the SED 19.8 per cent. In Kreis (county) and Landtag elections the SED came out on top. The SED had learnt

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its lesson and henceforth electors were presented with a single list of candidates which meant that no one could show a preference for a particular party. Reparations led to bitter disputes in the ACC, and in May 1946 General Lucius Clay, the US commander, went so far as to suspend all reparations from the American zone. The Soviets dug in their heels and ill will prevailed. In July 1946, US Secretary of State Byrnes offered to merge the US zone with any other power willing to join him. The upshot was that the US and British zones were fused, on 1 January 1947, and the Americans stated they would longer tolerate being baulked on economic matters. This angered the Soviets, who were demanding the $10 billion promised in reparations with much of this coming from the Western zones (especially the Ruhr) but this meant that the Soviets would now have to take more from their own zone. A German Economic Commission (DWK) was set up by SMAD in June 1947, and was tasked with preparing an economic plan for the whole zone. The DWK was responsible for the delivery of reparations and ensuring the needs of the Soviet occupation forces were met. In effect, the DWK was the provisional government of the zone. The economy was plagued with shortages. The Leuna Chemical Works came up with its own solution to the problem of food and it sent a train loaded with fertilizer to two villages in exchange for potatoes and vegetables. No official found it strange that Leuna had done this even though these villages had not met their plan for state deliveries of these products. The second SED congress, in September 1947, marks the transformation of the SED into a party of a ‘new type’, a Leninist party. Representatives from all zones of Germany met in Munich in June 1947 to discuss the establishment of pan-German central administrations but the West Germans were not permitted by the Allies to discuss the setting up of panGerman organisations. A German People’s Congress for Unity and an Honourable Peace gathered in Berlin, in December 1947, but the CDU officially refused to attend. Colonel Tyulpanov rearranged the leadership of the party and as the new leader commented, the leader of the party may enjoy the confidence of the members, but he must also have the trust of the occupying power. Radio played an important role in promoting socialism. Listeners were advised not to worry about the West German currency reform (introduction of the Deutsche Mark in June 1948). The ‘fulfilment and overfulfilment of the plan will solve the hard but necessary currency trouble’. Artists were told to produce works of art which help people in their daily struggle to fulfil the Five Year Plan. In 1948, radio scriptwriters were instructed to repeat endlessly the four key targets of the Plan: the 35 per cent increase in production, the 30 per cent increase in productivity, the 15 per cent increase in wages and the 7 per cent reduction in budgets. In case people mentally switched off after hearing these numbers endlessly repeated, profiles of enterprises which had overfulfilled the plan should be highlighted and positive criticism of delays should be forthcoming as failure could stimulate interest. The propagation of the economic and cultural development of the Soviet Union was to be given top priority.

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Cultural plans followed the economic model: there were quarterly, annual, twoyear and five-year plans. The number of novels published in a certain period was set down. Museums were instructed to construct, rapidly, an exhibit which described and explained the Two Year Plan (Applebaum 2013: 255, 261–2). The first phase of the development of the zone ended in the spring of 1948 when it was claimed that all war criminals and Nazis had been removed and the Potsdam Agreement carried out. The transformation of the SED into a Leninist party, begun in the autumn of 1947, was speeded up in the second half of 1948. The break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in June 1948, had an immediate impact, not only in East Germany but in all communist states. It was the death knell of the German road to socialism and heralded an even closer attachment to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party. It was claimed there were enemies of the party within its ranks and the purge reduced membership from about 2 million in June 1948 to 1.8 million in January 1949, and new memberships had to undergo a candidate stage; the Politburo and a small Secretariat and the formation of a control committee to monitor and dismiss party members (all following Soviet practice) were to be set up. To outflank the CDU and LDPD, two new parties, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) and the Democratic Peasants’ Party of Germany (DBD) were set up, in June 1948. The aim of the NDPD was to attract former national socialists and professional soldiers and the DBD was to win over peasants who were suspicious of the SED. Both leaders of these new parties were communists. The LDPD was informed that contacts with west Berlin liberals would be construed as espionage. The concept of two German states became reality on 7 October 1949 when the German Democratic Republic was founded and was a direct riposte to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 23 May 1949. Living standards and economic development until 1948 in the East were higher than in the Western zones. The animosity created by the Berlin Blockade (June 1948– May 1949) and other policies created deep wounds in the East and slowed economic development. The Soviet Union ended up with an unwanted child, the German Democratic Republic, and its coming into being was due to Stalin’s and the West’s mistakes after 1945. Opposition in the East was concealed rather than overt because of Soviet power, and those who were not satisfied with the building of socialism could cross an open border in Berlin and move on to the Federal Republic. Over 2 million east Germans had availed themselves of this option by 1949.

Czechoslovakia In June 1941 a small group of Czechoslovak communists found themselves in Moscow. They set about elaborating a strategy of national and democratic revolution which would evolve into a Soviet style communist system. Klement Gottwald, still a member of the secretariat of the Comintern, is thought to be the originator of these plans. In London, the head of the Czechoslovak

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government in exile, Edvard Beneš, was also cogitating about post-war Czechoslovakia and he had three goals: full international de-recognition of the Munich agreement; restore independent Czechoslovakia to its pre-war borders; and insure the country against another possible German attack in the future. Whereas the communist leader, Klement Gottwald, planned the route to power, Beneš took the reestablishment of a democratic political system as the norm. The Western betrayal at Munich weighed heavily on his mind and his wartime tactics were anti-Western and geared towards obtaining security guarantees from the Soviet Union. He regarded himself as the great mediator between Western democracy and Soviet communism and concluded that the Soviet Union would have to peacefully co-exist with the West and communists would soften their abrasive tactics towards other political parties. The product of this interpretation was the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed in Moscow on 12 December 1943. By then the Red Army had turned the tide against the Wehrmacht and the Tehran conference enhanced Soviet prestige. The London underground opposition was shattered after the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, in June 1942, as German reprisals were severe. This left the communist underground in pole position and it began to win prestige among the population. Czechoslovak troops in the Soviet Union nominally recognised Beneš as commander in chief but for all practical purposes were under Red Army command when they fought the Wehrmacht. Beneš informed Stalin that Slovaks would be punished for their alliance with Germany and that the nationalisation of their property was on the agenda. He was willing to pay any price to ingratiate himself with Gottwald and told him that he would ensure that he would be a member of every post-war government. In other words, communists would play a leading role in the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia and this was conceded before any elections had been held. The communists, in 1935, had only obtained 10 per cent of the votes and yet Beneš actually offered them the position of prime minister after liberation. Gottwald turned down the offer but did ask for the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the police, defence, agriculture, propaganda and education. He agreed with the communists that certain political parties should be banned on the basis that their leaders had collaborated with the Nazis, and these included parties which represented agrarian and tradesmen’s interests. Full scale state planning was envisaged, as was the re-orientation of foreign trade towards the Soviet Union. By the time of Beneš’s second visit to Moscow, in March 1945 (he became president on 4 April 1945), communists were well entrenched in the government. A National Front had been established as a ‘democracy without an opposition’. Zdenek Fierlinger, head of the Social Democratic Party but in reality a communist, was appointed prime minister on 5 April 1945, and was succeeded by Klement Gottwald on 2 June 1946. On 5 May 1945, Prague was surrounded by Wehrmacht and SS units. The Czech resistance appealed to the German-sponsored Russian Liberation Army, commanded by General Bunyachenko, to switch sides, promising them asylum in Czechoslovakia and that they would not be sent back to the Soviet Union

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where they would be accused of and executed for treason. The Czech resistance had no heavy artillery or tanks, so they were desperately in need of heavy armour. Bunyachenko switched sides and his army played a key role in holding off the Wehrmacht and the SS who would have slaughtered many citizens. On 7 May, Bunyachenko was informed that he and his men would not be granted asylum and would be sent back to certain death in the Soviet Union. Beneš was strongly opposed to the presence of Germans and Hungarians after liberation and the Beneš decrees expropriated about 3 million Sudeten Germans and Hungarians, but Hungary appealed to Moscow and their expulsion soon ended. Germans could be expelled since this was laid down in the Potsdam Agreement. SS Obergruppenführer Karl Frank, a Sudeten German, was put on trial in Prague, in March 1946, and accused of war crimes. Beneš ensured that the trial was given maximum publicity and was broadcast live on the radio. Frank was unrepentant and only regretted he had not killed more Czechs as he still regarded them as Untermenschen. He was publicly hanged, on 22 May 1946, before thousands of cheering people. From Beneš’s point of view, Frank and other Sudeten Germans were all criminals so it was quite reasonable to expel them. I met Sudeten Germans in West Germany and they told me that their land was so fertile they had to restrict production lest they flood the market and bring down prices. They spoke German with an accent which was influenced by the Czech language. Beneš had agreed to ban the Agrarian Party for allegedly cooperating with the Nazis, and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans made available beautifully tended farms with all their implements and animals. They were given to Czech and some Slovak peasants who would have voted for the Agrarian Party but now and afterwards voted communist. Instructions were handed down to communist activists in the wake of the Red Army: the party had to head the revolutionary renewal of the country; it had to spread everywhere, into every factory, workshop, office and community; it must act swiftly, not a day must be lost; the goal was a party with a dense organisational network, capable of leading a revolution. The Soviet military assisted them in restoring the water supply, removing debris, etc. By July 1945, the communists had half a million members and by the end of the year it was up to 800,000. All Red Army soldiers pulled out of Czechoslovakia in December 1945. Moscow annexed Sub-Carpathian Ukraine unilaterally, in December 1944, on the basis of ‘local demands’ and this was ratified in June 1945. Beneš played down the seizure and made no attempt to contact the British and Americans. A Communist Party congress, in March 1946, emphasised that the present period was non-socialist but that the achievements of the national and democratic revolution should be further developed. Gottwald visited Stalin in the summer of 1946, and was informed there were various roads to socialism, including a parliamentary one. The special road to socialism continued until June 1948 when Tito was expelled from the Cominform. Gradually the communists became more and more influential and powerful. They were skilful in creating large centralised organisations for trade unions, youth, farmers’ and women’s

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organisations, the paramilitary and sports activities, the co-operative movement and a war veterans’ association. Workers made up 57.7 per cent of the party in March 1946. In national elections in that year, the communists obtained 38 per cent of the votes and together with the social democrats had 153 seats in the 300-member National Assembly. Gottwald set the target for the next election at 51 per cent as communists had to be in charge. Until the summer of 1947, democracy had been re-established, with institutions such as the media, opposition parties, the churches, a youth movement and the Legionnaire veteran association functioning outside state control. In the spring of 1947, new Italian and French governments were formed without communist participation, and this led to calls for communists to step up pressure on those centres of power which were not in their hands. As regards the Marshall Plan, the Czechoslovak government, unlike the Polish government which wished to join but left the decision to Moscow, believed it had the right to decide and accepted. Stalin summoned Gottwald and Jan Masaryk, the non-communist foreign minister, to Moscow and informed them that the ‘Americans were trying to form a western bloc and to isolate the Soviet Union’ and Czechoslovakia was not to become involved. ‘It is necessary for you to cancel your participation in the Paris conference today – that is 10 June 1947’, and they did (Applebaum 2013: 234). Beneš visited Moscow and Molotov informed him that accepting Marshall Plan aid was a breach of the 1943 alliance. When he returned to Prague, he spoke of a ‘second Munich’ and commented that it was not acceptable for the Soviet Union to veto decisions of the Czechoslovak government. The setting up of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) on 5 October 1947 signalled a tightening of Soviet influence. French and Italian communists were lambasted for having been removed from government and ‘parliamentary cretinism’, and the Czechoslovak government was sharply criticised for overestimating the role of parliament. In November, Gottwald attacked the alleged collusion between ‘domestic wreckers and reactionaries’ and Western imperialists. Communists should link up with honest members of other parties and go over the heads of their leaders. Non-communist political leaders hoped that Western pressure would aid them in their resistance to communist tactics, but this was a pipedream (Kusin in McCauley 1977: 73–88). The communists were making themselves more and more unpopular, among farmers, for instance because of talk of collectivisation, and the high handed behaviour of the communist minister of the interior who was trying to sack non-communist police officers. As a result, they were expected to lose votes in the upcoming May 1948 elections. On 12 February, non-communist ministers demanded that offending communist members of the government be punished and end their subversion. Gottwald threatened to use force to avoid defeat in parliament and mobilised groups of communist supporters throughout the country. On 21 February, 12 non-communist ministers resigned in protest after the minister of the interior refused to reinstate eight non-communist police officers even though a majority of the cabinet had voted in favour. The non-

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communist ministers expected President Beneš to reject their resignations and insist on a new government which would include non-communists. However, mass communist-led demonstrations rattled him and he feared that the communists would launch a bid for power and in the ensuing chaos the Soviet Army would intervene and restore order. The non-communist ministers were quite unaware that the communists were mobilising for power and thought that it was just another governmental crisis. Valerian Zorin, the Soviet ambassador from 1945 to 1947 and head of the Information Committee (KI) or foreign intelligence agency, returned to Prague to oversee the seizure of power. Ostensibly he was there to monitor the export of grain to the Soviet Union! Armed police and the militia occupied Prague, the non-communist ministries were occupied and civil servants dismissed. The army, under Defence Minister Ludvik Svoboda, who had permitted the communist infiltration of the officer corps, remained in barracks. Gottwald threatened to call a general strike if Beneš did not agree to the formation of a new government and Zorin offered the help of the Soviet military which was camped on the Czechoslovak border. Gottwald declined the offer, believing that the threat of violence and the repeated calls to the President would see Beneš eventually concede communist demands, which he did on 23 February. Beneš still considered Germany as a potential threat and hence believed that security could only be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and so a rift with Moscow was to be avoided. Gottwald continued as prime minister in a new coalition government but the representatives of the other parties were all chosen by the communists. The only minister of any standing who was not a communist or fellow traveller was Jan Masaryk, the minister of foreign affairs, but he was found dead shortly afterwards probably out of despair of what had happened. The Social Democratic Party was swallowed up and communists quickly consolidated their power by dismissing and arresting thousands while others fled the country. On 9 May, a new constitution was passed by the National Assembly and stated that Czechoslovakia was now a People’s Republic but Beneš refused to sign it. The 30 May general election resulted in the National Front – a united list of all parties was presented – receiving 89.2 per cent of the vote with the communists having a majority in parliament and all the minority parties receiving some seats. President Beneš resigned on 2 June, and Gottwald assumed the presidency on 14 June. On 14 August, the Soviet and Czechoslovak media launched a violent attack on Beneš and accused him of turning down Soviet military assistance, in September 1938, because he wanted the Munich Agreement imposed so that the Germans could occupy his country. On his deathbed he demanded to know who had made the offer and to whom, knowing that no such offer had ever been made by Stalin. Beneš died on 3 September 1948, a broken man. There are striking similarities between events in Germany in 1933 and Czechoslovakia in 1948. In Germany, the ailing President Paul von Hindenburg was reluctant to make Adolf Hitler chancellor, but Franz von Papen badgered him until he relented. In Czechoslovakia, the dying President Edvard Beneš was bombarded by requests by Klement Gottwald to grant his request for a new

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coalition government, which Beneš realised was a fig leaf for a communist takeover. The communists in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria would not have come to power without the assistance of the Soviet military but in Czechoslovakia the communists needed no such assistance. Does this mean that Czechs and Slovaks were ‘natural’ communists?

Romania King Carol II tried to keep Romania out of the European war but the loss of France and the UK, the country’s guarantors, in 1940, led to the Iron Guard, a fascist organisation, gaining in popularity and proposing an alliance with Germany. In the summer of 1940, territorial disputes led to Romania losing most of the territory it had gained after World War I. A military coup led to Marshal Ion Antonescu becoming dictator and Romania joining the Axis powers (Germany, Hungary and Italy) in November 1940, and then joining the Axis attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Romania subsequently provided more troops than all the other Axis-allied states combined. They counted 686,000 troops in 1941 and 1.2 million in 1944, and fought in Ukraine, at Stalingrad (a disaster for them) and elsewhere, but also murdered about 260,000 Jews in Ukraine and other Romanian-occupied areas. Hitler rewarded their loyalty by returning Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (occupied by the Soviet Union a year earlier) and permitting Romania to annex lands east of the river Dniester, including Odesa. The Allies began bombing Romania in 1943, targeting especially its oil industry. A National Democratic Bloc (NDB) was set up in June 1944 by the representatives of the National Peasants’ Party, the National Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. The goal was to switch to the Allied side in the war and abandon Germany. A coup d’état was carried out on 23 August 1944 by King Michael and a group of officers backed by the NDB, at a time when the Red Army was breaking through the Moldovan sector of the front and Marshal Ion Antonescu, the prime minister, was removed. War was declared on Germany the same day and Romanian units then fought with the Red Army in Transylvania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Of the 538,000 Romanian soldiers who fought against Germany and its allies, some 167,000 died, wounded or went missing. Despite this sacrifice, Romania was treated as an ally of Hitler in the 1947 Paris Treaty and had to pay $300 million to the Soviet Union as war reparations. A 2016 Romanian source calculated reparations at $1.2 billion but it regained northern Transylvania from Hungary. After the coup, a government was formed by General Sanatescu and the only communist in it was the minister of justice. An armistice agreement, signed in Moscow on 12 September 1945, and the percentages agreement afforded the Soviet Union a dominant role in the shaping of the new Romania. After the coup, the Communist Party was flooded with new members and was willing to

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accept repentant former fascists. The communist leadership can be divided into locals and Muscovites. The new party leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, was a local and Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca were the leading Muscovites. Moscow naturally favoured the Muscovites but in the eventual showdown between the two factions, it sided with Gheorghiu. In October 1944, the Communists disrupted the NDB and with the social democrats set up a National Democratic Front (NDF), and this marked the beginning of the bid by the Communists to unseat the Sanatescu government and the formation of a democratic coalition government affording them the leading role. Tactics involved smearing bourgeois parties with accusations of pro-fascism and splitting the social democrats. The Soviets dominated the Allied Control Commission (ACC) and interfered constantly on the side of the communists. Peasants were encouraged to seize land and local governments were taken over by force. Sanatescu resigned but was asked by the king to form a new government, including social democrats and communists. The Sanatescu government only lasted a fortnight but Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet overlord, rejected the communist demands for a procommunist government and General Radescu, the chief of staff, became prime minister. Communist agitation for an NDF government led to armed clashes with non-communists, and after Gheorghiu and Pauker returned from Moscow they claimed they had Stalin’s backing to seize power. They used salami tactics to split opposition political parties, copying the tactics deployed successfully in Hungary by Mátyás Rákosi. In January 1945, Radescu was branded a traitor by the Soviet head of the ACC and the opposition fascist. Continual armed clashes between communists and non-communists led to Vyshinsky asking the king to form an NDF government – in the form of an ultimatum – and the king yielded. The new government was headed by Dr Petru Groza, not formally a member of the Communist Party and the ideal head of a coalition government. A rich, dapper lawyer from Transylvania, he had founded a left-wing Agrarian organisation, in 1933, and earned the sobriquet the Red Bourgeois. The Americans warned Moscow not to impose a minority communist government, but the UK did not back them up, mindful of the fact that they only had 10 per cent of the influence there. Churchill regarded Poland and Greece as more important and hence did not want to confront Stalin over Romania. On 5 March, General Radescu sought and was granted refuge in the British legation and the following day the Groza government took office. The communists and their front organisations had 17 portfolios and the bourgeois parties four. The communists had taken over, but the king refused to sign Groza’s decrees. He asked for Groza’s resignation on 19 August and called on the Soviets, Americans and British to help restore a legal government. The Soviets would have nothing of it and no help materialised. Groza added a member of the National Peasants and a Liberal to his government and this was enough to gain recognition by the Western powers, in February 1946. After the Paris Peace Treaty, in February 1947, 23 countries established diplomatic relations. Elections were called and conducted in a venomous atmosphere with the communists calling leading bourgeois politicians traitors and murderers. The

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results of the elections, on 19 November 1946, gave the communist-led bloc of Democratic Parties (BDF) 372 seats out of a total of 414 but falsification of results was widespread. The opposition parties disappeared from parliament and in less than a year the three main opposition parties were dissolved. Their leaders were tried and sentenced to life imprisonment. The atmosphere at the time was so febrile that a member of the British mission in Bucharest, in common with others, feared that World War III would break out next day! When Pauker and Luca joined the government, in November 1947, the period of the ‘fake’ coalition came to an end. On 30 December 1947, King Michael abdicated, and the People’s Republic of Romania came into existence. The Social Democratic Party was merged with the Communist Party to form the Romanian Workers’ Party and Gheorghiu-Dej became its secretary general. The Politburo counted ten communists and three social democrats and most social democrats joined the new party. The March 1948 elections saw the Democratic National Front gain 405 seats and there were seven non-communists. A new constitution appeared, in April 1948, and led to the nationalisation of education, the press and other aspects of social communication. The Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church was incorporated in the Romanian Orthodox Church and most of the Uniate leadership were imprisoned. Unlike Poland and Hungary, the great majority of intellectuals moved seamlessly into the communist orbit. Capitalism almost ended in 1948, when the main industrial enterprises and transport were nationalised. The collectivisation of agriculture began in March 1949, with the setting up of state farms and machine tractor stations – following the Soviet model. The Securitate (State Security Service) became the main instrument for the seizing of power by the communists and at the end of 1948 there was a purge of party members. It is not surprising that the bulk of the population harboured hostility to the communist regime and the Soviet Union (Vago in McCauley 1977: 111–27).

Bulgaria In Bulgaria when war came in September 1939, King Boris immediately declared neutrality but, in October 1939, the Soviets suggested a Soviet–Bulgarian mutual assistance pact and Soviet support for Bulgarian claims in the Dobrudja but Boris declined. The Balkan Pact powers (Greece, Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia) offered Bulgaria membership in February 1940, but he again turned the offer down, not wishing to become embroiled in any Balkan conflict. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact allowed Bulgaria to sign a commercial treaty with the Soviet Union as Berlin could not object to it. In September 1940, Romania was obliged to return southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria due to Soviet pressure. Bulgaria prepared for war, but it was uncertain if it would actually have to go to war and on which side. The Soviets offered another mutual assistance pact, with Bulgaria taking Thrace and the Soviet Union the Dardanelles. Boris was aware that Berlin had designated Bulgaria as a ‘Soviet security zone’. When the Germans decided to occupy Greece, they asked for permission for their soldiers

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to transit Bulgaria and Boris agreed provided they came as ‘tourists’. A German officer told me that they were given strict orders to be very polite when entering Greece. This changed later when partisans attacked them and were countered by savage SS reprisals. On 1 March 1941, Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy and Japan) and in so doing became an ally of Berlin; and when Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Greece, in April 1941, Bulgaria was given western Thrace and Serbian Macedonia. In Thrace, the local population rose up against the Bulgars and fearsome savagery reigned on both sides, but in Macedonia they were welcomed as liberators. What would the Germans demand as a quid pro quo? Boris insisted that Bulgarian troops would not serve outside the Balkans. After the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, he explained that Bulgarians would not fight Russians, whom they regarded as cousins, and troops were also needed at home in case the Turks invaded. German losses in the Soviet Union and the beginning of partisan attacks in Yugoslavia led to Berlin asking Bulgaria to garrison parts of German-occupied Yugoslavia, and three divisions, under German command, were sent and were also involved in attacks on the partisans. In May 1943, the Bulgarians were asked to occupy a part of northeastern Serbia so that Wehrmacht troops could be transferred to the eastern front. Boris declined to move into Greek Macedonia but agreed to Bulgarians in northern Serbia and along the Aegean coast of Thrace. The king refused a German request to form a volunteer legion to serve on the eastern front. The attack on the Soviet Union aroused the communists and exiled communists returned to help. The government acted, over 11,000 were arrested as suspected communists and 6,000 were sent to internment camps and the others to labour camps. The German ambassador pressed for action against Jews and legislation required Jews to wear a yellow star and the compulsory sale of Jewish businesses, but these measures met considerable resistance among the general public. In March 1943, Bulgaria permitted the deportation of Jews from the occupied territories. SS attempts to deport Jews who were Bulgarian citizens met fierce resistance from the Orthodox Church, political parties and trade unions, and the plans had to be dropped. The 50,000 Bulgarian Jews survived the war unscathed but those in the occupied territories were deported and murdered. On 15 August, Boris returned by air from a visit to Hitler very dejected because of a terrible row, presumably because the king had refused to send troops to the eastern front. He died, on 28 August, and was succeeded by his son, Simeon II, a minor, and this led to the formation of a regency. The Allies bombed Sofia in November 1943, and heavier attacks in January and March 1944 followed. The goal was to sow chaos and persuade Bulgaria to change sides. Political parties became more active as the economy deteriorated and the Fatherland Front (FF), led by Nikola Petkov, broadcast to Bulgaria from a Soviet controlled radio station. They proposed neutrality, the withdrawal of Bulgarian forces outside the country and democracy. There was a pro-regime opposition, but they refused to cooperate with the FF which they regarded as communist. In October 1943, and in February and March 1944, approaches were made to the Western Allies to withdraw from the war, but the

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terms were onerous: unconditional surrender and military occupation. Hopes that the Allies would land in the Balkans and that Bulgaria could join them, were shattered in June 1944 when the Allies landed in Normandy. The Soviets stepped up pressure by sending notes demanding that anti-Soviet forces cease activity in the country. The Bulgarians were caught in a vice: if they did not end the alliance with Germany, Soviet forces would occupy the country and if they did, German forces would occupy Bulgaria as they had Italy after it surrendered, in October 1943, and Hungary, in March 1944. To escape an almost impossible situation, Bulgaria declared neutrality, on 17 August, and reversed previous policies but it was too late and on 30 August, Moscow announced it would no longer respect Bulgarian neutrality. Bulgaria declared war on Germany on 8 September, but by then the Soviet Union had declared war on Bulgaria and the Red Army entered Bulgaria the same day to a wildly enthusiastic welcome. This emboldened the FF and it formed a new government with the communists in charge of the ministries of the interior and justice. The Bulgarian army joined Marshal Tolbukhin’s Third Ukrainian Front and fought their way through Hungary and Austria, sacrificing 32,000 lives. The FF was dominated by communists, but a multi-party system existed until 1947. The communists, calling themselves the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (BWP), were popular and, by late 1945 had about 250,000 members benefiting from the fact that they were the Russian party in a Russophile country. An Allied Control Commission (ACC), headed by the Soviets, was to oversee affairs and the Red Army was to remain until a peace treaty was signed. A Bulgarian who had served in the Red Army was made chief of staff and political commissars were placed alongside officers, and those officers judged politically unreliable were removed. A People’s Guard, formed mostly of former partisans, maintained order while the army continued the war. FF committees were quickly set up and run by communists and targeted members of the bourgeois order, with some murdered and others incarcerated in labour camps. Workers’ councils were set up in all enterprises. Control of the Ministry of the Interior made it possible to establish a completely new police force and secret police. Soviet advisers were attached to all ministries and decision making bodies. In January 1945, the police arrested the regents, royal advisers and all members of parliament and those who had held office in governments since 1941. Over 100 were found guilty and executed and this eliminated the old centre and right wing of Bulgarian politics. With about 80 per cent of the population being peasants, it was difficult for the communists to win them over. In other countries in the region, peasants had been given land taken from confiscated large estates but there were none of these and most peasants had enough land to farm. The communists used traditional salami tactics: force a split in the main agrarian party and other parties. The most formidable opponent the communists faced was Nikola Petkov, an agrarian leader. He was a founder member of the FF in 1943 and, from September 1944 to August 1945, was a minister without portfolio in the first FF government. From January 1945, he became leader of the anti-communist United opposition and was a member of the Great

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National Assembly. He fought to retain parliamentary democracy, which the communists viewed as counter-revolutionary activity. He was arrested on 5 June 1947 in the parliament building, and after a show trial – he was not permitted defence counsel or to present evidence – was found guilty of espionage and sentenced to death on 16 August. He was tortured and killed with a hammer and then his body was hanged, on 23 September, and buried in an unknown grave but he was posthumously rehabilitated on 15 January 1990. Georgi Dimitrov returned from Moscow in November 1945, and became leader of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (BWP) and prime minister, but the Western Allies refused to recognise the new government. A compromise was reached and two opposition members were to join the cabinet. A show trial of a journalist revealed a military conspiracy and over 2,000 officers were sacked. A referendum on the monarchy and elections to a Grand National Assembly were announced and it was a foregone conclusion that the state would be declared a republic. A single list was presented to electors on 27 October 1946, with the FF gaining 364 seats and the opposition 101. Even though Bulgaria had fought in Hungary and Austria on the Allied side, it was not recognised as a cobelligerent in the Paris Peace Treaty, signed on 10 February 1947, and lost Vardar Macedonia to Yugoslavia and Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace to Greece, while only southern Dobrudja was retained. As such, Bulgaria was the only country in the region to retain territory it had gained during the war. As regards war reparations (1938 prices), it had to pay $45 million to Greece and $25 million to Yugoslavia. A currency reform was introduced in March 1947, the object of which was to limit the money supply and eliminate much of the wealth of the bourgeoisie and traders. Those in the know were able to buy goods beforehand and then resell at a handsome profit. The FF brought trade unions, youth organisations, professional bodies and women’s groups under its control and then followed the nationalisation of industry, foreign trade became a state monopoly and many treaties were signed with the Soviet Union which integrated both states’ economic, social and cultural life. In 1947, a Two Year Plan had been adopted and then, in 1949, a Five Year Plan. Collectivisation was widely opposed but the establishment of machine tractor stations, following the Soviet model, effectively ended protest since collective farms had to rent machinery – and paid for this in kind – as they had little or no machinery of their own. In December 1948, the BWP reverted to its former name, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and modelled itself on the Soviet Communist Party. The nomenklatura system ensured that the party was able to select and confirm officials for all key institutions. A new Union of Bulgarian Priests was set up and priests were given a choice of joining or going to a labour camp. Other Christian denominations were treated harshly. Purges within the BCP were ongoing and, in 1949, Traicho Kostov, a leading communist, was arrested and sentenced to death. This saw the beginning of a

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purge which saw over 100,000 members being expelled and many of them going to labour camps. The civil service, military and other sectors of society also saw substantial purges. This was to eliminate all suspected Titoists who had been expelled from the Comintern in June 1948 (Crampton 2008: 167–90).

Yugoslavia The country, literally ‘South Slavs’, came into existence on 1 December 1918, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Serbia, with King Peter I of Serbia becoming the first sovereign. The official language was Serbo-Croat with Serbs using the Cyrillic alphabet and the Croats, the Latin alphabet. Yugoslavia gave in to Italian and German pressure and joined the Tripartite Pact in Vienna on 25 March 1941, thus becoming a German ally, but the Yugoslavs hoped they could stay out of the European war. President Roosevelt, who had decided that sooner or later the US would enter the war against Germany, sent ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, US Coordinator of Information, later to become head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), on a tour of the Mediterranean with instructions to urge neutral leaders in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Spain to resist German aggression. After meeting the pro-German Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul, Donovan held discussions with General Dušan Simovic´, who was anti-German, and informed him that the UK would hold out and the US would eventually enter the war. On 27 March 1941, Simovic´ launched a military coup d’état, removed Prince Paul and placed the 17-year-old King Peter II on the throne. The Führer’s reaction was to declare war, on 6 April 1941, and German, Hungarian and Italian (Axis) forces invaded and also entered Greece where the Italians were not making much progress. The Luftwaffe bombed Belgrade and other cities and, on 17 April, the Yugoslavs signed an armistice and over 300,000 Yugoslav officers and men were taken prisoner. Roosevelt’s reaction was to order US troops to occupy Greenland and the US Navy to start patrolling a vast stretch of the Atlantic, but this placed US warships in an area described by Hitler as a combat zone. This was deliberately provocative, and the President was hoping it would lead to an ‘incident’, which, in turn, might result in Germany declaring war on the US (Hemming 2019: 145–6). The German invasion of Yugoslavia was to have momentous consequences for Berlin and Moscow. Barbarossa originally was planned to begin in mid-May but the decision to invade Yugoslavia and Greece held it up until 22 June. Arguably, had the original plan gone ahead, the Wehrmacht would have had another five weeks before the Russian winter set in and this could have been crucial in securing its goal of taking Moscow. Yugoslavia was broken up and the independent state of Croatia became a German satellite, ruled by a militia, the Ustaše. Axis troops occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Serbia and Slovenia. The rest of the country was occupied by Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy. The Ustaše, between 1941 and 1945, murdered about 500,000 people, expelled 250,000 and forced another 200,000 to

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convert to Catholicism. Yugoslav resistance consisted of two main groups: the communist Yugoslav partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, and the royalists Chetniks, mainly Serbs, headed by Draža Mihailovic´. The partisans developed into the largest resistance army in occupied Europe and the Chetniks were supported by the Western Allies. The latter became more concerned with fighting Tito’s partisans than the Axis forces and gradually began to collaborate with the latter. Tito’s forces began to score significant victories and, in November 1943, at Jajce, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, established a federation which became the basis for post-war Yugoslavia. Tito’s partisans expelled the Axis troops from Serbia in 1944, and the rest of Yugoslavia in 1945, with some support from the Red Army. After Belgrade was liberated, the Red Army withdrew from Yugoslavia to continue the war in Hungary and elsewhere. Tito’s forces took over Trieste and parts of southern Austria. The British were very concerned about Trieste and prepared to fight Tito, if necessary, but his forces withdrew in June. Western attempts to bring the two partisan groups together floundered as Marshal Tito was dominant – he had 800,000 men – and was determined to establish a communist state. The war cost Yugoslavia about 1 million lives. On 11 November 1945, elections were held with only the communist-led National Front on the ballot sheet and it secured all 354 seats. A Constituent Assembly deposed King Peter II and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed. The king refused to abdicate but it availed him nothing as all opposition in the country had been eliminated. On 31 January 1946, the new constitution, modelled on the 1936 Soviet constitution, of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia set up six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia; the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina; and an autonomous district. The Serbian capital, Belgrade, became the federal capital. The capital of Montenegro was Titograd or Tito’s city. Tito’s ambitions extended to taking over Albania and Greek Macedonia and even parts of Austria and Hungary. In 1947, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria signed the Bled agreement which envisaged a close relationship between the two communist states and would permit Tito to intervene in the Greek civil war, but Stalin vetoed it and it never materialised. The German minority, which had collaborated with the Axis forces, was expelled. Tito saw himself as a loyal supporter of Stalin but believed that a Balkan federation would be possible. Stalin, initially, favoured this concept but then changed his mind and opposed an ethnic federation, preferring a multi-national federation along the lines of Austria-Hungary. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform and Tito was accused of revisionism, but it had nothing to do with revisionism but all to do with cutting Tito down to size. Tito requested American aid in 1949, and it was increasingly granted but the country did not participate in the Marshall Plan. Without US aid it is difficult to conceive of Yugoslavia surviving as an independent state in the hostile environment of the region. Tito ruthlessly eliminated all communists viewed as pro-Moscow and became a successful national leader, the only one in Eastern Europe. Stalin sent hitmen to eliminate Tito, but he eliminated them, and sent a note to Stalin

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saying that if he sent another one, he would send his own hitman to Moscow and he would not fail.

Albania Albania was the first country to be occupied by the Axis powers during World War II. Italy invaded on 7 April 1939, and Benito Mussolini proclaimed King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy as King of Albania, replacing King Zog, who fled to London with his family. The Albanian parliament deposed Zog and offered the crown to Victor Emmanuel III. Everything came under Italian control and an Albanian Fascist Party ruled the country. In October 1940, Mussolini, using Albania as a base, invaded Greece but was defeated and then the Greeks captured part of Albania. In order to forestall a British invasion, Hitler attacked Greece, in December 1940, and, in April 1941, Greece conceded defeat and the Greeks left Albania. The Italians then took over the part of Greece occupied by the Germans. Enver Hoxha was born in October 1908, the son of a Muslim cloth merchant who travelled widely in Europe and the United States, studied at the University of Montpellier, France, on a scholarship and later worked as a secretary at the Albanian consulate in Brussels and was therefore a member of the prosperous bourgeoisie. Many other communist leaders were from the bourgeois intelligentsia. About 1 per cent of the population owned 95 per cent of arable land, claiming feudal privileges, and dominated local politics. In October 1941, small groups in Tirana founded the Communist Party of Albania (renamed the Party of Labour of Albania in 1948) and Hoxha was chosen as a Muslim representative and a member of the provisional Central Committee, and elected first secretary in March 1943. The communists grasped the opportunity to call on the youth of the country to liberate their homeland and, in September 1942, it founded a National Liberation Movement (NLM) which included many resistance groups, some of them anti-communist. The NLM became the National Liberation Army, which received military support from the British organisation, the SOE, but was firmly under communist control. A National Liberation Front appeared, in September 1942, and included many nationalist groups but was under the control of the communists. The Italian army surrendered to the Allies in September 1943 but the Germans then occupied Albania. Communist partisans were able to liberate southern Albania in January 1944, and then convened a National Liberation Front which set up an Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation to play the role of a national administration and legislature. Hoxha was elected the chair and was also the Liberation Army’s supreme commander. A provisional government was formed in October 1944, with Enver Hoxha as prime minister. Tirana, the capital, was liberated by communist partisans on 17 November 1944, and they eventually expelled the Germans and Italians from Albania in the same month. They then liberated Kosovo, parts of Montenegro and southern Bosnia and Herzegovina. As such, Albania was the only country in Europe which liberated itself without aid from outside forces.

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During the Greek civil war, the Soviets paid great attention to Albania, and when Greek guerrillas appealed for help Hoxha turned to Stalin, who advised him to solve the question jointly with Tito. Another example of close Soviet influence was when the Politburo sent 156,000 membership cards to the Albanian People’s Union of Youth with appropriate instructions from the Soviet Komsomol, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Sea Transport and State Security Committee. All contacts with Albania were kept secret. The communists set about removing all political opponents and the country’s interwar elite was wiped out: thousands of politicians, clan leaders and members of former Albanian governments were condemned as war criminals and executed. Thousands of their family members were imprisoned in labour camps and gaols and later sent to state farms set up in marshlands. In December 1945, a new People’s Assembly was elected but only National Front (previously the National Liberation Movement and the National Liberation Front) candidates were permitted to stand and 93 per cent voted for it. It convened in January 1946, removed the monarchy and proclaimed the People’s Republic of Albania. Albania was the only country in the region which ended the war with a larger Jewish population than at the beginning of the occupation, as Albanian families hid Jewish refugees from other Balkan countries. Relations with Yugoslavia were strained when Hoxha refused an invitation to make Albania a federal republic of Yugoslavia. In 1947, the Yugoslavs launched a campaign against anti-Yugoslav communists in Albania. Tirana announced the arrest and conviction of nine members of the People’s Assembly who were strong critics of Belgrade but Tito then accused the Albanians of taking an independent line and turning the Albanian people against Yugoslavia. Another bone of contention was Kosovo, overwhelmingly peopled by Albanians, which Albania claimed but Yugoslavia insisted on retaining. After the drumming out of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, Albania, previously economically dependent on Yugoslavia, then became dependent on the Soviet Union. In October 1949, about 30 Albanians guerrillas opposed to the Hoxha dictatorship landed in Albania in an attempt to link up with resistance groups and perhaps spark a civil war which would overthrow the communist regime. The UK trained the guerrillas using sign language in Operation Valuable, which was promoted by the UK’s MI6 and the CIA. Albania was a tempting target, to the south of Yugoslavia which had, in June 1948, been expelled from the Cominform and it also bordered non-communist Greece. The mission was a disaster as many of the guerrillas were killed or captured. Undaunted, more guerrillas were trained and dropped into Albania in late 1950, but the result was the same: Albanian security forces were waiting for them and decimated them quickly. Altogether, Operation Valuable cost the lives of over 300 Albanians and was a total failure, but this led to much head scratching. What they did not know was that Kim Philby, who had been posted to the British embassy in Washington with the task of liaising with the CIA and FBI, was also reading communications between Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, and President Truman, and was a Soviet agent. Privy to all

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major secrets, Philby relayed this information to Moscow Centre which, in turn, passed on details of Operation Valuable. Albanian communism was as ruthless as the Soviet model but the regime was Albanian and did not have Soviet advisers attached to its ministries and other institutions. Albania developed ‘muscular socialism’, with industry nationalised and agriculture collectivised as it cut itself off from the outside world in order to maintain the dominance of Hoxha and his subordinates. Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968, after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and then turned to China for trade and security. Albania joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA) in 1949, and withdrew in 1961. It was the only European country which did not attend the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and hence did not sign the Helsinki Final Accord, in 1975. Albania was the last country in the region to end communist rule, in March 1992.

British policy in the Balkans In 1944, when armistice negotiations began with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria there was already a precedent which the Soviets exploited to the full. In August 1943, the British and Americans had negotiated with Italy’s Badoglio government on their own, simply keeping the Soviets ‘specially informed’. Stalin was not pleased and told the British and Americans that he would not tolerate such behaviour in future and wanted ‘military-political commissions’ of the Big Three to deal with countries wishing to disassociate themselves from Germany. By the time of the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ meeting, in October 1943, the Anglo-American military government system was operating in Italy, complemented by an Anglo-American Allied Control Commission (ACC) supervising the Badoglio government in the rear. At Molotov’s insistence, the British and American foreign ministers agreed to set up an Allied Advisory Council with Andrei Vyshinsky as the Soviet representative, but he realised quickly that he had little influence. When Roosevelt and Churchill met, in September 1944, and issued the Hyde Park Declaration which promised to hand over a greater measure of control to the Italian people, no mention was made of the Soviet Union. Unintentionally, the British and Americans had provided the Soviets with a handy grievance for future use. In March 1945, when Molotov was rejecting complaints about the treatment of British and American members of the ACC in Romania, he commented that the situation was completely different from Italy where the British and Americans had on no occasion informed the Soviet representative of important measures taken by the ACC. When terms were offered to Romania, Molotov insisted they should be presented to the Romanians as Soviet proposals and not as three power terms. Moscow took matters into its own hands by establishing direct contact with Antonescu in Stockholm and insisting the armistice be signed by a Romanian delegation in Moscow. On Bulgaria, Molotov agreed that while hostilities were ongoing there would be no direct participation by the British and Americans but after the war there

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would be three power participation on control. Purely for prestige, a British military officer signed the armistice with Marshal Tolbukhin, in October 1944, and this model was adopted when an armistice was signed with Hungary in January 1945. A striking fact about all three armistices was that none provided for a Soviet occupation and the probable reason for this was to prevent the British from sending a token force. Indeed, the armistices provided for the full restoration of civil administration in Hungary and Romania behind the front lines. There was no need for this in Bulgaria because there was no fighting there. The reality of Soviet influence was brought home to the British representative on the ACC in November 1944, when General Vinogradov had called on King Michael and Prime Minister Sanatescu and told them that Iuliu Maniu, of the National Peasants’ Party and Dinu Bratianu, of the Liberal Party, should be excluded from the government and two representatives approved by him – one of them was Petru Groza, the leader of the Ploughmen’s Front, should replace them. The British representative, Stevenson, complained that he had not been consulted and would tell the Romanians that the demarche did not have the ACC’s authority. Vinogradov told him that he had overall operational control and it was immaterial whether he was informed before or after a decision. This was along the lines of how the ACC functioned in Italy. London then instructed Stevenson not to inform the Romanian government of what had happened and it was clear that the Foreign Office had not apprised Stevenson of the percentages agreement. In the end Maniu remained in the government. In November 1944, General Rodion Malinovsky, the Red Army commander, told the Romanian General Staff to prepare accommodation for three infantry divisions, and this caused panic because it indicated the Soviets were preparing to stay. Vinogradov said they were tired divisions which required a rest from fighting. London could not protest that there was nothing in the armistice agreement to permit the stationing of Soviet troops in Romania because it was preparing to intervene in the Greek civil war, and this ruled out British pressure on the Soviets over Romania. Ana Pauker and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej visited Moscow in January 1945, and on their return began agitating against the new Radescu government and claimed that they had approval for a communist government, after which the Soviets would hand back the administration of northern Transylvania to Romania, grant co-belligerent status and return prisoners of war. In February 1945, the Yalta conference passed the Declaration on Liberated Europe promising representative democratic governments and early free elections, and the British hoped this would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the Soviets. The latter did not think so and demonstrated this when Vinogradov’s successor Pushkin refused to see Stevenson for two weeks. Pushkin told the Radescu government to maintain peace but not to use force which could precipitate civil war. The Soviets directly sponsored demonstrations against the king and the government, and Stevenson asked London to request an end to Soviet interference in Romanian affairs. Churchill informed Molotov that if the

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ACC took decisions with which the government disagreed, it would dissociate itself from them. Molotov countered by saying that the British government was misinformed and that the Radescu government was dominated by fascist elements which encouraged the shooting of peaceful citizens and was quite incapable of securing peace in the rear of the Red Army, and it was therefore the duty of the ACC to restore order. Radescu immediately called elections for mid-March in the spirit of the Yalta declaration. There was now a danger that the communists would lose face, and Andrei Vyshinsky arrived from Moscow and asked the king to dismiss the Radescu government. He agreed but played for time in appointing a new government. The Soviets applied pressure by disarming all Romanian troops in Bucharest and put Soviet tank patrols on the streets. The British complained to Vyshinsky about Soviet interference in the Romanian constitution, but he replied, had not the British interfered with the Greek constitution and had the Soviet government not refrained from interfering in Greece? The king asked London what he should do and it replied that it was consulting the Americans. Eventually the king was advised not to take any irrevocable steps but there was no promise of support. Churchill, mindful of the percentages agreement, wrote to Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, that Britain should not ‘develop an anti-Russian front’ in Bucharest. Eden then told his representative in Bucharest to leave the tough talk to the Americans. Vyshinsky warned the king that if he did not appoint a Groza government, ‘he could not answer for the independence of Romania’. The king appointed Groza and Radescu took refuge in the British legation, and Eden suggested the US legation should give refuge to the king. Churchill appealed to Roosevelt to prevent the ‘rule of a communist minority by force and misrepresentation’ but the President replied it would be a mistake to get involved in arguments over Romania which might prejudice a Polish settlement. Churchill instructed Stevenson to open fire if the communists tried to remove Radescu from the British legation by force and Stevenson passed on this information to the Soviets. Radescu left the legation later with a guarantee that he would not be arrested. Churchill went on hoping the Americans would take the lead in supporting the king but in vain. The British accepted defeat in Romania without a whimper and the same was to happen in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Bulgaria, the British played a much less active role than in Romania. This was partly due to the fact that the representative was extremely cautious and averse to taking risks. The leader of the agrarians, roughly the counterpart of the Romanian National Peasant Party, was Dr G. M. Dimitrov, who had worked with the British in the Middle East during the war. He was forced to resign as secretary of his party in January 1945, and the communist minister of the interior placed him under house arrest and arrested several of his closest colleagues. He sought refuge in the British Mission, which was refused but the Americans accepted him and spirited him out of the country. As early as 13 March 1945, the Foreign Office favoured giving up the struggle in Romania and Bulgaria, regarding the position as untenable. Another official suggested that the Soviets should be informed that London was in no position to prevent what the

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Soviets judged opportune in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. This would hopefully decrease the ‘suspicion which was poisoning Anglo-Soviet relations’. At Potsdam, the Americans intended to press for the implementation of Yalta, the reorganisation of the ACCs and the broadening of the region’s governments. The British expected the Americans to fail and then London would propose peace treaties. A compromise was reached, and a Council of Foreign Ministers was set up to draft the peace treaties but the British insisted that these treaties be with ‘democratic and recognised governments’. The ACCs remained under the control of the Soviets until peace treaties were signed. British and American journalists were to be allowed to work in the region and this boosted the morale of the anti-communist parties, but the communists were keen to put on a democratic face as they wanted Western recognition and membership of the United Nations. When Ernest Bevin succeeded Eden as foreign secretary he shot from the hip and declared that the governments in the region did not represent the people and did not recognise the Bulgarian electoral law, adding that one kind of totalitarianism was replacing another. The Bulgarian elections were immediately postponed, and in Bulgarian and Romanian newspapers criticism of the communists suddenly appeared and opposition political meetings could be held. Bevin was aware that until the UK promoted free elections in Greece, it could not argue for free elections in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Molotov, in the Council of Foreign Ministers, refused to give an inch and by the end of 1945 the British and American governments were looking for face saving solutions at another meeting in Moscow, in December 1945, when Molotov, James F. Byrnes and Bevin agreed that the governments should be broadened by adding some opposition representatives. In February 1946, both Western powers recognised the Groza government, which then proceed to terrorise the opposition to the extent that in elections in November they only obtained 10 per cent of the votes, about which the Western powers protested to no avail. In Bulgaria, opposition leaders refused to join the government despite Vyshinsky’s threats, and in the October 1946 elections the opposition obtained about a quarter of the votes. In February 1947, the Western powers signed peace treaties with Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary because they were anxious to get the Soviets out of Italy so as to turn it into a Western ally. In Hungary, the Soviets invited Admiral Miklós Horthy, who had spent the war in London, to Moscow to sign an armistice. They set up the Debrecen government without consulting the Western Allies and in the subsequent elections the communists only secured 70 seats compared to 245 by the main bourgeois party, the Smallholders. The Americans immediately recognised the Hungarian government and established diplomatic relations. The UK, after signing the peace treaty, had no weapons to stop the communist takeover (Barker in McCauley 1977: 201–17). The UK over the period 1944–6 only made at best half-hearted efforts to influence developments in the region, and presumably Western behaviour in Italy signalled that the Soviet Union could do the same in the region. Stalin was

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aware that the Western Allies were not going to go to war over Budapest or Bucharest or Sofia. It was vain for the Foreign Office to believe that by abandoning these countries it could purchase Soviet goodwill elsewhere. Stalin kept his word on Greece because it was not his main target. For him Turkey was the prize.

Greece Greece endured a war of liberation, a civil war and a class war. Despite the existence of the powerful Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the communists failed to take over, unlike other communist parties in the region. The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940, and the German invasion the following April threw the KKE into utter confusion. Initially Greek resistance to the Italians was called a ‘war of national liberation’ but later it became an ‘imperialist war’. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the KKE, faced with the ItalianGerman-Bulgarian occupation, resolved that the main task of the Greek people was to support the Soviet Union and to overthrow the ‘foreign fascist yoke’ and invited all Greeks to join a national liberation front, EAM, which was founded in September 1941. EAM was a coalition of the KKE and four small left-wing parties. There were several offshoots of EAM, including a relief organisation and a youth movement. The most important was ELAS, the National Popular Liberation Army. EAM/ELAS rapidly developed into the largest and best organised resistance movement and wielded authority over much of ‘Mountain Greece’ and performed many of the functions of civil government. In 1941 and 1942, several non-communist resistance movements appeared, the most important being EDES. In November 1942, with aid from a British military mission, ELAS/EDAM (National Democratic Liberation Front) blew up a viaduct. Within a month, units of ELAS attacked EDAM, revealing it would brook no opposition as the leading resistance movement. Believing that liberation in the form of a British landing was near, EAM/ELAS changed tactics. In July 1943, it agreed to adhere to the Military Agreement, elaborated by the British Military Mission, which involved the coordination of all guerrilla activities, with headquarters in Cairo. The agreement collapsed during a meeting in Cairo when Churchill insisted that they recognise King George II as the constitutional monarch and also the Greek government in exile. Soon afterwards civil war broke out, with EAM/ELAS attempting to wipe out EDES. The prime minister of the government in exile in Cairo broadcast a message, at Christmas 1943, appealing for an armistice which would be backed by the American, British and Soviet governments. This was agreed partly because the outnumbered EDES had put up stern resistance to communist attacks and also because the British were determined that EDES survive. Thus ended the first civil war. In March 1944, EAM surprised the opposition by announcing the formation of a Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), a provisional government in waiting. This was a direct challenge to the government in exile and its difficulties were compounded by mutinies among Greek military units in Middle East

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which demanded the formation of a government of national unity based on PEEA. Churchill ordered the vigorous suppression of the mutinies. It was unclear if the mutinies had been coordinated by EAM from within Greece, and the leader of the main non-communist resistance movement was liquidated by an ELAS unit in April 1944. Churchill was furious and commented that ELAS was the ‘most treacherous filthy beasts I have ever read of in official papers’. Afterwards Churchill regarded the prevention of a communist takeover in Greece as a personal crusade. The mutinies and the Red Army entering Bessarabia may have led Churchill and Eden to agree to spheres of influence in the Balkans, achieved in the percentages agreement with Stalin, in October 1944. In May 1944, Churchill had asked the US government about spheres of influence and Roosevelt, against the advice of Cordell Hull, secretary of state, agreed for an initial period of three months involving Romania and Greece and subsequently expanded to include Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. This agreement between the UK and the Soviet Union would appear to be the main reason why the two subsequent communist insurgencies in Greece, the December 1944 uprising and the 1946–9 civil war failed. It is worthy of note that the KKE was quite ignorant of what Stalin had agreed. The Lebanon conference in May 1944, that brought together 25 delegates (of whom only two were communists) representing 17 political parties and resistance movements, agreed that all guerrilla movements would be under the command of a government of national unity. EAM was given six relatively unimportant government posts but EAM refused the posts and demanded, among others, the Ministry of Interior and an under-secretary of the army. This reflected the standard communist demand to take command of the police and the army. Everything changed when, in July 1944, a Soviet military mission arrived at ELAS headquarters. A week later EAM agreed to join the government and accept the posts on offer. In September 1944, ELAS/EDES agreed to place their respective forces under the command of the Greek government, which in turn placed all Greek forces under the command of Lieut.-General Ronald Scobie, commander of the British force which was to accompany the Greek government in exile back to Greece after the German withdrawal. The confusion surrounding the German withdrawal in October 1944 and the late arrival of the Scobie mission presented the communists with a golden opportunity to seize power, but they failed to do so and instead saw imposing order as their main priority. That said, an armed uprising which would almost certainly have been successful, was party policy. One can assume that the communists had received instructions from Moscow not to seize power by force. ELAS refused to disband and Scobie declared that he would use force to defend the government. The communist ministers resigned from the government and called for a mass demonstration, on 3 December in Athens, with a general strike to follow. The police fired on demonstrators and caused panic and the Greek military forces were attacked but were quite incapable of quelling the unrest. Churchill ordered Scobie to treat Athens as a conquered city and to shoot to kill if necessary, but British forces elsewhere in Greece were not

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attacked. The Americans and the Soviets remained neutral. Churchill and Eden flew to Athens on Christmas Eve and called a round table discussion of bourgeois and communist parties which failed to reach agreement, but the king did agree not to return to Greece until a plebiscite had been held. Archbishop Damaskinos, whom Churchill had earlier called a ‘pestilent priest, a survival of the Middle Ages’, was made regent. A new prime minister took over and ELAS agreed to a ceasefire in January 1945. ELAS handed over a large quantity of arms and was granted an amnesty. One weak government succeeded another and Soviet hostility to the British military presence increased. Elections were held in March 1946, and the KKE abstained, which it later acknowledged as an error. The royalist Populists won a majority and a plebiscite restored the monarchy. The civil war began again and the KKE was banned. One of the reasons for the attempt by the communists to seize power by force was apparently that Tito had promised substantial aid and Greek insurgents were being trained in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. A rebel pro-communist Democratic Army formed and took control of large swathes of Greece and it appeared that the Athens government could collapse. In early 1948, Stalin informed Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav communist leader, that the Greek insurrection had to stop. Martial law was declared in October 1948. When Yugoslavia was drummed out of the Cominform in June 1948, the KKE sided with Stalin and it was only a matter of time before Yugoslavia closed it border – this occurred in summer 1949 – with Greece and thereby condemned the communist insurgency to defeat. The Democratic Army fought on but was decisively defeated and as a result KKE leaders fled over the frontier. One of the weaknesses was that no leader of the calibre of Tito or Hoxha emerged and no agreement could be reached about whether to take power by force or constitutional means. Were these the reasons why EAM/ELAS failed to achieve total dominance of the resistance movement, unlike Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia and Hoxha’s LNC in Albania? The communists missed out in October 1944 when the Wehrmacht abandoned the country, and again in December 1944, when they launched an abortive armed attempt to seize power. Then came the civil war of 1946–9 and total defeat. Had Stalin aided the communists they would have taken power, but he remained aloof. At Yalta, Stalin only mentioned Greece once when he asked Churchill what was happening there: ‘I don’t want to criticise anything, nor to interfere. I’m quite content to leave it to you’. Lord Moran, Churchill’s personal physician, records that Churchill was touched by the ‘faithful manner in which Stalin discharged his undertaking not to interfere in Greece’ (Clogg in McCauley 1977: 184–97). An important reason why Greece could not achieve a political consensus in the post-war years was the inability of the Greeks, British and Americans to reform the structure of the economy. The UK provided aid until 24 February 1947, when the British ambassador to the United States handed over two notes to the Department of State stating that the British government was in no position to provide aid to Turkey and Greece and asked the US to provide economic and military aid to these countries. President Truman agreed that aid should be provided to Greece and Turkey. On 12 March 1947, Truman asked

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Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey. Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, and his deputy, Andrei Vyshinsky, both condemned Greek and Turkish foreign policy. Beginning in March, the Turkish press began publishing details of the aid which would be extended to Greece and Turkey, which would partly replace that provided by the UK, especially military hardware. These reports spread to the British and American press. Truman requested $400 million ($4.67 billion in 2019 prices) from Congress, of which $150 million was earmarked for Turkey. This demarche became known as the Truman Doctrine (Hasanli 2011: 290–3). Why did Marshall aid to Greece not have the same positive effect on the economy as in many other countries? American officials failed to construct political institutions which could promote economic development. Americans favoured large, visible projects which had only limited success. Greek Marxist literature sees the aid as a disaster for the economy as it deformed it and without it, a peaceful resolution of the post-war conflicts could have been achieved. Non-Marxist literature points to the positive fact that Greece avoided communism but concedes that the structural problems of the Greek economy were beyond resolution by foreign aid officials. Greece received $175 million in 1948–9, and $156 million in 1949–50 and this strengthened the conservative parties in Greece and weakened the socialist and communist parties. Marxists finally achieved power in Greece when Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left) formed the government, with Alexis Tsipras as prime minister, between 26 January 2015 and 20 August 2015 and from 21 September 2015 to 8 July 2019 when the centre right party of Kyriakos Mitsotakis took 39.9 per cent of the vote compared to the 31.5 per cent of Tsipras’s Syriza. It was a crushing defeat for the Eurosceptic ‘new left’ which had pledged to defy the austerity demands of the European Union and International Monetary Fund. Voters did not forgive Tsipras for caving into their demands on the economy. The perennial structural weaknesses of the Greek economy were still in evidence and no Marxist solutions could be found to regenerate it.

US policy in the region How would one summarise US policy? The most important source of conflict between the US and USSR concerned the post-war arrangements for Eastern Europe. The State Department was very keen that the principles of the Atlantic Charter be applied (see Document 4, pp. 228–9); that self-determination be enacted and the region be integrated into the grand design of a universal market economy. However, the US did not wish to become embroiled in the conflicts in the region – that would be the responsibility of the United Nations. Roosevelt floated the image of the US, the UK, the USSR and China acting as the ‘four policemen’ who ‘would maintain such armed forces as to impose peace’ (Yergin 1980: 45). The idea had its weaknesses – for instance, China was incapable of imposing peace at home, let alone stepping outside its frontiers to quell conflict. The cooperation of the Soviet

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Union would be vital and Roosevelt took it for granted that the governments in Eastern Europe would be friendly towards the Soviet Union and the West. Roosevelt rejected in principal British requests, in February 1942, in favour of Soviet territorial demands and argued that such questions be left until hostilities had ended. In May 1942, he would not countenance territorial changes being written into the Anglo–Soviet treaty. In May 1944, Eden suggested to Molotov that the USSR take the lead in Romania while the UK did the same in Greece. Churchill persuaded Roosevelt to go along with this but his secretary of state was not present and it was not minuted. Churchill’s ‘percentages’ deal, in October 1944 (see Document 7, pp. 232–3) was not endorsed by the Americans. When Stalin occupied the region he acted unilaterally. This inevitably increased the influence of those who opposed Roosevelt’s policy of close cooperation with Stalin. The 7 million Polish Americans used every avenue to press for an independent, democratic Poland after the war and in Michigan the chief Republican spokesperson on foreign affairs, Senator Vandenberg, who depended on Polish votes, declared that the Senate would not agree to the US joining the UN if the provisions of the Atlantic Charter (see Document 4, pp. 228–9) were not respected. Stalin, at the Yalta conference, agreed to the publication of the Declaration on Liberated Europe (see Document 10, pp. 236–7) which embodied the principles of the Atlantic Charter (see Document 4, pp. 228–9). However, the declaration was pure ‘algebra’ to Stalin but an agreement was ‘practical arithmetic’ (see Document 5, pp. 229–31). Roosevelt told Congress on 1 March 1945 that the foundation for a lasting peace, based on the just principles of the Atlantic Charter had now been laid. This struck a responsive chord, spring had arrived after a difficult winter. Yergin refers to it as ‘Roosevelt weather’; (Yergin 1980: 66); optimism had really taken over. The USSR committed itself to entering the war against Japan two or three months after the termination of the European war and to participate actively in the setting up of the United Nations. Roosevelt’s foreign policy consisted of two parts: one for internal and the other for external consumption. A groundswell away from isolation gradually overtook the American public from 1942 onwards. This made it necessary for the President to speak the language of pure Wilsonianism at home, but he was aware that this was incompatible with the realities of Realpolitik or power politics.

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Turkey Imperial Russia fought ten wars against the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire between the 17th century and 1918 and won them all. This was due to the fact that Russia was a rising power and the Ottomans were in decline. Until the mid-1930s, relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were friendly. The Moscow Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity, signed on 16 March 1921, the Kars Treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, signed on 13 October 1921, and the Treaty between Turkey and Ukraine, signed on 21 January 1922, established good relations between the two countries and these developed into the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Turkey and the Soviet Union, signed on 17 December 1925, which envisaged non-aggression and non-participation in hostile coalitions in the event of military conflicts. The three-year treaty was automatically extended every year, unless one of the parties gave six months’ notice of its termination. It was extended for two years, on 17 December 1929, and for another five years on 30 October 1931, and then another ten years on 7 November 1935. Turkey conducted a balanced foreign policy during the 1930s, well aware that international tension could lead to war. It signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the London Convention for the Definition of Aggression, the Balkan Entente Pact and it became a leading actor during the Montreux Conference on the Turkish Straits which connect the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas to the Black Sea. They consist of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and the Straits are at opposite ends of the Sea of Marmara. The Straits Conference began in Montreux, Switzerland, on 22 June 1936, with Turkey, the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, France, the UK, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia and Australia attending. The first meeting discussed the Turkish draft of a new treaty. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits was signed on 20 July 1936, for 20 years after many heated sessions and all participants signed except Australia. It was acknowledged that it was the foundation of Turkish security as well as that of all Black Sea states. The international commission was dissolved at Montreux, which left Turkey to interpret the Convention in its own interests. Italy joined, in 1938, and Japan left, in 1951. DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-8

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The death of Atatürk, on 10 November 1938, led to less friendly relations with the USSR as Moscow attempted to revise the Convention. The occupation of Albania by Italy, in April 1939, alarmed Ankara as Italy and Germany had made clear their aspirations for greater influence in the Balkans and the UK and France, as a result, guaranteed the security of Greece and Romania. The German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 led to the UK and France declaring war on Germany on 3 September. When the Soviet Union attacked Poland on Sunday 17 September, the UK and France did not declare war on the Soviet Union. Bilateral agreements between the UK and France and Turkey, in May-June 1939, and British guarantees of Turkey’s territorial integrity when war broke out, were welcomed but similar guarantees with the Soviet Union were needed. On 24 September, the Turkish foreign minister visited Moscow for negotiations and was received by Stalin and Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov. Stalin asked against whom the proposed British– French–Turkish non-aggression pact was directed. Molotov stated that the Soviet Union could not sign a pact against Germany or Italy as the former was an ally of the Soviet Union and the latter did not threaten Turkey, and it became clear that Molotov did not favour signing a pact. Stalin maintained that the UK and France did not want to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union, believing they could do without it. They ‘are the persons responsible for the present crisis but we are guilty as well. We failed to foresee subsequent developments’. Stalin was actually conceding that the Soviet Union was partly responsible for the outbreak of war. Further discussions in Moscow were fruitless and when the foreign minister returned to Ankara the British–French– Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed, on 19 October. Stalin was piqued by Turkey’s show of independence but believed that its future could not be decided without the Soviet Union. In November 1940, Molotov headed a Soviet delegation in Berlin and expressed Moscow’s interest in joining the Tripartite Pact, signed by Germany, Italy and Japan on 27 September 1940. The Soviets wanted control of the Straits and military bases there. Molotov discussed dividing Turkey between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Stalin informed Georgi Dimitrov, head of the Comintern: ‘We shall banish the Turks to Asia. There are two million Georgians, 1.5 million Armenians, one million Kurds, etc. and there are just 6–7 million Turks proper’ (Dimitrov 2003: passim). When a pro-German seized power in Iraq, Germany asked for permission to aid him via Turkey, but Ankara refused. Vichy France wanted to recover its influence in Syria, but Turkey again refused passage and the British request to move weapons through Turkey was also rejected. Turkey’s refusal made it possible for the UK to re-establish its influence in Iraq, and Berlin then drafted a German–Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression which was signed on 18 June 1941. The treaty did not affect Turkey’s treaties with other countries, first and foremost the UK. Washington objected and immediately ceased deliveries of military matériel but after a request by London they were resumed. A Soviet diplomatic comment was that the friendship pact gave Germany a free hand to attack the Soviet

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Union. A statement in Pravda, on 14 June, that rumours about a possible war between them were groundless and that deliveries of strategic raw materials, foodstuffs, etc. to Germany were continuing, encouraged Ankara to sign the Friendship Pact with Germany. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, Germany published Molotov’s plans for Turkey during the November 1940 talks in Berlin, but Moscow immediately denied them. Turkey declared neutrality during the German–Soviet conflict, but Stalin commented that the Soviet Union could not rely on Turkish neutrality. In August 1941, Soviet and British troops moved into Iran and a joint Soviet– British statement confirmed support for Turkey if another power invaded. Stalin changed his mind in May 1942, when Red Army commanders of two armies were ordered to be ready to invade Turkey. Heavy military losses forced the Red Army to postpone preparations for the invasion and the Turkish military moved more troops to the border with the Soviet Union. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the British and Americans considered the creation of a Balkan front to weaken the pressure on the Soviet Union and open up a new transit link to it. In order to draw Turkey into the war, a British delegation, headed by Churchill, arrived in Adana, Turkey in January 1943 to win the Turks over, informing them that if they joined the war, they would play a role in the post-war reconstruction of the world. The Americans thought that if Churchill could not convince the Turks to go to war, it would be difficult to restrain the Soviet Union in the Straits. Turkey, nevertheless, decided to remain neutral because, it was claimed, it did not have a modern, well trained army and thus involvement in the war would result in certain defeat. If the UK provided modern weapons and munitions, Turkey would join the war. Another reason for Turkish reluctance was the belief that after Germany’s defeat the Soviets would copy German behaviour and were simply not to be trusted. The Turks likewise did not trust the British and Americans but shortly afterwards the UK began delivering modern weapons to the Turkish army and if Turkey were attacked, British military units would be dispatched. Churchill reported to Stalin that, in his opinion, Turkey would join the war by the end of the year. In July 1943, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara suggested to Moscow that pressure be brought on Turkey to permit it to be used as a springboard for military operations in the Balkans. At the Quebec Conference, in August 1943, President Roosevelt and Churchill accepted Turkish neutrality but the Soviet Union objected, seeing neutrality as aiding Germany. The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, in October-November 1943, stipulated that Turkey should immediately join the war and render all necessary assistance to the Allies by making available Turkish air bases and the Soviet Union was to join the AngloTurkish protocol. Turkish involvement in the war was on the agenda of the Tehran Conference, in November-December 1943, and Churchill stressed that this would permit the Allies to send the Soviet Union military and other aid via the Black Sea. If Turkey refused to go to war, aid would cease and it would be excluded from post-war peace conferences. He warned Ankara that if it did not join the belligerents the UK would not protect Turkey and it would have to

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settle the Straits problem with the Soviet Union on its own. Operation Overlord, the opening of the Second Front, was agreed and Churchill concurred with Stalin that the time had arrived to revise the Montreux Convention. British and American air forces were to land in Turkey in February 1944, and if Ankara disagreed diplomatic relations would be broken off. Churchill, Roosevelt and Turkey’s President Inönü met in Cairo but again the argument was advanced that the Turkish army was unprepared for war because it lacked modern weapons and needed substantial aid. The final press release made no mention of Turkey entering the war. In May 1944, the Soviets began the mass deportations of Crimean Tatars and the Soviet Black Sea coast was cleared of those who could form a fifth column. Lavrenty Beria, head of the NKVD, reported to Stalin in July that 225,009 people had been deported from Crimea of whom 183,155 were Tatars, 12,422 Bulgarians, 15,040 Greeks and other nationalities. Uzbekistan was the destination for 151,604 Tatars and 31,551 were resettled in the Russian Federation. The Soviet Politburo decided, on 30 June 1945, to rename the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic the Crimean Oblast and it became part of the Russian Federation (RSFSR) but this decision was not published at the time. On 19 February 1954, Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine but, on 18 March 2014, Vladimir Putin signed the Treaty of Accession and it thereby returned to the Russian Federation. In November 1944, the Metskhetian Turks residing on the Georgian–Turkish border, were resettled in Central Asia along with Kurds and Khemshils. Other nationalities deported included 400,478 Chechens and Ingush; 60,139 Karachais; 32,817 Balkars; 774,178 Germans and the total of Soviet citizens deported exceeded 2 million (Hasanli 2011: 1–20). On 14 April, a joint Anglo–American note was handed to Turkey demanding it cease exports of chrome to Germany. It did. In June 1944, the Allies demanded Turkey break off relations with Germany to permit Soviet aircraft to fly over Turkish territory and their air and sea bases be utilised. Stalin disagreed and demanded Turkey declare war on Germany and rebuffed Turkish attempts to improve relations. Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on 2 August, and with Japan on 6 August. When the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria, in September 1944, the spectre of the Red Army approaching the Turkish border became reality. Cooperation between the Allies began to fray as each set out to defend its strategic interests in the Middle East. The UK and the US sought to protect energy supplies from falling into Soviet hands and keep Moscow away from the Mediterranean. In September 1944 the Turkish ambassador had an audience with Molotov, who had an array of criticisms about Turkey’s foreign policy, but the former insisted his country had attempted to improve relations. For instance, it had released two Soviet agents who had been masquerading as press attachés at the Soviet embassy. They had been arrested and found guilty of trying to assassinate Franz von Papen, the German ambassador. The aim of this démarche was to sow discord between Turkey and Germany. The Bulgarian foreign minister,

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who had sought asylum after the entry of the Red Army, was returned to Bulgaria. Soviet citizens who had collaborated with Germany were extradited to the Soviet Union and about 40,000 Crimean Tatars who had moved to Romania and wished to settle in Turkey were refused entry for fear of upsetting Moscow. From autumn 1944, Moscow’s chief concern was the revision of the Straits treaty and Churchill told Stalin, in October 1944, that since Turkey had not joined the war ‘it had lost the right for British support in the matter of the Straits’. Stalin could reasonably conclude from this statement that a favourable revision was on the horizon. A commission, headed by Maksim Litvinov, drafted a report for Stalin on possible Soviet–British cooperation and indicated that the Soviet Union considered ‘Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Slav countries of the Balkan peninsula, as well as Turkey, as the maximum sphere of its interests’. The Soviet Foreign Ministry expressed confidence about post-war Anglo–Soviet cooperation in Iran, Afghanistan and even China. Formal control of the Straits would involve the use of force or the threat of force, even if the Soviet Union were supported by the UK. In March 1944, Commissariats of Foreign Affairs were set up in Soviet republics to increase the number of pressure points which could be utilised when attempting to achieve Moscow’s foreign policy goals. This was particularly significant in the Transcaucasian republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which had territorial claims on Iran and Turkey. Just before the Yalta Conference, the US government judged that changes to the Straits convention would infringe Turkish sovereignty and affect the political and strategic balance of power negatively. During discussions at Yalta, Stalin said he did not favour UN membership for Turkey because during the war it had changed positions to maximise its advantage. Churchill disagreed and pointed out that during the war Turkey had been friendly to the Allies. Immediately after the Yalta Conference, Stalin again stressed that the Montreux Convention had been linked to the League of Nations which no longer existed. It was essential to prevent Turkey closing the Straits when it wished in the future. The foreign ministers of the US, UK and the USSR were to discuss the Straits at their next meeting and Turkey would then be informed of what had been decided. It was agreed that all countries which had declared war on Germany and Japan before 1 March 1945 be invited to a UN conference in San Francisco in April. Churchill wanted Turkey to attend and Stalin agreed providing it declared war on Germany by the end of February. Turkey did so and soon after signed an agreement with the United States on Lend-Lease and became a founding member of the UN. The Soviet–Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was due to end on 7 November 1945, and Molotov made it clear that it was out of date and needed to be substantially revised. The Turks understood this would include the Montreux Convention. The US ambassador in Ankara was informed that the Soviet Union wanted a bilateral meeting with Turkey to change the Montreux Convention ahead of the next Allied meeting of foreign ministers. The Soviet

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press carried many articles critical of Turkey but, in reality, the main targets were the UK and the US. The Turkish ambassador in Moscow pointed out that the Soviets had sent a delegation of ‘minor importance’ to San Francisco and Molotov had not stayed to the end. The conclusion drawn was that Yalta was much more important than anything agreed in San Francisco. Molotov, on 19 March, terminated the Soviet–Turkish Treaty, which alarmed Ankara and left it wondering what Soviet policy would now be. In June-July 1945, the Soviet government demanded territorial concessions from Turkey and Iran. Moscow wanted joint Soviet–Turkish control of the Straits, Soviet military bases in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and the return of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union. Without a treaty with the Soviet Union and cool relations with the UK and the US, Turkey feared that it might be isolated vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Armenia wrote to Stalin pointing out that there were large Armenian diasporas in Syria and Lebanon (200,000); in Iran (up to 120,000); in the Balkans (80,000); Egypt (40,000); France (80,000); and the US (150,000). Many of them would like to return to Armenia and this would involve recovering previous Armenian territory now in Turkey. Soviet Armenia would like to establish diplomatic relations with Iran, Syria and Lebanon and exchange diplomats. When the Turks proposed a new treaty of friendship, Molotov informed them that the previous treaty had been signed when the Soviet Union was weak and ‘we were deprived of our legitimate share of territory’. Molotov quoted the case of Poland, which had unjustly taken advantage of the Soviet Union in the Treaty of Riga, in March 1921, and forced it to concede much territory and this had now been rectified by the new Polish government. Molotov would not back down on the territorial claims and the Turks were not willing to concede any territory and the result was that the new treaty remained a dead letter. The key question, Molotov reiterated, was now the Straits. The US military judged that Soviet access to the Straits would, sooner or later, result in Soviet control of the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, the ‘double blockade of Asia Minor’. The Turkish press launched a virulent antiSoviet campaign with headlines such as ‘Russians annex northern Iran’; ‘Russia wants Mosul oil’; Russians demand to annex Korea and take leading position in Inner and Outer Mongolia’; and if not opposed they ‘will seize Iran, China, the sun and the moon’. Needless to say, many Turks feared that World War III was about to break out. The Soviet embassy in Ankara traced many of these lurid stories back to the British press but failed to find any American input. The Soviets did have one fan, Dr Hewlett Johnson, the Anglican Dean of Canterbury, who declared: ‘I fully agree that all the regions annexed by Turkey should immediately be given back to Armenia’. When Molotov commented to Anthony Eden that even the Dean of Canterbury supported Armenian claims, the suave British foreign minister replied that he was a ‘Soviet man’ and was known as the Red Dean. The British ambassador in Moscow handed Molotov a note on 7 July, stating that his government was astonished by the territorial claims and that the Soviet

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and Turkish government had no right to discuss military bases in the Straits which was the prerogative of the multilateral Montreux Convention. He reminded the Commissar for Foreign Affairs that at Yalta, Stalin had promised to consult the British and US governments before contacting the Turkish government on changes to the Montreux Convention and Stalin had agreed not to act in a manner which affected the sovereignty and independence of Turkey. At Potsdam, the Turkish question came up and Stalin asked Molotov to clarify the Soviet position: he reiterated that the 1921 treaty was unfair and requested the return of Kars, Artvin and Ardahan to Armenia and Georgia. Territorially, this would have expanded Armenia by 80 per cent and Georgia by 8 per cent. This was the first time the Soviets had laid claim to Artvin. He also characterised the Montreux Convention as unfair and then offered three suggestions to resolve all problems: the Montreux Convention should be annulled; the setting up of a Straits regime according to which only Turkey and the Soviet Union would decide freedom of navigation there; and Turkey and the Soviet Union would jointly prevent the use of the Straits by hostile forces. Churchill objected and stated no Turkish government would permit Soviet military bases in the Straits, and President Truman interjected that he was not ready to express his view on the subject. When Turkey appeared again on the agenda, Truman said that the Montreux Convention should be revised and that the Straits should afford free passage for the whole world. On the territorial question, it was up to Turkey and the Soviet Union to resolve it. The final protocol of the Potsdam Conference stated that the ‘three governments acknowledge that it is necessary to revise the Convention as inconsistent with modern times. The given issue will be the focus of direct talks between the three governments and the Turkish government’. However, it transpired that there were differences between the English language text and the Russian text. The English language text instructed the three governments to inform Turkey about their view of the Straits problem, whereas the Russian text instructed each of them to negotiate directly with the Turkish government on the Straits. This difference later led to a major misunderstanding between the US and the Soviet Union. The final declaration of the Potsdam Conference did not mention Turkey, the Straits and Turkish–Soviet relations. All Stalin’s efforts to radically change relations with Turkey were in vain. Soviet commentators have concluded that Stalin expected his demands to be met. On his return to Washington, President Truman made a radio broadcast on Potsdam and advocated the principle of sea passage neutrality, which dismayed the Turks. The US ambassador in Ankara, on 25 September, warned Secretary of State Byrnes that the signing of an agreement by the great powers on the Straits could lead to the collapse of the present Turkish government and only benefit the Soviet Union. George Kennan, from Moscow, supported this analysis and reported that there was talk in the Soviet Union about war with Turkey and Turkish communists were ready to support a Soviet move into Turkey. In March 1945, the secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey had been sentenced to nine years in prison and other communists were also jailed. The Council of Foreign Ministers in London, in September

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1945, decided to remove the Straits problem from the agenda as the US government opposed debates until bilateral meetings between the UK, the US and the USSR had taken place. Washington also opposed discussion of the Montreux Convention. Molotov’s stated Soviet interest in Tripolitania (Libya), the Dodecanese islands and Eritrea was viewed in the Turkish press as a way of applying pressure on the British and Americans to soften their position on the Straits. The London meeting broke up without agreement. Soviet claims in the Mediterranean and the Middle East led to the American administration backing away from the internationalisation of the Straits and opposing military bases there, but it still regarded the Montreux Convention as requiring amendment. The British Foreign Office took the view the whole problem should be frozen to avoid confrontation with the Soviets but agreed with the Americans that the Montreux Convention should be amended. By the autumn of 1945, relations between Moscow and London and Washington had dramatically deteriorated, and two memoranda on economics by Ivan Maisky (né Lachowiecki), ambassador to the Court of St James between 1932 and 1943, underlined the negative impact of British and American policies on the Soviet Union, but judged that the US exhibited little interest in Eastern Europe (Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Hungary). A meeting of the foreign ministers in Moscow, in December 1945, failed to reach agreement on the Straits and indeed on other issues as well. During the conference, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, met Stalin and indicated his concern that Soviet troops were massing along the Turkish frontier, there was an anti-Turkish campaign being waged on Soviet radio and in the press, and there was Soviet support for Georgian claims on Turkish territory. In fact, a Soviet war of nerves was being waged against Turkey and Bevin appealed to Stalin to stop intimidating Turkey as it was a British ally. The vozhd told him his concerns were groundless. This neatly underlined the Soviet Union’s power and the powerlessness of the UK. The term ‘Cold War’ was not used but instead the terms ‘war of nerves’ and ‘psychological warfare’ repeatedly appeared. As little headway could be made on the Straits, Soviet foreign policy, from August 1946, switched to pressuring Turkey to cede territory to Armenia and Georgia. Stalin regarded the socialist system as the best in the world and it would therefore gradually take over the world. He emphasised that the Red Army was the ‘highest quality army of our era, equipped with the best modern weapons and ammunition and led by experienced commanders and soldiers with high morale and combat qualities’ (Pravda, 10 February 1946). The Americans read this as a prelude to World War III. This led George Kennan, from Moscow, to send his famous Long Telegram of 22 February 1946. The Soviet Union was not to be regarded as a supporter but rather a rival and the only language it speaks is the language of force. Force should be met with force. Truman’s reaction was that there isn’t a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia

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is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language they understand – How many divisions have you? I do not believe we should play compromises henceforth. (Truman 1956: vol. 2, 94–5) Truman was now surrounded by those who took a hardline policy vis-à-vis Moscow: Loy Henderson, head of the Near Eastern and African Department of the Department of State; James Forrestal, secretary of the navy; George Kennan; Edwin Wilson, ambassador to Turkey; among others. Secretary of State Byrnes said in a speech, in February 1946, that America was designed not only to protect its own security but also world peace. Guided by Moscow, from February 1946 Armenia and Georgia engaged in a vigorous anti-Turkish campaigns and church leaders also played their part. A commission was set up to help Armenians to return to their ancestral homeland. When Mehmet Ertegun, the Turkish ambassador to the United States, died, the Turks asked the US if it could return Ertegun’s body to Turkey on a battleship. This was regarded as a courtesy for diplomats who had died during their service. The US agreed and chose the USS Missouri, and it arrived at Istanbul with Ertegun’s body on 6 April 1946, to a tumultuous welcome (Blake 2009: 37). Special Turkish stamps were issued and senior officers were given numerous presents. The Turks saw the Americans now as their faithful protector against the Russian bear. The Soviet response was to step up the antiTurkish rhetoric. US policy changed towards the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East because of the crises which threatened US policy there. This came about because, on 7 August 1946, the Soviet Union, in a note, demanded that Turkey tear up the Montreux Convention, and the Potsdam agreement had included a clause confirming the right of the Soviet Union to seek a revision of the Convention. However, the Soviet demand came at a moment when the US administration was determined not to make any more concessions to the Soviet Union. Dean Acheson, under secretary of state, told President Truman that joint fortifications on the Straits would lead to Soviet control over Turkey and this in turn would extend to Greece and the entire Middle East – which would then put the Soviet Union in a ‘much stronger position to obtain its objectives in India and China’. The only way to hold the Soviets back was to make clear to them that the United States ‘was prepared, if necessary, to meet aggression with the force of arms’ (Acheson 1970: 261). A defensive war was now being contemplated to ensure that the domino theory (if one state falls to the Soviets, others will follow) did not become reality. This involved preparing strategic strikes against the Soviet Union, including the use of atomic bombs. A sharp note of protest was sent to Moscow and the Turkish government was encouraged to stand firm. American warships were dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean and shortly afterwards, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal’s proposal was adopted that a permanent presence be established. Containment had taken on a military aspect. Stalin, aware of war plans by his spies in the US administration, retreated. Molotov, on reflection, judged that had Stalin not

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backed down, joint military aggression against the Soviet Union would have resulted (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 93). In October 1946, Loy Henderson reported that Turkey intended to ask the US and UK for modern weapons, but that London would be in no position to deliver them. He pointed out that if Turkey were not helped, Soviet influence could extend to the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. Turkish public opinion was given a boost when the Sovietsponsored administrations in northern Iran collapsed following the withdrawal of the Soviet military. The situation in Greece was such that the UK had to increase military aid to Greece and the US provided more economic assistance. Turkey was still nervous because fighting was taking place along the Greek–Turkish border. The Americans expected Moscow to increase pressure on Iran and Turkey. From a Soviet point of view, they needed Turkey as it would guarantee the security of the ‘friendly regimes’ in the southwest and provide access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In January 1947, the Soviet Union informed Syria that if it raised the question of Iskenderum, on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, in the UN Security Council, it would support Damascus, and Cilicia was also mentioned. Moscow wanted the UN Security Council to debate whether Syria had a legitimate claim to these territories. Would Arab states back Syria? Damascus demurred and one of the reasons was the rapprochement between Turkey and the Arab states. Treaties of friendship and mutual aid had been signed with Iraq and Transjordan and the Soviets surmised that an Eastern Bloc was emerging which, of course, they assumed Washington sponsored. Then Moscow turned its attention to the 700,000 Turks living in Bulgaria who voted against the communists because they were informed that if the communists came to power, the Soviet Union would take over the Straits and also begin a process of assimilation and as a result, some Turks fled to Turkey. The visit of Field Marshal Montgomery to Moscow, in January 1947, alarmed the Turks as there were rumours that a joint commission of the British and Soviet General Staffs was envisaged. London made clear to Ankara that nothing of the sort was being planned. The Soviet ambassador in Ankara reported to Moscow that the Turkish government had granted permission for Anglo–American airfields, radar stations, repair bases, etc. on Turkish territory and British military instructors were present in military colleges. The ambassador concluded that American influence was increasing and, as a result, the UK eventually would be forced out. On 21 February 1947, the British ambassador in Washington handed two notes to Loy Henderson, head of the Office of Near Eastern and Africa Affairs of the Department of State. The UK was no longer capable of rendering economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece after 31 March 1947. The US should immediately replace the UK because if it did not, the Soviets would take over the Middle East. Although Loy Henderson had already indicated that this was liable to happen, the US administration was unprepared. As General George Marshall, secretary of state, was overseas, Dean Acheson, under secretary of state, took action and set up a committee to study the issue; it concluded that the US should take over the UK’s responsibility for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Henderson and Acheson had considerable influence on the drafting of a forthcoming

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speech that President Truman was due to deliver. Acheson believed that if Greece and Turkey fell to communism it would spread to other countries such as Iran, and the US was the only country which could prevent this. Henderson and Acheson had initially thought of including Iran but decided not to because of British oil interests there and also the UK had not requested aid for Tehran. Marshall sent a memorandum to President Truman stressing that the situation in Greece and Turkey directly affected US security. On 12 March 1947, Truman appealed to Congress to provide funds to Greece and Turkey and $400 million was promised, of which $150 million would be for Turkey. The President stated that US policy was to help free peoples to resist foreign pressures and decide their own future. There was a struggle going on around the world between democracy and totalitarian rule. This became known as the Truman Doctrine. Congress debated the issue for several weeks and then passed legislation which provided financial and military aid to the two countries. The Turkish government was delighted and viewed the démarche as definitive proof that Washington had ceased to pacify Moscow and was now prepared to oppose resolutely the Soviets. The Soviet ambassador thought that a ‘semi-fascist dictatorship’ had taken power in the country and that the sovereign right to an independent foreign policy had been forfeited. On 2 May, an American naval squadron headed by the aircraft carrier USS Leyte visited Istanbul amid great rejoicing and the Turkish president spoke of an eternal friendship between the two nations (Hasanli 2011: 285–95). On 12 July 1947, the Turkish–American Agreement on American Aid to Turkey was signed. Anti-Turkish sentiment in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece was strong but there was little the British and Americans could do to help Turkey in this respect. On 3 April 1948, President Truman signed the Economic Recovery Act, better known as the Marshall Plan. The Turkish press began discussing it in January 1948, and the general opinion was that changes needed to be made. The Plan treated Turkey as a mainly agricultural country and hence little emphasis was placed on industrialisation. The economy was not in very good shape due to the need to maintain a large standing army and the budget deficit between 1948 and 1951 was estimated to be $615 million ($6.5 billion in 2019 prices) but the US State Department thought that this could be eliminated through aid. One estimate puts Marshall Plan aid to Turkey, in 1948–9, at $49.7 million and, in 1949–50, at $164 million ($1.7 billion in 2019 prices) but the Turkish view was that the level of aid was inadequate. On 4 July 1948, the Turkish–American Economic Cooperation Agreement, which regulated Turkey’s participation in the Marshall Plan, was signed and was to terminate on 30 June 1953. Large amounts of military aid were also provided. The United States originally did not consider including Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as the country regarded itself as being far from the North Atlantic. However, some members of the government took the view that, from a security point of view, their country should be a member. In January 1949, when questioned by the Soviet ambassador, the Turkish foreign minister denied any intention of joining. In March 1949, Vyacheslav Molotov

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was replaced as Soviet foreign minister by Andrei Vyshinsky and Turks were delighted, seeing this as presaging improved relations with Moscow. The Turks regarded Molotov as a ‘representative of the expansionist and imperialist policy of the Soviet Union’. On 22 March, the US National Security Council revealed that Turkey’s request to join NATO had been rebuffed. After the North Atlantic Treaty, which established NATO, was signed in Washington, on 4 April 1949, Necmettin Sadak, the Turkish foreign minister, flew to Washington and was informed by Dean Acheson that Congress would soon be asked to increase aid to Turkey. The Turks were irked by the fact that Italy had joined NATO while they had been excluded, and pushed for a pact of Mediterranean nations, but the Americans did not favour this. Sadak was assured that in the case of Soviet aggression the US would come to Turkey’s aid and the British and French confirmed that the 1939 treaty was still valid. In July 1949, Turkey was invited to attend a session of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, and became a full member the following year. The Soviet Politburo sent notes to the UK, the US and France protesting against the inclusion of Italy in NATO. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 (Turkish troops formed part of the UN force), Ankara again asked to join NATO, and in September the UK, the US and France again said no, but Turkey was invited to attend meetings of the NATO Mediterranean group. In May 1951, a report of the US National Security Council stressed that Turkey was the only anti-communist state bordering the USSR which was capable of repelling Soviet aggression. In July 1951, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison stated that the UK had changed its position and would now welcome Greece and Turkey as NATO members, and consequently Turkey became a full member of NATO in September 1951. The Soviet Union’s response was to cancel the 8 October 1937 trade agreement with Turkey (Hasanli 2011: 325–65). It is of interest that Molotov, in old age, thought the vozhd was too cocky and sure of himself in 1945 and afterwards, and viewed his claims on Turkey as illegal and ill advised. In a conversation with Felix Chuev, he recounted a map being brought to Stalin’s dacha after the war. Stalin said everything was all right in the north: Finland has offended us, so, we moved the border from Leningrad. The Baltic States – that age-old Russian lands and they’re ours again! All Belarusians live together now, Ukrainians together, Moldovans together. It’s ok to the west … the eastern borders, the Kurile islands belong to us now, Sakhalin is completely ours … and Port Arthur (Dalian) is ours … and the Chinese Eastern Railway is ours. China, Mongolia, everything is in order. But I don’t like our border right here! Stalin said, pointing to the Caucasus. (Molotov 1993: 8)

Iran Tsar Peter the Great attacked Persia in 1722, in a bid to expand Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The campaign, which concluded in

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1723, resulted in the Russian Army losing 36,700 men out of a total army of 61,000. Persia ceded territories in the North Caucasus, South Caucasus and northern Persia, consisting of Derbent, Baku and the provinces of Shirvan, Gilan, Mazandaran and Astrabad but these gains were returned to Persia over the next ten years. In the Russo–Persian war of 1804–13, the Treaty of Gulistan ceded Georgia, Dagestan, parts of northern Armenia and Azerbaijan to Russia. In the Russo-Persian war of 1826–8, the Treaty of Turkmenchay ceded all of Armenia, Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan to Russia, but the Russian presence in Persia was highly unpopular and resulted in various uprisings which cost the lives of many Russians. By the end of the 19th century, Imperial Russia was so dominant that it occupied Tabriz, Qazvin and other Persian cities and the government in Tehran was so weak it could only nominate ministers with the permission of Russia and the UK. Northern Persia became officially a Russian sphere of influence and many ethnic Russian settlements were founded there. A Persian Cossack Brigade was set up and controlled by Russian officers. It became the military force in Tehran and most of northern Persia. The Russians also established trade and financial relations with Persia, and such was Russian influence that an Anglo–Russian Convention was signed, on 31 August 1907, which divided Persia into three parts. This awarded Russia control over northern Persia and the UK obtained the southeast and control of the Persian Gulf with the territory in between, which included the capital Tehran being declared neutral. Tibet was recognised as a neutral buffer state and Afghanistan a British protectorate and the Russians agreed not to attack them. Among the reasons for the Convention was the British concern about German power expanding in Persia and India and Russia’s nervousness about Germany establishing a foothold in Central Asia. Opposition to Russian control was considerable and was met with military force by the Russian army and included the shelling of the Majlis, the Persian parliament. In 1915, Russia and the UK discovered that Germany was negotiating a treaty with Persia and warned Tehran to desist. The UK and Russia signed the Constantinople Agreement, by which Russia would acquire Constantinople and the Turkish Straits after the war and the UK was to take control of the neutral zone in Persia. A Constitutional Revolution, led by Jangali, had been crushed in 1911 by Russian forces and about 17,500 Russian troops were stationed in northern Persia. When war broke out in 1914, the UK and Russia pressured Persia to join the coalition against Germany, the AustroHungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire but Persia declared neutrality on 1 November 1914. In 1914 and 1915, the Majlis became an important focus for pro-German and anti-Entente (the UK, France and Russia) activities. As a result, the UK and Russia, in 1915, signed a secret agreement in which the neutral zone was added to British interests and Russia was accorded a free hand in northern Persia. Russia, alarmed by rumours that Persia was considering declaring war on the Entente powers, dispatched a large force which threatened Tehran. A Persian force declared war on the Entente powers and continued until 1917 when Russian forces scattered them in Mesopotamia. In Gilan, in

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northern Persia, the Jangali movement gradually asserted itself due to the withdrawal of many Russian troops to fight in the Caucasus. They praised the Bolsheviks for their respect for Persian sovereignty. After the Red Army occupied Baku, capital of Azerbaijan, in April 1920, it continued to Gilan and was welcomed there in May 1920. The Jangalis formed themselves into the Socialist Party and eventually the Soviet Republic of Gilan, officially known as the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic, was proclaimed, on 5 June 1920. On 24 August 1920 Persian forces occupied the capital of the Gilan Soviet Republic, and Soviet Russia concluded it could not defend the republic and began negotiations. It collapsed in September 1921, with the withdrawal of Soviet forces following the signing of the Russo–Persian Treaty of Friendship. The Anglo–Soviet Trade Agreement, signed on 16 March 1921, also provided for Soviet forces to leave northern Persia. The October Revolution of 1917 led to thousands of Russians fleeing to northern Persia. Trotsky, commissar for foreign affairs, informed Tehran that the Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907 was null and void and Lenin sent a letter apologising for past Russian imperialist behaviour. The Russo–Persian Treaty of Friendship, signed on 26 February 1921, cancelled all previous agreements between the two countries, including the Treaty of Turkmenchay, and Persia was afforded shipping rights on the Caspian Sea together with Soviet Russia. A major reason for this was to end attacks on the Bolsheviks by White Russian forces from Persian territory. As the Majlis regarded the UK as the more dangerous adversary, it was passed after sustained debate. Especially controversial were clauses 5 and 6: no organisation was to be permitted which was hostile to Soviet Russia and military supplies which could be used against it were not permitted to be moved around the country. No military of a third country was to be given permission to enter Persia. If Persia was threatened by another power and did not have the ability to resist it, Soviet Russia had the right to send troops deep into the country to deal with the threat. Moscow undertook to withdraw its troops once the danger had been eliminated. On 31 October 1925, Reza Khan seized power, the Mejlis granted him supreme power, and he founded the Pahlavi dynasty and assumed the title of Shah on 15 December 1925. He favoured German aid over British or American, and the Germans improved the country’s roads and built the Trans-Persian railway which linked south and northern Persia. In 1935, he decreed that henceforth Persia be known as Iran, which is the name of the country in Persian. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union,in June 1941, the UK and the USSR became allies and were concerned that the large German presence in Iran could lead to an attack on the Caucasus from there. The UK also needed to provide Moscow with aid, and one route was through Iran. The British and Soviets requested the Shah to expel the Germans (Iranians are Aryans and hence favoured by Hitler), but he refused and the Soviet Union and the UK occupied Iran on 25 August 1941, with the Soviets taking over the north and the British the south with the centre declared a neutral zone. On 15 September 1941 the Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza and moved

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to South Africa, where he died, on 26 July 1944, in Johannesburg. The new prime minister released many political prisoners among whom were the future founders of the Tudeh (Masses) Party, in reality the Communist Party of Iran, formed in 1941. It did not use the term communist as a 1931 law banned communist activities in the country. The following year, it published its programme and a provisional Central Committee was elected and its 1st Party Congress held in 1944. In the same year, eight communists were elected to the Mejlis and a secret organisation was set up inside the Iranian military. By 1945, it had over 2,200 core members and tens of thousands of sympathisers in the trade unions, and the Americans feared it could win 40 per cent of the vote in a general election. Tudeh dominated intellectual life, but a socialist splinter group broke away in 1948, in protest over the overt pro-Soviet policies. In 1944–6, Soviet demands for oil concessions in northern Iran and Soviet sponsored ethnic revolts by Azeris and Kurds reduced its appeal. Despite advocating the nationalisation of the petroleum industry (dominated by British companies) Tudeh supported the Soviet demand for oil concessions on the grounds of proletarian solidarity. On 29 January 1942, the UK, the USSR and Iran signed a tripartite Treaty of Alliance. Allied troops were afforded the right of free passage and access to communications in Iran, but their presence was not qualified as a military occupation. The British and Soviets agreed to leave Iran six months after the Axis forces had been defeated. In 1942, the Persian government requested financial aid from the US, but the Shah refused to cooperate and as a result the venture failed. One reason for the government’s appeal to the US was to counter British and Russian influence there. The US legation became an embassy in 1944, when the first ambassador was appointed. Gradually the US began to play the role of an intermediary between the British, Soviet and Iranian governments. In 1942, as the British did not possess the resources, they requested that American advisers be sent, and the US military take over responsibility for aid to the Soviet Union through Iran. This became the Persian Gulf Command and eventually involved 30,000 troops. Legislation imposing income tax was passed, on American advice, but the ruling elites had no intention of paying any tax and the legislation became a dead letter. In spring 1943, President Roosevelt sent General Patrick Hurley on a factfinding mission to Iran and he was struck by the tension between the British and Soviets and recommended that the US could either go along with the British or develop its own policy. The fact that the British ambassador could decide who became prime minister highlighted London’s influence. Hurley viewed the pussy footing of the Americans vis-à-vis the Soviets to have been a foolish policy. American intelligence gathering in northern Iran was virtually nonexistent due to Soviet obstruction. Iran wished to sign the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942 and was informed that this was dependent on Iran declaring war on Germany and its allies. As a result, Iran declared war on Germany and its allies on 9 September 1943, and signed the United Nations

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Declaration. The Tehran Conference of the Big Three took place on 1 December 1943 and enhanced the country’s prestige. It was assured that its sovereignty would be respected. In 1943, the Iranian government considered granting an oil concession to an American company in southern Iran. The Soviets thereupon asked for one in northern Iran and their bid was supported by the Tudeh Party, which alarmed the government. The outcome was that the British, American and Soviet embassies were notified that no oil concessions would be granted until after the war. The Soviets thereupon criticised the government and the Tudeh Party organised demonstrations in favour of the Soviet bid. In December 1944, Mohammad Musaddiq, later to become prime minister and be toppled by a coup d’état in 1953 instigated by the CIA and the British MI6, tabled a bill in the Mejlis which banned granting oil concessions to any power because it was such a fractious political issue. On 8 February 1945, Iran was discussed at the Yalta Conference. Anthony Eden, speaking for the UK, argued that Iran should not be put under pressure to grant oil concessions until the war was over. Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, pointed out that this was contrary to what had been negotiated and he opposed the view that Anglo–Soviet troops should be withdrawn at the end of the war and, consequently, there was no agreement on the withdrawal of troops. In March 1945, the Tudeh Party stepped up its demonstrations against the government, which resulted in clashes with the police and, as a result, the government took a hard line against Tudeh. After the end of the war in Europe, the Iranian government sent notes to the British, American and Soviet embassies asking them to withdraw their troops according to the 1942 Tripartite Treaty. The British response was that they would withdraw their troops six months after the defeat of Japan. The Americans stated that on 1 June 1945 their mission delivering aid to the Soviet Union would end, but there was the problem of finding available transport and they would prefer to maintain a small air base at Abadan which was of vital importance for their troops in East Asia. The withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran was discussed at the Potsdam Conference and Anthony Eden maintained that British and Soviet troops had first to leave Tehran and then from the rest of the country. Stalin agreed to the withdrawal of troops from Tehran but refused to withdraw them from northern Iran, which would only happen six months after the defeat of Japan. The Soviets needed time to consolidate the takeover by Azeris and Kurds in their autonomous republics. Churchill made clear he wanted to ensure that British control of the southern oilfields continued. Truman had no interest in staying in Iran and wanted to transfer his troops to the Far East. The question of the withdrawal of troops was left to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in September. The surrender of Japan, on 2 September 1945, signified that Allied troops should be out of Iran by 2 March 1946, and the UK and the USSR agreed to this deadline. Iran is a multi-ethnic state and Azeris and Kurds in the northern province seized the opportunity to set up autonomous regimes in September 1945. They

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were guided by the Tudeh Party, which in turn was counselled by the Soviets. The Azerbaijani Democratic Party (ADP) was formed on 3 September 1945 in Tabriz by communists headed by Jafar Pishvari. The Tudeh Party there disbanded and its members joined the ADP. Aided by Soviet forces which prevented the Iranian army from intervening, the ADP claimed control of Iranian Azerbaijan. At its first congress, the ADP announced the formation of a peasants’ militia, and by 21 November 1945 had captured all remaining government offices, and on 12 December, the DPA, in Tabriz, declared the formation of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, headed by the Azerbaijan People’s Government. Its goals were to maintain autonomy, give preference to Azeri as the main language and promote economic development and social justice. Soviet documents reveal that the autonomous republic was formed on direct orders from Stalin. The Tudeh Party, in Tehran, opposed separatism and favoured a unitary state but Soviet intervention resulted in Tudeh warmly welcoming the ADP and its mission. George Kennan, the US chargé d’affaires in Moscow, reported to the State Department that the Soviet press had given wide coverage to the founding of the ADP and he saw similarities between Iran and Armenia and Xinjiang, in China, assessing that the Soviets were promoting their power through supporting national minorities. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan was set up, on 16 August 1945 in Mahabad, and headed by Qazi Muhammad. The ADP consisted mainly of Iranians who had lived in the Soviet Union and had a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, but the Kurdish party had little knowledge of communist ideology and as a result the Soviets had difficulty in moulding them into a communist formation. The US ambassador in Tehran reported to Secretary of State Byrnes that the Soviet goal was not limited to northern Iran but to take over the whole country. If this happened, British oil interests would be negatively affected, as would US oil concerns in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The ambassador’s recommendation was to take a firmer line with Moscow as there was no need for its troops to remain in Iran. In October 1945, the DPA organised demonstrations against the Iranian government and the following month, militia groups took control of large portions of Iranian Azerbaijan. The Shah ordered the army to intervene, but the Red Army prevented it from entering, claiming that it would provoke chaos in the province. The Iranians asked Washington for advice and, in November, Averell Harriman, the US ambassador in Moscow, sent a letter to the Soviet government asking for clarification on why the Iran military was prevented from entering the northern province and also stating that all US troops would leave by 1 January 1946, and suggesting that British and Soviet troops follow this example. Moscow responded by saying that it saw no reason to withdraw its troops by 1 January 1946. On 15 December, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of Kurdistan. On 19 December 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes met Stalin and the latter claimed that Soviet troops were not interfering in Iranian domestic politics and the Russo–Persian Treaty of 1921 afforded the Soviet Union the right to send its troops into Iran if its security

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was threatened. It was up to the USSR to decide when to withdraw its troops from the country. Iran raised the issue in the UN Security Council, and it concluded that Iran and the Soviet Union should resolve the problem themselves. The Iranian prime minister travelled to Moscow and met Stalin on 19 February 1946, and requested that Soviet troops leave Iran. Stalin rehearsed his previous arguments and asked for an oil concession and the setting up of a Soviet–Iranian oil company, but the prime minister politely declined these advances. Then came George Kennan’s famous Long Telegram in which he laid bare Soviet ambitions in Iran, Turkey and elsewhere and argued for a strong US response. This became the basis of the doctrine of containment. 2 March 1946 came and went but the Soviet troops remained after the American and British troops had left the country. The US vice-consul in Tabriz reported that Soviet troops were moving towards Tehran and the Turkish border to underline their claims on the eastern provinces of Ardahan and Kars. When the prime minister met the British ambassador, the latter warned him to watch out for a Tudeh inspired coup which could lead to a Soviet occupation of Iran. On 24 March, the Soviet ambassador presented three letters from his government. The first stated that the Soviet military would leave within six weeks; the second letter proposed the founding of a Soviet–Iranian oil company with Moscow having a majority stake; and the third letter suggested the Soviet Union would help negotiate a solution with the DPA. The Iranian government accepted the first two letters but rejected the third stating that it was a domestic matter. The Azerbaijani crisis was again on the agenda of the UN Security Council but Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet ambassador to the UN, asked for the matter to be postponed and when he was rebuffed walked out. In the end it was agreed to debate the matter on 6 May. The Soviet Union reached an agreement that Soviet troops would leave by 6 May 1946; the proposal of a Soviet–Iranian oil company would be submitted to the Majlis; and the Azerbaijani crisis was domestic and would be resolved by the Iranian government. Simultaneously, the US ambassador in Moscow met Stalin, who was disappointed by the Iranian complaint to the UN and the slow pace of negotiations concerning the oil company. The ambassador then asked about Soviet–Turkish relations and the vozhd stated that the Soviet Union needed to patrol the Straits because Turkey was incapable of controlling them effectively. On 6 April 1946, Gromyko requested the UN Security Council remove the Iranian issue from its agenda, but Byrnes refused and the British ambassador advised the Iranian prime minister to hold his nerve. When the UN Security Council met, on 6 May 1946, it could not be verified if Soviet troops had left northern Iran as Gromyko was absent. It transpired that all Soviet troops had left northern Iran by the end of May 1946. Why did the Soviets leave? President Truman stated, on 24 April 1952: ‘In 1946, I had to send an ultimatum to the head of the Soviet Union to get out of Iran. They got out because we were in a position to meet a situation of that kind’ (Truman 1956: vol. 2, 94–5). Later that day, the White House informed the press that the President was using the word ultimatum in a non-technical layman sense and was referring to the US

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leadership in the UN and meant the diplomatic efforts which were being made in the spring of 1946 to ensure Soviet troops left northern Iran. Stalin offered his explanation: We cannot leave them any longer in Iran mainly because the presence of Soviet forces in Iran has undermined the bases of our liberation policy in Europe and Asia. The English and the Americans have told us that if Soviet forces remain in Iran then why should English forces not remain in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Greece; and American forces as well – in China, Iceland, Denmark. (Haslam 2011: 74) On 13 June 1946, Tehran reached an agreement with the DPA which would recognise the National Assembly of Azerbaijan as the Provisional Council and the latter would nominate candidates for governor of Azerbaijan. Tehran would then choose the governor. Tudeh announced a general strike, on 14 July 1946, in Khuzistan, a centre of the British oil industry, which the government declared illegal. Eventually, an agreement was reached with higher pay for the workers. A new Iranian government included three Tudeh ministers. In September, the government asked Washington for military and other aid amounting to $250 million but was informed that no more than $10 million could be provided. In addition to an oil company, the Soviets wanted an Iranian–Soviet airline founded to cover northern Iran. The US ambassador advised the Shah to instruct the prime minister to remove the Tudeh ministers from his cabinet and this was done, and a new government formed. In October, Secretary Byrnes announced that the US would sell military equipment to the value of $10 million to Iran. New elections to the Mejlis were announced for December and Iranian troops would be sent to northern Iran to maintain order during the elections. The Soviet embassy warned that Iranian troops in northern Iran would be construed as a security threat to the Soviet Union. The US ambassador advised the prime minister to deploy the troops and any Soviet interference would be reported to the UN Security Council. On 11 December 1946, Iranian troops entered Tabriz and swept aside the DPA whose leading members fled across the border to Soviet Azerbaijan. The Iranian army entered Mahabad, on 15 December 1946, and the People’s Republic of Kurdistan came to an end and most of its leaders were executed. The Soviets did not react as they were waiting for the Mejlis vote to confirm their oil concession. Elections were not held in December as the government was more concerned with re-establishing control of northern Iran but were held in January 1947, and the Mejlis took its time to meet, claiming it had to check the credentials of the new members carefully. Then, on 21 February 1947, the British government notified the US government that it could no longer provide military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey and requested the US to take over responsibility. On 12 March 1947, President Truman asked Congress to agree to military and financial aid of $400 million for Greece and Turkey. The Shah was not pleased and thought

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that Iran should have been included with Greece and Turkey as part of the Truman Doctrine, and why was Turkey receiving more aid than Iran? In April 1947, an Iranian delegation arrived in the US to buy surplus military equipment and eventually a credit of $25 million was forthcoming. The US Army Mission was to coordinate the work of the Iranian Ministry of War and the Iranian Army Command to modernise the Iranian military. The Mejlis debated granting the Soviet Union an oil concession but eventually rejected it. The Soviet response was that the Iranian government had broken its word and the result was an anti-Iranian media assault on Iran. This continued throughout 1948 with the Soviets claiming that the increasing US army presence in Iran amounted to a security threat, but Tehran informed Moscow it was misinformed and that the US military was in the country to modernise the military. In March 1948, the Soviets again sent a letter claiming that Iran’s military policy contravened the principles of the 1921 Russo–Iranian Treaty. Tehran’s reply was that it was free to adopt any policy which was in its interests. The Shah was never satisfied with the military and economic aid Iran was receiving and wondered why Turkey was getting more. The US State Department conceded that America’s main policy in Iran was to prevent the country falling under the control of the Soviet Union and, as the Shah was the only reliable person there, the US was obliged to provide continuing military and economic aid. This led to an invitation to visit the White House but, on 4 February 1949, he was almost assassinated during a visit to Tehran University. The sniper was identified as a member of Tudeh, martial law was declared in the capital, Tudeh was banned and many arrests followed. A Constituent Assembly then amended the constitution, granting the Shah greater powers, including the right to dissolve the Mejlis. When the Shah visited Washington, in November 1949, his main concern was to lobby for more economic and military aid, but he came away disappointed (Blake 2009: 10–50). The proclamation of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949 and the onset of the Korean War changed all that. National Security Council Report No. 68 (NSC-68) adopted dramatic language which was typical of the era: ‘The issues which face us are momentous involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of the Republic but civilization itself’, but it excluded offensive military action. Iran benefited from this change of policy.

7

East Asia and Indo-China

China The Communist Party of China (CPC) was founded at the National Congress, on 23–31 July 1921, in Shanghai. Its origins date back to the May Fourth Movement of 1919 when Marxism and anarchism spread among Chinese intellectuals. The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 attracted a growing number to Lenin’s vision of socialism and world revolution. The CPC followed the model of the Bolshevik Party and applied for membership of the Communist International (Comintern). When Guomindang leader Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, he was succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek who set out to limit the influence of the communists within the party. The party received financial and military aid from the Soviet Union and Soviet political and military advisers were seconded to it. One of the conditions for aid was cooperation with the CPC. There was always tension between the left and right wings of the party and, on 20 March 1926, communists within the Guomindang’s National Liberation Army were purged by Chiang in Guangzhou (Canton) and then, on 12 April 1927, he marched on Shanghai and was welcomed by the CPC communists but murdered about 5,000 of them. Guomindang troops killed communists in Beijing and overall the CPC may have lost about 15,000 of its 25,000 members. On 15 July 1927, all communists were expelled from the Guomindang, but some communist sympathisers managed to remain and formed a fifth column within the party. The reaction of the CPC was to found the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army to fight the Guomindang, and Mao Zedong was appointed commander in chief but suffered defeats and marched east to Jiangxi province with the remnants of his army. By 1930, the Red Army had established the Chinese Soviet Republic there and Mao began a purge of anti-communists, but faced fierce resistance with the result that the Red Army lost three quarters of its soldiers. In 1933, Bo Gu and Otto Braun, a German Comintern adviser, arrived from the Soviet Union, reorganised the Red Army and took over Party affairs. They achieved some victories but were eventually defeated, and this led to the order to retreat from Jiangxi, led by Bo Gu and Otto Braun, in what became known as the Long March (16 October 1934–22 October 1935) with 130,000 soldiers and civilians trekking and fighting their way to the north and DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-9

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west. When three Red Army fronts met in Yan’an, Shaanxi province, the Long March ended with about 8,000 troops reaching their final goal. It was regarded as the greatest strategic retreat in military history, and Mao became a living legend. In November 1935, Mao Zedong became the leader of the CPC with Zhou Enlai as his number two. The South Manchurian Railway, built by the Russians, had passed to Japan after the Russian defeat in the 1904–5 war, and on 18 September 1931, a bomb exploded under the track. The Japanese Kwantung army sent in trainloads of soldiers and occupied the whole of Manchuria, rich in natural resources and farmland and the size of France and Germany combined with a population of about 30 million. Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo and installed Henry Puyi, later known as the Last Emperor, as its Manchu leader. China protested to the League of Nations, but it revealed itself impotent in the face of Japanese aggression and Japan left the League. Germany and Italy concluded that the League was a paper tiger and they were unlikely to be opposed if they engaged in military action. The Chinese boycotted Japanese goods and in January 1932 their shops were vandalised, and in retaliation the Japanese bombed Shanghai and killed about 100 Chinese. The ensuing battle between the Chinese and Japanese left about 14,000 dead with the Japanese the victors. A young Korean avenged the defeat, in April 1932, by igniting a bomb at a Japanese celebration of the emperor’s birthday, killing several leading Japanese military and civilian officials. The Sino–Japanese war, which began on 7 July 1937, led to the Nationalists and the Red Army forming an alliance to fight the common foe. The Nanjing massacre occurred in December 1937 and January 1938 after the Japanese had taken the city and left up to 300,000 dead, mainly civilians; in Chinese eyes a major war crime. One of the consequences was the withdrawal of the 40 German military advisers to the Guomindang and this signalled the end of Hitler’s interest in China. The Japanese used scorched earth tactics to retaliate against guerrilla attacks and parts of northern China became wasteland; they deployed biological and chemical weapons and carried out experiments on prisoners from Manchuria to Guangdong. Bodies were infected with germs, contaminated fleas and infected clothing was developed to spread plague, anthrax and cholera when dropped on civilians in encased bombs. Millions fled south towards Guomindang-held territory, but they were not safe from air raids and deaths were very high. By 1939 the Chinese were able to score some victories, but the Japanese were unable to defeat the Red Army forces in Shaanxi province. The Japanese were able to control the cities but unable to subdue the countryside. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the US began aiding China and despite its losses, China never surrendered. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, the Allies decided to restore to China all the territories it had lost to Japan including Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), ceded in 1895, and the Pescadores, and to leave Korea which it had occupied since 1910. China was recognised as one of the Big Four and became a permanent

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member of the UN Security Council with the right of veto. General Patrick Hurley was appointed US ambassador to China in 1944 and tried to bring Mao and Chiang together but had considerable difficulty with Chinese names. He referred to Mao as ‘Moose Dung’ and addressed Chiang as Mr Shek, unaware that Chiang was his family name. Hurley resigned as ambassador, informing President Truman that this was because of the undue influence of communists in the US State Department who were siding with Mao against Chiang. The formal surrender of Japan took place on 21 August 1945 in Hunan province. The Japanese commander surrendered a million men but they were permitted to retain their arms until Nationalist (Guomindang) troops arrived. When Japan surrendered to the Americans on 2 September 1945, over 4 million Chinese and Japanese military personnel and up to 25 million civilians were dead. The Japanese defeat led to wild rejoicing and Chiang Kai-shek was a hero in Shanghai. The US Air Force ferried about 80,000 Nationalist troops to Nanjing to retake their previous capital. At Yalta, as recompense for joining the war against Japan, Stalin had demanded control of the Manchurian ports of Dalian and Port Arthur as well as joint control with China over Manchuria’s railways as a reward for breaking the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact of 13 April 1941. The vozhd also asked for two months’ supply of food and fuel for an army of 1.5 million men and hundreds of shiploads of Lend-Lease matériel, including 500 Sherman tanks which were sent to Siberia. Roosevelt made all these concessions without consulting Chiang Kai-shek. On 8 August 1945, 1.5 million Red Army and Mongolian troops crossed the Amur river into Manchuria along a massive front stretching over 4,600 km, wider than the European front from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and made a separate move south from Vladivostok into Korea where the port of Rashin was captured. Within days, the Red Army had control of all strategic parts of Manchuria. On 14 August 1945 the Sino– Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed by the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China and the Soviet Union. China accepted the independence of Outer Mongolia and Moscow would cease aiding the CPC and the Ili National Army (rebelling in Xinjiang) and help to restore Chinese sovereignty there. Chiang was recognised as the leader of a unified China. The Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria surrendered on 15 August and left behind a present: plague-bearing rats which had been nurtured in a biological warfare laboratory in Manchuria. Mao Zedong had about 900,000 troops at his disposal in northern China and prepared to take over the country, but on 20 August 1945 Stalin instructed him, to avoid open confrontation with Chiang and remain in the countryside. Chiang began negotiating with Stalin and had to accept everything Roosevelt had conceded at Yalta. Port Arthur would become a Soviet naval base and Dalian would be used jointly with China, and the two countries would co-own the South Manchurian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway, both constructed by Imperial Russia. In return, Stalin recognised the sovereignty of the National Government over the whole of China and Manchuria would be handed over to

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Chiang. Mao and Chiang met to fashion a peace deal and Mao told Chiang that all parties had to unite to build a modern China under his leadership. When he returned to Ya’an, he confided to his comrades that the agreement was a ‘mere scrap of paper’. Moscow later claimed it provided the communists with 700,000 rifles, 18,000 machine guns, 860 aircraft and 4,000 artillery pieces. Stalin advised Mao to deploy most of his troops in Manchuria, where they recruited demobilised soldiers and Manchu men and assembled a force of about half a million. According to Goldman (2010: 86) some 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war were marched north to the Soviet Union and engaged in forced labour throughout the country. About 200,000 worked on the Baikal–Amur mainline railway and over 70,000 died of hunger and disease. About 200,000 Japanese prisoners of war were handed over to the Chinese. (Haslam 2011: 113). In Manchuria, they discovered that the Soviets had stripped the province of its machinery and everything else of value, and had used wanton violence in smashing up such things as WCs and hand basins. Moscow may have confiscated assets worth about $2 billion ($28.2 billion in 2019 prices). The Red Army left in April 1946, but handed the countryside over to the communists and Lin Biao was permitted to deploy his forces outside every major city. President Truman sent George Marshall to fashion an agreement between the Nationalists and the communists and he was charmed by the elegant, suave Zhou Enlai into believing that the communists were agrarian socialists and keen to learn about democracy and Mao, into the bargain, commented that ‘Chinese democracy must follow the American path’. Marshall even concluded that Stalin’s pulling out of Manchuria signified that he had given up on the province. Chiang attacked Lin Biao’s troops and drove them north and Harbin, the only major city in communist hands, was within reach. Marshall told Chiang to halt the offensive and announce a ceasefire. He even informed Truman that the communists were ‘loosely organised bands’ and told Congress, in February 1946, that there was no evidence that the Chinese Red Army (CRA) was receiving aid from outside. This was an astonishing thing to say, given that the UK and the US had been intercepting cables between Moscow and Mao in Yan’an. The head of the US mission in Yan’an informed Marshall that communism was international, and this meant that Moscow was aiding Mao, but Marshall chose to ignore this intelligence. He concluded, in early 1946, that the Nationalists could not defeat the communists militarily. The American goal was to avoid being sucked into the Chinese civil war, so if Mao and Chiang entered into a coalition to rule China, the US could withdraw. Marshall presented Chiang with an ultimatum on 31 May 1946: he was to stop attacking the communists, or the US would stop supplying him. This saved the CRA and the communists, who had been on the point of abandoning Harbin, capital of Manchuria. Had the Nationalists continued their advance, the communists might have been forced to seek refuge in the Soviet Union, Mongolia or north Korea. Instead, Mao now had a base 1,000 km long and 500 km deep, along the Mongolian and Soviet borders. In Dalian, the Soviets stripped the city of everything except its arsenals, and captured Japanese technicians began turning out millions of bullets and shells.

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The Soviets chipped in with 900 aircraft, 700 tanks and thousands of machine guns, among other things. About 2,000 wagons of equipment arrived from north Korea where the Japanese had maintained huge arsenals and, in return, about a million tonnes of grain was sent to the Soviet Union in 1947. Japanese prisoners of war trained Chinese pilots and showed them how to use ex-Japanese equipment. In September 1946, in contrast, Truman imposed an arms embargo even for those which had been paid for, and it lasted until July 1947, when the nationalists could again acquire some ammunition. Mao enlisted about 200,000 Koreans who had served in the Kwantung army and conscripted about a million men in Manchuria, and in huge battles gradually decimated the Nationalist forces. A major problem for the Nationalists was financing the war. It was impossible to sell bonds and taxation brought in little, so the inevitable course was to print money which resulted in raging inflation. In 1940, 100 yuan bought a pig; in 1943, a chicken; in 1945 a fish; and in 1947 one third of a box of matches (Dikötter 2013: 9–18). Eiling, one of three remarkable Soong sisters, Methodist converts educated in America, and married to H. H. Kung, the finance minister, controlled government finances and provided a top up when necessary. What she did not realise was that Chi Chao-ting, trained as an economist in the US, and a senior official in the ministry, was a communist and had been seconded to the Nationalists by Harry Dexter White, where his task was to sow confusion in the ministry. In 1942, the US Congress authorised a $500 million loan to Nationalist China and, in 1943, the Chinese government asked for gold worth $200 million to be delivered and to be charged to this loan because inflation was doing great damage to the economy. Roosevelt approved the gold loan and Treasury Secretary Morgenthau informed the Nationalists that the gold would be sent. White, together with Frank Coe and Solomon Adler (both communists) opposed the loan, arguing that corruption and the failure of the Nationalist government to enact financial reforms would result in the gold having little economic effect. By July 1945, two years later, only $29 million in gold had been sent and by then inflation was over 1,000 per cent. When Morgenthau realised he had been misled, he thought that Dexter, Coe and Adler had mishandled the gold transfer but it never occurred to him that they had a totally different agenda (Haynes and Klehr 2000: 142–3). Eiling encouraged Chiang, described as having large, intensely black eyes which radiated fearlessness, to marry her younger sister, sexy and smart Mayling (his present wife was shipped off to America with a handsome payoff) and the nuptials, in December 1927, were the most extravagant Shanghai had ever seen and Mayling soon became the brightest star of society. She accompanied her husband on campaigns against warlords and Mao. Once a Red Army unit sent Chiang the severed head of one of his commanders as proof of surrender. After the Japanese invasion of 1937, they were continually on the move up the Yangtze river and had to transport weapons, supplies and crates of government documents hundreds of miles on foot. Mayling tired of discomfort, took to fund raising tours of the US, was a hit in New York and became the first

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Chinese woman to address Congress. But her star dimmed in 1944, and she was so heavily criticised that she broke off her tour under the pretext of a nervous breakdown. Qinling Soong married Sun Yat-sen and campaigned at his side until he had to flee to safety in 1922, after an abortive attempt to remove the president of the republic, abandoning his pregnant wife en route. She stood by him and became his political partner until his premature death in 1925 from liver cancer. Sun was buried in the same mountain as the last Ming emperor, in a mausoleum three times as large (Chang 2019). Qinling then switched her allegiance to Mao. Chiang poured his best troops into Manchuria in the knowledge that if it were lost, the whole of northern China would be lost. In December 1947, Lin Biao laid siege to Shenyang, a key military centre, cut the railway lines in and out and blockaded the 4 million inhabitants for ten months. The devastated city surrendered on 1 November, and Manchuria was lost. The US began shipping out the wives and children of military personnel and advised their citizens in Nanjing and Shanghai to leave. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the new name of the CRA, 750,000 strong, began a march on Beijing and the south. Lin Biao’s tactics were to besiege, starve and force every city to surrender, and every city was to become a city of death. Beijing surrendered after a 40-day siege, on 22 January 1949, and all 240,000 Nationalist troops were drafted into the PLA. Mao only entered the city several months later, driving to the Summer Palace in a bullet-proof Dodge automobile made in Detroit for Chiang, a neat way to demonstrate that the world had been turned upside down. One of the greatest battles in Chinese history took place near Xuzhou involving over 600,000 PLA troops and 400,000 Nationalists. The PLA was supported by about 5 million civilians conscripted to help logistical support who were also used as human shields. By 10 January 1949 the battle was over and the fate of the government sealed. On 21 January, Chiang Kai-shek resigned and asked his vice-president to initiate peace talks. The British government sent a naval sloop, HMS Amethyst, with a 5-metre Union Jack painted on each side, up the Yangtze river to rescue citizens trapped in Nanjing, the capital. It was hit by two artillery shells and it hoisted two white flags, but the shelling continued and killed 44 sailors. After ten weeks the Amethyst managed to slip its moorings and escape (Dikötter 2013: 19–27) and I remember the widespread rejoicing at the news. From Mao’s point of view, it symbolised the end of the colonial era and the beginning of the new independent era for China, and he demanded that all foreign troops leave the country, to be followed later by all non-communist foreign nationals. There were other problems facing the communists. The Middle Kingdom was a multi-ethnic state and Tibet and Xinjiang (referred to by the Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other groups as East Turkestan with Central Asia being called Western Turkestan) had periodically resisted Chinese rule. The Kumul Rebellion established the first East Turkestan Republic in 1933, but the following year it was conquered by the warlord Sheng Shicai, with the assistance of the Soviet Red Army. In exchange for oil wells, tin and tungsten mines, the Red

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Army repeatedly assisted Sheng to put down local rebellions. In November 1940, the Soviets took virtual control of the region but in 1945 Chiang Kai-shek secured an end to the Red Army’s presence in Xinjiang in the Sino–Soviet Treaty. He also agreed that a coalition of Uyghurs and Kazakhs share power with the East Turkestan Republic in the north of Xinjiang. Mao invited five key leaders of the East Turkestan Republic to attend a conference and, on 22 August 1949, Stalin ordered them to accept. Two days later they boarded a plane in Kazakhstan, but the plane crashed near Lake Baikal, killing all on board. Rumours spread that their deaths were not an accident but the result of a secret deal between Stalin and Mao. The remaining leaders agreed to include their republic in the province of Xinjiang. Then in October, Pen Dehuai surrounded Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, and forced the Nationalists to surrender but he reported to Mao that he could no longer feed his troops and therefore needed help from the Soviet Union. In no time at all, large numbers of Soviet traders, engineers and Red Army troops were swarming all over the province. Tibet sent a letter to the US State Department stating that it would do everything possible to resist the PLA entering their country. Copies were sent to London and Beijing but on 7 October 1950, the Red Army moved into Tibet wiping out any resistance. India, independent since 1947, had recognised the People’s Republic and the UK was in no position to intervene, while the UN, occupied with the Korean War, paid little attention. The communists had now taken over almost all of Qing China as it had been at the end of the 19th century (Dikötter 2013: 33–35). Only Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau (a Portuguese colony) remained outside. On 1 October 1949, in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, Mao, no longer dressed in military fatigues but in a dark brown Sun Yat-sen suit and with a worker’s cap covering his thick black hair, proclaimed the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. On the dais was also Qingling Soong, now known as Madame Sun Yat-sen, who had sided with the communists and now appealed for a united front. Why did Mao defeat Chiang? Even in 1949, Chiang had more troops than Mao and the former began analysing the reasons for his defeat. The Guomindang had not learnt enough from Mao. ‘Disdaining the dialectic was the reason why we lost’, he mused, and he thought the Guomindang should have adopted democratic centralism, set up a youth movement and made workplace cells the building blocks of the party. The Leninist model was thus superior to the American model of democracy and liberal market economy. Mao found it astonishing that the US military had not intervened to save the Nationalists. The communist tactic of unleashing a class war in the countryside (ironically pioneered by the Nationalists) had been a great success. Just before the People’s Republic was founded, Mao outlined three major goals: set up a separate stove; put our house in order before inviting guests; and one-sidedly follow the Soviet Union. The first two goals implied removing the influence of imperialism in China. A Han Chinese dynasty, the Ming, had ruled the Middle Kingdom (this is the literal translation of the name of the country in Mandarin) from 1368 to

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1644 when the country again succumbed to foreign rule, the Manchu Qing dynasty lasting until 1911. The UK, the US, Russia, Italy, Germany, Portugal, France and Japan had all occupied parts of China. The years between 1839 and 1949 are known as the ‘century of humiliation’. Soon the Soviet Union was to join the league of imperialists. The third goal permitted China to join the communist commonwealth and thus the world of the future. The national flag was red or communist and the four yellow stars which surrounded the larger star in the left hand corner represented the national unity of classes: the bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie, the workers and peasants. The new order in the Middle Kingdom would be communist, nationalist and pro-peasant. Mao declared that China was no longer ‘on its knees’ and would stop kowtowing before foreigners. China had accounted for as much as 30 per cent of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as late as 1830 – an amount larger than the GDP of Europe and the US combined – and was still the largest world economy in 1860. The country had to be modernised and there was only one model available: the Soviet one, and everything capitalist had to be removed, by force, if necessary. Industrial output was only 3 per cent of GDP in 1952 and this underlined the gargantuan task ahead. In order to extract as much aid as possible from the Soviet Union, Mao had to be obsequious to Stalin, but the latter had no intention of making China strong enough to challenge his hegemony in the communist world. Mao kept asking for permission to visit Moscow but the vozhd kept him at arm’s length. On 26 April 1948, Stalin agreed that Mao could visit but the invitation was retracted on 10 May. On 4 July 1948, Mao informed him that he was ready to fly from Harbin to the Soviet capital but he was told that leading comrades needed to leave to bring in the harvest so November would be an appropriate date. Mao quickly saw through this flimsy excuse. He told Stalin that his bags had been packed, leather shoes acquired, a thick woollen coat was made, and he was thus ready to depart. On 28 September 1948, he wrote to Stalin that on a ‘series of questions it is necessary to report personally to the Central Committee and the glavny khozyain (big boss). It was agreed he could come in November, but the visit was postponed again and, on 14 January 1949, the vozhd suggested it be postponed once more. Anastas Mikoyan, the boss’s diplomat for all seasons, was dispatched to tell Mao that his visit to Moscow would ‘lead to a loss of prestige for the CPC and would be used by the imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique against Chinese communists’. Mao was in such a huff that he refused to see Mikoyan for two days. Then the Nationalist government moved capitals because of PLA advances, and to add insult to injury the Soviet ambassador was the only diplomat to accompany it. Mao never forgave the ambassador, who later became the Soviet envoy to the People’s Republic. When the ambassador threw a party for the Chinese leadership, Mao never uttered a word and according to a Soviet diplomat, his face revealed a ‘mocking-indifferent expression’. Mikoyan remained in China, from 30 January to 8 February, and Mao played the role of a ‘humble student of Stalin’. Mikoyan told Mao that the CPC’s experience enriched Marxism, but Mao wanted military aid, a credit of

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$300 million and Soviet specialists to help modernise the country. Mikoyan advised him to nationalise Japanese, British and French but not American property. When Mao requested that Outer Mongolia reunite with Inner Mongolia (a part of China) the Soviets told him it was an independent country (in reality a Soviet satellite). If they did later reunite, they would form an independent state. Mikoyan agreed that the Sino–Soviet Treaty was an unequal one and that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces from Port Arthur, but the Chinese Eastern Railway had been built with Russian money and was therefore not part of the unequal treaty. In June 1948, a Chinese request for arms to launch an attack on Manchuria had been turned down. However, the Soviet Union stepped up other aid, including restoring railway lines and building bridges. A CPC delegation led by Liu Shaoqi arrived in the Soviet Union on 26 June 1949, and remained until 14 August. This was the first high level delegation to visit Moscow since Mao had become CPC leader. In late June, Mao announced China’s policy of ‘leaning to one side’ (the Soviet Union) while Liu was there (in reality he had decided on this policy a year earlier). The Chinese were to get a $300 million loan at 1 per cent interest and the first group of Soviet specialists was ready to leave for China. Stalin hoped that China would assume greater responsibility for assisting national democratic movements in colonial and semi-colonial states, since Chinese revolutionary experience would be highly relevant to these countries. The vozhd proposed a division of labour: China would concentrate on the East and the Soviet Union on the West. The Soviet Union would help China develop an army, air force and navy but the Soviet Union would not support an attack on Taiwan as it could trigger World War III. In May and June, a US diplomat discussed US–China relations with a senior communist official, but nothing came of these talks as Mao had already decided to side with the USSR. In the euphoric days after the founding of the People’s Republic, Mao waited impatiently for the invitation of invitations, a meeting with the vozhd but none came and so, on 8 November, he sent a telegram saying he would like to come and would put the Sino–Soviet Treaty at the top of his agenda. Zhou Enlai, now number three and foreign minister, was dispatched to tell the Soviet ambassador that Mao would be delighted to pay his respects to Stalin on his 70th birthday, on 21 December 1949. He was thinking of spending four months away – one month negotiating a new Sino–Soviet Treaty with Stalin, two months in Eastern Europe and a month relaxing at a Soviet spa. Stalin grudgingly agreed but pointed out it would not be a state visit. Mao was to visit Moscow among a gaggle of communist leaders all cackling about how wonderful the master was. Mao left Beijing on 6 December by train and arrived in Moscow ten days later. The station clock dramatically struck 12 as he arrived, but Mao did not take his number two (Liu Shaoqi) or his number three (Zhou Enlai) with him and was greeted by Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, the latter resplendent in his marshal’s uniform. Stalin received Mao in his Kremlin office later that evening, but he excluded his own ambassador as he expected to be humiliated and wanted to ensure that no one witnessed his

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discomfort. Stalin’s brief on Mao described him as ‘unhurried, even slow … He moves steadily towards any goal he sets but does not always follow a set path, often with detours … is a natural performer; is able to hide his feelings and can play whatever role is needed’. During their first meeting, Mao simply asked for advice on the Sino–Soviet Treaty, signed by Chiang Kai-shek, to which the vozhd replied that he preferred to retain it but was willing to make concessions to the People’s Republic. Annulling it could permit ‘England and America’ to reconsider the treaty’s provisions awarding the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. Stalin mentioned that Mao’s collected writings would be published in Russian. Mao was ensconced in a dacha about 30 km from Moscow and all he could do was to fume and gaze at the snow. A succession of minions visited him, and it was evident that their task was to draw a psychological portrait of the Great Helmsman. He complained about the food and the bed and now and then was given a little treat, for example visiting a collective farm to admire the cows. He was only permitted to meet the Hungarian communist leader. On 21 December, he was seated on Stalin’s right at the birthday festivities in the Bolshoi Theatre and was the first foreign guest to speak. The audience roared: ‘Stalin, Mao Zedong!’ Mao responded with: ‘Long live Stalin, Glory to Stalin!’ He then returned to his dacha and became so frustrated that he shouted that he had come to negotiate and not to ‘eat, shit and sleep’. He met Stalin on 24 December, but there were no negotiations and Mao’s birthday, on 26 December, was ignored. He then decided to call Stalin’s bluff and shouted that he was willing to do business with the UK, the US and Japan, and diplomatic relations with the Court of St James were established on 6 January 1950. A rumour was reported to the British press that Stalin was holding Mao under house arrest. Stalin changed tack and began to negotiate, and Zhou Enlai and other officials were summoned to Moscow but told to take their time and come by train. On 22 January 1950, talks got under way in the vozhd’s Kremlin office and a Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed on 14 February 1950. The Soviet Union lost almost all the gains it had achieved at Yalta and in the previous Sino–Soviet Treaty. The Chinese Eastern Railway and Port Arthur were to be returned by 1952, and property leased in Dalian was to be returned immediately. The $300 million loan at 1 per cent, to be spent on defence, was confirmed. The USSR would begin building 50 large industrial projects and, in return, Mao conceded – through gritted teeth – that Manchuria and Xinjiang were Soviet spheres of interest. The Soviets were to exploit their mineral and industrial wealth and Moscow also had the right to acquire ‘surplus tungsten, tin and antimony for fourteen years’. This prevented China from selling these valuable products on the world market until the 1960s. Deng Xiaoping told Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1989, that of all the unequal treaties signed with Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, this was the most painful. China not only had to pay Soviet engineers but also had to compensate their home enterprises for the loss of labour, and all Soviet citizens were outside Chinese jurisdiction. The Soviet Union confirmed, by treaty, that if China were attacked by Japan or its allies,

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in particular the US, the USSR would come to its aid. At the signing ceremony, Stalin mentioned to Mao that any leader who copied Tito would be swiftly removed. No military alliance was needed as Japan or the US would not attack China and peace might last 25 years. So why did Stalin make so many concessions to Mao? He was wary of China going its own way and Mao becoming another Tito but vastly more powerful. Mao swallowed his pride in Moscow, but he would take revenge on Khrushchev for all the humiliations he had suffered at Stalin’s hands.

Korea In the wake of the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, Secretary of War William Howard Taft and the prime minister of Japan, Katsuro Tarō, reached an agreement on 27 July 1905, with Japan declaring Korea a protectorate and stating it had no interest in the Philippines, which the US had acquired by defeating Spain in the Spanish–American war of 1898. The agreement was not officially ratified but remained an understanding between the two powers. The Root–Takahira Agreement was negotiated by the US secretary of state, Elihu Root, and the Japanese ambassador to the US, Takahira Kogorō, and signed on 30 November 1908. The agreement confirmed the territorial integrity of China, Japanese recognition of the American annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines and the US’s recognition of Japan’s position in northeast China and the implicit recognition of Japan’s right to annex Korea and dominance in southern Manchuria. These two agreements were bad news for Koreans, and Japan formally annexed Korea on 22 August 1910. The South Manchurian railway, built by the Russians, passed to Japan after the defeat of Russia in 1905. At the Cairo conference, in November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek agreed that after the defeat of Japan, Korea would become free and independent. On 10 August 1945, Colonel Dean Rusk, an official in the US State Department and Colonel Charles Bonesteel, were given the task of deciding how much of Korea would be in the US zone. Neither knew much about the country but decided that Seoul, the capital, had to be in the US zone. They were also aware that the US Army opposed an extensive area of occupation. Taking a National Geographic map, they tried to find a natural geographical line but could not locate one. They saw the 38th parallel and decided to recommend it. This cut over 300 roads and railway lines. President Truman and Stalin accepted the line without demur. Japan had conscripted about 200,000 Koreans into the military, and taken up to 200,000 women as sex slaves to serve the military. When Japan surrendered, Koreans were ecstatic and hoped that they could now run their own affairs. When General John Hodges landed in Korea, he asked how many political parties there were and was told 54. The Korean welcome was so boisterous that Hodges called on the captured Japanese soldiers to restore order and some Koreans were shot. The general then announced that the Japanese would be retained to keep order in the zone of occupation. Many of the Japanese police

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were ethic Koreans and much hated by the population for their brutality and corruption. Many Korean women were raped by US soldiers, and General Douglas MacArthur, governor of the US zone, warned that any soldier guilty of rape would be hanged and any GI who assaulted a Japanese would get 10 years in a military prison. This had the desired effect and MacArthur gained respect from the population. He was also in charge of Japan, and Owen Lattimore, a former US State Department consultant to Chiang Kai-shek, was sent to advise MacArthur. Lattimore was regarded by many as pro-communist, and his task was to break up the cartels which were held to be responsible for Japanese militarism. In reality, he stripped Japan of all production facilities for aluminium and magnesium and half of all machine tools. This meant that in the event of a communist insurgency, the Japanese would not be able to maintain their own aircraft or rebuild aircraft for the Americans (Koster 2019: 228). In March 1946, Kilsoo Haan, a Korean who became an American citizen in 1956 and had links to the Korean underground, informed General Hodges that the Soviets had discovered a large deposit of uranium in their zone and had transported it to the Soviet Union. This information turned out to be accurate as US troops later discovered the uranium ore plant. During the Korean war Taiwan offered to send two divisions, 33,000 men, to fight and MacArthur thought it a good idea but was overruled. John Foster Dulles, US secretary of state, told the Japanese prime minister Yoshida that the Japanese army would be immediately rearmed and sent to fight the Chinese in Korea. The prime minister responded: ‘We cannot do that’, but Dulles informed him: ‘I’m not going to take any nonsense from a barbarian who eats raw fish! You’re going to do as you’re told’ (Koster 2019: 248). The Japanese held out and declined, wisely, to send troops again to fight the Chinese. Dulles’s attitude towards the Japanese was mirrored by many other Americans dealing with Asia. Overall, the US government revealed a studied indifference to things Asian and exhibited little respect for Asians (MacArthur was an exception). The Americans needed someone they could deal with to become head of state, and chose Syngman Rhee, a 70-year-old professor who had spent the previous 33 years in exile in the US. As an English speaker, Princeton educated and a Christian, it was presumed that he had imbibed American views on democracy. He was affectionately referred to as an uncle but underneath the charm he was a hard, ruthless politician who aimed to be a dictator. In the North, the Soviets installed a 33-year-old Red Army officer, Kim Il Sung (literally ‘Become the Sun Kim’). Kim was born in 1912 into a Christian family in Pyongyang, and his father was a member of a Korean nationalist organisation. Out of prison in 1920, the family moved to Manchuria where there was a thriving Korean émigré community. The language of Kim’s first school was Mandarin and he moved back to Korea in 1923 to attend a Christian school and was for a short time a Sunday school teacher, but joined a Marxist group at the school in 1929, became a member of the Communist Party of China in 1931, and then led a guerrilla group fighting the occupying Japanese. Kim became a political commissar and his superior was so impressed by him that he brought

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him to Mao’s notice in Yan’an. In 1940, with the Japanese in the ascendancy, he was obliged to cross the border to the Soviet Union and joined the Red Army; he rose to the rank of captain and his two children received Russian names. The future Kim Il Jong was called Yury at birth. As Stalin preferred a comrade schooled in the Soviet Union to a home-grown Korean, he was dispatched there in September 1945 along with some comrades. One observer thought he had a haircut like a Chinese waiter – hardly a compliment! Stalin had chosen wisely, and Kim set about uniting the various factions: those who had spent time in Manchuria, the Soviet Union and China and those who had moved from south Korea. In December 1945, the Soviet military made Kim head of the Communist Party and he was to prove himself a brilliant, ruthless politician who managed to get the help of Stalin and Mao in his quest to take over the whole of Korea. In February 1946, a communist dominated coalition government was formed, headed by Kim. Soviet advisers played a key role in the development of North Korea from 1945 to 1950. They drafted the land nationalisation decree in early 1946, which saw land redistributed among peasants while almost all landlords fled south. All industrial enterprises were also nationalised, although small workshops were tolerated until the late 1950s. This, plus fierce persecution of Christians, resulted in an exodus of about 1.5 million people or 15 per cent of the population. The founding of the Republic of Korea or South Korea, in August 1948, led to the coming into being of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) the following month. Both Pyongyang and Seoul claimed sovereignty over the whole of the Korean peninsula and still do. Kim became the head of a communist-dominated government and, in 1949, the Communist Party merged with the Korean Workers’ Party and Kim became the chair. One of Kim’s achievements was to build up the Korean People’s Army, which was equipped and advised by Soviet specialists, and it began to have ambitions to take over the south. Japan began industrialising Korea after occupying it in 1910, and they concentrated on the north. In 1945, it had 76 per cent of the mining output, 80 per cent of heavy industry, 92 per cent of electricity generating capacity and had the largest number of hydroelectric stations in Asia. Its factories were among the most efficient and modern in the world. North Korea was the most industrialised and urbanised region in Asia, second only to Japan. In comparison, south Korea resembled a collection of paddy fields. Until 1970, GDP per capita in the DPRK was higher than in the Republic of Korea. No wonder Kim fancied his chances of taking over the whole of Korea in 1950. Skirmishes were the order of the day and everyone took it for granted that only military force would reunite the country. The US provided substantial aid to Syngman Rhee in the hope that the economy would develop but Rhee spent most of the money consolidating his power and executed any communist he found. As long as there were American soldiers in the south, Stalin held Kim back and informed Soviet representatives, in May 1947, that ‘we should not meddle too deeply in Korean affairs’. Kim Il Sung visited Moscow in March

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1949 to ask for help in taking over south Korea but Stalin declined and kept him in check until he had the atomic bomb, the communists had taken over China and Korean units fighting with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army – amounting to about 50,000 troops with their weapons – had returned to North Korea. To apply pressure on the vozhd, Kim even hinted he might reorient his country’s policy towards China, but Kim was aware that only the Soviet Union could supply the weapons and aircraft needed, whereas the Chinese could supply the manpower. Soviet occupation forces began leaving the North in late 1948, and US forces vacated South Korea in June 1949. Kim again asked for Soviet help but received a negative answer. On 30 December 1949, the US National Security Council concluded that the ‘strategic importance of Formosa [Taiwan] does not justify overt military action’ and President Truman made it clear that there would be no military aid for Chiang. On 12 January 1950, Dean Acheson, US secretary of state, delivered a speech on Asian policy and outlined the US defence perimeter, which ran from the Aleutians through Japan and the Philippines, but Korea and Taiwan were not included, nor was Vietnam. He later tried to exonerate himself by claiming that he was repeating the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947. On 13 January 1950, Dean Rusk, now under secretary of state, stated that the Chinese communist revolution was not Russian in essence and did not aim at a dictatorship. When asked if the US had any responsibility to defend South Korea, he said that South Korea ‘could take care of any trouble started by North Korea’ (Koster 2019: 23–4). Acheson maintained that the greatest threat to the People’s Republic of China was the Soviet Union, which was detaching Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and Xinjiang from China. The integrity of China was in America’s national interest irrespective of communist ideology. The secretary of state was, in fact, proposing a Sino–American relationship (Kissinger 2012: 119–20). Stalin reacted as if stung – Acheson’s intention – and sent Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky and Vyacheslav Molotov to request Mao to ask for a rebuttal of the Acheson ‘slander’ but Mao merely asked Xinhua, the Chinese news agency, to publish a rebuttal. The Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang sent a telegram about Acheson’s speech and reported that Kim Il Sung had asked repeatedly for a meeting with Stalin to discuss the reunification of Korea. In September 1949, the Soviet Politburo expressly prohibited the North Koreans from engaging in any military measures near the 38th parallel. On 30 January 1950, Stalin changed his mind and said he would talk to Kim, probably based on Acheson’s speech. If North Korea won the war the whole of Korea would fall under Soviet control but if it lost the war, the situation would be so tense that the Chinese would request Soviet troops to remain in Port Arthur and Dalian. Kim flew to Beijing on 13 May 1950, to report on his talks with Stalin, reporting that the vozhd had approved his plans to attack the South. Mao wondered if the US would intervene, but Kim commented that, even if it did, the North would have occupied the South beforehand. Mao offered to deploy three armies along the Sino– Korean border, but Kim waved this aside saying his own forces did not require any help. Mao asked Zhou Enlai to cable Moscow and seek Stalin’s

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confirmation of Kim’s narrative and the vozhd replied that the decision to go to war was to be taken by China and North Korea, but if there was disagreement they should postpone the attack. Kim returned to Pyongyang on 16 May, with Mao’s support for war – or at least this is what he told Stalin, who did not think the US would intervene, but if he were wrong so were US policymakers, who believed that China would not intervene. This was based on the assumption that China needed peace for the CPC to solidify its power and also it would lose too many men. This proved a false assumption as Mao regarded war as a way of increasing the legitimacy of his regime. Mao judged the US intervention in South Korea to be an act of war against Asia and it was thus inevitable that China would become involved. Mao’s goal was a pre-emptive strike to take US military planners by surprise and thereby sow confusion about China’s intentions, and he thought that Kim could actually be defeated and set about preventing this. Chinese strategy normally exhibits three characteristics: meticulous analysis of long term trends; careful study of tactical options; and detached exploration of operational decisions (Kissinger 2012: 135). The Chinese had intended to invade Taiwan before the Korean War, but the US fleet had prevented this. They could then switch these troops – over 250,000 – to the Sino–North Korean border. The Chinese military believed it could defeat the Americans, whom they calculated could only deploy half a million soldiers while the PLA could muster 4 million. China also enjoyed logistical advantage and they calculated that most of the world would support them. A nuclear attack was discounted. Zhou Enlai thought that if the US won in Korea it would then move against Vietnam, so it had to be blocked in Korea. During the war, Andrei Vyshinsky, then Soviet minister of foreign affairs, told an American businessman: We don’t know what to think about you Americans. Look at Korea. You did everything you could to tell us you were not interested in Korea, and when the North Koreans went in there, you pour your troops in … We can’t trust you Americans. (Rusk 1990: 164) At 4 a.m. on 25 June 1950, the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel and initially were unstoppable. President Truman spoke of a police action and asked the UN Security Council for help; the Security Council approved a UN force because the Soviet delegate was not present since he was boycotting the Council. The North almost took control, but General MacArthur invaded at Inchon (predicted by the Chinese) and crossed into North Korea, occupying Pyongyang. On 1 October, Stalin requested that Chinese volunteers dressed in North Korean military uniforms intervene north of the 38th parallel. On 11 October, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao arrived at Stalin’s villa on the Black Sea and informed him that without Soviet supplies China might not commit itself to the planned invasion. On 13 October, Stalin told Kim that continuing resistance was pointless and he had to withdraw all troops and military hardware, and proposed a Korean

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government in exile in Manchuria. The Soviets informed Washington that if General MacArthur halted at the 38th parallel, they would convince the North Koreans to cease fighting. On 18 October, over 180,000 PLA troops crossed into Korea under cover of darkness and carried out the greatest ambush in modern warfare, with the Soviet air force also joining in. MacArthur wanted the US Air Force to start bombing China, but President Truman wanted a limited war and dismissed him, on 11 April 1951. Kim asked Mao for a ceasefire in June 1951, but China wanted the war to wear down the US and its allies, and the longer the war lasted the more military factories Mao could request from Moscow. In February 1953 the new US president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, warned China he might deploy the atomic bomb, and this was great news for Mao as he could now ask Stalin for an atomic bomb. On 28 February 1953, the vozhd decided the war had to end and, on 5 March, he was dead, but Mao did not bother to go to the funeral and sent Zhou Enlai in his place. An armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 (a peace treaty has still to be signed) and this ended one of the most savage, barbaric wars of the 20th century. China sent 3 million men and lost about 400,000 and the UN coalition counted 142,000 dead, including 30,000 Americans. The US dropped more ordnance on Korea than it had expended during the whole of World War II. The Soviet air force claimed to have won the air war and 12 Soviet air divisions were deployed, involving 72,000 in combat. William Perl, a brilliant young government aeronautical engineer, provided the Soviets with the results of secret tests and design experiments of American jet engines and jet planes. The US Air Force expected to dominate the skies but was shocked when MiG15 jets flew rings around the Americans’ propeller driven aircraft and were also far superior to the first generation of US jets. Only the deployment of the F86 Saber, America’s newest jet fighter, made it possible to compete with the MiG15 (Haynes and Klehr 2000: 10). The Soviets claimed they shot down 1,097 enemy planes and anti-aircraft guns accounted for another 212, with the Soviets losing 335 planes and 120 pilots. Widespread purges were carried out during the war and as many as 5 million Chinese may have been executed. Between 1950 and 1953, China received technical equipment worth 470 billion roubles from the Soviet Union, and Soviet specialists designed 80 per cent of all projects and provided technical equipment free of charge as well as 120,000 books and 3,000 scientific documents, again free of charge. Thousands of Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union and the Soviets, therefore, provided the science and technology base which permitted the Middle Kingdom to industrialise rapidly (Shen and Xia 2015: 89–90). Despite the terrible losses, the Korean War was good for China but the obverse of this was that the war poisoned Sino–American relations for almost two decades with many Americans, including President Eisenhower, seeing the war as a prelude to World War III.

Vietnam The French invaded southern Vietnam in September 1858, and on 18 February 1859 conquered Saigon and other provinces, and the Vietnamese were forced to

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cede these territories to France in June 1862, by the Treaty of Saigon. In 1864, all the territories conquered by France were merged in the new colony of Cochinchina and, in 1887, it became part of the Union of French Indochina. In 1933, the Spratly Islands were annexed to French Cochinchina. On 22–26 September 1940, the Japanese landed tanks and 4,500 troops near Haiphong, in Vietnam, and the pro-German French Vichy government asked for an armistice, but the battle of Tonkin concluded on 26 September with a Japanese victory. The reason for the attack was to end the transfer of arms and fuel through French Indo-China to southern China. On 28 July 1941, about 140,000 Japanese troops invaded southern Indo-China in preparation for an invasion of the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) but permitted the French troops and civil administration to remain albeit under Japanese supervision. Cambodia was also occupied by the Japanese, in August 1941. The United States responded by imposing an embargo on the sale of steel and scrap iron to Japan, but the supply of oil was of key importance to the Japanese economy. In September 1940 they began negotiating with the Dutch East Indies, requesting about half of local production, but by November the Japanese were demanding 80 per cent of output. On 28 June 1941, the US and the UK asked the Dutch to stop supplying oil to Japan, promising to come to their aid if Japan attacked. The Dutch cut off oil supplies but on 11 January 1942, Japan invaded and thereby took over the oil industry. American and British aid was not forthcoming. President Roosevelt had opposed an outright ban on the sale of US oil to Japan. While he was on vacation and Cordell Hull, his secretary of state, was also away, Dean Acheson, a State Department lawyer, changed the policy and imposed an outright ban. The Japanese prime minister was given a month to lift the ban but failed to do so and was replaced by a general. Hull suggested that oil could be sold for domestic use if Japan gradually pulled out of China. Harry Dexter White penned a letter strongly opposing the move for Henry Morgenthau, secretary of the treasury, to sign and present to the President. Since both of them were regarded as pro-Soviet, and the USSR favoured an American–Japanese war, it follows that they would not support any concessions to Tokyo. Hull then sent a note, on 26 November, to the Japanese telling them to leave China immediately and also Manchuria, which was of great importance for their economy. Tokyo, not surprisingly, found the terms unacceptable and instructed their consulates in the US and the UK to burn their files and destroy their decoding machines. At the Potsdam conference, it was decided that Indo-China south of latitude 16N was part of the South East Asia Command of Lord Mountbatten. Japanese forces south of that line surrendered to him and those to the north surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek. In September 1945, Chinese (Guomindang) forces entered Tonkin, in the north, and the British landed in Saigon. Chiang accepted the Vietnamese communist government under Nguyen Al Quoc or Ho Chi Minh (‘He Who Enlightens’), who was in control in Hanoi. The British refused to do likewise in Saigon and intended to give way to the French, the imperial power.

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On 2 September 1945 in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the foundation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and it ruled the whole of Vietnam for about 20 days, after the abdication of Emperor Bao Dai, who had governed during the Japanese occupation which had begun on 22 September 1940. Ho Chi Minh was a member of the PCF (French Communist Party) from 1921 to 1925, and then of the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1925, and was leader of the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam) movement from 1941, when he returned to Japanese-occupied Vietnam (the Japanese allowed French officials and troops to administer the country) after 30 years in exile in the US, the UK, France, the Soviet Union and China. In March 1945, the Japanese took control of all of Vietnam and expelled French troops, and this permitted the Viet Minh to seize more territory given the general confusion of the time. In March 1945, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer – the forerunner of the CIA – met Ho Chi Minh in Kunming, China, and a deal was struck: the OSS would equip the Viet Minh with radios and some light arms and, in return, the Viet Minh would provide intelligence, harass Japanese forces and try to rescue US pilots shot down over Viet Minh controlled territory. A small number of OSS officers parachuted into north Vietnam, in July 1945, to help train the Viet Minh. They found Ho very ill, treated him and he recovered. Ho mentioned that the country’s goal was self-determination: could the Americans help? ‘Am I different from … your George Washington?’ When proclaiming the formation of the DRV, Ho quoted the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, in 1776: ‘All men are created equal. They are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, among them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. Ho was making clear that he desperately needed US help to ensure the French did not return, and President Roosevelt’s opposition to European colonialism was well known. The 1941 Atlantic Charter had stated that the US and the UK respected the ‘right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’. However, President Roosevelt no longer occupied the White House and President Truman was not enamoured of anti-colonialism and favoured France re-establishing its authority in Indo-China. Ho sent a letter in September 1945 asking for help, and a telegram in February 1946, but never received a reply to either. We shall never know what would have happened in Vietnam had the US sided with Ho rather than the French. Could the Vietnam War have been avoided? After all, Ho was first of all a nationalist and secondly a communist. On 23 September 1945, the British commander stood aside as French forces ousted the DRV government and declared French authority in Cochinchina, a region of southern Vietnam. The Viet Minh held a general election on 6 January 1946, to the National Assembly of Vietnam. Cochinchina, now under French control, did not participate. On 1 June 1946, while the Viet Minh leadership was in Paris for negotiations, the Autonomous Republic of Cochinchina was set up by separatists. This provoked the first Indo-China War between the French and the Viet Minh, and in 1947 the Autonomous Republic was renamed the Provisional Government of South Vietnam. On 5 June 1948, a Vietnamese

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government, forming part of the French Union and the Indochinese Federation, which included the neighbouring Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia, was set up. The French wanted the former Emperor Bao Dai to return to Vietnam as national leader, as an alternative to Ho Chi Minh, but he refused until all of Vietnam was reunited. The Provisional Central Government of Vietnam was proclaimed on 27 May 1948, and was then reunited with Cochinchina, where French colonists were still influential, and, on 2 July 1949, this resulted in the State of Vietnam being proclaimed, but North Vietnam remained mostly beyond its control. The First Indo-China War began on 19 December 1946 and ended on 20 July 1954, with the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, prime minister since 1945, and Vo Nguyen Giap fighting French forces. The conflict covered the whole country and also spilled over into Laos and Cambodia, French protectorates. It cost the lives of over 192,000 Viet Minh and 135,000 French-led forces (of which almost 21,000 were French). The Viet Minh emerged the victors with Giap proving himself a brilliant guerrilla fighter. Even before the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu, the French had conceded that there was no military solution to the problems they faced in Indo-China and viewed the battle as a way of strengthening their position at the future Geneva talks. The battle raged from 13 March to 7 May 1954, when the Viet Minh, led by Giap, outnumbered the French by four to one and with Chinese supplied howitzers, medium artillery, some heavier field guns and anti-aircraft artillery, on high ground overlooking the French, surrounded them and they conceded defeat, with most of the survivors surrendering and some escaping to Laos. The French artillery commander, Colonel Charles Piroth, committed suicide in his dugout with a hand grenade. He was buried in secret to avoid a loss of morale among the troops. The US provided the French with matériel during the battle: aircraft, weapons, mechanics, pilots and US Air Force maintenance crews. President Eisenhower invited the UK and other allies to join the US in a joint military mission, but Churchill refused and proposed a collective security agreement for the region. The debacle was a disaster for the US military and revealed that war, a new type of guerrilla war, in Vietnam, was unlike anything the Allies had encountered in World War II. The French government resigned, and the new prime minister announced the withdrawal of France from Indo-China. The May 1954 Geneva accords saw France agreeing to withdraw all its forces, but Vietnam was to be temporarily divided along the 17th parallel, with Viet Minh in the north and in the south, the State of Vietnam, which was nominally under Bao Dai, to prevent Ho Chi Minh taking over the whole country. National elections were to follow in 1956 when the country would be reunited. The elections were never held due to opposition in the south, and the tragedy of the Vietnam War became inevitable.

Laos Laos, or the land of a million elephants (only a few hundred now remain) borders China in the north, Myanmar and Thailand in the west, Cambodia to

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the south and Vietnam to the east. It is the only landlocked country in Southeast Asia and the northern part consists of a mountainous chain and dense forests. Until the declaration of Lao independence, in 1945, Laos was the least developed part of French Indo-China. During the Japanese occupation Laos was treated as an independent state and when Japan surrendered, King Sisavangvong proclaimed the independence of Laos on 8 April 1945. Lao nationalist forces were weak, and French and Vietnamese forces reoccupied Laos in 1946. Lao nationalist forces linked up with the Viet Minh in northern Vietnam and did not return to Laos until 1949. France stopped regarding Laos as an appendage of Vietnam and began to defend its independence. This was the reason for establishing their military base at Dien Bien Phu, north west of Hanoi. In July 1949, a Lao–French agreement recognised Laos as independent within the French Union. The Viet Minh invaded Laos in April and December 1953, and handed over the occupied territories to the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation) resistance movement, headed by Suphanuvong (Stuart-Fox 2008: 12–22). The Geneva accords, in May 1954, allocated two provinces to the Pathet Lao. After France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Pathet Lao acquired more territory. After the South Vietnamese refused to hold elections, as stipulated by the Geneva accords, the Viet Cong (Vietnamese communists) guerrilla forces in South Vietnam, aided by regular North Vietnamese troops, attacked South Vietnamese forces. This was very bad news for Laos as the Viet Minh used Laos as a conduit (dubbed the Ho Chi Minh Trail) to supply its troops in South Vietnam. How did Viet Minh and Viet Cong guerrilla tactics differ from conventional warfare? Here are Henry Kissinger’s answers (Kissinger 1969: 213): Guerrillas seldom seek to hold real estate; their tactic is to use terror and intimidation to discourage cooperation with the constitutional authority … We fought a military war, our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our physiological exhaustion: In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrillas win if they do not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their main forces the way a bullfighter uses his cape – to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance. Guerrilla tactics have to be deployed when facing a numerically and better armed opponent, and a basic rule is never be drawn into a large, pitched battle because defeat is almost certain. These tactics were developed by Mao Zedong in confronting Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist and Japanese forces and Giap honed them when resisting the Japanese in north Vietnam. Guerrilla warfare is conducted for the long term. UN exhaustion in Korea demonstrated to Mao, who supplied military equipment and advisers to the Viet Minh, that Western countries had no stomach for long drawn out wars. Public opinion turns against such conflicts, fuelled by astute communist propaganda that the locals are fighting for a just cause, independence from colonial oppression.

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Malaya On 16 June 1948, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), began murdering plantation workers. Led by Chin Peng, secretary general of the MCP, their goal was to free Malaya from British colonial rule. The UK government immediately declared a state of emergency. Many MNLA fighters were former members of the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Liberation Army and the British secretly trained and armed them. They were disbanded in December 1945, when they handed in their weapons and were given gratuities but 4,000 refused and went underground. They were landless, predominantly ethnic Chinese squatters, who lived in ramshackle huts between commercial plantations and the jungle. Aided by Chinese and Viet Minh advisers, they formed small jungle bases, attacked British military installations and set out to destroy the rubber industry by murdering all those associated with it. About half a million of the 3.1 million ethnic Chinese in Malaya sided with them, with a small number of ethnic Malays as well, and they provided food, intelligence and new recruits. Ethnic Chinese did not have the right to vote and could not own land. They rapidly expanded their influence in central Malaya, helped by the jungle terrain and skilful guerrilla tactics, and they received some support from the Soviet Union and Indonesia. In the camps, the guerrillas were given instruction in MarxismLeninism and leaflets were published to be distributed among the civilian population. The MCP and other left-wing parties were banned, in July 1948. The UK’s response was to form a Commonwealth force (Rhodesia, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji (eventually numbering 40,000 regular personnel) and the Malayan Home Guard comprising about 250,000), confronting about 8,000 communist guerrillas. It was headed by General Sir Harold Briggs, whose tactics were to cut off the insurgents’ food supplies and relocate about half a million rural Malays (about 10 per cent of the population) and 400,000 ethnic Chinese to ‘new villages’ which were surrounded by barbed wire and guarded with the aim of keeping them in and the guerrillas out. They then engaged in search and destroy missions. When an attack was announced, rapid response units would immediately spring into action and volunteer auxiliary forces were recruited to guard towns and plantations. The colonial Malayan economy was based on tin and rubber and as a result subject to volatile world prices. Japan occupied the country in 1941, and only extracted some tin with many rubber plantations falling into disuse. Malaya relied on imports of rice and when these were cut off it led to the severe famine of 1942. When the Japanese left in 1945, the UK was in no position to provide the aid necessary for the economy to recover, and this led to a rapid increase in the influence of the MCP, which blamed the British colonial regime for the poverty, and it was influential enough to organise a general strike on 29 January 1946. As tin and rubber exports were valuable for the post-war British economy, harsh measures were used to deal with protestors, including deportation. The protestors as a result became more and more militant and there were over

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300 strikes in 1947. A British attempt to form a Malayan Union of Malays, Chinese and Indians failed due to ethnic Malay objections, and the Chinese saw this as a betrayal of their community which had borne the brunt of opposition to the Japanese occupation. In October 1951, the British High Commissioner was assassinated by the MNLA and General Briggs left, in December 1951, to be replaced by General Gerald Templar, who adopted a hearts and minds approach by giving food and medicine to Malays and indigenous tribes and also organised patrols which forced the MNLA deeper and deeper into the jungle, denying them resources. Templar used brutal tactics, including beheading, and two thirds of the guerrillas were killed over the following two years. Tactics used included booby-trapping jungle food supplies, burning villages and secretly supplying self-detonating hand grenades and bullets to the insurgents. Some civilians were shot for not giving intelligence. It was often difficult for British troops to identify guerrillas as they wore the same clothes as civilians, and the decapitation of insurgents was common. An amnesty was offered in September 1955, but had little effect, and the emergency was declared over on 12 July 1960.

8

Bretton Woods, the IMF and the World Bank

Designed by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, later assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in the summer of 1944, the most famous economic summit in history took place in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. There, 737 delegates from 44 nations, after three weeks of wrangling, agreed a new framework for the world economy, in which currencies were freely convertible, governments could call on a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help, and the dollar replaced the pound as the world’s leading currency. The war was not yet won, but the leaders of the US and UK were constructing an international financial system that would prevent the instability that had turned the Germans towards Hitler, contributed to the collapse of the US economy, and resulted in a war which had almost bankrupted the UK and ended the dominance of the pound sterling. Keynes, the intellectual leader, was at times abetted, often overridden by White, who did not find his position as leading US negotiator inconsistent with being a Soviet spy. Together they produced a system of fixed exchange rates, acceptable to Keynes but not always to his liking, because it was based on the dollar and gold. The US Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau said it would replace the ‘planless, senseless rivalry that turned neighbours into enemies … the old system is dead’ (The Times, 21 July 2019). There was considerable discord. The French refused to speak English, the Chinese threw loud, brash parties to get noticed and the Soviets repaired to the bar as often as possible. The working day began at 7.30 a.m. and ended often at 3.30 a.m. the next day. The pressure was too great for Keynes and he broke down and had to sit out the last few days. The conference marked the end of British economic power throughout the world and made way for the rise of the US and the dollar. Keynes’s main task was to strike the best deal he could. The IMF was to deal with macro-economics – government bail-outs – and the World Bank would finance development projects. Both institutions were based in Washington D. C. The Soviets decided they would not join the IMF or the World Bank. One of the sticking points was that gold reserves had to be declared if a loan was requested. Stalin judged the risk of US influence on the Soviet economy too great. On reflection, he could have gained a lot by joining. Bretton Woods provided the stability for the enormous growth in the capitalist world over the DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-10

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following two decades. It lasted until 1973 when the US abandoned the gold standard and currency instability became the norm.

US capital for the Soviet Union? Hopes were high during the war that the United States and the USSR would reach some mutually beneficial commercial agreement once hostilities ceased. Large American credits would permit the Soviet Union to import vitally needed equipment. The USSR would not be in a position to export industrial or agricultural goods, but it was a treasure trove of unexploited mineral reserves. Eric Johnston, president of the American Chamber of Commerce, spent eight weeks in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1944 and was able to inspect any enterprise he wished. Stalin, in a long conversation with him, underlined the USSR’s interest in importing heavy industrial products and exporting raw materials. Johnston received an enthusiastic response when he returned home and over 700 American firms declared that they were eager to sell to the Soviets. Banks began to form a consortium to finance US–Soviet trade, and moves were made to remove the ban, imposed in 1943, on loans to the USSR. Morgenthau proposed a credit of $10 billion and optimists spoke of annual exports of $1–$2 billion. However, there were dissenting voices. The oil and coal industries did not relish the prospect of Soviet competition; doubts were raised about the Soviet Union’s capacity to balance imports and exports; and George Kennan feared that the Soviets would exploit their huge purchasing power to the detriment of American industry. However, Averell Harriman, the US ambassador in Moscow from October 1943, was very enthusiastic about doing business and President Roosevelt saw credits as a way of making up for the delays in launching the Second Front. Anastas Mikoyan, the very astute commissar for foreign trade, immediately asked for a credit of $1 billion over 25 years, with repayments to begin after 17 years at 1.25 per cent interest. Mikoyan could hardly have expected the Americans to accept such a proposal, for given the rate of inflation it would have resembled something like a Christmas present, but it was an opening bid and revealed that there were some sharp business minds in the Kremlin. Little came of it, due to two factors. Congress would not commit itself to post-war credits while the war was still on; and the reserves of the ExportImport Bank were almost exhausted. Roosevelt therefore decided to make use of the Lend-Lease arrangements and encouraged the Soviets to put in orders for equipment which could be used for post-war reconstruction. Credits could be arranged at 3.375 per cent. Negotiations got under way, but in September 1944 the Soviet government broke them off, the rate of interest being the sticking point. Molotov then informed Harriman, on 3 January 1945, that the USSR would buy industrial equipment worth $6 billion if a 30-year loan at 2.25 per cent – with repayments to begin after ten years – could be agreed. A week later, Harry Dexter White persuaded Henry Morgenthau to urge the President to extend an even larger loan on even more generous terms: $10

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billion repayable over 35 years at 2 per cent. However, the climate for such an arrangement in Washington had become frostier. Congress was now unwilling to extend Lend-Lease beyond the end of hostilities, and the voices demanding Soviet political concessions had become much louder and more influential. Congress, for its part, wanted to tie the credits to Soviet cooperation in other fields. Roosevelt therefore decided to delay his response to the Soviet request, but he informed the Soviet Union that the reason was that the loan would involve time-consuming legislative procedures. It soon became clear to Moscow, however, that Washington placed a low priority on increased trade, and any hope that Roosevelt had harboured that a loan could be used as bait for Soviet concessions elsewhere vanished.

9

Conflict over Germany and the Soviet Union in a new light

Although the United States and the USSR had a mutual interest in solving the German question, no agreement about post-war Europe or the future of Germany could be reached, and this was an important factor in the exacerbation of relations. It was, however, the British government which made the early running, and it proposed on 1 July 1943 that a United Nations Commission for Europe should be established to supervise the liberated countries and those to be administered by the victors. More precise proposals were made by Anthony Eden in Moscow in October 1943, when he advocated the setting up of a European Advisory Commission (EAC) whose terms of reference were to include all problems which the Big Three wanted elaborated – including the peace settlement. When the EAC met for the first time in January 1944, in London, the British delegation presented its plans for three occupation zones and joint responsibility for Berlin. It was in the interests of the Soviet Union, as long as there was no second front in Europe and while the Wehrmacht was still on Soviet soil, to spin out negotiations, for there was just no way of predicting the constellation of forces at the end of hostilities. As for the Americans, they decided that their representative, John G. Winant, should not be given authority to decide on the exact conditions of German surrender or on how a defeated Germany was to be administered. The main reason for this attitude was that the Roosevelt administration – like the Soviets – had no clear conception of what was to happen to Germany after the war. The Americans also refused to discuss reparations in the EAC. This thorny question was only considered, for the first time, at Yalta in February 1945, when Stalin asked for $20 billion for the Soviet Union and Germany’s victims. Churchill opposed this, out of fear that, if granted, it would produce a rapid increase in Soviet economic strength. In the end Roosevelt accepted the sum as a basis for future discussions, but the Soviets failed to extract any hard and fast promises about reparations before the end of the war. The division of Germany into occupation zones was agreed in principle but the possibility of dismembering Germany was not excluded. No firm agreement was reached on Poland’s western frontier (Document 9, pp. 235–6). A major reason for the Americans’ indecisiveness at Yalta was that they had not DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-11

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prepared themselves sufficiently well. They had not attempted to work out what the USSR’s policy towards Germany might be, nor how this could be squared with American policy.

The Soviet Union in a new light Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe led the Americans to view the Soviets differently, and this change can be analysed on four levels (Loth 1980: 110–16): 1

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For the first time a whole range of Americans, from ordinary soldiers to top-level politicians, actually came into contact with Soviet citizens and their quite different attitudes and way of life. Many were led to ascribe these differences to the impact of Asia on Russian and Soviet culture. Averell Harriman spoke in April 1945 of the possibility of Europe being invaded by barbarians (Document 12, pp. 238–9), and maintained that Hitler’s greatest crime had been to open the gates of Europe to the Asian hordes. General George Patton thought that Soviet officers behaved like recently civilised Mongolian bandits. On the British side there was also the same sense of shock. There were several fracas between British and Soviet troops over Soviet maltreatment of German civilians, especially women. An apple of discord was the wholesale rape of German women by Soviet troops and personnel. Those raped included Ukrainian and Polish women who had been brought to Germany to engage in forced labour. The total number of those raped may have exceeded 2 million. Astonishment and resentment at Soviet behaviour, both personal and political, strengthened the influence of the proponents of the ‘Riga axioms’ both in Congress and throughout the nation. It also added weight to Republican criticism, under way since 1944, of Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Disappointed at the meagre results of the Yalta agreement, the critics demanded that the USSR fulfil its commitments in accordance with the American interpretation of them. Senator Vandenberg emerged as a powerful spokesman for these critics at the founding meeting of the United Nations. He looked at the Soviet Union through the lens of Poland and did not like what he saw. The meeting became acrimonious and Alexander Cadogan, permanent under secretary at the British Foreign Office, who had come to the conclusion at Yalta that Stalin was a great man, now wrote: ‘How can we work with these animals?’ (Dilks, 1971: 739). Vandenberg’s diary was equally frank: ‘I don’t know if this is Frisco or Munich. We must stand by our guns … This is the point at which to … win and end this appeasement of the Reds before it is too late’ (Loth 1980: 100). American diplomats began to adopt the interpretation placed on the Yalta agreement by the US public, and the beliefs of the ‘Riga’ school of thought – which accused Roosevelt of lacking political acumen in dealing with the Soviets – gained wide currency. Diplomats who were universalists and who hoped that world affairs could be managed through a world peace

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Descriptive analysis organisation had to concede some disappointment but were not prepared to abandon their hopes of arranging a deal with the Soviets which would secure a non-communist future for Eastern Europe. However, the contradiction between Roosevelt’s internal and external foreign policies – Wilsonianism at home and a Great Power consortium abroad – now surfaced. Just as they had underestimated Soviet security needs in Eastern Europe, the Americans now proceeded to overestimate the Soviet will to expand. The domino theory appeared – if one country falls under Soviet influence its neighbour will not be far behind – and Harriman in April 1945 declared before members of the State Department that Soviet plans to establish satellites constituted a major threat (Document 12, pp. 238–9). Once they had established them they would then set out to take over countries contiguous to them. Soviet demands for military bases in the Straits and a mandate in Libya seemed to provide substantial proof of the accuracy of this domino theory. Joseph C. Grew, the under secretary of state, saw what was happening in Eastern Europe as the harbinger of what would eventually happen throughout the rest of the world if the United States did not act to prevent it. He even regarded a war with the Soviet Union as inevitable. Henry Stimson, secretary for war, warned Harry Truman – who had succeeded to the presidency after Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945 – that the mounting economic chaos in Western and Central Europe would lead to political revolution and communist infiltration. By the summer of 1945 the voices advocating the ‘fulfilment’ of the Yalta agreement, no more concessions to the Soviets and the stabilisation of all countries in which there were no Soviet troops dominated US policy making. The death of Roosevelt and the accession to power of Truman – a selfconfessed amateur in foreign affairs – upset the balance between the internal and external components of American foreign policy. Although Truman was a Wilsonian he quickly adopted a ‘realistic’ approach, and in order to assert his authority he became very decisive. He had pledged to continue Roosevelt’s foreign policy but it was so complex that arguably only Roosevelt himself could have done that. Truman quickly adopted the view that the USSR needed the United States more than vice versa. In negotiations he did not expect to get 100 per cent of what he wanted but he felt that on ‘important matters’ the Americans ‘should be able to get 85 per cent’ (Truman 1955: 81–2).

Some of the fundamental reasons for the emergence of the Cold War emerged in 1945. 1

In 1945 it was American policy which changed, not Soviet. The United States tried to resolve the conflicts which arose in its own interests, on the whole. This caused the Soviet Union to concentrate on consolidating its position in Eastern Europe, but Moscow sought until the autumn of 1947 to reach agreement with the United States.

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The reason for the change in American policy was the behaviour of the USSR in Eastern Europe. The Americans underestimated the security needs of the Soviet Union and hence only succeeded in strengthening its desire to bolshevise the region. The single most important factor which led to more aggressive Soviet behaviour in the region was the atomic bomb. It could nullify Soviet conventional (non-nuclear) superiority at a stroke. American public opinion misjudged the Soviet Union, but it has to be remembered that the United States had gone to war in Europe to protect small countries against Nazi tyranny. It could not write off some countries merely because the USSR wanted close and friendly relations with them – something which was not possible in most of them if free elections were held. The Soviets feared the march of capitalism which in turn would almost certainly be accompanied by American imperialism. Hence they bolted the door because they could not compete on equal terms. The incompatibility of American and Soviet views had to surface sooner or later, but it was not pre-ordained that this should lead to a division of the world into blocs and that each side should feel threatened by the other. The economic expansion of the United States was inevitable, but it was not inevitable that the export of American capital and goods would be accompanied by American imperialism. Once American troops had pulled out of Western and Southern Europe, and assuming that Washington did not fear that the area would fall under communist control, there would be no reason for the United States to dominate this region. The prospects for a socialist Europe – more social democratic than communist – were in fact very bright in 1945 and 1946. The greater strength of the US political and economic system, compared to that of the USSR, afforded Washington greater opportunities to shape the post-war world. Had they so desired the Americans could have recognised the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, drawn the Soviets into joint control of atomic weapons and contributed to the reconstruction of the Soviet economy – thus redressing some of the imbalance. American decision makers misread Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe as proof of Soviet expansionism and refused to cooperate. This in turn led the Soviets to see US policy as aggressive capitalist expansionism and to harden their own attitude in their sphere of influence. A vicious circle thus came into being and it could not be broken after 1945. The formation of blocs became more and more pronounced (Loth 1980: 152). The plethora of views competing for primacy in the United States made it extremely difficult to elaborate a consistent policy. Washington was just not clear what its interests and policies should be at any given moment. This weakness was most marked when dealing with Germany, since there was no clear vision of its future. Given the confusion of views in the US administration, the Soviet government had a difficult task in judging whether American proposals were genuine or merely trial balloons. The crucial test they always applied was American willingness to allow them heavy

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Descriptive analysis reparations from Germany and other ex-enemy states. Molotov’s personality contributed to the mistrust between the former allies. His minatory stutter and stonewalling tactics infuriated many. He was very successful in holding on to Soviet gains but utterly failed to charm the Americans into trusting the Soviet Union. That said, he was severely taken to task by Stalin on occasions for appearing to be too friendly towards the United States. Stalin very jealously guarded his prerogative as chief foreign power decision maker and usually provided Molotov with very detailed guidelines. Hence the Western perception of Molotov as an obdurate negotiator (a less flattering sobriquet was ‘dome-headed zombie’) who was not willing to give an inch is not wholly correct. Had he had more leeway, he might have been more accommodating. This would only have been a tactic on his part as he was an imperialist to his fingertips. The motto: what we have we hold, we keep, certainly applied to him.

10 Decisions which led to division

Containment The doctrine of containment played a decisive role in American thinking about the developing East–West conflict. Its most articulate and persuasive progenitor was George F. Kennan, and its origins go back to the ‘Riga axioms’. Convinced that there could be no meaningful or long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union, Kennan found the tide of public and government opinion flowing against him until the contradictions inherent in Roosevelt’s grand design surfaced. He was always in favour of a ‘fully fledged and realistic showdown with the Soviet Union’ over Eastern Europe. He told Charles Bohlen in February 1945 that if the West was not willing to ‘go the whole hog’ to block the USSR, the only alternative was to split Germany, partition Europe into two spheres and decide the ‘line beyond which we cannot afford to permit the Russians to exercise unchallenged power or to take purely unilateral action’. Before Yalta he had favoured the division of the world into spheres of influence and a propaganda war against the USSR in the United States. What made Kennan’s analysis decisive was the decision by Freeman Matthews, head of the European division of the State Department, to choose him as the person to write a comprehensive appraisal of Soviet policy. Kennan’s famous ‘Long Telegram’ of 22 February 1946 (Document 18, pp. 245–7) is one of the most important documents of the post-war era. The suspiciousness and aggressiveness of the Soviet leadership stemmed, according to Kennan, from ‘basic inner Russian necessities’ and not from any ‘objective analysis of (the) situation beyond Russia’s borders’. He pointed out that the root cause of the Kremlin’s ‘neurotic view of world affairs’ was the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. This led Soviet leaders to go over to the offensive ‘in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction [of] rival power, never in compacts or compromises with it’ (Yergin 1980: 189). American concessions would not affect official Soviet aggressiveness: We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-12

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Descriptive analysis traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken if Soviet power is to be secure. (Yergin 1980: 169)

The Soviets would do all in their power to strengthen the socialist bloc and weaken the capitalist countries. Aided by communist parties directed by an underground general staff of world proportions and secretly coordinated from Moscow, they would seek to undermine the stronger Western powers and topple all those governments, from Turkey to Switzerland and Great Britain, which resisted Soviet demands. The Western nations must therefore draw together in a more cohesive bloc, led by the United States. Kennan’s analysis placed overwhelming emphasis on the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy formation. He also overestimated Moscow’s ability to dominate and manipulate foreign communist parties, as well as the influence of these parties in countries lacking a Red Army presence. Despite his awareness of Soviet economic weakness he was deeply pessimistic about the prospects for liberal capitalism in Europe and elsewhere. The weight he afforded ideology in his analysis of Soviet intentions led him to accord an inflexibility and singlemindedness to Moscow’s purposes which did not, in fact, exist. On the contrary, the USSR had revealed considerable suppleness in its policy. Kennan also omitted to draw a line between Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and the rest of Europe on the other. Afterwards he was to complain that he had been misunderstood, that he had not predicted that the Soviet Union would launch an all-out offensive to expand the number of countries under communist rule. A year later Kennan adopted the term ‘containment’ to describe his thinking, but again, in 1946, he did not make clear that it implied the division of Germany and of Europe into respective spheres of influence. Kennan’s Long Telegram was a devastating blow to the hopes and aspirations of Yalta. It was not new; it was a pungently expressed, intellectually coherent restatement of the old ‘Riga axioms’. It made Kennan influential, indeed famous, overnight. Byrnes thought the Long Telegram a ‘splendid analysis’; Matthews considered it ‘magnificent’. James Forrestal, secretary of the navy, so liked it that he had hundreds of copies made and dispatched them everywhere. Kennan was recalled from the US embassy in Moscow in April 1946 to support his views by personal advocacy in the administration and throughout the country. A media campaign was launched at the same time. Vandenberg articulated suspicion about Soviet intentions in the Senate; Byrnes made it clear that the United States would not tolerate any change in the status quo to its own disadvantage. Churchill, with President Truman present, delivered his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech (Document 19, pp. 247–8) at Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, and called for an American–British alliance to prevent Soviet expansion (but the US public gave the speech a cool reception; it was not ready yet for a ‘special relationship’). The American administration leaked enough information to Time magazine for it to publish on 1 April 1946 a full-page article, including a

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map which showed Iran, Turkey and Manchuria ‘infected’ and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan and India ‘exposed’. In Life magazine on 3 and 10 June 1946 John Foster Dulles warned against a Pax Sovietica, and called on Americans to show military resolve, to provide economic aid to the endangered regimes and to stand up to the Soviet Union. Kennan’s Long Telegram was the decisive factor in the Truman administration’s change of course to a policy of firmness towards the USSR. When Clark Clifford and George Elsey, a White House aide, were asked by Truman in July 1946 to prepare a detailed analysis of Soviet–American relations, the replies they received from officials were almost all along the lines of the Long Telegram. Clifford’s report, passed to the President on 24 September 1946, underlined the remarkable unanimity of views. There was general agreement that the very existence of the Soviet Union threatened the United States. America must therefore speak the language of military might and make the containment of the Soviet threat its primary aim throughout the world. ‘Stern policies’ should be adopted to protect American interests and those of small nations. Those countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence should be extended economic and political support in their struggle against Soviet penetration. Military support was not ruled out as a last resort, but economic aid, trade agreements and technical assistance would be a much more effective way of demonstrating the staying power of capitalism. Those who stressed the flexibility of the Soviet leaders and the possibility of reaching an agreement with them found their audience dwindling. The most significant voice was that of Henry Wallace, secretary of commerce. In a speech on 12 September 1946 he advocated the recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and warned that ‘the tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get’ (Document 22, pp. 250–1). Byrnes threatened resignation if Wallace did not go, and conservatives like Vandenberg applied all the pressure they could. Wallace had gone so far as to claim that the President agreed with the sentiments he had expressed in his speech, but the only effect of this was that Truman demanded Wallace’s resignation. There was no place in the administration now for anyone who had doubts about the new course in foreign policy. Why did the doctrine of containment spread like wildfire and exert such influence, given that it did not accurately reflect the realities of the time? There are five possible explanations (Loth 1980: 188–92). 1

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Churchill’s opinion that appeasement had prepared the way for Hitler and had permitted him to launch a world war was generally accepted. It was a short step from viewing Nazi Germany as totalitarian and expansionist to seeing the USSR in the same light. Both regimes had an internal need to expand and this was a direct threat to the national security of all other states. The West had deceived itself over Germany; it must not do the same over the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, the increase in American power had not been accompanied by a feeling of security – rather the reverse. Having earlier been caught off

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Descriptive analysis its guard by the totalitarian regimes, the United States was acutely aware of the risks to its security. The enormous expansion of its influence throughout the world meant that the potential for conflict had also increased. The obsolescence of all existing weapons due to swift technological change forced constant reappraisals of weapons programmes and of national security. Insecurity was increased due to fears of a recession after the war, fuelled by memories of the 1930s. Management and labour were seeking ways of avoiding another depression, and the state of health of the European market economies held out little hope. The Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and the widespread activities of communist parties, as well as the expected worldwide assault on the imperial powers by their colonial subjects, added more gloom. A possible solution, however, was the free flow of capital goods, entailing the elimination of tariff barriers and of all restrictive legislation. Wartime mobilisation had been remarkably successful in expanding output and enriching the United States. What was now needed was a peacetime equivalent which would inspire and motivate the American people. Without deliberately setting out to do so, Kennan provided the necessary rationale. The world war could be replaced by the cold war, thus allowing the US economy to benefit. The Second World War had given rise to a formidable military apparatus in the United States. The end of hostilities signalled the end of its raison d’être. It needed a powerful reason to reassert itself and this it discovered in the Soviet threat. The move to merge the army, air force and navy in one ministry at the end of the war led to them all fighting for their separate existence. Was it an accident that James Forrestal, secretary of the navy – the service most threatened by technical change – became one of the most militant proponents of the policy of containment?

11 The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

The year 1947 was a watershed in East–West relations. It was marked by two striking US initiatives, the Truman Doctrine which led naturally into the Marshall Plan. However, they were not what they seemed. The Truman Doctrine – the US would provide political, military and economic aid to all democratic nations facing an internal or external threat from communist forces – was to help Greece and Turkey to resist Soviet expansionism, but it was Yugoslavia which was aiding the Greek communists against Soviet advice. The Marshall Plan was to aid European recovery and, on paper, was a generous gesture. However, its real aim was to prevent communism spreading in Western Europe and to prove as a magnet to East European states. It had to be couched in such language as to ensure that Stalin would reject it for the Soviet Union. Truman started off 1947 in Baylor, Texas with a passionate speech for free trade throughout the world. He pointed out that protectionism and trade barriers had led to economic warfare in the inter-war years. Economics and politics were twins and free trade ensured peace. Germany needed a peace treaty and the Soviet Union and France agreed in principle but opposed in practice. Moscow wanted German reparations and France was afraid of a renascent German economy. British economic weakness was such that it could not long sustain its occupation of Germany and engage militarily against Greek communists. Truman delivered his speech on 12 March 1947 and sought to sound altruistic. Greece had asked for aid and would get it. Turkey had asked for aid and would get it. If Turkey were not helped ‘confusion and disorder would spread throughout the Middle East’. He argued that if America faltered in its leadership, it could endanger the peace of the planet. The reference to the Middle East was another example of the domino theory. If one country falls to communism, the others would quickly follow. Soviet domination could extend to India and the rest of Asia. Truman had been advised by Senator Vandenberg to scare the ‘hell’ out of the American people in order to get support. The speech was not well received in Europe where the supposition was that military action might be taken if the Soviets proved obdurate. At a congressional hearing Truman was asked about negotiating with the Soviets. ‘You cannot sit down with them’, was his retort. The foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow convened shortly afterwards and was doomed from the start. No progress was made on Germany but Stalin DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-13

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struck a conciliatory note. He told a US visitor that the Soviet Union and the US had cooperated during the war even though they had different economic systems. Why not now in peacetime? The President was warned that Western Europe was running out of money to pay for critical US imports. Within a year the region would be close to bankruptcy. France was desperate for German reparations and Britain was in dire economic straits. ‘The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate’, was George Marshall’s terse comment (Figure 2.2). There was also the danger that the US would lose markets and slide into recession. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal thought that recession would soon be a reality. France and Britain agreed that the Soviet Union should be excluded. The goal was to attract the East Europeans away from the Soviet embrace. European countries were to agree output targets. The aim was to promote European economic integration and this was sure to put off Moscow. Marshall’s speech on 5 June 1947 launched the European Recovery Programme but it was quickly dubbed the Marshall Plan. Novikov, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, told Stalin that the plan was another American attempt to subordinate the European countries to American capital. Its motives were clearly anti-Soviet. However, Novikov suggested it could be advantageous to turn up at the Paris conference and lay bare American motives. The Allies were surprised when Molotov turned up with an 89-person delegation. Molotov had a tight brief. The Soviet delegation was to object to any measure which infringed the sovereignty of European countries or meant their economic enslavement. A similar aid package as that extended to Greece and Turkey was quite unacceptable. The Soviets were to oppose German membership of the Marshall Plan. This would transfer the future of Germany away from the Allied Control Council on which the USSR had a veto. Molotov berated ‘dollar diplomacy’ and argued that the Plan involved an unacceptable level of intervention in the affairs of other states. A sticking point was that Molotov wanted bilateral agreements on aid, not a multinational approach. He left in a huff. His language was undiplomatic and he played right into the hands of the Americans. The East Europeans were told by the Soviets to leave. The Czechs showed some backbone, and in response Stalin ordered Jan Masaryk, the foreign minister, to Moscow and gave him a dressing down. This at a time when Czechoslovakia was not a member of the Soviet camp. Another country which was not permitted to participate was Finland, again technically not in the Soviet ambit. So Stalin ensured that Washington achieved its aim of excluding the Soviet Union. It was a great psychological victory for the West and began the process of binding these countries to the American chariot. This was particularly important as far as West Germany was concerned. Another important factor was that the US opened its market to European goods. There was considerable resistance to an integrated approach as most nations would have preferred bilateral agreements. The aid kick-started the West European recovery and in

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1948 it became clear that not all of the $17 billion on offer was needed. In total, by 1952, only $13 billion was disbursed. Chiang Kai-shek received only $3 billion. One can say that the Americans overestimated the appeal of communism in Europe but underestimated it in Asia. The Marshall Plan was a great economic success but there was a price to pay. It cut off Eastern Europe from the rest of Europe and ensured that the East was dependent on Moscow and the West on Washington. Moscow also ensured that its satellites did not participate in the Bretton Woods system – the IMF and World Bank. The Soviets hammered away at the imperialistic and monopoly capitalist goals of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. However, hostility to the Soviet Union was only one of the reasons for launching these initiatives. They permitted America to expand its political and economic influence into every corner of the world. Protecting the world from communism was a powerful message. It was even more powerful when dollars were attached. Another consequence of the policies was the tightening of Moscow’s grip on its satellites. Coalition governments were disbanded as non-communist members were purged. Stalin instructed communist parties in Western Europe to oppose the Marshall Plan. This cost the communists (PCF) many votes in France. However, there was a possibility that Italy would go communist in the general elections of April 1948. The communists (PCI) had 1.76 million members and were very influential in the north. Portraits of comrade Stalin adorned many buildings. Since the PCI received subventions from Moscow, the Americans were almost duty bound to support their friends. Washington threatened Italy that if it voted communist it would have its Marshall Plan aid cut off. About $10 million found its way to the ‘right’ people. It paid for literature, radio and anti-communist films. The British (MI6) supported the publication of Giovanni Guareschi’s stories about the priest Don Camillo and his battles with the local communist mayor, known as Peppone. Many of them are very humorous and relate how the wily cleric outwits communists. The Vatican launched a campaign to defend the country from atheistic communism. Those who favoured the communists would be excommunicated. A letter-writing blitz urging their relatives to vote for the Christian Democrats was launched by Italian Americans. Italians were warned if they voted communist they would be denied entry to the US. A communist victory would mean Italians would be carted off to the gulag in the Soviet Union! Frank Sinatra and Gary Cooper, among others, weighed in. As an added incentive the Americans replaced the gold which the Germans had stolen, ensured the return of merchant ships seized during the war and wrote off $1 billion of debt. The Christian Democrats won hands down (Alexander, 2011: 119–28). The new challenges led to the passing of the National Security Act in 1947. Two of the most important institutions which emerged from this act were the National Security Council – to advise the President – and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The latter had a worldwide remit. It cut its teeth in the Italian election campaign.

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On the Soviet side, the Information Committee (KI) was established in late 1947. It was put together from parts of the Ministry of State Security and military intelligence (GRU). Its remit covered foreign states.

12 The Soviet response

The Marshall Plan was a terrible setback for Stalin. It meant that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would have to recover from the war without any foreign capital. The vozhd had already warned the Soviet population in a speech to an electoral meeting on 9 February 1946 (Document 17, pp. 244–5) that the future was to be one of hardship. However, it is not accurate to say that the USSR did not receive any help to rebuild its economy. The armed services were cut from 11 million to 3.9 million between 1945 and 1947. Direct military expenditure dropped from 54.3 per cent of the budget in 1945 to 18 per cent in 1947. Tank production was then trebled, as was artillery. To compensate for the catastrophic wartime losses, the Soviet Union took a huge amount of reparations from Eastern Europe. In 1945, over 400,000 railway wagons moved eastwards, half to the USSR and the other half to provision the Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe. Over 5,500 complete enterprises were shipped east. Vast quantities of capital goods and raw materials moved in the same direction. The Soviet zone of Germany was stripped bare, much to the chagrin of the local communists. The Soviet Union suffered a severe drought in 1946 and famine during the 1947 winter. A Ukrainian communist told me his family only survived by secreting away black beans. The situation was made worse by Stalin exporting grain to pay for machinery imports. About 2.5 million tonnes went to Eastern Europe to stave off famine. The situation was also critical in France and Italy, which were facing famine due to lack of dollars. US exports were declining to less than pre-war levels. Traditionally 75 per cent of US food exports went to Europe. However, the US was already providing large amounts of foreign aid – emergency relief – not only to Europe but also to China, the Philippines, Turkey, Latin America and elsewhere. The economic recovery plan came with strings. Governments had to balance their budgets, maintain stable rates of exchange, reduce trade barriers, dismantle cartels, prevent monopolies emerging and grant US companies favourable access to their markets. It was a ‘you help me and I’ll help you’ approach. This was the only way the American public would buy into the programme. It was sold as a good business deal. One of the reasons why Stalin rejected Marshall aid was that he envisaged the US falling into recession in the near future. Then the Americans would DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-14

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come begging for contracts as they had after 1929. He also had the option of ordering Western communist parties to go on the offensive. This would promote economic and social chaos. He judged that the time for this was not opportune because right-wing or military dictators might emerge who would try to liquidate the communist parties. So he told the French, Italian, Norwegian, Finnish and other communists to calm down and wait for more propitious circumstances (Haslam 2011: 91–4). Greece was a test case. The partisans, led by the communists, had an opportunity to take power. Only British military intervention was preventing this. Stalin had agreed with Churchill in October 1944 that Greece belonged to the Western camp. However, Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists were keen to intervene and turn the tide. Stalin was cool-headed. If the partisans were going to win they could be helped. However, this might lead to increased Western military intervention. The US wanted naval bases in the Eastern Mediterranean, for instance. Washington could not allow Greece to fall to the communists as it would, as Truman had pointed out, have a domino effect. Communism would be on the march again. Stalin held back and told the Balkan communists to wait for a more favourable opportunity to intervene on the Greek communist side.

The Cominform Belgrade proposed a conference of communist parties in 1945 and the idea was discussed again in June 1946. It became an urgent priority in 1947, and Andrei Zhdanov was given the task of organising a meeting. In August 1947 the Soviet delegation had its instructions. The ‘task of democratic organisation in the struggle against attempts by American imperialism to enslave economically the countries of Europe [Marshall Plan]’ was the first item on the agenda. However, it was kept secret from the delegates. The unsuspecting delegates arrived at Szklarska Poreba, in Polish Silesia (until May 1945 Schreiberschau, Germany) in September 1947 to find that they were setting up the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). At the top table sat Zhdanov and Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov together with Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslavs. Gomułka, the host, opened proceedings and talked about the Polish road to social change. He pointed out that his party had no intention of setting up collective farms. He omitted any mention of the Red Army’s battles to drive out the Wehrmacht. Poland was treated well by Moscow and had been granted a $450 million credit after turning down the Marshall Plan. Kardelj was encouraged to launch a fierce attack on the PCF and PCI and accused them of not attempting to seize power. What the Yugoslavs did not know was that Stalin did not want another Greek insurrection. He was also cross with the Yugoslavs for proposing a Balkan federation. The Yugoslavs became very unpopular at the conference and no Yugoslav was elected to the Cominform committee. It is interesting that the East German communists (SED) were not invited to participate.

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At Szklarska Poreba the Czechs and Slovaks were pilloried for their lack of revolutionary ardour. That was corrected on 25 February 1948 when the communists took over. The Soviets now controlled Eastern Europe.

Tito expelled Soviet troops left Yugoslavia after helping to liberate it from German and Italian control. They moved on to Hungary and elsewhere. This permitted the Yugoslav communists a free hand in administering the country. Josip Broz Tito was an ardent admirer of Stalin. He favoured moving quickly to a socialist economy at a time when Stalin favoured a slow approach. On 17 March 1948, the Treaty of Brussels, signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, established the Western European Union. It contained a mutual defence clause and was intended to provide a bulwark against communist aggression. The Soviets read this as the creation of a Western bloc under the leadership of Washington. The response was to bind the satellite states more closely to Moscow. Stalin decided the partisans in Greece could not win and wanted to walk away. The Yugoslavs took a different view and continued to back the partisans secretly. This was leaked to Moscow by a Yugoslav Politburo member who was a Soviet spy. Tito intended to send a division of troops to Albania to protect it from reprisals for aiding the insurgents. He labelled Molotov’s latest reprimand ‘quite uncouth’. The Soviets were used to being lauded as the saviours of mankind and did not take kindly to the Yugoslav downgrading of their contribution to Yugoslavia’s liberation (Haslam 2011: 98–100). Stalin thought he had only to ‘wag his little finger’ to remove him and replace him with a more loyal party leader. On 18 and 19 March he announced that all Soviet economic and military advisers would be withdrawn from Yugoslavia. However, a large majority of Yugoslavs remained loyal to Tito and Soviet supporters were arrested. An acerbic correspondence ensued during which Tito categorically rejected the accusations hurled at him by Moscow. He repeatedly underlined his loyalty to the socialist camp. It all availed him nothing and the Cominform, meeting in Bucharest, expelled Yugoslavia on 28 June 1948 on the grounds that Tito had fallen victim to ‘bourgeois nationalism’. Tito had been invited to attend the meeting in person but had decided that it was wiser to stay at home. The other socialist states then tore up their trade and friendship treaties with Belgrade and broke off diplomatic relations. They also announced an economic blockade and called on the Yugoslavs to remove the ‘fascist Tito clique’ and the ‘hangman of the Yugoslav people’. A consequence of this was that a witch hunt ensued to remove ‘Titoists’ elsewhere in the region. The first show trial was that of Laszlo Rajk, the Hungarian communist politician. He was executed in October 1948. Another was Traicho Kostov, a leading Bulgarian communist. He was hanged in December 1949. The main criterion of a Titoist was a comrade whose total allegiance to the Soviet Union

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was doubted. It also included those who had favoured a national road to socialism or a more rapid move to a planned economy. Fortunately for Belgrade, Washington overcame its aversion to communists, and provided vital economic aid. Without it Yugoslavia would have collapsed and become Stalin’s lapdog. On reflection, Stalin had committed another diplomatic blunder. Tito was a loyalist but the Boss thought that he had to be brought to heel instead of massaging his ego and keeping him in the socialist camp. He was clearly misled about Soviet support in Yugoslavia. Stalin did not want a continuation of the Greek civil war once he had decided the communists could not win. Yugoslav intervention could result in further Western military aid. The Truman Doctrine made this palpably clear. Likewise, he warned the Italian communists not to entertain thoughts of an insurrection after the 1948 general elections.

The Berlin Blockade Stalin believed that Germany would go communist in the long term. In the short term, various strategies had to be deployed to outbid the British, the Americans and the French in the Western zones. He even floated the idea of setting up a National Democratic Party in the Soviet zone for former fascists. It would attract former military men and those from the middle class. It came into being in August 1948 and actually had fewer former Nazis as members than the communist (SED) party. One former SS officer almost made it onto the SED Central Committee! Stalin was playing the German nationalist card. After the failure of the London conference of foreign ministers (November– December 1947) to agree on Germany, the Americans declared the end of reparations from the Western zones to the Soviet Union. On 15 March Washington announced an embargo on strategic goods to the Soviet Union and required all recipients of Marshall Plan aid to do the same. On 20 March, Marshal Sokolovsky walked out of the Allied Control Council. It thereupon ceased to function. The Soviets began to restrict access to West Berlin by rail even for Allied military personnel. They regarded an air bridge to Berlin as too expensive. A currency reform was needed to overcome the reluctance of traders to accept the Reichsmark. One of the reasons was the rapid inflation due to the Soviets printing large amounts of the currency in their zone. When the currency project was discussed in the Allied Control Council the Soviets opposed it. They divined that it was a ploy to set up a separate West German state tied to the West. Representatives of the United States and other interested European states met in London on 23 February 1948 and discussed the administration of the three Western occupation zones. They agreed on the ‘London recommendations’ (7 June) which proposed that the heads of government of the West German Länder immediately convene an assembly to draft a constitution. The French National Assembly passed the recommendations on 17 June, by a small majority, due to French demands for the internationalisation of the Ruhr not being met. They also complained that the balance of power between the centre and the Länder was being left to the Germans to decide.

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On 18 June, Marshal Sokolovsky was informed by letter that a currency reform would be launched in the Western zones. It was introduced the same day and the Deutsche Mark (DM) replaced the Reichsmark. Citizens were issued with a certain amount of DM and there was considerable nervousness about whether they would accept the new paper. Overnight the shops put goods on sale and it was a roaring success. On 19 June the Soviets closed the autobahn and almost stopped the reduced railway traffic. On 22 June the Americans began to airlift supplies to their garrison in West Berlin (Figure 12.1). Three days later the RAF followed suit. Power and coal supplies were cut off but not drinking water. Sokolovsky was convinced the city could not be provisioned from the air and advised against making concessions. The price for lifting the blockade? Cancel the currency reform. A tentative agreement was reached to end the blockade in early August but the Soviet Union and the Allies disagreed about its practicalities. A new airport was built in the French sector at Tegel and at one time a plane landed every minute in West Berlin. They kept the Soviet garrison awake as

Figure 12.1 An American aircraft drops food and supplies near a crowd of Berliners during the blockade of Berlin. Source: © World History Archive/Alamy.

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they roared overhead. The blockade was lifted on 12 May and by then 278,000 sorties had ferried over 2.3 million tons of supplies, an extraordinary achievement. General Lucius Clay, the US military governor, regarded Moscow as a paper tiger and consistently called for tanks to break through the autobahn barriers. Aneurin Bevan, the left-wing Labour politician, wanted to call the Soviets’ bluff by sending an armoured column along one of the blocked roads. In the summer and autumn of 1947 rumours spread in East Germany about the introduction of a new zonal currency. This alarmed the Americans who feared that if this happened without a commensurate currency reform in the West, the useless eastern marks would flood Western Germany. The Americans printed large amounts of the DM and waited to launch the currency the day the Soviets introduced the new east mark. As it turned out the Americans went first and the Soviets were forced to follow. Berlin was a problem. Which currency should be legal there? The Americans printed two tons of Deutsche Mark notes – 250 million marks – and put a B on each note. The Soviets declared it an illegal currency which would not be legal tender in East Berlin or the Eastern zone. A German who accepted this was a traitor to German unity! This fuelled a black market and the exchange rate dropped to 30 East Marks to 1 Western Mark (Parrish 1998: 165–7). A Parliamentary Council composed of representatives of the West German parties met from September 1948 to May 1949 and drafted a Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the new republic. The first parliament, the Bundestag, convened in August 1949 and the government took office in September. The conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union – the name of the party in Bavaria – narrowly defeated the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Konrad Adenauer became Chancellor. The name of the new state was the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland) and thus claimed to speak for the whole of Germany. The Soviets responded by founding the German Democratic Republic on 7 October 1949. Again it was to represent all Germans. President Truman had opposed all those who wanted to plan for war against the Soviet Union. The blockade changed his mind. By July 1948 the Americans had 50 atomic bombs. On 28 July the joint chiefs of staff were instructed to plan for an atomic offensive and on 16 September Truman approved the use of the bomb. A directive on 23 November foresaw a war to remove communist control of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The following month plans to hit 70 Soviet cities with 133 atomic bombs were ready. Insecurity reigned in Western Europe and it was a short step from the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan to the setting up of a common defence alliance. General ‘Pug’ Ismay, the first NATO secretary general, said the idea of the pact was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. Vital to this development was the re-election of Truman in November 1948. His Republican opponent, Thomas E. Dewey, might have moved towards isolationism. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 (Document 28, pp. 255–6) (Kennan and Bohlen regarded it as a mistake

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and Truman thought it a gamble) and this developed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Article 5 is of significance. An attack on a NATO member was perceived as an attack on all. The explosion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in August 1949 revealed that American defence thinking was defective since it was based on the other side not possessing nuclear weapons. A massive build-up of US conventional forces was the result. The Soviet Union responded by founding the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) in 1949, and its answer to NATO, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955. The blockade was probably Stalin’s greatest diplomatic mistake. The longer it lasted the greater opposition to communism grew. It also banished doubts about the advisability of setting up a West German state. So why did Stalin allow it to last so long? Surely he should have cut his losses when it became clear that the air bridge was provisioning West Berlin? One can only guess at his reasons but several suggest themselves. The military advice he received stated that the air bridge could not succeed. He had other pressing problems to consider. Tito was expelled from the Cominform in June 1948 and the hunt for Titoists began throughout Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Show trials were being prepared. In the Soviet Union the Leningrad affair was under way and resulted in six death sentences and exile for thousands of Leningraders. Stalin suffered bouts of ill health and a British diplomat told me that he was ill-prepared at some meetings. This was quite unlike the vozhd who prepared for meetings meticulously.

13 Espionage

Political The National Security Agency’s (NSA) predecessors began to collect enciphered Soviet telegrams in 1939, but paid little attention to them as Japanese and German codes were more important. In 1942, success in deciphering Japanese codes between Tokyo and its military attachés in Berlin and Helsinki led to intriguing information. Finland, an ally of Germany from 1941 to 1944, had been working on Soviet codes and had passed on this information to the Japanese. In 1943, US military intelligence heard rumours of Soviet–German peace negotiations and began attempting to read Soviet telegrams. Only in 1946 were the first Soviet telegrams decoded, and what they revealed shocked the Americans as the information was not about diplomacy but about economic and military espionage. They were not sent by diplomats to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in Moscow, but between intelligence officers and General Pavil Fitin, head of the First Directorate, foreign intelligence, of the NKGB (secret police), in Moscow. By 1948, it was clear that Soviet intelligence had penetrated almost all major government agencies of military, economic and diplomatic importance. Large numbers of Soviet agents, aided by hundreds of Americans, many of whom were members of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), had passed on to Moscow masses of valuable information. The Venona project identified 349 citizens who had a covert connection with Soviet intelligence. Since only a part of the cipher cache was decoded, it is reasonable to assume that many more agents went undetected. The US, the UK and the Soviet Union became military allies in 1942, and Moscow became the main recipient of Lend-Lease. Washington invited the Soviets to expand their diplomatic presence and to set up special offices to handle Lend-Lease. Thousands of Soviet military officers and engineers travelled to the US to choose weapons, machinery, vehicles (over 400,000 American trucks were sent) and aircraft, and Soviet personnel had to be trained to use and maintain the American equipment. Entire Soviet naval crews arrived to be trained to handle US combat and cargo ships en route to the Soviet Union. This provided the opportunity to infiltrate large numbers of NKGB, GRU (military intelligence) and Navy GRU (naval intelligence) officers whose tasks included DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-15

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monitoring other Soviet personnel and spying. They quickly established contact with some members of the CPUSA and pro-Soviet sympathisers and became astonishingly successful in acquiring a huge quantity of what is now termed intellectual property (Haynes and Klehr 2000: 20–1). The Great Depression, which began in 1929, ended the Keynesian dream of rising prosperity and the bright young things of the University of Cambridge began looking elsewhere for a solution to the economic crisis. Marxism took hold of Trinity College and the Marxist economist Maurice Dobb soon converted Kim Philby. Donald Maclean (he attended Trinity Hall), Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross joined and they were dubbed the Magnificent Five by Moscow. The talent spotter was James Klugman, who was a CPGB functionary, and had spent time at Mao’s base camp at Yan’an and was to play a decisive role in convincing Churchill to support Tito and the communist partisans in Yugoslavia. The most successful recruiter of communist agents was Arnold Deutsch, a hugely academically talented Austrian Jew who was credited with 20 agents. He moved to England in 1934, where his brother Oscar had founded the successful cinema chain Odeon (an acronym for Oscar Deutsch Entertains Our Nation) and rented a flat in Lawn Road, Hampstead, where his neighbours included Walter Gropius and Agatha Christie. Donald Maclean, now in the Foreign Office, when introduced, was very impressed by him. Deutsch mentioned that the goal was a new world order which would free the human race from exploitation and alienation. Deutsch, in recruiting an agent, sought four characteristics: ‘an inherent class resentfulness; a predilection for secretiveness; a yearning to belong and an infantile appetite for praise and reassurance’ (Phillips 2018: 54). Maclean had weekly meetings with his handler and handed over documents from his bulging suitcase. In 1937, Deutsch was recalled to Moscow and never returned, presumably a victim of the Terror. The Soviet withdrawal from the Winter War in Finland, in 1940, may have been linked to information supplied to Moscow about an Anglo–French plan to intervene militarily. The Soviets left in such a haste that half-burnt code books were left behind. Years later, these helped the Americans identify Maclean as a Soviet agent. During 1941, Maclean supplied 4,419 documents and Cairncross came second with 3,449. Cairncross’s intercepts of German material from his position at the Government Code and Cypher School, at Bletchley Park, was of great value to the Red Army before the battle of Kursk. Anthony Blunt, assistant to Guy Liddell of MI5, passed on 1,771 documents, some of them originals, to Moscow. So rich was the treasure trove of material that Moscow began to suspect that the Magnificent Five were double agents. Correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt was also copied to Moscow, and intelligence on British plans for the Balkans and the desire of the US to have minimum involvement in European politics. Stalin commented: ‘Churchill is the kind of man who will pick your pocket for a kopek if you don’t watch him … . Roosevelt … dips in his hand only for bigger coins’. Stalin had the advantage in the next negotiations: ‘yesterday H learnt of a change in plans’. When Churchill, Roosevelt and

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Mackenzie King met in Quebec, in August 1943, Stalin was supplied with the minutes of the meeting, informing him about Lend-Lease, the Pacific War, the Morgenthau plan to deindustrialise Germany, and Greece (Phillips 2018: 147, 150). Maclean favoured the communists taking over in Greece and was bitterly disappointed when Moscow did not intervene. He informed Moscow that Washington had conceded that if Molotov stood his ground on policies, it would give in. Stalin knew the West’s agenda at Yalta and Potsdam and came away as the victor. On 4 September 1945, Konstantin Volkov, the Soviet vice-consul in Istanbul and deputy head of the NKGB in Turkey, entered the British consulate and stated that the Soviets had two agents in the Foreign Office and seven inside British intelligence, including the head of counter-intelligence. In his suitcase, in Moscow, were the names of 314 Soviet agents in Turkey and 250 in the UK and he wanted asylum and £50,000 pounds for the information. Philby realised immediately that the two agents in the Foreign Office were Maclean and Burgess and the head of counter-intelligence was none other than himself. Philby suggested he go to Istanbul as the officer chosen would not fly and would travel there by sea. As Philby had already alerted the Soviets, two agents arrived before Philby to drug Volkov and his wife and take them back to Moscow. A close shave. On 5 September 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a GRU cipher clerk, put 109 documents inside his shirt and left the Soviet embassy to contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and defect. As he did not speak English, he was sent on his way and then made for the Ottawa Journal, but his nerve failed when it occurred to him that the paper would have NKGB moles on the staff, and he fled and disconsolately returned home. His wife told him to try again but the night editor had gone home. He tried the Journal the next morning, but it showed no interest and he then went to the Ministry of Justice, but they understood he wanted to acquire Canadian citizenship which would take months. When he returned home, he found Soviet agents ransacking his flat looking for the documents, whereupon Gouzenko, his wife and young son clambered over the balcony into the next door flat where a Royal Canadian Air Force sergeant lived, and the Soviets then began banging on his door. When the police arrived, they found the Soviets ransacking the flat and the matter then went to Prime Minister Mackenzie King. Why was Gouzenko living outside the Soviet compound? His baby son cried so incessantly that no one could sleep at night and the other staff requested he and his family move elsewhere. Mackenzie King travelled to Washington to inform the President, and the FBI’s director J. Edgar Hoover sent two agents to Ottawa to question Gouzenko. The information in the documents led to the Canadian authorities breaking up several GRU networks, sacking some government employees and imprisoning five Soviet spies, including Fred Rose (né Rosenberg), born in Lublin, Poland, and a member of the Communist Party of Canada and a Member of Parliament. It was also clear that Alan Nunn May, a brilliant scientist working at the Chalk River establishment in Ontario since January 1943, had been passing on atomic secrets to the Soviets. He had also been at Trinity Hall at

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the same time as Maclean and presumably had imbibed his Marxism there. The public did not learn about the Gouzenko case until later because President Truman and Prime Minister King decided that a spy scandal would damage the delicate relations with the Soviet Union. When Drew Pearson of NBC discovered the spy story in February 1946, it became an overnight sensation. Joseph E. Davies, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote in the New York Times that same month that the Soviet Union ‘in self-defense has every moral right to seek atom bomb secrets through military espionage if excluded from such information by her former fighting allies’. Then came Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in March 1946, and the dream of a partnership with the Soviet Union to preserve peace in the world faded, but many Americans found it hard to let go of that dream. The speech was not well received by many and the New York Times commented that it presented a ‘dark picture of post-war Europe’. Truman and Churchill travelled by train to Jefferson City, en route to Fulton, Missouri, where the speech was to be delivered, and played poker all the way with Truman winning every time. Nunn May confessed and was sentenced to ten years in prison (Haynes and Klehr 2000: 168; Phillips 2018: 170–3). No hit squad ever located Gouzenko. Elizabeth Bentley, a vivacious blonde, codenamed Helen (of Troy) and a member of the US establishment, first of all was attracted to fascism In Italy during her studies there, then became disillusioned and moved to the opposite end of the spectrum, communism. She began working for the US Shipping and Service Corporation, a Comintern front organisation, and acted as a courier, carrying microfilm in her knitting bag. In August 1945, she entered the FBI offices in New York and informed them about the real activities of the Corporation and its affiliate, Global Tourist. The FBI immediately spotted about 30 agents, one of which was Alger Hiss, a high flyer in the US State Department. Bentley gave evidence to the House Un-American Activities Committee on several occasions and became a celebrity on the lecture circuit. Moscow Centre thought several times of liquidating her but concluded that it would be too risky. The information she gave almost ensnared Donald Maclean, the star of the British Embassy in Washington. His duties including reading all cable traffic and embassy security, and he handled the negotiations for British bases in the Atlantic and Pacific which were to be leased to the Americans as part of the huge British war debt, but something puzzled the US negotiators. How was it possible for the Soviets to publish information on every base under discussion? Maclean informed Moscow that the US was buying 2,547 tons of uranium (mainly from the Belgian Congo) in 1947–8, and this made it possible to calculate that the US would have about 50 atomic bombs in 1948; he also forwarded a day-to-day account and the minutes when NATO was being formed (Phillips 2018: 174–7, 190, 202). Maclean and Burgess were tipped off by Philby that the game was up and escaped to the Soviet Union, in 1951. Philby, who had begun spying for the Soviet Union in 1934, was never formally charged because there was not enough evidence to convict him. He was allowed to defect to the Soviet Union in 1963,

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while in Beirut. Anthony Blunt confessed in 1964 and was granted immunity from prosecution and not charged, but this information remained secret until 1979, and John Cairncross confessed in 1951, but this was not made public until 1990. It is possible there were several other Soviet spies in the Cambridge circle, but they remain undetected. The Magnificent Five caused enormous damage to Western intelligence but the UK owes a huge cultural debt to them. They ‘changed the country beyond all recognition by wrecking the smug assumptions of the post-war ruling class, shaking the intelligence community to its foundations and ushering in a new world: less comfortable and complacent and above all, less clubby’ (Macintyre 2015). The establishment was deeply shocked, often unwilling to believe that men born to privilege, educated at public schools and Cambridge could be traitors. Class protected them from suspicion. Philby described the ‘genuine mental block that stubbornly resisted the belief that respected members of the establishment could do such things’. He understood this mentality and exploited it ruthlessly and the archives reveal the slow realisation that the service ‘had fallen victim to its own ingrained assumptions about class, background, education and social status’. The scandal did much to undermine deference to wealth, accent and privilege. The Magnificent Five accidentally made the UK a more egalitarian country. The best symbol of the transformation wrought by the Cambridge spies is James Bond himself. Ian Fleming was a clubman but 007 is not. While ‘M’ takes Bond to lunch at the fictional Blades club, Bond is not a member. An orphan at 11, Bond has no father to ease him into the right clubs and he is classless and independent, and this stands out in Spectre, the 2015 film, where he defends the establishment but is outside it and, as such, he becomes the perfect post-war spy. (The Times, 23 October 2015) The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was set up on 13 June 1942 and headed by ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan to provide mainly intelligence about Germany. As there was an urgent need for information about the Soviet Union, a Research and Analysis Division was set up staffed by many prominent academics, including leading Marxists such as Paul Sweezy, Franz Neumann and Herbert Marcuse. They correctly predicted that the Wehrmacht could not win at Stalingrad because of the insuperable logistical problems, and they foresaw the looming problem of dealing with the Soviet Union after the war. It was held that the USSR was a growing power, the US a satisfied power and the UK a declining power. Concessions to Moscow should be made to ensure peaceful coexistence. One of the best sources turned out to be the Japanese ambassador, in Berlin, whose dispatches to Tokyo were decoded by Bletchley Park (of Enigma fame). He reported that Stalingrad was the greatest German defeat since Napoleon had crushed the Prussian army at Jena, in 1806. At the end of the war, thoughts turned to acquiring the Wehrmacht’s intelligence network on the eastern front. Lt. Colonel Richard Gehlen, senior intelligence

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officer of the Wehrmacht in the east, was held to be a star but he was no more successful at predicting the next Red Army attack than the General Staff. The reason why his star rose was his ability to recruit agents behind enemy lines who provided valuable information which influenced how military units were deployed. It transpired that he was brilliantly misled by Soviet intelligence and Aleksandr Demyanov was one of his key agents who fed him information, some of which was authorised by Stalin himself. He reported, for instance, railway sabotage near Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) and newspapers duly reported this canard. Some of the Red Army information was accurate but the Soviets were willing to make sacrifices in order to make greater gains later. Gehlen concluded that Germany would be defeated, and the next great struggle would be between the Soviet Union and the United States; and after Germany’s defeat he offered the Americans his archive and they welcomed him with open arms. This delighted the Soviets as they had controlled most of his sources (Hastings 2009: 223–38, 544–5). When the CIA was set up on 18 September 1947, it inherited most of this material. By 1948, the CIA was disbursing $1.5 million ($16 million in 2019 prices) to Gehlen to reward his spies and informants in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The CIA sent money, equipment and arms to an anti-communist resistance group in Poland, but it transpired it was a Soviet intelligence front organisation. Anti-communist Lithuanians, Estonians and Armenians were parachuted into their homelands by British and American planes and Ukrainians with radio equipment. Nothing was ever heard of them again (Macintyre 2015: 133–6). Why not? Philby had relayed the exact locations of entry to Moscow Centre. Whittaker Chambers joined the CPUSA in 1925, and was a Soviet spy from 1932 to 1938 when he opted out. On 2 September 1939, he met assistant secretary of state Adolf Berle and provided him with the names of mid-government officials who were secret communists or members of the CPUSA, and the names of people outside government who were supporters of the CPUSA. He implied that some of those names could be Soviet agents. Those he named included Alger Hiss, a mid-level US State Department official; Laurence Duggan, head of the US State Department Division which supervised diplomatic relations with Central and South America; Frank Coe, a Treasury official; Lauchlin Currie, recently brought into the White House as a senior aide to President Roosevelt; and Harry Dexter White, assistant secretary of the Treasury. Among others named were Noel Field, a US State Department official in the 1930s. Berle did not inform the FBI when it interviewed him in 1942, his notes were handed over in 1943, but no action was taken. Maurice Halperin was a Latin American specialist and in 1941, already a member of the CPUSA, he joined what later became the research division of the OSS and became head of the Latin American Research and Analysis Division. As he had access to the OSS cable room, he could read secret reports from any part of the world, and supplied the Soviets with copious information which included the Polish government in exile’s attitude on negotiations with Stalin, reports on peace feelers by Germans relayed through the Vatican, on Tito’s

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activities in Yugoslavia, and on discussions between the Greek government and the US. Halperin stayed with the OSS until it was dissolved in 1945, and then moved to the US State Department and worked on Latin American affairs but resigned in 1946, probably warned that his cover was about to be blown. In 1953, when head of Latin American studies at Boston University, the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee requested he testify but he refused, citing the Fifth Amendment, but informed the university he was not a member of the CPUSA. Requested again to answer question, he and his family moved to Mexico and, in 1958, to Moscow. He became disillusioned with Soviet communism, moved to Cuba in 1962, and was again disappointed by developments, finally moving to Simon Fraser University in British Columbia. He always denied that he had been a communist and Soviet spy, but the Venona transcripts confirm the evidence. Duncan Lee was a member of the American establishment, graduated in law from Yale and studied at the University of Oxford, where he may have converted to communism. He joined OSS and worked in China where he had lived with his missionary parents until the age of 12. In 1941 he was a legal adviser to the Russian War Relief Fund, and in 1942 he was elected to the executive board of the China Aid Council which channelled aid to organisations linked to the Communist Party of China. He provided his Soviet contact with information, always orally, on the activities of the OSS in Europe, and identified OSS contacts in various countries as well as OSS agents being parachuted into Hungary – the Sparrow mission, in order to persuade Hungary to surrender to the Allies – in late 1944. The FBI never discovered that he and wife had honeymooned in Moscow. He left the US in the early 1950s. Harold Glasser was an economist and member of the CPUSA underground in 1937, rose to be assistant director of the Division of Monetary Research, US Treasury, and was sent to Ecuador in 1940 as chief American adviser to the government. During the war he occupied important positions such as economic adviser to the American forces in North Africa; vice-chair of the War Production Board; and Treasury representative to the Allied High Commission in Italy. After the war he became economic adviser to the US delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in 1947; and assistant director of the Treasury’s Office of International Finance, but then resigned. Among information passed to his Soviet handler was a US State Department assessment of Soviet war losses and an OSS report on the movement of Nazi gold through Swiss banks. There was a communist cell in the US Treasury which promoted fellow communists, among whom was Frank Coe, and the key person was Harry Dexter White, director of the Division of Monetary Research and later assistant secretary of the Treasury. In 1941, the Treasury’s investigative arm identified Glasser as being involved in communist activities and the report was sent to White, who ensured that nothing happened. George Silverman, an economist, was active in the CPUSA underground in the 1930s, and in 1942 became civilian head of analysis and plans in the office of the assistant chief of the Army Air Force Staff for Material and Service. This

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permitted him to pass on information about US aircraft production and the training of air crews, among other things. White protected Silverman when he came under investigation. Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss were the highest placed Soviet agents in the US government (when Hiss was found guilty of perjury, in January 1950, Dean Rusk, later to be secretary of state under presidents Kennedy and Johnson, held him in high regard and declared: ‘I should like to make it clear to you that whatever the outcome of any appeal … I do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss’ (Koster 2019: 234). And then came Lauchlin Currie. He was a Scot from Nova Scotia, who studied at the London School of Economics and obtained a doctorate in economics at Harvard and became a US citizen in 1934. He then joined Harry Dexter White at the Treasury and later moved to the Federal Reserve Board. In 1939 he joined the White House staff as senior administrative assistant to the President. In 1942, Roosevelt sent Currie to China as head of the US economic mission to the Nationalist government and, in 1943, he became head of the Foreign Economic Administration. His links to the Washington communist underground began in the mid-1930s. He did not join the CPUSA but provided oral reports and documents which were then passed on. One important piece of intelligence was that Roosevelt was willing to accept the Soviet Union’s demand that it retain the part of Poland acquired in the Nazi–Soviet Pact and that the President would put pressure on the Polish government in exile to accept this. In 1948, Currie appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and stated that he had no reason to supect that Silverman, Coe and Glasser were communists but they were close friends. Under pressure, he moved to Colombia in 1950 and later renounced his US citizenship (Haynes and Klehr 2000: 100–8, 125–50).

Military and industrial Alger Hiss was the most famous GRU (Soviet military intelligence) agent and was a member of the CPUSA-GRU network, managed by Whittaker Chambers. He became a senior assistant to the Secretary of State and part of the US delegation at Yalta, was head of the US State Department’s Office of Special Political Affairs which supervised UN diplomacy, and presided at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco. He left the State Department in 1950 because of mounting evidence that he was a Soviet spy. Whittaker Chambers told the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1948 that Hiss had been a member of a communist group but did not state that he was a Soviet spy. Hiss denied that he was a communist and had never met Chambers. Chambers repeated the accusations on TV and Hiss sued. At the trial, Chambers was challenged for evidence that Hiss was a communist and then produced four sheets of paper in Hiss’s handwriting summarising US State Department information, 65 pages of copies of confidential State Department affairs and two microfilms of State Department documents, dated 1938. This did not prove that Hiss was a communist but did indicate that he had been a spy. The statute

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of limitations prevented a charge of espionage and he was sentenced to three and a half years for perjury. Oleg Gordievsky asserted that Hiss passed information to the GRU, in the 1940s. A Venona transcript states that Hiss only worked on obtaining military information and, it transpired, he had had access to top secret reports on atomic energy and other matters relating to military intelligence. After the Yalta conference, Hiss flew to Moscow and, according to one source, was thanked by Andrei Vyshinsky, deputy commissar for foreign affairs, for his assistance. On 26 January 1945, in the journal Amerasia, specialising in Far Eastern affairs, an OSS analyst came across a 1944 report on Thailand which he had written. OSS agents broke into the offices of the journal and discovered hundreds of classified US State Department, Navy and OSS documents. On 6 June, the FBI raided the offices of Amerasia and seized 1,700 classified State Department, Navy, OSS and Office of War Information documents. Since there was no proof that the documents had been handed to a foreign power, the Justice Department did not bring a charge of espionage and the case was dropped. Harry Gold copied the results of chemical processes in the laboratories of Pennsylvania Sugar and then became a courier for Klaus Fuchs and was paid $100 a month. He then asked for $2,000 to set up his own laboratory to study the thermal diffusion of gases but was turned down. He then went to work for a firm headed by Abraham Brothman, who was a chemist who began spying for the Soviet Union when working at Republic Steel, supplying industrial processes for the development of synthetic rubber and aerosols. Another of Gold’s contacts provided information on explosives; a formula for colour motion pictures; technical information on a radar guided glide bomb; civilian and military aviation design. Other agents supplied documents on radio control technology; the military aircraft industry in 1944 and the testing of guided bombs. Andrei Shevchenko, an aviation engineer and intelligence officer, was assigned to Bell Aircraft and recruited engineers to provide him with sensitive information while a librarian there photographed secret documents. Shevchenko was particularly interested in the prototype jet aircraft (P59), jet engine design and problems encountered in designing a swept-back wing aircraft. The FBI was not permitted to arrest Shevchenko as it would damage US–Soviet relations, and he continued spying. Among the data collected was research on the US equivalent of the German V2 rocket, the first cruise missile. Julius Rosenberg, besides being an atomic spy, was more important as an engineering spy. He headed a group which included Alfred Sarant and Joel Barr, electrical engineers who worked on military radar and became spies in 1941, and handed over 9,000 pages of documents on over 100 weapons systems. They then moved to Czechoslovakia in 1950, and helped design the first automated anti-aircraft weapon. In 1956 they moved to Leningrad and headed a military electronics research institute, and in May 1962 they convinced Nikita Khrushchev to set up a new city (Zelenograd) devoted entirely to microelectronics. Barr claimed they developed the first Soviet radar guided anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles, used very effectively against US aircraft in

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Vietnam. Rosenberg was an inspector for the Army Signal Corps which gave him access to a wide range of secret American military technology. He was dismissed for communist sympathies but found work at Emerson Radio, working on classified military projects. He manged to steal a working sample of a proximity fuse, one of the most innovative advances in military technology in World War II. The Soviets immediately awarded him $1,000 (Haynes and Klehr 2000: 288–300).

14 Culture wars

The great cultural conflict between communism and capitalism was played out against a backdrop of the 17th- to 18th-century European Enlightenment. Each vied for the accolade of being acknowledged as its true heirs. The Enlightenment promoted reason, analysis, high-minded culture and a rejection of overarching authority. The enlightened man or woman was a civilised person. Soviet culture, like Soviet sport and science, was rich in achievement but suffered from a fatal flaw: it feared freedom. Foreign contact with ordinary Soviet citizens was kept to a minimum. The reason was that gullible Russians would give away secrets to rapacious foreigners. There was even a warning that bunches of flowers, fruit and vegetables from the West could contain dangerous pests. The Soviet press nourished suspicion of everything Western. Journalists, academics, scientists, literary and music critics were regarded as ‘purveyors of spiritual poison’. What the Soviet citizen could read was strictly supervised. The Politburo thought that if people could read anything they liked, public order would break down. In 1945 it was quite different. In June 1945, to celebrate the 220th anniversary of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a vast array of eminent scientists and scholars from the US and many European countries were invited to Moscow. There were conferences, exhibitions, visits to the ballet, opera, concerts and the theatre. A glittering Kremlin reception, with Stalin as host, struck awe into the guests. Russian culture could hold its head up with the best. On 1 September, a telegraphic chess match got under way and Mayor La Guardia of New York made the first move. The Soviet team, in Moscow, responded. Eventually the Soviets won by a wide margin. At least when it came to chess the Americans were second best. Football was the most popular game in Europe and so a Soviet team, Moscow Dinamo, was dispatched to London in November. They had a plan and would only play top teams. The opposing players had to be submitted days before the game. They did not make a good impression even before they had kicked a ball. They refused to enter into conversation with their hosts and supposedly had brought along a huge quantity of food. This rumour was quickly scotched as they piled into English porridge, sausages and even steak. DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-16

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They went to the theatre and the greyhound track and gawped at fashion magazines and Hollywood stars. They played Chelsea before a 75,000 crowd and amazed fans with their expertise. The result was a 3–3 draw. They moved to Cardiff and were greeted by communist miners playing the Soviet national anthem. A huge portrait of comrade Stalin adorned the city stadium and the Soviets duly won 10–1. Back in London, Arsenal were played in a thick fog. The Arsenal team included many famous players who were not members of the club. The Soviets protested in vain. It was a rough game, refereed by a Russian who was predictably accused of bias by the English press, but Dinamo won 4–3. In December 1945, shortly after the publication of his anti-Soviet satire, Animal Farm, George Orwell mused about the mistaken belief that sport promotes friendship between peoples. He hoped no British team would pay a return visit to the Soviet Union. Three months after the end of the war, the Soviets closed down Thornton Wilder’s Our Town, at the Deutsches Theater in East Berlin, because of its ‘defeatist’ theme. In spring 1946, Ilya Ehrenburg penned unflattering reports of life in America that were widely disseminated by the Soviet press. Reports from London painted Britain as cold, hungry, riddled by strikes and short of housing. Another report gave the impression that the black market dominated and the behaviour of cinema audiences was outrageous – they even smoked and chewed oranges! Yet friendly contact was still possible. In September 1946 an American chess team arrived to play a match. The Soviets won again but everyone was friendly. In October, Soviet opera singers visited the US but ran into trouble. They attended a communist-front Slav Congress in New York at which hostile speeches about President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes were made. The President reacted as if stung. The whole concert party was to register and be fingerprinted. They left in a huff. Thus ended visits by magnificent Soviet singers and other stars. The Boston Symphony Orchestra offered to visit the Soviet Union and pay for themselves. The Leningrad Symphony Orchestra was invited to the US. Nobody replied. Massive jamming of Western broadcasts began in 1949, and in that year the number of American newspapers able to acquire a visa for a permanent correspondent dropped to one. Andrei Zhdanov became Stalin’s censor. In August–September 1946 he castigated Leningrad literary journals, writers, musicians, film makers, operas, even philosophers for veering away from socialist realism. The greatest sin was kowtowing to the West. Another one was formalism. Many lost their jobs, were banned from publishing and imprisoned. Violent anti-Western rhetoric was the norm and everything Russian (not Soviet) was glorified. Every world invention worthy of the name was ascribed to a Russian. This period of ferocious abuse and cultural nationalism (1946–9) is known as the Zhdanovshchina (the Zhdanov times). Its more correct name would be the Stalinshchina. What is striking is that Soviet cultural values were conservative and modernism was derided despite the fact that Russians were in

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the vanguard of modernism before 1914. They were also very prim. No sex or lust was permitted to appear and schools avoided the subject. During a student visit in the early 1960s an English girl confided to me that her Russian companion was unaware of the facts of life. Freud was held to be a pervert and Einstein off his head. In June 1947, the Smith–Mundt Act was passed. There was a need to engage in a ‘culture, education and information war’ against ‘Soviet propaganda’. It became law in January 1948 as the US Information and Educational Exchange Act. Every part of the media – print, radio, film, exhibitions – was to be deployed to foster a positive view of the US abroad. The foreign information programme budget for 1949 was doubled. The State Department was to ‘develop a vigorous and effective ideological campaign’ to project American values and virtues worldwide. American efforts to denazify the German population were quite harsh immediately after the war but became mild after the onset of the Cold War. The media war was hottest in Germany. In the US zone four major radio stations broadcast from Frankfurt, Bremen, Stuttgart and Munich. They were controlled by the military but staffed mainly by Germans. Voice of America, in German, broadcast every day from New York. In West Germany and West Berlin, US culture and films were disseminated through the opening of an Amerika Haus. They were a huge success. The Americans engaged in a massive propaganda campaign in France, Italy and other Marshall Plan countries. Documentary films, radio programmes, information libraries, cultural exchange groups and pressure groups flooded France. In 1949, perhaps 15 per cent of the population listened to Voice of America programmes such as Ici New York. Technology and science were also shared. American movies and stars, especially Humphrey Bogart, were hits in communist-dominated parts of France. Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech and the Truman Doctrine reinforced the image of the Soviet bloc as a prison or gulag. Stories of those who escaped were big news. The London Observer reported in February 1949 that ‘300 Russians Flee Country Every Month’, moving to west Germany and aided by a Russian and a Ukrainian émigré organisation. This report should be taken with a pinch of salt. Victor Kravchenko’s I Chose Freedom was devoured by sensationseeking Western readers. Soviet wives with Western husbands and denied exit visas also made great news stories. The Soviets responded by referring to American culture as decadent. Cultural life could not really be called cultural. Pollution reigned as individualism had got out of control. In contrast the Soviet hero, in Isaiah Berlin’s words, was ‘brave, puritanical, simple, noble, altruistic’ and entirely devoted to the service of the motherland (Caute 2003: 6–27).

Hollywood and the fear of the Reds Ernst Lubitsch’s Ninotchka (1939), starring Greta Garbo, is a brilliantly entertaining film. Garbo plays a beautiful, ice cold, puritanical Bolshevik sent to

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Paris to take over from wholly incompetent comrades the task of selling some court jewels. She has lines such as: ‘The mass trials were a great success. There are going to be fewer but better Russians’. However, she gets drunk, is seduced by Mervyn Douglas, goes American and forgets all about Lenin. Some fans may even have thought all commissars were like Greta! The film was rereleased in 1947 just after the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) had subpoenaed Hollywood actors, producers, writers, composers and directors to enquire about their political views. The attitude of Hollywood to the Soviet Union had been turned on its head. Films such as Mission to Moscow (1943), based on Joseph Davies’s memoirs, had been a big hit. Now US film companies received subsidies to produce films praising American democracy. The Blum–Byrnes Franco-American agreement of August 1946 contained a clause requiring French cinemas to screen only four French (down from nine) films every quarter. There were violent protests but the French film industry declined further. American films were offered at knock-down prices. However, almost everyone in Europe wanted to see American movies. Even in Italian communist strongholds, US films were preferred. The reason was that Soviet films were usually deadly serious and slow moving. American films, on the other hand, were often quite funny. There was also sex appeal. When Linda Darnell and Jane Russell were on, one had to fight to get in! For the girls, Gary Cooper was the he-man. The HUAC subpoenaed 41 from the film industry. Exchanges were heated and aggressive. Ten refused to answer questions about membership of the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA), citing the First Amendment. They were later indicted for contempt of Congress and imprisoned. The studios got the message and purged themselves of left wingers. Any cinema showing a film associated with a communist was picketed. The FBI built up extensive files. Later it was claimed that Dashiell Hammett was ‘one of the red masterminds of the nation’ and Charlie Chaplin had been a card-carrying communist for years. Judy Holliday always acts dumb but she is a ‘smart cookie … the commies got her a long time ago’ (Caute 2003: 163–5). Anti-communist movies appeared quickly and can be labelled ‘Red Menace’ films. The last pro-Soviet film was Berlin Express (1948) but Hollywood then switched sides in The Iron Curtain (1948). It is based on the defection of Igor Gouzenko, the cypher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. Dana Andrews plays Gouzenko and he is impervious to the allure of a Soviet seductress. The Red Danube (1949), as expected, is set in Vienna and the Russians are double dealers. Guilty of Treason (1949) is also played out in central Europe and features the trial of the Hungarian Cardinal Minszenty. He is presented as a symbol of hope and enlightenment. I Married a Communist (1949) stars Lorraine Day as the sweet, unsuspecting wife of Robert Ryan who turns out to be a Red under the bed. The CPUSA is presented as a bunch of gangsters who stop at nothing to achieve their objectives. Dozens of anti-communist films poured out of Hollywood in this period and were distributed worldwide. The way was prepared for Ian Fleming’s Casino Royale (1952), the first James Bond thriller. The public developed an insatiable appetite for thrillers

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about the Cold War and John le Carré brilliantly evokes the early Cold War years in his writing. Whereas Fleming’s James Bond has no qualms about his life as a spy, le Carré is ambivalent and sometimes jaundiced about the ‘profession’. Hollywood was capable of throwing up surprises. One of them was Hedy Lamarr (née Hedwig Kiesler, born in Vienna, Austria in 1900; Figure 14.1). She was promoted by her studio as the most beautiful woman in the world and starred opposite Clark Gable and other famous male leads. However, she was also a brilliant scientist. She co-invented with the composer George Antheil technology for spread spectrum and frequency-hopping communications. The US navy in the Pacific found that its torpedoes were being diverted by the Japanese. Lamarr and Antheil solved the problem by means of signals which made it impossible for the Japanese to change the trajectory of the torpedoes. These inventions were later incorporated in Wi-Fi, CDMA and Bluetooth technologies. In recognition of her outstanding work Lamarr (died 2000) was inducted into the National Inventors Hall of Fame in 2014.

Figure 14.1 Hedy Lamarr, c. 1942 Source: © Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy.

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Germany East and West Most German artists and intellectuals agreed that a new beginning in culture and politics was due. Hence they collaborated willingly with the occupation forces. In the two years after the end of the war, the Allies collaborated in promoting anti-fascism, humanism and democracy. The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) was especially keen to advance a cultural agenda. Its cultural head was the splendidly named Colonel Tyulpanov, or Comrade Tulip. In July 1945 a Kulturbund was set up in the east to emphasise humanism and democracy and similar organisations appeared in the west. However, the latter were banned in 1947 as communist. The Kulturbund was headed by Johannes R. Becher, who had spent the years 1934–45 in the Soviet Union, but claimed to be apolitical. However, KPD members occupied the top positions. The first major art exhibition in post-war Germany was held in Dresden in 1946 and contained abstract works and those deemed ‘degenerate’ by the Nazis. Aleksandr Dymshits, the cultural officer of SMAD, proclaimed the end of ‘denkfauler Nazinaturalismus’ (lazy intellectual Nazi naturalism). The public reaction varied from respect to ridicule. The local newspaper weighed in by calling it a ‘poisonous shot of the bourgeoisie’. The ‘democratic’ art of the Soviet Union should now be the model. These comments came at a time when Andrei Zhdanov was attacking formalism, lack of ideology and bourgeois decadence in the Soviet Union. Copying the Americans, the Soviets set up numerous Häuser der Kultur der Sowjetunion which put on films, musical events and provided an extensive library (Vowinckel and Payk 2014: 236–40). In 1946 there were over a hundred theatres open in the Soviet zone, all run by local authorities supervised by SMAD. The menu was quite broad: ‘progressive’ European classics (Schiller, Molière, Offenbach’s operettas, German anti-fascist plays, Russian classics and contemporary Soviet plays). A major goal was to reeducate the Germans. The Soviets and Americans regarded this as possible but the British were sceptical. The French had no say as there were no theatres in their zone. The Americans presented what they regarded as their best plays, headed by Eugene O’Neill’s Mourning Becomes Electra and Anna Christie and Tennessee Williams’s The Glass Menagerie and A Streetcar Named Desire (Caute 2003: 250–1). Theatrical coexistence continued until 1947. However, as regards cultural influence the Soviets came out on top. But Soviet films, with their robust patriotic message, did not go down well with German audiences. The communists tried to convince SMAD to tone down the triumphalism but were told that Germans had to learn to understand the Soviet defence of the motherland. It was pointed out that Traktorist, about a tractor driver on a collective farm, was not guaranteed to wow German audiences. An East German film company, DEFA, was set up in November 1945 and was closely monitored by SMAD. It managed one film which had an international impact – the subject was guilt and culpability – but in general the output went down like lead balloons (Caute 2003: 261–2).

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The onset of the Cold War led to differing interpretations of socialist realism. In the West it was regarded as stemming from national socialism (especially its contempt for ‘degenerate’ art). In the East modern art and culture was seen as originating in national socialism. This led to a call to ‘fight the cultural barbarism of American imperialism’. Books on modern art were removed from libraries and those on Renoir and van Gogh banned. Western officials continued to be invited to plays and other cultural events in East Berlin. They always politely refused. However, they instructed the person who conveyed their regrets to go to the box office and buy tickets, but not in the front row! The biggest fish in the pond was Bertolt Brecht, one of the leading German dramatists and poets of the 20th century. Who would net him – the West or the East? He had left Germany in 1933, moved to Denmark, Sweden and Finland but eventually secured an American visa and arrived there in July 1941. He was a Marxist but never joined the party. He put alienation at the centre of his work, and this brought him into conflict with socialist realism. He eventually settled in the GDR but carried an Austrian passport and perhaps deposited his Stalin Prize money in a Swiss bank. He appeared before the HUAC in October 1947 and likened the experience to a zoologist being cross-examined by apes. Afterwards, not waiting to be deported, he flew to Switzerland with his wife, Helene Weigel, who was a party member. In August 1945, the Hebbel Theater, in the American sector of Berlin, staged the most famous of Brecht’s dramatic works, Die Dreigroschenoper (The Threepenny Opera). A Soviet-zone newspaper savaged the work. Despite this, in 1947, Aleksandr Dymshits invited him to Berlin and virtually promised him a theatre. In October 1948 Brecht and Weigel arrived in East Berlin and were treated like royalty. Brecht did not close his eyes to the appalling behaviour of the occupying Red Army. Their rape and pillage was put down to the ‘psychological havoc that Hitler’s marauding armies have wreaked on the czar’s dehumanised “muziks” who have only just been exposed to the process of civilisation’. The first Brecht production was Mother Courage in January 1949. It was a resounding success. The Soviet zone commander told Brecht he could ask for anything he liked. The Soviets glowed in the greatest artistic coup of the immediate post-war era. In April 1949, the SED (communist party) Politburo set up the Berliner Ensemble theatre with Weigel as artistic director. Brecht was able to negotiate deals with East and West German publishers, to travel abroad as he wished and was showered with every conceivable material benefit. But Brecht never wrote a play about life in the GDR (Caute 2003: 271–84). Whereas the Soviets were ahead in classical music and ballet, the Americans dominated popular music and entertainment. Jazz aroused enormous controversy. One critic regarded it as a capitalist plot to encourage man to live through his sexual organs and forget the class struggle. The Red Army had its own jazz band and performed Glenn Miller hits. There was even a State Jazz Orchestra of the USSR. Then the roof fell in. Jazz musicians were consigned to

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the gulag. In early 1947 the tango, foxtrot and blues dances were banned in Vladivostok. Sailors were warned to beware of vulgar Western songs such as ‘It’s a Long Way to Tipperary’ and ‘There Is a Tavern in the Town’. Soviet officers got round the ban on Western pop music by taking records home from Berlin where they were played at young people’s parties. All saxophones were confiscated in 1949. Anyone playing blues was asking for trouble. Jazz was derided as negro music and seen as a preparation for war. Hordes of American jazz musicians were dispatched to Europe after 1945 and were mobbed by fans. Louis Armstrong took France by storm. Voice of America’s jazz programmes were a huge success. Paul Robeson had a wonderful bass voice which could fill any cathedral. He aroused enormous controversy as he doted on the Soviet Union. He was regarded as a communist and waved aside Stalinism and anything which demeaned the USSR. In April 1949 he called on black soldiers not to fight the Soviet Union. He maintained that the only place where he felt a whole man was in Moscow where there was no racial discrimination. This at a time when jazz was being ridiculed as negro music. In Britain, George Orwell, already well known for books such as Homage to Catalonia (1938), a searing personal account of the Spanish Civil War, published Animal Farm (1945). It relates the uprising of animals against humans and is clearly an anti-Stalin satire. He followed with Nineteen Eighty-Four (written in 1948) in 1949. There are three superpowers, Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia, which are permanently at war with one another. Everyone is controlled by Big Brother and slogans such as War Is Peace, and Peace Is War are commonplace. Orwell calls these examples of doublespeak and newspeak. Atomic weapons are used and deaths are taken as matter-of-fact. The goal is always to maintain a balance of terror. The book enjoyed an enormous readership and people became accustomed to the Cold War. Between 1941 and 1946 the American Censorship Office imposed a moratorium on terms such as atomic bomb, nuclear power, nuclear fusion and cyclotron so as not to tip off Berlin that the US was working on the Manhattan Project. It did not use the word bomb but chose ‘gadget’ to describe the most frightening weapon ever conceived. It was left to pulp science magazines to fill the gap, and they went overboard. ‘Atomic power will feed us, warm us, delight us and usher us into Paradise’; ‘A fistful of atomic snow will light up Baltimore for a year’; ‘A uranium power plant the size of a typewriter will allow an automobile to run for 5 million miles’ (Collier’s magazine, July 1940). In 1942, the American public purchased over a billion comics replete with atomic stories, and they became the most popular read among US service personnel. The message was one of unbridled optimism, and General Leslie Groves, head of security for the Manhattan Project, even wrote the foreword to Learn How Dagwood Split the Atom by Joe Musial. Comic books such as Mighty Atom, Atomic Mouse, Atomic Rabbit, Atomic Man (he becomes a human atomic bomb), Atomic Thunderbolt, Hawkman, Flash and Captain Marvel (the alter ego of Billy Batson who, uttering the magic word Shazam, transforms himself into a superhuman phenomenon capable of astonishing

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deeds). He was the most popular comic book character of the 1940s. Until the nuclear age, he battles Nazis and other low life undermining the American dream, then he takes on communists and their nuclear threat. Captain Marvel Battles the Dread Atomic War was a hit in 1946, and then he expands into dealing with corrupt politicians who underplay the dangers of atomic war and radioactive fallout. Marvel repeatedly warns about the danger of atomic war and its consequences. Superman, and, of course, Popeye, got into the action as well. The story line was always the same: our hero is the victim of a freak nuclear accident but then stumbles into a nuclear device which transforms him into a fearfully powerful atomic power whose object in life becomes doing battle with the atomic baddies who want to take away the good life. It was a struggle between good and evil and immortality and extinction. In 1946, who were the baddies? The Russkies, of course. Then there is Godzilla, a dinosaur which emerges from the Pacific Ocean contaminated with radioactivity and is capable of astonishing feats.

Propaganda The word in leading European languages implies providing information but in English it has negative overtones, implying that the information being offered is deliberately inaccurate so as to mislead the listener. For the Soviets, propaganda was extremely important as its goal was to inform the Soviet people in such a way as to transform them into model socialist citizens. They were to cast off their previous views and adopt new ones, articulated by the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee Secretariat (Agitprop). It shaped and reshaped Soviet ideology, and David Brandenburger has suggested that ‘ideology is best addressed from three different perspectives relating to its production, projection and popular reception’ (Brandenburger 2011: 2). Officials were referred to as ‘workers of the ideological front’. How did Agitprop decide how to present the communist truth about society and the Soviet Union? The goal was to win the hearts and minds of the people and this required, first and foremost, a good theory which made crystal clear the political goal society was striving to achieve. The key to success is political will, an absolute conviction on the part of propagandists that the goal is worthy and achievable. After a revolution, the sympathy of the masses does not come automatically, it must be won. The task of propaganda is not to develop a new theory but to transfer theory into the language of the people, to make it comprehensible to the masses. The goal of propaganda is to make clear to the people what the theorists have discovered. Theorists found a political movement and propagandists follow closely behind. They put theory – a world view – into clear, simple language which everyone can understand. Unless this is done, the theory will wither away. All forms of modern technology should be deployed: leaflets, handbills, posters, radio, mass demonstrations, press, theatre, etc. Avoid a multiplicity of views: keep it simple and repetitive. The essence of propaganda is not variety but the ability to choose those messages which will

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have the maximum impact and reiterate them incessantly. Only by trial and error can one decide which messages are the most impactful. People gain an understanding of life and its goals and are persuaded to help achieve these goals. An aim in life is fundamentally important and can have a great propagandistic effect. Goals must be high and inspire sacrifice, and success celebrated and the next step to success outlined. To summarise: avoid abstract ideas; appeal to the emotions; constantly repeat basic ideas; use simple, easily comprehensibly phrases; slogans are very valuable; attack constantly your political opponents; select a special enemy and vilify him mercilessly; propaganda should be planned and executed by only one agency; propaganda must not reveal a nation’s weaknesses, only its strengths because otherwise it will help the enemy to undermine the country; propaganda must be interesting, patriotic, and everyone is called upon to defend the motherland because the enemy is at the gates; identify the enemy without and within; repetition, repetition, repetition; propaganda must inspire people to act; propaganda must instil in the people fear if socialism is overthrown; shortages and failures etc. are the result of sabotage by the enemies of the people; choose specific targets to hate. From the above, it is not difficult to identify the main enemy of the Soviet Union. There were two Americas: progressive America, the second America, and the warmonger, headed by Wall Street. The American enemy was analysed in terms of class conflict and the struggle against imperialist powers. Ordinary Americans were regarded as victims of ‘evil’ Americans who are depicted as ‘greedy American capitalists who oppress their socially progressive compatriots’. Americans, in general, are well disposed towards the Soviet Union but are ‘merely misled and manipulated by bad Americans’. Top of the list of good Americans are the African Americans and it is no surprise that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin was immensely popular and was read in schools and performed in theatres. The tone was set by Stalin in November 1945, when he attacked the decision to print a speech by Churchill and told the Politburo that ‘we need to be fierce in fighting servility before the West’. This became the leitmotif of the Zhdanovshchina or Zhdanov times but, in reality, the Stalinshchina, the anti-Western, anti-cosmopolitan and anti-intellectual policy of the post-war Stalin era. All contact with foreigners became dangerous and marriage to a person from the capitalist West was banned, in 1947. The first manifestation of anti-Americanism was The Russian Question, written in 1946, by the celebrated writer Konstantin Simonov. It depicts the two Americas, the greedy Wall Street bankers who repressed the honest, real Americans. The final speech by the journalist Harry Smith, a good American, expresses his wish to find his place in the ‘America of Abraham Lincoln, in the America of Franklin Roosevelt’. President Truman is later depicted as the embodiment of the imperialistic aspirations of the US whereas Stalin is the peacemaker. As Stalin regarded war between capitalism and communism as inevitable, Agitprop warned that another war was on the horizon and everyone had to be on their guard. Demonstrating interest in anything American could lead to prison or something

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even worse. Film after film depicted the ‘evil’ Americans and their plans to destroy Soviet socialism. The Americans countered with Voice of America, founded in 1947, which broadcast in Russian and other Soviet languages. Propaganda and information activities became vital tools in countering communism. The Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, in 1947, became the American Zhdanov and his accusations of communists in high places, the Red Scare, pilloried the Democrat President Truman. McCarthy’s appeal owed a lot to a new medium, television, which carried his message far and wide. Why did the fear of communism grow so quickly? Most Americans were living better than ever before, but anxiety took over that everything could be lost if the Soviets attacked. In the 1948 midterm elections, the Republicans took control of Congress and this was partly due to McCarthyism. Elliott Roosevelt, the former president’s son, visited Moscow in December 1946, after the publication of his book, As He Saw It, about the Big Three and especially FDR, but was dismissed as pro-Soviet by many critics. He chatted with Stalin and they discussed scientific and cultural exchanges and the vozhd said he was all for them but nothing materialised. John Steinbeck and the photographer Robert Capa were invited to tour the Soviet Union in 1947, and he published A Russian Journal the following year. The Soviets were nervous that it might turn out to be a riposte to The Russian Question, but it was not because Steinbeck wanted to play down fears of war between the superpowers (Magnúsdóttir 2019: 10–69). It is also instructive to study the tactics deployed by Goebbels in undermining democracy in Germany. He was short and walked with a limp and because of this was mercilessly bullied and called insulting, risible nicknames when he was growing up. Out of this experience he recognised the power of bullying and demeaning a person. He labelled President Paul von Hindenburg a crook and politicians as liars and cheats without, of course, providing any evidence. His newspaper, Der Angriff (The Attack), repeated the allegations and slanders endlessly. All institutions of state only served the interests of a minority who oppressed society. Financiers were a conspiracy of blood-sucking vermin. Newspapers only reported fake news. Social democrats were derided as supporters of capitalist exploiters. Other politicians could be accused of treason and their parties banned. A policy could be announced one day and contradicted the next day so as to paralyse organised opposition. He encouraged gangs of young men to harass well-to-do shoppers and citizens and beat them up. This became their normal entertainment and nobodies thereby acquired power. The aim was to intimidate and sow confusion and it was very effective. Repeat lies ad infinitum and eventually people will begin to wonder if they represent the truth. The core of the message was hate: therefore sow hatred. Preaching hate is exhilarating and empowering. Anyone who criticised the national socialists was physically attacked. Bully everyone into submission. There was only one point of view which was correct: that of the leader and as such there was no need for rational debate. Fairness

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and decency did not belong in this new society (Bodanis 2020: 169–92). In a remarkably short time, democracy in Germany was abolished. The Bolsheviks deployed similar tactics in Eastern Europe after 1944, honed during their seizure of power after 1917.

Enticing the US into war with Germany Churchill, on becoming prime minister in May 1940, immediately concluded that the UK could not survive and defeat Germany unless the US joined the war. This was going to be an uphill task as the isolationists, one of whose leading lights was Charles Lindbergh, pro-German, anti-British and anti-Semitic, famous for making a non-stop flight from New York to Paris in 1927, were in the ascendancy. A Fortune poll, in June 1940, revealed that just under 8 per cent favoured joining the war on the side of the British. On 11 June 1940, MV Britannic set sail from Liverpool for New York and on board were the country’s gold reserves but also William Stephenson, small in stature, quietly intense, a good listener and impossible not to like. He had recently joined MI6 and was the new head of the organisation in the US and his brief was simple: ‘Get America into the war!’ Stephenson established a good rapport with Lord Lothian, the British ambassador, and they worked together to identify influential Americans who favoured helping the UK. One of them was Dean Acheson and another Wendell Willkie, the Republican candidate in the 1940 presidential election, who informed the ambassador that he would do everything possible to ensure that the UK was not beaten and would not oppose a destroyers for bases deal. On 3 September 1940, the first three destroyers set off and this may have played a part in Hitler’s decision to postpone the invasion of the UK. Another influential friend was ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, who played a key role in ensuring the destroyers for bases deal went through. He had to overcome the view in Washington that the UK was going to be defeated, and the US ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy, agreed and informed President Roosevelt that the RAF would be obliterated by the Luftwaffe and that a British surrender was inevitable. A remarkable shift in public opinion occurred, heavily influenced by leading interventionists, for the Burke-Wadsworth conscription bill in Congress was passed in September 1940. The isolationist group hit back and set up the America First Committee (‘Committee’ was quickly dropped) with the enthusiastic support of the charismatic Lindbergh. Robert McCormick, Irish-American and anti-British, and owner of the Chicago Tribune, threw his weight behind the movement to keep the US out of the war. British imperialism was judged to be more dangerous than German fascism. The other side of the coin was to label Lindbergh a German spy, but it was known that he was in contact with Hans Thomsen, the German chargé d’affairs (the ambassador had been withdrawn) whose task was to promote isolationism and was to prove himself a skilled agent of influence. The death of Lord Lothian, in December 1940, was a blow. A Christian Scientist, he believed that illness should be cured by prayer and not medical intervention which would have saved him. His successor was

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Lord Halifax, a former foreign secretary, who was nervous about spying, and had been dispatched to Washington by Churchill because he was a leading appeaser and this was a neat way of getting rid of him. Someone who was not amused was President Roosevelt, who favoured a more left-wing diplomat as he expected the UK to go socialist after the war. Halifax made the wrong type of headlines. At a baseball game, he likened it to cricket and when he was handed a hot dog, he calmly placed it on the seat beside him. ‘Hot Dog Baffles Lord Halifax’ was one of the kinder headlines. His persona completely changed later when he was pelted with eggs and rotten tomatoes. He stood his ground and muttered some remarks which the British then put out as ‘My feeling is one of envy that people have eggs and tomatoes to throw about. In England these are very scarce’. Afterwards he was greeted like a kindly uncle by the public. Stephenson had enemies in high places and one of them was Adolf Berle, an assistant secretary of state, who also had responsibility for intelligence matters, composed a dossier on Stephenson’s activities, now reaching industrial proportions, which he strongly objected to and favoured closing down. He presented the dossier to the President in a personal meeting, but Roosevelt was au fait with what MI6 was doing and had good relations with Donovan as they were all singing from the same hymn sheet: get the US into the war. On 8 February 1941, the House of Representatives voted in favour of the Lend-Lease bill and a key role was played by Wendell Willkie who was known as a staunch isolationist but he surprised everyone by coming out unequivocally in favour by saying, among other things, that if the UK did not receive aid, the US would face war in 60 days. What had changed his mind? A personal meeting with the President. Lend-Lease, enacted on 11 March 1941, was to supply the UK and British Commonwealth, Free France, China and later the Soviet Union and other Allied nations with oil, food and military matériel. This included warships and planes, and in return the US received leases of army and naval bases in Allied territory during the war. Canada operated a similar, smaller programme called Mutual Aid. On 18 June 1941, the press carried reports of a British parachute raid at Berck-sur-Mer in the Pas de Calais region. They attacked German positions, destroyed 30 planes, captured some German pilots and made it home without any casualties. A brilliant commando raid carried out with exemplary precision, but the only problem was that it was pure fiction. The story was carried worldwide and the British were becoming masters of fake news (the term was in circulation in 1940). Ian Fleming was in naval intelligence and was very impressed by Stephenson, who had the ‘quality of making anyone ready to follow him to the ends of the earth’. Something else impressed him: his martinis, so he jotted down the recipe: ‘Booth’s gin, high and dry, easy on the vermouth, shaken not stirred’ (Hemming 2019: 163–4, 180). Not surprisingly, Stephenson is regarded as one of the models for James Bond. The interventionists set up Fight for Freedom, and the White House even suggested members of the administration who could speak at their rallies,

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revealing they were the quintessential insiders. The UK was losing the Battle of the Atlantic and had already lost 2.6 million tons of shipping in 1941. After the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Churchill commented to an America journalist: ‘We shall lose unless you come in – with all you have’. On 19 July 1941, the Bolivian president declared a state of emergency, as he had information that German agents were planning to stage a coup, and documents and a map revealed their plans. Stephenson ensured the information landed on J. Edgar Hoover’s desk who, after examination, decided it was genuine. It then went to the US State Department and then to the President. Then it went public and Bolivia arrested Germans and dozens of army officers and closed down four proGerman newspapers. The US secretary of state informed La Paz that in the event of an ‘incident’, the US would provide full support. Hitler and the German press were beside themselves with rage and the American press waited for extraordinary measures to be announced but nothing happened. In reality, the whole episode was fake news, concocted by the British, and they did not even inform the President until afterwards. In May 1941, in a radio broadcast, the President had informed Americans that a state of unlimited national emergency existed. The public was primed to accept fake news. When Churchill met Roosevelt on HMS Prince of Wales, off Newfoundland, he hoped that discussions would lead to a declaration of war by the US on Germany. This was not to be and instead, on 14 August 1941, the two leaders issued a joint declaration ‘of certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries’. A peace was to permit all nations to live in safety within their own boundaries and to make it possible to live in freedom from fear and want. It was not a treaty and Roosevelt refused to sign it. Churchill was disappointed but he brightened up when the President informed him that he had signed an order for US warships to start escorting convoys from the US to Iceland, and they had instructions to attack any German or Italian submarine which appeared. Only Congress can declare war, but the President can wage war, and this is precisely what he was doing; he told William C. Bullitt, ambassador to France until July 1940, that the US would not attack Germany but ‘he was determined to make Germany declare war first’. Bill Donovan then asked Malcolm Lovell, a Quaker, to inform Hans Thomsen that he would receive $1 million ($17.5 million in 2019 prices) if he defected. Thomsen had been providing information on German military strength and movements to Lovell, who passed the information on to Donovan. This included a warning that Japan would attack the United States, and, on 13 November 1940, he reported that Germany would join Japan if the latter declared war on the United States. On 17 October 1941, a British transatlantic convoy, including several US destroyers, was attacked by U-boats, several merchant ships were sunk, and the USS Kearny was also damaged, killing eleven sailors, the first American casualties in the war with Germany. (The U-boat – Unterseeboot, or submarine, was not a submarine but a submersible which could only stay a few hours under water becoming coming to the surface for air. In 1939, Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander in chief of the Kriegsmarine, pleaded with Hitler for more U-boats, so as to

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blockade and starve the UK into submission, but Hitler did not understand sea (or air) power as he concentrated on land forces. In the spring of 1943, Germany had over 200 U-boats in the Atlantic and was sinking about half a million tons of Allied shipping monthly. Most of the U-boat successes took place in a large midocean gap, beyond the reach of land-based planes. To counter this, 60 B-24s were modified for ultra-long range flight and deployed to counter the carnage. They could cruise for 18 hours, carrying hundreds of depth charges, a dozen heavy machine guns and radar. U-boats were slow when submerged – they travelled at the pace of a man walking – but on the surface they could go as fast as a bicycle. Once the planes’ searchlights and radar were switched on, depth charges were dropped to force the submarines to the surface where they were easy prey. Other defensive strategies were used to such effect that in May 1943 Dönitz withdrew his entire U-boat fleet from the north Atlantic, leaving the route free to resupply the UK (Bodanis 2020: 260). A submariner, short and wiry, who was rescued by the Americans after his U-boat had been sunk, told me he would always be grateful to them for saving his life. In 1944 the Kriegsmarine developed the first submarine capable of remaining underwater for 72 hours. It was a revolutionary design but it never saw action. Had it been deployed earlier it would have devastated Allied shipping. The US acquired it and it became the basis of the modern submarine. On Navy Day, 27 October, the President delivered a speech, intoning each phrase for emphasis, informing the audience that he had in his possession a German map of South America and part of Central America, and Hitler had ambitions to reorganise it. This would never happen, he said, and the German drawings made it clear that another target was the United States. He then went on to state that he had another German document which made clear that the Nazis intended to abolish all leading world religions. A ‘god of blood and iron will take the place of the God of love and mercy’. (There is a grain of truth in this, as Himmler had been given the task of rewriting the New Testament and replacing Jesus Christ with Hitler as the saviour of the world.) Roosevelt did not produce the documents because they were skilful forgeries and he was aware of this (Hemming 2019: 211–12, 250–2). On 31 October 1941, the USS Reuben James, on escort duty, was sunk by a U-Boat and 115 sailors lost their lives and brought intervention closer. Many of the provisions of the Neutrality Acts, passed in 1935–9, were repealed on 17 November 1941, and merchant vessels could now be armed, carry cargo to any belligerent state and enter combat zones. Despite the many provocations, Hitler never took the bait but accepted that war with the US was inevitable. On 13 November, he ordered that ‘efforts to avoid incidents are to be abandoned’. Any US warship which appeared in the vicinity of a German vessel could be sunk. He told von Ribbentrop that he was now willing to go to war with America even though the Soviet Union had not yet been defeated. Why had he changed his mind? Possibly the Bolivian map and the document on religion revealed how brazen the Americans could be in distorting reality. It struck a nerve, and this is exactly what Stephenson, Donovan and the President had been trying to do. They had pierced his amour

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propre, his vanity about being the saviour of the Aryan race. Hitler accused Roosevelt of trying to incite war, telling lies and making baseless allegations, and complained about the President’s ‘shameless misrepresentation of the truth’ in a speech to the Reichstag. Presumably, the latter accusation referred to Roosevelt’s Navy Day speech. On Thursday 11 December, Joachim von Ribbentrop visited the US chargé d’affairs (the ambassador had been withdrawn) in Berlin, and read out a short declaration of war, and Hitler followed with a belligerent speech in the Reichstag. The Tripartite Pact did not oblige Germany to declare war on the US after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December. Kilsoo Haan, on 8 January 1941, informed Roosevelt that Japan was planning an attack on Pearl Harbor and later told Frank Knox, secretary of the navy, on 15 April 1941, that the Soviet Union and Japan would sign a nonaggression pact not later than 29 April 1941. It was signed on 13 April 1941 much to the surprise of the US State Department. While Haan was informing eight government agencies about an imminent Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese struck. Three of their midget submarines got through and caused considerable damage. Haan had informed the Americans in 1940 that Japan was building them to attack harbours, but the information was probably ignored. On another occasion his report was dismissed by the US State Department as ‘anti-Japanese propaganda’. After the attack the US did not have a single seaworthy battleship in the Pacific Ocean to counter the Japanese. Surprisingly, the Japanese did not attack the Navy’s oil tanks and dry docks and had the oil tanks exploded, Hawaii would probably have been lost. On 5 December 1941, Haan warned of the imminent attack and on 7 December he received a call from Maxwell Hamilton of the US State Department, warning him that if he released the 5 December warning to the press, he ‘would be put away for the duration’ and, on 8 December, the FBI told him to leave Washington D. C. until further notice (Koster 2019: 168). US naval intelligence had broken Japanese codes and was aware that Japan was planning an attack. Henry Stimson, secretary of war, afterwards said the main thing was to ensure that Japan fired the first shot and hence the US would not be branded an aggressor. One of the decoded messages asked the Japanese consul in Honolulu to report the exact disposition of every ship in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, was unaware of this or any other decoded message. The final codes consisted of 14 parts and no. 13 was read by Roosevelt at 9 p.m. on 6 December. He commented to Harry Hopkins: ‘This means war’. The Army sent a Western Union telegram instead of phoning, but Kimmel read it after the attack had begun. The Japanese embassy was expected to drop off the declaration of war half an hour before the attack, but the diplomats were so drunk – they were aware that the war would be a disaster for Japan – that it was delivered after the attack had begun. The Philippines was lost on 8 December because Japanese air power was vastly superior, and Guam fell on 10 December (Koster 2019: 171–3).

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Stalin had all the intelligence but did not believe it, and the Americans had all the intelligence but did not reveal it to the navy! The government also ignored Haan’s repeated warnings. Germany had warned the Japanese that the Americans had broken their codes, but they ignored this. No wonder the German High Command wrung their hands and complained that they had never contemplated war with the US and were thus totally unprepared. The key question now was whether America would give preference to a war against Japan and then turn on Germany or vice versa. Fortunately for the UK and Europe, the Washington War Conference, on 14 January 1942, decided that ‘only the minimum of forces’ would be ‘diverted from operations against Germany’. Had Japan attacked a year earlier, all resources would have been concentrated on defeating it and Germany ignored. The British undercover operation, headed by Bill Stephenson, was described by the Washington Post as ‘arguably the most effective in history; a virtual textbook in the art of manipulation and one that changed America for ever’. Another comment was that it was ‘one of the most diverse, extensive and yet subtle propaganda drives ever directed by one sovereign state to another’ (Hemming 2019: 2, 310–13). One should bear in mind that President Roosevelt became an interventionist and this led to its success. Had the President been a dedicated isolationist, it would have failed, and the UK would have lost the war against Germany. The operation not only changed America, it changed the world.

Churchill, Korda and the power of Hollywood Churchill was introduced to Alexander Korda, a refugee Hungarian Jewish filmmaker, in 1934, and immediately struck up a relationship as both saw the danger of a national socialist Germany. Churchill wrote some scripts for him and spent time in Hollywood, fascinated by the possibility of the cinema as a propaganda tool. After Churchill became prime minister in May 1940, Korda put his production company at the disposal of the government to produce propaganda films. A hero for the Briton was Admiral Nelson and, with Korda directing, the result was the film, premiered in March 1941, Emma Hamilton in the UK but That Hamilton Woman in the US, starring Laurence Olivier and Vivien Leigh. One of the scenes showed Nelson rejecting the offer of peace from Napoleon and saying: ‘you cannot make peace with a dictator, you must destroy him’. It was clear to the audience that Nelson could have been speaking about Hitler and it was pure war propaganda, and the film was a huge box office success. It was Churchill’s favourite film and during negotiations about the Atlantic Charter, on board the HMS Prince of Wales, he called a halt one evening for the politicians and crew to watch the film. The writer H. V. Morton was chosen to observe the scene and has left a memorable account of it. (Tragedy struck the HMS Prince of Wales, on 10 December 1941, when it was sunk by the Japanese off the east coast of Malaya by land based bombers and torpedo bombers with the loss of 327 sailors.) This was not the first pro-

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war film directed by Korda. The Four Feathers (April 1939) was about British colonial exploits in the Sudan, in which Churchill had taken part as a young man, and The Lion Has Wings (November 1939), made in four weeks, is partly fictional and tells of the successes of the RAF but also includes Queen Elizabeth I’s speech at Tilbury calling for resistance to the invading Spanish Armada. England stood alone but finally defeated the Spanish. The message was again clear: the UK stood alone again against tyranny and needed help. Korda was aware that the Hays Code, the film censorship board, did not permit any ‘negative portrayal’ of Germans in Hollywood scripts so ingenuity was needed to ensure the audience got the message. Charles Lindbergh and America First were furious and managed to get the US Senate to begin hearings, accusing Korda of being a British agent and the UK of warmongering, in September 1941, and That Hamilton Woman was highlighted as clear evidence of this and a blatant attempt to manipulate public opinion. Hollywood was not to be outdone and, in July 1941, Warner Brothers released Sergeant York, played by Gary Cooper, which tells the true story of Alvin C. York, who was drafted in 1917 but, as a pacifist, refused to fight but changed his mind, goes to France, takes on a German machine gun position, and becomes an all-American hero. Hollywood pulled out all the stops to portray York as patriotic, anti-German and an out-and-out interventionist. The script could have been written by Roosevelt or even Churchill. It was an even bigger box office success than That Hamilton Woman. The President invited the real life York and Gary Cooper to the White House and told them that he had been thrilled by what he had seen. Lindbergh and the isolationists were in despair as the movie moguls were priming the population for war. Joseph Goebbels, seeing the impact of films as war propaganda, was not to be outdone and commissioned the most expensive colour film ever in the Third Reich, Kolberg, which premiered on 30 January 1945, the 12th anniversary of the national socialists coming to power. It tells the story of a small town, Kolberg, which heroically resisted onslaughts by Napoleon’s Grande Armée. Two divisions were demobilised to provide the extras for the film, and it did momentarily raise morale, but the irony is that Kolberg fell to the Red Army shortly afterwards.

15 Who was responsible for the Cold War?

The orthodox or traditional view The term ‘Cold War’ first appeared in 1946, then became common in 1947 and from 1950 was taken up by both sides of the Iron Curtain and used worldwide. No exact definition was ever offered. As the Cold War became colder, it came to include greater and greater military confrontation and eventually, in the 1960s, the concept of nuclear war. It was not confined to the superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States – but embraced the whole world. The expression Cold War was long held to originate with Walter Lippmann, a prominent US journalist, who published a booklet, The Cold War, in 1947. However, the person who coined the expression was George Orwell, the British writer, who, in an essay entitled ‘You and the Atomic Bomb’, published on 19 October 1945, warned of a ‘peace that is not a peace’ which he called a permanent ‘cold war’. In November 1945, the US, the UK and Canada published a document on atomic energy which envisaged international control over all nuclear energy research. The explosion of the first atomic bomb, on 16 July 1945, in the New Mexico desert of the USA, scattered radioactive particles from the poles to the equator. It left an indelible signal in the surface strata of the earth. Human behaviour thus altered the geology of the planet and began a new epoch, the Anthropocene. This term derives from two Greek words, human and new. The previous era, the Holocene, began at the end of the last Ice Age about 11,700 years ago. There was then unprecedented human expansion and the emergence of towns and cities. The Anthropocene epoch began with the fallout from the atomic bomb and is detectable in the geological record, through radioactive isotopes. On 9 August 1945, President Truman warned of the danger of a Third World War and envisaged it as nuclear. The US magazine Life, on 20 October 1945, devoted much of the issue to the aftermath of the atomic explosions. In October 1946, several of the top physicists who had developed the atomic bomb, including Nils Bohr, Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer, head of the Manhattan project, penned a booklet with the apocalyptic title, One World or None, to warn the public of the dangers of atomic war. Oppenheimer had been DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-17

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in favour of developing an atomic bomb because he believed it would bring World War II to an end and prevent all future wars. Only the exchange of information on atomic research and international control would save humankind from obliteration. Einstein commented that he had no idea how World War III would be fought but he knew how World War IV would be fought: with sticks and stones. In April 1947, Bernard Baruch, a financier and advisor to several presidents, used the expression Cold War for the first time in a speech in South Carolina. He characterised the struggle with the Soviet Union as a new type of war. ‘We should not delude ourselves’, he maintained, ‘because we are now engaged in a Cold War. Our enemies are outside but also inside our country’. Then in late 1947 Walter Lippmann published his booklet entitled Cold War, A Study in US Foreign Policy. However, the term Cold War does not appear in the publication. The pro-Republican Lippmann gathered together some of his bitingly critical articles about the containment policy of the Democrat President Truman. He proposed a diplomatic war, propaganda and secret infiltration of the enemy. The Cold War was a substitute for a military conflict which was unthinkable. Hollywood and the news media followed suit. The claim was that Stalin had unleashed the most aggressive political, moral and economic war in history against the West. Its name? The Cold War. Europe soon adopted the same argument. Le Figaro used the term la Guerre Froide for the first time in February 1949. The German foreign policy journal, Aussenpolitik, adopted the same language soon after. In the German Democratic Republic, in 1950, the term was used in a translation of a book by a British journalist. The following year a book appeared in Moscow entitled Kholodnaya Voina (Cold War). In 1955 the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia defined the outbreak of the Cold War as an attempt by the Americans and the West to take over the world. So the blame game got under way. What arguments were used by the protagonists? The West regarded Marxist-Leninist ideology and its ambition to expand until it took over the world as the root cause of the Cold War. The end justifies the means was taken as a Soviet maxim. Skulduggery, deceit, brutality, false promises and lie after lie were regarded as weapons deployed by Moscow to expand its influence. To use a Reagan phrase, it really was the evil empire. The argument was given a veneer of intellectual respectability by the former diplomats in Moscow, some of whom had cut their teeth in Riga. Prominent among them was George F. Kennan. In his ‘long telegram’ of 22 February 1946 (Document 18, pp. 245–5) and in his anonymous (‘Mr X’) article in the July issue of Foreign Affairs (Document 26, pp. 254–5) he spelled out the nature and behaviour of the Soviet regime. By the end of 1948 the overwhelming majority of American and West European politicians subscribed to the above analysis. It was articulated in academic works, among which the books of William H. McNeill (1953) and Herbert Feis (1957) were particularly influential. It is instructive that Nikolai Novikov, Soviet ambassador in Washington, in September 1946, stung by Kennan’s analysis, penned a 4,000-word reply (Document 21, pp. 249–50). He set out to analyse the goals of US foreign policy

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and it will surprise no one that his conclusion was that ‘American monopoly capitalism’ was aiming at world domination. In other words, a mirror image of Kennan’s views.

The revisionist view Many of the documents published in the Foreign Relations of the United States covering World War II and its immediate aftermath undermined the simple good guy–bad guy interpretation of the origins of the conflict. This permitted a new school of thought to reject the traditional view as a self-serving capitalist exposé based on a profound misconception of Soviet domestic and external reality. The early revisionists are to be found among the critics of Truman’s foreign policy such as the former vice-presidential candidate Henry A. Wallace, and among European opponents of Western integration and in the ‘neutral’ movement (between the US and the USSR) of the late 1940s. The writings of William A. Williams, whose first major publication appeared in 1959, had a seminal influence (Document 2, pp. 226–7), and the research to which the protests against the Vietnam War gave rise, especially the ‘New Left’ in the late 1960s and early 1970s, completed the process. Books by Walter LaFeber (2006: 114), Joyce and Gabriel Kolko (1972: 80) and Lloyd C. Gardner (1970) argued that American policy makers were following a capitalist agenda in opening up Eastern Europe and the rest of the world to American companies. They regarded this as being conceived as being in the US national interest. Ger Alperovitz (1965) went even as far as arguing that the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan was an attempt to intimidate Moscow. The fact that the US enjoyed an atomic monopoly before 1949 is also regarded as a major reason for the Cold War. America overestimated its ability to bend Moscow to its will. In 1949, Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt’s secretary of state at Yalta, produced an analysis which included criticisms of US policy after Roosevelt’s death. Charles E. Bohlen, US ambassador to the Soviet Union 1953–7, took great exception to these comments. He told Stettinius that all those involved in formulating policy towards the Soviet Union agreed that the Cold War had originated in the ‘character and nature of the Soviet state’ (Costigliola, 2013: 7) and in its ideology. He did not accept that the Truman administration bore any burden of responsibility for the tensions in US–Soviet relations. Bohlen spelled out the generally accepted view: ‘Yalta proved the impossibility of expecting agreements with the Soviet Union to provide solutions to the post-war world’. Stettinius’s view that Yalta was a good starting point which had been dissipated by mutual suspicion on both sides was absolutely false. Bohlen’s vehement defence of the prevailing wisdom leads one to the conclusion that there was some substance to Stettinius’s criticisms. The Soviet analysis of the origins of the Cold War is almost a mirror image of the Western view. It was articulated by Andrei Zhdanov in September 1947, in Poland on the occasion of the founding of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). He divided the world into two camps: the peaceful

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communist one and the aggressive Western capitalist one. Countries such as India and Indonesia were not included in either. The revisionist school of thought believes that the Soviet Union cannot be held responsible for the Cold War.

The post-revisionist interpretation The orthodox and revisionist viewpoints found some common ground in the 1970s. The basic premise was that the perceived threat from the other side was exaggerated and this had led to misguided policies. This led to the view that failures in communications between East and West had given rise to the Cold War. If mistrust could be overcome the conflict could be put to rest. The major weakness of this argument is that it excludes the power political aspect. The Cold War is not regarded as a power struggle for world domination, one conducted by escalating and de-escalating tension, until one side won. Frustration at America’s inability to influence significantly Soviet actions by demonstrating trust or exerting pressure found expression in George Kennan’s 8,000 word ‘long telegram’ of February 1946 (Document 19, pp. 247–8). US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during and after World War II had been based on fallacies. One was that Stalin’s trust could be gained by being completely open with him and another was that his respect could be gained by a quid pro quo policy. Yet another was that if Washington chose the right policy, he would be amenable. Kennan regarded Soviet foreign policy as being conditioned by Soviet domestic policy and not by what the West did or did not do. He thought that a hostile international environment was the breath of life for the prevailing internal system in the country. He argued that suspicion in one degree or another was an integral part of the Soviet system and would not yield entirely to any form of rational persuasion or assurance. American diplomacy had to adjust to this reality. The founding text of the post-revisionist school is by John Lewis Gaddis, who developed a sophisticated analysis based on containment before and after Kennan (Gaddis 1972, reprinted 2000). Containment can be understood as a series of attempts to deal with the consequences of the bargains struck during World War II. The term ‘containment’ was coined by Kennan in July 1947 when he appealed publicly for a ‘long term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies’. Halliday, in a post-revisionist interpretation, suggests various theoretical approaches to explain the origins of the Cold War (Halliday, 1983). First, Soviet threat theorists place the blame on the policies of the USSR. Crises were the result of Soviet expansionism and aggressiveness. Whether Soviet behaviour was the result of Marxist-Leninist theory or of the traditional values of pre1914 Russian society is of secondary importance. The fact that Soviet actions were responsible for crises in world politics is self-evident, irrespective of whichever explanation one favours. Second, US imperialism theorists produce, in essence, a mirror image of the Soviet threat view. Again the responsibility is focused on the policies of one

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state, and the actions of the other, innocent, one are not regarded as having contributed to the impasse. These theorists locate the aggressiveness and belligerence of the West in the social system of capitalism, which they regard as needing confrontation and military production to survive. Third, the superpower theorists place the blame on the two major powers, arguing that the United States and the USSR jointly subordinated the world to their common interests and remaining differences. Popularised by China in the 1960s, the superpower theory identifies the two major powers as ‘colluding and contending’ in their efforts to dominate the world. This view was popular among those who wanted a third alternative to the superpowers, whether they were European conservatives, anti-Soviet Marxists or Third World nationalists. Fourth, arms-race theorists identify the stockpiling of weapons, particularly of nuclear weapons, as the central factor in world politics. The danger of the destruction of the economic, social and cultural fabric of the world by nuclear weapons, and the apparent lack of control of the arms race, were regarded as so significant as to explain the course of world politics. The political and social impact of the arms race was regarded as broadly similar in East and West. Fifth, North–South theorists locate the driving force of world politics essentially in the conflict between rich and poor states, between imperial and colonial, dominant and dominated states. The great importance this issue has assumed since 1945 and the immiseration of millions in the Third World have contributed to a situation where these issues override the East–West conflict and generate these and other conflicts. The production of weapons and the conflicts between rich states are, in reality, means of consolidating their influence over weaker and poorer states. Sixth, the West–West theorists see world politics dominated by conflicts between the richer capitalist states, reminiscent of the period before 1914. From this perspective, the US conflict with the USSR is a mask to hide the real conflict with its major capitalist rivals – Western Europe and Japan. The Soviet threat is the only ideological instrument available to unite the major capitalist states. Turmoil in the Third World is the consequence of these inter-capitalist rivalries. Seventh, intra-state theorists identify the primary causes in the inner workings of the major world powers. International relations are an extension of domestic affairs. Changes in foreign policy are the result of shifts in internal power relations, or of weaknesses and changes in the economy and/or social composition of the countries concerned. Those in charge of foreign policy may pretend that they are responding to forces and states abroad, but, in reality, are attempting to resolve domestic policy disputes. Last, class-conflict theorists perceive international politics to be determined by the flow of social revolution and the conflict between capitalism and communism, on a world scale. They believe that it is the simultaneous unity and diversity of the world as transformed by capitalism which explains the turmoil of the post-war world. Sometimes it is expressed in rivalry between the major states of the capitalist and communist blocs.

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The end of the Soviet Union and the opening of Soviet archives unleashed an avalanche of studies. Major biographies of Stalin were published by Robert Service (2010), Simon Sebag Montefiore (2003) and Hiroaki Kuromiya (2013). The nature of Stalin’s mind is explored by Vojtech Mastny (1996). Mastny sees him as possessing a warped personality and bent on an insatiable lust for security. This made an accommodation with the West almost impossible. He stresses the ‘sheer evil of Stalinism’ and concludes that the Soviet Union was not a normal state but ‘one run by a criminal syndicate at the service of a bloody tyrant hungry for power and ready to abuse it’ (p. 194). John Lewis Gaddis (1998) revises his previous assessment of Stalin’s policies. He places Stalin’s extraordinary personality in the centre of the analysis. Much of the problem stemmed from Stalin’s ‘paranoia’. He had waged cold wars in his rise and retention of power in the Soviet Union. He always sought total security for himself and thereby deprived others of it. Gaddis quotes Maxim Litvinov, who thought that conflict between the communist and capitalist worlds was ‘inevitable’ (p. 24). This was due to the concept that security was based on territory – the more one has the more secure one is. Had Roosevelt lived, the course of Soviet–American relations would not have substantially changed. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov (1996) based their study on Soviet archives. They do not regard Stalin as mad but admit that he had a ‘dark mind’. They see Stalin as both concerned with Soviet security while promoting the expansion of revolution abroad. Zubok and Pleshakov stress time and again that Stalin and many officials thought that cooperation with the United States was possible. Odd Arne Westad (2005) laments the damage done by the Soviet–US confrontation on the Third World. It was drawn unwillingly into proxy wars which distorted its development. Melvyn P. Leffler (1992) produces a sophisticated account of the conflicting personal, ideological and Realpolitik problems facing the main protagonists. Stalin is viewed as difficult to read but not insane. In common with other authors he underlines that Stalin was brutal, suspicious and sensitive to every slight. Wilson D. Miscamble (2011) presents Truman as much more realistic than Roosevelt. The former’s efforts to forge good relations were frustrated by the Soviet leader. Frank Costigliola (2013) regrets that Roosevelt died and ‘Harriman, Kennan, and company came to the fore at such a critical juncture between war and peace’ (p. 419). Roosevelt accepted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and hoped together with Moscow to promote decolonisation in the Third World. Roosevelt thought he had two aces up his sleeve: the atomic bomb and economic aid. Given Stalin’s skills they might have come to naught. Although a majority of the US cabinet favoured a direct deal with the Soviets on nuclear power, Truman decided to go it alone and banked on American scientific and technological skills to keep ahead of Moscow. He accepted there would be an

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arms race. Costigliola quotes Harriman, whom he sees as undermining much of Roosevelt’s vision, conceding that FDR was ‘basically right in thinking he could make progress by personal relations with Stalin … The Russians were utterly convinced that the change came as the result of the shift from Roosevelt to Truman’ (p. 428). Geoffrey Roberts (2008) concludes trenchantly that the conflict occurred because ‘Western politicians such as Churchill and Truman were unable to see that beyond the alleged communist threat there was an opportunity to arrive at a post-war settlement that could have averted the cold war’. Jonathan Haslam (2011) points out that if Stalin exclusively was to blame for the Cold War, it should have ended when he died. Instead it did not and even waxed. Hence the wellsprings have to be sought in the aspirations of Imperial and Soviet Russia. Imperial Russia was alien to Europeans and Americans but was accommodated. The irony is that the failure to reach an accommodation after 1945 led to the US becoming a military giant. Without the Cold War this would not have happened. The Soviets regarded their enormous bloodletting as conferring on them the right to dominate Europe. This had ideological as well as imperial underpinnings. Not surprisingly the rest of Europe took a different view. Since they could not defend themselves, they pleaded with the Americans to protect them. The Cold War should not be perceived merely as a superpower confrontation. The arrival of the People’s Republic of China, in October 1949, signalled that another great power would emerge. Analysts can be forgiven for treating the USSR and China as a single communist entity. After all, China could not develop economically without Soviet aid. Then there was Vietnam. China going communist meant it could obtain weapons from the USSR. So from the immediate post-war era, communism had many faces. Hence the Cold War should be seen as a global conflict. The fact that the death of Stalin did not end the Cold War reveals that it had deeper roots. Imperial Russia regarded itself as the natural defender of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. Russia ruled Warsaw and a sizable portion of Poland before 1914. The Crimean War (1854–6) was fought by Britain and France to prevent Russia taking over the Straits which would have given her access to the Mediterranean. The other great powers wished to deny her this control. The irony is that if Russia had remained on the Allied side until November 1918, she would have secured these waterways. Russia had no natural frontier with Eastern Europe and had suffered various invasions – in 1812 by Napoleon and in 1914 and 1941 by Germany. Hence security on its western front was always a top priority. As the wry Czech joke goes, Russia always regards a good neighbour as one it occupies. One can assume that Stalin cursed his luck when he heard of the explosion of the atomic bomb in New Mexico. It changed everything. Without the atomic bomb the Red Army could dominate Europe. With it, diplomacy had to take over. Stalin feared a resurgent Germany would seek revenge. The record reveals that Stalin blundered on several occasions and did not achieve his objectives. War was out so peace had to be promoted.

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The growing hostility of the Soviet Union towards the US and the West was soon matched by that of China. It was no longer a bipolar but a multipolar conflict.

Post 1991 During the Cold War, great power rivalry was mainly concentrated on Europe as it was thought that if World War III were to break out, it would probably be an incident in Germany or Eastern Europe which would provide the spark which would ignite conflict. The Soviet Union regarded Germany as the key country in Europe with the German Democratic Republic showcasing socialism and the Federal Republic showcasing capitalism. Four-power control of Berlin led to endless friction. The West did not intervene during the Hungarian Revolution and the unrest in Poland, in 1956, or during the Soviet led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, because, as President Lyndon Johnson made clear to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Eastern Europe was recognised by the Americans as a Soviet zone of influence. It is therefore not surprising that Cold War studies traditionally concentrated on Eastern Europe as the source of the Cold War because that region gave rise to the most conflicts between the Soviets and the Western Allies. Scholarship was overwhelmingly Europocentric with some attention being given to other parts of the world. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, in 1989, and in the Soviet Union in 1991, permitted scholars to escape from this emphasis and to examine other conflicts, primarily those in Turkey and Iran. Imperial Russia always dreamed of gaining access to the eastern Mediterranean and, ironically, Russia would have gained control of the Straits and Constantinople had it not been for the Bolshevik Revolution. The weak Soviet Union had to concede territory to Turkey, and Stalin set about regaining these territories and obtaining military bases in the Straits after the German attack on the Soviet Union. In 1945, the victorious Soviet Union believed that it could achieve its long cherished dream of adding Turkey to its sphere of influence. Time and again, Moscow claimed Turkish territory and bases in the Straits, and had it not been for British and American support, Ankara would have been forced to concede these. The term Cold War was not used at the time and ‘war of nerves’ and ‘psychological warfare’ appear often. Simultaneously, the Soviets were attempting to expand their influence in Iran and were in a stronger position to do this than in Turkey. A 1921 treaty permitted the Soviet Union to invade if it believed that its security was at risk. The Iranian Shah was pro-German and this led to the occupation of Iran in August 1941, with the Red Army in the north and the British army in the south, with Tehran forming a neutral zone. The Soviets sought an oil concession in the north and the setting up of a Soviet–Iranian airline. Politically, because northern Iran had a large Azeri population, communist officials were appointed to key positions and the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, a covert communist party, took over. The Soviets also promoted Kurdish autonomy and the

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Kurdish People’s government was set up. At Potsdam, it was agreed that all foreign forces would leave Iran six months after the defeat of Japan, but the Soviet Union refused. They wanted to stay until Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, granted the oil concession. The Red (renamed Soviet in February 1946) Army was forced to leave in May 1946, and there is some dispute over what role President Truman played in this retreat as he spoke of issuing an ultimatum, but this was later revised. Whatever the reason, the Soviets were forced out. The Turkish and Iranian crises can be regarded as the genesis of the Cold War although the term was not used at the time. The reason why American policy was so decisive was that Washington realised that Soviet bases in the Straits would gradually lead to Turkey becoming a Soviet satellite and this would immeasurably increase Soviet influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean. The same applied to Iran as the Tudeh, the communist party, had a wide following and without American support Iran could be taken over by the communists. The UK had vital oil interests in southern Iran and did not wish to lose them. Hence Turkey and Iran were strategically important to Washington whereas Eastern Europe was not. Iran is the only country where the threat of US military force led to a Soviet withdrawal. This could occur in 1946 because the US had a nuclear monopoly and Stalin would not risk a military confrontation. The US never threatened military force in Eastern Europe because it was not viewed as strategically important. Greece was strategically important and hence the communists had to be prevented from taking power. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were presented as political and economic policies, but strategic military interests were the foundation of these initiatives. The Cold War, therefore, began in the Middle East. There were insurgencies in Vietnam, Laos and Malaya and these can be considered as contributing to the belief that a Cold War had broken out. The US did not regard the advances of Mao Zedong’s Red Army as a strategic threat because, even if they did take control of large parts of China, they would not pose a strategic threat as China was predominantly agrarian and it would take decades to develop industry. This is why the Mao–Chiang Kai-shek conflict is not regarded as contributing to the emergence of the Cold War. All this changed with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which revealed that the Cold War was no longer restricted to Europe and the Middle East but was now worldwide. John Mearsheimer (2018) is a proponent of the realist school of international relations which regards the balance of power as the rationale of foreign policy, superseding calls to protect human rights abroad. In other words, intervention in other states is only necessary if national security is under threat. A superpower can pursue the promotion of liberal democracy abroad only in a unipolar global order where a single superpower can intervene and shape the behaviour of weaker countries. In 1945, the United States regarded itself as the only superpower – it estimated that it would take the Soviet Union at least two decades to recover economically and Washington had the atomic bomb – so America could shape the post-war world. It was able to do this in the weak West European states and the Middle East which felt threatened by the military

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power of the Soviet Union. It was quite unable to effect comparable change in Eastern Europe because Moscow was a rising power and could not be defeated militarily if only conventional (non-nuclear) weapons were used. Washington had not envisaged the role of protector of weak European states in Western Europe and the Middle East but appeals from the British Labour government and other states transformed America into an imperialist power by invitation. One of the reasons why this occurred was that Washington judged that a communist Western Europe and Middle East would constitute a strategic military danger. It would also mean a loss of foreign markets, and this added to the need to ensure that capitalism continued to be the driver of economic growth there.

16 The United Nations and the concept of collective security

The history of the United Nations is the history of a search for a global, allembracing system of collective security. The aim was to prevent wars and if they happened to bring fighting to a swift end by finding a compromise solution. The first Anglo–American discussions resulted in the Atlantic Charter in August 1941. This led to a ‘Declaration by the United Nations’ on 1 January 1942 which stated the determination of the Allies to continue the war against the Axis forces until they were defeated. In 1943 an understanding was reached with Stalin that an international organisation to ensure international peace and security would be established. It would be based on the equality of all peaceloving states. Cordell Hull, the US secretary of state, in 1943, expressed high hopes for the new organisation. He believed that there would be no need in the future for zones of influence, for alliances, for a balance of power or any other mechanism which had been deployed in the past by states to enhance their security or interests. He was echoing the sentiments of President Roosevelt. The discussions to draft a charter led to many heated discussions and even threatened the whole project. One of the most contentious issues was the granting of veto status to the Big Five (the US, the USSR, the UK, France and China) in the UN Security Council. Small nations feared that if war were declared by one of the Big Five the UN would be paralysed and unable to act. The charter of the United Nations was agreed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco. Stalin insisted that Belorussia (now Belarus) and Ukraine also be added as members. These were not sovereign states but only members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United States could have also asked for a few federal states to be added but Roosevelt desisted. Poland, although a founding member of the UN, had no government and was not present. A government was formed shortly afterwards and Poland signed. Denmark and Argentina were also added, and the UN had 50 members. The UN did not want to repeat the mistakes of its predecessor, the League of Nations. However, it was only as strong as its members wanted it to become. This, in reality, meant the Big Five decided policy in the UN and Security Council, which had the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (article 24). However, the UK, France and China were weak and had to defer to US wishes. The Yalta formula had laid down that a DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-18

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vote of the General Assembly could be vetoed by one of the Big Five. Another weakness, which soon emerged, was that the UN had no armed forces at its disposal. It had to call on its members to provide muscle when a conflict arose. The Cold War reared its head often. Between 1945 and 1947 the Soviet Union used its veto seven times, predominantly concerning the Greek Civil War. There was also discord over new members. The Soviet Union vetoed the admission of Ceylon in 1948 on the basis that it would strengthen the pro-Western majority. George Kennan, in his Long Telegram, was concerned that the Soviet Union would use the UN, not for furthering world peace, but as an instrument to promote its objectives worldwide (Stöver 2006: 84–6).

The Iran crisis The first issue, in January 1946, which was referred to the UN Security Council was the Iran crisis, at the behest of Tehran. The Soviet Union objected strongly to it appearing on the agenda but the US and the UK ensured that it was debated. The other permanent members, France and China, observed a neutral stance. The tone of the debate was quite civil. Firmness and patience were the hallmarks of US policy. The Soviets did not favour conciliation to the extent the Western side did. Soviet notes were couched in moderate language to begin with but became quite brusque later. US policy began to change during the sessions and the misreading of Stalin’s speech of 9 February 1946 led to a reinterpretation of Soviet motives. One can trace the beginnings of the Cold War here. The Soviets deployed considerable rhetorical skill in presenting their case. Alenius (2014: passim) compares tactics to a fairy tale which is a contest between good and evil. Needless to say the Soviets are always in the good corner and the British and Americans the evil ones.

The Palestinian crisis The US and the Soviet Union recognised Israel soon after it declared independence on 14 May 1948. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Transjordan immediately declared war on Israel. The Palestinian crisis was one of the most exceptional episodes of the Cold War in that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed and together opposed the United Kingdom. France and China remained neutral. The British placed relations with the Arabs above those of Israel and did not play an active part in discussions. This permitted the Soviet Union to describe British policy as being driven by greed, money and a total lack of morality or justice. The Soviet Union was good and the UK evil.

The Berlin Blockade The Berlin Blockade appeared on the agenda in October 1948. Again the Soviet Union objected to it being tabled. On 25 October the Soviets vetoed a compromise proposed by neutral parties. During the winter and spring the UN tried to resolve the crisis internally but failed (Alenius 2014: 126).

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Both superpowers regarded the UN as a major platform to wage their information war, or war of words. Lengthy, detailed speeches were the norm as this cut down the amount of time for others. The Soviet Union was the natural leader of its bloc. The US was acknowledged by Britain, France and others as the leader of the opposing bloc. The US normally spoke first, followed by the UK and France. China spoke last and had little to say. After defeat, the Guomindang moved to Taiwan and became dependent on the US for security. The Palestinian crisis revealed fundamental differences between the US and the UK and France.

Part III

Assessment

17 Was it all inevitable?

What was the Cold War about? When did it begin and when did it end? If the use of the term by the actors in the drama is adopted, then it began in 1947 and ended shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. If the Cold War is understood to be the overt or covert antagonism which existed between the Soviet Union and the United States, between socialism and capitalism, between a collectivist, planned society and the pluralistic values of a market economy, then the Cold War began in October 1917 and ended with the collapse of the USSR in 1991. A more exact end date would be 1989 when Gorbachev declared it to be over. On the other hand, if the Cold War is seen as the period during which the overt antagonism between Moscow and Washington dominated world affairs, then it began in 1943 and ended sometime in the 1960s or even as late as the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. During this whole period of Soviet– American confrontation a parallel process was underway – the formation of blocs. The division of Germany and the splitting of Europe, and indeed the world, into two camps, was a fait accompli by 1955. From then onwards the two major political groupings competed for spheres of influence. It was as if the scramble for colonies by the European powers in the 19th century had taken on a new lease of life. The new ‘scramble’, however, embraced the whole world, and there seemed to be no room for neutrals. The analysis set out in the preceding pages has concentrated on the years 1941–9 but also due attention has been paid to the important pre-1941 era. Who was culpable for the outbreak of World War II is a highly charged subject and the late 1930s are analysed in detail. President Putin rejects strongly the assertion that the Soviet Union, in signing the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, made war inevitable. He argues that the USSR undertook strenuous efforts to forge an alliance with the UK and France to prevent the outbreak of hostilities but was rebuffed. Needless to say, had there been no World War II there would have been no Cold War. Soviet–American relations dominated the world from 1943 onwards. The UK was important before that date but its economic weakness meant that it had to rely increasingly on the US. The Soviet Union had indirectly aided the rise of Hitler, seeing him as the most extreme representative of finance capital, one who would so exacerbate DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-20

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social relations that he would eventually provoke a successful socialist revolution. This analysis proved to be totally false and Moscow saw itself confronted with a resurgent Germany which made clear that it was bent on expansion. In 1939, the Soviet Union was engaged in a war with Japan in the east and feared a German attack in the west. In order to avoid a two front war, Stalin proposed a Non-Aggression Pact, which ensured that Germany would not face a two front war when it attacked Poland. If the pact with Germany had not saved the Soviet Union from attack, could a future agreement with a foreign power guarantee legitimate security needs? It was only in the late 1930s that President Roosevelt realised that Germany was a threat to world peace and made an attempt to mediate, but was rejected by Germany. When war broke out, Churchill made clear to the US President that without America joining the war, the UK faced certain defeat. However, public opinion in the US favoured isolationism. The President endeavoured to provoke a German declaration of war, but this only occurred after the Japanese declaration of war on 7 December 1941. The United States drew three lessons from its experience. The first was that appeasement does not pay; the Munich settlement of 1938 was a shining example of what to avoid. The second was that a totalitarian domestic policy produces a totalitarian foreign policy. If peace were to be preserved, following the defeat of the Nazis, Germany and the whole region previously under its influence would have to be won over to democracy, understood as Americanstyle liberal capitalism. The third lesson was the need to extend the benefits of the open American society resting on a market economy in which protectionism, preference and tariffs had been removed. American foreign policy before 1941 was active in Europe and fashioned some pacts (the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact for example) but Washington would not be drawn into any military commitment. Roosevelt’s death came at a critical moment in American–Soviet relations, for the inability or unwillingness of the UK and the US to concede the Soviets a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe – something which Stalin thought had already been accepted in principle by the wartime allies – led the USSR first to stabilise and then to consolidate its position in that region. Yet every step in this direction provided ammunition in London and Washington for those who were having second thoughts about Soviet power and had little faith in Roosevelt’s grand design. Clement Attlee, for instance, was already pessimistic about the future of East–West relations in 1945, and Ernest Bevin’s suspicion of communists was well established. The British government was tied emotionally to Eastern Europe. Speaking in the House of Commons on 20 August 1945 about the problems of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria, Bevin stated that it was important to prevent the substitution of one form of totalitarianism for another. Truman’s secretary of state James F. Byrnes’s attempt to prise concessions out of the Soviets in Eastern Europe in return for deliveries of surplus US stock forced Moscow to decide between security and credit, and it chose the former.

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American policy consequently became a self-fulfilling prophesy. The Soviets, it was argued, did not want an agreement since they were bent on expansion. Give them Eastern Europe and they would then start asking for the countries to the west. Mastny (1996) regards the Soviet Union’s striving for power and influence far in excess of its reasonable security requirements as the primary source of the Cold War conflict. However, had Roosevelt made clear to Stalin the limits beyond which he could not stray, Stalin might have acted with more restraint. To Mastny, the West’s failure to resist soon enough was an important secondary source of the Cold War. However, Mastny accepts that Stalin favoured cooperation and did not want a Cold War. It was not in the Soviet Union’s interests to engage in confrontation with the US. However, the Cold War did come about despite all Stalin’s efforts to prevent it. The main reason was lack of trust on the Kremlin dictator’s part. Another reason was that he made egregious mistakes such as the failure to join the IMF, the World Bank and the Marshall Plan. The Berlin Blockade was probably the worst Soviet blunder. Leffler sees the Cold War as the legacy of the Second World War (Leffler 1992: 26). That conflict upset the international system, altered the balance of power in Europe, shattered colonial empires, restructured economic and social arrangements within nations, and bequeathed a legacy of fear that preordained a period of unusual anxiety and tension. Hence security became predominant. The national security policies of the Truman administration were an attempt to apply the lessons and cope with the legacies of the Second World War as much as they were an effort to contain the Soviet Union. The United States, by providing a security umbrella, acting as financial hegemon and promoting multilateral trade, helped stimulate unprecedented economic growth. Policy makers also believed that the expansion of industrial power would drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and wean the region away from Moscow. The Kremlin might eventually and gradually conform to international norms. Truman and his advisers believed the Cold War could be won. They were right. A major factor was the weakness of the UK. Instead of London becoming an effective ally of Washington in and after 1945, it rapidly became clear that the UK desperately needed US economic aid. This factor had an important impact on British thinking. London wanted to involve Washington more and more in European affairs. In the Middle East, British thinking was decisive. Britain was aware that it could not retain its control over the Egypt–Suez area without US military and economic help. It also needed protection for its extensive petroleum interests in the region. The Iran crisis of early 1946 brought home to the United States the importance of bases in the Middle East. Washington accepted that British power had to be sustained in this region since this was in its own interests. In Southeast Asia, the United States acceded to the wishes of the European colonial powers for the restoration of the old order. The exception here was the Dutch loss of what became Indonesia. In Germany, France vetoed all Allied attempts to treat Germany economically as a single unit. France’s fear of a resurgent Germany dominated its

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thinking. In 1947, two-thirds of European trade was still on a bilateral basis. The inability of West Europeans to solve their own economic problems reduced their political self-confidence. Increasingly after 1945 they turned to the United States as their political, economic and military saviour. From a security point of view, Western Europe was incapable of defending itself. Hence the strategy of containment of the Soviet threat owes its conception to the European, not the American, mind. Churchill and later Ernest Bevin worked indefatigably to weld the United States and Western Europe together. The same pattern can be traced in Asia, where timorous allies clamoured for more and more American intervention in their region. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and, especially, the formation of NATO were articulated in the United States but were conceived in Europe. Had Germany and Western Europe experienced a rapid economic transformation after 1945, much of Kennan’s pessimism would not have arisen. The Americans became alarmed at the weakness of their allies and potential allies and exaggerated Soviet power. Geir Lundestad has coined the phrase ‘empire by invitation’ to explain the evolution of US global policy (Lundestad 1986: 55). The Soviets were their own worst enemies. The dispatches of US and British diplomats paint an unflattering picture of the Moscow leadership. A flavour of the view from the Kremlin (the British embassy overlooked the Kremlin) is provided by Frank Roberts, a brilliantly successful career diplomat. After observing the party Politburo at the opening session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he reported on 30 April 1945: The Group at the back with M. I. Kalinin are enough to make one shudder and fill one with considerable apprehension regarding future Soviet policy … They are all tough, fat, prosperous individuals who might equally have come to the top in any other ruthless, totalitarian society such as those we are defeating in Germany and Italy. Andrei Zhdanov in particular might be a plumper and perhaps more humane version of Hitler himself. Lavrenty P. Beria and George Malenkov … give the impression of being at worst perverts and sadists and at best reincarnations of medieval inquisitors justifying every action on the principle of the end justifying the means. Not the type of gentlemen, if that is the right word, in whom one would place great trust! Ulam regards Stalin’s domestic insecurity as the major reason. He needed to cut his empire off from the outside capitalist world. Contact with capitalists would run the risk of undermining his internal control (Ulam 1974: passim). Stalin’s demands in Turkey and Iran drove them into America’s arms. Here is the genesis of the Cold War. The US could give way in Eastern Europe but not in the Middle East because the latter was of great strategic significance to Washington. It threatened war to drive the Soviet Union out of Iran, something it would never have dreamt of doing in Eastern Europe.

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So let us sum up. The Cold War came to an end but neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had wanted it. So was it an accident? No, it originated in mistaken perceptions of world politics. Part of the blame rests with President Roosevelt who, not by design, but by ignorance of the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism and Stalin, conducted a policy which was mainly based on false assumptions. As an anti-imperialist, he did not perceive that Stalin was an imperialist, bent on increasing his and the Soviet Union’s security by bringing more and more territory under his control. Stalin’s thinking rested on three foundations: personal security; national security; and the security of the communist world. Personal security was always paramount and thus he always calculated: will this policy increase my personal security? He saw himself as the leader of the greatest socialist state in the world and, in his mind, his own and the Soviet Union’s security were one and the same. Another problem was Stalin’s understanding of democracy. To him, it was represented by the working class, guided by the Communist Party, with himself as the main guide. This became evident in an exchange with Stanisław Mikołajczyk, leader of the Polish government in exile, when the vozhd said: ‘There are certain people – both Left and Right – that we cannot allow in Polish politics’. Mikołajczyk pointed out that in a democracy it was not possible to dictate who could be in politics and who could not. Stalin’s response was to look at him ‘as if I were … a lunatic and ended the conference’ (Applebaum 2013: 208). Roosevelt never took communism seriously and regarded it as a passing phase in the history of Russia. He was right, as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, but from 1943 onwards Stalin and the rest of the world began to see the Soviet Union as a great power and then a superpower. Roosevelt was a patrician Machiavellian, possessed of the gift of giving his interlocutor the impression that he was going to get something while camouflaging his own views behind a constant flow of mellifluous phrases. He was also a master manipulator, and this gave him the confidence that he could juggle competing policies until he found the one which suited him. He was quite incapable of understanding Stalin, as he had never had to deal with such a politician before. He made fun of Churchill as an imperialist believing that this would ingratiate him with the vozhd. But Stalin was an imperialist, a Marxist imperialist, who looked forward to the Soviet Union, and himself, dominating the world. Molotov commented that Churchill was the cleverer imperialist – the Soviets also regarded Roosevelt as an imperialist bent on destroying the Soviet Union. Why did Roosevelt achieve so little in his dealings with Stalin? He engaged in due process, ever seeking a diplomatic solution to a problem, and never deployed raw power to achieve an objective. He resolutely separated diplomatic and military goals and never attempted to use raw power to achieve diplomatic goals. Stalin, on the other hand, used raw power to achieve political goals. Truman, likewise, deployed raw power to achieve political goals. Churchill was a bulldog, a lover of empire when empires were going out of fashion, unashamed about being an imperialist, an actor; with his hats, bow tie, cigar and V sign as props, he was a natural script writer and would have been

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at home in Hollywood; he cultivated a gravelly voice to give gravitas to his words and loved to talk, was given to long poetic speeches but did not like to listen and found it difficult to wait his turn to speak. He recognised Stalin immediately as an imperialist but was quite unable to convince Roosevelt, who preferred his own counsel. Presumably, the President regarded Stalin as just another politician he could charm into giving him what he desired. Churchill would have demanded a quid pro quo for everything he gave the vozhd and would have been loath to concede any territorial gains. He always had a weak hand to play but, like Roosevelt, believed in personal diplomacy. A face to face meeting was the best way to solve problems. Stalin was the master diplomat and politician who never raised his voice or showed anger or frustration during international conferences. Part of this was due to his excellent spy network in London and Washington, which meant that he knew the other side’s agenda. Churchill, on the other hand, was on the receiving end of his sharp tongue when he wanted a Second Front and more war matériel. One of Stalin’s weaknesses was that he was paranoid, always presuming that a proposal had a hidden agenda which would diminish his security. Roosevelt was quite willing to acknowledge Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence irrespective of what the Poles or Churchill said, but Stalin could not believe that the offer was without strings. The President’s health began to fail in 1944, at a crucial time when the post-war world was being designed. The fact that the President, and General Eisenhower, would not countenance setting military-political objectives in 1944–5, whereas Stalin always operated according to these principles, was very frustrating for Churchill. Hence Stalin bears as much responsibility as Roosevelt for the Cold War as he ignored many opportunities to fashion a Soviet–American dominated world. He expected, after 1945, that the main capitalist states, the UK and the US, would fight for markets in Europe and the rest of the world and so thought war between and among capitalist states was inevitable. His policies in Eastern Europe alarmed the weak Western European states, including the UK, and they came together to seek American military, economic and political protection. An example of how difficult it was to engage with the Soviets was Operation Frantic, in which American aircraft shuttle-bombed Germany and Axis-occupied territory, using airfields in Poltava, Myrhorod and Pyriatyn, Ukraine, to refuel and rearm, before heading westwards again. On 2 June 1944, a B-17 bomber carrying General Ira Eaker, commander of the Mediterranean air force was the first of over 200 US bombers to land in Poltava that afternoon. En route they had bombed targets in Hungary. Myrhorod and Pyriatin were relinquished in October 1944, but Poltava was still operational until the US left on 23 June 1945. Personnel reached a peak of 1,236 with perhaps only 38 being able to speak Russian or Ukrainian. The Americans hoped that similar facilities in western Ukraine and Poland would become available, together with bases in the Russian Far East to permit attacks on Japan, but these never materialised. Eighteen bombing raids on German targets were carried out from Poltava. In August 1944, the Americans wanted to fly relief supplies to the Home Army in

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Warsaw but the Soviets demurred, although they did permit this in September when the US lost two Flying Fortress bombers over Warsaw. The greatest combat losses were, however, suffered on the night of 21–22 June 1944 (the third anniversary of the Axis attack on the Soviet Union), when 49 Flying Fortresses and five other aircraft were destroyed on the ground during a German and Hungarian attack on Poltava, Myrhorod and Pyriatyn. This was the only occasion during World War II when Soviets and Americans lived and fought together and was geared to promote mutual trust and collaboration. The Americans were enthusiastic, but the Soviets were distrustful, remembering Allied intervention which followed the Bolshevik Revolution. To the Soviet mind, foreign troops, especially if they were technically superior, aroused fears that their real purpose could be to take over Ukraine. Paranoia resulted in all contacts between the Americans and Soviets being seen as potentially undermining security and led to arrests, cross examinations and girls being dubbed prostitutes. The Soviet military, not unsurprisingly, tried to prevent Operation Frantic and had to be ordered by Stalin, in 1943, to cooperate. Thereafter they did their best to scupper the operation and in early 1945, the Red Army even had contingency plans to attack the Poltava base. The US wanted to repatriate freed US prisoners of war through Poltava, but this was met with incomprehension by the Soviets as Americans treated returning POWs as heroes but, in the words of Lt. Col. Wilmeth, the Soviet attitude towards liberated American prisoners is the same as the Soviet attitude towards the countries they have liberated. Prisoners are spoils of war won by Soviet arms. They may be robbed, starved and abused – and no one has the right to question such treatment. (Plokhy 2019) This episode reveals the level of Soviet paranoia and the naivety of Americans who ignored the ideological divide between communism and capitalism and in so doing sowed the seeds of the Cold War. The fact that the Soviet Union was a rising power and the United States a dominant power is reminiscent of the Thucydides’s trap. The rise of Athens struck fear in the hearts of the Spartans and the inevitable result was war. Over the last 500 years in European history, the clash between a rising power and a dominant power has resulted in war sixteen times. War is not inevitable as there were instances when a war was averted. The risk of war between the Soviet Union and the United States waxed and waned over the decades but had Washington threatened to deploy the atomic bomb and been willing to carry out this threat before 1949, the USSR could have been forced to retreat from Eastern Europe. Churchill’s thinking about Operation Unthinkable only envisaged using conventional forces and never considered the nuclear option. This was probably due to the realisation that the dropping of an atomic bomb in Europe would have been opposed by an overwhelming majority of the British and American public.

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Another point which is significant is that Russians are not given to smiling. This leads foreigners to regard them as cold, unfriendly, unwilling to strike up acquaintances with strangers easily and hence uncommunicative. Often, they are portrayed as granite-jawed, frozen-faced and grim. This is a misreading of the Russian character. A Russian professor, Iosef Sternin, attempts to explain this gap in cultures: 

 



  

A smile in not equal to politeness; Western smiles when greeting is pure politeness; the more a person smiles the greater the friendlessness one is revealing to the other person; a constant polite smile is referred to by Russians as the ‘duty smile’ and is regarded as bad; it reveals insincerity and unwillingness to reveal one’s true emotions; the genuine Russian smile is a sign of personal empathy but not politeness. Russians do not smile at strangers; Russians smile at acquaintances; this is why sales assistants do not smile at customers because they do not know them; if the customer is known the sales assistant may smile. Russians do not smile back; if a Russian observes someone he or she does not know smiling, he or she will try to guess why that person is smiling; he or she may think it has to do with clothes or hairdo; the other person obviously finds these things amusing. Russians need a reason to smile; this gives a person the right to smile – from the other person’s point of view; Russia has a proverb which does not exist in any other language: To laugh without reason is a mark of stupidity. The unsmiling Russian person is not gloomy – most Russians are cheerful and reveal a zest for life; Russian folklore contains many examples of strictures against laughter and jokes. Russians do not normally smile while working or doing something serious; an example is that customs officials never smile because they are busy doing their job. The true Russian smile is a sincere smile and reveals a good mood.

Given the above, it is not surprising that Americans had difficulty in establishing a rapport with their Russian interlocutors! A social psychologist would point out that the American lack of foresight (and the indignation which followed), which was evident in and after 1945, was due to attribution errors, mistakes in how they perceived themselves and others. Self-serving bias leads the US to credit its triumphs to internal qualities – like intelligence, drive or the pioneer spirit – but to blame situational factors for its losses. Its belief in a just world credits the success of others merely to circumstances and their failure results from some character flaw. From here, it is a simple step for the US to persuade itself that its success, since it has come from an enduring source, will itself endure, but that the success of others will be transient. These biases make it more difficult to predict accurately how and when influence and favour will shift.

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US policy makers assumed the world would never really change, that history was for them and them alone. However, history teaches us that powers rise and fall, and attribution errors reveal that this is not perceived right up to the point when it happens. On this analysis the US was blind to the fact that the Soviet Union had arrived on the world stage and would challenge American hegemony in 1945. The emergence of the Cold War showed that America refused to recognise the rising power of the Soviet Union, and its policies (containment, roll-back, liberation policy) were designed to deny the Soviet Union its place in the sun. This would also help to explain America’s indignation when Moscow refused to give way and accept the US view of the world. On this basis, the Americans are as much to blame as the Soviets for the emergence of the Cold War. Another factor is that Washington overestimated Soviet power. It moved from dismissing a Soviet threat in 1945 to perceiving Soviet communism as a beast which was growing by the day and could eventually devour them. Indignation – indeed the shock – at the rise of communism morphed into the incredible phenomenon of McCarthyism. The extraordinary fact is that the atomic monopoly, enjoyed by the US from 1945 to 1949, did not generate a feeling of security. Containment, proposed by Kennan, was a defensive response to the appeal of communism – social justice and fair living standards for all. It did not answer the question: what narrative can we espouse which can compete with communism? America simply began to lose its self-confidence after 1945. Since Western Europe had no self-confidence after 1945 – it simply conceded that the Soviet Union was the dominant power in Europe – the two main centres of capitalism were wracked by anxiety. However, the weakness of Western Europe led inevitably to American economic hegemony. It, in turn, led to political hegemony. Henry Kissinger, in his memoirs, points out an American weakness after 1945. The US separated military power from diplomatic power. Roosevelt and Eisenhower strongly held this view. Had they followed the Soviet example of seeing these two as twins they might have achieved a better settlement than the one which emerged. Washington had a plan for nuclear war against the Soviet Union in December 1945. However, it was meaningless since Truman would not sanction the use of atomic bombs. It was counter-productive since Moscow was aware of it – through its spies – and sowed even more distrust about America’s intentions. So the conclusion is that the Cold War was not inevitable but a distinct probability given that the two giants on the world stage could not work out a language of communication. Not surprising, given that the United States refused to acknowledge the Soviet Union was a rising power in 1945 and eventually its equal – at least until the early 1970s.

Part IV

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Document 1 The Cold War: an orthodox view The orthodox or traditional view of the origins of the Cold War is here presented by Arthur Schlesinger. An analysis of the origins of the Cold War which leaves out these factors – the intransigence of Leninist ideology, the sinister dynamics of a totalitarian society, and the madness of Stalin – is obviously incomplete. It was these factors which made it hard for the West to accept the thesis that Russia was moved only by a desire to protect its security and would be satisfied by the control of Eastern Europe; it was these factors which charged the debate between universalism and spheres of influence with apocalyptic potentiality. Leninism and totalitarianism created a structure of thought and behavior which made postwar collaboration between Russia and America – in any normal sense of civilized intercourse between national states – inherently impossible. The Soviet dictatorship of 1945 simply could not have survived such a collaboration. The difference between America and Russia in 1945 was that some Americans fundamentally believed that, over a long run, a modus vivendi with Russia was possible; while the Russians, so far as one can tell, believed in no more than a short-run modus vivendi with the United States. Harriman and Kennan, this narrative has made clear, took the lead in warning Washington about the difficulties of short-run dealings with the Soviet Union. But both argued that, if the United States developed a rational policy and stuck to it, there would be, after long and rough passages, the prospect of eventual clearing. ‘I am, as you know,’ Harriman cabled Washington in early April, ‘a most earnest advocate of the closest possible understanding with the Soviet Union so that what I am saying relates only to how best to attain such understanding’. There is no corresponding evidence on the Russian side that anyone seriously sought a modus vivendi in these terms. Stalin’s choice was whether his longterm ideological and national interests would be better served by a short-run truce with the West or by an immediate resumption of pressure. In October 1945 Stalin indicated to Harriman at Sochi that he planned to adopt the second course – that the Soviet Union was going isolationist. No doubt the succession of problems with the United States contributed to this decision, but the basic causes most probably lay elsewhere: in the developing situations in Eastern Europe, in Western Europe, and in the United States. If the condition of Eastern Europe made unilateral action seem essential in the interests of Russian security, the condition of Western Europe and the United States offered new temptations for communist expansion. The point of no return came on July 2, 1947, when Molotov, after bringing 89 technical specialists with him to Paris and evincing initial interest in the project for European reconstruction, received the hot flash from the Kremlin, denounced the whole idea, and walked out of the conference. For the next fifteen years the DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-21

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Cold War raged unabated, passing out of historical ambiguity into the realm of good versus evil and breeding on both sides simplifications, stereotypes, and self-serving absolutes, often couched in interchangeable phrases. Under the pressure even America, for a deplorable decade, forsook its pragmatic and pluralist traditions, posed as God’s appointed messenger to ignorant and sinful man, and followed the Soviet example in looking to a world remade in its own image. In retrospect, if it is impossible to see the Cold War as a case of American aggression and Russian response, it is also hard to see it as a pure case of Russian aggression and American response. Source: Arthur J. Schlesinger, Jr., ‘Origins of the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs, 46, 1 October 1967.

Document 2 The Cold War: a revisionist view W. A. Williams, one of the key revisionist historians, here attacks the traditional view that the Soviet Union started the Cold War. He sees American universalism and the concomitant claim that it has the right to intervene anywhere as a major reason for the Cold War. He pays particular attention to the ‘open-door’ economic policy of the US government, seeing in it the seeds of conflict between the United States and the USSR in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. American leaders had internalized, and had come to believe, the theory, the necessity, and the morality of open-door expansion. Hence they seldom thought it necessary to explain or defend the approach. Instead, they assumed the premises and concerned themselves with exercising their freedom and power to deal with the necessities and the opportunities that were defined by such an outlook. As far as American leaders were concerned, the philosophy and practice of open-door expansion had become, in both its missionary and economic aspects, the view of the world. Those who did not recognize and accept that fact were considered not only wrong, but incapable of thinking correctly … Particularly after the atom bomb was created and used, the attitude of the United States left the Soviets with but one real option: either acquiesce in American proposals or be confronted with American power and hostility. It was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war … The real issue is rather the far more subtle one of which side committed its power to policies which hardened the natural and inherent tensions and propensities into bitter antagonisms and inflexible positions. Two general attitudes can be adopted in facing that issue. One is to assume, or take for granted, on the basis of emotion and official information, that the answer is obvious: Russia is to blame. That represents the easy, nationalistic solution to all questions

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about international affairs. That attitude also defines history as a stockpile of facts to be requisitioned on the basis of what is needed to prove a conclusion decided upon in advance … In undertaking such self-examination, the first and essential requirement is to acknowledge two primary facts which can never be blinked. The first is that the United States had from 1944 to at least 1962 a vast preponderance of actual as well as potential power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union … For power and responsibility go together in a direct and intimate relationship. Unless it tries all the alternatives that offer reasonable probabilities of success, a nation with the great relative supremacy enjoyed by the United States between 1944 and 1962 cannot with any real warrant or meaning claim that it has been forced to follow a certain approach or policy. Yet that is the American claim even though it did not explore several such alternatives. Instead, and this is the second fact that cannot be dodged, the United States used or deployed its preponderance of power wholly within the assumptions and the tradition of the strategy of the Open Door Policy. The United States never formulated and offered the Soviet Union a settlement based on other, less grandiose, terms … The popular idea that Soviet leaders emerged from the war ready to do aggressive battle against the United States is simply not borne out by the evidence … In a similar way, it is a grave error to evaluate or interpret the diplomatic moves of 1945 and 1946 in an economic vacuum. This is true in three respects. First, a good many of them were specifically economic in character. Second, all of them were intimately bound up with Russia’s concern to obtain either a loan from the United States or extensive reparations from Germany and its former allies in eastern Europe. And finally, the determination to apply the Open Door Policy to eastern Europe, which led directly to the policies of ‘total diplomacy’ and ‘negotiation from strength’ later made famous by Secretary of State Acheson, evolved concurrently with a deep concern over economic affairs in the United States … George F. Kennan’s 1946–1947 explanation of Soviet behavior … spawned a vast literature which treated Stalin as no more than a psychotic and, on the other [hand], an equally large body of comment which argued that the only effective way to deal with the Soviet Union was to apply the lessons learned from the experience with Hitler. When tested against known facts, rather than accepted on the basis of a syllogism, these interpretations and recommendations did not lack all validity. Even by their own logic, however, they pointed to ultimate failure. For, by creating in fact a real, avowed, and allencompassing outside threat, action based upon such analysis and analogy lent substance to what Kennan originally defined as a hallucination in the minds of Soviet leaders. Having argued that they had to create imaginary foreign dangers in order to stay in power at home, Kennan concluded with a policy recommendation to create a very serious (and from the Soviet point of view, mortal) outside challenge to their authority. Source: William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, rev. ed. (Delta Books, New York, 1962), pp. 206–9, 227, 266–7, 278–9.

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Document 3 The Cold War: a post-revisionist view Melvyn P. Leffler finds that both sides contributed to the Cold War. In 1946 and 1947 a tolerable configuration of power in Eurasia probably could not have been brought about without provoking the Soviets. The threats emanating from the post-war socio-economic dislocation and power vacuum were too great to allow for a policy of reassurance. Although unlikely, a sequence of events might have ended in Communist victories in France, Italy, and Greece, and might have led to an autonomous and revanchist Germany, and might have culminated in Soviet domination, however indirect, of major parts of western Eurasia. Prudent men could not take such risks when the leadership in the Kremlin was so totalitarian and repressive and when it possessed an ideology that appeared attractive to even larger numbers of people in the underdeveloped periphery. US officials intelligently decided to rebuild western Europe and to co-opt German and Japanese strength. These actions were of decisive importance in fueling the Cold War, but they were prudently conceived and skillfully implemented in cooperation with indigenous elites. Although US actions necessarily engendered legitimate security apprehensions in the Soviet Union, the Russian response was neither so belligerent nor so daring as to have necessitated the huge buildup in strategic armaments, the stress on European conventional rearmament, and the endless struggles on the periphery. The Russians backed down in Berlin. Moreover their capacity to affect developments in the Third World was severely circumscribed by their limited power-projection capabilities and their economic backwardness. Western Europe required security guarantees, not the extensive armaments that America wanted it to have. The Third World needed markets and capital and self-determination, not a reformed neo-colonial leadership bolstered by US military aid … The great achievement of the early Cold War years was that US officials helped forge a configuration of power in the industrial core of Eurasia that continues to safeguard vital US interests … Western Europe is no longer weak and vulnerable; Germany and Japan are strong; Marxist–Leninist ideology and the Soviet model of development are discredited. Source: Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1992), pp. 516–18.

Document 4 The Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941) President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill held a highly secret meeting on board a warship off Argentia, Newfoundland, from 9 to 12 August 1941 to discuss post-war peace objectives. Its outcome was this Charter.

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Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world. First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security; Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance; Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. Source: Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 32–3.

Document 5 Eden and Stalin In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Anthony Eden, British foreign secretary, flew to Moscow to discuss common Anglo–Soviet–American problems. He consulted with Stalin on 16 and 17 December 1941 and found him keen to settle the post-war frontiers, even though the German Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow.

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Stalin’s suggestions for this protocol showed me that the hope we had held in London, of being able to confine the discussion of frontiers to the general terms of the Atlantic Charter, had been vain. Russian ideas were already starkly definite. They changed little during the next three years, for their purpose was to secure the most tangible physical guarantees for Russia’s future security. Stalin proposed that Poland should expand westward at Germany’s expense. Other occupied countries were to return to their old frontiers, Austria being restored, while the Rhineland and possibly Bavaria would be detached from Germany. The Soviet Union would regain her frontiers of 1941 with Finland and Roumania and would recover the Baltic States. Her frontier with Poland would be based on the Curzon line. [The Curzon line, proposed by the British at the Peace Conference of 1919–20, was considerably west of the actual Russo– Polish boundary between 1921 and 1939; on the other hand, as a result of the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 1939, the new Russo–Polish boundary moved west of the Curzon line, thereby giving Russia large portions of Poland.] Stalin also wanted the right to establish bases in Finland and Roumania with a guarantee for the exits from the Baltic. The Soviet government would not object, he said, to Britain establishing bases in Denmark and Norway. Stalin then put two questions. What were our views about reparation by Germany for the damage she had done, and how were we to keep peace and order in Europe after the war? He suggested a council of the victorious powers, with a military force at its disposal. The Soviet Union would have no objection if some European countries wished to federate. I told Stalin that I agreed with much that he had said about post-war Europe. The British people were determined that every possible military measure should be taken to prevent Germany breaking the peace again. Exactly how this was to be done would have to be gone into carefully. There was no doubt that some kind of military control over Germany would be necessary and that Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, if they would help, would have to undertake it. On the partition of Germany, I said, the British government had not taken a decision either way. There was no objection to it in principle. Nor had we closed our minds to a separate Bavaria or Rhineland; we were certainly in favour of an independent Austria … So far as reparations were concerned, I was sure, from our experience after the last war, that we should be against any money reparations; the restitution by Germany of goods taken away from occupied territories was another matter. I then explained to Stalin that I could not agree to the secret protocol without reference to the Cabinet and added: Even before Russia was attacked, Mr Roosevelt sent a message to us, asking us not to enter into any secret arrangement as to the post-war reorganization of Europe without first consulting him. This does not exclude our two countries from discussing a basis for the peace …

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But there are many questions relating to the safety of our two countries which can be discussed between us. EDEN: We can discuss matters between us, but ultimately, for the purpose of the peace treaty, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States of America must all come in and agree with one another on the principal world affairs. STALIN: I agree. STALIN:

I then suggested that before we spoke of military plans, we ought to clear up a political point. Should we try to combine our two documents, or what course did Stalin propose? I think that what you have submitted is a kind of declaration, whereas ours are two agreements. A declaration I regard as algebra, but an agreement as practical arithmetic. I do not wish to decry algebra, but I prefer practical arithmetic.

STALIN:

Source: Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (Cassell, London, 1965), pp. 334–5.

Document 6 ‘There will no longer be need for spheres of influence’ Cordell Hull, US secretary of state, took part in the Moscow conference of late October 1943. The central problem was Poland, though Hull said little on this subject. These extracts are from his report to Congress on 18 November 1943. At the end of the war, each of the United Nations and each of the nations associated with them will have the same common interest in national security, in world order under law, in peace, in the full promotion of the political, economic, and social welfare of their respective peoples – in the principles and spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations. The future of these indispensable common interests depends absolutely upon international cooperation. Hence, each nation’s own primary interest requires it to cooperate with the others. These considerations led the Moscow Conference to adopt the four-nation declaration with which you are all familiar. I should like to comment briefly on its main provisions. In that document, it was jointly declared by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China ‘That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security’. To this end, the four Governments declared that they ‘recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small’. I should like to lay

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particular stress on this provision of the declaration. The principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general security will be the foundation stone upon which the future international organization will be constructed … The four Governments further agreed that, pending the inauguration in this manner of a permanent system of general security, ‘they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations’ whenever such action may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Finally, as an important self-denying ordinance, they declared ‘That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation’. Through this declaration, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and China have laid the foundation for cooperative effort in the postwar world toward enabling all peace-loving nations, large and small, to live in peace and security … As the provisions of the four-nation declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests. Source: US Department of State Bulletin, IX, 20 November 1943. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 41–2.

Document 7 The Percentages Agreement In early October 1944 Winston Churchill flew to Moscow to discuss with Stalin various post-war problems – especially who should have responsibility for overseeing Eastern and Southeastern Europe. On 9 October 1944 they concluded the Percentages Agreement. Molotov amended the percentages on Bulgaria and Hungary the following day in favour of the USSR. We alighted at Moscow on the afternoon on October 9, and were received very heartily and with full ceremonial by Molotov and many high Russian personages. This time we were lodged in Moscow itself, with every care and comfort. I had one small, perfectly appointed house, and Anthony another nearby. We were glad to dine alone together and rest. At ten o’clock that night we held our first important meeting in the Kremlin … The moment was apt for business, so I said, ‘Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety

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per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?’ While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper: Rumania Russia The others Greece

90% 10%

Great Britain (in accord with USA) Russia Yugoslavia Hungary Bulgaria

90% 10% 50–50% 50–50%

Russia The others

75% 25%

I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down. Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point, and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won. After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, ‘Might it not be though rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper’. ‘No, you keep it’, said Stalin. Source: Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1954), pp. 226–8.

Document 8 Djilas on Stalin Milovan Djilas became a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1940, and when Germany occupied Yugoslavia in 1941 he joined the Partisans led by Tito. He headed a military mission to Moscow in 1944 and visited the Soviet capital again the following year. Note his assessment of Stalin’s attitude to revolution. Stalin presented his views on the distinctive nature of the war that was being waged: ‘This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also

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imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army has power to do so. It cannot be otherwise’. He also pointed out, without going into long explanations, the meaning of his pan-Slavic policy. ‘If the Slavs keep united and maintain solidarity, no one in the future will be able to move a finger. Not even a finger!’ he repeated, emphasizing his thought by cleaving the air with his forefinger. Someone expressed doubt that the Germans would be able to recuperate within fifty years. But Stalin was of a different opinion. ‘No, they will recover, and very quickly. It is a highly developed industrial country with an extremely skilled and numerous working class and technical intelligentsia. Give them twelve to fifteen years and they’ll be on their feet again. And this is why the unity of the Slavs is important. But even apart from this, if the unity of the Slavs exists, no one will dare move a finger.’ At one point he got up, hitched up his trousers as though he was about to wrestle or to box, and cried out emotionally, ‘The war will soon be over. We shall recover in fifteen to twenty years, and then we’ll have another go at it.’ There was something terrible in his words: a horrible war was still going on. Yet there was something impressive, too, about his realization of the paths he had to take, the inevitability that faced the world in which he lived and the movement that he headed … It is time something was said about Stalin’s attitude to revolutions, and thus to the Yugoslav revolution. Because Moscow had always refrained at the crucial moment from supporting the Chinese, Spanish, and in many ways even the Yugoslav revolutions, the view prevailed, not without reason, that Stalin was generally against revolutions. This is, however, not entirely correct. His opposition was only conditional, and arose only when the revolution went beyond the interests of the Soviet state. He felt instinctively that the creation of revolutionary centres outside Moscow could endanger its supremacy in world Communism, and of course that is what actually happened. That is why he helped revolutions only up to a certain point – as long as he could control them – but he was always ready to leave them in the lurch whenever they slipped out of his grasp. I maintain that not even today is there any essential change in this respect in the policy of the Soviet Government. In his own country Stalin had subjected all activities to his views and to his personality, so he could not behave differently outside. Having identified domestic progress and freedom with the interests and privileges of a political party, he could not act in foreign affairs other than as a dictator. And like everyone else he must be judged by his actual deeds. He became himself the slave of the despotism, the bureaucracy, the narrowness, and the servility that he imposed on his country. It is indeed true that no one can destroy another’s freedom without losing his own. Source: Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Harcourt Brace International, San Diego CA, 1963). English translation copyright © 1962 and renewed 1990 by Harcourt, Inc., reprinted by permission of the publisher.

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Document 9 Poland at Yalta Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin discussed Poland at length at the Yalta Conference (6–11 February 1945). The crucial question was the composition of the Polish government. The declaration of 11 February 1945 appeared to concede much of what the West wanted. In the months which followed Churchill and Roosevelt/Truman argued bitterly with Stalin over the interpretation of this declaration. 6 February 1945 Marshal Stalin then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish question: Mr Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past grievances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland … It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death … 11 February 1945 The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference: ‘A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity … This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates … The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the New Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the

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final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.’ Source: US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 89, 93.

Document 10 The Declaration on Liberated Europe After the Percentages Agreement (Document 7, pp. 232–3) the Soviets afforded American and British representatives on the control commissions in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary little scope. This document, agreed at the Yalta Conference (February 1945), makes an attempt to redress the balance in favour of the West. The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations. To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration. When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action

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necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration. By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind. In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested. Source: US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 53–4.

Document 11 Roosevelt to Stalin on Poland Roosevelt, in a letter to Stalin on 1 April 1945, expressed his concern at the latter’s interpretation of the Yalta declaration on Poland. To Stalin it meant that the communists would stay in control, but to Roosevelt it meant that the communists would no longer dominate the government. I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta … So far there has been a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which the world expects, of the political decisions which we reached at the Conference, particularly those relating to the Polish question. I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be and must tell you that I do not fully understand in many respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having understood each other so well at Yalta I am convinced that the three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have developed since then. I intend, therefore, in this message to lay before you with complete frankness the problem as I see it … [The] part of our agreements at Yalta which has aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent relates to the Polish question. You are aware of course that the Commission which we set up has made no progress. I feel this is due to the interpretation which your Government is placing upon the Crimean decisions … In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement or our discussions. While it is true that the Lublin Government is to be reorganized and its members play a prominent role it is to be done in such a

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fashion as to bring into being a new Government. This point is clearly brought out in several places in the text of the agreement. I must make it quite plain to you that any such solution which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present Warsaw regime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed. Source: US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, V. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 94–5.

Document 12 A ‘barbarian invasion of Europe’ Truman, although vice-president, was not a member of Roosevelt’s foreign policy group. After he became president, Truman called all his key advisers together to analyse East–West relations. One of the ‘hardliners’ was Averell Harriman, US ambassador to Moscow, who warned Truman on 20 April 1945 about the consequences for a country if it fell under Soviet control. Ambassador Harriman said that in effect what we were faced with was a ‘barbarian invasion of Europe’, that Soviet control over any foreign country did not mean merely influence on their foreign relations but the extension of the Soviet system with secret police, extinction of freedom of speech, etc., and that we had to decide what should be our attitude in the face of these unpleasant facts. He added that he was not pessimistic and felt that we could arrive at a workable basis with the Russians but that this would require a reconsideration of our policy and the abandonment of the illusion that for the immediate future the Soviet Government was going to act in accordance with the principles which the rest of the world held to in international affairs. He said that obviously certain concessions in the give and take of negotiation would have to be made. The President said that he thoroughly understood this and said that we could not, of course, expect to get 100 per cent of what we wanted but that on important matters he felt that we should be able to get 85 per cent. The Ambassador then outlined briefly the issues involved in the Polish question, explaining his belief that Stalin had discovered from the Lublin Poles that an honest execution of the Crimean [Yalta] decision would mean the end of Soviet-backed Lublin control over Poland since any real democratic leader such as Mikolajczyk would serve as a rallying point for 80 to 90 per cent of the Polish people against the Lublin Communists … He said he would like to inquire in this connection of the President how important he felt the Polish question was in relation to the San Francisco Conference [where the United Nations would be set in motion] and American participation in the world organization. The President replied immediately and decisively that in his considered opinion unless settlement of the Polish question

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was achieved along the lines of the Crimean decision that the treaty of American adherence to a world organization would not get through the Senate. He added that he intended to tell Molotov just this in words of one syllable. Source: US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. V, Europe, Washington, 1967, p. 234.

Document 13 Soviet–American differences Prior to the Potsdam conference, President Truman sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow (26 May–6 June 1945) to discuss some of the contentious issues. It was clear that the two sides interpreted the Declaration on Liberated Europe (Document 10, pp. 236–7) quite differently, for the Americans wanted trade ties with Eastern and Southeastern Europe which the Soviets were not willing to concede. Poland and reparations were the main issues which caused the greatest discord. Mr Hopkins stated that the United States would desire a Poland friendly to the Soviet Union and in fact desired to see friendly countries all along the Soviet borders. Marshal Stalin replied if that be so we can easily come to terms in regard to Poland … Marshal Stalin said he would not attempt to use Soviet public opinion as a screen but would speak of the feeling that had been created in Soviet governmental circles as a result of recent moves on the part of the United States Government. He said these circles felt a certain alarm in regard to the attitude of the United States Government. It was their impression that the American attitude towards the Soviet Union had perceptibly cooled once it became obvious that Germany was defeated, and that it was as though the Americans were saying that the Russians were no longer needed. He said he would give the following examples: … 1

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The question of the Reparations Commission. At Yalta it had been agreed that the three powers would sit on this Commission in Moscow and subsequently the United States Government had insisted that France should be represented on the same basis as the Soviet Union. This he felt was an insult to the Soviet Union in view of the fact that France had concluded a separate peace with Germany [in 1940] and had opened the frontier to the Germans … The attitude of the United States Government towards the Polish question. He said that at Yalta it had been agreed that the existing government was to be reconstructed and that anyone with common sense could see that this means that the present government [dominated by the Polish Communists] was to form the basis of the new. He said no other understanding of the Yalta Agreement was possible. Despite the fact that they were simple people the Russians should not be regarded as fools, which was a mistake

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Documents the West frequently made, nor were they blind and could quite well see what was going on before their eyes … The manner in which Lend Lease had been curtailed. He said that if the United States was unable to supply the Soviet Union further under Lend Lease that was one thing but that the manner in which it had been done had been unfortunate and even brutal. For example, certain ships had been unloaded and while it was true that this order had been cancelled the whole manner in which it had been done had caused concern to the Soviet Government. If the refusal to continue Lend Lease was designed as pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up then it was a fundamental mistake.

Source: US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin, I. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 62–4. Truman had been briefed in detail about Stalin. Here are his first impressions. Promptly a few minutes before twelve I looked up from the desk and there stood Stalin in the doorway. I got to my feet and advanced to meet him. He put out his hand and smiled. I did the same. We shook. I greeted Molotov and the interpreter and we sat down. After the usual polite remarks we got down to business. I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but usually said yes or no to questions after hearing all the arguments. It pleased him. I asked him if he had the agenda for the meeting. He said he had and that he had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite – but I have some dynamite too which I’m not exploding now. He wants to fire Franco [the Spanish dictator] to which I wouldn’t object and divide up the Indian colonies and other mandates, some no doubt which the British have. Then he got on the Chinese situation, told us what agreements had been reached and what was in abeyance. Most of the big points are settled. He’ll be in the Jap war on August 15. Fini Japs when that comes about. We had lunch socially, put on a real show, drinking toasts to everyone then had pictures made in the back yard. I can deal with Stalin. He is honest – but smart as hell. Source: J. Robert Moskin, Mr Truman’s War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 2002), pp. 202–3.

Document 14 Reparations from Germany as agreed at Potsdam The Potsdam Agreement (1 August 1945) mentioned no specific figure whereas at Yalta the Big Three had agreed to total reparations of $20,000 million, half going to the Soviet Union.

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Reparation claims of the USSR shall be met by removals from the Zone of Germany occupied by the USSR and from appropriate German external assets. The USSR undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the western zones and from appropriate German external assets. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive additionally from the western zones: 



Fifteen per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. Ten per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Source: US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin, II, Washington, 1960, pp. 1486–7.

Document 15 Stimson proposes an atomic agreement with the USSR In a memorandum to the President on 11 September 1945 Henry Stimson, secretary for war but on the point of retiring, proposed that the United States should demonstrate its trust in the USSR by sharing with it the development of the atomic bomb. Stimson had favoured a hardline attitude at Potsdam but its failure had led him to rethink his attitude to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Soviets in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviets toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced … To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately

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pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. These relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase. It will inspire them to greater efforts in all out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other, inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of international bargain we can – one that has some chance of being kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever. The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust … My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with the UK and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes. Source: US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. II, General: Political and Economic Matters. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 67–8.

Document 16 The Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy The only major progress made in Soviet–American relations in late 1945 to early 1946 was on the question of how to control atomic energy. On 27 December 1945 James F. Byrnes, secretary of state, and V. M. Molotov, Soviet

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foreign minister, agreed to establish an Atomic Energy Commission in the United Nations. Bernard Baruch was the chief American negotiator. These are the American proposals. The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including 1 2 3 4

Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge …

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that 1 2 3

Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop; Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the knowhow for the production of atomic energy …

Now as to violations: in the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible should be fixed for 1 2 3 4 5

Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb; Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb; Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the Authority; Wilful interference with the activities of the Authority; Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body.

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. Source: US Department of State Bulletin XIV, 23 June 1946. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 73–4.

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Document 17 Speech by Stalin at an electoral meeting for the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Stalin Constituency, Moscow, on 9 February 1946 Stalin warns that capitalism inevitably brings with it war. The road forward is going to be hard as the country has to recover from the war and exceed pre-war production. Opinion in the US overreacted to this speech and saw it as aggressive. It caused Walter Lippmann, an influential columnist, to change his view of the Soviet Union and call for increased US defence spending. Comrades! It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen … As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of a general crisis and military conflicts, that, in view of that, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute ‘spheres of influence’ in its own favour – by employing armed force. As a result of this, the capitalist world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them. Perhaps catastrophic wars could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development. Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, the First World War broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the Second World War broke out. This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War differed substantially in character from the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the major fascist states – Germany, Japan and Italy – destroyed the last remnants of bourgeoisdemocratic liberties at home and established there a cruel terroristic regime, trampled upon the principle of the sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory, and shouted from the housetops that they were aiming at world domination and the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis Powers showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the freedom-loving peoples. In view of this, the Second World War against the Axis Powers … assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-

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fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis Powers could only augment – and really did augment – the anti-fascist and liberating character of the Second World War … Now a few words about the Communist Party’s plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new five-year plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new five-year plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the pre-war level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that rationing is to be abolished in the very near future, special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily reducing the prices of all commodities, and to the extensive organisation of scientific research institutes of every kind capable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country. As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful upswing of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of pre-war industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50 million tonnes of pig iron, up to 60 million tonnes of steel, up to 500 million tonnes of coal and up to 60 million tonnes of oil. Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies. This will need, perhaps, another three five-year plans, if not more. But it can be done, and we must do it. In conclusion, permit me to express my thanks for the confidence which you have shown me by nominating me as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. (A voice: ‘Cheers for the great leader of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!’) You need have no doubt that I will do my best to justify your confidence. (All rise. Loud and prolonged applause rising to an ovation. Voices in different parts of the hall: ‘Long live great Stalin, Hurrah!’ ‘Cheers for the great leader of the peoples!’ ‘Glory to the great Stalin!’ ‘Long live Comrade Stalin, the candidate of the entire people!’ ‘Glory to the creator of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!’.) Source: From the Pamphlet Collection, J. Stalin, Speech Delivered at the Meetings of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, pp. 21–4, 40–1, 43.

Document 18 The Long Telegram of 22 February 1946 One of the key documents of the Cold War, written by Kennan in the US embassy in Moscow, and forwarded to Washington. Only a part of the telegram is reproduced here.

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At the bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison for contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it. It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin’s interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced their country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security for their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate the importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven by necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which pictures the outside world as evil, hostile, and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power in Russia state, for that isolation of Russian population from the outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a

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centuries-old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and wartorn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before. Source: George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 (Bantam, New York, 1969), pp. 549–51.

Document 19 Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech (5 March 1946) Winston Churchill, now leader of the Opposition, was alarmed at the course of the Cold War and, in the presence of President Truman, called for a partnership between Great Britain and the United States to halt the Soviet colossus. Churchill was ahead of his time, however. Only a year later did his ideas become acceptable. This was not the first time that Churchill used the expression ‘Iron Curtain’. In May 1945, only three months after the Yalta conference, Churchill wrote to Truman that an ‘Iron Curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind.’ From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens, alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American, and French observation … However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth, and in the United States, where communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization … On the other hand, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable, still more that it is imminent. It is because I am so sure that our fortunes are in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have an occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines … From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of

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strength. If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all. Source: Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, A1146–7.

Document 20 Stalin’s reply to Churchill’s speech Stalin’s trenchant response to Churchill revealed his belief in Anglo–American collusion against the Soviet Union, his fear of Germany, and his conviction that Eastern and Southeastern Europe was so vital to Soviet security that Soviet influence there should be seen as natural. What is your opinion of Mr Churchill’s latest speech in the United States of America? ANSWER: I regard it as a dangerous move, calculated to sow the seeds of dissension among the Allied states and impede their collaboration. QUESTION: Can it be considered that Mr Churchill’s speech is prejudicial to the cause of peace and security? ANSWER: Yes, unquestionably. As a matter of fact, Mr Churchill now takes the stand of the warmongers, and in this Mr Churchill is not alone. He has friends not only in Britain but in the United States of America as well. QUESTION:

A point to be noted is that in this respect Mr Churchill and his friends bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends. Hitler began his work of unleashing war by proclaiming a race theory, declaring that only German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr Churchill sets out to unleash war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans, as the only superior nation, should rule over other nations. The English race theory leads Mr Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, should rule over the rest of the nations of the world … The following circumstances should not be forgotten. The Germans made their invasion of the USSR through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Germans were able to make their invasion through these countries because, at the time, governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union has lost irretrievably in the fighting against the Germans, and also through the German occupation and the deportation of Soviet citizens to German servitude, a total of about seven million people. In other words, the Soviet Union’s loss of life has been several times greater than that of Britain and the United States of America

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put together. Possibly in some quarters an inclination is felt to forget about these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget about them. And so what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, is trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries? How can anyone, who has not taken leave of his senses, describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies on the part of our state? Source: Pravda, 13 March 1946.

Document 21 The Novikov telegram, September 1946 Nikolai Novikov, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, forwarded this telegram to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in response to Kennan’s Long Telegram. He provides a classic Marxist analysis of the goals of US military and economic goals – domination of the world. His thinking mirrors that of Kennan, who was seeking to explain the wellsprings of Soviet policy to his superiors. Novikov is not as pessimistic as Kennan about the future, pointing out that internationally the Soviet Union is now stronger than in the pre-war period. The foreign policy of the US, which reflects the imperialist tendencies of American monopolistic capital, is characterised in the post-war era by a striving for world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles: that the US has the right to lead the world. All the forces of American diplomacy – the army, air force, navy, industry and science – are enlisted in the service of foreign policy. For this purpose, plans have been developed and are being implemented through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases far beyond the United States: through the arms race, and the creation of more advanced weapons … This reveals that the armed forces play the decisive role in seeking world domination. The war devastated the European economy and it will take time to recover. Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal demand for consumer goods, industrial and transport equipment, etc. which provides American monopolistic capital with opportunities for the enormous export of goods and capital investment in these countries … Such a development would seriously strengthen the US economic position in the whole world and would be a stage on the road to world domination. On the other hand, US circles mistakenly assumed that the war would destroy the Soviet Union, or it would come out of it so weakened that it would be forced to beg for US economic assistance. Had that happened, they would have been able to dictate conditions permitting the US to carry out its expansion in Europe and Asia unhindered by the USSR.

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However, despite all the difficulties of the post-war period, due to the enormous war losses and the German fascist occupation, the Soviet Union continues to remain economically independent of the outside world and is rebuilding its economy with its own resources and the USSR’s international position is currently stronger than it was in the pre-war period … The foreign policy of the US is not determined by those who seek cooperation. The ascendance of President Truman, a politically unstable person but with certain conservative tendencies, and the subsequent appoint of Byrnes as Secretary of State, meant a strengthening of the influence on US foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic party … Their policies are geared towards imposing the will of other countries on the USSR.

Document 22 Byrnes’s speech at Stuttgart (6 September 1946) Germany was divided economically as well as politically by the end of 1945. Byrnes proposed a treaty with the major powers to create a unified demilitarised Germany, but the Soviets turned it down. Great Britain and the United States agreed to merge their zones and the Americans decided to give Germans greater responsibility for their own affairs. Byrnes announced this at Stuttgart. The carrying out of the Potsdam Agreement has … been obstructed by the failure of the Allied Control Council to take the necessary steps to enable the German economy to function as an economic unit. Essential central German administrative departments have not been established, although they are expressly required by the Potsdam Agreement … The United States is firmly of the belief that Germany should be administered as an economic unit and that zonal barriers should be completely obliterated so far as the economic life and activity in Germany are concerned. The conditions which now exist in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach the levels which the occupying powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peacetime economy. Obviously, if the agreed levels of industry are to be reached, we cannot continue to restrict the free exchange of commodities, persons, and ideas throughout Germany. The barriers between the four zones of Germany are far more difficult to surmount than those between normal independent states. The time has come when the zonal boundaries should be regarded as defining only the areas to be occupied for security purposes by the armed forces of the occupying powers and not as self-contained economic or political units. That was the course of development envisaged by the Potsdam Agreement, and that is the course of development which the American Government intends to follow to the full limit of its authority. It has formally announced that it is its intention to unify the economy of its own zone with any or all of the other zones willing to participate in the unification.

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So far only the British Government has agreed to let its zone participate. We deeply appreciate their cooperation. Of course, this policy of unification is not intended to exclude the governments not now willing to join. The unification will be open to them at any time they wish to join. We favor the economic unification of Germany. If complete unification cannot be secured, we shall do everything in our power to secure the maximum possible unification … Similarly, there is urgent need for the setting up of a central German administrative agency for industry and foreign trade … Germany must be given a chance to export goods in order to import enough to make her economy self-sustaining. Germany is a part of Europe, and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoining Germany, will be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse … The Potsdam Agreement did not provide that there should never be a central German government; it merely provided that for the time being there should be no central German government. Certainly this only meant that no central government should be established until some sort of democracy was rooted in the soil of Germany and some sense of local responsibility developed … It is the view of the American Government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs. Source: Department of State Bulletin, XV, 15 September 1946. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 132–3.

Document 23 ‘The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get’ Henry Wallace, US secretary of commerce, was appalled by Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech. He favoured cooperation with the Soviet Union, and regarded the expansion of American trade abroad as vital if another depression was to be avoided. During the first half of 1946 he argued inside the administration for a volte-face in foreign policy. On 12 September 1946 he addressed a political rally in New York and made his worries public. Byrnes demanded that he resign. Wallace abandoned Truman and launched a campaign to defeat him at the presidential election of 1948. It was Wallace who lost. In this connection, I want one thing clearly understood. I am neither anti-British nor pro-British – neither anti-Russian nor pro-Russian. And just two days ago, when President Truman read these words, he said that they represented the policy of his administration. I plead for an America vigorously dedicated to peace – just as I plead for opportunities for the next generation throughout the world to enjoy the abundance which now, more than ever before, is the birthright of men.

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To achieve lasting peace, we must study in detail how the Russian character was formed – by invasions of Tartars, Mongols, Germans, Poles, Swedes, and French; by the intervention of the British, French and Americans in Russian affairs from 1919 to 1921; by the geography of the huge Russian land mass situated strategically between Europe and Asia; and by the vitality derived from the rich Russian soil and the strenuous Russian climate. Add to all this the tremendous emotional power which Marxism and Leninism gives to the Russian leaders – and then we can realize that we are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a ‘Get tough with Russia’ policy. ‘Getting tough’ never bought anything real and lasting – whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get … We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia. This does not mean appeasement. We most earnestly want peace with Russia – but we want to be met half way. We want cooperation. And I believe that we can get cooperation once Russia understands that our primary objective is neither saving the British Empire nor purchasing oil in the Near East with the lives of American soldiers. Source: Vital Speeches of the Day, XII, 1 October 1946. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 145–6.

Document 24 Molotov on ‘equal opportunity’ The Paris Peace Conference was discussing a peace treaty for Romania when on 10 October 1946 Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, revealed his opinion of ‘equal opportunity’ or the ‘open world’ economy the United States was striving for. In so doing he overturned the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe. We know that the United States made a very great effort in this war, in defence of its own interests and of our common aims, for which we are all very grateful to the United States. But for all that, it cannot be said that the United Sates is one of those states which suffered grave material damage in the second world war, which were ruined and weakened in this war. We are glad that this did not happen to our ally, although we ourselves have had to go through trying times, the consequences of which will take us long years to heal. Now that you know the facts, place side by side Rumania, enfeebled by the war, or Yugoslavia, ruined by the German and Italian fascists, and the United States of America, whose wealth has grown immensely during the war, and you will clearly see what the implementation of the principle of ‘equal opportunity’ would mean in practice. Imagine, under these circumstances, that in this same

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Rumania or Yugoslavia, or in some other war-weakened state, you have this so-called ‘equal opportunity’ for, let us say, American capital – that is, the opportunity for it to penetrate unhindered into Rumanian industry, or Yugoslav industry and so forth; what, then, will remain of Rumania’s national industry, or of Yugoslavia’s national industry? It is surely not so difficult to understand that if American capital were given a free hand in the small states ruined and enfeebled by the war, as the advocates of the principle of ‘equal opportunity’ desire, American capital would buy up the local industries, appropriate the more attractive Rumanian, Yugoslav and all other enterprises, and would become the master in these small states. Given such a situation, we would probably live to see the day when in your own country, on switching on the radio, you would be hearing not so much your own language as one American gramophone record after another or some piece or other of British propaganda. The time might come when in your own country, on going to the cinema, you would be seeing American films sold for foreign consumption – and not those of the better quality, but those manufactured in greater quantity, and circulated and imposed abroad by the agents of powerful firms and cinema companies which have grown particularly rich during the war. Can anyone really fail to see that if, as a result of the application of the principle of so-called ‘equal opportunity’ in small states, unrestricted competition begins between the home products and the products poured out by the factories of the United States or Great Britain, nothing will remain of the sovereignty and independence of these states, especially considering the postwar conditions? Is it not clear that such unrestricted application of the principle of ‘equal opportunity’ in the given conditions would in practice mean the veritable economic enslavement of the small states and their subjugation to the rule and arbitrary will of strong and enriched foreign firms, banks and industrial companies? Is it not clear that if such ‘principles of equality’ are applied in international economic life, the smaller states will be governed by the orders, injunctions, instructions of strong foreign trusts and monopolies? Was this what we fought for when we battled the fascist invaders, the Hitlerite and Japanese imperialists? Source: V. M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy: Speeches and Statements, April 1945–November 1948, Moscow, 1949, 215–16.

Document 25 The Truman Doctrine President Truman deliberately set out in this speech before Congress on 12 March 1947 to dramatise the Soviet threat so as to ensure that the aid requested for Greece and Turkey should be voted. He divided the world into two camps and called on the American people to take up their world mission.

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At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own identities in their own way … The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely. Source: Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1947. Reprinted in Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 154–6.

Document 26 The Marshall Plan This Plan was launched in a speech by George C. Marshall, secretary of state, at Harvard University on 5 June 1947. It was partly in response to European economic difficulties – Europe was importing twice as much as it was exporting to the United States – and partly to the American need to expand export markets. Europe wanted American goods but was chronically short of US dollars. Credits and aid therefore would have to be provided by the United States. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to

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permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist … It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations. Source: Department of State Bulletin, XVI, 15 June 1947, p. 1160.

Document 27 The Mr X article George Kennan wrote this article, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, but published it in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym Mr X. It soon became clear who Mr X really was. Together with the Long Telegram, the Mr X article, of which this is an extract, articulates the doctrine of containment. It is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies … It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure towards the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power. Source: Foreign Affairs, 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 580–1.

Document 28 Vyshinsky on the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan Initial Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan was cautiously positive, but in July 1947 Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, speaking at Paris on instructions from Stalin, turned down the offer of US credit. The other East and Southeast European states were obliged to follow suit. Andrei Vyshinsky, deputy foreign

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minister and Soviet spokesman at the United Nations, delivered this verdict at the UN on 18 September 1947. It was predictably hostile. The so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are particularly glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nations are violated, of the way in which the Organization is ignored. As the experience of the past few months has shown, the proclamation of this doctrine meant that the United States Government has moved toward a direct renunciation of the principles of international collaboration and concerted action by the great Powers and toward attempts to impose its will on other independent states, while at the same time obviously using the economic resources distributed as relief to individual needy nations as an instrument of political pressure. This is clearly proved by the measures taken by the United States Government with regard to Greece and Turkey which ignore and bypass the United Nations as well as by the measures proposed under the so-called Marshall Plan in Europe. This policy conflicts sharply with the principles expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 11 December 1946, which declares that relief supplies to other countries ‘should … at no time be used as a political weapon’. As is now clear, the Marshall Plan constitutes in essence merely a variant of the Truman Doctrine adapted to the conditions of postwar Europe. In bringing forward this plan, the United States Government apparently counted on the cooperation of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France to confront the European countries in need of relief with the necessity of renouncing their inalienable right to dispose of their economic resources and to plan their national economy in their own way. The United States also counted on making all these countries directly dependent on the interests of American monopolies, which are striving to avert the approaching depression by an accelerated export of commodities and capital in Europe … It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States and direct interference by the latter in the internal affairs of those countries. Moreover, this Plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet Union. An important feature of this Plan is the attempt to confront the countries of Eastern Europe with a bloc of Western European States including Western Germany. The intention is to make use of Western Germany and German heavy industry (the Ruhr) as one of the most important economic bases for American expansion in Europe, in disregard of the national interests of the countries which suffered from German aggression. Source: United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, 18 September 1947, pp. 86–8.

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Document 29 The North Atlantic Treaty The North Atlantic Treaty established the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Article 5 is the key article. It states that an attack on one member is regarded as an attack on all. The weak West European states, including the United Kingdom, welcomed this as they could offer little defence against any Soviet aggression. Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949 The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty. Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. Article 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and

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mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Article 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Article 6 (1) For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: 



on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7 This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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Article 8 Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty. Article 9 The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. Article 10 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. Article 11 This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.(3) Article 12 After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as

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well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 13 After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation. Article 14 This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories. 1

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The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states. Source: NATO website.

Further reading

On the outbreak of World War II see Roger Moorhouse, First to Fight: The Polish War 1939 (Bodley Head, London, 2019). On US–Soviet military cooperation see Serhii Plokhy, Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front: An Untold Story of World War Two (Allen Lane, London, 2019). There are now enough books on the Cold War written by historians and international relations specialists to fill several libraries. This review can afford only a flavour of the multitudinous writings on offer. The best book to begin with is Odd Arne Westad, ed., Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (Frank Cass, London, 2000). It is the product of a symposium which brought together many of the leading scholars in the field. The published contributions are the result of intense debate and many revisions. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 1, Origins (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) is a comprehensive treatment of the origins of the Cold War; Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, Origins of the Cold War: An International History (Routledge, London, 2005) is authoritative; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Cold War (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007) is comprehensive; an informative study of personality and politics is Frank Costigliola, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ and Oxford, 2013). The best summary of the orthodox school of thought is Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ‘Origins of the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs, 46 (1967), pp. 22–52. Also instructive is Jerald Combs, American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983). The most influential writers of this school are William H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941–1946 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1953). This study has stood the test of time extremely well. Another influential text is Herbert Feis, Churchill–Roosevelt–Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1957). The leading lights of the revisionist school are William Appleman Williams, Thomas J. McCormick, Walter LaFeber and Lloyd C. Gardner. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, rev. ed. (Delta DOI: 10.4324/9781003015338-22

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Books, New York, 1962); Thomas J. McCormick, Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD, 1989); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–1990, 6th ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1991); Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusions: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949 (Quadrangle, Chicago, 1970). See also Gar Alperowitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (Vintage Books, New York, 1967); Donna Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins 1917–1960 (Doubleday, New York, 1961), 2 vols. Gabriel Kolko is an impressive writer. See especially Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954 (Harper and Row, New York, 1972). John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, reprinted 2000) can be regarded as the text which established post-revisionism. A stimulating, up-todate statement of his position is John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998). Other major writers of this persuasion are Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1992); Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace Research, 23 (1986), pp. 263–77; Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998); Anders Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1989). See also Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1953 (Hill and Wang, New York, 1994). Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Penguin, London, 1980) is a splendid, left-of-centre post-revisionist analysis. A thoughtful analysis of the Cold War is Wilfred Loth, Die Teilung der Welt: Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1945 (Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1980). On the atomic bomb, the most informative is Frank Close, Trinity: The Treachery and Pursuit of the Most Dangerous Spy in History (Allen Lane, London, 2019) which is about Klaus Fuchs but also provides a technical analysis of the building of the bomb; also see the penetrating study by Wilson D. Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011). The best account of Britain’s role is Sean Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War 1945–1991 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000). The memoirs of Churchill and Eden are revealing: Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1954); Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (Cassell, London, 1965). See also David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945 (Cassell, London, 1971). Max Hastings, Finest Hours: Churchill as War Lord 1940–45 (HarperPress, London, 2009) is excellent.

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On Operation Unthinkable the main text is Jonathan Walker, Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War British Plans to Attack the Soviet Empire, 1945 (The History Press, Stroud, 2013). Of special note in regions outside Western and Eastern Europe are: Michael M. Boll, Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943–1947 (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1984); Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1980); Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1980); William W. Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy towards China and Korea, 1947– 1950 (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981). On American relations with Japan see: William R. Nester, Power across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996); worthy of note is Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of US–Japan Relations (Norton, New York, 1997); Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985); Andrew Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1987). On the Soviet occupation of east Germany the primary text is Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1995). Also important is Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949 (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996). The most incisive account of the Berlin Blockade is Thomas Parrish, Berlin in the Balance: The Blockade, the Airlift, the First Major Battle of the Cold War (Perseus Books, Reading MA, 1998). There has been a lively debate over the years about ‘lost opportunities’, meaning that windows of opportunity existed but this was not fully grasped or there was no desire to recognise that they existed. It follows, of course, that had they been taken everything would have turned out differently. A recent example of this argument is Deborah Larson, The Anatomy of Mistrust (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1997). However, the overwhelming weight of recent scholarship does not flow in this direction. See, for example, the excellent study by Stein Bjornstad, who is sceptical about the missed opportunities for German unification: Stein Bjornstad, The Soviet Union and German Unification during Stalin’s Last Years (Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, Oslo, 1998). The view that Truman was willing to pay the price of a Cold War because he did not believe that the West could win a war with the Soviet Union comes through in the following: Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons, The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–1953 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996); and David Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1994). See also Antonio Varsori

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and Elena Calandri, The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943–48 (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002). There are many major histories of the Cold War from beginning to end: the best single volume study is Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (Allen Lane, London, 2017). Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991 (Routledge, London, 1995); J. P. D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and Their Allies (Longman, Harlow, 1994), 2 vols; Ralph B. Levering, The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History (Harlan Davidson, Arlington Heights IL, 1994); Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States, and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998); Martin Walker, The Cold War: A History (Henry Holt, New York, 1993). An excellent general history of the Cold War is Bernd Stöver, Der Kalte Krieg: Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters 1947–1991 (C. H. Beck, Munich, 2006). An acerbic overview of US policy during the Cold War is Andrew Alexander, America and the Imperialism of Ignorance (Biteback, London, 2011). A valuable documentary source is Walter LaFeber, ed., The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents (John Wiley, New York, 1971). George Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 (Bantam, New York, 1969) is a major source. On the Soviet side, the most important works are: Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1996); and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996). Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1962), makes fascinating reading. The book which affords the greatest insight into Stalin the man is Sergo Beria, Beria: My Father inside Stalin’s Kremlin (Duckworth, London, 1999). On Moscow’s relations with the Greek communists see Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and the Greek Communists, 1944–1949 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1989). An important subject is Stalin and the bomb. The classic text is David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1996). Molotov’s memoirs are worth consulting. Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev (Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 1993). On eastern Europe see R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008). On Poland, an excellent study is Krystyna Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948 (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991). Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949 (Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1997); Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–1989 (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994); also interesting is Martin McCauley, ed., Communist Power in Europe, 1944–1949, rev. ed. (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1979).

Further reading

265

Worth perusing are: Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943–1947: Universalism in an Area Not of Essential Interest to the United States (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1975); and Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics, 1945–1996 (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1997); Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944–1956 (Penguin, London, 2012) is a formidable analysis of how the Soviets bolshevised the region. The best book on the Cold War in the Third World is Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005). On the Middle East, see Jamil Hasanli, Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953 (Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2011) and Kristen Blake, The US–Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945–1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War (University Press of America, Plymouth, 2009). On propaganda, see Rósa Magnúsdóttir, Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda, 1945–1959 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) and Harry Hemming, Our Man in New York: The British Plot to Bring America into the Second World War (Quercus, London, 2019). On China, see the brilliant study by Frank Dikötter, The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945–57 (Bloomsbury, London, 2013) and Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History (Lexington Books, London, 2015). On spying, the key text is John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2000); see also Roland Phillips, A Spy Named Orphan: The Enigma of Donald Maclean (Vintage, London, 2018); Ben Macintyre, A Spy Among Friends: Philby and the Great Betrayal (Bloomsbury, London, 2015); Andrew Lownie, Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess (Hodder, London, 2015); Miranda Carter, Anthony Blunt: His Lives (Macmillan Pan, London, 2001). On international relations see John Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2018). On the Marshall Plan, the best book is Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987). On the American side there is a mass of material. Very enlightening are Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New American Library, New York, 1970); Robert H. Farrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (Harper and Row, New York, 1980); Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Decision (Doubleday, New York, 1955); J. Robert Moskin, Mr Truman’s War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2002); W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946 (Random House, New York, 1975); Robert L. Messer, The End of

266

Further reading

an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982). A splendid analysis of Soviet foreign policy is Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973, 2nd ed. (Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1974). Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2008) blames the West for misreading Stalin’s intentions. An interesting left-of-centre analysis of the first and second Cold War is Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (Verso, London, 1983). On the United Nations see the study of rhetoric and tactics in Kari Alenius, Unselfishly for Peace and Justice – and against Evil: The Rhetoric of the Great Powers in the UN Security Council, 1946–56 (Tornion Kirjapaino, Tornio, Finland, 2014). The most informative book on the cultural wars is David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003); see also Annette Vowinckel and Marcus M. Payk, eds, Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on East and West European Societies (Berghahn, New York, 2014). The best fictional portrayal of Stalin is to be found in Robert Harris, Archangel (Arrow, London, 1998).

References

Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New American Library, New York, 1970). Alenius, Kari, Unselfishly for Peace and Justice – and against Evil: The Rhetoric of the Great Powers in the UN Security Council, 1946–56 (Tornion Kirjapaino, Tornio, 2014). Alexander, Andrew, America and the Imperialism of Ignorance (Biteback, London, 2011). Alperovitz, Gar, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (Vintage Books, New York, 1965). Applebaum, Anne, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956 (Anchor Books, New York, 2013). Blake, Kersten, The US–Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945–62 (University Press of America, Plymouth, 2009). Bodanis, David, The Art of Fairness: The Power of Decency in a World Turned Mean (Bridge Street Press, London, 2020) Brandenburger, David, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture in the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2002). Carley, Michael J., ‘Fiasco: The Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance That Never Was and the Unpublished British White Paper, 1939–1940’, International History Review, 41, no. 4 (2019). Carter, Miranda, Anthony Blunt: His Lives (Macmillan Pan, London, 2011). Caute, David, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). Chang, Jung, Big Sister, Little Sister, Red Sister: The Women at the Heart of Twentieth Century China (Vintage, New York, 2019). Churchill, Winston, Triumph and Tragedy (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1954). Close, Frank, Trinity: The Treachery and Pursuit of the Most Dangerous Spy in History (Allen Lane, London, 2019). Costigliola, Frank, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ and Oxford, 2013). Crampton, R. J., A Concise History of Bulgaria. 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008). Dikötter, Frank, The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945– 57 (Bloomsbury, London, 2013).

268

References

Dilks, David, ed., The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945 (Cassell, London, 1971). Dimitrov, Georgi, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949 (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2003). Feis, Herbert, Churchill–Roosevelt–Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1957). Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, reprinted 2000). Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998). Gardner, Lloyd C., Architects of Illusions: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949 (Quadrangle, Chicago, 1970). Goldman, Marshall, Oilopoly: Power and the Rise of the New Russia (One World Publications, London, 2010). Halliday, Fred, The Making of the Second Cold War (Verso, London, 1983). Harriman, W. Averell and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946 (Random House, New York, 1975). Hasanli, Jamil, Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War 1945–1953 (Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2011). Haslam, Jonathan, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2011). Hastings, Max, Finest Hours: Churchill as War Lord 1940–45 (HarperPress, London, 2009). Haynes, John Earl and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Soviet Espionage in America (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2000). Hemming, Harry, Our Man in New York: The British Plan to Bring America into the Second World War (Quercus, London, 2019). Holloway, David, Stalin and the Bomb (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1996). Kissinger, Henry, On China (Penguin, London, 2012). Kissinger, Henry, ‘The Viet Nam Negotiations’, Foreign Affairs, January1969. Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945–1954 (Harper and Row, New York, 1972). Koster, John, Action Likely in the Pacific: Secret Agent Kilsoo Haan, Pearl Harbor and the Creation of North Korea (Amberley Publishing, Stroud, 2019). Kotkin, Stephen, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power 1878–1928 (Allen Lane, London, 2014). Kuromiya, Hiroaki, Stalin (Routledge, London, 2013). LaFeber, Walter, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–2000 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). Leffler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1992). Loth, Wilfred, Die Teilung der Welt: Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1945 (Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1980). Lownie, Andrew, Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess (Hodder, London, 2015). Lundestad, Geir, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945– 1952’, Journal of Peace Research, 23 (1986). Macintyre, Ben, ‘The Spies Who Blew Up the Old Boy Network’, The Times, 23 October2015a. Macintyre, Ben, A Spy Among Friends: Philby and the Great Betrayal (Bloomsbury, London, 2015b).

References

269

Magnúsdóttir, Rósa, Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda 1945–1959 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019). Mastny, Vojtech, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996). Mawdsley, Evan, The War for the Seas: A Maritime History of World War II (Yale University Press, London, 2019). McCauley, Martin, ed., Communist Power in Europe, 1944–1949 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1977). McNeill, William H., America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941–1946 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1953). Mearsheimer, John, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2018). Miscamble, Wilson D., The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011). Molotov, V. M. and Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 1993). Moorhouse, Roger, First to Fight: The Polish War 1939 (Bodley Head, London, 2019). Moskin, J. Robert, Mr Truman’s War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 2002). Parrish, Thomas, Berlin in the Balance: The Blockade, the Airlift, the First Major Battle of the Cold War (Perseus Books, Reading MA, 1998). Phillips, Roland, A Spy Named Orphan: The Enigma of Donald Maclean (Vintage, London, 2018). Plokhy, Serhii, Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front: An Untold Story of World War Two (Allen Lane, London, 2019). Roberts, Geoffrey, Stalin’s Wars (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2008). Rusk, Dean, As I Saw It (W. W. Norton, New York, 1990). Schmidt, Paul, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–45: Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas (Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung – AULA GmbH, Wiesbaden, Germany, 1983). Sebag Montefiore, Simon, The Court of the Red Tsar (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2003). Service, Robert, Stalin: A Biography (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010). Shen, Zhihue and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History (Lexington Books, London, 2015). Stöver, Bernd, Der Kalte Krieg: Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters 1947–1991 (C. H. Beck, Munich, 2006). Stuart-Fox, Martin, A History of Laos (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008). Truman, Harry S., Memoirs: Years of Decision (Doubleday, New York, 1955). Truman, Harry S., Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946–1952. Vol. 2 (Signet, New York, 1956). Ulam, Adam B., Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973. 2nd ed. (Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1974). Vowinckel, Annette and Marcus M. Payk, eds, Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on East and West European Societies (Berghahn, New York, 2014). Walker, Jonathan, Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War British Plans to Attack the Soviet Empire, 1945 (The History Press, Stroud, 2013). Westad, Odd Arne, The Cold War: A World History (Allen Lane, London, 2017).

270

References

Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005). Yergin, Daniel, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Penguin, London, 1980). Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1996).

Index

Page numbers in italics refer to figures. Abyssinia 20 Acheson, Dean 113, 114–16, 138, 141, 191 Ackermann, Anton 76, 79 Adler, Solomon 129 Afghanistan 109, 117 Agitprop (Agitation and Propaganda Department) 188, 189–90 Albania 69, 106; communist partisans 94– 5; sovietisation 95–6; and Yugoslavia 95 Allied Advisory Council 96 Allied Control Commissions (ACCs) 74– 5, 87, 90, 96, 97, 99 Allied Control Council (ACC) 77, 160, 166, 250 Allies: deteriorating relationship 96, 108, 112, 151–2; mistrust 46, 57, 61–2, 215; post war collaboration 108; see also Potsdam Conference (1945); Tehran Conference (1943); Yalta Conference (1945) All-Russia Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 70 All-Russian Co-operative Society (ARCOS) 17 Alperovitz, Ger 200 Amerasia (journal) 178 America see United States America First 191, 197 American Censorship Office 187 Amethyst (HMS) 130 Anders, General 49 Andrews, Dana 183 Anglo-Russian Convention (1907) 15, 117, 118 Anglo-Russian Joint Advisory Council (ARJAC) 17

Anglo-Soviet Mutual Assistance Agreement (1942) 43 Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement (1921) 16 Animal Farm (1945) 181, 187 Anschluss 20–1 Antheil, George 184 Anthropocene epoch 198 Antonescu, Marshal Ion 86, 96 Armenia 109, 110–11, 112–13, 117 arms: arms race 61, 168; manufacture 35; sales to Iran 123–4 arms-race theorists 202 Armstrong, Louis 187 Atatürk 106 Atlantic, battle of 193–4 Atlantic Charter (1941) 103, 104, 142, 196, 208, 228–30, 237 atomic weapons: agreement 241–2, 243; American advantage 61, 66, 153, 168, 200, 204, 219, 226–7; anti-bomb sentiments 187, 198–9; bombs dropped on Japan 57, 59–60; as deterrent 67; espionage 173; hydrogen bomb 66–7; Manhattan Project 57, 65–6, 187; Soviet Union 63; see also nuclear research Attlee, Clement 17, 55, 57, 67, 95, 214 Attolico, Bernardo 22 attribution errors 220–1 Austria 20–1, 52–3 Avon, Lord see Eden, Anthony (Lord Avon) Axis powers, Romania 86 Azerbaijan 60, 109, 117, 121, 122–3, 205 B-24 planes 194 Badoglio, Pietro 96

272

Index

balance of power 199–200, 206, 208, 215, 226–7, 232 Balkan Powers Pact (1940) 88 Balkans 232–3; British policy 96–8, 99–100 Bao Dai, Emperor 142, 143 Barr, Joel 178 Baruch, Bernard 199 Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 168 Beaverbrook, Lord 41, 42–3 Becher, Johannes R. 185 Beck, Jósef 25, 27 Belgium 62 Beneš, Edvard 21, 82–6 Bentley, Elizabeth 173 Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich 216; atomic weapons 68; Crimea 108; personality 46, 63; Poland 49, 72 Beria, Sergo 50 Berle, Adolf 175, 192 Berlin: Blockade 166–9, 209; cultural centre 186; occupied zones 150, 166, 205 Berlin, battle of (1945) 36–7 Berlin Express (1948) 183 Bevan, Aneurin 168 Bevin, Ernest 57–8, 67, 99, 112, 214, 216 Bierut, Bolesław 74 Bletchley Park 171 blocs 202; Eastern bloc 69–70, 160, 225; formation of 114, 153, 213, 256; Western bloc 84, 165 Blunt, Anthony 171, 174 Blyukher, Marshal Vasily 28 Bo Gu 125 Bogart, Humphrey 182 Bohlen, Charles E. 12–13, 15, 155, 200–1 Bohr, Nils, 198 198 Bolivia 193 Bolsheviks 7–8 Bond, James 174, 183–4 Bonesteel, Colonel Charles 135 Boris, King of Bulgaria 88–9 Bratianu, Dinu 97 Braun, Otto 125 Brecht, Bertolt 186 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918) 16 Bretton Woods summit 147–8, 161 Brezhnev, Leonid 205 Briggs, General Sir Harold 145–6 Britain see United Kingdom British Metropolitan-Vickers 17 Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan 44–5, 47, 52–3, 55, 56, 57 Brussels, Treaty of (1948) 165 Bulganin, Nikolai 133

Bulgaria 69, 96–7; British involvement 98–9; and Greece 164; neutrality 90; pre-war alliances 88–9; reparations 91; sovietisation 70, 90–2; and Turkey 108–9, 114 Bullitt, William C. 13, 14, 193 Bunyachenko, General 82–3 Burgess, Guy 171, 172, 173–4 Byrnes, James F. 55, 80, 214; Atomic Energy Commission 242–3; Balkans 99; containment doctrine 156, 157; Iran 121, 122, 123; Stuttgart speech (1946) 250–1 Cadogan, Alexander 151 Cairncross, John 171, 174 Cairo Conference (1943) 126, 135 Cambodia 141 Cambridge Circle 171, 174 Canada 172, 192 Capa, Robert 190 capitalism 3–4; American agenda 200, 207, 214, 218, 229, 249; Bretton Woods 147–8; and communism 10, 202, 213, 219, 244; Great Depression 9; investment in Soviet Union 11, 13; Soviet view of 11–12, 153 Captain Marvel 187–8 Carol II of Romania 86 cartoons 187–8 Casablanca Conference (1943) 107 Casino Royale (1952) 183 Central Powers 7, 15 Chamberlain, Neville 21, 22, 23, 24, 30 Chambers, Whittaker 175, 177–8 Chaplin, Charlie 183 chess 180, 181 Chetniks 93 Chi Chao-ting 129 Chiang Kai-shek 125, 127–9, 130–1, 135, 141, 161 Chin Peng 145 China: Chinese Communists 125, 130–5; Chinese Red Army (CRA) 125, 126, 127–8, 130; civil war 125–30, 206; invaded by Japan 20, 126–7; modernisation 132, 140; Nationalists 127, 129–30, 131; rising power 204, 210; strategy 139; and United States 140; view of Cold War 202; weakness 103, 206–7 Chuev, Felix 116 Churchill, Winston Spencer 19; Allied conferences 51, 57; dislike of Hitler 41; Greece 101–2; Hollywood 196;

Index imperialism 217–18, 248; Iron Curtain speech 156, 247–8; Katyn massacre 49; Percentages Agreement (1944) 50, 232– 3; role in Cold War 217–18; and Roosevelt 52, 96, 171, 193, 214, 228–9; Second front plans 43–8; and United States 216; view of Soviet Union 18, 52, 157; White Russians 16 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 95, 120, 142, 161, 175 Ciano, Galeazzo 23, 24, 30 class conflict theorists 202 Clay, General Lucius 80, 168 Clifford, Clark 157 CMEA see Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) Coe, Frank 129, 175, 176 Cold War: duration 213; origins of the expression 198, 199 Cole, G. D. H. 18 collectivisation 11; in Eastern Europe 74, 79, 84, 88, 91, 96 collectivism 11, 213 colonialism 20–1, 158, 202, 204, 215; see also imperialism Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 96, 169 comic books 187–8 Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) 83, 84, 102, 164–5, 200; expulsion of Yugoslavia 93, 165 Comintern (Communist International) 15, 17, 20, 61, 70, 125, 173 communism 4, 217, 234; and capitalism 10, 202, 213, 219, 244; European parties 9, 61, 86–8, 100, 156, 164, 228, 247; fear of 9, 161 Communist Party of China (CPC) 125 Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 8, 9, 20, 64, 76, 79 Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 16–17 Communist Party of the Soviet Union 70, 217 Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) 9, 170–1, 175, 183 Constantinople Agreement (1915) 117 containment doctrine 201, 255; impact of 157–8, 199, 221; Long Telegram (1946) 122, 155–7, 245–7; military aspect 113 continental strategy 47 Cooper, Gary 161, 183, 197 cordon sanitaire 6, 56, 60, 69 Costigliola, Frank 204 Coulondre, Robert 31

273

Council of Europe 116 Crimea 108–9, 204, 238–9 Cripps, Sir Stafford 18, 28 Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 213 cultural rivalry 180–1 currency reform: Bulgaria 91; Germany 78, 166–7, 168 Currie, Lauchlin 175, 177 Cyrankiewicz, Józef 73 Czechoslovak Legion 16 Czechoslovakia 22–3, 69, 160, 204; Marshall Plan 84; resistance 82–3; sovietisation 81, 82–6; Sudetenland 21, 71 Daladier, Edouard 22 Damaskinos, Archbishop 102 Davies, Joseph 14–15, 41, 49, 55–6, 173, 183 Day, Lorraine 183 D-Day 45, 48 death toll, Second World War 35, 36, 46–7, 127 Declaration on Liberated Europe (1945) 97, 104, 236–7, 239 defectors 172, 173, 183, 193 defensism 8 democracy 206, 214, 217 Dempster, Arthur Jeffrey 64 Demyanov, Aleksandr 175 Deng Xiaoping 134 Denmark 54 deportations: Crimea 108–9; Eastern Europe 70–2, 83 Deutsch, Arnold 171 Dewey, Thomas E. 168 Dieppe raid (1942) 46 Dimitrov, Dr G. M. 98–9 Dimitrov, Georgi 61–2, 69–70, 91, 106 diplomatic power 221 Djilas, Milovan 102, 164, 233–4 Dobb, Maurice 171 Dodge, Cleveland E. 68 domino theory 113, 152, 159, 164 Dönitz, Admiral Karl 54–5, 193–4 Donovan, ‘Wild Bill’ 92, 174, 191, 192, 193, 194 Drax, Admiral 27 Duggan, Laurence 175 Dulles, John Foster 136, 157 Dutch East Indies 141 Dymshits, Aleksandr 185, 186 Eaker, General Ira 218 East Germany see German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

274

Index

East Turkestan Republic 130–1 Eastern Europe 225; deportations 70–2, 83; Percentages Agreement (1944) 232– 3; Soviet control of 69–71, 160, 165, 225; United States interests 206, 214, 218 economic power 157; Europe 8; United States 5, 153, 158, 159, 189, 251–2 Eden, Anthony (Lord Avon) 20, 42; European Advisory Commission (EAC) 150; Greece 101–2, 104; meeting with Stalin 47, 229–31; Middle East 110, 120; Romania 98, 104 Ehrenburg, Ilya 181 Einstein, Albert 64, 68, 198–9 Eisenhower, General Dwight 48, 55, 143, 218; as President 140 Elsey, George 157 Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists 68 Engels, Friedrich 3 Entente powers 7, 15 Erhard, Ludwig 78 Ertegun, Mehmet 113 espionage: political information on Allies 47, 50, 53, 218; scientific information 63–4, 66, 68, 140; Soviet agents 60, 66, 68, 95–6, 140, 147, 162, 170–9; see also intelligence services Estonia 25, 26, 70 ethnic cleansing 70–1 Europe: non-aggression treaties 20, 24, 27; rebuilding 230, 235–6, 254–5; weakness of 216; see also Eastern Europe; Western Europe European Advisory Commission (EAC) 150 European Union 103 Fabian Society 17 famine 163 Farkas, Mihály 74 fascism, rise of 19–20 Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 51, 81, 168, 205 Feis, Herbert 199 Fermi, Enrico 64, 66 Field, Noel 175 Fierlinger, Zdenek 82 Fight for Freedom 192 films: Hollywood 182–4, 196–7; Soviet 185 Finland 32, 160 First Indochina War (1946–154) 142–3 First World War 5–6, 7, 244

Fitin, General Pavil 170 Fleming, Ian 174, 183–4, 192 football 180–1 Ford, Henry 11, 13 Foreign Ministers: conferences 96, 107, 111–12, 159–60; council of 99, 111 Forrestal, James 113, 156, 158 The Four Feathers (1939) 197 France 163; appeasement of Hitler 21–2, 26; communism 161; economic power 8; fear of Germany 159, 215–16; French cinema 183; German occupied zones 77; German reparations 160; pre-war treaties 20 François-Poncet, André 21–2 Frank, Karl 83 Free German Youth 78–9 free trade 159 French Indochina 141, 142–3 Frisch, Otto 64 Fromm, Colonel General Friedrich 54 Fuchs, Klaus 64, 65–6, 67, 178 Gable, Clark 184 Gaddis, John Lewis 201–2, 203 Garbo, Greta 182–3 Gehlen, Lt. Colonel Richard 174–5 George II, King of Greece 100, 102 Georgia 109, 112–13 German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 69, 205; cultural plans 80–1; establishment 81, 168; reparations 79, 80; reunification 51; sovietisation 76–81 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact 27 Germans (ethnic), expulsion 70–1, 83 German-Soviet Frontier Treaty (1939) 25 Germany 8, 204–5, 214; communism 9; culture 185–6; currency reform 78, 166–7, 168; declares war on United States 29–30, 36, 194–5, 214; defeat 54–5; denazification programme 182; First World War 5–6; and Japan 28–9; Marshall Plan 160; occupation of 52, 77, 80, 150–1, 230, 250–1; offensives in Second World War 23–4, 33–5, 88–9; pre-war non-aggression treaties 20, 27, 106; Tripartite Pact (1940) 33, 89, 106; see also Federal Republic of Germany; German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Gerő, Ernő 72, 74 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 87–8, 97 Gilan Soviet Republic 118 Glasser, Harold 176

Index Goebbels, Joseph 10, 31, 54, 190, 197 Gold, Harry 178 Gomułka, Władysław 73, 74, 164 Gorbachev, Mikhail 134, 213 Gordievsky, Oleg 178 Gottwald, Klement 81–2, 83–5 Gouzenko, Igor 172, 183 gradualism 4 Great Depression 9, 171 Great Fatherland (Patriotic) War see Second World War Greece: aid to 114–15, 123, 159; British intervention 62, 164; civil war 101–2, 209; communism 62, 101, 103; economic weakness 102–3; liberation 100–1; partisans 165; Percentages Agreement (1944) 50, 232–3; strategic importance 206 Grew, Joseph 12, 152 Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich 57, 122 Groves, Major Leslie 65, 187 Groza, Dr Petru 87, 97, 98, 99 GRU (military intelligence) 162, 170, 172, 177–8 Guareschi, Giovanni 161 guerrilla warfare 94, 143, 144, 145 Guilty of Treason (1949) 183 Guomindang army 20, 125–6, 127, 131, 141, 210 Gusev, Fedor 44 Haan, Kilsoo 136, 195 Haganah 71 Hahn, Otto 64 Halifax, Lord 20, 22, 25, 26, 192 Hall, Theodore 68 Halliday, Fred 201 Halperin, Maurice 175–6 Hamilton, Maxwell 195 Hammett, Dashiell 183 Harriman, Averell 203, 225; Iran 121; Moscow conferences 41, 42–3, 44; and Soviet Union 148, 151, 152, 238 Harris, Sir Arthur 52 Harwell Research Establishment 66, 67 Haslam, Jonathan 204 Henderson, Loy 113, 114 Henderson, Neville 20, 25, 30–1 Heydrich, Reinhard 82 Himmler, Heinrich 55, 194 Hindenburg, Paul von 85 Hirohito, Emperor 59 Hiss, Alger 53, 173, 175, 177–8 Hitler, Adolph 9–10, 21; appeasement of 21–2; attitude to Stalin 33; and

275

Molotov 32–3; rise to power 20, 213– 14; and United States 10, 23, 193–5 Ho Chi Minh 141–3 Hodges, General John 135, 136 Holliday, Judy 183 Hollywood films 182–4, 196–7 Holocene epoch 198 Honecker, Erich 79 Hoover, Herbert 59 Hoover, J. Edgar 172, 193 Hopkins, Harry 41, 44, 46, 56, 60, 195, 239 Horthy, Admiral Miklós 99 House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 177, 183 Hoxha, Enver 94–6 Hull, Cordell 101, 141, 208, 231 Hungary 23, 26, 69; armistice 97, 99; deportations 70–1; Jewish population 72; reparations 74; revolution 205; sovietisation 74–6 Hurley, General Patrick 119 Hyde Park Declaration (1944) 96 hydrogen bomb 66–7 I Chose Freedom (1947) 182 I Married a Communist (1949) 183 ideology 156 imperialism 3–4, 158; American 5, 153, 189, 207, 216, 249–50; British 191, 217– 18, 248; Japanese 13; see also colonialism Indochina 141, 142–3, 206 industrialisation 3; China 140; Korea 137; Soviet Union 3, 11, 13, 35–6 inflation 76, 78, 129, 166 Information Committee (KI) 162 Inönü, President 108 intelligence services: Bletchley Park 171; codebreaking 29, 59, 170, 195–6; see also espionage International Atomic Development Authority 242–3 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 103, 147, 161 interventionists 191, 192, 196 intra-state theorists 202 Iran 60–1, 205–6; and Germany 118, 119; and Imperial Russia 116–18; neutrality 117; occupation 107, 118; and Soviet Union 114, 120, 122–3, 124, 209, 216; troop withdrawals 120, 122; United Nations 209; and United States 115, 119–20, 123, 216

276

Index

Iraq 106 The Iron Curtain (1948) 183 Iron Curtain speech 52, 55, 156, 247–9 Iron Guard, Romania 86 Ismay, General ‘Pug’ 168 isolationists 6, 168, 191, 197, 214, 225 Israel, creation of 71–2 Italy 20; the Balkans 106; communism 62, 161; post-war settlement 96, 99; Tripartite Pact (1940) 33; weakness of 163 jamming broadcasts 181 Jangali movement 117–18 Japan: China 20, 126–7; defeat of 58–60, 127; industry 136; Korea 135, 137; Manchuria 13, 18, 126; Naval codes 29, 59, 170, 195–6; Pearl Harbor 29, 195–6; Soviet Union 28–30, 32, 36; Tripartite Pact (1940) 33; Vietnam 141 jazz 186–7 jet engines 178 Jews: anti-semitism 9, 10, 89; migration 71–2; refugees 64, 95 Johnson, Dr Hewlett 110 Johnson, Lyndon 205 Johnston, Eric 148 Joyce, William (Lord Haw-Haw) 54 Kardelj, Edvard 164 Kars Treaty (1921) 105 Katsuro Tarō 135 Katyn massacre 49, 50 Kearny (USS) 193 Keitel, Field Marshal 54 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) 214 Kennan, George F. 12–13, 14, 148; atomic weapons 67; Iran 121; Long Telegram (1946) 112, 122, 155–7, 199, 201–2, 209, 245–7; ‘Mr X’ article 199, 255; and Stalin 46, 227; strategy 225 Kennedy, John F. 55 Kennedy, Joseph 191 Keynes, John Maynard 147 Khalkin Gol, battle of 28, 32 Khariton, Yuly 59–60 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich 178 Kim Il Jong 137 Kim Il Sung 136–8, 139 Kimmel, Admiral 29, 195 King, Mackenzie 172 King-Hall, Stephen 22 Kirov, Sergei 14 Kissinger, Henry 221 Knox, Frank 195

Kohlberg (1945) 197 Korda, Alexander 196–7 Korea: occupied by Japan 135, 137; post war occupation 135–6, 137, 138 Korean War (1950–1953) 61, 139–40, 206 Kostov, Traicho 91, 165 Kravchenko, Victor 182 Kriegsmarine 54, 193–4 Kuczynski, Jürgen 64 Kulturbund 185 Kurchatov, Igor 64 Kurchatov Institute, Moscow 63 Kurdistan, People’s Republic of 121, 123 Kurds 119, 120, 121, 205 Labour Party (British) 16–17, 56, 58 Lake Khasan, battle of (1938) 28 Lamarr, Heddy 184 Laos 143–4 Lattimore, Owen 136 Latvia 25, 26, 70 le Carré, John 184 League of Nations 7, 20, 126 Lebanon Conference (1944) 101 Lee, Duncan 176 Leffler, Mervyn P. 203–4, 215, 228 Leigh, Vivien 196 LeMay, Curtis 66 Lend-Lease aid 35–6, 148, 170, 192, 240 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich 7, 8, 10–11 Leuna Chemical Works 80 Leyte (USS) 115 Libya 112, 152 Liddell, Guy 171 Liebknecht, Karl 7–8, 9 Lin Biao 128, 130, 139 Lindbergh, Charles 191, 197 The Lion Has Wings (1939) 197 Lippmann, Walter 198, 199, 244 Lipski, Jósef 23, 31 Lithuania 23, 70 Litvinov, Maksim 25–6, 27, 109, 203 Liu Shaoqi 133 Locarno Treaty (1925) 27 Long March (1934–5) 125–6 Long Telegram (1946) see Kennan, George F. Lothian, Lord 191 Lovell, Malcolm 193 Lubitsch, Ernst 182–3 Lublin Government (Polish Provisional Government) 50–1, 56–7, 72, 237–8 Luca, Vasile 87, 88 Lundestad, Geir 216 Luxemburg, Rosa 8, 9

Index MacArthur, General Douglas 136, 139–40 McCarthy, Joseph 190 McCarthyism 190, 221 McCormick, Robert 191 MacDonald, Ramsey 16–17, 18 Maclean, Donald 171–2, 173–4 McMahon Act (1946) 67 McNeill, William H. 199 Maisky, Ivan Mikhailovich 16, 25, 26, 43–4, 112 Malaya 145–6 Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich 164, 216 Malinovsky, General Rodion 97 Manchuria (Manchuko): Chinese re-occupation 127–8; civil war 130; Japanese occupation 13, 18, 29, 126–7; Soviet claims 127, 134 Manhattan Project 57, 65–6, 187 Maniu, Iuliu 97 Mannerheim, Carl 32 Mao Zedong 206–7; guerrilla warfare 144; Korea 138–9; Long March (1934–5) 125–6; and Stalin 127–8, 132–5; victory over Nationalists 129, 131–2 Marcuse, Herbert 174 Marshall, General George 44, 46, 114, 128, 160 Marshall Plan 115, 159, 206, 216, 254–5; Eastern Europe 84, 160–1; Soviet Union 255–6 Marx, Karl 3–4 Marxism-Leninism 6–7, 7–8; American views 225, 228, 246; in Britain 17, 171; leading to Cold War 14, 199, 200 Masaryk, Jan 84, 85, 160 mass migration, Eastern Europe 71 Mastny, Vojtech 203, 215 Matsuoka 28–9 Matthews, Freeman 155, 156 Mearsheimer, John 206 Metskhetian Turks 108 MI5 171 MI6 60, 161, 192; Albania 95; Iran 120 Michael, King of Romania 86–8, 97 Middle East 60–1, 159, 206, 215, 216; see also Iran; Turkey Middle Kingdom see China Mihailović, Draža 93 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław 73, 217 Mikoyan, Anastas 132–3, 148, 238 military equipment, sales to Iran 123–4 military power 158, 221; see also atomic weapons

277

Miscamble, Wilson D. 203 Mission to Moscow (1943) 183 Missouri (USS) 113 mistrust 242; between the Allies 46, 57, 61–2, 96, 215, 219; East-West 201, 221 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos 103 modernism 181–2, 186 Modrow, Hans 78 Mohammed Reza 118 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich 96, 99, 115–16; Asia 133, 138; Atomic Energy Commission 242–3; atomic weapons 59; Greece 103; Middle East 106, 110, 112, 120; Nazi Germany 24–5, 32–3; Operation Barbarossa 34; Paris conference 160, 225, 252–3; personality 154; Romania 97–8; San Francisco conference 54; United Kingdom 43 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (1939) 24–5, 28, 30, 213–14 Montgomery, Field Marshal 54, 55, 56, 114 Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits (1936) 105–6, 108, 109, 110–12, 113, 122 Morgenthau, Henry 129, 141, 147, 148, 172 Morosov, Aleksandr 34 Morrison, Herbert 116 Moscow 4–5; First conference (1941) 41; Second conference (1942) 44; Fourth conference (1944) 50; Foreign Ministers’ conferences 96, 107, 112, 159–60 Moscow, battle of (1941–42) 36 Moscow Dinamo 180–1 Mother Courage (1949) 186 Mountbatten, Lord 67, 141 Munich conference (1938) 22 Musaddiq, Mohammad 120 music 181, 186–7 Mussolini, Benito 22, 30, 94 Nagy, Ferenc 75 Nagy, Imre 74 national security 206; collective security 208, 231; Soviet Union 217; United States 161, 170, 215 National Security Act (1947) 161 National Security Agency (NSA) 170 National Security Council 61, 161 National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) 19–20 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 115–16, 168–9, 216, 257–60

278

Index

Nazis 19, 77, 166 Neumann, Franz 174 New Deal 9 Nguyen Al Quoc 141 Nineteen Eighty Four (1949) 187 Ninotchka (1939) 182–3 NKGB 170 NKVD 46, 72, 78; sovietisation process 70 non-aggression treaties, Europe 20, 24, 27 non-verbal communication 220 North Africa 43, 44 North Korea 136–8 North-South theorists 202 Novikov, Nikolai 160, 199–200, 249–50 NSC-68 report 61 nuclear energy 63, 66–7, 198, 203, 242–3 nuclear research 63, 198; Manhattan Project 57, 65–6; Soviet research 63–4; United Kingdom 64–6, 67; see also atomic weapons Nunn May, Alan 172–3 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 142, 174, 176 Okulicki, General 51, 54, 57 Olivier, Laurence 196 One World or None (1946) 198–9 O’Neill, Eugene 185 Open Door Policy 226–7 Operation Barbarossa 33–5, 92 Operation Dropshot 61 Operation Frantic 218–19 Operation Innomus 63–4 Operation Overlord 48 Operation Pincher 60–1 Operation Torch 44, 45 Operation Typhoon (Battle of Moscow) 36 Operation Unthinkable 52, 56, 61, 219 Operation Valuable 95–6 Oppenheimer, Robert 57, 59, 198–9 orthodox perspective 198–200, 225–6 Orwell, George 18, 181, 187, 198 Oster Conspiracy 22 Ottoman Empire 105 Pacific war 58–9 Pact of Steel (1939) 24 Pahlavi dynasty 118 Palestinian crisis 209 Papen, Franz von 85, 108 Paris Peace Treaty (1947) 74, 86, 87, 91, 252–3 Patton, General George 55, 69, 151 Pauker, Ana 87, 88, 97

Paul, Prince, Regent of Serbia 92 Pearl Harbor 29, 36, 126, 195–6 Pearson, Drew 173 Peierls, Rudolf 64, 66, 67 Pen Dehuai 131 People’s Liberation Army 130; see also China Percentages Agreement (1944) 50, 97, 98, 101, 104, 232–3 peripheral strategy 47 Perl, William 140 Persia see Iran Peter I, King of Serbia 92 Peter II, King of Serbia 92, 93 Petkov, Nikola 89, 90–1 Philby, Kim 95–6, 171, 172, 173, 175 Piroth, Colonel Charles 143 Pishvari, Jafar 121 planned economy 15, 79, 166 plutonium 65, 66, 67 Poland 22, 48, 204; deportations 70–1; invasion by Germany 23–4, 30–2, 48; Katyn massacre 49, 50; Polish Americans 104; Polish Army 49, 50; Polish government in exile 49, 50, 53, 56, 72; Polish Provisional Government (Lublin) 50–1, 56–7, 72, 235, 237–8; post-war settlement 50–1, 55, 72, 235–6, 237–8, 239; pre-war treaties 20, 25; resistance members arrested 51, 53–4; and Soviet Union 48–9, 62, 69; sovietisation 73–4 Polish-Soviet War (1919–20) 8, 16 Poltava airfield, Ukraine 218–19 popular culture 186–7 post-revisionist perspectives 201–5, 228 Potemkin, Vladimir Petrovich 24 Potsdam Conference (1945) 57, 250–1; Allied Control Commissions (ACCs) 99; Council of Foreign Ministers 99; Indo-china 141; Iran 120, 206; LendLease aid 240; Poland 51, 239; reparations 239, 240–1; repatriation of Germans 70–1; Turkish question 111 power: balance of power 199–201, 206, 208, 215, 226–7, 232; diplomatic 221; intra-state 202; military 204, 221; rising and dominant powers 219; world domination 201, 202, 249–50; see also economic power Prince of Wales (HMS) 193, 196 propaganda 155, 188–9; American 156–7, 182, 190; German 190–1; Hollywood films 182–4, 196–7; Soviet 10, 181–2, 188, 189–90

Index purges 14, 18, 27 Putin, Vladimir 108, 213 Qazi Muhammad 121 Quebec Agreement (1943) 65–6, 107 radar systems 178–9 Radescu, General 87, 97–8 Rajk, Laszlo 165 Rákosi, Mátyás 72, 74–5 Reagan, Ronald 199 realist school 206 recession, fear of 158, 160, 163–4 Red Army: Azerbaijan 60, 118; Eastern Europe 35–7, 70–1, 83, 90, 93, 151, 153; Russian Civil War (1917–1920) 8; see also Soviet Union The Red Danube (1949) 183 Red Scare (1919–20) 9 refugees: German 71; Jewish 64, 95 Renner, Karl 52–3 reparations: ACC (Allied Control Commission) 80; for France 160; Potsdam Conference (1945) 239, 240–1; for Soviet Union 72, 74, 79, 150, 154, 163, 166, 227, 230; Yalta Conference (1945) 150 Reuben James (USS) 194 Révai, József 72 revisionist perspective 200–1, 226–7 Reza Khan 118–19 Rhee, Syngman 136, 137 Rhineland, occupation of 20 Ribbentrop, Joachim von 23–4, 30–2, 194; pact with Molotov 24–5, 28, 30, 213–14 Riga, Treaty of (1921) 110 Riga axioms 12–13, 14, 151, 155, 156 Roberts, Frank 216 Roberts, Geoffrey 204 Robeson, Paul 187 Romania 69, 86, 96; post-war settlement 97, 98, 232–3; pre-war alliances 25, 26; sovietisation 86–8 Roosevelt, Elliott 190 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 9, 13; Allied conferences 49–50, 51, 237–8; atomic weapons 64, 65; and Churchill 96, 104, 171, 228–9; colonialism 142; and communism 217; death of 52, 214; entering Second World War 92, 193; foreign policies 151–2, 155, 203–4, 214; and Hitler 9–10, 23, 41, 214; and Stalin 49, 103–4, 217; see also United States Root, Elihu 135

279

Root-Takahira agreement 135 Rose, Fred 172 Rosenberg, Julius 178–9 Rusk, Colonel Dean 135, 138, 177 Russell, Bertrand 67 Russia (Imperial) 4–5, 5, 204–5; First World War 5–6; Iran (Persia) 116–18; Poland 48; Turkey 105 Russian civil war (1917–1920) 8 A Russian Journal (1948) 190 Russian Liberation Army 82–3 Russian people, demeanour 155–6, 220 The Russian Question (1946) 189 Russian revolution 6–8; international impact 8–9, 16 Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) 10, 16, 108 Rutherford, Ernest 64 Ryan, Robert 183 Sadak, Necmettin 116 Sakharov, Andrei 68 salami tactics 73, 75, 76, 87, 90 San Francisco conference (1945) 53, 54, 109–10, 238 Sanatescu, General 86, 87, 97 Sarant, Alfred 178 Schlesinger, Arthur 225–6 Schmidt, Paul 21, 24, 30–1, 33 Schulenburg, Friedrich Werner von der 25, 29, 34 scientific research 177–9, 184; espionage 63–4, 66, 68, 140; see also nuclear research Scobie, Lieut.-General Ronald 101 sea: command of 48; sea passage neutrality 111 Second World War 213, 244; death toll 35, 36, 46–7, 59, 127; final stages 52–5, 58– 60; German offensives 23–4, 33–5, 88–9; leading to Cold War 215; Second front plans 43–8 security: Stalin 69; United States 61, 157– 8, 221; see also espionage; intelligence services; national security self-determination 11, 103, 228, 229, 254 Sergeant York (1941) 197 Shaw, George Bernard 17–18 Sheng Shicai 130–1 Shevchenko, Andrei 178 Sikorski, General 49 Silverman, George 176–7 Simeon II, King of Bulgaria 89 Simonov, Konstantin 189

280

Index

Simović, General Dušan 92 Sinatra, Frank 161 singers 181 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) 126–7 Sino-US relationship 138 Sisavangvong, King of Laos 144 Slavic people 69, 234 Slovakia 23 smiling 220 Smith-Mundt Act (1947) 182 social democracy 4, 7 socialism 3–4, 213; socialist economy 11, 15 socialist realism 186 Sokolovsky, Marshal 166–7 Soong Eiling 129 Soong Mayling 129–30 Soong Qinling 130, 131 Sorge, Richard 34 South Korea 137 South Manchurian Railway 126, 127, 135 Southeast Asia 206–7, 215 Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) 77, 80, 185 Soviet threat theorists 201–2 Soviet Union: arts 186; China 128–9, 132–5; end of 203, 213; establishment of 10; expansionism 61, 201, 225; and fascism 19–20, 213–14, 245; the IMF 147; imperialism 204–5; Iran 114, 120, 122–3, 124, 206, 209, 216; and Japan 28–30, 32; Korea 136–8, 139–40; Palestinian crisis 209; pre-war foreign policy 20, 25–6, 33; recovery from war 163, 244–5; security needs 153, 155, 203, 204, 215, 216–17, 225, 230; spheres of influence 49, 134, 153, 204, 205–6; and Turkey 100, 105–8, 109–12, 113–14, 115–16; UN Security Council 208–9; and United States 11–12, 14, 41–3, 148–9, 189–90, 199–200, 249–50, 252–3; weakness of leadership 216; see also Red Army; Stalin, Iosef Vissarionovich Soviet-Finnish War (1940) 32, 171 sovietisation 70; Albania 95–6; Bulgaria 70, 90–2; Czechoslovakia 82–6; German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 76–81; Hungary 74–6; Poland 73–4; Romania 86–8 Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact (1932, 1934) 20 Spain 62, 240 Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) 20 Spanish-American War (1898) 5 Spartacus League uprising (1919) 9

SPD (German social democrats) 19–20 Special Operations Executive (SOE), Albania 94 spheres of influence 155, 157, 213, 231–2; Balkans 50, 101, 104; Eastern Europe 24–5, 49, 205–6, 214; Middle East 15, 109, 205–6; see also Percentages Agreement (1944) spies see espionage sports competition 180–1 Stalin, Iosef Vissarionovich 42, 234; Allied conferences 57, 104, 235; Berlin Blockade 169; Churchill 232–3, 248; Eastern Europe 69–70, 229–31; Hitler 33–4; imperialism 217, 218; Kim Il Sung 137, 138; Mao Zedong 127, 132–5; mistakes 166, 169, 204, 215; mistrust of Allies 46, 57, 60, 215; personality 11, 46, 203–4, 215, 218; rejection of Marshall Plan 163–4; response to Iron Curtain speech 248–9; rise to power 8, 10–11; role in Cold War 204–5, 216, 217, 218; and Tito, Josip Broz 93–4; view of the West 154, 217, 244–5; see also Soviet Union Stalingrad, battle of (1942–1943) 36 Steinbeck, John 190 Steinhardt, Laurence 15 Stephenson, William 191–3, 194, 196 Sternin, Iosef 220 Stettinius, Edward R. 54, 200–1 Stevenson 97, 98 Stimson, Henry 152, 195, 241–2 Stowe, Harriet Beecher 189 Straits conference see Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits (1936) Strassman, Fritz 64 Sudetenland problem 21 Sun Yat-Sen 125, 130 superheroes 187–8 superpower theorists 202, 206 Svoboda, Ludvik 85 Sweezy, Paul 174 Szilard, Leo 64 Taft, William Howard 135 Taiwan 126, 131, 133, 136, 138, 139, 210 Takahira Kogorō 135 Tehran Conference (1943) 47, 49–50, 107, 120 Teller, Edward 64, 66, 67 Templar, General Gerald 146 Tenenbaum, Edward A. 78 That Hamilton Woman (1941) 196, 197 theatre 181, 185, 186

Index Third World 202–3, 228 Third World War 55; fears of 88, 110, 112, 198–9; triggers for 13, 60, 62, 140, 205 Thomsen, Hans 191, 193 The Threepenny Opera (Brecht) 186 Thucydides’ trap 219 Tibet 131 Tildy, Zoltán 75 Timoshenko, Marshal 32 Tiso, Josef 23 Tito, Josip Broz 55, 61, 83, 93–4, 165–6 Tolbukhin, Marshal 90, 97 totalitarianism 157–8, 214, 225, 228 Trades Union Congress (TUC) 16, 17 Trinity bomb 57, 66 Tripartite Pact (1940) 33, 89, 92, 106 Triple Alliance 7, 15 Triple Entente 7, 15 Trotsky, Leon 8, 118 Truman, Harry S. 250; Asia 129, 142; atomic weapons 198; attitude to Soviet Union 53–4, 55; Berlin Blockade 168; foreign policy 111, 122, 152, 203, 238; Korean War (1950–1953) 139–40; Long Telegram (1946) 112–13; post war settlements 56, 57; Truman Doctrine 103, 159, 206, 216, 253–4, 255–6; view of Hitler 41; view of Stalin 240; see also United States Tsipras, Alexis 103 Tube Alloys 64, 65 Tudeh Party, Iran 119–21, 206 Tukhachevsky, Marshal Mikhail 27 Turkey: aid to 123, 159; neutrality 107; pre-war foreign policy 105, 106; and Soviet Union 26, 60, 100, 105–8, 109–12, 113–14, 115–16, 205, 216; and United Kingdom 106; and United States 113, 115, 159, 205, 216 Turkish Straits problem 152, 205–6; Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits (1936) 105–6, 108, 109, 110–12, 113, 122 Turkmenchay, Treaty of 117, 118 Tyulpanov, Colonel S. I. 77, 79, 80, 185 U-boats 193–4 Udy, Giles 17 Ukraine 71, 108, 163 Ulam, Adam B. 216 Ulbricht, Walter 76, 77, 79 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) see Soviet Union United Kingdom: appeasement of Hitler 21–2, 23–4, 24–5; Balkans policy 96–8,

281

99–100; colonialism 145–6; elections 17, 56, 57; Greece 101–2; oil interests 215; Palestinian crisis 209; post-war settlements in Europe 96–9; and Soviet Union 15, 16, 17, 34, 41–4; and Turkey 106, 107; view of communism 16, 17–18, 214; weakness of 24, 47, 112, 114, 160, 213, 215; see also Churchill, Winston Spenser United Nations 208, 248; Big Five 208–9; Big Four 103, 126; crises 209–10; formation of 53, 104, 151, 231–2; Iran 119–20, 122; and NATO 257; Security Council 114, 124, 126–7, 208–9, 258; Turkey 109 United States 5, 6; capitalism 11–12, 206, 214, 252–3, 254–5; China 126–7, 140; Eastern Europe policies 103–4, 166; economic power 153, 239, 251–2; imperialism 5, 153, 189, 206, 216, 220–1, 249–50; Middle East 113–16, 121, 209; popular culture 186–7; post war strategy 60–1, 96, 152–3, 153–4; Second World War 191–3, 194–6, 214; security needs 157–8, 221; and Soviet Union 12–13, 14, 41–3, 148–9, 151–2, 199, 245–7, 255; see also Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S. United States imperialism theorists 201 uranium 64, 66, 67, 136 USSR see Soviet Union Uzbekistan 108 Vandenberg, Senator 104, 151, 156, 157 Vatican 161 Venona Project 170, 176, 178 Versailles, Treaty of (1919) 7 Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy 94 Vienna 52–3 Viet Cong 144 Viet Minh 142–3, 144 Vietnam: invasion by France 140, 142–3; invasion by Japan 141; Potsdam Conference (1945) 141 Vinogradov, General 97 Vo Nguyen Giap 143 Voice of America 182, 187, 190 Volkov, Konstantin 172 von Neumann, John 67 Voroshilov, Kliment 32, 74 Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuarevich 116, 178; Allied Advisory Council 96; Asia 138, 139; Eastern Europe 87, 98, 99; Greece 103; Marshall Plan 255–6 Wallace, Henry A. 45, 157, 200, 251–2 Warsaw, battle of (1920) 48

282

Index

Warsaw Pact 96, 169 Warsaw uprising 72 Webb, Beatrice and Sidney 17–18 Wehrmacht: brutality of 32, 82–3; German surrender 54; intelligence network 174–5; Operation Barbarossa 34–5, 36; Oster Conspiracy 22 Weigel, Helene 186 Wells, H. G. 18 West Germany see Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) Westad, Odd Arne 203 Western Europe: bloc 84, 165; economic weakness 216, 221; rebuilding 228, 234 West-West theorists 202–3 White, Harry Dexter 129, 141, 147, 148, 175, 176–7 White Russians 8, 16, 118 Wigner, Eugene 64 Wilder, Thornton 181 Williams, Tennessee 185 Williams, William A. 200, 226–7 Willkie, Wendell 191, 192 Wilson, Edwin 113 Wilson, Woodrow 7 Winant, John G. 150 Winter War (1940) 32, 171

World World World World

Bank 147, 161 War I see First World War War II see Second World War War III see Third World War

Yalta Conference (1945): Declaration on Liberated Europe (1945) 97, 104, 236–7; espionage 53; implementation of 56, 99; Iran 120; Manchuria 127; Poland 51, 235–6; reparations 150 York, Alvin C. 197 Yugoslavia 69; aid from United States 93, 166; and Albania 95; expansion of 55; German occupation 89, 92–4; Percentages Agreement (1944) 50, 232–3; and Stalin 62, 164, 165–6 Zernov, Pavel 63 Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich 164, 181, 185, 201, 216 Zhdanovshchina 181, 189 Zhou Enlai 126, 128, 133, 134, 138, 139 Zhukov, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich 28, 33, 51, 54 Zinoviev, Grigory 17 Zog, King of Albania 94 Zorin, Valerian 85 Zubok, Vladislav 203