Orientalism and Conspiracy: Politics and Conspiracy Theory in the Islamic World 9780755610969, 9781848854147

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PREFACE

Arndt Graf, Schirin Fathi, and Ludwig Paul Sadik J. Al-Azm has been considered one of the leading Arab intellectuals and social critics for about 40 years. He became known as such to a broader Western public in 1989, after the “Rushdie affair”, when he took a mediating position in the inter-cultural and inter-religious discussions. In all these, he never failed to make clear his commitment to enlightenment and freedom of the press and other media, through which he has become one of the leading proponents of civil society in the Arab world. He has also decisively influenced the Islamic/Western “orientalist discourse” of the last 30 years. The Saidian orientalist hypothesis aimed at correcting the “distorted” picture that (it said) Western societies had constructed of the Islamic world over centuries. By proposing an “Occidentalist hypothesis”, thus holding up a mirror to the Islamic world, Al-Azm gave another proof of his intellectual brilliance and wit. A typical ingredient of the distorted Orientalist and Occidentalist attitudes are conspiracy theories. It, therefore, seemed appropriate for us to organize a conference on “orientalism and conspiracy” to honor Sadik J. Al-Azm (in June 2005, Hamburg), the papers of which are collected in the present volume. The term “conspiracy theories” usually denotes ideological patterns of explanation that reduce complex political or social issues to a simple black-and-white picture. This is done typically by constructing a scenario in which the we-group is threatened and/or dominated by a wicked group or organization that is working in secret. Conspiracy theories are highly complex and socially relevant phenomena of global impact and have not yet been investigated sufficiently so far.

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P R E FA C E

Although conspiracy theories are widespread also in Western countries, they seem to be of specific interest for the study of modern Islamic societies. The one well-known conspiracy theory that ascribes the aspiration at global dominance to Jewish and Zionist circles may be called the universally most “successful” one and is indeed an integral part of most modern Islamist ideologies (but not only these). May conspiracy theories be characterized as products or by-products of modern social-political developments? Or is the recent increase in number and importance of conspiracy theories, in Islamic countries, rather to be understood as a sign of failed modernization? By addressing questions like these within various theoretical frameworks, the conference aimed at contributing to a better understanding, and more systematic investigation of conspiracy theories in Islamic societies, taking into account the relevant regional and cultural aspects that have influenced specific conspiracy theories. In detail, the following issues were addressed: •

case studies on specific conspiracy theories

•

the role that conspiracy theories have played in the framework of orientalist discourses

•

historical, theoretical, and conceptual conditions for the development and existence of conspiracy theories

In addition, the conference also aimed at contributing to a cross-cultural dialog, bringing together scholars from various Islamic and non-Islamic countries. It is hoped that with the publication of the present volume, a scholarly basis will be laid for a better mutual understanding of crosscultural misunderstandings.

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SADIK J. AL-AZM – SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER A PERSONAL TRIBUTE

Stefan Wild It was in the last days of December 1968, and I had just been posted to Beirut. The capital of Lebanon was at that time the intellectually liveliest of all Arab cities. It boasted four universities and had the freest press of any Arab country. The local historical background was the Arab defeat against Israel in the June war of 1967 – not more than 18 months had passed. Nasserism was on the decline, and the Palestinian presence in Lebanon began to emerge as a major political problem. On the international level, this was the era of the Cold War, and the US military got deeper and deeper entangled in Vietnam. I had only been in Lebanon for some months, but I had already heard much about the young Syrian university professor Sadik J. Al-Azm and his “radical views”. Sadik had been teaching at the American University of Beirut and had run into problems there. This was not the first and not the last time that Sadik was at loggerheads with a university administration. I am not aware that any Arabic university ever thought of awarding Sadik a doctorate honoris causa. In any case, when I wanted to meet Sadik in person, I could not see him. He had just been arrested and jailed. The reason given by the authorities was hard to believe even at the time. The charge was that Sadik had “stirred up confessional trouble”. The highest Muslim religious authority in Lebanon, the Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, had intervened after Sadik had published his collection of essays, Critique of Religious Thought (Arabic, Beirut 1968). The Sheikh started a legal procedure. Lebanese penal law at the time punished attempts to “foment confessional denominational trouble” as a kind of

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national high treason with up to three years in prison. The book had not unleashed religious unrest, but it had angered the religious authorities, especially the Sunni establishment. It was confiscated; Sadik at first hid but on 8 January 1969 gave himself up to the Lebanese authorities and was imprisoned. A week later, after a trial that was to become famous, Sadik was released, and I could finally meet him. Many months later, and to the credit of the Lebanese judicial system, he was acquitted on all accounts by a Lebanese court. Speaking truth to power often means to speak truth against power and has its risks. The conflict between the scholar or – let us use the much maligned word – the intellectual on the one hand and political power on the other is symbolized in many languages by the metaphor of the pen versus the sword. An Arabic proverb even idealistically proclaims the pen to be the “better sword”. The formula “speaking truth to power” as the quintessential function and duty of the intellectual was made famous by Edward Said (25 September 2003). This formula, of course, does not mean that the intellectual simply possesses truth and power does not. It means rather that the intellectual believes that truth can only emerge in public debate and that public debate can only thrive when this debate is not made subservient to and controlled by political power. The intellectual does not claim to have found the truth, but he insists that political power curbing public debate will kill truth. To create a space of free public debate is, therefore, an essential part of the intellectual’s task. It was and is Sadik’s task to create this space in Arab society. Thus, almost all of Sadik’s writings are intended as contributions to such a public debate. To be specific about Sadik’s part in this, I contrast for a moment Sadik’s oeuvre with Edward Said’s work on the one hand and Salman Rushdie’s on the other. To mention these two names, Edward Said and Salman Rushdie, in connection with Sadik J. Al-Azm is not a case of name-dropping. Sadik has written on Edward Said and was close to many of his views, especially about the Arab-Israeli conflict. That did not prevent him from clashing very publicly with him on some points and on some aspects of the Saidian concept of “orientalism” – the title of probably the most influential book Edward Said wrote (Orientalism, New York 1978). Sadik has also – much later – written extensively on Salman Rushdie’s literary work. He not only defended it as an exercise in free speech to which a novelist must be entitled, rather, Sadik explained, Salman Rushdie’s famous novel The Satanic

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Verses should be seen as a necessary step in modern literature that did for a Muslim culture and for Islam what James Joyce had done with his Ulysses for Irish Catholics and Christianity. There are numerous analogies and similarities between the three authors, Edward Said, Salman Rushdie, and Sadik J. Al-Azm. Sadik shares with Edward Said his predilection of the political essay, and he shares with Salman Rushdie a deep distrust of institutionalized religion. But while Edward Said and Salman Rushdie wrote and write mainly for a Western, especially a US public, Sadik’s target readership is primarily an Arab public. Most of his writing is done in Arabic, and his countless comments and interviews in the press address an Arab reader. It is probably fair to say that the favorite target of Sadik’s criticism is the alliance of political power with institutionalized religion. But one must not forget that Sadik’s first critique, the book Self-critique after the Defeat (namely the defeat of 1967, published in Beirut in 1968) was primarily a scathing attack on official Arab reactions to the defeat in the 1967 war. Already its title was a provocation. While official Arab political correctness at the time spoke of a “setback” or a “catastrophic misfortune”, Sadik called a spade a spade and a defeat a defeat. This book was also a showdown with Arabic nationalism and especially with Nasserism. One has perhaps to have lived through this era to fully appreciate how much courage it took for an Arab intellectual to criticize Gamal Abdel Nasser, the symbol of pan-Arab nationalism at the time. Sadik ironically wondered why the Arab leaders called the Israeli attack that led to the Six Days’ War of 1967 a “cowardly act”, when the Arab countries had claimed for years to be in a state of war with Israel, thus exposing the hollow rhetoric of the Arab regimes. He was also an early critic of Yassir Arafat, after the latter had become the chairman of the PLO and the new symbol of hope for Arabs and Palestinians. In many ways, Sadik is the writer who has made self-criticism of an Arab in Arabic famous; this book was the mother of Arab self-criticism, as it were. Sadik produced a constant parallel stream of criticism directed against the different US administrations – but this is in this context less interesting. Sadik is not only a writer, he is also somebody who loves public debates, even when or rather especially when they are sharp. His public debates with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an icon of Islamic fundamentalist thought, or Hassan al-Turabi, the most famous Islamist of Sudan, live on the Arabic TV channel al-Jazeera, years ago, have become famous.

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It must have been one of the very few occasions on which, to their great discomfort, these two had to publicly face flat contradiction and even sardonic irony. There are a number of constant topics in Sadik’s work: The commitment to more justice for the Palestinians, the critical view of US policy in the Middle East and his fight against the misuse of institutionalized religion in the service of oil and power. Let me try to point out what seems to me to be an important trait of Sadik’s written work with philosophical implications. Sadik is and was part of what loosely has – or should one say had – to be called the Arab left. Marxism seemed for many Arab intellectuals the best way to understand their societies; socialism seemed a good way to build a better and more equitable society. In this, Arab intellectuals were not alone. Throughout the world between Europe and Latin America and particularly in many developing countries, socialism promised reform if not revolution. The “Arab Left” had been projected back into the Middle Ages by such serious philosophers as Ernst Bloch; Avicenna, Averroes, and al-Farabi were claimed as forerunners of modern leftist ideology. In Beirut, publishing houses and literary circles, clubs, journals, and newspapers ran the whole gamut of the left: from orthodox communism split into Soviet and Chinese observance to non-dogmatic Marxism. In Germany, we have good reasons to be skeptical of Stalinism and “real socialism” as practiced behind the Iron Curtain. But in the Arab countries, most intellectuals were on the side of the left even if this left was ill-defined. Secularism, rationalism, feminism, and scientific research seemed possible only if and when these societies moved to the left. The Arab left offered the chance to be part of an international project that allowed for an unheard of pluralism. We may smile today when we go through the yellowing pages of Khamsin, the “Journal of Revolutionary Socialists of the Middle East”, which appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s; it bore the name of a desert storm and was published in Paris and London. But here was one of the few platforms that opened a discussion between Arabs and Israelis. This Arab left never confused Judaism and Zionism, and in Khamsin we find Sadik J. Al-Azm’s name next to the names of Jewish and Israeli intellectuals. The virtual disappearance of the Arab left after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and after the downfall of state socialism is, in my view, one of the factors responsible for the rise of an Arab and Muslim anti-Zionism that is becoming more and more tinged with

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old-fashioned European anti-Semitism and is colored by quotations from the Qur´an. One of Sadik’s most interesting books stated his commitment to an enlightened form of non-dogmatic Marxism under the title In defence of materialism and history (Arabic, Beirut 1990) – the date of appearance is a telling indication of its intellectual position. Sadik is an outspoken and unrepentant secularist. He fights for the Enlightenment and refuses to see in secularism and Enlightenment political notions poisoned by being derived from non-Arab or nonMuslim sources. He calls for humanism, rationalism, religious pluralism, freedom of conscience – his polemical force rests on an eminently moralist approach. The cliché that Sadik is an enfant terrible, a rebel who invites scandals, is not entirely wrong. There is a strong confrontational and combative element in most of what he writes. But the scandal is calculated and is moral in the sense that it is deeply rooted in political morality, in an almost deadly serious moral commitment. There is nothing playful about this. The worst thing one could do to Sadik would probably be to call him a post-modernist, a post-structuralist, a de-constructionist or God forbid an adherent of Jacques Derrida. The element of an arbitrary and endless epistemological game is incompatible with Sadik’s moral commitment. Finally, it is a pleasure to read his prose, especially the polemical passages.

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PERSONAL WORDS TO AN ADMIRED TEACHER AND FRIEND

Gernot Rotter Sadik, getting this honorary doctorate from the Asia-Africa Institute of the University of Hamburg may mean for you just one more – and I am sure not the last one and not the most important one – among all the prizes and honors you have been awarded by universities and other institutions around the world. But for the Department of Islamic Studies at the University of Hamburg it is certainly one of the unique events of the last 20 years. Since I am no longer an official representative of the Institute it is not my duty here to deliver the official laudatory speech in the name of the institute, but I would like to congratulate you in a very personal way. In the mid-1990s, we discussed at the institute in Hamburg whom we should invite to as a visiting professor. Without any hesitation, I proposed you as our first choice. Until that time we two had not even met personally. But intellectually you had already been a highly respected spiritual friend – or should I say, an admired teacher of mine for about 30 years. The starting point of this one-sided admiration must have been some time in the last months of my first longer stay in the Near East, when I was working as an assistant at the German Institute for Oriental Studies in Beirut in 1968–1969. I finally had learned to read Arab newspapers not only for the sake of improving my Arabic but for the sake of understanding the political and cultural life around me. At the same time, I had started to follow discussions in Arabic when meeting with intellectuals of the Lebanese society.

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Suddenly, in one of those days long gone, there was a book on every one’s lips: An-naqd adh-dhâtî ba‘da l-hazîma, “Self-criticism after the Defeat”, meaning the defeat of the Arab armies in the so-called Six Days’ War against Israel in 1967, written by an hitherto unknown young intellectual of Syrian origin called Sadik J. Al-Azm. And only a few months later, when I was already back in Germany, but still in close contact with some Lebanese friends, I learned that a second book by the same author with the title Naqd al-fikr ad-dînî “Critique of Religious Thought” had come out and that this book was discussed even more controversially than the first one. I do not want to discuss the impact these two books had on the political discourse in the Arab world in general – and on the life of their author. This will be done, I am sure, by others in much greater detail. Instead, I will focus on the considerable influence that these two books had on my own academic development as a scholar of Islamic and Arabic Studies or just as a politically thinking human being. Before going to Beirut, I had just graduated in Oriental Studies at the University of Bonn, where my two main teachers had been Otto Spies and Annemarie Schimmel. Spies, at least in my impression, was looking at the Near East in quite a conservative and realistic way, although his main interest lay mainly in very special juridical questions of medieval shari‘a law, mainly in Turkish and other oriental fairy tales and in Turkish history. These were topics I myself was not very much interested in, although I appreciated his capabilities as a teacher and his great sense of humor. Annemarie Schimmel on the other hand, herself being a mystic, was looking at the Muslim world in a very emotional, enthusiastic, and romantic way. This romanticism was not restricted to a certain time, social class or intellectual movement in Islamic history but included the whole modern Muslim world without any reservation and in all its manifestations. It cannot be denied that our small group of students was – in one way or the other – fascinated by the Middle East, but this could not prevent us from sometimes mocking her exaggerated admiration of the Muslim World. Nevertheless, the influence of Spies and Schimmel on my academic development was considerable at that time. With this background – in addition to the many sympathies for the revolutionary movements that was typical among European students

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in those days – I had come to Beirut for the first time. Only very slowly did I take notice of the numerous contradictions within the Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian societies around me, with the result that my established image of the Arab world started to crumble. Yes, to a certain degree, I lost my bearings. It was exactly at this time when your book Self-Criticism after the Defeat came out. Line after line, I felt how furious and enraged, how disappointed and hopeless you must have been while writing this book. Whereas most young academics on the campuses of Beirut’s universities – not to speak of the average citizens – were sure that foreign conspiracies and interventions had led to the Arab defeat in 1967, you looked for the reasons inherent in the Arab world itself, in its mentality and traditions, in its incompetence, inability, and unwillingness to criticize itself. Indeed, the word “self-criticism” (naqd dhâtî) is quite a recent word in Arabic and just looks like a literary loan translation from either English “self-criticism” or German “Selbstkritik”. Was it even you, Sadik, who introduced this word into the modern Arab vocabulary, because of your extensive knowledge of European philosophy, as only very few others have in the Arab world? Asking for self-criticism is asking for realism and rationalism. And this – and I hope you agree with me, Sadik – is the leitmotif of all your work: writing for rationalism in the Arab world. Apart from the contents of the two mentioned books and many more that followed – and into which I will not go here in more detail – there were two aspects of your writing style that attracted me. First, in spite of all your harsh criticism, irony, satire, and sarcasm you never regressed to plain hatred. And second, you never lost your great sense of humor. For instance, the way you used the word fahlawî or fahlawîya – taken from the dialect and impossible to translate – to characterize Arab mentality and the striking examples you used to depict this term to the reader were just hilarious. A good sense of humor is an important prerequisite of self-criticism and rationalism. Therefore, all fundamentalist movements of the world, be they religious or ideological or just moralistic, are lacking in any sense of humor. This lack of humor is the connecting link among them – it is their common feature. Living in the Arab world I met many an academic with an enormous sense of humor and very rationalist views. But there are only very few of them who dare to stand up for their opinions

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PERSONAL WORDS TO AN ADMIRED TEACHER AND FRIEND

in public, like you do. One unforgettable instance was your famous dispute with Shaikh al-Qaradawi on religious essentials broadcast on al-Jazeera a few years ago. And it is for these reasons, Sadik, that people like you are so important for the Arab world, especially in these days. Several times during my 30 years as a teacher at the Universities of Tübingen and Hamburg, I chose publications of yours as required reading for my classes. I remember at least one of my former students, Astrid Raab, decided on the basis of these classes to write her M.A. thesis on certain aspects of your publications. It goes without saying that I supported this decision. You may remember that she even visited you in Damascus and was very impressed by your personality. Upon her return, she was even more motivated and consequently got the highest marks for her thesis. This student stands as a very good example for the fact that reading your critical books on Arab society and politics did not deter her from the Near East – as it did not deter me in the late 1960s. On the contrary, she became so fascinated by the contradictions and inconsistencies of these societies that she decided to help establish modern educational institutions in the region. Now she is working toward this end in Afghanistan, as she had done already several years before in Yemen. Sadik, already years ago during your first stay as visiting professor at our Institute, the enthusiasm your lectures generated among students, as well as guests, confirmed my recommendation to invite you and in return – so I hope – validated your acceptance. Today, I came back to the university for the first time after nearly two years. You all know the reason for this long absence. But when I was told that you, Sadik, are here again and that you will be given an honorary doctorate by the University of Hamburg there was no question in my mind that I would come, as this is the best and most distinguished opportunity I could imagine. Thank you very much.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Sadik J. Al-Azm Born in Damascus, in 1934, philosopher, internationally well-known Arab intellectual, retired Professor of Modern European Philosophy at the University of Damascus, visiting Professor at the universities of Hamburg, Antwerp, and Princeton, fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. In 2004, he won the Duch Erasmus Prize and the German Lucas Prize. In 2005 he became a Dr. Honoris Causa at Hamburg University. Lorenzo Casini (MA SOAS/University of London, 2002; PhD University of Florence, 2005) is Assistant Professor in Arabic Language and Literature at the University of Messina. Previously, he has taught Arabic Language and Literature at the Universities of Perugia, Florence, and Genoa and has been Jean Monnet Fellow of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence. His publications include Beyond Occidentalism: Europe and the Self in Present Day Arabic Narrative Discourse (Florence: European University Institute/RSCAS, 2008). Schirin Fathi (PhD Hamburg 1993) teaches at the University of Hamburg, where she also worked as Assistant Professor in the AsiaAfrica Institute (1997–2006) and as Guest Professor (Winter 2009). She took on various research and teaching activities at renowned institutions in Washington, DC, Amman, Jerusalem and Cape Town. Publications cover the Middle East conflict, nationalism and nation-building in the Middle East, issues of peace education and conspiracy theories. Arndt Graf (PhD Hamburg 1997; Habilitation Hamburg 2004) is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Frankfurt,

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Germany, since October 2009. Previously, he worked at Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia from 2007 to 2009 and at the Asia-Africa Institute of the University of Hamburg where he also served as Assistant Professor (1999–2005). His teaching experience includes visiting positions at Cornell University (USA) in 1998/9, the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (Indonesia) in 2004, and the Université de La Rochelle (France) in 2005/6. Arndt Graf’s publications mostly cover aspects of rhetoric, media, and communication in insular Southeast Asia. Matthew Gray is Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktoum, Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Arab & Islamic Studies (The Middle East & Central Asia) at The Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, a position he has held since January 2005. Prior to that time, he held various positions with the Australian government. He has a PhD from ANU (2000) and an MA from Macquarie University (1994). His research and teaching focuses on the politics, international relations, and political economy of the modern Middle East, and his publications have appeared in Arab Studies Quarterly, Middle Eastern Studies, the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, and the Australian Journal of International Affairs. Karin Hörner, born in 1953 in Wuppertal, since 1986 lecturer of Islamic Studies at the University of Hamburg, Asia Africa Institute (AAI), since 2002 head of the AAI Library. Publications on Orientalist travelogs and iconography, Muslim gender roles, and clichés in media representations of Muslims. Robert Irwin read Modern History at Oxford and taught Medieval History at the University of St Andrews. He has also taught Arabic and Middle Eastern History at various universities. He is the author of The Middle East in the Middle ages, The Arabian Nights: A Companion, Islamic Art, The Alhambra and For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and Their Enemies. He has also published six novels, of which the most recent is Satan Wants Me. He reviews for a wide range of periodicals and is a director of a publishing company. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and a Fellow of the London Institute of Pataphysics. J. M. Muslimin graduated in 1995 at the Faculty of Syariah of the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (Indonesia) and in 1998 at the Rijksuniversiteit Leiden (the Netherlands). In 2005, he received his PhD

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at the Asia-Africa Institute of the University of Hamburg (Germany) with a dissertation on “Islamic Law and Social Change: A Comparative Study of the Institutionalization and Codification of Islamic Family Law in the NationStates of Egypt and Indonesia”. Currently, he is a lecturer and researcher at the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (Indonesia). Ludwig Paul, born 1963 in Munich, did Iranian studies and Linguistics at the universities of Bonn, Göttingen, and Tehran in 1985–1995. He was Research fellow at the Van Leer Institute (Jerusalem) in 1995– 1996. He obtained his PhD in Iranian Studies at the University of Göttingen in 1996. He was Assistant Professor there in the period 1996–2003 and Professor for Iranian studies at the University of Hamburg from 2003. Gernot Rotter, born 1941 at Troppau (Czeckoslovakia), Assistant Lecturer of Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn (1967), at the German Institute of Oriental Studies in Beirut (1968/9), and at the University of Tübingen (1969–1979), director of the German Institute of Oriental Studies in Beirut (1980–1984), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Hamburg until retirement (1984–2004), Member of Parliament at the Landtag of Rhineland-Palatinate (1987–1991). Publications on early and modern Islamic and African history, translations of medieval Arabic literature into German, articles on political affairs in the Arab world in newspapers and magazines. Mohd Hazim Shah holds a Bachelor’s degree in Liberal Studies in Science from Manchester University, England, a Master’s degree in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, and a PhD in the History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A. In 1993, he was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Melbourne, Australia. He is currently a Professor and Head of Department, in the Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Malaya, where he teaches the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. He has been the Deputy President of the Malaysian Social Science Association since 2000. He has edited a book with Prof. K.S. Jomo and Dr Phua Kai Lit entitled New Perspectives on Malaysian Studies (2002), and with Dr Phua Kai Lit entitled Public Policy, Culture, and The Impact of Globalization in Malaysia (2004), both published by the Malaysian Social Science

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Association. Recently he has edited another book entitled, History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science: Essays in Honour of Ungku Aziz (2006), published by the University of Malaya Press. He has published in journals such as The American Journal of Islamic Social Science, the Asia Europe Journal and Studies in Contemporary Islam. His research interest includes theoretical studies on science and culture, and comparative epistemology. Tanja Strube, MA, born in 1978 in Hamburg, majored in Islamic studies; her subsidiary subjects were legal studies and political sciences, she finished her MA thesis on the constitutional court of Egypt and started to work as a lecturer at the Asia-Africa Institute in 2005. Stefan Wild, born 1937 in Leipzig, 1968–1973, director of the German Institute of Oriental Studies in Beirut, 1974–1977, Assistant Professor of Arabic and Contemporary Islamic Studies at the University of Amsterdam, 1977–2002, Full Professor of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn. Since 2002, Professor Emeritus at the University of Bonn, and 2003–2004 Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Berlin. Publications on Semitic toponomastics, Arabic lexicography, modern Arabic literature, and Qur’ anic studies

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1 ORIENTALISM AND CONSPIRACY

Sadik J. Al-Azm1 I The topic of “Orientalism and Conspiracy” is complex and this chapter is an attempt to provide a collage of analyses, observations, criticisms, experiences and commentaries dealing with several conventional and unconventional themes substantively related to the issue. I say this, in spite of Hasan Hanafi’s long-winded, verbose and rambling call on the Arabs in general and the Arab intelligentsia in particular to rise to the pressing challenge of establishing a science of Istighrab (i.e. Occidentalism), for the purpose of systematically studying and scientifically understanding the West, pretty much the way the West had studied us through its science of Istishraq (i.e. Orientalism).2 Unlike the term Istishraq, Hanafi’s Istighrab is itself a strange and awkward word for naming a new scholarly discipline, considering its current usages, meanings and connotations in Arabic such as: To find strange, odd, queer and farfetched. “Gharb” means “West”, both in the geographical and political senses of the word, while “ghareeb” means “stranger”, literally “one who comes from the West”, also the far-off place where the sun sets. I certainly did not expect Hanafi’s call to lead to any tangible results, nor did it escape my attention that if this projected science of Occidentalism is to amount to anything at all, then it will have to seriously conform to international standards of scholarship, research, criticism, review and argument that are in their turn almost wholly of modern Western origin and provenance. This surely would not only be enough to impeach the authenticity of such a science in the eyes of the many in the Arab and Muslim worlds that Hanafi is trying to reassure and uplift but also enough to accuse Hanafi himself – by Islamists, for example – of conspiring with the enemy to produce such an un-Islamic science as Occidentalism.

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And surely enough, his introduction to the science of Occidentalism is so overloaded with modern Occidental wisdom, learning, philosophizing, teachings and approaches that one wonders what is so particularly Eastern or Islamic about it? Among its massive inclusions are an almost scholastic summa of the history of modern European philosophy, the affirmation of a naïve Hegelianism where the World Geist is about to return East after having completed its classical journey from East to West and a wholesale uncritical adoption of the West’s well-known modern critiques of its own modernity with particular emphasis on the European right-wing counter-Enlightenment types of critiques (Herder, Sombart, Spengler, Heidegger, T.S. Eliot, Toynbee, Foucault) but without, at the same time, neglecting to borrow profusely from such works on the left as Martin Bernal’s Black Athena.3 Furthermore, the heavy influence of Paul Hazard’s La Crise de la Conscience Européenne: 1680–1715 is unmistakable. Scholars in the field know that Hanafi was publicly accused of heresy, apostasy and Kufr in 1997 by none other than his fundamentalist friends at Al-Azhar University; this in spite of his long-sustained efforts to play to the Islamist gallery in Egypt and beyond. Sadly enough, Hanafi failed to mount any vigorous, and/or principled and/or honorable defenses of himself. The resulting disappointment led Gaber ‘Asfour, one of Egypt’s most prominent literary critics and public intellectuals, to openly castigate him for the shabbiness of his stand, the incoherence of his reply and the defensiveness and hypocrisy of his apology, especially compared with the strong position taken earlier by Nasr Hamid Abuzaid who had to deal with equally serious threats, charges and accusations (including the annulment of his marriage) after the publication of his by now famous book, Critique of Religious Discourse.4 In the end, Hanafi’s call for a science of Occidentalism (a) amounts to a reaffirmation by means of an emulation of the much denounced and much despised original Western science of Orientalism; (b) emanates from a politics of resentment and a barely camouflaged sense of inferiority where Occidentalism is supposed to do to the West what Orientalism had already done to us, Easterners; (c) confirms all over again the much derided and disparaged “essentialism” of the original Orientalist project by reifying (and at times even fetishizing) anew “Orient” and “Occident” to the point of characterizing his projected science of Occidentalism “as not a history of facts but a description of essences” (p. 103), essences that necessarily issue in a “struggle of civilizations” (p. 34), according to his

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account; (d) gives up completely on the possibility of historically ever transcending this whole Orientalism/Occidentalism problematique in the direction of a higher synthesis based on our common human concerns and shared scientific and scholarly interests (i.e. a scholarly horizon beyond both Orientalism and Occidentalism); and (e) forms a classical instance of what I once called the trap of “Orientalism in reverse”. There is also that other meaning of Occidentalism that comes through the recent book of Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit bearing the title of Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies.5 Here, Occidentalism refers to a specific kind of discourse (followed by violent actions), emanating from the Arab and Muslim worlds whose main purpose is to denigrate, denounce and condemn the West in every conceivable way. In their more sophisticated version, these discourses consciously model themselves on what is supposed to be the Orientalist original and mean to retaliate by paying back the West and its Orientalism in kind. But its productions, in my view, never rise to the level of a lofty parody, a captivating satire or a truly funny take-off, except perhaps in the literary works of Salman Rushdie. A good example of the practice of this kind of retaliatory Occidentalism is already to be found in Adonis’ “Manifesto of Modernity (or Modernism)” of 1980,6 where, for example, the old doctrine of Ernest Renan, about the imitative character of the Semitic mind versus the creative nature of the Western and/or European mind is turned around to affirm that the essence of the Western mind is technicism, while the Eastern mind is by its very nature creative. Adonis proceeds to explain that technicism is no more than “application, reproduction, the transformation of an already present raw material, the imitation of a pre-given model or plan”, while the Ibda’ of the Eastern mind is “creation out of nothing, an emanation without pre-givens, an eruption without preexisting models”. He, then, appropriates Edward Said’s evocative phrase to the effect that “the West Orientalized the Orient” and inverts it to conclude that whenever the West acts creatively, it Orientalizes itself, i.e., when it succeeds in transcending its technicism by engaging in real Ibda’ it Easternizes. For Adonis, the West is technique, reason, system, order, method, symmetry and such. While the East is the prophetic, visionary, magical, miraculous, infinite, inner, transcendent, fanciful, ecstatic and so on. In other words – and here I am using Adonis’ words – the East is an originary kind

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of nebular chaos out of which the derivative Western cosmos emerged. But, the technologically superior West is not satisfied at present with mere rebellion against the creative East out of which it came but is out to kill the father tout court. Then there is that vulgar, barbarous and spiteful Talibanish variety of Occidentalism, which insists that: What you, the West and your local stooges call our backwardness is our authenticity; what you term our primitivism is our identity; what you denounce as our brutality is our sacred tradition; what you describe as our superstitions is our holy religion; and what you despise as our illiteracy is our ancient custom, and we are going to insist on their superiority to all what you have to offer, no matter what you say and no matter what you do. Shukri Mustafa, the leader and chief theologian of the “Excommunication and Migration” Jihadi Islamist organization in Egypt was an ardent defender and propagator of this kind of vulgar Occidentalism. He glorified illiteracy and innumeracy in the true Muslim community as a part of the religious ideal of the imitatio of Muhammad himself. Challenging almost everyone else he asked: Was it really possible for the Prophet Muhammad and his companions – the hermits of the night and the knights of the day, in God’s service – to be also physicists, mathematicians, pioneers of space exploration and makers of modern civilization?! For thirteen years in Mecca, Allah’s Prophet taught the Muslims Islam and nothing but Islam, neither astronomy, nor mathematics, nor physics, nor philosophy; where are those impostors who claim that Islam cannot be established unless it becomes a pupil of the European sciences?7

Although Buruma and Margalit declare in their book that Islamism is the main source of the worst manifestations of Occidentalism in our time, they proceed to demonstrate the fact that the original springs of all forms of Occidentalism everywhere are in the Occident itself. 8 This is why we find the more glib, ethereal and tricky affirmations and defenses of the Talibanish version of Occidentalism in the work of a thinker and author like Jean Baudrillard, particularly his essay about the 11 September 2001 New York attacks: The Spirit of Terrorism.9 Here is an example of what I would call his highly refined form of Talibanish Occidentalism:

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This is the case, again, with Afghanistan. That, on a particular territory, all “democratic” freedoms and license (music, television – even women’s faces) can be prohibited, and that a country can stand out totally against what we call civilization (whatever the religious principle invoked) – these things are unbearable to the rest of the “free” world. It is unacceptable for modernity to be rejected in its universal pretensions. The lure of this kind of Occidentalism seems to emanate from what Baudrillard praises as the “refractory zones of the world”, its “uncolonized and untamed wild spaces, its sacrificial cultures, its sacralized societies, its high intensity communities” and so on. Actually, Baudrillard goes so far in his super-attenuated Occidentalism as to discriminate against the victims of the September 11 assaults in favor of their terrorist attackers by calling the first “the people of an employment contract” while celebrating the second as the people of a “pact and a sacrificial obligation”, and unlike the contract, the sacrificial obligation is “immune to any defection or corruption”. According to him “the miracle (of the ‘sacrificial band’)” is to Have adapted to the global network and technical protocols, without losing anything of this complicity “unto death”. Unlike the contract, the pact does not bind individuals – even their “suicide” is not individual heroism; it is a collective sacrificial act sealed by an ideal demand. And it is the combination of two mechanisms – an operational structure and a symbolic pact – that made an act of such excessiveness possible. But this is not the end of the story. Baudrillard’s September 11 sacrificial band turns even Hegel’s master-slave dialectic around or upside down, if you wish, for according to him: . . . seen in that light, this is almost an overturning of the dialectic of domination, a paradoxical inversion of the master-slave relationship. In the past, the master was the one who was exposed to death, and could gamble with it. The slave was the one deprived of death and destiny, the one doomed to survival and labor. How do things stand today? We, the powerful, sheltered now from death and overprotected on all sides, occupy exactly the position of the slave; whereas those whose deaths are at their own disposal, and who do not have survival as their exclusive aim, are the ones who today symbolically occupy the position of master.

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It is interesting to note as well that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri speak in their internationally successful book Empire10 of “a new nomad horde”, “a new race of barbarians that will arise” a “new positive barbarism”, and then proceed to celebrate at the end of their book the postmodern “nomadic revolutionary” of today, i.e. the jihadist of Al-Qaeda. At this point, I am certainly tempted to see in all this a sort of a European intellectual nostalgia dreaming of substituting Nietzsche’s exhausted Blond Beast with a new and more forceful Brown Beast. Here, I should not miss a mention of that benign and popular variety of Occidentalism which helps to reinforce shaken identities, promote some self-assertion, improve self-esteem, restore wounded amour propre and advance a sense of empowerment after the model of “black is beautiful”, “vive la diffirence” (may be spelled with an “a” also, à la Derrida, to indicate the simultaneous deferral of that “difference” which may never make a difference after all), “communalism is organic”, “identity politics authentic”, “multiculturalism liberating” and so on. Salman Rushdie excelled in the use of this sort of Occidentalism, particularly in his super novel, The Satanic Verses. This is what he had to say about it all: I must have known, my accusers say, that my use of the old devil-name “Mahound,” a European demonization of “Muhammad,” would cause offence. In fact, this is an instance in which de-contextualization has created a complete reversal of meaning. A part of the relevant context is on page 93 of the novel. “To turn insults into strengths, whigs, tories, blacks all chose to wear with pride the names they were given in scorn; likewise, our mountain-climbing, prophet-motivated solitary is to be the medieval baby-frightener, the Devil’s synonym: Mahound.” Central to the purposes of “The Satanic Verses” is the process of reclaiming language from one’s opponents. Trotsky was Trotsky’s jailer’s name. By taking it for his own, he symbolically conquered his captor and set himself free. Something of the same spirit lay behind my use of the name “Mahound.”11

It would be most inappropriate for me to leave this topic of discussion without saying something about or related to Edward Said’s sharply debated and most influential book Orientalism – a book that is still alive and kicking after the passage of more than a quarter of a century since

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its publication. First, I would like to present a prime example of what I would regard as “Orientalism” in its really bad Saidean sense: To live in Arabic is to live in a labyrinth of false turns and double meanings. No sentence means quite what it says. Every word is potentially a talisman, conjuring the ghosts of the entire family of words from which it comes. The devious complexity of Arabic grammar is legendary. It is a language which is perfectly constructed for saying nothing with enormous eloquence; a language of pure manners in which there are hardly any literal meanings at all and in which the symbolic gesture is everything. Arabic makes English look simple-minded, and French a mere jargon of cost-accountants. Even to peer through a chink in the wall of the language is enough to glimpse the depth and darkness of that forest of ambiguity. No wonder the Koran is so notoriously untranslatable.12

Obviously Arabic is judged, here (and found very wanting), by the principles of a Cartesian conception of language – a conception implicitly based on the doctrine of “clear and distinct ideas”, the primacy of quasi syllogistic reasoning of the “I think therefore I am” type, the propositional nature of all genuine saying and comprehending, and the full specifialibility and discreteness of communicable meaning. Now, if we shift to a postmodernist-deconstructionist approach to language based on such principles as the disjunction of sign, signifier and signified, the unending shiftiness of sense, the undecidability of meaning, the paradoxes of incommensurability, William Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity,13 the absurdities of self-reflexivity and so on, then would not the Arabic described by Raban seem like the ideal language for the angstridden Daseins of the postmodern condition? In a comparable vein, Daryush Shayegan adopts and quotes approvingly a similar view expressed by a most famous French Arabist saying: “Referring to the spirit of the Arabic language, Jacques Berque rightly observes, ‘the Arabic tongue, whose every word leads to God, has been designed to conceal reality, not to grasp it.’”14 Again, in his Islam in the World, Malise Ruthven reproduces this kind of judgment by quoting approvingly Jonathan Raban’s description of the Arabic language and by affirming that (a) “Arabic more than most other languages, eludes translation, at least into the European languages” and (b) Arabic is “an

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eminently suitable language for religious expression”. Then, Ruthven proceeds to explain this whole weird situation in the following manner: Arabic is a language built around verbs. Substantives and adjectives are always verbal derivatives, usually participles or verbal nouns. A clerk is a writer, a book is a writ. Aeroplanes and birds are things that fly. European languages, with their multiple origins, are much rooted in substances: most nouns in English are things-in-themselves, not parts of verbs, which are processes. It is precisely because Arabic refrains from classifying words into discrete particles, but keeps them instead in a logical and balanced relationship with a central concept – the verbal root – that it becomes an eminently suitable language for religious expression.15

Again, would not Arabic seem like the ideal language in light of a paradigm shift in the direction of, say, (a) Alfred North Whitehead’s critique of all Aristotelian philosophies of substance, simple location and misplaced concreteness in favor of reality as process or (b) of Henry Bergson’s attack on Chosisme and his dismissal of things-in-themselves in favor of universal flux and a continually creative form of evolution or (c) Georgi Lukács rejection of reification and its discreet particles in favor of a reality of events, circumstances and processes. If “In the beginning was the Word”, was that “word” a verb or a noun? According to Ruthven, it was a verb for Arabic and a noun for the European languages. Then, the question is: Which is closer to the spirit of modernity, starting with the static noun or the active verb? At least Faust’s answer is clear from his new translation of the first verse of the Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the deed.” Not that substances, nouns and things-in-themselves are absent from the “Arabic language paradigm”, for just as God had brought His creatures to Adam to give them their proper names in Genesis (2:19–20), the Koran also teaches that Allah “taught Adam the names of all things; then placed them before the angels, and said: Tell Me the names of these if ye are ight” (1:31). It is interesting to note as well that a committed Muslim feminist author, academic and activist like Leila Ahmed in the United States, not only accepts the pejorative “Orientalistic” Raban-Ruthven account of Arabic but proceeds to turn it into the primary virtue of the language by appealing to and making a lot out of the contingent fact that Arabic is

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written in consonants only, while the reader has to supply the vowels for any reading to occur and for any meaning to emerge. This is how Ahmed makes her case: Moreover, a bias in favour of the heard word, the word given life and meaning by the human voice, the human breath (nafas) is there, one might say, in the very language itself. In Arabic (and also Hebrew) script, no vowels are set down, only consonants. A set of consonants can have several meanings and only acquires final, specific, fixed meaning when given vocalized or silent utterance (unlike words in European script, which have the appearance, anyway, of being fixed in meaning). Until life is literally breathed into them, Arabic and Hebrew words on the page have no particular meaning. Indeed, until then they are not words but only potential words, a chaotic babble and possibility of meanings. It is as if they hold within them the scripts of those languages, marshalling their sets of bare consonants across the page, vast spaces in which meaning exist in condition of whirling potentiality until the very moment that one is singled out and uttered. And so by their very scripts, these two languages seem to announce the primacy of the spoken, literally living word, and to announce that meaning can only be here and now. Here and now in this body, this breath (nafas), this self (nafs) encountering the word, giving it life. Word that, without that encounter, has no life, no meaning.16

It is no less interesting to speculate about whether one may classify this kind of celebration of the properties of the language of the Koran as a form of Orientalism-in-reverse where Arabic certainly stops being a language like other languages. The very flaws that Raban and Ruthven detect in Arabic elevate it – and elevate the Koran and Islam with it – to what Ahmed calls an “intrinsically aural language”. Actually, for her what is most distinctive and valuable about Arabic, the Koran and Islam is their inherent orality and aurality (p. 127). Here are a few additional observations in a left-handed defense of Arabic, on these new very Occidental and very European grounds: 1) In favor of Arabic one may cite, here, Rousseau’s view in his “Essay on the Origin of Language” to the effect that “figurative language was the first to be born” while “proper meaning was discovered last”; all

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of which should please Adonis and suit his Occidentalist thesis (not to mention Ahmed’s auratic thesis), where such a figurative language as Arabic would certainly come first, while such modern languages as English and French, dedicated to “proper meaning” and literal comprehension, would come last. 2) Arabic, with its supposed “forests of ambiguity” would seem to fit much better than, say, English into the overall critical scheme of a master literacy theoretician like William Empson, especially when he speaks thus in praise of ambiguity: “Ambiguity” itself can mean an indecision as to what you mean, an intention to mean several things, a probability that one or other or both of two things has been meant, and the fact that a statement has several meanings . . . Thus, a word may have several distinct meanings; several meanings connected with one another; several meanings which need one another to complete their meaning; or several meanings which unite together so that the word means one relation or one process.17

We can even raise the stakes higher, in this regard, by imagining (a) the liberation that Arabic could consequently provide from what Stuart Chase once called “the tyranny of words” 18 and (b) the complex ramifications it could put at the disposal of either an Empson trying to make sense out of such second-order discussions as “the ambiguity of ambiguity”19 or of a critic like I.A. Richards attempting to figure out “the meaning of meaning”. 20 So, all lovers of Akira Kurosawa’s classic movie Rashomon (1950) should not only admire Arabic for its inherent auratic Rashomon-like qualities but should also esteem it as the natural medium of “magical realism” and the suspension of all realist norms. 3) Part of the problem of “living in Arabic”, according to Raban, is that “every word is potentially a talisman, conjuring the ghosts of the entire family of words from which it comes”; while on the other hand, part of the glory of “living in Arabic”, according to Ahmed, is that every word becomes an empty auratic receptacle for meanings. Raban, for his part, proceeds to explain this “peculiarity” of the language by

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looking up the Arabic word for “child” (tifl) in Hans Wehr’s famous dictionary – “the treasure-house of Arabic roots” – and then reporting on what he found there in the following manner: The word is tifl, and it derives from the root tfl, meaning to intrude, obtrude, impose (upon); to sponge, live at other people’s expense; to arrive uninvited or at an inconvenient time, disturb, intrude; to be obtrusive. The linguistic family includes the words for softness, potter’s clay, parasites, sycophants, initial stages and dawn. No richer or more sceptical definition of childhood has, as far as I know, ever been made. 21

Now, the intrigue should multiply greatly the moment we remember that it took the deconstructive skills of a Jacques Derrida to concentrate our attention on the talisman – word, “Pharmakon” in Plato’s Phaedrus and to conjure the ghosts of the entire family of words attendant on it. In other words, the verbal conjuring that seems to come so naturally and spontaneously to Arabic seems to require the Herculean intellectual efforts of a Derrida to accomplish in French and Greek. And à propos of all these ghosts and their conjural, it behooves us not to forget, here, Derrida’s equally celebrated interest in “specters” and the “spectral”.22 In his famous essay, “Plato’s Pharmacy”,23 Derrida also conjures the ghosts of the entire family of words related to “Pharmakon” such as remedy, recipe, poison, drug, cure, harm, medicine, philter, pharmacia, pharmakeus, sorcerer, magician, wizard, poisoner, scapegoat, etc., bringing into play many other related contexts as well, like medicine, politics, farming, law, festivity, sexuality, family relations and, of course, his favorite activity, writing. May one, therefore, conclude, à la Raban, that “no richer or more skeptical definition of ‘pharmacology’ has ever been made” in any language. Now, on a Derridean reading, Arabic, as presented by Raban, Ruthven and Ahmed, for example, would –

be intertextual through and through, an intertextuality that leaks on all sides to boot,

–

provide interpretative freedoms hitherto undreamt of under the grim repressive logocentric regimes of conceptual clarity, distinct meanings and literal truths,

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–

form the finest natural example of the rhetorics of free play coupled with an amazing capacity for limitless interpretative license, uncontrolled semantic slippage, unending textual vandalism and constantly deferred meanings (and unmeanings),

–

present the best simultaneous carrier of ambiguities, ambivalences, limitless ramifications of sense, complimentary and antithetical meanings, infinite signifying chains, indefinite play of semantic substitutions, etc. that work to defy the most concerted tidy-minded attempts to sort these things out and to baffle the most rigorous protocols of reading,

–

be all charisma and no routine and

–

seem to act like the natural destabilizer of Derrida’s bête noire: “the Western Metaphysics of Presence”.

Let me move on to say something about another engagement that I had with Orientalism, but an Orientalism of a different kind. A few months after September 11, I attended a prestigious conference at the India International Center in New Delhi, dealing with India’s relationships with the Middle East. Under the direction and chairmanship of the high politician, parliamentarian and scholar Dr. Singh, the Indian colleagues at the conference worked hard at pushing a certain agenda. They wanted to abolish the whole concept of the Middle East with all its attendant baggage, implications and applications on account of its colonialist origins, Orientalistic overtones and glaring Eurocentrist reference point. But, then, to my dismay and shock, they proposed instead the concept of “West Asia” as the “proper” and appropriate designation for my part of the world, the Arab Middle East, on account of its supposedly greater authenticity, accuracy, adequacy and superiority in comparison with the more conventional “Middle East”. I immediately shot back arguing: If I have to make a choice, by way of self-description and/ or self account, between your natural vision of us as “West Asia” and Europe’s natural vision of us as the “Middle East”, I will not hesitate for a moment in opting for the second designation and for excellent reasons at that.

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I explained to the conference: First, that out of these two inherently biased and tendentious ways of looking at and naming us, “the Middle East” has the advantage of wide currency, the privilege of long-standing usage and the prestige of emanating from and referring to the center of the Modern world, i.e., Europe. Second, that “West Asia” jarringly violates the fundamental way in which we see ourselves as “Middle Eastern” Arabs by cutting us off from Egypt – which is in Africa. In contrast, no Orientalist view, no Eurocentric definition, no colonial conception of the “Middle East” has ever separated Egypt from the rest of the Arab Mashreq, i.e., from the Eastern wing of the Arab world, as we often refer to ourselves as well. I insisted also that “West Asia” simply filters out another basic image of ourselves as part and parcel of the Arab world, since it seems to relegate the entire region of North Africa to some other realm or world. Third, that “West Asia”, unlike the “Middle East”, simply robs us from the Mediterranean dimension of our existence, history and selfconception, a dimension permanently bound to and continuously entangled with the other side of our lake, i.e., the European shore of the Mediterranean. Here, I had to marshal all my arguments. I said, think of Alexander the Great, Rome, Hannibal, Christianity going to Europe, Islam extending itself to Spain and beyond, the Crusades, the Ottomans in Europe, modern European colonialism and so on. Think of the fact that these two sides of the Mediterranean share the Judeo-Christian-Muslim tradition, the Greco-Roman heritage, Islam descending on Byzantium and a culturally Hellenized Christian Middle East, Hellenism underlying the scholastic reason of Judaism, Eastern Christianity, Western Christianity and Islam and their sharing of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Adam, Eve, Abraham and Moses. I concluded by insisting that this kind of transcultural, translinguistic and transcontinental historical dialectic can in no way sit well with such a meager concept as “West Asia”, so I would rather stick with the “Middle East” in spite of its obvious flaws and well-known shortcomings. I must confess, as well, that this intervention irritated my Indian hosts and colleagues – especially on the first day – for busting the conference agenda so soon. The mood improved later on, but I could not avoid developing the strong suspicion that they wanted so eagerly to call us “West Asia” because they imported most of their oil from what to them is actually West Asia.

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Finally, I would like to bring out a certain political aspect of Said’s Orientalism that I do not think has received adequate attention so far. Said – both as loyal American and committed Palestinian – was deeply disturbed by and very concerned over what I shall call the paradox of American policy in the Arab Middle East in general and vis à vis the Palestinians in particular. For, while, on the one hand, all of America’s vital interests and oil investments sit in the Arab world, its strategies and policies have on the whole favored Israel and unconditionally supported its expansionist aims, on the other, all at the expense of the Arabs and to the extreme detriment of the Palestinians. Since the birth of the state of Israel, this paradox has been the source of acute embarrassment (and even threat) to the Arab regimes allied with the United States during the Cold War. They all needed an “explanation” as to why America seemed incapable of producing policies commensurate with its vital interests in the area, on the one hand, and that also measured up to the minimum expectations of its closest Arab friends and strategic allies there, on the other. The dominant theory – for a long time favored and patronized by the Saudi monarchy – blamed Jewish-Zionist organizations, forces, pressure groups, vested interests, lobbies, funds, media, conspiracies and so on for distorting America’s vision as to its vital interests in the Middle East and as to where they really reside. The following are examples of how this tactic worked in practice, chosen from some past Arab political discourses: “And so, The Zionist and American forces supporting Israel succeeded in making the American President withdraw his commitment to the phrase: The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” “The American President gave in to Zionist pressure and retracted his support for Arab rights.” “The friends of Israel in congress and outside, put pressure on the American President and convinced him not to openly express his real convictions on account of their detrimental effects on Israel.”

This kind of explanation worked conveniently to absolve the American President from responsibility for very unpopular policies in the Arab world and to relieve the embarrassment of the local regimes so closely

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allied to that president. Actually, Arab rulers claimed, then, in their propaganda, that they were making progress in resolving the paradox of American policy in the Middle East by helping the Americans see correctly where their long-term vital interests lie. My claim, here, is that Said’s Orientalism meant also to provide a more sophisticated explanation of the paradox of American policies in the Arab world by appealing to French discourse theory in its Foucauldian version. Accordingly, what comes to distort America’s vision in the area and determine the wrong-headed policies pursued there is that massive prisonhouse of Orientalist discourse and language built over the centuries and now fully absorbed by all Western (and particularly American) decision makers, policy framers, administrators, rulers, diplomats, experts, specialists, academics, functionaries, military commanders, assistants, etc., dealing with that part of the world. Toward the end of his book, Said explains himself in the following way: The system of ideological fictions I have been calling Orientalism has serious implications not only because it is intellectually discreditable. For the United States today is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: the Middle East experts who advise policy makers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person. Most of this investment, appropriately enough, is built on foundations of sand, since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political elites, modernization and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely inadequate to describe what took place recently in Lebanon or earlier in the Palestinian popular resistance to Israel.24 The book certainly meant to dispel this distortion – by exposing the formidable Orientalist apparatus underlying it – in the hope of improved and more realistic American policies vis à vis the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular.

II Let me confess again that I am neither a believer in conspiracy theories and explanations nor particularly knowledgeable about their origins, causes and modes of operation. This is not to say, of course, that I am not

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very familiar with the genre, particularly the type that is so rampant in the Arab world and that I invested much time and effort in combating. My purpose in all that was always to minimize as much as possible the harmful and delusionary effects of such theories and explanations even on the considered views and judgments of otherwise very intelligent, enlightened and thoughtful people. I had always thought that the Arabs are the worst offenders around when it comes to the addiction to conspiracy theories, particularly when it comes to history, politics and international affairs, until one day Fred Halliday of the London School of Economics corrected me by insisting that that privilege belongs to Iran and the Iranians, by right. This set me thinking about the role of Shi’ism, for example, in intensifying this Iranian super addiction to conspiracy explanations, considering that power was in fact usurped from Imamu ‘Ali and his heirs through a series of dirty conspiracies. It set me thinking as well about the role of theistic religion in general and Islam in particular in perpetuating this affliction in the whole Middle East and beyond, considering that to the religious mentality all explanations are ultimately in terms of personalized will, intention, goal and design – to my mind, a kind of higher order animism. Actually, one of the attributes of God in the Koran is cunning (makr) and you cannot have a good conspiracy without a lot of makr, on the one hand, while any serious exercise of the faculty of makr is bound to generate conspiracies of all sorts, on the other. Perhaps, conspiracy theories are a humanized and secularized version of ultimately religio-theistic ways of making sense of history and of explaining the world. This, in turn, brings to mind the old teleological argument for the existence of God in philosophical theology known also as the argument from design, namely, that whenever and wherever a natural pattern seems to emerge and/or form, there must be a conscious design behind it; and a design always requires at least one designer. A similar situation would naturally obtain even more forcefully when it comes to making sense out of and explaining all the patterns that emerge, form and re-form in human affairs, plans, goals, decisions and histories. Could it be as well, that conspiratorial explanations are a reversion to the causal enchantment of an already thoroughly disenchanted modern world? Of course, I am not saying that in today’s Middle East, for example, you have to be religious and/or believe in gods and arguments from

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design to subscribe to conspiracy theories and act on them. For instance, the secular left in the Arab world is as predisposed to the production, circulation, adoption and use of such theories as the religious right. For, there is no running away from the fact that the conspiratorial modes of thinking and explaining are deeply ingrained in parts of the Arab social, intellectual, cultural and the political conscious and unconscious. This is why atheists, skeptics, agnostics, communists, Marxists, liberals, nationalists, secularists, etc. show themselves to be as prone to the influence and use of the drug as the rest. I am not saying either that conspiracies do not happen and that foes, friends, enemies and allies do not conspire in the Middle East, like everywhere else, against themselves and, above all, against each other. I am not denying either that very often, when the strong consult among themselves, take stock of their priorities and define their goals and policies, it all looks like a dark conspiracy in the eyes of the weak. I am certainly not affirming that conspiracy theories and explanations are always wrong, crazy and beside the point; for, later events and revelations have shown often enough that the peddlers of such theories and explanations turned out to be quite on the mark in their own time and place. Let me recount a small story from memory. Shortly after the Ba’ath party and the military seized power in Syria, 8 March 1963, Damascus was buzz with rumors about a conspiracy hatched by the CIA, in collusion with right wing Syrian forces and elements, to overthrow the new progressive regime. Then, I had just returned to Damascus after finishing my studies in the United States and quickly joined the “rational center” there in criticizing the reigning conspiratorial mentality and in denouncing the resulting hysterical rhetoric and “absurd” accusations of the new authorities against the United States and the West in general. Many many decades later, and while in Washington DC, I learned from freshly released classified documents of the State Department that the crazy Syrian conspiracy theorists of those days were right on target, while we the sober rational center of Damascus were dead wrong. Now, I would like to move on to place before you an account of some of my own experiences with conspiracy theories. (1) I was in Japan when the 9/11 airborne assaults on New York and Washington DC occurred. The startled Japanese friends and colleagues

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I was interacting with saw no conspiracies in what happened but were certainly at a loss as to what to make out of a situation where, on the one hand, Islamic Jihad perpetrates a sensational act of terroristic violence without precedent against the heart of the West, while, on the other, the President of the United States seemed to act immediately to mobilize the “Christian West” for a ferocious counter-crusade against Islam. It all appeared to them more like a religious war resurrected from some long gone dark ages than a conspiracy of any kind – hence the cultured Japanese lady who whispered in my ear: “what kind of savage religions do you have on your side of the world?” When I explained to her that our religions are all “heavenly religions” (adyan samawiyya, as we say in Arabic), revealed all the way down from the highest heaven, she ironically asked: “And what have you left to all the other earthly religions, then?” I would like to add a little aside, here, by saying that I found it quite edifying to have experienced the September 11 shock and its first repercussions in a culture very different from what I am normally used to, i.e., in a culture where such commonplace cries as “my God”, “mon Dieu”, “mein Gott”, “ya Rabbi”, “ya Ilahi” and so on had no meaning at all. Upon returning home to Damascus, Syria, I immediately found myself immersed in conspiracy theories of every conceivable shape, form and complexion about 9/11. The point of the whole commotion was to distance the Arabs, Islam and Muslims from what happened to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by blaming it all on all sorts of usual and unusual candidates: the Mosad, the CIA, the Pentagon itself, the JewishZionist-imperialist plot, globalization’s super plotters and schemers, the American military-industrial complex and so on. Right, Left and Center were all implicated. The most interesting rationalization in this context asked: But, since when are the Arabs capable of such strategic planning, such long-term preparations, such brilliant tactics, such faultless coordination, synchronization and implementation? The reassuring conclusion inevitably followed: Since contemporary Arabs are neither Germans nor Japanese, they could not have had anything to do with what happened in New York and Washington DC. For my part, I argued in favor of a much simpler explanation of the whole phenomenon: the Americans trained the mujahidin so well in Afghanistan, and for once the Arabs among them learned their lesson so well that at the first

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opportune moment they turned its devastating impact on the masters themselves. In all fairness, I should say that a gradual but steady retreat of the conspiracy theories occured in the face of the accumulating evidence as to the party responsible for the September 11 attacks, with some doubts, reservations and question marks lingering here and there. But as always, the hard-core conspiracy theory believers can never be convinced otherwise no matter how high the evidence piles up, because such theories and explanations are driven by the turns of their own dialectical momentum – no matter how phantasmagoric it gets – rather than by anything relating to evidence and the like. The other side of the Mediterranean is not immune to conspiracy explanations either – especially of the “super” variety. For example, in his treatment of the 9/11 conspiracy theories, Jean Baudrillard produced a meta-conspiracy theory of his own, i.e., a conspiracy theory of the circulating conspiracy theories about 9/11. He argued that the conspiratorial explanations of 9/11 really favor, work for and serve the interests of the United States and the West in general, because (a) they portray America as the sole agent and actor capable of such grand extremism and spectacular excess and (b) they rob all other possible actors and agents around of the ability to perpetrate such a grandiose feat as 9/11. In other words, it enhances the power and prestige of America to no end for the rest of the world to believe that only America dares to do a 9/11 to America. It is sick reasoning, but this is how Baudrillard puts the matter: The most recent of the versions of September 11, and the most eccentric, is that it was all the product of an internal terrorist plot (CIA, fundamentalist extreme right, etc.). A thesis that appeared when doubt was cast on the air attack on the Pentagon and, by extension, the attack on the Twin Towers (in Thierry Meyssan’s 9/11: The Big Lie). Above and beyond the truth of the matter, of which we shall perhaps never have any knowledge, what remains of this thesis is, once again, that the dominant power is the instigator of everything, including effects of subversion and violence, which are of the order of trompe-l’oeil. The worst of this is that it is again we who perpetrated it. This, admittedly, brings no great glory to our democratic values, but it is still better than conceding to obscure jihadists the power to inflict such a defeat on us. If it were

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to turn out that such a mystification were possible, if the event were entirely faked up, then clearly it would no longer have any symbolic significance (if the Twin Towers were blown up from the inside – the crash not being sufficient to make them collapse – it would be very difficult to say they had committed suicide!). This would merely be a political conspiracy. And yet, even if all this were the doing of some clique of extremists or military men, it would still be the sign (as in the Oklahoma bombing) of a self-destructive internal violence, of a society’s obscure predisposition to contribute to its own doom.25

Clearly, this super-conspiracy theory hints that the circulating 9/11 conspiracy theories may very well be excellent self-serving American fabrications and assures us that the United States ultimately stands to benefit from them because they act to desacralize, disenchant, neutralize and trivialize the massive sacrificial significance and grand impact of the 9/11 attacks by reducing them to just another big terrorist act not really that different from the infamous Oklahoma bombing. Allow me to confess that the following are some of the thoughts, images, notions and titles that crowded in on me while reading Boudrillard on this topic: Casuistry, Byzantine intrigue, hair-splitting, Surrealism, Jesuitical distinctions, Theologico-dialectical feats, Big Brother, double-speak, Dr. Calligary’s Cabinet, Kafka nightmares and George Orwell’s 1984. (2) In my involvement with the Rushdie affair, I did battle with the two major conspiracy theories that emerged in the Arab world about Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses. The first regarded him either as a witting or unwitting instrument of the continuing imperialist-Zionist-Orientalist plot against the Arabs and Islam in general. The second saw in him a secret agent of resurgent heretical Shi’ism out to defame, discredit and undo Sunni Islam. The “instrument” version found favor among leftist and nationalist circles and was best formulated, argued for and propagated by the late Iraqi communist author and activist (living, then, in Damascus) Hadi Al-‘Alawi. Conspiracy theories in the Arab world usually start with a certain formulaic rhetorical question: Exactly, why at this moment? Why now? Or more specifically why did Rushdie write and publish The Satanic Verses at exactly this moment and no other? The point of the question is, of course, to intimidate, foreclose any further discussion and dismiss from the start all other alternative answers or explanations, save the

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conspiratorial one intended. The question is usually asked assertively, menacingly and with a lot of the superior airs of those privy to some “deeper” knowledge or truth that escapes the rest of us, who naively trust in appearances. Inspite of Hadi’s intelligence, broad experience, learning and daring research and publications on such sensitive topics as “torture and assassination in Islam” (including the assassinations ordered by the Prophet himself), still he became the most important propagator of one conspiracy theory about the Rushdie novel. 26 According to him, Rushdie served the imperialists – knowingly or unknowingly – by sitting down to write a novel that fanned the flames of enmity between the Iranian and Arab peoples at a time when Iraq and Iran were at war, thus rendering a service to Saddam Hussein and his American allies and backers at the time. According to him, the imperialists resorted to the ruse of using both the novel form and the reputation of an already established British third world novelist to achieve their goal, because the more conventional forms and open methods of deepening and intensifying the hatred between the two now warring peoples have been exhausted – all to the profit and benefit of world imperialism. By way of entertaining you, I shall digress to mention that the Egyptian Islamist lawyer Abdul-Halim Mandour, who charged Professor Nasr Hamid Abu-Zeid of atheism before the courts in Cairo and clamored for his dismissal from the University of Cairo made the following comment about Naguib Mahfouz’s Islamically most controversial novel: “If we consider The Children of Our Alley (also Gabalawi’s Children), of Naguib Mahfouz we will find that it is an Italian novel translated to Arabic and turned over to Naguib Mahfouz just to add his name to it”. As is well known, conspiracy theories and explanations are in their nature unassailable and irrefutable, because all seemingly contrary instances, arguments, pieces of evidence, etc. are immediately absorbed into the theory itself and turned into confirming instances of its claims. So, my preferred tactic for combating them is to throw in the most outrageous and absurd theory possible under the circumstances and then challenge the others to refute it. For example, I would argue, by sheer assertion, and with all the necessary airs of superior knowledge, that the Palestinian Intifada is really and in depth the result of a secret Plot and Pact between Arafat and Ariel Sharon to destroy the resistance of

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the Palestinian People for the benefit of the Zionist-imperialist-Orientalist plot, etc. Even the extreme anti-Arafatists keep quiet at this point as a part of their “conspiracy of silence” against the man’s achievement and what he has come to represent. I shall return to Hadi now, for a glimpse of how the conspiratorial approach works, by pointing out a few of the principles according to which he said he had read The Satanic Verses – the following are virtual quotations from his writings on the subject: 1) To what extent does the novel serve the imperialist West by stirring up and nourishing Farsi-Arab enmity, particularly during the years of the Iraq-Iran war. 2) Identifying the immediate political Western-colonial objective which this or that character in the novel serves. 3) Exposing the Orientalist nature and drift of the novel in support of the ideology of the West and in opposition to the ideologies of national liberation. Here, Hadi accuses Rushdie of following in the footsteps of the Jesuit Orientalist at the Université St. Joseph in Beirut, Henri Lamens. 4) Demonstrating Rushdie’s role as a “spiritual missionary” by other means for and in the West and on “the ruins of atheistic communism”, a role traditionally reserved for the media and journalism of “America’s Arabs”. 5) Identifying those elements and forces that made Rushdie carry out that kind of work. 6) Drawing attention to the fact that the novel embodies a premeditated plan to denigrate the Arabs and to “detract from the personality of the Arab”. 7) Exposing the distortions visited on the personality of Salman Al-Farisi by Rushdie, all in the service of the ideology of the West in its war against Islam and the East, on the one hand, and against materialist scientific thought, on the other.

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8) Raising the consciousness of the Arab popular masses in order to undo the effects of the Western media’s imperialist magic regardless of whether that magic proceeds from a man of letters, a scholar or an Orientalist. Now, given Hadi’s Shi’i background, interpreting the personality of Salman Al-Farisi poses a particularly sensitive problem when reading The Satanic Verses. This is why he goes out of his way to contrast Salman’s supposed great personality in building early Islam with what he calls “the Salman Al-Farisi of Rushdie and of Western Ideology” constructed to fulfill the double function of “satisfying a folkloric need of the West’s idealistic obsessions with and misrepresentations of history” and of “confirming the Eurocentric rejection of any effective historical action outside the European continent”. The problem becomes even more complicated for him given his sure knowledge that Sunni-Omayad Damascus is still full of popular conspiracy theories about this hero, namely, that Salman was really a Persian plant sent to Arabia even before the Prophet became the Prophet to sabotage the purity of true Arab Islam from the very start, thus paving the way for the rise of the Shi’i schism and heresy. The second conspiracy theory about Rushdie and The Satanic Verses was elaborated at length by the Egyptian writer and literary critic, Zuheir ‘Ali Shaker, in a book published in Cairo under the title: The White Crow or the Salman Rushdie Phenomenon.27 Shaker accused Rushdie of the following misdeeds: 1) Belonging to the extremist esoteric Shi’i sect in India known as the “Ghurabiyyah” (from ghurab, meaning crow in Arabic). This faction holds the “heretical” belief that the Archangel Gabriel, either wittingly or unwittingly, delivered the first revelation of the Koran to Muhammad when he should have communicated it to ‘Ali, his first cousin (and extreme look alike), as Allah had ordered him to do. 2) Satirizing, distorting and discrediting the true Arab Sunni version of Islam, while cunningly adopting and promoting its false Shi’i version. 3) Camouflaging his true purpose of giving as wide a currency as possible to this heretical form of Islam by making dishonest and misleading declarations about his own atheism, secularism and leftism.

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4) Conspiring with Imam Khomeini to have the “fatwa” issued against his person in order to insure for his novel the greatest possible world attention and the broadest possible global circulation, all in the service of spreading and propagating the heretical Shi’i kind of Islam that it contains. 5) Producing a novel full of masques, pseudonyms, dreams, reveries and magical appearances that in reality are no more than a transfiguration of the despicable teachings of his sect about the transmigration, reincarnation and multiplication of souls. 6) Pretending to be a leftist, a secularist, an atheist and a libertine in order to better serve his esoteric Ghurabism and its anti-Muslim and anti-Sunni objectives. 7) Writing the novel to provide support in the West and other places to the Farsi-Shi’i side in Iran’s war against Iraq, a war also against the rest of the Arab world in general and Sunni Arabism in Particular. The first time I heard of the conspiracy theory accusing Rushdie of being a secret agent of resurgent Shi’i Islam was in the academic year 1989–1990 while teaching in the Near Eastern Studies Department at Princeton University. A Sunni Jordanian Fulbright Fellow from Yarmouk University, Jordan, spending some time there, assured me that the death sentence issued by Imam Khomeini against Salman Rushdie (and known as the fatwa) is really part of a secret plot agreed on by the Imam and Rushdie himself for the purpose of giving the widest possible circulation to The Satanic Verses, because the Islam that the author maligns in the novel is Sunni Islam, while the Islam which he promotes is Shi’ism with all its heretical doctrines. In a manner typical to this kind of mentality and approach, the Jordanian colleague assured me, with all the assertiveness and self-confidence in the world, that he can obtain for me the documents necessary to prove all that, including the text of the contract signed and sealed by both Rushdie and Khomeini. He then gave me some anti-Shi’i Arabic propaganda books and tracts produced in Pakistan and obviously financed by Saudi Arabian money.

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For him, it was self-evident that The Satanic Verses is a deliberate product of a conspiracy traceable back to Tehran the center of the expanding Shi’i International. According to Shaker’s elaboration of the plot, The Satanic Verses becomes at one and the same time a coded “ode of praise and glorification of Imam Khomeini”, in spite of all appearances to the contrary and “a manifest ode of biting satire and bitter defamation” (hija’), of all the traditional enemies of the Imam and of the Shi’i heresy, particularly ‘Aisha the most beloved and preferred wife of the Prophet. As for the Imam’s death sentence against Rushdie and the publishers of the novel, it was no more than a cunning ruse to achieve the following goals: 1) Introducing the beliefs of the Shi’i Ghurabi sect to the whole world, while at the same time denigrating the true Islam of the sunna. For, had Khomeini been serious about the death sentence, he would have had Rushdie killed first and then declared the fatwa to the world – but he acted in exactly the opposite manner in order to give Rushdie the chance to hide and escape. 2) Raising the sales of the novel from 50.000 copies in five months to 100.000 copies in a few days – and maybe the number will have risen to half a million, by now. 3) Making the British government extend its protection to Rushdie as a British citizen targeted by a Muslim foreign power, thus permitting the British to present themselves in the false appearances of “the home of democracy, the refuge of the scared and hunted and the protector of the freedoms of opinion and expression”. 4) Unleashing all the propaganda machines around the world in a vicious anti-Muslim campaign of vilification and abuse, denouncing Muslims for their savagery and blood-thirstiness. 5) Arousing the curiosity of Muslims all over the world about the novel, who, otherwise, would not have paid any attention to it without the so-called fatwa, as well as stirring some feelings of pity and sympathy among Muslims for “this poor writer hounded to death by a supposedly Muslim state”.

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6) Serving the Imam’s Shi’i vital interests while Saddam’s Iraq is involved in a protracted war defending Arabism and Islam against the historical enemy: Farsi-Shi’i Iran. In the end, my point is, first, that although the course of the history of the modern Middle East is indubitably full of conspiracies, the course itself is not either a conspiracy or the product of a conspiracy; and, second, that although the field of Orientalism is unquestionably full of all kinds of real and imagined conspiracies, the field itself is neither a conspiracy nor the product of a conspiracy.

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2 OCCIDENTALISM AS THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS IN THE LITERARY CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER

Lorenzo Casini INTRODUCTION One of the many merits of Sadik J. Al-Azm’s contribution to the academic debates on the subjects of orientalism and conspiracy is that it has always been very attentive to the epistemological problems arisen by the reference to civilization as a category in the fields of Cultural Studies and International Relations. Al-Azm’s critique to an incautious use (direct or indirect) of this category can be appreciated not only in his famous essay on Said’s Orientalism (Al-Azm, 1981) but also in a recent article in which he compares Samuel Huntington’s understanding of civilization with that of contemporary Islamist thought (Al-Azm, 2004). This paper is a study in the politics of the construction of the Other that moves from theoretical assumptions that are very close to those of Sadik J. Al-Azm. The subject matter of the study is the construction of the West by Arab writers and intellectuals who published their works during the first half of the twentieth century. Its objective is to contribute to the elaboration of a theoretical approach to the analysis of the construction of the Other that does not base itself on the category of civilization, whose use, in my opinion, implies an a priori (and too often misleading) understanding of what defines a cultural identity. The paper individuates narrative texts as the privileged locus for the study of the cultural and ideological components that have participated in the making of cultural identities and highlights how modern Arab identity developed in a dialogical relationship with European modernity and through a rupture with the cognitive categories of the Islamic tradition. While asserting the “dialogical” nature of modern Arab identity, the paper investigates the ideological and political reasons

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that in different moments of the first half of the twentieth century have brought Arab writers to represent Europe as the Other with respect to their imagined self. After presenting the theoretical foundations of this study, two major narrative texts written by Egyptian authors and published respectively in 1907 and 1933: the maqama by Muhammad al-Muwailyhi Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham (‘Isa Ibn Hisham’s Tale) and a renowned novel by Tawfiq alHakim: ‘Awdat al-Ruh (The Return of the Spirit) are considered. The analysis of al-Muwailyhi’s maqama is aimed at revealing the role played by the Arab appropriation and elaboration of European modernity in the formative process of modern Arab identity. The period considered is that of the transition from Islamic reformism to modernist thought (Hourani, 1983, ch. 6–7), when the new ideals of modern nationalism were taking root in Egypt and in other Arab societies, but the traditional Islamic world view was still exerting an important appeal on the Arab intellectual élite of the age. After having considered the situation at the beginning of the century, I analyze the important transformations that occurred in the Egyptian cultural context of the 1930s. Through the analysis of ‘Awdat al-Ruh, I attempt to show how the most radical attacks on “Western civilisation” originated in Egypt in continuity with the romantic and elitist side of Egyptian territorial nationalism, in order to defend the class interests of the Egyptian élite from the possible democratic and socialist developments of the liberal ideals that had dominated during the 1920s.

OCCIDENTALISM AND MODERN ARAB IDENTITY: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE LITERARY CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER The studies on the representation of Europe in modern Arabic narrative have tended to accept uncritically – as a factual reality and a grounded epistemological basis – the divide between the domain of the Self and that of the Other portrayed by the Arab writers in their fictional works. As a result of this approach, the scholars have regarded the authors of the works that they were studying as the representatives of a specific community: a nation (especially the Egyptian nation in the case of the first Arabic novels and short stories) or a civilization (the East

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or Islam), and have focused their attention on their perceptions of the European/Occidental Other. This kind of approach, centered on the description of the image of Europe inferred from the different texts is made explicit also by the titles of many critical studies, including those of two significant monographs: Rasheed el-Enany’ Arab Representations of the Occident: East-West Encounters in Arabic Fiction, 2006; and Rotraud Wielandt’s Das Bild der Europaer in der modernen arabischen Erzahl und Theaterliteratur, 1980. The present contribution moves from a radically different premise and embraces the constructionist assumption that collectivities (and their boundaries) are symbolic constructions continuously re-shaped by its members according to their own cultural and political agenda (Jenkins, 2002, pp. 12–22). According to this perspective, the function of the critical analysis cannot be limited to the description of “the image” of the Other represented by a particular author, but needs to investigate the relationship between the literary construction of the Other and the production of a specific image of the collective Self. Constructionists have given “linguistic context” a primary importance in the construction of identities. The attention of the paper has therefore been focused on the analysis of the radical process of transformation of the Arabic “discursive space” during the first half of the twentieth century. The semantic sediments that form a language – and constitute the potential basin of identities – should not be imagined as a harmonious whole but as a combination of contrasting forces described by Bakhtin with the concept of heteroglossia. With this term, he indicates: “the coexistence (within a language and each word) of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 291). The literary genre of the novel represents a privileged locus to study the components of modern Arabic heteroglossia, because, as Bakhtin demonstrates, the stylistics of the novel is distinguished by “the movement of the theme through different languages and speech types, its dispersion into the rivulets and droplets of social heteroglossia, its dialogisation” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 263). Though the narrative representations of reality are always historically and ideologically determined, that is, contained by the forms in which reality is interpreted, articulated and represented by each writer, narrative texts subsume the contradictory character of reality within their language at the very

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moment in which they operate to contain it. It is to the heteroglossia of a language that the critic can make reference to unveil the strategies of containment of a text and grasp what Frederic Jameson (1981) names as its political unconscious. The literary construction of Europe as the Other in modern Arabic fictional works can be analyzed as a narrative strategy aimed at “containing” the collective identity of the authors within a unitary and coherent image through the contrast to an as much unitary image of Europe (Casini, 2008, p. 4). Through the analysis of the texts’ heteroglossia the critic can highlight the limits and contradictions of the texts’ strategies of containment and analyze the ideological motivations that in different moments of the twentieth century have brought the Arab writers to represent a hiatus between their own identity and modern European culture. From this perspective, the construction of Europe in modern Arabic narrative (at least till the turning point of the 1960s) corresponds to what James Ketelaar and Chen Xiaomei have defined as “strategic Occidentalism” (Siegerist, 2009, pp. 8–20), because it has played its primary role as a tool in the domestic politics of the Arab societies, where the competition for cultural and political hegemony has taken place through the construction of rival images of the Self and of its European Other.

ISLAMIC REFORMISM T HE LITERARY CONSTRUCTION OF TH E O T H E R I N HAD ITH ‘ ISA IBN HISHAM: THE FORM A S A S T R AT E G Y O F C ONTA INM EN T

Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham (1907) by Muhammad al-Muwaylihi represents the peak of a long process of rejuvenation experienced by the classical genre of the maqama during the nineteenth century (Hafez, 1993) and also the most successful literary expression of Islamic reformism. According to the ideology that can be inferred from the strategy of containment of the text, Islam and the West form two separate civilizations that pivot around different epistemological principles. While modern Europe in order to attain progress had to question the role of Christianity within Western civilization, Islamic civilization can rely on the cognitive system of its own tradition.

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In the context of the British occupation of Egypt, and of a society sharply fragmented by the process of modernization, a reformed Islam is held to be the sole force capable of keeping Egyptian society united and of leading it toward modernity, progress and independence. What is asked of Egyptians and all Muslims is to replace the imitation of the past (taqlid) that had characterized the period of decadence of Islamic civilization, with the adherence to the true spirit of Islam. This new approach requires of the community’s intellectual élite an “effort” (ijtihad) in the interpretation of Islamic revelation: the understanding of what are the challenges of the modern age and the elaboration of a response based on the fundamental principles of Islam. Before highlighting the limits and contradictions of Islamic Reformism as embodied in al-Muwaylihi’s maqama, I will reconstruct the strategy of containment of the text and show how the Reformist concept and practice of ijtihad finds its literary expression in the rejuvenation of the maqama form. The aspect of Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham that most contributes to distinguishing the text from the classical maqama is the attention, typical of modern journalism, to the social and political reality of the time. This journalistic mark of al-Muwaylihi’s maqama is a fundamental part of the formal rejuvenation of the genre and of the text’s strategy of containment. Through the character of ‘Isa, the author explains how in the modern age the tasks that the shari‘a (the legislative part of Islam) assigns to the “ulama” (plural of ‘alim, the religious scholars) are performed by journalists: (Newspapers) are one of the aspects of Western civilisation that we have imported into our own society. The purpose of issuing papers is to publish articles which give due credit for value and merit, and to rebuke depravity; to criticise bad actions and encourage good ones, to draw attention to points of imperfection and to urge people to correct mistakes. (. . .) To sum up, those who run the press occupy the position of “those who condemn good deeds and rebuke bad ones” as referred to in the Islamic shari‘a. (al-Muwaylihi, 1992b, pp. 136–37)

This identification between ‘alim and journalist can appear to be innovative and revolutionary with respect to the Islamic tradition. But if from one side it implies a new social function and cultural formation

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of the ‘alim, on the other it binds the function of the journalist to the prescriptions of the shari‘a. Even Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham (serialized in a newspaper) and its author (a journalist) are therefore bound to the mission of Islamic reform: that of defining the role of the modern ‘alim and fulfilling its functions. This “mission” finds its literary expression in the specific roles carried out by the narrator and the protagonist of al-Muwaylihi’s maqama. Most of the episodes that in 1907 were to form Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham had been serialized in the newspaper Misbah al-Sharq between 1898 and 1900 with the title Fatrah min al-Zaman (A Period of Time), with the declared intent to compare contemporary Egyptian society with that of the first decades of the century. With this purpose in mind, the author adopted as his hero the character of Ahmad Pasha al-Manikali, minister of war during the reign of Muhammad ‘Ali, who in the first episode is made to come back to life from his tomb in a Cairo cemetery, where he immediately meets the narrator (‘Isa Ibn Hisham). The first part of Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham shows the impossibility for the Pasha of understanding the rules of the new society by resorting to the conceptions and interpretative categories of his own time. In this part, the narrator becomes the Pasha’s imam (spiritual guide). His function is not only that of helping the Pasha to understand the rules of the new society but also of giving him the instruments to discern what is good and in agreement with the true spirit of the Islamic revelation and what, instead, has to be condemned as corrupt and in contradiction with the tenets of Islam. Following the teachings of the narrator, the character of the Pasha undergoes a gradual change that leads him to become a pious and virtuous Muslim. After this transformation, the hero and the narrator proceed together on the right path (al-sirat al-mustaqim), in the pursuit of those norms of behaviur (mu‘amalat) that in the modern world should guide the life of every Muslim. To this purpose, they decide to make contact with every aspect of modern Egyptian society and to judge it through a rational interpretation based on the sources of Islamic shari‘a. The gradual change of the Pasha in the first part of the text is one of the distinctive features of al-Muwaylihi’s maqama and is highly indicative of the moral and ideological principles that inform it. The transformation of the characters as a result of the narrative events is a feature of the new genre of the novel and cannot be found in the classical maqama. But

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the transformation of the Pasha in Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham is quite different from that experienced by the characters of the novel, as it brings the Pasha to share the narrator’s focalization with whom al-Muwaylihi identifies. The narrative result of this transformation is that the Pasha becomes a second voice at the disposal of the writer/‘alim to express his opinions on social and religious reform. TH E SEM ANTIC OPENING OF THE TEXT

In Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham, Egyptian cultural identity is identified with “the authentic spirit” of Islam. In this sense it is an “absent self”, because this spirit, according to the author, cannot be found in modern Egyptian society, neither among the Europeanized élite nor the traditional “ulama”. But it is also “a self in formation”, because the function of the text is that of contributing to the manifestation of the spirit of Islam through a social criticism that assumes as its main source the Islamic shari‘a and as its operative tool the Islamic category of ijtihad. According to this view, the concept of Other can refer to all that contradicts the spirit of revelation as conceived by Islamic reformism but first of all to Europeans who do not belong to the Islamic community and who are referred to with the generic name of “foreigners”. The binary opposition “reformed Islam” vs. the West, which constitutes one of the pillars of the strategy of containment of Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham, reveals limits and contradictions throughout the text that cannot be overcome. These contradictions are revealed in particular by the incapacity of the language of Islamic tradition to describe the ideas and institutions appropriated from Europe and the impossibility of the author to determine the limits of ijtihad, that is, to establish a clear divide between the aspects of modernity that can be considered in harmony with the “authentic spirit of Islam” and those that contradict it. The belief that the cognitive categories of Islam can “contain” modernity implies that they can describe modern ideas and institutions. The first chapters of Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham demonstrate quite the contrary, as the Pasha cannot understand ‘Isa though they speak the same language. The reason for the two characters’ inability to communicate is that in the period between the death of the Pasha and his resurrection, the Arabic heteroglossia had been permeated by concepts and ideas that cannot be translated with reference to the traditional Islamic world view. The

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attempt of the narrator to explain these ideas to the Pasha in the language of tradition leads to a series of endless and hilarious misunderstandings. Among them, the most emblematic for the present study are those related to the new judiciary system. After being arrested for having beaten a donkeyman who was cheating him, the Pasha is brought to the office of the public prosecutor (niyaba). ‘Isa explains to the Pasha what this office is and how it works: Pasha:

What is this “niyaba”?

‘Isa:

In the new system it is the judicial authority responsible for bringing criminal charges against offenders, acting on behalf of the social body (al-hay’a al-ijtima‘iyya) (. . .)

Pasha:

What is this social body on whose behalf he acts as deputy?

‘Isa:

The community (umma) as a whole.

Pasha:

Who is this mighty Amir whom the umma allows to act as its deputy?

‘Isa:

The man you see in front of you is neither an Amir nor a man of great importance, but merely a peasant’s son whose father has sent him to schools where he has obtained the certificate (shahada). He is thus entitled to act as an attorney of the Parquet (. . .)

Pasha:

In God’s eyes the martyr has an exalted status (he understands the term shahada in the traditional sense of martyrdom) but how can you suppose that shahada and life here on earth can both apply to one man at the same time? (al-Muwaylihi, 1992a, p. 29)1

What is most interesting in this passage, for the present study, is the impossibility of translating the idea of social body (al-hay’a al-ijtima‘iyya) with the traditional concept of umma. As the political organization of the umma is based on Islamic revelation, the judicial authority is not a people’s delegate but responds directly to the Islamic shari‘a conceived of as an expression of the divine will. ‘Isa, as an Egyptian citizen living at the end of the nineteenth century cannot himself realize the distance that separates the new institutions from the traditional ones, his world view from that of the Pasha. As has been observed, another expression of the contradictions implicit in the strategy of containment of Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham is the

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absence of precise indications about the limits accorded to the practice of ijtihad. It is only through determining these limits and establishing what are the aspects of modernity that are in accordance with the spirit of Islam and those that are not that the project of Islamic reformism becomes plausible. The position of the author on this subject proves to be ambiguous and contradictory at several points in the narration. The most explicit ambiguity emerges in Chapter 23, dedicated to the visit of ‘Isa and the Pasha to a wedding party. While a group of ‘ulama’ leaves the party as soon as the music starts, because they consider it in contrast with the tenets of Islam, a particularly learned religious scholar gives his opinions about music (considered very positively) and other important topics of a theological nature. In his speech, the scholar is able to find a synthesis between Greek and Islamic philosophy, history, science, as well as the traditional sources of Islamic law. He seems to be the prototype of the perfect ‘alim according to the criteria of the narrator who in the course of the text supports a wider and more profound preparation of the religious scholars: a ‘alim who should complement his traditional learning with general knowledge and the capacity to think rationally and critically. But, at the end of the long speech given by the ‘alim, the author expresses (through the Pasha) his concern about the ‘alim he has created: You, however, esteemed shaykh, with your broad learning, your profound study of the various aspects of knowledge, and your comprehension of the main features of European scholarship, you are clearly quite exceptional! However, with all that said, I still would not wish all Islamic “ulama” to have such a broad-based learning as yours. I would not wish to see such subjects distract their attention from shari‘a scholarship and watch them become confused and bewildered. Few people will force themselves to steer a middle course in things, to maintain a balance in their pursuits, and stop at the appropriate limits (. . .). “Thus God misleads on the basis of learning.” (al-Muwaylihi, 1992b, p. 101)

The “appropriate limits” accorded to the practice of ijtihad remain indeterminate, just as the divide between modern Arab identity and modern European culture is impossible to determinate in terms of religion or civilization.

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FROM EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL NATIONALISM TO ORIENTALISM O RIENTA LISM AND “THE CRISIS OF OR I E N TAT I O N ”

In the Egyptian cultural context of the 1930s, the secular-territorial nationalism that had dominated during the 1920s suffered the advance of other ideological orientations that had a different image of the Egyptian cultural identity and of its relationship with the West. The trend that prevailed in the second half of the decade has been defined orientalism because it represented Egypt and the Arab world as part of a larger Eastern civilization engaged in a millenary antagonism with the West. The major criticism moved by orientalism to modern Western civilization was directed to its rationalist and materialist character, accused to have eradicated every form of spirituality in the West and to be a tool in the hands of European cultural imperialism. The orientalist intellectuals considered that the only way for the Egyptians to attain a cultural as well as a political independence was to cleanse themselves from the evil influences of European materialism and recover their authentic Eastern – Islamic – spirit (see Gershoni and Jankowski, 1995, ch. 2, pp. 35–53). The spread of these hostile attitudes toward “Western civilisation”, and the fact that the most influential writers of the period dealt with religious themes (and with the life of the Prophet of Islam in particular), have brought many scholars to state that the Egyptian intellectuals had gone through a “crisis of orientations” with respect to the secular ideals supported in the previous decade (about this debate: Charles Smith, 1973). Among these scholars, someone has hinted that the “crisis of orientation” of the intellectuals would demonstrate the superficial nature of the process of secularization and westernization in the Arab context (Vatikiotis, 1969, p. 323). In the following pages, through the analysis of ‘Awdat al-Ruh, I will demonstrate how the dichotomy East vs. the West (conceived as a dichotomy spirit vs. matter) originated from within the theoretical background of the Egyptian nationalism of the 1920s and cannot be interpreted as a return to the past of Islamic tradition. T HE C ONSTRU CTION OF THE OTHER IN ‘ AW D AT A L - R U H

A recent study by Jeff Shalan (2002) has examined the ideology of the Egyptian novels published in the years of the apogee of Egyptian cultural

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nationalism (or Pharaonicism), with particular reference to the themes of class and gender. As highlighted by Shalan’s study, the Egyptian Pharaonic novel has been characterized by the coexistence of a progressive understanding of history (in the Positivist sense) and of a conservative and paternalist attitude toward social relationships aimed at obscuring the contribution made to the nationalist movement by Egyptian peasants and women. In my opinion, the conservative character that Shalan identified in Egyptian nationalist novels can be traced back to one of the basic concepts of Egyptian territorial nationalism: environmental determinism adopted in the 1920s by some of the most prominent Egyptian intellectuals in order to support the thesis of a continuity between modern Egyptian identity and the ancient Pharaonic civilization. According to this view, at the basis of any nation is its territory (milieu) which determines the very essence of a nation throughout its entire history. The Nile Valley would thus possess very marked and unitary geographical traits that have remained unaltered in the course of the millennia so as to keep unchanged the spirit and the social structure of the Egyptian nation (Gershoni and Jankowski, 1986, pp. 130–36). The political implications of this representation of Egyptian national identity can be grasped quite easily. If the social relationships and hierarchies within the nation are conceived of as a mechanical consequence of the environment, any project aimed at transforming them can be accused of being unrealistic, if not a betrayal of the deepest essence of the nation. The literary construction of the West in ‘Awdat al-Ruh is founded on environmental determinism and performs the function of distancing the Egyptian nationalist movement from democratic ideals and ambitions (identified with the West) and directing it toward authoritarian and antidemocratic horizons, represented as connate to the Egyptian national personality. To this purpose, the novel develops the Romantic and metaphysical character of environmental determinism and contrasts the spiritual unity of the Egyptians with the individualism and rationalism of the Europeans. If the Egyptian nation has a spirit (al-ruh of the novel’s title) determined by the environment, this does not vary according to each citizen but instead unites all the population. The stress on the unity of Egyptian citizens (imagined as a single individual) is the most recurring theme of the novel. The individualism of the Europeans is represented

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as an evil that afflicts the European democracies, a centrifugal force that undermines the unity of the nation in the name of the rights of a particular class or individual. As observed by Anshuman A. Mondal (2000, p. 247), if the orientalist dichotomy of East vs. West that imposed itself in Egypt during the second half of the 1930s contrasts the spiritual nature of Eastern civilization with the materialist character of the West, ‘Awdat al-Ruh is already moving in this direction when it shows that there are two ways to know reality: intuition (or knowledge through the heart) and intellect (or knowledge through reason). Though the novel does not deny the value of the latter, it is the former which is privileged. Intuition is held to be a hallmark of Egyptian national identity and considered to be foreign to European culture. The opposition between Egyptian intuition and European rationality is represented in two different moments of the novel, through the direct speech of some of its characters. The first moment consists in the dialog that takes place in the compartment of the train that brings the young hero to his parents’ home in Damanhur. The second takes place in the house of the hero’s parents, during a conversation between a French archaeologist and a British inspector. The conversation in the train compartment takes place when a Coptic afandi (a representative of the emerging middle class) begins to exalt the spirit of solidarity and collaboration of the Egyptian people and contrasts it with the individualism of the Europeans. When a religious shaykh seated next to him observes that Europeans are “people without Islam”, a third passenger (who notes the embarrassment of the Copt) corrects him by saying that the Europeans are “a people without a heart”, while a fourth passenger adds that the word Islam, “as used today”, should not be interpreted in a merely religious sense as it refers “to the sense of piety, good heart, and solidarity: feelings that one finds in Egypt and not in Europe” (al-Hakim,1988, 2nd vol., p. 13). This contrast between the heart of the Egyptians and the cold rationality and individualism of the Europeans is resumed later in the novel, in the speech made by the French archaeologist about the spirit of the Egyptian nation, contrasted to that of Europe. The archaeologist starts his long speech with a parallelism between the modern Egyptian peasants and the ancient Egyptians, the builders of the pyramids:

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Our languages have terms only for the material reality. We cannot imagine the feelings that have made of all these people a single person capable of bearing on his shoulders huge stones for the length of twenty years. He was smiling, cheerful, and friendly, happy to suffer in the name of his idol (al-ma‘bud: the worshipped) (al-Hakim, 1988, 2nd vol., p. 56 – our translation)

After having praised the ancient Egyptians, the archaeologist compares them with the modern Egyptian peasants. As he observes, the modern peasants, like their ancestors, work for hours and hours in the most difficult conditions, they receive just a piece of cheese as a reward for their job and in spite of everything are happy. On the basis of these elements, the archaeologist defines the Egyptian peasants as “a magnificent industrial people” for the immediate future and contrasts them to the European working class: This is the other difference between them and us: our workers, when they suffer together, let grow among them the seeds of revolution, the discontent for what they suffer, disobedience. Their peasants, when they suffer together, feel a secret satisfaction, and the pleasure for the unity in sufferings. What a wonderful industrial people for the day of tomorrow!! (al-Hakim, 1988, 2nd vol., p. 57 – our translation)

In this last passage, in addition to the binary oppositions that have already been observed (heart vs. individualism, intuition vs. rational knowledge) a new one emerges, which is relative to the different attitudes of the Egyptian peasants and the European workers toward work and the ruling class. If the union of the former testifies to the unity of the whole nation and its identification in the leader (al-ma‘bud), the unity of the latter is the potentially subversive one of modern trade unionism. The different attitude of the Egyptian peasants is traced back to their symbiosis with the Egyptian environment and, thus, to the concept of environmental determinism. As highlighted by Table 1 below, the formal dichotomy that contrasts two different civilizations hides in reality two competing political options both supported by cultural orientations and ideologies originated in modern Europe. The concept of Europe is associated with the democratic

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developments of European liberalism while the Egyptian “spirit” is identified with an anti-democratic nationalism not dissimilar from the political reality of the Fascist regimes that were emerging in several European countries. Table 1: The construction of the Other in ‘Awdat al-Ruh Egyptian identity

European identity

National unity

Individualism

Intuitive knowledge (through hearth/spirit)

Rational knowledge (based on reason and free will)

Organic society

Social conflict

Veneration of the leader

Revolutionary threat

Anti-democratic nationalism

Liberal democracy

CONCLUSIONS O CCI DENTALISM AND THE DEBATE O N C O N S P I R A C Y

The concept of occidentalism that has been elaborated in this paper and applied to the analysis of two masterpieces of modern Arabic literature neither refers to a “dehumanising” representation of the West nor to any particular image of it. It rather describes the tendency, widespread in modern Arabic thought and literature, to represent the self through fictitous oppositions to an imagined Western “Other.” It is a clearly distinguished phenomenon from Arab conspiracism but, as the latter, can be traced back to a condition of powerlessness with respect to the policies carried out by the European countries and the United States. In spite of its projection outside the borders of the Arab world, the literary construction of the Other, like conspiracism, has played its primary role as a tool in the domestic politics of the Arab societies where the competition for political and cultural hegemony has taken place also through the literary construction of rival images of the West.

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REFERENCES

Primary Sources al-Hakim, T. (1988a): ‘Awdat al-Ruh (2 vol.). Cairo: Misr li-l Tiba‘a. al-Muwaylihi, M. (1992a): Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham aw fatra min al-zaman (1907). Tunis: Dar al-Janub li-l nashr. al-Muwaylihi, M. (1992b): A Period of Time/part two (English translation of Hadith ‘Isa Ibn Hisham by Roger Allen). Reading: Garnet Press, pp. 99–379.

Secondary Sources Al-Azm, S.J. (1981): “Orientalism and Orientalism-in-Reverse”, Khamsin 8. London: Ithaca, pp. 5–27. Al-Azm, S.J. (2004): “Time Out of Joint”, Boston Review, October-November, on line edition: www.bostonreview.net. Bakhtin, M. (1981): The Dialogic Imagination. Austin: University of Texas Press. Casini, L. (2008): “Beyond Occidentalism: Europe and the Self in Present Day Arabic Narrative Discourse”, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2008/30, Mediterranean Programme Series, available online at http://cadmus.eui.eu/ dspace/bitstream/1814/9367/1/RSCAS 2008 30.pdf. El-Enany, R. (2006): Arab Representations of the Occident. East-West Encounters in Arabic Fiction. London and New York: Routledge. Gershoni, I.; Jankowski, J.P. (1986): Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: the Search for Egyptian Nationhood (1900–1930). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gershoni, I.; Jankowski, J.P. (1995): Redefining the Egyptian Nation, -1930–1945. Cambrige: Cambridge University Press. Hafez, S. (1993): The Genesis of Arabic Narrative Discourse. London: Saqi Books. Hourani, A. (1983): The Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jameson, F. (1981): The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. London: Methuen. Jenkins, R. (2002): “Different Societies? Different Cultures? What are Human Collectivities?”, in M. Sinša, H. Mark (eds) Making Sense of Collectivity. London: Pluto Press. Mondal, A.A. (2000): Nationalism, Literature and Ideology in Colonial India and Occupied Egypt. Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS – University of London. Published in 2003 as Nationalism and Post Colonial Identity: Culture and Ideology in India and Egypt. London and New York: Routledge. Shalan, J. (2002): “Writing the Nation: the Emergence of Egypt in the Modern Arabic Novel”, Journal of Arabic Literature. Leiden: E.J. Brill, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 211–247. Siegerist, M. (2009): Wrestling With The West: Consistency and Change in the Representation of the United States in the Chinese Communist Party Newspaper

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People’s Daily 1949–50 & 1978–79. M.Phil. Dissertation discussed at the University of Utrecht. Available online at: //www.igitur.nl/studenttheses/ per_faculteit.php?faculteit=Letteren&language=ne. Smith, C.D. (1973): “The ‘Crisis of Orientation’: The Shift of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects in the 1930s”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 4, pp. 382–410. Vatikiotis, P.J. (1969): The Modern History of Egypt. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Wielandt, R. (1980): Das Bild der Europäer in der modernen arabischen Erzähl-und Theaterliteratur. Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

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3 EDWARD SAID AND BERNARD LEWIS ON THE QUESTION OF ORIENTALISM: A CLASH OF PARADIGMS?

Mohd Hazim Shah

INTRODUCTION The controversy between Edward Said and Bernard Lewis on the question of Orientalism is not only a matter of scholarship but also involves partisanship and the advocacy of certain causes. Scholarship, however, has been deployed for their respective purposes. In this article, I would like to look at the controversy between Said and Lewis on the question of Orientalism, both in terms of scholarship and scholarly values, as well as the broader issues which are related to, and which frame and provide the context, for the debates. I will approach the question by engaging in a close reading of two major texts, namely Said’s Orientalism and Lewis’s Islam and the West, apart from consulting other secondary sources that threw light on the debate. My contention is that the controversy be best looked at not in terms of a purely scholarly debate between scholars working “in the same field” but rather in terms of a clash of perspectives on an issue which lends itself to both scholarly analysis and popular advocacy, in which the scholarly resources of various disciplines are called into play, and in which even the “rules of the game” or “the groundrules of discourse” are themselves contested. This contestation takes several forms, such as the legitimacy of certain epistemological positions, the relevance of disciplinary tools and resources, and the relationship between politics and knowledge, scholarship, and advocacy. In other words, I would like to argue that the controversy between Said and Lewis be looked at in terms of a clash of paradigms, rather than a straightforward scholarly dispute in the spirit and mode of modern critical scholarship, or on the other extreme, a vulgar political controversy couched in scholarly

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language and attracting their own band of followers. The notion of paradigms was first used and popularized by Thomas Kuhn (1970[1962]) in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn used the term “paradigm” to indicate a theoretical entity or network that is more comprehensive and all-embracing, compared to what is usually connoted by the word “theory”. For example, a scientific paradigm contains the component of “metaphysics” or “world-view”, which is not usually associated with a “scientific theory”, especially after the efforts of the Logical Positivists and their successors, the Logical Empiricists. The term “paradigm” therefore suggests something broader, and in a sense more ineffable, as can be seen in the various efforts at defining the exact meaning of the term “paradigm” as used by Kuhn. Transposed to the context of the Said–Lewis debate, we can say that since the debate involved not only cognitive or scholarly content but also that of epistemology, cultural, and political perspectives, which are closely linked to scholarly content, one can therefore characterize the debate as that of a clash of paradigms, where what is debated cannot be resolved simply by appealing to the empirical database – in this case, historical facts and evidence for instance – but has to be understood within a broader context of differing epistemological, cultural and political perspectives, which inform the debate. Also, the outcome of the debate touches on certain cultural, political, and even civilizational sensitivities and therefore cannot be treated on a purely scientific plane, as if it involved a purely scientific question or issue, and hence can be settled by purely scientific means. Since it involves ways of seeing or looking at events in the world, it is also philosophical in its intent and import and hence conforms more to Nietzche’s conception of philosophy as “attempts to persuade others to look at the world the way we do”. But having said that, I also grant the fact that the very notion of a “clash of paradigms” might suggest from the outset a relativistic way of looking at the issue and hence undermine any hope of achieving some satisfactory resolution of the issue. It might very well be, however, that there is an “in-built relativism” in the whole debate, in the sense that they are both committed to a different set of premises and perspectives, in which disciplinary content is merely incidental to the debate. However, that conclusion should only come at the end of our analysis and not be presumed from the outset. The use of the concept of “paradigm”, however, need not necessarily imply a global, holistic perspective, whose clash can only be explained in terms of relativism. As some philosophers of science have

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argued, even paradigm clashes need not necessarily involve or imply incommensurability.1 My aim in this article is not necessarily to “resolve” the Said–Lewis issue concerning Orientalism, by judging between them and keeping a score-sheet on certain parameters or suggesting how a solution or resolution can be achieved out of their differences. My essay has the more modest aim of attempting to understand the issues involved in the debate and how they bear on larger political, socio-cultural, and civilizational matters. Hopefully, such an understanding could pave the way toward overcoming some of the major obstacles that have been impeding intercultural and inter-civilizational relations, because of the entrenchment of certain viewpoints which have been academically sanctioned or legitimized.

THE NOTION OF “ORIENTALISM” IN SAID AND LEWIS: MEANING AND REFERENCE What do Said and Lewis mean by the term “Orientalism”? An answer to this question is important in helping us understand the controversy between them on the subject of Orientalism. In the Introduction of his Orientalism, Said sets out to define what he means by the term “Orientalism” (Said, 2003, pp. 2–3). Here he presents 3 different meanings of the word “Orientalism”; Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient – and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist – either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism. (p. 2) Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the “Orient” and . . . “the Occident”. (p. 2) . . . Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (p. 3)

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Finally, after having stated what he meant by the term, Said offers his take on what Orientalism consists of, or refers to: Therefore, Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarships, or institutions; nor it is a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor it is representative and expressive of some nefarious “Western” imperialist plot to hold down the “Oriental” world. It is rather a distribution of geographical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction . . . but also of a whole series of “interest” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape sociological description, it not only creates but also maintain; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different world . . . (Said, 2003, p. 12)

While Lewis restricts the term “Orientalism” to that of academic Orientalism, of the kind produced by scholars on the Orient, Said, on the other hand, extends the usage of the term to include the more popular, non-academic writings on the Orient, including novels and travel diaries, apart from government documents by scholar-administrators. This difference in the treatment of the scope of Orientalism (in fact Said devotes one whole chapter to it) by the two writers explains in part the differences in their views on the subject and some of their disagreements. But as Lewis himself admits, Said’s concern is more with western attitudes toward the Orient, rather than factual knowledge about the Orient. As a study of attitudes and perceptions, it is therefore justified for Said to appeal to literary texts, speeches, minutes, etc., and other writings which are not strictly academic. Said’s claim however, is that attitudes invariably influence and inform content and the presentation of facts. Given his reading of western attitudes toward the Orient, the inescapable conclusion is that almost all writing on the Orient are biased, the bias being part of the Occident’s will to power over the Orient. Here Lewis disagrees with Said, and tries to claim for himself and other Orientalists an intellectual space marked by academic objectivity. As Lewis put it (1993, p. 118):

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Another charge levelled against the Orientalists is that of bias against the peoples they study, even of a built-in hostility to them. No one would deny that scholars, like other human beings, are liable to some kind of bias, more often for, rather than against, the subject of their study. The significant difference is between those who recognise their bias and try to correct it and those who give it free rein . . . Beyond the question of bias there lies the larger epistemological problem of how far it is possible for scholars of one society to study and interpret the creation of another. The accusers complain of stereotypes and facile generalizations. Stereotyped prejudices certainly exist – not only of other cultures, in the Orient or elsewhere, but of other nations, races, churches, classes, professions, generations, and almost any other group one cares to mention within our own society. The Orientalists are not immune to these dangers; nor are their accusers. The former at least have the advantage of some concern for intellectual precision and discipline.

Although the intellectual space that Lewis is trying to defend can perhaps be granted to the academic Orientalist, whose professional norms require such an imperative, there is no guarantee, and in fact every possibility of infringement of such norms, when we deal with “popular” Orientalism, including literacy works such as that of Gustav Flaubert whom Said took to be his target. But for Said, – and this is the more serious contention – even the academic Orientalist is not free from reproach. In fact knowledge on Orientalism and politics are enmeshed through and through (Hussein 2002), at least in Said’s assessment of scholars such as Bernard Lewis. Said saw Lewis’s attempt to protect Orientalism as a branch of objective scholarship, as a ploy to keep at bay critics of Orientalism such as Said himself. To quote Said (2003, p. 342): On the one hand Lewis wishes to reduce Islamic Orientalism to the status of an innocent and enthusiastic department of scholarship; on the other hand he wishes to pretend that Orientalism is too complex, various and technical to exist in a form for any non-Orientalist (like myself and many others) to criticize.

Said defends his critique and approach to Orientalism by stressing the different approach to history which he took and of the relevance of

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literature (Said’s field) to Orientalism. In the spirit of Foucault’s (2002) Archeology of Knowledge, Said (2003, p. 342) claimed that “Lewis’s tactic . . . is to suppress a significant amount of history”, which when taken into consideration, can throw light on past and present attitudes toward scholarship on the Orient. On the relevance of literature to Orientalism, Said (2003, p. 343) wrote: There are strong affiliations between Orientalism and the literary imagination, for example, as well as the imperial consciousness. What is striking about many periods of European history is the traffic between what scholar and specialists wrote and what poets, novelist, politicians and journalist then said about Islam. In addition – and this is the crucial point that Lewis refuses to deal with – there is a remarkable (but none the less intelligible) parallel between rise of modern Orientalist scholarship and the acquisition of vast Eastern empires by Britain and France.

In highlighting the traffic between scholars and “popular” writers on Islam, Said appears to be suggesting that there is a direct causal influence between the two groups in the shaping of their outlooks on the Orient, hence justifying Said’s textual-literary approach toward understanding Orientalism. But Said’s main thesis, as stated in the last sentence of the above quotation, remains contentious and controversial. In fact, Said’s formulation of the thesis, i.e. in terms of a “parallel” between Orientalist scholarship and Imperialism/Colonialism, rather than a direct causal influence, suggests his own recognition of the difficulty involved in establishing the stronger version of the thesis in terms of a direct causal relation (Said, 2003, p. 343). To Lewis’s charge (Said, 2003, p. 342) that Said’s work is polemical and partisan, not a product of academic scholarship issuing out of a scientific process of “disinterested enquiry”, Said’s reply is two-fold. On the one hand, he openly admits the partisan nature of his Orientalism, when referring to his critics, as when he wrote (Said, 2003, p. 339): . . . among American and British academics of a decidedly rigorous unyielding stripe, Orientalism, . . . has come in for disapproving attacks because of its “residual humanism”, its theoretical inconsistencies, its insufficient . . . treatment of agency. I am glad that it has! Orientalism is a partisan book, not a theoretical machine.

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On the other hand, he points out to Lewis’s equally partisan approach toward Orientalism, which he thought Lewis tried to hide beneath a cloak of academic objectivity. In a strong retort to Lewis, published in the Afterword of the second edition Orientalism, Said (2003, p. 342) wrote: Lewis’s verbosity scarcely conceals . . . the ideological underpinning of his position. . . . He proceeds by distorting the truth, making false analogies and, by innuendo, methods to which he adds that veneer of omniscient tranquil authority which he supposes is the way scholars talk. Take as a typical example the analogy he draws between my critique of Orientalism and a hypothetical attack on studies of classical antiquity, an attack which, he says, would be a foolish activity . . . . . . the present political moment, with its reams of racist anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stereotypes (and no attacks on classical Greece) allows Lewis to deliver a historical and willful political assertion in the form of scholarly arguments, a practice thoroughly in keeping with the least creditable aspect of old-fashioned colonialist Orientalism. Lewis’s work therefore is part of the present political, rather than purely intellectual, environment.

But given the above scenario on Lewis and Said, and the question of the relationship between scholarship, academic objectivity, ideology, partisanship and advocacy, what are we to make of the role of scholarship in the assessment of an “academic subject”? Perhaps what this episode illustrates is the nature of the Humanities, as distinct from the sciences, in which the question of objectivity can only be approached as an ideal (or perhaps even not) but can never be realized. This does not, however, detract from the value of the Humanities, because at least it makes clear in explicit, articulated, intellectual forms the points that are at issue and that bewitches the human imagination.

THE ISSUES DEBATED AND EXAMINED In response to Said’s 1978 Orientalism,2 Bernard Lewis had published an article “On the Question of Orientalism”, in The New York Review of Books, 24 June 1982, pp. 49–56. This was subsequently revised and enlarged

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into a chapter with the same title, which later appeared as Chapter 6 in Lewis’s (1993) Islam and the West. In response to Lewis’s criticisms in that chapter, Said devoted a part of his 1994 Afterword to a rebuttal of Lewis. What were the issues debated in the exchange between Edward Said and Bernard Lewis? In this section, I will examine some of the salient issues involved in the debate between Said and Lewis, considered as archetypal representatives who epitomized two major diametrically opposed positions taken on the question of Orientalism. I will examine them in terms of two major categories, i.e. (a) the epistemological and (b) the methodological. In terms of epistemology, I believe the divide that separates them is the division between modernist and postmodernist epistemology (Hart 2004; Best and Kellner 1997), with Said taking the postmodernist stance. In terms of methodology, again we see the influence of epistemology and Said’s insistence on the relevance of the humanities, literature, and the social sciences in the assessment of Orientalism, as opposed to Lewis’s more conservative stance reminiscent of the Orientalist scholar whose emphasis is on history, philology, and Oriental languages. In other words, the rhetorical strategy deployed by each party is to claim the relevance of their own disciplinary backgrounds in making authoritative claims on Orientalism, with Lewis insisting on “academic specialisation” in the classical Orientalist fashion, while Said argues for a more interdisciplinary approach in order to support some of his more controversial claims regarding the interplay between knowledge and power. M OD ERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM IN L E W I S A N D S A I D

Perhaps one way of looking at the difference between Said and Lewis is the difference between their underlying epistemologies which influenced their basic outlook, method of approach, historiography, etc. (Rosenau 1992). To put it simply, Lewis’s epistemology is basically modernist, while Said’s is postmodernist. Said’s postmodernist approach is evidenced by his scattered references to Foucault and other postmodernist writers, even sometimes acknowledging their influence on him. Lewis’s “conservative” modernist approach and methodology, on the other hand, is seen in his conservative attitude toward methodology, rationality, and objectivity – as least as ideals to be pursued, even though they might not be achieved in practice.

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Whilst previously, critiques of colonialism were largely Marxist inspired, this role has now been partly taken over by postmodernist critiques such as Said’s. Even if one were to look at the intellectual genealogy involved, postmodernist theories of knowledge such as that of Foucault had their origins and were influenced by Marxist philosophy and theory of knowledge. Thus post-colonial critiques that avail themselves of postmodernist theories of knowledge, such as Said’s, can be said to be an extension of leftist critiques of colonialism, with postmodernism now encompassing “leftist” epistemologies in a post-cold war period.3 Said’s postmodernist perspective is amply illustrated in his 1978 Orientalism and further reinforced in a later edition with an Afterword written in 1994. For example, Said’s various references to, and acknowledgement of, Foucault’s work, especially The Archeology of Knowledge, involving Foucault’s notion of discourse and the relationship between knowledge and power. Other elements of postmodernist thought present in Said are (a) his rejection of essentialism and essentializing tendencies and (b) the social construction of knowledge and reality. As opposed to this, we have Lewis’s conservative, “establishment”, “modernist”/“objectivist” academic stance. That this is in fact a point of contention between them is attested to by Lewis himself when he wrote Anti-Orientalism is essentially an epistemology – concerned . . . with “the theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge”. In this sense it should deal with facts and not, so one would assume, with fantasy or invention. (Lewis, 1993, p. 109) The success of this book [Orientalism] and the ideas or, to be more precise, the attitudes that it expresses . . . requires some explanation. One reason is certainly its anti-Westernism. . . . Similarly, the book appeals by its use of the ideas and still more of the language of currently fashionable literary, philosophical and political theories. (Lewis, 1993, p. 114)

In the first quotation above, Lewis directly refers to Said’s anti-Orientalism as an epistemological position. However, Lewis defines epistemology in its classical, traditional sense and does not seem to be aware of later

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developments in epistemology such as naturalistic epistemology or the social constructivist epistemology that grew out of the sociology of knowledge. The latter conception of epistemology, which is postmodernist in character, however, constitutes a departure from the classical (modernist) conception of epistemology which Lewis referred to and perhaps endorsed. That Lewis endorsed the classical, modernist definition of epistemology, whilst Said’s epistemology is essentially social constructivist, and hence postmodernist in character, thus supports my contention that epistemological differences, i.e. modernist vs. postmodernist, underlie the differences in their respective outlooks and positions. This interpretation is further reinforced in the following remark made by Lewis (1993, p. 115) on the question of truth: . . . According to a currently fashionable epistemological view, absolute truth is either nonexistent or unattainable. Therefore, truth doesn’t matter; facts don’t matter. All discourse is a manifestation of a power relationship, and all knowledge is slanted. Therefore, accuracy doesn’t matter; evidence doesn’t matter. All that matters is the attitude – the motives and purposes – of the user of knowledge, and this may be simply claimed for oneself or imputed to another. In imputing motives, the irrelevance of truth, facts, evidence, and even plausibility is a great help . . . This is demonstrated in Orientalism, in which scholars whose methods and procedures are indistinguishable by any scholarly or methodological criterion are divided into sheep and goats according to their support or lack of support for Arab causes. Such support, especially when buttressed by approved literary or social theories, can more than compensate for any lack of linguistic or historical knowledge.

There are two things to note in the above comment made by Lewis on Said’s approach in Orientalism. The first is his allusion to Said’s alleged relativism (Chuaquai 2002) in Lewis’s characterization of “the currently fashionable epistemological view of truth” – which is again associated with postmodernism. The second concerns the methodology that issues out of such an epistemology, in which appeals to “literary or social theories . . . compensate for lack of linguistic or historical knowledge.” The suggestion made by Lewis concerning Said’s approach is clear: that it issues out of the currently fashionable postmodernist ideas, which according to Lewis is unsound, and is not a mark of true scholarship. But these

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remarks only serve to further underscore the point made earlier about the modernist-postmodernist divide in Lewis and Said, respectively. ORIENTA LISM AND DISCIPLINARY RELE VA N C E

Orientalism, conceived as the academic study of the Orient, mainly by Europeans or Westerners, but not exclusively so, brings into question the methodology which is appropriate, and the disciplines which are relevant, to its study. That this is a contentious issue is none the more obvious than in the debate between Said and Lewis. Lewis chides Said for not equipping himself with, and for not using, methods and disciplines, which are customary for a seasoned Orientalist such as himself. For example, Lewis points out to a knowledge of philology and Oriental languages as a prerequisite for studying the Orient. On Lewis’ terms, someone who is not trained in philology or Oriental languages is therefore not in a position to make authoritative judgments or pass credible opinion on the subject of Orientalism. Lewis’ ploy here – presented in the guise of scholarly standards – is to undermine the credibility of someone like Edward Said in their pronouncements on Orientalism. Lewis would therefore in effect be maintaining the status quo in Oriental Studies by arguing for the very methodology and scholarly practices which have defined Oriental Studies in the West for the last few centuries. But Said would have none of this attempted exclusion by virtue of the non-possession of certain qualifications deemed necessary for Oriental Studies. As Said (2003, p. 106), in agreeing with Gibb, put it, “Orientalism is too important to be left to the Orientalists”. But has Said really abandoned the demands of scholarship when venturing into a subject such as Orientalism, for which his own field of specialization or academic background did not specifically prepare him for? The fact that someone ventures into a field which is not his initial field of specialization is not in itself sufficient grounds for indictment. In fact, there have been instances, even in science, when discoveries were made through the process of disciplinary migration, when a new field of vision is brought into an existing field of study, from methods and perspectives brought from elsewhere. So for Said, the social sciences such as history, economics, and politics are important and relevant for the study of the Orient, because these factors do influence societies. He saw these disciplines as being highly relevant toward achieving an understanding of the Orient. But it is unfair to criticize Said, as Lewis

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did, for deploying the social sciences, which, according to Lewis, was done in order to compensate one’s lack of knowledge in philology and Oriental languages, replacing one’s analysis instead with dubious concepts drawn from contemporary social science. The fact of the matter is that bringing in the social sciences does not in itself load the dice in favor of the anti-Orientalist. On the other hand, one’s Orientalist attitude can still be sustained, even though one has moved from being a conservative Orientalist using traditional Orientalist methods to being more receptive of the social sciences. In fact one of Said’s criticism of H.A.R. Gibb rests on this very point. When Gibb talked about the shift from Orientalism to Area Studies, in which the social sciences then become relevant, 4 none of his previous Orientalist stance and attitude changed, with the result that the social sciences has now become an additional tool for the indictment of the Orient. But in Said’s hands, an appeal to the social sciences became instead a strategy for defending the Orient against the Orientalists. So in other words, bringing in the social sciences to the study of the Orient does not in itself render unfair advantage to the anti-Orientalist or to the Orientalist for that matter. Thus Lewis’ contention, or perhaps fear, that invoking the social sciences would facilitate a critique of traditional Orientalism is itself unfounded and unwarranted. The more important question to ask perhaps is the question of whether the social sciences could in fact contribute toward an understanding of the Orient? And I think here that the answer is a resounding “Yes!” Here one can think of the works of anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz on Indonesia and North Africa, and Bernard Cohn (1996) on India, to see how they could contribute immensely to an understanding of the East. It could also help to overcome the “textual attitude” syndrome that Said talked about, which prefers to reduce reality to the written word, as how a philologist or a linguist would or might.

T HE M ETHODO LOGICAL CRITICISM TO S A I D ’ S O R I E N TA L I S M A ND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Said had in fact anticipated some of the methodological objections raised by Lewis (1993), in his Orientalism of 1978. Said’s sensitivity to some of the methodological issues involved is quite apparent in his remarks on methodology in his critique of Orientalism. Said however, in my assessment, had successfully circumvented some of these problems and justified his

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approach, partly based on a postmodernist epistemology which consequently bears on his methodology. This is perhaps why Lewis’ criticism of Said makes a direct reference to his postmodernist epistemology, quite similar in fact to the way the late Ernest Gellner (1992, pp. 46–47), a sociologist in the modernist mould, criticized postmodernist social science. 5 One methodological objection which Said himself was aware of, and which Lewis raised, was the question of disciplinary specialization. Is a non-Orientalist, such as Said himself, qualified to pass judgment on the Orientalist enterprise? Do not the strictures of academic professionalism and specialization require one to be an “insider”, i.e. trained in the methods and practices of a particular field of study, in order to have any credibility in commenting on the subject? What gives Said the right or the qualification to be a disciplinary trespasser and yet maintain his academic integrity? I think there are several responses that can be made to this kind of skeptical criticism of Said’s critique, some of which had been given by Said himself. For a start, for Said “Orientalism is too important to be left to the Orientalists”, which gives him the motivation to embark on the enterprise, even though that in itself does not provide a methodological justification. Secondly, Orientalism as a field of study has more in common with the humanities such as history and literature than it does with the social sciences such as economics or sociology. Said’s own background in Western literature is therefore relevant to his task of examining the Orientalist enterprise, especially since his focus was the study of Orientalist and Colonial attitudes toward the Orient, rather than a historical survey or analysis of the Orient which would require him to be more firmly based on “factual” disciplines such as history or economics. One objection which has been raised by Lewis is the lack of knowledge of Philology and the Oriental languages in scholars interested in Orientalism such as Said. A lack of such knowledge, according to Lewis, cannot be compensated by a knowledge of the humanities and social sciences – an approach which Said himself seems to take – in trying to understand the Orient. But given the fact that the subject of Said’s study is the Occidental perception and treatment of the Orient, rather than a study of the Orient itself, i.e. a kind of meta-level study. Lewis’s criticism, therefore, seems to be irrelevant and off the mark. Said’s knowledge of European languages such as English, French, and German, plus his knowledge of Arabic, seems to serve his purpose quite well. As for Philology, since Said’s concern was not with the textual analysis of Oriental texts, there does not,

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therefore, appear to be any terrible need for Said to be trained in the field. Having satisfied ourselves that the so-called “methodological deficiency” attributed to Said is not really serious, let us now look at Said’s more positive construction and try to see the novelty which Said brought to bear in the study of Orientalism. There are basically two novelties which Said introduced in his study of Orientalism. The first is the multi-disciplinary approach which he adopted, thus enriching the study by bringing in the resources provided by the different disciplines, in order to bear on the subject (Bayoumi and Rubin 2000). This results in a sort of disciplinary migration or hybridization. In fact, sociologists who have investigated the phenomena of innovation, pointed out to this factor as a cause of innovation. Thus it enhances, extends, and enriches the field of study, rather than create gross inaccuracies or distortions. The second novelty is not quite unrelated to the first but nevertheless requires separate mention. It is Said’s creative use of his knowledge of literature and literary analysis that is brought to bear on the question of Orientalism. Thus he was able to scrutinize motives and hidden plots and meanings in the writings of Orientalists, the same way he dissects and elicits meanings out of his study of novels and other forms of literary works. So all considered, I think the objection to Said’s critique of Orientalism made on methodological grounds cannot be sustained and can be justifiably rejected.

A CLOSER LOOK AT SAID’S ORIENTALISM In this section, we will be taking a closer look at Said’s Orientalism, discussing its problems, and where possible, will attempt to clear common misconceptions. T HE STRUC TUR ALISM OF FOUCAULT A N D E D WA R D S A I D

Said’s approach, insofar as it is modeled on Foucault’s perspective on knowledge, suffers from similar drawbacks found in Foucault. One problem, in particular, relates to the question of “structure” and “agency” and the relationship between them. Although both Foucault and Said subscribe to some form of Humanism, their “structuralist” positions with regard to knowledge-formation deprive “agency” of some measure of autonomy,

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and this to some extent undermine their Humanism. Foucault’s emphasis on the “social”, as the determinant and (collective) agent of knowledge production, not unlike the Marxist perspective, with Marx linking the social with the economic, implies the lack of empowerment on the part of the individual agent to create knowledge free from social or political pressures. In fact with regard to scientific knowledge, this social constructivist thesis has created a fair amount of controversy concerning the objectivity and rationality of science. In defending his allegation that Orientalist knowledge is not value-free, not the objective expression of an individual researcher’s thinking, Said has maintained the position that the individual scholar is part of a social-institutional framework and that the knowledge produced cannot therefore be free from the interests of such a framework. Whether in Said’s mind this is regarded as an a priori truth, or whether this claim has the status of an empirical thesis is not quite clear. Such thinking of course is reminiscent of the (social) theories of knowledge found in Marx, Mannheim, and recently Foucault. In trying to undermine the notion of the objectivity of scientific knowledge (and hence all knowledge that claims a scientific pedigree or status), Foucault has looked at how certain science-related disciplines such as medicine, psychology, and psychiatry were produced by certain institutions whose norms and values – some of which are percolations from the wider society – are intricately interwoven with the content of the disciplinary knowledge so produced. There is in a sense a kind of Kantian (social) synthetic a priori in this process of the production of scientific knowledge. Similarly, when Said argues that the Orientalist is similarly situated – hence similarly constrained in his knowledge production – involving as it does power transactions at various levels, including the social, political, and economic, he is thereby directly or indirectly endorsing the view that there cannot be an autonomous moral agent in the production of knowledge. But not only is this theoretically false, it is also untrue in practice. It is theoretically false because as academic institutions, Universities in the West had acquired some degree of autonomy throughout its history till the present, and it is empirically untrue because even amongst Orientalists themselves, we find scholars of different stripes, some of whom were readily accepted by the “natives” who form the object of their study. Examples that come to mind are A.J. Arberry in the case of Islam, and Joseph Needham (1954) in the case of China.

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At a normative level, such “structuralist” stances on knowledge are undesirable on several grounds. Firstly, it denies the possibility of individual agency to create knowledge that does not serve the interest of “structure” or that go against the current of structure. This would severely curtail the possibility of critique, including the ones advanced by Foucault and Said in the twentieth century or Marx and Nieztsche in the nineteenth century. The empowerment of individual thought seems to be denied even at the outset. In any case, its assumption of a mutually exclusive separation between “structure” and “agency”, can be called into question, especially when one looks at more “synthetic” views of their relationship as found in Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration or that of Margaret Archer’s (1996) view of the relationship between culture and social structure. Secondly, it also privileges from the outset, the social – as opposed to the objective (or insightful) cognition of the solitary thinker a la Descartes (however fictitious such an entity might appear to be) – in the process of knowledge construction. No doubt a great deal of light can be thrown when one adopts such a social constructivist perspective in looking at the relationship between Colonialism and the corpus of knowledge produced by the West on the Orient within a largely colonial context. In fact, looked at in this way, it almost becomes a truism and does not require the fancy intellectual footwork of a Foucault or an Edward Said to make the thesis look credible. However, as I have argued above, such a thesis overlooks or even denies the possibility of the independence of agency in the face of (colonial) structure. One way historians can test this view is perhaps by looking at the relationship between metropolis and colony and how the perception and ideas of colony can sometimes differ from that of metropole within the same colonial framework.7 No doubt there have been prejudices and bias in the construction of knowledge of the Orient by the West, as Said himself has so remarkably documented and textually analyzed. But prejudice and bias exist on the other side too, as when the East describes itself or the West on its own terms.8 Perhaps the difference lies in the asymmetrical power relationship, thus lending greater moral credibility to the so-called “subaltern” voice. But such an asymmetrical power relationship cannot justify a distortion of truth by either side. The “oppressed” and “exploited” must seek their political and economic redress by fair and true means, by knowledge that

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is ethically based and informed, not by seeking to commit the very sins of those they condemn. KANTIAN SYN THETIC A PRIORI IN SA ID ’ S A P P R O A C H ?

In a sense, Said’s thesis is irrefutable, or difficult to refute, not because it is certainly true but because it contains an element of Kantian synthetic a priori expressed or translated in social terms.9 The synthetic a priori in Said’s thesis consists in the claim that knowledge is socially constructed and that this construction is built or based on the European psyche and value system, which is distinct from the Oriental mind and personality. Presented in such a manner, Said’s approach seems to buy into the essentialist position, which Said rejects when looking at Occidental characterizations of the Orient.10 However, going back to my transposition of the Kantian notion of the synthetic a priori on to Said’s social constructivism, we can see that although the a priori element can be identified with the assumption of the power–knowledge nexus, its existence is historically forged – hence the synthetic element. So Said can be exonerated from the charge of essentialism, primarily because he saw the domination of the East by the West as an episode in human history that is capable of change and not eternally transfixed. Constructed in such a manner, Said’s thesis then becomes only capable of illustration, or even confirmation, but not refutation. Karl Popper has attributed such characteristics to Marxist and psychoanalytic theories, defining them as unscientific according to his criterion of falsification. Said’s assumption about knowledge and power has to be presupposed, in order to see the explanatory power of such a theory. Given such an assumption, it then becomes relatively easy to see history and literature as expressions, or illustrations, of power in knowledge. But if that be the case, does not Said’s thesis run the risk of being tautological, platitudinous, and even vacuous? Bernard Lewis (1982, p. 48) has attempted to refute or criticize Said’s claim concerning Orientalism, by arguing, for instance, that German Orientalism, with its highly respectable scholarship on the Orient, did not lead to German colonialism over Asia and Africa, unlike what happened in the case of Britain and France.11 If that be the case, i.e. if Said’s thesis is indeed open to refutation, then it suggests or implies that Said’s thesis does have empirical content in that it attempts to state and perhaps establish an empirical thesis about the influence of

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Orientalism on Colonialism. But Said fudges the issue when he falls back on a weaker thesis, i.e. that there existed parallels between Orientalism and Colonialism. T HE RED EM PTI VE SIDE TO SAID’S WRIT I N G

Although Said’s Orientalism has been criticized for its “anti-westernism”, unfair portrayal of the Orientalist enterprise, and the tension it could create in East–West understanding and relations (Hitchens 2003), a closer reading of his work could dispel some of these misconceptions and perhaps could even lead one to see the redemptive side of his writing. It remains true, however, that the sting will not be removed in the major bulk of his text on Orientalism, and perhaps rightly so. This is because Said saw it as his task to launch a critique on Orientalism, revealing the West’s bias against the Orient, and generally showing how the Orient has been victimized both through knowledge and power. That central thrust must remain with Said. But that thrust must be seen in its proper perspective, as an advance whose aim is to redress, not dominate, to reveal, not hide. Only then can one see the redemptive side of Said’s work. However, Said has also admitted that the book has turned into “several different books” through the different interpretations and emphases given to it by various readers. As Said (2003, p. 330) put it, “Orientalism, almost in a Borgesian way, has become several different books”. In a way, the various readings of the 1978 version of Orientalism have gone out of control, so to speak, thus prompting Said to write an “Afterword” in the later 1994 edition, partly as a reply to his critics and partly to clarify parts of his position which have been misunderstood. A close re-reading of the 1994 version of Orientalism, I would argue, enables us to see the redemptive side of his writing, partly because here Said clarifies what his true intentions are and discusses certain views or interpretations which were previously attributed to him. One major misunderstanding of Said is the perception that he is antiWest, pro-Arab and pro-Islam, in other words partisan in a most negative way, letting his partisanship influence his writing to the point that it becomes an ideological piece, devoid of scholarly merit. Said’s aim rather is to redress the East–West imbalance in knowledge and power relations and create a sense of humanity based on equality and justice.

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To quote Said (2003, p. 28), “If this stimulates a new kind of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it eliminates the ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ altogether, then we shall have advanced a little in the process of what Raymond Williams has called the ‘unlearning’ of ‘the inherent dominative mode’.” In a passage clearly directed at his critics, and those who took him to be a defender of the Orient, Islam, and Arab causes, Said caustically remarked (2003, p. 331): One scarcely knows what to make of these caricatured permutations of a book that to its author and in its arguments is explicitly anti-essentialist, radically skeptical about all categorical designations such as Orient and Occident, and painstakingly careful about not “defending” or even discussing the Orient and Islam. Yet, Orientalism has in fact been read and written about in the Arab world as a systematic defense of Islam and the Arabs, even though I say explicitly in the book that I have no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are. Actually I go a great deal further when, very early in the book I say that words such as “Orient” and “Occident” correspond to no stable reality that exists as a natural fact.

And in another passage he wrote (2003, p. 337): “ . . . in all my works I remained fundamentally critical of a gloating and uncritical nationalism.” Although Said’s Orientalism hardly comes out as an argument for Universal Humanism, and despite his own admission that “Orientalism is a partisan book, not a theoretical machine” (Said, 2003, p. 339), something can be said about that Humanism which motivates Said’s work. Referring to his own experience as an “outsider”, an “exile”, a cultural hybrid and migrant, who crossed and transcended the East–West divide, Said (2003, p. 336) wrote: I have no doubt that this was made possible because I traversed the imperial East-West divide, entered into the life of the West, and yet retained some organic connection with the place from which I originally came. I would repeat that this is very much a procedure of crossing, rather than maintaining, barriers; I believe Orientalism as a book shows it, especially at moments when I speak of humanistic study as seeking ideally to go beyond coercive limitations on thought toward a non-dominative, and non-essentialist type of learning.

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Although some have appealed to his Orientalism in support of (Arab) Nationalist or Islamist causes, Said distances himself from both Orientalism and Occidentalism, seeking instead to a adopt a humanistic, multiculturalist perspective. It is more accurate in fact to view Said’s Orientalism as a multiculturist critique of the Orientalist enterprise, rather than an attack on the Occident by the Orient – a suggestion which Said himself would repudiate and reject because of its “Orient-centrism” or “reverse Orientalism”,12 and because of its essentializing quality.

THE DEBATE ON ORIENTALISM AND ITS BROADER IMPLICATIONS The debate on the question of Orientalism, epitomized by the two scholarly giants representing diametrically opposed positions, and with their own band of followers or sympathizers, is not an isolated academic debate without broader implications or repercussions. Among these implications are the following: •

Its impact on inter-cultural, inter-civilizational, and hence international relations, especially the relationship between Islamic and Western countries. It sets the tone for dialog between the two groups since the debate has brought out issues which are central to East–West relations involving post-colonialism, Islam, etc.

•

The relationship between scholarship, advocacy, politics, and group interests.

•

The question of how postcolonial states should deal with their own colonial heritage, involving colonial knowledge of themselves, yet maintaining their own sense of cultural identity and authenticity.

Part of the reason for the popularity and widespread reception of Said’s Orientalism is the context in which the book came into publication. After its first publication in 1978, there occurred the so-called “Islamic Revolution” in Iran in 1979, in which Islam was again pitted against the West, i.e. against America. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the

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disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, ushered in the Post-Cold War period, in which Islam was set up as the “new enemy” for the modern, liberal Western democracies in place of Communism. And finally with 11 September 2001 and its political and military aftermath involving Afghanistan, Iraq, and their invaders, namely, America and Britain, the stage is set for an Islam–West dichotomy, rivalry, and enmity, in the manner of the previous Cold War. Thus debates such as the one on Orientalism, in this new geopolitical and geocultural context, assumes the dimension and proportion of an “ideological warfare”, in which the lines between politics, ideology, scholarship, and academic objectivity becomes blurred. In fact this is nothing strange when we think of how scientists were brought into the service of the conflicting nation-states in the First and Second World Wars, thus debunking the myth of scientific universalism and internationalism so passionately argued for by Robert K. Merton, himself an American sociologist in favor of an open and free liberal-democratic society a la America. Third World Islamic countries are caught in a dilemma on this issue because support of an anti-Orientalist position might eventually set them against the military might of America, whilst accepting the Orientalist position would mean a travesty of their own sense of national sovereignty and cultural identity, with its implied acceptance of Colonialism, especially in the wake of Said’s critique. The only way out perhaps is to see the debate in more nuanced terms, not in a simple dichotomy which leads to the above-mentioned dilemma. Positions taken on the issue of Orientalism certainly have broader implications and bear on related issues such as Colonialism, Modernism, and East–West relations. I have chosen to focus on the two major figures in the debate on Orientalism, namely, Edward Said and Bernard Lewis because it is in them that we find the most detailed articulation and cogent argumentation of the issues involved concerning Orientalism. Furthermore, their views have been influential on others concerned with the same subject. Other lesser debates serve as footnotes to the Said–Lewis encounter. Because of their importance, in terms of implications and influence, it is all the more important not to misunderstand or misrepresent them, especially the stance taken by Edward Said. Said’s Orientalism is a sophisticated and nuanced discussion of Orientalism and not a simplistic and unqualified thesis that condemned the Colonial West for conjuring up a distorted image of the East through their scholarship,

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literature, etc., which then serves as an instrument for subjugating the East through physical, military, economic, and cultural domination. In fact Said himself disowns the various attempts to appeal to his works in support of causes such as Islamic fundamentalism, Arab Nationalism, or even anti-Westernism. Even Bernard Lewis saw the appeal of Said’s Orientalism in what he described as “the anti-Westernism of the book” (Lewis, 1993, p. 114). So much so that Said had to add an extra chapter entitled “Afterword” in the 1994 edition of Orientalism, in order to clear the various misunderstandings that his book has generated. Said’s Orientalism, when read closely and carefully, shows that the position he adopts is a highly sophisticated, nuanced, and qualified one, though admittedly partisan, passionately argued at certain places, and sometimes rather harsh in its condemnation of what he perceived to be a blatant/flagrant affront on the human spirit and dignity. It is as a humanist in a postmodernist setting that Said’s views must be understood, rather than as a vulgar critic of the West. Though he chides the West for what it had done – and is still doing – to the Orient, his prescription for redress is certainly not one based on aggression and hatred toward the West. As he himself insists, his efforts in exposing what he saw as the injustices of the Occident toward the Orient does not have as its aim a further split between East and West but rather so that humanity can learn to come together on equal terms. The West must not continue to use its political, economic, and military might to bring the East under its control and domination but must ultimately learn to accept its humanity on the basis of ethics. In this regard, Said was equally a critic of the “East” as he was of the “West”. Lewis for instance, tactically deployed the views presented by certain Middle Eastern intellectuals in attempting to undermine Said’s anti-Orientalist position and depriving it of legitimacy by pitting Muslim intellectuals themselves against Said, citing in particular the views of the Egyptian philosopher, Fu’ad Zakaria (Lewis, 1993, pp. 116–117). According to Lewis, there are Arab intellectuals who do not see Said’s work as doing a favor to them but as something that could work against their interest, because it puts the blame on scapegoats such as White Colonialists and fail to look at their own weakness. This is in fact an old argument to be made and is not dependent on Said arriving on the scene. But the difference is that whereas previously such anti-colonial rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s resonate against the background of the Cold War and perhaps inspired by leftist, Marxist, or nationalist ideology, Said’s critique

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coincides with Islamic revivalism and the decline of Communism, thus re-igniting the Islam–West controversy. The relevance of Bernard Lewis in this account, and his iconic stature as a Western scholar on Islam, is also neither accidental nor coincidental. Lewis’s knowledge of Islamic history, especially political and cultural history and his ability to connect this knowledge with contemporary events involving America’s relationship with the Islamic world further reinforce the perception that what is at stake is the relationship between Islam and the West and the survival of the two (Akhavi 2003). True to what Said had so ironically pointed out in his Orientalism, the alliance between Knowledge and Empire seems to be resurrected once more in its modern form. Has scholarship therefore reached an impasse, a dead end, in attempting to undo what evil Empire had done? Or is scholarship perpetually doomed to be a servant of power, however unjust and cruel that power might be? Or can scholarship and rational discourse create a “fifth column” of enlightened individuals who can break out of the vicious cycle of ideology, power, and the State? I would like to think that this is possible – that agency can retain its independence from structure and power. But I must confess that under the present circumstances, I have to remain a skeptic and at best entertain the slimmest of hopes in the remotest of hearts.

REFERENCES Akhavi, S. (2003): “Islam and the West in World History”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 545–562. Al-Attas, S.M.N. (1993 [1978]): Islam and Secularism. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization. Al-‘Azim, S.J. (1981): “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse”, Khamsin, vol. 8, pp. 5–26. Andersen, H. (2001): On Kuhn. Belmont, California: Wadsworth. Archer, M. (1996): Culture and Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bayoumi, M.; Rubin, A. (eds). (2000): The Edward Said Reader. New York: Vintage. Best, S.; Kellner, D. (1997): The Postmodern Turn. New York: Guilford Press. Chuaqui, R. (2002): “Orientalism, Anti-Orientalism, Relativism“, Nepantla: Views from South, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 373–390. Cohn, B.S. (1996): Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Fakhry, M. (2004 [1983, 1970]): A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press. Foucault, M. (2002 [1972]): The Archeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge Classics. Gellner, E. (1992): Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London and New York: Routledge. Hall, C. (2004): “Remembering Edward Said (1935–2003)”, History Workshop Journal Issue, vol. 57, pp. 235–243. Hart, K. (2004): Postmodernism: A Beginner’s Guide. Oxford: Oneworld -Publications. Hitchens, C. (2003): “Where the Twain Should Have Met“, The Atlantic Monthly, no. 292, pp. 153–159. Hussein, A.A. (2002): Edward Said: Criticism and Society. London: Verso. Kuhn, T. (1970 [1962]): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Laudan, L. (1984): Science and Values. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lewis, B. (1993): Islam and the West. New York: Oxford University Press. Lewis, B. (2003): The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Little, D.P. (1979): “Three Arab Critiques of Orientalism“, The Muslim World, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 110–131. Needham, J. (1954): Science and Civilisation in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rose, J. (2004): “Edward Said“, History Workshop Journal Issue, vol. 57, pp. 244–246. Rosenau, P.M. (1992): Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP. Said, E. (2003 [1978]): Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. Said, E.; Lewis, B. (1982): “Orientalism: An Exchange“, New York Review of Books, 12 August 1982. Spivak, G. (2005): “Thinking about Edward Said: Pages from a Memoir“, Critical Inquiry, vol. 31, pp. 519–525. Winstedt, R. (1961): The Malays: A Cultural History. Singapore: George Brash. Zakariyya, F. (2005): Myth and Reality in the Contemporary Islamist Movement. London: Pluto Press. Translated with an Introduction and Bibliography by Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’.

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4 AN ORIENTALIST MYTHOLOGY OF SECRET SOCIETIES

Robert Irwin In Orientalism, Edward Said argued that the French expedition to Egypt in 1798 was the formative event in the establishment of institutional Orientalism (Said, 1998, pp. 22, 42–3, 76, 79–88, 122, 168). But though the brief French occupation of Egypt was an intellectual event in the history of Egyptology, it had little impact on the way that Arabic and Islamic studies evolved in Europe in the decades that followed, and here it will be argued that the bloody events of 1789 and the years that immediately followed were more important in shaping the minds and interests of the great generation of Orientalists who were to dominate the field in the early nineteenth century. In 1789 a mob stormed the Bastille. “In its most general form the ideology of 1789 was the Masonic one expressed with such innocent sublimity in Mozart’s Magic Flute (1791) . . . ” as Eric Hobsbawm has observed (Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 79). In its less innocent form, the tree of liberty could “not flourish unless moistened with the blood of kings” (The Times, 23 January 1793, quoting Bertrand Barère). In 1793 Louis XVI was guillotined and the Jacobin Reign of Terror gathered momentum. Revolutionary agitation spread to other places, most notably the Low Countries. The Terror was bloody but brief and came to an end in Thermidor 1794, that is to say July of that year. The subsequent regime of Napoleon brought stability of a sort to France, though Bonapartist propaganda had spread disturbing egalitarian ideals throughout Europe. After the Bourbon restoration of 1815, there were those who hoped to see the complete and permanent re-establishment of the Ancien Régime. However, in the decades that followed, the monarchies of Europe were haunted by spectres of revolution. The Austrian minister, Metternich, wrote of himself, “You see in me the chief Minister of Police in Europe. I keep an eye on everything. My contacts are such that nothing escapes me” (De Bertier de Sauvigny, 1962, p. 105). His

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officials, policemen, and spies were particularly obsessed with the threat posed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire by Masons, Carbonari, Illuminati, and similar secretive and subversive organisations. Those obsessions were fuelled by a heated and somewhat imaginative literature, produced by exiles from the French Revolution that sought to find the origins of the Revolution in a Masonic conspiracy. The most important and influential work here was the Abbé Barruel’s Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du Jacobinisme published 10 years after the outbreak of the revolution (Barruel, 1797; c.f. Cohn, 1967, pp. 30–6; Roberts, 1972, pp. 199–219). Everybody read Barruel. Apprehensions of conspiracies and riots found justification in the events of 1848, the Year of Revolutions, when, for a moment, thrones across Europe tottered. Such was the broad historical background to the beginnings of a sustained tradition of academic Orientalism in France, Germany, Russia, and elsewhere. A word now about the nature of Orientalism in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The first thing to note is that there were very few people indeed working in the fields of Arabic and Islamic studies. None of the important figures was British, after the radical Whig, Sir William Jones abandoned his early interest in Persian and Arabic in favour of Sanskrit. Prior to Silvestre de Sacy’s elevation to a chair at the Ecole des langues orientales vivantes in Paris, most Arabists and Persianists were perforce selftaught, and interested amateurs continued to predominate throughout the nineteenth century. Aristocrats and clergymen played a disproportionately large role in the development of Oriental studies. In the 1820s, the Perpetual President of the Societé Asiatique was the Duc d’Orleans; two barons were its vice presidents, and various dukes, marquises, counts, and barons sat on its council (Nouveau, 1829, pp. 59–60). The Duc de Blacas, though only an ordinary member, was one of the greatest collectors of Islamic art in the century (Vernoit, 2000, pp. 1, 23). The British Royal Asiatic Society was, like the Societé Asiatique, founded in 1823, and in the course of the nineteenth century its members included the Duke of Wellington, the Earl of Liverpool, the Earl of Aberdeen, the Marquess of Salisbury and other members of the aristocracy far too numerous to list here – as well as quite a few Indian princes (Beckingham, 1979, pp. 4–5). Salons had as large a role as libraries in the diffusion of Orientalist learning, and in Paris, such grand scholars as Silvestre de Sacy, Julius Mohl, and Ernest Renan were the successive habitués and even the hosts of such salons. Orientalism was a field that was monopolized by Christian

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gentlemen. In France, the stern Jansenist Catholicism of Silvestre de Sacy and other key Orientalists, including Etienne Quatremère and Garcin de Tassy, was one of the reasons that “France’s most famous atheist”, Ernest Renan, was an outsider in the field. Another reason, by the way, was that Renan’s Arabic was lousy (Renan, 1883, p. 288). One of the side effects of the Napoleonic Wars was the emancipation of the Jews, but the great age of Jewish Orientalism came in later decades with Geiger, Weil, Goldziher, and others (Kramer, 1999, pp. 11–19). Though Orientalism was dominated by the aristocracy, the two key figures in the development of Orientalism in the early nineteenth century, Antoine Isaac Silvestre de Sacy and Joseph von Hammer were not of noble birth but both eventually acquired titles. Born in 1758, Silvestre de Sacy was the son of a Parisian notary. Under Louis XVI, he worked in the Royal Mint where he apparently had sufficient leisure to teach himself Arabic, Persian, and several other languages. During the Terror he abandoned his job at the Mint and fled Paris for a brief while. In 1795, he was appointed to the Professorship of Arabic at the Ecole des langues orientales vivantes. Despite the title of the institute at which he taught, Silvestre de Sacy was not in fact interested in living Arabic and could not speak the language. Texts were the thing. The furthest he went abroad was Genoa. He published copiously on Sasanian, Arabic, Persian, and Islamic studies. In recognition of his scholarly achievements, he was made a Duke in 1832. He died in 1838 (Dehérain, 1938; Fück, 1955, pp. 140–57). Publications apart, he was an energetic and apparently inspiring teacher. He not only taught most of the next generation of French Orientalists, including Quatremère and Garcin de Tassy, but also most of the first great generation of Orientalists in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere. Above all, Silvestre de Sacy taught Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer and the methodologically dour, dry, and pedantic Fleischer was to teach most of the following generation of German Orientalists (Fück, 1955, pp. 170–3; Mangold, 2004, passim), and it was German-speaking Orientalists who were to dominate the field until, perhaps, the 1930s. One person that Silvestre de Sacy did not teach was Joseph von Hammer. Von Hammer exemplified a pre-Fleischer, romantic, and quite unpedantic enthusiasm for all things Oriental. Von Hammer was born in Graz in Austria in 1794. He entered the diplomatic service in 1796 and trained as a superior kind of tarjuman or Dolmetsch. He was posted to Constantinople in 1799 and took part in Sir Sidney Smith’s expedition

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against the French. In 1807, he returned from the East and was made a privy counsellor. Subsequently he worked in the civil administration where he had sufficient leisure to publish an intimidating amount of stuff. In 1835, he inherited estates in Styria and took the title Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall. The Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (2nd ed., 10 vols., pp. 1827–35) is his main work, and when I was a student in the 1960s it was still on the SOAS reading lists (but those were the days when English undergraduates might be expected to know some language other than their own). Von Hammer also wrote and translated a vast amount of material, and in 1809 he founded the Fundgruben des Orients, the first ever Orientalist periodical, of which he was the major contributor. Though prolific, von Hammer was wild and careless. His translations were excessively free, and he was extensively criticized for scholarly inaccuracy. Friedrich Christian Diez wrote a great fat book, Unfug und Betrug, in order to expose von Hammer’s numerous errors, and the meticulous Fleischer published a detailed criticism of von Hammer’s misreadings of al-Zamkhshari’s Qur’an commentary (The Golden Necklace), the details of which do not concern us here. Von Hammer died in 1856 (Fück, 1955, pp. 158– 66; Mangold, 2004, pp. 47–54, 77–80, 82–8; Reichl, 1973). Unlike, say, the Orientalists of the seventeenth century (Pococke, Erpenius, and Golius among them), both Silvestre de Sacy and von Hammer were obsessively interested in heterodox Islam, though both tended to view it as if from a Sunni perspective, perceiving Shi‘ism as a breakaway from mainstream Sunni Islam and regularly judging Shi‘ism in terms of the way it deviated from the alleged norms of Sunnism. De Sacy wrote about both the Druzes and the Assassins as conspiratorial cults and as revolutionary movements that used the trappings of religion to disguise political ambition. From his youth onwards, the Druze doctrines and organisation were his first and chief enthusiasm. In part, the reason was chronological. It just happened that some Druze doctrinal manuscripts in the Royal Library were among the first texts to fall under his gaze, and it was on these manuscripts that he cut his philological teeth. However, when one reads the Exposé de la religions des Druzes, which he only finally got around to publishing in 1838, shortly before his death, by which time he had been working on the subject for over 40 years, it was hard not to feel that at times when he appeared to be writing about the Oriental sect, he was actually writing about agitators closer to home, and the ostensibly dry and positivist Orientalist had in effect transformed the

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Druzes into the Masons and Jacobins of the Middle Ages. De Sacy was not such a dry old stick, and he wrote with passion. He wrote in the hope that “quelle fasse servir ce tableau de l’une de plus insignes folies de l’espirit humain, à apprendre aux hommes qui se glorifient de la superiorité de leurs lumières, de quelles aberrations est capable la raison humaine laissée à elle-même” (Silvestre de Sacy, 1838, p. viii). As with early Orientalist portrayals of Sufism, the Druze faith was presented as a foreign import into Islam, since the Druze creed was judged to be a mixture of Greek and Persian philosophy. Sacy’s contempt for the masses is evident in his account of the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim who, he claimed, imposed on foolish worshippers ready to become the toys of anyone who could be bothered to take the trouble to seduce them. In Hakim the Druzes had deified a sinister monster. The Druze practice of reading the Qur’an allegorically also attracted Sacy’s unfavourable attention. He compared it to the way that contemporary German theologians were re-reading the Bible in order to find in it the ideas of Kant and described those theologians as making use of the criticism of pure reason in order to destroy the truths of the old Greek and Hebrew books (Silvestre de Sacy, 1838, p. xxxiiin). (Just two years earlier in 1835–1836 David Strauss had published his critically analytical Das Leben Jesu, kritische bearbeitet, which debunked the supernatural events related in the Gospels.) The general introduction to the Exposé was lengthy, and Silvestre de Sacy did not confine his discussion narrowly to the Druzes. He also discussed the Fatimid Isma‘ilis, whom he thought similar to the Druzes, and the Carmathians, whose aim had been to lead mankind to atheism and immorality. De Sacy drew upon al-Nuwayri and al-Maqrizi in order to present a picture of the nine successive stages of initiation by which an Isma‘ili aspirant was successively led from a state of naïve belief in the truths of revealed religion to a state of total cynicism combined with utter subservience to the leader of a power-hungry cult. In presenting this story of the nine-stage initiation of evil, de Sacy uncritically drew on fragments of early Sunni propaganda that had been preserved in the late Mamluk sources. A mythical Maymun ibn Abdallah al-Qaddah was alleged by those sources to have founded Isma’ilism and to have fashioned what was initially a seven-stage system of progressive revelation that was designed to conduct the apprentice to unbelief and evil. This particular piece of Sunni myth-making was eventually exposed by the

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researches of Ivanov in the twentieth century (Ivanow, 1955). Only after 246 pages of introduction did de Sacy think it fitting to bring “an end to the listing of the aberrations of the human spirit that have disfigured Mohammedanism over the centuries”. In an earlier article on Druze manuscripts in European libraries, de Sacy had outlined how Druze initiates were not only dispensed from believing in God, the mission of the Prophet, prayer, alms, fasting, and jihad but also excused from submission to legitimate authority (Silvestre de Sacy, 1824). De Sacy also published a couple of articles on the Assassins which retold the legends of the Paradise Garden which the Old Man of the Mountains made use of in order to persuade drugged young men to carry out nefarious deeds on his behalf. The Assassin system of beliefs (or should that be unbeliefs?) was held to be similar to that of the Druzes in that there was one message for the neophyte and quite a different one for the man who was fully initiated. De Sacy was the first European to suggest that the Assassins’s name in Arabic derived from their consumption of hashish (English translation and commentary by Daftary, 1994, pp. 136–88; Silvestre de Sacy, 1809, 1818). However, von Hammer’s Geschichte der Assassinen was wilder and more vehement, and it circulated more widely and was translated into English (Hammer-Purgstall, 1818a, 1835). The book starts as it means to go on: “the Assassins – that imperium in imperio, which, by blind subjection shook despotism to its foundations; that union of spies and impostors and dupes, which under the mask of a more austere creed and severer morals undermined all religion and morality; that order of murderers, beneath who daggers the lords of nations fell. The history of this empire of conspirators is solitary and without parallel; compared to it all earlier and later secret combinations are crude attempts or unsuccessful imitations” (Hammer-Purgstall, 1835, pp. 1–2). Though von Hammer acknowledged a debt to de Sacy, he went somewhat further in tracing a mythical genealogy of secret societies. Much of the evil was Persian in origin, for the Persians, resenting their conquest by the Arabs, sought the ruin of Islam “by open war, but also by secret doctrines and pernicious dissensions”. The Isma‘ili da’is, or missionaries, were “apostles of crime and impiety”. Al-Hakim was “the most stupid tyrant of whom Islam makes mention”. The Assassins of Syria and Iran were the ancestors of Europe’s subversives, the Illuminati:

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To believe nothing and to dare all was, in two words, the sum of this system, which annihilated every principle of religion and morality, and had no other object than to execute ambitious designs with suitable ministers, who daring all and knowing nothing, since they consider everything a cheat and nothing forbidden, are the best tools of an infernal policy. A system which, with no other aim than the gratification of an insatiable lust for domination, instead of seeking the highest of human objects, precipitates itself into the abyss, and mangling itself, is buried amidst the ruins of thrones and altars, the wreck of national happiness, and the universal execration of mankind”. (Hammer-Purgstall, 1835, pp. 36–7)

In common with many scholars whose notions of Pharaonic Egyptian culture had been formed before Champollion began his work of decipherment, von Hammer regarded hieroglyphs as means of concealing secret doctrines, rather than as an ordinary mode of written communication, and for him Egypt, “the mother of alchemy and treasure-hunting”, had become in modern times “the native soil of secret sciences and secret societies” (Hammer-Purgstall, 1835, p. 40). Elsewhere von Hammer had made use of an occult treatise on cryptography ascribed to Ibn Wahshiyya in order to support a ludicrously botched attempt to decipher Egyptian hieroglyphics (Hammer-Purgstall, 1806; c.f. Iversen, 1993, pp. 130–1). It seems most probable that the appearance in Ibn Washiyya’s treatise of a bogus hieroglyphic labelled “Bahumid” that first made von Hammer think that the alleged idol worship of the Templars had an Oriental origin. He claimed that “the Templars had some acquaintance with the hieroglyphics, probably acquired in Syria” (Hammer-Purgstall, 1806, p. xiii). In his treatise on the Assassins, von Hammer drew attention to the perceived similarities in the structure of the order of the Assassins and the order of the Knights Templar and to the fact that both orders had a red and white garb, and he briefly referred to the Templars’ supposed blasphemous initiatory abjuration of the Cross (Hammer-Purgstall, 1835, p. 57, c.f. p. 216). His study was explicitly a tract for the times and at one point he asks himself whether he is being fair to the Assassins but then insists that he is and asks the reader to consider the declared pure aims and sinister realities of such modern groups as the Jesuits, Illuminati, and Templars (in their bogus eighteenth-century revival) who actually practised regicide and rebellion. Von Hammer digressed to discuss the Nusayris and

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the Druzes whom he denounced as being apostates from Islam and practitioners of free love. Toward the end he returned to the question of modern secret societies and now insisted that their resemblance to the secretive Islamic sects of the Middle Ages could not be coincidental. The Crusades were probably the vehicle by which the Assassin contagion was brought to Europe, where it spread not just amongst the Templars but also the Jesuits, the Freemasons and the Vehme. The Assassin infection was ultimately responsible for the French Revolution. So, his book was a warning against the “pernicious influence of secret societies in weak governments, and of the dreadful prostitution of religion to the horrors of unbridled ambition” (Hammer-Purgstall, 1835, p. 218). In the early nineteenth century, the history of the medieval Near East was monopolised by monarchists and conservatives, and scholars like de Sacy and von Hammer unthinkingly championed the rights of caliphs, sultans, and emirs against the complaints of free-thinking philosophers, agitators, and disorderly mobs. Von Hammer’s history of the Assassins was written in a fever of dread and hatred. Yet, it is comparatively sane compared to some of his other writings. He was fluent in English and French, as well as Turkish, Persian, and Arabic. Presumably he wrote “Mysterium Baphometis Revelatum seu fratres militiae templi, qua Gnostici et quidem Ophiani apostasie idoluliae et impuritatis convicti per ipsa eorum monumenta” in Latin because of the alleged obscene rites that torturers working under the instructions of Philip IV of France had got the Templars to confess to. In this lengthy article, von Hammer argued that the Templars had been infected by the doctrines of Oriental sects, including the Mazdakites and the Assassins and that they had become Ophites, that is, worshippers of the demonic snake which tempted Eve in the Garden of Eden. Ophites were alleged to have worshiped the phallus and cursed the name of Jesus. He cited various curious bits of statuary and metalwork in support of his claim that the Templars worshiped a demon called Baphomet and that Baphomet was to be identified as the Holy Grail as featured in Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival and other works of medieval literature. Moreover, von Hammer believed that Baphomet was Arabic for calf and thus its origin lay in the golden calf that the Druzes were supposed to worship (Hammer-Purgstall, 1818b; c.f. Partner, 1982, pp. 139–45, 156–61). His ferocious indictment of the Templars must have been influenced by the legends that circulated in the last decades of the eighteenth

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century concerning Jacques de Molay and the curse of the Templars. De Molay, the Grand Master of the Templars, who went to the stake in 1314, was thought to have cursed the lineage of the Kings of France. In the eighteenth century, the German neo-Templars, a late eighteenth-century secret society akin to the Illuminati, were known to have created “grades of vengeance”. The death of the child Louis XVII in captivity in the Temple in Paris was widely seen as the working out of the Templar’s curse, and in 1796, Charles Louis Cadet de Gassicour’s Le Tombeau de Jacques de Molay had already advanced the proposition that the Templars were medieval anarchists whose lineage could be traced back to the Old Man of the Mountains (Partner, 1982, pp. 130–2; Roberts, 1972, pp. 114–5, 193–4, 195–6). Von Hammer’s proposition that, during the period of the Crusades, Isma‘ili heterodoxy had infected Europe with the spirit of revolution and unbelief was passed on in generations of crank literature. One finds it in the anonymous Secret Societies of the Middle Ages published in London in 1846. Much later, Bernard H. Springett’s Secret Sects of Syria and Lebanon: A Consideration of Their Origin, Creeds and Religious Ceremonies, and Their Connection with Influence upon Modern Freemasonry relied on de Sacy and von Hammer as well as Madame Blavatsky to construct the case that is advertised by the title of his book (Springett, 1922). And here we may remark that fantasies about the Eastern origins of Freemasonry were enhanced by Masonic lodges’ adoption of pseudo-Oriental and Egyptian rites and trappings, much of it under the influence of the charlatan Cagliostro (Baltrušaitis, 1985, pp. 57–75; Gervaso, 1972; Iversen, 1993, pp. 121–3). Sayed Amir Ali’s The Spirit of Islam (1922) presented the Isma‘ilis as nihilists and as the intellectual ancestors of the Templars, Illuminati, and revolutionaries of France: “In Islam the evils that we shall describe arose from the greed of earthly advancement and the revolutionary instincts of individuals and classes impatient of the moral law and order” (Ali, 1922, pp. 338–9). Nesta Webster’s virulent Secret Societies and Subversive Movements (1924) revived the full force of von Hammer’s polemic. “The East is the cradle of secret societies” is her opening sentence. In what follows, Webster drew upon de Sacy, von Hammer, and Dozy. According to Webster: “In Turkey, in Egypt, in Syria now, as a thousand years ago, the same secret societies which inspired the Templars, have never ceased to exist, and in this mingling of the East and West it is possible that the Grand Orient may draw

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reinforcement from those sources whence it drew its system and its name” (Webster, 1924, p. 284). Some decades later, Arkon Daraul’s Secret Societies presented once again the mythical nine-stage initiation of the Isma‘ilis. Somewhat wildly, it also claimed that the Thugee cult was a branch of the Assassins. It is evident that “Arkon Daraul” was actually Idries Shah writing under a pseudonym (Daraul, 1961). In The Sufis, Idris Shah, this time writing under his own name, claimed that the Carbonari were “deteriorated Sufis” and that Freemasonry had Sufi origins (Shah, 1964). The idea of Isma‘ilis and Druzes as members of super conspiracies dedicated to atheism, republicanism, free love and general mayhem remained surprisingly popular with academic Orientalists for quite a long time. In Histoire des musulmans d’Espagne, Reinhart Dozy wrote in his characteristic novelettish high style about the vast and sinister Isma’ili conspiracy that had threatened Umayyad rule in Spain and his particular hostility was reserved for medieval Spanish Muslim intellectuals who thought they were above the religious observances that they deemed to be fit only for the vulgar (Dozy, 1861). Then Michael J. De Goeje’s Mémoire sur les Carmathes de Bahraïn et les Fatimides presented Abdallah ibn Maymun as a kind of crazed super criminal motivated by hatred of the Arabs and Islam. Indeed de Goeje described his techniques of achieving power over his followers as downright “satanic” (De Goeje, 1886, p. 1). Edward Granville Browne’s A Literary History of Persia approvingly cited de Sacy, Dozy, and de Goeje on Abdullah ibn Maymun and on the dark aims and elaborate organisation of the Isma‘ilis. He also uncritically reproduced de Sacy’s account of the levels of initiation all the way up to the ninth and last level in which every vestige of dogmatic religion has been practically cast aside, and the initiate has become a philosopher pure and simple, free to adopt such system or admixture of systems as may be most to his taste (Browne, 1928, vol. 1, pp. 393–5, 413–5). One cannot help feeling that Abdallah ibn Maymun was welcomed by the Orientalists and introduced into their monographs as a kind of early version of either Moriarty or Fu Manchu in order to enliven what would otherwise have been remarkably dull accounts of obscure Eastern heterodoxies. The Orientalists were members of the establishment. As Eric Hobsbawm has observed, “the bulk of the amateurs of the East and writers of pseudoPersian poems, out of whose enthusiasm much of modern orientalism emerged, belonged to the anti-Jacobin tendency” (Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 265). But some literary figures, such as Shelley, Hazlitt, and Michelet

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took a more benign view of the French Revolution, subversive conspirators, and the possibility of social change in the future. There were even those who made a cult of the Assassins. The Club des Haschischins, as described by Theophile Gautier in Revue des Deux Mondes in 1846, appears to have been a joyous Romantic parody and inversion of the sinister sect that had been chronicled by the Orientalists. The membership that gathered in the Hotel Pimodan in Paris may have included Gautier himself, Baudelaire, Alexandre Dumas, and Gerard de Nerval (Jay, 2000, p. 105). Baudelaire’s ‘Paradis Artificiels drew upon de Sacy and von Hammer for the history of hashish (Jay, 2000, p. 109). Dumas’s novel, The Count of Monte Cristo, included an episode that conflated elements from the Arabian Nights with the story of the Old Man of the Mountains and his hashish-intoxicated paradise as transmitted by the Orientalists (Jay, 2000, pp. 112–3). Nerval was particularly enthused by the idea of a subversive Orient, and in his case this led him to think more kindly of al-Hakim and the Druzes. His Voyage en Orient is not a straightforward narrative of his travels to Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey (Nerval, 1851). For one thing, he plagiarised a great deal from earlier writers, especially Edward William Lane. For another, not only did the Voyage serve as a vehicle for a series of fantastic stories, but his purportedly true accounts of his attempts to secure a bride first in Egypt and then in Lebanon are almost certainly also fictitious. It is quite clear that he read widely in the literature of academic Orientalism, including that by Silvestre de Sacy, and he recycled their findings in his stories. Those stories also fed upon his ill-fated love for actress Jenny Colon and his recent nervous breakdown, as well as his consumption of opium. His Cairo was a drug-infested “artificial paradise”. Edward Said has criticised Nerval for his lack of documentary accuracy (Said, 1978, pp. 23, 43, 180). One is surprised to find such a sophisticated literary critic attempting to read a proto-Surrealist literary fantasy as if it were an old newspaper. Unlike his grand French predecessors in the Orient, Chateaubriand and Lamartine, Nerval travelled without a retinue, and he mingled with the local people. Although probably not a Freemason, Nerval was fascinated by Freemasonry and sympathetic to it. “The Story of the Queen of the Morning and Soliman Prince of the Genii”, embedded within Voyage en Orient, is in large part a disguised and weirdly mystical account of his emotional problems, but it is also a whimsical version of the origins of the

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story of the Freemasons – that is the career of Adoniram, builder of the Temple in Jerusalem, his murder and the institutional descent from him of the Freemasons as the “Sons of the Widow”. This story followed on from what Nerval learnt or, more likely, pretended to have learnt about the origins of Freemasonry in Lebanon. Here, Nerval claimed to have visited a Druze Sheikh in prison in Beirut in pursuance of his daughter’s hand. When the Sheikh objected that Nerval was not a Druze and that it was impossible to become one by conversion, Nerval claimed that he was a sort of Druze, by virtue of being a Freemason. Nerval tells the reader that Druze regard Masonic rituals and beliefs as being descended from the Druze ones. The Templars were among the secretive groups that borrowed Druze ideas. As symbols of recognition, the Druzes carried black stones which they called “Bohomets” – that is the Baphomets of the Knights Templar. The Druze allegedly believed that they had co-religionaries in Scotland, that is to say, members of the Ancient and Scottish rite of Freemasonry. Back in Europe, Nerval returned to the Eastern sources of Western esoteric knowledge in Les Illuminés, where, in his brief and sympathetic account of the occult charlatan Cagliostro, he reiterated his belief that the Templars were the vehicle for an Esoteric wisdom of Eastern origin and that their synthesis of Catholicism and that Eastern wisdom lay at the origins of Freemasonry. He invoked Barruel in support of his contention that the origins of the French Revolution had been mystical (Nerval, 1976, p. 375). But if Nerval had fed upon Orientalists texts, at least one Orientalist fed upon Nerval’s romances, for Louis Massignon was obsessed with them (as for that matter was Henri Corbin). From early on, Massignon was also fascinated both by the Isma‘ilis and the Freemasons. Among other things, he produced a survey of modern Freemasonry in Syria. However, unlike most earlier Orientalists, he was inclined to take a relatively benign view of the Isma‘ilis and the related secretive group, the Ikhwan al-Safa, which he wrote about as if they were the precursors of modern guilds. Massignon took the Isma‘ilis out of their mythical Paradise Garden and placed them in the cities. Specifically he argued that in the ninth and tenth centuries the Qarmatians were the first to organise guilds and that these guilds in turn influenced the development of urban communes in medieval Europe (Massignon, 1920a, 1952). Massignon read and used some of the same materials that de Goeje had, but he discarded a part as Sunni

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propaganda and put a much more amiable spin upon the rest. In his article “Karmatians” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, Massignon declared that their secret conspiracy which was “based on reason, tolerance and equality . . . seems to have reached the West and to have influenced the formation of European gilds and freemasonry” (Massignon, 1927, pp. 767–72). Just as important, as far as Massignon was concerned, was his conviction that Qarmatian ideas and vocabulary had had a crucial influence on Islam’s greatest saint, al-Hallaj. Even so, Massignon regarded all forms of Shi‘ism as deviations from Sunnism and expressions of Islam’s decline (Rocalve, 1993, p. 80). And, in another article on the Legend of the Three Impostors, he traced the legend back to Abu Tahir, tenth-century Bahraini Qarmathian, who was alleged to have remarked that “the world has been taken in by three impostors: a shepherd, a doctor and a camel driver and the last of the three was the worst of the lot” (Massignon, 1920b). Traces of Massignon’s fascination with the conspiratorial nature of the Qarmathians can be found in the early writings of his research student, Bernard Lewis. In an article on medieval Islamic guilds, Lewis wrote of “the days when the guilds formed a part of the Masonic system of the Qarmatis” (Lewis, 1937, p. 37, c.f. pp. 23–6). The nineteenth-century European grand panic about the subversive menace of secret societies lingered on. As late as 1870, in his novel Lothair, Disraeli wrote as follows: “It is the Church against secret societies. They are the only two strong things in Europe, and will survive kings, emperors or parliaments” (Roberts, 1972, p. 18). However, in the course of the nineteenth century such fears waned, particularly after the suppression of the revolutions of 1848. Moreover, the alleged menace posed by Illuminati or Neo-Templars was first supplemented, and then to large extent replaced, by the supposed dangers of a Jewish conspiracy, and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1905) came at last to replace Barruel’s Memoires as the favourite text of the paranoid. Though fantasies of a Muslim conspiracy did linger on and indeed were given renewed vitality by the Indian mutiny of 1857, those fantasies were usually about a contemporary Sunni Muslim conspiracy, as, for example, in such novels as John Buchan’s Greenmantle and Talbot Mundy’s King of the Khyber Rifles (both published in 1916). However, to return to the main subject of this essay, scholars of the generation of de Sacy and von Hammer tended to have a positivist and philological formation. They were not historians by training, and they assembled their historical narratives by stringing

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together in a scissors-and-paste-fashion “facts” uncritically picked out from early sources. Most of those sources regarding the Isma‘ilis and Druze happened to be Sunni ones written centuries after the conspiracies they purported to describe. Since the early nineteenth-century, Orientalists were unschooled in the methods and insights of social and economic history; they tended to interpret a large and violent historical process such as the French Revolution in terms of the deeds of wicked master criminals and men bound to regicidal and atheistic conspiracy by oath and initiation. Greed and ambition were viewed as the motors of revolutionary change. When those same Orientalists came to write about social and intellectual upheaval in the medieval Near East, they naturally relied on the same type of interpretation, and they presented their findings with a passion and a cadenced style that are no longer fashionable in academic circles.

REFERENCES Ali, S.A. (1922): The Life and Teachings of Muhammad or Spirit of Islam. London: W.H. Allen. Baltrušaitis, J. (1985): La Quête d’Isis: Essai sur la légende d’un mythe. Paris: Flammarion. Barruel, A. de (1797–1798): Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du Jacobinisme, 5 vols. 1797–1798, London: Le Boussonier. Beckingham, C.F. (1979): “A History of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1823–73”, in S. Simmonds; S. Digby (eds) The Royal Asiatic Society: Its History and Treasures. Leiden: Brill. Bertier de Sauvigny, G. de (1962): Metternich and His Times. London: Darnton, Longman and Todd. Browne, E.G. (1928): A Literary History of Persia, 4 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohn, N. (1967): Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. Daftary, F. (1994): The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Isma‘ilis. London: I.B. Tauris. Daraul, A. (1961): Secret Societies. London: Frederick Muller. Dehérain, H. (1838): Silvestre de Sacy, 1758–1838: Ses contemporains et ses disciples, vol. 27, Paris: Bibliothèque archéologique et historique. Dozy, R.P. (1861): Histoire des musulmans d’Espagne, 4 vols., Leiden: Brill; English translation by F.G. Stokes (1913) Spanish Islam, London: Chatto and Windus. Fück, J. (1955): Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20 Jahrhunderts, Leipzig: Harrasowitz.

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Gervaso, R. (1972): Il grande mago: vita, morte e miracoli del conte di Cagliostro, Milan: Rizzoli. Goeje, M.J. de (1886): Mémoire sur les Carmathes de Bahraïn et les Fatimides, Leiden: Brill. Hammer-Purgstall, J. von (1806): Ancient Alphabets and Hieroglyphic Characters Explained with an Account of the Egyptian Priests, their Classes, Initiations and Sacrifices in the Arabic Language (A translation of Ibn Wahshiyya, Kitab Shawq al-Mustaham fi ma‘arifat rumuz al-aqlam), London: G. and W. Nicoll. Hammer-Purgstall, J. von (1818a): Die Geschichte der Assassinen, Stuttgart. Hammer-Purgstall, J. von (1818b): “Mysterium Baphometis Revelatum seu fratres militiae templi, qua Gnostici et quidem Ophiani apostasie idoluliae et impuritatis convicti per ipsa eorum monumenta”, Fundgruben des Orients, vol. 6, pp. 1–120, 445–499. Hammer-Purgstall, J. von (1835): The History of the Assassins, tr. O.C. Wood, London. Hobsbawm, E. (1962): The Age of Revolution. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Jay, M. (2000): Emperors of Dreams: Drugs in the Nineteenth Century. Sawtry, Cambs: Dedalus. Kramer, M. (1999): “Introduction” in M. Kramer (ed) The Jewish Discovery of Islam. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Ivanow, W. (1955): Studies in Early Persian Ismailism. Bombay: The Ismaili Society. Iversen, E. (1993): The Myth of Egypt and Its Hieroglyphs in European Tradition, 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lewis, B. (1937): “The Islamic Guilds”, Economic History Review, 1st series, vol. 8, pp. 20–37. Mangold, S. (2004): Eine “weltbürgerliche Wissenschaft” – Die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Massignon, L. (1920a): “Le Corps de Métier et la Cité Islamique”, Revue Internationale de Sociologie, vol. 29, pp. 473–489. Massignon, L. (1920b): “La légende ‘de tribus impostoribus’ et ses origines islamique”, Revue d’Histoire des Relgions, vol. 82, pp. 74–78. Massignon, L. (1927): “Karmatians”, Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leiden: Brill, vol. 2, pp. 767–772. Massignon, L. (1952): “La ‘Futuwwa’ ou ‘Pacte d’Honneur Artisanal’ entre Travailleurs Musulmans au Moyen Age”, La Nouvelle Clio, vol. 4, pp. 171–198. Nerval, G. de (1976): Les Illuminés. Paris: Gallimard. 1st ed. (1850), Paris: n.i. Nerval G. de (1851): Voyage en Orient. Paris: n.i. Nouveau (1829): “Tableau du Conseil d’Administration”, Journal Asiatique, ou Recueil de Mémoires, no. 17 bis May, pp. 59–60. Partner, P. (1982): The Murdered Magicians: The Templars and Their Myth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reichl, S. (1973): Hammer-Purgstall: Auf den romantischen Pfaden eines österreichischen Orientforschers, Graz: Leykam Verlag.

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Renan, E. (1883): Souvenirs d’enfance et de jeunesse, 8th ed. Paris: Calmann Lévy. 1st ed., 1881. Roberts, J.M. (1972): The Mythology of the Secret Societies. London: Secker and Warburg. Rocalve, P. (1993): Louis Massignon et l’Islam. Damascus: Institut français de Damas. Said, E. (1978): Orientalism. New York: Vintage. Shah, I. (1964): The Sufis. New York: Doubleday. Silvestre de Sacy, A.I. (1809): “Mémoire sur la dynastie des Assassins et sur l’origine de leur Nom”, Annales des Voyages, vol. 8, pp. 325–343. Silvestre de Sacy, A.I. (1818): “Mémoire sur la dynastie des Assassins et sur l’étymologie de leur Nom”, Mémoires de l’Institut Royal de France, vol. 4, pp. 1–84. Silvestre de Sacy, A.I. (1824): “Notice des manuscripts des livres sacrés qui se trouve dans diverses bibliothèques de l’Europe”, Jounal Asiatique, 1e série, vol. 4, pp. 1–18. Silvestre de Sacy, A.I. (1838): Exposé de la religion des Druzes, Paris: n.i. Springett, B.H. (1922): Secret Sects of Syria and Lebanon: A Consideration of Their Origin, Creeds and Religious Ceremonies, and Their Connection with Influence upon Modern Freemasonry. London: Allen and Unwin. Vernoit, S. (2000): “Islamic Art and Architecture: An Overview of Scholarship and Collecting, c.1850–c.1950”, in S. Vernoit (ed) Discovering Islamic Art: Scholars, Collectors and Collections. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 1–61. Von Hammer, J. Tubingen: n.i.; English translation by O.C. Wood (1835): The History of the Assassins. London: Smith and Elder, Cornhill. Webster, N. (1924): Secret Societies and Subversive Movements. London: Boswell.

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5 A CULTURAL SENSE OF CONSPIRACIES? THE CONCEPT OF RUMOR AS PROPAEDEUTICS TO CONSPIRACISM

Karin Hörner Up until now, I have belonged to the cock-up persuasion, but it doesn’t mean I can’t see the appeal of a good CT. [. . .] there is that all-purpose, highly democratic and broadly rigorous research tool, Google, which discloses 2.52 million results for “conspiracy theory”, and for “cock-up-theory”, 761. So, clearly time for a re-think. Charles Nevin: “I’m beginning to see conspiracies everywhere” (The Independent, 20 March 2006) Controversial topics cause strange side effects sometimes. Conspiracies and so-called conspiracy theories are such a topic that seems to befuddle many a mind. Thus, you find a scorching review of a pertinent book in an academic journal followed by another rather unkind review of the same book in the same journal a year later. Obvious oversights can indicate the blind spot determined by a specific point of view. If you look somewhat closer at the double review, this supposition of blocked reasoning is confirmed. The most conspicuous feature of this strange duplication is that both reviewers share the basic supposition of the book, strictly speaking they share a proposition masked as a known fact: “The Middle East” is a field rich in conspiracy theories. What the reviewers reject is the author’s failure to substantiate this proposition in the proper scholarly way. The scholar’s method is defective, and his social attributions are offending. This kind of reasoning is very peculiar and deserves to be quoted. The first review resents the flippant style and analytical shortcomings: Although not unique, the Middle East has provided some of the more fertile case studies for scholars interested in understanding conspiracy theories and their implication. [. . .]./[. . .]. Even if one accepts Pipes’

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claim that Muslim Middle Eastern conspiracism is ubiquitous and intense, [. . .] the book is more a collection of anecdotes than a serious scholarly product.1

The second reviewer is even more bothered by an allegedly snotty attitude and misses persuasive social and regional classifications: We all know that the people of the Middle East, from all walks of life and all ideological orientations, have relied on conspiracy theories to understand their politics and history [. . .]./[. . .] What is objectionable about this work is its reliance on a catalogue of public utterances of undoubtedly paranoid leaders in the Middle East [. . .]. Even more troublesome is the denigrating manner in which this is done. Conspiracy theories are not peculiar to the Muslim crowd. They are common throughout the Third World, as well as among all human groups who have been relatively powerless against an aggressive adversary.2

Usually, academic research has the purpose to find out things we do not already know. On the contrary, scholars strive toward original and critical studies; they wish to till their own field. My primary aim is a critique of the concepts “conspiracy theory” and “conspiracism”, respectively, as represented in the pertinent works of two scholars, Bassam Tibi and Daniel Pipes. I can see no explanatory or other scientific advantage for the concept of an ingrained conspiracism of all or a majority of Arabs or Muslims as much as I doubt that you have to be an American nowadays to be a proper imperialist. The first reason why I chose their approaches is that they marked the reopening of a field of research that had not been tilled for decades. Most scholars cite Richard Hofstadter’s article on the “paranoid style” in US politics, published two years after Kennedy’s assassination, a focal point of conspiracy theories up till now. The disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the events of the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 marked a new general set-up of world politics after the cold war. At the same time, the extension and success of the internet proved to incite a revolution in public communication. Accordingly, old insecurities re-emerged with their concomitant remedies alongside new insecurities that furthered new explanations and their circulation by new means. The second reason for my choice restricts the field the other way round: Tibi and Pipes defined their framework long before al-Qaida entered

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the political arena which changed the world of media and information policies in a way that in terms of cultural limits may prove to be no less important to the West than the fall of the USSR. These radical changes are yet perceived to be so dramatic that they often obfuscate basic assessments of information and explanation. To step back in time, therefore, renders possible a clearer sight. What I intend is a kind of sampling, a beforehand filter for theories on conspiracy theories that might prove useful. So this is neither about principal corrections of these notions nor an alternative concept to take their place. I propose a concept that belongs already to the semantic field of conspiracies but has been conceptualized as an analytical tool in a different academic context: “rumor”. The main reason for my proposal is that research on conspiracism and its sister frameworks share with their objects an inclination to overextend their scope. Or, to change the field of metaphors, they can fall under the influence of this virus that makes them look compulsively for secret webs of hidden actors. Conspiracy theories have considerable intellectual charm. This is how they earned the appreciative appellation “theory” and why scholars are protesting unfailingly that there are real conspiracies and that conspiracy theories are not “real” theories.3 These are sign of at least partial blockades in reasoning. Therefore, I would recommend looking out for related concepts that share principal features with conspiracism but that are less beguiling. Most research on conspiracy theories makes use of two kinds of written sources: News reports by professional journalists, on the one hand, editorials and publications on the internet that are more or less clearly marked as opinionated on the other hand. Examples of both genres will be examined critically. The following analyses of a typical example of a report shows that oral communication, not written documents, are the medium of conspiracy theories in certain contexts. A typical internet source will be analyzed afterward in the context of the Orientalism paradigm. Paul Taylor reported for Reuters in April 2003, under the heading “Baghdad’s Easy Fall Fuels Arab Conspiracy Theories”, the following news: ‘Arabs and Muslims do not believe what has happened and the coming days will reveal these secrets,’ Amman shopkeeper Jalal Aboud said. ‘I don’t think Saddam was killed as some believe. He’s hiding in a place known only too well to the Americans.’4

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Is the shopkeeper’s communication good evidence for the headlined “Arab conspiracy theories?” Journalists are no scholars, and it is a media convention to cite the man from the street as a representative of “the people”, and scholars should take care to use such “news” as evidence. However, journalists themselves can be influential opinion leaders for certain groups, especially certain popular authors of leading articles who are important spokespersons of certain social classes in specific countries. MEMRI’s reports include documentation of conspiracy theories published by newspapers in Palestine. A few months after 9/11, MEMRI cites from an article by a Palestinian journalist published in the Palestinian Al-Ayyam. He wrote that the Orientalists faked evidence pointing at Arab Muslim perpetrators to blacken the image of Arabs and Muslims.5 This is a good occasion to have a look at the second kind of source for conspiracy theories: the internet. Firstly, in case the internet is the medium that by its very nature as a web best suited for conspiracy theories and their distribution6 and, secondly, in case that Middle Easterners suspect Western conspiracies everywhere, Western Orientalists should be perfect candidates for conspiracy theories with Orientalists as agents not only in some obscure Palestinian publication but also in numerous variations on the World Wide Web. ARE ORIENTALISTS CONSPIRING AGAINST THE ORIENT? However, Orientalism is not a popular concept outside academia, and most Orientalists are known only to specialists. For this reason, Orientalism is no popular subject matter for conspiracy thinking either. Islamist thinkers and organizations sometimes pick out Orientalist scholars as protagonists of a hostile West; they but rarely call them “Orientalists” or charge them for their “Orientalism”. The invectives they prefer are “imperialists”, “capitalists”, “crusaders”, “Zionists” or “missionaries”. One of the rare examples of Orientalism meant as a sub-project of the great Western conspiracy is to be found on the internet. It is from a publication of the notorious Hizb ut-Tahrir, and it shows that Orientalism is not a concept the anonymous author uses confidently. The frame he prefers obviously is crusader-missionary-imperialism: Behind these missionary movements came the Orientalist movements who had the same target and the very same objective.

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(. . .) a crusade was waged against Islam for the second time; this time it was a cultural war which poisoned the mind (. . .) which was far more dangerous than the crusader wars. The missionaries carried out the spreading of their poisonous filth in the name of science and humanity. The[y] used to do it in the name of Orientalism.7

All in all, Orientalists seem to be no promising candidates for the role of conspiratorial agents of Western political domination. Orientalism itself can be dismissed as a rival of conspiracists’ favorite ideologies, Zionism and Imperialism. Conspiracists do not use specific agents, specific topics and topoi arbitrarily. They choose subjects for reasons that are to be found in the social context in which they develop and address their conspiracy theories. If real or imagined conspiracies constituted an essential part of contemporary political culture in the Middle East and if it were in fact a typical trait of Arab or Muslim political thinking or mentality to suspect conspiracies, then you must expect or even respect their cultural sense of conspiracies and act accordingly. But perhaps people in general are more inclined to suspect conspiracies nowadays than they were 20 years ago. In this case, conspiracy thinking loses its distinctive quality for Arabs and/ or the Muslim world. Questions like this represent two levels of research on conspiracies in the context of Middle Eastern studies. There is the level of subject matter where you ask whether you are dealing with a pervasive phenomenon. You explore the possibility that all, many or some people in the Middle East prefer or fall for conspiracy theories as explanations of what happens in the world, even if there are other possible explanations. Statistics, interview techniques, content analyses, and the elaborate and time-consuming approaches would be appropriate on this level. However, is a “Middle Eastern disposition to believe in conspiracy theories” a conceptual framework promising enough to be worth the trouble? This question leads to the second level. On the level of methodology, you can ask whether “conspiracism”, a term coined by Daniel Pipes, “conspiracy theory” or “conspiracy thinking” is a promising heuristic concept to analyze a particular kind of phenomena you already marked as conspicuous, if not pervasive. To categorize certain political statements as products of “conspiracy thinking” may have political consequences which are dramatically different from an

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assessment of the same statements as a product of individual lunacy. This difference has to do with the political uses of scientific research which is part of the domain of “Orientalism” as a theory. This is outside the scope of this article.

TWO THEORIES OF CONSPIRACISM My hypothesis is that there are many instances recorded as evidence of the so-called conspiracy thinking which should be classified as rumors because they are not necessarily designed as building blocks for a conspiracy theory. Research on conspiracies mentions rumors as a material for conspiracies8 or a field with blurred limits to conspiracies.9 As a methodic guideline for the study of rumors, I chose a study by the French scholar Jean-Noël Kapferer which was first published in 1987 and translated into English and German during the 1990s. Kapferer nowadays holds a chair of marketing in Paris. He analyzed press scandals and established a phone answering service “Allô, Rumeur!” People all over France were encouraged to report rumors. This way Kapferer got additional hard data for a sociological research on how rumors work. Rumors have already been part of the research done on conspiracies in the Middle East but in an unsystematic way. I selected the work of two scholars for the reason that they paced off the field more than a decade ago: Bassam Tibi and the afore-mentioned Daniel Pipes. There is another reason why I chose the work of these two scholars. Both of them fit closely the profile of a typical Saidian “Orientalist”. They both offer their professional expertise for political advice to media and their respective governments. They share quite a few findings in their search for the historical roots of Arab or Muslim conspiracism: e.g. its roots in nineteenth-century European ideologies.

BASSAM TIBI: MODERNISATION, DIALOG, AND TRUTH AGAINST CONSPIRACISM Bassam Tibi, a scholar of Syrian origin, has held the chair of political science in the University of Göttingen since 1973. He is a wellestablished scholar who can boast an impressive list of publications

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and many international honors. During the Gulf War, he was regularly consulted as an expert on the Middle East in the national radio station Deutschlandfunk. Kapferer remarks in an addenda to his book that the Gulf War coverage in the media in France amounted to “rumours as live program”.10 The same applies to Germany where full-time coverage of the war refashioned and boosted the so-called breakfast television, i.e. early morning news programs that were in dire need of interesting information. Therefore, academic advice by scholars of Middle Eastern studies formerly largely ignored became much sought after. Tibi’s political position is best illustrated following the conservative Carl Schmitt’s definition of policy as enmity. Tibi likes to itemize his enemies: multiculturalists, leftists, feminists, totalitarianists, and last but not least scholars of Arabic and Islamic studies. All these people either make the principal mistake of glossing over the failings of Islam, Muslims or Middle Easterners, or they do underestimate his work that has pioneer quality from his point of view – a view that is more often correct than not. After the Gulf war, Bassam Tibi found that contemporary Arab culture encourages a perception of political and historical processes as shaped by conspiracies. Machinations of the West and scheming fellow Arabs characterize a position Tibi explains in his book on “Die Verschwörung – al-Mu’a-mara [in Arabic script]: Das Trauma arabischer Politik” [Conspiracy: Trauma of Arab Policy] (1993). Arab societies are portrayed as lacking individualization and enlightenment. Two years after 9/11, Tibi stressed in an article for the weekly magazine Die Zeit the Islamist tradition of alleged Jewish conspiracies against Islam and Arabs in general. 11 Like many of his colleagues in political science, Tibi realigned his line of focus from Arab to Muslim topics in the aftermath of 9/11, preferring to analyze radical Islam and Muslim terrorism to the merely verbal and notional violence of Arab conspiracy thinking. Tibi mentions rumors in general in several places. He rarely gives particular historical events and related interpretations contrasting their scholarly accepted and distorted explanation, respectively, in detail. However, he features general outlines of the standard Western version of the history of the Middle East. The following passage is characteristic for a particular instance:

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The veracity of reports cannot be checked in countries with a despotic government. [. . .] the report about Shiite rebellions in South Iraq that newly flared up [. . .] was neither ‘rumour’ nor ‘conspiracy’, but real.12

Tibi’s general political advice concerning Middle Eastern conspiracism is modernization. He recommends to European politicians in face of conspiracy thinking a remedy that reflects the liberal consensus more than 10 years ago: Europeans should develop a sense of understanding of the conspiracy thinking without forsaking their own politico-cultural identity. They have to overcome the Arab’s conspiracy anxieties in a dialogue and by joint global action of Europeans, Arabs, and other Muslims that should testify to the non-existence of conspiracies.13

Remedies are not at the center of my argument, but I would like to mention two obvious stress cracks in this bridge of understanding in order to emphasize the relatively small scale of social groups in contrast to the daunting quasi-objective Weltgeist-level of tradition vs. modernity. Firstly, there would be no need of understanding without European anxieties rooted in their “politico-cultural identity”. Secondly, it is modernization itself that produces the anxieties that are expressed, appeased, and at the same time reproduced by conspiracy theories. Modernization as an antidote against “the non-existence of conspiracies” at first glance may be likened to setting a thief to catch a thief. Tibi suggested another concept for a similar problem in the context of Islamism, “half-way modernity”.14 Closer inspection shows that the uses of this displacement are also limited. Anxieties are no privilege of the last two centuries. Research on conspiracy theories includes articles on early modern witchhunts, political intrigues, “popery”, and the like. 15 Conspiracy is discussed by social psychology as a historical phenomenon to be found not only in the Middle Ages but also, for example, in the myth of cannibalism.16 Anxieties aside, which half of modernity could it be that Middle Easterners, Arabs, or Muslims miss by their failure to recognize reality for what it really is? Conspiracy theories and conspiracism are about the “hidden hand” of a secret actor causing certain phenomena. Is the correct application of the category “causality” such a missing part of full-fledged modernity?

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Niklas Luhmann inspected the notion of causality in terms of modernity. While Tibi’s concept can be visualized as a pie chart of whole and half modernity, Luhmann distinguishes between center and periphery of modernity. Luhmann’s model suggests smooth transitions between the two parties at first glance. He argues that on the periphery people think and communicate in more personalized networks than at the center They acquire and reproduce social competence “by numerous social contacts, a lot of oral communications” that produce a certain “pattern for the discovery of forms of causality”. These forms are “not self explanatory and not given by nature and not to be changed as quickly as an adjustment to the structures of modern society would call for.”17 Luhmann finds that research on the periphery of modern societies, especially on different concepts of the attribution of causality and freedom are “autological theories” that exclude a naive concept of a single objective reality, “simple two-value logic of truth”, both of which are part of an outdated European tradition of “rationality-centredness”. 18 If you accept Luhmann’s notion of the social construction of causality, conspiracism is not a failure. Modernity, half of fully fledged, as a measure of reality is tautological. However, a second glance reveals that the dichotomy of modernity and tradition he criticizes as “tautological” is replaced by two “autological” positions. Modernity of whatever grade or purity seems to be a closed circle that offers no alternative to assimilation.

PIPES: LESSONS IN REALITY AGAINST CONSPIRACISM Tibi’s American colleague Daniel Pipes is amongst scholars of Middle Eastern studies notorious for founding Campus Watch to name just one instance of his political activities. Pipes wrote his thesis in history about Muslim slave soldiers in 1978 at Harvard University. He taught at several universities and wrote several books on academic topics. He is also well known as a political columnist and much sought after as an interview partner, also by Arab media like the al-Jazeera. Pipes has worked as a political adviser, adept at different functions, e.g. as director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute from 1986 to 1993; he is founding director of the Middle East Forum (Philadelphia) and publisher of Middle East Quarterly. Pipes’ political work is thus much more

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conspicuous than Tibi’s. However, Pipes has much in common with Tibi’s general political and academic stance: Both of them condemn intellectuals of the political left, particularly feminists and multiculturalists. Both rediscovered the uses of the concept of totalitarianism years before it became a fashionable topic in the media. Both deplore their marginal status in the academic circles of Middle Eastern Studies and Islamic Studies, respectively. Whenever influential academic colleagues judge Tibi’s and Pipes’ political assessments in public as cases of cliché Orientalist alarmism, they in turn assert their claim for valiant political realism vis-à-vis a leftist majority’s intellectual garment dyeing and reject the alleged intellectuals’ betrayal of their own Western values. Tibi and Pipes both claim that the Middle Eastern nations either have to follow in the steps of Europe’s development to modernity or bear the consequences. Pipes corroborates Tibi’s hypothesis that Arabs are more inclined than other people to consider their political conflicts in terms of victimization and hostile plots. However, Pipes developed the framework of his research a bit earlier than Tibi. In 1992, he wrote in Orbis, a journal published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, mentioned above: While the conspiracy mentality exists in all regions of the world, it is outstandingly common in the Middle East. Few there resist its impact; leading politicians, religious figures, intellectuals, and journalists espouse wild fears of world domination by enemies. These ideas have a home at the heart of the political spectrum and therefore influence the tenor of Middle East political life. Nothing is so false that someone will not believe it; and transparent silliness does not reduce the importance of conspiracy theories.19

In his book, “The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy” (1998)20 Pipes argues for a special Oriental mentality that breeds real and imagined conspiracies and defines: “A conspiracy theory is the nonexistent version of a conspiracy.”21 The stylishly positioned attribute “nonexistent” points to the colloquial concept of “theory” in contrast to reality. He introduces the new term “conspiracism”, a neologism that not incidentally ends on “racism”. The “conspiracist” Arab and Muslim state of mind is – according to Pipes – not a genuine trait, much less

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an anthropological feature of mankind. It is an ideology imported from the West like communism, nationalism, and other “-isms”. True to the Orientalist’s prejudice, the Orient is a bit late and not able to do a good copy. Like Tibi, Pipes underlines that conspiracism in the Middle East is lagging behind for about a century after the European original, and the Easterners got it all wrong because they did not import the appropriate Western context. Since Pipes sees himself as a scholar-cum-political adviser, he on the one hand analyzes historical and present events, and on the other hand, he foretells future developments, thus presenting guidelines for diplomats and politicians confronted with Middle Easterners conspiracy theories. The political mentality Pipes ascribes to Easterners is not very favorable. The quotation above includes the mentioning of falsity and silliness. Pipes calls instances of conspiracism consistently pathological, illogical, preposterous, risible, ignorant, outdated, and – last but not least – dangerous. Consequently, conspiracism is merely a lunatic “theory” but still something that deserves serious research. Middle Easterner are extremely gullible and, therefore, are to be compared only with fringe groups in the West, thus reflecting on a global scale the centrality of the West and the marginalized Middle East. The conspiracist collects obsessively “factoids” as evidence for his theory. Pipes gives a bundle of detailed advice on how to deal with conspiracists. I would like to mention one that is comparable to Tibi’s. Under the heading “Deny”, Western politicians are addressed like adults who should deal patiently with recalcitrant children: Without being rude, they [Europeans and Americans, KH] can signal their disdain of Middle Eastern fancies and rationales. [. . .] This sort of denial may not be heeded, but it needs to be made, repeated, and amplified.22

Rumors are to be found in the explorative phase of research. The history of Pipe’s book and its sequel “Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From” (1997)23 echoes the stages of an intellectual infatuation that reminds me of Umberto Eco’s novel “Foucault’s Pendulum”. Or perhaps, if you would prefer to avoid the literary, you could analyze it as a stereotypical story about acquiring a bad habit that turned into an addiction and in the end even into an obsession.

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THE TEMPTATION OF FANCY STORIES Conspiracies as curious stories are Pipes’ raw data and their attraction is described with a mixture of nostalgia and regret typical for a reformed sinner. Some intellectuals, Pipes says, love to flirt with conspiracies as fashionable distractions24 for their humor and “happy insanity”.25 Rebecca Moore calls conspiracy theories “wild stories”, and finds at least on the internet “frequently a sense of humour and fun in most of the conspiracy sites”.26 I doubt that the attribution of “humour” has any critical power in this context and should like “fashion”, “happy insanity”, and “distraction” be interpreted in contrast to the serious work of scientific research.27 Wild and curious stories are the domain of novels and movies on the market. Conspiracy plots of secret societies were the mark of one of the most successful genres of eighteenth-century novels. There has been a hausse for mysteries in all kinds of media for many years, from JFK by Oliver Stone and The X-Files to the bestsellers by Dan Brown and publications like Robert Anton Wilson’s “Everything Is Under Control: Conspiracies, Cults, and Cover-Ups” (1998).28 Obviously, Pipes himself has been attracted in the same way.29 He explains in his preface that his book “began as a lighthearted collection of anecdotes” (p. IX).30 He gives no details in this context. However, if you take a look at his articles on conspiracy you get an idea of what he means. For example, on the topic of Lady Di’s death, Pipes and his co-author Hill Kasha wrote an article in 1997. They start with a clear distinction of the Western and Arab press, beginning with the Western press representing a source critical approach: Western journalists mused on the purported drunkenness of the driver and how the paparazzi distracted him, their Arabic-speaking counterparts overwhelmingly agreed that ‘There is no doubt about the presence of a conspiracy behind the death of Diana.’

The use of litotes (“no mere curiosity”) transports a reasoning by innuendo. It is amusing what these people say. Amusement is no good reason for serious people to take an interest in these childish stories. However, if these stories are signs of a “mentality” it is a legitimate business. The metaphors of “plumb line”, and deep exploration suggest that the mentality is of a dark underground nature.

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The conspiracy theories (. . .) are no mere curiosity but a plumb line into the mentality of a people. This makes them worth exploring in some depth.

Curiosity is declared to be no good reason for serious research, but the word “intriguing” suggests that it is still a major temptation. (…) “Hypothesis” is a term associated with rational operations. It stresses that the difference of Western reader-journalist and Arab press is reflected in different rational approaches: on the one hand genuine “solid fact” (Western criticism) and on the other hand reputed “whimsical” fact (Arab conspiracism). What makes the Arab press so especially intriguing is the manner in which it builds on its own hypothesis, reporting the merest whimsy as solid fact.

Now at least Pipes shows his hand and lists the intriguing “factoids”. They are typical anonymous rumors blown up into extravagant headlines that are characteristic of the yellow press all over the world: Some journalists assumed that Diana had already converted to Islam: ‘Recite the Fatiha [the opening chapter of the Qur’an] for the soul of Diana’ read one headline, implying that she was a Muslim at the time of her death. Or another: ‘Murder was the easiest solution for the British government to deal with a Muslim princess.’ One account asserted that Diana had agreed to wear the hijab, Islamic modesty clothing, on her head. Others stated as fact that Diana was pregnant by Dodi and the two were soon to announce their plans to marry in November.31

RUMOR, FACTUAL INFORMATION, AND VALUE JUDGMENT The main reason for classifying the messages on Diana rumors is that there is no reason why they should be more than rumors. A rumor can be defined as the expression of beliefs in an unofficial public sphere which are – like opinions – not fully determined by proven facts and – unlike opinions – not rooted in some fancy of the speaker but based on

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and implied by a system of convictions shared by the speaker’s community. I propose the use of Ockham’s razor: Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily. Why assume lasting effects of a nineteenthcentury European pattern of thinking on the thoughts of a shopkeeper in Amman in April 2003 if the explanation as an instance of rumor will do? The main characteristics of conspiracism are its defensiveness and social exclusiveness. Rumor is also a strictly group-oriented and exclusive concept, but not necessarily defensive. Rumors share with conspiracism an aesthetic predilection for “a good yarn” and often present variations of historic stock motifs.32 However, in contrast to conspiracism, rumors have nevertheless the popular reputation to be short-lived and to be easily “refuted by science”. One of the reasons why rumors are thought to be ephemeral might be that the favorite way of expressing is traditionally an oral person-to-person communication. The bulk of Kapferer’s data are from the local and national press. Today, SMS and blogs should be included. Also in contrast to conspiracy theories, rumors are generally seen as a generic form of human communication, while conspiracy theories are associated with modernity by Pipes and Tibi alike. There are good reasons for such a historical contextualization; still there are drawbacks to this view which should not be ignored. In addition, it is difficult to find ways of falsifying an imputation of conspirational thinking on a macro-level. However, if you cannot criticize an attribution of conspiracy thinking what you are dealing with is not research, but faith or ideology. Rumor is defined by Kapferer as a communicative media used by groups to convey certain evaluations. He lists several dead ends of research on rumors: Rumors are not pathological or irrational33 – rumors will not be spread without good reason; people who circulate a rumor jeopardize their reputation. Tibi and Pipes as well as many colleagues are concerned about the difference between real and imagined conspiracies. This is besides the point if you follow the research on rumors. Kapferer shows that rumors are not false or fictitious – therefore there is no use in presenting evidence against a rumor. This confirms findings on prejudices and identity. Recent research on conspiracies stresses also that it is not wise to explore the veracity of conspiracy theories.34 However, there is more to this advice than a reservation or a suspension of judgment, more than a tactical disguise in the presence of deluded informers. It means that the rumors and

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the so-called theories are not about facts but about values and have to be analyzed in the context of specific groups and their values and interests. This is an insight that is very hard to convey – “truth” itself is an overwhelmingly strong value in the social discourse of science in the public. Therefore I will not expound it in this paper.35 Real conspiracies should be addressed not by Middle Eastern Studies but by secret services and other security institutions that have to defend the present government and powerful people in general. At least one of the rumors Kapferer analyzes in extenso is still en vogue all over Europe: The list of food additives that are reputedly carcinogenic, a list of E-Numbers that is still distributed by health shops and consumer counseling institutions. French people are perhaps more concerned about the quality of their food than Germans are. It will be no surprise to you to hear that typical French rumors are about McDonald’s Hamburgers being made of earthworms – while in Germany it is dog food in Chinese restaurants. Rumors thus often, but not always, reflect apprehensions of particular groups. These anxieties might concern a large group, for instance, parents of teenage daughters who care about their safety. This is the background of rumors about the kidnapping of girls from fashionable shops, discos, and similar places, the names of which and the type of perpetrators will conform to the local situation. To give an example for a rumor of a smaller social range – wearers of contact lenses are interested in the rumor that lenses can be “welded” to the eye in case of explosions. Other rumors reflect specific political conditions: Kapferer mentions rumors about Pompidou’s illness and the purported political consequences. There is an important area that has been neglected up till now – at least to my knowledge. Kapferer does not mention hopeful rumors that stem not from anxiety but from the opposite, wishful thinking. Anxieties as well as wishes can be translated into normative statements. For instance, the case of Lady Di’s conversion is a wishful rumor: Muslims who spread it confirmed thereby that they find it proper for Christian consorts of Muslim men to become Muslims themselves and make that public by wearing the hijab that in turn is a sign for their valuing female modesty. If you wish to understand the specific social evaluation of the Zionist world conspiracism, you first have to look for the group the ideology is addressed to. Conspiracism amongst German Neonazis is to be

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distinguished from conspiracism amongst French Beures and amongst people in Gaza.

RUMOR AS WATCHDOG AGAINST ALARMISM The downgrading and contextualisation of explanations we find fanciful to rumors should enhance the quality of analyses on reactions of the “Arab Street” as well as political theorizing in the Arab press. Rumors are – as Sadik J. Al-Azm tells us – one of the media by which politics are developed and come to pass: Consider [. . .] the intense debates that have been raging inside Syrian society since the Madrid Conference on Israel over the ‘peace process’ and the nature of our future relationship with the neighbor, as well as the fears, anxieties, disappointments, failures, and expectations aroused by a coming, seemingly willy-nilly, deal with the old enemy. Here, a word of warning is very much in order against possible misunderstandings. These intense discussions are not open public debates aired on radio and television or conducted through newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, etc., but are highly charged, comprehensive, and pervasive exchanges whose main vehicles are the time-honored methods of oral transmission, through conversations among people who are within earshot of each other. This is Damascus’s rumor mill and the people’s free press at one and the same time.36

After 9/11 the thresholds for aggressive anti-Western propaganda and Islamophobia dropped. Threats from any Islamic group or faction are taken seriously, no matter who it is. Scientific discussions of conspiracy theories in Middle Eastern Studies often show a strong touch of excitement you do not find in studies on US American New Age cults or Indonesian fringe groups. “Rumours mills” can prove to be effective political weapons; still, on a scale of political relevance they are usually classified as petty in comparison to the grand master level of world conspiracies. On the other hand, it might be interesting for future research on the workings of propaganda amongst Muslims to compare the failed global scandalization against the rumor about defilements of Koran pages and the successful worldwide dispute about Muhammad caricatures.

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Since universities and disciplines must compete increasingly for public funds and public attention, it is a temptation to draw public attention by dramatizing representations of your own field of research. So the introduction of the level of rumors should work as a safeguard against conscious or unconscious alarmism and culturalist attributions of mentality. Scholars like Tibi and Pipes show that conspiracism is an interesting phenomenon for Middle Eastern Studies. Years before their colleagues in the fields of political and Middle Eastern studies, they pointed out to the public that there is a renaissance of anti-semitic topoi in Islamist publications which proved to spread into more moderate circles and discourses in Europe and elsewhere, mixing sometimes with streaks of neo-nazism. Conspiracism is certainly worthwhile to study in historical and recent works of conspiracists. However, for analyzing Middle Eastern explanations of contemporary events, premature assumptions of an Arab or even Muslim cultural sense of conspiracism can obstruct and distort the view. Therefore, you should first try on theoretical boots of the smallest size available and that would be rumors instead of world conspiracies.

REFERENCES Al-Azm S.J. (2000): “The View from Damaskus”, The New York Review of Books, 47, No. 10 (15 June 2000), pp. 70–77, citation p. 70, also to be found on the internet: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/46 – (20 June 2005). Carl, F.G.; Serge, M. (eds) (1987): Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy. New York: Springer. Coward, B.; Swann, J. (eds) (2004): Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in Early Modern Europe: From the Waldensians to the French Revolution. Aldershot: Asghate. Farhi, F. (1999): “Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy.” (Review). IJMES, vol. 31, pp. 454–457. Hellinger, D. (2003): “Paranoia, Conspiracy, and Hegemony in American Politics”, in H.G. West, T. Sanders (eds) Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, (2005): The Crusader’s Animosity, p. 2. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir. org/english/books/state/chapter_41.html – (15 June 2005). Hörner, K. (1993): “Der Begriff Feindbild, Ursachen und Abwehr”, in Hrsg. von V. Klemm; K. Hörner (eds) Das Schwert des Experten. Heidelberg: Palmyra, pp.34–43.

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Jaworski, R. (2001): “Verschwörungstheorien aus psychologischer und aus historischer Sicht”, in Hrsg. von U. Caumanns; M. Niendorf (eds) Verschwörungstheorien: anthropologische Konstanten. Osnabrück: fibre. Kapferer, J.-N. (1987): Rumeurs, les plus vieux média du monde. Paris: Éd. du Seuil. Kapferer, J.-N. (1996): Gerüchte: das älteste Massenmedium der Welt, Leipzig: Gustave Kiepenheuer Verlag. Luhmann, N. (1995): “Kausalität im Süden”, Soziale Systeme, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 7–28. Matt, P. von (2006): Die Intrige: Theorie und Praxis der Hinterlist. München, Wien: Hanser. Moore, R. (2005): “Reconstructing Reality: Conspiracy Theories about Jonestown”, Journal of Popular Culture, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 200–220, 2002 also to be found as prepublication on the internet: http://jonestown.sdsu.edu/AboutJonestown/ Articles/conspiracy.htm – (21 June 2005). Paul T. (2005): “Reuters: 11 April 2003”, Baghdad’s Easy Fall Fuels Arab Conspiracy Theories. available online at http://www.drumbeat.mlaterz.net/April% 202003/Arab%20conspiracy%20theories%20fueled%20041103a.htm – (15 June 2005). Pipes, D. (1992): “Dealing with Middle Eastern Conspiracy Theories”, Orbis: A Jornal of World Affairs, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 41–56, also to be found on the internet: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/214 – (15 June 2005). Pipes, D. (1997): Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes from, New York: Free Press. Pipes, D. (1998): The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, 2nd ed., New York: St. Martin’s Griffin. Pipes, D.; Hilal K. (2005): “Diana and Arab Conspiracy”, Weekly Standard, 10 November 1997. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/290 – (15 June 2005). Siavoshi, S. (1998): “Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy.” (Review). IJMES, vol. 30, pp. 272–274. Stein, H. (2004): Endlich Nichtdenker! Handbuch für den überforderten Intellektuellen (mit praktischen Übungen). Berlin: Eichborn. Tibi, B. (1994): Die Verschwörung, Hamburg, p. 147. Tibi, B. (2003): “Der importierte Hass”, Die Zeit, no. 7.

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6 POLITICAL CULTURE, POLITICAL DYNAMICS, AND CONSPIRACISM IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

Matthew Gray Conspiracy theory (naz. ariyyah al–mu’¯amarah), conspiracy rhetoric, and the more general “conspiracism” 1 have begun to gain greater attention among scholars and observers of politics in the Arab Middle East, even though traditionally there has been a paucity of scholarly analysis of it, especially by political scientists. Arab Middle Eastern conspiracism has been touched upon by some scholars, including Leon Carl Brown in his influential work International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (1984), more recently by El–Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) in the context of the characteristics and influence of the Qatar-based satellite television station Al-Jazeera, and less comprehensively by some other writers on religious concepts and radicalism in the region (see for example the short mentions in Bonney 2004 and Juergensmeyer 2000). The main English language book on Middle Eastern conspiracism is Daniel Pipes’ The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy (1996); a largely polemical work, useful for having identified the importance of conspiracism and in providing a description of some of its manifestations but marred by Pipes’ own preoccupation with anti-Semitism and by an extremely limited and rudimentary analytical or explanatory discussion of the political dynamics that might account for Arab Middle Eastern conspiracism. This paucity of scholarship on conspiracism is unfortunate, given that as a phenomenon conspiracism says much about political culture and political dynamics in the Arab Middle East, while also drawing on political culture and dynamics as a source. While conspiracism is not unique to the Middle East region – witness the strong state conspiracism of the former Soviet Union, and of course the degree of popular conspiracism in the contemporary United States – it is important at two main levels in Arab countries: first, as a tool of state communication with society and, second, as an explanatory discourse at the more popular, “street” and elite levels

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of Arab politics. It appears to broadly cross regions and social classes, and, therefore, perhaps is a less pejorative tag than in, say, the United States. This may not be just a reflection of its breadth but also of the relatively formative stage of explanations of conspiracism in the region; there is no seminal work such as that of Hofstadter (1965) on the “paranoid style” in US political culture with which to explain – or also to discount – conspiracists and conspiracism in the Arab Middle East. Conspiracism in the Arab world is different, therefore, to that in the United States, as it is a feature of state rhetoric and not solely or predominantly a discourse by individuals within marginal or disenfranchised social forces, even if it is partly sourced from such individuals and groups as well as from the state and its political elites. This paper offers some thoughts from political science about possible sources of conspiracism in the Arab world and of possible explanations for conspiracism as a style of political discourse and popular explanation in the region. It covers four broad areas in its narrative and seeks to place conspiracism into a context of existing political science theory. The aim in so doing is to consider not only the origins of conspiracism in the Arab world but also the ways in which conspiracism is created, fostered, and used as a form of political language and as a representation of interpretations of political dynamics. It begins by considering the roots and history of political conspiracy in the Middle East and how this history influences contemporary thinking by both political leaderships and wider social forces. It then discusses past failures of Arab political ideologies and the weaknesses of newer models of economic development and political modernization, suggesting that a sense of ideological “aimlessness” may in part account for mistrust of government and a propensity toward conspiracism. Partly as an extension of this dynamic, the multiple layers of political identity and political loyalty are outlined, with the impact that the state must compete for legitimacy and support against other, more local units of belonging and loyalty, such as family, tribe, and religion. When the state fails to ensure such support, and instead is often seen as an abstract actor or an imposed layer of authority, the affect may be a suspicion of the state and its motives and, less often, the interpretation of the state as a threat to the individual or to groups with which people are most closely linked at a local, social, and political level. Finally, the gaps between Arab leaderships and their populations is considered, including the ways in which leaderships and political elites – in some cases

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consisting of minorities that are often exclusionary toward wider social forces – use conspiracism as a source of popular legitimacy, mass mobilization, or to “Otherize” threats to the regime and thus to strengthen the metaphorical fortress within and from which they often govern. The dynamics of conspiracist discourse is also assessed, including the ways in which conspiracism forms an unwritten political contract between leaderships and populations, with conspiracism paradoxically being both a tool of political control and an informal method of popular criticism of political leaderships and elites. The essay concludes with some thoughts on political culture and conspiracism; while not supporting a pathological explanation for the preponderance of conspiracism, political culture nonetheless plays a small role in providing the mood and mechanics by which conspiracism is more likely than otherwise to occur.

POLITICAL HISTORY AND CONSPIRACISM The rather obvious and banal observation that conspiracies do, in fact, occur as a natural dynamic of politics does not detract from the inherent truth of the observation. In the case of the Arab Middle East, moreover, there is a strong history of foreign penetration of the region, most notably over several centuries of Ottoman rule and, more recently, in the first half of the twentieth century, by European powers operating under colonial mandates. Despite the economic benefits that colonialism brought to many parts of the region (Owen, 1993, pp. 111–124), such rule was penetrative and submissive of traditional and local political elites, undermined political development both at the national and local levels (Bill and Springborg, 1990, pp. 231–233), and even sought to move beyond mere physical control of territory and individuals to also influence the thinking, and by extension the political perspectives and dynamics, of the colonized (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 95–127). To many Arabs under colonial rule, the European elite was an opaque layer of authority positioned above society but able to exert political control over its destiny and to shape social norms and group identity (Fanon, 1965, see especially pp. 127–158). The new political elites that were created or the old ones that were nurtured by colonialism were often seen as being in consort or even under the direct control of the foreign occupying power; even though many were to later lead post-independence modernizing efforts in many

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countries, a great many instead represented an extension of colonial control and, by definition, an actor within and target for conspiracist theories. This is a pattern that continues to occur, when contemporary governments are seen as colluding with major powers such as the United States, by inviting the foreign power into the region, whether in the form of military forces for the protection of the state or in the guise of Western culture and its symbols. Two classic examples of conspiratorial conduct with enduring legacies are the collusion between King Abdallah of Transjordan and the Zionist movement in Palestine in the 1940s, and the 1953 overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. King Abdallah’s collusion with the Zionist movement was aimed initially (especially in the 1920s) at gaining Jewish investment for Transjordan. Later, especially in the lead-up to the Israeli declaration of statehood and the 1948–1949 Arab–Israeli war, Abdallah colluded with the Zionists and the British on the partition of Palestine to guarantee the border of Transjordan and to avoid the emergence of a Palestinian state led by the firebrand nationalist and Islamist Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al Hussayni (Rogan, 2001, pp. 108–110). Abdallah’s collusion was real and had real consequences for the failure of a Palestinian state to emerge based on the 1947 UN Partition Plan but is often explained by conspiracists as being encouraged or caused by British duplicity and meddling. In turn, a link is then established to a broader colonialist conspiracy, with Abdallah as a tool of the British in securing the emergence of Israel. Abdallah as a calculating, rational political actor, with his links to Zionists explained by his own political calculations, is often downplayed or ignored. The overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran in 1953 is also important, as it adds emphasis to conspiracist views on the United States as a meddling foreign power in the region. Officials based at the US and UK embassies in Tehran, including intelligence officers, provided financial and logistical support to anti-Mossadeq rallies and conservative forces, as well as worked to reinstall the Shah and avoid a strengthening of the communist Tudeh party (Rubin, 1980, pp. 54–90 but especially pp. 80–90; Saikal, 1980, pp. 11–45 but especially pp. 44–45). With US support, the Shah’s rule was re-established, and strong links between him and the United States would later prove crucial in the growth of anti-Shah sentiment that led to the 1978–1979 Iranian revolution. Beyond that, the overthrow of Mossadeq continues to be cited popularly as an example of US willingness to meddle

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in the Middle East and to create or sustain governments that suit US strategic and economic ambitions. There are, of course, other political events of a conspiratorial nature of note. Pipes (1996, p. 330) points to Israeli intelligence activities in Egypt, specifically to the 1954 Lavon Affair, as an example. Other Mossad activities – and indeed, Mossad’s efficiency in general – help to support a conspiratorial view that Israel has a far stronger hand in regional events than it in fact does have. If even a small number of the claims made about Mossad are true, then it is indeed effective at mounting operations against Arab countries and targets (see among others Raviv and Melman, 1990; Reeve, 2000; Thomas, 1999). Some of these books, however, such as Hoy and Ostrovsky (1990), contain a tone and allegations that make it seem, at times, like the book is actually itself a case of conspiracist paranoia.2 Beyond the operations of Mossad, the opaque nature of patrimonial leadership in the Middle East, and the traditional threat to leaders from coups d’ètát, sets a climate of political suspicion and provides plenty of ammunition to conspiracy theorists. Important to note here is the importance placed by Middle Easterners on the past and on an understanding of history. The Egyptian intellectual Fawzy Mansour quotes Marx on the link between the past and the present: “[a]longside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited events oppress . . . we suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. Le mort saisit le vif.” (Mansour, 1992, p. 47), declaring “How much more fitting this description is for the Arab World in the second half of the twentieth century” than Germany a century earlier (Mansour, 1992, p. 48). Barry Rubin, when discussing the overthrow of Mossadeq, makes the observation that “[t]he political events of the early 1950s are little more than ancient history to most Americans. To most Iranians, however, that period was the essential backdrop to their 1978–1979 revolution . . .” (Rubin, 1980, p. 55). The strength of popular memory is recognized by regimes, which will construct historical interpretations to build popular legitimacy and the concept of shared heritage (Davis and Gavrielides, 1991, pp. 116–148), although when such attempts fail, society’s view of the state is likely to plunge. This is not to argue that the strength of historical memory in the Middle East creates a propensity toward conspiracism. Rather, that conspiracies actually occur means that conspiracists can point to examples of foreign intervention or collusion by indigenous political elites, which in turn

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strengthens arguments that wider conspiracies are at work in society. Historical memory provides more foundations upon which conspiracists can potentially build but does not in itself create or cause conspiracism. Thus conspiratorial events in recent Middle Eastern history help to move conspiracism beyond being merely a discourse of the powerless that challenges conventional or orthodox political and historical explanations for events or conditions, or beyond being what Rudmin (2003) calls “naïve deconstructive history”, and instead grounds a conspiracy theory in the context of an actual past political conspiracy. Actual cases of conspiracy help construct the foundations for an argument that is presented as internally consistent, often by extrapolating past events into imbued current implications, or by citing past examples as evidence that anyone challenging the conspiracy – or the conspiracist – is inherently ignorant or naïve.

CONSPIRACISM AND THE SENSE OF IDEOLOGICAL INCHOATENESS AND AIMLESSNESS The contemporary Middle East appears to many to be in a condition of ideological aimlessness and introspection, brought on by the failure of post-independence political and economic ideologies such as Arab Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, state-led economic development, and “Nasserism” in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, and with later political ideologies such as economic liberalization, democratization, and political Islamism failing to widely or adequately fill the void left by the shortcomings of these earlier political and developmental strategies. To the prolific – and some would say controversial or hostile (Said, 1978, pp. 314–319) – scholar Bernard Lewis, for example, the Middle East is in a period of economic and military weakness, especially vis–à–vis its traditional competitor, Europe (Lewis, 2002). He extends this view into a relationship between a sense of decline and a rise in political Islamism, especially violent or extremist Islamism, by pointing to the past achievements of Muslim Empires, where it is widely held that religion was coterminous and concomitant with political, military, and economic development and growth. He argues, therefore, that the perception of history of the “Middle Easterners” is nourished from the pulpit, in the schools, and by the media, and although it may be – indeed, often is – slanted

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and inaccurate, it is nevertheless vivid and powerfully resonant (Lewis, 2003, p. xxi). However, Sadik J. Al-Azm differently argues that the same fate awaits (political) Islamism as was met by earlier secular ideologies: “Today the hard–core Islamists’ spectacular terrorist violence reflects a no less desperate attempt to break out of the historical impasse and terminal structural crisis reached by the world Islamist movement in the second half of the twentieth century.” (Al-Azm, 2004, n.p.). The Lebanese-born scholar Fouad Ajami, in talking about “the Arab predicament”, sees what is termed here as “ideological aimlessness” as being in fact an indigenous ideological conflict over the degree to which external power, the lure of introversion, and the fear of foreign penetration play out; in his words, it is in essence a conflict “between the quest for the Occident’s power and success and the desire to retreat to their own universe, to try to find their own values, to rebel and say no to those who judge and penetrate” (Ajami, 1992, p. 251, also quoted in Sadiki, 2004, p. vii). In Ajami’s view, therefore, there is not just a sense of decline in the region but also a fear of penetration or conquest by outside powers and, by implication, of foreign influences – an important point to note when looking at some of the possible psychological explanations for the preponderance of conspiracism at both leadership and popular levels in the region. A later work by Ajami (1998) provides a more specific consideration of the role of intellectuals, and their thinking in modern Arab political history, but draws a not-dissimilar conclusion; that the gap between the intellectual world and the “world as it was” (Ajami, 1998, p. 283) was not breached, and the intellectual impact on political elites’ behavior, especially in the diplomatic realm and in relation to Israel, slid in the 1970s and 1980s toward irrelevance (Ajami, 1998, pp. 283–297). A different approach but one with essentially the same impact is offered by Al-Azm, who views Arab intellectuals as a crucial source of non-state discourse but laments the lack of critical freedom enjoyed by intellectuals as a result of “the state’s monopoly over culture . . .” (Al-Azm, 1997, p. 125). Either way, the impact was that Arab intellectuals – who it can be assumed were and are less prone to the imaginations of conspiracism – sat alone in a twilight of irrelevance both to the political deeds of their statesmen and the political aspirations of the wider Arab population in the post-independence period. It is noteworthy that Ajami’s The Arab Predicament (1992) clarifies its aims with a subtitle of “Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967”,

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as it is 1967 that is widely considered to be the year that Arab Nationalism (and its close cousin, Pan–Arabism3) died, having been embodied in large part by the former Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Nasser himself lived on for three more years, but the humiliation of the Arabs’ dramatic and comprehensive defeat in the June 1967 ’Six Day’ war ended effectively any hope that it would be the vehicle on which Arabs would ride, unified, into Jerusalem to reclaim the Holy Land for the Palestinians. Of course, it was not only the 1967 war that in practice ended Arab Nationalism; also important was the growing divisions among Arab states, especially the schism into rich and poor as oil wealth poured into the region after the 1960s. Perhaps most important, however, was the inherent vagueness of the term, which complicated attempts to apply it in practice (such as in the ill-fated attempt at the formation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria over 1958–1961), plus the challenges of applying it to the weak or young political institutions of the state (Bill and Springborg, 1990, p. 78). While the Arab “street” and its sense of Arabness remains strong even today – perhaps out of political frustration – a more formal Arab Nationalism at the political leadership level was weak and unwieldy because it remained predominantly conceptual rather than practical, slowly giving way to a more unifying, class-bridging Islamism (Bill and Springborg, 1990, p. 78) and providing a “veneer” behind which nation-state nationalism grew stronger despite its fractious nature (Sadiki, 2004, p. 165). Al-Azm sees Arab nationalism as having been less about Arab unity per se and more as “a means of retrieving that usurped role of world–historical leadership and of history–making” (Al-Azm, 2004, n.p.); a view consistent with the commonly heard calls for a return to the “Golden Age” of Islam as well. To many conspiracists, the failure of earlier ideologies can be put down to foreign interference or even collusion between domestic elites and foreign powers. Certainly, the failure of the United Arab Republic was due in no small part to opposition to the union from landed and traditional elites in Syria, who saw their wealth and social positions threatened by unification. More widely, however, conspiracism serves as an excuse for the failure of leaderships and ideologies during this period and is an attempt to lay blame for failed or inadequately managed developmental and modernization efforts at the feet of other, more veiled political actors. The attendant economic policies of Arab political leaderships during the 1950s–1970s have also struck trouble and seen a collapse in their

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legitimacy and popular support. Along with much of the developing world during this period, most of the Middle East sought to control private sector activity, especially at the larger or more strategic end of the economic scale, and to modernize economies and societies through state ownership and state interventionism. This was certainly the model of economic development chosen by the larger Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Syria, and others (Perthes, 1995, pp. 36–42; Waterbury, 1983, pp. 57–82, 1993, pp. 31–68), as well as Iran in the 1950s, when nationalization came to the political fore (Saikal, 1980, pp. 35–45) and later remained at least as a notion or aspiration. Such experiments – usually mounted by the same modernizing, secular (often military) leaderships that espoused Arab Nationalism (Bill and Springborg, 1990, pp. 14–30) – failed for several reasons and not only because of the broad change in development ideology toward the market (explained by those such as Fukuyama (1992), Friedman (1999), and the like who see liberalism, whether economic or political, as a natural path to development and democracy). Public sector-led modernization instead created bureaucracy-led stagnation, often with state institutions remaining weak and potential economic leaders more loyal to primordial groupings such as family or clan than to the state and its institutions. Import substitution industrialization failed to maintain its initial pace, especially when the state failed to meet industrial firms’ later need for further capital. The state’s extractive capacity remained limited to the extent of its popular legitimacy – even if it regularly exceeded that boundary out of fiscal necessity – and in some states economic crisis forced the state into programs, usually modest ones, of crisis-induced economic reform. In Egypt and elsewhere, this took the form of a policy of “[economic] opening” (al-infit¯ah.). Perhaps above all, economic modernization and a strong state did not bring with it the political development, including democratization that had been promised and which had become the expectation of much of the population – a reason for the ebb in support for modernization theory among scholars, as well. Gradually but increasingly commonly, the state’s ideological rhetoric remained static, while its economic policies and political conduct drifted further away from what it had initially enunciated as its raison d’ètre. The more recent attempts at economic reform and al-infit¯ah. promise economic development – as did their predecessor ideologies – but such development is by no means guaranteed. Even in its early years, al-infit¯ah. was challenged as being a policy that created “fat cats” and encouraged

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profiteering (Bill and Springborg, 1990, p. 426). Thus an appendage was created under the new Egyptian president Husni Mubarak in the early 1980s to create the new term “productive infit¯ah.” (al-infit¯ah. al-int¯aji4) (Bill and Springborg, 1990, p. 426). Not only do economic prescriptions risk becoming “ritualistic incantations” (Bill and Springborg, 1990, p. 440) – which would have the same impact as past policies in marginalizing certain groups or of expanding the chasm between the state’s elites and society – but many of the economic policies thrust upon the region by multilateral lending bodies, in the form of what has become known as the “Washington consensus” (Williamson, 1993), inflict immediate pain. Regardless of their longer-term benefits or justifications, such policies impact large segments of society through, for example, the removal of subsidies on basic commodities or the rationalization of public sector services. Moreover, if – some would say when – such policies fail to deliver what they have promised, and especially if they marginalize large (sub) groups, conspiracism will likely manifest itself as a popular explanation for the policies and their impacts, probably linking foreign intervention (economic in this policy instance, but related in many minds to a broader cultural and social penetration of the region by the US and Western culture and cultural symbols) to the negative results of the state’s liberalist development policies. Sadiki makes this link when talking about democracy as “simply a footnote” to the ultimately exploitative “economic correctness” (which he defines very simplistically as “marketization and privatization”) (Sadiki, 2004, p. 372). This perspective is touched upon several times, for example, also when discussing the link between sovereignty and international lending bodies such as the World Bank (Sadiki, 2004, p. 348). The language, if not the intent, of this simplified linkage of economics to politics and exploitation is reminiscent of a broad, mass style of conspiracist explanation in the region. The link between Western economic policy prescription and foreign penetration had, of course, already been made by leaderships: Ayatollah Khomeini’s conspiracist-type fear of “Westoxication”, which he first enunciated in the early 1980s, was not only about cultural penetration but also developed from Iran’s experience with economic penetration and exploitation and was not-coincidentally heard during periods of economic difficulty or austerity (Hiro, 2001, pp. 199–200, 210–213). In a somewhat similar vein, Fawzy Mansour sees economic penetration as having created a praetorian bureaucracy and a comprador business and quasi-business sector that is in cahoots with

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external or foreign capitalist powers (Mansour 1992, see as an example pp. 92–104 on the case of Egypt). He goes on to make the Marxian pan– Arabist argument that Arab unification is linked to economic autonomy and thus both to a freedom from foreign penetration and to a resurgence and redevelopment of the Arab world (Mansour 1992, pp. 116–127). Lessarticulate populist arguments along this line are very common in the Middle East. Linked somewhat to a sense of ideological aimlessness in the region and a sense or fear of Western penetration, therefore, is a less specific fear of what the “West” actually is and for what it stands. There is a defensive “Othering” aspect to anti-Western or anti–US conspiracism, in other words, especially at the mass levels but also among some intellectuals. Framing this as Bernard Lewis (1993) and others do as the “West” and “Islam” – thus contrasting a geography with a religion – does not help such interpretations, for it automatically creates the image of a secular “West” and a “religious” Middle East, in turn sharpening the characterization that many Middle Easterners, Muslim or not, make of a comparatively corrupt, impersonal or imposing “West”. At a more radical level, this can translate into Occidentalism (typically expressed as al–istighr¯ab in Arabic) but noting that Occidentalism can mean different things to different people. Buruma and Margalit (2004) use it as a term for a hatred of the West: “The dehumanizing picture of the West painted by its enemies” (Buruma and Margalit 2004, p. 5). It can also, of course, be a diametric of Said’s (1978) “Orientalism”, in which case it might be interpreted as “Oriental discourse about the Occident” [including but not exclusively that which is subjective and an act of counter-othering] (Sadiki, 2004, p. 111). A more generous view of it is provided by Sadiki (2004, pp. 128–129), when discussing the views of the contemporary thinker Hassan Hanafi on Occidentalism, where it is offered as an “emancipatory counter–discourse [to Westernization]” (Sadiki, 2004, p. 129). Any of these forms of Occidentalism may include conspiracism. In some cases, conspiracism will provide a way to justify anti–Western sentiments by pointing to real or imagined wrongs of the Western “Other”. In other cases, such as that of the notorious medievalist Islamist Taliban that ruled much of Afghanistan in the period 1996–2001, the destruction of Western symbols, “signs” or objects was also a reinforcement of their interpretations of themselves; a way of “purifying” Afghanistan (Buruma and Margalit, 2004, pp. 44–45) and removing things which they saw as foreign and as having a negative

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impact on social morality or religion. This is consistent with the views of Wildavsky, a prolific writer on political preferences and political culture: “Adherents of cultures learn their identity by knowing not only what they are for but also what they are against. It is cultural conflict that gives meaning to cultural identification” (1988, p. 593). Finally, conspiracism can form part of a cultural narrative about the “Self” in the Middle East: as a way to define one’s strengths by contrasting them with other cultures; to explain weakness or foreign penetration in the past; or, most simply, as a (witting or unwitting) expression of xenophobia.

CONSPIRACISM AND THE GAP BETWEEN LEADERSHIPS AND SOCIETY If we take at face value the common view that the Middle East is a high power distant culture, the impacts of this on conspiracism raise two interesting questions. One, does this promote a fatalistic interpretation of political outcomes that, in turn, suits the development of conspiracism? Alternatively – or as well – does conspiracism represent an attempt at a discourse by the weak or marginalized, within a political system that allows them little formal discursive space? Given the large and possibly growing chasm between political word and deed in the Middle East, there is clearly a link between political dissatisfaction, even marginalization, and conspiracism at a popular level in the Middle East, as there is elsewhere. Fenster (1999, p. 67, quoted in Pratt, 2003: n.p.) claims that he takes a “realist” approach to explaining conspiracism (versus what he calls the “symbolist” approach of Hofstadter and others), in that “[conspiracy theories] ideologically address real structural inequities, and constitute a response to a withering civil society and the concentration in the ownership of the means of production, which together leave the political subject without the ability to be recognized or to signify in the public realm” (Fenster, 1999, p. 67, quoted in Pratt, 2003, n.p.). Such an assertion is just as true of the Middle East as it is of the United States, on which Fenster focuses, although there is less of the “symbolist” discourse in the case of the Middle East, perhaps because of the important role that conspiracist rhetoric plays in formal state discourse and communication with society (more on which later).

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The gap between leaderships and society stem not just from the gap between policy rhetoric and policy implementation, despite the importance of this as an explanation for conspiracism at the mass level. The gap is also an indication of the strengths of local politics and of the multiple layers of identity held by many people in the Middle East. Further, the gap is a manifestation of minority governments, which remain a feature of some Arab states and the opaque neo-patrimonial networks that many leaders create around themselves to reinforce their positions and enhance their reach into the institutions and social forces of politics. Minority governments also are an important consideration as a source of popular conspiracism. They are in power in Syria, where an Alawi leadership controls a majority Sunni population, in Bahrain, where a Sunni royal family controls a majority Shi’a population, and in effect in Lebanon, where a consociationalist quasi-democracy means that no one group – Sunni, Shi’a, Christian, Druze, or others – controls government, even if the Christians and Sunnis have disproportionate power and influence over it. Until 2003 Saddam Hussayn’s Iraq was another example of a minority government. Minority governments, of course, must find something other than structural legitimacy upon which to base their power, and as part of this process, many choose to marginalize other, non-governing groups (that is, in most cases, the majority of the population). A sense of conspiracism by the state against the population can, therefore, emerge, where the state is viewed as being – or is – deliberately exclusionary and at times oppressive against movements that might develop into a more pervasive threat to the state or its elites. More generally, even in states where the ruling elite broadly represents the society’s majority, there is still a propensity to marginalize, or even conspire against, groups that present a real, potential, or imagined threat to the regime or elite, the result of the large minority populations of the region and the broad heterogeneity of the states of the region (Bill and Springborg, 1990, pp. 38–39). This marginalization, and the ways in which it is challenged, occurs not just because of minority governments, or sectarian or ethnic fragmentation but also on the basis of social class. Bayat (1997) provides some interesting examples of poor people’s movements in Iran, citing examples of how such movements are formed out of groups dislocated or neglected by the 1978–1979 revolution. While he does not discuss conspiracism, his observations about the origins of dislocation and the forms of anti-state

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thinking and conduct are relevant and highlight the broader challenges to governments in the region. Silverstein (2000) considers conspiracism in Algeria during the civil war in the 1990s, with informal accounts and popular, informal discussion taking the place of media and other information that the state had censored, as well as conspiracism forming part of the popular response to the violence suffered by Algerians during the civil war (Silverstein, 2000, n.p.). In response, therefore, to the “tactical manipulation of knowledge [by the state]” (Silverstein, 2000, n.p.) and to violence, conspiracism becomes a method of fighting back, of challenging the state’s censorship by construing that it must have something to hide, of undermining party officials that are often popularly viewed as no more genuine or nationalistic than the colonial administrators they replaced, and of explaining nasty state behavior by groups such as the security services (Silverstein, 2000, n.p.). The Algerian example gives strength to the idea that conspiracism in the Middle East can be a genuine, mainstream response to people’s fears and political anxieties – and even a way of challenging authoritarianism or poor political leadership – and is not merely a manifestation of paranoia as in Hofstadter’s (1965) more dismissive, pejorative view of the case of the United States. More important, conspiracism as essentially a self-delusion, as per Pipes’ (1996) more pathological explanation, is demonstrated by the Algerian example as being especially shallow and simplistic. El–Nawawy and Iskandar (2003, pp. 58–65) make a strong case that the Qatar-based satellite television station Al-Jazeera uses conspiracism effectively as a way to empower its viewers, vis–à–vis their individual governments, at an inter-state level. It is important to recall that not only “all politics is local” but more broadly that there are multiple and often competing layers of identity and loyalty in the Middle East, of which the state is but one. While nationstate nationalism and the power of centralized authority has increased in the Middle East in the post–independence period, this does not preclude alternative or contending loyalties from distancing citizens from their government nor indeed of localized politics and sub-state loyalties from usurping the state’s authority. Middle Eastern societies have continually had a strong element of family, clan, and tribal loyalties – what Bill and Springborg (1990, pp. 85–138) call “the genes of politics” – with which the state has had to relate and contend for power (Lapidus, 1990, pp. 25–47). These loyalties not only compete with each other and with the state but also with other influences on politics and identity such as social

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class and religiosity (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996, pp. 35–36). When the state has failed to build its popular legitimacy, as demonstrated earlier, plus shifted into a post–populist phase of authoritarianism or some similar form of greater coercive control over society, an obvious outcome is a growing mistrust by the citizenry of the state itself and, by extension, of the state’s motivations. That the state’s motivations come into question is a foundational aspect of conspiracism in any society; indeed such a case for conspiracism in the United States and other societies is made routinely, pointing to the growth of government secrecy (CCC, n.d., n.p.), as minority fears of majority governments (added to the strength of some conspiracist orators) (Cooper with Ferguson, 1990, pp. 30–31) or as an Othering of the bureaucratized state (Fenster, 1999, p. 74 quoted in Pratt, 2003, n.p.). Conspiracism could also be viewed more broadly in the same way that Kishtainy (1985, p. 128) sees Arab humor and joke making as a method for an independent-minded population to express their autonomy from government. The bureaucratization that has occurred in much of the Middle East over the second half of the twentieth century, especially a massive growth in domestic intelligence services’ penetration of society, reinforces distrust of the state and acts as a source of popular conspiracism. The opaqueness of the state’s motivations is linked not least of all to the intricate neo-patrimonial webs that leaderships build around and below themselves, through which they exert control over, and ensure the loyalty of, the wider institutions of state power such as the bureaucracy, the military and, increasingly, religious institutions and new classes such as private sector business people. Through these networks, leaders create a web of “power elites”, which “shapes the political style and molds the political system of a society” (Bill and Springborg, 1990, p. 137). Such a system has two important impacts for the study of conspiracism: it encourages informal politics and opaque decision-making dynamics, and it creates rivalries among the elite but loyalty upward to a political leader. Thus the state, as evidenced by its leader and those surrounding him or her, becomes seen by the wider population as an inaccessible, secretive network that reaches its own private symbiotic arrangements, and oftentimes therefore as corrupt and out of touch with popular concerns. It is only a short step from seeing the state in this light to thus viewing the individuals at the summit of the state as people who act against their own citizenry to guarantee their political survival and to build their own

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political and financial positions and thereby assume that such individuals are inherently conspiratorial toward others. This is, of course, often an accurate interpretation of such actors, who will conspire against each other or work together against social forces to secure their political positions and the attendant privileges. Thus, it is less the inherent culture of the region that accounts for conspiracism and more the ways in which Middle Eastern political culture fosters a set of dynamics, not least of all state–society dialog (or lack thereof), from and within which conspiracism emerges and becomes part of popular discourse about an elite that is distant and opaque.

THE STATE AS THE CONSPIRACIST RHETOR The discussion above has predominantly been focused on cases where the population, rather than the state or its elite, is the rhetor. One characteristic which sets the Middle East apart from some other regions, however, is the fact that conspiracism is often part of the state’s discourse and not just a discourse by particular marginalized or dissatisfied minorities (or less transparently, by social forces). While some forms of conspiracism may challenge a state’s power, it is common to find states also acting as conspiracist rhetor, typically through the use of monopolized mass media, or governing party structures, or under the direction of a charismatic leader. There are several explanations for this state behavior. First, such conspiracism can aid the state in diverting attention away from its political or developmental flaws or failures and toward a constructed enemy; to “relieve responsibility” (Pipes, 1996, p. 359) and to win wider popular support for state policies or behaviors that otherwise may be more effectively challenged (Pipes, 1996, pp. 358–361). Pipes dwells, if largely descriptively, on this when looking at the portrayal of Israel and Jews by Arab leaderships and political institutions. In this sense, state conspiracism is a version of the United States and USSR using conspiracism as state propaganda, as touched upon (but unfortunately not fully developed) by Young and Launder (1988, p. 217), even though the rhetoric in, say, the United States was usually less extreme and vitriolic than what often comes from state media in the Middle East. Conspiracism becomes a form of state-led Othering and of creating a larger imagined enemy, in turn increasing popular suspicions of the enemy.

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Conspiracism also serves as a form of inverse–relevance rhetoric during political or economic transition, as a way of pretending that nothing is changing when, in fact, it is. States therefore maintain the rhetoric of earlier ideologies – often reflecting the popular view of the “street” – and the rhetoric of conspiracies against these ideologies, as a way of distracting attention from the state as the agent or source of change. Conspiracism is also, of course, a useful way to construct counter-facts; if believed by people, they serve a direct purpose of protecting the state or elite through misinformation. If not believed, counter-facts may still be useful, as Wedeen points out, as a way for citizens to justify to themselves their compliance with the state (Wedeen, 1999, p. 41). All of the above has the three-pronged effect of strengthening popular nationalism, diverting opposition energies away from the state or its leadership, and reinforcing the state as a source of protection against a perceived enemy – all of which are especially useful to states, such as those common in the Middle East, that lack structural legitimacy or whose policies are moving into a post-populist phase. Conspiracism can also form part of the symbolism of the state. One reason why many states tolerate conspiracism by social groups is perhaps because dialog serves the state’s interests as well; in such cases the state, while not the rhetor, is nonetheless at least partly the conspiracist. More specifically, it can occur in what Kassem (2004, p. 170) refers to as the assertion and reassertion of a political leader’s domination. While Kassem does not enter the debate about conspiracism directly, his observations about leadership attacks on individuals and groups in the public sphere (Kassem, 2004, pp. 170–177) are of great relevance, as such actions commonly include conspiracism as a tactic. Kassem uses the example of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who among other things was accused of taking and misusing foreign funds and of damaging Egypt’s international image; such accusations are very close in flavor to conspiracism. Lisa Wedeen’s (1999) observations on the role of symbolism in Syrian politics may also be instructive in explaining state conspiracism not only in the uses of counter-facts already mentioned but also a way for the state to monopolize public space and discourse (Wedeen, 1999, p. 42) or to “disorientate” people and thus reduce their capacity for independent action counter to that desired by the state (Wedeen, 1999, pp. 44–45). Such rhetoric and conspiracism can, of course, have a reinforcing effect at two separate levels: first, if state lies or misinformation creates an environment where people

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falsely repeat the rhetoric or an expression of allegiance with the state, or second, where citizens themselves develop and engage their own conspiratorial or counter-factual discourses to challenge those of the state.

CONCLUSION The Middle East is not unique in containing examples of conspiracism either as popular discourse or as state narrative nor necessarily in the preponderance of conspiracist language in the public and private spheres. There is no objective measure of the degree to which certain societies or polities are conspiracist; however that conspiracism occurs – and occurs on a regular basis, sustained by a variety of political actors and forces – is not under serious challenge. What can be challenged, however, are the reasons for this, which is also an under-studied area of political science in the Middle East region. The aim of this paper has been to present some thoughts on the political science explanations that might assist in developing a cohesive account for conspiracism in the Middle East. The three main areas of explanation outlined have sought to do this by analyzing the state and society as conspirator: first by establishing the foundational prospects that actual conspiracies offer a potential conspiratorial narrator; second, by outlining the sources of popular conspiracism, including the current political and ideological situation in much of the Middle East and how this is perceived in the region; and third, by examining the ways in which the state, often consciously, contributes to the place of conspiracism in the public sphere and in popular discourse. Many of these observations are not unique or exceptional to the Middle East; in terms of the perceived gap between local and national politics, and the breach between state ideology and policy implementation, for example, a similar argument could be made for it being a source of conspiracism in the West as well. Even state conspiracism is not wholly unique to the Middle East and occurs in other cultures; while most Western liberal-democratic states are less inclined toward outright conspiracist discourse, and perhaps even less sharp in their political rhetoric, they are not unfamiliar with political language and idiom that seeks to influence populations through the less-than-scientific application of fact to state narrative. The

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Middle East is an interesting case study, however, not least because of the political fragility of many states, the conflicts within groups in many states, the international conflicts that have bedeviled the region and continue to do so, and in turn the role that conspiracism has played in these areas and the relationships that it has developed with them.***

REFERENCES Ajami, F. (1992): The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ajami, F. (1998): The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation’s Odyssey. New York: Pantheon. Al-Azm, S. (1997): “An Interview with Sadik J. Al-Azm”, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 3, Summer, pp. 113–126. Al-Azm, S. (2004): “Time Out of Joint: Western Dominance, Islamist Terror, and the Arab Imagination”, Boston Review, October–November, available HTTP: http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/alazm.html (accessed 11 March 2005). Bayat, A. (1997): Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran. New York: Columbia University Press. Bill, J.; Springborg, R. (1990): Politics in the Middle East, 3rd ed. Glenview IL: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown. Bonney, R. (2004): Jih¯ ad: From Qur’¯ an to bin L¯ aden. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Brown, L.C. (1984): International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Buruma, I.; Margalit, A. (2004): Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies. New York: Penguin Press. CCC (Centre for Conspiracy Culture). (no date): Conspiracy Thinking and Conspiracy Studying, available online at http://www.wkac.ac.uk/ccc/content/essay1. htm (accessed 11 March 2005). Cooper, M.; Ferguson, G. (1990): “The Return of the Paranoid Style in American Politics”, U.S. News & World Report, 12 March, pp. 30–31. Davis, E.; Gavrielides, N. (1991): “Statecraft, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture in Iraq and Kuwait”, in E. Davis, N. Gavrielides (eds) Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture. Gainesville FL: University Press of Florida. Eickelman, D.F.; Piscatori, J. (1996): Muslim Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. El–Nawawy, M.; Iskandar, A. (2003): Al–Jazeera: The Story of the Network that is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.

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Fanon, F. (1965): A Dying Colonialism. London: Pelican; an English translation from the original French, F. Fanon (1959) L’An Cinq de la Révolution Algérienne, François Maspero. Fenster, M. (1999): Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Friedman, T. (1999): The Lexus and the Olive Tree. London: HarperCollins. Fukuyama, F. (1992): The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press. Hofstadter, R. (1965): The Paranoid Style in American Politics. New York: Knopf. Hoy, C.; Ostrovsky, V. (1990): By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer. New York: St Martin’s Press. Juergensmeyer, M. (2000): Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley: University of California Press. Kassem, M. (2004): Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Kishtainy, K. (1985): Arab Political Humour. London: Quartet Books. Lapidus, I.M. (1990): “Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History”, in P.S. Khoury; J. Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press. Lewis, B. (1993): Islam and the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, B. (2002): What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Lewis, B. (2003): The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Mansour, F. (1992): The Arab World: Nation, State and Democracy. London: Zed Books. Mitchell, T. (1988): Colonising Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ostrovsky, V. (1994): The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad’s Secret Agenda. New York: HarperCollins. Owen, R. (1993): “Egypt and Europe: From French Expedition to British Occupation”, in A. Hourani; P.S. Khoury; M.C. Wilson (eds) The Modern Middle East: A Reader. Berkeley: University of California Press. Perthes, V. (1995): The Political Economy of Syria under Asad. London: I. B. Taurus. Pipes, D. (1996): The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy. London: MacMillan Press. Pratt, R. (2003): “Essay Review: Theorizing Conspiracy – Before and After 9/11”, Theory and Society, vol. 32, no. 2, April, 255–271, available HTTP: http://mtprof. msun.edu/Spr2002/Pratt.html (accessed 11 March 2005). Raviv, D.; Melman, Y. (1990): Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Reeve, S. (2000): One Day in September: The Story of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre. London: Faber and Faber. Rogan, E.L. (2001): “Jordan and 1948: The Persistence of an Official History”, in E.L. Rogan; A. Shlaim (eds) The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Rubin, B. (1980): Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rudmin, F. (2003): Conspiracy Theory as Naïve Deconstructive History. available online at http://newdemocracyworld.org/conspiracy.htm (accessed 11 March 2005). Sadiki, L. (2004): The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter–Discourses. London: Hurst & Company. Said, E. (1978): Orientalism. New York: Vintage (“Vintage Edition”). Saikal, A. (1980): The Rise and Fall of the Shah: 1941–1979. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Silverstein, P.A. (2000): “Regimes of (Un)Truth: Conspiracy Theory and the Transnationalization of the Algerian Civil War”, Middle East Report, 214, Spring, available online at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer214/214_silverstein.html (accessed 11 March 2005). Thomas, G. (1999): Gideon’s Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. New York: St Martin’s Press. Waterbury, J. (1983): The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Waterbury, J. (1993): Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wedeen, L. (1999): Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Wildavsky, A. (1988): “Response to D.D. Laitin, ‘Political Culture and Political Preferences’”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 82, no. 2, 589–597. Williamson, J. (1993): “Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus’ ”, World Development, vol. 21, no. 8, 1329–1336. Young, M.J.; Launer, M.K. (1988): Flights of Fancy, Flights of Doom: KAL007 and Soviet–American Rhetoric. Lanham MD: University Press of America.

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7 POLEMICS ON “ORIENTALISM” AND “ CONSPIRACY” IN INDONESIA: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON THE CASE OF JIL VERSUS DDII (2001–2005)

J. M. Muslimin

INTRODUCTION In the context of Indonesia, the discussions and deliberations on Orientalism and conspiracy have been discussed quietly and prevailed for years. The discussion on this issue had been started at least before the Independence of Indonesia, especially when the polemics on cultures was in progress, and correspondence occurred between the figures of Islamic movement, M. Natsir, A. Hassan, and Soekarno (The first Indonesian President) in the 1930s and 1940s.1 The intensified discussion came up again in the 1970s with the emergence of the Islamic reform movement. The spokespersons of this movement were Nurcholish Madjid and friends, who were mainly the Islamic activists and those from Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) and from the circle of the State Islamic Institute (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta promoted by Harun Nasution. Furthermore, an intellectual figure from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Abdurrahman Wahid, participated as well in the movement.2 What had been done by Nurcholish Madjid and Harun Nasution were then “confronted” by old figures, especially those from the ex-Islamic Party Masyumi, such as Rasjidi, a professor in Islamic Studies from the University of Indonesia (UI), who was at the same time one of the founders of the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII). In support of Rasjidi´s position, a similar reaction also came from Ridwan Saidi, a colleague of Nurcholish Madjid from the Islamic Student Association (HMI) itself.3

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If we observe some points carefully, such as the logic used by the proponents of reform and those who were against the Islamic thought reform movement, we find that the points of argument were indirectly based on the assumption that there were strong influences of orientalist’s thoughts in the minds of reformers. Furthermore, the influences were so strong that it was possible that the reformers had made themselves complicit with Western or Orientalist interests.4 The following elaborations will shed light on the development of the discourse and themes of the debates which had occurred, especially in recent years: in the time when words like “orientalist’s influences” and “conspiracy” have become more direct and real.

LIBERAL ISLAMIC NETWORK (JARINGAN ISLAM LIBERAL, JIL) VERSUS THE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC PREACHING COUNCIL (DEWAN DAKWAH ISLAMIAH INDONESIA, DDII) The emergence of JIL in 2001 was the continuation of Islamic reform movement whose seeds had been planted long before. The activists of JIL are dominated by young people who had been raised on NU traditions and led by Ulil Abshar Abdallah who is also active in the NGO known as the Committee of Human Resources Development Studies (LAKPESDAM) of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Other names associated with this group are Zuhairi Misrawi and Lutfi al-Saukani.5 It can be said that JIL originally brought up the agenda of Islamic thought reformation which was more or less similar to the movement that preceded them (Paramadina group led by Nurcholish Madjid). However, compared to Paramadina, JIL activities and voices are more various, vocal and influential. JIL runs its own website on the internet and initiates public dialogs through radio all over Indonesia, 6 television and national newspapers. Furthermore, JIL actively pursues cooperative programs with American-based foundations, such as Ford Foundation or the Asia Foundation. Such widespread networking and publications had never been attempted by Paramadina. The antithesis of JIL is DDII.7 The founding fathers of the latter were the old activists of the legendary Islamic Party (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Masyumi). The prominent spokesmen of this group are Adian Husaini and Adnin Armas. Both are graduates of the International

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Institute of Islamic Thought (ISTAC) Malaysia, and also Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, an ex-journalist and social activist.8 Related to the accusation of the orientalist’s role and the influence and the existence of a conspiracy, some of the main themes brought up by the JIL which are confronted directly by DDII’s activists are as follows:9 IN C LUSIVE THE OLOGY

JIL activists are people who vocally state this issue on some occasions. The JIL community hold a common view that the epistemological building of the right Islamic attitudes (theological) is the submission to God regardless of the color and nature of the religion. By submitting to God, everyone will be able to achieve rewards from Him even without participating in an organized religion.10 For JIL activists, there are generally three types of attitudes toward the inter-faith dialog process. Firstly, it is an exclusively theological attitude. Consequently, by this attitude only Islam is considered the right religion, while other religions are wrong paths that mislead their followers. Secondly, it is the inclusive attitude; this attitude confirms the view that religions outside Islam are considered to be implicit forms of Islam. Thirdly, it is the pluralistic-theological attitude. This attitude is best expressed in the statement that “other religions are equally valid ways to the same truth”, “other religions speak of different, but equally valid truths”, “each religion expresses an important part of the truth”.11 From the logic and arguments used in expressing their inclusive and plural theological views, the JIL group usually refers to the theologians and religious thinkers such as Karl Rahner, Alvin Platinga, John Hick and Syed Hosein Nasr, besides referring to the Koran. TH E D ESAC RA LIZATION OF ISLAMIC LAW

The refusal of Islamic Law within the nation-state context is a theme eagerly taken up by JIL as well. For JIL activists, the first victims of an imposition of Islamic Law shall be women.12 Besides, there will be many negative impacts which will come up as a result of forcing the implementation of Islamic Law in Indonesia. Ranging from poverty issues, injustice in Law to the deprivation of civil rights as a result of the centralism of power and exegesis by one single exegete.13

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Besides those effects, for JIL activists the tragic thing is that the implementation of Islamic law will ruin the foundations of national secularism which will end up in a totalitarian state. Ulil Abshar Abdallah states . . . Liberal Islam can accept a secular form of a state which is superior to a fundamentalist one because secular country is capable of containing both energies of piety and sinfulness at the same time.14

On other occasions, Ulil also explains that in Islamic law, ritual aspects are distinguished from the inter-personal (interactive and horizontal activities) ones. Ritual areas have been arranged in detail. All ritual procedures must be in accordance with the fixed guidelines of the religion. For example, the number of raka’as in prayers cannot be added or reduced. On the other hand, inter-personal areas are progressive and dynamic, corresponding to the development of human civilization and cultures. Whereas God’s law related to The Book of Criminal Law (Kitab Undangundang Hukum Pidana, KUHP) never existed. The punishments such as cutting off hand, retaliation and stoning are simply derived from the influences of Arabic cultures.15 According to Ulil, the core of law is the realization of five basic virtues: to protect the soul, mind, religion, possessions and honor. For instance, the protection of the mind is realized in the form of liquor prohibition. This prohibition is conditional. Therefore, vodka in Russia can be allowed, since it is very cold there.16 In other essays, Ulil states that issues concerning Islamic law is a manifestation of the the Muslim community which have resulted from their incapacity to cope with the many essential problems they face. Furthermore, the JIL group also suggest a process of deconstruction of the established logics of Islamic law. The failure in deconstructing it will cause Islamic law to remain in shackles and restricted within the old paradigm.17 Still related to the Islamic law, another member of JIL (Luthfi al-Saukani) also proposes that the concept of Islamic law does not really exist. The concept was in fact derived from ideas and works of those who have over-idealized Islam.18 To Luthfi, all laws implemented by a society are basically positive laws. These include the law applied by the Prophet himself. The Koran became the source of the constitution used at that time only because there were no other sources better than the Koran itself.19

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However, Luthfi also states that the Koran itself was not the only source of law at that time. Historically, Muhammad himself also derived from the traditions of the people, including the cases of criminal law, such as stoning, body amputation, burning at the stake, in the cases of sodomy, and the implementation of blood money in cases of murder and forgiveness. To Lutfi, given such historical facts, Muhammad was a man who interacted with the Jewish people and tribal groups living in Medina and took up the existing laws which applied to the society at the time. Therefore, the law which was implemented was not a purely Islamic law. Furthermore, in some rituals such as the pilgrimage to Mecca, are continuations from the tradition and practice of the Jahilliyah era (before Islam). The concept of alms giving is a heritage of Roman law which had been revised. Prayer is a legacy of the Jewish traditions taught by David, which had been modified.20 In the economic system, according to Luthfi, Muhammad consented to all Roman practices which dominated almost all administrations and states. Moreover, Muhammad himself still used coins with the picture of Yustianus and dealt with trade transactions following Roman ways. In short, all the efforts of the Prophet were directed toward establishing a civil society on the basis of revelations which he had received recorded in the Koran, but he did not stop there. He also analyzed the realities which had developed whether in economic, social or cultural issues. 21 CONFRONTIN G FUNDAMENTALISM

In their statements, the JIL community also declared that one of their main tasks is to eliminate the virus of fundamentalism. It is expressed in one of the essays they posted in their official website: The fear over the emergence of “extremism” and “fundamentalism” of the religion has made some people worried recently. The indications of this are so significant. The rise of a number of Islamic militants, church destruction (and other religious buildings), the proliferation of media that publicise “militant Islam” aspirations, the use of the term “jihad” as a means of justification in some attacks towards other religions, etc, are several developments which indicate the rise of the extreme religion aspirations. Of course, if there is no effort to restrain the dominance

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of the militant religious point of views, in the long term, these views held by militant religious groups will possibly be dominant. When this happens, there will be some negative impacts on the establishment of democracy in Indonesia because the militant religious point of view generally provokes conflicts between existing religions, let’s say between Islam and Christianity . . . Open, plural and humane religious points of views are the only essential values at the foundation of a democratic life.22 JI L´ S SOURC ES O F ARGUMENTS AND J U S T I F I C AT I O N

If we observe the sources of authority used, and the process of legitimizing arguments conducted by JIL in all their statements and opinions, we will find that the patterns and references are as follows. First, they refer to the legitimate primary and secondary religious textual sources. Primary texts are the ones taken from the Qur’an or traditions, while the secondary texts are derived from the opinions of classical and contemporary scholars; second, they refer to the texts and opinions contextually and not literally. It means that the socio-historical situations and conditions when the text were made constitutes the most important part in understanding the meaning of the texts; third, to find social relevance and problems mapped according to modern situations, the JIL community also refer to the books and main opinions of orientalists. Some of the Christian theologists’ and orientalists’ thoughts which are frequently referred to are the conceptions of religious secularization and theological revolution of Harvey Cox, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ludwig Feuerbach, analysis of the social history of Islamic law by JND Anderson, Joseph Schacht, intellectual and sociological mapping by Charles Kurzman, Qur’anic studies and researches by Theodore Nöldeke, Friedrich Schwally, Gotthelf Bergsträsser, Aloys Sprenger, Arthur Jeffrey, Andrew Rippin, John Wansbrough, Abraham Geiger, history of Islamic culture by Montgomery Watt, etc.23 Among Muslim writers, the JIL group quote much from the results of studies on Islam by Fazlurrahman, theological revolution by Farid Essack, Ashghar Ali Enginer, analysis of Islam and politics by Ali Abdurraziq, Islam and feminism by Fatima Mernissi, social history of Islamic law by AA Fyzee, Qur’anic textual analysis by Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Muhammad Arkoun, etc.24

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Furthermore, as mentioned in their official website in 2001, in order to become contributor in some of the JIL publications and media, the JIL group cooperates with several scholars and intellectuals from many parts of the world, including Sadik J. Al-Azm from the University of Damascus, Syria.25 DDII´S RESPONSES As we can predict, the emergence of the JIL group was harshly responded to by the DDII group. From some responses available, especially the ones represented by the writings of Adian Husaini, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz and Adnin Armas, the characteristics of the responses can be classified as follows: First, the JIL group are refuted through the Islamic literal approach. The JIL group is clearly classified as a group that goes astray theologically. The JIL group is not only regarded as disturbing the established religious understanding, but they have also departed from the basis and foundation of Islam itself. Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, who best represents the first response states that the JIL group destroys the meanings of Islam, faith, believer and infidel; delegitimate (doubt) the validity of the copy of the Utsmani Qur’an and offer a critical edition of Qur’an; compares the Qur’an with other holy books; delegitimate (doubt the validity) of Qur’anic exegesis; ruin Islamic law.26

Intending to compare what has been done by the JIL group with the opinions of Ali Abdul Raziq from al-Azhar University, Adian Husaini gives historical illustrations that Raziq was expelled from the al-Azhar Scholar Council due to (a) making Islamic law a religious law that had nothing to do with wordly rules; (b) having the opinion that the only motive of prophet Muhammad’s campaigns was political expansion; (c) asserting that governmental body in the Muhammad era had no definite government system; (d) believing that Muhammad was supposed to be a mere messenger of God (spiritual leader), not a political leader; (e) stating that there was no agreement among scholars to appoint an Islamic leader; (f) denying the existence of the Islamic court system; (g) thinking that the government in the early period of Islam was a secular government, and not a religious one.27

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Second, there are responses and accusation that the JIL in fact has been involved in a conspiracy with orientalists, Christian, West and Jewish people to weaken the strength of the Muslim community. Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Adian Husaini and Adnin Armas say that all the opinions put forward by the JIL group are the manifestations of orientalist influences and part of conspiracies involving Christian-Western-Jewish interests.28 Adian Husaini, a prolific writer on conspiracy theory, after giving his comments that there are orientalist influences in the JIL ways of thinking, concludes that these are all “Christian missionary traps” and “Zionist’s tricks”.29 Furthermore he mentions that the history of Zionist influence has prevailed in Indonesia since long ago. Referring to the book written by Iskandar P. Nugraha titled Decomposing East and West Boundaries: Theosophy and Nationalist movement in Indonesia (Mengikis Batas Timur dan Barat: Gerakan Theosofi dan Nasionalisme Indonesia (2001),30 A. Husaini concludes that long before the independence of Indonesia, Freemasonry organization which were really a secret Jewish organization had emerged in Indonesia.31 According to Husaini, Freemasonry exerted influence through its activities in the theosophy movement. This theosophy movement had a great impact on national independence figures. For instance, Soekarno’s parents were members of this theosophic organization. Muhammad Hatta himself (vice-President in Soekarno´s era) also obtained a scholarship from Ir. Fournier and van Leeuwen, who were both members of the theosophy organization. While other figures of the national movement, namely, Mohammad Yamin, Abu Hanifah, Agus Salim, Achmad Soebardjo, Radjiman Widyodiningrat, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Douwes Dekker, Armijn Pane, Sanoesi Pane were classified as members or closely associated with this theosophy organization.32 To Husaini, this Zionist influence was so significant in Indonesia that in the reformation era (2001) Zionist strategies were still being applied. He quotes without critical comment the book of Sidik Jatnika The Zionist´s Movement with Malay Face (Gerkan Zionis Berwajah Melayu)33 as follows: The most advanced Zionist movement agents in Indonesia is a movement that hijacks the reformation euphoria. In the name of liberty, human rights, etc, they openly start to strive for a recognition of many social and sexual deviant behaviors as the reality that must be

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appreciated and given the right to live in Indonesia. They campaign clearly that communism and atheism or satanic worship must be provided the right to live in Indonesia as religions or ideologies. They even shamelessly strive for prostitution, homosexuality and lesbianism to be regarded as valid professions and behaviors. Surprisingly, when people raid or attack these social deviants, the blame is not on the latter, but the people are the ones who are held responsible for violating individual human rights to fornicate, and to have sex with the same sex (homosexuality or lesbianism).34

Husaini´s colleague Adnin Armas wrote a book which is fully illustrated with many comments and philosophical arguments. However, he gives his book the very simple title of “The Influence of Christian-Orientalists towards Liberal Islam”.

THE TRIUMPH OF CONSPIRACY THEORY? In responding to the arguments and ideas of the JIL, the activists of DDII seem to accuse JIL of being conspirators using the theory of conspiracy to refute their ideas. Why did they suggest such an assumption? Looking at the structure of their arguments and the socio-political context of Indonesia, there are several possibilities that can motivate it, namely the following: First, it is the psycho-politics of the Indonesian scriptural Moslem group. They feel that they have repeatedly failed to implement Islamic syariah as the national system of Indonesian law. Since the Dutch colonial era, the Old Order of President Soekarno, the New Order of President Soeharto, until the era of reformation, Islamic syariah, as they have defined it, could not become part of the real life in Indonesia. This reality could generate social disappointment which can in turn create prejudice toward others.35 Such psycho-politics does not take place among the substantial Moslem groups, such as the JIL group. This group basically assumes that the content and substance of Islam is more important than its formal nature. They also believe that though Islam is a universal and eternal faith, it must nevertheless be interpreted continually in accordance with the development of the time and context. Besides, they assume that the form

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of the Indonesian state which is based on Pancasila is a final alternative, and there is no need to establish an Islamic State. They also assume that personal interpretations regarding the validity and truth of the religion is relative; the absolute and authentic truth can only be reached by God. These assumptions of the JIL group make them more tolerant than others on the issue of religious interpretation. Such a basic understanding can also make it easier for them than the scripturalist group to hold dialog with different social entities. With such a basic attitude, socially and politically, the JIL are more pragmatic, open-minded and accommodative toward others. These attitudes, without doubt, can be accused by the scriptural group as conspiracies with out-group interests, mainly America (United States of America). Second, it is an oversimplified reading of reality. The scriptural reading and interpretation of reality give a theological and normative concept similar to the formulas in math and the natural sciences. With this formula, people can generalize the definition of “we” and “they” only by a simple understanding. As a consequence of such an outlook, when they see something different from their standard they will judge it soon as a part of an imitative process and/or conspiracy. The example of such a quick judgment can be seen from how Husaini concludes that Agus Salim’s interaction with different figures from different political groups can be interpreted to prove that he was involved and was a part of conspiracy with a secret mission which is called Freemasonry movement. In fact, Salim was known since his youth as a Moslem leader in the history of Indonesian struggle for independence. He was also involved for long time in the Sarikat Islam (SI). Furthermore, without a clear and detailed explanation, Husaini also assumed that the emergence of the human right awareness movement and the defense of communism, lesbianism and homosexualism are also parts of a Zionist global mission. So far, we cannot understand what the relationship between these issues and Zionism is. The proper answer we find is that the root of the assumption and accusation is an oversimplified reading of reality and the cultivation of a theory of conspiracy. Third, the use of conspiracy theory found its ground and political momentum through the use of nationalistic issues, public sentiment as well as public emotion for particular purposes. After the process of reform in the atmosphere of Indonesian politics signaled by the fall of Soeharto, the scriptural Moslem group failed to win significantly and dominantly

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in the fair and democratic political competition. The emergence of suspicion of the influence of global Zionism can be understood as the struggle to decrease and combat what they called American interest (such as the campaign to uphold human rights, democratization issues, cooperation with Ford Foundation or the Asia Foundation). However, such a strategy of accusation relates also to the efforts of strengthening the symbols of Indonesian solidarity and to come closer to the nationalist conservative group who are still dominant, particularly in military. Moreover, after Indonesian reform, there are many individuals in the military who had a special relationship with the scriptural Moslem group. The close linkages between them are due to the existence of mutual benefit: by approaching the scripturalists, the ex-military group expected them to give political support and moral protection from being jailed due to their black record concerning the politics of violence and human rights in the era of Soeharto. Whereas for the scriptural Moslem group, to be close to the ex-military power is also important, because it can break tensions in their relationship (at least at a symbolic level) with the nationalistconservative group. Furthermore, with this process of mutual symbiosis, the teaching and mission of the scriptural group can be conserved and accommodated in the political structure and bureaucracy.

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8 STRUCTURAL ORIENTALISM, CONTESTED ORIENTALISM, POST-ORIENTALISM: A CASE STUDY OF WESTERN FRAMINGS OF “VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA”

Arndt Graf 1 The debates on Orientalism tend to reiterate some particular aspects:2 –

the possible bias of Western academic, literary, and artistic productions of “knowledge” about non-European or non-Western cultures and societies;

–

the relevance of such a possible bias to Western countries and their political, economic, and military strategies toward non-Western countries;

–

the relevance of such possible Western bias to the world market of knowledge production on non-Western countries, including the knowledge market of the (formerly) colonized.

In this paper, I develop the hypothesis that, at least in the case of academic knowledge production on Indonesia, the overall Western intellectual hegemony has considerably decreased since the colonial era, in several clearly distinguishable phases which I call structural Orientalism, contested Orientalism, and post-Orientalism. To illustrate this hypothesis in an initial, limited case study, I depart theoretically from one of Edward Said’s observations on typical aspects of Western Orientalist bias, namely Western constructions of the deviant violence of such “Oriental peoples”, as Muslims, Indians, or Africans. Said (1978) argues that such notions of Oriental violence often served historically as a legitimization for imperialist “pacification” and “civilizing” efforts shouldered, as they saw it, by Western powers. If this is the case, then such an assumed popularity of the cliché of the

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“violent Oriental” may have led to a great quantity of publications on violence in non-Western countries in certain phases. Hence, the quantity of Western publications on non-Western violence can be taken as an indicator of a qualitative tendency, especially in a long-term comparative perspective. As a case study, I have decided to look at the output numbers of printed publications on “violence in Indonesia” published in Indonesia and abroad, from the era of high imperialism and colonialism (1880) to the present day. Indonesia could be an excellent example for Orientalist constructions of the violent Oriental in general and the violent Muslim in particular, since it is the world’s most populous Islamic country with about 200 million people as registered believers. The question is whether the assumed Orientalist clichés of violent Orientals have produced a corresponding quantity of Western publications on Indonesian violence.3

THE SAMPLE My inquiry is based on the holdings of the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV) in Leiden, the Netherlands, which is the central research center for the former and current colonies of the Netherlands in Southeast Asia, South Africa, and the Caribbean. The aim of the KITLV is to collect and document everything which is of interest to these (former) spheres of Dutch interest. Its holdings are most comprehensive on the topic of violence in Indonesia, although there are certainly various publications which have still escaped the attention of the KITLV team. In this regard, the acquisition policies of the KITLV function as an important filter for the field. Since the KITLV is one of the most prominent centers of Indonesian studies worldwide, its policies of inclusion or exclusion in its library exert an important gatekeeper role. This gatekeeper role is even more accentuated by the documenting services of the KITLV online catalog.4 In contrast to other great collections on Indonesia, the KITLV online catalog documents not only its book holdings but also its holdings of journal articles on Indonesia in great detail. This additional service adds to the attractiveness of the KITLV as the standard resource on Indonesia which most researchers in the field of Indonesian studies would choose to consult. The KITLV makes its

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immense library accessible through such aids as keywords. On average, four to five keywords are assigned per publication, usually according to the concepts which occur in the texts themselves. This means that, for instance, a text which centers on terms like “war” or “conflict” is only accorded the additional keyword “violence” if this term plays an important role in the text, at least in the eyes of the librarians of the KITLV. Consequently this assignment of keywords constitutes a second gatekeeper filter. The sample which any researcher on Indonesian affairs can obtain via a keyword search in the KITLV online catalog is therefore a doubly filtered rendition of the complex realities of publications on that topic. However, it is a powerful and important rendition, since it contributes largely to the subsequent renditions in further research. Our inquiry into the publications on “violence in Indonesia” can only benefit from this librarian gatekeeper practice, since it allows us to check all the publications on Indonesia that are catalogued in the KITLV system for the occurrence of the keyword “violence” – regardless of what kind of violence is dealt with in the individual publication. We thereby obtain the standard sample which every researcher on Indonesian violence consulting the KITLV catalog would obtain using this keyword search. In the following, I will look at this standard sample by taking into account the main periods in the history of modern Indonesia, namely: –

the period of high colonialism, from 1880 until 1942;

–

the period of Japanese occupation, 1942–1945;

–

the period of Indonesia’s war of independence (the so-called revolusi), 1945–1949;

–

the first democratic period in Indonesia, 1949–1957/9;

–

the period of authoritarian regimes in Indonesia under Sukarno and Suharto, 1957/9–1965/6 and 1965/6–1998;

–

the second period of democracy and freedom of speech, 1998 to now.5

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“VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA” IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD In the phase of high colonialism, according to the KILTV keyword assignments, there was almost no monographic publication with a central focus on the concept of “violence in Indonesia”. The few exceptions are literary works, mostly with a Sino-Malay background, which feature violence against women. The KITLV holds such works from 1897, 1935, and 1938. Since Sino-Malay novels were not collected systematically in colonial times, it is possible that the few documented works represent an entire genre focusing on that particular notion of violence against women.6 The computer catalog of the KITLV does not list any academic work by either Dutch or other Western authors from the colonial era under the keyword “violence in Indonesia”. Possible explanations are that –

the violence on the Dutch side was not framed by Dutch colonial writers and the KITLV librarians as “violence” but, say, as “punishment”, “war”, or “conflict”;

–

the fashionable term for framing Indonesian violence in that period was and still is not “violence” but something with a more cultureoriented focus, such as “head-hunting”.

The first assumption can be substantiated if we check the keyword “war” in the computer catalog of the KITLV, for every year from 1880 to 1942, i.e. the year in which the Dutch East Indies were occupied by Japanese troops. In fact, this framing of Dutch violence as Dutch warfare in Indonesia was apparently rather popular in the colonial period as well as it is still in the present cataloguing system, since the KITLV catalog lists numerous Dutch works from the colonial period under the keyword “war”. Many of these publications focus on colonial wars in various areas of Indonesia, such as Lombok, Bali, Java, and Aceh. In fact, one of the most violent, cruel, and bloody colonial wars against the kingdoms of Bali in 1906 is featured under the euphemistic book title “The Expedition to Bali” (Ekspeditie naar Bali 1906).7 Apart from such euphemistic renditions of Dutch violence, the search for the keyword “war” in the phase of high colonialism in Indonesia also produces a number of Malay-language literary texts, mostly novels. In some of these novels, “war” is associated with distant times and remote

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countries. However, some of these works have a very contemporary setting, such as the Japanese cruelties in China in the 1930s, the colonial war of Italy in Libya, or wars over Tibet. It might be an interesting topic for future research to see whether such Malay-language literary renditions of distant wars served the function of fictionalizing domestic conflicts, including those with the Dutch colonizers. Possibly, books like that on the war of Italy in Libya can be seen as an important sub-text in the colonial Indonesian discourse on “violence” between Europeans and non-Europeans which was otherwise dominated by official Dutch euphemistic framings. Let us now have a closer look at how Indonesian violence was framed by Dutch authors in the period of colonialism, according to the KITLV sample. A certain emphasis seems to lie on the topic of head-hunting, with monographic publications in 1916, 1931, and 1936 which are listed with that particular keyword.8 Apart from these, there are various anthropological publications on Indonesian affairs featured under the keyword of “death” which span the entire colonial period. In most of these publications, however, it is death rituals which are described and discussed, which means that it is not so much the violent death which constituted the main emphasis. For the colonial period, it is therefore questionable whether books on violent Orientals as such were published in great numbers in the Netherlands or in the Dutch East Indies. Rather, it seems, the emphasis tended to be placed on deep cultural differences in a broader sense. It is possibly part of this perceived deep cultural gap between the colonized and the colonizer to which the anthropological gaze in most of the books from the colonial era kept in the KITLV seems to be restricted. The vast majority deals with the study of the colonized. The colonizing endeavor undertaken by the Dutch, including violence perpetrated by the Dutch themselves in the various colonial wars, is left unruffled in this field of colonial anthropological studies.

1945–1949: “POLICE ACTIONS” AGAINST “VIOLENT YOUTH GANGS” On 17 August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia. At that time, the defeated Japanese army was still in the archipelago, and many parts of the Netherlands were still destroyed by the

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Second World War. However, the government of the Netherlands which had just been itself liberated from foreign occupation did not accept this declaration of Indonesian independence and sent troops to restore “order”. Until the final recognition of Indonesia’s independence in 1949, a cruel and very violent colonial war was fought out, with an unaccounted number of Indonesians being killed.9 Our keyword search in the library of the KITLV for the traces of this immense violence produces only a few hits for this period from 1945 to 1949. These few hits seem to link the notion of “violence” only to the acts carried out by the Indonesians involved. One such title of a pamphlet written by a Chinese Indonesian in 1947 reads as follows: Memorandum, outlining acts of violence and inhumanity perpetrated by Indonesian bands on innocent Chinese before and after the Dutch police action was enforced on 21 July 1947. This publication seems to have been in line with other elements of the public relations of the pro-Dutch elements, since the KITLV holds another similar publication from 1949 under the keyword “violence”, namely Miscellaneous documents covering the period January 1948–June 1948 in connection with the Truce Agreement and the Eighteen Renville Principles.10 Apparently, there is a distinct associative link between the concepts of “Indonesian violence” and “revolusi”, under which name the Indonesian war of independence from 1945 to 1949 is known. It seems that the two documents mentioned were part of the political strategy of the pro-Dutch elements to denigrate Indonesian endeavors to achieve independence by pointing out acts of violence committed by pro-independence youth bands. The overall propaganda goal was to create the image of pro-independence Indonesians as being violent in the sense of being uncivilized, inhumanely cruel, and savage. It begs the question to what extent such a rendition of Indonesian violence as non-civilized savagery could build on already existing stereotypes of Indonesian cultures as being culturally fundamentally different. In contrast to the association of the notions of “Indonesians” and “violence”, the violence perpetrated by the colonizer was merely labeled as “police action”, underlining the fundamental difference between those who defend law, order, and civilization, and those who are in need of being policed or pacified. The antonym of the concept of “violence in Indonesia” can thus be seen in the often-quoted “pax neerlandica” (Dutch

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peace) which hides the structural and partially very manifest violence of the colonial regime behind the image of “Dutch peace”.11 It is interesting that both documents of 1947 and 1948 mentioned were written in English, not Dutch, the language of almost all the other publications from the colonial period. The principal target group was apparently an international, English-speaking audience outside the Netherlands, most probably in America, which should be convinced of the deep cultural legitimization of further Dutch rule, police actions, and efforts at pacification. Eventually, for various reasons these propaganda efforts finally failed, and the government of the Netherlands had to accept the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, not least having to bow to American pressure. One of the main legacies of that period of Dutch violence in Indonesia is that the concept of “violence in Indonesia” obtained the connotation of Indonesian savagery as opposed to Dutch-Western civilization. The question in terms of Orientalism is how powerful that particular Orientalist construction of “violence in Indonesia” was to be in the post-colonial period.

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION ON INDONESIAN VIOLENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE One of the key factors in the evaluation of Orientalist distortions of Indonesian affairs is that the Dutch colonizers had invested very little in the modern education of the millions of Indonesians whom they governed. Werner Röll (1981, 2nd ed.) estimates that in the year of Indonesia’s declaration of independence, 1945, there were only about 400 Indonesian alumni of universities and colleges, including engineers and medical doctors, out of a population of then approximately 70 million people. More than 93% of Indonesians were illiterate. Since the Dutch colonizers were systematically trained at their excellent Orientalist institutions, the colonizers enjoyed a considerable intellectual hegemony over the colonized. This intellectual hegemony dominated all academic fields, including those concerned with aspects of violence. In order to liberate Indonesian discourses from that kind of Orientalist intellectual hegemony, the various Indonesian governments since 1945 have launched huge endeavors to build up an educational system which

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would be able to produce competitive knowledge. Despite various hostile Duth interventions in the 1940s and 1950s, and despite several errors of learning as they went along, the overall results in the education system of Indonesia are impressive. In 1980, there were already 196,000 Indonesian students at about 40 universities and colleges. In 1990, these numbers had mushroomed to the incredible number of 1.5 million students at about 900 universities and colleges.12 It is the intellectual abilities of these millions of well-educated Indonesians which have shifted the balance of intellectual hegemony considerably. Foreign renditions of Indonesian affairs have become increasingly less important. Orientalism as a foreign intellectual hegemony seems therefore to be most relevant for the colonial period and the few first decades thereafter. For this period, it could be called “structural Orientalism” in the production of academic knowledge, since structurally the academic centers of the colonizers were of an overwhelming importance to the colonized. At the same time, “structural Orientalism” does not necessarily mean that each and every contribution which was published in the Netherlands or, more generally, by non-Indonesian researchers, was biased. Rather, it is the immense imbalance in the quantities of production of knowledge that led to a hegemonic position of the colonizers and hence a distorted representation of the colonized. The background to structural Orientalism in the colonial period might also have informed the ideology of anti-Orientalism with which we can identify the broad interest in books on “Orientalism”, particularly in the 1970s in Indonesia and beyond. Examples for that heightened interest are Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) as well as the Indonesian-language book Orientalisme dan Orientalisten (“Orientalism and Orientalists”), by Ismail Jakub (1971), than Rector of the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) of Surabaya, Indonesia.13 At an individual level, the anti-Orientalist ideologies were probably most important to the generation of Indonesian scholars of the 1970s who were among the first to face Dutch or Western intellectual hegemony at an academic level in greater numbers. Probably, it was often quite a bitter struggle for many Indonesians of that generation to gain academic acceptance in the traditional Western centers of research on Indonesia. It is understandable that concepts of Western academic arrogance and bias like “Orientalism” gained great popularity in these years, especially since

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ideologies of anti-Orientalism were often linked with those of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. However, as far as the topic of “violence in Indonesia” is concerned, the situation for Indonesians was even more complicated because of the authoritarian regimes of Sukarno and Suharto which lasted from 1957/9 to 1998, with a transitional period wrenched by violence from 1965 to 1968.14 State violence committed by these regimes15 was all too often too dangerous to be discussed openly within the country itself. In this regard, Western universities offered not only Westerners, but also dissident Indonesians, an open space for research and criticism. This has to be kept in mind when we look at the quantitative output of independently published publications (monographs, collective volumes, separate editions and the like) on Indonesian violence from 1945 until the step-down of President Suharto in May 1998 which are listed in the KITLV catalog with the keyword “violence”. Until the end of 1997, 30 such monographic publications on violence in Indonesia were published outside the country (eleven of which in the Netherlands). In Indonesia itself, the number in the same period was 29. These approximately balanced output numbers are a clear indicator that the conditions of structural Orientalism had already altered considerably. This clearly different period should therefore bear a different name. I would suggest designating it the period of “contested Orientalism”, since it is marked by a shifting balance in the struggle on intellectual hegemony in which neither party had a clear advantage.

THE BOOM IN PUBLICATIONS ON INDONESIAN VIOLENCE, 1998/9–2003 1998, the year of Suharto’s step-down, marks a watershed in the knowledge production on Indonesian violence. In Indonesia, 24 books on “violence in Indonesia” were published in this year alone, outside of Indonesia only three. Broadly speaking, reviewing the sample of the KITLV holdings it can be said that the liberalized book market in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto and his regime resulted in a veritable boom in the production of knowledge about violence in Indonesia itself, as Table 1 demonstrates. From 1999 to 2003, in Indonesia alone 157 books were published on aspects of violence. This is almost three

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Table 1: Books on Indonesian violence by country, 1999–2003

Country of publication

Number of books

Percentage of the world market (i.e. of 220 books)

Percentage of the non-Indonesian market (i.e. of 63 books)

Indonesia Netherlands Australia United Kingdom USA Germany Denmark Philippines Belgium East Timor France Portugal India Singapore

157 17 10 10

71.36% 7.72% 4.54% 4.54%

– 26.98% 15.87% 15.87%

9 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1

4.09% 1.81% 1.81% 1.36% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45%

14.28% 6.34% 6.34% 4,76% 1.58% 1.58% 1.58% 1.58% 1.58% 1.58%

Total

220

quarters (71.36%) of the total production of the entire world market of books on Indonesian violence (220 books) in that period. Such an overwhelming hegemony in the production of knowledge and ideas is of course very different from the situation of structural Orientalism that had prevailed in the colonial period and the first decades after independence. I would call this period thus the period of post-Orientalism. It is interesting that these objective quantitative changes in publication output on violence in Indonesia were not immediately realized at a subjective level by everybody in the field. On the basis of the analysis of collective volumes which appeared outside of Indonesia, Purdue (2004, p. 191), for instance, summarizes that in this period “with the exception of a few entries, particularly in Coppel,16 there is little writing by Indonesian scholars” on the topic of Indonesian violence. However, whether Indonesian authors were finally included in Western collective volumes on Indonesian violence or not, the main argument

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which we can obtain from the analysis of the KITLV keyword sample is that such Western policies of exclusion and inclusion had become much less significant in terms of intellectual hegemony and Orientalist knowledge production than in the period of structural Orientalism. In this period of structural post-Orientalism, the change in the quantitative balance of intellectual hegemony becomes even clearer if the other places where books on violence in Indonesia have been published are taken into consideration. The Netherlands, as the former colonial power, still occupies the leading position in the non-Indonesian market, with 17 volumes (monographs, collective volumes, etc.) on “violence in Indonesia” published between 1999 and 2003. However, this is only 7.72% of the world production on that topic, namely 220 books. If we consider only the non-Indonesian market, i.e. 63 books, the publications published in the Netherlands still represent about a quarter of all book publications. Even if we remember that the place of publication is not necessarily linked to the national or academic background of the authors, the net balance of Indonesianist publications per country can be taken as an indicator of the attractiveness of its academic centers and academic publishers. The publication record of 1999–2003 for the Netherlands is far from the old times when this country held the academic monopoly in Indonesian studies, although it is still remarkable. This is especially the case if we limit our view to the European market only. Here, the Dutch share still consists of 17 out of 38 publications, which is almost half of the regional European market. This means that it is no longer the formerly colonized Indonesia which is confronted with the intellectual hegemony of the Netherlands, but rather its European neighbors which are not as active in studies on Indonesian affairs or which do not have similarly specialized publishing houses. At the global level, the KITLV keyword sample suggests that the non-Indonesian market of publications on violence in Indonesia from 1999 to 2003 is dominated not only by the Netherlands (17 books or 26.98%), but also by Australia (10 books or 15.87%), the United Kingdom (10 books or 15.87%), and America (9 books or 14.28%). The rest of the market is divided between 9 other countries, of which Germany, Denmark, and the Philippines produced more than one publication. In general, in these nine “small” countries the attention paid to the topic of “violence in Indonesia” by both authors and publishers seems to be of a scale considerably less than in the Netherlands and the

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three Anglo-American countries. The reasons might include a different emphasis in terms of the object of study, a different density of centers of Indonesian studies, and also that these countries are less attractive to international publications on Indonesia than the Netherlands and the Anglo-American countries.

THE WORLD MARKET OF JOURNAL CONTRIBUTIONS ON “VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA”, 1999–2003 As documented above, the general picture of the KITLV keyword sample is that the production of knowledge on the topic of “violence in Indonesia” is now far and away in the hands of Indonesians themselves. The question is whether under these thoroughly altered conditions, foreign publications (still) place different emphases on certain aspects of “violence in Indonesia” than do Indonesian contributions, constructing a particular distorted image which would fit a hypothesis of an eternal, ongoing, static Orientalism. In order to investigate this point in more depth, I shall now look at the world production of academic journal articles on the topic of “violence in Indonesia” in the five year-period from 1999 to 2003. The reason for choosing journal articles is that they are much shorter than books and that the assignment of the same number of keywords as for books is consequently much more revealing of the actual content. This enables a greater understanding of qualitative aspects. At the same time, it allows us to compare the output numbers of book publications and journal contributions on “violence in Indonesia”. Since these are two closely related, yet different categories of publication, a comparison of the results can give an indication for the validity of the keyword methodology. The sample is again constituted according to the keyword assignments by the librarians of the KITLV who normally give between four and five keywords per article. This allows the inclusion not only of those articles that have the word “violence” in their title, but also those that cover that aspect in their contents. In order to concentrate on more elaborated intellectual contributions, only journal articles of more than seven pages are taken into consideration. Contributions to collective volumes are not included, since the computer catalog of the KITLV seems to be a bit erratic in its inclusion politics in this point, with collective volumes

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sometimes being entered only as a whole, sometimes with all its individual contributions. It is of course possible that there are more publications than those mentioned here, however, the sample is constructed according to the choices made by the KITLV library team as the main gatekeepers and therefore represents one of the most important perspectives on the scene of journal contributions on “violence in Indonesia”. The first look is at the rough geographical distribution of journal articles on Indonesian violence in the five-year period from 1999 to 2003. For this period, the KITLV library documents worldwide 70 journal articles which are related to this keyword. Of these, 47 or 67.14% were published in Indonesian journals. Only about 32.86% or roughly a third of the total appeared outside of Indonesia. These numbers are very similar to those found in the book production on “violence of Indonesia” since the fall of the New Order documented above, with the Indonesian share at 71.36%. This means that the journal articles documented by the KITLV library, albeit probably not all-encompassing, also convey a realistic picture of the overall relations of knowledge production. On the basis of the KITLV keyword sample, we can no longer speak of a non-Indonesian hegemony in the intellectual discourse on the issue of Indonesian violence or of an ongoing structural Orientalism. Rather, in this phase of postOrientalism, Indonesians seem to dominate this field, at least in terms of quantitative output. The leading place for journal publications on “violence in Indonesia”, outside the country itself during the period considered, is America, or, to be more precise, the journal Indonesia which is published at Cornell University. Nine out of 23 non-Indonesian journal articles were published there, which is almost half (39.13%) of the non-Indonesian journal contributions on the subject. In this non-Indonesian category, it is possible to prove that a particular journal has a relative quantitative hegemony. This dominance is unrivaled, since the closest followers in this race for publications, Australia and the Netherlands, have only about a third of the American output in this category. With both countries each at only 13.08% of the non-Indonesian output and even a mere 4.28% share of the total world output respectively, there can be no allegations leveled that academic journals in any of these countries exert a quantitative hegemonic impact in either category which would be comparable to the colonial period of structural Orientalism. However, it has to be added that several of the 17 book publications on this topic published

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in the Netherlands in the period considered also centered on “violence in Indonesia” in the form of collective volumes. The apparent leading role of the American journal Indonesia (39.18%) in the category of journal contributions is therefore in reality challenged by the overall market share of Dutch book publications in the non-Western category (26.96%), which is about twice as much as the total American share in the book category (14.28%). In general, the analysis of the shares of the journal contributions by country of publication results in about the same leading countries of knowledge production on “violence in Indonesia” as in the book category, namely Indonesia itself as the unrivaled market leader, followed by the Anglo-American countries and the Netherlands, with a few publications elsewhere. This picture is, of course, based only on the KITLV keyword sample. It reveals, however, the journal contributions which are made available most prominently in the field of Indonesian violence studies. With this qualification in mind, it is nevertheless a good indicator that also in the field of journal contributions on Indonesian violence, the period of structural Orientalism is over, and that Indonesians themselves have now in the period of post-Orientalism taken the lead in writing their own history, including its violent aspects.

THEMATIC EMPHASES AND DIFFERENCES BY JOURNAL, 1999–2003 The question is whether the analysis of journal contributions on “violence in Indonesia” can reveal more than just the relations of quantitative output and hence the market shares of countries in publication. In order to get a better glimpse of the qualitative aspects of these journal contributions, I would like to reorganize Table 2 according to the contributions on “Indonesian violence” by journal, not by country, as is done in Table 3. The analysis per journal reveals that one single journal alone, namely the Indonesian Jurnal Perempuan (“Journal of the Women”), produces about one-third (32.85%) of all elaborated journal articles of more than seven pages that are published worldwide on topics related to “violence in Indonesia” and that are taken notice of in the KITLV keyword sample. In Indonesia, the market share of that journal is even higher, namely about half of all contributions (48.93%). One might safely

154

9

3

3

2

2

2

1

1

70

Australia

Netherlands

United Kingdom

Singapore

PR China

Switzerland

Japan

Total

47

Number of articles

USA

Indonesia

Country of publication

Tonan Ajia kenkyu (1)

Rev. int. Croix-Rouge (1) –

Proceedings of the international union of anthropological and ethnological sciences (IUAES) inter-congress (July 24–28): 2

Commentary (1), Sojourn (1)

Southeast Asia Research (2)

RefleXie (1), Erasmus mag. (1), Volkskrant mag. (1)

Review of Indonesian and Malaysian affairs (2), Melbourne Journal of Law (1)

Indonesia (9)

Jurnal Perempuan (23), Analisis CSIS (5), Jurnal Demokrasi dan HAM (5), Antropologi Indonesia (4), Pantau (2), Populasi (2), Gamma (1), Kalam (1), Mitra (1), Persimmon (1), Seni (1), Tajuk (1)

Journal names (number of articles on Indonesian violence)

100%

1.42%

1.42%

2,85%

2.85%

2.85%

4.28%

4.28%

12.85%

67.14%

Percentage of the world market (i.e. of 70 journal articles)

Table 2: Journal articles on Indonesian violence by country of publication, 1999–2003

–

4.34%

4.34%

8.69%

8,69%

8.69%

13.04%

13.04%

39.13%

–

Percentage of the non-Indonesian market (i.e. of 23 journal articles)

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155

156 USA Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Australia Singapore China

Indonesia

5 5 4 2 2 2 2 2

1

Analisis CSIS

Jurnal Demokrasi dan HAM

Antropologi Indonesia

Populasi

Pantau

Review of Indonesian and Malaysian affairs

Southeast Asia research

Proceedings of the international union of anthropological and ethnological sciences (IUAES) inter-congress (July 24–28)

Kalam

Indonesia

23 9

Country

Number of articles

Indonesia

Jurnal Perempuan

Journal of publication

1.42%

2.85%

2.85%

2.85%

2.85%

2.85%

5.71%

7.14%

7.14%

12.85%

32.85%

Percentage of the world market (i.e. of 70 journal articles)

Table 3: Popularity of the topic “violence in Indonesia” by journal, 1999–2003

–

8.69%

8.89%

8.69%

–

–

–

–

–

39.13%

–

Percentage of the non-Indonesian market (i.e. of 23 journal articles)

2.12%

–

–

–

4.25%

4.25%

8.51%

10.63%

10.63%

–

48.93%

Percentage of the Indonesian market (i.e. of 47 journal articles)

O R I E N TA L I S M A N D C O N S P I R A C Y

Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Australia Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Singapore Sojourn Singapore Switzerland Japan

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Mitra

Tajuk

Seni

Persimmon

Gamma

Melbourne journal of law

RefleXie

Erasmus mag

Volkskrant mag.

Commentary

Sojourn

Rev. int. Croix-Rouge

Tonan Ajia kenkyu

Total

–

Country

Number of articles

Journal of publication

100%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

1.42%

Percentage of the world market (i.e. of 70 journal articles)

–

4.34%

4.34%

4.34%

4.34%

4.34%

4.34%

4.34%

4.34%

–

–

–

–

–

Percentage of the non-Indonesian market (i.e. of 23 journal articles)

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

2.12%

2.12%

2.12%

2.12%

2.12%

Percentage of the Indonesian market (i.e. of 47 journal articles)

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assume that in this journal, aspects of violence against women play an important role. At the same time, it is interesting that, based on the keyword assignments of the KITLV, this single Indonesian journal alone seems to have the same quantity of violence-related output as the entire non-Indonesian academia, namely 23 publications on “Indonesian violence” from 1999 to 2003. It seems that, at least in the KITLV keyword sample, in the period of post-Orientalism the most prominent issues in Indonesian violence studies are no longer Western renditions of Indonesian violence but rather gender-related aspects which are discussed in Indonesia itself. The second place in this ranking of journals excelling in contributions about Indonesian violence is the American journal Indonesia (9 contributions = 12.85% of the world output = 39.13% of the non-Indonesian journal output). The question is whether at least these nine contributions have something in common which could be interpreted as a particular Orientalist framing of Indonesia. In this regard, it might be helpful to consider the particular setting of the editorial board of this journal Indonesia which consists mainly of the professors of the Southeast Asia Program of Cornell University. Benedict Anderson, James Siegel, and several others have to be mentioned here as the most important gatekeepers in the period considered.17 It seems that their particular research interest in “Indonesian violence” has contributed to the high density of publications on this topic in their journal. However, the question is whether the fact that a group of scholars is working on a particular problem in a concentrated way should necessarily be linked to a huge accusation like that of Orientalism or even conspiracy with all its implications. It seems instead that we have a close network or a school at work in this case, as it happens with other topics in other cases, as well. The following place in this ranking of journal articles based on the KITLV keyword sample shows that the topic of “violence in Indonesia” was also thematized five times in Analisis CSIS, the journal of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta. This emphasis is quite understandable since the CSIS is closely linked to an influential fraction within the Indonesian military which has a natural interest in discussing such topics. In a certain sense, this interest-driven emphasis is mirrored by the next journal on the list, the Jurnal Demokrasi dan HAM (“Journal for Democracy and Human Rights”) that can be considered an important forum of the democratic movement of Indonesia. If taken

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together, the comparatively high numbers of articles on “violence in Indonesia” in these two journals are an indication that in the period considered, political aspects of violence, such as those related to the military, or concepts of democracy and human rights, played a significant role in Indonesian domestic politics. This can be explained by the circumstances of the transition in Indonesia from an authoritarian regime to a parliamentary democracy, with violent riots and even elements of civil war in several parts of the country in 1999 and the following years. The next journal in the ranking is Jurnal Antropologi (“Journal of Anthropology”), which demonstrates that in Indonesian anthropological discourse, the topic of violence seems to enjoy a certain degree of heightened attention. This degree of emphasis and attention cannot be compared, however, with the popularity of topics of gender-related violence as evidenced in Jurnal Perempuan. Jurnal Perempuan features five times more articles on violence-related issues than Jurnal Antropologi. The other journals in the ranking which, according to the KITLV keyword assignments, have published only one or two articles on “violence” are statistically insignificant and will therefore not be considered further.

CONCLUSION It has been demonstrated in this study informed by a methodology from media and communication studies that the concept of “Orientalism” can be modified in the Indonesian case by a differentiation of the concept into three phases. In particular, the results in this case study on Western and Indonesian publications on the topic of “violence in Indonesia” based on the KITLV keyword sample are as follows: There was an almost monopolistic intellectual hegemony of the former colonizer, the Netherlands, in the production of academic knowledge on “violence in Indonesia” up until the end of the colonial period (1945–1949). This can be called the period of “structural Orientalism”. Typical for Orientalist distortions in this period are Western euphemistic framings of Western violence in Indonesia as “war”, “expedition”, “punishment” and the like. Especially in the period of the Indonesian war of Independence (1945–1949), Indonesian violence is portrayed as savagery which constituted an important legitimization of Dutch efforts to bring about “civilizing” and “pacification”. In this colonial setting,

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the associative antonym for “Indonesian violence” is “Dutch peace” (pax neerlandica). The monopolistic power relations in the production of knowledge on “violence in Indonesia” were increasingly challenged in the first decades after Indonesian independence by the new generations of Indonesian scholars who were raised in an environment of much greater intellectual freedom than in the colonial period. However, in this period of “contested Orientalism”, the production of knowledge on topics related to violence in Indonesia was still hampered by the political situation of authoritarian rule at home, especially by state violence committed by the Indonesian regime itself. This means that the former centers of Orientalist knowledge production abroad served in this period increasingly as places for study and publication by dissident Indonesian intellectuals. The big shift in power relations in the quantitative production of knowledge on “violence in Indonesia” was brought about by the upsurge in democratization in Indonesia after the step-down of President Suharto in 1998. In the five-year period from 1999 to 2003, Indonesia dominated both the global markets in book publications and journal contributions on Indonesian violence by about two-thirds. Indonesian perspectives have, therefore, in this period of “post-Orientalism” become hegemonic, while the Netherlands has to share its formerly monopolistic position in foreign studies on Indonesian violence at least with the Anglo-American countries Australia, America, and the United Kingdom. Other countries, such as France, Germany, Denmark, and Singapore have produced much less on this topic which might be attributed to several reasons, including a lack of interest in and a fascination for this particular topic or a weaker institutional situation of Indonesian studies in general. The analysis of journal contributions in the KITLV keyword sample for the period 1999–2003 suggests that one particular aspect of violence, namely, that of violence against women, has gained an important position in the Indonesian, and hence the global, discourse on violence in Indonesia. The output of the Indonesian Jurnal Perempuan (“Journal of the Women”) in the sample is as high as the combined output of all non-Indonesian journals together. This could be an argument that in this period of post-Orientalism the gender problematic might have become in certain regards more prominent than the problematic of Orientalism, at least in the Indonesian discourse. For the non-Indonesian journal contributions, particularly those published in the Cornell University journal Indonesia, seem to play a hegemonic

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role, at least in quantitative terms, with almost half of the non-Indonesian category being published in that journal. The Cornell school, therefore, does have an important stake in this topic, as has the Netherlands that is still of considerable importance in the category of book publications. However, the significance of both non-Indonesian places of publication seems to have decreased, given the enormous vitality in the Indonesian intellectual production itself. Conceptually, I would suggest distinguishing the following periods in the production of knowledge on “violence in Indonesia”: 1) The period of structural Orientalism, in which the academic centers of the colonizers determined the discourse, framing Western violence euphemistically and Indonesian violence often in cultural terms; 2) The period of contested Orientalism, marked by an emerging academic self-consciousness of the formerly colonized. In this period, various personal encounters between the perpetrators and the victims of colonialism took place, often still in asymmetric power relations. This period is hence still often marked by bitter personal experiences and a strong ideology of anti-colonialism in general and anti-Orientalism in particular. I would see much of the writings of the generation of Edward Said, Ismail Jakub, and Sadik J. Al-Azm in this light, in which the varying degrees of bitterness or openness might be attributed to different personal experiences with Western academic snobbery. 3) The period of post-Orientalism which is marked by a very vital market in academic knowledge production undertaken by the formerly colonized people themselves, facilitated by a successful democratization and liberalization. The Indonesian discourse itself has become hegemonic in Indonesian studies in a way that the former preoccupations with the ideology of anti-Orientalism are now being overridden by new topics, such as the gender problem. The Indonesian case demonstrates that structural Orientalism can be overcome by a strongly increased investment in the education system of the formerly colonized, by contesting Orientalist distortions intellectually, and finally by liberalization and democratization of the political

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regime. However, the question is whether such a reversal of intellectual hegemony could again be counterbalanced by foreign powers by nonintellectual means in the political, military, or economic realms. REFERENCES INTERNET SOU RCE KITLV Collections Library. (2005): http://www.kitlv.nl/home/Library/. The Netherlands: Library of the KITLV, Leiden. Coppel, C. (ed) (2001): Violent Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, Resolution. Richmond: Curzon. Cribb, R. (ed) (1990): The Indonesian Killings of 1985–66: Studies from Java and Bali. Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. Cribb, R. (2000): “From Petrus to Ninja: death squads in Indonesia”, in B. Campbell; A.D. Brenner (eds) Death Squads in Global Perspective. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 181–202. Jakub, I. (1971): Orientalisme dan Orientalisten. Perihal ketimuran dan para ahli ketimuran. Surabaya: Faizan. Kusliah, W. (ed) (1999): Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan. Jakarta: Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional. Lombard, D. (1990): Le carrefour javanais. Essai d’histoire globale. Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. MacFie, A.L. (2000): Orientalism. A Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Maier, H. (1990): “Some Genealogical Remarks on the Emergence of Modern Malay Literature”, Journal of the Japan-Netherlands Institute, vol. 2, pp. 159–177. Moedjanto, G. (2003): Dari pembentukan pax neerlandica sampai Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Universitas Sanata Dharma. Philpott, S. (2000): Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism and Identity. Basingstoke: MacMillan; New York: St Martin (Indonesian translation: Meruntuhkan Indonesia: politik postkolonial dan otoritarianisme. Transl. Nuruddin Mhd. Ali, Uzair Fauzan. Yogyakarta: Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKIS), 2003. Purdue, E. (2004): “Describing Kekerasan: Some Observations on Writings on Violence in Indonesia after the New Order”, Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde, vol. 160, no. 2–3, pp. 189–225. Röll, W. (1981, 2nd ed.): Indonesien: Entwicklungsprobleme einer tropischen Inselwelt. 1st ed. 1979. Stuttgart: Klett. Said, E. (1978): Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. Siegel, J.T. (1998): A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Statistisches Bundesamt. (1993): Länderbericht Indonesien. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. Suwirta, A. (2000): Suara dari dua kota: revolusi Indonesia dalam pandangan surat kabar “Merdeka” (Jakarta) dan Kedaulatan Rakyat (Yogyakarta), 1945–1947. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka. Tarling, N. (2001): Southeast Asia: A Modern History. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Tobing, K.M.L. (1986): Perjuangan Politik Bangsa Indonesia: Renville. Jakarta: Gunung Agung.

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9 MEMRI.ORG – A TOOL OF ENLIGHTENMENT OR INCITEMENT?*

Schirin Fathi 1 INTRODUCTION Any discussion of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is controversial to the point of activating conspiratorial allegations of varied shades. If I were not fully aware of this, it became clearly evident in the run-up to and preparation of, this paper, as will be shown further down. This topic elicited reactions from various quarters. The views on MEMRI have come to be another one of those yardsticks by which a person’s affiliation or leanings may be measured. The way in which MEMRI is received, either embraced or rejected, allows conclusions to be drawn regarding the political and ideological standing of any one person. Similar to the way in which Said’s Orientalism or, in a lesser way, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations have managed to polarize a whole range of disciplines, the proponents and critics of MEMRI, too, mark the two poles of ideological discourse on the Middle East. Now, the partisanship among scholars and experts on the Middle East is deplorable as such, and it has become so widespread, lending itself to ridiculous interpretations and reinterpretations, that MESA’s current President, Ali Banuazizi, warned that “the barrage of criticism directed at scholars on the Middle East . . . accusations of ideological bias and distortion of the truth, mediocrity, and irrelevance to the nation’s foreign policy goals . . . could potentially undermine the integrity of our academic institutions.” He reiterates that “our real strength as *In a cautionary note, I would like to point to the fact that the research for this article was conducted in 2004 and 2005. Since then a number of articles have appeared on MEMRI, continuing the debate. Some of those articles may be found on the following webpage http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/Middle_East_Media_Research_ Institute. One major problem, however, is presented by the fact that MEMRI has updated its website since this article was written, deleting and restructuring some pages as well as changing the focus of its research topics.

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a mature professional association, . . . , is demonstrated by our ability to welcome and accommodate colleagues with diverse perspectives on the critical issues that we face.”2 A discussion of MEMRI is deemed important for several reasons: the first reason has been alluded to above, MEMRI’s capacity within the realm of Middle Eastern academic and popular discussion to polarize and incite. The second reason is to look at MEMRI as an extremely successful media, campaign and public relations tool geared toward “western” decision and policy makers. And the last reason is situated within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its accompanying instruments of the dissemination of information about oneself and the other. The fact that such an instrument exists only on one side of the equation makes its examination all the more expedient.

THE CONTROVERSY ON MEMRI The launch of MEMRI in February 1998 was hailed by many observers of Middle Eastern events as a positive step to enhance transparency, to ease communications and to foster a better mutual understanding between “the Middle East” and “the West”. Bernard Lewis was quoted commending MEMRI on being an invaluable source for anybody really interested in the region (Doering 2002). Martin Peretz, editor-in-chief of the New Republic, calls MEMRI “the most important research source for the Arab world”, Richard Cohen of the Washington Post considers MEMRI “to be an invaluable research tool”, and the former CIA Director James Woolsey finds it “excellent”.3 The Institute’s self-proclaimed raison d’être as espoused on its homepage is to explore the Middle East through the region’s media. It aims to bridge “the language gap which exists between the West and the Middle East, providing timely translations of Arabic, Farsi, and Hebrew media, as well as original analyses of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends in the Middle East.” It thus provides a view into the region’s media that is often otherwise unavailable to English speakers who are not literate in those languages. MEMRI’s stated aim is to observe the political and cultural controversies and conflicts in the Middle East. Within this context, it wants to reveal the Arab “double talk”, especially concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict/ peace attempts, and to expose the hate propaganda that is widespread

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in sections of the Arabic and Farsi press, thus sensitizing the West to its image in parts of the Middle East as the enemy or the other. Its principle is to translate and not to assess. And this is exactly where the many critical voices take up and dispute the stated purpose of this Institute. The accuracy of its translations is rarely disputed. However, the extent to which its selection is contextual or truly representative of Arab/Iranian media is very often disputed. The critics allege MEMRI to construct a selective view of Arab and Farsi opinion and to present through its tendentious sample a distorted and unbalanced picture of the Arab and Muslim world. Not disputing that the articles translated by MEMRI are actually found in the Arabic and Farsi press but stating that they are counterbalanced by other opinions which hardly find their way into MEMRI’s selection – thus goes the charge of “cherry-picking” the vast Arabic press, highlighting “those [articles] that suit its agenda [but] are not representative of the newspapers’ content as a whole” (Whitaker 2002). Another contention is that MEMRI attempts “in some way [to] further the political agenda of Israel” (Whitaker 2002). MEMRI is geared toward Western policy and decision makers, and the claim goes that through sweeping generalizations and selective statements reflecting minority opinions, the ignorance and misunderstandings between the “west” and the Arab world and Iran are perpetuated and Western perceptions are changed for the worse – which furthers Israel’s agenda. Arab Media Watch alleges that “by passing itself off as an independent organisation with a quasi-academic name, MEMRI has deceived a number of journalists into thinking it is a reliable source of information. . . . [and] almost all its staff members have been strongly partisan in their political and military work. [This too] should cast immediate doubt upon its credibility as an organisation and the accuracy of its work”.4 Some of these allegations will be picked up in the course of this analysis and commented upon. The fact that MEMRI’s headquarters are located in Washington, DC, with branch offices, among others, in Jerusalem, where MEMRI also maintains its Media Centre, certainly fuels some of the critics’ suspicions. The suspicions went so far that MEMRI’s founder accused critics of “trying to paint MEMRI in a conspiratorial manner by portraying us as a rich, sinister group”,5 clearly trying to evoke conspiracies of a different kind.

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Nonetheless, MEMRI is viewed by its adversaries as one more public relations campaign on behalf of Israel, and it has been placed in close proximity to far right political quarters in Israel and the neo-conservative establishment of the United States.

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS Some facts are indisputable, and these refer to the institutional organization and structural make-up of MEMRI. One among these facts is that it was founded in 1998 with its headquarters in Washington, DC, and branches presently in Jerusalem, Berlin, Baghdad and Tokyo. It assumed a more prominent role after the events of 11 September 2001, due to increased Western public interest in Arab and Iranian affairs. At that time, it expanded its staff considerably, setting up new branches, and it was regularly quoted by major American and European newspapers. A conversation with a MEMRI staff in Berlin6 revealed that the London office has apparently closed recently due to personnel problems but that offices in Baghdad and Ankara are in the process of being opened. Yigal Carmon, the founder and head of MEMRI, confirmed in a phone conversation7 and ensuing email correspondence that the London office has been closed; however, he cited the heavy financial burden as the reason. Rumors of an office in Baghdad began circulating right after the official end of the military intervention in Iraq.8 Mr. Carmon confirmed the opening of an office in Baghdad, with “several Iraqis on MEMRI’s payroll” – a fact that was disputed by the Berlin office a day or two before. He pointed out, however, that under the current circumstances in Iraq, their presence is not transparent, and the office is not publicly identifiable. There had also been an office in Moscow in 2003 but that too has closed due to financial restraints. On the other hand, a Turkish branch is in the process of being established. The impression conveyed is one of a dynamic, fluid, rapidly exploring and expanding institution, considering that up to eight locations have been established within a span of seven years. Originally, MEMRI translated out of Arabic, Farsi and Hebrew with an emphasis on Arabic media and press and an increasing share of Farsi press. Yet, articles translated out of the Hebrew press were scarcely found. The head of the Berlin office, Dr. Jochen Müller, maintains that the project

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of Hebrew translations has been discontinued altogether, partly also to avert the charge of an obvious imbalance between the Arabic and Hebrew media covered. Mr. Carmon from the Washington headquarters maintains that the project of covering the Israeli media had been originally envisioned when – due to personnel and financial restraints – the work of MEMRI was limited to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. However, he asserts, within the first year after MEMRI’s launching, the scope expanded, and the “Israel Project” was abandoned. In addition, he points out, 80% of the Israeli media may be found online in English, so there is no need to provide additional translations. I might interject that this similarly holds true for a large share of the Iranian media. The fact that Hebrew is still listed on the websites is shrugged off by Mr. Carmon as a pure oversight that “should be changed one day”.9 In my phone conversation with him, Mr. Carmon tried to discount the web presentation as a minor concern of his. This appears curious for an organization that ostensibly and detectably attaches great importance to its self-presentation. Apart from English, the Institute translates into a host of languages: French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Russian, Spanish and Turkish. Considering that the Institute hopes to enlighten the West about the East, the separation of Turkey from the East does not become quite clear and seems arbitrary, almost evoking orientalist hegemonic divisions of the area in question. On inquiry, the staff at the Berlin office was unable to explain this division in any satisfactory way. Mr. Carmon denied that there were translations into Turkish. Rather, it was the other way round. This misinformation on the website, too, was attributed to an oversight and a negligent handling of the website. MEMRI is financed through private donors and foundations, such as the Shoah Foundation, the Meyerhoff Foundation, Randolph Foundation, Schusterman Foundation, Cohen Foundation and Koret Foundation among others that were supplied through said telephone conversations by the staff members in Berlin. A precursory and very limited check revealed that a good number of these foundations have emphases on “Jewish Life and Culture” or Israel-related projects and/ or support conservative projects in the United States.10 The Lynde And Harry Bradley Foundation – which was incidentally not mentioned by the MEMRI staff but has verifiably supplied MEMRI with funding – is according to www.mediatransparency.org one of “the country’s largest and most influential right-wing foundations”, sponsoring

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also the Heritage Foundation and the Hudson Institute. 11 According to Mr. Carmon, however, it is mostly “centre/centre-left foundations” who finance MEMRI. As an example, he cites the Ford Foundation which has apparently entered into negotiations as a possible sponsor. Since MEMRI is registered as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization, it has tax-deductible status under American law and is as such subsidized by US taxpayers. I did not follow Mr. Carmon’s provoking advice to consult the IRS records as to MEMRI’s financial standing, but nonetheless I find the stated $3 million as the annual budget of MEMRI quite unrealistic, considering that it is currently maintaining five or possibly six offices and 60 permanent staff.12

THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL AFFILIATIONS There is more than one way of looking at such an institution. A basic structural analysis looking at the institutional structure, as I have attempted to do above, is one option. The ardently conspiratorial approach would be to limit the analysis to the people behind the institution. And incidentally, the controversy, if not saying conspiracy, that has been brewing about MEMRI, has been mostly suspended on the person of MEMRI’s founder, president and registered owner of the website, Yigal Carmon. According to Whitaker, a journalist with the British Guardian, and Kirchner13 of the University of Gießen, Carmon has spent most of his adult life in the Israeli military, mostly working with intelligence units and counter-terrorism. As both these sources, however, have encountered the wrath of MEMRI in the form of lawsuits or the threat of legal proceedings – and to avert the always latently implicit accusation of antisemitic sentiments that critics are often admonished and charged with – I will quote Yossi Melman of the Israeli daily Ha’aretz who wrote: “Carmon, today president of the Middle East Media Research Institute, embarked at the time [the time refers to the post-Oslo period] on a private crusade, closely monitoring reports that circulated in Palestinian and Arab media. A former senior officer of MI’s 504 unit, who subsequently served as an anti-terror adviser to prime ministers, Carmon operated as a one-man intelligence force, and relentlessly tracked down recordings. He handled a network of informants in PA areas, and paid each dozens, or hundreds, of shekels for a single

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tape.”14 When asked about his professional career, Colonel Carmon describes himself as a former member of the Israeli government and stresses the fact that he has been retired for 13 years. In a phone conversation with me, he tried to dispel the doubts about his person and to construct an ideological proximity between himself and ex-General turned peace activist Matityahu Peled. I can understand that people feel unfairly treated when their work is judged by their past career. Yet, when dealing with the media is it good enough to say that who you are or who you associated with does not matter? One of these former associates is Meyrav Wurmser, who used to be the executive director and has since quit MEMRI. Currently, she is director of the Centre for Middle East Policy at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, which was founded by Herman Kahn and can be safely called a bastion of the neo-conservative establishment in the United States. She is also associated with the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia, directed by Daniel Pipes. Topping the current research agenda of the Hudson Institute is the “The War on Terror and the Future of Islam”. Dr. Meyrav Wurmser, in a very telling, current self-description on the biographical pages of the Hudson Institute’s website, is described as “a leading scholar of the Arab world. Through her work at MEMRI, Wurmser helped to educate policymakers about the Palestinian Authority’s twotrack approach to “negotiating peace” with Israel: calling for peace in the English press and with Western policymakers while inciting hatred and violence through official Arab language media.” This statement corresponds to MEMRI’s original mission statement, and it is in line with the information supplied by Yossi Melman; however, it stands in stark contrast to a statement made by Jochen Müller of MEMRI Berlin, who describes the current political agenda as working toward “a contribution for a sustainable peace and reform process in the region”. 15 As there is no reason to think that the goals of MEMRI Berlin and MEMRI Washington differ to such an extent, speculation would be that MEMRI has begun to redefine its goals under – possibly – the impression of unabated criticism. This might also offer an explanation as to why the original websites of MEMRI with its mission statement and a description of its core staff have disappeared into the Internet archives. In response to my personal inquiries directed toward the MEMRI office in Berlin, they were obliging and courteous. Still I find it a bit disconcerting that its current website furnishes no information about its staff, board of

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directors or advisors, or funding as is usual practice with think tanks and non-profit organizations elsewhere. In either case, this discussion of MEMRI’s staff and funding has been exhausted elsewhere, 16 and there is no need to dwell on the same arguments.

MEMRI’S HANDLING OF ITS CRITICS There is, however, need to say a few words on MEMRI’s interaction with its critics. In the preceding section, there was some allusion to the efforts on part of MEMRI to discredit those who publish or say things that are in contradiction to MEMRI’s self-representation. One way to cast disrepute on their adversaries is to allege that the critics have dishonest motives. Most often these motives smack of antisemitism or have to be seen in some conspiratorial context. When taking its critics on, MEMRI does not shy away from entering into public debate, just as it is not squeamish when it comes to resorting to legal action. The mayor of London, Mr. Ken Livingstone, the Guardian’s Brian Whitaker, the German magazine inamo and Juan Cole from the University of Michigan are among those that have entered into, or been threatened with, legal battle with MEMRI. Cole refers to them as “SLAPPs – Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”, and they have been prominently used against environmentalists. “The targets of these law suits are generally not radical environmentalists nor professional activists. They are ordinary middle-class people who are concerned about their local environment and have no history of political activity. They are often the organisers of opposing groups, or perceived trouble makers”17. The author of this article encountered a similar treatment, short of a lawsuit, but with an effort at intimidation. This paper was presented at the University of Hamburg in June 2005, at a workshop in conjunction with the conferral of the honorary doctorate upon Prof. Sadik J. Al-‘Azm, emeritus professor of modern European philosophy at Damascus University, in recognition of his seminal intellectual achievements. When I presented the paper, my object of research and analysis, namely MEMRI, was attendant – in itself an unsettling, or at least an uncommon, situation. MEMRI’s founder, Yigal Carmon, was quite active lobbying during the breaks against my paper before it was held, but then he left the workshop when

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it was my turn to speak, while the head of the Berlin office and a colleague of his stayed on. The situation got a little out of hand when aforementioned members of MEMRI and other sympathizers accused me during the ensuing discussion of hatching a “conspiracy against MEMRI”, of having a “secret agenda” and “not liking” the organization. It must be pointed out that this is not really the kind of language used in academic settings. But more than that, this kind of language bespeaks the mentality and mindset of the denouncer, revealing less about my work than about his own disposition. In addition, MEMRI’s repeated denial that it is a partisan lobbying institution highlighted in an exemplary way some of the issues touched upon in this workshop. While it was my initial intention to scrutinize an organization that lacks a certain transparency and transports an image of the “Orient” that may be seen in continuation of the school of Orientalism in the Saidian sense, the precursory research – and much more, the spectacular performance during the discussion in the workshop – turned into a little case study of the possible mechanics of conspiracies. At least, this case study highlights the importance of transparency and reiterates the fact that its absence facilitates a milieu open to all possible theories, conjectures and allegations.

THE SUBSTANCE OF MEMRI’S WORK – A BRIEF OVERVIEW Apart from the sometimes inconclusive and contradictory structural information on MEMRI and the personal data, I would like to focus now on the substantive content of MEMRI’s work. In addition to press translations, MEMRI regularly publishes media analyses and “in-depth studies”, the “Inquiry and Analysis Series”, relating to Middle Eastern affairs. It distributes them, free of charge, by fax and email to anybody interested, with a wide distribution among Congresspersons, congressional staffers, legislators, policy makers, journalists, academics and interested parties. According to its president, it reaches 60,000 direct subscribers per email list with multiplication through postings on other email lists. The number of individual users is estimated to be about a million. MEMRI is explicitly geared toward a Western audience, most prominently the United States. It has been hardly received in the Middle East itself, and if there is mention of MEMRI there, it is done with regard to its founder’s past, for

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example, in al-Jazeera in conjunction with the recent antisemitism legislation, the “Global Antisemitism Review Act” of 2004,18 or in private discussions where it is perceived as an Israeli institution. MEMRI runs several press-monitoring projects on specific topics. Its currently ongoing subjects are as follows.19 •

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At the top of the list is the Jihad and Terrorism Studies Project, in which it responds to the “threat of militant-Islamic terrorist organizations operating in the United States [which] has become a reality”. This project “monitors militant-Islamic groups that educate and preach Jihad and martyrdom in mosques, school systems, and in the media.” The work of this focus is self-explanatory. United States and the Middle East - This section features translations and analyses of Middle Eastern news and events which impact the United States. The Middle East Policy is a quick review, which presents this picture: out of the 12 items of this project in the current year (2005), 11 portrayed a clear-cut anti-American tone, be it on the Iranian nuclear program, on the strain of Egyptian-US relations, anti-Americanism in the Turkish media, anti-Americanism in Palestinian sermons or the issue of American alleged Koran desecrations and Arab reactions to that. A particular gruesome report is on a Saudi paper writing on American harvesting of Iraqi organs. Granted that US policy has seen better days than these in the Middle East, this representation in MEMRI does cast a very lopsided view, considering the number of Middle East states that can still be counted as loyal friends of the United States. The Arab-Israeli Conflict - a project which supposedly “focuses on current developments in the peace-process, as well as its breakdown” seems to have been discontinued as the last item dates from December 2003. Inter-Arab Relations - Also, this focus seems quite inactive as the last entry dates from July 2004. MEMRI states that “this section of the website focuses on main inter-Arab developments such as the decline of pan-Arab nationalism, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and will review elements of unity and disunity in the Arab world.” Yet, the majority of reports in this project aim mostly to point to differences among Arab states, often in an unqualified, rhetorical and irrational and emotive way. Some of the headlines read, for example: “Syrian

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Newspaper hints: Saddam better off committing suicide”, “Long live dictatorship”, “Saudi paper calls on Saddam to abdicate or commit suicide” and the like. Economic Studies - This is apparently also inactive, as it was covered only until 2003 with one additional report in 2004 and none since. Its “primary purpose . . . is to bring to the American reader news and comments of an economic nature on the Middle East based on surveys of primarily non-English sources”. In effect, the studies published again portray a one-sided image, presenting the Arab world as only stagnant (“the failure to establish a knowledge society”), corrupt, non-productive (“the Saudi nightmares about Iraqi oil”) and not attractive for investment (“record decline in gdp”). This too, is not the full picture! Antisemitism Documentation Project - “this section of MEMRI’s website documents Arabic newspaper reports, editorials, and other media sources which are primarily based upon antisemitic themes. During recent years, Arab antisemitism has become a main catalyst of antisemitic incidents throughout the world”. This last sentence, to insinuate that antisemitism is a predominantly Arab phenomenon in itself would deserve a lengthy debate, as I find this statement incendiary if it is allowed to stand on its own, in total neglect of historical developments of the European/Christian roots of antisemitism and the current political realities.

Most items under this rubric corroborate a view of rampant antisemitism in the Middle East. Interestingly enough, in the past months (early to mid-2005, prior to the election of Ahmadinejad as Iran’s President!) there is a heightened interest about Iranian antisemitism. One wonders whether this could in any way be linked to the Iranian nuclear program or to Iran’s image as the new/old “bad boy on the block”? This should, however, not detract from the fact that the items in this section fulfill an important purpose by exposing the antisemitic accusations that are unfortunately widespread in all sectors of Arab society. Apart from exposing the most gruesome examples of Holocaust denial and blood libel, among others, there is also a report in the Inquiry and Analysis Series (No. 135)20 – incidentally by Yigal Carmon – that takes up the relatively recent, incipient discourse among Arab intellectuals

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to criticize and battle Arab manifestations of antisemitism. His analysis is limited to recent examples of criticism, it is ahistoric (for a relatively recent analyses of Arab intellectual discourses regarding the Holocaust, see Omar Kamil 2003 or Israel Gershoni 1999, who emphasizes the intellectual discourse among Arabs until the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the Palestinian Nakba, or Azmi Bishara and Edward Said), and it does not refer to the current political circumstances that may not be totally dismissed in this discussion. Yet, he portrays some intellectuals who distance themselves from the instrumentalization of the Holocaust in Arab discourses, who demand that Arab intellectuals recognize the Holocaust for what it was and who heavily criticize Arab intellectual denial so far, pointing to many of the historical mistakes the Arabs have committed in their recent past. In this respect, the item discussed presents a valuable and constructive contribution in contrast to other reports of this kind that have more of a fig-leaf character,21 or the sheer listing of recurrent accusations. • Reform in the Arab and Muslim World, - According to MEMRI’s selfdescription, this project “focuses on advocates of reform, and the debate surrounding it, within the Middle East and Muslim world. The project . . . will focus on women’s rights, civil society, and educational systems . . . debates on democracy and the rule of law, protection of the individual, and freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. . . . the debate on reform in Islam, as well as the misuse of religion and Economic Reform, which examines issues of free market economy, globalization, and modernization.” A review of this year’s headlines only, however, reflects a different stress. Out of 36 items in the reform project, approximately half deal with a critique – in one way or the other – of the pervasiveness of Islam in the Middle East, advocating a secularist agenda to separate religion from politics. This probably prompted Cole to say that MEMRI “rewards secular Arabs for being secularists”.22 The other half deals with oppositional politics of some form, with the electoral process, with the harassment of intellectuals and with feminist issues. As I said before, this cannot be more than a very brief overview of the topics and issues addressed and especially the last two projects warrant a much more detailed analytical discussion than could be offered within the scope of this paper. Especially the reform project needs a

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detailed analysis that cannot be done without in-depth background information and knowledge of the various oppositional forces in the Arab world. Only then can one ascertain whether the reform project actually reflects all shades of reformers, those that try to synthesize reform with their convictions – be they Islamic, leftist or nationalist – or whether it concentrates on those that advocate and emulate the “American way of Life”. An in-depth analysis of this section is all the more imperative, as MEMRI seems to recently present the reform project as its flagship. The picture of the Arab/Islamic world that has been presented, albeit in a sketchy way, through the projects discussed so far, has not been the most flattering. It has construed for the most part a view of the Arab world and Iran that thrives on negative stereotypes and clichés that are all too familiar. To counterbalance this impression, it seems that the Reform Project has been designed as a figure head to veer in a new direction. It’s aim is to find and amplify the progressive voices in the Arab world. Thus a bipolar view of the Middle East is construed, on whose one pole you may find the radical, jihadist, terrorist, corrupt, stagnant, irrational and antisemitic elements, and on the other extreme, the pro-western, secular, reform-willing representatives, corresponding to the hegemonic view of the American establishment. That there exists a whole middle range of all shades of conservative to leftist, religious to secular, authentic to imitative discourses in the Middle East – that incidentally make up the bulk of the debate – is neglected.

CONCLUSION Originally, in that above-mentioned, now-deleted archived page from MEMRI’s website it has also been said that “In its research, the institute puts emphasizes [sic] the continuing relevance of Zionism to the Jewish people and to the state of Israel” (sentence removed from its site on 5 November 2001.)23 Now, since the war in Iraq, the purpose is ostensibly a different one, reflecting a change in its self-conception. The focus now is on “encountering the stereotypes about Islam and the societies of the region” and to “support the Middle East peace process and democratisation and reform processes in the Arab societies and Iran” 24 Interestingly enough, the Institute accuses Western, especially German,

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scholarship of assuming a paternalistic, protective, guilt-ridden postcolonial attitude toward the Middle East and of not taking the dangerous specters of Arab nationalism and Arab antisemitism seriously enough.25 Yet, it is actually MEMRI that assumes a paternalistic attitude when, for example, Mr. Carmon counters charges of misrepresentation in an interview with Al-Sharq al-Awsat and maintains that “MEMRI directly or indirectly even serves the Arabs in that it points the misleading Arab voices to their mistakes and thus advances the positive voices. This way, it becomes apparent that not all Arabs are like Osama bin Laden or Zarqawi.”26 Contrary to all protestations of the facts’ neutral presentation as they are found in the Middle East, a certain sense of mission is apparent throughout the work. And to be fair, it has to be said that there have definitely also been positive side effects to MEMRI’s work, not the least being a re-evaluation of ethical standards in Arab newspapers toward a critical self-censorship when it comes to antisemitism. In addition to a mission – how ever we want to define it – a clear agenda is also apparent. And this one is easier to pinpoint: it is clearly pro-Israeli and pro-West, in a US-conservative fashion. Israel has long understood that it needs strong and enduring allies outside the region, and it has always taken on an unwavering pro-Western stance just as the “west” – notably the United States – has come to rely on Israel. MEMRI likes to present itself as the window toward the Middle East. God knows, the Middle East needs many windows to allow transparency and fresh winds to enter – and thankfully there are some organizations and initiatives who aim to do exactly that. But MEMRI is not the window to the Middle East, if anything it offers peepholes on two poles of Arab and Islamic discourse. But what about using MEMRI, what about the various accusations? There is no monolithic answer. As a translation service, it is of great value. As a research tool, the evaluation is more complex as it demands good background information in order to contextualize the information obtained, due to the organization’s lack of transparency and attempt to pose as something different than what they are. The problem is that many of the journalists, politicians and lay persons who use MEMRI cannot and will not do this. And this is where the main objection to MEMRI comes into play. It presents itself as an independent research institute, but it acts as a tool geared toward shaping opinion by “producing an orient” – in the true sense of Edward Said’s usage – and through this it has an

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increasing influence in shaping perceptions of the Middle East. MEMRI has understood that politics today is waged in the media and it fulfills its role as a public relations, lobbying and policy-making instrument with the highest professional standard.

REFERENCES Beder, S. (1995): “SLAPPs – Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Coming to a Controversy Near You”, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 72/3, pp. 22–29. Bishara, A. (1994): “Die Araber und der Holocaust – die Problematisierung einer Konjunktion”, in R. Steininger (ed), Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust: Europa – USA – Israel, Wien: Böhlau, pp. 407–432. Bishara, A. (2004): “Die Feinheiten des Rassismus”, inamo, 39/2004, pp. 45–50. Böhme, C. (2002): “Die Stimme des Nahen Ostens”, Tagesspiegel 12 April 2002. Carmon, Y. (2003): “Harbingers of Change in the Antisemitic Discourse in the Arab World”, MEMRI – Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 135, 23 April 2003. Doering, M. (2002): “Sprudelnde Quellen”, Berliner Zeitung, 2 October 2002. Fisk, R. (1996): “Blind für die Geschichte”, Die Zeit, 11 October 1996. Flores, A. (2004): “Arabischer Antisemitismus zwischen Dämonisierung und Analyse”, inamo, 37/2004, pp. 48–52. Freund, C.P. (2001): “The End of the Orientalist Critique”, Reason, December 2001. Hayes, C. (2002): “‘Selective MEMRI’ – eine Präzisierung”, inamo, 32/2002, pp. 50–51. Höpp, G.; Wien, P.; Wildangel, R. (eds) (2004): Blind für die Geschichte? Arabische Begegnungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag. Institute for Policy Studies (2010): “Right Web – Tracking Militarists’ Efforts to Influence US Foreign Policy”, http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/ Middle_East_Media_Research_Institute (last accessed on 25 May 2010). Joggerst, K. (2004): “Vergegenwärtigte Vergangenheit(en) – Die Rezeption der Shoah und Nakba im israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt”, in G. Höpp; P. Wien; R. Wildangel (eds) Blind für die Geschichte? Arabische Begegnungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, pp. 295–334. Kamil, O. (2003): “Araber, Antisemitismus und Holocaust. Zur Rezeption der Shoah in der arabischen Welt”, Teil 1 und 2, analyse + kritik 33, vol. 473 and 474, pp. 14–15; 20–21. Kirchner, H. (2002): “Yigal Carmon – Ein Leben für die Besatzung”, Inamo, 32, pp. 46–48. Knoblauch, E. (2004): “Israel eine Stimme geben”, zenith, 4/2004, p. 49. Lavie, A. (2003): “Partners in Pain, Arabs Study the Holocaust”, CounterPunch, 12 February 2003. Meier, C. (2002): “Absichten statt Einsichten”, zenith, 4/2002, p. 20.

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Melman, Y. (2002): “Don’t Confuse us with Facts – How Israeli Military Intelligence Botched Assessment of Arafat”, Ha’aretz, 16 August 2002. MEMRI. (2002): “Stellungnahme MEMRIs zu dem Artikel v. Brian Whitaker in inamo Nr. 31/2002”, inamo, 32/2002, p. 49. MEMRI. (2005): Aus arabischen Medien – Gesellschaftskritische Stimmen im Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Berlin: iz3w und MEMRI. MEMRI Special Dispatch (2005): “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: Interview zur Arbeit von MEMRI und zu Scheich Al-Qaradawi”, 31 März. Newsletters der Botschaft des Staates Israel–Berlin, various issues. http://nlarchiv.israel.de/ Nordbruch, G. (2004): “Geschichte im Konflikt – Der Nationalsozialismus als Thema aktueller Debatten in der ägyptischen Öffentlichkeit”, in G. Höpp; P. Wien; R. Wildangel (eds) Blind für die Geschichte? Arabische Begegnungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, pp. 269–294. Raz-Krakotzkin, A. (2004): “Aus dem Lehrbuch: Geschichte des Zionismus und Geschichte des Landes”, inamo 10/38, pp. 24–28. Said, E. (1998): “An die arabischen Unterstützer von Roger Garaudy: Der Dritte Weg führt weiter”, Le Monde Diplomatique (dt. Ausgabe) 5608, 14 August 1998, pp. 1–5. Said, E. (2000): The End of the Peace Process, Oslo and After. London: Granta Books. Solnick, A. (2003): “An Israeli Arab Initiative to Visit Auschwitz”, Inquiry and Analysis Series – No. 136, The Middle East Media Research Institute 25 April 2003. http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/855.htm Taub, G. (2003): “MEMRI Gains”, Correspondence – An International Review of Culture and Society Winter 2002/2003, vol. 10, Published by the Council on Foreign Relations. Whitaker, B. (2002): “Selective MEMRI”, Guardian Unlimited 12 August 2002. Internet site is accessible at http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,773258,00.html Wulf, J.-H. (2004): “Rollentausch der Dunkelmänner – Das Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) mit Sitz in Washington weist auf Antisemitismus in arabischen Medien hin”, taz 30 April 2004, p. 19. Zuckermann, M. (2003): Zweierlei Israel? Hamburg: KVV Konkret. Zuckermann, M. (2005): Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 33, Antisemitismus – Antizionismus – Israelkritik, Göttingen: Wallstein.

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10 THE TRAGEDY OF IBLIS 1

Sadik J. Al-Azm2 I am the spirit that ever denies. —Goethe, Faust SECTION ONE PR OLOG UE

If we try to identify the basic feelings through which the three Semitic religions expressed man’s relationship to God, we would discover that they are limited to three: love, fear, and hatred – love of God, fear of His power and punishment, and hatred of His enemy, Iblis (Satan). Religious thinkers treated these feelings in numerous books and lots of pages. Their views on Iblis ranged from serious attempts to determine the position that he occupies in the order of the universe, his relationship to God, and the purpose of his existence to mere profuse explanations of his deception of people and to teaching them well-known invocations and incantations so that they can dismiss him and ward off his evil. There is no doubt that each one of us bears in our minds a particular image of Iblis’ character inherited as an indivisible part of his or her traditional culture and religious upbringing. I find it unnecessary to expatiate on recalling this image of Iblis in the popular mind because it is well known to all of us. Iblis was a favorite angel of God and was of great consequence in the order of the heavenly host until he disobeyed God’s order and was expelled from paradise, incurring eternal damnation. Thus, Iblis became the embodiment of everything evil, acquiring all the attributes that are incompatible with God. We note here that Iblis’ name indicates his essence, which is “iblas” – that is, total despair of God’s mercy and of return to paradise (this according to traditional Muslim interpretations of the meaning of iblas).3 We are all familiar with the proverb that signifies a total loss of hope: Like Iblis’ hope of return to paradise. The word Iblis connotes

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scheming, temptation, suggestion of evil thought, instigation to rebellion, disobedience, and other hideous and abominable characteristics that the imagination of man has incorporated into a single character: Satan. In the course of time, man’s imagination generously allotted to Iblis great creative intellectual powers, innovative artistic capabilities, and the ability to perform supernatural and miraculous acts and deeds. Thus, Iblis became next to God in terms of his powers, abilities, and achievements. Imam Jamal al-Din ibn al-Jawzi wrote a book entitled Talbis Iblis, (The Dissemblance of Iblis)4 in which he recounted the ways that Iblis employs to deceive people, leading them away from the right path. What is curious about this book is that not only does it depict the conventional image of Iblis’ character, but it also, inadvertently, confers on him innovative, creative powers that elicit appreciation and admiration. A case in point is Ibn al-Jawzi’s crediting to Iblis the emergence of most great religious and philosophical movements in the history of Islamic civilization. He thus turns Iblis into a great philosopher and a superb theologian. Ibn al-Jawzi claims that sophistry, materialism, naturalism, the theory of natures, the religions of the Far East, Christianity, scholastic theology, and the Muctazilah (school) were all the work of Iblis and the result of his deception of thinkers and of ulema (religious scholars).5 Likewise, Ibn al-Jawzi attributes the movements of the Kharijites and the Rafidites (al-Rafida, i.e., the Shi’a branch of Islam), asceticism and sufism to Iblis’ deception of the imams (leaders) of these movements, including Abu Talib al-Makki and Imam al-Ghazali.6 Of some philosophical ideas, Ibn al-Jawzi says, “Aristotle and his followers claimed that the earth was a star in the center of the celestial sphere and that there are people (cawalim), rivers and trees on each star, just as on Earth . . . so consider what Iblis has led those fools to believe, despite their claim to sound mind.”7 Moreover, Ibn al-Jawzi recounts the following about Iblis’ deception of grammarians and men of letters: “He deceived those people and preoccupied them with the important disciplines of grammar and language, which are individual duties (fard cayn), and diverted them from the necessary knowledge of the acts of worship (cibadat) and from what is worth knowing, such as morals and righteousness (salah al-qulub).”8 It can thus be inferred that the prevalent idea about Iblis’ capabilities is not limited primarily to leading people astray from the right path but rather proceeds to include vast powers and great capabilities. If taken seriously, the powers attributed to Iblis would make him responsible for

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the course of most events and for most philosophical, artistic, and political movements in the history of civilization. The above quick review examined the popular traditional image of Iblis and the powers attributed to him. That aside, the purpose of this study is to reconsider the story of Iblis and to study his character, attitude, responsibilities, and fate from a perspective different from the beliefs and ideas that have heretofore governed our conception of this creature. The primary sources to be examined are the Koranic verses that recount the story and biography of Iblis, as well as works by Muslim thinkers who took interest in Iblis, his character, his disobedience, his function, and his end. However, I would like to make it clear that this study is conducted within a specific mytho-religious framework, which ensues from man’s mythical imagination and fabulatory faculties. I do not intend to treat the story of Iblis within the purview of pure religious faith, or to talk about him as if he were a real existing being. Rather, I will approach him as a mythical character created by man’s fabulatory faculties and amplified by man’s fertile imagination. In dealing with the subject of Iblis, I find myself face to face with an ancient, deep-rooted mytho-religious tradition. What I most desire to achieve is to reconsider one of the primary characters to come down to us in this heritage, but always remaining within the confines of the primary data of mythological thinking, and without deviating from its basic postulates. It is worth mentioning here that the popular preconceived notion of myth and its importance is somewhat removed from the real role that myths play in people’s lives and the texture of cultures. We are accustomed, for example, to dismissing something as mere “legend or myth,” to depreciate its importance, to banish it from mind, to deny it any practical reality and/or objectivity, and to show that it is mere illusion and fantasy. It is therefore necessary to digress a little and explain some important facts about the nature of myth and the significance of mythological thinking for man and society. Philosophers have defined man as a rational being, an animal endowed with the faculty of speech and reason. If man is such, then he is also a “mythological” animal, for just as man is the only animal that is endowed with speech and reason, he is also the only animal that creates fables and legends and transforms them into complex mythologies, and then believes in them categorically as if they were real indubitable

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facts. Mythical thinking is thus an essential characteristic of man and an important aspect of his mental activity in the broad sense of the word. That is the reason why many researchers have directed their attention to the study of the mythical activity of man, for uncovering fundamental truths about him, his society, his capabilities, cultures, and civilizations. By way of example, when you hear me speak of the “tragedy of Iblis” in this lecture, you undoubtedly go back in your minds to the old organic connection between tragedy and drama on the one hand and myth and mythical thinking on the other. Moreover, a reconsideration of this legendary character that we customarily call Iblis will yield new dimensions and significant results as regards religion, art, and philosophy. Researchers have spared no effort to explain the organic relationships and connections between mythical thinking and the religious, artistic, and philosophical dimensions of any of the great issues that mankind faces. Mythology in itself has been and still is potentially a religion, potentially an art, and potentially a philosophy, because it contains in its flexible and indeterminate framework (a) the elements of comfort and solace that are necessary for every religion, (b) the elements of creative artistic expression necessary for human aesthetic responses to the stimuli that affect humans everywhere, and (c) a disposition to explain events and interpret existence, as well as to inquire about its origins and purpose. Additionally, myth has been and still is the medium through which mankind confronted its great and persistent problems, such problems as death, destiny, evil, and the origin, purpose, and meaning of things in general. For that reason, mythology has always been a creative cultural force and a rich source for religious thinking, philosophical contemplation, and artistic expression. For further elucidation, I shall quote a statement by the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), who was one of the pioneering scholars to study the nature of myth. He showed its essential relationship to man’s other intellectual, spiritual, artistic activities. Cassirer defined the world of myth, the world to which I have confined myself in this lecture, as: The world of myth is a dramatic world – a world of actions, of forces, of conflicting powers. In every phenomenon of nature it sees the collision of these powers. Mythical perception is always impregnated with these emotional qualities. Whatever is seen or felt is surrounded by a special

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atmosphere – an atmosphere of joy or grief, of anguish, of excitement, of exultation or depression. Here we cannot speak of “things” as a dead or indifferent stuff. All objects are benignant or malignant, friendly or inimical, familiar or uncanny, alluring and fascinating or repellent and threatening.9

I must affirm, at the end of this prefatory section of my essay, that the mention of God, Iblis, jinn, angels, and the heavenly host does not mean that these names refer to real but invisible beings. The structure of the (Arabic) language ipso facto necessitates that I write and speak in a certain manner that seemingly suggests the actual existence of these characters. This is merely a linguistic illusion. If I were writing about Prince Hamlet, for example, none of you would believe that the name Hamlet referred to a real being outside the scope of the literary heritage from Shakespeare. Likewise, when we say “Hamlet killed his uncle,” we do not believe that such an incident did actually occur in Denmark. Similarly, when we say “God expelled Iblis from Paradise,” we should not think that such an incident did occur in the history of the universe. Such utterances are meant symbolically and are not descriptions of actual events.

SECTION TWO The sources that we are consulting in this study on the story of Iblis begin with a description of his lofty position in the heavenly host before he was expelled from Paradise. In his book Taflis Iblis (The Failure of Iblis), Imam Izz al-Din al-Maqdisi addresses Iblis thus: God in His omnipotence created you, showed you His wondrous creations, summoned you to His presence, clothed you with the robe of His unity, crowned you with His hallowed and praiseworthy crown, allowed you to move freely amongst His angels. These angels sought your light, enjoyed your presence, were guided by your knowledge, and followed your example. Hence, you still remained in the heavenly host, savoring the fullest cup and the sweetest speech. How often were you a teacher for the angels and a leader of the cherubim? 10

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Then there are the Koranic verses that relate what happened to Iblis, how he disobeyed God, and how God cursed him until the Day of Judgment and expelled him from paradise: And when thy Lord said unto the angels: “Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth, they said: Wilt Thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee? He said: Surely I know that which ye know not. And He taught Adam all the names, and then showed them to the angels, saying: Inform me of the names of these, if ye are truthful.” They said: Be glorified! We have no knowledge saving that which Thou hast taught us. Lo! Thou, only Thou, art the Knower, the Wise. He said: O Adam! Inform them of their names, and when he had informed them of their names, He said: Did I not tell you that I know the secret of the heavens and the earth? And I know that which ye disclose and which ye hide. And when We said unto the angels: Prostrate yourselves before Adam, they fell prostrate, all save Iblis. He demurred through pride, and so became a disbeliever (Koran 2: 30–34).

And (remember) when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am creating a mortal out of potter’s clay of black mud altered. So, when I have made him and have breathed into him of My spirit, do ye fall down, prostrating yourselves unto him. So the angels fell prostrate, all of them together save Iblis. He refused to be among the prostrate. He said: O Iblis! What aileth thee that thou art not among the prostrate? He said: Why should I prostrate myself unto a mortal whom Thou hast created out of potter’s clay of black mud altered? He said: Then go thou forth from hence, for verily thou art outcast. And lo! the curse shall be upon thee till the Day of Judgment. He said: My Lord! Reprieve me till the day when they are raised. He said: Then lo! thou art of those reprieved till an appointed time. He said: My Lord! Because Thou has sent me astray, I verily shall adorn the path of error for them in the earth, and shall mislead them every one, save such of them as are Thy perfectly devoted slaves (Koran 15: 28–40).

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And We created you, then fashioned you, then told the angels: Fall ye prostrate before Adam! And they fell prostrate, all save Iblis, who was not of those who make prostration. He said: What hindered thee that thou didst not fall prostrate when I bade thee? (Iblis) said: I am better than him. Thou createdst me of fire while him Thou didst create of mud. He said: Then go down hence! It is not for thee to show pride here, so go forth! Lo! thou art of those degraded. He said: Reprieve me till the day when they are raised (from the dead). He said: Lo! thou art of those reprieved. He said: Now, because Thou hast sent me astray, verily I shall lurk in ambush for them on Thy Right Path. Then I shall come upon them from before them and from behind them and from their right hands and from their left hands, and Thou will not find most of them beholden (unto Thee). He said: Go forth from hence, degraded, banished. As for such of them as follow thee, surely I will fill hell with all of you. (Koran 7: 11–18).

The story of Iblis, as recounted in these verses is simple on the face of it. God ordered him to prostrate himself before Adam, but he refused and suffered the consequences. However, to surpass this superficial view of the problem of Iblis, we need to go back to an important idea advanced by some Muslim scholars: The distinction between divine command or order and divine will. An order ipso facto is either obeyed and executed or is disobeyed. The one given the order has the choice of obeying or disobeying. As for divine will, it is not subject to such considerations because it cannot, by its very nature, be refused. Anything that the divine will wants is of necessity existent. God willed the existence of a great many things but also ordered mankind to keep away from them. Similarly, He ordered man to perform certain things but also wanted man to fulfill things other than the ones He had ordered. Thus, we can say that God ordered Iblis to prostrate himself before Adam but willed him to disobey His order.11 Had God willed Iblis to fall prostrate, he would have done so immediately, since God’s slave has no strength or power to disobey divine will. If we were to consider the matter from this perspective, we would be able to regard order and command as accidental, or contingent, in comparison with the eternity of divine will and the timelessness of God. If we reconsider the Koranic verses that we have just cited, it becomes clear that God wanted the angels to “hymn His praise and sanctify Him.” Al-Tabari states in his famous Tafsir that “praising and sanctifying” God

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constitutes profession of the Oneness of God (tawhid), affirming His utter transcendence and denying to Him the attributes that the polytheists assign to Him.12 In other words, tawhid (profession of the Oneness of God) is the foremost and absolute duty of angels to their Creator and is thus the reason why the angels are totally immersed in fulfilling their duty to God with all their being and esse (essence). As for the other duties imposed on the heavenly host, they are accidental and secondary in comparison with the absolute duty that derives from the divine will itself. After having demonstrated the difference between absolute duty toward God and the partial duty of obedience to the orders of God, it is now possible to distinguish the following points about Iblis’ refusal of God’s order: 1) There is no doubt that Iblis disobeyed the divine order when he refused to prostrate himself before Adam, but he was in total conformity with divine will and with his absolute duty toward his Creator. 2) Had Iblis prostrated himself before Adam he would have departed from the reality of tawhid and rebelled against his absolute duty toward God. God wanted the angels to sanctify Him and to hymn His praise. Thus, prostrating himself before Adam would have subjected Iblis to the errors of the polytheists, who ascribe to the Him attributes He is free from. Falling prostrate before any other than God is absolutely impermissible, because such an act constitutes polytheism. In fact, Iblis’ choice raises a very important question: Does real obedience consist in obeying an order or in submission to God’s will? Does righteousness lie in submission to absolute duty or to the secondary duties of obedience? If the answer to this question were simple and clear, tragedy would not have been a part of man’s life, Iblis would not have found himself in such a dilemma nor would he have fallen between the claws of Command and Will. We infer from this that Iblis’ attitude represents absolute insistence on tawhid in its purest sense and manifestation. It is as though Iblis wanted to say, “A forehead that has fallen prostrate before the One God will not be humbled before any other existent creature.”13 Al-Hallaj, the martyr of Sufism, expressed such an opinion in his book Kitab al-Tawasin: “Moses met Iblis at the steep incline of Mount Sinai and said to him: “What hindered thee that thou didst not fall prostrate?” Iblis

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replied, “What hindered me was my profession of the One God. Had I prostrated myself [before Adam] I would have been like you. You were summoned once to ‘gaze upon the mountain,’ and you gazed. I was called one thousand times to prostrate myself, but I did not, for I believe in my profession of the Oneness of God.”14 3) Iblis justified his refusal to prostrate himself before Adam logically and clearly: “I am better than him. Thou createdst me of fire, while him Thou didst create of mud.” In addition, the Koranic verses just mentioned imply a latent justification of Iblis’ refusal: his foreknowledge that Adam and his progeny would create havoc and disaster and would shed blood on earth. Such was the common feeling of all the angels when they said to God, “Wilt Thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee?” The angels, including Iblis, were cognizant of the great sins and offenses that Adam and his progeny would perpetrate on earth. Thus, they found it to be an enormity that God should create those who would disobey Him and who would shed blood. A close examination of Iblis’ first argument, which consists of a comparison between his essence, fire, and Adam’s essence, clay, demonstrates that it was not as much haughtiness and vainglory as it was a reinvoking of a fundamental truth, which God had willed and brought into being. This truth is that the natures created by God are not all of the same degree of sublimity and perfection. Rather, He distinguished between them, not only with respect to their material and natural characteristics but also with regard to their worth and perfection. Accordingly, we can classify beings and kinds in a specific hierarchy of perfection which starts with Absolute Perfection itself, and descends gradually according to the degree of perfection that God had bestowed on each kind, until we draw near nothingness, the lowest limit that we stop at. There is no doubt that fire, by nature and essence, occupies a higher and more sublime rank in this order than clay. In other words, Iblis’ comparison between his essence and that of Adam involves a specific philosophical viewpoint of the order of the universe and the classification of natures according to their degree of perfection. Iblis’ reply was thus correct, because the Creator had created things as they are regarding their degrees of perfection and sublimity, and His order to Iblis to

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prostrate himself before Adam constitutes an obvious violation of this system and a departure from the hierarchy that God willed and brought into being. If Iblis’ essence in the ladder of perfections was higher than Adam’s, then fire can only lower itself to clay by following a course contrary to its nature, which is incompatible with the degree of perfection bestowed upon it by God. This will remain impossible until there is a radical change in the divine will, whereupon It changes the order of essences or natures from what they had been since He made them. In other words, God ordered Iblis to do one thing but willed him to perform another. We will, therefore, realize later that the command to lay prostrate was not an order of will but rather an order of trial. It is curious to note in this regard that the change that occurred in Iblis after his expulsion from paradise did not affect his essence but rather his attributes and modes. His image was thus disfigured, and he became damned and cursed. In his own special way, al-Hallaj illustrated this reality in the above-cited dialog between Moses and Iblis, whereby Iblis explains to Moses that the change and disfigurement that befell him affected only his external and ephemeral conditions but did not affect his permanent essence or his constant knowledge of the provisions of the divine will. Moses said to Iblis: “You ignored the order.” Iblis replied: “That was a trial, not an order.” Moses said: “He surely changed your image.” Iblis replied: “Moses, this is all deception. The circumstance is unstable; it changes, whereas the true knowledge is still the same. It has not changed. Only the persona has changed.”15 As for the second argument that Iblis presented to justify his refusal to lay prostrate before Adam, it was based on the angels’ knowledge that Adam and his progeny would do harm unto the world and would shed blood. Therefore, how could Iblis, who was immersed in tawhid, in God’s praise and sanctification, the one who was imam of angels (archangel), the preacher of the cherubim, how could such as he fall prostrate before a creature who would do harm on earth and would shed blood? Al-Hallaj summarized this aspect of the subject as such: God said to Iblis: “Do you not lay prostrate, O ignominious one? Iblis replied: I love Thee and he who is in love is humble (mahin). You characterized me as ignominious, but I have read in A Revealed Book what this will bring upon me, O Thou Omnipotent One. How could I debase myself to Adam while you created me of fire and created him of clay?

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Clay and fire are irreconcilable opposites. I have served you longer, am of greater worth, am more knowledgeable, and am more perfect of age than Adam.”16

We thus infer that the story of Iblis as recounted in the Koranic verses is not as simple as we had imagined. It is not a story of conflict between good and evil, right and wrong. Iblis fell between two millstones, the millstone of divine will and that of divine command. He had to make a choice that would determine his destiny, a choice between his absolute duty of professing the Oneness of God, of hymning His praise, and sanctifying Him and the secondary duties of obedience that God had ordered him to fulfill. His ordeal was therefore replete with dramatic and tragic elements. Before I proceed with unpacking the implications of this conception of Iblis’ ordeal, I feel obliged to refute the assertions promoted by Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad in his book, Iblis. Al-Aqqad attempts to defend the superficial traditional conception of Iblis’ character as merely a being who disobeyed God’s order, and so God expelled him from paradise. As such, Al-Aqqad refuses to acknowledge Iblis’ ordeal and upholds the necessity of Iblis’ prostration before Adam. Upon scrutiny, we find that Al-Aqqad’s opinion is based on two arguments. 1) Angels had to lay prostrate before Adam because he was better than they. Adam was capable of doing good and evil, whereas angels could do good only. They are safeguarded against the temptation of evil and thus it is not attributable to them.17 2) Iblis must prostrate himself before Adam because God had taught Adam all the names but had not taught them to the Angels, which makes Adam superior to them.18 I shall refute each argument separately. It seems to me that al-Aqqad’s claim that Adam was superior to the angels because he was subject to both good and evil, whereas they are safe from such temptations, is fundamentally false for the following reasons: a) The story of Iblis demonstrates that even the chiefs of the angels and those favored by God among them are not safe from the temptation of evil, or else Iblis would not have disobeyed God and would not

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have met such a miserable fate. We therefore infer that angels are subject to good and evil. Like man, they are subject to the trials of evil and are required to do good, which negates Adam’s superiority to angels and consequently eliminates the need to lay prostrate before him. b) If we assume, hypothetically, with al-Aqqad that the angels are not subject to good and evil but rather always do good, due to their nature and essence, does that mean that Adam is better than they? Let us rephrase the question in more general terms: Which creatures are superior: Those who do good on occasion and do evil on other occasions, inflicting harm on earth and shedding blood, or those who do good only, constantly and forever? The answer to this question is very clear and needs no discussion, based on the premise that our moral conception of the perfect will dictates that it is the will that constantly and effortlessly does good, because doing good has become part of its essence and intrinsic nature. As for the imperfect will, it is still struggling and striving to defeat the temptation of evil in an attempt to come close to the perfect will, which is its ideal. If the angels, according to al-Aqqad’s claim, are free from the temptation of evil, then God had undoubtedly bestowed upon them a perfect will that would make them far superior to Adam and his progeny. When God said to the angels, “Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth,” the angels demurred before such an enormity and answered: “Wilt Thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood?” Does al-Aqqad intend to make Adam’s ability to do harm and shed blood a source of his superiority over the angels? We now proceed to refute al-Aqqad’s second argument, the claim that it is the angels’ duty to fall prostrate before Adam because God had taught him, not the angels, all the names. We have shown earlier that Iblis was superior to Adam because of Iblis’ intrinsic nature and essence; his superiority was not due to contingent, ephemeral conditions such as those acquired by Adam when God taught him all the names. In other words, Adam’s knowledge of all the names does not constitute one, or indeed any, of his distinguishing and essential characteristics. There is no doubt that the angels could have learned all the names if God had wanted that. We therefore infer that Adam’s knowledge of all

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the names was contingent, and was bestowed upon him by God to entice the angels to lay prostrate before him. Hence, 1) Adam is not superior to the angels, including Iblis, neither because of his ability to do good and evil nor due to his knowledge of all the names. 2) Iblis’ essence is better than and superior to Adam’s essence, because God created him from fire and created Adam from clay. God had not intended clay to be as high in the order of things as fire. 3) Al- Aqqad’s claim that it was incumbent upon Iblis to fall prostrate before Adam because Adam was superior to the angels is false and to be rejected.

SECTION THREE We return now to Iblis’ ordeal that resulted from the contradiction of command and will. Al-Hallaj expressed Iblis’ ordeal with splendid conciseness: “When Iblis was told to lay prostrate before Adam, he addressed the Truthful (God): “Has the lofty honor of prostration only for You been lifted, so I prostrate myself for him? By ordering me to lay prostrate [before Adam], You have prevented me from doing so.”19 Imam al-Maqdisi defined the nature of the contradiction between divine order and divine will as follows: I have considered with certitude the circle of eternal happiness and eternal damnation. It turns on the line of the command and the centers of the will. Between them is indeterminate subtlety and lonely narrow space. The traveller in this strait has no companion for success. The giver of the order grants, but the will plunders. What is endowed by the giver of the order is plundered by the will. The orderer says, “Do,” but the will says, “Do not do.”20

It appears that Imam al-Maqdisi had considerable understanding of the importance of the dramatic and tragic elements of Iblis’ ordeal, hence his emphasis on the element of contradiction faced by Iblis and on his

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inability to find an appropriate exit from his ordeal. The choice that Iblis had to make was critical for his destiny. His eternal happiness or misery depended on his choice. He could surrender to the requirements of the will and be consistent with his absolute duty, thereby attaining eventual happiness, or he could slide into submission to God’s order and to the secondary duties of obedience, thus failing the test and becoming forever miserable. In short, the order to lay prostrate placed Iblis’ being, life, and eternal happiness in the balance because “the giver of the order grants, but the will plunders,” and “the orderer says do, but the will says do not do.” In addition, al-Maqdisi’s statement shows that those who undergo such an ordeal do not have a clear, bright path nor are they given a chance to distinguish easily between a right choice and a wrong choice because of the indistinguishable “subtlety . . . of the two.” Furthermore, those who are placed in such a predicament find themselves totally alone, unable to benefit from the counsel or assistance of friend or companion. They have to make the choice alone and they must bear the consequences of their choice. The path that they were predestined to take is, as al-Maqdisi said, a “lonely narrow space.” In the following pages, I shall try to determine the elements of tragedy in Iblis’ ordeal and to highlight its various aspects as precisely and clearly as the subject allows. I will, therefore, rely on two principal sources: the Greek drama of Sophocles and the story of Abraham in the Semitic religious tradition. I need not dwell long on the story of Abraham. Abraham was ordered to slay his son Isaaq (or Ishmael) and when he was about to execute the order, God ransomed him “with a tremendous victim (Koran 37: 107).”21 I pause here for a moment to refer to a well-known study by Kierkegaard of the story of Abraham in his book, Fear and Trembling. I have relied in this section of my study on the general outlines of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Abraham’s trial. However, this should not preclude some basic differences between the opinions that I will present and Kierkegaards’special standpoint on the persona of Abraham. There is no doubt that the story of Abraham contains powerful tragic potentials and many of the basic elements of tragedy. However, we cannot under any circumstances consider it a real tragedy because it has a happy, optimistic, and pleasing ending. The feeling left by the story of Abraham differs completely and qualitatively from the feeling left by the story of King Oedipus, for example.22

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There are many considerations that make Iblis’ ordeal a real tragedy, and I will point them out as follows: 1) A tragedy often occurs at the time of major crises and violent events that upset the status quo, rock the foundations of current systems, and shake the prevailing values so much so that those undergoing such trials feel that their former being and familiar mode of existence have been put to trial and that the moral, spiritual, and material components of their surrounding world are about to collapse. God had given Abraham “a gentle son.” “And when his son was old enough to walk with him, Abraham said, “O my dear son, I have seen in a dream that I must sacrifice thee. . . . ” (Koran 37: 101–102). Abraham was ordered to sacrifice his son as an offering to God. This order upset all measures and standards, broke down all values, and blurred and confused all features and characteristics. The merciful compassionate father has to kill his son, with premeditation, calmness, and submission. Iblis was a teacher to the angels and a leader to the cherubim. He was, as al-Maqdisi observes, calm and peaceful, sound and virtuous, and while he was in the presence of witnesses, God brought Adam into being and ordered him to lay prostrate before Adam.23 Thereupon the order of the heavenly host shook, and all standards and measures were toppled again. The forehead of Iblis, which had only prostrated itself before the One had to prostrate itself before a human. The teacher who taught tawhid to angels had to disavow the earlier sanctification and glorification of God. Fire had to submit to clay. But Iblis refused to prostrate himself before Adam and was thus damned until the Day of Judgment. In other words, the story presents Iblis’ disavowal and his expulsion from paradise at the highest of his glory, then at the lowest point of his suffering and misery. In this respect, the story of Iblis was much like the ancient Greek story that presents King Oedipus at the apex of his power and glory and then presents him wandering in the labyrinths of despair, suffering, and agony. Both Iblis and King Oedipus became outcasts, disfigured and loathsome, after they tumbled to the abyss of suffering. Whoever had supported them became their adversary. 2) When we consider the drama Antigone, we discover that the heroine’s tragic end was a consequence of the essential contradiction between what Antigone represents on the one hand and what Creon, the King

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of Thebes, represents on the other. Antigone was absolutely determined to bury her murdered brother, regardless of happenstance or cost. Her motive was her great love for her brother and her unshakeable belief in the need to bury the dead, as decreed by the gods. Antigone addresses her sister Ismene as follows.24 Go thine own way; myself will bury him. How sweet to die in such employ, to rest,– Sister and brother linked in love’s embrace– A sinless sinner, banned awhile on earth, But by the dead commended; and with them I shall abide for ever. As for thee, Scorn, if thou wilt, the eternal laws of Heaven.

King Creon, on the other hand, was motivated by a noble, patriotic emotion when he ordered punishment against the brother who bore arms against the city and was killed at its gates. He was also sincere in his attempt to uphold the rule of law and to restore order to the city of Thebes after the chaos that had swept it. It was, therefore, incumbent on him to be firm, to insist on the thorough execution of his orders and directives, and to threaten with extreme punishment whoever violated the law. All of these measures were natural and necessary in Thebes, a city that had suffered the calamities of war, disease, and chaos before Creon took the reins of government. The result was the tragic conflict between the temporal requirements and needs of the city, as represented in the character of Creon, and the divine requirements, as represented in the character of Antigone. In the end, everyone endured death, despair, and tragedy. When Creon asked Antigone, “And yet were bold enough to break the law?” She answered: Yea, for these laws were not ordained of Zeus, And she who sits enthroned with gods below, Justice, enacted not these human laws. Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man, Could’st by a breath annul and override The immutable unwritten laws of Heaven. They were not born to-day nor yesterday; They die not; and none knoweth whence they Sprang.

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I was not like, who feared no mortal’s frown, To disobey these laws and so provoke The wrath of Heaven. I know that I must die, E’en hadst thou not proclaimed it; and if death Is thereby hastened, I shall count it gain.25

If we were to consider the story of Abraham from such perspective, we would discover that it contains a contradiction similar to the one that Sophocles depicted in his play. There is no doubt that Abraham suffered tremendously as a result of the contradiction between his respect for the emotional requirements and moral obligations of paternity on the one hand and the imperative to submit to the divine order that decreed the slaying of his son Isaaq on the other. Abraham loved his son more than he loved himself and he performed his paternal duties superbly well. But what could he do when his love for his son and his paternal duties were incompatible with the requirements of total obedience to God’s order and with his absolute religious duties to his God? It must be admitted that Abraham’s ordeal is charged with the elements of tragedy and its tensions to a larger degree than is Antigone’s, because the basic contradiction in Sophocles’ play was between temporal authority and the eternal orders of Heaven. Each side of this contradiction has its own independent origin. As for Abraham, the two sides of the contradiction revert ultimately to the same origin, God. When Antigone obeyed the orders of Heaven she disobeyed the orders of temporal authority. But when Abraham submitted to God’s order and placed the knife on his son’s neck, he disobeyed the absolute moral norms that God had bestowed upon man: Rules that govern fathers’ treatment of sons and vice versa. In other words, when Abraham obeyed his God from the religious standpoint, he was obliged to disobey him form the moral standpoint. Iblis’ ordeal is not qualitatively different from the ordeal of either Antigone or Abraham. He had a direct divine order to prostrate himself before Adam and at the same time he was under the requirement of divine will that called for the profession of tawhid, sanctification, and praise of God and that prohibited prostration before anyone but the eternal God. Iblis submitted to the requirements of divine will and thereby disobeyed the order to prostrate himself. He was thus expelled from paradise, damned, and foreordained to absolute despair of returning to paradise. However, Iblis’ tragedy was bigger and more catastrophic

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than Abraham’s ordeal, which turned out not to be a tragedy, because Abraham was able in the end, to slay a ram in place of his son Isaaq. The contradiction that Iblis faced was not between the duties of religious obedience and those of moral obedience but rather between the duties of obedience to the divine order only. Expressed otherwise, Iblis confronted God in direct and compromising self-contradiction, thereby becoming a victim of this contradiction and of the stand that he, Iblis, had chosen and assumed. A careful examination of Antigone reveals more than a conventional heroine who represents all good, truth, and beauty, whereas her adversary represents the opposite of such qualities. Likewise, a subtle understanding of the story of Abraham in its humanistic dimensions cannot but reveal that his attempt to slay his son was not simply an abominable crime incompatible with the simplest axioms of humaneness and morality. The same is true of the story of Iblis. A careful examination of his ordeal and of his disobedience of the prostration order reveals more than an embodiment of rebellion, evil, and sin. Furthermore, if we consider matters from a different perspective, we will have no doubt that Iblis was disobedient and a denier. Yet, we should not forget that his denial (juhud) was the most sublime form of sanctification of God and the grandest example of commitment to the reality of tawhid. Iblis sinned when he argued with his God, but it was God who permitted him to argue and who listened to him when he said, “I am better than him. Thou createdst me of fire, whilst him Thou didst create of clay.” Here, Iblis’ tragic character is manifest as a mixture of innocence and sin, beauty and ugliness, right and wrong, and good and evil. Iblis possesses all these attributes, just as do the heroes of the great tragedies of literature. Iblis had to reject prostration totally. Likewise, Orestes had to kill his mother and Hamlet to kill his uncle. Like Orestes and Hamlet, Iblis had to suffer the resulting tribulation, pain, and despair. All of these heroes found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. They are at once in the right and are not right. Only those who are intrepid, robust, and of heroic mettle can endure such tragic tension. 3) For further elucidation, we should differentiate between two kinds of tragedy: The “tragedy of alienation” and the “tragedy of fate.” Here I am suggesting that Iblis’ ordeal clearly represents those two kinds

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of tragedy. Misfortune in the tragedy of alienation is the result of separation from a “fixed situation” that the hero had been associated with but then found himself dissociated from. The works of Milton, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, and Camus (in his book, The Stranger) are good examples of the tragedy of alienation. As for Iblis’ alienation and its tribulations, al-Hallaj describes it in the words of Iblis as follows: He isolated me, left me alone, confused me, expelled me, lest I associate with the faithful; prevented me from those who are jealous on account of my jealousy. He transformed me on account of my confusion; confused me on account of my estrangement; made me haram (unlawful) on account of my companionship; disfigured me on account of my praise; excommunicated me on account of my abandonment; abandoned me on account of my disclosures (with Him), exposed me on account of my connection (to Him).26

Imam al-Maqdisi described Iblis’ alienation and misery in Iblis’ words as follows: And to perfect my misery I asked to be reprieved (till the day of resurrection). So, I became the laughing stock of those in the Presence. I pine away when I hear those who invoke and repeat His name; I am rent when I see those giving thanks to Him. I run away from the shadow of one, and from the pure deeds of another. One burns me with his breath, while the other disables me with his strength. When the repentant repents he breaks my back and when the stray one returns he shortens my life. All that I built with the disobedient in a slumber is demolished by repentance in a slumber. I am in interminable woe, unalterable war and a sorrow that lasts long.27

Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi’s splendid description of alienation applies aptly to Iblis’ situation: O Ye! The stranger (gharib) is one whose sun of beauty has set; one who is estranged from his loved ones and from his censurers; one who speaks and acts in strange ways. The stranger is one whose description says: One ordeal after another, whose title indicates: One trial after another; and whose truth shows in him time and again. Oh, mercy on the stranger! His journey extends without arrival, his tribulation lasts

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without wrong, his hurt intensifies without fail, his suffering magnifies to no avail.28

Sophocles’ King Oedipus and Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet are considered to be among the best works on the tragedy of fate. Sophocles’ play reveals how fate took its inevitable course, how all prophecies were realized, and how all efforts by Oedipus and Jocasta to escape their dark fate failed. An examination of Iblis’ ordeal from a similar perspective shows that he also was subject in all his deeds to God’s preordained fate just like any creature of God’s kingdom, as stated in the following holy tradition (hadith qudsi, a Muslim tradition in which God Himself speaks, as opposed to hadith nabawi, an ordinary prophetic tradition): The pen was the first thing that God created. He said to it, “Write.” The pen replied: “What do I write?” God said, “The fates of everything until the Hour of Resurrection. He who dies believing otherwise is not one of Mine.”29

Al-Hallaj too expressed this truth in a very famous line of poetry about Iblis: “He dropped him, hands tied, into the open sea and said to him, Beware! Beware! Do not get wet.” In other words Iblis was subject in his circumstance, choice, expulsion, damnation, and disfigurement to the ordinances of the Divine Will and to the inescapable fate that He had decreed. He was compelled by God’s wisdom, as they say, and overwhelmed by God’s will, as attested to by God’s words: “Lo! We have created every thing with a fate” (Koran 54: 49). Al-Hallaj wrote the following on Iblis’ submission to his fate as divinely decreed: The Truthful, may He be praised, said to Iblis, “The choice is mine, not yours.” Iblis answered, “All choices, and mine as well, are Yours. You, Creator, have made the choice for me. If You have forbidden me from prostrating myself [before Adam] it is because You are the All Invincible. If I misexpressed myself, it is because you are the All-Hearing. If you want me to prostrate myself before him I am the obedient. Of all those I know knowYou, none knows You better than me. Do not blame me, for I am not to blame. Protect me, Lord; I am all alone.”30

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I must point out here that not everyone who has been wronged by fate and crushed by predestined decree is a hero. Nor is anyone who finds himself in a tragic ordeal – such as Iblis, Antigone, and Abraham – a tragic character. It depends to a large extent on the quality of one’s reaction to one’s ordeal and on the nature of one’s response to one’s destiny. Antigone’s sister, Ismene, for example, was well aware of the conflict that led Antigone to her tragic end. However, we cannot under any circumstances consider Ismene a tragic personality because her response to that conflict was negative, and she totally surrendered to the flow of events. That is the reason why she counseled prudence, raised doubts, and expressed fears, which proves that hers was not the mettle of heroes. The same applies to the angels whose “mark of them is on their foreheads from the traces of prostration” (Koran 48: 29). It would be interesting to make a comparison, here, between Iblis’ attitude and that of Adam. Adam disobeyed God just as did Iblis. If God had willed Adam not to disobey, Adam would not have disobeyed, nor would God have reproached him for his disobedience. Adam did not evince any positive reaction [to God’s reproach] but rather said, “Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves. If Thou forgive us not and have not mercy on us, surely we are of the lost!” (Koran 7: 23). As for the tragic hero who fought his destiny like King Oedipus did, he would not have said “I have wronged myself,” because he knew full well that it was his ineluctable fate that had wronged him. Iblis, on the other hand, responded positively to God’s reproach, saying, “My Lord! Because Thou hast sent me astray, I verily shall adorn the path of error for them in the earth “ . . . , thereby denying that he had wronged himself or that he was responsible for his destiny and his end. Once again, al-Tawhidi’s description of the stranger applies to Iblis: “He has no excuse so he may be excused; he committed no offense so he may be pardoned; he committed no disgrace so he may be forgiven.”31 Adam was afraid of admitting this truth when God reproached him, whereas Iblis argued with God and attempted to defend his act and to justify his choice, although he was aware that there was no escape from the fate that God had preordained for him. As such, he was comparable to Oedipus and Jocasta when they attempted to escape their ominous destiny, even though they knew that their failure was expected and inevitable. Iblis, however, remained positive, in attitude and deed, even after he was damned, as proven by his reaction: “Verily, I shall adorn

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the path of error for them in the earth and shall mislead them every one” (Koran 15: 39). The heroes of the great works of tragedy in world literature were thus made of the same mettle as Iblis and their tragic personae were modeled after him. No wonder that such tragic characters were either in direct contact with Satan or that they had clear Satanic characteristics. It is no coincidence either that the great tragic characters are most often drawn from groups of eccentrics, saboteurs, rebels, infidels, deniers, and murderers. It is for that reason that legal trials abound in famous tragedies. Examples of authors and such literary works are those of Aeschylus, Kafka, The Brothers Karamazov, and Camus’ novel The Stranger. It is possible to consider the argument that took place between Iblis and God in the Koran as a speedy court-martial in which Iblis was given a chance to defend himself before God delivered a verdict that was already in force. 4) In investigating the nature of tragedy, it is difficult not to touch on the subject of the emotion of pride and the role that emotion plays in the life of tragic characters. Pride assumes special significance because of the opinion that attributes Iblis’ refusal to prostrate himself before Adam to the motive of pride and boasting. The Truthful (God) said to Iblis when He expelled him from paradise: “Then go down hence! It is not for thee to show pride here, so go forth! Lo! Thou art of those degraded” (Koran 7: 13). In order to comprehend the true nature of Iblis’ pride, we must distinguish between pride in the sense of arrogance and “tragic pride,” which characterizes the great tragic personae. That is not to say that the tragic hero cannot be arrogant. However, this reprehensible quality, arrogance, remains accidental and contingent in relation to his heroism and tragedy. Hubris and quixotic pride can only elicit pity and ridicule; tragic pride imposes a serious attitude toward the hero, and great admiration and appreciation for him, even if his attitude is contrary to our principles and attitudes. For that reason, pride has always been an important incentive that has motivated tragic characters, from King Oedipus to Ivan Karamazov. The essence of tragic pride is manifest in the hero’s refusal to remain passive in the face of what he considers to be a challenge to his duty,

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status, and dignity, even though he knows that such challenge is part of his fate and that his pride will lead him to destruction, despair, and death. Oedipus, Antigone, and Iblis came to this end. Adam, on the other hand, did not possess that kind of pride, and had he been predestined to become a tragic character he would not have proclaimed, “Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves. If Thou forgive us not and have not mercy on us, surely we are of the lost.” From this we deduce that Iblis’ pride did not derive from empty arrogance, nor from insolence toward God, but rather was tragic pride that prompted him to seek refuge in God from God’s fate. Iblis did not change his attitude toward God even after he was expelled from paradise and damned by God. He still acknowledged God’s omnipotence and was afraid of Him and would not accept another deity but Him as is evident from the Koranic verses which say: “And the hypocrites are on the likeness of the devil when he telleth man to disbelieve, then, when he disbelieveth (Iblis) saith, ’Lo! I am quit of thee. Lo! I fear Allah, the Lord of the worlds” (Koran 59: 16). Also, on the evidence of Iblis’ answer when he made an oath before God: “Then, by Thy might, I surely will beguile them every one, save Thy single minded slaves among them” (Koran 38: 83). Iblis thus demonstrated that nothing was more precious to him than God’s might, even after he was eternally damned. Moreover, Iblis excluded God’s devoted servants (“single minded slaves”) from his oath as if he were trying to prove his appreciation of God and his sincere loyalty to the Lord of the worlds, even after he was expelled and cursed. Not only was Iblis an alien but he was also an alien in his alienation as al-Tawhidi stated. In the conversation that he imagined between Moses and Iblis, al-Hallaj describes Iblis’ attitude toward God after he received eternal damnation as follows: Moses said to Iblis, “Do you mention His name in praise (dhikr)?” Iblis replied, “O, Moses, the thought does not invoke God’s name. I am mentioned and He is mentioned, His mention is my mention and my mention is His mention, can the mentioners be save with one another? My service to Him is now purer, my time is more free and my praise is more distinct. In time past it was my good fortune to serve Him, but now I serve Him for His good fortune.”32

Imam al-Maqdisi had an unconventional view of Iblis’ destiny and pride, influenced by Al-Hallaj’s viewpoint. He said,

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He (God) said to me, “Prostrate yourself before someone other than I.” I said, “No one but You.” He said, “I curse you.” I said, “No harm done. If You draw me near You, then You are You.” He said, “You do that in arrogance and vainglory.” I said, “Lord! Whoever has known You for an instant in his lifetime, or has been with You for a moment throughout his life, or accompanied You in your love for a while, surely can be proud. Just imagine how much more proud would be one who spent his whole lifetime with You and who built monuments out of your love. How many times have I day and night professed your oneness. How many times have I learned privately and publicly the lessons of your sanctity and praise? Traditions and signs witness for me, the abodes know my right and the night and day believe me. Where was Adam when I was the imam of the angels, the preacher to all the cherubim, and the leader of your close companions? I have worshipped You since time immemorial, and You have willed for me since time immemorial. When the signs of your will appeared, the traces of worship disappeared. The legist (mujtahid) missed in his judgement. The master lost his high rank and the arrow of fate (death) unmistakably struck his heart. Whether I prostrate myself before Adam or not, worship You or not, it is inevitable that I return to preordained fate. You have created me of fire and it is inevitable that I return to fire. “Thereof We created you, and thereunto We return you (Koran 20: 55).”33

SECTION FOUR In the previous pages, I treated the predicament of Iblis on many levels. I began with the popular traditional viewpoint; then I described his ordeal, and then I specified the tragic aspects of his character and attitude. There is no doubt that as we move from one of these three levels to the other, Iblis’ reality as well as the numerous facets of his character become more distinct and profound. This does not mean that our understanding of Iblis’ character on the tragic level will reveal his reality completely and in full. The reason is that his character is not as much the product of dramatic literary imagination as it is the offspring of pure religious imagination. Our tragic view of Iblis will, therefore, remain deficient and will reveal only part of his truth. A treatment of Iblis on a purely religious level

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would, however, complete our picture of him and would reveal his real and ultimate status in the order of creation. The main reason compelling me to make such a statement is that tragedy, in its definitive and absolute sense, cannot exist within the framework of the three Semitic religions. It is impossible for religion to accept tragedy in its definitive form because divine providence encompasses the universe completely and leads it to the ultimate ends that God had chosen for it. That is why it is natural for religion to claim that it can surpass tragedy, no matter how afflicting it is, and that it can solve all the complexities involved in it, if not in this worldly life then in the hereafter. The tragic view of events, for instance, requires that heroes suffer grave, absolutely irreparable losses, symbolized often by death or total despair. Heroes are also required to suffer undeserved and unwanted disaster and torture. Religion, on the other hand, rejects such a tragic logic and maintains that the pious will someday be recompensed for the losses they suffer, just as God compensated Job for the disasters that had befallen him, and rewarded him for his long patience. Whereas losses suffered by evildoers are the just punishment they deserve because of their sins and evil deeds, as indicated by the Koranic verse: “And whoso doeth good an atom’s weight will see it then, And whoso doeth ill an atom’s weight will see it then” (Koran 99: 7, 8). Even the tragedy of death is, according to religion, only but a temporary loss that signifies transition from the temporal world to the eternal abode. In other words, religion accepts tragedy only as a transitory, temporary phase. Subsequently, Iblis’ tragedy must be a temporary one and will someday come to an end. After this reference to the limitations of the tragic view of Iblis’ character, I would like to pose the following question: Why was Iblis ordered to prostrate himself before Adam? More precisely, why did God put him in this predicament? The answer is that God wanted to test and try Iblis just as He did Job and Abraham and other pious men after them. The reference to Iblis’ trial is clear in what he said to his God: “My Lord! Because Thou has sent me astray, I verily shall adorn the path of error for them in the earth,” and “Now, because Thou has sent me astray, verily I shall lurk in ambush for them on Thy Right Path.” That is, Iblis will lead people astray, tempt, and test them just as God had sent him astray, tempted, and tested him. Iblis was an archangel and the orator of the cherubim. God wanted to test him, and so he ordered him to prostrate himself before Adam in order to determine his adherence to the essence of Oneness and

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his devotion to his mission of sanctification and glorification of God. Iblis proved that he was willing to sacrifice everything for the sake of his profession of one God. Al-Hallaj says of Iblis: Of all the angels, Iblis was the most knowledgeable of prostration, the closest to what Is, the most exerting of efforts, the most honoring of vows, and the closest to the Worshiped One. The angels fell prostrate before Adam for the purpose of assisting him; Iblis refused to prostrate himself before Adam because of the long time he had spent observing God.34

And just as God tested Abraham by asking him to sacrifice the most precious thing he had for His sake, God similarly tested Iblis by asking him to sacrifice the dearest thing he had for the sake of his God and Beloved. One of the characteristics of a religious test is that it thrusts the one who is tested into a forbidding and unbearable predicament. Consequently, his reality is distinctly revealed, without distortion or falsification. The main idea that I would like to present here is that Iblis had successfully passed the test that God had put to him. This truth becomes evident on the basis of the following considerations: 1) Abraham passed the test because he suspended his paternal duties and his human and familial commitments in order to obey divine orders and fulfill his duty to his God at whatever cost. We can similarly say that Iblis passed the test because he suspended the partial duties of obedience in order to submit to divine will and adhere to his absolute duty of acknowledging the oneness and sanctity of God. 2) Just as the divine order transformed the slaying of Isaaq from a mere vicious crime into a great sacrifice and an unparalleled gift, Iblis’ adherence to his absolute duty transformed his refusal to prostrate himself before Adam from mere disobedience to a most sublime form of sanctification a creature has ever given to God. 3) In fact, the divine order rendered Abraham’s paternal duties and human commitments into trial-duties, if obeyed Abraham would have failed the test. Similarly, Iblis’ partial duties became trial – duties

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in relation to the absolute duty. Had Iblis submitted to them, he would have failed the test. 4) Abraham did not behave like an ordinary human being with regard to his paternal duties but rather behaved in the manner of prophets and saints, thus revealing his reality through the trial. Likewise, Iblis did not behave like the angels in the face of his partial duties toward God but followed the conduct of saints, the pious, and the closest men of God, thus revealing his truth in its full purity and pristineness. 5) It is clear that divine trial is the cause of the affliction, agony, and despair that the tested one suffers. Abraham’s strong desire to save Isaaq and keep him was the cause of his agony and misery. Had it not been for this intense desire, his test would not have received much attention, because Abraham would have offered his God something only slightly precious, something whose loss would not have been a great disaster. So it was with Iblis’ trial. When God tried him, Iblis had an intense desire to obey the order of prostration before Adam, and it was extremely painful for him to sacrifice such desire for the sake of adhering to the truth of the oneness of God. Otherwise, Iblis would have sacrificed something for which he originally had had very little desire. Both Iblis and Abraham knew that God was testing them and was asking of them the most difficult and precious sacrifices of all. But no sacrifice was too difficult for them for the sake of God. For that reason, Iblis refused to prostrate himself before Adam, and Abraham rejected all paternal and human relations. When we treated Iblis’ predicament on the level of tragedy and compared it to the story of Abraham and to the play Antigone, we mentioned that Abraham’s predicament failed to reach the level of tragedy because of that famous scapegoat (lit., ram) and because of the impossibility of the existence of real tragedy in religion. We also mentioned that Antigone’s predicament follows that of Abraham in importance because it represents a real tragedy. As for Iblis’ predicament, we considered it the ultimate tragedy because it gives expression to tragedy in its most explicit form, utmost limit, and most profound meaning.

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However, when we study this subject on the level of religious trial, we are obliged to change this classification and replace it with a new one that is harmonious with the logic of religion and its stance vis-à-vis tragedy. If Iblis’ reality could have been manifested on the level of tragedy only, our chief concerns would have ended with the earlier classification. The new classification places Antigone’s predicament at the lowest rung of the ladder, because her trial imposed on her the choice between an order by temporal authority as against divine orders, each order originating from a different source. On the other hand, Abraham’s trial was more potent and meaningful because it gave him a choice between a direct divine order and his paternal duties and human and moral commitments, which Abraham thought were sacred and sent down from Heaven. In other words, Abraham’s choice was between two orders that emanated from the same source, God. With regard to Iblis’ trial, it is the ultimate trial of trials, the most significant, and the most bitter, because it forced him to choose between the requirements of divine will on the one hand and the direct divine order on the other. That is to say, Iblis did not have to choose between the temporal and the eternal as Antigone did, nor between the divine and the moral as Abraham had to, but between the divine and the divine, between the eternal and the eternal. For that reason, Iblis’ trial was unbearable, his disaster immeasurable, and his despair indescribable. One of the basic components of a successful religious trial is the total ignorance of the one who is being tried, of the result of the trial, and whether the issue of such a trial will be in his favor or not. Had Abraham suspected for a moment that he would be slaying a ram in place of his son Isaaq, his predicament would not have been a trial but a farce. Had Job expected compensation for his patience through the disasters that God had inflicted upon him, thus enduring great distress in the hope of reaping the ease that would succeed it, his trial would have lost its meaning and substance and he would have failed the test. And had it ever occurred to Iblis that his damnation was not eternal or that his ultimate end was not hell and a terrible fate, his predicament would have turned from a tragedy-laden trial to a farce. In other words, one condition of a successful trial is the undoubting, firm belief of the one who is being tried that his trial would have a tragic end. How great his joy will then be when he finds out that the trial has a happy ending, as happened to Abraham

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when he recovered his son and to Job when God gave him back all his wealth and children a hundredfold. Since God rewarded Abraham and Job for their patience and adherence to their absolute duty toward Him, we can deduce that He will also reward Iblis for his success in passing the test and for his sacrifice and will compensate him for suffering a tragic loss and for enduring hardships, agony, and estrangement. But if this conclusion is correct, why did, then, God damn Iblis until the Day of Judgment? The answer is simple: He damned him until the Day of Judgment because the trial itself required it. Had Iblis believed that his damnation was temporary and that there was hope that he would return to paradise, his trial would have lost its meaning and substance. This is so because his adherence to the reality of Oneness, despite his total despair of salvation, is the proof of his successful passing of the test. This is similar to Abraham’s despair of saving his son Isaaq. Placing the knife on his son’s neck was solid proof of Abraham’s passing of the test to which God had subjected him. In other words, the eternal damnation does not disclose Iblis’ real fate much as it forms an integral part of his trial. As for Iblis’ real fate, it had to remain a secret concealed from him until it was time to divulge it, just as Isaaq’s fate remained a secret concealed from Abraham until it was proper time to disclose it. Furthermore, Iblis could not be damned forever, especially after successfully passing the test, because such a situation would constitute a real and major tragedy in the universe. Religion’s logic, as I have repeatedly mentioned, never allows that. Just as our understanding of Iblis’ character on the level of tragedy does not explain his total reality, so is the case with our treatment of his character on the level of trial and affliction. We must bear in mind, though, that the level of trial draws us more explicitly and profoundly to his reality than any of the other above-mentioned levels. In order to comprehend the total reality of Iblis and his actual place in the universe, we must define his direct and essential relationship with the divine will. No matter how hard I looked, I could not find a better expression of Iblis’ relationship with the divine will than that of Imam al-Maqdisi’s, who said through Iblis: He created me as He willed. He brought me into being as He willed. He used me as He willed. He preordained for me what He willed, so I could not bear to will except what He willed. I never exceeded what

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He willed, nor have I done except what He willed. If He willed, He would restore me to what He willed and would guide me with what He willed. But thus He willed, and I was what He willed. Who then would be my support against fate, and would stand to protect me from destiny? But whatever pleases Him of me, I very gladly accept. Oh! What is one to do? One whose head is in the grip of Divine subjugation (qahr), his heart in the hand of Divine Decree, and his present state stems from the judgment of eternity (qidam). It is all over. The pen has dried.35

In other words, Iblis was the making of divine will, subject to its decrees and executor of its demands. When Iblis chose refusal and rebellion, he only chose what God had chosen for him from the beginning. Iblis was used by what God had willed for him, caught in the grip of His subjugation. As such, command and interdiction (al-amr wa-’l-nahy) are null and void as far as Iblis is concerned, even though the pretext that was used to expel him was based on command and interdiction. Further explaining the true position of Iblis and God’s purpose of expelling him, Imam al-Maqdisi continues to say on behalf of Iblis: O Listener, do you think that I mismanaged? That I rejected predestination (taqdir)? That I was changed by the change? Nay. By His exalted might and His splendid omnipotence, I have not. But He has created the beautiful and the ugly (good and evil), the straight and the correct, combining the thing and its opposite in order to demonstrate His perfect omnipotence. And things are only known through their opposites. At first, He had me teach the virtues to angels in the heavenly host, and adorn the orbits with these virtues. I was the teacher of Oneness (tawhid). When the children in the school of knowledge read their lessons in Oneness and learned the alphabet-letters of His sanctifications and glorification, He transported me from heaven to earth to teach them the opposite of that, to adorn the vices and show them to them. Through me, the beautiful and the ugly (good and evil) were thus known, the straight and the correct were distinguished. I am in both heaven and earth, the master of knowers and teacher of teachers. I am of inimitable power and observer of the Presence of Wisdom. Who then is closer to His Presence (hadrah) than I? Who is more renowned in His mention than I? I have all the honor that He mentioned me, even though He damned me. I have all the pride that He reprieved me, even though He expelled me. By my knowledge of Him He denied me . . . Happiness disappeared because of

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separation. You think it is separation? If I had dropped in His estimation, I fell into the heart of the heart of Estimation.36

SECTION FIVE I shall devote this section of my study to finding an acceptable religious interpretation for some of the paradoxes that occurred in the previous sections of the lecture and to answering some outstanding important questions. Following is a classification of the most important of these paradoxes and questions: 1) When I posed the question, why did God order Iblis to prostrate himself before Adam? I answered it by saying that God wanted to test and try him as he tested and tried Abraham and Job after him. The new question that arises before us now is: Why does God test His angels and his people when He knows everything they divulge or conceal? Can we, for example, specify any of the divine attributes that calls upon God to test His people? Rather, to which one of these divine attributes should we ascribe such a tendency to test people? 2) When we distinguished, at the beginning of this lecture, between Will and Command, we mentioned that God sometimes orders something while He would have willed to realize something else. I wonder, is there a religious explanation for this paradox in God’s behavior? 3) We have also seen that Iblis was caught in the grip of God’s power and was totally subject to the fate willed and decreed for him, like the rest of His creatures. Hence, the effect of divine command and interdiction is nullified as far as Iblis is concerned. If this be true, why then did God expel Iblis from paradise on the pretext of command and interdiction? In addition, God has since eternity predetermined who would go to heaven and who would go to hell. Religious proofs that support this statement are numerous. I shall cite, by way of example, only the following holy hadith: “God Almighty seized a handful and said: this goes to paradise with my blessing, and I care not. Then He seized another handful and said: this goes to hell, and I care not.”37

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But despite all that, God revealed scriptures and sent messengers and charged them with commands and interdictions and distinguished between halal and haram (lawful and unlawful). What is the benefit of all this for those who are compelled by His wisdom and who are manipulated by His preordained fate? 4) If God is the Creator of all things and the One who predetermines good and evil for His people, why then does He want people to believe that Iblis is the cause of all evil and sin? And why does He want to burden Iblis with the sins of those He had created evil and made to do evil? Can we explain this paradox by ascribing it to any of the well-known attributes of God? I believe that the divine attribute that we are searching for to answer these questions is that of cunning (makr: plotting, scheming). Following are some Koranic verses that illustrate the nature of this attribute: •

“And they (the disbelievers) schemed, and Allah schemed (against them): and Allah is the best of schemers” (Koran 3: 54).

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“And when those who disbelieve plot against thee (O Muhammad) to wound thee fatally, or to kill thee or to drive thee forth; they plot, but Allah also plotteth; and Allah is the best of plotters” (Koran 8: 30).

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“And when We cause mankind to taste of mercy after some adversity which had afflicted them, behold! they have some plot against Our revelations. Say: Allah is more swift in plotting. Lo! Our messengers write down that which Ye plot” (Koran 10: 21).

We also find that some other verses ascribe to God a similar attribute, that of mocking, as in the following verse: “Allah (Himself) doth mock them, leaving them to wander blindly on in their contumacy” (Koran 2: 15). Some verses stated the same meaning without mentioning or specifying divine cunning, as in the following ones: 1) “And let not those who disbelieve imagine that the reins We give them bodeth good unto their souls. We only give them rein that they

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may grow in sinfulness. And theirs will be a shameful doom” (Koran 3: 178). 2) “And when We would destroy a township We send commandment to its folk who live at ease, and afterward they commit abomination therein, and so the Word (of doom) hath effect for it, and We annihilate it with complete annihilation” (Koran 17: 16). 3) “Lo! The hypocrites seek to beguile Allah, but it is Allah who beguileth them” (Koran 4: 142). We deduce from al-Tabari’s interpretation of the above-mentioned verses the following: a) Cunning (makr) implies mocking and beguilement.38 b) Cunning implies disclosing something for someone and at the same time harboring something else for him: “God shows mankind judgments (ahkam) in this world contrary to what He has for them in the afterlife.”39 c) God gives people their reins; that is, “He prolongs their life, happiness, and influence, so that when they have felt peaceful and secure He can suddenly doom them.”40 d) When God said: “And when We would destroy a township We send commandment to its folk who live at ease, and afterward they commit abomination therein, and so the Word (of doom) hath effect for it,” He had willed the destruction of the township. But lest God’s folk held an allegation against what He had willed, He resorted to cunning. Thus, He ordered the township folk, who lived at ease, to act sinfully and go astray so that it would appear to all that they had deserved such destruction, when the truth of the matter is not so. In his famous book Qut al-Qulub, Abu Talib al-Makki explains the idea of divine cunning by tying it clearly to divine testing of people: He related to us on the authority of Abu Muhammad Sahl, said he: I perceived as if I had been ushered into paradise where I met three hundred prophets. I asked them: What was the most frightening thing you ever dreaded in life on earth? They said to me: An evil ending out

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of God’s cunning which is indescribable, indiscernible, and inscrutable. God’s cunning is infinite, because His will and His judgments have no purpose. An example of that is the famous account about the Prophet and Gabriel who both wept out of fear of God. God revealed to them the following: Why do you cry when I have secured you? They said to Him: But who is secure from Your cunning? Had they not known that His cunning was infinite because his judgment has no purpose they would not have said to Him: but who is secure from Your cunning? Although He had said to them that He had secured them. His reassuring words should have ended His cunning, and they should have seen the end of His cunning, but they were afraid from the rest of His cunning that was concealed from them. It was as though they were afraid that His words: “I have secured you against my cunning” were also a cunning on His part. They were afraid that He was testing them as He did with His companion Abraham, when the mangonel catapulted him in midair and Abraham said: “Sufficient unto me is God, my Lord.” Gabriel intervened with him asking, do you need anything? Abraham answered no, living up to his words: “Sufficient unto me is God”, thus confirming word with deed.41

We can state, after this quick review of the idea of divine cunning that the good will that God had shown Iblis was different from the fate, predicament, and ending He had willed and harbored for him. That is to say, God practiced His cunning against Iblis by ordering him outwardly to prostrate himself before Adam while inwardly Willing him to disobey the order so that He would have a pretext against him, to do anything He wished to him, and carry through the fate he had preordained for him. The order of trial, then, was only an instrument of divine cunning whose objective was to execute the decrees of divine will and justify them before His creatures. It will thus all look acceptable to them and they will not have a pretext against Him for what He has done to them. As Abu Talib al-Makki has said, there is no purpose to His will and to His decrees. Divine cunning intervenes to make things appear to people different from what they actually are, i.e., to make the divine will seem as if it had objectives, justifications, and reasons. Accordingly, God practiced His cunning against the angels by making it appear to them as if Iblis had been expelled from paradise for a notable reason, disobedience. Had it not been for this cunning arrangement, the angels would

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have regarded the expulsion of their chief [Iblis] an enormity greater than the enormity of Him saying: “Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth.” Furthermore, it would have been difficult for them to bear with the decrees of divine will, or to face such decrees directly without the intervention of that cunning and its justifications and explanations. That is why God expelled him from paradise on the pretext of command and interdiction, not on the plea of carrying out His will against him. Similarly, it is more appropriate for people, from a practical point of view, to believe that Iblis disobeyed His Lord’s order, and hence, he was expelled on account of that rejection. For, if people were truly to believe that God had preordained Iblis’ miserable destiny since eternity, their minds would be unable to withstand the wisdom of such an act, and they would lose their minds and would cease to believe in His justice and mercy. I therefore believe that Imam al-Maqdisi was absolutely right when he wrote the following about Iblis: If someone erred, people would say Iblis made him fall into error. If somebody forgot something, people would say Iblis made him forget. If somebody did something wrong, they would say this is Iblis’ doing. I am thus the bearer of sinners’ offenses, and the bearer of the heavy burdens of the sinful.42

We have seen how Abu Talib al-Makki associated Abraham’s trial with divine cunning, because when Abraham was about to fall into the fire, he completely entrusted himself to God by saying: “Sufficient unto me is God, my Lord.” God wanted to test Abraham’s adherence to His trust (tawakkul), so He schemed against him by sending Gabriel to offer him help. That is to say, God sent Gabriel to entice Abraham to renounce his trust of God. But Abraham refused Gabriel’s help, passed the test, and the fire thus became coolness and peace upon Abraham. Put differently, God had since eternity willed Abraham to be one of the people of Paradise and one of His pious prophets. He, therefore, tested him so that none of His creatures would raise objections against Him for the kind of fate and destiny that He had willed for Abraham. As for Iblis, God had since eternity wanted him to be the teacher of Oneness of God in the heavenly host and the teacher of evil and sin on earth. That is why God tested Iblis and schemed against him so that none

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of His creatures would have a pretext against the miserable destiny that He had willed for him. Although God had since eternity decided who would be the people of Paradise and who would be the people of Hell, He nevertheless sent messengers, revealed holy scriptures, filled them with command and interdiction, and distinguished between halal and haram. He did that in order to make it clear to His people that their happiness and misery depended on their behavior and choices, on following His prophets, and on adhering to His laws. As a result, they would have no pretext against Him regarding the fate that He had preordained for them any way. For, “Allah verily sendeth whom He will astray, and guideth whom He will,” and “He will not be questioned as to that which He doeth, but they will be questioned” (Koran 21: 23). This means that God’s sending of messengers and holy scriptures and His distinguishing between halal and haram are no more than tools of His cunning in order to carry through the decrees He had already willed for people. This is similar to the situation of the township that God wanted to destroy, so He ordered its affluent folk to lead a dissolute life and to His prolonging the good life of some people so they could further indulge in sin and He would then inflict upon them a humiliating doom. Although Iblis was compelled by God’s wisdom and was totally powerless and helpless vis-à-vis His Lord, God did not carry out His will against him and damn him until after He cunningly tested him by ordering him to lay prostrate before Adam. It thus appeared to everyone that Iblis was responsible for his act and therefore deserved that punishment. We have repeatedly contended that God was the creator of good and evil, as indicated by the following holy tradition: “God, may He be exalted, says: there is no deity besides me. I created good and preordained it. Blessed are those whom I created to do good, created good for them, and caused them to do good. I am God and there is no deity but I. I created evil and preordained it. Woe unto those whom I created to do evil, created evil for them, and caused them to do evil.”43 It is due to His cunning that people believe the opposite of that and attribute faults and shameful deeds either to themselves, as Adam did when he said: “Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves,” or to Iblis’ deception and temptation. It is also God’s cunning that leads people to ascribe good, justice, and mercy to Him, as Adam did when he said, “If Thou forgive us not and have not mercy on us, surely we are of the lost!” In addition to that, it is proper for people, from a practical point of view,

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to generally believe that God has an enemy, the cursed Iblis, the source of all evil, error, and sin. Because were they truly to believe that God was the source of all their disasters and afflictions, their minds would not be able to endure such fact, they would lose their minds, and disbelieve in God and his blessings. Imam al-Maqdisi wrote the following in the name of Iblis: And now, God has made me the reason for the existence of error, and the cause of betaking command and interdiction. In reality, there is no cause for His command, no consequence for His judgment, no reason for the distancing of His enemies and no relevance to the closeness of His saints. God Almighty is not in need of His creatures. He is self-existent. He is the caretaker of His people. The good deeds of the doers of good are of no use to Him, nor do the misdeeds of the evildoers harm Him. His command was carried out; His judgment was executed. His pen went dry with what exists in His Kingdom. . . . If He willed, He would punish; and if He willed, He would pardon. He does not have to confirm His threats. He alone is the master of His threats. It is up to Him to punish for no reason or to make happy for no relation or gain.44

If Adam could ascribe fault to himself or to Iblis who tempted him and to ask his God for forgiveness and mercy in keeping with Jesus’ counsel: “Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and unto God that which is God’s,” to whom should Iblis ascribe his disobedience and refusal? Or as Iblis himself said, “Since I am Adam’s Iblis, I wonder who is my Iblis?”45 Naturally, Iblis referred his refusal to its real and ultimate source by saying: “Now, because Thou hast sent me astray”, thus giving unto God that which is God’s, and gave nothing unto Caesar (Adam), because Caesar owned absolutely nothing as far as Iblis was concerned. And Caesar had no power or strength to have anything ascribed to him. If we were to elaborate on a comparison between Adam’s position and that of Iblis, we would discover that if Iblis was the first tragic hero in the universe, then Adam was the first opportunist. That is because Adam refused to take a definite position vis-à-vis the contradiction between the divine command and the divine will, prompted by a desire for salvation at any cost, as evidenced by his reply which we have already cited. If it turns out at the end of time that the divine command is correct and Adam is

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really responsible for his own disobedience, Adam would have, then, confessed to his guilt and asked for God’s pardon when he said: “Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves”, thus keeping open the chance of salvation on this side of the choice. At the same time, if the divine will turns out to be correct, and Adam is not really responsible for his disobedience, He would have again saved himself by resigning himself to the will of God and trusting all to his mercy and forgiveness (like Abraham) in adding: “If Thou forgive us not and have not mercy on us, surely we are of the lost.” In other words, when Adam referred the action to himself and assumed responsibility for his disobedience by saying: “Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves,” he acted as a free-willist and as such disavowed that God had preordained that injustice and willed it for him. But, when Adam added: “If Thou forgive us not and have not mercy on us, surely we are of the lost!” he acted as a predestinarian clinging to divine mercy which is connected to divine will, and as such disavowed responsibility for the injustice, because in this case God would have predetermined since eternity whether He was going to have mercy on Adam or to punish him. Meanwhile, the injustice would be God’s pretext against Adam (in case he wanted to punish him in eternity), and Adam would have no pretext against His Lord. Thus, Adam tried, out of precaution, to save himself through both free-willism and predestinarianism at one and the same time, since he was not certain which one would ultimately turn out correct. As for Iblis, he took a definite position by saying: “Now, because Thou hast sent me astray,” referring nothing to himself but rather referring everything to its real source, the divine will. By so doing, Iblis was a sincere predestinarian and did not try to take advantage of free will as Adam did for his own safety and salvation. Some legists have refused to ascribe imperfection to divine will. They contend that Iblis is the source of evil and the creator of sin (macsiyah),46 deeming God too exalted for creating evil and preordaining it for His people. This opinion (ijtihad) is more in conformity with philosophical theories that influenced Muslim thinkers than with the purely religious approach to the subject. Since we are now treating Iblis’ character and position in the universe on a purely religious level, we cannot adopt the aforementioned opinion, especially that it attributes to Iblis not only the ability to distort and to cause mischief but also to create and originate. This is unacceptable from a religious point of view. If Iblis had wanted to create sin, God would have been capable of preventing it. Since God did

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not prevent it, we can then deduce that the existence of sin is in conformity with His eternal will. 5) We have already cited Abu Talib al-Makki’s statement that “the end is of God’s cunning, which is indescribable, indiscernible, and inscrutable.” This should remind us of the ultimate end that I forecast for Iblis when I said that God will reward him for passing the divine test and will return him to Paradise when this universal drama nears its conclusion. Following are the reasons and considerations that have prompted me to conclude that Iblis’ end will be a happy and satisfactory one: •

Iblis’ tenacious adherence to the reality of Oneness was unparalleled. Therefore, he cannot come to an end in Hell, in accordance with the holy hadith that states: “God, may He be exalted, said: I am God. There is no deity but I. Whoever acknowledges my Oneness shall enter My bastion, and whoever enters my bastion shall be secure from My punishment.”47

•

Iblis passed God’s test and patiently endured the disaster that befell him as a result. Therefore, his ultimate reward is guaranteed, as indicated by the holy hadith that states: “God, may He be exalted, said: If I test one of my believing creatures and he praises Me and patiently endures My affliction, he shall awaken as free of sin as when his mother gave birth to him. God will say to His scribes (hafazah): I have shackled this slave of Mine and tested him, so [you must] reward him as you used to before the test.”48

•

Had it not been for this foreseen happy ending for Iblis, his ending would have been a real and ultimate tragedy, which cannot be accepted by religion’s logic, as we have already seen. Since the ultimate end is of God’s cunning, He made Abraham and Job believe that the result of their test would be contrary to what it actually was and contrary to the result that God had wanted it to be. That is to say, the decrees that God had shown Abraham and Job at the beginning of the test were different from the ones He had harbored for them regarding its ending. This assumption applies to Iblis, since God’s cunning requires that Iblis firmly believe that his end will not be anything but miserable and desperate. We thus deduce that Iblis’ damnation was not an expression

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of the real end which God had willed for him but was divine cunning whose objective was to carry out the decrees of His will against him. Let us suppose for the sake of the argument that I am right about what I said regarding the reality of Iblis, his end, and his final destiny. What consequences does such a supposition entail with respect to our personal view of Iblis? First, I believe that we must drastically modify our traditional view of Iblis and effect a crucial change in our conception of his character and position. Secondly, we must rehabilitate him to his true position: that of an angel who has wholeheartedly and in all sincerity devoted himself to the service of his God and who has carried out the decrees of His will with utmost care and precision. Lastly, we must desist from heaping abuse and insults on him, forgive him, seek forgiveness for him, and ask people to think well of him, after we have falsely and slanderously made him responsible for all faults and abominations. I feel also that it is my duty to warn you that forgiving Iblis and rehabilitating him issue in significant consequences that do not immediately occur to all. Such a step obliges us to change many of our religious views and traditional beliefs about this worldly life and the hereafter. In order to give you a simple idea about the grave consequences that a pardon of Iblis might entail, I shall quote a funny and beautiful story written by Tawfiq al-Hakim, “al-Shahid” (“The Martyr”). Tawfiq al-Hakim relates in his story that Iblis decided one day to turn to God in repentance and to refrain from wrongdoing so that he could dedicate himself to doing good and to following the right path. Iblis went to the Rector of al-Azhar to repent at his hands and embrace The True Religion (Islam) with his guidance. The following dialogue ensued between Iblis and the Rector of al-Azhar: “Satan becoming a believer? This is great, but . . . ” “What? Is it not the right of people to embrace God’s religion in droves? Is not the following verse in God’s Holy Book: ‘Then hymn the praises of thy Lord, and seek forgiveness of Him’? Here I am! I hymn God’s praises and seek His forgiveness. I want to embrace His religion in all purity and sincerity. I want to become a Muslim, a good Muslim, and I want to be an example for those who follow the right path.”

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The Rector of al-Azhar began to ponder the consequences. If Satan were to become a Muslim, how would the Koran be recited? Could people still say: “I seek refuge in God from accursed Satan”? If this verse were to be abrogated, then it would follow that most verses of the Koran would have to be abrogated. Cursing Satan and warning people against his evil deeds, abominations, and temptation do occupy a sizable proportion of God’s Book. How could the Rector of al-Azhar accept Satan’s embracing of Islam without damaging the whole structure of Islam? The Rector of al-Azhar raised his head, looked at Iblis, and said, “You have come to me with something I have no power over. This is far beyond my authority and capability. I do not have what you seek. I am not the right authority in this matter.” “Then to whom should I go? Are you not the chiefs of The Religion? How then do I reach God? Is that not what those who want to draw near God do?” The Rector of al-Azhar kept silent for a moment, scratched his beard, and said: “You have good intentions. There is no doubt about that! But despite all that, I must tell you frankly that my specialty is to lift high the word of Islam and to preserve the glory of al-Azhar. It is not my specialty to put my hand in yours.” In other words, the Rector of al-Azhar realized the necessity of Iblis’ existence for the promotion of religion and for preserving its institutions. Were Satan to disappear, religion’s existence and continuity would be unnecessary and unjustifiable. And as Al-Hakim says in the same story: “How can Iblis be erased without the extinction of all those images, myths, meanings, and themes that have saturated people’s hearts and stimulated their imaginations? What would be the significance of the ‘Day of Judgment’” if evil were erased from the face of the earth? Would the adherents of Satan who had followed him before his belief in Islam be punished? Or would their misdeeds be erased so long as Iblis’ repentance had been accepted?” After Iblis despaired of the Rector of al-Azhar, he went directly to Heaven and spoke with Gabriel. Iblis asked Gabriel to intercede with God for him so he could obtain forgiveness and acceptance of his repentance. The following dialog took place between Iblis and Gabriel: “Yes, indeed! But your disappearance from the earth would bring down pillars and shake walls, would obliterate features and confuse lineaments,

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would efface colors and destroy traits. Virtue has no meaning without the existence of vice . . . no meaning for right without wrong, for good without bad, or white without black, or light without darkness, or good without evil. Only through your darkness can people see God’s light. Your presence on earth is necessary so long as earth remains a place of descent for those sublime attributes that God has bestowed on his human creatures!” “My existence is essential for the presence of good itself? My dark soul should remain dark so it can reflect God’s light? I shall be content with my loathsome lot for the sake of preserving good and for the sake of God’s purity. But would people’s wrath still pursue me and damnation be stuck to my name despite the noble intentions and the good faith that reside in my heart?” “Yes! You must remain cursed until the end of time. If damnation were removed from you, then everything would collapse.” “I beg your forgiveness, O God! Why do I have to bear this onerous burden? Why was I given this frightful fate? Why don’t You make me now one of Your simple angels so I can be allowed to love You and love Your light, and be rewarded for such love with compassion from You and praise from people? Here I am! My love for You is incomparable and nonpareil. My love for you requires this sacrifice which is not perceived by angels nor is known to people. My love for You compels me to accept wearing the cloak of disobedience against You and to appear as if I were rebelling against You. My love for You necessitates that I endure Your damnation and people’s curse of me. A love, You do not allow me even the honor of claiming, or the joy of associating with? A love, if concealed by ascetics, would fill their hearts with light. I conceal that love, but its light refuses to approach my heart.” “Iblis wept, left Heaven in obedience and descended to earth in total submission. But a suppressed sigh burst out of his breast as he penetrated the sky; a sigh reechoed by the stars and celestial bodies. It was as though the stars and celestial bodies had banded together to utter that bleeding scream: “I am a Martyr! . . . I am a Martyr! . . . ””

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PART ONE CHAPTER 1 1. Delivered at the Asia-Africa Institute of the University of Hamburg, 23 June 2005, on the occasion of receiving an Honorary Doctorate from the Faculty of the University. 2. Hasan Hanafi, Introduction to the Science of Istighrab (Occidentalism), Al-Dar Al-Fanniya, Cairo, 1991 (881 pages). 3. Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, Free Association Books, London, 1987. 4. For Hanafi’s reply see the Egyptian weekly magazine Al-Musawwar, 16 May 1997. For ‘Asfour’s critical assessment see Al-Hayat newspaper, 7 July 1997. 5. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies, Penguin Press, New York, 2004. 6. See Adonis’ collection of essays published under the title: Fatiha li Nihayat al-Qarn, Dar Al-‘Awda, Beirut, 1980, pp. 212–240. Adonis confuses on purpose the two senses of “modernity” in Arabic, (Hadatha), i.e., modernity in general and modernism as a literary movement of the twentieth century. 7. See my essay, “Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critical Outline of Problems, Ideas and Approaches,” South Asia Bulletin: Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 13, no. 1–2, 1993 and vol. 14, no. 1, 1994. 8. This point is also noted and discussed by the British author and critic Jonathan Raban in his book, My Holy War: Dispatches from the Home Front, New York Review of Books Inc., New York, 2006, pp. 36–39. 9. Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism, Verso, London, 2002. 10. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 11. Salmna Rushdie, “In Good Faith: A Pen Against the Sword,” Newsweek, 12 February 1990. 12. Jonathan Raban, Arabia through the Looking-Glass, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1980, p. 19. 13. William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, Penguin Books, London, 1995 (first published, 1930). 14. Daryush Shayegan, Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting the West, Al-Saqi Books, London, 1992, p. 4.

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15. Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984, p. 111. 16. Leila Ahmed, A Border Passage: From Cairo to America – A Woman’s Journey, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1999, pp. 127–28. 17. Seven Types of Ambuguity, p. 24. 18. Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938. 19. Ibid. 20. Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956 (first published 1923). 21. Arabia Through the Looking-Glass, pp. 18–19. 22. See his The Specter of Marx. 23. See Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, University of Chicago Press, 1972. 24. Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, New York, 1979, p. 321. 25. The Spirit of Terrorism, pp. 77–79. 26. Hadi Al-‘Alawi’s articles on the subject (in Arabic) are to be found in the Palestinian weekly magazine Al-Hurriyah, Damascus, 9 March 1988, 29 July 1990 and 3 March 1993. See also my book in Arabic: Beyond the Tabooing Mentality: Reading the Satanic Verses, Dar Al-Mada, Damascus, 1997, pp. 53–109, 414–422. 27. Al-Hilal Books No. 465, Cairo 1989. See also Beyond the Tabooing Mentality, pp. 85–107.

CHAPTER 2 1. Our translation of the Arabic text. The excellent English translation by Roger Allen does not succeed here in expressing the actual cultural distance that separates the two speakers as can be grasped in the original text.

CHAPTER 3 1. See for example, Laudan’s (1984) Science and Values. 2. Said devoted several pages of his 1978 Orientalism, in the chapter “Orientalism Now”, to a critique of Lewis (see Said, 2003, pp. 314–320). 3. However, this is not to suggest that the two are equivalent. Sadik’s (1981) Marxist critique of Said’s “post-modernist” Orientalism, is a case in point. 4. To quote Said (2003, pp. 106–107): “What we now need, said Gibb is the traditional Orientalist plus a good social scientist working together: between them the two will do ‘interdisciplinary’ work.” 5. To quote Gellner (1992, pp. 46–47): “ . . . in social anthropology fieldwork became increasingly more difficult and uncomfortable. Under the colonial system, the widely employed method of indirect rule preserved neat, conspicuous, ritually highlighted social structures; but in the post-colonial world the existence of archaic structures was frequently denied by the new authorities,

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6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

and local administrators were hostile to extraneous researchers. Their ideology precluded the recognition of archaic structures, their interests were threatened by the presence of independent outsiders, free to report whatever they liked. The disillusion with the scientistic aspiration and the inconveniences, conceptual and political, of trying to find things out on the ground made it terribly attractive to turn to hermeneutic-relativist-subjectivism.” See for instance Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ in The Edward Said Reader, pp. 195–217. I have in mind for example, Winstedt’s non-essentialist view on Malay indolence, where he ascribed Malay indolence to a feudal social and power structure in which peasants are not materially rewarded for hard work. See Winstedt (1961). For example the remarks made by Syed Naguib Al-Attas (1993) on Islam (Sufism) in the Malay world, on how Sufism was responsible for inculcating a rational attitude among the Malays. Naguib (1993, p. 173) wrote: “Islam came to the Archipelago couched in Sufi metaphysics. It was through tasawwuf that the highly intellectual and rationalistic religious spirit entered the receptive minds of the people, effecting a rise of rationalism and intellectualism not manifested in pre-Islamic times. This emergence of rationalism and intellectualism can be viewed as the powerful spirit that set in motion the process of revolutionizing the Malay-Indonesian worldview, turning it away from a crumbling world of mythology . . . to the world of intelligence, reason and order.” Although it is true that Islam has to some extent replaced magical and animistic beliefs among the Malays, Naguib’s remarks about Sufism inculcating a rational attitude among the Malays, seems to me untenable, in view of the mystical world-view which it holds, and its ‘supra-natural’ approach toward causality. Foucault in fact compared his enterprise – which is an analysis of the history of thought – with that of Kant’s critique of reason, but with the difference that his interest is in the socio-historical, and not the conceptual or logical a priori. (See Hanne Andersen, 2001, p. 13) See endnote no. 11 in this chapter, on this point. To quote Lewis (1982, p. 48): “ . . . Mr. Said represents Orientalism as an imperialist by-product, in which the British and French provided the material and set the tone, and in which the Germans and others did no more than “elaborate” on the “major steps” of their British and French predecessors. But if Arabic studies in Germany, and for that matter in Holland, began as early as in France and earlier than in Britain, and moreover reached at least an equal level of competence and originality, without any imperial Arab connection, his thesis falls to the ground.” In fact the Syrian scholar Sadik J. Al-Azm wrote an article with a similar title. See his “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” in Khamsin, vol. 8, 1981, pp. 5–26. In the article Sadik criticized Said for what he calls Said’s ‘Reverse Orientalism’, in which scholars like Said, who wrote on the Occident, make

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the same kind of mistakes which the western scholar writing on the Orient made. In his critique of Edward Said, Sadik took a leftist position, defending Marx against Said’s ‘bourgeoise’ critique of Marx, with its priviledging of the epistemological/mental/superstructure, over the economic base/institutions. In fact the journal Khamsin in which Sadik’s article was published, has the full title, Khamsin: Journal of revolutionary socialists of the Middle East, indicating its leftist orientation. But regardless of its leftist leanings, Sadik’s critique of Said was fair-minded, and was not overtly ideological to the point of bias. In fact Sadik was quite right in pointing out Said’s over-emphasis on the ‘epistemological’, at the expense of the economic-institutional, in his analysis of the impact of Orientalism on colonized states. As for Sadik’s Marxist philosophy, a similar assessment was made by the historian of Islamic philosophy, Majid Fakhry (2004, p. 391) when he wrote: “A serious attempt at expounding and defending Marxist doctrine is contained in a book written by a Syrian intellectual, Sadik J. Al-‘Azm, entitled Critique of Religious Thought (1969). In this book, Al-‘Azm examines the ‘supernaturalism’ of traditional thought and argues that it is incompatible with the modern scientific outlook . . . The author’s viewpoint is identified with the ‘scientific, materialist conception of the world and its evolution,’ reducible according to him, to dialectical materialism which marks the culmination of the whole scientific and philosophical evolution of human thought.” 13. For a more detailed account of Zakariyya’s views on Muslim intellectuals in general, see Zakariyya (2005).

PART TWO CHAPTER 5 1. Sussan Siavoshi: “Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy.” (Review). IJMES, vol. 30, pp. 272–274, 1998, quotations pp. 272/274. 2. Farideh Farhi: “Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy.” (Review). IJMES, vol. 31, pp. 454–457, 1999, quotations pp. 454/457. 3. E.g. Rebecca Moore: “Reconstructing Reality: Conspiracy Theories about Jonestown.” Journal of Popular Culture, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 200–220, 2002, citation p. 203, also to be found as prepublication on the internet: http://jonestown. sdsu.edu/AboutJonestown/Articles/conspiracy.htm – (21 June 2005). 4. Paul Taylor: “Reuters, 11 April 2003”, Baghdad’s Easy Fall Fuels Arab Conspiracy Theories. http://www.drumbeat.mlaterz.net/April%202003/Arab%20conspiracy%20theories%20fueled%20041103a.htm – (15 June 2005). 5. MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute): Special Report 08. Januar 2002, p. 1.

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6. Cf Hannes Stein’s “Praise of Conspiracy Theories”: “Wenn Sie mich fragen, aus welcher Quelle die Konspirationstheorien besonders reichlich sprudeln, dann antworte ich ohne Zögern: aus dem Internet. Dieses Medium ist wie für sie gemacht [. . .]. Es gibt sogar eine Website, mit deren Hilfe Sie sich Verschwörungs-theorien nach Gusto auf den Leib schneidern lassen können! Man gibt bei ‘Turn Left’ eine ethnische Minorität, einen abstrakten Begriff und ein bedeutsames historisches Ereignis und noch ein paar andere Daten ein” (Endlich Nichtdenker! Handbuch für den überforderten Intellektuellen (mit praktischen Übungen), Berlin: Eichborn, 2004, p. 114) 7. Hizb-ut-Tahrir: The Crusader’s Animosity, p. 2. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir. org/english/books/state/chapter_41.html – (15 June 2005). 8. “[. . .] their [the Internet conspiracists’, KH] meat and potatoes is exploiting rumours, innuendos and wild stories.” (Moore: “Reconstructing Reality”, p. 209. Moore uses “conspiracism” and “conspiracist” as synonym for “conspiracy theory” and a respectively a personalised phrase, e.g. pp. 202, 205.) 9. Rudolf Jaworski: “Verschwörungstheorien aus psychologischer und aus historischer Sicht”, Verschwörungstheorien: anthropologische Konstanten. Hrsg. von Ute Caumanns und Mathias Niendorf, Osnabrück, 2001, pp. 11–30, cf. p. 14: “Verschwörungstheorien weisen wiederum fließende Übergänge zu anderen massenpsychologisch relevanten und verwandten Erscheinungen auf wie z.B. zu Gerüchten, Verratsvorstellungen [. . .].” 10. Jean-Noël Kapferer: Gerüchte: das älteste Massenmedium der Welt, Leipzig, 1996, p. 343. (Rumeurs, les plus vieux média du monde, first published in Paris, 1985, rev. ed. 1995; I saw the paperback edition of 1987). I could not see the American translation by Bruce Fink (Rumours: Uses, Interpretation and Necessity, 1990). 11. Bassam Tibi: “Der importierte Hass”, Die Zeit, vol. 7, 2003. 12. Bassam Tibi: Die Verschwörung, Hamburg, 1994, p. 147 (If not indicated otherwise, my translations). 13. Die Verschwörung, Hamburg, 1994, p. 29. 14. Tibi characterises Islamic “fundamentalism” as failed attempts to modernise in many publications. 15. Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in Early Modern Europe: From the Waldensians to the French Revolution, Barry Coward and Julian Swann (eds.), Aldershot, 2004. 16. Thomsen, Christian W.: “‘Man-Eating’ and the Myth of the ‘New World’: Anthropological, Pictorial, and Literary Variants”, In: Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds.), New York: Springer, 1987, pp. 39–70. 17. Niklas, Luhmann: “Kausalität im Süden”, Soziale Systeme, vol. 1, no.1, pp. 7–28, 1995, citation pp. 17–18. 18. “Kausalität im Süden”, p. 28. 19. Daniel Pipes: “Dealing with Middle Eastern Conspiracy Theories.” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 41–56, 1992, citation p. 42, also to be found on the internet: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/214 – (15 June 2005).

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20. Daniel Pipes: The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, 2nd ed., New York, 1998. 21. The Hidden Hand, p. 10. 22. The Hidden Hand, p. 377/378. 23. Daniel Pipes: Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes from. New York, 1997. 24. Conspiracy, pp.14–15. 25. Conspiracy, pp.144–146. 26. “Reconstructing Reality”, p. 209. 27. Cf. “Pipes gives us the profile of a conspiracy theorist and by inference the profile of a Muslim Middle Easterner. this person, according to the author, is humorless, politically extremist, self-centered, and non-analytical [. . .].” (Siavoshi: “Daniel Pipes” p. 273.) In my opinion, the hypothesis that lacking humour is a kind of defining characteristic of Islamists or fanatics in general is a projection. 28. The German title is “Lexikon der Verschwörungstheorien” (2nd ed. available in 2004). 29. Jaworski: “Verschwörungstheorien”, cf. p. 15: “Der Verlockung, sich von einem grenzenlosen Entlarvungseifer hinreißen zu lassen, hat auch Daniel Pipes nicht ganz widerstehen können.” 30. Hidden Hand, p. xi. Pipes quotes Laqueur that conspiracist-terrorists are “neither funny nor tragic”, so they are lacking a sense of humour (Conspiracy, p. 26). I think this reflects on the researcher’s state of mind after the initial stage of fascination. 31. Daniel Pipes and Hilal Khashan: “Diana and Arab Conspiracy”, Weekly Standard, 10 November 1997. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/290 – (15 June 2005). 32. There are other concepts that might work in the same way as well. You could reduce the methodological problems in other fields of research if you decide to abandon conspiracism and the associated problems of falsehood, modernity etc. whereever you do not really need this concept. E.g. modern magic and witchcraft are discussed in terms of conspiracism by several ethnographers in: Transparency and Conspiracy, Harry G. West and Todd Sanders (eds), Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2003. A recently published book concentrates on intrigues as a literary device and mentions conspiracism of global scale under the heading “Weltintrigen” (“world intrigues”). Cf. Peter von Matt: Die Intrige: Theorie und Praxis der Hinterlist, München, Wien: Hanser, 2006, Chapter xxvii: “Der Weltintrigant”, pp. 245–250. Von Matt characterises the imagined world intrigues as counterdrafts to the world of science (p. 245). 33. Kapferer argues against the “psychiatrisation de la rumeur”, Rumeurs, pp. 19–22. 34. Daniel Hellinger quotes Anita Waters’ recommendation “that we reserve judgement on the truth of conspiracy theories and employ an ethnosociological approach.” Daniel Hellinger: “Paranoia, Conspiracy, and Hegemony in

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American Politics”, In: Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order, Harry G. West and Todd Sanders (eds.), Durham NC, 2003, pp. 204–232, cf. p. 208. Cf. Lars-Broder Keil and Sven Felix Kellerhoff: Gerüchte machen Geschichte: folgenreiche Falschmeldungen im 20. Jahrhundert, Berlin: Links, 2006. The authors underline the virtues of rumours as “false reports” in some cases of German history, e.g. the fall of the Berlin Wall. 35. Cf. Karin Hörner: “Der Begriff Feindbild, Ursachen und Abwehr,” Das Schwert des Experten. Hrsg. von Verena Klemm, Karin Hörner (eds), Heidelberg: Palmyra, 1993, pp.34–43. Cf. Hans-Joachim Neubauer: Fama: eine Geschichte des Gerüchts, Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, rev. ed. 2009 [1st ed. 1998]. The ambiguous title indicates Neubauer’s approach: rumours are anonymous and notorious. 36. Sadik J. Al-Azm: “The View from Damaskus,” in: The New York Review of Books, 47 (2000), Nr. 10 (June 15), pp. 70–77, citation p. 70, also to be found on the internet: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/46 – (20 June 2005).

CH A P T E R 6 1. The term “conspiracism” is perhaps most relevant here; thus its prominence ahead of competing terms such as “conspiracy theories”, “conspiracy theorizing”, or “conspiracy rhetoric”. “Conspiracism” implies a broader, yet, for the purposes of this discussion, a more precise definition that encompasses both the trend of developing “conspiracy theories” and the use of “conspiracy rhetoric”. In effect, it is the act of using conspiracy theories, for whatever purpose. By implication “conspiracism” covers a broad set of conspiracist actors (the state, political elites, political leaderships, social forces, and marginalized or disenfranchised individuals, among others). Arabic language uses the term naz ariyyah al–mu’ã marah to apply both literally to a “conspiracy theory” and also to “conspiracism” in the sense meant here, even though there is no exact Arabic equivalent for “conspiracism”. 2. This is especially true of the sequel to his first book (Ostrovsky, 1994) where the claims and allegations he makes border, at times, on the absurd. The book also provides greater detail on his dismissal from Mossad as a case officer, which he effectively blames on an internal conspiracy against him. 3. “Arab Nationalism here is taken to be a sense of shared, secular identity among peoples considering themselves to have a common sense of ‘Arab’ ethnos, developing initially out of the works of (often Christian) intellectuals, including George Antonius, Nasif al-Yaziji and Butrus al-Bustani, and later developed by more politically–active individuals such as Michel ’Aflaq, the Damascene Christian founder of the Ba’ath Party which would later rule Syria (1963–) and Iraq (1968–2003). Under an ideological conglomeration that would later become known as ‘Nasserism’, the Egyptian leader Gamal abd al-Nasser (president 1954–1970) became the leading figure in the Arab World – he was at his popular political peak from 1956 to 1967 – and a key espouser

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of Arab Nationalism. In contrast, Pan–Arabism is taken here to be an ideology that moves beyond Arab Nationalism to not only call for ‘unity’ among Arabs based on their shared ethnos, but also the creation of a single, Arab nation–state in the Middle East. In Arabic the term al-qawmiyya al-’arabiyya, literally meaning ‘Arab Nationalism’ is used essentially interchangeably for both terms.” 4. The term al-infitãh al-intãji could also be read as “industrial opening” or “industrial reform” but has the meaning here of a “productive al-infitãh”.

PART THREE CHAPTER 7 1. M. Thalib and Haris Fajar, Dialog Bung Karno-A.Hassan (Jakarta: Sumber Ilmu, 1985). 2. Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1989); M. Rasjidi, Koreksi terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid tentang Sekularaisasi (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1972); Bachtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998); Allan Samson, “Indonesian Islam since the New Order” in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, compiled by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), p. 167; Harun Nasution, Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya (Jakarta: UI Press, 1986); Abdurrahman Wahid, “The Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam in Present Day Indonesia” in Taufiq Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (eds.) Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1988), pp. 175–185. 3. Ridwan Saidi, Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan (Jakarta: SIP, 1995). 4. Daud Rasyid, “Meluruskan Akidah, Menangkal Muktazilah” in Saidi, Menggugat, pp. 240–243. 5. www.Islamlib.com; Gatra, 1 December 2001. 6. Among the Radios; Radio Attahiriyah FM (Jakarta), Radio Muara FM (Jakarta), Radio Star FM (Tangerang), Radio Ria FM (Depok), Radio Smart (Manado), Radio DMS (maluku), Radio Unisi (Yogya), Radio PTPN (Solo), Radio Mara (Bandung), Radio Prima FM (Aceh). 7. For DDII, see R.William Liddle, Islam, Politik dan Modernisasi (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997), p. 37; Liddle, Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia, cf., Greg Barton, Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p. 33. 8. Adian Husaini, Islam Liberal: Sejarah, Konsepsi, Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002); Adnin Armas, Pengaruh Kristen-Orientalis terhadap Islam Liberal (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2003); Hartono A. Jaiz, Menangkal Bahaya JIL & FLA (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Kautsar, 2004). 9. Husaini, Islam Liberal, pp. 81–221; Armas, Pengaruh, pp. 23–98; Jaiz, Menangkal, pp. 27–50.

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10. Charlez Kurzman (ed.), Wacana Islam Liberal, Pemikiran Islam Kontemporer tentang Isu-isu Global (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001). 11. Budhy Munawar Rahman, “Mengembalikan Kerukunan Umat Beragama” in Republika, 24 June 2000; Sukidi, “Teologi Inklusif Cak Nur”, Kompas, 2001. 12. Husaini, Islam Liberal, p. 130. 13. Ibid. 14. Tempo, 19–25 November 2001. 15. Armas, Pengaruh, pp. 32–34. 16. Compare with Ulil Abshar Abdallah, “Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam” in Kompas, 18 November 2002. 17. See Ibid. 18. Armas, Pengaruh, pp. 32–33. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Husaini, Islam Liberal, p. 171. 23. See www.islamlib.com. 2001; Armas, Pengaruh, pp. 3–22. 24. Armas, Pengaruh. 25. See Husaini, Islam Liberal, p. 6. 26. Jaiz, Menangkal Bahaya, pp. 54–55. 27. Husaini, Islam Liberal, pp. 13–14. 28. Jaiz, Menangkal Bahaya, pp. 18–26; 27–38; 87–100; 143–165;245–251; 288–290; Husaini, Islam Liberal, pp. 1–40; 81–128; 169–200. 29. Husaini, Islam Liberal, p. 110 and p. 122. 30. Iskandar P. Nugraha, Mengikis Batas Timur dan Barat: Gerakan Theosofi dan Nasionalisme Indonesia (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2001), pp. 47–62. 31. Husaini, Islam Liberal, pp. 123–124. 32. Ibid. 33. Sidik Jatnika, Gerakan Zionis Berwajah Melayu (?, 2001), p. 196. 34. Cf. Husaini, Islam Liberal, pp. 122–123. 35. Compare with Todd D. Nelson, The Psychology of Prejudice (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002) pp. 7–9; see also Calvin S. Hall and Lindsay Gardner, Psikologi Kepribadian (Yogya: Penerbit Kanisius, 1978), pp. 245–248.

CH A P T E R 8 1. I would like to thank Schirin Fathi and Christian Oesterheld for their comments on this paper. All remaining errors and mistakes are of course in my own responsibility. 2. For an overview on the debates of Orientalism cf. MacFie (2000). 3. This paper is not so much concerned with content-related aspects of Indonesian violence. For a qualitative discussion of publications on violence in Indonesia cf. Purdue (2004). 4. KITLV Collections Library (2005), http://www.kitlv.nl/home/Library/.

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5. For an introduction into the modern history of insular Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, cf. Tarling (2001). 6. For an introduction into the debates on Sino-Malay literature cf. for example Lombard (1990) and Maier (1990). 7. For a contemporary Indonesian rendition of that war cf. Wiwi Kusliah (1999). 8. The publication of 1936 is a translation of a German-language book of 1932. 9. A good impression of Indonesian perceptions of this period can be obtained from the reports in the press. Cf. Andi Suwirta (2000) for a study of the newspapers Merdeka (Jakarta) and Kedaulatan Rakyat (Yogyakarta), from 1945 to 1947. 10. For an Indonesian account of the importance of the Renville agreement for Indonesian independence cf. for instance Tobing (1986). 11. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of “Pax neerlandica” cf. Moedjanto (2003). 12. Statistisches Bundesamt (1993, p. 44). 13. This book is the result of an exploratory journey of the author to various European Orientalist institutions as well as to a number of countries in the Muslim world. It features a theoretical discussion of the concepts of Orientalism and Occidentalism, as well as a detailed account of the specific histories of Islamic studies in Europe and the US, by country and institution. 14. Cf. Cribb (1990). 15. For aspects of that state violence cf. e.g. Cribb (2000) and Siegel (1998). 16. Purdue relates here to Coppel (2001). 17. For a critical analysis of the research agenda of the Cornell school cf. Philpott (2000).

CHAPTER 9 1. I would like to thank Arndt Graf for many invaluable suggestions and hours of intensive discussions. 2. Ali Banuazizi in “Letter from the President” in: Middle East Studies Association Newsletter, May 2005: 3. 3. The past three quotes have been taken from http://www.aljazeerah.info/ Opinion%20editorials/2003%20Opinion%20Editorials/May/ consulted on 3 June 2005. 4. http://web.archive.org/web/20050326085210/http:/www.arabmediawatch. com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=436, last accessed April 18, 2010. 5. In a letter from Yigal Carmon to Juan Cole, dated 8 November 2004 and to be found under Tuesday, 23 November 2004, “Intimidation by Israeli-Linked Organization Aimed at US Academic – MEMRI tries a SLAPP” on Juan Cole’s weblog: http://www.juancole.com/2004_11_01_juancole_archive. html, consulted 4 June 2005.

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6. Doing research on this paper, I contacted the MEMRI office in Berlin in order to acquire firsthand information, particularly as this was used as a major point of critique on part of MEMRI when confronting their critics. There were three or four exploratory phone conversations with Mr. Jochen Müller and Mr. Wahied Wahdat-Hagh in early to mid-June 2005. When subsequently there is talk of conversations with or information obtained from MEMRI staff in Berlin, reference is always to these phone conversations. 7. Phone conversation with Mr. Yigal Carmon on 20 June 2005, approx. 5–6 pm Hamburg time. This and all following reference to Mr. Carmon’s views are based on this phone conversation and ensuing email correspondence, until otherwise noted. 8. For example: “An Israeli center said to be specialized in Mid Eastern studies was opened in the occupied Iraqi capital Baghdad, in a provocative move seen by Iraqi academics as the beginning of an Israeli scheme to infiltrate the Iraqi society. ‘Israel opened its center on 1 August at a large rented building in Abu Nawaas St. overlooking The Tigris river,’ they told IslamOnline.net Friday, 15 August. The sources, who requested anonymity, said that the center has already started operation, noting that it was the first Israeli center operating publicly in Baghdad since its downfall on 9 April. The heavily guarded building, they said, obtained work permits from the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq and the Pentagon. The Iraqis sources said the center is affiliated to the Washington-based MEMRI (short for the Middle East Media Research Institute), an Israeli association set up five years ago, with offshoots in London, Berlin and West Jerusalem.” Reactions among Iraqi intellectuals were sampled, among them: “Israel’s underground goals in the Middle East are not a secret; this center is, in effect, a façade for intelligence and security bodies orchestrated by the Mossad (Israel’s intelligence service)” . . . The academic urged the U.S.-handpicked interim Iraqi Governing Council to immediately shut down the Israeli center in Baghdad ‘because it will penetrate our security. . . . It is breaking our hearts to see the Israeli Mossad in Bahdad, the citadel of Arabs’, . . . ‘Israel will never fulfill its much-pursued dream of establishing a (Jewish) state from the Euphrates to the River Nile as long as the Arab nation continues to give birth to heroes every day’ ”. Quoted in: http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2003-08/16/article02.shtml, last consulted on 22 June 2005. 9. It should be noted that since the presentation of this paper there has been an overhaul of the German web presence of MEMRI. It would be immodest to see a causal relationship to my paper, but it is conspicuous that some of the recurrently criticized issues have been addressed. 10. For example: the Meyerhoff Foundation supports a project called ELEM – Youth in Distress in Israel – part of the Schusterman Foundation’s mission statement reads: “The Charles and Lynn Schusterman Family Foundation is dedicated to helping the Jewish people flourish by supporting programs throughout the world that spread the joy of Jewish living, giving

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11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

and learning”. The Cohen Foundation’s mission is to “provide quality Jewish summer camps” while the Koret Foundation has a focus on Jewish Life and Culture that consists of the Koret Jewish Book Awards, the Koret Jewish Studies Publication Programme, the Young Writer on Jewish Themes Award and the Koret Synagogue Initiative, apart form a section on Israel where its “funding has primarily focused on economic expansion and higher education”. According to an organization called “People for the American Way” and its “Right Wing Watch” “Bradley has made right-wing inroads in academia by establishing chairmanship positions, undergraduate and graduate programs, fellowships, and whole departments at many prestigious universities. . . . It also has supported and in some cases, had to defend controversial right-wing recipients of their grants, particularly Charles Murray and David Brock. Murray, author of ‘The Bell Curve,’ which argues that intelligence is predicated on race, and ‘Losing Ground,’ whose thesis is that social programs should be abolished.” Quoted in: http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/ default.aspx?oid=11219#1, last consulted on 22 June 2005. The approximate number of permanent staff was also supplied by Mr. Carmon in the above-mentioned telephone conversation. Kirchner, in a very detailed study that can be found in full in the internet and in a slightly altered way, due to a legal suit in inamo has described the political and military past of Colonel Carmon. Kirchner, H. “Yigal Carmon – Ein Leben für die Besatzung.Die politische Biographie des MEMRI-Präsidenten und Gründers Yigal Carmon” in: inamo 32: 2002. Melman, Y., “Don’t Confuse us with Facts – How Israeli Military Intelligence botched Assessments of Arafat” In: Ha’aretz, 16 August 2002. made in a private email exchange with me on 16 June 2005. Translations are mine. For example by Kirchner, Cole and Whitaker. As quoted in: Beder, S. 1995 “SLAPPs – Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Coming to a Controversy Near You” Current Affairs Bulletin 72/3: 22–29. ManÁÝ, H. 2004 “Al-ÝÀdÁ’ al-SÁmÐya wal-ÍuqÙq al-InsanÐya” In: http:// www.aljazeera.net/KnowledgeGate/aspx/print.htm, consulted 7 June 2005. These are projects that were being run as of June 2005 and were found on the English website. The German website has additional and alternative issues and is in the process of revamping their internet appearance. Carmon, Y. 2003 “Harbingers of Change in the Antisemitic Discourse in the Arab World” In: MEMRI – Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 135, 23 April 2003. For example, see Solnick, A. 2003 “An Israeli Arab Initiative to Visit Auschwitz” In: Inquiry and Analysis Series – No. 136 that takes the visit as a pretext to discuss all the negative reactions which fall into the usual stereotypical line. in Cole’s weblog, see above.

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23. See for more info the articles on MEMRI by Whitaker, Kirchner and also http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/memri. consulted on 20 May 2005. The archived site can be found under http://web.archive.org/ web/19990220054656/www.MEMRI.org/about.html. Last consulted on 16 June 2005. 24. As quoted in a recently published pamphlet in German (translations are mine), whose purpose seems to advocate the new emphases of MEMRI. MEMRI 2005 Aus arabischen Medien – Gesellschaftskritische Stimmen im Nahen und Mittleren Osten, Berlin: iz3w und MEMRI. 25. Dr. Jochen Müller of MEMRI Berlin in stated phone conversation with me. 26. MEMRI Special Dispatch, 31 März 2005, “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: Interview zur Arbeit von MEMRI und zu Scheich Al-Qaradawi”. I could not find an English version of this interview and thus provide the original German version here: “Direkt oder indirekt diene Memri den Arabern sogar, indem es die irreführenden arabischen Stimmen, auf ihre Irrtümer hinweise und die positiven Stimmen fördere. Auf diese Weise, so Carmon, würde deutlich, dass ‘ja nicht alle Araber wie Osama Bin Laden oder Zarqawi sind’.”

CH A P T E R 1 0 1. Translated from the Arabic by Dr. Mansour Ajam, this essay was originally delivered as a lecture at the Arab Cultural Club, Beirut, Lebanon, 10 December 1965, and shortly after at al-Muntada al-Ijtima’i (the Social Club) in Damascus, Syria. An abridged version appeared in the monthly journal Hiwar (Beirut, January 1966). See also the journal of the Arab Cultural Club, al-Thaqafah al-cArabiyyah No.2, February 1966. Reprinted in my book Naqd al-Fikr al-Dini (Critique of Religious Thought), Tali’a Publications, first printing, Beirut 1969. Texts, views, and ideas marginal to and/or marginalized in Islam’s traditional grand narrative have been intentionally brought center stage in this lecture. The heavy rhetorical lecture form was maintained on purpose (author’s note). 2. The translation of the Koran used in this English translation of Al-Azm’s article is that of Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, Penguin, a Mentor book (no date). (Translator’s note). 3. This derivation of the name “Iblis”from “Iblas”was really an arbitrary fabrication of the Egyptian author and thinker Abbas Mahmoud Al-‘Aqqad in order to Arabize the word “Iblis” and work around its manifest connection to “Diabolos”. To the best of my knowledge the fabrication and derivation are baseless. See ‘Aqqad’s book “Iblis”, Kitab Al-Yawm, Published by Dar Akhbar Al-Yawm, Cairo, 1955 (author’s note). 4. Imam Jamal al-Din ibn al-Jawzi Talbis Iblis, Ed. Muhammad Munir al-Dimashqi, Al-Nahdah Publishing House, Cairo, 1928. 5. Ibid., pp. 39–44, 65, 73, 82–83. 6. Ibid., pp. 164–165.

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7. Ibid., pp. 45–47. 8. Ibid., p. 126. 9. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, Doubleday & Co., New York, 1953, pp. 102–103. 10. Izz al-Din al-Maqdisi,Taflis Iblis, Matbacat Madrasat Walidat Abbas al-Awwal (Cairo, 1906), p. 11. 11. Al-Tabari, in his famous Tafsir of the Koran, related the following myth, which is of great significance to the subject of this essay: God sent Gabriel to Earth to fetch some clay. The Earth said, “God forbid that you should diminish me or disfigure me. So Gabriel did not take anything and returned to God, saying, “O God, the Earth sought your protection so I granted it to it. Then God sent Michael to do the same thing. The Earth sought God’s protection and Michael granted it to Earth. Michael returned to God and reported the same answer as Gabriel’s, whereupon God sent the Angel of Death and Earth sought God’s protection, the same as she had done the previous two times. The Angel of Death said, “I too seek refuge in God that I should go back to him without executing his order. So the Angel of Death took some soil from different parts of the surface of the Earth – red, white, and black soil. That is the reason why the sons of Adam are so different. (Tafsir al-Tabari, Ed. Mahmud Muhammad Shakir, Dar al-Macarif Cairo, vol. 1, p. 459). This story represents the difference between will and command. God ordered both Gabriel and Michael to bring him some soil but God willed that the order be fulfilled by the Angel of Death. So God received what he had willed. 12. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 475. 13. Taflis Iblis, p. 15. 14. Al Hallaj, “Tasin al-Azal wa-’l-Iltibas” in Kitab al-Tawasin, Ed. Louis Massignon (Paris, 1913). 15. “Tasin al-Azal wa-’l-Iltibas”. 16. Ibid. 17. Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad, Iblis, Kital Al-Yawm, Published by Dar Akhbar Al-Yawm, Cairo, 1955. 18. Ibid., p. 148. 19. Kitab al-Tawasin, Introduction, pp. 11–12. 20. Taflis Iblis, p. 4. 21. A group of mujtahidun (legists) say that the son that Abraham was ordered to slay was Isaaq, while others say it was Ishmael. Al-Tabari discussed the opinions and arguments of the two groups in his Tafsir and adopted the opinion of those who said it was Isaaq. I shall follow al-Tabari’s conclusion. Tafsir al-Tabari, old edition, Al-Matbacah al-Maymaniyyah (Egypt), vol. 8 part 3, p. 49. 22. Kierkegaard considers Abraham’s recovery of his son Isaaq a special religious ending that elevates the story of Abraham above the level of tragedy in its known literary sense. For him, Abraham’s persona has surpassed by leagues the tragic heroes found in world literature. In reality, the story of Abraham

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NOTES

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

falls completely short of reaching the status of tragedy, and his character remains well below that of the tragic hero for the reasons mentioned above. Taflis Iblis, p. 15. Sophocles, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 321. Ibid., p. 349. “Tasin al-Azal wa-’l-Iltibas” Taflis Iblis, pp. 36, 37. al-Isharat al-Ilahiyyah, Ed. Abd al-Rahman Badawi (Cairo, 1950), pp. 80–82. Shaykh Muhammad al-Madani, al-Ittihafat al-Saniyyah fi ’l-Ahadith ’l-Qudsiyyah (Haidarabad, 1258 A.H.), p. 87. “Tasin al-Azal wa-’l-Iltibas”. al-Isharat al-Ilahiyyah, p. 81. “Tasin al-Azal wa-’l-Iltibas” Taflis Iblis, pp. 21–22. “Tasin al-Azal wa-’l-Iltibas” Taflis Iblis, p. 13. Ibid., pp. 22–23. al-Ittihafat al-Saniyya fi ’l-Ahadith al-Qudsiyya, p. 68. Tafsir al-Tabari, vol. 1, pp. 301–302. Ibid., p. 303. Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 421–423. Qut al-Qulub (Food for the Hearts), vol. 1, p. 229. Taflis Iblis, p. 36. al-Ittihafat al-Saniyya fi ’l-Ahadith al-Qudsiyya, p. 71. Taflis Iblis, pp. 38–39. Ibid., p. 16. Tafsir al-Tabari, vol. 1, pp. 477–488, 508 al-Ittihafat al-Saniyya fi ’l-Ahadith al-Qudsiyya, p. 4. Ibid., p. 10.

BI B L I O G R A P HY 1. We examined and compiled the bibliographic data mostly from library records. This is the reason why several articles are listed without page numbers.

237

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

based on his own handlist, compiled by Karin Hörner and Tanja Strube

BOOKS 1966 ، ‫ الطبعة الثالثة‬.١٩٦٦ ، ‫ منشورات اجلامعة األميركية‬: ‫ " بيروت‬، ‫"دراسات في الفلسفة الغربية احلديثة‬ .١٩٧٩ ‫ دار العودة‬: ‫بيروت‬ (Studies in Modern Western Philosophy, Beirut: American University of Beirut Publications, 1966.) 1967 Kant’s Theory of Time, New York: Philosophical Library, 1967. 1968 ‫ دار‬: ‫ دمشق‬، ‫ الطبعة اخلامسة‬.١٩٦٨ ، ‫ منشورات نزار قباني‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"في احلب واحلب العذري‬ .٢٠٠١ ، ‫املدى‬ (Of Love and Arabic Courtly Love, Beirut: Nizar Kabbani Publications, 1968.) .١٩٧٤ ، ‫ الطبعة العاشرة‬، ١٩٦٨ ، ‫ دار الطليعة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"النقد الذاتي بعد الهزمية‬ (Self Criticism after the Defeat, Beirut: Tali’a Publications, 1968.) 1969 ، ‫ الطبعة العاشرة‬، ١٩٨٢ ، ‫ الطبعة اخلامسة‬، ١٩٦٩ ، ‫ دارالطليعة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"نقد الفكر الديني‬ .١٩٩٨ (Critique of Religious Thought, Beirut: Tali’a Publications, 1969.)

239

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1970 . ١٩٧٠، ‫ دار الطليعة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"دراسات يسارية حول القضية الفلسطينية‬ (Leftist Studies of the Palestinian Problem, Beirut: Tali’a Publications, 1970.) 1972 The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. 1973 .١٩٧٣ ، ‫ دار العودة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"دراسة نقدية لفكر املقاومة لفلسطينية‬ (A Critical Study of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, Beirut: Al-Awdah Publications, 1973.) 1975 .١٩٧٥ ، ‫ دار العودة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"الصهيونية والصراع الطبقي‬ (Zionism and the Class Struggle, Beirut: Al-Awdah Publications, 1975.) 1977 .١٩٧٧ ، ‫ دارالطليعة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، " ’‫"سياسة كارتر ومنظرو ’احلقبة السعودية‬ (Carter’s Policies and the Ideologues of the Saudi Era, Beirut: Tali’a Publications, 1977.) 1978 .١٩٧٨ ، ‫ دار الطليعة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"زيارة السادات وبؤس السالم العادل‬ (Sadat’s Visits and the Poverty of the Just Peace, Beirut: Tali’a Publications, 1978.) 1980 Four Philosophical Essays, Damascus: University Publications, 1980.

240

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1981 Politics of Religion in the Middle East, London: Ithaca Press, 1981. .١٩٨١ ، ‫ دار احلداثة‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"االستشراق واالستشراق معكوسا‬ (Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse, Beirut: Al-Hadatha Publications, 1981.) .١٩٨١ ، ‫ منشورات جامعة‬: ‫ دمشق‬، "‫"قراءات في الفكر السياسي املعاصر‬ (Readings in Contemporary Political Thought, Damascus: University Publications, 1981.) .١٩٨١ ، ‫ منشورات جامعة‬: ‫ دمشق‬، "‫"مناهج البحث في العلوم الطبيعية‬ (The Methods of Scientific Inquiry in the Natural Sciences, Damascus: University Publications, 1981.) 1990 .١٩٩٠ ، ‫ دار الفارابي‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫"دفاعا عن املادية والتاريخ‬ (Materialism and History: A Defense, Beirut: Farabi Publications, 1990.) 1991 ‫ العربية‬: ‫ تونس‬، ) ‫ محمد بن احمودة‬، ‫اثر الثورة الفرنسية في فكر النهضة ( مع مصطفى التواتي‬ .١٩٩١ ، ‫محمد علي احلامي‬ (The Impact of the French Revolution on the Idea of al-Nahda, Tunis: Al-Arabiya, 1991.) 1992 .١٩٩٢ ، ‫ رياض الريس للكتب والنشر‬: ‫بيروت‬/‫ لندن‬، "‫"ذهنية التحرمي سلمان رشدي وحقيقة األدب‬ ‫ الطبعة‬.١٩٩٧ ، ‫ الطبعة الثالثة‬.١٩٩٤ ، ‫ دار املدى‬: ‫ دمشق‬، ‫الطبعة الثانية مع ردود النقاد وتعليقاتهم‬ .٢٠٠٢ ، ‫الرابعة‬ (The Tabooing Mentality: Salman Rushdie and the Truth of Literature, London/Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1992.) English Translation: Themental Taboo: Salman Rushdie and the Truth within Literature, London: Qubrus, 1992.

241

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

Farsi translation: .١٩٩٩ ، ‫ انتشارات سنبلة‬: ‫ هامبورغ‬، ‫"سلمان رشدي وحقيقة در ادبيات" ترجمة تراب حق شناس‬ 1993 Unbehagen in der Moderne: Aufklärung im Islam, herausgegeben von Kai-Henning Gerlach, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1993. Dutch translation: Kritiek op godsdienst en wetenschap. Vijf essays over islamitische cultuur, redacteur Ronald Kon, vertalen nit het Engels en Arabisch door Sonja Alers, Amsterdam: El Hizjra, 1996. Italian translation: L’Illuminismo islamico: Il Disagio della Civiltà, Roma: Di Renzo, 2002. 1995 Mot Hevdvnne Sannheter: Et Korrektiv Til Oppfatninger om Islam og Muslimer, red. og med forord av Gunvor Mejdell, oversatt Jan Tore Knutsen, Ina Tin og Oliver Moystad, Oslo: Cappelen, 1995. 1997 ‫ مركز الدراسات واملعلومات‬: ‫ القاهرة‬، "‫ حتديد نقدي للمشكالت واألفكار واملداخل‬: ‫"األصولية االسالمية‬ .١٩٩٧ ، ‫القانونية حلقوق االنسان‬ (Islamic Fundamentalism: a Critical Outline of Problems, Ideas and Approaches, Cairo: Center for Legal Information and Studies about Human Rights, 1997.) ‫ الطبعة‬، ١٩٩٧، ‫ دار املدى‬: ‫ دمشق‬، "‫ قراءة "اآليات الشيطاني َة" ر ّد وتعقيب‬: ‫"ما بعد ذهنية التحرمي‬ .٢٠٠١ ‫الثانية‬ (Reading the Satanic Verses: a Reply to Critics, includes the whole debate over “Salman Rushdieand the Truth of Literature”, Damascus: Al-Mada Publications, 1997.) 1998 .١٩٩٨ ، ‫ مركز الدراسات واملعلومات القانونية حلقوق اإلنسان‬: ‫ القاهرة‬، "‫"العلمانية واملجتمع املدني‬ (Secularism, Civil Society and Other Essays, Cairo: Center for Legal Information and Studies about Human Rights, 1998.)

242

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1999 .٢٠٠٠ ، ‫ الطبعة الثانية‬، ١٩٩٩ ، ‫ دار الفكر‬: ‫ دمشق‬، ) ‫"ما العوملة؛" ( مع حسن حنفي‬ (What is Globalization? Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 1999.) 2004 Islam, Terrorism and the West Today, Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, 2004. Il Mediterraneo: ancora mare nostrum? relazioni di Sadik J. Al-Azm (et al.), a cura di Maurice Aymard, Giovanni Barberini, Sebastiano Maffettone, Roma: LUISS University Press, 2004. 2005 Religie en Moderniteit/Religion and Modernity: Erasmusprijs 2004/(with Fatima Mernissi, Abdulkarim Soroush, Max Sparreboom), Samenstelling: Max Sparreboom, Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, 2005. Islam und säkularer Humanismus/Islam and Secular Humanism, übersetzt von Alexandra Riebe, herausgegeben von Eilert Herms, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005.

ARTICLES

1964 ‫ ص‬، ٩٠ ‫ عدد‬،١٩٦٤ ، ) ‫ بونيو ( حزيران‬، ) ‫ املجلة ( القاهرة‬، "‫"نظريات الزمان في فلسفة كنط‬ .٣٧–٢٤ (“Kant’s Theories of Space”, The Review, Cairo, 90, 1964, June, pp. 24–37.) 1965 .١٩٦٥ ‫ أيار‬، ) ‫ الثقافة العربية ( بيروت‬، "‫"الثقافة العلمية واالعتقاد الديني‬ (“Scientific Culture and Religious Belief”, Al-Thaqafa Al-Arabiya, Beirut, 1965, May.)

243

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1966 ١٥٣. -– ١٤٨ ‫ ص‬،١٩٦٦ ، ‫ متوز ـ آب‬، ) ‫ حوار ( بيروت‬، "‫"الدروز في كتابني‬ (“The Druzes in Two Books”, Dialogue, Beirut, 23, 1966, July–August, pp. 148–153.) .٢ ‫ عدد‬، ١٩٦٦ ‫ كانون الثاني ـ شباط‬، ) ‫ حوار ( بيروت‬، "‫"مأساة إبليس‬ (“The Tragedy of Satan”, Dialogue, Beirut, 2, 1966, January–February, pp. 5–28.) .١٠٩–١٠٦ ‫ ص‬، ١٢٠ ‫ عدد‬، ١٩٦٦ ‫ ديسمبر‬، ) ‫ املجلة ( القاهرة‬، "‫"املعجم الفلسفي‬ (“The Philosophical Dictionary”, The Review, Cairo, 120, 1966, December, pp. 106–109.) ‫ ص‬،١٩٦٦، ٢٩ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ أكتوبر‬، ) ‫ مجلة الكتاب العربي ( القاهرة‬، "‫"رأي في املصطلحات الفلسفية‬ .٥٩–٥٩ (“An Opinion about Technical Philosophical Terms”, The Arab Review of Books, Cairo, 29, 1966, October, pp. 51–59.) 1967 “Whitehead’s Notions of Order and Freedom”, The Personalist: International Review of Philosophy, Religion and Literature, University of Southern California, 48, 1967, 4, pp. 579–591. .١٩٦٧ ‫ شباط‬٦ ، )‫ ملحق النهاراألسبوعي (بيروت‬، "‫"الفكر االسالمي املعاصر‬ (“Contemporary Muslim Thought”, Al-Nahar Sunday Supplement, Beirut, 1967, 6 February.) .١٩٦٧ ‫ حزيران‬٤ ، )‫(بيروت‬، ‫ ملحق النهار األسبوعي‬، "‫"الفكر املسيحي املعاصر‬ (“Contemporary Christian Thought”, Al-Nahar Sunday Supplement, Beirut, 1967, 4 June.) -١٦٦ ‫ ص‬١٩٦٧ ، ‫ اجلامعة األميركية في بيروت‬، ‫ كتاب العيد‬، " ‫"نظريات الزمان املبكرة في فلسفة كنط‬ .١٩٣–١٦٦ .١٩٣ (“The Early Theories of Time in the Philosophy of Kant”, Festival Book, American University of Beirut, 1967, pp. 166–193.)

244

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1968 “Absolute Space and Kant’s First Antinomy of Pure Reason”, KantStudien, University of Köln, 2, 1968, pp. 151–164. “Kant’s Conception of the Noumenon”, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Queen’s University, 6, 1968, 4, pp. 516–520. 1969 .٣٣–٣٥ ‫ ص‬،١٩٦٩ ، ٦ ‫ عدد‬، )‫ مواقف (بيروت‬، "‫"خمس مالحظات على ثورة يوليو‬ (“Five Comments on the July 23 Revolution”, Mawaqif, Beirut, 6, 1969, pp. 25–33.) ٧٩.–٤٥ ‫ ص‬،١٩٦٩ ، ٥ ‫ عدد‬، )‫ مواقف ( بيروت‬، "‫"نحو فهم أفضل للفكرة الصهيونية‬ (“Towards a Better Understanding of the Zionist Idea”, Mawaqif, Beirut, 5, 1969, July–August, pp. 45–79.) 1970 .٤٩–٣ ‫ ص‬،١٩٧٠ ‫ كانون الثاني‬، ‫ دراسات عربية‬، "‫"العرب والنظرة املاركسية إلى املسالة اليهودية‬ (“The Arabs and the Marxist View of the Jewish Question”, Dirasat Arabiya, Beirut, 1970, January, pp. 3–49.) 1972 ‫ ص‬، ١٩٧٢ ‫ أيار‬، ٩ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ شؤون فلسطينية‬، "‫ النصوص األساسية‬: ‫"الفكرة الصهيونية‬ .١٥٥–١٥٢ (“The Zionist Idea: The Basic Texts”, Palestine Affairs, Beirut, 9, 1972, May, pp. 152–155.) ، ١٩٧٢ ‫ حزيران‬، ١٠ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ شؤون فلسطينية‬، "١٩٦٧ ‫"كتب أجنبية حول معركة اخلامس من حزيران‬ .١٨٣–١٦٠‫ص‬ (“Foreign Books about the June 5 War”, Palestine Affairs, Beirut, 10, 1972, June, pp. 160–183.) .٠٣٣-٢٠٠ ‫ ص‬، ١٩٧٢ ‫ آب‬، ١٢ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ شؤون فلسطينية‬، "‫"املاركسية والدولة الصهيونية‬ (“Marxism and the Zionist State”, Palestine Affairs, Beirut, 12, 1972, August, pp. 200–203.)

245

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

.١٧٤–١٧٢ ‫ ص‬،١٩٧٢ ‫ متوز‬، ١١ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ شؤون فلسطينية‬، "‫ إعادة نظر‬: ‫"الصهيونية‬ (“Zionism Reconsidered”, Palestine Affairs, Beirut, 11, 1972, July, pp. 172–174.) .١٩٩–١٤٦ ‫ ص‬، ١٩٧٢ ‫ آب‬، ١٢ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ شؤون فلسطينية‬، "‫"الصهيونية في خمسة وسبعني عام ًا‬ (“Zionism after 75 years”, Palestine Affairs, Beirut, 12, 1972, August, pp. 146–199.) ١٩٧٢ ‫ تشرين الثاني‬،١٥ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ شؤون فلسطينية‬، "‫"تيارات في السياسة العربية وعلم االجتماع العربي‬ .١٩٤–١٩١ ‫ ص‬، (“Currents in Arab Politics and Sociology after June 1967”, Palestine Affairs, Beirut, 15, 1972, November, pp. 191–194.) 1973 “The Palestinian Resistance Movement Reconsidered”, The Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow, Forum Associates Inc. (Columbus/Ohio), 1973, pp. 121–135. German translation: “Der palästinensische Widerstand neu durchdacht”, Die Dritte Welt, 3, 1974, 1–2, S. 164–178. .٩٢–٧٣ ‫ ص‬، ١٩٧٣ ‫ نيسان‬، ) ‫ الثقافة العربية ( بيروت‬، ‫"حول ثقافة االستعمار وثقافة التخلف‬ (“On Colonial and Underdeveloped Culture”, Al-Thaqafa Al-Arabiya, Beirut, 1973, April, pp. 73–92.) 1981 “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse”, Khamsine, 8, 1981, pp. 5–25. Reprinted in: Forbidden Agendas, London: Al Saqi Books, 1984. 1982 .٤٧-٤٧ ‫ ص‬، ١٩٨٢ ‫ شباط‬، ٤ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ بيروت‬، ‫ دراسات عربية‬، "‫"أدونيس والنقد املنفلت من عقالة‬ (“A Reply to Adonis”, Dirasat Arabiya, Beirut, 4, 1982, February, pp. 47–74.) .١١٧–١١٥ ‫ ص‬، ١٩٨٢ ، ٨ ‫ عدد‬، ) ‫ ( بيروت‬، ‫ شؤون فلسطينية‬، "‫"إسرائيل والفلسطينيون‬ (“Israel and the Palestinians”, Palestine Affairs, 11, 1972, July, pp. 115–117.)

246

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1984 .١٩٨٤ ، ٢٠ ‫ حزيران‬، )‫ واألسئلة الفلسطينية الصعبة" السفير (بيروت‬٨٢ ‫"بيروت‬ (“Beirut 82 and the Difficult Palestinian Questions”, Assafir, Beirut, 1984, June 20.) 1985 ‫ ص‬،١٩٨٥ ، ‫ تشرين الثاني ـ كانون األول‬، )‫ دراسات عربية (بيروت‬، "‫"حول الفلسفة احلديثة وتاريخها‬ .١١٧–٧٩ (“On Modern Philosophy and its History”, Dirasat Arabiya, Beirut, 1985, November–December, pp. 79–117.) 1986 .١٩٨٦ ، ‫ متوز‬٥ ، ‫السفير‬، "‫"البيان والتبيني في أحوال التخلف واملتخلفني‬ (“The Conditions of Underdevelopment and its Clarification”, Assafir, Beirut, 1986, July 5.) 1988 “Palestinian Zionism”, Die Welt des Islams, 28, 1988, S. 90–98. 1991 “Der Friedensprozess und die Golfkrise: ein kritischer Standpunkt”, Wir sind die Herren und ihr seid unsere Schuhputzer! Der Nahe Osten vor und nach dem Golfkrieg, herausgegeben von Norbert Mattes, Dagyeli Verlag: Frankfurt a. M. 1991, S. 182–195. “The Importance of Being Earnest about Salman Rushdie”, Die Welt des Islams, 31, 1991, S. 1–49. German translation in: Lettre International, Berlin, 13, 1991, S. 12–21. Italian translation in: Lettera Internazionale, Rome, 28, 1991, pp. 22–29. Swedish translation: Upplysning är inte upplösning, Rabelais, Joyce, Rushdie och den stridsglada moderniteten, översätting av Maria Ekman, Stockholm : Svenska Rushdiekommitten, 1995.

247

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

Republished in: South Asia Bulletin, 11, 1991, 1–2, pp. 1–20, and in: Reading Rushdie: Perspectives on the Fiction of Salman Rushdie, edited by D. M. Fletcher, Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1994, pp. 255–292. 1992 “Krieg im Namen Gottes: Dschihad”, Zeit Magazin, 4, 1992, 17 January, S. 12–20. “Salman Rushdies Satanische Verse im muslimischen Kontext”, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Jahrbuch 1990–1991, Berlin, 1992, S. 166–185. “Wider den fundamentalistischen Ungeist”, Der Islam im Aufbruch? Perspektiven der arabischen Welt, hrsg. Von Michael Luders, München: Piper Verlag, 1992, S. 246–260. 1993 “Is the ‘Fatwa’ a fatwa?”, Arab Studies Journal, 1, 1993, 2, p. 3. 1994 “Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critical Outline of Problems, Ideas and Approaches”, South Asia Bulletin, Part I: 13, 1993, 1–2, pp. 93–121, Part II: 14, 1994, 1, pp. 73–98. “Quelle Fatwa?”, Pour Rushdie, La Découverte, Paris 1993. Also in: For Rushdie : essays by Arab and Muslim writers in defense of free speech, Anouar Abdallah et al., New York: George Braziller, 1994. 1995 “‘I do want to play games!’: samtal med Sadik J. Al-Azm”, Al-Azm u.a., TfMS: Tidskrift for Mellanosternstudier, 2, 1995, pp. 46–54. .١٩٩٥ ، ‫ شتاء‬، ٢ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ دمشق‬، ‫ النهج‬، "‫"االسالم والعلمانية‬ (“Islam and Secularism”, Al-Nahj, Damascus, 2, 1995, Winter.) .١٩٩٥ ‫ صيف‬، ٤ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ دمشق‬، ‫ النهج‬، "‫"العلمانية واملجتمع ملدني‬ (“On Secularism and Civil Society”, Al-Nahj, Damascus, 4, 1995, Summer.)

248

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1996 “Fundamentalism in Comparison”, Political Prophets and the World, Göteborg: The Swedish Rushdie Defence Committee, 1996. “Is Islam Secularizable?”, Jahrbuch für Philosophie des Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie Hannover, 7, 1996, S. 15–24. Reprinted in: Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul 1997. Turkisch translation: “Sivil Toplum, Demokrasi ve Islam Dünyasi”, yayna hazrlayan: E. Özdalga/S. Persson, Istanbul 1998. “L’islam et la laïcité” traduction de M. Borrmans, in: Etudes Arabes: Dossiers, 91–92, 1996–1997, pp. 161–189. “The Satanic Verses as a Literary Manifestation”, Political Prophets and the World, Göteborg: The Swedish Rushdie Defense Committee, 1996. 1999 “Sur l’Islam, la Laïcité et l’Occident”, Le Monde Diplomatique, September 1999. “Westliches Geschichtsdenken aus arabischer Perspektive”, Westliches Geschichtsdenken: eine interkulturelle Debatte, herausgegeben von Jörn Rüsen, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999. 2000 “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse”, Orientalism. A reader, edited by Alexander L. Macfie, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000, pp. 217–238. “The Satanic Verses Post Festum: the global, the local, the literary”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 20, 2000, 1–2, pp. 44–78. Dutch translation: “De duivelsverzen post festum: mondiaal, lokaal, literair”, in: Religie en Moderniteit (with Fatima Mernissi, Abdulkarim Soroush), Samenstelling: Max Sparreboom, Breda: De Geus, 2004, p. 78–147. “Syrien und der Friedensprozess”, Lettre International, Berlin, Winter 2000, pp. 33–41.

249

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

“Owning the future: modern Arabs and Hamlet”, ISIM Newsletter, 5, 2000, p. 11. “The View from Damascus: Syria and the Peace Process”, The New York Review of Books, 47, 2000, 10, June 15, pp. 70–77. “‘The View from Damascus’, cont’d.”, The New York Review of Books, 47, 2000, 13, August 10. .٢٠٠٠ ‫ سبتمبر‬، ٢٠ ‫ عدد‬، ‫ القاهرة‬، ‫ وجهات نظر‬، "‫"سوريا والسالم‬ (“Syria and the Peace Process”, Weghat Nazar, Cairo, 20, 2000, September.) 2003 “Globalization and Literature”, History, Culture and Society in India and West Asia, edited by N. N. Vohra, Delhi: Shipra, 2003, pp. 179–196. “Det universelle vs. det partikulaere – Tale Ved Princeton University”, Kritik, 162, 2003, S.148–149. 2004 “Islam, Terrorism and the West today”, Die Welt des Islams, 44, 2004, 1, pp. 114–128. “Islam, Terrorismo ed Occidente oggi”, Il Mediterraneo: ancora mare nostrum?, relazioni di Sadik J. Al-Azm (et al.), a cura di Maurice Aymard, Giovanni Barberini, Sebastiano Maffettone, Roma : LUISS University Press, 2004, pp. 79–98. “Time Out of Joint: Western Dominance, Islamist Terror, and the Arab Imagination”, Boston Review, October/November 2004, http:// bostonreview.net/BR29.5/alazm.html (07.03.2006). De Tragedie van de Duivel: op weg naar een liberale Islam, redacteur Ronald E. Kon, vertalen nit het Engels en Arabisch Sonja Alers, Amsterdam: Van Gennep/El Hizjra, 2004. 2005 “Dankwoord Sadik J. Al-Azm”, in: Religie en Moderniteit/Religion and Modernity: Erasmusprijs 2004, Herman Beck (et al.), Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, 2005, pp. 56–57.

250

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

“Islam, Terrorism, and the West”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 25, 2005, 1, pp. 6–15. “Die Zeit aus den Fugen. Westliche Vorherrschaft, islamistischer Terror und die arabische Vorstellung”, Wespennest – Islam, 138, 2005.

BOOKS ABOUT SADIK J. AL-AZM

1970 ، ‫ املكتب التجاري‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫ البرهان اليقيني للر ّد على كتاب "نقد الفكر الديني‬: ‫ جبر همزة‬، ‫فرج‬ .١٩٨٠ ، ‫ الطبعة الثانية‬، ١٩٧٠ (Farraj, Jabir Hamzah: The Positive Proof to Refute the Book, Critique of Religious Thought) .١٩٧٠ ، ‫ مؤسسة دار فلسطني‬: ‫ بيروت‬، ‫ الر ّد على صادق العظم‬: ‫ محمد‬، ‫نسر اهلل‬ (Nasr Allah, Muhammad Izzat: The Refutation of Sadik J. Al-Azm) .١٩٧٠ ، ‫ دار الطلية‬: ‫ بيروت‬، "‫ على هامش "نقد الفكر الديني‬: ‫ عثمان إبن عبد القدير‬، ‫سفي‬ (Safi, Uthman ibn Abd al-Qadir: Notes to Critique of Religious Thought) 1971 ١٩٧١. ، ‫ مطبع لبنان‬: ‫ بيروت‬، ‫ محمد حسن الياسني‬، "‫هوامش على كتاب "نقد الفكر الديني‬ (Notes on the Book, Critique of Religious Thought) 2003 .٢٠٠٣ ، ‫ دمشق دار املجد‬، ‫ بؤس احلقيقة في أدب سلمان رشدي و صادق العظم‬: ‫ أحمد‬، ‫عمران‬ (Umran, Ahmad: The Suffering of the Truth in the Literature of Salman Rushdie and Sadik J. Al-Azm)

ARTICLES ABOUT SADIK J. AL-AZM

1994 Höpp, G.: “Verdient der Islam Dissidenten? Anmerkungen zu Sadik J. Al-Azm, zur säkularisierten Moderne und zum islamischen

251

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

Fundamentalismus”, Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika, 22, 1994, 6, S. 637–651. Lawrence, B. B.: “Tracking Fundamentalists and those who study them: a Sequel to Sadik J. Al-Azm, ‘Islamic fundamentalism reconsidered . . .’”, South Asia Bulletin, 14, 1994, 2, pp. 41–50. Urvoy, M. T.: “Un philosophe arabe face á l’histoire de la pensée”, Horizons Maghrébins, 25–26, 1994, pp. 83–98. 1995 Hallden, P.: “Kättaren fran Damaskus”, Mellanosternstudier, 2, 1995, pp. 41–45.

TfMS:

Tidskrift

for

2005 Meier, Christian: “Damaszener Feuerkopf. Mit ketzerischer Vernunft dem Fundamentalismus zu Leibe rücken: Der syrische Philosoph Sadik J. Al-Azm”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 169, 23. Juli 2005.

INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS

1993 “Rethinking the Middle East” (3 February 1993), one VHS tape, recorded by the Fairfield University Media Center. 1997 Talhami, Ghada: “An Interview with Sadik J. Al-Azm”, Arab Studies Quarterly, 19, 1997, 3, pp. 113–126. .‫ تلفزيون اجلزيرة‬، )١٩٩٧.٥ .٢٧( ‫ يوسف القرضاوي‬-‫مناظرة صادق العظم‬ (Disputation between Sadik J. Al-Azm and Yusuf al-Qaradawi) 1998 Abu Fakhr, Saqr: “Trends in Arab thought: an Interview with Sadik J. Al-Azm”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 27, 1988, 2, pp. 68–80.

252

PERSONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SADIK J. AL-AZM

1999 “An Interview”, The June 1967 War after Three Decades, William W. Haddad (et al.), Washington, DC: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1999. 2000 ‫ املؤسسة العربية‬: )‫ صقر أبو فخر) (بيروت‬: ‫"حوار بال ضفاف مع صادق جالل العظم" (أجرى احلوار‬ .٢٠٠٠ ، ‫ الطبعة الثانية‬، ١٩٩٨ ، ‫للدراسات والنشر‬ (A Dialogue without Boundaries with Sadik J. Al-Azm, conducted by Saqr Abu-Fakhr) 2005 Meier, Christian: “Der arabischen Welt fehlt die kritische Masse. Ein Gespräch mit dem syrischen Denker Sadik J. Al-Azm”, Neue Züricher Zeitung, 23 August 2005.

253

INDEX

Adonis, 5, 12 Afghanistan, xviii, 7, 20, 65, 115 Africa, xxi, 15, 56, 61, 85, 141, 142 Ahmed, Leila, 10, 224 Al-Alawi, Hadi, 22, 224 Al-’Azhar University, 4, 135, 220, 221 Alexander the Great, 15 Al-Qaeda, 8 America, 16, 17, 21, 24, 64, 65, 67, 138, 147, 151, 153, 160 American(s), 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 50, 65, 88, 89, 95, 97, 102, 103, 109, 123–125, 130, 139, 147, 152–154, 158, 160, 168, 170, 174, 177, 228, 233 Apostasy, 4 Arabic, 3, 9–13, 20, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31, 35, 42, 43, 57, 71–73, 76, 78, 85, 93, 98, 115, 132, 166–168, 175, 185, 223–225, 229, 235 Arabs, 3, 15–18, 20, 22, 24, 43, 63, 76, 80, 88–91, 93, 94, 96, 107, 112, 115, 123, 175, 176, 178, 233 Aristotle, 15, 182 ’Asfour, Gaber, 4, 223 Baudrillard, Jean, 6, 7, 21, 223 Bergson, Henry, 10 Bernal, Martin, 4, 223 Berque, Jacques, 9 British, 23, 27, 33, 40, 50, 72, 99, 108, 124, 170, 223, 225 Buruma, Ian, 5, 6, 115, 123, 223 Byzantium, 15 Cartesian, 9 Chase, Stuart, 12, 224 CIA, 19–21, 166 Civilization(s), 5–7, 29, 30, 32, 33, 38–40, 42, 46, 47, 64, 67, 68, 132, 141, 146, 147, 159, 165, 182–184, 223

Cold War, ix, 16, 53, 65, 66, 88 Crusades, 15, 78, 79 Derrida, Jacques, xiii, 8, 13, 14, 224 Egypt, 4, 6, 15, 23, 25, 30, 33, 34, 36, 38–44, 66, 71, 77, 79, 81, 85, 109, 112–115, 121, 124, 125, 174, 223, 235, 236 Eliot, T. S., 4 Empson, William, 9, 12, 223 English, xv, 9, 10, 12, 57, 74, 76, 78, 92, 105, 147, 166, 169, 171, 175, 234, 235 Enlightenment (or: counter-Enlightenment), xiii, 4, 93, 165 Essentialism (or: essentialist), 5, 53, 61, 63, 64, 225 Farsi, 24, 26, 28, 166–168 Faust, 10, 181 Feminism, xii, 10, 93, 96, 134, 176 Foucault, Michel, 4, 50, 52, 53, 58–60, 68, 97, 225 French, 9, 12, 13, 17, 40, 57, 71, 72–74, 78, 81, 82, 84, 92, 101, 103, 124, 169, 225, 227, 241 German(s), xv, 20, 57, 61, 75, 79, 92, 101, 169, 172, 177–178, 184, 225 Germany, xii, xv, xvi, 72, 73, 93, 101, 109, 150, 151, 160, 225, 228, 229, 231, 233, 234 Greek, 13, 37, 75, 194, 195 Hamid Abuzaid, Nasr, 4 Hanafi, Hasan (or: Hassan), 3, 4, 115, 223 Hannibal, 15 Hardt, Michael, 8, 223 Hazard, Paul, 4 Hebrew, 11, 75, 166, 168, 169 Heresy, 4, 25, 27 Huntington, Samuel, 29, 165

255

INDEX

Ibda’, 5 India, 14, 15, 25, 43, 56, 72, 83, 125, 141, 150, 250 Indonesia(n), 56, 102, 129–139, 141–163, 225, 230, 231 intelligentsia, 3 Iran, 18, 23, 24, 26, 28, 64, 76, 108, 113, 114, 117, 123, 125, 167, 175, 177 Iranian(s), 18, 23, 108, 109, 167–169, 174 Iraq, 23, 24, 26, 28, 65, 88, 94, 113, 117, 123, 168, 177, 229, 233 Iraqi(s), 22, 168, 174, 175, 232, 233 Islam, 6, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 45, 50, 51, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 91, 93, 99, 112, 115, 129, 130–135, 137, 138, 171, 176, 177, 182, 220, 221, 224, 225, 229, 230, 231, 242, 243, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252 Islamic, 4, 20, 23, 29, 30, 32–38, 44, 49, 64–68, 71–73, 78, 83, 85, 86, 93, 96, 99, 102, 124, 129–137, 142, 148, 174, 176–178, 182, 223, 225–227, 230, 232 Islamist(s), 4, 6, 23, 29, 64, 68, 90, 93, 103, 108, 111, 115, 123, 228 Israel, ix, xi, xvi, 16, 17, 102, 108, 109, 111, 120, 166–171, 173–174, 177–180, 232–234 Istighrab, 3, 223 Istishraq, 3 Italian, 23, 169 Italy, 145 Japan(ese), 19, 20, 143–145, 155, 157, 169 Jesuit(s), 22, 24, 77, 78 Jewish, viii, xii, 16, 20, 73, 83–85, 93, 108, 133, 136, 169, 177, 233, 245 Jihad, 6, 8, 20, 21, 76, 133, 174, 177 Koran, 9–11, 18, 25, 102, 131–133, 174, 183, 186, 187, 189, 191, 194, 195, 200–205, 212, 213, 216, 221, 235 Kufr, 4 Kurosawa, Akira, 12

256

Lukács, Georgi, 10 Mahfouz, Naguib, 23 Malay(s), 68, 136, 144, 145, 156, 225, 232 Malaysia, 131, 155, 156 Margalit, Avishai, 5, 6, 115, 123, 223 Marxism, xii, xiii, 19, 53, 59–61, 66, 109, 115, 224, 226, 245 Mashreq, 15 Mecca, 6, 133 Media, vii, xx, 16, 24, 25, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 100, 102, 103, 110, 118, 120, 133, 135, 159, 165–175, 179, 180, 226, 227, 230, 232, 233 Mediterranean, 15, 21 Mosad, 20 Muslim(s), 4–6, 11, 15, 20, 26, 27, 33, 34, 51, 66, 68, 80, 83, 88–96, 99, 101–103, 110, 115, 123, 130, 132, 134, 136, 141, 142, 167, 176, 181, 183, 187, 200, 218, 220, 221, 226, 228, 232 Mustafa, Shukri, 6 Negri, Antonio, 8, 223 New Delhi, 14 New York, 7, 19, 20, 86, 103, 123 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 8 Ottoman, 15, 107 Pakistan, 26 Palestinian(s), ix, xi, xii, xvii, 16, 17, 23, 90, 108, 112, 166, 168, 170, 171, 174, 176, 224, 240, 246, 247 Persia(n), 25, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 80, 84, 85 Plato, 13, 15 Prophet Muhammad, 6, 8, 23, 25, 27, 38, 76, 132, 133, 135, 214 Raban, Jonathan, 9–13, 223 Renan, Ernest, 5, 72, 73, 86 Richards, Ivor Armstrong, 12, 224 Rome, 15

INDEX

Rushdie, Salman, vii, x, xi, 5, 8, 22–27, 223, 241, 242, 247–249, 251 Ruthven, Malise, 9, 10, 11, 13, 224 Said, Edward, x, xi, 5, 9, 16, 17, 29, 45–68, 71, 81, 86, 92, 110, 115, 125, 141, 148, 161, 163, 165, 173, 176, 178–179, 180, 224–226 Saudi-Arabia, 16, 26, 174, 175, 240 Semitic (or: anti-Semitic), 5, 103, 105, 170, 172, 173, 175, 177–181, 194, 205, 234 September 11, 2001, 6–7, 14, 19–22, 65, 168 Shayegan, Daryush, 9, 223 Shi’ism, 18, 22, 25–28, 74, 83, 94, 117, 182 Spain, 15, 80 Sunnism, x, 22, 25, 26, 74, 75, 83, 84, 117

Syria(n), ix, xvi, xvii, 19, 20, 76, 77, 79, 82, 86, 92, 102, 112, 113, 117, 121, 124, 125, 135, 174–175, 225, 226, 235, 250 Taliban, 6, 115 United States, 10, 16, 17, 19–22, 42, 43, 105, 106, 108, 116, 118–120, 138, 167, 169, 171, 173, 174, 178 Wehr, Hans, 13 Whitehead, Alfred North, 10, 244 Zionism, vii, xii, 16, 20, 22, 24, 90, 91, 101, 108, 136, 138, 139, 177, 180, 231, 240, 245–247

257