Organized Crime: A Cultural Introduction [1 ed.] 0367461269, 9780367461263

Citation preview

Organized crime is a social bad, that harms people and the economy. Yet it is also a phenomenon that goes beyond the profit motive, involving rituals, norms of behaviour, and codes of conduct. This book by Danesi and Nicaso is an excellent general introduction to the topic, that also sheds light on several neglected aspects of this phenomenon. A text well worth reading. Federico Varese, Author of Mafia Life, Professor of Criminology, Oxford University, UK

At long last, a book that combines the rigour of an academic text with the accessibility and page-­turning qualities of some of the best works of literary non-­fiction covering the Mafia. In Nicaso and Danesi’s latest offering, we once again see their non-­traditional and multidisciplinary approach to exploring the cultural underpinnings and rituals of organised crime and their place both within not only larger and complex social and legal structures but also within the popular imagination. The format of this book also allows for quick reference as needed, making it ideal as a course text for those criminology courses out there focusing on not only the Mafia per se, but also any groups recognized as being adherents to the “traditional” organised crime model. Dr. Michael Arntfield, Criminologist and Homicide Scholar, Western University, Canada

Like many people, I am, I must confess, both drawn to and repelled by certain types of organised crime, at least in terms of what I  see in the movies and elsewhere. The family bonds in The Godfather draw me in, I never wanted Sonny to die like that, the slaughter in Al Pacino’s Scarface repels me. The news most nights tell me that organised crime is behind most of society’s ills. But what’s behind the emotional (and sometimes glamorous) images and the headlines? Organized Crime: A Cultural Introduction by Antonio Nicaso and Marcel Danesi explains fully. This interdisciplinary approach to the subject of organised crime is a truly fascinating read which will be an eye-­opener for scholars and students across a range of disciplines including criminology, sociology, anthropology and psychology. Academic authority, cultural and semiotic sensitivity, and a deep understanding of the subject matter shine through this important book. Professor Geoffrey Beattie, Edge Hill University, UK

Organized Crime

This book aims to describe and demystify what makes criminal gangs so culturally powerful. It examines their codes of conduct, initiation rites, secret communication methods, origin myths, symbols, and the like that imbue the gangsters with the pride and nonchalance that go hand in hand with their criminal activities. Mobsters are everywhere in the movies, on television, and on websites. Contemporary societies are clearly fascinated by them. Why is this so? What features and constituents of organized criminal gangs make them so emotionally powerful – to themselves and others? These are the questions that have guided the writing of this textbook, which is intended as an introduction to organized crime from the angle of cultural analysis. Key topics include: •

An historic overview of organized crime, including the social, economic, and cultural conditions that favor its development; • A review of the type of people who make up organized gangs and the activities in which they engage; • The symbols, rituals, codes, and languages that characterize criminal institutions; • The relationship between organized crime and cybercrime; • The role of women in organized crime; • Drugs and narco-­terrorism; • Media portrayals of organized crime. Organized Crime includes case studies and offers an accessible, interdisciplinary approach to the subject of organized crime. It is essential reading for students engaged with organized crime across criminology, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Antonio Nicaso teaches courses on the social history of organized crime and Mafia culture at Queen’s University. He is a leading expert on Mafia and Mafia-­like criminal organizations in the world. He has published more than 30 books on organized crime, including many bestsellers. Marcel Danesi is Full Professor of Anthropology at the University of Toronto, where he has been teaching since 1974. He has published extensively in the fields of linguistics, semiotics, and forensic semiotics.

Organized Crime

A Cultural Introduction

Antonio Nicaso and Marcel Danesi

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Antonio Nicaso and Marcel Danesi The right of Antonio Nicaso and Marcel Danesi to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-­P ublication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­P ublication Data Names: Nicaso, Antonio, author. | Danesi, Marcel, 1946- author. Title: Organized crime : a cultural introduction / Antonio Nicaso and Marcel Danesi. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020044958 | ISBN 9780367461263 (hbk) | ISBN 9780367461270 (pbk) | ISBN 9781003027072 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Organized crime. | Transnational crime. | Mafia. | Gangs. Classification: LCC HV6441 .N54 2021 | DDC 364.106—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020044958 ISBN: 978-­0 -­3 67-­4 6126-­3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-­0 -­3 67-­4 6127-­0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-­1 -­0 03-­0 2707-­2 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Prefacexi   1 What is organized crime? Introduction 1 The enemy within  2 Definition 4 Terminology and legal views  9 Generic characterization  17 Organized criminal groups versus terrorist groups  19 Parallel cultures  22

1

  2 The Italian Mafias Introduction 27 Piracy 28 Banditry 32 The Neapolitan Camorra  33 The Sicilian Mafia  35 Cosa Nostra  41 The Calabrian ’Ndrangheta  46 The Mafias and immigration  50

27

  3 Other criminal organizations Introduction 55 The Yakuza  56 The Triads  64 Outlaw biker gangs  69 The Vory v Zakone  72

55

  4 Organization Introduction 76 Organizational structure  77 Operationality 84

76

viii Contents

The appeal of organizational structure  87 Syndication 89   5 The players Introduction 92 Membership principles  93 Initiation rites  96 Associates and hitmen  101 OCs names  103 Titles and nicknames  107

92

  6 Codes Introduction 113 Codes of conduct  115 Omertà 120 Secrecy 127

113

  7 The made man Introduction 129 Dress codes  130 Hells Angels jacket and insignia  135 Slang and gesture  137 Physical appearance  141 Tattoos 142

129

  8 The Women Introduction 147 The role of women in gangs  148 Mafia women  150 The double standard  153 Female gangs  155

147

 9 Resources Introduction 158 Financial resources  159 Money laundering  160 Human capital  163 Social capital  165 Corruption 167

158

10 The business agenda Introduction 171 Extortion and racketeering  172

171

Contents ix

Drug trafficking and narcoterrorism  175 Transnational organized crime  178 11 Strategic violence Introduction 183 Strategic violence  184 The gray zone  188 Revenge killing  190 Symbolic violence  193

183

12 Symbols and myths Introduction 196 Symbols 197 Myths 201 Inventing traditions  207

196

13 Secret communication Introduction 210 Cryptolects 211 Anti-­languages  213 Cryptography 216

210

14 Popular culture Introduction 221 The movies  222 Television 229 The Internet  231 Two legacies: mythologization and alien conspiracy  234

221

15 Cyberspace Introduction 238 The globalization of organized crime  239 The Dark Net  242 Criminalizing the Internet  245

238

16 Theories Introduction 250 Differential association  251 Social disorganization  253 Social control  254 Anomie theory  256 Subculture theory  258 Ethnic succession  258

250

x Contents

Psychoanalysis 260 Psychological approaches  261 17 Tribalism and adaptability Introduction 265 Tribalism 266 Adaptability 269 The lure of gangsterism  271

265

18 Epilogue Introduction 274 Overview 275 The modern-­day mobster  279 The future  280

274

Index283

Preface

The image of mobsters as “men of honor and tradition” has become iconic throughout the world, perpetuated by movies, television, videos, websites, and even Mafia memes. Even though this image is a caricature created mainly by the media of the past, having changed considerably today, we are still inclined to adopt it as representative of real gangsters, because it is so embedded in our cultural genes that it has become an unconscious mindset. The Mafia and other Mafia-­like criminal organizations worldwide are ruthless gangsters, no matter how we opt to perceive them. Their “cool” lifestyles have always been nothing more than part of a public performance, a form of play-­acting, largely constructed and then glorified by Hollywood and American pop culture generally. And this image of macho men who live by honor codes has been a convenient mythology for them. It has allowed them to stand apart in the public eye from common delinquents. They have been seen as celebrities, as famous as Hollywood actors, including those who portray them in the movies. The goal of this book is to deconstruct this mythology by delving into the evolution of the wise guy celebrity as a fabrication. It is intended as an introductory textbook that examines the origins, evolution, organizational structures, and cultural elements of the gangs that sustain them psychologically and socially. It will also look at other aspects of criminal organizations, such as their financial and criminal operations, so as to complete the picture. Our treatment involves two dimensions – the historical and the evolutionary. It is impossible to understand the modern-­day mobster without understanding the historical forces at work in the emergence of modern criminal organizations. We will thus describe how organized crime cultures originated and constituted themselves socially, including how they created their organizational structures, symbols, myths, codes, enforcement tactics, linguistic expressions, actions, and overall lifestyles. This is intended to provide a particular angle from which to view the raison d’être of criminal gangs. It involves an interdisciplinary approach that blends theoretical and methodological elements from anthropology, psychology, criminology, linguistics, and semiotics. The historical record shows that a member of a crime gang is someone who, in the past, leaves his family and friends (and it is usually a male) to be reborn into a criminal

xii Preface

family, rejecting even his real family. This is rendered psychologically significant through arcane rituals, oaths, and symbols that purportedly transform him into a new “made man,” in the image and likeness of all the others in the mob. The focus will be on the traditional crime groups, from the Sicilian Mafia to the Japanese Yakuza and the Hong Kong Triads. But interspersed throughout is a discussion of what can be called “neophyte” criminal gangs, from outlaw biker gangs and drug cartels to the Vory v Zakone (colloquially called the Russian Mafia) and the phenomenon of transnational organized criminal groups. The second dimension incorporated into this text is an evolutionary one. This implies looking at how Mafia cultures have evolved adaptively in an age of technology. Although several chapters are devoted specifically to this aspect, it is nonetheless interwoven throughout the book. Since the advent of the Internet, there has been a veritable paradigm shift in criminal gang culture and the illegal operations on which it rests. The gangs continue to thrive, hidden behind the computer screen, where they now operate in virtual anonymity. Although many of the facts, events, and themes used in this textbook can be found scattered throughout the vast literature on organized crime, the goal here is to organize them in an introductory way, so that it can be read by anyone interested in organized crime as a cultural phenomenon. It is designed especially for introductory courses in criminology and forensic psychology but can also be used in disciplines that contextualize the study of crime in cultural ways  – anthropology, sociology, and forensic linguistics. One of the authors of this book is a Mafia historian and an organized crime expert (Nicaso); the other is an anthropologist and semiotician who deals with the relation between crime and culture (Danesi). The motivation for writing it comes from our own pedagogical experiences, since each of us teaches undergraduate courses on organized crime and its relation to the contemporary world. Our previous work together has also put us in contact with instructors of similar courses who have given us constructive input on what kind of text they would welcome – we have incorporated many of their suggestions into this book. We hope that it is both informative and enjoyable to read. We have taken nothing for granted and have used sidebars throughout to complete historical profiles of certain figures or to list specific information in a compressed way. We have also kept references to the technical literature to a minimum. Countless novels, movies, television shows, and Internet sites exist on the Mafia and other criminal organizations. All tell a romanticized story, at least in their subtexts. Our main objective is to de-­romanticize it at the same time that we will describe the story as it has been told in the past and how it has evolved. The interest in organized crime is growing because of the migration of crime to new venues, such as the Dark Net (a topic that we will broach in various chapters). As legal cultures change, so too do criminal cultures. Without adaptability, organized crime would have disappeared a long time ago.

Chapter 1

What is organized crime?

Introduction Thanks to Hollywood and television characters like Tony Soprano, the American Mafia (also called Cosa Nostra) is probably the world’s best-­known organized crime group, but there are plenty of others, which have also been the subject of movies and TV shows, albeit to a lesser extent. Why the fascination? This question will be broached throughout the subsequent chapters of this book. Here, we will address a different but related one: What is organized crime? All organized criminal groups (henceforward abbreviated to OCs) have a similar kind of organizational structure, even though they may speak different languages and emanate from vastly different cultural environments. They all have codes of conduct and specific symbols, rituals, and modes of in-­group communication that they have created to set themselves apart from the mainstream world and to generate a sense of in-­group meaning that gives them purpose and identity. OCs are self-­styled cultural enclaves from which members draw their inspiration, pride, and sense of belonging based on the very codes and symbols that have been concocted to distinguish the OCs from everyone else. There are many OCs that fit this characterization, from street gangs such as the Norteños in California to the Mafia in Sicily, from outlaw motorcycle gangs like the Hells Angels to drug cartels, such as the Sinaloa one. One way to classify them distinctively is according to whether they have existed for a considerable period of time or have emerged in more recent times. The former can be called traditional, classical, or historical, and the latter neophyte or emergent. There are also gangs that are offshoots of the traditional ones, such as the American Cosa Nostra, which is a derivative of the original Italian Mafia gangs, developing a separate identity in America, as will be discussed subsequently. Cosa Nostra has been a veritable criminal melting pot, bringing together criminals originally descendent from Sicily, Calabria, and other regions, thus breaking with traditional membership based on ethnicity. The Mafia and Mafia-like criminal organizations are “species of a broader genus” (Varese 2001: 4). The Italian-­based criminal organizations, such as the Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta and the Camorra; the Japanese Yakuza; and the Chinese Triads are among the best known of the traditional OCs, while the Vory v Zakone

2  What is organized crime?

(sometimes called Russian Mafia by the English-­language media) and the Hells Angels are examples of neophyte OCs (gangs that emerged in more recent times). All OCs see themselves as different from common delinquents and random street thugs, operating like monopolistic businesses and corporations, albeit in an illicit fashion. They aim to obtain exclusive control over specific criminal marketplaces not only by using violence and intimidation but also by creating networks of trusts outside the gangs – lawyers, chartered accountants, brokers, bankers, bureaucrats, politicians, police officers, judges, and labor union representatives. Without them, these “species of a broader genus” would be like coffee without caffeine; that is, they would be all surface show without any potency. Their ultimate goal is power, not money, and they will do anything to get it, using all kinds of tactics, from violence to bribery and other corruption schemes. In the legitimate corporate world, money also talks, colloquially speaking, constituting the basis for gaining power over their business territory, and in society more generally. In the world of OCs, the aim is also to acquire control or power over crime territories, which constitute the main source of money for the OCs and which then, in turn, can be used to expand the power realm, thus guaranteeing more power in a vicious circle that is of great advantage to the criminal groups. This territory-­power-­money dynamic can be compressed into a formula that emblemizes the overall objective and operationality of all OCs: Territorial control = Power = Money = More power This opening chapter will provide a historical snapshot of how OCs came into existence and how they are constituted. It will also look initially at how they form self-­styled cultures as differentiated from legitimate cultural systems; this aspect allows OCs to perceive and represent themselves as parallel (and superior) cultures.

The enemy within The general prosecutor of Palermo, Sicily, Roberto Scarpinato, gave the following first-­person assessment of the pernicious effects that Mafia culture has inflicted upon Sicilians and Italians generally in a 2015 article (Scarpinato 2015: 129): The evil we are fighting out of us is also among us, inside us. Murderers and torturers do not only have the cruel and famous faces of those who got their hands dirty with blood and in popular imagination are considered monsters (from monstrum: the person who is put on display) and on whom the evil of the Mafia can be cathartically projected, and exorcized. They also have the faces of people like us, who attended the same schools, can be met in the best salons and pray to our same God, feeling they are good Christians and at peace with themselves.

What is organized crime? 3

The statement is a penetrating one, suggesting that mobsters live among us undetected, making them enormously dangerous. They do not stand out publicly as marauders, like the pirates or brigands of the past, who could be identified easily through the particular type of clothes they wore and the kinds of weapons they bore. The mobsters move about incognito, indistinguishable from everyone else. They are doubly dangerous because they are well connected within legitimate society, having established connections with people in positions of influence and power – an arrangement based on the reciprocal exchange of favors. At one time, this system of collusion was called patronage. Today we call it corruption, a quid-­pro-­quo system formed between the gangsters and city politicians, members of the police, and other upright citizens. This is why the Mafia constitutes an “evil among us,” as described insightfully by Scarpinato. As Michael Woodiwiss (2001: 62) observes, in a similar vein, corruption has always been of mutual benefit: Gangsters and the operators of illegal business helped win elections as campaign workers or financial contributors, or they helped to steal elections using fraud or intimidation. In return, politicians used their direct or indirect influence over the police and the courts to provide virtual immunity for favoured criminals, particularly those who ran or protected gambling or prostitution enterprises, and even to eliminate petty potential rivals to established entrepreneurs. As the late anti-­Mafia judge Giovanni Falcone noted in an interview (cited in Nicaso and Danesi 2013), the Mafia is perniciously powerful because “it always lived in perfect symbiosis with a myriad of protectors, accomplices, debtors of all kinds, informers, and peoples from all strata of society who have been intimidated or subjected to blackmail.” This use of corruption methods to complement and render violent criminal activities more effective is not unique to the Italian Mafia. Organized criminal groups, from the Japanese Yakuza to Russian mobsters, all employ them. As Scarpinato’s article goes on to indicate, Mafia and Mafia-like criminal organizations have always been opportunistic, manipulating political and key social players in a country and even across the globe, allowing them blend into society seamlessly. They have not arisen as a result of a struggle between the rich and the poor or between the strong versus the weak, as the legends the OCs spin about themselves would like us to believe, but rather as opportunism by a small group of wrongdoers and miscreants to benefit themselves. All OCs are opportunistic, clever, and adaptive, revealing an instinct for survival that can be called “criminal Darwinism” (to be discussed in Chapter 17). An OC group, as different from other criminals, is one that has engineered a covert connection to political and socially important players. The ability to manipulate people for self-­serving criminal reasons is one of the key features of the historical OCs, but it is becoming more and more a feature of the neophyte or emerging OCs

4  What is organized crime?

as they discover the importance of corruption for their own survival. As Scarpinato correctly asserted, the evil is indeed within us and among us. The Mafioso is no longer recognizable as a distinctive role character  – someone dressed in a black shirt, white tie, and diamond stickpin, whose activities are commonly believed to affect only a remote underworld circle of people. Today, he moves around in plain clothes  – more likely outfitted in a normal business suit, looking more like an industrialist or corporate tycoon than an old-­ fashioned Mafioso dressed in “black and white.” Lacking any regular confrontation with the gangsters, the average citizen typically fails to see any reason for alarm – Mafiosi fight among themselves, so what is the problem? But as Scarpinato so cogently argued, this is hardly the truth of the matter. The resources accumulated by the gangsters are not limited to the vast illicit profits they gain from such activities as illegal gambling schemes and the trafficking of narcotics but are bolstered considerably by their infiltration into legitimate businesses. When the corrupt infiltration is into some manufacturing enterprise, the Mafioso’s cut is paid for by higher prices for the products. When the mobsters bribe local officials and secure immunity from police arrests or investigations, an incalculable economic and moral price is paid, again, by the public. In short, organized crime affects everyone. Therefore, it cannot be the concern only of law enforcement officers. The objectives, methods, and operations of organized criminal gangs need to be understood and addressed by everyone, since they constitute an “enemy within.” Only with such broad awareness can an effective plan of defeating OCs be contemplated in the first place. Scarpinato’s characterization of organized crime was prefigured by the late Senator Robert Kennedy, who referred to La Cosa Nostra as “the enemy within.” In 1963, Kennedy warned a congressional committee about the risk of La Cosa Nostra’s infiltration into business, labor, politics, and government. He was determined to stop the drain of political power in America by obscure criminal forces that were beyond moral and legal accountability. As attorney general a little later, under his brother John F. Kennedy, he challenged the ­FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover by dismissing the operations against the so-­called “Red menace” (of Soviet Russia), cherished by Hoover as his pet project, asking him to crack down on the enemy within rather than the enemy without, which Hoover had ignored for over forty years. Kennedy was ultimately unsuccessful in eradicating the Mafia, being assassinated in 1968. The lesson to be learned from the Kennedy episode in American history is that the government alone cannot confront organized crime; it will require the cooperation of many others, as will be discussed in later chapters.

Definition In 2000, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime defined organized crime as a group of three or more people who undertake serious criminal activities in concert and in some coordinated manner for the purpose of obtaining financial or other benefits. Moreover, the group must have some

What is organized crime? 5

internal organization and have existed for some time. This definition excludes individual delinquents or groups constituted randomly and ephemerally for the transient commission of offences. A key aspect of this definition is that of historicity (perpetuity) – that is, of the criminal group existing for a period of time. Many street gangs are often born overnight and disappear almost as quickly, as the gang members move away from the streets where they congregated and operated. OCs, on the other hand, continue to exist beyond the locales in which they emerged and the first generation of members that founded them, who pass on their traditions and operations, virtually unchanged, to subsequent generations. The main methods of transmission are the self-­styled cultural systems that OCs have created for themselves and which they adapt to changing conditions, like any normal cultural system. In other words, the perpetuity of the gang rests on its ability to pass on the torch to subsequent generations. Along with the ability to adapt to significant social changes, such as those based on technology, OCs are able to constantly renew themselves internally, figuring out new ways to conduct their illegal activities that are in step with the times (as we shall see). All this enhances the esprit de corps of the group, keeping the bonds of fellowship strong no matter what. A comprehensive definition of organized crime involves several main features and aspects, which can be delineated as follows: •

OCs embed themselves into a society, forging alliances with those in positions of authority, from politicians to the police. • The previous feature is missing from random and ephemeral street gangs. Street gangs are sometimes co-­opted by the OCs to carry out some of their unpleasant activities, from intimidating people to committing actual murders. They are seen as convenient “guns for hire,” which can be easily dispensed with, if need be. An example is how the classic Mafias, like the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, are delegating their activities in the domain of narco-­trafficking to Albanian gangs – so much so that the latter are becoming in Italy an operative branch of the ’Ndrangheta. • An OC has its own culture, complete with a particular mode of communication, a code of behavior, secrecy pledges, rituals, rites of initiation, symbols, and a specified lifestyle. Without a cultural structure, the gang would simply be a group of thugs. • Gang-­based values emerge from the internal cultural artifacts, which cohere into a worldview that extols conformity and allegiance to the group from each member. All organized crime groups are distinctive because of the particular cultural systems they carve out for themselves. They are “mini-­ nations” with their own laws, languages, and even “commandments.” Random street gangs may also develop a kind of sui generis culture, with the adoption of a particular slang and set of distinctive symbols (such as tattoos), but these are short lived and not passed on to subsequent generations, with some exceptions such as the Crips and the Bloods. Both started as stand-­alone gangs in the late 1960s but have since formed a broader

6  What is organized crime?

membership network, which has given them some stability. This allowed them to gain perpetuity through subsequent generations of members. • Except for scattered female gangs, the world of OC is a macho-­male one (Chapter 8). Various theories have been put forth to explain this, as will be discussed subsequently. Suffice it to say here that the majority of OCs are composed of men and that women play subservient and obsequious roles within them, but often replace the men in a supplementary way when needed, such as when the men are in prison. Even in an era of gender equality, a double standard perseveres in criminal gangs. In some of the Mafias, however, a woman is treated respectfully and protected by the crime family, although she is still expected to tolerate the infidelity of her spouse, while prohibited from engaging in it herself, under punishment of death. There are exceptions to this, as we shall see, with women in OCs playing an increasingly important role in drug trafficking operations, money laundering, and even in organizational restructuring. In some OCs, the women are conduits between the gangs and the outside world, thus forming links with external enablers of the gangs. • A current example of the double standard is in the initiation rite of various Mexican and Central American gangs, such as Barrio 18 and MS-­13 (Mara Salvatrucha-­13). The male initiates must undergo a severe beating by the existing gang members as part of their induction rite. Women can also join, but are given three options. The first one is to endure a beating like the men; the second one is engagement in sexual relations with multiple gang members; the third option is direct entry into the gang, which applies to a woman who is the paramour or wife of a gang member and thus does not have to endure the initiation rite. The beating option is seen as the best one, however, since it is intended to reproduce the model of pseudo-­ masculinity for membership based on strength, endurance, and courage. • The OCs have remarkable ability to adapt to changes, as mentioned, including how they govern themselves and how they present themselves to society at large (as we shall see). They have spread their tentacles into the political and economic spheres of society, giving them validation, which they use to strengthen their organizations even further. • They maintain a sense of exclusivity, admitting only “valiant” members who must stand out as “men of honor” – men who do not mix in with the meaningless crowd (nuddu mbiscatu cu nenti “no mixing in with nothing,” as a Sicilian motto propounds). • They use violence strategically – that is, only if and when it is necessary to carry out their power and control plays. This implies the use of strategic violence  – that is, the promise of violence itself (through intimidation), which is more powerful and effective than actual acts of violence. • They complement their monopolistic control and governance of territories with a diversity of other activities, legitimate and not, including reinvesting their illicit money in legal ventures. The modern-­day OCs can

What is organized crime? 7

be described metaphorically as “polyhedral”; that is, unlike the past, they have many sides to their operations and to their modes of governance. Another defining characteristic of OCs is the requirement of allegiance by every member to the group and its leadership. In return, the gang member receives the unconditional protection of the group. Membership might thus instill the illusion of invulnerability in a member, encouraging him to take extraordinary risks and to rationalize warnings and potential danger signs. Overall, the allegiance factor is intended to inculcate several behaviors and attitudes, including the following: • • • • •

•

•

•

consensus on key gang issues must be unanimous among all members; the broader ethical implications of what the gang does must be ignored; hostility to outsiders is expected and often enacted with violence; straying from the group’s belief system must be punished in some way, including killing a member if it is deemed necessary; avoidance of speaking out against the leader or his actions is compulsory, unless the leader is found to be inadequate and is thus removed either by internal politics or by outright expulsion – as in any human group, internal wars might determine the process of succession; the leader must always be protected, even if it means losing one’s life over it, at least in principle if not in fact; communications with the leader are restricted to selected members as a way to protect him from exposure to varying perceptions of his role; gang symbolism (tattoos, scars, etc.) and modes of communication (gestures, slang, etc.) must be adopted uncontested; in the case of tattoos, some of the classic OCs, like the Yakuza, are using them less and less for various reasons (as will be discussed subsequently), and the traditional Italian Mafias have always prohibited their use as demeaning and undignified for men of honor; patrolling a turf is seen as central to the member’s obligations.

Overall, there are nine distinguishing features that characterize criminal organizations, traditional and neophyte.

Essential features of OCs 1 Membership: Three or more. 2 Gender: Usually male. 3 Goal: To commit serious crimes in concert with the overall objective of attaining prestige and power. 4 Perpetuity: OCs pass on their traditions and operational structure to subsequent generations of members.

8  What is organized crime?

5 Corrupt (and Strategic) Alliances: OCs form corrupt associations with government authorities, police, and other officials for mutual benefit. 6 Culture: OCs develop and pass on their own cultural systems, including specialized communications, symbolic practices, and codes of conduct. 7 Allegiance: Members take oaths of allegiance to the leader and the other group members, binding them indefinitely to the group. 8 Strategic Violence: Violence is never random; it is carried out physically when absolutely necessary; strategic (psychological) violence is used instead because it is effective in keeping victims in a state of fear (Chapter 11). 9 Territorial Control: Ensuring control over territories is crucial to sustaining organized criminal groups. Antonino Calderone, a former Sicilian Mafia boss, who turned state witness, described the Mafia as follows: “We are the worst of all, and not so much because we have sworn in, but because we are the elite of organized crime; we are far superior to common delinquents” (cited in Arlacchi 1993). Another Sicilian Mafia informant, Tommaso Buscetta, characterized the organization from which he had distanced himself during his trial in Palermo in 1986 with the following words: “The Mafia is not just a criminal gang. The police combat its criminal side, but the Mafia is much more – it is based on criminality + intelligence + omertà (honor)” (translation ours, from the transcripts of the Maxi-­ Trial of Palermo, 1986). As the quotes reveal explicitly, an OC is perceived by the members themselves as more than a group of thugs  – they see it as something “elite,” as Buscetta further remarked. This perception enhances the perpetuity factor of the criminal organization, allowing them to transmit their culture and traditions to subsequent generations as something unique and special. However, the OCs can also disappear for various reasons. An example is the Markham Gang, which was once one of Canada’s largest criminal groups established after the Rebellion of 1837, composed of a diverse admixture of farmers, loyalists, and commoners. The gang had the key attributes of an OC (above). For example, they took an oath of secrecy and pledged to support the brotherhood wholeheartedly. The leaders were those with more seniority than others. Their crimes ranged from theft and extortion to murder, acting upon their plans in systematic non-­random ways. They became a fearsome gang, intimidating victims, concealing their crimes cleverly, and manipulating authority figures by corruption and by protecting each other at all costs. But the gang did not survive. It disbanded after the arrest and death of its leader because it had no mechanism for passing the leadership on, leading to internal disorder. The foregoing discussion does not imply that subsequent generations of gang members remain exactly like their predecessors. Living in an ever-­changing world, they are attuned to the emerging new lifestyles and social attitudes that

What is organized crime? 9

change brings about. The new generations of criminals today are computer natives and, in some cases, have a high degree of computer savvy. While they might accept many of the traditions of their gangs, they bring with them new ideas and criminal methods based on new social realities and new technologies. Millennial mobsters are therefore not changing the structures of organized crime radically; they are shaping them to fit the realities of the Internet age, as we will discuss in subsequent chapters. The traditional criminal organizations were rigid and ethnocentric. Today, they have loosened their membership criteria somewhat, even though ethnicity still persists as a membership criterion – that is, it is unlikely that a non-­Japanese individual will join the Yakuza or a non-­Sicilian the Mafia. Moreover, the highest echelons of the leadership still remain open primarily to those with the correct ethnicity.

Terminology and legal views There are a number of terms used commonly to refer to specific OCs, such as the Yakuza, the Triads, the ’Ndrangheta, and so on. The term Mafia is often employed to refer to OCs in general – the American Mafia, the Chinese Mafia, the Albanian Mafia, and so on. Originally, this term was restricted to the OC group that was founded and still operates in Sicily, Italy. Perhaps because the Sicilian Mafia is among the most well known globally, the term Mafia has become a moniker for OCs in general. It is now a synonym for organized crime, unfairly stigmatizing the Sicilians who are just one of many OCs but who were etched into the public imagination by Hollywood and American television, as we shall see. The Godfather (1972) in particular promoted the American Mafia (or La Cosa Nostra) as the prototype criminal organization – a stereotype that has hardly disappeared even in today’s in radically changed technological world.

Specific names of organized criminal groups • • •

•

Calabrian ’Ndrangheta: also known as the Calabrian Mafia, originated in Calabria, Italy, in the nineteenth century and has spread worldwide since the 1950s. It is still based in Calabria, however. Sicilian Mafia: known simply as the Mafia, it originated in Sicily in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries and continues to have its primary roots there. Neapolitan Camorra: the third major and the oldest Italian OC, it is based in the city of Naples but spreading to communities in other parts of Campania (the region where Naples is located) and worldwide as well (as we shall see). Chinese Triads: organized crime syndicate originating in mainland China but now based in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao and

10  What is organized crime?

• •

•

•

•

•

spreading to the United States and other countries with large Chinese immigrant communities, where they blend in with the Tongs and other gangs, such as the Big Circle Boys in the Canadian province of British Columbia. Japanese Yakuza: criminal organization which traces its origins to itinerant peddlers and gamblers in medieval Japan, even though it brags of descendancy from the samurai warriors. Drug Cartels: neophyte OCs located mainly in Mexico, Colombia, and other parts of Latin America, whose main criminal activity is the illegal drug trade. In some areas, they are so powerful that they have morphed into paramilitary organizations. Eastern European Organized Crime Groups: term referring to a collectivity of criminal organizations based in Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Chechnya, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and so on. Some of the groups, such as the Vory v Zakone, originated in the previous Soviet Union. (La) Cosa Nostra (American Mafia): term used to refer to the Mafia in America, meaning “our thing,” but the term has also been cycled back into Sicily, where the terms Mafia and Cosa Nostra have become virtually synonymous. Irish Mob: OC originating in the United States on the East Coast in the early nineteenth century in Irish communities; it was ironically exported to Ireland only in the 1960s. In some cities, the Irish Mob has adopted names with territorial references, such as the West End Gang in Montreal. Hells Angels: outlaw biker gang started in 1948 in California that has gradually spread throughout the United States and the world. Along with the Pagans, Banditos, and Outlaws, the Hells Angels are part of an outlaw gang culture that values a publicly open form of operation and movement. The gang is particularly adaptive to changes, restricting their use of conspicuous symbols and dress codes (vests, jackets) primarily to “official functions” (bike runs, funerals, etc.).

There are a host of colloquial terms for referring to OCs, including the mob, the gang, the racketeers, the ring, the syndicate, the outfit, among others. In their 1915 report, the Chicago City Council Committee on Crime used the term dips to refer to professional criminals who have developed the ability to escape from detection, by collusion or connivance, or incompetence of the police, by the work of the professional fixer; by the pressure of political influence; by the inactivity and incompetence of prosecutors; the spineless attitude of some judges, or by some loophole of escape in the mazes of criminal law. (Merriam 1915: 164)

What is organized crime? 11

In the report, there are several instances of the terms mob and gang. The network of the gangsters and alliances is popularly called the underworld  – a metaphor that derives from the term for the mythical abode of the dead, under the earth. This image is an appropriate one, since the OCs, which have always lived in this underworld, now inhabit (and are actively exploring) a new type of underworld – the Dark Net (as will be discussed). The migration of crime to the Internet has led to the coinage of a new term – transnational organized crime (TOC)  – defined as organized crime that involves the cooperation of various gangs and criminals across national borders, planning and executing illegal business ventures in concert through the Internet, forging collaborations in the new geopolitical climate brought about by the global economy and softer borders. The term also refers to crimes that are planned in one state but carried out in another or crimes in one state committed by groups that have their operational base in another state. But the main tactics of OCs remain unchanged. Like the traditional OCs, TOCs use strategic violence and corruption to obtain their goals. It is important to emphasize the distinction between organized crime and conventional crime. The latter does not require membership in an organizational structure nor the adoption of codes of various kinds; it simply involves carrying out illegal activities revolving around money, usually perpetrated by individuals (robbers, thieves, fraudsters, etc.). While money is essential to the operations of OCs and is obtained as well with violence and fear tactics, their ultimate goal is power, not money. The OCs see themselves as ersatz nation-­ states with their own military, rules of conduct, and norms. They seek to exercise control over people and their territories. They are on a “power trip,” to use a cliché. Therefore, the OCs do not conform to the legal notion of mens rea, or the intention to do something criminal, nor to the juridical concept of “consciousness of guilt.” They hardly perceive their acts as criminal – they see them instead as part of their business operations. In most law systems, four main types of crime are identified: 1 Offences against the person (assaults, injurious acts, fraud, abuse of all kinds, etc.) 2 Violent offences (assaults that are highly injurious, including murder, manslaughter, etc.) 3 Sexual offences (assaults involving sexual violence, sexual abuse, etc.) 4 Offences against property (burglary, larceny, arson, etc.) Any or all of these categories apply to individuals who commit illegal acts, but they do not apply in the same way to OCs. First, OCs do not engage in sexual offences as defined by the law; in some OCs, such as the Sicilian Mafia, those who engage in sexual violence are seen as despicable. The OCs commit offences against property but only if their victims of extortion do not comply with their demands or if the property’s damage is part of the enactment of some

12  What is organized crime?

revenge scheme or else utilized as a tactic to get victims of extortion to comply with demands. In effect, the violence used by OCs has a specific strategic objective – to settle debts, to back up their protection rackets, to settle internal disputes among members, to resolve territorial harangues with other gangs, and so on. In all cases, there is no mens rea, since the OCs see themselves as above the law, having developed their own rules and norms of conduct. The term Mafia has been used broadly in society and especially in popular culture, evoking a whole range of contrasting social perceptions, from xenophobic ones to the worship of mobsters as celebrities. In early America, the term was used as a dog whistle against specific ethnic groups, such as immigrant Italians, who were described as “dangerous fraternities whose members for generations have been and are addicted to criminal pursuits” (Lampe 2016: 17). In 1896, it was used to describe the collusion between city officials and brothel owners in Manhattan by the chairman of the New York Society for the Prevention of Crime, the Reverend Charles Parkhurst. That era marked the beginning of a repressive reform movement that succeeded shortly after the passage of the Prohibition laws – laws making the manufacture and sale of alcohol, especially between 1920 and 1933, illegal (Gilfoyle 1994: 406). Parkhurst’s expression “dangerous fraternities” was a euphemism for Mafia, harboring xenophobic undertones. To this day, the term Mafia evokes an unconscious bias against Italians. Even if the times have changed somewhat, and Italians are less and less subjected to negative stereotyping, when grouped together under the term Mafia, residues of bias surface. The point is that OCs are not seen simply as criminal gangs but as representing race and ethnicity.

Prohibition Prohibition is a general term referring to legislation and social measures undertaken to prohibit the manufacture, sale, and distribution of alcohol in the United States. Between 1880 and World War I  in 1914, many American states adopted local-­option laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol. In 1913, Congress passed the Webb-­Kenyon Act, which forbade the mailing or shipping of liquor into any state that banned alcohol. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, most Americans considered Prohibition an appropriate patriotic sacrifice. It was the National Prohibition Act, known as the Volstead Act, ratified in January of 1919, which established Prohibition throughout the United States starting in 1920. The act made it obvious that there was an ongoing cultural war going on in the country at the time, which pitted Protestants against Catholics (and other religious groups), religion against secularism (church versus saloons), countryside versus city life, and so on. It also provided a legal instrument to combat “otherness” – anyone who

What is organized crime? 13

was not Protestant, white, Anglo-­American and not a promoter of the “sober” life, which was perceived as being threatened by immigrants and young people who indulged in a secular lifestyle that was perceived to be as dangerous as the immigrants. Despite Prohibition, many Americans ignored the national ban and drank alcoholic beverages in private or in night spots called speakeasies. The alcohol was supplied by networks of bootleggers who were part of organized crime gangs. Actually, the first recorded use of the term speakeasy goes back to an article in the Pittsburgh Dispatch, June 30, 1889:

14  What is organized crime?

Prohibition was eventually abolished in 1933. Those who were responsible for Prohibition claimed that alcohol damaged health and, more importantly, corrupted moral behavior, as well as fostering poverty. But there were hidden motives at play. One of these was xenophobia. Some felt that the large numbers of recent immigrants to America, especially the Italians and the Irish, would become more “American” if their drinking habits were changed. Another was religious zealotry. Many religious denominations taught that drinking alcohol was immoral. Similar laws were passed in Canada in the same era  – called temperance acts. The exception was in the province of Quebec, whose citizens rejected it in a referendum by 78.62%. As Klaus von Lampe (2016: 23) observes, it was during Prohibition in the 1920s that “organized crime no longer referred to an amorphous ‘criminal class’ but to ‘gangsters and racketeers’ who were organized in ‘gangs,’ ‘syndicates,’ and ‘criminal organizations,’ following ‘big master criminals’ who functioned as ‘powerful leaders’ of organized crime.” It was also in that era that mobsters became pop culture icons, gaining celebrity status through newspaper coverage, movies, and radio programs. In that era, the name of Chicago mobster Al Capone became as well known as that of any movie star. A sui generis “Mafia culture” had crystallized in America that paralleled celebrity culture. Prohibition was thus a springboard for launching organized crime in America in an era when a “subsistence economy” was giving way to a “wealth-­capital-­ based economy,” that is, from an economy that allowed people to subsist to one that was based on the profit motive. In Europe, this shift had coincided with the advent of contraband activities connected with tobacco products produced abroad, which provided one of the first opportunities for the different Mafias to enter into advantageous collaborations. To this day, contraband activities produce enough wealth for the traditional OCs (especially in Italy) so that they can invest in other areas, such as internantional drug trafficking. The term Mafia was permanently ensconced into American groupthink during the hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Operations, chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, from May 1950 to May 1951, which were held in more than a dozen cities and were televised across the nation. Kefauver even made it to the cover of Time magazine. The Committee was among the first to connect organized crime to popular culture, pointing out that “Through the medium of television, the citizens of the country for the first time had it driven home to them with dramatic and startling impact that top-­ranking hoodlums and underworld leaders were in their midst and were not story-­book characters” (Kefauver Committee, August 31, 1951). The mobsters called to testify were mainly Italian Americans. As James Finckenauer (in Cressey 2008: xiii) aptly remarks, the Committee “served to

What is organized crime? 15

confirm in at least some people’s mind that organized crime was some kind of alien conspiracy of foreigners colluding against hard working Americans.” Similarly, Dick Hobbs and Georgios Antonopoulos (2013: 44) argue that the “alien conspiracy” perspective became a means to attack or blame the foreign-­ born “Other” for endemic social ills while failing to acknowledge the fact that homespun organized crime existed outside the ethnic communities. The Kefauver Committee described the Mafia as a secret conspiracy with a centralized organization, capable of using violence and corruption to achieve profit. In 1962, Joe Valachi, a small-­time drug dealer and low-­ranking soldier of the Genovese Family of New York City, became an informer to the police, testifying in 1963 before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the US Senate Committee, headed by Arkansas Senator John McClellan, which concluded that the infiltration of the American Mafia, called La Cosa Nostra (“our thing”), posed a serious threat to the economy of America. As a result, in 1970, the Congress passed the Racketeering Influence Corruption Organization Act, better known as RICO. In its statement of finding and purpose, the Act reads as follows (cited in Wynn and Anderson 1982: 10): The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-­gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-­gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.

16  What is organized crime?

It is interesting to note that in Italy, where the Sicilian Mafia originated, it was not until 1982 that the Italian parliament passed its first anti-­Mafia legislation with provisions on the seizure and confiscation of criminal gains. Before that, the Italian Criminal Code contained reference only to an “unlawful association” whose purpose was to commit crimes – a legal notion that goes back to the 1588 Papal Bull of Pope Sixtus V, which defined crime as an act of association, for the first time, as a way to counteract the rise of the Huguenots – a French Protestant group who suffered persecution at the hands of the different papacies. The legislation marked a turning point in the fight against organized crime in Italy, stipulating that a Mafia-­type unlawful association is said to exist when the participants take advantage of the intimidating power of the association and of the resulting conditions of submission and silence to commit criminal offences, to manage, either directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorizations, public contracts and services, to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for others, or with a view to prevent or limit the freedom to vote, or to get votes for themselves or for others on the occasion of an election. (cited in Carnevale, Forlati and Giolo 2017: 319) From the outset, Mafiosi were perceived as different from ordinary criminals. In the United States and Canada, they became scapegoats for national social ills, as mentioned. Mafiosi became legends of sorts as a result. In Canada, the classic example of this can be found in the story of Rocco Perri, Canada’s most famous bootlegger.

Rocco Perri (1887–1953?)

Figure 1.2  Mug shot in the 1920s

What is organized crime? 17

Prohibition enabled organized crime groups to establish themselves deeply in the social substratum of the United States and Canada. The classic example is that of Rocco Perri, who took advantage of Prohibition to accumulate great wealth through bootlegging. Perri had immigrated to the United States from Calabria in 1908, moving almost immediately to Canada as a struggling immigrant, obtaining work in construction and in a bakery. By September of 1916, when Prohibition laws were coming into effect, Perri and his common-­law wife, Bessie Starkman, became involved in selling liquor illegally across Ontario and to various parts of the United States, where he was named the “King of the Bootleggers.” The police turned a blind eye, since many of them were bribed by Perri. Eventually, Perri was charged with perjury and served five months in prison. In 1940, Perri was arrested and sent to internment at Camp Petawawa as part of Canada’s discriminatory reaction against Italians in Canada during World War II. He disappeared on April 23, 1944, when he went for a walk. However, a letter written in 1949 by Perri to his relatives in Calabria indicated that he was still alive. After a long period of silence, relatives of the gangster revealed in 1992 that he had moved to Mexico in 1944 where he died of a heart attack in 1953. It is said that he came back to Canada several times in that period dressed as a woman. His body was never found (Nicaso 2004). As Hollywood and the media became more and more fascinated by the Mafiosi during Prohibition, the perception of the men as “dangerous others” started to change, catapulting some of the more (in)famous gangsters into the celebrity spotlight. But even so, the subtext in the representations still harbored residues of xenophobia and ethnic bias – as will be discussed. The Mafia evolved early on in America to something larger than a mere a criminal consortium – it was inserted into a narrative of celebrity that is being told in different media to this day. Therefore, the role of popular culture cannot be understated in crafting the image of Mafia culture as an attractive parallel culture in America. It has become what Bill James (2011) calls a “popular crime culture,” in which Mafiosi are primary iconic figures and actors.

Generic characterization Criminologist Federico Varese (2001) compiled 115 definitions of organized crime, from 1915 to 2009, consulting official documents and dictionaries. As a result, Varese was able to provide a generic characterization of OCs in terms of several categories, which can be used to summarize the foregoing discussion in this chapter: 1 Structure: organized, continuous, typically hierarchical; it involves restrictive membership, and its activities are specialized; there are internal

18  What is organized crime?

2 3 4 5 6 7

codes and rules; crimes are carried out by planning and coordination; a network of members is established; the criminal activities are seen as part of an enterprise; flexibility in operations is sometimes involved; patron-­client relations are seen as key; an internal system of power is established. Activities: include provision of illegal goods and services, extortion, theft, fraud, and so on. Means: violence, corruption, graft. Goals: power, profit. Effects: harm. Others: outsiders are seen as competitors in the case of rival gangs or as useful in the case of corrupt officials. Non-­Ideological: OCs do not subscribe to any specific political or social ideology; they are self-­contained criminal cultures.

The category non-­ideological differentiates OCs from terrorist and subversive groups banded together for political, social, or various other ideological reasons (Collins 2010; Zubrzycki 2015). OCs have two main objectives, as mentioned throughout this chapter – power and money. They do not harbor or espouse any ideologically based political or religious agenda. This distinction is key in identifying and distinguishing between the two types of groups. The non-­ideological category also differentiates OCs from cults, which are religious-­based groups, devoted to a guru-­type leader, and committed to observing his teachings and practices. Cults range in size from a few followers to worldwide organizations directed by a complex chain of command. There are some structural similarities between these groups and OCs, nonetheless. For instance, both cult leaders and Mafia capi claim to possess truth exclusively. They both command absolute obedience and allegiance from followers, expecting the female members to be subservient, to accept arranged marriage agreements, and so on, although this is changing, as we shall see, with the women today being less and less servile than their predecessors (Chapter 8). Howard Abadinsky (2016: 3) also provides a useful characterization of OCs, identifying key attributes such as the following: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

An OC, traditional or neophyte, has no political goals. It is typically hierarchical (with a leader at the top). It has a limited or exclusive membership. It constitutes a unique subculture. It operates through its own rules and codes. It exhibits a willingness to use violence. It is monopolistic, ruling specific territories or turfs exclusively. It perpetuates itself by passing on its organizational features to subsequent generations.

What is organized crime?

19

The attribute of subculture requires further commentary, especially in the case of street gangs, such as the ones in California, which emerge from rife social situations characterized by disorganization and failing social relations. In such cases, the term is an appropriate one, since these gangs provide an outlet to dispossessed youth for the pursuit of material gains, an escape from fragile societal structures and environments, and a sense of belonging to something meaningful – all characteristics of a subculture (to be discussed subsequently). On the other hand, traditional OCs see themselves as parallel cultures to the mainstream, not as hiding from it as a subculture. The difference is an important one, as we shall see throughout this book.

Organized criminal groups versus terrorist groups As just discussed, OCs are utilitarian and non-ideological; terrorist groups are instead ideological and might espouse martyrdom to achieve their objectives. Both groups, however, display a similar type of contempt for society – terrorist groups actually seek to undermine, overthrow, and even destroy governments and institutions; criminal organizations are instead motivated by a thirst for power and money, manipulating the porosity of society by corrupting officials, penetrating policy forums, and weakening institutions. Terrorist groups stay completely away from those they abhor, seeing themselves as an avenging army involved in a cultural-religious war (Zubrzycki 2015: 54). Criminal organizations avoid political partisanship and involvement in political processes altogether; their interest is in corrupting individuals in institutions so that they can plant their roots deeply into society. They will thus give their support to any

20  What is organized crime?

candidate during elections, regardless of political stripe, as long as they can reap benefits from the association. To reiterate, the Mafias are enemies within, as Scarpinato so aptly remarked; terrorist groups are enemies without. The latter will use digital platforms as channels to proliferate their rhetoric to the world as well as to establish alliances in the political and private arenas (Fernández 2009: 613). OCs use the Internet instead to enhance and plan their criminal activities – not to promote themselves as distinct entities.

Terrorism Terrorism is defined as the use of violence for political or religious purposes during peacetime. The term originated during the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century, gaining international currency in the 1970s from the conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and Palestine. Terrorist groups include religious fanatics, right-­wing and left-­wing political organizations, nationalist groups, and various revolutionaries. When terrorism is perpetrated by nation states, it falls into a gray definitional area, since there is no consensus as to whether it should be regarded as such. A method of violence used by terrorists that sets them apart from the Mafias is the suicide attack, which is any violent attack whereby the attacker accepts his (or her) own death in order to damage or destroy the target. Suicide attacks have occurred throughout history, often as part of military campaigns, but more recently they have become part of terrorist tactics, such as the 9/11 attacks. Terrorists use the media, and especially the Internet, for self-­serving purposes, seeking to both advertise their objectives and to spread fear with images of massacres, slaughters, and mass executions. Some actions on the part of Mafiosi have bordered on terrorism. For example, the Corleonesi clan of the Mafia, headed by Totò Riina in the 1980s and 1990s, undertook terrorist attacks against the state, especially in Palermo, which included the brutal assassinations of the anti-­Mafia judge Giovanni Falcone and prosecuting magistrate Paolo Borsellino in 1992. This was declared a subversive act by the government, not just a criminal act. Most of the members of the clan were arrested, some of whom died in prison and others of whom became state witnesses. There is a current ongoing investigation on the possible collusion between the clan and public officials, which is revealing how much corruption continues to be a part of Mafia operations – the enemy within is still a dangerous and powerful one.

What is organized crime? 21

Despite such fundamental differences, some criminologists and police agencies prefer to treat the two – OCs and terrorist organizations – as a singular menace to society (D’Alfonso 2014). As Frank S. Perri, Terrance G. Lichtenwald, and Paula M. MacKenzie (2009: 16) argue, the “war against terrorism cannot be separated from the fight against organized crime.” To promote their own specific agendas, the two groups have actually formed sinister alliances for mutual benefit, sharing their expertise and networks to enhance the realization of their own particular agendas.

Case in point: Narcoterrorism in Afghanistan The association between OCs and terrorist groups is evident today in the trafficking of illicit drugs – a relationship that comes under the rubric of international narcoterrorism, defined, at one level, as the use of narcotics trafficking to influence the policies of a government or a society through violence and intimidation and, at another level, to hinder the enforcement of anti-­drug laws by the systematic threat or use of such violence. An example is the situation in Afghanistan, where terrorist groups, narcoterrorists, and drug cartels work in partnership. The drug trade itself is controlled largely by the cartels, which are allowed to operate by the terrorist groups in the country. A considerable financial share of the earnings from the drug cartels is then given to the terrorists and corrupt military commanders and administrators, allowing them to influence local and national politics. There is acquiescence on the part of the authorities, given that the drug trade in Afghanistan amounts to over one-­third of its economy. The terrorists have also themselves evolved into drug lords, taxing and protecting poppy farmers to finance their activities, which allows the farmers to survive. The organized crime gangs are the worldwide distributors of the drugs, forming a key cog of the cooperative system. In effect, the tacit partnership between OCs and terrorist groups, even though they do not share the same objectives, is of substantial benefit to both. The former are experts at trafficking drugs, procuring weaponry and fraudulent documents, laundering money, and so on; their spoils are used by the latter to help them carry out their own ideological agenda. As the Italian expression goes, in this case “una mano lava l’altra” (“one hand washes the other” = “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”). A  concrete example of this occurred in July  2020 when Italian police discovered 14 tons of amphetamines in three containers in the port of the city of Salerno in southwestern Italy. In the cache, there were 84 million pills labeled as Captagon, the epithet symbol for the “drugs of the Jihad,”

22  What is organized crime?

that is, of terrorist groups, such as Isis/Daesh, who rely on the peddling of synthetic drugs to finance their activities. These are produced mainly in Syria, which has become the foremost producer of illegal amphetamines in the world. Captagon is trafficked throughout the Middle East where it is popular among both the fighters and civilians because it energizes the body. The value of the pills discovered at the Salerno port was estimated to be more than one billion Euros. The drugs were likely intended for the clans of the ’Ndrangheta, the Mafia, and the Camorra; they were hidden in industrial paper cylinders, manufactured in Germany, that were able to avoid detection by scanners. Two weeks prior, at the same port, a container of counterfeit clothing items was found to contain 2800 kilograms of hashish and 1909 kilograms of Captagon amphetamines (Gratteri and Nicaso 2020: 100–102).

As with any modern-­day corporation or business, it is more efficient for a terrorist group to outsource some tasks to organizations that have the experience and resources to carry them out quickly and well – and that is where the OCs step in to form alliances with terrorist groups. Organized crime and terror groups will thus put their diverging objectives aside for pragmatic mutual benefit. This may involve such tasks as consultation on how to launder money, where the best bomb-­making devices can be obtained, how to get access to a monopolized asset, and so on. In return, the OCs are given a monopoly over the assets or markets that are in the hands of the terrorists (D’Alfonso 2014). Overall, the Mafiosi and the political terrorists may have different motives for their operations, but they are not averse to cooperation. Both finance themselves with the illegal narcotics trade and collaborate in carrying it out. Police agencies have discovered that those who deal with narcotics trafficking often utilize the services of middle men who have ties to terrorist groups, using hawala, a system for transferring money used in Muslim society whereby the money is paid to an agent who then tells an associate to pay the final recipient. In this way, the gains of narcotics trafficking are passed on from one continent to another to the benefit of both the gangsters and the terrorists.

Parallel cultures A central goal of OCs is to create and maintain an autonomous pseudo-­culture, with its own codes of conduct, requirements for membership, symbolism, pledges of allegiance, shared values, special communication techniques, and the like. This creates a mystique, deflecting critiques of malfeasance and banditry away from the OC, assigning an ersatz legitimacy to it. As Paul Lunde

What is organized crime? 23

(2004: 11) has emphasized, it is the “mystique” that guarantees the stability and perpetuity of the gang: Organized crime, however defined, shares a few basic characteristics, whatever the differences among individual groups and the cultures that produced them. They have in common: durability over time, diversified interests, hierarchical structure, capital accumulation, reinvestment, access to political protection, and the use of violence to protect their interests. Successful organized crime groups each have their own mystique, ensuring solidarity and loyalty through shared ethnicity, kinship, or allegiance to a code of behavior. A basic technique for creating and ensconcing the mystique is to mythologize the origins of the gang. The stories that Mafiosi invent about themselves and their mystical origins (as will be subsequently discussed) are designed to generate reverence, pride, and respect for the gang itself – a mystique bolstered by pop culture, through films like The Godfather (1972), which have crafted a mythic image of the Mafioso as a man of honor and respect, who traces his origins to chivalric traditions. In effect, OCs constitute parallel cultures, as pointed out several times previously. They see their lineage as representing a “parallel evolution” to the evolution of the mainstream culture in which they exist. This term comes from biology, where it is defined as the development of a trait in species that are not closely related but that share an attribute in response to similar evolutionary processes. It is used here in a modified, yet analogous, way to describe the evolution of a parallel culture, that is, of a distinct culture – the Mafia culture – that might share original traits with the mainstream culture but has evolved its own responses to the same social-­evolutionary processes. The same term is used by Lord and Strietska-­Ilina (2001) to describe cultural divisions in certain societies that operate in tandem, such as the Catholic and Protestant cultures in Ireland. In the case of OCs, the term can be refined to allude to a pseudo-­culture created by the gangs to set themselves apart from the mainstream culture while at the same time living within it. Some criminologists refer to OCs as subcultures (as mentioned previously). But this is more applicable to describing the type of street gangs that surfaced in deprived urban areas around the middle part of the twentieth century (see Hebdige 1979 for a comprehensive treatment of the notion of subculture). As Irving Spergel (1995: 55) also argues, the term subculture is more appropriate in describing the temporary youth gangs that spring up mainly in urban centers motivated by “Large-­scale social, economic, cultural, and political as well as local forces [that] generate different patterns of poverty and social disorganization. These together, interactively, create distinctive subcultures.” As the members of gang subcultures age or move to other areas, becoming exposed to greater opportunities outside of criminal life, the subcultures dissipate. As Kubrin and Weitzer (2003: 380) have aptly pointed out, youth gangs emerge in

24  What is organized crime?

socially disorganized neighborhoods where “some residents, who lack conventional opportunities for economic advancement and status attainment, embrace unconventional values and pursue alternative routes to gaining status and prestige, which may include criminal acts.” In contrast, organized criminal groups are not necessarily tied to these conditions; they emerge for various other reasons (as we shall see), not from conditions of social disorganization or lack of privilege.

Gelder’s characterization of subcultures One of the most widely used characterizations of subcultures is the one by Ken Gelder (2007), who distinguishes them from countercultures and parallel cultures in terms of level of immersion into mainstream society. Subcultures withdraw from the mainstream, acting below it, even though in the area of work, members might engage with the mainstream in a superficial way. Gelder lists several main ways in which members of subcultures can be identified: 1 They often display negative relations to common work situations and their related ethics, seeing themselves as different from co-­workers. 2 The demonstrate negative or ambivalent relations to the existent class system – that is, they are not class conscious and do not subscribe to the traditional class definitions. In effect, they do not see themselves as part of any specific class. 3 They locate themselves, physically and metaphorically, in specific territories (the “street,” the “hood,” the “club,” etc.). 4 Members might move out of the home and into non-­domestic social enclaves, which become substitutes for the family. 5 They endorse and enact different lifestyles, including the use of a specific slang, hand gestures, clothing, music preferences, and so on. 6 They reconstruct their identity on the basis of the subculture’s values. 7 They refuse the banalities of ordinary life and massification. 8 They develop an internal relational hierarchy in an informal way. Roles emerge through actions and events, not through assignments or by induction ceremonies.

As anthropologist Francis A. J. Ianni (1974: 14–15) has observed, an OC is “an organization of individuals who produce or supply those goods and services, and corrupt public officials who protect such individuals for their own profit or gain.” As such, it acts independently of mainstream cultures. But the era of the Internet

What is organized crime? 25

is affecting this overall status of OCs as independent, parallel cultures. With the globalization of international markets and of cyber-­criminality, the traditional Mafias might be seen as risking their traditional organization, which is predicated on social relations, within and outside the clan, more than market dynamics. So, the traditional models of organized crime may no longer be apt ones today. On the other hand, as we shall see, OCs have not disappeared but rather migrated to cyberspace, and taken advantage of the global market economy, where they have reconstituted themselves without losing their sense of identity. As Michael D. Lyman and Gary W. Potter (2009: 9) put it, the reason the OCs have adapted to the new technological world so easily is because of the promise of great profits to be garnered with “new computer and communication technology, massively expanded air transportation services, and instantaneous electronic banking services,” which ensures them access to “illegal goods and services . . . anywhere in the world.” So, while the territorial reach of the Mafias has stretched out considerably, the power dynamic described at the beginning of this chapter, Territorial control = Power = Money = More power, is still the operative one; without actual territories, the Mafias would not be able to realize their objectives easily. As the French expression goes, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose (“the more it changes, the more it is the same”).

References Abadinsky, Howard (2016). Organized Crime. Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publishing. Arlacchi, Pino (1993). Men of Dishonor: Inside the Sicilian Mafia. An Account of Antonino Calderone. New York: William Morrow. Carnevale, Stefania, Forlati, Serena and Giolo, Orsetta (eds.) (2017). Redefining Organised Crime: A Challenge for the European Union? Portland: Hart Publishing. Collins, Alan (2010). Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cressey, Donald (2008). Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized Crime in America. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. D’Alfonso, Steven (2014). A Look at Why Organized Crime and Terror Groups Are Converging. Security Intelligence. https://securityintelligence.com/why-­organized-­crime-­and-­terror-­ groups-­are-­converging/. Fernández, Luciana M. (2009). Organized Crime and Terrorism: From the Cells Towards Political Communication, a Case Study. Terrorism and Political Violence 21: 595–616. Gelder, Ken (2007). Subcultures: Cultural Histories and Social Practice. London: Routledge. Gilfoyle, Timothy J. (1994). City of Eros New York City Prostitution and the Commercialization of Sex, 1790–1920. New York: Norton & Company. Gratteri, Nicola and Nicaso, Antonio (2020). Ossigeno illegale. Milano: Mondadori. Hebdige, Dick (1979). Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London: Routledge. Hobbs, Dick and Antonopoulos, Giorgios A. (2013). Endemic to the Species: Ordering the ‘Other’ via Organised Crime. Global Crime 14: 27–51. Ianni, Frank (1974). Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime. Journal of Criminal Justice 2: 272–274. James, Bill (2011). Popular Crime: Reflections on the Celebration of Violence. New York: Scribner.

26  What is organized crime? Kefauver, Estes (1951). U.S. Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Kefauver Committee Final Report, 31 August. https://www.senate.gov/ about/powers-­procedures/investigations/kefauver.htm. Kubrin, Charis E. and Weitzer, Ronald (2003). New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 40: 374–402. Lampe, Klaus von (2016). Organized Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures, and Extra-­Legal Governance. Los Angeles: Sage. Lord, Christopher and Strietska-­Ilina, Olga (2001). Parallel Cultures: Majority/Minority Relations in the Countries of the Former Eastern Bloc. New York: Routledge. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Lyman, Michael D. and Potter, Gary W. (2009). Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. Merriam, Charles E. (1915). Report of the City Council Committee on Crime of the City of Chicago. Chicago: H. G. Adair. Nicaso, Antonio (2004). Rocco Perri: The Story of Canada’s Most Notorious Bootlegger. Toronto: Wiley. Nicaso, Antonio and Danesi, Marcel (2013). Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Perri, Frank S., Lichtenwald, Terrance G. and MacKenzie, Paula M. (2009). Evil Twins: The Crime-­Terror Nexus. The Forensic Examiner 18: 16–29. Scarpinato, Roberto (2015). Focus on the Mafia’s Thinking Mindset. World Futures 71: 125–136. Spergel, Irving A. (1995). The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat. New York: The United Nations. Varese, Federico (2001). The Russian Mafia. New York: Oxford University Press. Woodiwiss, Michael (2001). Organized Crime and American Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Wynn, Simon and Anderson, Nancy (1982). Organized Crime, RICO, and the Media: What We Think We Know. Federal Probation 46: 9–13. Zubrzycki, Waldemar (2015). Similarities and Differences Between Organized Crime. Internal Security 7: 53–70.

Chapter 2

The Italian Mafias

Introduction Criminal cliques under a charismatic leader go right back to antiquity (Hopwood 2009; Swenson 2012), where myths and legends of such leaders were common. One story concerns a rebel bandit named Bulla Felix, who lived during the reign of the emperor Septimus Severus in the third century CE. It was made famous by the Roman senator Cassius Dio (Grünewald 2004), who recounted that Bulla had rounded up a regiment of more than 600 men, which included slaves and freedmen, wreaking havoc over certain Roman territories. Other legends surrounding Bulla spread shortly thereafter across the Roman Empire, all of them portraying him as a social justice fighter who stole from the rich and gave to the poor. But there is no historical evidence that someone named Bulla Felix ever existed, nor that he helped common folk (if he did indeed exist). The Latin name “Bulla Felix” means “Lucky Charm,” an apt name, as Cassius Dio suggested, because he was someone who was “never really seen when seen, never found when found, never caught when caught” (cited in Grünewald 2004). Stories of legendary bandits, whether real or mythical, were common in the ancient world. Dio also wrote about two other mythical bandits, named Corocotta and Claudius, and the Roman writer Apuleius wrote about a bandit in his Metamorphoses (second century CE), whom he portrayed as a hero. Such depictions reveal what can be called a “Robin-­Hood principle” – a belief that some bandits are larger than life, that they have a good heart, and that they turned to crime to champion the underprivileged classes. But stories based on the Robin-­Hood principle do not hold up to historiographical scrutiny. Real ancient criminals, such as pirates, highwaymen, brigands, and bandits, were self-­serving and violent. They were hardly the Bulla Felixes and other noble scoundrels of fictional lore. As Paul Lunde (2004: 24–25) aptly observes: “Piracy and banditry were to the preindustrial world what organized crime is to modern society; they were for the most part non-­ideological, predominantly ethnically based, used violence and intimidation, and adhered to their own codes of law.”

28  The Italian Mafias

It was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that similar legends about bandit groups emerged in southern Italy, based partly on fiction and partly on historical events. Although the direct ancestors of the Italian Mafias are not known with any degree of certainty, it is likely that they came out of the various bandit groups in this era, who opportunely took advantage of social and political conditions, as will be discussed in this chapter. So, a convenient starting point for tracing the origins of modern-­day criminal organizations is in southern Italy, where the three best-­known organizations emerged on the basis of the Robin-­Hood principle – the Sicilian Mafia, the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, and the Neapolitan Camorra. We will deal with the origins and evolution of other historical OCs in the next chapter. It should be mentioned that the appearance of criminal gangs in Italy is not restricted to the south. Already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, bands of brutal assassins for hire, called bravi, were common in northern Italy, employed by the rural landlords to protect their interests. Their fame as terrifying bullies comes to us in part from their inclusion by Alessandro Manzoni in his historical novel, I promessi sposi (The Betrothed 1827), one of the classic works of Italian literature. Manzoni came across the bravi while he was researching the background to the events he included in his novel, finding that they had been present in Italy from at least 1583. They are hardly ever mentioned today in the annals of crime history, because they disappeared a few centuries afterwards. Other similar gangs appeared in various parts of Italy, with no connections to the southern Mafias.

Piracy Pirates are criminals on the high seas, who attack ships and coastal areas to steal cargo and valuables, using violence to carry out their criminal activities. The earliest documented cases of piracy go back to the Aegean and Mediterranean civilizations, when it is recorded that groups of ocean raiders attacked ships. The pirates thrived because they were organized like a military group, adopting codes of conduct and oaths of allegiance that were designed to obtain the commitment of the pirates to a captain and to the criminal goals that the he pursued. They also specified rules for behaving on board and the types of punishment that would be meted out for those who broke them. While pirates today have modernized their operations and weaponry – with automatic guns, sophisticated artillery, and computer systems on board that help them plan and carry out their criminal activities – their codes of conduct and allegiance have not changed in any significant way. They remain the organizational mechanisms that keep the pirates united, imparting to them a sense of belongingness, fulfilling the need to be accepted as part of a group. Such mechanisms allow the pirates of one generation to pass on their legacy to subsequent generations, thus enhancing perpetuity. The kinds of rules

The Italian Mafias 29

that pirates incorporated into their codes are the following – paraphrased from Edward T. Fox (2013): 1 No man shall rob from any other man on board. If he does, he will have his nose and ears cut off and be thrown ashore. 2 Gambling for money, with dice or cards, is prohibited. 3 Women are not allowed on board, and if anyone is caught with a woman for purposes of seduction, he shall be punished by death. 4 Anyone who deserts the ship in time of battle shall be punished by death. 5 No member shall strike another on board, and any quarrel shall be ended on shore by sword or pistol. 6 No man shall talk of breaking up their way of living until each has a share of the booty. The rules reveal explicitly that piracy is a male vocation, with the few women allowed on board being relegated to second-­class status. Women are seen as weak and as bringing mayhem on board, caused by male members bickering and fighting over them. So, with few exceptions, women are prohibited from coming on board. The rules were established to ensure order at sea. Those who disregarded them were subject to severe punishments, including confinement in the ship’s stockade, banishment on a desert island, torture, or, depending on the violation, even death. The pirates also had initiation rites. One of these was called “ducking at the yard-­arm.” It was devised by Captain Woodes Rogers, a commander of an English pirate ship in the early eighteenth century. In the ritual, the initiate would have a rope fastened under his arms and under his breech; he is then hoisted up and then violently dropped down into the sea. This was repeated several times to ascertain if the initiate had the nerves and fortitude to withstand the challenge and thus of future adversity. The pirates were involved in corruption activities and illicit alliances  – prefiguring modern-­day OCs. As Michael Woodiwiss (2001: 18) notes, piracy was a criminal enterprise that was “well protected” by the economic and political classes of France, England, and other European countries: Pirates could not have carried on their trade without the support of merchants, gentlemen and officials, especially admiralty officials, and measures taken against such abettors of piracy were for the most part ineffective, since all too frequently those responsible for executing the law were themselves notorious offenders. Pertinent to this topic is the so-­called letter of marque and reprisal (French lettre de marque, lettre de course), which shows how collusions between pirates and officials was effectuated. The letter was a government license that authorized a privateer or corsair to attack and capture vessels of a nation

30  The Italian Mafias

at war with the issuer. The license included permission to cross borders in order to carry out a reprisal. The differences between privateers and pirates were moot, allowing the latter to form alliances with rulers that benefitted both.

Example of a letter of marque issued to Captain Robert Kidd by William the Third of England

The Italian Mafias 31

Figure 2.1 The Jolly Roger

Another benchmark of pirate culture was the role of symbolism, designed to garner the fealty of the members by representing something of value to the gang, such as strength or fearsomeness. One of the most recognizable pirate symbols is the Jolly Roger, a flag with a white skull and crossbones on a black background, which was flown on pirate ships to instill fear in opponents and victims and to demonstrate that those on board were united powerfully under the flag. The Hells Angels’ winged-­head death skull insignia is a modern-­day version of this type of symbolism. Piracy became a cliché of literary fiction in the nineteenth century, emerging as part of an adventure genre established by Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel Treasure Island (1883) and Gilbert and Sullivan’s comic opera The Pirates of Penzance (1879). The latter depicted pirates as comedic and often bungling villains, an image adopted by J. M. Barrie in sculpting the character of the fictitious pirate Captain Hook in Peter Pan (1904). Since then, the lure of the pirate scoundrel, as a big-­hearted comedic swashbuckler, has penetrated the popular imagination, with appearances in movies such as the Pirates of the Caribbean series of films and in the many versions of the Peter Pan story in film, television, musicals, and so on. These representations have not only fashioned the image of the pirate as a loveable buccaneer but also introduced into the conceptualization of piracy itself various fictitious notions and purported traditions. One of these is “walking the plank,” whereby a captive is blindfolded and forced to walk off a plank extending over the sea. This was never a part of historical piracy; it was introduced into piracy mythology by Barrie’s novel. The lines between fiction, make-­believe, and reality are blurry ones in the stories told about pirates. This makes them appealing for narrative purposes, while the reality is that they are brutal criminals. In its history, Italy has also had few pirates. However, as a sea-­based economy (especially in the past), many pirates landed on Italian shores. There is some speculation by historians that they may have influenced the birth of the various

32  The Italian Mafias

Mafias. But there is little evidence to link pirates and the latter directly. More than likely, those who came on land for criminal intent, whether they were pirates or not, continued their criminal ways in the form of banditry. What is pertinent here is that the Mafias adopted a similar organizational system, with analogous rules of conduct and oaths of allegiance – an aspect of criminal groups that might have a bio-­evolutionary basis (as will be discussed subsequently).

Banditry Records of bandits who ambushed and robbed people in Italy go as far back as the 1500s. The term bandito entered the Italian language around 1590, meaning literally “banned person,” who was relegated to living in the forests. Over time, the bandits became fixtures of the malavita (“criminal life”). They had realized early on that there was strength in numbers and started forming broader associations among themselves, separating into clans controlling specific territories so that they could carry out their criminal activities without fighting each other. Many stories told about bandits reflect the Robin Hood principle, starting with the one in the Metamorphoses of Apuleius (mentioned previously), where a young bandit is portrayed as a heroic figure with noble qualities. However, there is little historical evidence that bandits were loveable rogues who came from the peasants. It was in the late sixteenth century that documents indicate the espousal of this principle in various parts of Europe. The Elizabethan playwrights and pamphleteers of the day became so fascinated by the criminal groups that they invented a literary genre, known as the “Literature of Roguery,” that aimed to tell their story. In 1591, English dramatist Robert Greene produced a series of five works on various aspects of the criminal underworld, which etched this image of the likeable rogue into the public imagination, followed by similar works written by Thomas Middleton (The Black Book 1604) and Thomas Dekker (The Bellman of London 1608 and Lantern and Candlelight 1608). Shakespeare also gave prominence to the rogues by incorporating their slang into his As You Like It (1623) and The Winter’s Tale (1623), bringing realism into those plays. Like the pirates, the bandits had internal organization, a charismatic leader, and codes of conduct. Many had been soldiers and thus had access to sophisticated weapons and armors. The leader was typically well connected to the social elites (Robinson 2001). By the late eighteenth century, bandit gangs spread to many parts of Italy, becoming powerful by forming illicit alliances with the authorities. It is not clear, however, if they are connected to the origins of the Mafiosi in southern Italy. All that can be said is that there are many parallels between the two, including the use of codes of conduct and a system of command that was top down. Actually, the Mafias saw themselves as different from the bandits, portraying themselves as men of honor, while the bandits were perceived as mere robber gangs.

The Italian Mafias 33

The Neapolitan Camorra The first reliable historical evidence of an organized crime group in southern Italy dates back to 1735 in Naples, when the term Camorra appears for the first time in an official document in reference to illegal gambling. The term is likely a blend of ca (short for capo “chief ”) and murra, a common game (morra in standard Italian) – a hand game that goes back to ancient Roman and Greek times  – where two players simultaneously reveal their hand, extending any number of fingers, calling out a number; the one who calls out the correct total number of fingers scores a point. The game was seemingly very popular in Naples during the reign of Ferdinand IV. Other possibilities for the etymology of the term Camorra have been put forth, but the gambling one is further strengthened by the fact that in 1803, a superintendent of the Neapolitan police issued a deposition against all camorra games because they attracted people of both the low classes and the gentlemanly classes and were thus the source of disruption of public order. The connection of gambling to the Camorra is further strengthened by a mention of the term with this meaning by Marc Monnier, a nineteenth century writer, in his La camorra (1862). While in jail, the Camorristi (“gamblers”) formed a brotherhood, practicing extortion within the prison walls. Extortion became the mainstay criminal activity not only of the Camorra but of all the Mafias. The word that came to be used for extortion money was pizzo, referring initially to the place in which a Camorrista prisoner relaxed and kept his things and thus where the extorted money was hidden. The pizzo was a sort of “tax” that the Camorristi imposed on prisoners, to which the prison authorities acquiesced to guarantee peace and quiet in the prisons. It was during the Unification of Italy that the Camorristi became even more united as a powerful gang after they were hired by Liberio Romano (an important political figure of the times) as vigilantes to keep social order during the mission in Naples by Italian military leader Giuseppe Garibaldi (see subsequently). One of the gangsters, Salvatore De Crescenzo, was even made chief of the local faction of the National Guard. As a result, the Camorristi gained amnesty for their previous crimes, boastfully wearing a symbolic patriotic pin on their shorts or hats with the colors of the Italian flag. Taking opportunistic advantage of social and political situations allowed the Camorristi to establish themselves socially and settle into the culture of Naples and the surrounding region, becoming one of the first “enemies within,” as discussed in Chapter 1. Opportunism and adaptability are key factors that have allowed the Italian Mafias to entrench themselves into the cultural fabric of southern Italy, allowing them to survive crackdowns and investigations by the authorities. An early example of this was the Cuocolo trial of 1911–1912, which decimated the Camorra at the time. The case involved Enrico Alfano, one of the chiefs of the Camorra, who was accused of being behind the murder of rival Camorra boss Gennaro Cuocolo and his wife. The trial quickly evolved

34  The Italian Mafias

from a murder case into a public condemnation of the Camorra, attracting the attention of newspapers, which tarnished the image of the Camorra as a legitimate enterprise in the service of Italian patriotism. For decades after, the Camorra seemed to be either defeated or in retreat. But, being opportunists, the Camorristi reinvented themselves somewhat later, both in the kinds of criminal activities they carried out and the public image they conveyed. After World War II, they controlled various black markets, including those based on horticultural and tobacco products, which were scarce and very expensive, providing them abundantly and cheaply to citizens directly. As a result, the Camorra re-­emerged as a social-­service provider, regaining the social status that it had lost. Since then, its opportunism has known no bounds. During the 1980 earthquake that hit the region surrounding Naples (Campania), they came forward to help in the recovery effort while pocketing most of the relief funds themselves, appearing, however, to be committed to the people of Naples and Campania. It is this type of raw opportunism and public-­image manipulation that has allowed the Camorra to gain a foothold in Neapolitan politics and society, despite occasional setbacks. Today, Camorra groups have become so powerful and implanted in corruption schemes that they form a kind of parallel government in the entire region. What further strengthens the perpetuity of the Camorristi is the Neapolitan philosophy of arrangiarsi (“making do”), as Jason Pine (2012) has argued and documented ethnographically. The term is a cultural metaphor for Neapolitans themselves, designating a stoical and shrewd approach to life that shelters common people against the vicissitudes and curves that life throws at them. As Pine observes, the Camorra is a powerful force in the conduct of everyday life in Naples, forcing common folk to “make do” in an environment that is constantly cutting its connections with the past and becoming increasingly dangerous. Coping with a shadow economy controlled by violent organized crime networks, from the Camorra to fringe criminal cliques, Pine argues that the making-­do attitude allows ordinary Neapolitans to survive, as they have always done. What both the criminals and common people understand, via this worldview, is that they are destined to co-­exist in parallel worlds, with constant crossovers that cannot be blocked, given the corrupt nature of humans – hence the need to make do. The role of the Camorra in the constitution of all the other Italian Mafias should not be understated. Even some of the terms used widely to describe Mafia culture can be traced to the Camorra. The concept of omertà (honor, humility, and virility), for example, was coined by the early imprisoned Camorristi (Benigno 2015). One of the names that the Camorra has fashioned for itself is, in fact, the Società dell’Umiltà (“Society of Humility”). The stranglehold that the Camorrista clans have on the local community and its economy is based on their ability to corrupt officials. So, through a mixture of brutal violence, political corruption, and the conveyance of a pseudo-­image of social leadership, the Camorra is today one of the most powerful OCs in Italy. It has

The Italian Mafias 35

also evolved into a silent power broker in national politics, providing politicians with broad electoral support in return for favors.

The Sicilian Mafia The historical record suggests that the Sicilian Mafia emerged a little later than the Camorra, in the nineteenth century, although some legends trace its roots back to the resistance fighters who dedicated themselves to throwing out intruders starting in the 1600s, when Sicily was ruled by Spanish foreigners. The fighters were largely Sicilian peasants who refused to cooperate with the Spanish invaders. When the latter finally left, however, the fighters took advantage of the security void they left, becoming increasingly consolidated as protection gangs in the 1800s, extorting the very peasants they claimed to protect. From the start, the Mafia adopted many of the features of the Camorra, which may have occurred while many early members of the Mafia-­to-­be were in prison, among Camorristi and members of a secret society known as the carboneria. At that time, they all served their time in penitentiaries often located on islands. There had always been armed groups in Sicily in the service of the aristocracy. Some were mobilized to engage in battle during the revolutions of 1821 and 1848, the period of the handover of powers from the Bourbon rulers, who had invaded the region, to form the unitary state of Italy (see subsequently). An identifiable criminal organization, subsequently called Mafia, was born at that particular historical juncture, thanks also to the legitimacy and political recognition afforded to it by the ruling classes of the time. Aware of the inherent dangers that such organized gangsters presented, Nicolò Turrisi Colonna, a member of the revolutionary government in 1849 and future senator of a unified Italy, warned the people in an 1864 report, Public Security in Sicily, to be wary of this “sect of thieves,” which lived by its own rules. He also noted that the members were bound to each other by oaths and that they used special secretive signals to communicate among themselves, that they had garnered political protection in many of the Sicilian regions where they operated, and that they had the ability to make affiliates every day of the brightest young people coming from the rural class, of the guardians of the fields in the Palermitan countryside, and of the large number of smugglers; a sect which gives and receives protection to and from certain men who make a living on traffic and internal commerce. Colonna concludes as follows: “It is a sect with little or no fear of public bodies, because its members believe that they can easily elude this” (cited in Paoli 2003: 33). In the year before Colonna’s study was published, a play by Giuseppe Rizzotto and Gaetano Mosca, entitled I Mafiusi di la Vicaria (“The Mafiosi of the Vicaria”), was staged in Palermo. In that play, the (fallacious) view that the Mafia

36  The Italian Mafias

was an ancient society of chivalrous fighters linked to a past of oppression was installed into social groupthink. In 1865, two years after the play, the term Maffia (with two F’s) appeared for the first time in an official report sent to the Minister of the Interior by the Prefect of Palermo, Filippo Antonio Gualterio. Twelve years after that, in 1877, two Italian politicians, Sydney Sonnino and Leopoldo Franchetti, called for an investigation into the social reach of the Mafia. Franchetti described the organization as an “industry of violence,” practiced by a consortium of diverse groups, including members of the bourgeoisie and landowners, who sought to become ruling classes; he also depicted the criminals as belonging to the lower “dangerous classes,” an image of particular significance in the perception of Italians abroad generally, as will be discussed subsequently. The problem with Franchetti’s characterization is the suggestion that the criminal actions of the Mafiosi were widespread and thus part of Sicilian culture itself, even in areas where there were no gangs. To solve the problem of crime, he proposed a bigoted plan to exclude Sicilians from governing themselves, which was rejected by the Sicilian ruling class of the time. The Mafiosi, on their side, saw a great opportunity to join the fight for self-­government, thus promoting an image of themselves as legendary fighters for Sicilian culture during the struggle for Italian Unification. Giuseppe Pitré, a founder of folklore studies in Sicily during the era, described the Mafia as “the conscience of one’s own being” (cited in Cisterna 2011), adding speciously (and chauvinistically) that the term “Mafia” was used in the past to define the “beauty of a woman,” as well as the “value of a man.” As ludicrous as this portrayal now may seem, Pitré’s views were influential, embedding the idea of the Mafia as an honorable society into the mindset of many Sicilians, an idea that influenced the outcome of important trials in favor of the Mafiosi during the era. Only in trials and crackdowns in the 1980s and 1990s did the true nature of the Mafia as a vicious criminal gang finally become known and accepted widely. The term Mafia is not native to the Sicilian dialect. According to a popular legend, it was coined as an acronym during the Sicilian Vespers, an uprising of Sicilians against the French Capetian House of Anjou headed by the despotic Charles I of Sicily on March, 30, 1282 – that is, it stood for “Morte Alla Francia, Italia Anela” (“Death to France, Italy Cries”). This origin of the term is now largely discredited by historians and linguists. Pasquale Natella (2002) suggests instead that the word is of Semito-­Hamitic origin, designating beauty, perfection, and bravery, and may have existed since antiquity in the Middle East, reaching Sicily through migrations and settlements from people of the region. Sociologist Diego Gambetta (1993: 139) believes, on the other hand, that the term Mafia was made up by the gangsters themselves, which may have itself been “inspired by the real thing and can be said to have created the phenomenon.” It is, in other words, a classic case of reification, whereby something imaginary crystallizes into something that is believed to be real, gaining greater credibility over time. People at the time knew that organized bandit gangs existed. But they were not identified as distinctive or possessing any “honor”

The Italian Mafias 37

or “humility.” This perception became widespread, according to Gambetta, because of the power of words to shape beliefs and perceptions. The term may also be a derivative of the word Mafiusu (Sicilian for Mafioso), which came into general use after the play mentioned previously by Rizzotto and Mosca. The play was about a fictitious gang of prisoners in the city of Palermo, which had a leader; an initiation rite for new gang members; a code of silence, called umirtà (omertà in standard Italian); and a system for obtaining pizzu (pizzo in Italian, a code word for extortion money). The fictitious gang possessed, in other words, all the hallmark features of the real Mafia, as John Dickie (2004: 55) observes: “The mafiusi are a gang of prison inmates whose habits look very familiar in retrospect. They have a boss and an initiation ritual, and there is much talk in the play about ‘respect’ and ‘humility.’ ” The real gangsters now had a corporate name for themselves, likely coined in prison, as the play suggests. All that was missing was a link to an origin story, which would then complete the picture of the Mafia as an organization that transcended mere banditry. This was done by the gangsters themselves, who scripted a convenient fictional story of their origins connected to Sicilian history, as we shall see later. Made-­up histories repeated over and over become real and almost impossible to distinguish from real facts. Sicily’s history of incursions and occupations started with the Greeks, followed by invasions from the Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, and Bourbons. This situation led to the rise of secret criminal societies allied to resistance movements. So it is easy to see why real and make-­believe histories merged in Sicily in the nineteenth century, since the latter tapped into Sicilian history opportunistically, as Lunde (2004: 55) observes: From Norman times, the political system in Sicily was feudal. Foreign rulers controlled the island by cultivating the local aristocracy, who obtained concessions in return. The law was whatever the rulers made it. There was no concept of common justice and the peasants were excluded from the political process. They lived desperate lives on the margin of survival. It was from this social milieu that the mafia eventually arose, not as liberators of the oppressed, but as able individuals intent on obtaining their share of wealth and privilege however they could. Traditional Sicilian suspicion of state institutions created the conditions in which the mafia could develop. The late Giuseppe “Joe Bananas” Bonanno, a boss of one of the five infamous crime families of New York, connected the origins of the Mafia opportunistically to one of Italy’s most significant political events in its history, the Risorgimento (literally “resurrection”), the movement for the unification and independence of Italy, which was achieved in 1870. Among the fighters were a group called the Camicie Rosse (“Red Shirts”), who were the volunteers who followed the Italian patriot and military leader Giuseppe

38  The Italian Mafias

Garibaldi during the Risorgimento. Bonanno made the claim that the original Mafiosi were Red Shirt liberators in Sicily (cited in Cawthorne and Cawthorne 2009: xiii): In my grandfather’s time, Sicily was under the dominance of the Bourbon dynasty, a royal family of Spanish and French ancestry. Italy itself was like a jigsaw puzzle with the pieces owned by various powers. Because of the patchwork of foreign domination and internal weaknesses, Italy was the last major country in Europe to be unified under a native ruler. The unification movement was spearheaded by King Victor Emmanuel II and his brilliant prime minister, Cavour. It could not have been accomplished, however, without the leadership and inspiration of the Italian patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi. Garibaldi catalyzed the unification movement by enlisting a volunteer army to liberate Sicily. These volunteers, a motley crew of idealists and zealots, wore a distinctive garb and became known as the Red Shirts. In 1860 Garibaldi’s enthusiastic band, some 1,000 strong, landed in Marsala on the west coast of Sicily. Needless to say, the factors and movements that led to the Risorgimento were much more complex than what Bonanno described. One of the most influential revolutionary groups in nineteenth-­century southern Italy was called the carboneria (“charcoal burners”), a secret society that started as a branch of the Free Masons, who were quashed (in theory) in 1815. The carboneria was committed to Italian nationalism, attracting not only previous Free Masons but also many intellectuals, spreading across Italy as a powerful political movement. Giuseppe Garibaldi was associated with the movement, being jailed and sentenced to death after participating in an uprising in Piedmont in 1834. He escaped to South America, though, spending fourteen years there and learning the art of guerrilla warfare. He returned to Italy in 1848. With his volunteer force of Red Shirts, he captured Sicily from the Bourbons in 1860– 1861, thereby playing a key role in the establishment of a United Kingdom of Italy. When Garibaldi landed in Sicily, he actually terrified the landowners, who feared that they would lose their possessions. Some came forward to propose social reforms rather than take a loss, and in return, Garibaldi was promised fighters and other military benefits. Many of the former were called picciotti (literally, “little ones” or “youngsters”) – a name that stuck with the Mafia, later indicating “foot soldiers.” The few who distrusted the agreement between Garibaldi and the landowners tried to take back their lands, but they ended up in front of firing squads, as the writer Giovanni Verga pointed out in his novella, La libertà (“Liberty”), one of his Novelle rusticane (“Rustic novellas”) of 1883. So, the future Mafiosi, Camorristi, and ’Ndranghetisti learned how to sacralize violence, by ritualizing it, and thus justifying it. The carbonari would point out that they killed for a worthy cause – to eliminate the “wolves from the forest.”

The Italian Mafias 39

Unification of Italy Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882)

The Unification of Italy in 1861, called the Risorgimento, was a key event that allowed the various bandit gangs to unify as criminal organizations after they were co-­opted to help in the military efforts at Unification. Italy had been subject to invasion and control by foreign regimes after the Napoleonic Wars – a series of military campaigns from 1800 to 1815 of French armies under Napoleon against Austria, Russia, England, Portugal, and other European powers, which ended with Napoleon’s defeat at the Battle of Waterloo. The restoration of repressive regimes after the Wars led to revolts in Naples and Piedmont (1821) and Bologna (1831). With French aid, the Austrians were driven out of northern Italy by 1859, and the south was won over by Giuseppe Garibaldi and his troops, resulting in the ascendancy of Victor Emmanuel II as the first king of a United Italy in 1861. With his volunteer force of Red Shirts, Garibaldi had liberated Sicily and the rest of southern Italy from the Bourbons in 1860–1861, thereby playing a key role in the establishment of a united kingdom of Italy.

40  The Italian Mafias

Whatever the historical truth, the weaving of Mafia culture into the fabric of the larger Sicilian culture after the Risorgimento brought nothing but negative consequences to the region, leading to the debilitating stereotyping of Sicilians and diminishing their ability and political will to act against the Mafiosi. Already in 1900, Antonino Cutrera, an early anti-­Mafia activist and an officer of public security, wrote the following cautionary warning (Cutrera 1900: 2): For historical and ethnographic reasons, Sicily has for many years suffered a social vice perpetrated on it by the Mafia. This vice has hindered its social development and has compromised the thrust of its civilization. Initially, the Mafia based its criminal activities in the western part of Sicily, around Palermo and Trapani. After World War II, it expanded its base of operation to the other parts of Sicily and eventually to other regions of Italy. As Nicaso and Lamothe (2005: 35) remark, the Mafia has been one of the most powerful OCs not only in Sicily but around the world: Whatever the true roots of the Sicilian Mafia are, and whatever origin of the name, the organization is the most cohesive and active of all the criminal groups in the world, with the possible exception of Chinese Triads. The Sicilian Mafia has endured oppression by governments and armies, survived incredibly bloody internecine warfare, and sullied the accusations of informants. In times of power and prosperity, the Sicilian Mafia has extended its reach around the world, at times influencing, if not controlling, international drug trafficking. And after periodic government crackdowns the Sicilian Mafia has always been able to quietly regroup and bide its time. It has never disappeared. To survive, the Mafia must continue to control territories, extort money, and corrupt officials. To reiterate here, it must continue to spread its tentacles as the “enemy within.” Historically, in Sicily, the territory claimed by a criminal clan was called a cosca, which refers to the heart of an artichoke (its middle stem) that is protected by the surrounding leaves of the plant, which are often thorny. The word-­symbol refers to the fact that the Mafia uses tactics and strategies that shelter or protect it from outside forces – social, intellectual, legal, cultural, and political. For a cosca to gain a foothold in the social terrain, it requires the veneer of legitimacy. So the members continue to present themselves as fighters against corrupt legal systems, at the same time that they act in blatant self-­ interest, gaining power through extortion activities. Each capocosca (“cosca head or leader”) gains prominence by corrupting public officials through intimidation and bribery. Law-­abiding citizens are thrust into a quandary – they live in two worlds, paying taxes to both, that is, to the legally constituted government of the region and to the cosca in the form of the pizzo. The cosca, in return, offers assurance that they would not harm a business or a specific person and

The Italian Mafias 41

the promise to protect the business or individual from common street criminals and corrupt authorities. As a common Sicilian proverb aptly puts it, A paura guarda a vigna, no a sipala, which means, “It is fear that oversees a vineyard, not a fence.” To ensure that the cosca maintained a separate identity from common street criminals, a code of omertà was created and enforced, demanding, in its original version, that anyone who strayed or was disloyal to the cosca would be severely punished (to be discussed in Chapter 6). The goal was to instill internal cohesion into a cosca, since disputes and jealousies were common and resolved through self-­defeating bloodshed – vying for territory and dominance among the various cosche was also commonplace. The code of omertà also allowed the cosche to survive outside threats, since it unified members under common statutes of behavior and belief, like the pirate codes discussed previously. A highly allusive body language also became part of the whole criminal code, with dire-­ looking faces and fearsome gestures, such as those that alluded to cutting someone’s throat or face, becoming part of a symbolic system of terror and control. “The best word is the one not spoken” was, and continues to be, a basic principle of the omertà code – a principle that comes from the Masonic carboneria, which exacted complete silence and obedience from its members. Between the end of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, Sicily became the battleground of a Mafia internecine clan war that upset its equilibrium. The old rules that had moderated disagreements within the ranks and allowed for inter-­clan cohesion were compromised. The many pentiti (“informants,” literally “those who have repented”) who collaborated with the authorities in the 1980s and 1990s opened up the secret society to public scrutiny, weakening substantially the symbolic power of the Mafia’s code of omertà. But the organization survived the crisis and still prospers, because it continues to adhere to its code as a sacrosanct set of principles that allows its members to feel a strong bond among themselves (Chapter 6). And it has expanded its reach globally, weaponizing the new digital technologies strategically, as will be discussed subsequently. The Mafia is always updating itself at the same time that it keeps its roots deeply entrenched in Sicilian culture. This has been the key to its perpetuity and success.

Cosa Nostra One of the first recorded incidents of a supposed Mafia crime in the United States goes back to 1891 in New Orleans, when a group of Sicilian gangsters assassinated the chief of police, David Hennessy, who had been harassing them. They were arrested but were eventually acquitted because the gangsters had bribed and threatened the witnesses, who ended up not pronouncing them guilty. This caused great uproar in the city, leading to one of the first acts of ethnic cleansing in the United States against a group that was not of African American heritage. A lynch mob was organized after the release

42  The Italian Mafias

of the gangsters. They rounded them up and then shot or hanged eleven of them. The horrific event seemed to herald the demise of the “Mafia in America.” But two events revived it – in actual historical fact, created it. The first one was Prohibition (Chapter  1), which provided, as Reynolds (2006: 182) puts it, “a low-­cost, high-­demand and high-­profit opportunity for criminals, especially those operating within an organization that could manufacture, import, and distribute its products under the noses (or with the collaboration) of law enforcement.” The second event was Italian dictator Benito Mussolini’s crackdown on Mafiosi in Sicily. Mussolini had appointed Cesare Mori, the Prefect of Palermo in 1925, to go after the Mafia, giving him special powers to do so. Over 11,000 people were arrested, many of them innocent individuals. They were tried and convicted expeditiously for being either Mafiosi or for having Mafia connections. But Mussolini’s “Mafia genocide” strategy did not work as well as expected, since many Mafiosi outwitted the authorities and avoided their round-­up net. As a consequence of Mussolini’s dire actions, many gangsters fled to the United States, where they joined other random gangsters who were already there. Others stayed behind to fight against fascism, transforming their image after the War, once again, into that of valiant saviors of the people, presenting themselves as fighters against the spread of Communism in Italy in the post-­ War period and offering their services to the local governments. Some saw through this ploy but remained silent for fear of reprisals. An example is Cardinal Ernesto Ruffini, who served as archbishop of Palermo in the post-­War era and who protested against Communism but also secretly supported anti-­Mafia campaigns. He saw the Mafia as a fake anti-­Communist group but wanted to avoid both controversy and perhaps the ire of the gang. He was once asked the question “What is the Mafia?” by a journalist. He responded: “So far as I know, it could be a brand of detergent” (cited in Bolzoni 2013). Those who emigrated to America quickly blended in with the American crime families that had emerged during Prohibition, which had gained control over many speakeasies – the locales for bootlegging operations. The gangsters stepped conveniently forward to satisfy a large part of the demand for the illegal alcoholic beverages. Because of the great profits that were involved, different crime clans battled each other for control of the bootlegging market. Violent gang wars erupted in many large cities, with resulting carnage. The bootlegging business led to a radical shift in American politics and society. Because the American Mafiosi did not care to whom they sold the liquor, Prohibition may have indirectly influenced, paradoxically and ironically, the evolution of an egalitarian trend in society, as Lunde (2004: 130) observes: It was during Prohibition that the modern United States, along with American organized crime, was born. Class, racial, and gender barriers began

The Italian Mafias 43

to erode in the fellowship of the speakeasy, where everyone present shared the camaraderie of breaking the law. Politicians, attorneys, and policemen rubbed shoulders with blue collar workers, gangsters, and entertainers. Al Capone’s Cotton Club in Cicero hired black jazz musicians and by 1927 Chicago had become the jazz capital of the world. Early on, the American Mafiosi developed a different culture from their counterparts in Italy, leading to a new version called Cosa Nostra (“our thing”). It still adopted the same initiation rites, codes of secrecy, symbols, and communicative ploys (such as the use of the native dialect) of both the Sicilian Mafia and the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta. Even if Cosa Nostra seemed to be different from the Italian Mafias, it was still an ethnically based old boys’ club, with only members of Italian background allowed in. Cosa Nostra did, however, enact partnerships with non-­Italian gangsters, given its location in a melting-­ pot society. Cosa Nostra caught the attention of Hollywood, which enshrined the image of the gangster as a well-­dressed and honorable individual, but still a ruthless man, into its early movies. One of the most famous gangster movies of all time, Little Caesar (1931), was inspired by real Chicago mobster and bootlegger Al Capone. The actor, Edward G. Robinson, attended Capone’s trial in 1931 for tax evasion. He wanted to take a close-­up look at Capone for his character role. The screen became the image-­maker, historian, and moralizer at once with respect to gangsterism, remaining so to this day. The 1930s saw a slew of gangster films that entrenched the Hollywood-­ carved image of the Mafioso into American popular culture indelibly. They included the following, which dealt either directly with the Mafiosi or indirectly as cautionary tales about the effects of gangsterism on society: • • • • • • • • • • •

The Public Enemy (1931) Scarface (1932) G-­Men (1935) The Petrified Forest (1936) Bullets or Ballots (1936) Kid Galahad (1937) The Last Gangster (1937) Racket Busters (1938) I Am the Law (1938) Angels with Dirty Faces (1938) The Roaring Twenties (1939)

It was also in the decade of the 1930s that the mobsters started pursuing other illegal paths in America, including gambling, extortion, loan sharking, prostitution, drugs, and so on in major urban areas. Cosa Nostra also played a role in the construction of the early casinos in Las Vegas in the 1940s, taking

44  The Italian Mafias

advantage of moral shifts in American culture, thus spreading its tentacles even more broadly into the nation and giving hard-­working Italian Americans, who were the real builders of Las Vegas, a bad name by association. As Lunde (2004: 44) points out: Probably the place that first comes to mind in association with the topic of casinos and gambling is Las Vegas, that grew with Mafia money during the 1940s. The Hotel Flamingo was opened in Las Vegas in 1947 by Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, friend of Meyer Lansky and Charles “Lucky” Luciano. Organized crime made a great deal of money skimming profits from the casinos for 40 years, until the laws regarding gaming were strengthened, and it became impossible for anyone with links to organized crime to openly operate in Las Vegas. Cosa Nostra had emerged as a criminal confederation of Italian-­born mobsters. It was a reinvention. As Al Capone, aptly put it “My rackets are run on strictly American lines and they’re going to stay that way” (cited in Cockburn 1981). The term Cosa Nostra gained broad diffusion through the media in the 1960s after the pentito Joseph Valachi used the term while testifying before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the US Senate Committee on Government Operations in 1963. It was actually the FBI who added the article La to the term, referring to it as La Cosa Nostra, perhaps to differentiate it from the use of the term as exported back to Sicily (Anderson 1965). In Italy, actually, the authorities did not take the new term seriously at first, seeing it mainly as a label for the American gangster clans. But in 1984, it entered the Italian language when another pentito, Tommaso Buscetta, revealed to the anti-­Mafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone that it was being used by the Sicilian Mafia as well, which saw an opportunity to reject the traditional term Mafia as a mere literary epithet. Whether true or not, it certainly brought the name Cosa Nostra to center stage in the world of organized crime and in the popular imagination.

Cosa Nostra timeline The birth and rise of Cosa Nostra in America can be seen in several key events. •

There is some controversy over the initial formation of Cosa Nostra, but some trace it to the Mano nera, or Black Hand (to be discussed subsequently), an extortion racket which likely started in various regions of southern Italy and was exported to the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The Italian Mafias 45

•

•

•

• • •

•

•

• •

It was Prohibition in the 1920s that created an underground market for illegal alcohol, filled by the mobsters, who started organizing themselves into clans, engaging in brutal turf wars to gain control over the bootlegging markets. The clans realized that they would only be able to survive crackdowns via the corruption of officials, from the police to government authorities. The combination of bootlegging and corruption was the spark that ignited the rise and spread of Cosa Nostra. One of the most famous of the turf wars, called the “Castellammarese War” in New York City, was fought between a clan headed by Joe “The Boss” Masseria and that of Salvatore Maranzano. The war lasted from February of 1930 to April of 1931. The war ended when Maranzano conspired with Masseria’s right-­ hand man, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, to have Masseria murdered – one of the most infamous examples of betrayal in the annals of organized crime. Maranzano named Luciano to be the head of what came to be the biggest organized crime family in New York, the Genovese family. Barely five months later, Luciano had Maranzano killed, taking over the reins of power, becoming the most powerful mob boss in America. Luciano set up a governing body called the “Commission,” which was a ruling committee the included the five major organized crime families of New York: Bonanno, Colombo, Gambino, Genovese, and Lucchese. It was in this timeframe that the term Cosa Nostra spread broadly. In 1936, Luciano was convicted of running a prostitution ring. He was released ten years later, moving back to Sicily, where he connected the Mafia and Cosa Nostra into a transnational crime organization. The two names became synonymous right after. Cosa Nostra was able to operate successfully in both countries because of its ability to bribe city officials, businesses, witnesses, and juries to keep illegal activities undetected and to gain shelter from arrests and prosecutions. In 1957, at a series of meetings of the different clan leaders at the Grand Hotel et des Palmes back in Palermo, called the 1957 Palermo Mafia summit, Cosa Nostra made its first major decision to move into the international illegal heroin trade. At the millennium, legal measures and crackdown operations led to hundreds of high-­profile arrests of Cosa Nostra members. But although weakened by law enforcement, Cosa Nostra continues to exist and is still regarded as one of the largest organized crime gangs in the United States.

46  The Italian Mafias

• • •

The criminal organization has survived, and even thrived, by establishing real businesses to both complement and conceal their illegal ones. Through dummy firms, Cosa Nostra controls numerous entertainment places, construction companies, food distribution services, large chunks of the garbage business, and much more. It feeds on fear, sustaining itself through its display of power. Cosa Nostra is also highly adaptive to change, expanding its activities into the new industrial and technological areas of the contemporary world, as well as engaging in financial market manipulation.

Luciano had put an end to internecine warfare by uniting the different clans into a syndicate. Wars between clans still go on, but they are hardly over alcohol or drugs but sparked by intergang rivalries for maintaining control over territories. Syndication had allowed Cosa Nostra to survive as a singular structural unit, even in the face of constant crackdowns. This was first brought into public light during the so-­called Pizza Connection Trial that took place in New York City in 1985 (Alexander 1988). The case revealed that a number of independently owned pizza parlors were used by the gangsters as fronts to distribute drugs between 1975 and 1984. The trial ended with eighteen convictions. It reduced syndicate wealth, considerably undermining Cosa Nostra’s financial power base. The FBI also used an effective investigative technique called the enterprise technique, whereby in a prosecution or civil proceeding, evidence collected from a legitimate enterprise, such as a pizza parlor, can be used against those associated with it – namely the gangsters. But despite such legal measures and tools, the tentacles of Cosa Nostra have penetrated much too deeply into every aspect of social, economic, political, and cultural life. When Bernardo Provenzano, the boss who replaced Totò Riina, was captured on April  11, 2006, in Corleone, Italy, after many decades on the run, anti-­Mafia prosecutor Pietro Grasso put it as follows (cited in La Sorte 2009): He was protected by professionals, politicians, businessmen, law enforcers. We found all of them in our investigations. Provenzano was under the protective umbrella of his criminal colleagues and more importantly by entire sectors of society. It was not a single politician who served as his protector all those years. It was the political system.

The Calabrian ’Ndrangheta The roots of the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta are traced to around the same time as the Sicilian Mafia; the ’Ndranghetisti also became a distinctive gang in prison, like their counterparts in Naples and Sicily, discovering while in

The Italian Mafias 47

jail the importance of organization and secrecy. As they emerged into the general populace in the 1880s, they established the main elements of their organizational structure, cutting deals with merchants and entrepreneurs to gain access to territories so as to enhance their extortion activities. They also undertook corruption tactics, supporting political candidates who, in return, would allow them to escape the investigations that began to take place in the era. The early ’Ndrangheta is linked to Giuseppe Musolino, known as the Brigante Musolino, who was born in Santo Stefano in Aspromonte, a rugged mountainous area of Calabria, and had become a local folk hero – an association that served the ’Ndranghetisti quite well from the outset. On September  28, 1898, Musolino was sentenced to 21  years in jail, due to the testimonies of several local miscreants. In January of 1899, he escaped from jail but was captured on October 22, 1901. He was tried and sent to life in prison on July 11, 1902. Musolino was seen by his fellow citizens as a Robin-­Hood figure  – a symbol of the injustices Calabria was facing at the time, becoming the subject of Calabrian folk tales and popular songs. The 1950 film, Il Brigante Musolino, by Mario Camerini, was based on his life, further ensconcing his folk-­ hero image into Calabrian folk culture. Musolino would organize annual meetings at the sanctuary of Our Lady of Polsi, a popular shrine attracting many pilgrims on the occasion of an annual religious festival that is celebrated on September 2 and 3. The ’Ndrangheta co-­opted these meetings, which provided them with the opportunity to gather without public scrutiny. Whether Musolino was “in” on the gang’s activities, the point is that his meetings allowed the ’Ndrangheta to organize itself in secrecy. Following an earthquake in 1908, a number of ’Ndranghetisti émigrés to the United States returned to Calabria under the guise of helping out the victims of the quake but actually aiming to help the organization become even more powerful, adopting what they had learned about corrupt organization in America during the Reconstruction period following the Civil War. They introduced the idea of uniting the three main clans in terms of three mandamenti  – one in Reggio Calabria, a second in Locri and San Luca, and a third in Palmi and Gioia Tauro  – thus putting the finishing organizational touches to a powerful crime network that has since evolved into one of the most dangerous in the world. In 1950, the Italian central government established the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, a government policy established to encourage the development of the infrastructure of southern regions, promoting subsidies and tax breaks to encourage investments. As it turned out, the Cassa provided a new opportunity for the ’Ndrangheta (and the other Mafias) to take advantage of the financial mismanagement of the funds by local governments. Many construction projects were promised but never built, because the various organized criminal syndicates siphoned the funds for their own purposes.

48  The Italian Mafias

Like the Sicilian Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta has its own code of silence and rules of internal behavior. It is also strictly bloodline-­based, as Reynolds (2006: 81) asserts: Sons of Mafia members may choose to follow their fathers into the organization or not; sons of the ’Ndranghetisti have no choice. To become a member of the criminal family is their diritto di sangue (right of blood), assigned at birth. While being groomed for their life’s work, a process that begins shortly after puberty, male children are giovani d’onore, or “boys of honor.” At maturity, they become picciotti d’onore, soldiers expected to carry out orders from their superiors without question and without fail. Like the other Mafias, the ’Ndrangheta has always spun imaginary tales about its origins in order to legitimize itself in Calabrian culture. Some of these overlap in content with the origin myths of the other Mafias, as will be discussed (Chapter 12). Suffice it to say here that the stories are all based on the Robin-­ Hood principle; namely that the gangsters are of noble origins, avengers of injustices, and protectors of the underprivileged. One of these, called the Garduña legend, is actually shared by the three main Mafias. The story claims, in essence, that the criminal groups are all descended from three Spanish brothers, who were medieval knights, called Osso, Mastrosso, and Carcagnasso, and who belonged to a mythical secret society called the Garduña. In 1412, the knights purportedly killed a nobleman who was aiming to violate their sister. Other versions of the legend refer to a defenseless young woman, rather than a sister. After escaping by sea, they were shipwrecked on the island of Favignana (a Mediterranean island that is part of Sicily), where they hid for 29 years undetected. During this time, they prepared a code of honor that was to become the basis for the codes adopted by the Mafia gangs. When the knights reemerged from their secret hiding place, they migrated to different parts of Italy. Osso remained in Sicily to found the Mafia, Mastrosso went to Calabria to establish the ’Ndrangheta, and Carcagnosso to Naples to found the Camorra. This story has become part of local folklores, reproduced in songs and derivative legends. But there is no evidence whatsoever to substantiate the Garduña narrative as having any historical validity. It is convenient fiction, a “just-­so” story, to borrow a phrase from writer Rudyard Kipling. In Just So Stories for Little Children (1902), Kipling made up stories for children to explain things to them in fanciful ways. The Garduña story is a just-­so narrative, intended to create a mystique about the clans based on heroism and adventure, a mystique that is imprinted in the word ’ Ndrangheta itself, which comes from a Greek word meaning “heroism” and “virtue.” It also alludes to blood ties among the members, since they have a common ancestor. A  key to the success of the ’Ndrangheta is a firm belief in the significance of blood and honor (sangue e onore), which means that every initiate to the clan must be, first and foremost, connected to the clan by blood or marriage.

The Italian Mafias 49

The ’Ndrangheta is divided into so-­ called ’ndrine (essentially meaning “clans”), which are family-­kinship units. Two or more of these are said to “give life” to the place they inhabit and which they control, called a locale, the base cell of the ’Ndrangheta. The capo of a locale holds a lifelong position; the overall capo, called capo società, is instead elected and can be replaced. The former is a chief executive officer, while the latter is a chief operating officer. The locale looks after the criminal operations in its territory. All locali must give a small percentage of their proceeds to head office – the Province (Provincia) or Crimine (Crime) – as a tribute to acknowledge its authoritative status. The Provincia is also responsible for settling disputes among the members and planning overall strategies for the operation of the ’Ndrangheta. If a locale decides to assassinate some authority figure or politician, it must discuss it with the Provincia. The diaspora of members outside of Calabria is allowed under the category of colonization, which justifies the spread of the clans to other areas of Italy and the world so that these can be appropriated and controlled by the ’Ndrangheta head office. Colonization involves the creation of Camere di Controllo (“control chambers”) outside of Calabria, which coordinate local groups with the main clan in Calabria. The latter holds annual meetings of all the locali near the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Polsi during a September Feast. The meetings are held to discuss future operations and to settle disputes among the different clans.

’Ndrangheta clan structure The Provincia is also called Crimine. It is the central unit of territorial organization in the overall clan structure. Below the Crimine are the different territorial overseers, including the following: the Ionica, the Tirrenica, the Città within Reggio Calabria, the Lombardia and Liguria clans, and the international Camere di Controllo for clans abroad. Then there are the locali, made up of several ‘ndrine. Though the locali typically operate independently, they have access to the main Crimine’s resources. The ’Ndrangheta is a genealogical organization, basing the requirements of membership mostly on blood ties. This is designed to reduce the risk of being betrayed by an informant, since it is believed that blood relatives are less likely to be betrayers or turncoats. Colonization actually began at the end of the nineteenth century, when many clan members emigrated first to the United States, then to Canada, and after that to Australia. After World War II, the emigration was extended to Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. One of the advantages of colonization is that the ’Ndrangheta can combine the old with the new, and this has allowed it to become one of the most globalized criminal organizations today, present on at least five continents.

50  The Italian Mafias

The ’Ndrangheta has become adept at rechanneling the spoils gained from criminal activities into legitimate venues, making it doubly dangerous, since it has surreptitiously entered the real economy. It is now a major player in transnational criminality (Chapter 10). Since drug trafficking makes up nearly two-­thirds of its current income, the ’Ndrangheta has formed close ties with South American and Mexican drug cartels, making the organization one of the largest suppliers of illegal drugs on a global scale, many of which pass through the port of Gioia Tauro in Calabria.

The Mafias and immigration The Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra, the Camorra, and other criminal gangs in Italy perceive themselves as genuine, legitimate parallel cultures (Chapter 1), possessing a pseudo-­value system that prizes honor, respect, and family ties – all of which are seen as lacking in the contemporary secular world in which relativistic philosophies are seen as destructive of traditional ethics and morals. In actual fact, Mafia culture is a social cancer that has spread not only throughout Italy but throughout the world. The spread today occurs through the Internet, and the globalization of markets, but in the past it took place through immigration, leading to the first instances of xenophobia and bigotry against Italian immigrants. In New Orleans, where the first Sicilian immigrants made their home, the mayor openly called them the most “idle, vicious and worthless” people he had ever encountered (Nicaso and Danesi 2013). He stated publicly that he wanted to wipe out every one of them from the face of the earth. As social scientist Dwight Smith (1976) suggests, the Italians had become part of a convenient alien conspiracy backlash, which was really xenophobia disguised as outrage against criminality. This exacerbated the situation for the Italian communities, which as a consequence became willing to accept protection from the criminals because of the fear that they felt from the public outcry against them, even though most of them worked honestly and diligently, contributing significantly to American society. The American Mafiosi thus found new ways to protect their own countrymen from corrupt police forces and xenophobic individuals. In reality, though, the primary target of the gangsters was their own countrymen. An example of the latter occurred at the turn of the twentieth century, when the so-­called Mano Nera (“Black Hand”) emerged as an extortion racket. Victims in the immigrant communities would receive a letter warning them to give the sender a certain sum of money or else risk death at the hands of a secret “Black Hand Society.” The letters were always signed with a black handprint with a dagger piercing it, designed to enhance the fear factor. The most infamous Black Hander was a man named Ignazio Saietta, also known as “Lupo the Wolf.” Saietta had emigrated from Italy to live with his brother-­in-­law Nicholas Morello, who had built a criminal operation in New York City, which was eventually able to challenge all other gangs for territorial

The Italian Mafias

51

Figure 2.2 Black Hand signature

control. Saietta joined the Morello gang from which he carried out his own Black Hand operations, exploiting the innate distrust of authority among the immigrants into a self-serving racket. He used Black Hand tactics to expand into other criminal areas. Black Hand terror was real. In 1908, there were over 400 documented cases of Black Hand extortion in New York City. Between 1910 and 1914, there were over 100 murders attributed to the Black Hand. The power of the symbolism did not go unnoticed by the early moviemakers. An early silent film short, The Black Hand (1906), originally in Italian (La mano nera), became highly popular throughout America. Another movie of the same name came out in 1909. It was a stark portrait of the damaging effects of imported criminal culture based on the funeral of Italian-Amer ican police detective Giuseppe (Joe) Petrosino, the first officer to understand the need for American police forces to cooperate with Italian ones in weeding out the American Mafia. Petrosino came to prominence as a champion against Black Hand operations in New York City. As an Italian-speaking officer, he understood the nuances of the Italian language and the cultural ideology behind the code of honor used by the criminals. No one knows who murdered Petrosino – a murder that was carried out while he was secretly visiting Palermo to orchestrate a cooperative anti-Mafia crusade. His body was returned to New York and his funeral was attended by more than 250,000 people. The movie was a filmic snapshot of the growing brutality of la malavita (“the bad life”) that Mafia culture entailed. It warned of things to come at the same time that it captured a gangster ethos that both repelled and appealed to the movie audiences of the silent film era.

52  The Italian Mafias

Joseph Petrosino (1860–1909) Petrosino was a New York City policeman who became famous as an anti-­Mafia fighter in the United States. He was born in Padula, south of Naples, emigrating to the United States in 1860. After joining the New York City Police force, as an Italian-­speaking officer, he was assigned to handle crime in the Italian communities of the city. In 1901, he uncovered the murderous activities of the Morello crime family, making it obvious that organized crime had entered America, even before Prohibition. A few years later, the NYPD established an “Italian Squad” unit, headed by Petrosino, which made a significant dint in the operations of the criminal gangs. As a result, unknown assassins murdered Petrosino in 1909 while he was visiting Sicily to gather evidence against several New York City mobsters, indicating that the American and Sicilian Mafias were in cahoots already in the early 1900s. New evidence of the reasons behind Petrosino’s murder has, however, recently emerged (see Nicaso, Barillà, and Amaddeo 2019) that connects the murder to corruption in New York, where Petrosino was aware of the dishonest operations of political organizations in the city. At the time, elected officials routinely franchised vice and crime in exchange for money and votes. The crime syndicates could not have existed without the official blessing of those who controlled municipal, county, and state government, including police chiefs. Petrosino’s clash with the role players may have been the motivation for his murder.

The Black Hand episode has left residues of conspiratorial intrigue to this day, as can be seen in one of the conspiracy theories surrounding the murder of President John F. Kennedy, popularized by American director Oliver Stone in his 1991 movie JFK. The theory claims that the murder was the result of collusion between the Mafia, the FBI, and the CIA. Whether sustainable or not, the point is that it reflects the broader issue of the role of immigrant criminals in the affairs of North America generally. For example, during testimony of the 1885 commission on Chinese immigration policies in Canada, a chief of police gave the following revelatory testimony (in Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, Report and Evidence 1885: 87): It brings us face to face with a most sinister element in Chinese crime. A society of highbinders exists, which overawes Chinamen who would be disposed to aid the law, protects the keepers of brothels, and undertakes, it is said, for money, assassinations. They live in fact by organized crime.

The Italian Mafias 53

The report recommended legislation to restrict Chinese immigration into Canada, despite evidence that Chinese communities were important contributors to the economy and society generally. It is truly unfortunate that the criminal activities of a specific group of individuals within an immigrant community is generalized as a character trait to the whole society. When bolstered by images of criminality in movies and other media, the stereotype becomes an unconscious one, making it rather difficult to eradicate. In 1934, politician Charles Washburn made the claim in his book, Come into My Parlor, that the Black Hand murders were invented by a reporter for the Chicago Examiner, Charlie Johnson, in order to advance his own career. Johnson used the Black Hand symbol to sensationalize ordinary killings that occurred in Italian communities, using it to grab the attention of his readers. Every Italian shooting was framed as a Black Hand crime. Washburn had obtained his information in a 1936 interview with Minna and Ada Everleigh, proprietors of the famous high-­class Everleigh brothel that operated in Chicago from 1900 to 1911. Johnson was a regular customer of the brothel. Washburn’s story is supported by accounts that the Chicago Examiner was owned by William Randolph Hearst, famous for turning news into sensationalist tabloid-­style items (Lombardo 2010). Even before Washburn’s book, reporter Jack Lait, who became famous for his own book, Chicago Confidential (1950), claimed in a 1918 article that a fellow reporter was responsible for the Black Hand name, explaining that it was common for newspaper reporters to embellish and even to forge articles in order to get their editor’s attention and that it was a common practice to use Italian words and events in Italian communities for headlines. Already in 1911, American wildlife artist Charles Robert Knight protested against the use of the term Black Hand as an example of discrimination targeting an immigrant community in a letter he wrote to the Chicago Record-­Herald. Knight cited the case of Joseph Vacek who, after having killed his own father, left a note at the crime scene signed “Mano Nera” (Black Hand). After the young Vacek had confessed to the truth, his ruse made it obvious that the term was used to scapegoat people whom society was targeting as criminal with no reason other than the fear of otherness (as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 14).

References Alexander, Shana (1988). The Pizza Connection: Lawyers, Drugs, and the Mafia. London: W. H. Allen. Anderson, Robert T. (1965). From Mafia to Cosa Nostra. The American Journal of Sociology 71: 302–310. Benigno, Francesco (2015). La mala setta. Alle origini di Mafia e Camorra 1859–1878. Torino: Einaudi. Bolzoni, Attilio (2013). White Shotgun: The Sicilian Mafia in Their Own Words. New York: Macmillan. Cawthorne, Nigel and Cawthorne, Colin (2009). The Mafia: First-­Hand Accounts of Life Inside the Mob. London: Constable & Robinson.

54  The Italian Mafias Cisterna, Alberto (2011). The Parabola of the Mafia from the Italian Unification to the Present. Gnosis: Rivista Italiana di Intelligence. http://gnosis.aisi.gov.it/gnosis/Rivista26.nsf/ ServNavigE/11. Cockburn, Claud (1981). Cockburn Sums Up. London: Quartet Books. Cutrera, Antonino (1900). La mafia e i mafiosi. Palermo: Reber. Dickie, John (2004). Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia. London: Houghton and Stoughton. Fox, Edward T. (2013). Piratical Schemes and Contracts: Pirate Articles and Their Society, 1660– 1730. University of Exeter, Exeter, Ph.D. Thesis. Gambetta, Diego (1993). The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Grünewald, Thomas (2004). Bandits in the Roman Empire: Myth and Reality. London: Routledge. Hopwood, Keith (ed.) (2009). Organised Crime in Antiquity. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales. Lait, Jack (1950). Chicago Confidential. New York: Crown Publishers. La Sorte, Mike (2009). Cosa Nostra Power in Sicily. www.americanMafia.com/Feature_Articles_ 445.html. Lombardo, Robert M. (2010). The Black Hand: Terror by Letter. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Monnier, Marc (1862). La camorra. Firenze: Barbera. Natella, Pasquale (2002). La parola mafia. Firenze: Olschki. Nicaso, Antonio, Barillà, Maria and Amaddeo, Vittorio (2019). Quando la ’Ndrangheta scoprì l’America. Milano: Mondadori. Nicaso, Antonio and Danesi, Marcel (2013). Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Nicaso, Antonio and Lamothe, Lee (2005). Angels, Mobsters & Narco-­Terrorists: The Rising Menace of Global Criminal Empires. Toronto: John Wiley Paoli, Letizia (2003). Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pine, Jason (2012). The Art of Making Do in Naples. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Robinson, David (2001). Bandits, Eunuchs and the Son of Heaven: Rebellion and the Economy of Violence in Mid-­Ming China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Smith, Dwight C. (1976). Mafia: The Prototypical Alien Conspiracy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 423: 75–88. Swenson Danowitz, E. (2012). Chronology of Organized Crime Worldwide, 6000 B.C.E. to 2010. Reference Reviews 26: 25. Verga, Giovanni (1883). Novelle Rusticane. Torino: F. Casanova. Washburn, Charles (1934). Come into My Parlor: A Biography of the Aristocratic Everleigh Sisters of Chicago. New York: Knickerbocker Publishing. Woodiwiss, Michael (2001). Organized Crime and American Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Chapter 3

Other criminal organizations

Introduction The Italian Mafias discussed in the previous chapter are among the oldest OCs, self-­constructed by taking advantage of social conditions and political events and perpetuating themselves through opportunism, adaptability, corruption, symbolic strategies, codes of honor, and Robin-­Hood origin stories that fit in with the narratives and folklore traditions of the locales from which they emerged. The formation patterns of the Italian Mafias are not unique  – organized crime groups across the world have emerged on the basis of similar strategies of opportunism, adaptation, and symbolism. Two of the best-­known ones are the Yakuza in Japan and the Triads in China, which will be discussed in this chapter. These are classifiable alongside the Italian OCs as classic, or traditional, criminal groups (Chapter 1). We will also look at outlaw motorcycle gangs and the Russian Vory v Zakone as neophyte gangs – in the sense that they emerged after the traditional ones, and so could also be named emergent gangs. We will deal with criminal groups such as the drug cartels in subsequent chapters. The focus here is on how the Yakuza, Triads, Vory v Zakone, and the Hells Angels exemplify the same kinds of patterns of all criminal organizations, fitting in with the definition and characterization of organized crime put forth by the Organized Crime Control Act (1970), which defined organized criminal groups as self-­contained enclaves that have the ability, means, and resources to spread throughout society. In other words, OCs are threats to mainstream cultures and local economies, having increased their presence worldwide through cooperative syndicates among themselves, making them even more powerful. The cultural study of OCs is a complex one, since the gangs can no longer be pinned down to specific geographical areas as in the past. Nonetheless, a starting point for understanding the lure of organized crime is to grasp the underlying reasons for the emotional power and historical significance of the classic criminal organizations – since they are the ones that have transformed criminality into a pseudo-­story of honorable brotherhoods, which, like the pirates of the past, impose the taking of oaths of allegiance and rules of behavior that are designed to keep the gangs intact and self perpetuating.

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The Yakuza Along with the Italian Mafias, the Japanese Yakuza is one of the best known of the classic OCs, having become ingrained into mainstream Japanese culture, having a hand, today, in almost every aspect of Japanese society, from an engagement in legitimate businesses to roles played within the political system. Also, like the Italian Mafias, the Yakuza spins origin tales that are designed to connect it to Japanese history and its foundational values, claiming to be descendants of the Tekiya and Bakuto during the Edo period (1600–1867). The former were traveling peddlers, while the Bakuto were gamblers who ran small illegal gambling houses and augmented their income by loan sharking. Both groups were claimed to support poor people in a Robin-­Hood way. The Edo government recognized them, so the legend goes, by giving them the authority to carry swords, which was a privilege previously enjoyed only by noblemen and samurai warriors; together they formed the Yakuza, a word that comes from a card game that the Bakuto played called oicho-­kabu-­oicho, similar to blackjack or baccarat, in which the term Yakuza refers to the losing hand of the game – ya, ku, sa (“eight,” “nine,” “three”). To this day, Yakuza gangs might refer to themselves as Tekiya or Bakuto, depending on their perceptions of themselves or on the specific methods they employ of attaining money, legal or illegal. Traditional Japanese culture values strong family ties and places great importance on giving respect to elders. The Yakuza’s organizational structure mirrors these values, and, like the Mafias, the new members, called kobun (“foster children”), must take an oath to cut ties from their own biological families, pledging blind allegiance to their new family and unquestioning obedience to the leader, called the oyabun. As Peter Hill (2003) writes, among the Yakuza, “if the oyabun says that the passing crow is white, then the kobun must agree.” Yakuza organizational structure has hierarchical tiers that are almost identical to those of the Mafias, with the family head at the top and the others falling into line below him (see Chapter 4). Those who have traditionally sought membership into the Yakuza tend to be from poorer backgrounds or are social misfits. The Yakuza clan has thus functioned as an adoptive family, providing dispossessed youth with a sense of belonging to a substitute family system. Each Yakuza clan is structured and its members named as if they were in a real family, with a father (oyabun) at the top and the children (kobun) at the bottom. As Kaplan and Dubro (2003: 19) write: “The oyabun provides advice, protection, and help, and in return receives the unswerving loyalty and service of his kobun when needed.” Initiation rites are formal, including an exchange of sake cups (a traditional rice alcoholic drink) to symbolize the exchange of blood (metaphorically) between the oyabun and the kobun. The ceremony was carried out traditionally in a Shinto shrine, imbuing it with religious undertones – although today it is more likely that the members meet in a room set up with Shinto décor. Interestingly, the importance of religious symbolism for initiation purposes connects the Yakuza to

Other criminal organizations 57

the ’Ndrangheta. A candidate for admission into the latter must participate in a ceremony in which his index trigger finger is pricked and the blood smeared on the picture of a saint. The picture is then set on fire, burning the initiate’s hands as he swears his loyalty and silent obedience to the family. Blood is not exchanged in the Yakuza ceremony, but sake is a metaphor for blood, since rice is seen as a life-­giving substance in Japan. Also like the Italian Mafias, the Yakuza have a code used to stipulate the “way of life” that members must follow uncritically. The code thus legitimizes criminal acts as simply part of the duties of members, thus allowing them to perceive themselves as being apart from existing law systems. It also allows members to see themselves as ninkyō dantai, which translates as “chivalrous organization,” an almost identical notion to the cavalleria rusticana (“rustic chivalry”) of the Sicilian Mafia (as will be discussed). This means that the Yakuza must reach out to common people in need with acts of aid and charity – as was witnessed when the gang sent aid to Kobe (1995) and Tōhoku (2011) after devastating earthquakes in those regions. Such acts emphasized the fact that the Yakuza was able to respond more effectively and quickly to the disasters than the Japanese government, even though this was not reported widely by the media at the time. Another key point of comparison between the Yakuza and the Italian Mafias is the corruption of officials and the funneling of illegally gained money into legitimate businesses, as Lunde (2004: 9–10) points out: Organized crime is an economic activity, and differs from street gangs like the Bloods and Crips, not just in the degree of organization and purpose, but because organized crime accumulates capital and reinvests it. It is this that differentiates organized criminal groups from street gangs and “unorganized” criminals. It is the accumulated capital of organized groups like the U.S. Mafia and the Yakuza that enables them to buy the political protection that allows them to diversify and to respond to market shifts, such as the upsurge in demand for illicit drugs in the 1980s and human trafficking in the 1990s. The Yakuza maintain their chivalric image by avoiding common theft, armed robbery, and other pedestrian and random criminal acts, thus avoiding the perception that they are street thugs (katagi ni meiwaku wo kakenai). They also leave the “dirty work” of carrying out killings and vendettas to enforcers and outside hired gangsters, which allows the Yakuza members to keep their hands clean in the public eye. This thus leaves them space and time to carry out their primary criminal activities. For instance, the Yakuza are now leading sex traffickers, having become adept at tricking young women from poorer Asian countries, like the Philippines and Indonesia, with the promise of a job in Japan but instead trapping them into prostitution and other sexual lifestyles. The Yakuza are also involved in the entertainment business, both as operators and providers of private protection for establishments. However,

58  Other criminal organizations

their ability to collect protection money has diminished over the years, in large part because of the introduction of anti-­Yakuza regulations that make it illegal to give money to Yakuza groups (Baradel 2020). So the focus of the gang has shifted considerably. For example, they have developed strong ties to the real estate market and banking sectors through a system of illicit partnerships called jiageya, which involve pressuring small real estate owners to sell their lands in order for large development plans to come under the control of the Yakuza. Although the government has tried to crack down on these activities, its efforts have been largely unsuccessful because, as Jake Adelstein (2012: 156) writes, “The modern-­day Yakuza is an innovative entrepreneur. Rather than a bunch of tattooed nine-­fingered thugs in white suits wielding samurai swords, a more appropriate description would be ‘Goldman Sachs with guns’.” Another key parallel between the Yakuza and the Italian Mafias is opportunism. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Mafias took advantage of World War II to re-­ establish themselves by forming tacit agreements with the Allies. After the War, they were thus free, initially, to control black markets of all kinds. Similarly, in the same timeframe, the Yakuza took advantage of the lack of resources and disorganized police forces to gain control over the black markets in Japan (Paoli 2014). Yakuza groups also worked as labor brokers during the Korean War, developing close links to many hospitality businesses such as bars, restaurants, sexual services, and pinball parlors. In the early 1980s, the Yakuza expanded overseas to San Francisco, from where they smuggled drugs and guns back into Japan. Today, the Yakuza is composed of multiple groups operating at national and international levels; most clans are associated with one of three national syndicates  – the Rokudaime Yamaguchi-­ gumi, the Inagawa-­ kai, and the Sumiyoshi-­kai (Hill 2003). These have adopted the same kind of organizational structure, composed of ikka, meaning families composed of father-­son and brother-­brother relationships. This structure closely resembles that of Cosa Nostra, the Chinese Triads, and other gangs (Chapter 4). While the contemporary Yakuza no longer adhere closely to the older traditions and symbols, they nevertheless continue to endorse them in some key ways, such as the wearing of tattoos for symbolic purposes and using specific greeting rituals among themselves that allow them to declare and maintain distinctiveness from mainstream society.

Yakuza traditions Traditional “jingi” greeting •

Jingi. This is the traditional greeting members use when meeting new members; it is performed with a forward crouch, which symbolizes a martial-­arts stance of defense and of respect to the other.

Other criminal organizations

• •

• • •

Irezumi. This is the tradition of wearing full-bodied tattoos (Chapter 7), which are meant to reflect the individual and collective experiences that are considered meaningful to the group. Yubitsume. This refers to the ritualistic self-amputation of a finger as an apology to the leader for committing a mistake or violating the Yakuza code; it is a self-immolating act of contr ition, symbolizing enduring commitment to the group. Allegiance Activities. Yakuza members must attend various ceremonies such as weddings, funerals, and jail releases to demonstrate their closeness to individual members as a group. Appearance. Yakuza members are encouraged to adopt specific kinds of clothing, hairstyles, speech mannerisms, and even a unique style of walking to show their appurtenance to the gang. Non-Conformity. Traditional Japanese society places great value on conformity – a common Japanese proverb states that “The nail that sticks up must be hammered down.” Individualism generates suspicion. But acts of individualism inspire silent admiration. This is why the Yakuza, which stubbornly refuses to fit into the traditional Japanese social mold, has secret admirers among the Japanese populace. Yakuza members show conformity to their own codes and rules, but they are seen as nonconformist vis-à-vis society at large, which enhances their Robin-Hood image as warriors who stand at the margins of society.

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As mentioned, after decades of adapting to economic and political change after World War II, Yakuza gangs have built and solidified strong legitimate businesses. Originally, the Yakuza gained much of their income from illegal gambling, which they have not abandoned completely, running casinos and online gambling schemes throughout Japan and the world (Paoli 2014). The police closed down 300 online casino booths owned by Yakuza groups in the mid-­2000s. Since then, the income generated from gambling has been declining considerably, leading the gang to turn instead to the illegal drug and sex trades. Legislative attempts to clamp down on the Yakuza, and widespread politics of urban “hygienization,” have had a considerable impact on the Yakuza, weakening various clans considerably (Baradel 2020). However, the mythical image of the Yakuza as Robin-­Hood warriors persists in the collective imagination, as can be seen in the many movies about the Yakuza in Japan. According to legend, the Yakuza had few weapons in the beginning, using their bare hands and pugilistic skills to vanquish their opponents, like the ancient samurai warriors. They thus rose to folk hero status in a very short time, with their exploits being extolled and magnified in legends, stories, and plays about them. As Lunde (2004: 95) observes: “Yakuza leaders have devised largely mythological genealogies linking themselves to these past folk heroes.” In most of their self-­created legends, the Yakuza trace their ancestry to the ronin, “masterless samurai warriors,” who were a warrior group that defended the estates of aristocrats. The real samurai wore a distinctive helmet and armor and used two curved swords, one long and one short. They became folk heroes throughout Japan. Although the lure of the Yakuza is diminishing in Japan, some still see, or want to see, the organization as a direct descendant of medieval warriors with their martial arts skills and their codes of honor.

Tomoe Gozen (c. 1157–1247) The samurai emerged from two historically significant feudal conflicts in Japan: the Genpei War (1180–1185) and the Warring States (1467– 1590). The former produced the Kamakura shogunate (1185–1333); the latter the Tokugawa shogunate, which ruled Japan from 1603 to 1868. Given the masculinist nature of the Yakuza, it is ironic to note that one of the first famous samurai warriors was a female, Tomoe Gozen (c. 1157–1247), who distinguished herself with her ferocity and bravery. This indicates how implausible the Yakuza ronin story is. Before the samurai became a formalized caste, women were trained to use weaponry to protect communities with few male fighters. Tomoe led over 1000 cavalry soldiers, chopping off opponents’ heads mercilessly. In The Tale

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of the Heike, an epic poem about the war written around 1309, it is stipulated that in addition to Tomoe’s beauty, “She was also a remarkably strong archer, and as a swords-woman she was a warrior worth a thousand, ready to confront a demon or a god, mounted or on foot.” It is not known what became of her, but she has since become an iconic cultural figure, etched into prints and literature.

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Another tale that the Yakuza spin about themselves is called machi-­yakko, which refers to a group of self-­styled warriors who fought roving gangs that assailed common people. The most famous of the leaders of these warriors was Banzuiin Chōbei, born into a family in southern Japan, who journeyed to Tokyo around 1640, where he joined his brother, who was the chief priest of a Buddhist temple. Chōbei became a labor leader, recruiting workers to build the road surrounding Tokyo and to repair the stone walls around the shogun’s palace. Using a ploy that would become a Yakuza mainstay, he opened a gambling den. The betting not only served to attract workers but also enabled Chōbei to take back a portion of the salaries he paid to them. According to one of the many stories that were subsequently written about his life, Chōbei became the leader of Tokyo’s machi-­yakko, carrying out great deeds – such as saving a girl from assault, arranging the marriage of two lovers once unable to wed because of their different social classes, and so on. Whenever thanked by those he helped, Chōbei would answer: “We have made it our principle to live with a chivalrous spirit. When put to the sword, we’ll lose our lives. That’s our fate. I just ask you to pray for the repose of my soul when my turn comes.” While characters such as Chōbei were historically real, the tales told about them are largely fiction. There are so many of these that it is hard to pin any of them down to any verifiable source. Interestingly, some stories are told widely about the Yakuza that they themselves deny. One of these is the legend of the so-­called kabuki-­mono (“crazy men”), who stood out from common folk with their odd clothing styles, bizarre haircuts, long swords, and violent behavior. The kabuki-­mono would use their swords to cut down anyone who went against them or even for the sheer pleasure of it. They spoke a dialectal slang so that no one could listen in on their plans. They swore absolute loyalty to each other, no matter what the circumstances, even going against their own families, if necessary. Having no established system of leadership, they eventually lost their ability to operate in a unified way and thus started to wander nomadically around Japan as bandits pillaging villages and towns. The Yakuza, according to this legend, descended from this band of gangster-­warriors, which the gang denies. Like the Mafia, they concoct tales about themselves linking themselves to chivalry and a Robin Hood code, taking up arms against criminals in defense of towns and villages, garnering the support of the people as a consequence. The chivalric images that the Yakuza have devised are, however, changing, as members adapt to changing times to ensure their future existence. Their traditional criminal activities have become less and less viable as they turn more and more to cybercrimes and diversified criminal activities. Since the 1990s, the Yakuza lost much of its power due to increasingly restrictive legislation, the hemorrhaging of members, and the difficulty of attracting new members. The weakened grip of the Yakuza on the underworld led to the emergence

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of new forms of crime, commonly referred to as hangure (Baradel 2020). Like other historical OCs, the Yakuza have survived and will likely continue to survive because of their adaptability to change. Moreover, their image as honorable warriors with great martial-­arts skills has been inculcated into the popular imagination through film, television, and even video games, despite the counterpart portrayals of the gang as a vicious group of gangsters.

Contrasting Yakuza images in popular culture Cinema Twentieth-­century Yakuza films are based on two contrasting themes – the Yakuza as honorable and respectable men versus the Yakuza as criminals who use brutal violence and intimidation to get what they want. Films like Brutal Tales of Chivalry (1963) fall into the first category, and those like the Battles Without Honor and Humanity set of movies in the 1970s into the second. Today, Japanese cinema shows how tradition and modernity overlap in the criminal gang’s perceptions of itself. Yakuza films have also been popular in the West, with movies such as The Yakuza (1975), Black Rain (1989), and The Outsider (2018) that have reinforced the image of the Yakuza as an honorable society that, while involved in crime, still has (purported) respect for traditional values.

Television The Yakuza have appeared in various American TV programs. The lead fictitious character in the police crime drama Hawaii Five-­0 (starting in 2010) is a former head of the Yakuza who took over after his father died. As a Yakuza, he is brave, strong, and skilled in pugilism, solving crimes honorably and effectively. An episode of The Simpsons called “The Twisted World of Marge Simpson” (January 19, 1997) is a satirical jab at both the Yakuza and the Mafia. In it, we see Marge’s pretzel rivals beckon the Yakuza to appear outside the Simpson family house to engage in a fight with a Mafia family led by Fat Tony.

Video games There are various video games that further enshrine Yakuza mythology into the popular imagination. For example, the game series Yakuza, which was launched in 2005, revolves around different ranking members

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of the Yakuza, as well their associates (corrupt policemen and loan sharks). The series espouses the same themes of the films, including Yakuza violence, honor, politics, and the status of the gang in Japan. It has spawned sequels, a movie, and a web TV series. Other video games featuring Yakuza characters and themes include Grand Theft Auto III (launched 2001), where a Yakuza clan helps the protagonist against the Mafia and other gangster groups, such as the Colombian cartels, and Hitman 2: Silent Assassin (launched 2002), which involves the Yakuza in several plots and subplots.

The Triads Another historical organized crime group that displays similar features to the Italian Mafias and the Yakuza is the Chinese Triads. The origin of the name Triad is connected to the symbolism of the triangle with vertices representing Heaven, Earth, and Man, as used in Confucianism. Interestingly, among the Chinese people, they are commonly referred to as Hut Sei Woo, or “black societies,” rather than Triads. The main profit-­garnering activities of the Triads today include human and drug trafficking, illegal gambling, racketeering, counterfeiting, and various online schemes. There are numerous factions of the organization, the most notorious being the Wo Shing Wo group, established in Hong Kong in the 1930s. Like the Mafia and the Yakuza, a popular culture has arisen around the Triads, which has largely shaped how people perceive them. Films like the Bruce Lee movie Enter the Dragon (1973) portray them as a highly disciplined and organized network of brave martial-­arts warriors, whose origins and rules of conduct are shrouded in mystery but which make them chivalrous, using their skills in the service of common folk. Pop culture has also mythologized many of the traditions of the Triads, including their blood initiation rituals and the thirty-­six oaths the new members are expected to take. Today, some of these have been lost or at least attenuated, even if films continue to romanticize them. The modern Triads are a network of loosely affiliated groups rather than the disciplined, ritualistic, and rank-­based organized crime entities of the past. Nevertheless, some of the traditions of the past continue to be practiced, albeit in less dramatic ways. Without these, the Triads would degenerate into common delinquents both in their own perceptions and that of society more generally. Triad-­like groups originated in China the seventeenth century. In the most common origin tale they tell about themselves, they are said to be descendants of Buddhist monks employed by the emperor to fight against the Manchu invasion that installed the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Some of the monks eventually splintered away, turning to criminal activities following the 1912 collapse

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of the Qing empire that left a power vacuum and vast insecurity in China. They organized themselves into gangs for the purposes of profitable criminal activities, from opium trafficking to illegal gambling, with little opposition. The gangs remained operational until 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party rose to power and began its crackdown on them. This caused many of them to escape to neighbouring territories, forming new gangs or aligning themselves with other criminal organizations that had emerged previously. Most ended up in Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan, where they abandoned the ritualistic and symbolic traditions associated with the original Triads. Hong Kong is the Triad’s home base for planning operations worldwide. This became their headquarters after the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong during World War II, which created the conditions that made it possible for the Triads to consolidate control over illegitimate industries by supporting the foreign authorities, who in turn gave them immunity for their opium dens, brothels, and gambling venues. After the occupation ended, the accumulated power and wealth of the Triads allowed them to continue to grow until Communist China gained indirect control of the city in 1997. Since then, the group has been in decline in Hong Kong, especially since it has suffered a breakdown in its traditional structure, leading to a lack of discipline in the ranks, at the same time that there has been an increase in crackdowns by the Chinese government in both Hong Kong and China generally. As a result, the Triads have become weaker and less influential, suffering significant decreases in membership. Despite such setbacks, the Triads continue to operate in secret and as part of transnational criminal organizations. The OC has also found new life in the group called the Tongs  – an organization that started among Chinese immigrants living in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. The word means “gathering halls,” alluding to meeting halls in most Chinatowns, where they would intermingle with common people. Today, many Tong groups are, for the most part, members of benevolent associations, providing essential services to Chinatown communities such as immigrant counseling and English classes for adults. But others continue the pattern of criminality of the Triads. The first Tong groups in America are traced to San Francisco in 1874. They formed a protective association to defend Chinese merchants against prejudicial attacks and brutal treatments directed at them by the inhabitants of the city. Eventually, they became powerful enough to sell protection to any merchant and to establish illegal gambling halls. Their success at extortion and gambling activities led them to branch out to include opium distribution. In 1900, rival Tongs ignited a series of turf wars that lasted intermittently until the 1930s. It was at that time that the American public became fully aware of the Tongs that lived amongst them through media exposure. Like other organized criminal groups, the Triads spin fanciful Robin-­ Hood legends about their origins. The main one tells of a community of monks who lived in the Fukien Province of China in the Shao Lin monastery in the 1600s, who became masters in the art of war. When a foreign

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prince and his army invaded China, the emperor sent 128 of these monks to throw out the invading forces. After three months of bitter fighting, the monks routed the enemy and returned to their monastery laden with gifts and honors from the grateful emperor. While the monks were content to resume their lives of contemplation, some of the emperor’s ministers were jealous of the favors he had bestowed upon them and persuaded him that the monks were deceptively planning a rebellion. Fearful of their martial arts skills, the emperor decided to attack the monks without warning, sending a strong force of the Imperial Guard, armed with gunpowder, to destroy the monastery. It is said that the flames ignited by the blasts soared up to heaven, where they were seen by the “Immortals” who, perceiving the injustices being dealt against the monks, came down to Earth, knocking down one of the monastery’s huge walls, enabling 18 monks to escape. Most of them were so badly burned that they soon died, but five of them survived miraculously. After undergoing many ordeals, the five monks came to Fukien Province, where they founded the mystical City of Willows, vowing to avenge the death of their fellow monks. The monks came to be known as the Five Ancestors of the Triads, establishing five Provincial Grand Lodges, each led by one of the five monks. Through these Five Ancestors, the Triads link themselves to the history of China and the Ming Dynasty, thereby portraying themselves as descendants of freedom fighters. This positive image is the basis of a common Chinese aphorism: “The army protects the Emperor, but the secret societies protect the people.” The Triads have thus embedded themselves into Chinese history, cementing their image from generation to generation. The traditional initiation rite of the Triads pays tribute to this supposed historical event. It takes place in a lodge representing the City of Willows and is headed by an Incense Master dressed in white alongside the group’s leader, dressed in red (Morgan 2000). All other members present are dressed in black. The rite starts with a martial-­arts-­type dance, as the prospective new member approaches from the east gate where he is challenged by another member, with whom he is expected to exchange a ritual handshake. He then passes under swords held in the form of an arch and through three more gates guarded by statues of famous Triads. The initiate then reaches the altar, stepping through a bamboo hoop. This has historical significance. It alludes to the legend of the Five Ancestors escaping from the Shao Lin monastery, and it symbolizes the member’s rebirth into his new family. He then takes the 36 oaths, the last one of which pays direct homage to the Five Ancestors: After entering the Hong Gates, I  shall be loyal and faithful and shall endeavor to overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming by coordinating my efforts with those of my sworn brothers, even though my brothers and I may not be in the same profession. Our common aim is to avenge our Five Ancestors.

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The new member’s finger is pricked and dipped in a bowl containing spices, wine, ashes, and the blood of a rooster. The concoction is then shared by everyone in attendance. The Triads also use numbers to label each other – a practice that goes back to the I Ching and sacred numerology (Mallory 2012). For example, the foot soldiers are named “49-­ers,” because the digits, when multiplied, equal 36, alluding to the 36 Oaths: 4 × 9 = 36. Others in the ranks are labeled with the digit 4 in some numerical position, a number that refers to the common Chinese superstition that 4 is bad luck, as it sounds similar to “death” in the language. Up until the end of the nineteenth century, the Triads might have actually been a monastic secret society rather than a criminal organization. But all this changed in 1900 after the Boxer Rebellion, a bloody uprising in northern China. It was the climax of a movement that started in the late nineteenth century against influence from the West and Japan into China, started by a secret Chinese group called Yihequan (“Righteous and Harmonious Fists”), which had connections with the Triad monks. They were nicknamed Boxers by westerners because they showed expertise in pugilism. The Boxers set out to destroy everything they considered foreign, slaughtering anyone who supported western ideas. Foreign diplomats in Beijing sent out calls for help. But the Manchu government itself declared war against the foreign invaders. Allied with the Boxers, government troops took over the official residences of foreign diplomats, whom civilians resisted courageously, until a rescue force of eight nations crushed the uprising. It was clear to the Triads that it would be impossible to throw out the foreigners. At that point, Reynolds (2006: 164) writes, the Triads turned inward: If they could not win against foreign abuse, they would win by exploiting their own people, growing in strength and dissociating themselves from any non-­Chinese influence or threat, although they retained interest in, and influence on, political issues for some time. Their most significant move was to provide support for Dr. Sun Yat-­sen’s overthrow of the Manchu Ch’ing dynasty, replacing the emperor with a republican system of government. Sun may have actively recruited the triads to ensure his revolution’s success, an obvious move if he had been, as many observers suggest, an enforcer in the triad Green Gang/Three Harmonies Society (San Ho-­Hui) during his youth. Today, as mentioned, the Triads are less powerful than they once were inside China, so they have migrated to transnational criminal gangsterism (see Chapter 10), having adapted to the changing times. Like the other traditional OCs, they too have been glorified by popular culture. There are myriad movies based on Triad myths, in which the martial-­arts skills of the gangsters and their ability to control turf effectively are front and center. Television programs and video games based on the crime gang have also become popular, such as the 2012 video game Sleeping Dogs, which is set in Hong Kong and in which a player

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can assume the role of Wei Shen, an undercover police officer on a mission to infiltrate the Triads, with his own pugilistic skills. Today, the Triads are involved in a wide variety of crimes ranging from extortion and prostitution to fraud, drug trafficking, arms, and copyright infringement, operating via a transnational network while retaining corrupt ties to officials. There are many historical examples of the Triad’s political savvy, which was recognized by political leaders like Chiang Kai-­shek of the Kuomintang Nationalists and Mao Zedong of the Communist Party in China. There is also the claim that Dr. Sun Yat-­sen, considered “the father of modern China,” had Triad ties in his youth as an enforcer. Mao Zedong even wrote on the Triads in his Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society (1926), going so far to label them “a useful section of society to rely on, but apt to be violent.” During the Chinese Civil War, both Chiang Kai-­shek and Mao Zedong actually sought the support of the Triads, culminating in the evolution of the modern Triad gangs. Parallels can be drawn between the Triads and Russian gangs such as the Georgian chapter of the Vory v Zakone, who have also integrated themselves into the political sphere in the post-­Soviet world. During the nineteenth century in Canada and America, the Triads emerged in Chinese communities, which were targets of anti-­Chinese sentiment, labeled the “Yellow Peril,” and blamed for increases in the availability of opium. As a consequence, community groups were formed for support and protection but turned to illegal activities like gambling to financially support themselves. These groups took on the name of Tongs, as mentioned previously. The Tongs share features with the Triads, with similar traditions, rituals, and beliefs based in Chinese culture. Tongs differ from the Triads in level of criminality, with most modern-­day Tongs turning away from crime to help immigrants adapt to their new environments (Shanty and Mishra 2008). In Canada and the United States, various Chinese street gangs have emerged, which are different from the Triads, accepting both native and non-­native Chinese members. The Big Circle Gang, or 大圈仔, is one of the most notorious of these gangs. It actually originated from the exiles of the purges in China of “social pariahs” by the Communist Party in the 1950s (Chung 2008). The exiles consisted of political opponents to the Communist Party, Triad members, and various freedom fighters, who turned to crime for survival, spreading first around Hong Kong and eventually to other areas around the world. The Big Circle gang is now headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, and is involved in all kinds of crimes, from heroin smuggling to the United States to warfare with other street gangs. Alliances between the Big Circle and other Asian American gangs, such as Tiny Raskal Gang, Realist Dragon Family, and Ghost Shadows, are common. In this admixture of gangs, the legacy of the original Triads has not disappeared. The largest Hong Kong Triad groups, like the 14K Triad, the Sun Yee On, or New Righteousness and Peace Commercial and Industrial Guild, and the Wo Shing Wo, all have branches in Canada and the United States, some of which go back to the 1930s. The Triads exist just below the

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social radar screen, along with their countless offshoots. They may look different, and even escape attention, but they are still around, probably because of guanxi – the system of social networks and influential associations that open doors for new opportunities. Someone who has a large guanxi is seen as being able to generate more business than somneone who does not.

Outlaw biker gangs The first outlaw biker gangs emerged in the post-­World War II era of the latter half of the 1940s in California. Unlike the Italian Mafias, the Yakuza, and the Triads, these gangs tell no legendary tales about themselves  – they simply consider themselves original American rebels, standing apart from mainstream society, which they see as timid, gutless, and too liberal in its politics and social worldview. They live by their own rules, ignoring society’s laws and norms, seeing themselves as the last truly “free citizens” in the world (Veno and Gannon 2012). The initial gangs were breakaway factions from legitimate recreational clubs of motorcycle riders, differentiating themselves from them, evolving gradually into subcultures with their own lifestyles and codes of conduct. Some of these have become major criminal organizations. The event that led to the formation of the first outlaw motorcycle gang took place on July 1947 at the American Motorcycle Association Gypsy Tour Event in Hollister, California. At the event, a member of a motorcycle club was arrested for disorderly conduct, which caused approximately 4000 other motorcyclists to storm the police station where the member was being held, demanding his release, using sabotage and vandalism to make their case, leading to other arrests. In reaction, the president of the American Motorcycle Association released a statement in which he indicated that ninety-­nine percent of the motorcycling community were law-­abiding citizens and only the other one percent were outlaws (Veno and Gannon 2012). This statement induced those who had rioted to distinguish themselves as the “1%,” using it immediately thereafter as a distinctive logo sewn onto their jackets. Since then, biker gangs have sprouted up throughout North America and now throughout the globe. Violence and intimidation are the primary methods used by the gangs to execute their crimes. They are also renowned for their vicious turf wars, such as the one that occurred between the Hells Angels and Rock Machine in Canada in the 1990s. During the war, over 160 bikers were killed, as well as two prison guards and an 11-­year old boy, causing a general uproar in society at large against biker gangs. The Hells Angels wanted complete control over the illegal distribution of drugs throughout Quebec, but Rock Machine refused to give up their hold over the drug trade in the region – hence the wars. The prototypical outlaw biker gang is the Hells Angels, formed on March  17, 1948, in Fontana, California, when several motorcycle clubs agreed to amalgamate. According to their website, their name was first suggested by a friend of the founders, named Arvid Olsen, who had served in the

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“Hell’s Angels” (with the apostrophe) squadron of the Flying Tigers in China during World War II. This is likely to be the gang’s own just-­so origin story, designed to evoke the image of fighters engaged in dangerous feats of bravery, as showcased in the 1930 Howard Hughes film Hell’s Angels. The gang became notorious across America by associating with a number of the leading actors of the hippie counterculture movement of the 1960s, including Allen Ginsberg, Jerry Garcia and the Grateful Dead, Timothy Leary, The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, and Tom Wolfe. The gang’s association with the movement came unraveled, however, at the Altamont Speedway Free Festival rock concert held on Saturday, December 6, 1969. By most accounts, the gang was hired as a security team by the Rolling Stones, who were among the musical acts at the concert. Although denied by the Stones that they were the ones who actually hired the gang, a tragic event occurred at the concert that has hounded the band ever since – a young African American named Meredith Hunter was stabbed multiple times by one of the Hells Angels, dying before the Stones had finished playing. Since then, the gang has become dissociated with youth movements, being seen as a band of ruthless mobsters. Today, the Hells Angels consists of geographically distributed chapters, including a national chapter that regulates membership standards and approves the creation of charters. The local chapters operate semi-­autonomously but must maintain certain standards and adopt specific rules set by the national chapter. Each chapter also has the same kind of initiation process. A prospect must put in time to show his mettle and fealty before a vote is taken in which unanimous consent is required by all members of the chapter in order to be accepted (Barker 2014). If the prospect is accepted, he must then undergo a final test of loyalty whereby he may be required to commit some sort of crime, such as theft or even murder. This test is meant to protect the gang against infiltration by law enforcement or intelligence groups, who might have sent an infiltrator into the gang in the guise of a prospect. Once voted in, the initiate becomes a “full-­patch” member – allowed to don a patch with the official Hells Angels’ skull-­wing insignia stitched on the back of his vest or jacket. Although the gang was formed in 1948, it was not until 1957 that it came to national prominence. That was the year when a high school toughie named “Sonny” Barger founded a motorcycle gang which he named the Hell’s Angels (with the apostrophe) unaware that a gang named Hells Angels already existed (without the apostrophe) (Barger 2009). Barger contacted the latter and proposed a merger, gradually building the gang into a powerful criminal organization, which even became legally incorporated in 1966, as Lunde (2004: 174) observes: Under Barger’s guidance they took steps to protect themselves from imitators in order to franchise the Angels “brand”; the Angels were legally incorporated in 1966 with an issue of 500 shares and the drawing up of

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a memorandum and articles of association, all with the wholly laudable aim of the promotion and advancement of motorcycle riding, motorcycle clubs, and highway safety. A patent on the Flying Death’s Head emblem was taken out in 1972. Revenue from breach of copyright cases has been used to establish defense funds for Angels charged with offenses from murder to racketeering. The Angels have also been able to secure tax-­exempt status with the formation of the Church of the Angel, of which there are numerous pastors. The gang is involved in all kinds of illegal activities. Nonetheless, it attempts to present a positive public image by participating in good deeds for the community. For instance, on an annual basis, several Hells Angels charters participate in local Toy Runs, where members will come with unwrapped gifts and monetary donations. But this image is tainted by accusations of racism and white supremacy against the gang, which it denies. However, some chapters or allied gangs, such as the White Boy Posse in Canada openly espouse racism.

The White Boy Posse The White Boy Posse is a white supremacist street-­biker gang, based in Edmonton, Canada, with connections to the Hells Angels. Their operations extend to Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories, and Alberta. The gang is involved in drug trafficking and carrying out brutal murders for hire, reputedly for gangs such as the Hells Angels. The Posse is infamous for their Nazi symbolism, as members brazenly wear Nazi tattoos. The Posse imposes brutal initiation rituals, including committing murder, granting membership only to those individuals capable of violent behavior.

Public perception of the biker gangs has been shaped by movies and television series, where they are often portrayed as ersatz freedom fighters whose aim is to liberate people from the tedium of everyday life and destroy the vacuous measures taken by mainstream society that purportedly constrain people’s ability to act independently. Starting with the iconic movie The Wild One (1953), the image of the tough macho biker, free from the false restraints of society, has become part of a popular criminal theater. Films such as Pee-­Wee’s Big Adventure (1985), the reality television series American Chopper (2003–2010), and Sons of Anarchy (first episode 2008), among others, have glorified the macho biker as

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last true “man” left standing in a world of deadening conformity and political correctness. The result has been a mythologization of the biker gangs that has made it virtually impossible to eradicate them legally, since we would need to start by eradicating them first from the screen.

The Vory v Zakone The gruesome conditions of prison life in Russia during the Tsarist period have been documented by a number of sources, including fictional ones, such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s House of the Dead (1862), based on the author’s experiences as a convict in Omsk from 1850 to 1854. Dostoyevsky’s novel showed how prison inmates can easily come together to form a criminal gang via in-­ prison social activities like card-­playing and storytelling. These were, in fact, the real conditions that eventually led to the emergence of a distinct Russian criminal gang called the Fraternity of the Vory v Zakone, meaning “thieves in law” in the Georgian language, during the Soviet Union. The name continues to be used to describe the many criminal groups that emerged in both the Soviet Union and after. Because it draws its origins from the prison culture of the Soviet era, the Vory v Zakone does not need to spin origin myths about itself as do the classic OCs. The term is actually much too limited to describe the sheer extension of the criminal gangs throughout Russia and the previous Soviet territories, with the many nationalities and ethnic groups that constitute it, including Chechen, Georgian, and Ukrainian clans, to name a few. To avoid internecine conflicts based on historical ethnic conflicts of the members in the clans, the Vory v Zakone operates at different levels of operation and command designed to promote cohesion, or at least to avoid strife among the clans. At the lower level, we find the Gruppirovki, who are bands of professional criminals operating as cells, followed by the Prestupnaia, who are middle-­level criminals composed of those who control operations, and finally, at the highest level, is the central command center composed of the Soobschestvo (Abadinsky 2016). The Vory v Zakone has become virtually untouchable by the authorities, having infiltrated the government in an insidious way. When the Soviet Union disbanded, so too did the formal and brutal law enforcement structure once utilized in the country, leaving wide gaps in the legal system. As a result, Vory groups took full advantage of the chaos, making tacit agreements with the government and military to guarantee beneficial mutual co-­existence (Abadinsky 2016). This led to a political system in modern Russia that is corrupt, allowing the gangster groups to operate virtually in full freedom, using brutal violence on anyone challenging them. There are substantive differences among the different Vory groups, however. Since the different clans operate in areas with different languages, native cultures, and political backgrounds, the hegemony of the Vory as a whole is threatened not by crackdowns but by multiculturalism. However, they are still

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united by several key features and ideologies. One of these is a penchant for religiosity, which in turn endears the gangs to a large section of the Russian people. Leading Vory members are often seen bowing and reciting prayers. They are also generous donors to religious projects. But behind the façade, the association with the Church is a strategy of self-­promotion and an example of “you scratch my back, and I will scratch yours,” since in recompense, the Church has access to the muscle of the gangsters to settle its own debts. Another feature that is shared by all the gangs is the use of tattoos, which are designed to indicate a member’s rank or something related to his criminal exploits. The practice started in the prisons but has now become a common one among all the Vory.

Meanings of some Vory tattoos • • • • • • • • • • •

Sun rays: the number and length of the individual’s prison terms Skull: a murderer Eagle: senior authority figure Cross: traditional symbol for thieves Hooded executioner: someone who has murdered a relative Ship with full sails: someone who has fled from custody Upside-­down spider: someone who has left the gang Crown: a criminal boss Bells: a long sentence with no chance of early release or, if placed on the right shoulder, a thief who stole from the Church Skull inside a square: convicted for robbery There are also tattoos that are forcibly applied to a prisoner to indicate demotion or scorn, allowing other prisoners to enact harsh treatment on the wearer. These are applied typically to those convicted of sexual crimes or those revealed to be stool pigeons

The Vory gangs have also developed a slang that provides insights into the mindset of the gangsters and the overall worldview of the Vory. The following are several illustrative examples: • •

Ponyatiya: literally meaning “notion,” are the unwritten life rules, models of behavior, traditions, norms, prohibitions, and so on that pertain to the criminal community. Mujik: meaning “man,” refers to the different kinds of men who are either part of the Vory or else associates and outsiders who are of relevance to the gang.

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• •

Vorovskoye: these are rules for all those who are part of, or support, the Vory, including codes of conduct, rules for internal justice, prohibitions (such as cooperating with the police), and so on. Nelyudskoye: literally “nonhumans,” refers to a large assortment of people, from homeless people and riff-­raff street criminals to those of diverse sexual orientations.

Some see the almost complete integration of the Vory into the Russian social and political mainstream as an example of the creation of a so-­called “Mafia state,” to be discussed subsequently. Suffice it to say here that this refers to a nation where the government and organized crime have formed an enduring partnership. In part, this has been brought about by the enormous changes that occurred following the collapse of the Soviet system, but in greater part, it has been brought about by the efficacy of the Vory to corrupt officials and to form alliances with the most unscrupulous and unprincipled leaders of the Russian polity. In February of 1993, the Russian Defense Ministry’s press officer announced that between 40,000 and 50,000 officers would be discharged every year (Varese 2001: 56). This created a vast number of disgruntled and unemployed Russian men with military training in a nation lacking legitimate employment opportunities. To compound this situation, under the Soviet Union, the vast majority of businesses and industries were state run, leading to their collapse following the Communist government’s own collapse. Powerful, corrupt oligarchs quickly bought out large swaths of the Russian industrial and economic sectors at a hugely undervalued price (Leonard and Pitt-­Watson 2015). The conditions were set for the corruption of the new Russian economy and political system to take place, with Russian businesses used as the economic engine for the propagation of criminal activity, starting with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 – a situation that parallels what happened in Sicily in 1860 with regard to the increased demand for property rights, and the emergence of criminal gangs to take advantage of the chaos created by the shift from a planned economy to a market one. When Vladimir Putin came to power, he entered into a tacit pact with the gangsters and the oligarchs, giving them a guarantee of secure operations in return for support of his government. This partnership has been mutually beneficial, allowing the Russian government to employ enforcers outside of official state channels. As Mark Galeotti (2017: 23) explains, the criminals are so nested into Russian politics and society that they themselves may not even know for whom they are working, but are typically Russian-­ based groups (who can thus be pressurised by the Kremlin) which, like “upperworld” businesses, can occasionally be “asked” to carry out missions large or small, from smuggling someone across a border to an outright murder, to avert Moscow’s ire and perhaps gain some advantage in the future.

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It is worrisome to note that similar Mafia states are springing up throughout the world, alongside the formation of larger and larger networks of criminal gangs through mergers and agreements via the Internet. The world is becoming “gangsterized” more and more  – a topic that will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

References Abadinsky, Howard (2016). Organized Crime. Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publishing. Adelstein, Jake (2012). Global Vice: The Expanding Territory of the Yakuza. Journal of International Affairs 66: 155–161. Baradel, Martina (2020). The Shaming of Paternalism in Japan: Recent Tendencies in the Japanese Criminal Justice System. SpringerLink. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ s12117-­019-­09357-­8/email/correspondent/c1/new. Barger, Sonny (2009). Hell’s Angel: The Autobiography of Sonny Barger. New York: Harper Collins. Barker, Thomas (2014). Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs as Organized Crime Groups. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Chung, Alex (2008). The Big Circle Boys: Revisiting the Case of the Flaming Eagles. Global Crime 9(4): 306–331. Galeotti, Mark (2017). Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages Its Political War in Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/controlling_chaos_ how_russia_manages_its_political_war_in_europe/. Hill, Peter (2003). The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, David E. and Dubro, Alec (2003). Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld. Berkeley: University of California Press. Leonard, Carol S. and Pitt-­Watson, David (2015). Privatization and Transition in Russia in the Early 1990s. London: Routledge. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Mallory, Stephen L. (2012). Understanding Organized Crime. Sudbury: Jones & Bartlett. Mao, Zedong (1926). Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Morgan, W. P. (2000). Triad Societies in Hong Kong. London: Routledge. Paoli, Letizia (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime. New York: Oxford University Press. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Shanty, Frank G. and Mishra, Patit Paban (eds.) (2008). Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism. Santa Barbara: ABC-­CLIO. Varese, Federico (2001). The Russian Mafia. New York: Oxford University Press. Veno, Arthur and Gannon, Edward (2012). The Brotherhoods: Inside the Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin.

Chapter 4

Organization

Introduction The traditional organized crime groups, from the Sicilian Mafia to the Japanese Yakuza, have survived and continue to operate effectively today because they have a stable structural feature – organization, with a leader, a chain of command, a set of internal rules of conduct, an agenda of operations, a way to allocate tasks, and so on. An OC can be structured in different ways, depending on its history, the society in which it emerges, its objectives, and its adaptive capacities. The Sicilian Mafia, for instance, is organized hierarchically, with a capofamiglia (“head of a family”) at the top, a sottocapo (“underboss”), a consigliere (“counselor”), a capodecina (one of a number of lieutenants overseeing ten or more men) in the middle, and foot soldiers, picciotti (“little ones”) at the bottom, who carry out threats with violence and brutality, following orders blindly. The capofamiglia’s words, like that of a CEO or a military general, are to be followed uncritically. The sottocapo is appointed by the capo. He is the one who passes information along the command chain and manages the everyday affairs of the clan. The consigliere advises the capofamiglia; he mediates disputes in the clan and is in charge of corruption schemes, such as bribery and political payoffs. In addition to internal structure, OCs enhance their stability by forging alliances with associates outside the gang, who may be either enlisted or corrupted to carry out various tasks. These include lawyers, who are hired typically as go-­betweens between the clan and the authorities, public officials, the police, and any other outsider who can be co-­opted by the gang for various purposes. The OCs also delineate the kinds of criminal activities they can and cannot perform, playing on their strengths. They typically avoid committing random thefts and assaults, as much as possible. Extortion is a mainstay source of income for many of the gangs, which is seen as a kind of tax offered to victims in return for protection, much like the state uses taxation to pay for policing services. The mobsters actually see the state as a criminal organization itself, controlling the money flow in a society, so they consider it a competitor and antagonist. As the theologian St. Augustine of Hippo observed in the fourth century, “For

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what are states but large bandit bands, and what are bandit bands but small states?” (cited in Lunde 2004: 7). This chapter looks at how OCs have built their organizational structures, allowing them to establish an ipso facto corporate identity for themselves that allows them to perpetuate themselves. Structural stability implies ergonomic strength – a term used in psychology and sociology in reference to the design of workplaces to enhance productivity and efficiency. A stable criminal organization is, in effect, an ergonomic structure.

Organizational structure As mentioned, the organizational structure of an OC can take several forms, but there are two main ones – hierarchical (or vertical) and horizontal (or network) with power distributed across the clans; in both cases, however, there is a supreme leader with subalterns with descending power. An example of a hierarchical structure is the one described previously of the Sicilian Mafia. In simplified form, it is shown in Figure 4.1. An example of an OC with horizontal (network) structure is the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta. The network consists of clans clustered around a main power hub. Recall from Chapter 2 that the clusters are called locali, which are aggregates of several ‘ndrine (criminal families) – each one of which must be authorized by the main family, called the Provincia (“Province”). Each locale must be composed of at least 49 members, controlling a portion or the territory or region where it is located but answering to a central body called the Crimine (“Crime”), which settles disputes among the clans and is responsible for planning overall operations and administering internal justice. As John Lawrence Reynolds (2006: 81) points out, this structure mirrors actual Calabrian kinship

Figure 4.1  Hierarchical structure of the Sicilian Mafia

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structure, allowing the ’Ndrangheta to operate as a veritable extended family system, whose members are seen as faithful siblings and relatives because they are tied to each other by blood: The combination of tight structure and family blood provides the ’Ndrangheta with an enormous ability to maintain both secrecy and loyalty, consolidated through carefully arranged marriages between ‘ndrine. Nothing in Sicilian or Calabrian culture is more sacrosanct than family, and where linkages exist through marriage it would be an act of serious dishonor for one family to perform any act that would threaten the security of a related family. In a phrase, the ’Ndrangheta is organized like a tight-­knit family business – a structure that enhances its survival because any member’s disloyalty would be equivalent to a betrayal of his own blood, literally. It would be seen as dishonoring the entire family, and so he would be condemned to some extreme punishment, including death. Blood ties, justified violence, and the building of trust among the members through a network with kinship structure are the main elements in the organizational make-­up of the ’Ndrangheta. As Masys (2014: ix) remarks, the ’Ndrangheta’s success can be traced to its “complex social and organizational structure, [where] blood and community ties, rituals, affiliation ceremonies [etc.] strengthen the trust among members, due to the blood kinship. In this network structure, there is a distribution of power.” The main power hub is the Crimine, but the capi of the different locali, who are actual fathers, brothers, uncles, and cousins, have direct control over the different ‘ndrine that they oversee. A locale itself has an internal hierarchical structure, consisting of two so-­called “societies” nested within it (Paoli 2000: 51–52). At the top is the società maggiore (“major society”) with its capo locale (head of the locale); underneath him is the capo società (the head of the società). The mastro di buon ordine (“master of good order”), the contabile (“accountant”), and the mastro di giornata (“master of daily affairs”) are next in descending order of power. Finally, any associate, libero o vincolato (“free or tied”), completes the società maggiore. The società minore is nested below the società maggiore and is made up of a capo giovane (“young capo”) who answers directly to the mastro di giornata of the società maggiore and who supervises below him the picciotti (“foot soldiers”) and the puntaiolo (“cashier”). As mentioned, the blood requirement of the ’Ndrangheta may be the reason it has not been beset by the countless traitors and informers of other Italian OCs. In-­ breeding is minimized by intermarriages among distant clan members, which is also the mechanism that allows for the formation of new ties among the different ‘ndrine, thus providing some ethnic diversity to the organization, which, in turn, has allowed it to expand beyond Calabria. Nevertheless, the ’Ndrangheta remains fundamentally a blood-­based ethnocentric OC to this day, wherever it is located. The Neapolitan Camorra is also structured horizontally but in a looser way than the ’Ndrangheta. Family ties are not essential – anyone can join the Camorra and even rise to the top by proving his mettle through the enactment

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of brutal violence and criminal savoir faire. This makes the Camorra an equal-­ opportunity employer for dispossessed youth to make money quickly and gain social prestige among their peers. Today, in response to police crackdowns, the Camorra has reacted adaptively by creating new positions such as the “family messenger” and the “street boss” who carry out the traditional criminal activities in a low-­key way so as to avoid detection. As Shelley Klein (2005: 177) notes, this gives it a new operational advantage because it is “very difficult for opposition groups to eradicate any particular Camorra ‘family’, for without a recognizable head of operations and subordinate chiefs, there are no targets.” The chain of command in hierarchical OCs is rigidly structured. For example, in the Sicilian Mafia, the capofamiglia is the one who makes all major decisions, passing instructions down through the chain of command. Most of the time, he gives his orders to an underling capidecina. However, he might also give orders directly to the consigliere, who in turn passes them down to the appropriate subaltern, soldier, or associate. This chain of command has a security feature built into it for the boss, since it makes it difficult to indict a boss for illegal acts, given that the soldiers almost never receive orders directly from him and thus cannot testify specifically against him. Each capodecina is in charge of a crew of soldiers and associates and has major social status in the organization. The consigliere, together with the boss and underboss (sottocapo), form a triumvirate ruling panel that runs the clan in actual practice. The capodecina is comparable to a military captain who commands a group of foot soldiers. The latter (picciotti) are young recruits who carry out the operational tasks of the gang, such as beatings, extortion, even murder. Killing is assigned to a member designated as an enforcer. Occasionally, a contract killer is enlisted from outside the organization, but this is seen as risky, since he is not bound by oath to the organization and thus could easily betray it. Nevertheless, in some cases, contract killing may be necessary, so the pattern is to hire someone from outside the territory where the killing will take place, including enforcers from different clans. Finally, the associates at the bottom of the hierarchy are the outside contacts that are employed, bribed, or threatened so that the Mafia can create external links to solidify itself within society. This hierarchical structure was adopted by Cosa Nostra, epitomized by the Five Crime Families of New York City.

The Five Crime Families of New York Formation and Operations The Five Crime Families of New York City were formed in 1931 by Salvatore Maranzano following his victory in the Castellammarese War (Chapter 2). The original families are called: Bonanno, Colombo, Gambino, Genovese, and Lucchese. Historically, each one controlled

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operations in a demarcated territory, reporting to the same overarching governing entity, called the Commission, which was set up to oversee all Cosa Nostra activities in the United States, mediating conflicts between the various clans and families in the country. In 1963, it was informer Joseph Valachi who publicly confirmed the existence of the Five Families, leading to subsequent crackdowns. The Commission has not held a formal meeting in decades, but it is rumored to still exist below the social radar. The original Five Families have undergone many convictions and legal actions but continue to exist.

In Popular Culture The Five Families have been co-­opted by popular culture. Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather (1972) and Martin Scorsese’s Goodfellas (1990) are loosely based on the legendary feats of the Five Families, and the satirical comedy Analyze This (1999), directed by Harold Ramis, starts with a flashback to a key 1957 meeting of the Families. The HBO series Boardwalk Empire portrays the rise of Charles “Lucky” Luciano to power, a major player in the constitution of the Five Families and criminal syndication generally in the United States. The series revolves around the figure of Enoch “Nucky” Johnson, who ruled over of Atlantic City and the Atlantic County government from the 1910s to his conviction and imprisonment in 1941. Atlantic City was a highly popular refuge from Prohibition in the 1920s. In addition to bootlegging, Johnson was also involved in gambling and prostitution. The earlier HBO series The Sopranos portrays a crime family based on the real-­life De Cavalcante crime family of New Jersey, which had strong ties to the New York City families. The video game Grand Theft Auto IV (2008) features five fictional Mafia families called Gambetti, Ancelotti, Messina, Pavano, and Lupisella, that together form the Commission, in obvious imitation of the real Five Families.

Vertical hierarchical structure is also characteristic of the Yakuza’s organization; it differs from the Mafia one only in the details. As discussed in Chapter 3, at the top, there is a father figure called the oyabun, who is the undisputed leader to whom obedience must be total. At the tier just below are the group of executives (shikkōbu), which includes the wakagashira (lieutenant, or second in command), the wakagashira hosa (helpers of the wakagashira), and the shateigashira (an underboss, meaning “head of the younger brothers”). On the tier below them, there are executives who make up the kanbu (“management”). Each one controls his own direct followers, some of who may have their own

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group who, in turn, may have their own followers  – in effect, this nested structure repeats itself down to the fifth level of organization. The saikō-­komon are senior administrative advisors to the oyabun, corresponding to the Mafia’s consiglieri. They directly oversee the shingiin or komon bengoshi, who are the lawyer-­advocates for the organization, and the accountants (kaikei), who run its financial affairs and keep the books. The wakagashira and the shateigashira oversee the criminal operations and activities, which are carried out physically by the kyodai (“big brothers”) and the shatei (“younger brothers”). The foregoing organizational model applies to the so-­called Yamaguchi-­gumi clan, perhaps the best known of the Yakuza clans; other groups vary somewhat from this model in accordance with the number of members and the extent of their presence in certain territories. For instance, the Inagawa-­kai, which is today one of the most powerful of all the Yakuza groups, does not have wakagashira but rijicho (“chairmen of the board”) and kaichō hosa (“assistants to the chairmen”). Another group, the so-­called Sumiyoshi-kai, has iinchō (“chairmen”) and a complex system of advisors who answer directly to the boss or management. Some clans, like the Sumiyoshi-­kai, have a number of bosses at the top, of whom one is considered to be in charge. A central element of criminal organizational hierarchies is the assignment of specific roles to members within them, tagged with levels of importance (from top to bottom). This system makes it easier to stabilize customs, tasks, and various duties, thus ensuring the ergonomic structure (efficiency) of the group. An equally important role is that of the alliances established with outside associates, given their positions of social importance and influence in mainstream society. The alliances can be formal, as in the case of the employment of lawyers or accountants to help run the organization, or through corruption, including the bribery or blackmailing of political, governmental, and police employees and even entire agencies, which, as discussed in Chapter 1, has led to the characterization of some OCs as “the enemy within.” Needless to say, horizontally structured OCs engage in similar corruption activities and may be even better at them, as the case of the Camorra has shown in Italy. A contemporary example of such an organization is the Hells Angels, which (as discussed in Chapter 3) is made up of charters, the equivalent of franchises in legal businesses, which are spread over dozens of countries, operating somewhat independently, thus forming a powerful global criminal network. This organizational structure was established during the 1960s, when the gang realized that the market for illegal methamphetamines was ripe for the taking. By the 1970s, the gang started taking advantage of increasing opportunities for expansion into multiple territories, hampered only by turf wars with other biker gangs. The most famous series of brutal wars was between the Hells Angels and the Outlaws. Eventually, they called a truce and established a tacit agreement to leave each other alone based on an unstated subdivision of turfs. Nevertheless, the gangs remain bitter rivals, mocking each other intrepidly in public but generally staying away from each other’s criminally controlled territories and activities.

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The Outlaws The main historical rival to the Hells Angels is the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, incorporated as the American Outlaws Association, or AOA. Membership is limited to white men who must own and ride only American-­ made motorcycles of a particular size. The club was actually formed before the Hells Angels. It was established in 1935 at Matilda’s Bar on old Route 66 in McCook, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. But their activities were limited until after World War II, when they re-­emerged as rivals to the Hells Angels. Their current logo, a pirate-­like Jolly Roger skull (Chapter  2) with crossed motorbike pistons, was adopted in 1954  – influenced by the patch worn by actor Marlon Brando in the 1954 movie The Wild One. The gang has chapters throughout the United States and in other countries. Its pact with the Hells Angels is always on shaky ground. The gang’s motto is “God forgives, Outlaws don’t.” And it uses the phrase ADIOS in reference to the Hells Angels, which stands for both the Spanish word “good-­bye” (to the Angels) and is an acronym for “Angels Die In Outlaw States.”

Most Hells Angels members are also white males who ride Harley-­Davidson motorcycles. Each is known by a nickname given to him by the gang’s leadership. Membership status is tightly controlled. Some chapters have clubhouses, but members typically gather in bars and ride out together on runs to various destinations. The network model of gang organization has a patron (boss) at the center, and the members in the network are his clients (gang members or charters), who must show trust and loyalty to each other and to the patron. The role of the boss is to “provide economic aid and protection for the client, in return the client shows appreciation by performing necessary duties that are ordered by the patron” (Abadinsky 2016). The boss controls the resources and sets up all contact meetings for the clients. He also has a network of informants and connections with the police and other officials who have been co-­opted as operatives. Once such an organization has grown to a size that requires more persons qualified to carry out the expectations, the gang will typically form mergers and alliances with other gangs, including ties with the traditional criminal gangs, such as Cosa Nostra. Despite such mergers and tacit cooperative agreements, the biker gangs are essentially monopolistic. As Federico Varese (2001: 4) observes, “Some kinds of crime are organized in monopolistic fashion, and characterized by occasion gang wars and truces and market sharing arrangements. For instance, loan-­sharking, gambling and drug dealing are criminal business that

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lend themselves more than others to monopolizations.” Criminal biker gangs, like other criminal organizations, do not simply grab and sell illegal goods. They organize markets and control spaces, areas, and territories. The two main types of criminal organizations – the hierarchical versus the horizontal – are not exclusive to OCs. The former has also been designated a bureaucratic structure and the latter (as discussed) a patron-­client one. Various combinations of these systems have also become common, especially among neophyte gangs, such as the drug cartels and the transnational criminal groups, which will be discussed subsequently. Traditionally, though, it is these two systems that have characterized both the formation and operations of organized criminal gangs.

Bureaucratic versus patron-­c lient structure Bureaucratic (hierarchical, vertical) A bureaucratically structured criminal gang has the following main features, some of which are similar to the organizational structures of successful business corporations. 1 It has a rigid vertical structure, with specific authority roles; meritocratic promotion; and impersonal, calculated operations. 2 It is composed of a boss-­leader at the top, who is usually a senior member or who has proved his criminal mettle. 3 Below there are underbosses, advisors, lieutenants, and foot soldiers, who are charged with implementing the orders of the boss according to specified duties. 4 It has established communication channels, internal norms, and best practices, avoiding uncertainty regarding roles or chain of command. 5 It has linkages with outside associates who sustain the gang’s operations by connecting it to the social mainstream.

Patron-­c lient (horizontal, network) A patron-­client criminal organization has the following main features. 1 Some are based traditionally on family (blood) ties, as is the case of the ’Ndrangheta. 2 But all such systems, whether kinship or ethnocentric or not, operate in terms of a network of clans, chapters, or charters that have autonomy over their local operations but still report to the leadership of a central clan or charter.

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3 They consist of looser relations, with each member clan being interested in running its own affairs, with guidance from the power hub. 4 The network also includes corrupt outside members, such as politicians or government officials. 5 It focuses on interpersonal relationships and on forging social ties among the membership, even though there is still a boss who oversees everything. 6 Greater autonomy is offered to those who are lower in rank.

Operationality Each OC has rules and practices that are designed to establish explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct and task assignment within the group, prescribing what is possible or allowable, including a division of labor among the members. Entry into the organization is typically based on an initiation rite and the taking of oaths of loyalty, designed to bind each new member to the leader and the group enduringly. A classic example of the emotional power of oath-­taking can be found in the 36 oaths of the Chinese Triads, based on the narrative of the Five Ancestors who survived the burning of the Shaolin temple during the Ming-­Qing wars of the seventeenth century (discussed in Chapter 3). When someone wishes to join this organization, he must explicitly recite the oaths, which constitute the norms, instructions, and rules of conduct by which he must subsequently abide, including how to protect the other brothers and sacrifice himself for the entire gang, if the occasion arises – a principle illustrated in fiction by the pledge of the Three Musketeers (Alexandre Dumas 1844), “All for one, one for all.” The oaths impel the new member to swear allegiance and loyalty to the leader and the group, as well as to pledge secrecy. They are written traditionally on sheets of paper in the locale where the initiation ritual takes place. Below are ten selected for illustrative purposes (Clement and McAdam 1994: 35–37):   1 After having entered the Hong Gates I must treat the parents and relatives of my sworn brothers as my own kin. I shall suffer death by five thunderbolts if I do not keep this oath. Each thunderbolt is thrown by one of the Five Ancestors.   2 I shall not disclose the secrets of the Hong family, not even to my parents, brothers or wife. I  shall never disclose the secrets for money. I  shall be killed by a myriad of swords if I do so.   3 I shall never betray my sworn brothers. If, through a misunderstanding, I have caused the arrest of one of my brothers, I must release him immediately. If I break this oath I will be killed by five thunderbolts.

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  4 I will take good care of the wives or children of sworn brothers entrusted to my keeping. If I do not do so I will be killed by five thunderbolts.   5 If I should change my mind and deny my membership of the Hong family I will be killed by a myriad of swords.   6 If I am arrested after committing an offence, I must accept my punishment, and not try to place the blame on my sworn brothers. If I do so I will be killed by five thunderbolts.   7 If any of my sworn brothers are killed, arrested, or have departed to some other place, I will assist their wives and children who may be in need. If I pretend to have no knowledge of their difficulties, I will be killed by five thunderbolts.  8 I shall not cause discord amongst my sworn brothers by spreading false reports about any of them. If I do so I shall be killed by a myriad of swords.   9 I must not disclose any address where my sworn brothers keep their wealth, nor must I conspire to make wrong use of such knowledge. If I do so I will be killed by a myriad of swords. 10 If any of my sworn brothers has committed a big offence, I  must not inform upon them to the government for the purpose of obtaining a reward. I shall be killed by five thunderbolts if I break this oath. Similar oaths and rules of conduct are found in the codes of virtually all the OCs. By taking oaths, the member knows full well that disobedience will mean reprisal and even death. As in a religious cult, each member is expected to follow the pledges he made during the initiation ceremony until his dying day. He must always obey the leader’s orders, ask permission on all important matters, never lie to another member, and maintain silence when interrogated by the authorities. A transcript of a recording made by the New Jersey Police on July 19, 1990, of crime boss Anthony Piccolo as he was talking to an initiate to Cosa Nostra illustrates how emotionally compelling pledges to the gang are, since they are based on an implicit code of honor (cited in Nicaso and Danesi 2013): If you stay you become part of us, then you have to do the right thing. . . . This is a family, you stay with the family, I’m your family. We can help each other. It’s got to be with the family. No outsiders. Anybody approaches you, it’s another place, it’s another family, you report to your man, whoever’s in charge. . . . This is a thing of honor. This is not a thing of business. A  lot of people misunderstand that. This is honor. You’ve got to be an honorable person. . . . You don’t talk about none of your friends, because we become brothers. You don’t talk behind them, you got something to say, you see who’s in charge, get it squared away, and that’s the end of it. The oaths, pledges, and internal rules of conduct vary according to the organizational structure of the OC, reflecting the ways in which duties and operations

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are distributed within the system. OCs with a top-­down or vertical authority structure espouse a mentor-­apprentice system with a strictly defined division of labor between the members within the organization – and the internal rules reflect this, specifying enforcement mechanisms explicitly. Patron-­client OCs, in contrast, have a more fluid operationality, whereby smaller crime groups in the organization operate semi-­independently within the overall network. So, the rules of operation reflect this structure, specifying how members must behave towards each other. Both systems, however, espouse the same belief that honor is the fundamental principle behind the organization, and they both carry forth traditions from the “archives” of the clan. Operationality differentiates OCs from random delinquent groups. Nevertheless, even street gangs that crop up from time to time will develop a temporary self-­styled organizational structure which, as Miller (1992) notes, exhibits a self-­formed association of peers, united by mutual interests, with identifiable leadership and internal organization, who act collectively or as individuals to achieve specific purposes, including the conduct of illegal activity and control of a particular territory, facility, or enterprise. If the street gang survives beyond the initial generation of members, then it may graduate into a veritable OC. Street gangs like the Crips and Bloods are cases in point – they started as random street gangs but have become highly organized and thus able to ensure for themselves a degree of perpetuity. Whether the gangs have a hierarchical or network structure, their fundamental operational principles and tactics are strikingly similar, if not identical. These include the following: 1 Membership. Only members that conform to established criteria for membership are allowed in. However, as Abadinsky (2016: 6) remarks, although membership is restricted, “nonmembers may be involved on a contingency basis.” 2 Corruption. Corrupting politicians, leaders of the community, and others in positions of authority or social influence is a central operational tactic. This allows organized crime groups to infiltrate legitimate institutions and organizations, optimizing their criminal activities and sheltering themselves effectively against crackdowns and prosecutions. 3 Violence. Real and threatened violence is a major tactic, allowing the OCs to retain their power over people. 4 Monopolization. OCs aim to hold a monopoly over specific criminal activities or turfs; they are averse to competition from others. The monopoly can be over a particular sector, such as gambling, over a particular geographic region, or both. A well-­known example of monopolization involving corruption is the one related to the Rizzuto crime family in Montreal in the 1950s, which would receive construction contracts for the city of Montreal

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5

6 7

8

9

prior to any bidding taking place and then take a cut of the eventual profit (Edwards and Nicaso 2017: 258). Forging Links. When monopolization is not possible or feasible, then the gang might forge links with another gang competitor for mutual benefit. A gang may also forge links with other kinds of groups, such as terrorists, if it is advantageous. Discipline. Each OC has rules of discipline that apply especially to the lower ranks. Each one also has specific forms of punishment that are meted out to those who have broken the rules. Mobility. OCs must be prepared and willing to move their operations if need be to avoid prosecutions that would wipe them out. This does not mean that they are nomadic but that they know how to hide for a while from the authorities in different locales and reorganize after the danger passes. Allegiance: Members must take oaths that impel them to obey rules, follow orders, and keep secrets. A  strong sense of allegiance is thus instilled in members, as well as a claim to righteousness, an Us-­versus-­Them mindset based on the belief that they are honorable, while the rest of the world is dishonest and superficial in its value systems. Role Distribution and Role Permanency. As Abadinsky (2016: 6) notes, the roles of the members “are not dependent on the individuals occupying them at any particular time. Permanency is assumed by the members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in pursuit of its goals.”

The appeal of organizational structure As will be discussed subsequently (in Chapters  16 and 17), there are a host of social and psychological theories that attempt to explain why people join OCs and why they have arisen in the first place. Suffice it to say here that the organizational structure of OCs may itself be a primary reason some young people gravitate towards them. Without it, the lure of gang membership will be ephemeral; the lure of its structure, on the other hand, provides a concrete locus for individuals already inclined towards criminality to carry out their inclinations systematically and in an ordered fashion. Arguably, such individuals may feel disorder or chaos in their lives, and it is the sense of order provided by the OC that appeals unconsciously to them, drawing them in. One theory, called entrepreneurial theory, explains the lure of OCs in such terms. It claims, essentially, that OCs provide a locus and systematic mode of interaction between criminals, allowing them to feel validated by sharing pseudo-­values and activities. A criminal act of any kind, including murder, is thus not perceived as an immoral one but as an entrepreneurial decision that is necessary for procurement of the continuity of the OC. Much like a cult, the OC provides a way for a dispossessed individual to immerse himself in a sheltered system based on specific beliefs, which are then assimilated as the

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only true ones. While a gang culture like the Hells Angels one may arise from antagonism to certain social conditions, it could only have grown into a solid organization because of the belief of its members that their view of life was the only true one – a worldview that is instilled into the membership via oaths of allegiance. The oaths of some of the traditional OCs are often seen to have a divine origin and function – as is evident in the Triad oaths, which include provisions for the intercession of the Five Ancestors through thunderbolts. They are part of the gang’s sacred dogma, guaranteeing that the new members will reject any other dogma. Breaking the oaths invokes divine displeasure because the oath taker betrays his sworn duties. In effect, while there may be various theoretical paradigms to explain the lure of OCs, it seems plausible that the organizational structure itself is a major one. In the case of new members who come from deprived social situations, the structure affords an environment that replaces the family emotionally and organizationally. But this is not universal. New members of, say, the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta hardly come from depressed social conditions – they are part of a kinship system. OCs provide a means to obtain power systematically, providing a system within which one can achieve power via a subsystem of meritocracy. Without the organizational structure, power dynamics dissipate because they cannot be institutionalized. So, regardless of the specific definition we might give organized crime, without the promise of power, and an attendant chain of command, it would gradually dissipate. When one boss dies, or is overthrown, the structure of the ranks remains constant, with different members fulfilling the roles. As Earl Johnson has stated (1963: 141): “Unlike most criminal groups but like most business enterprises, a criminal organization contemplates a continuous indefinite life-­span.” In a classic study of gang membership, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) found that the lure of gangs lies basically in the promise of structure and its shelter system. An individual born and raised in disordered and underprivileged environments, with a limited ability to succeed in society, will tend to seek contact with other alienated individuals and will thus easily adapt to a delinquent subculture that will allow him to use delinquency to achieve self-­esteem. An OC thus turns pessimism into optimism by providing an organized framework within which the new criminal can feel above everyone else in his previous world as a “newly made man” supported by his fellow partners in crime, who have become his ersatz brothers. An important theoretical stream in contemporary criminological thinking about OCs in is the counter-­claim that a gang is actually not organized at all, at least as portrayed by traditional accounts. The lack of centralized control, formal lines of communication, and fragmented clan structure are now common not only among biker and other neophyte gangs but also among the traditional OCs. Overall, the claim is that networks of criminals involved in crimes today do not exhibit organizational cohesion as they did in the past. And even in

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the past, it is suggested that an OC like the Mafia has always been a “part of a heterogeneous underworld, a network characterized by complex webs of relationships,” as Peter Reuter (1983), the one who introduced the term “disorganized crime” in the 1980s, wrote. But this view is somewhat marginal, given that history records that organization and operationality differentiate OCs from random gangs.

Syndication The financial success of bootlegging for the American Cosa Nostra in the 1920s led eventually to brutal turf wars among different clans. Mafia bosses and their soldiers were slaughtering each other on a daily basis, with few ruling their families for no longer than a few months at a time. In the middle of this bloodbath, Charles “Lucky” Luciano saw a way out of the internecine carnage. He realized that the solution was organizing the fighting gangs into a syndicate, as in multinational corporations. His model for Cosa Nostra was a multifamily syndicate, called the Commission, that would approve and subdivide activities nationwide.

Charles “Lucky” Luciano (1897–1962) Italian-­born gangster Lucky Luciano, born Salvatore Lucania, who operated mainly in the United States, was instrumental in the development of the first-­ever crime syndicate, called the Commission, in 1931, which abolished the boss of bosses title held at the time by Salvatore Maranzano (Chapter 2). In 1936, Luciano was convicted for running a prostitution racket and was sentenced from 30 to 50  years in prison. Ironically, it was an African American woman prosecutor, Eunice Hunton Carter, a graduate of Smith College and the granddaughter of slaves (as unlikely a prosecutor as one could imagine in New York of the 1930s), who devised the strategy to bring down Luciano, one of the most powerful Mafia bosses in history. When special prosecutor Thomas E. Dewey selected twenty lawyers to help him clean up the city’s underworld, she was the only member of his team who was not a white male. But during World War II, an agreement was engineered between Luciano and the government whereby he would guarantee that the port of New York would be guarded and kept secure by his fellow gangsters. By the end of World War II, the Mafia had revived itself as a major crime syndicate. In Italy, Luciano aimed to reconnect the American Cosa Nostra with the Sicilian Mafia by reviving heroin trafficking as a shared activity.

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Syndication led to the formation of the Five New York City crime families, discussed previously. As mentioned, they came eventually to be known as follows: •

• • • •

The Bonanno Family was under the leadership of Joseph “Joe Bananas” Bonanno from the 1930s and 1960s, becoming one of the most powerful Cosa Nostra clans in the United States. Bonanno retired temporarily from the family in the mid-­1960s because of internecine warfare. In the late 1970s, the family was infiltrated by an FBI agent, Joe Pistone, with the pseudonym of Donnie Brasco, leading to various crackdowns. This event has been popularized by the 1997 movie Donnie Brasco, directed by Mike Newell. In 2004, the boss of the Bonanno family, Joe Massino, became the first boss of the Five Families in New York to turn state’s evidence. The Colombo Family traces its roots to a bootlegging gang in the late 1920s. The family gained a foothold in New York City in the early 1960s under Joseph Colombo. It has been torn apart by internal wars and multiple convictions. The Gambino Family is named after Carlo Gambino, who was the boss in the 1960s. The family’s operations extended beyond New York City and the eastern seaboard to encompass California. The Genovese Family was founded by Lucky Luciano and was known as the Luciano family until 1957, when it was renamed after boss Vito Genovese. The Lucchese Family traces its origins to the early 1920s, founded and headed by Tommy Gagliano until his death in 1951, when Tommy Lucchese, who served as Gagliano’s underboss, took over and turned the family into one of the most powerful to sit on the Commission. The Lucchese family has left its imprint all over popular culture. For example, Henry Hill, a former associate of the family and government informant, was played by Ray Liotta in Martin Scorsese’s Goodfellas (1990); the character of Dominic Cattano in Ridley Scott’s American Gangster (2007) portrayed a drug trafficker of the family.

Through syndication, OCs enhance their ability to survive and thrive. Aware of the advantages that it offers, many have formed global syndicates in the Internet age, forming ties with OCs of completely different backgrounds, leading to transnational crime syndicates – a topic to be discussed in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say here that the traditional OCs have taken advantage of globalization to form larger syndicated systems among themselves, thus strengthening and extending their operations across the globe and diversifying their operations considerably. Illegal drugs are now shipped via global transportation networks. Money laundering is carried out more broadly and with little detection because of the lack of a global authority over transnational crimes. While police organizations have set up transnational crime units, a central global regulatory authority has yet to be established to counteract the global criminal syndicates that operate almost freely today.

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References Abadinsky, Howard (2016). Organized Crime. Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publishing. Clement, Gary and McAdam, Brian (1994). Triads and Other Asian Organized Crime Groups. Hong Kong: Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Cloward, Richard A. and Ohlin, Lloyd E. (1960). Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs. Glencoe: Free Press. Edwards, Peter and Nicaso, Antonio (2017). Bad Blood: The End of Honour. Toronto: Vintage. Johnson, Earl (1963). Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System: Part III. Legal Antidotes for the Political Corruption Induced by Organized Crime. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 54: 127–145. Klein, Shelley (2005). The Most Evil Secret Societies in History. London: Michael O’Mara. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Masys, Anthony J. (ed.) (2014). Studies of Organized Crime: Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security. Geneva: Springer International. Miller, Walter B. (1992). Crime by Youth Gangs and Groups in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Nicaso, Antonio and Danesi, Marcel (2013). Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Paoli, Letizia (2000). Cosa Nostra e ’Ndrangheta. Milano: Il Mulino. Reuter, Peter (1983). Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Varese, Federico (2001). The Russian Mafia. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 5

The players

Introduction A main theme of this book is that joining the Mafia, or any other criminal organization, involves a process of being born again, much like gaining entry into various religious cults. This is why there typically is a rebirth initiation rite that compels the new member to completely leave his previous life behind, along with its values, lifestyle, and worldview. The initiate must pledge allegiance to his new brotherhood and assert that he will become exactly like them – a made man, a term that surfaced within American Cosa Nostra initiation ceremonies; in Sicily, the term for a member of the clan is, instead, omu d’onuri (“man of honor”). To become a made man or man of honor, the individual must be sponsored by another clan member. He must then take an oath of obedience, after which he is assigned foot soldier duty. Once inside, he can work his way right up to the rank of boss by merit, manipulation, and internal plotting and scheming (as in any organization). As discussed briefly in previous chapters, membership in virtually all OC clans is based on a set of established rules and criteria, involving ethnicity, gender, and character profiling, among others. New members into the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, for instance, must have blood ties to the clan and be young, honorable men within the kinship system. Individuals who do not have blood ties to the gang but who may be affiliated in some way with other members are allowed into the gang but must show that they are faithful and loyal during an apprenticeship period. In effect, each gang has its own membership rules. A new Hells Angels member must own a Harley Davidson motorcycle. In all the traditional, and most of the neophyte (or emergent) OCs, the players must undergo an initiation rite, as discussed, usually preceded by an apprenticeship period whereby they must show feats of loyalty and courage. There are other (outside) players that complete the constituency of most OCs – these are associates, collaborators, and enablers of the clan, including lawyers, accountants, and others who may be hired to run some of the gang’s affairs, and corrupt collaborators, such as politicians and police who are drawn in through bribery, extortion, and blackmail or with the promise of gaining the help of the

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gangsters for their political and electoral benefit, in return for favors to be handed out to the gang. This chapter will deal with the players, the initiation rites they must undergo, the types of roles expected of them, the names used to identify the role players, and the nicknames coined to rename the made men. The latter play a key role in the process of identity-­making that the OCs promote, bringing out the symbolic power of names to carve out identities and to generate a sense of distinctiveness. The nickname is much more than a substitute for the birth name. It is packed with connotations that relate to the made man’s criminal achievements or appearance. As we saw in the previous chapter, organized crime is structured like a corporate business. To extend the analogy, recruiting membership into the clan through various formalities and prerequisites can be said to correspond to a company’s hiring practices. And roles can be compared to a company’s job qualifications. These will be discussed here. The appearance, language, and lifestyle aspects of the players will be treated in Chapter 7.

Membership principles As mentioned, the players in OCs are men. As a general principle, an OC will not admit a woman into the fold as a full-­fledged member but only as a subsidiary or ancillary role-­player, or else as a companion or spouse to a male within it. The gang is a masculine brotherhood – the topic of women in OCs will be taken up in Chapter 8. The roles that the male players assume are specified explicitly by the organizational structure of the gang, by traditions, and by concrete rules of operation (Chapter 4). Respect and obedience to the leader and higher-­ranking members in the clan from those at the bottom of the hierarchy, or in lower positions in a network, is an obligation. It is viewed as a moral value, serving as a basis for how individual members must behave and conduct themselves in the clan. To reiterate here, the roles of each member are delineated clearly, from foot soldiers to lieutenants and others high up in the organization. The key role in any OC is, needless to say, that of the boss-­leader, who must always assume a stately mien and serious demeanor, like any monarch. He has the overriding task of maintaining internal order, ensuring that his underlings do not disobey orders and follow the rules, and overseeing the overall “business agenda” of the clan. The boss is a commander-­in-­chief who must be obeyed blindly; the mere threat of violent reprisal against disobeyers is normally sufficient to ensure compliance. All members must be subservient and obsequious to the leader, no matter what. He may not always be the one who develops the specific plans for criminal activities, leaving it up to his advisors, but without his approval, these cannot be carried out. The Vory v Zakone deviates somewhat from the one-­leader system. It is overseen instead by the bratski krug (“circle of brothers”), an elite group of policymakers who are the brains behind the gang’s operation, much like an executive committee in a corporation. The leaders of a typical Vory gang are

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called the pakhan/krestnii otets, and the soldiers are the boyeviky. Membership is based primarily on ethnic ties but is open to individuals who will show their mettle and loyalty to the gang via an apprenticeship period. Admission to most criminal organizations involves both an apprenticeship period and recommendation by one or more established members, who are the initiate’s guarantors, taking responsibility for him and sometimes paying with their own death for recommending an inadequate person (Abadinsky 2016: 4). Once the member is considered a legitimate enrollee, he must pledge loyalty to the rules and principles of the clan via a set of oaths. Among the principles that most OCs endorse, the following seem to apply to virtually all: 1 The members must commit criminal acts according to a code of honor and according to orders, even if they are brutal; random acts of criminality for self-­serving purposes are condemned or prohibited and often punished severely. There is chain of command for assigning criminal tasks, which, as in military organizations, legitimizes them as part of one’s duties. 2 The members are charged with controlling specific territories. If rival gangs intrude into these territories, then warfare may be declared or a truce negotiated that is mutually beneficial. 3 The members must know the rules, values, regulatory codes, and the specific type of communication styles to be used, which may differ according to the rank of the member. For example, a deferential mode of speaking is the appropriate one when a foot soldier addresses a lieutenant or boss. 4 The members are expected to resist authority outside the gang and to always maintain secrecy about the gang’s activities and membership, even under aggressive interrogation tactics. 5 The members must pledge permanent allegiance to the leader and the gang by adopting the appropriate rules of conduct. 6 A member must show respect for the other members. To even slap another made man in the face, without the permission of the capo, can be punished by death, regardless of whether the act was a provoked one or not. It is seen as an act of dishonor and thus cannot be tolerated. Each gang will, of course, have its own specific rules that translate these principles concretely, modifying them for specific gang purposes. These may be written down, as in the case of the Mafia and the Triads, or unwritten, as in the case of most neophyte gangs, such as La Eme, also called the Mexican Mafia, which, despite its name, originated and operates in the United States. The gang has a set of eleven unwritten rules that have been reconstructed by the police. They reveal the worldview, biases, and overall principles of conduct of the gang. They are as follows (Blatchford 2008):   1 A member may not be an informant (called a “rat”).   2 A member may not be a coward.

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  3 A member may not raise a hand against another member without approval.   4 A member must not show disrespect for any member’s family, including sex with another member’s wife or girlfriend.   5 A member must not steal from another member.   6 A member may not be homosexual.   7 A member must not politic against another member or cause dissension within the organization.   8 Membership is for life.   9 It’s mandatory to assault or kill all dropouts. 10 La Eme comes first. Even before your own family. 11 A member must not interfere with another member’s business activities. Similar rules exist across the spectrum of organized criminal groups. They are designed to: (a) define the character, personality, gender, sexual orientation, and in some cases ethnicity of the members; (b) specify the pledges to the group that all members must take under threat of death; (c) describe the nature of the relations among the members; (d) specify what to do with dropouts or informants. As will be discussed subsequently, in neophyte street gangs, female members may be required to engage in sex with male members as part of their initiation rites, known as “sex in.” In such cases, the female members face substantial risks of sexual exploitation by the male members. Traditionally, in the Mafia and Cosa Nostra, to become a made man, the inductee must be a male of full Sicilian descent (although this has changed somewhat today). A famous case in point is that of Henry Hill, an associate of the Lucchese crime family from the 1950s through the 1970s, who was never allowed as a full-­fledged member into the family, despite his extensive mobster career and despite the fact that his mother was of Sicilian descent. However, this strict membership requirement was later weakened to allow members of Italian descent from the father’s side alone. Famous examples include the son of Italian-­American mobster John Gotti, whose maternal grandmother was Russian, and Frank Salemme of the Patriarca crime family (a crime family based in New England), whose mother was of Irish descent. An associate who has been a member of a police force, or even who has just taken police training, can never become a made man. A well-­known example is that of Henry Borelli, who was never allowed into the Gambino crime family, because he had taken the New York City Police Department entrance exam in the 1970s. A famous exception to this rule is that of Ron Previte, who was a former corrupt member of the Philadelphia police force; he was allowed entrance into the Scarfo crime family given his fierce loyalty to the gang. The sociologist Emile Durkheim (1897) called groups bound together by stipulated principles such as the ones above “segmentary societies,” which constitute parallel cultures that exist as segments within the mainstream with their own norms and beliefs. They set their own conditions for membership and they stipulate the principles that the new members must adopt, including a belief system

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that is consistent with the expectations of the group. Sometimes the principles are grafted from history. For instance, the Sicilian Mafia’s initiation rites have been resurrected and recalibrated liberally from those of both the secret societies of the past, such as the Freemasons, and from various religious and chivalric practices (Scarpinato 2015). This purported historical link to ancient societies is a powerful strategy for promoting obedience and conformity among members, since it evokes the authority of history itself, as Dickie (2004: 37) points out: More than anything else about the mafia, the initiation ritual bolsters widespread myths about how ancient the organization is. In reality, it is as modern as everything else about the mafia. It was almost certainly borrowed originally from the Masons.

Initiation rites To re-­emphasize here, a fundamental principle of criminal organizations is that entry into the clan is through some form of initiation rite. In any of the three main Italian OCs – the Sicilian Mafia, the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, and the Neapolitan Camorra – according to tradition, the initiate must be of Italian descent, and specifically of Sicilian, Calabrian, or Neapolitan ethnicity according to clan. In all three, moreover, only one or two standing members of the clan can sponsor a potential new member, vouching for his reliability, trustworthiness, and courage. Ultimately, the decision to induct him lies with the capo. The initiate is required to take the oath of omertà, the code of honor and silence. After the rite, the initiate becomes a “man of honor,” holding the entry rank of picciotto (“soldier”). The term Mafioso is never used by gang members; it is despised, since it is associated with colloquial usage by the press, media, and general public. In fact, certain individuals who have all the criteria for membership may nonetheless be turned down, or later thrown out, if they stand out in the public eye, bringing unwanted attention to the clan. A classic example is “Mad Sam” DeStefano in the early period of Cosa Nostra (in the 1910s), who was a brutal and sadistic loan shark who took pleasure in torture and in murder. He was used as a hired killer but never admitted to the status of a made man by the mob, who feared that his extreme violence garnered too much public attention. As Mircea Eliade (1961) has discussed about initiation rites in general, there is typically a sacred-­like subtext in them whereby the initiate goes through a symbolic death in order to overcome the fear of real death. This subtext can be seen in all the Italian Mafia initiation rites. For example, Tommaso Buscetta (Shawcross and Young 1987), one of the most notorious members of Cosa Nostra to have betrayed the clan in the 1980s, outlines the initiation rite of the clan as follows (cited in Cimino, Durden Smith and Frasca 2017: 34): The neophyte is brought to a secluded spot, which could even be someone’s home, in the presence of three or more Men of Honour of the family.

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Then the oldest of those present informs him that the purpose of “questa cosa” – this thing – it to protect the weak and to eliminate the oppressors. Then a finger is pricked on one of the hands of the person being sworn in and the blood is made to fall on a sacred image. Then the image is placed in his hand and is burned. At this time the neophyte must endure the fire, passing the sacred image quickly from one hand to the other until it goes out, and he swears to remain faithful to the principles of the Cosa Nostra, stating solemnly, “May my flesh burn like this holy picture if I am unfaithful to this oath.” This in broad outline was the method of swearing in used when I became a member of the Cosa Nostra. After the swearing-­in, and only then, the Man of Honour is introduced to the head of the family, whose post he did not know about beforehand, knowing even less of the existence of the Cosa Nostra per se. Although the initiation ceremonies vary somewhat from clan to clan, the pricking of the trigger finger of the inductee is common, with the blood dripping onto a picture of a saint or the Madonna, which is then put on fire in his hand as he swears an oath of loyalty: “As burns this saint, so will burn my soul. I enter alive and I will have to get out dead” (cited in Cimino, Durden Smith and Frasca 2017: 35). The blood oozing from the finger symbolizes the metaphorical death of the inductee from his previous life and a pledge that he will spill the blood of others, if the need arises. As Lunde (2004: 68) observes, the blood is critical in the ceremony, since it binds the initiate to the clan for life: “His cosca was his new family, and he could not switch allegiance.” After the blood ritual, the other clan members sit around a table, asking the candidate specific questions, to ascertain if he is indeed loyal. If declared to be so, the ceremony ends and the candidate is welcomed as a man of honor. One of the first accounts of the blood ritual is found in a police report of 1876 in Palermo on Antonio Giammona, one of the first infamous Mafia bosses in the post-­Unification period of Italy. The ritual is described as follows (from Nicaso and Danesi 2013): The boss pricks the index finger of the initiate. He then lets the blood from the finger fall onto a sacred image, which is then burned and put in the hands of the initiate who is expected to hold the burning artifact. The burning image symbolizes the fate that the initiate will suffer if he were ever to betray the clan. The first known published account of the blood ceremony comes a year later in 1877 in Monreale, Sicily. It is described in an article in the Giornale di Sicilia in an account about the Stuppagghiari, an early Mafia-­type gang. The ’Ndrangheta’s initiation ceremony involves various other religious symbols and subtexts in addition to those associated with blood-­ letting.

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The initiate must invoke Santa Liberata and the Archangel Gabriel, the patron saint of the organization. He is then expected to recite a pledge of undivided loyalty to his new family, sealing it with a prayer. The whole ceremony is called taglio della coda (“cutting the tail”), because the initiate is viewed as entering the clan as an animal with a tail, a lugubrious unnecessary appendage that only serves to stir up dust as he walks. After the ceremony, he will thus be able to walk freely and efficiently on a tappeto di erbe e fiori (“a carpet of grasses and flowers”), since it means cutting the tail. He is thus declared liberated from his previous state of ignorance and declared a man of furbizia (“wise-­guy-­ness”) and rispetto (“respect”). The previous state was devoid of sangue e onore (“blood and honor”), which is precisely what the participant is supposed to seek in his transition from his previous life to the new one (Gratteri and Nicaso 2009: 34).

Religious symbolism in Mafia (’Ndrangheta) initiation rites The religious symbolism involved in Mafia initiation ceremonies consists of several aspects, summarized here for convenience.

Santa Liberata The invocation of Santa Liberata is motivated by the fact that she is the patron saint and protector of children. She is seen as the protector of the “new child,” the picciotto, who has been born again into the Onorata Società (“honorable society”).

Archangel Gabriel Invoking the Archangel Gabriel as a witness to the rebirth is meant to recall the Annunciation in the New Testament when Gabriel announces to Mary that she is to be the mother of Jesus (Luke 1:26–31).

Saint Michael During the ceremony, an image of the head of Saint Michael the Archangel is shredded and burned. A cross is carved on the participant’s right thumb with a knife to symbolize the fact that Saint Michael was a fearless warrior. The leader of the clan consecrates the member to the new role by uttering an oath that makes reference to three knights who cut off Michael’s head.

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Blood The initiate’s finger is pricked or cut, and the blood is either allowed to drip or is smeared onto a picture of a saint, followed by setting fire to the picture, as the initiate takes a vow of silence. This has several meanings: (a) it symbolizes the fact that the initiate is becoming part of a “blood brotherhood”; (b) it represents the fact that the member might have to shed someone else’s blood if asked to do so; and (c) it stands for the fact that his own blood will be shed if he betrays the gang in any way, and he would also be burned just like the picture.

Overall, the rite can be characterized as a “baptism of fire.” The term baptism was actually recorded during an induction ceremony in 1989 in the Patriarca crime family – a long-­established Cosa Nostra crime family based in New England, also known as the Boston Mafia. The ceremony was taped clandestinely by the FBI. Before the inductee took the oath, he was told that he would be baptized: “You were baptized when you were a baby, your parents did it. But now, this time, we gonna baptize you.” When the inductee was asked by a clan member if he would kill his brother, he answered yes. Blood is symbolic in many non-­Italian gangs as well. In the Triad initiation ceremony, blood symbolism is included in one of the five phases of the ceremony, paraphrased as follows: 1 The ancient Five Ancestors are invoked by an Incense Master, who offers libations of tea and wine. 2 The initiate is challenged at the entrance to the lodge by guards carrying razor-­edged swords, whereby he must show courage and endurance, after which he is allowed to enter by crawling under crossed swords as a sign of submission and subservience. 3 Once inside the lodge, the initiate participates in a lengthy reenactment of the traditional ordeals of the Five Ancestors, swearing 36 oaths (Chapter 2) and learning his first secret signs. 4 A rooster is then brought in and beheaded, a warning to the initiate that he will suffer the same fate if he betrays the clan. 5 Finally, he drinks a mixture of blood, wine, cinnabar, and ashes. In times past, the blood used to be drawn from the initiate and other members of the lodge. More typically today, the blood is generally that of the slaughtered rooster. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the summer of 1900, an offshoot of Triad culture, known as the Boxers, undertook a siege that drove more than 3000 people – mainly European missionaries, their families, and Chinese Christian

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converts – into exile. They had been given rein by the Manchu government to free the nation from foreigners, whom they accused of exploiting the Chinese people. The Boxers invoked supernatural elements to aid them in achieving invulnerability to counter-­attacks. Their initiation rituals included self-­hypnotism and the taking of hallucinogenic drugs, so that the inductee would reach a state of frenzy, smashing his clenched fists against unyielding surfaces until the blood flowed from his broken knuckles. Then, after a period of spasmodic twitching, foaming at the mouth, and hysterical screaming, the initiate would roll about on the ground until he became unconscious. At this point, he was awakened and led into the Inner Temple to be taught the magical secrets of the gang and to receive their power of invulnerability against death at the hands of the foreigners. The ceremony was completed with an oath during which the initiate drank blood. The scenario was meant to be emotionally powerful, impelling the initiate to believe in his immortality in fighting for a cause, in a kamikaze way – hence the success of the Boxer Rebellion. Similar kinds of symbolism play a role in all gangs. The following is a list of scattered symbols and practices that illustrate how the main principles discussed previously are applied in diverse ways. 1 The Hells Angels initiation ceremony involves a “fecal baptism.” Gang members urinate and defecate in a bucket, which is then poured on the initiate’s head. The new member cannot wash or change his clothes for the duration of day. There are several subtexts in this act: (a) it alludes to the fact that the new member will be involved in dirty work and that he must be able to endure all kinds of challenges; and (b) it suggests that those outside the gang are excrement that the new member must endure and then wipe off. 2 A drug cartel called The Knights Templar based in Mexico is one of the country’s most brutal gangs, known for decapitating and boiling enemies alive. In line with this violent behavior, new members are forced to eat a human heart in front of the others, both as a symbol of loyalty and as a sign of the brutality that the member is expected to enact. 3 The recruits of the Numbers Gang, which originated in the 1800s in the Western Cape prison system in South Africa, are offered two options to become a permanent member: (a) the “Gold Line” option, which involves drawing blood from prison guards, or (b) the “Silver Line” option, which requires the member to be a willing sex slave to the higher-­ranking members. 4 The Bloods (The United Blood Nation) is an American drug-­dealing and racketeering street gang founded in Los Angeles in the early 1970s. The Bloods are clad in red, to reflect both their name and their activities (blood-­shedding). In one of their rituals, which takes place in the New York City chapter, the recruit is required to slash someone’s cheek with a box cutter, leaving the person with a deep laceration.

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5 In the Taitung gang, which is based in Taitung County in Taiwan, the recruit is subjected to a bunch of firecrackers thrown at him, to symbolize endurance, loyalty, and courage. It is considered a way of weeding weak people out.

Associates and hitmen In all OCs, the ranks and roles of the members are named in specific ways, according to the language and traditions of the clan, but they all converge around three main roles – leader, counselors, foot soldiers. Other roles, such as the one who looks after the finances and the one who looks after legalities – accountants and lawyers – are either assigned within the clan or farmed out to outsiders. Some of the more brutal activities, such as murders, which might potentially bring public attention to the clan members, may also be assigned outside the clan to enforcers or hitmen. The role of accountant is not normally assigned a specific distinctive name, because he is usually outside the clan. In fact, outside of a few cases, such as the Yakuza, this role is outsourced to individuals with the required expertise, who either accept the role tacitly or else do so because of bribery or threats to their own health or that of their loved ones. A classic case in point of a Mafia accountant is Meyer Lanksy, a crime boss himself and an accountant hired by Cosa Nostra.

Meyer Lansky (1902–1983) Meyer Lansky was known as the “mob’s accountant.” He was an American organized crime figure who, along with Lucky Luciano, drafted the plan to unite the warring Mafias into a corporation called the Commission, or National Crime Syndicate, in the United States. Lansky built a gambling empire with casinos in Las Vegas, Cuba, the Bahamas, and London. He played a major role in the consolidation of the criminal underworld with his financial skills. Lansky became a pop culture figure over the years. For example, the character of Hyman Roth, in The Godfather Part II (1974), is based on Lansky. He is the inspiration for the character of Maximilian “Max” Bercovicz in Sergio Leone’s film, Once Upon a Time in America (1984); he is played by Patrick Dempsey in Mobsters (1991) and Dustin Hoffman in The Lost City (2005). In the 1981 NBC series The Gangster Chronicles (1981), the character of Michael Lasker was based on Lansky. Because Lansky was still living at the time, the producers invented the “Michael Lasker” name for the character to avoid legal complications. In the HBO series Boardwalk Empire, Meyer Lansky is played by Anatol Yusef.

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Lansky was one of the most financially successful gangsters in the history of organized crime in America. During World War II, he was instrumental in aiding the Office of Naval Intelligence’s Operation Underworld, which recruited criminals to identify Nazi infiltrators and saboteurs. Lansky made a deal with the government to secure the release of his friend, Lucky Luciano, who had been imprisoned at the time. In exchange, Luciano and his Mafia confrères would provide security for the warships that German submarines were sinking along the eastern seaboard. As a result of this turn of events, Lansky and Luciano revived the Mafia in America (and in Italy) in the post-­World War II era. Hitmen are sometimes hired from the outside the criminal organization to carry out contract killings to eliminate a targeted individual or group of people. Contract killing provides the mob the advantage of not carrying out the actual killing, making it difficult for law enforcement to connect them with the murder. A number of hitmen have become (in)famous. One of the best-­ known ones is Richard “The Iceman” Kuklinski, who has become an icon of the brutal hitman archetype through media exposure.

Richard “The Iceman” Kuklinski (1935–2006) The Iceman was one of the mob’s most prolific and famous contract killers. Kuklinski was born in Jersey City in 1935, raised by a violent father. One of his brothers died at the hands of the father, but the family lied to the authorities, saying that the death was an accident. Kuklinski took his first life when he just 13. At 19, he roamed the streets killing people randomly, for nothing more than for the pleasure of it. He claimed to have carried out around 250 murders, both by contract and for his own satisfaction – which may be an exaggeration. Kuklinski would kill people for no reason other than to practice and hone different murder techniques. His nickname, “The Iceman,” comes from the fact that he would often freeze the corpses of his victims in order to throw off investigators about their time of death. The Gambino family took notice of his psychopathic willingness to murder anyone for any reason, hiring him to do their dirty work. Kuklinski used every weapon and method of killing imaginable, including his fists “just for the exercise,” as he put it in a televised interview. A nearly two-­year-­long undercover operation led to his arrest in December of 1986. He was sentenced to consecutive life sentences, dying in prison in 2006. Kuklinski has since become a figure in pop culture. For instance, the 2012 documentary The Iceman takes a look at the Iceman as a bogeyman scary character. The 2003 song “Iceman” by the American metal band Macabre is about Kuklinski. And the 2010 song “Lyrical Hitman” by Royce da 5’9” incorporates Kuklinski’s exploits into its lyrics.

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A few other infamous hitmen of the mob are the following, who also became subjects of interest by pop culture: 1 Salvatore “Sammy the Bull” Gravano was a protégé of the Gambino crime family in the late 1960s. He initially caught the eye of the clan by committing several brutal murders, which he perpetrated in order to earn respect from the gang. He was soon hired as an enforcer, carrying out at least 19 murders. He set up an underground smuggling business, which made him wealthy. When arrested, he turned state’s witness, allowing him to escape severe punishment – he was sentenced to five years in prison in 1994. 2 Sam “Mad Sam” De Stefano was a petty criminal and enforcer before being allowed to join Chicago’s notorious Forty-­Two Gang in 1930. He became one of Chicago’s first loan sharks. When a victim failed to pay up on time, he would sadistically torture him until he died. He was arrested for murder, but before going to trial, he was killed by an associate. 3 Joseph “The Animal” Barboza was actually a chef who became heavily involved in contract killings for the New England Mafia. He got his nickname “The Animal” from an altercation at a pub. While he was drinking, he was asked to keep the noise level down by an elderly man. Barboza slapped the man. His boss warned him never to touch an elderly person again. Barboza responded by biting his ear off and taking a chunk out of his cheek. He was arrested but only served limited time, becoming a snitch on other Mafia members. He was found dead outside his house with four shotgun holes in his chest in 1976. 4 Harry “Pittsburgh Phil” Strauss was hired by various organized crime groups in the 1930s and 1940s in New York City. Strauss was eventually arrested after a fellow enforcer, Abe “Kid Twist” Reles, cooperated with police to identify Strauss as a murderer. During his trial, Strauss tried to convince the judge and jury that he was insane, growing a long beard, stinking of body odor by not showering, and chewing on a leather briefcase strap. Despite the performance, he was sentenced to death in Sing Sing Prison. Reles, the informant, fell mysteriously from a window and died while under police protection in November of 1941.

OCs Names Labels and names are critical signs of identity. Without a “brand name” (Mafia, Yakuza, Hells Angels, etc.) there would be no recognizable gang, just a group of thugs. Recall from Chapter 2 that the name Mafia is of uncertain origin, although most linguists trace it to one of a number Arabic words  – mahyas (“exaggerated boasting”), marfud (“rejected”), ma fi (“it doesn’t exist”), mahfaz (“protection”), or mahfil (“a gathering”) (Natella 2002). Any one of these, or

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some combination, is a plausible source for two reasons: (a) semantically, they describe what Mafia culture is all about (boasting, protection, secrecy, etc.), and (b) Middle East settlements in Sicily left their residues in the languages and cultures of the region. Recall also from Chapter 2 that the term Mafia came into general use after an 1863 play by Giuseppe Rizzotto and Gaetano Mosca, I mafiusi di la Vicaria (“The Mafiosi of the Vicaria”). The use of the word mafiusi by the play spread quickly as a general term, listed shortly thereafter in an 1868 Italian-­Sicilian Dictionary, where it is defined as “the actions, deeds, and words of someone who tries to act like a wise guy” (Lunde 2004: 55). As Nicaso and Lamothe (2005: 34) point out, the mafiusu concept was an apt one, since it allowed people to gather under its semantic range any number of what would otherwise have been seen as random anti-­social criminal acts: In truth, these traits even absent of criminal activity, are nonetheless anti-­ social concepts that refuse to bow before the laws of either church or state. That such men could come into conflict with the law  – particularly if they’re engaged in criminal activities – makes a strong underpinning for a cohesive mafia-­like mindset. Names identify something as being a fact of life, predisposing speakers to attend to their referents as being necessary. When we name something, we are bringing it into reality. Assigning the name mafiusi to a group of criminals bestows on them a real identity that they would otherwise not have. Incidentally, in Rizzotto and Mosca’s play, the mafiusi are a gang of prison extortionists with a capo, an initiation rite, and a code of omertà – describing what the real Mafia was all about, baptizing it linguistically.

Leonardo Sciascia’s Filologia The twentieth-­ century Sicilian novelist Leonardo Sciascia (1921– 1989) wrote an interesting story in 1973, titled Filologia (“Philology”). It takes the form of an imaginary conversation between two Sicilians about the meaning of the word Mafia. The older of the two, who is a politician, traces it to an Arabic source; the younger prefers to explain it as a slang term for “manly swagger.” As it turns out, the two are actually Mafiosi, and their conversation is a rehearsal in case they are called to testify. The intent of the explanations they offer for the term Mafia is to confuse. As Dickie (2004: 34) points out, Sciascia is suggesting that “the name ‘mafia’ became the Sicilian mafia’s own little joke at the state’s expense.”

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The origin of the terms Camorra and ’Ndrangheta to designate the Neapolitan and Calabrian crime groups or families, respectively, is also not clear. Some historians trace the former to the common Italian gambling game called morra, as explained in Chapter 2, which is played with the fingers of the right hand – as mentioned, the “ca” part of the word is said to be a shortened form of capo, hence Camorra (ca + morra). The first use of this name is actually recorded in a 1735 document referring to a gambling den in Naples, thus seemingly supporting this etymological explanation. The name has since taken on ominous connotations, conjuring up “images of secret sects, mysterious occult powers, bloodthirsty revenge, and an invincible brotherhood” (Nicaso and Lamothe 2005: 63). The word ’Ndrangheta derives from the Greek andragathes, meaning “a noble and courageous man worthy of respect,” and it likely emerged as a general moniker for the gang at some early point in its history (Reynolds 2006: 181). Sometimes a name comes from literature or popular culture. This is the case of the criminal gang known as the Mafia dei basilischi, based in the region of Basilicata, which emerged in the 1980s, taking its name from a 1963 film, I basilischi, by director Lina Wertmüller, even though the movie had nothing to do with organized crime. Its plot simply took place in the Basilicata. The term Yakuza, as discussed (Chapter 3), also has a gambling-­based etymology, referring to a losing combination of numbers in a card game called oicho-­kabu, a version of Black Jack. The losing combination – 8–9–3 – is pronounced ya-­ku-­za in Japanese, hence the term. The term has come to connote “misfit” or “outcast,” suggesting that the Yakuza see themselves as underdogs or outcasts, who are nonetheless kyokaku, that is, “chivalrous persons, men of honor.” The card game is still played by members of the Yakuza, who might take off their shirts and drape them around their waists to reveal their full-­body tattoos to each other as they play the game. The word Triad is an English word that emerged in the sixteenth century. It is believed to be a periphrasis of Chinese San Ho Hui, literally “triple union society,” alluding to the Confucian triangle of the union of Heaven, Earth, and Man. The legend goes that the Five Ancestors who escaped calamity chose the triangle as their symbol of resistance, a shape that had mystical connotations. The monks called their secret society Hung Mun, which literally translates into “Heaven and Earth Society.” The society never named itself as a Triad. It was in 1821 when Dr. William Milne of Malacca, a missionary to China, adopted that term, spreading it broadly through newspaper reports. In fact, as Reynolds (2006: 182) observes, “Resident Chinese usually refer to the organization as hei she bui, literally translated as “black (or secret, sinister or wicked) society.” An offshoot of the Chinese gang is the Tongs, which, as discussed (Chapter 3), means “meeting halls.” To reiterate here, the Tongs surfaced in the nineteenth century to help Chinese immigrants adapt to the United States and Canada. After a while, criminal elements within the Tongs surfaced, becoming involved in illegal activities, from gambling to prostitution and drug trafficking. Wars ensued among Tong factions.

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Sometimes gangs are named after their leaders. Two examples are the Sabini Brothers gang, formed in 1939 in London, which took its name from five brothers who were in charge, and another London gang named after the two brother leaders, the Richardsons, in the 1960s. The main rival gang of the Richardsons was also named after two brothers, the Krays, which is one of the most notorious of all British gangs. The rivalry between the two was portrayed by the 1990 British movie The Krays. Some gangs are named after territories or places. The Dover Road Gang, for instance, named itself after a street in London that they seized as their own territory; the Yardies, also a London gang, got their name from the fact that they originated in the impoverished back streets of their native Jamaica, where the word “yard” can mean home or patch of territory. Sometimes gangs get their names from literary works. The British gang called the Forty Thieves, founded in the 1890s, got its name from the book of tales The Arabian Nights, in which there is a story about Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves. It was, and still is, one of the few OCs run by women. The gang is based in South London, and its new recruits are trained in thievery and required to serve an apprenticeship under the leader, called the “Queen.”

Selection of gang names Here is a sampling of gang names, which illustrate the semantic range that they encompass.

Mexico Sinaloa Cartel, Gente Nueva (New People), Los Rojos (The Red Ones), Los Metros (City People), Knights Templar, Jalisco Nueva Generation, Lo Zetas, Gulf Cartel

Asia Golden Triangle, Han Cartel, Khan Organization, Bagcho Organization, Haqqani Network

Canada Red Scorpions, Dubois Brothers, Rizzuto Crime Family, Siderno Group, West End Gang, Big Circle Boys

United States Seven Group, Cosa Nostra, Wall Gang, MS-­13 (originated in the United States), The Commission, The Chicago Outfit, 69th Street Gang, Aso Posse

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Ireland Cahill Gang, Dunne Gang, The Westies, Hyland Gang, Kinahan Gang, Foley Gang

England Buttmarsh Boys, Gooch Close Gang, Essex Boys, Messina Brothers, Brighton Razor Gangs, Aggi Crew

Russia Agron Gang, Izmaylovskaya Gang, Solntsevskaya Bratva, Kazan Gang, Donetsk Clan, Uralmash Gang

Organized crime groups have no political goals and are not motivated by social doctrines or ideological concerns (Chapter  1). However, their names might become associated with certain social events, such as charitable ones. The Hells Angels, who carry out widespread violent crimes, maintain a positive public image by participating in good deeds for the community, as discussed (Chapter  3), showing up at children’s events with toys and goodwill. Gang names might also become widely known because of popular culture and media representations. As a case in point, the Chinese Triads have been featured in over 140 motion pictures in China and the United States, allowing them to become known broadly, starting in 1917 with an American film, The War of the Tongs. A similar fame has been achieved by many other gangs, such as the Mafia and the Yakuza, which are also the subject of films, documentaries, video games, and the like.

Titles and nicknames Titles and nicknames are key symbolic features in criminal cultures of all kinds. For instance, in the various Italian Mafias, the title of Don is a common one for referring to the capo to show deference and obsequiousness; it is sometimes used with other officers of the organization. It fits in with the broader historical culture of southern Italy, where the title is given traditionally to a prominent person. It comes from Latin Dominum, meaning “master (of a household”). The abbreviated form, Don, appeared in the Middle Ages, when it was reserved for clergy or nobles and certain people of distinction as a sign of honorific respect. Given the importance ascribed to a “Don,” the bearer of the title must appear like a leader, elegant and authoritative. In Italy today, it is sometimes used ironically, to satirize someone who gives himself self-­importance undeservingly.

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The use of Don to refer to a high-­ranking member of the Mafia was introduced into pop culture by The Godfather (1972), in which the main character is Don Vito Corleone – a name that alludes to the first real capo to bear that title, Don Vito Cascio Ferro, known as “Don Vito.” Ferro was born in Palermo in 1862, becoming a gabellotto (‘revenue collector”) for a baron. By the time he emigrated to New York in 1901, he had established a reputation as a ruthless but honorable man of honor. In New York, he gave advice to Black Handers, laying the foundations for the American Mafia to emerge. In the city, he crossed the path of legendary police detective Joe Petrosino, who arrested him for murder. Don Vito was never convicted, returning shortly thereafter to Sicily to escape persecution from the police. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in 1909, Petrosino was murdered during a visit to Palermo. Don Vito was arrested for the murder but was acquitted because of dubious testimony given at his trial. In 1927, Don Vito was arrested by dictator Benito Mussolini’s Sicilian prefect, Cesare Mori, and sentenced to 50 years in prison, where he died in 1943. Another early boss to bear the title of Don was Calogero Vizzini (1877– 1954), born to peasant parents in a village near Caltanissetta in Sicily. He joined a bandit gang as a young man and was involved in the racket of offering protective services to ensure the safe passage of grain products. Vizzini became a powerful capo, collaborating opportunistically with upstanding citizens, including army officers, politicians, and businessmen. During World War II he was co-­opted by the Allies and was, ironically, made an honorary officer of the American army. There are similar titular epithets in many other OCs. For example, in the Yakuza, the term oyabun is both a designation of the leader and an honorific title to use when addressing him or talking about him. This practice is not as common, though, in the neophyte gangs, where leaders are generally referred to as the boss or the bossman. The term Mr. Big is sometimes used in an informal way when talking about, not to, the leader. In the latter case, it might be interpreted as derision, rather than respect. In addition to titles, nicknames abound in criminal culture, being either assigned by the clan to describe a member or (less frequently) devised by a member himself. Sometimes, the nickname is a dialect one that implies the gangster’s ethnicity. An example is the name of Salvatore in Sicilian, rendered by the more regionally appropriate form Totò, the nickname given to one of the most brutal Mafiosi of all time, Salvatore “Totò” Riina (1930–2017). Riina was also given the descriptive nickname of “The Beast” to characterize his violent and abject character. Riina ordered the murder of anti-­Mafia judge Giovanni Falcone in 1992. He was arrested six months later, betrayed, ironically, by a loyal follower, Balduccio Di Maggio. Abbreviated names may also serve the same dialect-­based function, implying regional identity. The name Salvatore is shortened to “Salvo” in Sicily, used normally among friends and family members. One of the most famous bearers of that name was Salvatore “Salvo” Lima (1920–1992), a corrupt politician in Palermo who was murdered by the clan

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who had co-­opted him after it was determined that he was no longer useful to them. The irony of the form “Salvo” is that it is also an Italian word meaning “safe” – a fact that was not missed by the newspapers that reported on his death on March 12, 1992. In the history of Cosa Nostra, perhaps no other nickname is more famous than “Scarface,” given to Al Capone, in reference to the scars on his face, which he got during a scuffle while he was working the door at a bar. The story goes that he insulted a woman, and as a consequence he was slashed three times with a knife by her brother to avenge the dishonor. The wounds left scars on his face  – hence the nickname, which Capone apparently loathed.

Alphonse (Al) Gabriel Capone (1899–1947) Capone is perhaps the most famous of all American Mafia gangsters, and he gained notoriety during the Prohibition era as a bootlegger and boss of the Chicago Outfit. He was born in New York City to Italian immigrant parents, joining a gang as a teenager and taking a job as a bouncer in brothels run by mobsters. He moved to Chicago and became a bodyguard for a criminal gang that illegally supplied alcohol. When Capone became himself a bootlegger, he expanded his business not only by violent means but by corrupting police and government officials. He became a celebrity, making donations to various charities, and was called a “modern-­day Robin Hood” by some in the media at the time. However, the Saint Valentine’s Day Massacre, in which seven of his gang rivals were murdered, Capone’s media image changed, and he was dubbed “Public Enemy Number One.” Ironically, Capone was prosecuted in 1931 for tax evasion. He was convicted and sentenced to eleven years in federal prison, where he died on January 25, 1947, of cardiac arrest after suffering a stroke.

Mafia nicknames are descriptive, referring to appearance, character, affiliation, or activities. The following are a few famous examples:   1 Michele Greco, born in Palermo in 1924 into a family with strong Mafia ties, was called Il Papa (“The Pope”) because of the power he wielded in his clan, which was named with the religious epithet of La Cupola (“The Cupola”).

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  2 His brother was known as Cicchiteddu (“Little Bird”) Greco, because he was raised in a fruit grove where birds would flock.   3 Antonino Manuzza (“Little Hand”) Giuffrè got his nickname because of his deformed right hand, mangled in a hunting accident.   4 Totò Riina was also nicknamed U Curtu (“Shorty”) for the evident reason that he was a short man.   5 Pino Scarpuzzedda (“Little Shoe”) Greco was an underboss and hitman for his clan. His Mafioso father was nicknamed Scarpa (“Shoe”) – hence his nickname.   6 American racketeer Joseph Lanza was nicknamed “Socks” because of his tendency to settle disputes with his fists (as in to sock someone).  7 “Diamond” Jim Colosimo was a powerful Chicago mob boss and was named in this way because he stood out, like a diamond.   8 Earl “Hymie” Weiss, a boss of the North Side gang in Chicago during the Al Capone era, was given this nickname because of his Polish ethnicity; it was an ethnic slur.   9 Richard “Peg Leg” Lonergan, a leader of a 1920s Irish gang, was called this because he had a prosthetic leg. 10 “Machine Gun” Jack McGurn was a hitman implicated in the St. Valentine’s Day massacre; his name is an obvious reference to his weapon of choice. 11 Jimmy “The Weasel” Fratianno was a hitman who turned state’s evidence, hence the nickname “Weasel.” 12 Sammy “The Bull” Gravano (discussed previously) was a hitman for John Gotti in New York City who testified against Gotti in order to save himself. His nickname describes his physical appearance as comparable to that of a bull. 13 Joseph “Crazy Joe” Gallo earned this nickname because of the fact that he was a maniacal killer for a Brooklyn-­based clan. 14 Vincent “Chin” Gigante, a boss of the Genovese Family, had a prominent chin. 15 Richard “Shellackhead” Cantarella, a caporegime of the Bonanno Family, was given this name because he always slicked his hair (with pomade). 16 Vincent “Vinny Gorgeous” Basciano, an acting boss of the Bonanno Family for a while, was called this because he always dressed fashionably in dapper clothes and kept his hair neat and coiffured. 17 Earl “Squint” Coralluzzo, a soldier in the Genovese Family, was called by this name because he squinted continuously. 18 Thomas “Tommy Karate,” a hitman for the Bonanno Family, was nicknamed this way because of his martial arts skills, which he would use during his vicious killing sprees. 19 As discussed previously, Ignazio Saietta, considered one of the most deadly gangsters of all time, who used torture as a primary method of extortion, was aptly called “Lupo the Wolf,” with Lupo itself meaning “wolf ” in

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Italian. Fear of wolves is endemic in Southern Italian culture, and ­Saietta was perceived as being a wolf who may have carried out over 60 ­murders but was never convicted of any of them, showing again his wolf-like qualities. 20 Michele “The Cobra” Cavataio, a brutal killer who got his nickname from his deceitfulness and the fact the he carried a Colt Cobra revolver, lived like a snake, metaphorically speaking, hiding quietly but becoming vicious when disturbed. The Palermo bosses decided to kill him in 1969 because he was seen to be a loose cannon. Lunde (2004: 168) summarizes the logic behind such nicknames as follows: Mafia underworld nicknames are self-­explanatory, usually based on some notable mental or physical characteristic or inspired by their real last name, like “Tony Pro” (Anthony Provenzano). In the case of Murray Llewellyn Humphreys, “The Hump” and “The Camel” are both a play on the first syllable of his last name and the fact that he always wore camel hair overcoats. “Happy” Malone was a dreaded killer who never smiled. Sam “Golf Bag” Hunt carried his favorite weapon, a semi-­automatic shotgun, in his golf bag. He was also a very good golfer. The “Gurrah” in Jacob Shapiro is simply Brooklynese dialect for “Get out of here,” which Shapiro used to say to resident union officials when taking over their local branch. Tony “Ducks” Corallo somehow always ducked convictions. “Scarface” was a nickname bestowed on Capone by the media. It would not have been wise to address him as such. His friends called him “Snorky.” Similar nicknaming patterns are found throughout OC cultures, revealing emphases and beliefs within them. For example, in Vory v Zakone, one finds nicknames such as Tarzan, Quiet Godfather, Lord Lenin, Mussolini, Merchant of Death; in Latino gangs, Bullet, Spider, Shorty, Sniper, Wicked, Swifty; in biker gangs, Handlebars, Chains, Crow, Knuckles, Gunner, Hawk, Gears; in Aryan (White Supremacist) gangs, Pitbull, Hammer, Razor, Trigger Mike, Shadow, and so on. Nicknames promote distinctiveness. As American writer Florence King (1989: 23) aptly puts it, “In its purest sense, nicknaming is an elitist ritual practiced by those who cherish hierarchy.” Criminal organizations have always practiced this “elitist ritual.” A  gangster is a “nobody” until he earns a nickname that describes something of significance to the clan. One important aspect is courage in the face of adversity. Lucky Luciano was called “Lucky” because of the noticeable large scars around his neck that permanently recorded his fortuitous escape from death after being slashed and left dead by criminal rivals. The nickname “Scarface” was given to Al Capone because he was involved in an altercation that left him with three noticeable scars on his face.

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As Nicaso and Lamothe (2005: 140) aptly observe, made men are renamed men: Those who are brought into the formal underworld may have had nicknames in their former lives; however, when initiated they’re given new names or allowed to choose one. Some names describe a physical characteristic  – Vyacheslav Ivankov, for example, was called Yaponchik because of the Asiatic cast to his eyes. Others might be for a thief ’s attitude: Tank or Dashing. A home invader might be called Madhouse because of his single-­minded wrecking of a victim’s house.

References Abadinsky, Howard (2016). Organized Crime. Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publishing. Blatchford, Chris (2008). The Black Hand: The Bloody Rise and Redemption of ‘Boxer’ Enriquez, a Mexican Mob Killer. New York: HarperCollins. Cimino, Al, Durden Smith, Jo and Frasca, A. (2017). The Mafia: The Complete Story. London: Arcturus. Dickie, John (2004). Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia. London: Houghton and Stoughton. Durkheim, Emile (1897). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Collier. Eliade, Mircea (1961). The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. New York: Harper Torchbooks. Gratteri, Nicola and Nicaso, Antonio (2009). Fratelli di sangue. Milano: Mondadori. Gratteri, Nicola and Nicaso, Antonio (2020). Ossigeno Illegale. Milano: Mondadori. King, Florence (1989). Reflections in a Jaundiced Eye. New York: St. Martin’s. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Natella, Pasquale (2002). La parola mafia. Firenze: Olschki. Nicaso, Antonio and Danesi, Marcel (2013). Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Nicaso, Antonio and Lamothe, Lee (2005). Angels, Mobsters & Narco-­Terrorists: The Rising Menace of Global Criminal Empires. Toronto: John Wiley. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Scarpinato, Roberto (2015). Focus on the Mafia’s Thinking Mindset. World Futures 71: 125–136. Shawcross, Tim and Young, Martin (1987). Men of Honour: The Confession of Tommaso Buscetta, the Man Who Destroyed the Mafia. London: Collins.

Chapter 6

Codes

Introduction An English proverb says that “there is no honor among thieves,” capturing the kind of duplicity that common criminals might display against each other  – betraying one another to save themselves. Perhaps aware of the proverb, organized criminals have developed codes of conduct that are designed fundamentally to avoid betrayal within and without the gang. These are not unlike the constitutions of nations – codes that grant sovereign power to the leader, specify what beliefs and values are important, what the rules of conduct that the gangsters must follow are, and so on. Without such codes, the danger of betrayal implicit in the English proverb might become real and lead to the disintegration of the criminal groups. The best-­known example of this kind of code is the Italian Mafia one called omertà (mentioned in previous chapters), which means “humility,” “honor,” and “manliness.” It constitutes a code that harkens back to so-­called principles of rustic chivalry, which have allowed the Mafia to differentiate itself from common delinquents and to endure. It not only regulates behavior among clan members but also contains rules for carrying out retribution for injustices and for reclaiming “honor” when it has been impugned in some way by insiders or outsiders. The code was embedded into the popular imagination by Italian composer Pietro Mascagni’s 1890 opera Cavalleria Rusticana (“rustic chivalry”), which deals with the rustic-­based honorable ethos of Sicilian culture. The opera emphasizes how violent behavior emerges when common people are under emotional strain from the poor conditions that affect their lives. The rustic code is, among these people, a coping mechanism that transforms virtuous living into a survival strategy – as another proverb asserts, “virtue is its own reward.” It is relevant to note that Martin Scorsese used the opera’s famous intermezzo as background music in Raging Bull (1980), a movie about pride and honor, and Francis Ford Coppola incorporated various excerpts from the opera into his Godfather, Part III (1990), in a scene in which a Mafioso stalks a victim in the Teatro Massimo in Palermo where Mascagni’s opera is being performed on stage.

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Cavalleria Rusticana (1890) Cavalleria Rusticana is a one-­act tragic opera by the Italian composer Pietro Mascagni (1863–1945). The libretto (text) is by Guido Menasci and Giovanni Targioni-­Tozzetti, based on the novella and play Cavalleria Rusticana by the Sicilian author Giovanni Verga (1840–1922). The plot takes place during Easter in a Sicilian village around 1880. Turiddu is a soldier who has seduced Santuzza, a young village girl. But Turiddu quickly tires of the relationship and goes back to his former sweetheart Lola, who in the meantime has become the wife of the local carter, Alfio. Santuzza makes a passionate but futile appeal to Turiddu to come back to her. Rejected and humiliated, she tells Alfio about the love affair. Alfio realizes that he must seek vengeance for the dishonor done to both him and Santuzza – explaining the meaning of the opera’s title, which refers to an implicit village code of honor. According to this code, Alfio must seek revenge. During the Easter service, he challenges Turiddu to a duel and kills him.

Omertà is powerful emotionally, as the opera brings out. It is reflective of the strong sense of family, friendship, and trust in many cultures, especially traditional rustic ones; it is also a cultural response to centuries of invasion and foreign rule that have historically undermined the Sicilian’s trust in officials and authorities. Family can be trusted; others cannot. The code entails a system of ethics and justice, warning Mafia members not to dishonor themselves by taking part in petty crimes or collaborating with outside officials and outsiders generally. Any injustice against a member will be taken care of within the clan; punishments for betrayal or dishonoring oneself will be punished severely, but honorably, as in the opera. Sicily’s tradition of private justice is what gives omertà a powerful psychological grounding for the Mafiosi. By claiming omertà, they are not held responsible morally or ethically for their brutal activities. As philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1840: 160) so aptly observed about honor in situations of social imbalances: “It is the dissimilarities and inequalities among men which give rise to the notion of honor; as such differences become less, it grows feeble; and when they disappear, it will vanish too.” The Mafia defines itself in terms of their code of rustic chivalry, and one cannot truly penetrate the raison d’être of the Mafia without reckoning with the power of that code. Codes of conduct are not unique to the Sicilian Mafia, of course; they are found in virtually every OC. They are designed to impart a sense of distinctiveness and internal values to what would otherwise be nothing more than random criminality. The made man must be perceived as an honorable man. This chapter will deal with this key aspect of OCs – it is the one that gives moral

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legitimacy to the gangs, at least among the members. Honor is so critical that any “dishonor” perpetrated on the gang or any member is cause for revenge against the person who is responsible for it. Not to act upon it would bring shame on the clan. The challenge of dishonor is equated with masculinity and virility – an honorable man must use force, or at least display a willingness to do so, in order to “make the wrong right” again.

Codes of conduct Cultural codes regulate or provide guidelines for appropriate conduct and interactions among members of a culture, stipulating the fundamental values and beliefs shared by the members and by which they should live. A codeless culture is an oxymoron. OCs are self-­made parallel cultures (Chapter  1), in large part because they have developed codes of conduct that are designed to establish norms of behavior that every member must follow; without them, the gangs would collapse into groups of random thugs. Criminal codes are not uniform, but they share several principles. The primary one is that the member must be a trustworthy individual; any member who is not will be thrown out unceremoniously and even murdered – there is no room for cowards and backstabbers in the clan. This universal precept explains many violent conflicts within a clan, such as avenging murders and vendettas on traitor members. Another principle is the rejection of society’s laws and legal officials. In an OC, the member must stand up for himself and not rely on outsiders for justice. He can depend on his brothers, but ultimately he is the one who must show courage and mettle. Another common principle of criminal cultures is that they are patriarchal – that is, the men are in charge and the women must play subordinating roles. While the women are seen essentially as the property of the men, they must be treated with respect, and any infraction against them is treated as brutally as the treatment of traitors. Women who betray their men are also severely punished (see Chapter 8). Criminal codes are passed on either by word of mouth or, sometimes, in writing. An example is the Mafia’s “Ten Commandments,” the principles that every clan member must obey, like religious commandments (Nicaso and Danesi 2013). Their religious subtext impels a made man to believe that the oaths he takes have spiritual value. Starting with the symbols adopted during initiation rites (Chapter  5), the Mafia aims to associate itself with religious practices, values, and meanings, distorting them to its own requirement of self-­ justification, as John Dickie (2004: 16) points out: Like mafia honour, mafia religion helps Mafiosi justify their actions – to themselves, to each other, and to their families. Mafiosi often like to think that they are killing in the name of something higher than money and power, and the two names they usually come up with are “honour” and “God”. Indeed, the religion professed by Mafiosi and their families is like

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so much else in the moral universe of mafia honor, in that it is difficult to tell where genuine – if misguided – belief ends, and cynical deceit begins. Understanding how the mafia thinks means understanding that the rules of honor mesh with calculated deceit and heartless savagery in the mind of every member. The Italian police found an actual document listing “Ten Commandments” in the hideout of a Mafia boss in 2007. It is not known how long the clan had these, but what stood out to investigators immediately was how deliberately they followed the style of the Biblical Commandments, turning this on its head to reflect values of the clan.

Ten Commandments of the Mafia (translated into English)  1 No person can present himself directly to another of our friends. A third person must do it.   2 Never look at the wives of friends.   3 Never be seen with cops.   4 Do not go to pubs and common clubs.   5 Always being available for Cosa Nostra is a duty, even if your wife is about to give birth.   6 Appointments must be absolutely respected.   7 Wives must be treated with respect.   8 When asked for information, the answer must always be the truth.  9 Money cannot be appropriated, unless it belongs to others or to other families. 10 Anyone who has a close relative in the police, anyone who has a two-­timing relative in his family, anyone who behaves badly and immorally cannot be a member of Cosa Nostra.

The traditional Mafias see and portray the modern world as “unnatural” and “immoral.” By adopting commandments, they can project themselves above the perceived secular, relativistic culture and assume a sense of superiority over it. They have always aligned themselves with religion, not only because of the religious rustic village culture from which they emanate but also to justify the purported righteousness of their criminal activities. The first commandment is consistent with a medieval chivalric rule of conduct. A man of honor cannot be so brutish as to introduce himself spontaneously to another man of honor. This must be done through a third member, who knows both and who will thus introduce one to the other, according to

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an inherent principle of chivalric courtesy and gallantry. In this way, the honor of both is guaranteed. As part of the introduction protocol, the presenter utters the following: Lui è come noi oppure lui è la stessa cosa (“He is like us or is the same thing”) (Bolzoni 2008: 23). In Mafia culture, an individual has no worth if he does not espouse the chivalric code of manners and civility. After the first encounter, Mafiosi of the same clan often greet each other with a kiss, a practice that also likely goes back to medieval chivalry as a greeting sign among knights (Danesi 2013). The third and fourth commandments require members of the clan to set themselves apart from outsiders and mainstream social lifestyles. The third requires no comment – simply put, being seen with cops is a capital sin. The Mafia has its own means to carry out justice against anyone who has perpetrated some betrayal or dishonor against its members or their families. The fourth commandment implies that members must stay away from social club venues and pubs so as to stand apart from the riffraff who socialize in indiscriminate ways. The only friends that the Mafioso is allowed to have are other Mafiosi – other men of honor. The second and ninth commandments define relations among the members, paralleling the content of two Biblical Commandments related to adultery (“Thou shall not covet thy neighbor’s wife”) and stealing (“Thou shalt not steal”). The difference is, of course, that the real Commandments refer to adultery and stealing in general, while these refer to adultery and stealing within the clan. Stealing is sometimes allowed outside the clan, as is infidelity (to be discussed subsequently). The seventh commandment informs the Mafioso always to treat his wife, and the wives of the other members, with respect. The fifth, sixth, and eighth commandments inform a Mafioso how to act and behave with regard to his superiors and the other members. A Mafioso must always be on alert and prepared to act on a moment’s notice for the clan. The tenth commandment incapsulates the essence of what criminal honor (or, better, criminalized honor) is about. A Mafioso must not behave “immorally” by interacting with outsiders, such as with relatives who have connections to the police or who are informers. Violation of any of these commandments is punished accordingly. For minor offenses, a common form of reprisal is the taglio sulla guancia (“cheek cut”), which will mark the offender as a transgressor permanently. For serious offenses, such as going to the police, it is death. Oftentimes the vendetta is announced in some symbolic way. In the movie I cento passi (2000), directed by Marco Tullio Giordana, a transgressor is sent a tie as a sign of disloyalty, indicating a hangman’s noose. It came with the following message: “If you do not shape up, you will find yourself hanging from one of these.” Needless to say, the commandments never refer to killing directly, since this would raise awareness as to what the Mafia is fundamentally all about – terror, power, and murder. The Yakuza have developed a strikingly similar set of commandments by which members are expected to live and abide. A  principle adopted by the Yakuza that is the same as the one of the Italian Mafias, especially the

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’Ndrangheta, is that only individuals of Japanese ethnicity are allowed into the gang. And like the Mafia commandments, even the youngest Yakuza recruits are expected to avoid engaging in banal recreational culture, including the use of trendy American words. It would dishonor the Yakuza clan for a member to import into the clan “foreign rubbish” that relates to the impure secular world of mainstream culture – in a similar vein to the Sicilian Mafia, which stresses the use of the Sicilian dialect among clan members and the ’Ndrangheta of the Calabrian dialect.

The Yakuza codes The following “commandments” come from various sources (such as Kaplan and Dubro 2003); they are paraphrased here.   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 10

Always treat your oyabun with respect. Never reveal the secrets of the organization. Never violate the wife or children of another member. No personal involvement with narcotics is allowed. Do not withhold money from the gang. Do not steal from the common man. Do not fail in obedience to superiors. Do not appeal to the police or the law. Never use foreign words. Always act chivalrously.

As in the Italian Mafia codes, a primary commandment regards the giving of respect to the oyabun. This implies that the kobun must do everything that he tells them to do without fail or even hesitation. Disobedience is treated severely. In some clans, the only way for kobun to gain redemption is, as discussed previously, to amputate part of his little finger to show his remorse and loyalty. The principle of “not stealing from the common man” is designed to impart the mythology of the Yakuza as a Robin Hood-­like organization. And, like Mafiosi, Yakuza must always act like chivalrous knights. Codes such as these are recited during initiation rites (Chapter 5), indicating that the prospective member must pledge his allegiance to the clan’s system of values and pseudo-­ethics. They also have a bonding function, ensuring the stability and perpetuity of the clans. Criminal gangs may dissipate if they become detached from the application of codes of conduct. These not only allow them to justify their criminal activities but also to establish and define themselves as honorable alternative cultures to the mainstream ones.

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In virtually all cases, the codes allow the OCs to declare themselves as descendants of rustic, chivalrous cultures, along with their noble principles and brave exploits, both in their own eyes and those of people who are disparaged by the authorities and downtrodden by their social conditions. The gangs thus delineate themselves, through such codes, as the inheritors of the values, courage, and overall spirit of ancient folk heroes, who aim to ennoble the plight of the agnostic mainstream world, despite the violent means they use to do so. The codes specify, in fact, that common people must be left alone. At the same time, they contain canons and principles that allow the members to torture, murder, and dismember others in the pursuit of a sui generis justice. In a relativistic, heathen society, the gangs contend that their codes are the antidote to the cynicism and nihilism of mainstream secular society. Codes of conduct started in pirate and bandit cultures, as discussed in Chapter 2. A famous example is the code of English pirate captain, John Phillips, in the eighteenth century, which contains articles of conduct that are strikingly similar to the one discussed previously. His code is one of only four complete sets of pirate systems of conduct to survive from the Golden Age of Piracy (cited in Fox 2013).

Pirate code of John Phillips 1 Every man shall obey civil command; the Captain shall have one full share and a half of all prizes; the Master, Carpenter, Boatswain and Gunner shall have one share and quarter. 2 If any man shall offer to run away, or keep any secret from the Company, he shall be marooned with one bottle of powder, one bottle of water, one small arm [weapon], or shot. 3 If any man shall steal anything in the Company, or game, to the value of a piece of eight, he shall be marooned or shot. 4 If any time we shall meet another marooner, and that man shall sign his articles without the consent of our Company, he shall suffer such punishment as the Captain and Company shall think fit. 5 That man that shall strike another whilst these articles are in force, shall receive Moses’ Law (that is, 40 stripes [lashes] lacking one) on the bare back. 6 That man that shall snap his arms, or smoke tobacco in the hold, without a cap to his pipe, or carry a candle lighted without a lanthorn, shall suffer the same punishment as in the former article. 7 That man that shall not keep his arms [weapons] clean, fit for an engagement, or neglect his business, shall be cut off from his share, and suffer such other punishment as the Captain and the Company shall think fit.

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8 If any man shall lose a joint in time of an engagement, he shall have 400 pieces of eight; if a limb, 800. 9 If at any time you meet with a prudent woman, that man that offers to meddle with her, without her consent, shall suffer present death.

Comparable principles to the Mafia and Yakuza ones characterize the pirate code, including the nature of interpersonal relations on board, allegiance to the leader, and respect towards women, which are included among more specific rules that regard pirate activities. The pirates are expected to act tough and be intolerant of disrespect. An insult or transgression must be met with a response, or the stain of disloyalty or dishonor can affect the others and the cohesiveness of the clan. This type of honor-­code system is not unique to criminal gangs. It is found in many groups, from cults to various subcultures. In the United States, for example, sociologists call the vendettas enacted in small towns a “small town effect” in reference to incidents of argument-­based homicides in honor-­oriented states in the country. In such a culture, when honor is ruined, a person can be socially ostracized and seen as morally spineless and thus must enact a vendetta to get his reputation back.

Omertà Honor refers to the kind of bond that connects an individual to a society, shaped by historically established codes of conduct, which outline what it is in culture-­specific ways. Accordingly, individuals (or institutions) are assigned worth and status based on how their actions are in conformity to the code, which supersedes all other ideas and rules. Criminal organizations are “cultures of honor.” If their honor is challenged, then they have vengeful means to settle the dispute. No better code illustrates the principles of honor adopted by a criminal gang than does that of omertà, which defines honor as being based on humility and manly subservience to the family. As Giuseppe Giarrizzo (1996: 128) notes, this is criminal incorporation of the concepts of humility and total submission of the Masonic codes that were present in Sicily in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Generally speaking, omertà means “humility” (umirtà in Sicilian, umiltà in Italian). As Lunde (2004: 57) comments, it is an ancient Mediterranean ideal of manhood, “going back to the ancient Stoic tradition of ancient Greece and Rome,” that connects it to “the larger category of onore (‘honor’).” The central tenet of the code demands a vendetta against anyone who dishonors a Mafioso or his family. The true uomo d’onore (“man of honor”) must defend the honor of his crime family, which reveals why the Sicilian Mafia refers to itself as the Onorata Società (the “Honored Society”). The code sets the clan above

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common delinquents who commit random crimes. The following words of Antonino Calderone provide a window into this mindset. Calderone became a leading figure of the Sicilian Mafia in the 1970s (cited in Follain 2009: 25): You must forgive me for this distinction I make between the mafia and common crime, but it’s important to me. It’s important to every Mafioso. We are Mafiosi, the others are just the rabble. We are men of honour. And not so much because we have sworn an oath, but because we are the elite of crime. We are very much superior to common criminals. We are the worst of all! Omertà implies obedience, manliness, silence, and cultural exclusivity all at once – a “you are either with us or against us” mindset. Similar codes of omertà are found in other areas of the Mediterranean, which share a similar history with southern Italy. A core principle of omertà is that seeking aid from legal sources and authorities to settle personal disputes is a serious breach of manliness. An individual who has been dishonored must avenge that wrong himself. Another key principle is silence – it seals the lips of a man of honor even to defend himself when innocent of alleged crimes. As Letizia Paoli (2003: 109) puts it, omertà implies “the categorical prohibition of cooperation with state authorities or reliance on its services, even when one has been victim of a crime.” The only form of justice for a man of honor is by revenge. Even if a member of the clan is convicted of something he has not done, he must serve the sentence in silence, without giving the authorities any information about the real perpetrator. If he does, he will be punished by death. Omertà is the reason many Mafia-­related crimes go unsolved. The essence of omertà is found, actually, in a Sicilian proverb: Cu è surdu, orbu e taci, campa cent’anni ‘mpaci (“He who is deaf, blind and silent will live a hundred years in peace”). As Reynolds (2006: 179) observes, omertà has allowed the Mafia to develop a culture of honor, obedience, discipline, and control that keeps it stable, much like governments or the Church: Primitive in terms of other, more beneficent institutions such as governments and the Catholic Church, the Mafia nevertheless managed to develop a configuration that exerted discipline and control over its members. Over time, it crafted the group into an effective power in the same manner that disorganized guerrillas are transformed into an effective fighting force by adapting the techniques of a regimented and motivated army. According to some crime historians, the initial concept of omertà is traced to the Camorra, spreading to the other Mafias subsequently. Indirect evidence for this can be seen in the original name for the Camorra, Società dell’Umiltà, wherein umiltà implies humble obedience in the Masonic sense of the word – obedience through secrecy. Whatever the source, it is clear, as writer Aldous Huxley (1934: 12) wrote, that secrecy in cultures of honor affords members

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“a source of profound psychological satisfaction. Exclusiveness will add to the pleasure of being several, but at one; and secrecy will intensify it almost to ecstasy.” Unfortunately, this characterization has been applied stereotypically to stigmatize southern Italians in general, thus marginalizing them further and forcing them to entrench themselves even more against the mainstream, socially and culturally. The Mafias know this and use it to advantage by continuing to claim that their culture is the only true honorable one, implanted in the traditions of rustic chivalry. They also know that they can enforce control over people by the principle of vendetta – anyone whom the Mafia has targeted or persecuted and who seeks recourse to legal authority against it is branded as a coward meriting reprisal. This principle reflects, again, a common attitude in various Mediterranean societies, namely that recourse to the law for offenses involving personal insult is unmanly. A real man will defend his honor and that of his family, no matter what personal consequences he will incur. In chivalric times, the appropriate action for restoring lost honor was the duel or some other form of vengeful retribution involving physical conflict. Today, in criminal cultures, it is death by assassination. The code exacts total and complete obedience and compliance from members, as Dickie (2004: 13) observes: Honour accumulates through obedience: in return for what they call “availability,” individual Mafiosi can increase their stock of honour and in doing so gain access to more money, information, and power. Belonging to Cosa Nostra offers the same advantages as does belonging to other organizations, including the achievement of aspirations, an exhilarating sense of status and comradeship, and the chance to pass responsibility, moral or otherwise, upwards in the direction of their bosses. All of these are ingredients of mafia honour. As in any secret cult or society, admittance into the criminal group involves accepting the code completely, especially blind obedience to the leader. Traitors to the code are the most despised, because they have broken the oath of silence, honor, and respect. Belonging is perceived to be a privilege that only “real men” can earn. Omertà is thus a “legitimizing” document, complete with its own attendant norms, principles of justice, and set of rules of conduct that veritably transform a Mafia culture into a parallel culture. Omertà produces a shared illusion of invulnerability and personal empowerment, and this illusion provides members with the impetus to take extraordinary risks and to rationalize warnings and potential danger signs. It generates an “empathy of belonging” based on the belief that agreement on issues is unanimous among all members. This puts the individual member in a position to ignore the broader ethical implications of what he does – once a man of honor, always a man of honor. Like the three musketeers of fictional narrative, men of honor live (as mentioned previously) by the creed of “one for all, all for one.” Members feel compelled to shelter and protect the clan, especially the leader, from adversities of all kinds.

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The Italian television series Il capo dei capi (2007) tells the story of the infamous Mafioso Totò Riina (mentioned in previous chapters), revealing the distorted view of honor and family that the Mafia upholds. Riina had no respect for the lives of others, apart from those in his immediate family, circle of friends, clan members, and acquaintances. He endorsed family and Catholic values openly but ended up perverting both. In the movie, Riina often says that one must never kill a cristiano, which in Italian means both “Christian” and “human being,” yet he turns around and does exactly that. Riina invokes omertà to justify his actions, alluding cynically to the historical plight of Sicilians that necessitated the code in the first place and, subsequently, the rise of the Mafia. As Reynolds (2006: 173) notes, omertà “was born not from the machinations of a criminal mastermind but out of the desperate necessity of middle-­class Sicilian families seeking control over their lives,” and this rationalizes or justifies that “the appalling behavior of the Mafia and its various progeny is actually rooted in good intentions.” The concept of omertà is an attractive one to this day. It became a key theme in Hollywood’s appropriation of Mafia culture already at the turn of the twentieth century, as can be seen in movies such as: Italian Blood (1911), Omertà (1912), Dramma alla masseria (1912), The Padrone’s Ward (1914), Tresa (1915), and Malacarne (1918). The testimony of a certain Salvatore D’Amico in the 1870s before a judge in Sicily accusing certain Mafiosi of having murdered his two sons emphasizes dramatically what Mafia justice entails and the kind of fear it instills in ordinary people (cited in Nicaso and Danesi 2013): I will die at the hands of the Mafia because without doubt I will be killed. Neither you yourself, your authority, or the entire police force will be able to save me. A mother never forgives her dishonorable children. Eleven days after giving this testimony, D’Amico was found shot dead with a tappo (“cork”) in his mouth. The message was clear – from the mouth of a dishonorable man, nothing should come out, not even his bad breath. Such symbolism is a silent warning of breaches of the code. Another example is the severed hand left on the chest of a victim, denoting that he had stolen from a territory that was under the control of the Mafia. The genitals hanging around the victim’s neck is yet another common form of symbolic communication – it indicates that the perpetrator attempted to seduce the woman of a Mafioso while the latter was in jail. Omertà is not exclusive to Mafia culture; as discussed, it has been a principle in banditry as well (Chapter 2). A case in point of is that of the legendary bandit Salvatore Giuliano, perhaps the most famous bandit in Italian history. It helped that Giuliano was a rugged and handsome “bad boy”; the photos taken of him by journalists added to his mystique, as Dickie (2004: 260) notes: At the peak of his notoriety, Salvatore Giuliano made himself as accessible for photojournalists as he was elusive for the authorities. Consequently his

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features are still instantly recognizable in Italy. In one of the most familiar photographs he looks straight into the camera, his thumbs hooked inside the belt from which his holster hangs, his jacket pushed behind his hips to reveal a loose shirt unbuttoned at the neck. Giuliano had what is called an open countenance. By a recent calculation forty-­one biographies of him have been written since his death – more than any other person in post-­ war Italian history. Each book has promised finally to reveal the secrets hidden behind that broad, handsome face. Giuliano’s reign as Italy’s Robin Hood lasted from 1943 to 1950. He prevailed because he was protected by the Mafia, who saw the advantage of having a folk hero in their midst. When he was no longer useful to them, they murdered him at the age of 27. Admired by peasants and portraying himself as a staunch anti-­Communist, he became a veritable folk hero in his heyday. Many Mafiosi came to model themselves in appearance after Giuliano (Block 1972). As Bill James (2011: 14) writes, bad-­boy archetypes are appealing because they are part of an ongoing morality tale from which common folk learn about themselves. But lost in all this mythic glorification of criminals is, ultimately, the intense human suffering that comes from their crimes. Demystifying the archetypes and the symbolism is crucial in bringing about a change in this deeply rooted attitude. Reality is vastly different from the legends. The gangster is hardly a larger-­ than-­life personage, given his propensity for ruthlessness. The popularized images of the chivalric gangster is an opportunistic one for the Mafia, ensconced in the imagination by movies such as The Godfather (1972). It is little wonder that a few of the American Mafiosi loved the movie, even adopting various themes and images from it to refashion their own image. It encapsulates a convenient fiction that the Mafia has willingly adopted as their own. The reason for this, nevertheless, makes historical sense. The padrino (“godfather”) figure is an archetype in Sicilian culture. His role is to reinforce family cohesiveness and promote religious values in the children. He is a back-­up plan for fatherhood (should the biological father disappear from the family). In some southern Italian cultures, the padrino is even perceived as being more important to preserving family unity than the biological father. He is considered an elder, providing wisdom and guidance to younger kin. Real padrini do not resemble the padrini of Hollywood. They appear commonplace; Hollywood ones appear powerful and handsome. In the Sicilian Mafia, no such figure existed before The Godfather. The boss could, of course, have been a godfather to someone in the cosca. But it was not a requirement. Nevertheless, the notion of a leader as a godfather fits in perfectly with the religious culture that the Mafia has always tried to fashion for itself. The irony in all this is that there was a parrina (padrina in Italian) in real Mafia culture, a provider of sexual entertainment for the Mafiosi. The American Mafia’s co-­option of the padrino figure into its symbolic universe is a convenient

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fiction that adds to its mystique in American popular mythology. It is an example of the psychological power of what French philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1983) called the simulacrum, a state of mind whereby the world of fiction is perceived as being more real than reality. From early myths to legends told about heroes, real and fictitious, we seem to prefer living in the realm of fantasy than in real life. The borderline between the two breaks down through the power of symbolism. The cinematic padrino is a Hollywood simulacrum, penetrating real Mafia culture. In a 2003 report, the Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia (Parliamentary Anti-­Mafia Commission) characterized the ’Ndrangheta as a dangerous society, in large part because it was governed by omertà, ensuring the undaunted faithfulness of the membership. Omertà has even allowed the clan to make false claims about its origins. One of the symbols used by the ’Ndrangheta to represent itself is, in fact, an ancient one connected to human origins – the “tree of knowledge,” divided into its various parts (Gratteri and Nicaso 2009: 297) and first made public by testimony given in a Calabrian court in 1897 by a certain Pasquale Trimboli, published in Cronaca di Calabria, a weekly newspaper, on March 11, 1897. The tree is described as follows: 1 The base of the tree represents the head of the clan, or capobastone, who exerts control of life and death over members. At the top of the base is the contabile, or accountant, who looks after financial and legal matters. 2 The branches represent the sgarristi or camorristi, who are responsible for organizing activities; the smaller branches stand for the foot soldiers, the picciotti. 3 The leaves that fall to the ground are the betrayers  – the traditori, who, because of their disloyalty, are destined to die. Anyone who is vile, infame, also falls down to the ground. The tree symbol implies organicity and growth, in contrast to chaos and randomness in the rest of the world. In a conversation with a fellow mobster in 1998, Carmine Alvaro, an ’Ndrangheta boss, was recorded as saying the following: Let me say one thing. The ’Ndrangheta is ugly for those outside of it. But the ’Ndrangheta is extremely beautiful because it has the most beautiful rules. If anything goes, everything comes apart. Chaos results. Things must be done according to the rules. (cited in Nicaso and Danesi 2013) Honor is central as well to the Yakuza and the Triads. Like their Italian counterparts, they exert control over the membership because of their codes and oaths. And even in an age of cybercrimes and transnational criminal alliances, these remain intact. There are signs that the Yakuza’s lure is

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Figure 6.1 ’Ndrangheta tree symbolism

diminishing, but these can be deceiving, since Japanese youth, like Italian and American youth, are still drawn magnetically to a group where a sense of belonging, along with honor and respect, can be achieved through trials of bravery and where dishonors, colloquially called “disses,” are handled brutally by the clan as a whole. Because they are tightly knit as a group and secretive in their lifestyles and criminal operations, like the fabled ninjas of ancient Japan, the Yakuza can be everywhere and nowhere. They terrorize by their silence. Violence, fear-mongering, control of the streets, and intimidation are the operational procedures that are not stated explicitly in the criminal codes of honor but derive from them as corollaries. These are attractive to some young people because they promise a form of virile empowerment. Gangster culture appeals because it makes one feel part of an important dynamic of belonging.

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Secrecy All secret societies espouse the principle of confidentiality, as we have seen. From the ancient Pythagoreans to the Freemasons, the best way to maintain secrecy for the members is a code that binds members irrevocably to each other via trust and silence. This not only allows group members to keep their ideas and schemes secret to outsiders but also to gain a sense of belonging and of power that secret knowledge produces – a fact emphasized by the late semiotician Umberto Eco in his novel about secret societies, Foucault’s Pendulum (1989). The pendulum of the title refers to the actual pendulum invented by French physicist Léon Foucault to demonstrate the Earth’s rotation, pitting science against mysticism – with the latter being the inherent principle of belief in secret societies and the basis of personal bonds between members of the organization, solidified by the use of secret rites and symbols. The subtext of all criminal honor codes is similarly enshrouded in mystical secrecy: brothers can be trusted; others cannot. This deeply rooted belief is what makes criminal organizations cohesive. Each gang has its own system of justice, warning members not to dishonor themselves by cooperating with the government and outsiders. Any injustice against a gang member is to be taken care of within and by the clan. In other words, secrecy codes allow the gangs to declare themselves as self-­contained states, which, as French writer Jean de La Bruyère observed in 1608, will “admit nothing well said or well done except by one of themselves, and they are incapable of appreciating anything from another source, to the point of despising those who are not initiated into their mysteries.” Given the large presence of Freemasons and other secret societies in Sicily, it is little wonder that the Mafia sees itself as inheritors of the values of that secret society. A Masonic sect named the carbonari (“charcoal burners”), as discussed previously, became a subversive political group who wanted to unite Italy; it is probable that the arcane oaths and ceremonies used in initiation rites and the symbols used in secret writing originated in this way, as Dickie (2004: 37) notes: More than anything else about the mafia, the initiation ritual bolsters widespread myths about how ancient the organization is. In reality, it is as modern as everything else about the mafia. It was almost certainly borrowed originally from the Masons. Gang-­based systems of communication, from hand gestures to vocabularies that are designed for members only, are manifestations of the principle of secrecy (see Chapter 13). Ironically, and tragically, the excessive secrecy of the gangs is a source of much conflict. Moreover, it is almost impossible to hold secrets down permanently, and this is why crackdowns occur constantly, as authorities decode the secretly coded messages, as we shall see in Chapter 13. As Sophocles so aptly put it in his play Hipponous: “Do nothing secretly; for Time sees and hears all things, and discloses all.”

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References Baudrillard, Jean (1983). Simulations. New York: Semiotexte. Block, Anton (1972). The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered. Comparative Studies in Society and History 14: 494–503. Bolzoni, Attilio (2008). Parole d’onore. Milano: BUR. Danesi, Marcel (2013). The History of the Kiss: The Birth of Popular Culture. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Dickie, John (2004). Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia. London: Houghton and Stoughton. Eco, Umberto (1989). Foucault’s Pendulum. New York: Mariner Books. Follain, John (2009). The Last Godfathers: Inside the Mafia’s Most Infamous Family. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. Fox, Edward T. (2013). Piratical Schemes and Contracts: Pirate Articles and Their Society, 1660– 1730. University of Exeter, Exeter, Ph.D. Thesis. Giarrizzo, Giuseppe (1996). Mafia. In: Enciclopedia Italiana. Roma: Treccani. Gratteri, Nicola and Nicaso, Antonio (2009). Fratelli di sangue. Milano: Mondadori. Huxley, Aldous (1934). Beyond the Mexique Bay. London: Paladin. James, Bill (2011). Popular Crime: Reflections on the Celebration of Violence. New York: Scribner. Kaplan, David E. and Dubro, Alec (2003). Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld. Berkeley: University of California Press. La Bruyère, Jean de (1688). Characters. New York: Scribner & Welford. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Nicaso, Antonio and Danesi, Marcel (2013). Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Paoli, Letizia (2003). Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Tocqueville, Alexis de (1840). Democracy in America. New York: Signet Classics.

Chapter 7

The made man

Introduction A gangster must look like a gangster. This is a tacit principle of the psychology of gang membership and one of its main draws for recruits. Gang membership affords young people the opportunity to look and act tough, allowing them a means to communicate a sense of strength and bravery that has traditionally been seen to be intrinsic to virility. In Mafia culture, this virility myth dovetails with the view that a man’s responsibility is to protect and defend his family. This overall mythology implies that the man of honor is someone who possesses bravery, courage, and strength, displaying it publicly through the persona he presents to others. He is a type of self-­styled mythic bad boy who must stand out from others to show his inner masculinity through appearance and actions. Becoming a made man in an OC group involves not only the adoption of a new family and new friendships but also a new fashion style, a new language, and a new body image – in short, to become made man, one must act, look, and talk like one. This chapter will look at the importance of adopting and presenting the correct persona to reflect the values of a gang’s culture. Specifically, it will look at dress, language, and aspects of physical appearance (including tattoos) that define the “made-­up” character of the gangster. These constitute symbolic codes, allowing members to conform to the expectations and models of masculinity adopted by the criminal organization. A made man must be a man, as the expression goes, different from everyone else. The term made man surfaced in Cosa Nostra culture, but it can be used more generally to refer to any gangster who “re-­makes himself ” into an image of manliness crafted by a specific gang, even though the details of that image may vary considerably. As pop culture has certainly realized, made men are attractive because they literally put on appearances that exude traditional patriarchal manliness and honor, both of which are becoming attenuated in contemporary societies. In The Godfather (1972), the character Don Vito Corleone is seen as an imperious person, always well-­dressed, with his facial expression always demure yet defiant, his movements measured and composed, and his manner of speaking concrete and powerful. Don Vito’s look, talk, and walk stereotypically reflect what an honorable man is supposed to be. Like a patriarch, he imparts a sense

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Late nineteenth-­c entury Black Handers

of fear and reassurance at once. He is a defender of his family, which he puts above all else – he is even seen playing with his grandson in the movie. But are real Mafiosi really like this? Photos of Mafiosi at the turn of the twentieth century hardly convey this Hollywood image of the well-­dressed and poised gangster. They show men dressed in peasant or nondescript clothes, as can be seen in photos of late nineteenth-­century Black Handers. The first appearance of the made man as a celebrity can be traced to the rise of Cosa Nostra in the 1920s, when Mafiosi like Al Capone became Mafia icons, dressing and behaving publicly like movie stars. Hollywood ensconced this image of the Mafioso indelibly, starting with its own gangster movies in the 1930s, culminating in the Godfather movies of the 1970s (as will be discussed subsequently).

Dress codes A writer of French origin, Maximilien de Santerre, born in 1924, was arrested in the Soviet Union as a spy in 1946 and confined to the Gulag – the name for the labor camps maintained in the Soviet Union from 1930 to 1955 – for twelve years. While there, he noticed that some of the prisoners dressed in a peculiar uniform way that seemed to have been intentional. He wrote about his observations later in 1962, pointing out that these individuals wore “home-­made aluminum crosses round their necks and waistcoats and were often bearded and almost always wore their shirts outside the trousers with one or several waistcoats above” (Santerre 1962: 63). Santerre also noticed that the prisoners had tattoos covering their bodies. For example, he observed prisoners with a common type of religious tattoo consisting of “a picture of praying angels on each side of the crucifix,” with the following words underneath: “O Lord, save thy slave! or I believe in God, indicating some respect for religion” (Santerre

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1962: 89). He also remarked that the gang members spoke a coded language of their own (fenya), whose grammatical structure was Russian but which had a special vocabulary that only the prisoners understood. Santerre’s observations are among the first to describe the Vory v Zakone, although the notion of a “Vory” as we know it today goes as far back as the Czarist era of Russia (Chapter 3). Santerre concluded that what bonded the prisoners together was their distinctive dress, tattoos, and language. From the leather jackets donned by members of outlaw motorcycle gangs to the ostentatious suits that some Cosa Nostra members don, clothes literally make the gangster, as Santerre found out concretely. The Cosa Nostra case is particularly relevant, because it brings out how fiction and reality become intertwined in modern-­day gangsterism. Starting with early movie portrayals of gangster characters in the 1930s, the image of gangster chic has become an unconscious one, imprinted into groupthink by subsequent movies and television programs. But this was not always the rule, as Nicaso and Lamothe (2005: 36) observe: “Early Mafia dons often resembled peasants in appearance, wearing homespun clothes and living in modest houses.” The traditional pre-­ Hollywood Mafioso wanted to put on a public face of modesty, not of gaudy appearance. The persona he aimed to present publicly was that of a man steeped in rustic chivalry, not that of a glamour boy who would not only appear as vain to common folk but who would also stand out to the authorities. As a Mafia saying of the early era emphasized, “I colori attirano le mosche” (literally: “colors attract flies,” meaning the police). One of the most renowned Mafia bosses, Giuseppe Genco Russo, who ruled in Sicily in the period after World War II, would wear only a cotton white shirt, dark pants, and a simple fedora hat, emphasizing that the Mafioso must appear to be a common man and thus remain inconspicuous.

Giuseppe Genco Russo (1893–1976, Sicilian Mafia boss)

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Al Capone

It was during Prohibition when the gangsters, who became themselves patrons of the speakeasies to which they supplied illegal liquor, started dressing fashionably in the clubs and even in public. The dress code included elegant suits with white shirts and ties; stylish hats, rather than the coppola, a traditional flat cap worn by men in southern Italy; and cigars – all of which cohered to produce a new composite picture of the Mafioso as fashionista. The prototype of this new persona was, as mentioned, Al Capone, who dressed always impeccably and who may well be the originator of the gangster dress code. The difference between Russo and Capone is striking. Virtually no one today would think of the former as the portrait of a Mafia boss. It is the image of the dapper Capone that has become so widespread and embedded into the popular imagination that defines the Mafioso to this day. The number of movies in which characters based on Capone play a role is truly remarkable. Some of these are listed in the sidebar.

Movies featuring Al Capone Scarface (1932) Al Capone (1959) The George Raft Story (1961) Al Capone (1966) The St. Valentine’s Day Massacre (1967)

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Capone (1975) The Untouchables (1987) Revenge of Al Capone (1989) The Lost Capone (1990) Mobsters (1991) Dillinger and Capone (1995) Al’s Lads (2002) Legends of Tomorrow (2016) The Making of the Mob: Chicago (2016) Timeless (2017) Capone (2020)

In the 1920s and 1930s, Capone built a criminal empire in Chicago that is still imitated as a model for organized-­crime operations (Chapter 4). Capone was nicknamed “Scarface,” as discussed previously (Chapter 5), because he had been slashed on his left cheek in a fight, which had left three scars. The scars became a symbol of the macho gangster, which Capone coupled with fashion chic, always wearing a suit, tie, and hat. His hair was slicked down, and his manner of speaking was subdued yet authoritative. Capone became a celebrity, and he lived like one, riding in limousines to theaters and sports venues, where he entertained guests in private boxes. His appearance belied his brutality. Although it was never proven, there is little doubt that he was responsible for the St. Valentine’s Day massacre, captured many times on film, including Roger Corman’s St. Valentine’s Day Massacre (1967) and Billy Wilder’s 1959 comedy Some Like It Hot. The FBI agent who hounded Capone was Elliot Ness, who has been immortalized by the TV series The Untouchables (1959–1962) and by Brian De Palma’s film The Untouchables (1987). Another well known gangster was Lucky Luciano, who also appeared in public in suit and tie and wore his thick hair in a slicked-­down fashion. Luciano co-­founded the New York syndicate in 1931, an organization that put the finishing touches to the America Cosa Nostra (Chapter 4). He also wanted to create a “new look Mafia” from the peasant one in Sicily. This involved new weaponry, such as the “tommy gun,” a type of submachine gun, introduced by George “Bugs” Moran, making it part of the gangster’s newly fashioned image, as Lunde (2004: 14) observes: Although it could deliver bullets at a rapid rate of fire, the gun was only really effective at close range. It was the ideal weapon for urban warfare, if you didn’t mind killing bystanders. George Moran’s gang was the first to use it, but gangsters everywhere soon took it up, paying as much as $2,000 per weapon. The Thompson submachine gun was the classic gangsters’ weapon.

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Elegant suits and new weaponry became part of a gangster look in the era of Prohibition, to the point that some mobsters would never be caught in public without the appropriate dress code. An anecdote connected to Frank Costello, a crime boss of the Luciano family, brings this out perfectly. As Reynolds (2006: 189) notes, Costello “was the original dapper don, sporting thousand-­ dollar tailored suits, custom-­made shoes, perfect manicures and a bullet-­proof haircut.” Facing tax evasion charges, Costello was warned by his lawyer to dress unpretentiously in court, because it might negatively influence the perceptions of middle-­class jury members. Costello is purported to have responded: “I’d rather lose the goddamn case” (Reynolds 2006: 190). It is largely believed that Costello was probably the model for Don Vito Corleone, played by Marlon Brando, in The Godfather (1972). Costello had a raspy voice, which Brando adopted for his role. Fashion styles have of course changed, but the image of men in suits carrying tommy guns is indelibly imprinted in the popular imagination, thanks to the movies. Today, made men wear either designer clothes (continuing the Capone legacy) or else hoodies and T-­shirts, depending on age or situation. Nevertheless, the original dress code of the Prohibition-­era gangsters has become a stereotypical image throughout the world, even though changes are occurring on a daily basis, as technology and new social norms are taking hold of everyone, including the Mafiosi.

Mafia dress code The stereotypical dress code of Mafiosi comes from cinema and other media. So the fashionably elegant dress that we still imagine to be part of Mafioso culture is a largely fabricated one. It remains mainly as part of a made man mythology. There are many examples of how this mythology has played out in real life. Cosa Nostra bosses, like Vito Genovese, would never be caught in public without the appropriate dress code – suit, tie, and slicked down hair.

Vito Genovese (1897–1969, Cosa Nostra boss) Gangsters from the 1920s to the 1980s would dress in a similar way to Genovese, fitting in with the Hollywood-­based image of the era. The color tones were simple – black, gray, or brown. The shirt was a collared one with a black tie, or a black collared one with a white tie. Only dress shoes, either black or brown, were worn. The hat was optional, and if worn, it was typically a fedora hat. In old gangster films, Mafiosi typically smoked a cigar. A number of real Mafiosi did as well.

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Anonymous Gangster Today As fashions change, so too does Mafioso dress, which has become much more informal. Among younger gangsters today, wearing baggy, casual clothes in different colors is a common option. This includes a T-­shirt, a hoodie, and a puffy jacket. Bling is also common, including silver or gold chains with symbols on them that vary from dollar signs to crosses. A bandana or beanie may also be worn in any color, as can be seen among the younger Camorra foot soldiers in Naples and elsewhere. Again, this image comes from recent gangster movies and has been adopted by the Camorristi themselves, although not homogeneously. Whatever is the style, it is clear that image is as important to the made man as anything else in the gangster lifestyle.

Today, the capo is more likely to be outfitted in a gray flannel suit, or some chic new type of clothing, and his persona is more likely to be fashioned like that of an important industrialist. Designer clothes, rather than the older types of suits, are now part of the made man’s wardrobe. This was borne out in 2011, when the warden of Ucciardone prison in Palermo, Sicily, wanted to put a stop to the practice of Mafioso prisoners wearing designer clothes and flashy jewelry. The symbolic power of the dress code among made men was not missed by the warden. The nickname of the prison became “The Grand Hotel,” because of its lax conditions with regard to uniforms. One Mafia capo is reported to have celebrated his birthday with champagne and lobster, dressed in fashionable evening attire. This prompted comparisons with the film Goodfellas (1990), in which two Mafioso protagonists lived the high life behind bars. Dress codes, explicit or implicit, are part of the armory of self-­presentation that every gangster adopts. Let us briefly consider the dress code of the Hells Angels, which stands in stark contrast to that of the dapper don of Cosa Nostra culture. Jackets, usually of black leather, are de rigueur in biker culture, as is the death’s head insignia inscribed on the jacket as a patch.

Hells Angels jacket and insignia The jacket not only provides physical protection against the elements while riding a motorcycle but is also designed to harbor symbolic meanings through the patches and other marks that indicate the status of the member and the specific chapter to which he belongs. The actual motorcycle make is an intrinsic part of the overall lifestyle code – a kind of extension of the dress code. The motorcycle of choice is the Harley-­Davidson, likely because it is American

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made and generates a huge roar when the engine is revved. It is little wonder that the gang members fiercely detest imitators who emulate their dress and ride similar motorcycles. The Hells Angels reserve the epithet of “morons” for the wannabes. The toughness image that the real members exude is taken seriously, while the ersatz one is condemned and might even lead to violence against the “yuppie imitators.” The dress code is sacrosanct to the bikers. The patch on the jacket has to be earned, not put on as a fashion item. However, the gang does support and encourage the use of support merchandise, like the hoodies worn by some music artists, which is seen as a form of promotion and public relations. The various symbolic meanings of the patches give us a glimpse into their importance in gang culture. Without them, the Hells Angels would hardly be perceived as a conglomerate but rather as a dispersive group of biker thugs.

Hells Angels patches • The skull with crossbones patch means that the individual has escaped death situations or has actually killed someone. • The 666 patch stands for FFF, “Filthy Few Forever,” since F is the sixth letter of the alphabet and the number 666 is a sinister Satanic symbol. The Filthy Few is the name of the Hells Angels’ enforcer squad. • The ace of spades patch indicates that the biker will fight to the death for his rights. • There are also specific patches for each club that designate positions in the hierarchy of the club. • Colors on the patches (and in other symbolic codes) mark the identity of each club and member. A  member must guard his colors; allowing them to fall into the hands of outsiders or other motorcycle gangs is seen as a disgrace and punishable by banishment or death. • Some of the gangs are distinguished by a “1%” patch, referring to the comment by the American Motorcyclist Association (AMA) that 99% of motorcyclists were law-­abiding citizens, implying that only the last 1% were outlaws (Chapter 3). • Additional patches may involve symbols such as the Nazi swastika or the SS Totenkopf, which may or may not indicate Nazi sympathies but certainly serve to indicate the outlaw biker’s rejection of social constraints and his desire to shock those who do not subscribe to or understand his worldview.

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The Hells Angels may have arisen from antagonism to authority (Chapter 3), but it has gone beyond this, growing into a solid criminal organization because of the belief of members that their view of life is the only one – imprinted in the symbolism of the dress code. As Santerre had discovered, a uniting factor of criminal gangs is symbolism. The dress code is a symbolic uniform, a statement of whom the gangster aspires to be. Dress is a silent language and thus a very powerful one. Without it, the made man would be perceived as just another everyday person. With it, he becomes a member of a group that the everyday person recognizes as different and to be feared and respected.

Slang and gesture Made men use secret languages for one main reason – to conceal the content of their messages to the authorities and to outsiders. These are like the military codes created with cryptography that have mainly strategic value. We will discuss this aspect of OC communication subsequently in Chapter 13. Here the focus is on how the particular type of slang that gangs develop is socially strategic, both within and outside the gang. Like dress, it is a marker of identity and distinction, as well as a cohesive force among the members. One of the most infamous pentiti was, as mentioned, Joe Valachi, who exposed the workings of Cosa Nostra in public testimony. He broke the code of silence because he feared that bossman Vito Genovese, with whom he shared a jail cell, was planning to have him murdered, claiming that Genovese had given him the kiss of death – the symbol for a Mafia killing to be carried out. Valachi was pegged with the insulting nickname of “Joe Cago,” which means “I defecate Joe,” a sarcastic version of his previous nickname “Joe Cargo,” which he had received because he would build makeshift scooters for people as a young man. This new epithet literally defiled him in the eyes of honorable men, constituting a form of linguistic retributive justice. Once labeled in this way, it is almost impossible to shed the image that the epithet evokes. Nicknames of this kind are psychological weapons, used to attack people linguistically and thus psychologically. Some words have particular meanings to the made men, which they utilize as part of their profile. For example, the term pizzo (Chapter 2), a word deriving – among various hypotheses – from the Sicilian expression fari vagnari u pizzu (“to wet one’s beak”) which, in English slang can be rendered as “to wet your whistle,” referring to a glass of wine offered in recognition of services rendered, is imbued with special meanings to the Mafiosi, as Cawthorne and Cawthorne (2009: 63–64) aptly observe: The principle was simple. Instead of asking for a large amount that risked bankrupting the victim, it was better to ask for smaller amount that the victim could afford, then return later for more money. Don Vito decreed that no one who could afford it was to escape paying the Onorata Società u pizzu for its protection.

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In Mafia culture, communication among the members is expected to occur in terms of the local dialect, which bears powerful historical and cultural resonance  – it is the language of ancestors and thus a marker of true identity, a sign of solidarity, and a means to express pride in one’s heritage. In ordinary conversations among fellow gangsters, it might even be considered to be snobbish to use standard Italian, which is felt to be meaningless. Dialect brings the gangsters together psychologically, allowing them to gain control of meaning and thus to evaluate the world around them on their own terms. To a Neapolitan Camorrista, a word such as scugnizzo (“street urchin”) describes an emotionally powerful reality that evokes both laughter and shrewd understanding. Words such as picciotto and pizzu have the same kinds of effects on Mafiosi. They are part of a system of understanding that is seen as exclusive and correct. Similar kinds of vocabulary are found in all criminal organizations. One of the first dictionaries of slang by Jonathan Green in the sixteenth century, reissued as Green’s Dictionary of Slang (Green 2017), includes large sections on criminal slang, indicating that language has always been central to criminality. Criminal slangs are called, more specifically, cants. These are defined as the forms of language developed and used by a criminal group, often employed to exclude or mislead people outside the group. Cants consist mainly of vocabulary items that relate to the interests and values of each gang. Even in translation, the nuances and connotations that the terms have cannot be understood in the same way as by the gangsters themselves (see Lunde 2004: 86, 96).

Yakuza and Vory v Zakone cants Yakuza cant • • • • •

Bosozoku: refers to a youth who exhibits a character that makes him suitable for recruitment to the Yakuza. Burakumin: denotes a discriminated group by society and thus constitutes a source of recruitment. Giri: designates the traditional Japanese sense of obligation by which Yakuza members must abide. Sokaiya: refers to common thugs and extortionists, separate from the honorable members of the Yakuza. Yubitsume: indicates the requirement of an unfaithful or disloyal Yakuza member cutting off part of his finger and presenting it to the leader as a sign of repentance.

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Vory v Zakone cant • • • • • • • • • • • •

Akademiya: (literally “academy”) refers to the prison where the gangster (Vory v Zakone) learns his trade. Bandity: is a military-­styled word for the criminals themselves. Dan: is the Russian equivalent of pizzo, or extortion money. Krestnii otets: is the boss of the clan. Krysha: (literally “root”) refers to the protection provided after someone has paid the extortion money. Nayekhat: denotes the activity itself of collecting the extortion money. Pakhan: is a gang leader. Panama: is the descriptive name given to the dummy company set up to launder extortion money. Skhoda: refers to a gang meeting. Suka: is the Russian equivalent of the pentito; he is the snitch or traitor, and the word literally means “bitch.” Torpedo: is the descriptive English word used to describe a contract killer. Vorovskoi obschak: is the communal fund that gang members can access in time of need.

Slang functions as a linguistic membership card. So too does gesture, which typically accompanies the slang code as part of forging and maintaining a distinct identity. Many gangsters use distinctive hand signals and gestures as part of in-­group communication laden with nuanced meanings. Also, like slang items, some of these are intended to threaten others, especially if the gesture indicates a specific action to be taken. For example, a street gang might use a “noose sign” as a threat to commit some violent act against someone. Slashing the neck with a finger, to use another example, has been used commonly by Mafiosi to indicate the threat of murder against someone. Many street-­based gangs use hand signs systematically, sometimes through a series of movements. Several movements might designate the gang name, or that a rival gang is to be shown disrespect by turning the symbol upside down. “Throwing up” signs formed with the hands are made to claim membership in a particular gang. Typically, they are made with the fingers on one or both hands to outline a symbol or letter. The following is the gesture for gang membership of the Crips (a street gang based in Los Angeles) and the one used by the 18th Street Gang (a Central American and Mexican gang):

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Crips hand sign

The use of slang and hand signs will be discussed again in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say at this point that they are part of the gang’s lifestyle code, along with dress and even hairstyles. Adam Kendon (2004) makes the cogent argument that verbal language and gesture form a continuum on which speech declines when “the language-like properties of gestural behaviors increase and idiosyncratic gestures are replaced by socially regulated signs.” In OCs, the continuum is especially noticeable, since slang terms and hand signs go hand in hand (no pun intended). Much of criminal slang and gesture codes are too specific to be used outside of the gang culture. Overall, language forms that are meaningful inside the clan resonate with a sense of magical bricolage, or the belief that words have power to bring about what they stand for – a term used by anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss in his 1962 book La pensée sauvage to describe tribal rituals and the magical incantations employed in them. To outsiders, this type of language may appear to be meaningless, but to insiders, it is part of a coherent unity of meaning embedded in the ritual that evokes powerful emotions. All societies, Lévi-Strauss claimed, create solutions to their dilemmas by using the linguistic resources that they already have in a collective (bricolage) fashion. The use of language in ritual is not to create new meanings but to assert communal sense-making and to ensure cultural cohesion. This creates a “word magic” aura that keeps insiders bound to each other through the power of words.

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Physical appearance Gangs will adopt signs, symbols, colors, signals, and so on to differentiate themselves from other gangs, confirm their loyalty to the clan, instill pride in membership, communicate with other members, and intimidate their rivals. Together they constitute a “body language” that is emotionally powerful, including a mode of physical appearance that is part of the persona that a gangster assumes. For example, the lax, insouciant bodily movements of street gangs exudes masculine power and self-­control. In contrast, a Cosa Nostra capo is expected instead to show a laid-­back autocratic persona, showing strength of will and silent courage. As Lunde (2004) observes, “The marks of the true Mafioso are that he speaks little, makes each word count, and maintains a grave and dignified presence at all times, even under extreme provocation.” Hollywood has been both a documenter and fabricator of what a Mafioso should look like. The ruthless gangster on the screen has, in the past, been crafted as a macho male figure, complete with slicked hair, erect body posture, and a gait-­style walk. The subtext is a transparent one – No one can tell him how to behave. And his “sexy” or “cool” appearance implies that he must be a promiscuous man in order to maintain his virility, as emphasized by the movie Goodfellas (1990): “Sunday was wives night at the club, but Saturday was girlfriend night.” A large part of the allure of Mafia culture is machismo and the unconscious sense that it is appealing to women, as Reynolds (2006: 192) observes: The allure of a secret society, the macho posturing of its leaders, and the immense wealth at the fingertips of its most successful members attracted women to the Cosa Nostra men almost from the beginning. Of course, the reverse was true as well: many ambitious young Italian men wanted to join because Cosa Nostra members had no trouble attracting good-­looking women. The adoption of a cinema-­style look became ludicrously obvious when Cosimo Di Lauro, the son of a notorious Camorra boss, intentionally donned a stereotypical gangster appearance before the cameras as he left his house handcuffed in 2005. He slicked back his hair with gel and pulled up the jacket collar of his black raincoat in imitation of characters in movies. Such appearance junkies are not only modern-­day made men; they actually go back considerably in time. In a famous trial in Calabria in 1890, the members of an ’Ndrangheta group were distinguished by wearing their hair cut in a “butterfly style,” with a tuft of hair in the middle that was slicked and combed high towards the back of the head. In 1911, Joe Musolino, a boss in the city of Toronto, was arrested wearing the same hairstyle, showing that Mafia symbolism knows no borders or era (Edwards and Nicaso 1993: 17).

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Whatever era he comes from, the made man must always appear to be a sexually potent macho man. Any deviation from this is viewed unfavorably. This macho mystique was satirized by the movie, Analyze This (1999), in which a Cosa Nostra boss sees a psychiatrist to find out why he is finding it difficult to have sex successfully with his mistress. One of the members of the capo’s crime family discovers the therapy sessions and passes the gossip on as a sign of weakness – a true Mafioso would never be a participant in psychiatry as a remedy to sexual problems. Real men solve their own problems, or take advice from family members, not from therapists. Of course, models of masculinity will vary from criminal culture to criminal culture. Motorcycle gang members show virility with their tough-­looking clothes and often profane language, along with a biker swagger all its own. The modern-­day Yakuza who, instead of wearing traditional Japanese samurai-­style clothing, seem to favor silk suits, slicked long hair, and a swagger more reminiscent of movie stars than of warriors, promote a silent humble attitude, which can easily be transformed into a violent martial-­arts demeanor on the spot. Gangster appearance codes are, in sum, part of the construction of an appropriate persona that is intended to give the gangster a recognizable look and to elicit fear in anyone who comes upon him on the streets. As part of his appearance code, the modern-­day gangster has adopted several noticeable accoutrements. Dark sunglasses, for instance, have always stood for toughness and dark sexuality, as the movies have constantly emphasized, starting with a famous 1944 photo of movie actor John Ford donning a pilot uniform, with a cigar and dark glasses. The look caught everyone’s attention, especially the gangsters. Gun Crazy (1949) was likely the first movie in which a gangster wore sunglasses to convey coolness and toughness. Right after, the glasses were adopted by gangsters everywhere as part of an evolving appearance code. In Sicily, Prince Alessandro Vanni Calvello Mantegna di San Vincenzo, suspected of having Mafia connections, was invited to a reception in honor of Queen Elizabeth II, during her visit to Palermo in 1982. A photo taken at the reception showed the prince standing to the left of the Queen wearing sunglasses, which stood out incongruously (Gambetta 1993: 188).

Tattoos As Santerre noticed about the Soviet prison gang (previously), tattoos are an intrinsic part of many gangster appearance codes. Tattooing is, actually, one of the most ancient forms of creative body decoration. Cave paintings date it to at least approximately 8000 BCE, but it may go back even farther in time to the Upper Paleolithic era (Green 2003; Rush 2005). Around 2000 BCE, the Egyptians used it to indicate social rank and class affiliation. The ancient Greeks and Romans, on the other hand, used tattoos mainly to brand slaves and criminals. Sailors introduced the practice of tattooing into Europe during the Age of Exploration; it remained a rarely used body art until the middle part

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of the twentieth century, when it gained popularity among disparate groups, including fashion models, youth gangs, and prison inmates. Prison tattooing can be traced back considerably in time. In the 1920s, tattoos were used by prisoners to recount their criminal activities in visual images (the tattoos themselves), as well as to show contempt for the authorities. Many of these early criminal tattoos remain part of prison lore to this day. Their meanings are self-­explanatory (Lunde 2004: 90): • • • • • •

•

Skull on a finger: means that the wearer is a murderer. Barbed wire across the forehead: represents a life sentence. A spider’s web: indicates that the wearer is a drug addict. Head of a tomcat: a good luck sign. SS runes: denotes that the wearer is not a stool pigeon. A dagger running through the neck from shoulder to shoulder: implies that the wearer is a sex offender and that the tattoo was applied forcibly on the wearer to brand him as a lowlife. Tattoos are often involuntarily administered across criminal cultures as punishment or to shame someone for betraying the code of manliness or honor. The pointed star on each shoulder: indicates the length of the prison sentence, one point for each year.

The initiation ceremony scene in the film Eastern Promises (2007) is like a page from Santerre’s account. The character played by actor Viggo Mortensen can be seen sitting in his underwear in front of a panel of members of the Vory, as they read the tattoos on his body to determine what kind of man he really is. The tattoos reveal that he was a thief who had spent time in a Siberian prison, and that he is a trouble-­maker in prison, spending considerable time in solitary confinement. After Mortensen passes the initiation test, he is marked with three new tattoos: a star on each shoulder near the collarbone and a star on his knee to indicate his status as a new member of the gang. The importance placed on tattoos by the Vory v Zakone was first brought to wide attention by the documentary film Mark of Cain (2000), which consists of interviews and conversations in a Russian prison with actual gangsters.

Vory v Zakone tattoos • A rose tattoo generally indicates the rite of initiation itself. The rose is a traditional symbol of silence; in Roman society, a sub rosa (“under the rose”) sign put on a door indicated that a secret meeting was unfolding behind the door. • A tattoo of famous Soviet communists like Lenin and Stalin on one’s chest means a death sentence.

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• •

Knuckle tattoos identify a member as a convicted armed robber. A tattoo of a ring on a finger represents a journey through a juvenile correctional facility. • A star tattoo on a knee means that the gangster will not get down on his knees before authority. • Tattoos of churches stand for the religiosity that the gangsters are expected to adopt. • A spider’s web tattoo indicates that the criminal is a drug addict or a repeat offender. • The more tattoos a criminal has, the more time in jail he has served, and thus the more respect he is afforded.

Prison tattoos vary from place to place. In Ireland and Britain, the acronym ACAB, tattooed between the knuckle and first joint, may mean either “Always Carry A Bible” or “All Cops Are Bastards.” This tattoo is sometimes made with a series of dots, similar to the Morse code. Yakuza tattooing practices are unique because they involve intricate tattoos covering the entire torso, including the arms and the legs (Kaplan and Dubro 2003). Traditionally, the new member is supposed to show his determination and courage by subjecting himself to hundreds of hours of painful tattooing. The Yakuza tattoos are designed not only to represent the toughness of individual members but also their financial status in being able to purchase tattoos, as well as symbolically turning their back on society. As Nicaso and Lamothe (2005: 110) point out, the original Yakuza criminal tattoo was “a permanent marking that displayed the adherent’s permanent self-­expulsion from society.” The permanence of tattooing also makes switching careers or criminal organizations challenging, if not impossible, given that the Yakuza tattoos cover most of the body. However, today, the symbolism is somewhat attenuated; it is more accurate to say that this tradition of tattooing was obligatory amongst the Yakuza’s older generations, having somewhat fallen out of favour with the newer generation. Today, a full-­body tattoo is very expensive and can cost as much or more than 20,000 US dollars; also, a full-­body tattoo stands out in the public eye and thus marks the wearer in a negative way. The full-­body tattoos are called irezumi. Historically, they were signs of nobility and social distinctiveness in Japan. In the Kofun period (300–600 CE), tattoos were branded on criminals by authorities for identification purposes. At the start of the Meiji period (1868–1912 CE), tattoos were banned from being shown in public because of their criminal connotations. But tattooing continued underground. It was legalized after the occupation forces entered Japan in 1945.

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Example of traditional Yakuza body tattoos

A tattoo in criminal culture is not a fashion statement; it is a biographical statement – a statement of the gangster’s achievements. Wearing unearned tattoos is seen as a punishable offense across the criminal world, with discipline ranging from the painful removal of the tattoo to death. Not all criminal organizations, however, have endorsed the use of tattoos. The Italian Mafias had initially accepted the use of tattoos in the late 1800s but then decided to prohibit them, since they would draw the attention of the authorities. The modern Mafia does, however, tolerate individual tattooing, recognizing it as a trend. Young Camorristi, for example, adopt tattoos as part of their identity, separating themselves from the past and adopting the strategies of body symbolism common among street gangs across the world. Similarly, members of the gang Stidda (Sicilian for “star”), which operates independently of the Mafias,

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identify themselves by a tattoo of five greenish marks arranged in a circle, forming a star called i punti della malavita, meaning “the points of the criminal life.” It is relevant to note, as a concluding word to this chapter, that dress codes, language, tattoos, and so on were first used by the pirates as part of a membership lifestyle code. Many of the meanings of the symbols in this code have been adopted and adapted by traditional and neophyte OCs; they are capsules of criminal history that allow us to reconstruct commonalities of meaning across criminal cultures and across time.

References Cawthorne, Nigel and Cawthorne, Colin (2009). The Mafia: First-­Hand Accounts of Life Inside the Mob. London: Constable & Robinson. Edwards, Peter and Nicaso, Antonio (1993). Deadly Silence. Toronto: Palgrave Macmillan. Gambetta, Diego (1993). The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Green, Jonathon (2017). Green’s Dictionary of Slang. Hachette: Mobius Press. Green, Teresa (2003). The Tattoo Encyclopedia. New York: Fireside. Kaplan, David E. and Dubro, Alec (2003). Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kendon, Adam (2004). Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lévi-­Strauss, Claude (1962). La pensée sauvage. Paris: Plon. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Nicaso, Antonio and Lamothe, Lee (2005). Angels, Mobsters & Narco-­Terrorists: The Rising Menace of Global Criminal Empires. Toronto: John Wiley. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Rush, John A. (2005). Spiritual Tattoo: A Cultural History of Tattooing, Piercing, Scarification, Branding, and Implants. Berkeley: Frog. Santerre, Maximilien de (1962). Ihr Name ist Legion. München: J. Pfeiffer.

Chapter 8

The Women

Introduction According to the Mafia code of omertà, a made man must be humble and honorable, free from senseless emotions, calmly accepting all contretemps and facing them bravely (Chapter 7). The same code sees women as subservient – as wives and mothers, who must care for the men and thus are allowed to show emotions openly. Recall that pirate codes excluded women from coming on board because it was assumed that they would bring emotional havoc and instigate sexual rivalries among the men (Chapter 2). This view of women is found across virtually all OCs, from the classic to the neophyte-­emergent ones. They assign to women roles of subservience, at the same time that in many of the gangs, they must be treated with respect. Although not stated explicitly in their codes, OCs see these different roles as part of a “natural law” and thus as independent of, and pre-­existent to, the laws and practices of any given social order with regard to sex and gender. According to this law, the men are the “stronger sex” and the women the “weaker sex.” Any deviation from this view is seen as foolish and unnatural. This chapter looks concretely at the role of women in OCs, focusing on Mafia culture, which has always espoused this double standard as a natural law. In the early Mafia, a woman was called a panza lenta (“loose guts”) because she was seen as untrustworthy, that is, as being too talkative and gossipy and thus “spilling her guts out.” Men, on the other hand, were called uomini di panza (“men of the gut”) because they could be trusted not to talk and spill their guts. Even though today feminism has made some inroads into Mafia culture, with women showing themselves to be as ruthless and violent as their male counterparts when assigned important roles, by and large they continue to be subsidiary players, with few exceptions – in some situations, for instance, the wife of the capo will be allowed to take over the “family business” temporarily if the husband is either jailed or killed. The Yakuza also do not trust women, seeing them as weaklings and thus as a threat to the stability of their organization. The only woman who is expected to play any role in the gang is the leader’s wife, called ane-­san, meaning “older

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sister.” She is given the same respect as the boss, simply because she is his wife. The women in the Yakuza are also the gang’s storytellers, tasked with recounting the deeds of the brave fallen men, turning them into folk heroes for the consumption of present and future gang members. They have no other discernible role to play. There has, however, been one historically relevant exception to this. In an extraordinary and unusual turn of events, Fumiko Taoka, the wife of Kazoo Taoka, the third boss of the Yamaguchi-­gumi, the largest Yakuza clan in Japan, became the caretaker boss of the entire organization for three years, between 1981 and 1984. In general, though, the Yakuza women are not allowed get involved in any of the criminal enterprises, nor to give advice of any kind. To a Yakuza member, the most important personality trait is courage, which women are thought to lack. If there is a conflict, the male Yakuza warrior must be ready to fight to the death. Yakuza women are seen instead as mothers and wives, not warriors, staying at home and looking after the children, not engaging in “men’s affairs.” In this way, they are blocked access to gang information and thus cannot talk to the authorities. Although it is true that all-­female gangs have emerged in the last decades, espousing traits that resemble those of male gangs, it is also true that these are typically sporadic and tend to last only with the first generation of female gangsters. Nevertheless, they are important to an overall understanding of the lure of organized crime culture and so will be discussed briefly at the end of this chapter.

The role of women in gangs The reasons women would willingly join a gang, outside of being married to a gang member, are not clear cut. They may be seeking a surrogate family system, coming from abusive backgrounds; they may be involved romantically with one of the members; they may come from criminal backgrounds themselves and thus may know no other lifestyle; they may come from poor neighborhoods where there is little opportunity to succeed; among others. Whatever the reason, when the woman joins the gang, she is assigned subservient roles, and if she refuses to obey, she will put her life seriously at risk. In Mafia culture, the main reason appears to be hereditary; that is, females born into Mafia families become candidates for marriage within them. Their role in the family is thus passed on to them by circumstance, not by conscious choice, as will be discussed subsequently. This is thought to be a corollary to the natural law, whereby the sexes inherit their gender roles via the channel of nature, not society. Women might, however, be assigned various roles, such as purchasing firearms on behalf of their male counterparts, helping in the dealing of drugs, and even committing murder if the situation demands. But despite any criminal achievements that they may accrue, the women are largely excluded from leadership roles in the gang. If they do not obey, then they may be subjected to

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abuse, physical and psychological. So, it comes as a surprise to find that some women find the gangster lifestyle attractive. Reasons such as those delineated previously may explain this. If she comes from violent communities, then she already has experienced violence herself. If she comes from a disadvantaged social environment, she may see the gang as a replacement for family, providing resources and protection, which she may not have had in her previous life. In other cases, gang membership may be seen as giving her access to desirable things that she believes she could not gain otherwise – clothes, jewelry, prestige in the gang (especially if she is the girlfriend of a leader), and so on. The price to be paid is often counted in sexual favors. This does not mean that all the women in gangs are victims; the woman herself may be cognizant of the exchange of sex for membership privileges and not feel victimized by it. But this does not justify the kind of sexual mistreatment some women are forced to suffer. Certain gangs coerce women to perform sexual acts before they are even allowed into the gang; in compensation, the woman is offered the protection system of the gang, once inducted. In some gangs, the main role of the woman is in child-­bearing and child-­rearing, thus providing potential future gang members from within. Once in the gang, the women must conform to the culture and lifestyle of the gang. In biker gangs, this includes using drugs and alcohol and adopting identification markers, such as tattoos, so that she will always bear her membership physically and thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for her to gain employment in mainstream society outside of menial jobs. The foregoing discussion does not imply that women themselves have not played infamous roles in the history of crime, even becoming part of cultural lore like any male bandit, as the three following examples show – all from the so-­called public enemy era between 1931 to 1934, when outlaws became media stars. • Ma Barker (1873–1935), whose real name was Arizona Donnie Barker, was one of America’s most notorious female gangsters, who founded her own crime family, called the Barkers, consisting of herself as leader, her husband, and their four sons – Herman, Lloyd, Arthur, and Fred. They became involved in highway robberies as early as 1910, some of which involved killings. In a police raid, Herman killed himself to avoid arrest. Arizona and her husband were finally killed by the FBI in 1935. The legend of Ma Barker has inspired film and television stories, including The FBI Story (1959), Bloody Mama (1970), and Public Enemies (1996). • Bonnie Parker (1911–1934) rivals Ma Parker as the best-­known American female gangster. She was half of the crime duo of Bonnie and Clyde (Barrow), perhaps America’s most notorious robbers. Some of their robberies led to killings, catapulting the duo into the public eye, especially after a photo found by police at their hideout in Missouri became public  – a photo that seemed to mix in romance, an outlaw mystique, and a life of freedom from conformity.

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  The duo was killed in a police shootout in 1934. Bonnie was barely 23; Clyde was 25. Like Ma Barker, Bonnie has been immortalized by pop culture in movies such as The Bonnie Parker Story (1958), Bonnie & Clyde (1967), and the 2013 television mini-­series Bonnie & Clyde. • Marie Baker was a famous leader of a robber gang in Miami known as the Pretty Pants gang in the 1930s. The gang was given this name because Baker would demand that shop clerks take off their pants under threat of murder after taking the loot. Those who were not compliant were helped forcibly to do so. No one really knows why she made this demand, but there are likely gender undertones to it, since the clerks were all male. While she checked her makeup during a heist, the police raided the shop, and so she took a hostage to escape. After allowing the hostage to run free, she was caught soon after and booked under the name of Marie Baker. Later, it was found that this was a fake name. Her real name was Rose Durante. She served three years in prison.

Mafia women The women in the Mafia are, by and large, seen to be subsidiary players, keeping the families in the clan safe and sound. There have been few recorded exceptions to this pattern. One of these is the case of Maria Serraino (1931– 2017), born into an ’Ndrangheta family, who met her husband – a jail guard – during visits to her incarcerated father. She married him against the will of her parents. Marginalized from the family, they moved to Milan, where they had twelve children, and from where they carried out illegal activities for the ’Ndrangheta, from cigarette contraband to the trafficking of illegal weapons and drugs. By the late 1980s, she had her own clan, running one of the largest and most successful drug dealing businesses for the ’Ndrangheta, collecting money from middlemen and corrupting law enforcement officers. Her fame was acknowledged by the fact that she, like the men, was given nicknames, including Mamma Eroina (“Mommy Heroin”) and La Signora (“The Lady”). To reiterate, the Maria Serraino case is an exception. In the ’Ndrangheta and the other Italian Mafias, the women are seen as mothers and wives; their rank in the clan varies according to whom they are married – the wife of a capo is more powerful among the women than is the wife of a foot soldier, for example, possessing wide-­ranging powers with regard to internal family affairs. Romance and courtship among clan partners have to be approved and supervised by her within the family context. A young girl within the clan who enters into a romantic tryst without such approval might suffer dire consequences, especially if the paramour is a policeman. There are documented examples of young ’Ndrangheta women who, having fallen in love with a carabiniere (“policeman”), ended up being killed by her family for a questione d’onore (“a point of honor”). Marriage is thus a tribal affair – that is, it must be realized within the clan and approved by the leading women within it.

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As Dickie (2004: 115) points out, ’Ndrangheta men are expected to “marry the sisters and daughters of other men of honour or women who have lived in a mafia environment all their lives and are therefore more likely to have the kind of discretion and/or submissiveness that the organization requires of them.” Although seen as subservient, Mafia women are held in high respect (as mentioned previously). But in sexual matters, they are held to a double standard. Flirtation or adultery with other men is denounced and tolerated (if at all) only in secrecy. For the men, these are not only tolerated but expected. Having mistresses is seen as part of manliness, although the affairs must be kept secret. Open womanizing is strictly forbidden, but extramarital sex in secret is encouraged. If a Mafioso is seen in public with his mistress, he must be chastised. Cawthorne and Cawthorne (2009: 403) recount a story related to Brooklyn mobster Frankie Saggio, which brings this out conspicuously: From the age of seven, his uncle would take him over to the East River to have a haircut, a shoeshine and a lunch in Little Italy. It was there that Frankie got a detailed education in the ways of Cosa Nostra. Uncle Philly was steeped in the Mafia ethos. His father-­in-­law was Carlo Gambino, head of the Gambino crime family. If one of his men turned up at his house with his girlfriend, the door would be shut in his face. He would be told to come with his wife, or not at all. Promiscuity for the men is seen as actually preserving family unity, since the Mafiosi subscribe to the masculinist view that “boys will be boys” and thus will inevitably engage in sex. Keeping mistresses is thus seen as constituting a “safety valve mechanism,” a means for giving “harmless” vent to masculine urges. Moreover, having a mistress is a sign of power within the organization, and this why it is expected of the leaders of the clans. On the other hand, if the women are caught in an adulterous relation, they are banished from the family or punished in brutal ways. Omertà is certainly a convenient code for the men; not so much for the women. As Reynolds (2006: 193) observes, “Any woman who swears risks being labeled a puttana, a prostitute, and cheating on a husband who happens to be a ‘made’ man is a capital crime.” As part of omertà, a husband must punish the transgressions of an unfaithful wife. As the case of Maria Serraino shows, women’s roles have not always been subservient ones in Mafia culture. In the ’Ndrangheta, if a wife, daughter, sister, or fiancée shows particular criminal qualities, she could rise to be a sorella d’omertà (“sister of honor”). There are documented cases of Mafia and ’Ndrangheta women seeking to avenge some perceived wrong by imploring the men of the clan to track down and eliminate the wrongdoer or even taking the vendetta into their own hands. However, the code of omertà, being a pseudo-­chivalric one, generally excludes women from the exercise and display of violence, unless they are charged to do so by the men.

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There are indications that the plight of Mafia women might be changing, albeit slightly. Recent studies are showing that the women might be rising up the ranks of leadership in some of the traditional Mafias. As underworld activities have shifted to cybercrimes and financial crimes, the use of physical violence has dropped at the same time that clan structure has become less localized or centralized and thus less subject to traditional cultural codes. This situation has led to women having more managerial roles. While there are few statistics on the number of women in the Mafias, more women are being arrested today than ever before as perpetrators of crimes that were previously assigned exclusively to the men. Actually, Mafia wives have never really been the silent homebodies that they have often been made out to be. They have always helped their men run affairs behind the scenes. The ’Ndrangheta in particular relies on women to ensure that secrecy is maintained throughout the clan system, which makes an ‘ndrina difficult to penetrate by the authorities and thus to defeat. Overseeing this code of secrecy is the fimmana (femmina “woman” in standard Italian) who ensures that its rules are maintained and that activities and plans are kept within the fold. In the case of imprisoned husbands, the women emerge as liaisons between them and the other members. Women have not always abided by the code of silence, however. There are many examples of Mafia women provoking clan feuds, which resulted in public scrutiny and in the disruption of family units. Ultimately, however, Mafia culture is a retrograde one for women. Growing up in a Mafia family isolates a woman from the changes that are occurring in the broader society. A young Mafia woman cannot normally have romantic contact of any duration with individuals outside her family. She also is prohibited from interacting with, or frequenting, certe persone (“certain persons”), such as policemen and unreliable outsiders. There are many tragic cases of Mafia women being murdered for the dishonor they have been seen to bring to the family through their relationships with outsiders. As Schneider and Schneider (2005) have cogently argued, the fate of women in Mafia culture is paradoxical; it is both a locus for gaining respect and for accepting subservience as their “normal condition” in life. Women are conditioned to see themselves as beneficiaries of the criminal lifestyle, not participants in it. This has, however, appeal to some women, as does the fact that they will have access to substantial wealth, as Reynolds (2006: 293) astutely observes: The benefits include the prospect that her man will rise high enough in the ranks to generate an impressive flow of income, permitting her and her family to enjoy the perks of wealth – a large home, expensive clothes, luxury cars and first-­class vacations. Another perk is respect from her husband and his cohorts. The family remains a powerful unifying force among Sicilians and especially among Cosa Nostra members. You don’t embarrass your wife, and you don’t abuse her either.

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The double standard The promise of protection, respect, and control over family is clearly attractive to women in the Mafia. The macho sexuality of the Mafioso “bad boy” is also a captivating one for them. But there is a price to pay. The women have to accept the fact that romantic trysts are allowed only to the men, since the credo in the Mafia is that a made man “who is without a mistress or two may be suspect” (Reynold 2006: 193). Weekdays are for wives; weekends for mistresses. This tacit rule is understood by the women as part of life in Mafia culture. Betrayal in love or fidelity must be avenged. One of the most famous Cosa Nostra bosses of all time, Vito Genovese, had another Mafioso killed because he lusted after his wife. The murder was accepted as an act of honor. Omertà demands, furthermore, complete avoidance of homosexuality, as the case of John “Johnny Boy” D’Amato so brutally brings out. Reynolds (2006: 194) summarizes it as follows: D’Amato was head of the DeCavalcante family, the largest in New Jersey and reputed to be the basis of the popular Sopranos television series. He had also been a confidante of the notorious John Gotti, a relationship that might have protected him in other times and other circumstances. With his girlfriend Kelly, D’Amato began frequenting clubs where men and women swapped partners and engaged in group sex. At more than one of these events, D’Amato’s girlfriend witnessed him performing oral sex on other men, and she tearfully confessed it to one of D’Amato’s wise guy friends. When the friend reported the incident to Mafia heavyweight Vincent (Vinnie Ocean) Palermo, the mob boss ordered D’Amato’s murder. The motive was clear. “Nobody’s gonna respect us if we have a gay homosexual boss sitting down discussing business,” D’Amato’s killer testified in court. An unwritten commandment of the omertà code is that, if you are a made man, you can have all the sex you want, discreetly, as long as it is heterosexual. In 1902, the Calabrian police found a document containing rules for admission into the ’Ndrangheta in which it is explicitly stated that homosexuals were prohibited from joining. Ironically, in a 2009 trial, a Gambino family pentito admitted that he was gay, living in the closet for many years. However, this might have been a ruse to garner sympathy for himself so as to obtain a more lenient sentence for a crime he had committed in 2003. In his 2018 book, The Good Mothers: The True Story of the Women Who Took on the World’s Most Powerful Mafia, journalist Alex Perry explores the double standard in Mafia culture and the kinds of tragedies it has brought about. In a famous ’Ndrangheta trial, Perry notes that conviction hinged on the testimony from a woman, Giuseppina Pesce, a pentita from a prominent ’Ndrangheta clan. Her testimony was a clear affront to a clan ruled by pseudo-­honor codes and sexist gender roles. When the accused were led into the courtroom on the first

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day of the trial, they were shocked to see that a high number of the lawyers and police, as well as the three judges, were women. The men protested, asking for a male magistrate to preserve their honor. The double standard had never before been expressed so publicly, leading to a critique of omertà as an antiquated and irrelevant code – nothing is more offensive to a mobster than to be seen as irrelevant, as the trial showcased. Lost in all the pseudo-­chivalric notions is the brutality that underpins the criminal lifestyle. In reality, being married to, or the mistress of, a mobster is hardly a matter of exciting romance, with stylish clothing and cosmetics, as the movies and TV programs proclaim. The glamorous fantasy that is created both by Mafia fiction and Hollywood fiction is just that – fantasy. By and large, it is the enactment of a double standard that has set Mafia women back considerably in terms of social mobility. This double standard comes out in all kinds of public gestures and behaviors. For example, to commemorate the death of a Mafioso, the women are expected to dress in black and to display their grief at the funeral by crying and praying out loud over the casket. While the weeping takes place, the capo, or some other high-­ranking officer, goes to the grieving wife or daughter of the dead Mafioso, hugging her in a public display of consolation. She is, however, expected to rebuff his gesture dramatically, beating her breast with her fists. The Mafioso must nonetheless insist on providing solace, whereby she finally gives in, sobbing, to show resignation to the death. By so doing, the woman shows acceptance of the role of the Mafia in her life and acknowledges her submission to its principles of omertà. Such rituals and public performances are embedded throughout Mafia culture and its patriarchal worldview. As Lunde (2004: 57) explains: the true Mafioso looks after his crime family like a father, often serving as godfather to the children of his underlings, attending their weddings and funerals, and holding frequent, almost ritual banquets, where the seating arrangement reflects each person’s status in the family. The intended subtext of such public displays and rituals is obvious  – the Mafia respects traditional values and morals based on the family. This is perhaps what makes the Mafia so attractive to Godfather-­ and Soprano-­enamored audiences, which might tend to see the Mafia as an oasis of traditional values in a social quagmire where traditions are being engulfed more and more every day. But Mafia culture twists these very values for its own criminal objectives. The biblical commandment “Honor thy father” is warped to read, “Honor thy capo.” The Mafia is all about power – power over women, power over other men, power over the government, and, subconsciously, power over death, since the Mafioso believes that he alone will decide when and how he will die. The double standard is not exclusive to Mafia culture. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, it is a tacit principle of most gangs, whereby the women are

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expected to take on the male-­devised codes of behavior and lifestyle and carry out criminal tasks, including murder, upon the request of the men. Mainly, they are expected to “act like women,” cooking and caring for the men, children, and any sick or wounded gang member. The double standard is also evident in initiation practices. While men are subjected to hazing or some physical challenge, the women are typically given the choice to suffer the same kind of punishment as the men or else sustain sexual relations with gang members, even though they will likely be derided for the latter choice after induction. And, like Mafia women, they are expected to tolerate infidelity from their partners in the gang, and if they reciprocate, they may lose their lives. Despite the dangers in gang membership, as discussed, some women opt for this lifestyle for various reasons. In the case of the Mafia and the ’Ndrangheta, it is part of tradition, whereby the women born into the criminal family must stay within it. In the case of street gangs, biker gangs, drug cartels, and the like, women join for various socioeconomic and psychological reasons. This is, of course, somewhat of a simplification, but it is nonetheless a pattern that still applies today.

Female gangs In recent drug cartel trials of Latin America, it is becoming obvious that there is a rising number of women who have been convicted and imprisoned as enforcers, assassins, and drug dealers. Some of the women are part of their own female-­only gangs rather than as surrogate criminals for the males – a growing area of concern among the police and social agencies everywhere. This phenomenon actually gained a foothold in various urban centers of North America in the late 1980s, although female gangs may go as far back as the 1920s (Taylor 1993; Chesney-­Lind and Hagedorn 1999). By and large, the gangs are similar in organization to the male ones and sometimes may form partnerships with them. The female groups have their own symbolic codes, including dress, tattoos, color nuances, and hierarchical leadership structure. Like the male street gangs, each female takes an oath that prohibits her from engaging in any form of betrayal. There is also an implicit code of sexual conduct, which normally means that multiple partners are shunned or eschewed. And female gangs have initiation rites that are similar to those of male gangs, including proof of valor via an apprenticeship period, usually involving robbery. Proof of fearlessness by committing an act of murder is, however, rare in these gangs. Recruits in female gangs share similar motivations for joining them – many of them come from low socioeconomic neighborhoods, facing poor job prospects. The gangs themselves originate in places where hopelessness and boredom due to a dearth of opportunities provide incentives to create a surrogate family structure (Taylor 1993). Another reason for all-­female gangs may well be that they have emerged in response to the blatant sexism and gender inequality found in male gangs – an aspect with which the media became fascinated,

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starting in the 1990s when these became increasingly spread out across society, leading to what has been called a “liberation hypothesis,” whereby the struggle for equal gender rights and perceptions is occurring in all areas of society, including in those traditionally associated with male criminality. Female gang members must talk, look, and act tough to sculpt an image of themselves as veritable gangsters and thus unconsciously liberate themselves from the gender shackles of being subservient females. The subtext is: “Gone are the times when girls were slaves to male gangsters, providing sex and money and running criminal tasks for them; we can do it ourselves.” The liberation hypothesis is seen as matching the fact that as women are becoming more powerful in business and government, the same thing is happening in gangs. The theory implies, therefore, that there is a correlation between increases in women’s liberation generally and women’s involvement in criminal activities. This is seen in pop culture’s spate of films and TV shows that portray women as aggressive, violent, and as involved in criminal gang culture as men, thus shattering previous views of women as the “gentle sex.” Whether this is sustainable or not, the evidence is, contrarily, that female gangs are rare. Gangs are by and large “androcentric,” that is, based on emphasizing a masculine point of view as central, marginalizing femininity. While it is now clear in anthropology, psychology, and sociology that masculinity and femininity are socially constructed, the gangs continue to believe in male privilege as based in biology (the “natural law” discussed previously). According to this mythology, men are seen as leaders because they have traits that include aggressiveness and strength, while women have opposite traits such as gentleness and sensitivity. Male gangs thus avoid displaying any supposed female traits, emphasizing machismo as their biological right to gangsterism and its rules of conduct as the legitimizing factor in their criminality. As always, there are exceptions to this theory, since, as discussed at the start of this chapter, there are women gangsters who are as brutal and as clever as any of their male counterparts. Two recent examples are Shashikala Ramesh Patankar, known as “Baby,” and Griselda Blanco Restrepo, the “Godmother” of cocaine. Arrested in 2015, Patankar was one of India’s most notorious narcotics dealers, after the police found drugs in the locker of her paramour, a police constable. She was arrested in the past, but she had frequently avoided capture by employing lookouts to keep her informed about police raids. Patankar had amassed properties and other assets, including apartments and shops in Mumbai and real estate in Pune. It is said that she may herself have tipped off the police about her corrupt paramour after the two had argued  – an event that, if true, led ironically to her own capture. Blanco Restrepo was a Colombian drug lord of the Medellín Cartel and a major player in the Miami-­based cocaine drug underworld from the 1980s to the early 2000s. It is believed that she was responsible for more than 2000 murders while transporting cocaine from Colombia to various parts of the United States. She was shot and killed in September of 2012, at the age of 69.

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Blanco Restrepo’s fame has been a target of popular culture, probably because, as a female, she was as vicious as any male drug lord, as portrayed in movies such as Cocaine Cowboys (2006) and Cocaine Cowboys 2 (2008) and TV series, such as Cocaine Godmother, which premiered in 2018 on Lifetime, and La viuda negra (Black Widow, 2014–2016). She has also been the topic of popular songs and of books and podcasts. It is interesting to note that Blanco was a leading drug kingpin in the era when Pablo Escobar, perhaps the best-­known drug lord of all time, was just stealing cars. Overall, however, most female gangs have ephemeral leadership and membership and thus tend to disappear after the first generation of gang members.

References Cawthorne, Nigel and Cawthorne, Colin (2009). The Mafia: First-­Hand Accounts of Life Inside the Mob. London: Constable & Robinson. Chesney-­Lind, Meda and Hagedorn, John M. (1999). Female Gangs in America: Essays on Girls and Gender. Chicago: Lakeview Press. Dickie, John (2004). Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia. London: Houghton and Stoughton. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Perry, Alex (2018). The Good Mothers. New York: HarperCollins. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Schneider, Jane and Schneider, Peter T. (2005). Mafia, Antimafia, and the Plural Cultures of Sicily. Current Anthropology 46: 501–520. Taylor, Carl S. (1993). Girls, Gangs, Women and Drugs. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Chapter 9

Resources

Introduction Like modern-­day legitimate corporations, organized crime syndicates need to ensure a diversity of income sources and a minimization of expenditures to sustain profit-­making and even to survive. In other words, they need to deploy adaptive mechanisms to manage their financial, human, and social resources like any big business enterprise. The difference is, of course, that the mobsters get their resources through illegitimate means and tactics that involve violence and intimidation. The mobsters also need to expand their resource system by investing in and managing legitimate business enterprises. Today the OCs are involved in both areas. Many have become sophisticated, multinational organizations that deal in criminal and legitimate affairs at the same time. They have also entered the global village seamlessly and surreptitiously, as will be discussed in Chapter 15. Organized crime is thriving in cyberspace, where risks are negligible and profits are truly immense. This chapter will look at the resources aspect of OCs – without which they could not sustain themselves. Organized criminal organizations have gone from localized, neighborhood enterprises to multinational ones, just like mainstream businesses. Along the way, they have adapted to changing market forces and political climates, showing themselves to be adaptive, clever entrepreneurs. Drugs may be a staple for organized criminals, but land swindles, tax frauds, online gambling, and selling lists of well-­to-­do victims to other criminals for fraudulent reasons are now also major money-­making activities. So is dealing with terrorists and whoever else can provide resources. As one of the most astute and crafty Mafiosi of all time, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, was once purported to have said, “There’s no such thing as good money or bad money. There’s just money” (cited in Nites 2015). The principle that this statement bears is a fundamental one in Mafia culture  – money must be obtained by any means. This implies that people and institutions are just pawns in the gang’s overall money-­power-­territory game (Chapter 1). Playing the game successfully includes corrupting and manipulating people outside the clan  – lawyers, charter accountants, brokers, bankers, bureaucrats,

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politicians, police officers, judges, and labor union representatives. They are the associate players in the syndicates, remaining as important, if not more so, than they have in the past.

Financial resources Accumulating financial resources for the Mafia has historically involved a main activity – the extortion of small businesses. But during the era of Prohibition, as the income from this source was not sufficient to keep it viable in the United States, it expanded its sources of income considerably, starting with bootlegging. The expanded business agenda subsequently included racketeering and the strongarm manipulation and corruption of labor unions. Using brute-­force methods to secure major construction contracts became, and continues to be, a major source of income. Labor unions are attractive to organized criminal groups because of their lucrative pensions, welfare, and health funds. Racketeering in the labor area occurs primarily in large cities but can be implemented anywhere. Today the gangsters have a diversified portfolio, which includes not only the traditional extortion rackets and labor union corruption but anything else from banking and mortgage fraud to straw buying (making purchases for people who cannot complete purchases themselves) and check fraud. These are added to expanding activities in areas such as drug trafficking, loan sharking, arms trafficking, and gambling. The criminals rationalize their participation in their criminal activities cleverly by simply describing themselves as “service providers” who only make available products to consensual parties who actively demand them. They point out that they did not induce drug addiction, sexual perversity, or addiction to other substances  – they simply provide the means to satisfy these desires. In other words, they proclaim to be in tune with the weaker part of human character, whereby humans are seen as naturally incapable of overcoming their base passions. This is a twisted view that recalls the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, who saw people as inherently corruptible. In his book Leviathan (1651), Hobbes claimed that civilization was a sheen that people created to tame their true nature, which he called the “natural state of humanity,” a state of living in constant fear of loss or violence. In the natural state, people will do anything necessary for preserving life, which he describes as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” In subscribing unwittingly (in all likelihood) to this Hobbesian view, the Mafia simply claims to serve “natural humanity,” detaching itself from any moral or ethical issues that their activities might bring about. So, when a person dies from a drug overdose, that death is attributed to the user who made the decision to abuse a drug rather than themselves, the dealers, who made the drug available to the victim. Because of their Hobbesian-­based unscrupulous view of humans as feeble beings, the OCs have taken advantage of the new conditions in which

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“natural humanity” now exists, namely in cyberspace, which has allowed them to become globalized and diversified, given their view that humans are the same everywhere. From the many proceeds of crime, they now invest in technology sectors, protected markets, agriculture, and other market economies. The ever-­expanding global economy and its increasingly globalized financial systems, as well as the opaque rules that exist for international financing systems, provide many opportunities for OCs to be seen and even become legitimate entrepreneurs (in part). The goal is, and has always been, to blend into the social mainstream, normalizing their illegalities surreptitiously and opportunistically, providing illegal goods behind the computer screen and corrupting those in power to leave them alone. As anthropologist Francis Ianni (1974: 14–15) has observed, the true menace of organized crime is to be found in its supply-­and-­demand practices that are made effective because of corruption: I have defined organized crime as an integral part of the American social system that brings together a public that demands certain goods and services that are defined as illegal, an organization of individuals who produce or supply those goods and services, and corrupt public officials who protect such individuals for their own profit or gain. In the global village, there are, however, hidden risks to the wellbeing of the traditional OCs, since in cyberspace they might become geographically and culturally diffuse and thus watered down in their operations and in their strategic use of symbols. Italian sociologist Letizia Paoli (2003) has suggested that the globalization of international markets risks impugning the functionality and the utility of large hierarchical organizations like the Sicilian Mafia, the Yakuza, or the Chinese Triads. She suggests that these organizations, whose traditional structure is often predicated on in-­person social relations rather than market systems, are no longer able to maintain their self-­preserving practices and symbolic mechanisms. So, she maintains that there may be a paradigm shift in the nature of criminal cultures that is underway in cyberspace – a topic that we will deal with in Chapter 15.

Money laundering Since the finances gathered by an OC can easily come under the scrutiny of the authorities, a major financial tactic that they use is money laundering, whereby an OC conceals the source of its illegally obtained money gathered from illegitimate sources by investing it or transferring it to foreign banks or legitimate businesses. The overall scheme returns the “laundered” money to the OC in a typically undetectable indirect way. However, a common problem for the OCs is accounting for the transfers without raising the unwanted suspicion of law enforcement. So, a four-­part

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scheme is commonly utilized by the gangsters that is designed to avoid, or at least lessen, the chance of detection by the police: 1 Placement. This implies taking the money gained from illicit activities and recycling it into legitimate economic and financial structures, often through what is called colloquially “smurfing,” that is, having many individuals deposit cash in small amounts, since these are below reporting thresholds. 2 Layering. The funds are then layered within financial systems in several economic sectors and companies across the globe, thus deflecting attention away from them. 3 Integration: This disguises the source of the money via false paper trails, such as converting cash into assets through various legitimate purchases. 4 Repatriation. Finally, the money is repatriated to the original criminal owners – ready to be used as a financial resource for further criminal activities. Money laundering opportunities often arise because laws are contradictory across jurisdictions. During Prohibition, Cosa Nostra laundered money through Canada to avoid scrutiny from American enforcement agencies, providing the first example of how to run a Mafia business by using existing legal systems and bending them for self-­serving illegal purposes. Also, anti-­ corruption legislation is usually ineffective to block the gangs from enticing outside help. For example, Canada’s 1996 Anti-­Smuggling Initiative was meant to reduce organized crime considerably, yet the policy outlined vague efforts to “ensure public visibility of law enforcement.” The law has not since been updated to be more effective. The previous four-­part scheme (placement-­layering-­integration-­repatriation) has proven quite effective. One of the main placement strategies used by the gangsters is to put money in the real estate industry, especially in shell companies that have been inactive and can thus be used as a vehicle for various financial maneuvers to shelter the identities of the owners and beneficiaries of the accounts. In this way, OCs can purchase land or buildings using money from illegitimate sources without raising suspicions unduly. They can then collect rent from legitimate tenants, thus laundering their money into clean profits that can be deposited into local banks. Placement can be carried out in many other ways, needless to say, such as by currency smuggling and exchange, via bank complicity, securities brokers, and through the blending of funds and purchasing assets. Layering involves essentially converting the cash into monetary instruments and buying and selling material assets with cash. Integration includes engagement in property dealings, shell companies, false loans, and false import or export invoices, among other such dealings. Repatriation involves placing the laundered funds back into the OC’s own accounts with a legitimate explanation for their origin. The repertoire of money-­laundering tactics today is boundless and quite ingenious, including online strategies,

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such as the use of electronic money transfers, which cannot be tracked easily. Another way is online gaming. In a growing number of online games, it is easy to convert money into virtual goods, services, or electronic currency that can be converted back into real money. Some countries have become havens for money laundering, including those that are not considered the “usual suspects.” Canada, for instance, is a desirable country for money laundering activities, because of its lax laws in this area. In 2007, a powerful Russian crime syndicate known as the Klyuev Group was able to launder millions of dollars through Canadian banks and registered companies and then smuggle them out of Canada into foreign accounts. Over 200  million dollars flowed through more than 23 offshore companies across the world under the control of Dmytro Firtash, an elite Ukrainian businessman who served as an intermediary for the Group. Without a transparent system of ownership required by law, it is likely that many of those who were involved in the scheme were unaware that they were unintentionally helping to launder money. Canada continues to have an image as a safe haven for criminals and their families. For this reason, it has become home in the millennium to branches of the Yakuza, the Triads, the ’Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra, and the Hells Angels, among other OCs. Efforts to crack down on these groups are hampered by laws of freedom of association. Nevertheless, behind the scenes, police agencies such as the RCMP are keeping track of the gangsters, thus making it difficult for them to operate as freely as in the past, since they know that they are being monitored. Another obstacle in the way of eradicating money laundering is the fact that people do not think that it concerns them directly, nor that it affects the general economy of the country. Nothing could be further from the truth. Money laundering through the real estate market, for example, can distort the values of homes, especially in small towns. It also makes money accessible to criminals to use as a tool for political influence and power, thus affecting legislation and social policies that concern everyone. The Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism found that in countries such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Turkey, Serbia, and Armenia, among others, there has been a substantial shrinkage of the taxation base and a considerable move away from money supply balance in favor of cash. These have complicated the management of the economies of these countries and contributed to the growth of the many shadow economies within them. Money laundering is also detrimental to international trade, banking systems, and even the rule of law. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime conducted a study in 2009 which estimated that money laundering profits equaled about 1.6 trillion US dollars. During the financial crisis of 2008, many banks actually owed their survival to the illicit drug trade: as Antonio Costa, ex-­director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, claimed to the press, the criminal recycling of money has become the “oxygen” of the underground economy.

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Human capital The term human capital is used in sociology and economic theory to refer to the kinds of skills, knowledge, and experience possessed by individuals or groups in organizational structures, measured in terms of their asset value or liability to them. Human capital is critical to the constitution and perpetuity of OCs, who assign a hierarchical or network distribution of roles based on individual skills, knowledge, and experience, from the capo to the foot soldier. The notion of human capital is traced back to Adam Smith (1776) in the eighteenth century, the Scottish economist and philosopher often regarded as the founder of modern economics, who advocated minimal state i­nterference in economic matters. Today, this view has become a key principle within ­economic theory, emphasizing that the talents of individuals in organizations are as valuable as liquid (money) capital, since it enhances the ability to increase actual capital income, which can then be reinvested propitiously. The costs of imparting talents through education or apprenticeship are recovered, and profits are enlarged. Smith (1776: 12) defined human capital as follows: The acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise that of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labor, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit. Smith went on to suggest that the appropriate division of labor, based on how capital is invested in people, is a key way to ensure success, given that it assigns skill in optimal ways. Overall, the theory suggests that the success of an organization rests on its ability to develop the talent of its workers and to deploy their skills to the maximum benefit of the organization; it also implies that drawing the “right talent” into the organization is a key personnel decision-­making process. As discussed in previous chapters, the OCs excel in the deployment of their own human capital, assigning roles to specific members through recruitment and by hiring, or coercing, outsiders according to the talent required. It is the backbone of the Mafia’s power. They do not assess it in terms of background education or other high-­capital-­investment practices by society but by evaluating the skills possessed by individuals through experience in the criminal trade. Since the 1980s, the Mafia gangs have searched for, and invested in, their own version of human capital, with the need for violence to enforce their criminal schemes becoming less of a desired talent, while the “brain power” of the recruits in areas of expertise such as economics, computer science, and the

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like is being seen as increasingly vital. The Mafia gangs now seek young recruits who are in synch technologically with the times, at the same time as promoting themselves as distinctive (honorable) organizations.

Human capital in Italian organized crime The organizational structures and operations of the four classic Italian-­ based Mafias reveal how effective they have been at exploiting specialized talent as the basis for making themselves powerful and successful. Cosa Nostra: has been one of the most successful of all OCs in developing and investing in human resources via a nationwide alliance of members. It has shown how syndication and specialized allocation of roles can bolster unity and avoid self-­destruction through turf wars. It did this, as discussed, by branching out into families who use their own human resources as they deem necessary, without interference from other families. If a situation should arise that requires the talent of members in one of the families by another, then an exchange agreement is made, by which the individual is allowed to work for the other family in return for some favor. • The Sicilian Mafia is among the largest criminal organizations in Italy to this day, because it has evolved into an institution that is effective in deploying its network of members and associates, assigning tasks and roles according to individual strengths and talents. Those who do not make the grade are typically ostracized (or worse). • The ’Ndrangheta has been able sustain itself through a network structure that assigns roles, tasks, and power to individuals in the separate clans. If the skill needed is not available within the network, then, like the other Mafias, it will seek it outside. This is common today, since the ’Ndrangheta requires people skilled in computer science and new technologies to help out with its activities. • Camorra is perhaps the most flexible and adaptive of all the Italian OCs, constantly recruiting into its fold members who are adept at new ways of conducting money laundering with technological skills, allowing the gang to operate effectively in cyberspace. • Sacra Corona Unita (United Sacred Crown) started in the late 1980s as a prison gang in the Puglia region of Italy; it has since grown considerably by linking up with other Mafia groups, collecting payoffs from them for landing rights along the southeast coast of Italy where smuggling operations from countries like Croatia, Albania, and the former Yugoslavia are carried out. •

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To reiterate, the effective use of human capital is intrinsic to the operations of all the OCs. The skills, knowledge, and experience possessed by an individual are invariably viewed in terms of their value and cost to the clan. If these are possessed by someone already in the clan, then he is assigned the appropriate tasks; if not, then an individual might be recruited from the outside, by any means necessary. Human capital is an intangible asset, since its value is measured in terms of the individual’s experience and skills. It also recognizes that not all labor is equal – hence the different task assignments within the clan. An OC is as good as its people, to use a common business cliché.

Social capital In sociology and economic theory, the term social capital theory refers to the networks of relationships among people who work in a particular organization, enabling it to function effectively in terms of the specific kinds of interpersonal relations that people must establish in the organization to guarantee its smooth functioning. It maintains, in other words, that the effective functioning of social groups is enhanced by establishing congenial interpersonal relationships within the organization, based on a shared sense of values, trust, and cooperation. The values have both tangible (territory and property) and intangible (human dynamics) dimensions, and these have a direct impact on both the actual monetary resources of the organization and on the public image that it aims to convey. In the nineteenth century, French historian Alexis de Tocqueville (1840) was among the first to point out the importance of social capital, although he did not name it as such. He noted that Americans met at many gatherings to discuss issues of state, country, or the world. As a result, there was greater participation from the people, which overall allowed for the country to work better. It was educator L. J. Hanifan who first used the term to refer to the need for social cohesion for a state to function successfully. In defining the notion, he contrasts social capital with material goods as follows (Hanifan 1916: 130–131): I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit. If he may come into contact with his neighbour, and they with other neighbours, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbours.

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In OC groups, social capital is critical  – the gang’s survival rests on the interpersonal cooperation and bonding of all its members. To ensure this, rules of interaction must be obeyed fervently, with no obstacles thrown into the functioning of the organization by individualism and random, unsocial acts by any member. The views of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977) are relevant for grasping the importance of social capital to the well-­oiled operation of any organization. He argued that cultural traditions that involve people working in concert and according to their position in society help maintain a division of class structure. For example, he pointed out that working-­class people tend to avoid going to art galleries, especially those that display modern abstract art, since it is perceived to be the privilege of the social élite. So, it is generally upper-­class people who will visit galleries as part of the enactment of their social status. In other words, art galleries are branded for social class. He defined this type of power as being based on “cultural capital.” Like real capital, cultural capital is not distributed equally throughout society. By extension, cultural capital is exclusive to in-­group solidarity and success, and does not spill over into society at large. So, those who go to art galleries share values that others are assumed not to possess; analogously, those who belong to OCs similarly believe that they share values that outsiders are assumed not to possess. Bourdieu formulated the notion of habitus as an unconscious system of habits that define cultural capital and even social capital, an idea that comes originally from the French sociologist Marcel Mauss (1934). Success in a social group depends largely on the individual’s ability to absorb the dominant habitus of the group. Bourdieu maintained that habitus even influenced one’s body language, which he called hexis, alongside more abstract mental processes, such as cognition, perception, feeling, and action. These are not simply “habits of mind,” although they may have started out as such, but rather unconscious patterns of behavior that are shared collectively by members of the group. As a result, habitus is imprinted in the body, language, and in daily routines. Sociologists today describe two primary forms of social capital: 1 Bonding refers to the fact that social capital is created within a group with shared interests and goals. 2 Bridging is the creation of social capital across groups or with entities outside the main group. This allows individuals within and outside the group to discover shared interests and goals and work together to achieve them. In OCs, bonding has always been a key aspect of the group (needless to say); it is ensured by strategies such as initiation rites, codes of conduct, and the like. Bridging is a euphemistic way of saying corruption, that is, of manipulating outside players, such as politicians, to become engaged in the activities of a clan, usually by remaining silent about them. It might also involve the engagement of hired guns or enforcers. Both types of social capital, therefore, are key to the functioning of OCs; without them, they would literally fall apart.

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Corruption To ensure financial success, any corporation must create links outside of itself. In normal businesses, these are typically formal and above board. In OCs, these involve one of the most important tactics that they employ to ensure that their sources of income remain stable and undetected – corruption. This is not exclusive to OCs, of course – corruption goes on all the time in legal organizations, but it is the Mafiosi who have become experts at the use of this kind of tactic, again based on the Hobbesian belief that humans are weak and inherently corruptible. Then main methods of corruption include bribery, extortion, blackmail, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. Corruption facilitates the implementation of the OC’s business agenda, including drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, among many others.

Corruption methods and tactics Bribery This involves the improper use of gifts, money, sexual entertainment, and other favors in exchange for some corresponding favor, such as acquiescence about illegal activities and even their facilitation. Bribery makes the targeted person or official more susceptible to blackmail or extortion and thus more willing to be compliant.

Embezzlement This involves taking illegal control of funds or assets. Examples include the redirection of illegal funds into shadow companies, the skimming of money intended for some charity or foreign aid, and other similar activities.

Graft This involves the misdirection of funds intended for legitimate projects to corrupt individuals or to the OCs themselves.

Blackmail This refers to the use of threats of violence or other attacks on an individual who resists corruption. This can involve menacing the targeted individuals with exposure of their secrets.

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Influence peddling This is the use of influence or connections with persons in authority to obtain favors or preferential treatment.

Networking This is the tactic of cultivating personal relationships with authorities to influence their decisions and actions in a favorable way for the mobsters.

Nepotism This involves using people in institutions who are related by kinship to the mob, making it easier to broaden the corruption activities within the institutions.

In some countries, collusion between the OC and the government has become so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish between the operations of the two. This type of situation has been called a Mafia state (Chapter 3) – that is, a state in which organized crime and the government form a tacit partnership in running the country’s affairs, allowing the mobsters to carry out their illicit enterprises freely and even openly (Harding 2012; Naím 2012; Wang and Blancke 2014). As Moisés Naím (2012) argues, Mafia states have existed previously, to a lesser extent, as evidenced by the history of the Italian Mafia and the Japanese Yakuza, both of which have always formed close relationships with their respective local governments in diverse eras. Recall that the post-­Unification period in Italy allowed the gangsters to reinvent themselves and to contract relations with the authorities at various levels of government (Chapter 2). Although technically not a Mafia state in the modern sense, the situation in various parts of southern Italy to this day nonetheless approaches such a state. At the very least, in cities and towns throughout the region, there is a tacit agreement between the Mafia, the police, and government officials to leave each other alone. Only occasional crackdowns, due to public pressure, shatter the agreement. But it is soon after that it re-establishes itself, after the pressure from the broader society subsides. A case in point of this corrupt system of tacit agreements became public during the trial of the late former prime minister of Italy, Giulio Andreotti, who was indicted for Mafia association in 1993 in the city of Palermo. He was on trial for making himself “available to the Mafia association named Cosa Nostra for the defense of its interests and attainment of its criminal goals, the influence and power coming from his position as the leader of a political faction” (cited in Allum 1997). It was alleged that this collusion was motivated to gain

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the support of politician Salvo Lima, a likely Mafia collaborator, so as to ensure his own political success and continuity. Andreotti had purportedly agreed to protect the Mafia in return, fixing the Maxi Trial – a criminal trial against the Sicilian Mafia that lasted from 1986 to 1992. Andreotti’s defense was based on the fact that the key witnesses against him at trial were themselves involved with the Mafia. Andreotti’s trials were part of an investigation into political corruption in Italy in the 1990s, resulting in the demise of many political parties and a political reorganization of the party system so as to make it less susceptible to corruption. The corrupt system uncovered by the investigation was called tangentopoli (“kickback city”). Another classic example of deep corruption akin to that of a Mafia state is the one in the city of Naples, where the Camorra Casalesi clan rose to power in the 1980s by gaining control of large sectors of the local economy via the corruption of politicians and the intimidation of judges. The clan was involved in bringing about the waste management crisis that dumped toxic waste around the region outside of Naples in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The boss of the clan, Gaetano Vassallo, admitted to systematically working for twenty years with the local government, using bribes, intimidation, and blackmail to gain the acquiescence of officials to his illegal dumping operations. Today, Mafia states can be found across the globe, to various degrees. One of them is in Russia, to which the term Mafia state was first applied by defector Alexander Litvinenko. Journalist Luke Harding (2012) has argued that Russia has become “a state peopled by ex-­KGB and FSB officers, bent on making money above all,” collaborating with Russian gangsters to maintain power by employing them to carry out fear and violence tactics. Another purported Mafia state is Mexico, which economist Edgardo Buscaglia describes as a Mafia bureaucracy (see Buscaglia, González Ruiz and Ratliff 2005), whereby the state and organized crime have formed a silent, mutually beneficial partnership. Mexico has actually been labeled a narco-­state – a state where the political power and the economy rely on protecting drug trafficking operations. Clearly, the most effective criminal use of social capital involves corruption. Without it, the Mafias would have likely disappeared; with it, they have entered the social mainstream, often forming partnerships with governments. In some cases, it might even be the state itself, as some criminologists maintain about the Albanian Mafia, which is involved in all kinds of global criminal activities, especially in the area of trafficking – drugs, arms, people, and human organs. There are over fifteen Mafia families in the country that are not only tolerated by the authorities but who work with them for their own schemes surreptitiously. According to the Research Institute for European and American Studies, the Albanian Mafia families are defined as hybrid organizations, involved in both criminal and political activities. The Albanian Mafia is, in a phrase, a twisted success story. It amalgamates the traditional organizational and symbolic-­r itualistic features of OCs, strict rigid clan-­like structure, like that of the ’Ndrangheta, and transnational agreements

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with other gangs, providing the “services” that people want illegally. Up until the 1990s, Kosovo Albanians served as couriers for Turkish mobsters. However, migration to Western Europe in that era allowed for an Albanian takeover of the entire illegal drug trade coming to Europe via the Balkans. As a result, there was an increase in Albanian gangs following the economic collapse during the 1990s. This created the conditions for Albania to become a virtual Mafia state, allowing it to remain economically above water. There are signs that things are changing in Albania and other Mafia states, as young people become more aware of the illicit partnerships and demand change through protest, social media campaigns, and the ballot box. It remains to be seen how effective these will be in a world that is in constant flux.

References Allum, Percy (1997). Statesman or Godfather? The Andreotti Trials. Italian Politics 12: 219–232. Bourdieu, Pierre (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buscaglia, Edgardo, González Ruiz, Samuel and Ratliff, William E. (2005). Undermining the Foundations of Organized Crime. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Press. Hanifan, Lyda J. (1916) The Rural School Community Center. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 67: 130–138. Harding, Luke (2012). Mafia State: How One Reporter Became an Enemy of the Brutal New Russia. London: Guardian Books. Hobbes, Thomas (1651). Leviathan. London: Andrew Crooke. Ianni, Frank (1974). Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime. Journal of Criminal Justice 2: 272–274. Mauss, Marcel (1934). Les Techniques du Corp. Journal de Psychologie 32: 3–4. Naím, Moisés (2012). Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office. Foreign Affairs 91: 100–105. Nites, Gary (2015). Lucky Luciano. Amazon eBook. https://www.goodreads.com/book/ show/24893512-­lucky-­luciano. Paoli, Letizia (2003). Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, Adam (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations: Of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock. London: Essex Street. Tocqueville, Alexis de (1840). Democracy in America. New York: Signet Classics. Wang, Peng and Blancke, Stephan (2014). Mafia State: The Evolving Threat of North Korean Narcotics Trafficking. The RUSI Journal 159(5): 52–59.

Chapter 10

The business agenda

Introduction Every corporation has its own business agenda, with a list of activities and enterprises that constitute its core operations. The agenda of organized criminals invariably involves several main ones – extortion, gambling, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering – at which gangsters are quite adept, bribing and corrupting authority figures (government officials, police agencies, etc.) to guarantee various degrees of freedom for their operations, as we saw in the previous chapter. This chapter will deal with four main of the main items on the core business agendas of OCs, since it would be beyond the present purposes to go into detail on the multitude of activities that OCs perform today. So, the discussion here is illustrative, not comprehensive. Drug trafficking in particular is now critical to the sustenance of profits. This became obvious in the 1960s, when a pipeline was set up to move heroin from the poppy fields of the Middle East via Turkey and then to the streets of America, a scheme known as the “French Connection.” Since then, drug traffickers have learned to interact with other groups, thus reaping huge profits. Not surprisingly, violence has increased with the chance of profits.

The “French Connection” The French Connection was a smuggling scheme whereby heroin was channeled from Turkey to France and then to the United States and Canada. The operation began in the 1930s, reaching its peak in the 1960s, and was broken up in the 1970s. The operation was headed by Corsican criminals Paul Carbone and Antoine Guérini. They exploited the high demand for heroin during the 1960s, and by 1969, they were supplying the United States with eighty percent of its illegal heroin. As a consequence, US officials negotiated an agreement with the Turkish government for phasing out drug production, curtailing the export of drugs into the United States. In 1971, Turkey agreed to a complete ban

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on the growing of opium, as authorities in both the United States and France started a series of roundups and crackdowns. In the same year, the Guérini clan was eliminated during internecine wars within the French underworld. In 1982, Marcel Francisci, a major player in the French clans, was shot to death as he was getting into his car in Paris. That put the final period on the French Connection scheme.

The French Connection movie The French Connection is a 1971 American film, directed by William ­Friedkin, that dramatized the actual French Connection scheme. Based on Robin Moore’s 1969 book The French Connection, it recounts the story of New York police detectives Jimmy “Popeye” Doyle and Buddy “Cloudy” Russo, whose real-­life counterparts were Eddie Egan and Sonny Grosso. Doyle and Russo pursue French heroin smuggler Alain Charnier, based on the person of Jean Jehan, who was arrested in Paris for drug trafficking. The tactics used by the two policemen in the film were like the reported tactics used by Egan and Grosso, who would enter bars and create panic until their suspect revealed himself. The movie emphasized how troubling American society viewed the use of drugs imported illegally, seeing the country’s drug culture as part of a destructive countercultural movement that was ongoing at the time. The belief was that the elimination of the drugs would eliminate unrest in society – a simplistic view that has proven to be groundless, as can be seen today with the enormous spread of illegal drugs throughout society without any connection to a cultural movement.

Extortion and racketeering The main way in which the Mafias have traditionally conducted their business affairs is by extortion operations, that is, by demanding a percentage of a victim’s earnings or a fixed rate from businesses in exchange for protection. Simple demand for money would be perceived as being mere theft, a vulgar form of street crime. So, the gangsters instituted early on a kind of “honorable system of taxation,” which they used to justify the intimidation and violence they would use if failure to pay up emerged as a concrete possibility. This was, and still is, a clever self-­serving tactic for ennobling a criminal enterprise. It bespeaks of omertà, not the vulgar tactics of street thugs. The central goal of extortion, however, is not just money but control  – by extorting common citizens, the clan is better able to establish a firm control over them psychologically and to exercise control over territories, putting itself in a better position to negotiate with the authorities through corruption activities (Chapter 9).

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In the Sicilian Mafia, the extortion booty is called the pizzo, as we saw. Along with the code of silence – both as a system for maintaining control over members within the Mafia and as a threat of reprisal for anyone who runs to the authorities – the pizzo racket has always worked effectively and efficiently and continues to be central to Mafia operations to this day, even as more and more people react against it, often at high risk to their own safety. As Lunde (2004: 38) notes, the pizzo has always been the main type of activity of the Mafia, starting with the early criminal bands, such as the Black Hand ring: In the 19th century, an organization that helped newly arrived Italians in the United States to find homes and work was the Unione Siciliana, which had branches across the country. It was infiltrated by extortionists, the so-­called “Black Hand gang,” the foremost of whom was Ignazio Saietta. By 1901 Saietta had become the national chairman of the Unione Siciliana and he filled its regional offices with many of his criminal associates. Many new Italian immigrants, especially in New York, were leaned on to pay a percentage of their weekly wage to the extortionists, fearing violence and the loss of their jobs. Small businesses such as grocers, drug stores, and barbers also paid “protection.” Those who are being extorted prefer not to make a fuss, agreeing to pay the “reasonable” pizzo as part of the expense of running a business. They often choose to risk criminal charges of perjury or of false testimony rather than to risk the wrath of reprisal from their extortionists. In fact, those that refuse to pay the pizzo might be vandalized, burned down, and the owners and their families attacked and even murdered. In return, businesses receive protection and can use the Mafiosi to help cut through government red tape or resolve disputes with other businesses. Surveys show that a majority of commercial businesses in Sicily and other parts of southern Italy submit to the pizzo willingly. A famous case of noncompliance shows why – that of a certain Libero Grassi, a shopkeeper from Palermo, who refused to pay the pizzo. In January 1991, he wrote a letter to the Giornale di Sicilia, the local newspaper, which was published on its front page and was addressed to an anonymous extortionist. Later that same year, Grassi was murdered. The anti-­Mafia movements that sporadically surface in Sicily, Naples, and Calabria are appropriately termed Addiopizzo (“Goodbye to the pizzo”), implying that if one breaks the code of silence and does not collaborate by paying the pizzo, the Mafia will be defeated. But this is easier said than done, given the emotional-­cultural power of the silence code. The pizzo phenomenon penetrates deeply into the fabric of Sicilian, Calabrian, and Neapolitan cultures, where a philosophy of una mano lava l’altra (“one hands washes the other,” that is, “I scratch your back if you scratch mine”) is intrinsic to the cultural worldview. It is ironic to note that the southern Mafias have been tagged stereotypically for this philosophy, given that it is now a common one across the spectrum of organized criminality. Being the opportunists and cunning

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operators that they are, the Mafiosi are extremely careful not to drive their victims to bankruptcy. Too much greed is seen as being “immoral,” tending injudiciously to provoke public outcries, not to mention public pressure on the police to intervene. Gouging victims is simply not good for business, especially since the extortion business is easy to prosecute in the courts. However, as new technologies surface faster than corresponding laws, the extortion opportunities in cyberspace seem literally infinite for mobsters, as Lunde (2004: 49) observes: “Organized criminals are now able to carry out protection rackets without moving from their desks.” Like the Mafia, the base criminal activity of the Yakuza is extortion, allowing the gang to control territories and businesses, such as restaurants and trucking companies. In recent years, the gang has changed some of its operational activities, leading to recruitment from non-­traditional sources. Most new members come from the bosozuku, the name for violent street punks, who can be seen riding around on motorcycles. The traditional Yakuza members consider such members an insult to their historical integrity. However, the bosozuku are now the ones who collect the extortion money – hence the crisis in identity that the Yakuza is undergoing. Extortion is a part of the more general criminal activity of racketeering, defined as dishonest and fraudulent business dealings. Historically, the gangs have engaged in two main types of rackets: protection and labor. The former one has been discussed previously; in a labor racket, the gangsters steal labor union funds or use strongarm tactics to force companies to give them money. Charles “Lucky” Luciano was the one who moved Cosa Nostra away from bootlegging, when it was no longer needed with the end of Prohibition, to drug trafficking and various types of racketeering as major criminal activities. Luciano controlled most of New York City, importing drugs from the port in Montreal, Canada. His astuteness in criminal matters allowed him to reign over Cosa Nostra for years, until his arrest in 1936, charged with running prostitution rings. Even in prison, Luciano continued to build his empire. Later on in life, he left the United States to try to run a crime syndicate in Cuba but was eventually deported to Italy, where he died in 1962.

RICO In the United States, racketeering is prohibited under RICO, a section of the federal Organized Crime Control Act of 1970; it is an abbreviation of the section’s title, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Under RICO, people convicted of racketeering can be sent to prison for a considerable period of time. RICO has proved to be a powerful legislative tool against organized crime. A number of countries have drafted a similar law, including Italy, Belgium, Germany, and South Africa.

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Racketeering is still today a mainstay activity of virtually all the major criminal organizations. Under RICO, the list of racketeering operations is truly vast and includes such activities as loan sharking, fraud and embezzlement, counterfeit money, casino skimming, illegal gambling, bookmaking, soccer match fixing (Hill 2008), labor racketeering, dog fighting, fencing, illegal gambling, and many more.

Drug trafficking and narcoterrorism Drug trafficking is today a major global criminal enterprise. The drug trade is comparable to a franchise business – the drugs are manufactured in one place, such as Afghanistan, and then passed onto a wholesaler somewhere else, who then distributes them to retailers (also elsewhere), finally making its way to the consumer in different locales. In North America, the drug trade was actually legal in the mid-­1800s with drugs such as opium and other opioids coming in from Asia – these became illegal after the Opium Act in Canada in 1908 and the Harrison Act in the United States in 1911. More drugs would become listed as illegal substances in the subsequent years. This made it possible for the OCs to move into this profitable territory after Prohibition. By the early 1950s, major criminal gangs, like Cosa Nostra, started to realize the financial rewards from the smuggling and distribution of illegal drugs in an international scheme that became known as the French Connection (previously). At its peak in the late 1960s, this scheme was responsible for most of the heroin entering North America, with shipments valued at over 50 million dollars. After the Vietnam war, the cocaine trade also became a profitable enterprise for all the OCs, spawning the various cartels, from the Colombian to the Mexican ones, with smuggling routes into the United States and Canada through the Mexican border. A drug cartel is a specialized criminal organization – its operations revolve around drug trafficking operations. The term emerged when the large drug trafficking groups decided to collaborate in coordinating the production and distribution of drugs such as cocaine. Like any OC, the drug cartels have an internal structure as follows: 1 Drug lords. These are the capi, responsible for supervising the drug trafficking operations, appointing territorial leaders, making alliances, and planning assassinations. 2 Falcons. These are the foot soldiers, who, like real falcons, provide the “eyes and ears” of the streets – they are charged with supervising and reporting the counter-­activities of the police, the military, and rival groups. 3 Sicarios. These are the enforcers responsible for carrying out assassinations, thefts, kidnappings, and extortions, as well as defending their turf from rival groups and the authorities. 4 Lieutenants. These are responsible for supervising the sicarios and falcons, making sure they remain faithful to the cartel. They can carry out low-­ profile murders without permission from the drug lords.

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One of the best known and most infamous of all the cartels is the Sinaloa Cartel, established during the late 1980s in the city of Culiacán, Sinaloa, with operations in various Mexican states. According to US intelligence, the Sinaloa Cartel was once the most powerful drug trafficking organization in the world. Its original capo, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, became a celebrity, appearing on international newscasts and portrayed in movies and television programs. Several narcocorridos (narco ballads) glorifying the exploits of El Chapo and his organization were once popular. In 2017, Netflix and Univision co-produced the series El Chapo about his life; Netflix television has also produced the series Narcos: Mexico, which features the exploits of El Chapo.

El Chapo (b. 1957)

Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera is known as “El Chapo” (“shorty”), because of his small stature. He is one of the best known of all the Mexican drug lords and former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. He was raised in poverty, suffering physical abuse at the hands of his father, who was himself a drug trafficker and who introduced his son to the drug trade. Guzmán began working alongside of Héctor Luis Palma Salazar in the late 1970s in the cartel led by Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, alias “el padrino”, one of Mexico’s top drug lords at the time. After Gallardo was arrested for the homicide of Enrique Camarera, “el kiki,” an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Guzmán took over the reins of power. Guzmán used long-range tunnels near the American border,

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allowing him to export more drugs to the United States than any other drug lord in history, bringing him enormous wealth, power, and celebrity status. After several arrests and escapes, he was finally recaptured in 2016. In 2019, he was found guilty and sent to prison for life.

Drug trafficking as a source of money, power, and control has spread throughout the criminal world, spawning all kinds of new OCs throughout the globe, including such places as Nigeria, where criminal gangs dealing drugs in several major urban areas started appearing in the 1980s. Some of these have evolved into major transnational gangs, operating in countries across the world. They are among the most aggressive and expansionist criminal organizations, having become major drug trafficking gangs. They are also adept at committing financial and identity fraud globally, which now complement their drug trafficking activities. Clever money laundering techniques have also allowed them to thrive. The lucrative success that OCs have gained from drug trafficking has translated into a new and powerful type of criminal activity – narcoterrorism, defined as operations involving terrorism that are associated with the illegal drug trade. The violence and drug-­dealing operations of Pablo Escobar, for instance, constitute one of the most infamous and best-­documented examples of narcoterrorism.

Pablo Escobar (1949–1993)

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Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria was a Colombian drug lord, named the “king of cocaine,” and considered one of the first narcoterrorists. He founded and became leader of the Medellín Cartel in 1976, amassing a fortune through the drug trade, establishing smuggling routes from Colombia into the United States in the 1980s. His success led to brutal wars among rival cartels, leading to the murders of police officers, judges, and politicians. The degree of corruption was so high, and so well hidden, that in 1982 Escobar was elected as an alternate member of the Chamber of Representatives. He did become an integral part of government even after the director of the newspaper El Espectador discovered his criminal background and published it in the newspaper. For this, the journalist paid with his life on December 17, 1986. This setback notwithstanding, Escobar became involved in various community projects, which gained him popularity among the local citizenry, transforming him into a Robin-­Hood figure. In 1991, Escobar was imprisoned in a self-­built enclosure from which he easily escaped, leading to a manhunt, which ended when he was killed in his hometown of Medellín in a shootout with the police. In Colombia, he has remained a controversial figure, an outlaw comparable to Salvatore Giuliano in Italy (Chapter 6), given his work with helping poor people during his time as a politician. Escobar’s private estate has even been turned into a theme park. And his life has been mythologized in various media, including film and music.

Escobar not only built a powerful drug cartel per se, he turned it into a paramilitary group to terrorize officials, victims, and rival gangs. Similarly, El Chapo and his cartel engaged in military-­style terrorism, brutally murdering enemies and authority figures. The drug cartel world is different from the traditional OC one based on honor codes – it is a world based on the enactment of terrorism via paramilitary gangs and the unscrupulous manipulation of citizens and officials. While the illegal alcohol trade spawned Cosa Nostra in the United States during Prohibition, the illegal drug trade created the drug cartels. Today the two worlds – the traditional OCs and the drug cartels – are forming dangerous alliances, making narcoterrorism a global threat.

Transnational organized crime Today, goods and services that have traditionally been localized within one country are now manufactured and distributed across nations, enlarging markets and enhancing profits for all concerned. This state of affairs, called a global economy, has not escaped the attention of the OCs, leading to the formation of international crime groups to coordinate their efforts to maximize operations

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and profits. Transnational organized crime, as it is now called, is a fearsome new criminal structure uniting different OCs into a criminal network of activities coordinated across national borders, using the Internet, and especially the Dark Net, to plan and execute their illegal business ventures. Throughout the twentieth century, the most prominent revenue sources for organized crime were extortion, gambling, prostitution, loansharking, drug trafficking, and racketeering. These were typically localized within countries and even within regions and territories. With the advent of the global economy, this state of affairs has changed, with more and more OCs forging mergers with each other to run their operations across the globe, opening up new sources of income, such as rackets involving video gaming and lottery machine gambling. What makes TOCs particularly dangerous is that they operate irrespective of geography. This shift in operations has somewhat weakened the traditional criminal organizational structures. There is no central hub of power around which TOC groups revolve – they are more likely to form small networks and cells, rather than clans and identifiable groups; there are also no ethnic criteria for membership, given the globality of operations, which are broad and extensive, including drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, firearms trading, online gambling, counterfeit goods, and wildlife and cultural property smuggling, among many others. The vast sums of money that these generate are undermining some legitimate economies and are having a direct negative impact on politics, since TOCs are able to target victims and execute their schemes from anywhere in the world, utilizing new digital technologies to execute many of their illicit activities (see Chapter 15). Technology also enables TOC groups to engage in traditional criminal operations, such as illegal gambling, but with a greater reach and efficacy than ever before, thus expanding the impact of their racketeering operations across the world. For example, art or culture theft has become a major enterprise, including theft of individual artworks, illegal export of artifacts protected by international laws, and the pillaging of archaeological sites. Widespread cargo theft is another new source of illegal income, which itself has generated all kinds of related criminal activities, from kidnapping and motor vehicle theft to internationally planned and executed homicides.

Examples of transnational organized crime groups Nigerian African TOC groups emerged in the 1980s after economic globalization, enabling local crime groups to branch out and target victims across the globe and develop criminal networks within more prosperous countries

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and regions. Nigerian criminal operations are the most significant of these groups and are now active in more than eighty countries, being engaged primarily in drug trafficking and financial fraud schemes. They do not operate under the traditional OC systems of organization or codes – the Internet has virtually rendered these obsolete for neophyte gangs.

Balkan Balkan TOC groups are based in Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and other Balkan countries. These groups are highly adept at using new technologies, expanding their criminal base through cyber-­ fraud schemes, identity theft, real estate fraud, and drug trafficking. The enormous profits acquired from these activities have allowed the gangs to influence the democratic institutions in their countries, creating Mafia states throughout the region.

Middle Eastern Middle Eastern TOCs cover a vast territory in the Middle East. Like other TOCs, they engage in theft, fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, and smuggling of all kinds. They often enter into joint criminal ventures with one another, across ethnic lines, ignoring age-­old animosities for the sake of profit. Narcotics is of primary importance – for example, Lebanese “brokers” are responsible for accounting practices related to narcotics trafficking in Colombia, recycling the illegally obtained funds.

Asian Asian TOC groups cover a vast territory that includes China, Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. They rely on extensive networks of criminal associates. They typically have many technological skills, allowing them to adapt easily to the globalized world. Their criminal enterprises include extortion and drug trafficking at transnational levels, alongside new activities such as smuggling aliens and various cybercrimes. Many have commercialized their criminal activities and are now business firms of various sizes.

Eurasian Eurasian TOC groups are politically and financially based in former Soviet Union countries. The Vory v Zakone are now involved with other Eurasian crime networks or cells, each with a specific responsibility.

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This allows the cells to operate independently and to limit contact with members, thus shielding themselves from police detection. The groups engage in a plethora of criminal activities, from fraud to drug trafficking, extortion, and murder for hire.

Traditional Mafias The traditional Mafias, such the ’Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra, have retained their traditional identities as much as possible. They too have developed expertise in technology and have formed alliances with various other global crime networks. In this way, they have kept their roots intact, geographically and symbolically, at the same time that they have taken advantage of the globalization of crime.

Needless to say, a mainstay activity for all the TOCs is drug trafficking across international borders. As Bagley (2012) has amply documented, there are several reasons why drug trafficking is the primary activity behind the spread of TOCs; but the most common one is the upsurge in drug consumption across the Americas and the “dispersion and fragmentation of organized criminal groups or networks within countries and across sub-­regions” (Bagley 2012: 1). As the drug of choice changes, from cocaine and heroin to opioids, for example, the TOC distribution system adapts accordingly to provide the product of choice. As long as there is demand for these drugs, criminal organizations will do whatever it takes to supply them. Another major reason is the entrenchment of criminal organizations within certain states. An example of this is Mexico, which has witnessed the development of multiple new criminal organizations to take advantage of the void left after crackdowns in Tijuana and Juárez, two of the country’s largest cartel areas (Bagley 2012: 8). Similarly, Colombia has seen the rise and dispersion of several small organizations that took charge of the drug market following the collapse of some of the nation’s leading cartels. In February of 2011, a website called the Silk Road became the first indication of how the phenomenon of TOCs was evolving. It was the first illegal drug market on the Dark Net (Chapter  15). Online users could browse it anonymously and securely without potential monitoring. It facilitated drug trafficking globally. Once on the website, the drugs were purchased using cryptocurrency which was almost untraceable. In October of 2013, the website was shut down, but this did not signal the end of online drug trafficking. Other sites that offered the same services and products quickly replaced it (Barratt, Ferris and Winstock 2014). This does not mean that the drug trafficking business is now solely online. In Canada, Montreal is still an important geographical location for drug trafficking due to its ideal location. It has a large port of entry

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situated on the Saint Lawrence Seaway, as well as being a short drive to the New York State border. As a result, drugs can be imported and exported quite easily from there to the United States. Containers arrive via the Saint Lawrence Seaway and are transferred across the border to New York into Indigenous reserves like the Saint Regis Mohawk Nations. Once they have reached the border, drug traffickers use numerous methods to get across, including bribing officials, using boats in the summer, and driving across on skidoos in the winter (Revels and Cummings 2014). Crossing borders is now possible through air, rail, road, water, or on foot. Many land borders are not properly monitored at all locations, making the transport of illegal goods easier to carry out. Shiploads of containers are inspected upon arrival, but each individual container cannot be monitored and as a result may can contain the illegal goods. The organized crime group facilitating the transport may form agreements with the handlers or officials at the receiving port or with the captains and sailors of the ship. Many people must be involved to ensure the smooth distribution of criminal goods and services. So, corruption continues to be the major tactic; without it, even TOCs would eventually dissipate. As technology continues to advance, criminal organizations will continue to become stronger and smarter, changing the face of organized crime itself. The convergence of communications systems through the Internet has led to the crystallization of Internet-­based criminal lifestyles, careers, and gangs. This is leading to the erosion of traditional distinctions among the Mafias and to a globalization of criminality, as will be discussed subsequently.

References Bagley, Bruce (2012). Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty First Century. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. www. wilsoncenter.org/publication/drug-­trafficking-­and-­organized-­crime-­the-­americas-­ major-­trends-­the-­twenty-­first-­century. Barratt, Monica J., Ferris, Jason A. and Winstock, Adam R. (2014). Use of Silk Road, the Online Drug Marketplace, in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. Addiction 109: 774–783. Hill, Declan (2008). The Fix: Soccer and Organized Crime. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Moore, Robin (1969). The French Connection. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company. Revels, Asa and Cummings, Janet (2014). The Impact of Drug Trafficking on American Indian Reservations with International Boundaries. The American Indian Quarterly 38: 287–318.

Chapter 11

Strategic violence

Introduction Power, territorial control, and money are the primary objectives of all OCs (Chapter 1) – it is difficult to say which of these is more important or critical, since they are all interrelated. To ensure that these are realizable, they share one overarching method – actual physical acts of violence and, more significantly, the threat of violence, or strategic (psychological) violence. Random physical acts of violence are rarely sanctioned by the established gangs, since it brings too much public attention to them. It is the sporadic (and even neophyte) street gangs who use physical violence habitually and randomly, settling scores with rival gangs or perpetrating crimes in an ad hoc fashion. The successful organized criminals do not have to use violence in an open, arbitrary way. The promise of violence is sufficient, because their every word carries an implied threat. Public displays of violence are not condoned by the traditional Mafias, unless they are designed to send specific kinds of messages, such as warnings to other gangsters or to noncompliant victims of extortion. The Mafia prefers to run its business nonviolently, if at all possible. This was actually brought out by a comment made by Virgil “The Turk” Sollozzo to Tom Hagen, a consigliere in the fictional Corleone family in The Godfather (1972): “I don’t like violence, Tom. I’m a businessman. Blood is a big expense.” The threat of violence is a key strategy that keeps people in fear, giving the mobsters power to control others through intimidation. And when actual physical violence is perpetrated, it is never random but strategic, that is, carefully designed to serve a particular purpose. Strategic violence is, in fact, a distinguishing feature of the traditional OCs, suggesting a general principle – the less organized the group, the more it resorts to random violence; the more organized, the less the need for physical violence. This chapter deals with strategic violence, a modus operandi of all the traditional OCs. It also looks at the use of symbolism in actual acts of violence and at the nature of revenge killings (RKs) in crime families. The movie A History of Violence (2005), directed by David Cronenberg, is a filmic essay on the bio-­social roots of violence. It argues, above all else, that violence will

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disrupt people’s lives indelibly, changing them forever. One never forgets an act of violence against oneself – it lingers throughout life, festering feelings of revenge or vindication, which can rarely be forgotten. Whatever the source of violence, the point is that the Mafias understand that it is effective as a strategy, being connected to fear, which is what the gangs aim to evoke in order to keep both internal members in line and outsiders in dread of some form of violence against them for not obeying their demands. To reiterate, the traditional Mafias shun the use of overt violence, since they can use threats more effectively. Moreover, they are also much more apt to get their way through corruption methods, which, as discussed several times, have allowed them to surreptitiously become part of the political and social systems of many countries. So, violence can be said to be an option, not a systematic tactic, used primarily as a means of seeking retribution to preserve honor and as a last means to make good on threats in a public fashion.

Strategic violence Murder carried out by such groups as the Yakuza or the Sicilian Mafia is rarely, if ever, an act of unplanned or random violence. When it is performed, it has a specific reason behind it – it might be carried out as part of honor restoration, it might be an intimidation tactic, or it might be part of a military-­like operation against rivals or authorities. As such, it has strategic and symbolic importance. The actual physical perpetration of the killing is carried out by the enforcers of the gangs, although it is occasionally farmed out to so-­called hired guns. This type of “performance violence,” as it can be called, allows the OCs to maintain their image as an undefeatable force. It is carried out as a kind of self-­fulfilling prophecy, whereby the mere expectation of violence induces people to align their behavior to that expected by the gangs accordingly. The only exception to this is the allowance (and even expectation) of revenge killings over disputes, offenses against members, and so on. The rise of the various Mafias in the nineteenth century was made possible by a combination of political corruption and violence. Over the years, the former has become more critical than the latter. A pivotal trial in Rome in 2015, called the Mafia Capitale, highlighted this radical tactical change in the operations of the Mafia. It was the culmination of one of the biggest investigations into organized crime in Rome’s modern history, involving forty-­six defendants. Two of the defendants were Massimo Carminati, who was the alleged organizer of a gang called the Banda della Magliana (based in Rome, founded in 1975), accused of infiltrating city hall, and his aide Salvatore Buzzi, a convicted murderer. Both were charged with the crime of controlling the criminal operation, which prosecutors maintained represented a new type of Mafia in Italy that was based on corruption, on a broad scale of political control over public contracts, making violence less crucial as a strategy of control for the Mafiosi. Nevertheless, the trial made it clear that without the threat of

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violence, the corruption methods would themselves fade, since corrupt individuals will respond not only to bribery but also to the menace of losing their lives if they do not comply or if they snitch on the gangsters. It was during Prohibition that brutal violence came to the forefront as a strategy of the Mafia, with turf wars among the gangsters being fought with guns and knives. Perhaps the best known of all these was the so-­called St. Valentine’s Day Massacre on Valentine’s Day in 1929, when seven members and associates of Chicago’s North Side Gang, who had met at a garage, were lined up against a wall and assassinated by four unknown assailants who were dressed to impersonate police officers. The incident was connected to the bootlegging turf wars during Prohibition, pitting the Irish North Siders, led by George “Bugs” Moran, against the South Side Gang, led by Al Capone. The perpetrators have never been conclusively identified, but it is widely assumed that Capone was the mastermind behind it (Helmer and Bilek 2004). The event has since been enshrined in the popular imagination by movies and other media. The 1932 film Scarface, loosely based on the life of Al Capone, is one of the first movies to deal with the massacre dramatically. Other films followed, including Some Like It Hot, a 1959 comedy which revolves around the main characters who are on the run after witnessing the massacre. Because of the popular representations of Mafia violence, it has become itself a kind of popular mythology about the brutality of the wise guys themselves, even though today they are more inclined to conduct their affairs without actual violence, using it only as a last option. The massacre has even entered the archives of criminology and anthropology as a significant event. The National Museum of Crime and Punishment now has on display a brick from the event that is riddled with bullet holes, constituting a symbolic memorandum of the violent scene. The sense of belonging and self-­worth that comes with joining a criminal gang exceeds the desire for wealth, as discussed several times. Mafia fugitives could enjoy a life of luxury, leaving the gang whenever an opportunity presented itself, especially as they become older and thus able to negotiate a separation pact without losing their lives. Instead, they remain, even if it means being hunted down and in danger of being arrested or killed by internal betrayers, the police, or other gangsters. They do so not because of money but in order to retain their sense of control and power. “Being someone” is a more compelling incentive than any amount of money. The Mafia is a power trip, as the character Rico Bandello in Little Caesar (1931) emphasized repeatedly in the movie. His ambition to be a fearless and fear-­mongering mobster encapsulates the Mafia ethos perfectly. At one point he articulates this as follows, talking to his friend, Joe Massara: I could do all the things that fella does, and more, only I never got my chance. Why, what’s there to be afraid of? And when I get in a tight spot, I shoot my way out of it. Why sure. Shoot first and argue afterwards. You know, this game ain’t for guys that’s soft!

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Joe wants to be a dancer, instead, so that he may pursue a career that might eventually make him wealthy. Rico is incredulous, emphasizing that money is not the main goal of being a wise guy, as the following dialogue between the two reveals, indicating that he is prepared to go anywhere to become a made man (in this case, it is “East”): RICO:   Yeah,

money’s all right, but it ain’t everything. Yeah, I’ll be somebody. Look hard at a bunch of guys and know that they’ll do anything you tell ‘em. Have your own way or nothin’. Be somebody. JOE:   You’ll get there, Rico, you’ll show ‘em. RICO:   Joe? This was our last stand in this burg. We’re pullin’ out. JOE:   Where are we goin’? RICO:   East! (He gestures toward the newspaper story). Where things break big! After the two arrive in the big city – never identified – Rico goes to the Club Palermo to speak to mobster chief Sam Vettori, imploring Vettori to allow him to become a member of the gang: “You won’t be sorry for lettin’ me in, Mr. Vettori. I’ll shoot square with ya. I’ll do anything you say. I ain’t afraid of nothin’. There’s nothin’ soft about me. Nothin’ yella. I don’t quit.” Rico is hired on the spot: “All right,” says Vettori, “you stick around, but remember, I’m the boss and I give all the orders. And when we split, we split my way, and no squawks, you get me?” The sense of empowerment that Rico feels by becoming a gangster is emblematic of the pride and sense of masculine power of the real Mafiosi. It is rare for Mafiosi to use actual violence; when they do, it is an act of power, ensuring the efficacy of future intimidations. So they use threatening physical contacts, menacing glares, emotional manipulation, verbal abuse, and so on. Alliances with other criminal groups are also forged to consolidate power, even though such alliances are contrary to the origins of criminal societies, as discussed in Chapter 10. A victim who does not see a way of escaping the threat will normally cede to it. The traditional source of revenue for the traditional Mafias has been extortion, as discussed. Today, it is narcotics trafficking, which provides them with a huge source of income (Chapter 10). This line of criminal business requires cooperation. So, logically, the traditional Mafias have established relationships with other criminal gangs, such as the drug cartels, closing a convenient eye to their violent methods. However, even in such situations, violence has become less and less of an option, starting in the period after the French Connection case (Chapter 10). For example, in November of 1989, the individuals in Miami linked to the Mafia were indicted for shipping cocaine by train and car from Miami to Philadelphia and New York City. Among those charged were a member of the Sicilian Mafiosi and Barranquilla drug cartel members. In 2008, a joint Italian, Mexican, and American investigative team uncovered a link between the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta and the Mexican Gulf Cartel, leading

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to the arrest of 507 individuals, the seizure of over 60 million dollars in US currency, and large amounts of cocaine, heroin, and other narcotics. Interestingly, there was little violence enacted in the two collaborative efforts mentioned, since the gangsters needed to cooperate with each other to maximize the income from the drugs, and the victims were willing clients, not victims of strongarm tactics. These cases made it obvious that the principle of living by the sword was anachronistic. Rather than living by the sword, the more appropriate aphorism would be living by intimidation. Along with corruption activities, as revealed by the Mafia Capitale trial, allegiances are leading to a general reassessment of the role of violence in Mafia culture. With income accumulating through online venues, and through inter-­ criminal alliances of all kinds, violence is not only less important, it may even be counterproductive. As the fictitious Don Corleone of Godfather (1972) fame put it: “A lawyer with his briefcase can steal more than a hundred men with guns.” The Don also suggests throughout the movie that the methods of the Mafia are more honorable than those of mainstream society, including the use of violence when and if it is needed. As he puts it in one scene: “I don’t trust society to protect us. I have no intention of placing my fate in the hands of men whose only qualification is that they managed to con a block of people to vote for them.” In Italy, corruption methods gained momentum after World War II, when the Mafiosi formed secret alliances with leading political figures in the Christian Democratic Party – the dominant political party in Italy for four decades following the war. With support at the highest echelons of the government, the different Mafias were able to expand their criminal control over the entire country. As Michael Woodiwiss (2001: 62) observes, this system of una mano lava l’altra (“one hands washes the other”) was of great mutual benefit to both parties: Gangsters and the operators of illegal business helped win elections as campaign workers or financial contributors, or they helped to steal elections using fraud or intimidation. In return politicians used their direct or indirect influence over the police and the courts to provide virtual immunity for favoured criminals, particularly those who ran or protected gambling or prostitution enterprises, and even to eliminate petty potential rivals to established entrepreneurs. It was not until the Mafiosi overreached their boundaries in the 1990s that the judicial system found the nerve and courage to crack down on the Mafia’s massive influence over the entire Italian Peninsula. The Mafia had declared in that decade an open war on the Italian state, through a series of car bombings of Italian political figures. It had become an ersatz terrorist organization. The outrage from the public forced the government to lend concrete support to honest, crusading anti-­Mafia judges and officials. Trials followed that momentarily curtailed the Mafias and, more significantly, brought down the Christian

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Democratic Party, leading to an overhaul of the entire political party system (as discussed previously). The Mafiosi have always deployed accomplices – bankers, white-­collar workers, police, and so on – to enhance their perpetuity, seeing them as just as effective, if not more so, than methods of violence. This strategy has allowed OCs to protect themselves from law enforcement and to institutionalize themselves socially. The main regional body of the ’Ndrangheta, for example, is the one that decides if violence should be used, regulating the use of violence both in Calabria and outside. As Sergi and Lavorgna (2016: 67) observe, this has made the ’Ndrangheta both “static and dynamic.” The latter term alludes to the international activities and colonization of new places that the ’Ndrangheta now engages in through the Internet; the former refers to the fact that the organizational hub of the gang remains in Calabria. The same pattern applies to virtually all the traditional OCs – they are both static and dynamic and thus capable of adapting and taking advantage of political, social, and technological changes while retaining identity and their overall system of behavior and lifestyle.

The gray zone The amalgam of strategic violence and corruption allows the Mafias to insert themselves into legitimate society – a situation that is sometimes characterized colloquially as a “gray zone”  – a term introduced by the writer Primo Levi in his collection of essays, I sommersi e i salvati (1986, “The Drowned and the Saved”), in which he describes his experiences as a Holocaust survivor. Levi employed the expression, “gray zone,” to refer to the area of moral conscience that made it difficult to distinguish between prisoners who helped the Nazis in order to save themselves from prisoners who instead silently suffered atrocities at their hands. In the case of mobsters, the gray zone is, by extension, an intermediate area of conscience that envisions different types of criminal activities not in terms of black and white but in many shades of gray. In that zone, violence is one of those shades and can easily be brought into the light if the conditions require it. The two main reasons for this are restoration of honor and retaliation. According to the code of omertà, a made man must defend his honor and that of his family, no matter what personal consequences he might incur – it is part of cavalleria rusticana. In real chivalric times, the appropriate action for restoring lost honor was the duel or some other form of vengeful retribution involving physical conflict – a tradition that the Mafiosi see as part of their own heritage. But outside of such pseudo-­chivalric forms of violent retribution, violence has become less and less of a viable method for the Mafias. One plausible reason: it is needed less today than in the past is because of the adaptability of the gangs. As Lunde (2004: 8) points out, Attempts by law enforcement and other agencies to provide a single definition of organized crime have been confounded by the fact that the activities

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of the criminal underworld are, by their nature, kaleidoscopic, constantly responding to shifts in market conditions and exploiting the myriad money-­making opportunities provided by the legitimate overworld. Another factor is the advent of the Internet and transnational organized criminality (Chapter  10). Criminal cultures are no longer limited to having their operational base in their countries of origin; they have found new locales in cyberspace; as a consequence, they require violence much less to settle scores that were tied to local disputes or even to carry out strongarm tactics for purposes of extortion. But this is a two-­edged sword for the organizations. Their strength has always been a claim to cultural authenticity and historical lineage. In cyberspace, they risk losing this crucial component of identity-­making. As they become more technologically sophisticated, they risk morphing into anonymous criminal gangs. The claim to distinctiveness is at risk, especially if the gang loses its mystique. The world of transnational criminality is not as dependent on the historical mythologies and codes of the gangsters, making the gray zone a broad one indeed – a zone where laws and norms are seen as irrelevant by the Mafiosi, or at least as relativistic options. History is being rewritten daily on the computer screen, which is changing how we experience criminality. The Vory v Zakone and outlaw motorcycle gangs are gaining more and more of a stake in the criminal universe because they are not tied to arcane and anachronistic views of their origins. But the traditional Mafias have taken notice, being adaptable organizations, using technology in advantageous ways themselves. Ironically, when Pasquale Manfredi, a wanted ’Ndrangheta boss and one of the most wanted of all Italian criminals, was arrested in 2010, the police were able to track him down through his Facebook account, registered under the handle of Scarface – the famous nickname of Al Capone, which he had ostentatiously adopted for himself. He was caught because of vanity, not because of some criminal act. This is the reality in which everyone lives today. Actually, as Lunde (2004: 51) observes, the seeds for change were planted in the 1960s – the era of the French Connection – when the Mafias realized that the time for radical change had come upon them, leaving behind previous moral ideas in the gray zone: Until the 1940s and 1950s organized crime, in the main, did not include drug running in its activities because it was considered morally unacceptable. However, from the 1960s, organized crime became very much involved in the trade of illicit narcotics. Similarly, until relatively recently, many of the organized crime bosses refused to get involved in the trade of pornography. This situation is now changing, as they begin to see the massive profits that such operations can realize. As discussed previously, the Mafia already knew in the 1950s that they would survive by moving away from their antiquated patriarchal models of self-­styled

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morality. It was on October 12, 1957, at a meeting of bosses from the Sicilian Mafia and the American Cosa Nostra at the Grand Hotel des Palmes in Palermo, that the gray zone was finally implanted into Mafia culture. It was Lucky Luciano who had organized the meeting. The agenda was to coordinate a move into the international narcotics trade, which was a growing market at the time, and this required collaboration with the authorities and outsiders in a new, updated way. Although the Mafia clans on both sides of the Atlantic were traditionally opposed to drug trafficking as a legitimate enterprise, given the code of omertà, they gradually gave in, allowing profit to override honor. Hypocrisy is clearly rampant among thieves. The Mafia is no exception. Luciano got around the honor code by simply suggesting that it needed an updated interpretation. He negotiated a conglomerate of over 150 clans who agreed to the new narcotics enterprise, calling it La Cupola, headed by “Little Bird” Greco and twelve members. The Cupola thrived. But eventually, it was brought down, ironically, by an internecine conflict over the traditional principles of the code. It became clear, however, that Mafia culture was changing, moving away from its cavalleria rusticana worldview to more urbanized views of itself. Eventually the drug traffickers won out, under the leadership of Salvatore “Totò” Riina, who brutally eliminated those opposed to the new criminal paradigm, relying once again on physical violence – a fact that eventually led to his capture, since the actions fell outside the gray zone, becoming conspicuous to the authorities. As Reynolds (2006: 173) notes, this period traced “the fall of one of the world’s most powerful secret societies from a zenith of authority and dominance down to a band of disorganized thugs, many of whose exploits would be humorous if they were not so deadly.”

Revenge killing In the gray zone, there is one principle of violence that persists even as the world is changing for the Mafiosi. That principle was once called vendetta – a revenge killing defined as a part of a blood feud in which the family of a murdered person seeks vengeance on the murderer and his family. A Mafia revenge killing is enacted on anyone within the clan who betrays or dishonors the clan, or else on any outsider who dishonors the clan or one of its high-­ranking members in some overt way. The RK allows the clan to maintain its ideal of honor and respect, which the Mafia (falsely) claims is embedded in the cultural heritage of Sicily. RKs cannot, however, be carried out in the form of brutal revenges. They are to be performed according to the norms of chivalry as spelled out by the code of omertà. In any RK, a Mafioso must show emotional control – never brutishness or vulgarity. The RK resonates with a biblical “eye for an eye” nuance. Also, as a form of justice in many rural cultures to this day, the RK serves as a method to punish crimes wherever governments are greatly distrusted. In the case of a blood feud, the clan of the murdered individual must seek vengeance on the

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murderer or on the killer’s family. In effect, RKs, silence, and honor all converge in the code of omertà, imbuing it with chivalric overtones. RK is not common revenge; it is an honorable enactment of murder to avenge a dishonor or betrayal. How it works and why it is so deeply embedded in Mafia culture is explained insightfully by the Sicilian novelist Leonardo Sciascia in his mystery novel Il giorno della civetta (1961, “The Day of the Owl”), which is a fictional treatment of the RK in all its horror and symbolism. The historical subtext of the Mafia’s rustic code of honor is a longing for justice, which never came to Sicily from the corrupt Italian governments of the past. Sciascia understood this unique Sicilian experience, as a Sicilian himself, which is enmeshed in a deep sense of family (Sciascia 1961): The only institution in the Sicilian conscience that really counts is the family; counts, that is to say, more as a dramatic juridical contract or bond than as a natural association based on affection. The family is the Sicilians’ State. The State, as it is for us, is extraneous to them, merely a de facto entity based on force; an entity imposing taxes, military service, war, police. Within the family institution the Sicilian can cross the frontier of his own natural tragic solitude and fit into a communal life where relationships are governed by hair-­splitting contractual ties. To ask him to cross the frontier between family and State would be too much. In imagination he may be carried away by the idea of the State and may even rise to being Prime Minister; but the precise and definite code of his rights and duties will remain within the family, whence the step towards victorious solitude is shorter.

The Day of the Owl, by Leonardo Sciascia (1921–1989) This novel, published in 1961, was set in early 1940s Sicily. It revolves around the problems that one policeman, captain Bellodi, faces when he tries to investigate a crime – an investigation blocked by the Mafia, which has infiltrated every sector of Sicilian society and which has imposed silence on everyone through strategic violence. The plot begins when a man in a dark suit is gunned down in broad daylight as he runs to get a bus. When those present at the scene are interrogated, they all claim to not have seen anything. What follows is an investigation led by Bellodi, who is not Sicilian, described by Sciascia as follows: Captain Bellodi was by family tradition and personal conviction a republican, a soldier who followed what used to be called ‘the career

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of arms’ in a police force, with the dedication of a man who has played his part in a revolution and seen law created by it. This law, the law of the Republic, which safeguarded liberty and justice, he served and enforced. Bellodi heads up the Carabinieri (Italian military police). His pursuit of the truth is constantly blocked by the code of silence. So, unlike most crime thrillers, there is no solution to the crime or redemption at the end. The novel is an honest look at a society that is subjugated by a small gang of powerful and immoral men, who claim to live by a code of honor but who are nothing more than self-­serving scoundrels. Deadly RK warfare among gangs and clans was once a common occurrence as they vied for territorial control in order to carry out their criminal activities and, more importantly, to make a wrong right in terms of omertà. The threat of RK in no way deters Mafiosi from their activities and lifestyles; in fact, it fuels it. Membership in a clan is perceived as prestigious and even an obligatory coming-­of-­age rite for some young people in Sicily, Calabria, Naples, and in many American inner-­city districts, where RKs intended to avenge dishonors of various types are common occurrences. Glorified by movies, the prospect of RKs dupes many young people into believing that they too can avenge themselves against those who have shamed or dishonored them in public. Upholding honor through violence is part of a larger narrative, wherein murder becomes divine justice, violence sacred battle, and betrayal sacrilege. Without this implicit narrative, murder would just be gutless homicide and violence brutal savagery. A similar system of RKs is espoused by the Yakuza (Hill 2003). Japanese society places great value on conformity. A common Japanese proverb states that “The nail that sticks up must be hammered down.” Individualism generates suspicion. But acts of individualism also inspire silent admiration. This is why the Yakuza, which stubbornly refuses to fit into the traditional Japanese social mold, have secret admirers among the Japanese populace. Their individual acts of strength, based on the martial arts, are awe-­inspiring for many young people. As mentioned previously, the origin of the gang is traced to the early seventeenth century, when a group of “crazy men,” called the kabuki-­mono, purportedly engaged in criminal activities, standing out through odd clothing styles, bizarre haircuts, and violent behavior, which involved the use of long swords and highly skilled pugilism. The kabuki-­mono harassed and terrorized those living in their immediate milieu. They would use their swords to literally cut down anyone who went against them or even for the sheer pleasure of it. They also spoke a self-­made slang so that no one could listen in on their plans. They swore absolute loyalty to each other, protecting each other no matter what

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the circumstances, even going against their own families, if necessary. Having no established system of leadership, they eventually lost their ability to control people and thus started to wander nomadically around Japan as a band of thugs, pillaging villages and towns. Many historians believe that the Yakuza descended from this band of gangster-­warriors. Whatever the truth, it is clear that the samurai warrior image is a key one in keeping the Yakuza in the minds and hearts of many young people. The ability to enact violence through the martial arts is self-­empowering, especially when it is connected to the performance of honor RKs – at least in the movies.

The martial arts in Japan The origin of the Japanese martial arts is traced to the warrior traditions of the samurai during an era when use of weapons was illegal among common citizens. The samurai were proficient in the use of weapons but eventually became experts at unarmed combat. A number of schools emerged shortly after to teach these skills to the public. To this day, proficiency in the martial arts is felt to be part of a samurai tradition that is critical to the foundation of Japanese culture. One of the first treatises on the martial arts was The Book of Five Rings (Go Rin no Sho), written by the legendary Japanese swordsman Miyamoto Musashi around 1645. The book continues to attract a large readership of martial artists and people across Asia, who see it is a founding text. Musashi claimed that the true martial artist was a “no-­nonsense” man, who had no time for frivolities. He also remarked that showing off with technical flourishes is silly and counterproductive, since the techniques to be used should only be aimed at cutting down one’s opponent. The book is read extensively by Yakuza members today, who see the recreational martial arts as condescending to the historical importance of the samurai. It should be noted that the martial arts are based on the same mythology of the Yakuza.

Symbolic violence Marks left on dead bodies, indicating the nature of the victim’s injustice towards the clan, are symbols used in the enactment of violence of any type. Symbolic violence, as it can be called, includes not only signs left on or near the cadaver, but also menacing sguardi (“looks”), mosse (“gestures”), and other signature strategies, constituting a system of symbolic intimidation (Pantaleone 1970). Recall the kiss of death (il bacio della morte) symbol from Chapter  7, performed on the traitor Joe Valachi by Mafia boss Vito Genovese to symbolize

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the fact that he had been marked for death. Whether it was a fact of Mafia history or something invented by Valachi, it is now a cultural trope that appears in pop culture texts from time to time. A classic example is in the film The Valachi Papers (1972) when the character of Vito Genovese gives the kiss of death to Joe Valachi, informing him that his betrayal is known and that he will be executed. The exact origin of this symbol is unknown, but some historians see it as continuing the tradition of giving an assassin a kiss to empower him to execute a death going back to at least the early nineteenth century in Sicily (Sifakis 2005). The symbolism might also be read in broader cultural terms. In the gospels of Matthew and Mark, Judas betrayed Jesus with a kiss, suggesting that the Mafia kiss may be an allusion to this spiteful act of betrayal. Another well-­known Mafia violence symbol is the faccia tagliata (“the cut face”), which is a sign of infamy, deriving from the kind of punishment meted out by the religious Inquisitors to heretics. The former would literally slash the face of the latter to symbolically indicate that they were scarred morally. The “stone in the mouth” sign is also reminiscent of Inquisition symbolism, constituting a version of the mordacchia (a type of muzzle) used by the Inquisitors to punish blasphemers. Overall, such symbolism is meant to connect killings to a sanctimonious view of betrayal and dishonor. Recall the testimony of Salvatore D’Amico in the 1870s before a judge in Sicily accusing certain Mafiosi of having murdered his two sons which empasizes dramatically what symbolic Mafia justice is all about (cited in Nicaso and Danesi 2013): I will die at the hands of the Mafia because without doubt I will be killed. Neither you yourself, your authority, or the entire police force will be able to save me. A mother never forgives her dishonorable children. As mentioned previously, days after giving this testimony, D’Amico was found shot dead with a tappo (“cork”) in his mouth. The message was clear – from the mouth of a dishonorable man nothing should come out, not even his bad breath. In April of 1980, a Mafioso in Philadelphia, Antonio Caponigro, and his brother-­in-­law, Alfred Salerno, were brutally murdered in upstate New York. Salerno was shot three times behind the right ear and once behind the left ear. The killers then stuffed Caponigro’s rectum with $300. The symbolism was unmistakable – he was killed because of his greed. Similarly, in the 1990 murder of Bruno Facciolo, a Lucchese crime family member, he was found dead with a dead canary stuffed in his mouth – a symbol for snitching on the gang. The list of symbols is a vast one  – for example, the severed hand left on the chest denotes that the victim had stolen from an area that was under the control of a clan, the genitals hanging around the neck indicate that the victim had attempted to seduce the woman of a Mafioso while the latter was in jail, and the list could go on and on. Symbolic violence is widespread among all gangs, as can be seen in the types of graffiti used by street gangs, including the

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rest-­in-­peace symbols to memorialize dead gang members; cross-­outs, which involve the crossing out of a rival gang’s tag or symbol; and so on. Most of these are an invitation to conflict so as to rectify some perceived wrong. As the Mafia Capitale trial emphasized, criminal organizations still have the option of violence, but they use it only when necessary, and when they do, it invariably involves symbolism, which is the main topic of the next chapter.

References Helmer, William and Bilek, Arthur J. (2004). The St. Valentine’s Day Massacre: The Untold Story of the Bloodbath That Brought Down Al Capone. Nashville: Cumberland House. Hill, Peter (2003). The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levi, Primo (1986). I sommersi e i salvati. Torino: Einaudi. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Nicaso, Antonio and Danesi, Marcel (2013). Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Pantaleone, Michele (1970). Il sasso in bocca: Mafia e Cosa Nostra. Bologna: Cappelli. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Sciascia, Leonardo (1961). Il giorno della civetta. Torino: Einaudi. Sergi, Anna and Lavorgna, Anita (2016). ’Ndrangheta: The Global Dimensions of the Most Powerful Italian Mafia. London: Springer International Publishing. Sifakis, Carl (2005). Kiss of Death: Mafia Murder Signal. In: The Mafia Encyclopedia. New York: Facts on File. Woodiwiss, Michael (2001). Organized Crime and American Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Chapter 12

Symbols and myths

Introduction The symbols and made-­up stories that characterize criminal organizations are crucial to constructing their identity and to maintaining the mystique that they are “above” both the law and common street thugs – a theme that has been woven throughout this book. This chapter will look at the symbols and stories, both historically and anthropologically, including some of the symbols used in initiation rites and the thematic subtexts of the origin myths that define some of the traditional OCs. We have dealt with some of these in previous chapters under different rubrics. In this chapter, we will complete the discussion, tying up a few loose ends, in order to emphasize the importance of symbolism and mythic story-­telling in the constitution of organized crime groups. We can only be selective here, since the number of symbols and myths that every gang concocts would fill several large tomes. The selection is illustrative and tied to the overall theme of this book – namely that organized crime is based on culture-­constructing strategies, such as symbolism and narrative, that stand either in contrast to the mainstream culture or are derived from it in a twisted self-­serving way. Every nation and independent state needs a founding story and a set of specific symbols that allow it to demarcate a distinctive identity for itself and to connect its origins and evolution to the overall history of civilization. The traditional OCs tell origin stories, as we saw, in order to transform themselves from being perceived as mere gangs of thugs into historically valid parallel cultures, with a specific chivalric genealogy, imparting to its members a sense of belonging to something meaningful and thus producing internal cohesion and a sense of unique identity that allows the mobsters to set themselves markedly apart from the riff-­raff, which includes not only random gangs and street thugs but virtually everyone else. Most of the foundation stories revolve around a Robin-­Hood mythology, as we saw, whose underlying theme is that of a criminal or outcast stealing from the rich and giving to the poor. This mythic structure to most of the OC origin stories allows the members to justify their actions, which would otherwise be seen as part of random self-­serving

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violence, and present themselves publicly as legendary folk heroes, who are ipso facto servants of the people. From the Mafias to the Yakuza and the Triads, the Robin-­Hood principle is also embedded in an archetypal notion of rustic chivalry, as discussed in previous chapters – a chivalry that emanates not from the noble classes of the past but from the people, called cavalleria rusticana in Italian, which (as mentioned) is the relevant title of a famous novella by the Sicilian writer Giovanni Verga (1880) and an opera based on it by Pietro Mascagni (1890). The actual historical chivalric code emerged with the medieval Christian institution of knighthood between 1170 and 1220. It was designed not only for noble men but for noble women as well. It was popularized in medieval literature and ballads and by historiographies such as the one by Geoffrey of Monmouth, Historia Regum Britanniae, written in the 1130s, which popularized the legend of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table. The code of chivalry is actually older than this, traceable to the Carolingian Empire, applied to the cavalrymen in Charlemagne’s army – the term chivalry comes from French chevalerie, which meant “horse soldiery.” Over time, its meaning was refined to highlight social and moral virtues that every noble gentleman (and gentlewoman) should espouse. Its extension to the peasantry as a rustic code of ethics and conduct was largely a literary trope, gaining broad diffusion in the nineteenth century, when the Romantic writers saw it as a trait of rural individuals – hence the emergence of cavalleria rusticana.

Symbols Gang initiation rites are steeped in allegiance symbolism (Chapter 5). A new member shows allegiance to the clan and its leader by donning appropriate symbols (such as tattoos) and performing particular symbolic acts (such as taking oaths of loyalty and allegiance). He must also learn to use various signs, signals, and words so as to be able to communicate with the others with the type of language, verbal and nonverbal, that is meaningful and functional to the group. Blood is a key symbol in many initiation rites. As we saw, it must be shed over a religious icon in ’Ndrangheta initiation ceremonies; the exchange of sake cups in Yakuza initiation represents the metaphorical exchange of blood between the oyabun and the kobun, leader and follower; in the initiation ritual of the white supremacist Aryan Brotherhood, the new member must say out loud the motto “blood in, blood out” – a pledge meant to symbolize life-­long membership with no exit from the gang other than death, that is, other than by the shedding of blood. In all such cases, the idea is to produce an empathy of belonging that is etched in blood symbolism. Blood is connected to life and rebirth, as well as to family lineage (“related by blood,” “blood is thicker than water,” “bad blood”). The powerful symbolism

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of the family blood ties in Mafia culture is explained insightfully by Lunde as follows (2004: 55): In a world where power was arbitrary, safety lay in the family. The larger and more extended the kinship group, the more protected the individual, especially in a social system of vendettas, where honor demanded that no offense should be allowed to pass unavenged. An army of brothers and cousins was the best protection in an unjust world. Blood is also a religious symbol. This connection to religion, fictive (through the use of symbols and rituals) and non-­fictive (through actual adherence to real religious practices), allows the Mafias to insert themselves into the religious cultural substratum of southern Italy. This is seen in The Godfather films, as well as in the HBO series The Sopranos, with the many trips to Italian churches and places of worship that American mobsters take. In fiction and real life, the performance of religion is part of the code of omertà. There is one reference in the second Godfather (1974) movie to the Mafia being a 2000-­year-­old Italian secret religious society. This is, of course, fiction. But it is a convenient one for the real Mafia, allowing it to create a mystique for itself shrouded in religious symbolism. Mystique is central to all the traditional OCs. The film Yakuza (1975), which represents actual claims of the Yakuza, opens by informing the viewer that the Yakuza have been in Japan for over 350 years, abiding by a code of honor as rigorous as the samurai code of Bushido. Quotations from the Bible are found throughout the documents of the Italian criminal syndicates rounded up by the authorities. One criminal organization, the Sacra Corona Unita (“the United Sacred Rosary”), which (as mentioned) is based in the Puglia region, has even named itself after an important Catholic artifact, the sacra corona (“sacred rosary”), which will purportedly “unify” the members (unita) in a sacred way. Police raids of the homes of Mafiosi and Camorristi have uncovered religious icons and artifacts scattered throughout, revealing conspicuously that the Mafia views and presents itself as an honorable association based on faith and moral values. The deliberate connection to religion is also evident in the fact that many vendettas and murders are planned to coincide with religious feasts or on sacred sites and places (cemeteries, sanctuaries, and the like). The history of Mafia-­Church relations is an ambiguous one. Being the center of social activities in villages and rural areas in the past, a tacit acceptance of clan members, who attended Church services regularly, was a practical reality. In the last few years, all this has changed, not only because the Church is no longer the center of social life but also because in many regions, parishes have joined in on the anti-­Mafia sentiment, starting around 1993 when the late Pope John Paul II addressed the Mafiosi while visiting Agrigento in Sicily, imploring them publicly to abandon their criminal ways. In 2009, however, the Church rescinded somewhat, proclaiming that there was no need to excommunicate

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alleged members of the Mafia, because their criminal activities in themselves put them automatically outside the Church. The Church is ultimately powerless in excluding the Mafiosi from attendance and devotion, because of its theology of forgiveness. The recent public condemnation of the Mafia by Pope Francis has changed some of the old rules on the surface, but there is little real change occurring in the villages where the Mafiosi reign supreme and where religion is a mainstay of the local culture. When allegiance is broken, some OCs allow for a symbolic repair. An example is the practice of yubitsume of Yakuza culture, which, as mentioned previously, is the cutting of the little finger’s joint, as a symbolic form of apology by a Yakuza member who displeased or defied the boss – highlighted in the first Kill Bill (2003) film by director Quentin Tarantino. This involves cutting off the top joint of the left pinkie finger in order to present it to the boss; if it is decided that there were additional wrongdoings then the member will have to cut off further finger joints. If the boss accepts the finger as a form of apology, the ritual is completed, but if not, a death sentence to the offender would ensue. In Japan to this day, if someone is seen with a shortened finger, it is assumed that he is a member of the Yakuza. Colors and numbers are also allegiance symbols, especially in street gangs, as the following sidebar illustrates.

Gang symbols Colors, letters, and numbers are key street gang symbols. The following are some examples. •

The Sureños gang based in California favors blue or gray sport clothing so as to align themselves with local sport culture, such as the colors worn by the Los Angeles Lakers. • The Sureños use the number thirteen because the letter M is the thirteenth letter of the alphabet, signifying La Eme or “The M” in Spanish, which represents their association with the Mexican gang (Chapter 5). The symbols for their tattoos include XIII, X3, 13, Sur 13, and others, which constitute versions of the number thirteen. • Another California street gang, called the Norteños, Northerners, or Nuestra Familia (“Our Family”), which is a bitter rival of the Sureños due to a split between members in the 1960s, uses the color red to differentiate itself from the Sureños, including red belts, red shoes, and red shoelaces. The Norteños also use the number fourteen to distinguish themselves from the Sureños, who (as mentioned) use the number thirteen symbolically.

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•

•

The number thirteen is also used by the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-­13), an international gang based in Los Angeles, standing for the thirteenth letter of the alphabet (“M”); the gang also has an extensive system of hand signals – an example is the “devil’s head” as a greeting sign, likely adopted from the heavy metal bands who use it as part of their concert performances. The number twelve is associated with the Aryan Brotherhood, AB, with the digit 1 symbolizing the letter A, the first letter of the alphabet and the digit 2 standing for B, the second. The members mark themselves with distinctive tattoos, based on symbols such as “AB,” Nazi swastikas, and various other white power symbols.

In a phrase, the symbolism imprinted in clothing, color, tattoos, and other signs is emotionally powerful for the street gangs, as the following list illustrates: •

•

• • •

Graffiti. Graffiti symbols are used to declare allegiance to the gang or to convey identity, including the gang’s name, member nicknames, threat signs, images of criminal acts in which the gang has been involved, and so on. Graffiti are also used to mark turf or to advertise the gang’s power. The color of the graffiti might also be used to identify a gang. As discussed in the sidebar previously, a red color may show that the Norteño gang is present in the area; similarly, the number thirteen might refer to the MS-­13 gang announcing its presence in the area. Attire. As discussed in Chapter  7, dress codes are symbolic systems. So, street gang members will adopt a common uniform that identifies them as a distinct group, including T-­shirts, thin belts, baggy pants, cap or hoodies, and bandanas tied around the forehead. Color is also involved in the code, as discussed in the sidebar previously  – that is, the gangs might impose the wearing of specific types or brands of shoes, pants, and shirts. Gang symbols are often sewn into jackets. Belt buckles or key chains with gang initials are also part of the attire of some gangs. Cosmetics. Female gang members might wear heavy eye make-­up, dark lipstick, fingernails painted a certain color that is indicative of the gang’s identity, and so on. Hairstyle. Hairstyles can range from shaved heads, which is typical of white supremacist gangs, to the slicked-­down hair that was used by Cosa Nostra gangsters of the past to fit in a with a celebrity-­style look. Jewelry. Also called bling, jewelry is coded symbolically for some gangs and includes heavy gold chains, earrings, and large rings. Some jewelry might have the gang numbers etched into them – for example, the five-­ point star is used by various California-­and Chicago-­based street gangs

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•

• •

• • •

on their jewelry. Some gang members may also wear religious symbols, like crosses, which have nothing to do with the gang but may simply indicate a belief in a particular religion or even be part of some (allowed) fashion statement. Weaponry. The particular type of weaponry used by a gang is often meant to be distinctive. The weapon of choice night be baseball bats, pipes taped at the ends, spiked wrist bands, knives, shotguns, machetes, and semi-­automatic firearms. Gangs may also use homemade bombs and Molotov cocktails if the occasion requires it. But in all cases, the weapons are more than arms; they symbolize the style of violence that the gang endorses. Hand signs. Hand signs are common. These have communicative and symbolic functions, including greeting a peer gang member in a ritualistic way, challenging a rival gang, or intimidating others. Tattoos. As discussed in Chapter 7, tattoos have many symbolic functions; for example, they can indicate gang affiliation or geographic origin. Numbers like 666 (mark of the beast), 13, and 14 have symbolic value, as discussed in the sidebar previously. The tattoos may also indicate the gang name or a particular gang belief. Body modifications. Some gangs get their members to purposely scar their bodies to show affiliation. The scarring is sometimes done with cigarette burns, a knife, or a razor blade. Photographs and videos. Gang members memorialize themselves and their achievements by taking photos and videos of themselves in various situations, posting them on social media. Music. Music is often important to the culture of the gang. The genre adopted allows the gang members to identify themselves with the beliefs expressed by the music.

The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1944) saw symbolism as a powerful mode of representation. A  flag, for example, is a symbol that represents a nation. Those who believe and live in the nation see it as a unifying sign; any defilement of the flag would be seen as a direct affront to everyone in the nation. The same type of meaning is embedded in all national symbols, and it is this type of emotional meaning that the symbols in gangs accomplish. There is no culture without its special symbols, and this includes criminal ones. For street gangs in particular, the symbols represent their own understanding of their lives, standing for beliefs that they hold onto tenaciously.

Myths As writer George Orwell (1968: 6) put it, “Myths which are believed in tend to become real.” As we saw, the Italian Mafias spin origin myths about themselves, such as the one of the Garduña knights, which over time has become

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accepted as real among the Mafiosi, since it has been repeated over and over and enshrined in symbolic and ritualistic behaviors, such as in initiation rites (Chapter 2). In many origin myths, the underlying subtext is a Robin-­Hood one (as discussed), whereby the Mafiosi depict themselves as descendants of legendary bandit folk heroes who steal from the rich to help the poor or who show uncommon courage. For example, one of these tells the story of a man named Saponara, captured and imprisoned by Spanish invaders in 1578, who preferred death over the betrayal that might have saved him (Reynolds 2006: 177–178): According to Sicilian lore, Saponara was tortured by his Spanish captors in an effort to learn the names of his cohorts but Saponara chose to die in agony rather than betray others. His bravery became a symbol for every Sicilian who believed their salvation could be achieved only through loyalty. Interestingly, Saponara (Sicilian Sapunara) is a municipality in the Metropolitan City of Messina in Sicily. It is impossible, of course, to make a direct connection between the municipality and the Saponara character of legend. But a suggestive linkage comes from the fact that the town has medieval origins and has its own historical legends revolving around brave and loyal fighters against invaders. So, it could be argued that the name of the purported hero, Saponara, is a type of eponymous personification of the town, alluding to its history. If this is so, then this example is illustrative of how the Mafias use mythic tropes and metaphors to define themselves culturally, all of which are hardly historical in any factual sense. In all the mythic legends that the gangsters spin about themselves, there is an unconscious sublimation of fantasy figures, from chivalric knights to heroic bandits, all of which are tropes, as just mentioned, standing for moral strength, personal dignity, and honor  – the virtues that the Mafiosi claim to espouse. Another example is the myth of the Beati Paoli (“the Blessed Paulists”) that is traced to a secret society of monks, who disguised themselves in hoods and masks, meeting at night in the galleries and tunnels of Palermo’s underground, to deliver justice to the oppressed, to protect orphans, and to punish the guilty. From this, the Mafia myth of their descendancy from Beati Paoli emerged, connecting the gang to the fight against oppression. Even a novel, published in 1909 as a serial in a daily newspaper of Palermo, picked up on this legend and enshrined it in popular lore even more deeply. Written by Luigi Natoli, the novel, titled Beati Paoli, became a reference point for justifying the chivalric origins of the Mafia. In the novel, the nobleman protagonist, Coriolano della Floresta, creates an alternative justice system to which those who have been oppressed and who distrust the authorities can resort (Santino 2000: 119). However, the Blessed Paolists used violence against the oppressors, protecting innocent people.

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The Beati Paoli legend The Mafia story of the Beati Paoli is myth. It is the name given to a secret sect thought to have emerged in medieval Sicily. As described by Luigi Natoli in his historic novel, I Beati Paoli, which he initially wrote under the pseudonym of William Galt in 1909, the sect was an order of knights fighting for the poor. But there is no real historical evidence of the existence of any such sect. In medieval feudal society, any action by commoners in Sicily would have been interpreted by the state as an act of treason or heresy, punishable by death. In this fearful environment, several secret sects emerged. Of these, legends tell us that the Beati Paoli became the most famous, allegedly formed to defend the commoners from brutal retaliatory actions of the State and the Church. They are described as wearing black hooded coats and operating at night in the catacombs and underground tunnels of Palermo. Interestingly, Natoli sets origins of the sect in the seventeenth-­ century town of Paoli, thus contradicting the origin story itself as emerging in the medieval period. Also, the source of the name of the sect is unknown. It is popularly tied to Saint Francis of Paola, or Beato (di) Paola. But again, there is no historical proof of this. Nevertheless, tributes to the Beati Paoli in Palermo continue to this day, where even a public square, a street, and a restaurant are named after them. The Mafiosi use Natoli’s novel opportunistically as a real historiography of their origins, using the myth in all kinds of situations. For example, during a trial, Mafia boss Totò Riina and the pentito Gaspare Mutolo confronted each other, making references to the characters of the novel (cited in Paoli 2003: 184). Another pentito, Antonio Calderone, claimed that after he was initiated in Cosa Nostra, he was told to “follow the example of the Beati Paoli” (cited in Gambetta 1993).

Two widely known anecdotes show how effective the novel has become as a legitimizing foundation story for the Mafia. The first one is recounted by Jane and Peter Schneider (2003: 14). As the two researchers were gathering information about the origins of the Mafia during a research stay in a Sicilian town in the mid-­1960s, a local Mafioso advised them that if they wanted to understand “the true spirit of the Mafia,” they should read Natoli’s novel. Whether the reference was meant to be allegorical or factual, it became obvious to the researchers that the Beati Paoli legend was widely believed to be true. The second one is recounted by Gaia Servadio (1978: 19) in her historiography of the Mafia. She reports that during trial proceedings in Sicily (and other places), lawyers representing Mafia defendants have often invoked the Blessed Paulist

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defense, claiming that their clients were not perpetrating crimes but rather delivering justice to the victims of an unjust society. Clearly, the Blessed Paulist myth is a self-­justifying charter myth for many Mafiosi, who use it to present to people a raffish image of themselves. Foundation myths are emotionally powerful tales, emanating from a collective need for a people to give itself a place in the historical scheme of things. They serve the function of transmitting the cultural identity of a group across time, cementing the sense of belonging of its members. In these myths, heroism, courage, and self-­immolating dedication to people and their cause are etched into their characters. In some of these, outlaws stand out as possessing these virtues to perfection. The myth of the honorable outlaw is, in fact, a ubiquitous one among the traditional OCs. The Yakuza, like the Mafia, recount similar Robin-­Hood stories about their origins, as Kaplan and Dubro (2003: 14) observe: The heroes of these stories are society’s victims who made good, losers who finally won, men who lived the life of the outlaw with dignity. These tales stand at the heart of the yakuza’s self-­image, and – much to the chagrin of Japanese police – of public perception as well. The police challenge the accuracy of these portrayals, as do most scholars of Japanese history; but the feeling persists among the Japanese that organized crime in their country bears a noble past. Kaplan and Dubro (2003: 14–15) go on to emphasize the emotional power of the Yakuza’s mythic self-­portrayal to Japanese society generally: To understand this romantic image of the gangsters, one must go back nearly four centuries to the country’s Middle Ages, the source of countless modern legends that in Japan take the place of the frontier West in American culture – where the sword replaces the six-­shooter and the cowboy is a samurai. To the commoners of feudal Japan, they were known as Kabuki-­ mono, the crazy ones, and as early as 1612 they began attracting the attention of local officials. Like rebels of a more recent era, they wore outlandish costumes and strange haircuts; their behaviour was often equally bizarre. At their sides hung remarkably long swords that nearly trailed along the ground as the outlaws swaggered through the streets of old Japan. Terrorizing the defenceless townspeople almost at will, these outlaws were not above using them to practice tsyji-­giri, a hideous rite in which a samurai would waylay a passerby to test a new blade. Interestingly, some Yakuza clans do not see the Kabuki-­mono as their “ancestors.” Instead, they claim to be descendants of the Machi-­yakko (“city servants”), who became the people’s heroes, praised by the citizens for their help against the Kabuki-­mono. These clans have spun countless tales of benevolent acts

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performed by the Machi-­yakko, who would save young girls from assaults, provide sustenance to people in underprivileged social classes, and so on. As the legend goes, the Machi-­yakko were composed of poor criminals who found a sense of belonging and purpose through membership in the group. With this myth, the Yakuza clans continue to attract those who are feeling out of place and looking for a purpose to join them. The Triads tell a singular story of their origin – the story of the Five Ancestors, as discussed several times, summarized by O’Callaghan (1978: 11) as follows: A sect of Buddhist monks of the Shao Liu monastery in Fukien province helped to put down a rebellion against the Emperor. The 128 fighting monks, skilled in Chinese martial arts, were showered with honours. The Abbot was given valuable gifts, including the Imperial seal, which, when affixed to a document, gave it the force of an Imperial edict. Their triumph was short lived. One of their number, jealous or plain bloody-­minded, went to the Emperor and told him that the Abbot, drunk with success, was now plotting against him. Imperial troops were sent to the monastery to arrest the alleged plotters. Under cover of darkness they surrounded the monastery and blocked all exits. At daybreak they attacked. The fighting monks resisted all day, but by nightfall only five remained alive. The monastery was in flame. The five survivors, although wounded, made their escape under cover of darkness. Next morning they pledged to set up five separate monasteries, as centre of resistance against the Manchu dynasty. A banner, secret sign and password were agreed upon, and they went their separate ways. The story creates the sense of an honorable, monastic past among the Triads. But, like other origin legends, there is little or no evidence that it is a historically verifiable story. What is true about the gang is that during the colonial period of Hong Kong, the British banished all criminal gangs from the city. It was after World War II, which brought uncertainty to the city, that there was an opening for the Triads to re-­emerge, virtually unchecked. But by 1949, the take-­over of Hong Kong by the Chinese government caused members to escape to other places, including Taiwan, North America, and Europe. To summarize the foregoing discussion, the origin myths and legends serve a specific purpose to the gangs  – they allow them to construct a pseudo-­ genealogy showing them to be descendants of honorable bandits. For instance, the ’Ndrangheta (a name from the Greek word andragathos, meaning “a man of courage”) tell tales of secret societies who worked for the poor, from which they claim descendancy. During the seventeenth century there was, actually, a secret society in Calabria that resembled the contemporary ’Ndrangheta (Lunde 2004: 76). But there are no evidentiary linkages between this society and the

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’Ndrangheta. The gang emerged after Italian Unification, when the mobsters were hired by powerful stakeholders to threaten their rivals during elections. As discussed several times, Unification did not bring about economic prosperity in southern Italy. Southerners remained impoverished while the new government imposed heavy taxation and military conscription. The Camorra and the ’Ndrangheta started working duplicitously – on the one side for the landowners in order to gain social recognition from them and on the other as “secret” helpers of the people. It is from that era that a folk culture in Calabria takes shape around the ’Ndrangheta, celebrating the ’Ndranghetisti in legends and songs. Gradually, the function and role of the ’Ndrangheta changed, developing into the fearsome, brutal society it is today – a fact documented not by folklore but by crime statistics. To reiterate, the Mafias have never given to or helped the poor. Just the opposite happened. But the power of mythology still reverberates in the gangs and in many of the people in regions they control. As Dickie (2004: 14) writes with reference to the opera Cavalleria rusticana, the subtle power of criminal origin myths is that we cannot even talk about the organizations today without reference to them: What is less known about Cavalleria is that its story is the purest, most anodyne form of a myth about Sicily and the mafia, a myth that was something akin to the official ideology of the Sicilian mafia for nearly a century and a half. The mafia was not an organization, it was believed, but a sense of defiant pride and honour, rooted deep in the identity of every Sicilian. The notion of “rustic chivalry” stood square against the idea that the mafia might even have a history worthy of the name. Today, it is impossible to tell the story of the mafia without reckoning with the power of that same myth. Stories and legends have been written about criminals and villains throughout history and across societies. In American lore, outlaws such as Jesse James and Billy the Kid are as well known as heroes such as Davy Crockett and Jim Bowie. The tales of criminal gangs are metaphors – they bring out the fascination with criminals as challenging the status quo, urging society to change and evolve towards an ideal state. Crime and criminals bring about a temporary dystopia that impels people to resolve it, especially through the fictive narrative template of bravery and honor on which origin tales are grounded. This is perhaps why we are drawn to both heroes and villains, angels and monsters – they are unconscious metaphors that stand for the battle between good and evil. Criminal myths inform people of their social inequalities and of the oppression they may feel. The problem is that the myths are opportunistic, not genuine – the Mafiosi are as exploitive and oppressive of common folk as any State, if not more so. As mentioned, they see themselves as service providers – providing protection, drugs, and so on – that people want or need.

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As John Dickie observes (2004), a large part of the ability of the Mafia to endure is the mythology that comes from the code of omertà, which is based on a concept of honor and retribution for injustices. This constituted the thematic fabric of Pietro Mascagni’s marvelous 1890 opera Cavalleria Rusticana (“rustic chivalry”), which deals with the rustic ethos of Sicilian culture (Chapter 6). The opera sheds light on the reasons for the violent behavior that arise when people are under great emotional and economic strain seeking to make sense of their lives. In such situations, people rely for guidance on a set of principles that espouse honor, respect, and fidelity. Mascagni was not Sicilian. He was Tuscan. As an outsider, he was likely captivated by the emotional power of the Sicilian code of honor that he even saw imprinted in the facial expressions of common people and deeply entrenched in their daily life routines. As mentioned (Chapter  6), it is no coincidence that the opera’s famous intermezzo was used by Martin Scorsese in the slow-­motion title of Raging Bull (1980), a movie about pride and honor, or that Francis Ford Coppola used various excerpts from the opera for his Godfather, Part III (1990).

Inventing traditions By studying the foundation myths of the traditional OCs, we can learn a lot about how the different criminal societies define themselves and how they insert themselves psychologically into the cultural terrains from which they spring. They have done so, in a phrase, by literally inventing their traditions through the medium of storytelling and the attendant symbolism connected to the contrived legends. These gain credibility over time, becoming real in people’s mind and thus almost impossible to distinguish from the real histories of the Mafias, which are more down to earth, revealing the dark side of human nature, not its bright side. When people accept the myths as true, they hold on to them even in the face of contrary evidence. The origin myths today continue for the reason that they are reinforced by movies and the media, which recycle them for their entertainment value. The result has been that the myths have become mythologies – a term used by semiotician Roland Barthes (1957) to differentiate the original myths from their recycled versions in movies, TV programs, and so on. The pop culture mythologies have thus reinforced the original myths, making them virtually immune from counterarguments, like many conspiracy theories today that move virally through the Internet. French philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1983) used the term simulacrum to claim that modern-­day people, fixated on visual media such as television, can no longer distinguish, or want to distinguish, between reality and fantasy, having become so accustomed to watching imaginary events and characters on screens. The content on the screen becomes believable in the fantasizing part of the brain, making it difficult to detach the make-­believe images on the screen in order to perceive them as fictitious. Baudrillard maintained that the borderline between fiction and reality has utterly vanished because of

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this image-­driven form of mythologization, collapsing into a mindset where the two are perceived as part of the simulacrum, with one reflecting the other. It is useful to enlist philosopher Susan Langer’s (1948) concept of discursive-­ versus-­presentational representation in order to make the case that invented traditions are as believable as those that come from actual history. The discursive mode is the one used in reading linear texts such as books. When we read, we can stop and think about something that is written in the text, examine it closely, and so on. Discursive texts have the property of “detachment,” which means that their constituent elements can be considered separately, allowing us to focus, say, on a single word in the text, detaching it from its location in the text, without impairing overall understanding. This feature of discursive texts allows us to reflect on the meanings of texts and thus be critical of their content. In contrast, the elements in presentational texts, such as movies and images generally, cannot be detached from them without impairing the overall meaning – for example, one cannot detach a note or phrase from a melody without destroying the sense of the melody. This type of text makes it almost impossible to detach an element from its content. Now, as Langer argued, these two modes are interactive in narratives such as myths – that is, while they are presented discursively as stories, they have a presentational effect on us. We do not interpret such narratives in terms of their separate parts but overall as cohesive stories, much like melodies. It is this blend of discursivity and presentationality that gives myths and mythologies their ability to create belief in their content structure. This can be seen every time we read stories to children about mythical creatures. The act of reading creates (temporary) belief in the children. In effect, once a myth is believed, it is rarely counteracted with rational arguments. It has a presentational “narrative logic” that cannot be shattered easily by discursive argumentation. In The Invention of Tradition (1983), Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger observe that the perceived pageantry and honor of the past is a powerful psychological force that remains constant across time. This is why OCs invent their traditions. The rites, symbols, and stories that they concoct are examples of what the two historians call an “invented tradition,” which serves to impart a positive view to an organization that has a very different nefarious purpose. Invented traditions reinforce the importance of origin myths and foster a shared set of values that connect the gangsters to one another via a pseudo-­descendancy from honorable criminal ancestors. The tales are archetypal, similar to the one used by Romans to connect with the Greeks. The hero Aeneas was a defender of Troy, the city in Asia Minor that the Greeks destroyed in the Trojan War. After the war, Aeneas led the Trojans who survived to the land now called Italy. According to Roman versions of the myth, Aeneas and his followers founded Rome, and he became its first great archetypal hero and legendary father – a myth that competes with others, such as the Romulus and Remus one. Archetypal legends help the gangs win acceptance, because people can relate to the characters and their situations both socially and culturally (Jung 1983).

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Organized crime cannot be understood without recognizing the mythological-­ archetypal mystiques that it creates for itself. A criminal gang like the Sicilian Mafia does indeed have historical roots, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, but these are hardly based on the archetypal stories they themselves tell. Every culture has myths that define collective identity. Nations use these myths for political functions, legitimizing shared identity and nationhood. Organized crime stories work in a similar fashion to create a system of beliefs, which are designed to document the group’s supposed beginnings. They allow the gangs to literally invent themselves as parallel cultures.

References Barthes, Roland (1957). Mythologies. Paris: Seuil. Baudrillard, Jean (1983). Simulations. New York: Semiotexte. Cassirer, Ernst A. (1944). An Essay on Man. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dickie, John (2004). Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia. London: Houghton and Stoughton. Gambetta, Diego (1993). The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hobsbawn, Eric and Ranger, Terence (1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jung, Carl G. (1983). The Essential Jung. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kaplan, David E. and Dubro, Alec (2003). Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld. Berkeley: University of California Press. Langer, Susanne (1948). Philosophy in a New Key. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Natoli, Luigi (1909). Beati Paoli. Milano: Sellerio. O’Callaghan, Sean (1978). Triads: The Illustrated Inside Story of the Chinese Mafia. London: W. H. Allen. Orwell, George (1968). The Collected Essays, vol. 3, edited by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. London: Secker and Warburg. Paoli, Letizia (2003). Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Santino, Umberto (2000). La cosa e il nome. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino. Schneider, Jane C. and Schneider, Peter T. (2003). Reversible Destiny: Mafia, Antimafia, and the Struggle for Palermo. Berkeley: University of California Press. Servadio, Gaia (1978). Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from Its Origin to the Present Day. New York: Dell.

Chapter 13

Secret communication

Introduction A key aspect in the study of criminal gang culture is communication – how they speak to each other, how they develop modes of secret communication that allow them to confuse outsiders such as the police, what kinds of secret forms of communication they use, and so on. The in-­group language (or slang) that members of criminal gangs use constitutes what linguists call a cant, discussed briefly in Chapter  7. Cants are invented for secretive in-­group communication, allowing criminals in gangs or in prisons to communicate with each other effectively so that others will not be able to understand. The study of cants is used by forensic linguists to interpret criminal behavior through the lens of language (Arntfield and Danesi 2017). The general term used in linguistics to refer to cants and other in-­group secretive languages is cryptolects. This chapter will deal with criminal communication, from cryptolects to cryptography. The focus here is: (a) on the secret aspects of the in-­group language, rather than on the nature of the slang per se, and (b) on coded writing, which is a common technique used by criminals. Police forces now see these two aspects of OCs as key ones for penetrating the mindset of the gangs and for interpreting their messages in order to prevent the commission of crimes. Cryptanalysis has actually been considered an important crime-­fighting tool by the police as far back as the 1930s, as can be seen in an article by Don L. Kooken titled “Cryptography in Criminal Investigation,” in which he states the following (1939: 904): Cryptograms are encountered in criminal investigations much more frequently than one would imagine; often, however, they are not recognized as such. If the investigator will carefully scrutinize the notes, memoranda, letters, etc., of a criminal suspect, enciphered documents may be brought to light which otherwise would have gone undetected. A  letter seemingly devoid of sense, a note book containing what appears to be pages of meaningless numerals, or an apparently insignificant scrawl on the back of an envelope, may prove to be secret writings, and though little importance is attached to it at the time, if deciphered, the result may alter the entire

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investigation. Of course, ciphers will be found which, after decipherment, may have no immediate bearing upon the case, but it must always be borne in mind that anything of sufficient importance to be enciphered is likewise of sufficient importance to be deciphered. All OC modes and forms of communication can be considered cryptographic, in the sense that they need to be decoded by outsiders. There is an obvious overlap between such communications and the sense of symbolism that allows gangs to identify themselves (Chapter 12). It is impossible to separate the two. It is done in this textbook simply for convenience and clarity.

Cryptolects Criminal organizations, as discussed in Chapter  7, use in-­group slang as an insider code. This type of language is known more specifically as a cryptolect (literally a cryptic or secretive dialect). It is designed to keep outsiders out of the communicative loop of the group and to generate a sense of inner savvy that is etched into the words and stylistic mannerisms of the cryptolect. The two most common cryptolects are called argots and cants. The difference between the two involves length of duration – argots are used by street criminals on a temporary basis, and so they come and go quickly; cants, on the other hand, are linguistic codes that emerge in durative criminal gangs and thus have continuity across generations. The cant is sometimes based on regional or dialectal versions of a language. For example, the Mafia gangs use a lexicon and style of pronunciation based on older dialectal forms of Sicilian or Calabrian, which virtually no one other than the criminals themselves now use (Nicaso and Danesi 2013). This has allowed the gangs to declare themselves “authentic” traditionally, since the dialects connect people to the history of their regions. Along with origin myths (Chapter 12), this legitimizes the gangs through the dialectal channel. In the history of Italy, dialects have played key roles in identity formation. In Sicily, it has always been connected to the particular origins of the region and to the sense of pride that Sicilians feel in speaking it, even in adaptive forms, to this day. In the early 1200s, the Sicilian volgare (the language of the common folk of Sicily) became a literary language for a while, because in that era Sicily had become a major center of European cultural life. The court of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II in Sicily attracted intellectuals, artists, and writers from all parts of Italy and Europe. After 1250, the center shifted to Tuscany. And it was the volgare of Florence and the surrounding Tuscan region that soon after became the basis for a “common language” for all of Italy. The Tuscan volgare came to the forefront primarily because it was used by such writers as Dante Alighieri, Francesco Petrarca, and Giovanni Boccaccio. From the 1300s to the 1500s, Tuscan was also widely used as the language of commerce in the eastern Mediterranean area. By the middle 1500s, the Tuscan volgare had almost completely replaced Latin as a written language for use in all kinds of official documents.

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In a way, the Tuscan language that became the general standard was seen unconsciously as a form of conceptual colonization in other parts of Italy, such as Sicily, given the latter’s position of literary importance prior to the spread of the Tuscan volgare. Before the 1200s, the “official language” of Italy was Latin. The earliest poetry written in volgare was connected with the German Hohenstaufen court, which ruled Sicily. In the late 1200s, the innovations of Guido Guinizelli of Bologna, creator of the dolce stil nuovo (“sweet new style”), profoundly influenced Italian writing and thus catapulted the use of the volgare tongues for the writing of poetry to the social foreground. But in Sicily, the original volgare, now defined as a dialect, still resonates with all kinds of historical-­cultural nuances, from its role in the formation of Sicilian culture to its marginalization in modernity. There is little doubt that the Mafia uses the dialect as its primary in-­group language for both ethnic and self-­serving purposes – as men of honor who respect not only chivalric traditions but also linguistic ones that connect them to the “real Sicily.” Dialect words and speech mannerisms have great emotional resonance to this day in Sicily. The same situation applies to the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta and the Neapolitan Camorra, which also use local dialects as their main modes of in-­group communication. These constitute identity codes, being perceived as indexes of pride in the cultural past and its relevance to the present. To speak with a Neapolitan accent among the Camorristi is to claim that “I am what I am and I am proud of it” – a subtext imprinted in each dialect word used. But this is essentially a ploy, whereby the gangs exploit the historical languages of their regions, twisting them for self-­serving purposes. Cryptolects are found in all kinds of gangs, and they possess similar features, structures, and processes. A  main one is changing the meanings of existing words to suit the realities and domains of references that pertain to the gang. For instance, in Parlache – a Colombian drug cartel dialect that originated on the streets of Medellín in the 1980s among the foot soldiers of the cartels as a coded language to keep messages with sensitive information secretive – the meaning of the Spanish word cocina is changed from “kitchen” to “drug lab.” Interestingly, Parlache has become a generalized Colombian dialect, probably because its words entered the mass media of several Latin American countries, spreading broadly from there. The biker lingo of the Hells Angels similarly shows how a cryptolect restructures the semantics of words, shaping them to convey specific connotations or metaphorical meanings. The following are a few examples: • • • • •

Brain Bucket: Helmet. Bro: A  member of the gang, or anyone who has helped a member, not expecting anything in return. The term bro cannot be used to refer to any generic motorcycle rider; it is reserved for members of the gang. BUG: Big Ugly Guy. Cager: Someone who drives a car, truck, or van, rather than a bike. Church: Official club meeting.

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• • • • • • • • • • •

Defender: A  full patch member whose job is to defend a club’s turf or reputation. Free Rider: A  biker who shares the values and lifestyle of a member but chooses not to join the club. Graybeard: An old wise biker who’s been a member a very long time. Heat: Law enforcement officer; synonyms include AKA The Man, The Fuzz, Pig, Law Dog. Nomad: Member of the club, but not attached to any particular chapter. Old Lady: Wife or paramour of a club member. Poser: A rider only superficially dedicated to the biker lifestyle, who acts tougher than he really is. Prospect: A prospective gang member during his probationary period. Raisin Pie: A worthless reward for a good deed or favor. Run: A club-­sanctioned outing to a certain location for a special event. Squid: Someone who rides recklessly, beyond his abilities.

The first examples of criminal cants can be traced back to the thirteenth century across Europe, including Italy (Trumper, Nicaso, Madalon and Gratteri 2014), emerging as a kind of koiné, as can be seen in documents of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, such as The Highway to the Spitalfields, written in the 1530s by Robert Copland. Pamphlets of the era incorporated cants, perhaps to grab attention.

Anti-­l anguages In excluding outsiders semantically and socially, cant creates a sense of unity among its speakers at the same time that it turns a language on its head, constituting a form of linguistic weaponry against the social mainstream. For this reason, linguist Michael Halliday (1976) has referred to cants as “anti-­languages,” that is, as languages that pit themselves against standard forms of discourse. He identifies several criteria that a cant must meet to be considered an anti-­ language. They are paraphrased as follows: • • • • •

The anti-­language must assign new meanings to existing words, keeping the grammar of the native language intact. Effective communication depends on ensuring that the semantic system is inaccessible to the outsider. The anti-­language is not just an option, it is central to the existence of the group. It is also a vehicle of resocialization. There must be some continuity between a language and an anti-­language; otherwise, comprehension may be difficult.

Halliday designated the group that used the anti-­language an “anti-­society,” which he defined as a small, separate community intentionally created within a larger society as an alternative to it or as a form of resistance to it. OCs are

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examples of anti-­societies who use cants to identify themselves, preventing outsiders from understanding their communications and establishing an alternative social structure described by their modified words that reflect particular needs, values, and worldviews. Anti-­languages differ from other kinds of slang in that they are used solely among rebellious or criminal groups. They are based on the native language but incorporate words and styles of delivery with special nuanced meanings, as we saw with the biker lingo. In prison environments, anti-­languages allow for the formation of separate prison subcultures, allowing them to define themselves as special enclaves and to shelter themselves from the authorities (Little 1982). As Dziedzic-­Rawska (2016: 80) observes: Prison facilities are special: they are complexes defined by a variety of parameters, whose understanding for an ordinary person is far from perfect. It may be observed that two main cultures clash in prisons: that of jailers and that of inmates. Both groups have different rules of conduct, which results in many misunderstandings and new norms of behaviour created on a daily basis. This, in turn, gives way to a constant creation of unique vocabulary specific to the institution, its inhabitants and employees. It may be said that under such conditions prison language thrives: prison slang is extremely changeable and adapts itself to the current needs of the facility. Thus, the level of linguistic creativity is tremendously high: prisoners base their vocabulary loosely on similarities between animate and inanimate beings, which leads to the development of highly figurative language. As mentioned, the Italian Mafias use the original dialects of their regions – Sicilian, Calabrian, and Neapolitan – among themselves not so much as anti-­ languages but as linguistic badges of pride in their traditional cultural heritage, making the dialectal code fit in with the motivations behind their origin myths, harkening back to a time when only the dialects were used in the regions, before Standard Italian – the language of the oppressors – was imposed on the people through Unification. The dialect thus reverberates with cultural honor, omertà, and traditional values. In this context, metaphorical language plays a vital role. For example, when a Mafiosi utters Jittari i virmiceddi, which is old Sicilian for “vomit the pasta,” it alludes to someone revealing secrets in analogy to how he would regurgitate his meal. It is an expression imbued with moral rebuke for rejecting the sustenance the criminal life gave him. Sometimes, entire dialectal cryptolects are developed by the Mafiosi. This is the case of bacchiaggiu, a dialectal anti-­language used by the ’Ndrangheta as a way of marking its boundaries, ensuring secrecy, and strengthening its identity. As Paoli (2003: 112) asserts: The use of this in-­language characterizes and protects communication among the ’ndranghetisti, making it obscure and unintelligible to anyone outside the group. Bacchiaggiu distorts and even coins de novo expressions

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and words borrowed from the Calabrian dialect and standard Italian. Members of the police forces are described as migni or sbirrami; the Carabinieri, in particular, are labeled as strisci russi, referring to the red stripes on the trousers of their uniform. The initiation ceremony of the ’Ndrangheta is based on this kind of in-­ language  – a ceremony called appropriately fedelizzazione (“faithfulness-­ making”). Many of the terms originate in Masonic rites. For example, as Paoli (2003: 78) points out, during the ritual, the presider asks: “Do you know the family of the Masons?” The initiate must answer: “No, but if necessary I embrace it with my skin, flesh and bones, swearing the loyalty asked of me to the family of the holy order of the Masons.” Furthermore, as in Masonic practices, while the new member’s name is communicated to all the existing members, their own are initially not disclosed to him. Paoli (2003: 78) goes on to make the following relevant observation: Indeed, the mafia group is often called Mummy, and the transfer of mother images into mafia slang is frequent. The most powerful ’Ndrangheta chiefs are called, for example, mamma santissima [most sainted mother]. Through this analogical procedure, every affiliate is taught that from the moment of his initiation all aspects of his life – even the most intimate ones – are automatically subordinated to his mafia membership. Because such language is understandable to non-­Calabrian speakers of Italian, it is more correct to classify it as an argot. Interestingly, the French writer Victor Hugo, refers to this kind of discourse as both the language of the dark and the language of misery, in his novel Les Misérables (1862). The narrator begins by examining the slang of some prisoners as a means to understand the linkage between criminality and poverty. He describes their language as emanating from wretchedness, constituting a linguistic attack on social order. In the second chapter, the narrator argues that, while the slang of the prisoners has a dark tinge to it, it is nevertheless poetic – it is full of metaphor, like saying “to wriggle” for “to eat,” or “a rat” for a “bread thief.” The narrator also points out that “argot is subject to perpetual transformation – a secret and rapid work which ever goes on. It makes more progress in ten years than the regular language in ten centuries.” This is certainly a common trait in all cryptolects (Blake 2010). While the original Sicilian dialect is still the main form of communication in the Mafia, it has nonetheless adapted somewhat to changing times, incorporating vocabulary that refers to activities that were not part of the Mafia’s original agenda, such as drugs and different kinds of trafficking. The study of gangster language patterns is of great relevance to decoding their beliefs and system of activities and behaviors. Part of the mystique of being in the gang is speaking in a coded way, which, like dress and tattoos, constitutes powerful symbolic behavior, creating a tribal sense of belonging, world-­savvy, and group solidarity.

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Cryptography As cybercrime specialists Dorothy Denning and William Baugh argued in 1998, the use of cryptography by organized crime groups has become sophisticated, given the digital technologies at their disposal. Actually, criminals have often used rudimentary cryptography to send each other encrypted messages so as to keep them secret. A well-­ known example is that of two convicted Aryan Brotherhood leaders, Barry Mills and Tyler Bingham, who were found guilty of ordering attacks on inmates from maximum security cellblocks in 2006, after investigators decoded their messages. The whole case revolved around the testimony of Al Benton, a Brotherhood defector, who testified that he stabbed a victim after receiving a smuggled note from Bingham. Benton indicated that the order was written in invisible ink, which came into view when held over a flame. It was also written in code – the 400-­year-­old binary alphabet code devised by Sir Francis Bacon (see Gaines 1989: 6). The question that comes immediately to mind is why a group of criminals would have acquired such erudite knowledge. Perhaps they read about it in some prison library book, or maybe the Bacon cipher has been known among criminals longer than investigators realized. Whatever the truth, the fact remains that the secret message was easily decoded because it was based on straightforward cryptanalysis.

Bacon’s code English scientist and philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) invented a cipher in which all the letters of the alphabet are represented by different stretches of a and b, which is also written with 0s and 1s in place of the two letters. Bacon called it a “Bi-­literary Alphabet”: Letter

Code in letters

Code in binary digits

A B C D E F G H I, J K L M N O P

aaaaa aaaab aaaba aaabb aabaa aabab aabba aabbb abaaa abaab ababa ababb abbaa abbab abbba

00000 00001 00010 00011 00100 00101 00110 00111 01000 01001 01010 01011 01100 01101 01110

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Letter

Code in letters

Code in binary digits

Q R S T U, V W X Y Z

abbbb baaaa baaab baaba baabb babaa babab babba babbb

01111 10000 10001 10010 10011 10100 10101 10110 10111

Figure 13.1 U sing this cipher, the name Bacon would be encrypted as: aaaab aaaaa aaaba abbab abbaa

A similar type of system, called a Caesar cipher, replaces letters in a message by other letters of the same alphabet, or symbols, according to a code, such as replacing each letter with one that is one, two, or other steps up in the alphabet. This type of system was used by a Sicilian Mafia boss, Bernardo Provenzano, to encrypt his secret messages, which were found in a 2006 raid by Italian police. Provenzano’s cipher was easily unraveled, leading to his arrest after years on the run. It also led investigators to track down other members of the clan. Provenzano used a modified Caesar cipher to write notes to his family and clan. He simply assigned a number in order to each letter: that is, he replaced “A” with “4,” “B” with “5,” and so on. The decrypted notes contained orders to his lieutenants and the names of other members. The investigators took no time to crack the simple code and were thus able to gain access to the valuable information contained in the notes.

Main types of ciphers Although there are many sophisticated ciphers today, historically there have been several main types – these are the ones still used by criminals generally today because they do not require the technical knowledge of mathematically trained cryptologists.

Caesar ciphers These involve replacing alphabet characters with other characters in a precise way (called the “key”). So, the word love can be encrypted as mpwf – where each letter is replaced by the one after it: l by m, o by p, v

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by w, and e by f. This type of cipher is called a Caesar cipher, because Julius Caesar was the one who devised it.

Polyalphabetic ciphers Developed by the Renaissance Florentine scholar Leon Battista Alberti in 1466, in this type of cipher, a letter is replaced by letters from several alphabets rather than a single one. A “keyword” is established to specify which alphabets have been used or how they have been coordinated. If the keyword is bin, the three alphabets will begin with the letters b, i, and n.

Polybius ciphers This method was named after the Greek historian Polybius, because he was among the first to encrypt messages by converting letters to numbers or smaller sets of symbols. The best-­known example of a Polybius cipher is the so-­called Playfair Cipher, used in both World Wars. It starts with a 25-­letter scrambled alphabet arranged in a 5-­letter by 5-­letter square. The encryption method allocates letters in pairs according to their positions in relation to each other within the square. Suffice it to say that it makes decryption very difficult.

Transposition ciphers Transposition ciphers involve transposing, modifying, or reordering the letters in some way, often using replacements. As an example, consider the following message: Meet Martha on Monday in front of the bridge (Danesi 2002: 64). This can be encrypted in various ways such as by writing the words backward and eliminating the vowels: brdg th f frnt n mndy n mrth mt. Other transposition strategies can be used, of course. The more used, the more complex and difficult the task of decoding the message. Messages can also be encrypted by a combination of substitution and transposition methods In jail, Provenzano diversified his method of encryption to throw off the authorities. He kept asking for his copy of the Bible, so the police came to suspect that it harbored a secret code (or key) because excerpts from the Bible were found on other notes. The police suspected that specific words in the Bible were associated with numbers and then used as part of encrypted communiqués. Unable to crack the secret code at first, Italian police sought the help of the FBI’s cryptography specialists, who noted that one note referred to

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Revelation 17, Chapters 8 and 9: “The beast that thou sawest was, and is not; and shall ascend out of the bottomless pit, and go into perdition; and they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, whose names were not written in the book of life from the foundation of the world, when they behold the beast that was, and is not, and yet is.” So far, no one has cracked this code (at least at the time of writing this book). In another case, Italian police decrypted a three-­page handwritten document of the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta in 2016 written in a strange cipher of symbols that resembled a series of alphabets  – Greek, Cyrillic, and Egyptian hieroglyphs. The investigators who cracked it were two police officers who regularly solved word puzzles. The decryption gave the police access to several aspects of the gang, including a pledge of honor that new members would recite and a version of the Garduña legend. Another illustrative example of the criminal use of cryptography comes from the FBI (2011); it is worth repeating here: The letter from a gang member in prison to a friend on the outside seemed normal enough. “Saludos loved one,” it began, and went on to describe the perils of drug use and the inmate’s upcoming visit from his children. But closer inspection by examiners in our Cryptanalysis and Racketeering Records Unit (CRRU) revealed that this seemingly ordinary letter was encoded with a much more sinister message: every fifth word contained the letter’s true intent, which was to green-­light the murder of a fellow gang member. A relevant example of the growing efficacy of secret communications used by OCs today relates to a Canadian-­based communications platform that allowed El Chapo to issue orders to hitmen, organize global drug trafficking operations, and corrupt the authorities, according to evidence presented during his trial in Brooklyn. It was after Cristian Rodriguez, Guzmán’s in-­house computer geek, had moved four servers out of Canada that American authorities were able finally to tap into the sophisticated encrypted messaging system. The trial also heard that Guzmán used Canadian-­made BlackBerries to spy on his wife, Emma Coronel, and her lover, Agustina Cabanillas Acosta. In Hogan and Century’s 2018 book, Hunting El Chapo, El Chapo’s communication system is described in detail – a system that allowed the Sinaloa cartel to conceal for a period of time the formidable distribution system used to smuggle cocaine, with the help of computers, GPS, and other technological devices. Secret communications, like cryptolects, instill a sense of inner-­group savvy that binds the gang emotionally together. The many secret societies that have emerged in history are evidence of their belief that secrecy is key to preserving exclusive knowledge, to keeping it away from outsiders, and to creating personal bonds among the members of the group. Interestingly, some anthropologists trace the origin of secret societies to all-­male warrior-­bands of

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pre-­modern cultures (Gennep 1960) – a possibility that may have implications for determining the origins of criminal groups themselves, as will be discussed in Chapter 17.

References Arntfield, Michael and Danesi, Marcel (2017). Murder in Plain English: From Manifestos to Memes – Looking at Murder Through the Words of Killers. New York: Prometheus. Blake, Barry J. (2010). Secret Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Danesi, Marcel (2002). The Puzzle Instinct: The Meaning of Puzzles in Human Life. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Denning, Dorothy E. and Baugh, William E. (1998). Encryption and Evolving Technologies: Tools of Organized Crime and Terrorism. Trends in Organized Crime 3: 44–75. Dziedzic-­Rawska, Alicja (2016). Linguistic Creativity in American Prison Settings. Lublin Studies in Modern Languages and Literature 40(1): 81–88. FBI (2011). Cryptanalysts. www.fbi.gov/news/stories/breaking-­codes-­to-­stop-­crime-­part-­1. Gaines, Helen Fouché (1989). Cryptanalysis: A  Study of Ciphers and Their Solutions. New York: Dover. Gennep, Arnold van (1960). The Rites of Passage. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Halliday, Michael (1976). Anti-­Languages. American Anthropologist 78: 570–584. Hogan, Andrew and Century, Douglas (2018). Hunting El Chapo: The Inside Story of the American Lawman Who Captured the World’s Most-­Wanted Drug Lord. New York: HarperCollins. Hugo, Victor (1862). Les Misérables. Paris: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven & Cie. Kooken, Don L. (1939). Cryptography in Criminal Investigations. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 26: 903–920. Little, Bert (1982). Prison Lingo: A Style of American English Slang. Anthropological Linguistics 24: 206–244. Nicaso, Antonio and Danesi, Marcel (2013). Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Paoli, Letizia (2003). Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Trumper, John, Nicaso, Antonio, Madalon, Marta and Gratteri, Nicola (2014). Male lingue. Cosenza: Pellegrini.

Chapter 14

Popular culture

Introduction The number of movies, television programs, bestselling trade books, video games, and Internet sites that deal with organized criminal gangs and the persona of the Mafioso is immense. The criminals have become celebrities in the modern world. Already in the era of Prohibition, writers like F. Scott Fitzgerald took notice of the lure of the gangster persona in his 1925 novel The Great Gatsby (see Brauer 2003), which revolves around Jay Gatsby, a wealthy bootlegger, through whom Fitzgerald offers up a biting criticism of the moral emptiness of the era and its many contrasts – it was decadent, yet exciting; it was immoral, yet still in the grasp of moralism; and above all else, it was filled with bad boys like Gatsby, who is a composite persona of the gangster as a dandy figure, as attractive as any movie star of the early era. Fitzgerald understood that Prohibition allowed the gangsters to gain wealth and power, as well as social status and respectability. Although depicted as a fashionable and charming individual, we get the sense throughout the novel that Gatsby is silently dangerous – just like the real Mafiosi. In effect, Fitzgerald’s novel created a popular image for the figure of the gangster, which was further embedded in groupthink by the films of the classic Hollywood era. This portrayal overturned the view of the gangster as a lowlife, substituting it with a figure who was wealthy and stylish. This image became an impelling one that manifested itself in various ways to this day, from the movies to television and the Internet. Clearly, the question of the relation between the media, popular portrayals of crime, and Mafiosi is a significant one. That question is the subject matter of this chapter. The movies have mythologized the figure of the Mafioso, making him a larger-­than-­life celebrity. As Dickie (2004: 9) observes, even if the criminals can discern unrealistic elements in the fictional portrayals, they bask in the artificial light of celebrity that these shed on them: Mafiosi are like everyone else in that they like to watch television and go to the cinema to see a stylized version of their own daily dramas represented

222  Popular culture

on-­screen. Tommaso Buscetta was a fan of The Godfather, although he thought the scene at the end where the other Mafiosi kiss Michael Corleone’s hand was unrealistic. The conflicting demands that lie behind the motivation of a fictional character like Al Pacino’s Michael Corleone  – ambition, responsibility, family – are indeed the same ones that are central to the lives of real mafiosi. Pop culture has certainly made the symbolism and concepts of the Mafiosi common knowledge. An example is the figure of the “godfather” (padrino in Italian) as the capo dei capi in Mafia culture. As it turns out, it is partially a mythic concept, stemming from Mario Puzo’s 1969 novel The Godfather, which was the basis for the 1972 movie directed by Francis Ford Coppola. The godfather figure was made public first by Joe Valachi’s testimony, as a metaphor, but it was the movie that took it literally and spread it broadly. The notion of a godfather figure fits in perfectly with the mythology of the Mafia as an organization that extols traditional family values. The impact of the movie on the Mafiosi was immediate. Salvatore “Sammy the Bull” Gravano, an underboss in the Gambino crime family at the time, stated: “I left the movie stunned. I mean I floated out of the theatre. Maybe it was fiction, but for me, then, that was our life. It was incredible. I remember talking to a multitude of guys, made guys, who felt exactly the same way.”

The movies The initial movie that led to the establishment of a gangster genre in Hollywood is widely recognized to be Underworld (1927), directed by Josef von Sternberg. The film revolves around a love triangle and a gang war involving the mobster kingpin “Bull” Weed against the backdrop of the Prohibition. It was, however, the 1931 movie Little Caesar that ensconced the persona of the Mafioso in the public imagination, as embodied by the gangster protagonist Cesare “Rico” Bandello, scripted after real gangster Al Capone. Rico became the figure of the “wise guy,” a ruthless mobster with street savvy and gritty toughness but who nonetheless lived by the code that his gang imposed on him. The movie indelibly shaped the perception of Mafiosi as underdogs and tough guys. Hollywood and the Mafia have made perfect partners in crime (no pun intended). The former crafted the wise guy figure, fashioning him after a real-­life Mafia astuto (“astute one”), such as Al Capone or Lucky Luciano. The success of Little Caesar made it clear that the movies and criminal culture had formed a dynamic partnership that benefitted both parties. The genre was new, unknown in Italy at the time, as Robert Warshow (1948: 13) perceptively writes: The experience of the gangster as an experience of art is universal to Americans. There is almost nothing we understand better or react to more readily or with quicker intelligence. In ways that we do not easily

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or willingly define, the gangster speaks for us, expressing that part of the American psyche which rejects the qualities and the demands of modern life, which rejects “Americanism” itself. As the golden age of cinema, the 1930s made the gangster genre popular. Interestingly, the actor who played Rico Bandello, Edward G. Robinson, became so immersed in the role that he attended Capone’s trial in 1931 for tax evasion (as mentioned previously). He wanted to take a close-­up look at Capone to shape his own portrayal of his movie character. The same movie introduced Mafia culture to the general public, from the code of manliness that each gangster was expected to adopt to the code of allegiance, whereby once in the gang, there is no way out of it, as encapsulated in the following stretch of dialogue between Joe Massara, Bandello’s best friend, and Olga Stassoff, Massara’s fiancée: JOE MASSARA:   Once in the gang, you know the rest. OLGA STASSOFF:   I don’t want to know. Only maybe,

maybe it could be different this time, if we try. JOE MASSARA:   I’ve never seen a guy that could get away with it yet. In the movies, the gangster never wins and must submit to justice in the end. These were essentially cautionary tales, warning people about the dangers of criminal life at the same time that they glorified the image of the gangster as an alluring bad boy. There was also a moral subtext, whereby the Mafia is a pathological deviation from the American Dream. At the end of the movie, Rico is killed under a billboard that announces the show starring his friend Joe and Olga – symbolic of the saying that crime does not pay. The movie created an instant legacy, spawning a set of movies in the same decade that were either imitations or derivatives.

1930s gangster films • • • • • • • • • • •

The Public Enemy (1931) Scarface (1932) G-­Men (1935) The Petrified Forest (1936) Bullets or Ballots (1936) Kid Galahad (1937) The Last Gangster (1937) Racket Busters (1938) I Am the Law (1938) Angels with Dirty Faces (1938) The Roaring Twenties (1939)

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As a result of the popularity of this genre, the Mafioso figure gained enormously in stature within America – like Jay Gatsby, he was a larger-­than-­life scoundrel who stood apart from the colorless rank and file. The image was an opportunistic one for the Mafiosi, who literally cashed in on it, venturing into public businesses virtually unmonitored – for instance, it allowed them to play an unobstructed role in the construction of the early casinos in Las Vegas, thus spreading their reach even more broadly into society, while at the same time giving the hard-­working Italian Americans who were the real builders of Las Vegas a bad name by association (Balboni 2006). Las Vegas is still embedded in the popular imagination as part of the history of the American Mafia, as Lunde (2004: 44) notes: Probably the place that first comes to mind in association with the topic of casinos and gambling is Las Vegas, that grew with Mafia money during the 1940s. The Hotel Flamingo was opened in Las Vegas in 1947 by Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, friend of Meyer Lansky and Charles “Lucky” Luciano. Organized crime made a great deal of money skimming profits from the casinos for 40 years, until the laws regarding gaming were strengthened, and it became impossible for anyone with links to organized crime to openly operate in Las Vegas. The Mafiosi saw movies about themselves as empowering, allowing them to craft a new attractive image of themselves broadly across American and back in Italy. When Lucky Luciano returned to his hometown of Lercara Friddi in Sicily, he financed a movie theater there. The first film projected was, not surprisingly, the Italian version of Little Caesar. He often recounted that people would come to him on the streets and kiss his hand in recognition of his celebrity status because, as he boasted, they wanted to show him that he was more worthy of adulation than Rico Bandello in the movie (Gambetta 1993: 190). The movies have also occasionally told the real villainous story of the Mafia. An example is the Valachi Papers (1972), which dramatizes the story of Joseph Valachi, the first American Mafia informant. But even this became part of an ever-­expanding mythology of Mafia culture. In the movie, there is a reference to the use of concealed weapons in a violin case, which soon after became an intrinsic part of Hollywood Mafia lore, part fact, part fiction. The importance of choosing the appropriate weapon is seen when a gun and a knife are placed on a table in front of Joe Valachi. He is told menacingly by the capo that anyone who lives by the knife and the gun will die by the same weapons – a version of the Biblical warning, “For all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword,” a line that also appears in the opening of Little Caesar. In another episode of the movie, symbolic violence is highlighted – in it, the penis of someone who slept with the capo’s mistress is cut off. Such filmic portrayals not only influenced the perception of the criminals, but also, by extension, of Italian Americans in general. As Carlos Cortes (1987:

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107) points out, the disclaimer at the beginning of some of the movies about authenticity is “a recognition that entertainment films do, in fact, teach, possessing the power to create reinforce, and modify public images about ethnic groups, including Italian-­Americans.” But the stereotyping started even before the Mafia movies. In the early silent films, Italian immigrants are portrayed anxious to pursue the American Dream, abandoning their previous ways. The implication was that life back home was miserable, while America allowed the immigrant to climb the social ladder. The wise guy image created by Hollywood was further entrenched in post-­ war movies such as Black Hand (1950), The Brothers Rico (1957), Inside the Mafia (1959), and Pay or Die (1960). As Cortes (1987: 112) points out: Such movies not only reinforced the gangster image of the Little Caesar/Scarface tradition, but also added a new dimension. Larger, better organized, and far more brutal than their film predecessors, these Italian-­ American movie gangs also enjoyed venal connections with international Italian criminality, a far cry from the bumbling Italian soldiers of World War II Hollywood lore. The problem with these filmic portrayals is that they painted Italian-­ Americans with a broad, biased brush. No wonder that Italian-­American groups assailed the Godfather when it first came out in 1972 as creating a false image of Italians. Aware of the problem, Italian-­American film directors started deflecting the spotlight away from Mafia culture to other gangsters, implying that gangsterism is not exclusive to Italians but part of human life. An example is Brian De Palma’s 1983 remake of Scarface, which includes Cuban Americans in the gangster mix. Predictably, there was an outcry from the Cuban American community, which, like similar protests by Italian-­ American groups, was short lived and ineffectual. A disclaimer was found at the end of the movie: “The characters do not represent the Cuban American community and it would be erroneous and unfair to suggest that they do,” which indirectly emphasized the biased representation. Michael Cimino put the focus on New York’s Chinatown’s criminal gangs, a little later, with the Year of the Dragon (1985). Chinese Americans protested, but again to no avail. The movie’s accompanying disclaimer indicated that it was about “a group of ruthless criminals” who should not be seen as being typical of any specific ethnic group. If one film can be chosen to represent the various subtexts in all the Mafioso gangster films, it is undoubtedly Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather (1972), mentioned in previous chapters. The choice of the movie’s setting, Corleone, was not accidental. It is the name of a small town south of Palermo. In his novel, Il Gattopardo (1958, “The Leopard”), Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa described it as a harsh place with downtrodden people constantly facing challenges, travails, and setbacks. Corleone was the place of one of the earliest

226  Popular culture

Mafia strongholds. Probably derived from the name of an Arab fighter, Kurliyun (“Lionheart”), the town has a long tradition of exhibiting public courage and of standing up to injustices. In the second half of the 1800s, Corleone became the center of the farmer uprisings against the large agricultural estate holders. The town also boasts a warrior, sword-­wielding patron saint, Saint Bernard, who, as a poor cobbler in the seventeenth century, defended the poor and the women against corrupt aristocrats before donning the hood of the Capuchin monks. It is no coincidence that the main character of the movie, Don Vito Corleone, was reminiscent of Don Michele Navarra, the actual capo of Corleone: “Like a deity the doctor [Navarra], a short, corpulent figure with a bull-­like neck and a broad, apparently kindly face, had the power of both life and death over every single one of them” (Follain 2009: 10). It is ironic to consider retroactively that the fictitious Corleone Mafia family stood out to American audiences as a model of the traditional family. Even Cosa Nostra boss Joe Bonanno was quoted as saying: “This work of fiction is not really about organized crime or about gangsterism. The true theme has to do with family pride and personal honor. That’s what made The Godfather so popular” (Lunde 2004: 171). Was the portrayal realistic or simply an ersatz condemnation of the moral relativism of American society that was spreading broadly through it at the time? The role of Vito Corleone, played by actor Marlon Brando, was based on the actual capo of the Corleone clan in Sicily at the time, Luciano Leggio. And there are a number of striking parallels between the actor’s role and the real capo. The character of Don Vito assumed various appearance features of Leggio – he dressed ostentatiously in a suit, tie, with a pocket handkerchief; he would hold a giant, thick cigar, playing with it in a twirling motion. But the movie character was much more benevolent than Leggio, who was a ruthless scoundrel. Dickie (2004: 332–333) compares Brando’s characterization and Leggio’s public persona in the following way: And with his cigar, his long, heavy jaw, and his arrogant bearing, he actually managed to pull it off; there is more than passing resemblance between the two. In fact Leggio’s face was already infamous before The Godfather was released. The Antimafia commission’s analysis of Leggio, published in the same year that the movie came out, is not a document that tends to dwell on anything as frivolous as appearances. Yet it was transfixed by Leggio’s “big, round, cold face”, his “ironic and scornful” glower. If the cinematic Don Vito was the face of the mafia as it likes to think of itself – judicious and family-­centred – then Luciano Leggio’s features, by contrast, were an emblem of capricious terror. Whereas Brando’s heavy lids gave his character an almost noble reserve, Leggio’s staring eyeballs suggested that he was as volatile as he was malevolent. The cigar was also identified with Al Capone, who would rarely be caught without a cigar in front of the cameras. Significantly, Carmine Galante, a New

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York Mafia boss, was gunned down while having lunch at a restaurant in Bushwick, Brooklyn. The police found him with a cigar stuck in his mouth. Galante’s nickname was “Cigar,” and it is likely that the killers inserted it into his mouth to make a brutal symbolic statement. The Godfather became so popular that even other criminal groups were influenced by it. It is reported that Triad enforcers used an episode from the movie to couch a threat against a Hong Kong businessman who, as Reynolds (2006: 169) writes, “was sent the severed head of a dog” by the enforcers who were obviously “impressed with the celebrated scene, incorporating the severed head of a horse, from the Godfather.” A similar event occurred in Sicily in 1991 when a horse’s head, with a knife stuck in it, was found in the car of a construction company executive who had refused to pay the pizzo. The same pattern of imitation was adopted by the Mafiosi themselves. Antonino Calderone, who became a state witness, tells of a homicide ordered by Mafia boss Totò Di Cristina after having read Puzo’s book, where Di Cristina tells his hitmen to dress up as doctors (as in the book) and go to a hospital and murder a rival (Arlacchi 1993: 23).

The legacy of The Godfather (1972) The opening scene of the movie shows the wedding of Don Vito Corleone’s daughter. At one point in the scene, someone asks Don Vito to carry out “justice” for him, because the law had failed to do so. He responds: “Why did you go to the cops, why not come to me first?” This scene sets the tone and mood for the whole movie, which revolves around the role of omertà in Mafia culture at the same time that it highlights the kinds of shady deals and random vendettas that occur behind the façade of honor. The Mafia’s form of justice in the movie is direct and effective; society’s justice system, on the other hand, is besieged by legal entanglements and is effete, not to mention corrupt. Don Vito expresses this theme in the following way, which has become a common cliché: “A lawyer with his briefcase can steal more than a hundred men with guns.” The use of forthright justice was a part of what made the movie highly popular – things are made right with fists and the gun, not with endless reams of legal red tape. In a way, the movie was a treatise on what is wrong with the byzantine American system of justice at the same time that it showed how vendetta justice cannot, in the end, really solve anything, no matter how glorified it is. The images that came out of The Godfather have remained imprinted in the popular imagination. Its residues can be seen in media descendants

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such as The Sopranos, which began airing on HBO in 1999, and subsequent crime movies. In effect, America and the world have learned about the Mafia through movies and television. As Reynolds (2006: 168) observes, it is through exposure “to The Godfather movies or an episode of The Sopranos,” that most of us now know that “the Italian organized gangs are as rigidly structured and tightly controlled as any corporation.” The movie was seen as peddling a biased portrait of Italian Americans. In 1970, the Italian American Civil Rights League held a rally to stop production of The Godfather. Cleverly and opportunistically, crime boss Joe Colombo became a role-­player in the protest. Before the movie came out, he made a pact with the producers at Paramount Pictures that they would not use the words Mafia or Cosa Nostra, although he allowed the use of the term Five Families. Ironically, he was seriously wounded during one of the League’s protests, dying right after the premier of the movie. The protest had little impact. The Godfather was followed by two sequels, winning many awards. However, it might have motivated the production of a few subsequent movies that came forth to shed a different kind of realistic light on the presence of an expanding gangster culture in America, including The Untouchables (1987), Goodfellas (1990), and Donnie Brasco (1997). These dealt with the psychology of the gangster and why Mafia culture is so dangerous and self-­immolating, wherein the criminal activities that the Mafiosi carry out are the same ones in which they themselves indulge, including drugs, gambling, and adultery. In contrast to the Godfather trilogy, these movies cast a light on the morally ambiguous side to Cosa Nostra culture. The language of the characters is hardly dignified, as in The Godfather, but foul-­mouthed, setting the tone for subsequent movies and TV programs in the genre. While these movies also loosely gave some prominence to the principles of family values and omertà of The Godfather, they added an edge of uncertainty and self-­examination that was not present in that movie or the ones before it. Overall, the movies have been good for criminal organizations, imprinting archetypal images of the gangsters as Männerbund, brave male warrior bands, in cultural groupthink. They have also educated the public directly and indirectly about organized crime in all its dimensions – constituting a kind of visual historiography and psychology of the phenomenon. The existence of the Vory v Zakone came to general public awareness after two movies, The Mark of Cain (2007) and Eastern Promises (2007) – a criminal organization that was unknown to the American public until the movies stepped in to put the spotlight on it. In a similar fashion, the movie Yakuza (1974) projected the Japanese gang into American popular culture, rebounding back to Japan, where it enabled the real Yakuza to grow even more in prestige. The image of a brutal but honorable bunch of modern-­day criminal samurai was bolstered by subsequent movies

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such as Black Rain (1989). A similar story can be told about the Triads, who made it to the silver screen indirectly through the movies of the martial arts’ first legendary movie hero, Bruce Lee. Films such as Enter the Dragon (1973) featured Triad fighters, enhancing the appeal of both the martial arts and the lifestyles of these “noble warriors.” It should not come as a surprise that the movies not only helped construct the image of the wise guy in the popular imagination but also provided an opportunity for the Mafia itself to become involved in the movie business, albeit a short-­lived one. During the Capone era the movie business was the fourth-­largest industry in America. Many of the crime movies in the 1930s were shot in Chicago, whereupon the Chicago chapter of Cosa Nostra saw its opportunity to get a cut of movie profits by taking over movie trade unions while running extortion rackets on movie theater chains. As Lunde (2004: 155) points out: By controlling the unions, they could cripple any studio that refused to pay protection against strikes and close down all the theaters in the country with a single telephone call. This came to an end in 1943, however, when three Mafiosi, Johnny Roselli, Frank Nitti, and Paul Ricca, were indicted for extortion. At their trial the involvement of the Mafia in Hollywood came out and the Mafia’s dream to control movies came to an end. To summarize, the movies have been promoters, documenters, fabricators, and influencers of Mafia culture since at least the 1930s. One movie mentioned previously, Donnie Brasco (1997), is based on the real-­life events connected with Joseph D. Pistone, an FBI agent who successfully infiltrated the Bonanno crime family in New York City during the 1970s, under the alias “Donnie Brasco.” The character of Donnie Brasco is played by Johnny Depp, who met with Pistone several times while preparing for his role. After it was revealed that Donnie Brasco was an FBI agent, Dominick “Sonny Black” Napolitano was murdered for having allowed the agent to infiltrate the family. He was shot dead, and his hands were cut off. It was not another informant who gave him away; ironically, it was the movies.

Television Paralleling the importance of the movies in spreading constructed images of Mafia culture throughout society is television. The HBO television series The Sopranos, which ran from 1999 to 2007, and which won many accolades for treating the vicissitudes of Mafia psychology and culture, is a case in point. The series revolved around the character of Anthony Soprano, a family man and a Mafia boss, and his struggles to strike a balance between his criminal activities and achieving affluence like his fellow suburbanites. He struggles throughout the episodes with an existential crisis that something is missing, perhaps

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alluding to the fact that Mafia culture was no longer viable and may have damaged perceptions of Italian-­Americans. Soprano suffers constant panic attacks that cause him to faint, for which he visits a psychiatrist in whom he confides – an unthinkable situation for real Mafiosi. But, as the series implied, Mafiosi are human, not idolized chivalric warriors, who suffer from the same kinds of maladies of common folk. In the perception of some Italian Americans, the series was seen as promoting the ethnic stereotyping of first-­and second-­generation Italian Americans. As it did for The Godfather, the National Italian American Foundation harshly critiqued The Sopranos as an offensive caricature of Italian Americans. To determine if this was indeed the case, a 2001 national survey of 800 people was conducted by Fairleigh Dickinson University. It found that 37% watched the show regularly, but 65% of this group disagreed that the show negatively portrayed Italian Americans. Perhaps the image of the Mafioso had become so entrenched in the public eye that it no longer had the same kind of stereotypical ethnic nuances that it had in previous eras. At the end of the series, in 2007, the same team conducted a second national survey. In this poll, 41% of the 776 people polled said that they watched the show regularly, and 61% of this group also said that it did not portray Italian Americans in a negative light. Nevertheless, critics worried that the show was inaccurate and dated in its representation of Italian Americans, depicting only a small criminal subculture. On the other hand, others saw the characters in the Sopranos as representing the values that American society was thought to have abandoned at the time. After a few attempts to replicate the success of the series, such as Growing Up Gotti (2004–2005) and Mob Wives (2011–2016), the public mood with respect to Mafia culture changed. Post-­Soprano television has, actually, dealt with gang culture in psychologically realistic ways, moving away from the simplistic glorification of the past that had primarily entertainment value. It has also examined gang culture more broadly, as the following three programs indicate: •

•

•

Sons of Anarchy (2008–2014). This series focused on an outlaw biker gang that carried out its illegal activities in a fictional town named, ironically, Charming, California. It dealt with corruption and racism, portraying the biker philosophy as based on white supremacy. An actual Hells Angels member served as a technical adviser and played an assassin in the series. Boardwalk Empire (2010–2014). This series was set in Atlantic City during Prohibition in the 1920s, the first true era of Cosa Nostra. It was based on real events described in the book by Nelson Johnson, Boardwalk Empire (2002). It focused on a politician who formed alliances with the Mafiosi as they carried out their bootlegging activities. It paints a graphic portrait of an era where crime, corruption, and violence were spreading, leaving traces within society to this day. Narcos (2015–2017). This series was set in the 1980s. The narrative is told from the perspective of a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency

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who is sent to Colombia to stop the rise of the drug cartels and the brutality that they brought about to everyone. It is a stark portrait of narcoterrorism and the havoc it wreaks on people. Italian TV avoided Mafia themes initially, although it did translate American movies for audiences, with some notable exceptions, such as In nome della legge (1949, “In the Name of the Law”) directed by Pietro Germi and Salvatore Giuliano (1962), Le mani sulla città (1963, “Hands on the City”), and Lucky Luciano (1973) directed by Francesco Rosi. Since the turn of the millennium, Italian TV has taken a keener interest in Mafia culture, with various popular series devoted to its exploits, its figures, and its mindset. Among these, one that stands out in particular is Gomorrah (which premiered in 2014), based on the novel by Roberto Saviano (2006). The series focuses on the rivalry between two clans, the Savestano and the Conte clans, which fight each other to take control of illegal drug trafficking in the Neapolitan district of Scampia, highlighting the reality with which the region must deal on a daily basis, where the gray zone of violence and corruption has cast a wide net over it. Italian TV has become a narrative tool to help combat corruption, highlighting the danger that the gray zone has always posed and continues to pose even more as the criminal activities of the gangsters move more and more to the online world, where they are even more effective, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Internet The online world is a space where various media converge and where cultural content is entangled in a state of constant flux and change, augmenting a state of mind that the semiotician Roland Barthes (1957) called neomania, defined as a constant desire for new things, new fads, and even new or alternate realities. Although coined in the pre-­Internet era, Barthes’ notion applies especially today. Obsolescence occurs literally overnight, as trends appear on one day and disappear into the ether on the next day. It has even turned the images and exploits of the Mafiosi into ephemeral memes. The Internet has been a powerful democratizing force, giving everyone a voice and a locus for bringing to light their own ideas. But it has also given a powerful and deranged voice to villains and reprobates. The mobsters are nothing if not adaptive to change. The Bellocco ’Ndrangheta clan of Rosarno has been reported as boasting that “If they write our name on Google, they will understand what we are made of,” implying both that the Internet is the “stage” on which Mafia culture is now displayed and popularized and that it can be used more effectively than physical intimidation. The Mafia, like everyone else, has also developed an obsession with how the Internet portrays its image. Antonio Piromalli, the grandson of one of the most powerful bosses of the ’Ndrangheta, which for generations has controlled Gioia Tauro, home to an important port hub, showed his obsession with the Internet

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by asking a computer expert to find a way to remove the news of his conviction from the Internet, or at least to make it appear after many others, because each time he googled his name, his criminal record came up. At the time (before ending up again in jail), he was promoting food products in the United States and thus wanted to avoid any association with criminality. The Internet has surreptitiously turned the pop Mafia culture of Hollywood and television into a digital (or meme) culture. Social media games, such as Mafia Wars (release date 2008), have entrenched the mythology of the Mafiosi even more than the movies or television. Players assume the roles of gangsters who are establishing their own Mafia fiefdoms. In stereotypical Hollywood style, the players fight other mobster-­players, complete missions, and carry out various operations in order to gain rewards and rise to prominence in a game that has no end. The game was closed down on June 6, 2016. It was relaunched on mobile platforms but was again cancelled in July of 2017. But the game concept did not vanish, as different sequels have emerged. On the Internet, ephemerality rules – nothing lasts for very long, and in fact, the game no longer exists. Some aspects of Internet-­shaped Mafia culture are, however, more long lasting. Sites and hyperlinks to Mafia memorabilia, infamous criminals, and so on are creating a veritable digital culture for the gangs, creating a new cognitive and social environment for them, blending information, entertainment, documentary, and drama into one hyperreal state of mind. Internet Mafia culture includes everything from video games to Mobster Museums, as the illustrative sidebar shows.

Internet Mafia culture Video games The number of video games based on Mafia culture, real and fictional, is extensive. Here are only a few selected examples: The Godfather (1991) is a video game whose plot is based on the Godfather films, with scenes reflecting the locations in the films, from New York and Miami to Corleone in Sicily. Yakuza (2005) is a game that presents a sentimental view of the crime gang, with the plot revolving around a Yakuza member who was wrongly imprisoned. Mafia III (2016) is the third installment of a game in which the protagonist aims to take the criminals down.

Memorabilia and collectibles Memorabilia sites of real and fictional Mafiosi are also popular. There are also posters of Mafiosi, movie scenes, and so on available on various websites to download.

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Mafioso celebrities A Google search will lead to a vast number of sites dedicated to famous Mafiosi, from Lucky Luciano to Al Capone. Visitors can read about them like they can about any celebrity.

Online reports Journalistic reports of famous Mafia stories and events are also common on the Web.

The Mob Museum This website keeps updates on real gangsters and on their portrayals in popular culture, with hyperlinks to ongoing events.

MafiaWiki There is a wiki that contains information and links to video games, collectibles, figures, famous criminal events, and so on.

The figure of the wise guy on the Internet is a composite (cut-­and-­paste) one, based on established mythic images and tropes – reinforcing the stereotypes of Mafia culture of other media. TV documentaries have immortalized such violent mobsters as Paul Castellano, John Gotti, and Sammy “The Bull” Gravano, among others – and these are made available through streaming and other digital systems. The gangsters are paid indirect tribute with memes of stereotypical Mafioso expressions such as “fogget about it” (forget about it) and “How ya’ doin”. In a relevant study, Panos Kostakos (2018) used big data analytics to assess the popularity of organized crime across social media, finding that “profiles linked to ‘mafia’ tweets were predominantly linked to entertainment and leisure activities” (Kostakos 2018: 299). All this suggests that the ethnic bias associated with early portrayals of the Mafiosi in film may have dissipated somewhat but may still be there in the background One way to understand why Italian American immigrants went from being marginalized and victimized in the early part of the twentieth century to being embraced as part of American culture is provided by the concept of psychological distance, as developed by Yaacov Trope and Nina Liberman (2010). This refers to the tendency of the native denizens of a society to separate themselves from foreigners yet feel positively about them because of certain events. Using this theoretical framework, it can be seen why we grant the mobsters a form of dignity, even though their actions are horrific. We do this because we can

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remain distant from them yet still admire them in fictional representations. This is perhaps why mobsters are so well liked – as long as we have nothing to do with them.

Two legacies: mythologization and alien conspiracy As emphasized in this chapter, popular culture has been good for the Mafia, fabricating new myths about gangs that have played a role in their perpetuity. The Godfather is a prime example of how Mafia culture is mythologized. Released during a turbulent time in American society, the counterculture 1970s, the story of Vito Corleone draws on a nostalgic feeling to return to simpler times where authority, order, and traditional family values were important to the society at large. It embedded in groupthink the notion of the Mafia as espousing an honorable form of justice, without the legal bureaucracy of the justice system of mainstream society. But this is problematic because it undermines the real threat and brutality of organized crime, leaving skewed images in the popular mind that are almost impossible to eradicate. And it also ignores the hidden bias that the images produce. There are thus two legacies that pop culture has created for the Mafia – the one of mythologization and ethnic bias. In terms of the first legacy, the movies, television, and Internet media have played a large role in creating an America-­made Mafia mystique that is even more powerful than the one of cavalleria rusticana mystique of the real Mafias. Mafiosi are largely depicted in the various media as wealthy, powerful, violent, and extremely loyal men. Crime is understood to be part of their honorable lifestyle, in part because it resonates as an act of defiance against the “establishment.” This trope is not found in Italian media, where the Mafia is hardly glorified as a breakaway anti-­establishment group but a brutal society-­destroying one. The television series Il capo dei capi (2007), which tells the story of infamous Mafioso, Totò Riina, reveals the distorted view of family that the Mafia really upholds. Riina had no respect for the lives of others, apart from those in his immediate circle of friends, family, and acquaintances. He endorsed family and Catholic values openly but ended up perverting both. In the movie, Riina often says that one must never kill anyone, yet he turns around and does exactly that. Riina sees himself as a larger-­than-­life figure, resorting to omertà to justify his actions, alluding cleverly to the historical plight of Sicilians by suggestion. Fiction is one of the main factors that allows the Mafia to endure – both the fiction created by the Mafiosi themselves to legitimize their lives (such as the cavalleria rusticana myth) and the fiction created by Hollywood and other media. Without these two kinds of fictions, the stability of the Mafias would become highly fragile. Fiction is the main reason police crackdowns against the Mafia have proven largely ineffectual in defeating it. The movies have also enshrined Mafia symbolism and rituals in the popular imagination, as discussed previously. Recall the kiss of death one more time

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here, revealed to the world in the Valachi Papers (1972). The real-­life Joe Valachi testified that he was given this while imprisoned, to mark him as a dead man walking. That event is referenced in The Godfather, Part II, when Michael Corleone kisses a Mafioso who had turned informant as he utters, “I know it was you, Fredo; you broke my heart.” The second legacy is the biased imprint that popular culture has left on Italian Americans, even though it is hardly recognized consciously today. Known more generally as alien conspiracy theory, it references the belief that organized crime was imported into American society by “outsider” ethnic groups, such as the Italians, the Irish, and the Chinese, corroborated by representations in popular culture. An early example is the Black Hand era (as already discussed). Recall that the extortion technique of the Black Handers consisted of letters sent to victims demanding money, which were signed with a black hand. The newspapers instantly jumped in to portray the scheme as a sign of the criminal darkness that was imported into America from Italy. Italian immigrants were targeted as the scapegoats for internal economic and social problems that they had nothing to do with. It was also conveniently neglected that America had its own homegrown criminal gangs, such as Butch Cassidy’s “Wild Bunch,” which had evolved in the nineteenth century into a powerful criminal organization that became the most feared train-­robbing gang in America. It is difficult to determine where mythologization ends and alien conspiracy starts. For example, journalist Lindsay Denison mythologized the Black Handers by attributing the use of the black hand symbol to an older secret society. Writing in the September  1908 issue of Everybody’s Magazine, he stated that Black Handers traced their roots to “a secret society which fought the government and the church in Spain during the Inquisition and the [era of] secret societies of Southern Italy” (cited in Cawthorne and Cawthorne 2009: 69). The president of the United Italian Societies of New York during the era, Gaetano D’Amato, believed in a similar source for the symbol. He claimed that it had been used in Spain in the 1860s by a group of bandits who proclaimed themselves to be protectors of the downtrodden and that the term migrated to the United States “probably by some Italian desperado who had heard of the exploits of the Spanish society, and considered the combination of words to be high-­sounding and terror-­inspiring” (quoted in Cawthorne and Cawthorne 2009: 69). For their part, the Italian immigrants saw the Black Hand situation differently, as Cawthorne and Cawthorne point out (2009: 60–61): Italian immigrants felt that American law had no understanding of their situation and no power to help them. They knew that the threats in Black Hand letters were likely to be carried out if they did not pay up. Italians were armed. According to an official at Ellis Island, the clearing station for immigrants, two-­thirds of all male immigrants landing were carrying knives, revolvers or blackjacks.

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A group of Italians calling itself The White Hand (Mano Bianca) Society was eventually formed, claiming that they understood the real character of the gangsters better than did the American authorities. The White Handers declared war on the Black Handers in vigilante style. But they did not succeed, because the code of secrecy that was brought along from the old world operated as well in the new social environment. In Chicago, there is a famous incident involving the notorious “Shotgun Man” in the 1910s who murdered over a dozen people in the same area of town, the corner of Oak and Milton (known as “Death Corner”), in broad daylight during ten years of terror. The murderer was never identified, despite witnesses. The code of secrecy allowed the killer to go free. Italian immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century were viewed as either part of crime families or as sympathetic to them – a reputation that they still find somewhat difficult to shed today. Only a tiny percentage of the huge migration of Italians, primarily from the south of Italy, to America in the early twentieth century were criminals. Still, their association with Mafia culture remains a subtext in the perception of Italian-­American identity. But the negative portrayal of Italians is not an invention of Hollywood. It dates back to literary trends in Europe in the nineteenth century, where the concept of “dangerous classes” emerged as a conceptual link between crime and Italians – a term that comes from the title of a book by Honoré Antoine Frégier published in 1840. Fictional portrayals in England and France alluded to the dangerous classes, who were ensconced in endemic vices, ignorance, and misery, constituting the social cauldron from which the gangs arose, prefiguring the criminological studies that were to come almost a century later. At the same time, these portrayals embedded the stigma of Italian immigrants as a dangerous class. In 1862, Alexandre Dumas depicted the Camorra as a product of the dangerous classes in his book, La Camorra et autre récits de brigandage (“The Camorra and Other Tales of Brigandage”), nonetheless showcasing the unique character of the Camorristi themselves as honorable brigands. This type of portrayal was simply translated into American pop culture of the early twentieth century, when internal social anxieties were projected onto the immigrants, leading to blatant bigotry in some cases. American lawyer Grant Madison’s book The Passing of the Great Race (1916), decried the influx of southern Europeans (Italians) into America, threatening to “dilute” the blood of the Nordic, Anglo-­Saxon stock living in the United States. Measures taken to control immigration have also been used to keep America free of “intruders,” starting with a 1911 commission on immigration chaired by Senator William Paul Dillingham, which concluded that Italian immigrants were even worse than African Americans. This xenophobic proclivity unfortunately left destructive residues in contemporary America.

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References Arlacchi, Pino (1993). Men of Dishonor: Inside the Sicilian Mafia. An Account of Antonino Calderone. New York: William Morrow. Balboni, Alan (2006). Beyond the Mafia: Italian Americans and the Development of Las Vegas. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Barthes, Roland (1957). Mythologies. Paris: Seuil. Brauer, Stephen (2003). Jay Gatsby and the Prohibition Gangster as Businessman. The F. Scott Fitzgerald Review 2: 51–71. Cawthorne, Nigel and Cawthorne, Colin (2009). The Mafia: First-­Hand Accounts of Life Inside the Mob. London: Constable & Robinson. Cortes, Carlos E. (1987). Italian-­Americans in Films: From Immigrants to Icons. Melus 14: 107–126. Dickie, John (2004). Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia. London: Houghton and Stoughton. Dumas, Alexandre (1862). La Camorra et autre récits de brigandage. Paris: Vuibert. Fitzgerald, F. Scott (1925). The Great Gatsby. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Follain, John (2009). The Last Godfathers: Inside the Mafia’s Most Infamous Family. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. Frégier, Honoré Antoine (1840). Des classes dangereuses de la population dans les grandes villes et des moyens de les rendre meilleures. Lausanne: J.-­B. Baillière. Gambetta, Diego (1993). The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Grant, Madison (1916). The Passing of the Great Race. New York: Charles Scribner’s & Sons. Johnson, Nelson (2002). Boardwalk Empire. Medford: Medford Press. Kostakos, Panos (2018). Public Perceptions on Organised Crime, Mafia, and Terrorism: A Big Data Analysis Based on Twitter and Google Trends. International Journal of Cyber Criminology 12(1): 282–299. Lampedusa, Giuseppe Tomasi di (1958). Il gattopardo. Milano: Feltrinelli. Lunde, Paul (2004). Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London: Dorling Kindersley. Puzo, Mario (1969). The Godfather. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books. Saviano, Roberto (2006). Gomorrah. Milano: Mondadori. Trope, Yaakov and Liberman, Nina (2010). Construal-­Level Theory of Psychological Distance. Psychological Review 117: 444. Warshow, Robert (1948). The Gangster as Tragic Hero. London: Partisan Review.

Chapter 15

Cyberspace

Introduction In late 2012, office workers at a shipping company in Antwerp, Belgium, started complaining that their computers were consistently too slow. An investigation by the company’s IT experts, aided by the Belgian police, discovered that several workstations had been hacked, allowing the computer wizards to gather information on containers at the shipping company’s port that was then used by a local gang to organize picking them up at the port without arousing any suspicion. This is a salient example of the fusion of traditional gang operation and the art of hacking. It became immediately obvious to investigators that organized crime groups were employing computer geeks to carry out their everyday business. Police agencies throughout the world quickly established cybercrime units or expanded those they already had. The Antwerp incident was just one in a vast and expanded quagmire of similar ones throughout the world – the criminal organizations had realized that their reach could be extended throughout the globe with only a few clicks of the computer mouse or touches on a screen. In fact, investigators into contraband activities and into the illegal trafficking of drugs, people, and animals soon discovered that crime gangs from anywhere in the world – from Latin America to Ukraine and Nigeria and South Africa – were using the Internet and digital messaging services to plan and execute their criminal schemes in ways that paralleled the Antwerp situation, evading detection effectively. It was clear, in other words, that cyberspace had become a new and profitable hunting ground for mobsters of any kind. The term cyberspace was coined by the avant-­garde writer William Gibson in his short story “Burning Chrome” (1982) – a term he popularized broadly through his widely read novel Neuromancer (1984). Since then, it has been used commonly to describe a “virtual cognitive space” in which thinking and acting unfold in tandem with real-­world thinking and behavior. This new mind-­ world was described perfectly by the 1999 movie The Matrix, which showed how cyberspace has redefined human perception. The main protagonist of that movie, Neo, lives “on” and “through” the computer screen. His engagement

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with reality is largely shaped by that screen, whose technical name is the matrix, as the network of circuits that constitutes computer technology is called. But the same word also meant “womb” in Latin. The movie’s transparent subtext was that, with the advent of the Internet, people are now born in two kinds of wombs – the biological and the technological. Since the advent of cyberspace, criminals have realized that it affords them many new opportunities to perpetrate their misdeeds and to remain undetected by the authorities, hiding behind the screen. Movement and interaction in cyberspace are virtual and thus harder to track. Money laundering, for instance, is greatly facilitated and concealed in this digital environment, as is the fabrication of false documents, from credit cards and passports to bank accounts, with simple-­to-­use software. So too are smuggling, racketeering, trafficking in narcotics, and other criminal activities, which are planned so as to remain undetected, especially on the Dark Net (to be discussed subsequently). As discussed throughout this book, organized crime syndicates gain and exude power through fear-­mongering. The online world has enhanced the fear factor, since threats in cyberspace are nowhere, yet everywhere. This chapter will look at the migration of organized crime to the online world and how that world has taken note of this migration, with its sites and hyperlinks to Mafia memorabilia and infamous criminals, as we saw in the previous chapter, which create the false illusion that Mafia culture is modern and exciting. As in previous chapters, our goal is not to present the situation in strictly criminological terms or in terms of prevention strategies but in terms of the cultural and psycho-­social forces at work in such a migration. Online crime is a reality. Profits are higher; chances of getting caught are lower. Online gambling, stock fraud, mortgage fraud and many other crimes can be carried out with keystrokes rather than bullets. It comes as little surprise that rather than the traditional “accountant,” à la Meyer Lansky (Chapter 5), who was called the “Mob’s Accountant” in the United States and who handled gambling affairs and kept false records, today’s Mafia has webmasters, hackers, and web designers to manage its affairs. With cybersmart engineers, the crime syndicates now conduct everything from establishing supply chains and distribution to disabling competitors on both sides of the law.

The globalization of organized crime Gibson’s novella “Burning Chrome” (mentioned previously) actually predicted that cybercrime would become a fact of everyday life. The story revolves around the exploits of two early hackers – Automatic Jack and Bobby Quine. Jack is in possession of so-­called Russian “icebreaker” software that makes it easy to hack corporate security systems. Bobby suggests hacking an infamous and vicious criminal computer wizard known as Chrome, who launders money for organized crime. Their break-­in is successful, allowing them to empty Chrome’s bank accounts. The plot thickens, however, because Bobby, who is infatuated

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with a young lady named Rikki, discovers afterward that Rikki has criminal ties to Chrome. Rikki eventually disappears, leaving Bobby devastated, and the plot remains unresolved, perhaps reflecting how many cybercrimes remain obscure and unsettled. Gibson’s story is one of the first narratives to deal with hacking as an activity that organized crime was already engaging in even in the pre-Internet era. Criminal organizations today can perform their traditional activities, either in part or completely, via online media, planning and coordinating them much more effectively, from illegally farmed caviar and the trafficking of women for sexual purposes, to the distribution of narcotics to markets that in the past would have been unthinkable, including India, Brazil, Ukraine, Nigeria, South Africa, Vietnam, and China, among many others. This state of affairs has placed severe strains on the ability of all countries today to curtail these activities, which have put a strain on local economies. Also, a new sense of syndication has taken place through the Internet, with crime groups linking up with each other to form mutually beneficial partnerships. Organized crime has, in a phrase, become a multiethnic global phenomenon because of cyberspace. As we saw, this has led to the formation of transnational criminal organizations (Chapter 10), to describe organized crime that crosses national borders for planning and executing illegal activities from counterfeiting and drug trafficking to illegal wildlife trade and the theft of cultural property. This has led to a kind of ersatz global standardization of organized crime, whereby criminal gangs of different nationalities and ethnicities are now adopting a common set of rules based on similar utilitarian principles of criminal conduct, while at the same time retaining their historical identities through linguistic and cultural differences. As Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells (1996) argued at the start of the Web society, the digital technology revolution has brought about a tension between the adoption of global cultural trends and the need to preserve local cultures. The former constitutes the pan-­cultural structures that have emerged on the Internet and the latter people’s attempts to retain their historically based identities (religious, ethnic, territorial, or national) in the new digital universe. As Khan and Estrada (2016: 2) have remarked, globalization has led to a situation whereby it is possible to “create the values that are shared by or pertinent to all the world’s more than 7 billion people, their surroundings, their roles as residents, customers, or producers with a concern for a co-­operative action planned to solve general problems.” Like never before in the history of OCs, criminal gangs have the ability to spread their activities across the globe, recruit new resources from anywhere, and use more sophisticated methods of planning and conducting their activities, as the Antwerp case saliently showed. In cyberspace, there are no borders, so that when the police enter this virtual world, ironically, it is the different ethnicities of the gangs that make investigations slow and difficult, at best, and often impossible.

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Organized crime and cybercrime are not synonymous. The main difference is that organized crime carries out its physical activities and operations in the real world rather than in cyberspace alone, using cyberspace as a planning and organizational platform; on the other hand, cybercrimes are perpetrated by individuals. Organized crime is to be differentiated as well from organized cybercrime, which is defined as small groups of hackers who come together for a little while to perpetrate crimes involving fraud and identity theft and then disappear. These cybercriminals lack a structured organization, at least as traditionally conceived, but possess the computer skills necessary to carry out complex crimes over the Web. The difference between the two may be encapsulated colloquially as follows – the cybercriminals are hit-­and-­run groups; the traditional OCs are hit-­and-­stay groups. The Internet has, of course, enabled the traditional organized crime groups to enlarge their scope and sophistication, employing hackers to create secure systems of communication and to help them in their extortion and racketeering operations.

Cybercrime lexicon Cyber-­fraud: misrepresentation of facts, or alteration of data, to get someone to provide personal and financial information for criminal purposes such as carding (credit card fraud), bank fraud, extortion, identity theft, and the theft of classified information. Cyber-­extortion: extortion perpetrated by threats or repeated types of computer attacks by malicious hackers who may utilize techniques such as doxing and bug poaching – the former is publicly revealing embarrassing or incriminating personal information about someone through social media and other venues, and the latter is the tactic of hacking an individual or an organization in order to gather private information and potential vulnerabilities, which the hacker then uses to contact the victim with evidence of the breach and to demand ransom. Cyberterrorism: terrorism planned in cyberspace. For example, a criminal organization can contact a targeted person or group, informing them that a bomb attack on their business will occur shortly unless some demands are met. The objective is to cause fear and collect relevant information. Cyberwarfare: online attacks, called cyberattacks, that involve transnational crime groups (and others), including killings and destruction of property planned through Internet channels and then perpetrated in the real world. Cyberheist: monetary theft carried out through hacking; it is the online equivalent of the traditional bank heist.

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According to some estimates, most of the truly effective criminal hackers are associated with various organized crime groups, creating a new era for organized crime (Glenny 2018). The Internet has also led to a revision of the methods of traditional recruiting, as crime bosses have come to understand that to conduct crime over the Internet, they will require well-­educated, computer-­trained experts, not just the usual muscle-­bound enforcers. The consequences of globalized organized crime cannot be underestimated. It undermines governments and the social stability of many countries. Online criminality has become difficult to prosecute, given that several countries may be involved in a single operation – for example, the victim of a sex trafficking scheme may come from Russia or Ukraine, be transported through Turkey, and be sold into sex slavery in the United States or Canada. Transnational organized crime has grown to such large proportions that it can no longer be combated in individual countries, since it crosses geographical borders and consequently must be fought on multinational fronts. In sum, cyberspace has been good for the Mafias. The forms of criminal culture today are shaped not only by those living in a specific area of the world but increasingly by people in diverse parts of the globe. The Internet has virtually obliterated the distinction between traditional and neophyte gang cultures.

The Dark Net In a highly publicized 2016 case, six suspects were arrested in Belgium, accused of running a drug operation through the so-­called Dark Net (Vitáris 2016). The initial investigation was launched in February of 2014, after a certain number of companies received returned parcels which they had never sent in the first place. The gang had used the names of companies that sold products which had a similar appearance to their illegal drugs. Called the “Italian Mafia Brussels,” the gang was found to be present on several Dark Net marketplaces. Had the returned packages not been detected, the gang, which deceitfully used the moniker of Mafia, would have continued with its illegal drug trafficking. This incident is now one among an infinitude of similar ones. The mobsters have gone underground, as they always have, but in a new virtual way. The Dark Net (also called the Dark Web) refers to the domains of the Web that are not indexed by the normal search engines and are thus not searchable without the right kind of software and authorizations for gaining access. The Dark Net is the nefarious part of the so-­called Deep Web, which is typically managed and accessed by small networks, which are not typically involved in criminality but offer information and services not normally available on the regular Internet, known as the Surface Net.

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Internet lexicon Dark Net/Dark Web: the term Dark Net, also written as one word, Darknet, is a secret network on the Internet, whereas the term Dark Web refers to websites on the Dark Net, which cannot be accessed by a regular search engine without a permissioned account and password. The two are generally conflated semantically and thus used interchangeably. Botnets: (portmanteau of the words robot and network) are Internet-­ connected devices, each of which can be used to perform distributed denial-­of-­service (DDoS) attacks, steal data, send spam, and allow hackers to access various sites. Botnets are structured with command-­ and-­control servers based on a censorship-­resistant hidden service. Deep Web: the contents of the Deep Web cannot be found or accessed via the normal search engines. Access requires direct-­link systems via sites that are designed to keep search crawlers out. The Deep Web actually has many common uses such as webmail, online banking, video on demand, and more. Very few illegal activities occur on the Deep Web. These occur on the Dark Web or Dark Net. Bitcoin: a type of online currency (or cryptocurrency) in which encryption techniques are used to regulate production and verify the transfer of funds independently of a central bank. With Bitcoin, criminals can hide their identity. Surface Web: also called the Visible Web, Indexed Web, or Lightnet; this is the one we all use regularly. It is the portion of the World Wide Web that is available to the general public and searchable with standard search engines. It is the opposite of the Deep Web. The Dark Net virtually guarantees that the identities and locations of users cannot be easily tracked because of the type of encryption system used. This has made the criminal agenda easy to implement without detection.

The Silk Road The earliest Dark Net criminal website was called the Silk Road, founded in 2011. It was used extensively to carry out illegal activities, including drug and weapons sales and trafficking. The FBI caught up with it in 2013, shutting it down. But its success inspired a multiplicity of copycat markets. The Silk Road was one of the first marketplaces to use the cryptocurrency Bitcoin – see previously.

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Dark Net sites became widespread after the Silk Road was shut down. As journalist Jamie Bartlett (2016) has argued, this is hardly a brave new world but a dark new world that has rather profound implications for how criminality might be evolving or mutating. The Dark Net is composed of a vast hidden network of sites, where the liberty to do what anyone wants is pushed to its limits. This is a world inhabited by trolls, pornographers, drug dealers, mobsters, hackers, stalkers, political extremists, Bitcoin programmers, perverts, psychopaths, sociopaths, weirdoes, and vigilantes, all of whom use deception as their main mode of communication so as to remain anonymous. Bartlett starts his book with the frightening story of a young woman who posed nude on the Dark Net as a way to gain the self-­esteem that she did not have in the real world. Her images became memes on Dark Net sites, migrating to regular social media sites, where her friends and family became aware of them. Not only did this accomplish the opposite of what she desired, shattering, not building, her self-­esteem, but it turned her into a social pariah. An even scarier point made by Bartlett is that the Dark Net has become almost mainstream. Not all Dark Net platforms are nefarious. Some involve peer-­ to-­peer platforms as well as popular networks such as Freenet and Tor, which are operated by legitimate organizations and people. Users of these sites refer to the regular Web as the Clearnet, in reference to its unencrypted nature. Overall, however, the Dark Net has become a vast virtual world of crime – a dark region of cyberspace where gangsters now operate more freely than ever before. This migration brings out several key aspects of the OCs that can be listed schematically here: 1 Adaptability. Since their inception, the criminal gangs have shown a keen ability to adapt to changes in the world outside of their own, not only growing along with it, in terms of social and technological changes, but also affecting it directly. 2 Real-­World Savvy. The gangsters are psychologists of sorts, who understand human emotions and weaknesses. Their savvy has always allowed them to control others through fear tactics. They now use the Dark Net to enhance these tactics. 3 Evolving Strategies of Syndication. Lucky Luciano’s goal of stopping internecine warfare among the Cosa Nostra clans through syndication has now expanded to cyberspace via transnational crime syndicates. The question arises: If organized criminals can use the Dark Net so effectively, why not shut it down completely, like the authorities did with the Silk Road website? The simple answer is that to shut it down, the FBI would need to ascertain the compliance of many countries to do so that are unlikely to cooperate with the agency or with other Western police agencies. And even when a specific criminal website is closed down, the criminals will simply migrate to other sites or create new ones with their own software engineers.

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Moreover, the Dark Net has gone mainstream in some areas. Journalists, news organizations, writers, and researchers have been using it for legitimate reasons. So it can no longer be shut down even in part without upsetting the existence of legitimate groups on it.

Criminalizing the Internet Advances in Internet technologies have led to a convergence of communications systems, which have led, in turn, to the crystallization of new Internet-­ based lifestyles, careers, and institutions. Today, the Web contains all types of documents, databases, and publications in all media forms (print, audio-­oral, visual, graphic, etc.). The agglomeration of information it encompasses, and the speed and facility at which it can be accessed, have turned the Internet into the primary source of knowledge engineering, information storage, and information retrieval, supplanting traditional institutions such as reference libraries and print encyclopedias.

The 9/11 example The importance of the new digital technologies for organized crime became evident by disturbing post-­9/11 revelations that cellphones were used to organize, implement, and execute the events. Untraceable pay-­ as-­you-­go cellphones have since been used by organized criminals and terrorists alike, as was discovered in the aftermath of the Madrid and London bombing incidents in the 2010s.

Globalization is the process by which formerly separate, discrete, or local cultures, businesses, or institutions are brought into contact with one another and with new groups of people in an interactive fashion, generally through the Internet. This gives the sense that the world is a single place. Supporters of globalization claim that it liberates populations from often restrictive social conditions, generates wealth, makes possible the free movement of people and ideas, and contributes to the development of human rights. But, at the same time, it has also eliminated many of the previous real-­world barriers to the circulation of illegal goods. One of the greatest advantages of this new world order for the gangsters is in the area of moving and laundering money. A Mafia gang can make enormous amounts of money via illicit activities online, easily masking the identity and source of these funds through rapid currency transfers (Hall 2012). It is extremely difficult to trace the dirty money to its sources. Globalization has led, overall, to “criminalizing the Internet” and to the ability of the gangs to expand in new ways. Global cities, like Tokyo, New York,

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London, and Toronto, are becoming the hub points for many criminal organizations, capitalizing on the ethnic diversity in the communities of these cities. In such places, the criminals can blend into the linguistic and cultural systems of these communities through social media and other venues. There has also been an emergence of “second tier” cities that serve as trans-­shipment points en route between larger global cities (Hall 2012). An example of one of these cities is Montreal. Due to its proximity to the US border, it is an ideal median point for transporting illegal substances from abroad to New York. Other second-­tier cities include Hong Kong and Istanbul, which serve as gateways to European and Asian cities. Hub cities are a breeding ground for global organized crime, where people can maintain a connection to their home country and act as a liaison between the two (Hataley and Leuprecht 2013: 15). When ethnic groups feel secluded from the greater population, or do not feel secure about their resources in their new host country, it gives them greater incentive to identify with the gangsters of their home countries. Globalization has also created new opportunities for organized crime, such as the movement of refugees and escapees. Because of wars and endemic poverty, there has been an exodus of people from war-­torn and poor countries to Europe and North America. Multinational criminal gangs are often the ones who transport the migrants illegally. But in order to be able to do this effectively, they require corrupt officials and experts in the use of technology. The rapid pace of globalization has outpaced the growth of “mechanisms for global governance” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010), whereby globalization activities can be effectively controlled and regulated in a way that can provide sustained but manageable growth for a given nation. This discrepancy has provided a new environment for organized crime, whereby the most susceptible nations are those with weak laws. Even though goods and people can move increasingly freely from nation to nation, criminals can only be apprehended at a national level, and there is no international governance mechanism in place to prevent criminal “safe havens” from existing. The main consequences of this situation are the following (Mittelman and Johnson 1999; Roth 2017). 1 A rise in human trafficking, with a wider pool of victims regardless of their nationality, has occurred. The victims are often trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation; women from Eastern Europe were formerly the majority suffering from this after the end of the Cold War, but this reality is changing and now includes sex trafficking across a wider variety of nations. 2 Migrant smuggling across the world has also seen a rise due to globalization. Transnational criminal organizations facilitate this movement, coordinating their efforts through the Dark Net. 3 Drug trafficking has also seen a rise, with the majority of heroin originating from poppy cultivated in Afghanistan (United Nations Office on

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Drugs and Crime 2010). The drug then makes its way to Europe through Central Asia and Russia, relying on cross-­border ethnic linkages to facilitate smuggling, and is then shipped to Europe in larger volumes using a complex network that spans multiple borders and states. 4 Money laundering activities have been facilitated considerably, as mentioned several times. It is relevant to note that online gaming sites have allowed the gangsters to convert money obtained through the games into virtual goods, services, or cryptocurrency that can be converted back into real money. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported in 2012 that organized crime has become a problem on a global scale that has many adverse effects on all nations, including putting at risk their peace and prosperity, human safety nets, and sociopolitical orders.

Examples of globalizing criminal activities Triads Traditionally, the Triads were involved in armed robberies, kidnapping, and piracy in China. Today, they have added extortion, human trafficking, drug trafficking, gambling, and prostitution to their repertoire, often joining forces with other criminal groups through the Internet.

Eastern European organized crime As discussed previously, the term Russian organized crime comprises many ethnic groups (Abadinsky 2009). The ex-­Soviet organized crime groups have also migrated to the Internet to traffic in narcotics and in humans, to engage in money laundering, and to infiltrate legitimate business ventures through cyberwarfare.

Mexican cartels Mexican cartels have been growing exponentially because of globalization, expanding their operations to include extortion; kidnapping for ransom; smuggling of narcotics, persons, and weapons into the United States; and engaging in extreme violence on border towns. They have now formed ties with South and Central American organized crime groups to facilitate narco-­trafficking into the United States and other countries.

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Traditionally, the organized crime gangs have shared many archetypal features in their structure, from hierarchical systems to similar ways of carrying out their activities guided by codes of honor and omertà (obedience and silence). Differences crystallized because of local or national situations, involving differing perceptions among the populace of their roles and origins. The differing styles of organization, although based on a similar set of values and goals, varied because of historical-­cultural differences. Because of globalization and of transnational crime syndication, this paradigm has shifted, with compromises and adaptations in the organization and codes of the traditional OCs. While the organizational structure and its mystique may have changed, the effectiveness of the operations has actually increased enormously – as the proverb says, there is strength in numbers, and globalized organized crime is making it extremely difficult for the authorities to stop them or at least curtail their activities. Organized crime can no longer be combated in individual countries, as it once was, since it crosses geographical, cultural, social, and language barriers. Cyberspace is a borderless world, and the OCs have jumped into it advantageously. There are precedents for the use of new technologies by criminals. The first example occurred in 1834, involving the hacking of a French telegraph system, carried out by bribing a telegraph operator in the city of Tours. During the attack, the infamous Blanc brothers, François and Joseph, stole confidential market information from the government and profited from having early access to market movement reports (Standage 2017). As long as there is a way, the criminals have always exploited it. As journalist Tom Standage (2017) remarks: “The tale of the Blanc brothers is also a reminder that with any new invention, people will always find a way to make malicious use of it. This is a timeless aspect of human nature, and is not something that technology can or should be expected to fix” (see also Fell 2017). Today, online illicit gaming has become one of the more lucrative markets for the gangsters. This was made evident in 2012, when the RCMP and the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit in Canada discovered an organized crime group that ran an offshore illegal gambling website called “PlatinumSportsBook.com,” making millions in illegal profits every year. The eventual takedown and dismantling of the operations took place under Project ORIVER. Police later revealed that the online betting service was the result of an agreement between the Mafia and the Hells Angels between 2009 and 2013. While the website physically operated in Ontario, it was also run through servers in Costa Rica and was also used to launder money gained from criminal activities by the two organizations.

References Abadinsky, Howard (2009). Organized Crime. Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publishing. Bartlett, Jamie (2016). The Dark Net, Inside the Digital Underworld. London: Melville House. Castells, Manuel (1996). The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell.

Cyberspace 249 Fell, Jade (2017). Hacking Through History. Engineering Technology 12(3): 30–31. Gibson, William (1982). Burning Chrome. Omni Magazine, July (Reproduced in Gibson, William (1986). Burning Chrome. New York: Arbor House, pp. 169–191). Gibson, William (1984). Neuromancer. London: Grafton. Glenny, Misha (2018). Partners in Crime: Why Mafia Groups and Cybercriminals Are Joining Forces. The Globe and Mail. www.globalnews.ca/news/3350193/canada-­launder-­money-­ real-­estate-­report/. Hall, Tim (2012). Geographies of the Illicit: Globalization and Organized Crime. Progress in Human Geography 37(3): 366–385. Hataley, Todd and Leuprecht, Christian (2013). Organized Crime Beyond the Border. MacDonald-­ Laurier Institute Report. https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/2013.04.24-­MLI­BorderSecurity_F_vWeb.pdf. Khan, Alam and Ruiz Estrada, Mario A. (2016). Globalization and Terrorism: An Overview. Quality & Quantity. doi:10.1007/s11135-­016-­0367-­5. Mittelman, James H. and Johnston, Robert (1999). The Globalization of Organized Crime, the Courtesan State, and the Corruption of Civil Society. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 5: 103–126. Roth, Michael P. (2017). Global Organized Crime: A  21st Century Approach. London: Routledge. Standage, Tom (2017). The Crooked Timber of Humanity. The Economist, 5 October. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat. New York: The United Nations. Vitáris, Benjamin (2016). Dark Net Vendor Group ‘Italian Mafia Brussels’ Busted. Deep.Dot. Web, 1 July. www.deepdotweb.com/2016/07/01/dark-­net-­vendor-­g roup-­italian-­mafia­brussels-­busted/.

Chapter 16

Theories

Introduction The question of why OCs exist and why some young people desire to join them has been the subject of various theories in criminology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. These have been put forth to explain the motives behind why people join organized criminal cliques, not why they exist in the first place – a topic that will be discussed in the next chapter. In this one, we have selected some of the major theories that focus on the psychological and social factors that might explain why people join gangs. Among these are the following: the influence of criminals or people who have little regard for the law on young people, poverty, upbringing, and urban overcrowding. Another reason is that some young people might find criminality exciting, a form of escape from boredom and routine and a way to stand above others. There is no one all-­encompassing theory that can adequately explain OCs – the different ones are useful in a complementary way. They are summarized in the sidebar.

Theories of organized crime Differential Association: claims that criminal behavior is learned by people who want to imitate it and in so doing evolve into criminals. Differential Opportunity: claims that when there is a discrepancy between societal expectations for success and limited opportunities to pursue it, the resulting tension induces some people to seek the success vicariously in gangs. Social Control: claims that deviance and crime occur because of inadequate social controls or constraints, which allow the deviant side of human behavior to seek realization in criminal activities. Anomie: explains criminality in terms of a lack of social or ethical norms, as is the case in secular and urban societies.

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Subculture Theory: claims that some people are attracted to criminal subcultures because it allows them to set themselves apart from the mainstream. Ethnic Succession: maintains that criminal gangs in immigrant communities often arise to help the communities achieve economic parity with the dominant economic classes. Psychoanalysis: aims to identify the unconscious factors that potentially lead to crime and to the formation of organized crime gangs. Rational Choice: claims that the decision to commit crimes is a rational choice made by individuals who have weighed both the benefits and consequences of doing so.

Differential association Imitation is a form of social learning that involves someone copying, mimicking, or emulating the behaviors of someone else. This tendency in all humans has been used to explain the reason some young people copy the actions of criminals  – perhaps because they might believe that the latter possess more knowledge than they do or because their lifestyle is somehow attractive. It was sociologist Edwin Sutherland who put forth one of the first versions of this theoretical paradigm, called differential association, in 1924 (see Sutherland 1947; Lyman and Gary 2009), claiming that criminal behavior is learned by constant contact with criminals or criminal groups. According to this theory, such behavior is not innate but rather acquired in a social environment where criminals are perceived as having some distinction. The tendency to imitate and absorb criminal behaviors is a function of the intensity, frequency, and duration of the contact with the group. So, those who have grown up in close proximity to criminal gangs are more likely to join them, developing a natural desire to adopt the lifestyle patterns of the gang. Within this framework, there is no necessary link between the social class of the individual and this desire. The individual could belong to any class – it is the attractiveness of the lifestyle that draws him into the gang. Sutherland’s theory sidelines the discriminatory notion that certain ethnic groups are predisposed to crime, or that mainly lower-­class individuals gravitate towards it. Instead, it emphasizes the influence of existing criminals on some individuals who may wish to emulate them, simply because they might believe that the gangs have important knowledge that others do not. So, criminal behavior is acquired intentionally by individuals from the peers they attend to; as Sutherland (1947) states, “all behaviour is learnt,” and, “a person who is not trained in crime does not invent criminal behaviour.” Sutherland’s theory suggests that when the emulated behavior reaches a certain level, through repetition and intensity, the individual undergoes a change

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in his moral outlook, activating rationalization mechanisms that allow him to play down the criminal behaviors as aberrant or deviant. A colloquial condensation of this theory is built into the idiomatic expression peer pressure, which refers to the fact that peers can influence a young person to leave home, to join a gang or cult, to take drugs, or to take upon himself or herself some perilous risk to display mettle to the peer group. Psychologist Erik Erikson (1950) saw peer pressure as the key to understanding problematic behaviors during early adolescence, since it unconsciously conditions how young people come to view themselves and thus how they dress, how they style their hair, and how they conduct themselves in the company of others. Erikson argued further that those who were unsuccessful in fulfilling peer expectations would develop an “identity crisis,” which tended to bring about various psychological consequences, including withdrawal from most forms of social contact with others. Differential association theory claims, in a phrase, that an individual who joins a criminal gang is influenced to do so by observing other individuals who are believed to be “in the know” and because there is pressure to join from peers in the gangs. Interactions with the gang are seen as shaping the individual’s understanding of how the OC provides a means to belong to something meaningful.

Differential association theory 1 Criminal behavior is learned via a process of interaction and intercommunication with criminals. 2 Developing criminal behavior involves learning the techniques, motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes of the gang members through a form of peer pressure. 3 An individual does not necessarily become a criminal under peer pressure, but he will be predisposed by such pressure to rationalize his choice to join. 4 Mechanisms of rationalization are activated early on, allowing the individual to justify his choice of criminality, including explaining why he veered towards the crime group. 5 An individual becomes predisposed to criminality when there is no clear condemnation of the criminal lifestyle in his environment – a situation that leads to what is called the “social proofing” of the individual, who is inclined to assume that the criminals possess more knowledge about the world than anyone else. 6 Differential associations vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity, affecting if and how a prospective gangster will behave.

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Differential association theory does not suggest, however, that the mere interaction with criminals will invariably lead an individual to criminal behavior. It assumes intentionality on the part of the individual, whereby he might come to see deviance in social behavior as “normal.” Sunderland’s theory was elaborated on by sociologists Robert Burgess and Ronald Akers in 1966, calling their version, differential-­reinforcement theory. They cast aside Sutherland’s view that criminal behavior was learned in primary reference groups (those in an individual’s environment), indicating that it can be acquired in various kinds of situations outside the primary environment. In addition, they suggested that criminal behavior could result from non-­social factors, such as the influence of drugs on an individual’s psychological and social mindset, which could contribute to the adoption of deviant behavior by the individual. Moreover, an individual might make a rational decision to join a gang not just through imitation but also on the basis of past experiences in order to calculate the effectiveness of his future behaviors. The latter view is part of so-­called rational choice theory, which assumes that an individual makes rational decisions among available alternatives. So, unlike Sutherland’s original theory, which sees individuals as acquiring behavior unconsciously from their environments, such versions claim that the individual undergoes a “cost and benefit” analysis in order to determine if he will follow the criminals.

Social disorganization Like differential association theories, social disorganization theory sees the environment in which an individual is reared as affecting his outlook. The difference lies in the concept of disorganization, that is, of an environment that lacks organization and is felt to be chaotic. This is viewed within this model as typical of those reared in poorer living conditions, which then are seen as breeding grounds for criminality. Formulated initially by sociologists Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1942), the theory maintains that criminal associations such as street gangs emerge when access to public resources, employment, effective education, and social mobility are lacking, because social success is instead seen as achievable only in gangs. When people experience poverty and witness affluence in others of which they are deprived and which is virtually impossible for them to attain through conventional means, they turn to other means to achieve it. Moreover, fear and lack of trust in mainstream social structures and systems may also contribute to the sense of marginalization such individuals may experience; in such cases, crime groups are seen as replacing these structures to provide a means to pursue personal success. Overall, this theory views criminal and antisocial behaviors as being conditioned by a reaction to the disorganized worlds in which individuals live. Gangs provide the sense of order that individuals might seek. The three main premises of this theory are as follows: 1 Physical status: high rates of delinquency are found in or around certain environments that tend towards chaos, such as abandoned industrial areas and areas experiencing decreasing population.

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2 Economic status: areas with low economic status are cauldrons of unrest, leading to a sense of disorganization that will inhibit the ability to make ends meet. The gang provides a way to gain ill-­gotten economic rewards. The theory sees areas with the lowest housing prices and with residents who require relief assistance as ripe for criminality. 3 Differential values: As Shaw and McKay (1942: 170) explain, this refers to the differing value systems in specific areas of a society: in areas of low rates of delinquents there is more or less uniformity, consistency, and universality of conventional values and attitudes with respect to child care, conformity to law, and related matters; whereas in the high-­rate areas systems of competing and conflicting moral values have developed.

They discuss further that this similarity of values in middle-­class areas is expressed through mainstream institutions and voluntary associations which are “designed to perpetuate and protect these values” (Shaw and McKay 1942: 171). In lower-­class areas, on the other hand, children are exposed to fluctuating values and behavior patterns that deviate from the conventional ones, creating the sense of disorganization that may lead to criminality.

Ruth Kornhauser (1978) has elaborated on this theoretical framework to cover a broader domain of factors, including the fact that (street) gangs are attractive to some because they themselves may have the same loose social structure into which individuals are born. Delinquency arises mainly in communities suffering from structural disorganization, lacking the money and skill to ensure structure. This is then seen as a pattern of life by those born in such communities, whereby the gang is similarly structured but also offers a way to achieve financial success illicitly. Thus, rather than disorganization in itself, it is the neighborhood economic status that has the greatest impact on delinquency rates. Social disorganization theory has been applied to the traditional OCs. But in this case, it is the displays of virility that might play a more fundamental psychological role than a disorganized rearing environment, or else it might be blood ties or some historical factor, such as the tradition in some areas of young men becoming part of gangs, as if by birthright. Moreover, social disorganization theory has difficulty dealing with the issue of relatively stable and organized neighborhoods where some gangs emerge spontaneously. Interestingly, these theoretical models assign a role to lack of social control as one of the (hidden) factors that may lead to delinquency, which is the topic of the next section.

Social control Social control theory aims to explain how an individual’s behavior is guided by the formal controls a society has in place. Instead of investigating why individuals join criminal organizations, this theory seeks to understand why everyone

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does not join them, given the advantages that they might offer to many. It asserts, therefore, that those individuals that end up joining criminal organizations do so when formal controls in a society are weak or broken. Like psychoanalysis (see subsequently), social control theory maintains that the lack of external restraints allow some individuals to stray from normalcy and veer towards deviancy. Without these restraints, there is no internal obligation for an individual to behave lawfully. Psychoanalysts refer to these restraints as part of the Superego, or conscience, which regulates the individual’s ability to feel guilty or remorseful. It is conjectured that the Superego is developed from healthy relationships during a person’s childhood. Growing up in a hostile or loosely structured environment can, however, cause an individual to lack a sense of guilt, therefore loosening the internal restraints imposed by social controls, including a weakening of shame and fear of punishment. In effect, when the normal social controls are lacking, individuals might lose any consciousness of guilt and act illegally or immorally with no qualms of conscience. The theory finds its first elaborate articulation in the work of French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1897), who saw institutions such as the family, the state, religious organizations, schools, and the workplace as control systems, varying from informal to formal. The former impart norms via socialization, which, as Lindzey (1954) aptly points out, is “the process by which an individual, born with behavioral potentialities of enormously wide range, is led to develop actual behavior which is confined to the narrower range of what is acceptable for him by the group standards.” Formal social control systems include the laws and sanctions imposed by government to maintain order and regulate behavior. Some control theory proponents see childhood as the key period when criminality is learned – the period when a sense for social constraints develops. However, it does not see the lack of these constraints as determinant of criminality, just instrumental. Moreover, it does not imply that even those who break laws or violate social norms do not share the general belief that the norms should be followed, just that they may not apply to themselves for various rationalized reasons. The crux of social control theory can be encapsulated as follows – those who are not socialized to obey the rules will feel free to break them, since they sense that they do not apply to them. The absence of conventional relationships with others can also liberate individuals from social constraints, thereby allowing them to engage freely and with self-­justification in delinquency. In a sense, this theory complements both differential association and social disorganization theories, which claim that either or both the conditions in which individuals are reared and the peers with whom they interact may condition certain individuals to adopt criminality as a means to gain social success, especially if no social restraints are present in the rearing environment. As mentioned, this model can be traced back to the writings of Émile Durkheim (1895, 1897, 1912, 1938), who saw crime and deviance as resulting from a breakaway from moral and religious traditions and the social norms they entailed, leading to an inherent sense of irrational purposelessness: “We are

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moral beings to the extent that we are social beings” (Durkheim 1897: 64). His definition of “social fact” is a relevant one (Durkheim 1895: 23): A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations. In this framework, crime serves the function of redefining behavioral norms in a sui generis fashion: “The more weakened the groups to which [the individual] belongs, the less he depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of conduct than what are founded on his private interests” (Durkheim 1897: 209). Aspects of social control theory are reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes (1651), who (as discussed previously) believed that there was an inherent tendency toward self-­indulgence and self-­service in all people that could only be tamed or curtailed by external restraints and, therefore, that the role of governments and social institutions was to impose these restraints. Hobbes argued that the power of the political and social sphere in regulating the affairs of people should be unlimited, which Rousseau called a “social contract” which individuals living in a society agreed to accept so that they could protect themselves from their own brutish instincts and make possible the satisfaction of desires. Political and legal systems probably started out in the shadow of human needs, urges, and fears, according to Hobbes. While social control theory is rather different from this extreme view, it is nonetheless synchronized with the idea that humans themselves develop social controls because they are aware of their own weaknesses.

Anomie theory Durkheim’s theory is broader than most Hobbesian social control theories, since it maintains that it is the reactions of some individuals to social orders where moral strictures are loosened that condition them to seek solace in some alternative moral structure. The theory comes more generally under the rubric of anomie (from Greek “lawless”), claiming that some individuals might develop a desolate sense of living in an impersonal society that has a weak moral compass. Anomie theory can be linked to the notion of alienation – a term coined by Karl Marx (1959) to describe a sensed estrangement from other people that he claimed was endemic to capitalist societies, which he described as depersonalizing. Durkheim (1897) suggested, on the other hand, that alienation stemmed not from a particular political system but from a loss of moral and religious traditions in a secularized and materialistic world. He used the term anomie to refer to the sense of irrational boredom and purposelessness experienced by a person or a class as a result of living in such a world. Anomie is thus a factor

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in producing the high crime rates that modern-­day societies experience, given that it might be a reaction to their lack of traditional values. Anomie takes different forms and may have different consequences. Alienated individuals may become disoriented or hostile, feel helpless, withdraw within themselves, or reject established values. But this theoretical framework does not explain the motivations of many criminals, who are not necessarily bored and apathetic individuals. It was sociologist Robert Merton (1938) who adopted Durkheim’s framework as an overall theory of crime, believing that deviance depended on society’s definition of success and the desires of individuals to achieve success through socially defined avenues. Criminality becomes attractive when expectations of being able to fulfill goals by legitimate means cannot be met. Criminal organizations thus capitalize on the sense of anomie that develops in such instances, providing the structures and tactics to achieve them. Merton put forth a set of “deviance criteria” that resulted when people experienced the impossibility of access to opportunities to achieve success and prosperity through hard work.

Merton’s deviance criteria 1 Conformity: the person seeks the same goals of the mainstream, aiming to conform to them, but via deviant means. 2 Innovation: in rejecting the traditional and legitimate means to obtain social goals, some people may see crime as an innovative way to achieve them and are thus willing to accept the methods of criminal gangs as legitimate ones. 3 Ritualism: criminal organizations provide the ritualism that is lacking in some people’s lives, affording them the possibility to engage in ritualistic processes that provide a sense of meaning and belonging to something worthwhile. 4 Retreatism: some individuals see crime as an alternative means of obtaining the rewards of mainstream society, from which they retreat. 5 Rebellion: crime might provide an opportunity for rebellion against the society that has denied an individual opportunities for success.

Anomie theory has led to a derivative theory, called strain theory, which emphasizes that underprivileged social conditions may pressure some who live within them to commit crime or seek admittance to criminal organizations because of the strain they feel that society places on achieving success, seeing it as attainable only through deviant means.

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Subculture theory The term subculture is applied to describe various cliques that are based on alternative lifestyles – a term spread broadly by social critic Dick Hebdige in his 1979 book Subculture. Subcultures differentiate themselves through language (slang), clothing, lifestyle preferences, symbolism, and so on, providing members with a sense of being a single collectivity. This term has been used in criminology to refer to drug dealers, street gangs, and other scattered criminal groups who have achieved success and wealth that they could not have achieved through socially provided opportunities. This view of how some criminal gangs arise was first elaborated on by sociologist Richard Cloward (Cloward 1959; Cloward and Ohlin 1960). Recall that Merton’s work introduced the idea of strain. Cloward sought to answer the question of “how these pressures are resolved, or how men respond to them” (Cloward 1959: 164). Delinquent subcultures provide a means to release these pressures through the relationships established within them. Three types of delinquent subcultures were identified by Cloward and Ohlin (1960), each surfacing as a response to economic conditions (see also Lilly, Cullen and Ball 2002): 1 Criminal: this results in places where economic success is not abandoned but pursued through alternative means. 2 Retreatist: this provides a means of escape from the pressures of life wherein drugs and alcohol become the means of retreat from the mainstream. 3 Conflict: these emerge in environments where transiency, violence, and volatility are common. Respect, as opposed to economic success, is the primary goal of these subcultures. Those participating in them rarely become addicted to drugs, because it is not conducive to the enactment of their roles and is seen as impacting the group negatively.

Ethnic succession Recall from Chapter 1 the case of Rocco Perri, an Italian-­born Prohibition-­era crime figure in Ontario, Canada, during the early part of the twentieth century (Nicaso 2004). In one way, his descent into crime is a case of differential association. Perri did not have access to steady legitimate work opportunities, due to a combination of discrimination with regard to his Italian heritage, shortages of materials during World War I, and abject poverty. He demonstrated a natural propensity for criminality, employing physical intimidation, arson, and extortion activities to achieve his illicit goals. Perri struggled greatly during his first years in Canada. Given the opportunity afforded by Prohibition, he and his wife Bessie Starkman developed a bootlegging empire that provided the access route to the world of organized crime and to material success. Cloward and Ohlin (previously) noticed, in fact, that frustration arising from abject poverty

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caused many to turn to organized crime – describing the Perri case accurately, since Perri lived in underprivileged conditions in southern Italy, moving to Canada in 1908 in an attempt to remedy his situation and seek material success. But facing ethnic discrimination and unemployment in his new world, Perri became involved with organized crime when Prohibition laws were passed in Canada. Selling bootleg liquor afforded him the financial success he would not have been able to achieve otherwise. Perri’s case leads to another theory, called ethnic succession, which refers to the emergence of criminal gangs within immigrant ethnic communities motivated by the financial and social hardships that some members in the communities might face. Ethnic settlements are usually located in poorer areas of a society, though eventually, as the community integrates into the mainstream, the members are able to work their way up the socioeconomic ladder (Zucchi 2007). This allows the immigrant group to move to more prosperous areas, thereby creating room for a subsequent ethnic group to take its place, restarting the cycle. However, when there are differential opportunities because of ethnic bias, then a case such as that of Perri crystallizes. Ethnic succession theory has been applied to organized crime in areas where immigration has historically been very high (Cooley 2016). In this framework, it is claimed that some ethnic minority immigrants become involved in organized crime to obtain success unavailable to them otherwise (Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti 2011). Overall, the claim is that ethnic minorities are law-­abiding groups, despite the hardships, but that some members face true desperation and thus the strain on them leads them to seek criminality as a viable means to survive. An oft-­cited case of ethnic succession comes from the late nineteenth century, when Irish immigration to North America was extensive. Some of the immigrants became involved in organized criminal gangs, realizing that they had been reduced to second-­class citizens by mainstream society, making work difficult to find and physical attacks against them common. However, as time went on, the Irish immigrants were able to assimilate into mainstream society, with gang activity decreasing accordingly. Similarly, in the 1950s, Chinatowns were perceived as criminal breeding grounds, with their opium dens and illegal gambling activities (Zucchi 2007). This stemmed from the fact that immigration to Canada was constrained by the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act, which restricted immigration from China. Because of this, those who were allowed into the country were mainly young men (under strict stipulations) who formed Chinatowns to preserve their cultural identities. A  few turned to crime in order to achieve economic stability. Real change began to occur when the Government of Canada repealed immigration restriction on the basis of race and national origin in 1967. This allowed Chinese men to immigrate to Canada with their wives and children and become more accepted in society, thereby allowing them to be successful, resulting in Chinatowns turning into tourist attractions by the 1980s (Zucchi 2007).

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Unfortunately, ethnic succession theory has been used by some to cast negative impressions on entire ethnic communities. Strains put on them by segregation, discrimination, and denial of economic opportunities are not exclusive to ethnic minority groups but to all people of any background, as research on differential opportunity theory has so abundantly documented. As Merton argued (previously), organized crime is a logical response to the social pressures placed on individuals by society, and that might include the pressure that comes from bias and discrimination.

Psychoanalysis The discipline of psychoanalysis has fallen somewhat into the margins of mainstream psychology. But many of its tenets and procedures have worked their way into current criminology generally. The key aspect of a psychoanalytic perspective in explaining OCs is the notion of the collective unconscious, which suggests that there exists a sense of criminality that is buried in the evolutionary history of humans based on the need for gaining and holding territories so as to ensure survival by any means necessary. We will return to this evolutionary explanation of criminality in the next chapter. For the present purposes, suffice it to say that a psychoanalytic approach to crime would locate its causes in the individual unconscious and how it is shaped during childhood. The clinical notion of the unconscious comes, as is well known, from Sigmund Freud’s (1963: 235–236) concept that the psyche has a number of different levels, one of which, the unconscious, is inaccessible to us: It was a triumph for the interpretative art of psychoanalysis when it succeeded in demonstrating that certain mental acts of normal people, for which no one had hitherto attempted to put forward a psychological explanation, were to be regarded in the same light as the symptoms of neurotics: that is to say that had a meaning, which was unknown to the subject but which could easily be discovered by analytic means. A class of material was brought to light which is calculated better than any other to stimulate a belief in the existence of unconscious mental acts even in people to whom the hypothesis of something at once mental and unconscious seems strange and even absurd. As Freud maintained, there seem to be “unconscious mental acts” that we do not comprehend, and these might, purportedly, lead someone to commit crimes, especially if he is vulnerable to various emotional and irrational impulses that Freud categorized under the notion of the Id, which he describes as follows (quoted in Hinsie and Campbell 1970: 372): We can come nearer to the Id with images, and call it chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement. We suppose that is somewhere in direct

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contact with somatic processes, and takes over from them instinctual needs and gives them mental expression. These instincts fill it with energy but it has no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-­principle. If this “cauldron of seething excitement” dominates, then someone may have an abundance of energy that he or she cannot safely disperse because of social rules and constraints. Criminality could thus be envisioned as an impulse of the repressed Id – hence an “Id Hypothesis” (Danesi 2013). Opposing the Id is the Superego, which (as mentioned previously) is the type of conscientious ideas and behaviors acquired in specific social contexts. Some criminals may have the Id and the Superego at loggerheads with each other within their unconscious. The Id seeks gratification and has great energy, which cannot be released freely because it must submit to the demands of society. The Ego is the sense of awareness that mediates between the conflicting demands of the Id and the Superego. It tests reality and stores up experiences in memory, finding a way to balance the demands of the two opposing psychic impulses. Following Freud’s overall theory (1901), some criminologists have attempted to develop theories that highlight the connection between unconscious mechanisms and criminal behavior. Psychoanalytic theory thus goes contrary to the pseudoscientific physicalist (or phrenological) theories of crime that go back to first criminologist of history, Cesare Lombroso (1876). Lombroso was an Italian physician who examined and classified the physical appearances of known criminals on the basis of traits such as facial expression, cranium size, eye structure, and so on, coming to the conclusion that certain physical traits differentiated criminals from the general population. These could thus be used in the identification of real and potential criminals. Although his ideas are now largely rejected, his approach has left residues in pop culture portrayals of criminals and villains as possessing a “monstrous” or “grotesque” appearance. Lombroso believed that criminals constituted a distinct “subspecies” of society, recognizable by physical features, such as above-­or below-­average height, projecting ears, thick hair, thin beards, enormous jaws, a square chin, large cheekbones, and other visible features. Although most of Lombroso’s claims have been shown to be false, his influence on their representations in various fictive media has remained (as mentioned previously).

Psychological approaches Most of the theories of crime generally see social conditions as the main factor in shaping the criminal mind. It is relevant to note that, as some of the theories predict, the crime rate stays relatively stable in traditional societies where people believe their way of life will continue (Newman 2010). Crime rates are particularly high in industrial nations that have large cities.

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However, there may be strictly psychological factors that compel some individuals to commit senseless crimes or join criminal gangs. Using data from brain imaging studies, Barbara A. Oakley (2008), for example, suggests that serial killers and mass murderers may have a genetic predisposition to criminality. The killers are charming on the surface but harbor evil thoughts constantly that she attributes to a pathological form of narcissism combined with emotional disturbances that lead them to believe they are actually altruistic. In other words, these criminals do what they do mainly because of their “risky genes,” not upbringing. There are certainly criminals who might have an unlucky dose of risk genes. But the same ones often have had impoverished experiences in their upbringing. And many others who do have the risk genes do not end up becoming criminals or killers. Looking at crime across cultures and across time, it is obvious that crime cannot be explained in strictly biological ways without taking cultural, social, and historical factors into account. There are bad people, and there have always been so. But bad character in itself does not necessarily lead to criminality. However, there is one psychological approach that overlaps with the previous sociological theories – namely that criminality is acquired by conditioning processes during childhood. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the controversial American psychologist B. F. Skinner (1938) became famous for his studies on how rewards (positive conditioning) and punishments (negative conditioning) can influence behavior. His work had an impact on some theories of crime and models of penology, even though his overall perspective fell into disfavor among psychologists and criminologists generally in the late 1960s. Skinner’s work revived the age-­old debate of nature-­versus-­nurture, which has been incorporated by Hollywood and pop culture into their various representational paradigms. An example is the film Natural Born Killers (1994), directed by Oliver Stone, which explored the reasons serial killers are so popular as dark celebrities. Stone locates the evil of purposeless crime in a culture of violence that breeds a lack of respect for morality, thus indirectly sustaining anomie theory. The rise of serial murders is thus connected to the rise of the influence of the mass media on human behavior. A young couple is united by a common love of violence. Together, they embark on a frenetic and gory killing spree that grabs the attention of a sensation-­hungry tabloid media. Their fame is ensured by a newsman who features them on his show, American Maniacs. There is little doubt that the two killers are psychotic, but so are the media and the culture that glorify them. In previous chapters, we mentioned the concept of the criminal as a folk hero, a Robin-­Hood figure who is immortalized by legends. Mafiosi are hardly folk heroes, but they perceive themselves to be so and certainly present themselves as such through their words and codes of honor. This may itself be the greatest motivation for becoming a Mafioso, licensing him to torture, murder, and dismember people in a twisted pursuit of pseudo-­justice. The legends they spin of themselves are metaphors of a specific kind – they bring

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out the psychological fascination with criminals as challenging the status quo, urging society by implication to change. This is perhaps why we are drawn to both heroes and villains, symbolizing the fight within us between Good and Evil.

References Burgess, Robert and Akers, Ronald L. (1966). A Differential Association-­Reinforcement Theory of Criminal Behavior. Social Problems 14: 363–383. Cloward, Richard A. (1959). Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and Deviant Behavior. American Sociological Review 24: 164–176. Cloward, Richard A. and Ohlin, Lloyd E. (1960). Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs. Glencoe: Free Press. Cooley, Will (2016). Immigration, Ethnicity, Race, and Organized Crime. In: Ronald H. Bayor (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Immigration and Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Danesi, Marcel (2013). Signs of Crime: Introduction to Forensic Semiotics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Durkheim, Émile (1895). The Rules of Sociological Method. Paris: Félix Alcan. Durkheim, Émile (1897). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Collier. Durkheim, Émile (1912). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Collier. Durkheim, Émile (1938). The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press. Erikson, Erik H. (1950). Childhood and Society. New York: Norton. Freud, Sigmund (1901). The Interpretation of Dreams. New York: Avon. Freud, Sigmund (1963). Civilization and Its Discontents. London: Hogarth. Hebdige, Dick (1979). Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London: Routledge. Hinsie, Leland E. and Campbell, Robert Jean (1970). Psychiatric Dictionary. New York: Oxford University Press. Hobbes, Thomas (1651). Leviathan. London: Andrew Crooke. Kornhauser, Ruth R. (1978). Social Sources of Delinquency: An Appraisal of Analytic Models. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lilly, Robert J., Cullen, Francis and Ball, Richard (2002). Criminological Theory: Context And Consequences. London: Sage. Lindzey, Gardner (1954). Handbook of Social Psychology. Oxford: Addison-­Wesley Publishing. Lombroso, Cesare (1876). L’uomo delinquente. Milano: Hoepli. Lyman, Michael D. and Potter, Gary W. (2009). Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. Marx, Karl (1959). Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Merton, Robert K. (1938). Social Structure and Anomie. American Sociological Review 3(5): 672–682. Morselli, Carlo, Turcotte, Mathilde and Tenti, Valentina (2011). The Mobility of Criminal Groups. Global Crime 12(3): 165–188. Newman, Graeme R. (ed.) (2010). Crime and Punishment Around the World. Santa Barbara: ABC-­CLIO. Nicaso, Antonio (2004). Rocco Perri: The Story of Canada’s Most Notorious Bootlegger. Toronto: Wiley. Oakley, Barbara A. (2008). Evil Genes. New York: Prometheus.

264 Theories Shaw, Clifford R. and McKay, Henry D. (1942). Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior of Organisms. New York: Appleton-­Century-­Crofts. Sutherland, Edwin (1947). Principles of Criminology. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. Zucchi, John (2007). A History of Ethnic Enclaves in Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association.

Chapter 17

Tribalism and adaptability

Introduction Organized bandit groups reach back to antiquity (Hopwood 2009). Since the beginning of time, there have always been cliques and groups that rallied around a self-­designated leader to carry out activities meant to gain control over people and territories. The fact that civilization has never been successful in eliminating such groups bespeaks an innate tendency that may have an evolutionary basis, which can be called, metaphorically, a “gang instinct.” The appearance of pirates, bandits, and various gangs throughout history may well be products of this instinct, adapting, like any organism (to extend the evolutionary metaphor), to changing conditions. If this paradigm is true in any sense, then the future of Mafia organizations is guaranteed, and likely no measure to eliminate them will be effective. In the previous chapter, we dealt with various psychological and sociological theories that have been advanced to explain the emergence of gang cultures and their lure for some individuals, such as the role played by socioeconomic factors, upbringing, and the latent force of anomie in some individuals. These are all useful ones, as we have seen. However, they do not delve into the origins of gangs from a bio-­evolutionary perspective. So, in this chapter, we will look at criminality from this angle in order to provide a plausible reason why organized criminal gangs are so adaptive to change and why they continue to have an intuitive “tribal” appeal. In fact, tribalism may be a primary factor in bringing together people for criminal purposes. In no way does this imply that tribes emerged as criminal cliques; on the contrary, they were the first cultures of humanity that laid down the basis for its intellectual and cultural evolution. The term tribalism is used here only to refer to the evolutionary tendency to form small groups for a host of reasons and that some of these veer towards the use of activities aimed at controlling others. It was British philosopher Herbert Spencer (1864) who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” after being inspired by Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859). It is a useful metaphor for explaining why criminal gangs have always existed and have always adapted to changing times. Humans live by an

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inherent principle for enhancing survival that is encapsulated by the cliché “there is strength in numbers.” Criminal gangs can thus hypothetically be characterized as tribal groups who fit in with Spencer’s idea of survival of the fittest. This paradigm does not preclude, in any way, factors such as personality differences and negative experiences resulting from upbringing that may influence young individuals to seek refuge in gang structures. But tribalism casts a different light on the whole situation, explaining why criminal gangs see themselves as strong and outsiders as weak, on whom they can easily prey; they gain power by controlling people and territories, and they see themselves as superior to everyone else. The main focus of this chapter will be to explore the possibility that criminal gangs are such configurations.

Tribalism Gangs have always fought over territories, as discussed throughout this textbook. Territoriality is an evolutionary mechanism – an imperative of survival, based on acquiring, marking, and protecting territories, which allow for the systematic location and protection of food sources to different species, as well as a means for ensuring security from the elements and invaders. Species will fight for territories for these reasons either by force or in some negotiated arrangement with other animals. Biologists define territoriality as: (a) an innate survival mechanism that permits an animal to gain access to, and defend control of, critical resources (food, nesting sites, etc.) and (b) the instinctive need of an animal to procure a safe boundary around itself. The zoologist Konrad Lorenz (1952) was among the first to document territorial patterns, which, he claimed, were as important to an animal’s survival as its physiological attributes. Lorenz also suggested that human aggression was explainable as a residual mechanism of territoriality – a controversial theory that became popularized through Robert Ardrey’s 1966 book The Territorial Imperative, leading to a debate on the nature and origin of human aggression. Humans are at war all the time with each other, as Hobbes (1651: 34) observed: “The condition of man is a condition of war of everyone against everyone.” As the first civilizations emerged, non-­physical, linguistically based ways were invented to preserve territories, including treaties, legal pacts, and agreements. History also records that the use of violence by the first civilizations was part of the fight against piracy, since the pirates made commercial routes insecure. War has certainly not disappeared, remaining a constant pattern in human history, remaining as a latent factor for groups to preserve territories and, in some cases, take them over. Some anthropologists trace the origin of war to the early tribes, labeling it ritual warfare – defined as physical aggression permitting the display of masculine courage, but the frequency of warfare in tribal cultures is a matter of dispute. Intertribal warfare was a pattern based on animosity between tribal enclaves or else on some form of retribution for some malfeasance, from theft to the abduction of women.

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The archeological evidence suggests that tribalism as a way of communal life emerged around 30,000 to 40,000 years ago. Each tribe circumscribed a territory for itself so that it could carry out the activities of everyday life routinely. Any invasion into the territory met with resistance. This was typically assigned to specific small groups within the tribe, usually young men who possessed superior strength and who rallied around a leader (the strongest of the group) to devise warrior strategies to protect the tribe. Clearly, tribalism is neither bad or good; it is a tendency within humans and has left its residues in humans to this day – it may well be the unconscious force that leads some people to form gangs, which have the same kinds of functions of the tribal warriors. In other words, the evolutionary penchant for tribalism may be a viable reason Mafia groups continue to exist and thrive. They are modern tribes with their own warriors and warrior practices. As opposed to impersonal urbanized mass societies, criminal gangs, like tribes, are felt to be more “natural,” because the members know each other and can relate directly to each other through specific understanding of their warrior goals. The term tribe refers to a small collectivity of people who are connected, normally via ancestry. The original tribes located themselves in specific geographical territories, leading to the rise of villages as extensions of tribal life. This sense of kinship and emotional attachment to a specific territory have always been tribal bonding mechanisms that virtually disappeared in city-­ societies, where the shared territory is so large that it constitutes a mere abstraction. It is thus not surprising to find that the tendency for individuals to relate to tribal-­type groupings that exist within the larger societal context manifests itself regularly. People continue to perceive their membership in smaller groups as directly meaningful to their lives. This inclination towards tribalism resonates in criminal enclaves and may be the source of appeal that they have to young people, who might feel alienated and stranded emotionally in urban environments, as Durkheim emphasized in his writings (previous chapter). A latent sense of tribalism is arguably what keeps gangsters loyal and committed to the group, even when personal relations among the members may break down, even violently – it keeps members from straying or joining other groups. To distinguish general tribalism from the type that criminal gangs display, it is useful to refer to the latter as “criminal tribalism.”

Criminal tribalism 1 In-­group loyalty. Loyalty to the group and the leader is the key principle that keeps gangs united. This is inscribed in their codes and in their symbolic practices. Disloyalty or any insult to the leader or group must be avenged.

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2 Hostility to outsiders. Tribes have always drawn their territories physically, in order to keep out outsiders, who are seen as endangering the group and thus are treated with hostility. This same hostility is evident in all criminal tribes. 3 Endurance. Gangs value toughness and the ability to endure hardships, a principle that is embedded in the symbolism and practices of initiation rites. Masculinity and virility are seen as primary attributes for membership. The tribal warrior gangs were similarly made up of the stronger males, who were the designated protectors of the tribe. 4 Exclusivity. Gangs live for themselves. Outsiders are not seen as equal to them, and for this reason, they can be eliminated with no sense of guilt. 5 Resentment of authority outside the gang. The rules and laws outside the gang are resented and resisted at any cost (Miller 1958). 6 Siege mentality. The gangs see themselves as being constantly surrounded by enemies and always under siege. This siege mentality allows them to justify extreme levels of violence against outsiders. 7 Contempt for mainstream society. The gangs see mainstream society as degenerate, relativistic, and without fundamental moral values. Like the tribes, they see their rituals and symbolic practices as based on fundamental tenets of survival. 8 A sense of kinship. The gangs promote a sense of kinship that binds the members together, allowing them to collaborate like brothers. If the kinship is real, based on blood, then the bonds are even stronger, as we saw in the case of some Mafias, like the ’Ndrangheta. Even in an era of globalized crime, the crime syndicates still retain a tribal appeal. To distinguish between the early tribes and current-­day criminal gangs, the terms primary and secondary can be used. Primary tribalism is the natural evolutionary form of social grouping; secondary tribalism is its unconscious reconstitution within contemporary societies  – in other words, while tribal societies have been pushed to the margins of the modern-­day urban world, tribalism is still latent. Criminal tribalism may well be a form of secondary (latent) tribalism, and since it has never been eradicated, the possibility exists that it may be hard-­wired in the brain, presenting evolutionary advantages that dissipate in larger urban agglomerations. With regard to the latter possibility, the work of evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar (2010) of the University of Liverpool is of relevance. Dunbar has put forth an interesting theory, called the “Dunbar Number,” which posits that the primate brain is programmed to determine the ideal or optimum group size. According to Dunbar, this falls within the range of the early tribes, around 150 people, suggesting that there may be a critical

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mass in the number of people in a group to ensure loyalty, cohesion, and member affinity. If the theory is verifiable, then it would mean that tribalism is impossible to evade, since it is indeed hard-­wired in the brain. As the cliché goes, you can take the human being out of the tribe, but you cannot take the tribe out of the human being. This is corroborated anecdotally by the manifestation of some of the inherent characteristics of tribalism within the criminal clans: 1 Learning the criminal trade is through an apprenticeship format rather than through some form of abstract educational system, so that learning has a connection to the everyday needs of the tribe. It is transmitted by word of mouth and by example from other group members. 2 There is an extroversion of thought, rather than introspection, which is based on the examination of one’s own behaviors within the group. 3 An episodic mindset dominates, whereby understanding consists of a series of connected parts or events rather than a product of singular ideas laid out in a linear fashion. 4 Punishment and justice occur within the tribe and are decided by clan elders. 5 The oral histories of the tribes are mythological, as they are in the criminal gangs; that is, they are designed to establish ancestry in some mythic or divine way. These have been evident in all the criminal gangs across history, tending to support the hypothesis that criminal gangs are ensconced in the sense of tribalism. The gangs also share another tribal characteristic called homophily, the tendency of individuals to bond with others of a similar mind, as expressed in the colloquialism, “birds of a feather flock together.” This is crucial to gang survival, since, as one major study on homophily by Chierchia and Coricelli (2015) found, the perception of interpersonal similarity improves collaboration and in-­group empathy and increases the expected payoff of group membership beyond merely a sense of compatibility – a finding supported by another study by Karimi, Génois, Wagner, Singer and Strohmaier (2018).

Adaptability As discussed throughout this textbook, criminal gangs are highly adaptable, adjusting their activities and lifestyles to fit new social conditions. They are like chameleons, capable of taking on any social coloration temporarily if it will help them survive in the long run. As we saw (Chapter  15), they now abound in real and virtual spaces, such as the Dark Net, making it extremely difficult for police agencies not only to catch up to them but even to detect their operations. Adaptability enhances survival. Whatever new technology or state of affairs will come about, mobsters will strive to fit in, blend in, and take

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advantage of the changes. The Mafias will never become antiquated or old-­ fashioned – they will always be au courant. As we saw in Chapter  15, three main events have been key in allowing the traditional gangs to adapt to cyberspace, where hundreds of transnational criminal pathways now form an opaque criminal network spanning the world: (a) the deregulation of controls on capital movement in the Anglo-­American sphere starting in the 1980s, (b) the emergence of vast criminal zones following the collapse of communism, and (c) the growth of cyber-­criminality and the rise of hackers whom the gangs co-­opted early on to work for them. Cybercrime began with young hackers who defaced websites or erased data for mischief and self-­enjoyment. But soon, the underworld in cyberspace started hiring the hackers like they once hired shooters and enforcers. As a result, two organized criminal cultures have developed in tandem  – the traditional real-­world one and the digital virtual one, paralleling what is happening more broadly in society, where offline and online cultures are evolving in parallel. Today, the Mafiosi have sophisticated computer skills and can come from anywhere and from all social classes. The capi have also adapted – they are increasingly digital natives who are comfortable with the new digital technologies and understand the advantages offered by cyber-­criminality. The wise guy may still have a physical presence in the world, but he is now in a partnership with computer technicians who can victimize people both in the real world and on the Internet. The adaptability of OCs fits in with the hypothesis that gangs are products of evolutionary mechanisms. Again, a distinction between primary and secondary forms of adaptability is necessary. The former is more precisely encapsulated with the term adaptation, which refers to the biological responses by which an organism or species becomes better suited to the environment; the latter is called adaptability, which for the present purposes can be defined as the intentional social adaptation to new conditions. Adaptability is characterized by some biologists as a manifestation of autopoiesis, a term introduced by Maturana and Varela in their famous 1973 book, Autopoiesis and Cognition, where they claim that an organism participates in its own evolution, since it has the ability to produce, or at least shape, its various biochemical agents and structures in order to ensure their efficient and economical operation. It can be argued by analogy that the gangs are autopoietic in the sense that they are self-­adapting systems that change creatively according to new conditions. Adaptability enhances the ability to cope with unexpected changes in the social environment. Nonetheless, there is a paradox, because even though the gangs show autopoietic adaptability, they are also resistant to change, being steeped in traditions, which are the same kinds of stabilizing mechanisms of the early tribes. So, like chameleons, they know how to change on the spot to ensure their survival. However, there is still a tendency to rely upon traditions designed to inhibit the fragmentation of the gang. Cleverly, though, these are incorporated into the broader changes that are going on all the time.

Tribalism and adaptability 271

The lure of gangsterism As mentioned previously, the lure of the gangster image has been reinforced by Hollywood, television, and now the Internet. In this case, too, the gangs have adapted, moving away from their origins as rustic noblemen to “honorable celebrities” of modernity. This turns weaklings into warriors, at least in their imagination. As Rico Bandello put it in the movie Little Caesar (1931), the Mafioso is “a somebody.” It is this warrior ethos that motivates many to become gangsters. The following dialogue between Rico and his friend Joe Massara encapsulates this psychological principle: RICO BANDELLO:   (reading

the newspaper) Underworld pays respects to Diamond Pete Montana. JOE MASSARA:   Ah, what’s that gotta do with the price of eggs? RICO BANDELLO:   Plenty. Diamond Pete Montana. He doesn’t have to waste his time on cheap gas stations. He’s somebody. He’s in the big town, doing things in a big way. And look at us, just a couple of nobodies, nothin’. JOE MASSARA:   Is that what you want, Rico? A party like that for you? “Caesar Enrico Bandello. Honored by his friends.” RICO BANDELLO:  I could do all the things that fella does, and more, only I never got my chance. Why, what’s there to be afraid of? And when I get in a tight spot, I shoot my way out of it. Why sure. Shoot first and argue afterwards. You know, this game ain’t for guys that’s soft! JOE MASSARA:   Yeah, there’s money in the big town, all right. And the women. Good times, something doing all the time. Exciting things, you know. The clothes I could wear. And then I’d quit, Rico. I’d go back to dancing, like I used to before I met you. I don’t know. I ain’t made for this sort of thing. Dancing. That’s what I wanna do. RICO BANDELLO:   Dancing? Women? And where do they get you? I don’t want no dancing. I’m figuring on making other people dance. Oh, I ain’t forgetting about the money. Money’s okay, but it ain’t everything. Be somebody. Look hard at guys and know they’ll do anything you tell them. Have your own way or nothing. Be somebody. JOE MASSARA:   You’ll get there, Rico. RICO BANDELLO:  Yeah. Being a somebody is what gangsterism affords – the chance to exercise power over others, to stand out as a tribal warrior, who will get the respect of others from this very fact. Deadly warfare among street gangs is a common event in many urban areas, as they vie for territory in which to carry out their criminal activities and, more importantly, to lay a symbolic stake to their warrior fame. – “I am here. I am part of my own people. Don’t mess with me. Stay away.” As Bandello put it in the movie: “Shoot first and argue afterwards. You know, this game ain’t for guys that’s soft!”

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In a key 1991 survey by the National Crime Prevention Council, it was found that teens who join gangs are primarily those who live in situations and locales where gang membership is perceived as prestigious or even an obligatory coming-­of-­age masculine rite. The enormous emotional power of gang symbolism, with its tribal connotations, has probably much more to do with the lure to this day than any other factor. Glorified by movies and videos, gang membership affords many teens the opportunity to look and act tough, just for the sake of it, or more accurately, for the look of it. Juvenile groups were called “gangs” for the first time in the 1927 study by Frederic Thrasher, according to whom social conditions in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century encouraged the crystallization of juvenile street gangs, for the simple reason that inner-­city enclaves were characterized by deteriorating housing, poor employment prospects, and a rapid turnover in population. These conditions led to socially disorganized neighborhoods where social control mechanisms were weak and ineffectual. This encouraged youths to find other means of achieving a sense of order, which they found in gangs. Gang membership reduced feelings of powerlessness by providing access to illicit means of gaining power through the gang – a situation that can be called the “Bandello effect,” since the fictional story of Rico Bandello encapsulated the real-­life power dynamic that some dispossessed young people may seek to achieve. Gangs provide youths with status, recognition, security, and opportunities for excitement when these needs are not met by conventional social institutions. The underworld is fraught with danger and excitement but is also a power trip. As Jean Genet (1949: 13) once put it, by “repudiating the virtues” of our boring everyday world, “criminals agree to organize a forbidden universe.”

References Ardrey, Robert (1966). The Territorial Imperative. New York: Atheneum. Chierchia, Gabriele and Coricelli, Giorgio (2015). The Impact of Perceived Similarity on Tacit Coordination: Propensity for Matching and Aversion to Decoupling Choices. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 9. doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00202. Darwin, Charles (1859). The Origin of Species. New York: Collier. Dunbar, Robin I. M. (2010). How Many Friends Does One Person Need? Dunbar’s Number and Other Evolutionary Quirks. London: Faber and Faber. Genet, Jean (1949). The Thief’s Journal. London: Blond. Hobbes, Thomas (1651). Leviathan. London: Andrew Crooke. Karimi, Fariba, Génois, Mathieu, Wagner, Claudia, Singer, Philipp and Strohmaier, Markus (2018). Homophily Influences Ranking of Minorities in Social Networks. Scientific Reports 8(1): 11077. Hopwood, Keith (ed.) (2009). Organised Crime in Antiquity. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales. Lorenz, Konrad (1952). King Solomon’s Ring. New York: Crowell. Maturana, Humberto and Varela, Francisco (1973). Autopoiesis and Cognition. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Tribalism and adaptability 273 Miller, Walter B. (1958). Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency. Journal of Social Issues 14(3): 5–19. Spencer, Herbert (1864). The Principles of Biology. London: Williams and Norgate. Thrasher, Frederic (1927). The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 18

Epilogue

Introduction In 2020, a coronavirus pandemic afflicted the entire planet. Lockdowns were imposed throughout the world. One would think that such a drastic situation would hamstring organized crime and even lead to its demise. But nothing was farther from the truth. The gangsters are nothing if not adaptive, as argued in the previous chapter. Getting drugs to the streets was the biggest challenge for the criminal organizations during the pandemic, forcing them to think of other distribution options, including online sales and courier deliveries. In some countries, they used drivers working for essential services to provide door-­to-­ door deliveries. Despite social distancing, closures, and other measures to limit the spread of COVID-­19, the drug trade remained alive and fared well. Police seizures in March and April of 2020 showed that tons of drugs were still being moved around, even as land borders had become more supervised. According to the UN Security Council, cybercrime rose dramatically during the crisis, with phishing campaigns and ransomware dominating the cybercrime scene. In some cases, the hackers impersonated reliable organizations, such as the World Health Organization, claiming to provide an interactive map of the spread of the virus as they spread malware. The following are a few examples of the criminal activities perpetrated during the pandemic: •

• • •

Illicit drug prices went up considerably, similar to the increase in the price tag for human smuggling. To counteract the situation, an Interpol operation, dubbed Pangea, was established whereby ninety countries took part in a collective action against the illicit online sale of medicines and medical products. Phishing scams promised government stimulus money. Fake coronavirus tests and treatments were promised in online scams. The pandemic offered new opportunities for making fast cash, as the gangs took advantage of the high market demand for personal protection and hygiene products.

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•

Law enforcement agencies found over 2000 online links advertising items related to COVID-­19. Of these, counterfeit surgical masks were the medical device most commonly sold online. The seizure of more than 34,000 counterfeit and substandard masks, “corona spray,” “coronavirus packages,” or “coronavirus medicine” revealed only the tip of the iceberg regarding this new trend in counterfeiting.

In effect, the criminal gangs saw the pandemic as an opportunity to exploit or take advantage of human needs, weakness, and gullibility. Organized crime showed itself once again as being adept at transforming a crisis into opportunity, as they did during the 2008 financial crisis, when drug money became a major form of liquid investment capital available to some banks on the brink of collapse. Whereas the State needs months to make good on its promises of help, organized crime has the advantage of liquid assets that allow it to step quickly into the vacuum that the State leaves. They can forage loan sharks or directly lend usury money to entrepreneurs who have liquidity problems within a few days. They may also offer guaranteed credit to businesspeople on the verge of bankruptcy. Media reports in Italy throughout the pandemic confirmed that the Mafia and the Camorra were highly active, reemerging as Robin-­Hood figures, distributing food to the poorer neighborhoods. But this was an old tactic of the gangs, aiming to further increase their status and credibility in the region and step in as an alternative to the incompetent legal State. At the end of 2020, Interpol issued a global alert to law enforcement across its 194 member countries warning them to prepare for OC networks targeting COVID-­19 vaccines, both physically and online, including the selling and administering of fake vaccines. It seems that nothing will eliminate the world of organized crime. Some of the theories discussed in this book provide glimpses into why criminal cultures may have originated, why they are alluring to some young people, and why they persist. But no one paradigm can truly explain the phenomenon of organized crime and its perpetuity completely. As discussed throughout this book, one of the most revealing ways into the mindset of the Mafiosi and the raison d’être of Mafia cultures is through an analysis of the latter. In this final chapter, we will first present an overview of the main aspects of a cultural approach to the study of organized crime. We will then conclude with reflections on its future.

Overview The approach taken in this book has focused on the importance of culture in the formation and perpetuation of organized crime – both the self-­styled system of cultural organization that the gangs have devised for themselves and its relation to mainstream cultures. In this approach, a number of main features stand out, summarized in the following sidebar.

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Main features of organized crime • Criminal organizations fall into several categories  – the two main ones are the traditional OCs, such as the Sicilian Mafia and the Japanese Yakuza, and the neophyte-­emergent gangs, such as the Hells Angels, MS-­13, and so on. • While both types adopt symbolism and spin various myths about themselves, the traditional ones connect their symbolism and mythologies to significant historical events of the real cultures from which they spring; the neophyte gangs want to set themselves apart from mainstream society. So, the traditional gangs are more appropriately called parallel cultures within a society and the gangs subcultures, or groups within the mainstream culture. • Organized crime is different from terrorist organizations, although it shares many of the same methods; the main difference is that the terrorists have an agenda based on ideology (religious, political, social, etc.); the criminal gangs are non-­ideological. • The origin of OCs can be traced to piracy and banditry, which go back to the origins of civilizations. • The traditional OCs, such as the Italian Mafias, the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triads, and so on, legitimize their origins with made-­up stories about their descendancy from honorable figures (knights, monks, samurai warriors, etc.) and organizations who took from the rich to give to the poor, thus embracing a kind of Robin-­Hood trope to inform their myths. The truth is, however, to be found in social and political conditions that favored their emergence. • Some of the OCs are born in prison culture, for example, the Camorra and the Vory v Zakone, or in illegal events, such as the storming of a prison by the Hells Angels. • OCs have an organizational structure. It can be hierarchical, with the boss at the top and the foot soldiers at the bottom, that operates in terms of a chain of command, or it may be based on a network organization, with different clans or chapters operating like members of a kinship system. • The OCs typically have connections to State officials via corruption methods, allowing them to embed themselves deeply into the social mainstream. They also form mergers or syndicates to strengthen their operations, much like the mergers of corporations. • The members undergo initiation rites that introduce them formally into the gangs, taking a pledge to leave their previous lives behind permanently for their new family.

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•

OCs also name themselves in specific ways, either to be consistent with their origin myths or else to convey the type of character they aim to impart to each other and the public. The members are also typically given a nickname that is intended to portray some aspect of their personality, appearance, or achievements. • The members adopt dress codes and a discourse style that sets them apart from the mainstream culture. • In some gangs, identity construction is also through body decorations such as tattoos. • All gangs have codes of secrecy and allegiance that bind members to the group; the traditional OCs also have a code of honor, called omertà in Italian, that allows them to think of themselves as honorable men and to present themselves to others as endorsers of moral and ethical values, thus justifying their violent acts on the basis of omertà. • Women are typically seen as second-­class citizens within the clans, although they are treated with respect within some of the traditional OCs. There is a double standard in most of the OCs, with the women seen as subservient actors within them. • There are also female-­only gangs, but these are short-­lived, typically dissipating after the first generation of members. • All OCs must manage their resources systematically. These include finances, cleaned through money laundering, and the strategic use of human and social capital. • All gangs have a criminal business agenda, from extortion to trafficking. To consolidate their operations, they have formed transnational organized crime syndicates that allow them to take advantage of Internet technologies to plan their criminal agendas in cooperative ventures. • The main goal of the gangs is power, achieved through the resources, corruption of public officials, and violence. In traditional OCs, the violence is never random but systematic and strategic, as can be seen in the revenge killings that are carried out regularly. • The symbols and myths that the OCs adopt are signs of identity, allowing the gangs to invent their own traditions so as to perpetuate themselves like any legitimate culture. • OCs have developed sophisticated systems of secret communication that allow them to keep outsiders out and to establish an in-­group savvy that is self-­perpetuating. • Popular culture has adopted OCs in film, television, and the Internet. The images that pop culture generates shape our perception of the OCs, mythologizing them. Popular culture may also have reinforced ethnic stereotypes about some criminal groups.

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• Organized crime has migrated to cyberspace, finding new locales, such as the Dark Net, to plan and carry out plans. This has made it increasingly difficult to control the OCs, legally, since cyberspace does not have specific geographic delineations. The OCs are highly adaptive to new conditions, social and technological, ensuring their perpetuity through adaptation. • Various psychological and sociological theories have been put forward about the nature and lure of OCs. One plausible theory is the possibility that the gangs are products of an innate sense of tribalism that might manifest itself in the formation of criminal tribes.

The sources of organized criminal behavior are multifaceted and can never truly be narrowed down to one. Symbolism plays a fundamental role in establishing and directing such behavior. Each gang has its own system of symbols, which allows it to define itself, forming the “emotional glue” that binds gang members together. Also, the myths they concoct about themselves are powerful forms of pseudo-­history-­making that allow the gangsters to declare themselves legitimate cultures with noble origins. Perhaps the most significant insight that the cultural study of criminal cultures provides is their adaptability to change. While the cultural tropes, business strategies, codes, and rituals of the Mafia seem to remain untouched by time, the Mafiosi are nonetheless always adapting to changes and to the ever-­ transitory images of themselves that popular culture generates. Fiction is what makes the Mafia attractive, both the fiction created by the Mafiosi themselves to legitimize their lives and the fiction created by pop culture to make them look even more attractive and exceptional than they themselves could ever have imagined. Without these dual fictions, the perception of the Mafia as an honorable society of heroic figures would dissipate. By excising its allure from the domain of popular culture, the Mafiosi (and all the OCs) would be reduced to common thugs. Portrayals of criminal gangs on the screen have given rise to an unconscious “Godfather culture,” as it can be called, a culture that filters out the unsavory reality of the criminal gangs, as Reynolds (2006: 12) so eloquently notes: Viewers of The Godfather left the movie theater feeling that they had acquired an insight into the operations of Cosa Nostra, but few felt any new threat to their lives. Both the film and the book it was based upon ignored the historic heritage behind the organization, choosing to focus on actions of ruthless criminals united by blood and marriage who saw their work as simply a means of doing business. The groups were real, but the threat, while also real, remained distant, and the Mafia’s historical roots were never addressed.

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The modern-­d ay mobster The image of the mobster as an Al-­Capone-­type well-­dressed celebrity figure who lives by the gun and a moral code in tandem may have started to fade from the popular imagination, starting perhaps in 2011 when the FBI arrested 127 wise guys in New York City, leaving the Colombo and Gambino crime families depleted and virtually inoperative. In March of 2017, the FBI continued its crackdown on the Lucchese and Bonanno families. These raids may have attenuated the power and reach of Cosa Nostra but not its adaptability and resilience. Since then, the mobsters have gone global, forming alliances with drug cartels and other OCs and investing more and more into legitimate businesses, where the laundered money is difficult to trace back to its criminal sources. The modern-­day mobster has a new face – a blend of Wall-­Street businessman and Dark Net hacker. The Yakuza and the Triads, like their Cosa Nostra counterparts, have also infiltrated white-­collar businesses throughout Asia, as well as public institutions like the judiciary. The mobsters may have been contained, but their cultures continue to evolve adaptively. Ex-­ Mafia figures have even emerged as writers, with their autobiographies and retrospective accounts becoming international bestsellers. In a phrase, the criminals are going mainstream in social perception, reinvesting their criminally acquired money into legitimate ventures, increasing their corruption budgets to pay off politicians and the police and to hire expert online operators and computer experts. Emerging technologies are determining the future of organized crime. The same way that sites like eBay, Amazon, and Alibaba have changed how people shop for goods in the legitimate economy, so too has the Dark Net allowed the gangsters to run a large part of the illegal economy. A  good example of how online operations work was the Beteagle illegal online gaming website, owned by Joseph Graziano, an associate of the Gambino crime family, which conducted illegal sports betting. Before Graziano was arrested in 2015, bets were taken online via access identifiers given in person. Money was exchanged hand to hand, but the betting occurred online. Enormous amounts of money were made in this simple-­to-­pull-­off way. Today, the Mafioso is an incognito figure, as he was before Prohibition and the rise of the celebrity gangster. The bosses in American Mafia culture are now virtually unknown outside of law enforcement circles. Movies and series with the title The Last Don inform us that the end might have come. But this is somewhat premature. As discussed, the Mafiosi have formed transnational alliances and are keeping a constant eye on changing technologies. Moreover, the lure of criminal societies will endure not because of economic conditions, new laws, or police crackdowns but because of the power of outlaw symbolism and the promise of power, fame, and fortune that it brings with it, which has been called the Bandello effect in this book (Chapter 17). The proof is indirect – it can be seen in the adoption and co-­option of Mafia and other criminal gang symbols throughout the pop culture sphere, a sure sign that Mafia culture is now an intrinsic part of Internet meme culture, as discussed.

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In some ways, nothing has changed  – to use the French expression again here, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose (“the more it changes, the more it stays the same”). The original Mafiosi in the nineteenth century were hardly Hollywood-­type celebrities; they stayed away from the social limelight, carrying out their operations in secret so that they could avoid detection by the authorities and enact their fear-­mongering activities in the dark. The Mafia was originally a shadow culture. In the age of the Internet, they have returned to the shadows, inhabiting the dark regions of the Web, operating as fearfully as ever. The modern-­day mobster is no longer a rustic knight; he is a blend of corporate figure, sinister Internet troll, and monster in the sense of the word used by Scarpinato (Chapter 1). He is truly an enemy within – within real and virtual space. New York City’s Five Families defined the public image of OCs in the twentieth century. Those families created the wise guy celebrity – an image that is now anachronistic. The mobster today has returned to his roots, retreating to the shadows, avoiding the glitz and glamour of the celebrity dons of the past. From the shadows, he still seeks power and money, forming flexible alliances. The days when mobsters hung out at social clubs have vanished, but the mobsters themselves have not disappeared – they have moved on.

The future Will Mafia culture survive? We use Mafia here as a general moniker for organized crime. We believe that it will, mainly because it is adaptive and because it is based in ingrained human tendencies  – symbolism, storytelling, coded systems of behavior, tribalism, and so on. While a gang like the Hells Angels is born from antagonism to certain social conditions, it grew into a mythologized organization because of the movies and various tabloid media exploiting outlaw culture as entertainment. Also, one should not understate the importance of how the gangs stay one step ahead of the law. In a world where advancements in AI and big data enable the police to identify and track criminal organizations globally, the gangs have become experts themselves at counterintelligence and computer science. Exploiting all kinds of opportunities as they present themselves, from social to technological ones, the OCs are bound to survive any paradigm shift in the future. Their profits are attractive to many greedy outsiders, which allows the gangsters to easily make their way into the legal economy, thanks as well to the fiscal opportunities offered to them by the lax financial laws in most countries. To understand the power and allure of organized crime, we must look somewhat beyond the classic theories, which characterize it as a deviance of sorts. History teaches instead that criminal groups could not have emerged without corruption, which is an indirect statement on the inherent weakness of human beings. Crime results from opportunism, which may, itself, go back to our origins, as discussed. But, then, there is also a powerful sense of goodness

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and justice within humanity. It seems that the conflict between Good and Evil has come out in various ways, one of which is the fight between ordinary people and the gangsters. Organized crime is especially motivated by a pathological thirst for power and control. It is the main force behind their existence and will guide their evolution in the future. A statement by Sicilian Mafioso Antonino Calderone serves to make it clear that not everything is as it seems. Calderone was the brother of a former representative of the Commission of Cosa Nostra. He lived in Canada in a secret location, dying in 2013. After cooperating with officials, he recounted his life to Pino Arlacchi in The Men of Dishonor (1993). From his account, the Mafia emerges as a universe doubled, schizophrenic and hallucinated, in which everyone is at the same time friends and enemies of all. In which everyone professes and flaunts intense loyalty and fidelity, knot and dissolve pacts and federations, at the same time as they claim the false, promote deception, plan conspiracies and ambushes, betray and kill loved ones. And it dominates all the continuous, Hobbesian fear and the danger of violent death. (Arlacchi 1993: v) Calderone’s words provide a perfect description of the hypocrisy and brutality of the Mafia, hidden behind a façade of honor. Also, as Calderone suggests, hypocrisy leads to betrayal. Joseph Massino (a boss of the Bonanno family) decided to betray his own organization in 2004 to avoid a possible death sentence for the numerous crimes he had committed. In prison, he recorded his conversations with other inmates for the FBI, many of them members of his own organization, leading to arrests and convictions. What such events show is that the Mafiosi themselves are aware of the deception, implying that no matter how criminality is mythologized or sugar-­coated, it is a pathology of power. Their statements are useful, especially for debunking the myth of the man of honor, which is the main goal of any cultural approach to organized crime. Organized crime is not located in any one area or society. It is everywhere. As Allum, Marinaro and Sciarrone (2019: 1) observe, to this day, “Italian mafias are widely dismissed as ‘an Italian problem’ despite vast evidence that these criminal groups have expanded well beyond Italy as their base for business. All of Italy’s mafia groups have become – in fact many have long been – transnational in their economic and political activities and in their social effects.” Penetrating what the future is for OCs involves understanding how their pseudo-­cultures are evolving and how mainstream (pop) culture is portraying them. Today, international networks of forensic scientists are studying the role of symbolism and rituals in various criminal activities. The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, founded in 1995, holds regular meetings for its membership of forensic laboratories. The American Society of Crime Laboratories maintains an international liaison so that the labs can collaborate

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across the globe. Within this movement lies the awareness that interdisciplinarity is critical as an approach to crime and criminality and that to bring down the gangs, it is necessary to decode how they create meaningful codes about themselves. Crime is essentially about meaning, or its absence, as we have seen throughout this book.

References Allum, Felia, Marinaro, Isabella Clough and Sciarrone, Rocco (eds.) (2019). Italian Mafia Today. Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing. Arlacchi, Pino (1993). Men of Dishonor: Inside the Sicilian Mafia. An Account of Antonino Calderone. New York: William Morrow. Reynolds, John Lawrence (2006). Shadow People: Inside History’s Most Notorious Secret Societies. Toronto: Key Porter Books.

Index

Adadinsky, Howard 18, 72, 82, 86, 87, 94, 247 adaptability 33, 55, 63, 188, 244, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 278, 279 alienation 256 alien conspiracy 15, 50, 52, 54, 207, 234, 235 allegiance 5, 6, 8, 18, 22, 23, 28, 32, 55, 56, 59, 84, 87, 88, 94, 97, 118, 120, 187, 197, 199, 200, 223, 277 anomie 250, 256, 257, 272, 263, 265 anti-languages 213, 214 appearance 141, 142, 261 Archangel Gabriel 98 associates (crime) 76, 79, 81, 83, 92, 101, 164 Bacon’s code 216, 217 Baker, Marie 150 Bandello, Rico 185, 222, 223, 224, 271, 272, 279 banditry 32, 37, 123, 129, 276 Barger, Sonny 70, 75 Barker, Arizona Donnie 149 Barrio (18) 6 Barrow, Clyde 149, 150 Beati Paoli 202, 203 biker gangs 69, 71, 72, 81, 82, 83, 111, 149, 156 blackmail 3, 81, 92, 167, 169 blood (symbolism) 56, 57, 64, 67, 78, 83, 98, 99, 100 bloodline 48, 49, 92 Bloods 5, 86 Bonanno, Giuseppe 37, 38 Bonanno family 45, 90, 110, 229, 281 bonding 118, 166, 267 bootlegging 17, 42, 45, 80, 89, 90, 174, 185, 230, 258 Bourdieu, Pierre 166

Boxers 67, 99, 100 bribery 2, 40, 76, 81, 92, 101, 167, 185 bricolage 140 bridging 166 Buscetta, Tommaso 8, 44, 96, 222 Caesar cipher 218 Calderone, Antonino 8, 121, 203, 227, 281 Camorra 1, 9, 22, 28, 33, 34, 35, 44, 48, 50, 53, 78, 79, 81, 96, 105, 121, 135, 141, 164, 169, 206, 212, 236, 275, 276 cant 138, 139, 210, 211, 213 capodecina 76, 79 capofamiglia 76, 79 Capone, Al 14, 43, 44, 109, 110, 111, 130, 132, 133, 134, 185, 189, 195, 222, 223, 226, 229, 233, 279 carbonari 38, 127 carboneria 35, 38, 41 Castellammarese War 79 Cavalleria Rusticana 113, 114 chivalry 113, 114, 117, 122, 131, 190, 197, 206, 207 Chobei, Banzuiin 62 cinema 63, 125, 134, 141, 221, 223, 226 code of conduct 1, 8, 22, 28, 32, 84, 85 Colombo family 45, 79, 90, 228, 279 color (symbolism) 134, 135, 136, 141, 155, 199, 200 commandments (Mafia) 115, 116, 117, 118 consigliere 76, 79, 183 coronavirus 274, 275 corruption 167, 168, 169, 172, 178, 182, 184, 185, 276, 277, 279, 280 Cosa Nostra 1, 4, 9, 10, 44, 45, 46, 89, 90, 95, 96, 99, 116, 122, 128, 129, 174, 175, 181, 190, 195, 200, 203, 278, 279, 281 cosmetics 154, 200

284 Index Crimine 49, 77, 78 Crips 5, 57, 86, 139, 140 cryptography 137, 216, 218, 219 cryptolect 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 219 cults 18, 120 Cutrera, Antonino 40, 54 cybercrime 152, 180, 216, 238, 239, 240, 241, 270, 274 cyberspace 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244 dangerous classes 36, 236 Dark Net 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 269, 279 dialect 36, 43, 62, 108, 111, 118, 138, 211, 212, 214, 215 differential association 250, 251, 252, 253, 256 differential opportunity 250, 260 double standard 6, 147, 153, 154, 155, 277 dress code 132, 134, 135, 136, 137 drug cartel 155, 175, 178, 186, 212 drug lord 157, 177, 178, 220 drug trade 10, 21, 69, 162, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, 274 drug trafficking 6, 14, 40, 50, 64, 68, 71, 105, 159, 167, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 192, 190, 219, 231, 240, 242, 246, 247 Dumas, Alexandre 84, 236, 237 Durkheim, Emile 95, 255, 256, 257, 267 embezzlement 167, 175 entrepreneurial theory 87 Escobar, Pablo 157, 177, 178 ethnicity 1, 9, 12, 23, 92, 95, 96, 108, 110, 118, 263 ethnic succession 251, 258, 259, 260 extortion 18, 50, 51, 65, 68, 76, 79, 159, 167, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 180, 229, 241, 237, 258, 277 Falcone, Giovanni 3, 20, 44, 108 falcons 175 female gang 156, 200 Ferro, Vito Cascio 108 feudalism 60, 203, 204 finances 101, 160, 277 Fitzgerald, F. Scott 221, 237 Five Ancestors 66, 84, 88, 99, 105 Five Families (New York City) 80, 90, 223, 280 folklore 36, 48, 55, 206

Free Masonry 38, 96, 120, 121, 127, 215 French Connection 171, 172, 175, 189 Freud, Sigmund 260, 262 Gambetta, Diego 36, 37, 142, 203, 209, 224 Gambino family 45, 79, 90, 95, 102, 151, 153, 222, 279 gambling 4, 15, 33, 43, 44, 56, 60, 82, 158, 159, 171, 175, 179, 187, 228, 239 Garduña legend 48, 201 Garibaldi, Giuseppe 31, 38, 39 Gelder, Ken 24 Genovese family 15, 45, 79, 90, 110, 134, 137, 153, 194 gesture 7, 24, 41, 127, 137, 139, 154, 186, 193 Giammona, Antonio 97 Giuliano, Salvatore 123, 124, 178 globalization 25, 26, 50, 90, 160, 179, 181, 182, 239, 245, 246, 248 global organized crime 246 Godfather 9, 23, 80, 101, 108, 111, 113, 124, 128, 129, 130, 134, 154, 183, 187, 198, 207, 222, 226, 227, 228, 230, 232, 234, 278 Gozen, Tomoe 60 graffiti 194, 200 graft 18, 96, 167 gray zone 188, 189, 190, 231 Gúzman Loera, Joaquín Archivaldo (El Chapo) 176, 178, 219 habitus 166 hairstyle 59, 140, 141, 200 hand signs 140 Hells Angels 1, 2, 10, 31, 56, 69, 70, 71, 81, 82, 88, 92, 100, 103, 107, 135, 135, 136, 136, 137, 162, 212, 248, 276, 280 hierarchy 24, 29, 93, 111, 136 hitman 102 Hobbes, Thomas 159, 167, 256, 266, 281 Hollywood 1, 9, 17, 43, 123, 124, 125, 130, 131, 134, 141, 221, 221, 222, 224, 225, 229, 232, 234, 236, 271, 280 honor code 190 horizontal 77, 78, 81, 83 human capital 163, 164, 165 immigration 50, 52, 53, 236, 259 initiation rite 6, 37, 66, 84, 92, 96, 107 insignia 31, 70, 135 Internet Mafia culture 232

Index 285 inventing traditions 207 irezumi 59, 144 Italian Unification (Risorgimento) 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 97, 168, 206, 214 jewelry 135, 149, 200, 201 jingi 58 Jolly Roger 31, 82 Kipling, Rudyard 48 kobun 56, 118, 197 Kuklinski, Richard 102 Lansky, Meyer 44, 101, 102, 224, 239 Las Vegas 43, 44, 101, 224, 237 Little Caesar 43, 185, 222, 224, 271 loansharking 179 locale 49 Lombroso, Cesare 261 Lucchese family 45, 79, 90, 95, 194, 279 Luciano, Lucky 44, 45, 46, 80, 89, 90, 101, 102, 111, 133, 134, 158, 170, 174, 190, 222, 224, 226, 231, 233, 244 made man 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 147, 153, 186, 188 Mafia (Sicilian) 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 Mafia state 74, 168, 169, 170 Mano Nera (Black Hand) 44, 50, 51, 52, 53 Manzoni, Alessandro 28 Maranzano, Salvatore 45, 79, 89 martial arts 60, 66, 110, 192, 193, 205, 229 Mascagni, Pietro 113, 114, 197, 207 Massara, Joe 185, 223, 271 Masseria, Joe 45, 123 Mauss, Marcel 166 McKay, Henry 253, 254 memorabilia 232, 239 mens rea 11, 12 Merton, Robert 257, 258, 260 mobility 87, 154, 253 Mob Museum 233 money laundering 6, 90, 160, 161, 162, 164, 167, 171, 177, 180, 239, 247, 277 monopolization 86, 87 Morello, Nicholas 50, 51, 52 motorcycles 82, 136, 174 Musolino, Giuseppe 47, 141 Mussolini, Benito 42, 108, 111 mythologization 72, 208, 234, 235 mythology 31, 118, 125, 129, 134, 156, 185, 193, 196, 206, 207, 222, 224, 232

narcoterrorism 21, 175, 177, 178 ’Ndrangheta 9, 22, 28, 46, 47, 50, 105, 118, 125, 126, 141, 150, 155, 162, 164, 169, 197, 205, 219, 231, 268 ’ndrina 152 neophyte (emergent) 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 18, 55, 83, 146, 147, 180, 183, 242, 276 nepotism 168 networking 168 nicknames 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 137, 150, 200 oaths 8, 28, 32, 35, 55, 64, 66, 67, 84, 85, 87, 88, 94, 99, 115, 125, 127, 197 omertà 8, 34, 37, 41, 96, 104, 113, 114, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 147, 151, 153, 154, 172, 188, 190, 191, 192, 207, 214, 227, 228, 234, 248, 277 otherness 12, 53 Outlaws 10, 81, 82 oyabun 56, 80, 81, 108, 118, 197 Parker, Bonnie 149 patches 70, 82, 135, 136, 213 patron-client 18, 82, 83, 86 pentito 44, 139, 153 perpetuity 5, 6, 7, 8, 23, 28, 34, 86, 118, 163, 188, 275 Perri, Rocco 6, 17, 26, 258, 259 Petrosino, Joseph 51, 52, 108 Phillips, John 119 picciotto 96, 98, 138 Piccolo, Anthony 85 piracy 28, 29, 31, 50 pirate code 119, 120 pizzo 33, 37, 40, 137, 139, 173, 227 polyalphabetic cipher 218 Polybius cipher 218 Prohibition 12, 13, 14, 17, 42, 45, 73, 74, 80, 109, 121, 132, 134, 159, 161, 174, 175, 178, 185, 221, 222, 230, 237, 258, 259, 279 Provenzano, Bernardo 46, 111, 217, 218 Provincia 49, 66, 77 psychoanalysis 251, 260 racketeering 64, 71, 100, 159, 172, 174, 175, 179, 219, 239, 241 rational choice 251, 253 revenge killing (RK) 190, 191, 192 Riina, Salvatore 20, 46, 108, 110, 123, 190, 203, 234

286 Index ritual warfare 266 Robin-Hood (principle) 27, 28, 32, 43, 47, 48, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 65, 109, 118, 124 Rock Machine 69 Rogers, Captain Woodes 29 ronin 60 Russo, Giuseppe Genco 131 rustic chivalry 113, 114, 122, 131, 197, 206, 207 Sacra Corona Unita 164, 198 Saietta, Ignazio 50, 51, 110, 111, 173 Saint Michael 98 samurai 10, 56, 58, 60, 142, 193, 198, 204, 228, 276 Santa Liberata 98 Saponara 202 Scarpinato, Roberto 2, 3, 4, 20 Sciascia, Leonardo 104, 191 secrecy 127, 128 secret communication 210 Shaw, Clifford 253, 254 sicario 175 Silk Road 181, 182, 243, 244 simulacrum 125, 207, 208 slang (criminal) 137, 138, 139, 140 Smith, Adam 163 social capital 165, 166, 169, 277 social control 250, 254, 255, 256, 272 social disorganization 253, 254, 255 Sopranos 80, 153, 198, 228, 229, 230 sottocapo 76, 79 Spencer, Herbert 265, 266 strategic violence 183, 185, 185, 186 subculture theory 258 Sutherland, Edwin 151, 153 symbolic violence 193, 195

symbolism 31, 55, 64, 98, 100, 126, 191, 194, 196, 198, 200, 201, 207, 272, 276 syndication 89, 90, 164, 240, 244, 248 tattoos 7, 58, 59, 71, 73, 105, 129, 130, 131, 142, 144, 145, 146, 149, 197, 199, 201, 215, 277 territoriality 266 terrorism 20, 21 thirty-six (36) oaths 36, 67, 84, 99 Tocqueville, Alexis de 114, 165 Tongs 10, 65, 68, 105, 107 transnational organized crime (TOC) 11, 179, 180, 181 transposition cipher 218 Triads 64, 65, 84, 94, 107, 160, 162, 205, 229, 247. 276, 279 tribalism 265. 267, 268, 278, 280 Valachi, Joe 15, 44, 80, 137, 193, 194, 222, 224, 235 Valentine’s Day massacre 109, 110. 132, 133, 185 Varese, Federico 17, 82 vertical 77, 80, 83, 88 video game 67, 80, 32 Vizzini, Calogero 108 Vory v Zakone 68, 72, 93, 111, 131, 138, 139, 143, 180, 189, 228, 276 Washburn, Charles 53 White Boy Posse 71 Yakuza 1, 3, 7, 9, 55, 56, 57, 69, 75, 101, 108, 117, 138, 142, 145, 147, 148, 160. 184, 199, 204, 276, 279 yubitsume 58, 138, 199