Order of East Asia: Regional Transformation, Competition among Main Powers, and China’s Strategy [1st ed.] 9789811546532, 9789811546549

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Honghua Men

Order of East Asia Regional Transformation, Competition among Main Powers, and China’s Strategy

Order of East Asia

Honghua Men

Order of East Asia Regional Transformation, Competition among Main Powers, and China’s Strategy

123

Honghua Men School of Political Science and International Relations Tongji University Shanghai, China

This book is the result of project “Prospects for East Asian Integration: Regional Order and China’s Strategy” (No. 08BGJ018) supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China. ISBN 978-981-15-4653-2 ISBN 978-981-15-4654-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4654-9

(eBook)

Jointly published with Shanghai People’s Publishing House The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. © Shanghai People’s Publishing House and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Dedicated to My Wife, Prof. Xi Xiao (肖晞)

Contents

1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Importance of East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Process of East Asian Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Strategic Game and Evolution of East Asian Order . . . . . 1.4 China’s Peaceful Development and the Future of East Asian Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Logic of Regional Order Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Order, International Order and Regional Order . . . . 2.2 Historical Evolution of International Order . . . . . . . 2.3 New Features of the Change in International Order 2.4 Logic of Regional Order Construction . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Journey of Regional Integration . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Upsurge of Regionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Logic of Regional Order Construction . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 Historical Legacy of East Asian Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 China and the Tributary Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The US and the Open Door Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Japan and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere Scheme 3.4 The US and the Hegemonic Security Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Japan and the Flying Geese Economic Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 ASEAN and the Sub-regional Community Order . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 East Asian Economic Integration Process and Its Spillover Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 East Asian Economic Integration Process . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Institutionalization of East Asian Integration . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 Model and Path of East Asian Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.4 Competition and Challenges in East Asian Cooperation . 4.2 China’s Overall Rise and Integration into East Asia . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Historical Process of China’s Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Path and Process of China’s Integration into East Asia . 4.2.3 A Rising China’s Impact on and Contribution to East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Spillover Effects and Limitations of the ASEAN Norms . . . . . . 4.3.1 Creating ARF to Promote the ASEAN Way . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Promoting “10 + 1” and “10 + 3” to Lead Regional Economic Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Creating EAS to Boost Regional Political Cooperation . 4.3.4 ASEAN’s Effort to Ensure Leadership and Its Dilemma . 4.4 Evolution and Adjustment of the US Strategy Towards East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Evolution of the US Strategy Towards East Asia . . . . . . 4.4.2 Inertia of the US Strategy Towards East Asia . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Effect of the US Strategic Shift Eastward in East Asia . . 4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.1 Japan’s Conception of East Asian Community . . . . . . . 4.5.2 Japan’s FTA Strategy Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.3 Japan’s Strategic Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Prospects for East Asian Order Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.1 Status Quo and Dilemma of East Asian Order Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.2 Foundation for East Asian Order Construction . . . . . . . . 4.6.3 Path of East Asian Order Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5 China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 China’s National Positioning and Strategic Direction . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Institutional Positioning: A New-Type Socialist Power . 5.1.2 Economic Positioning: A Developing Power . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 Cultural Positioning: A Great Power with Rich Cultural Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.4 Political Positioning: A Responsible Power . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.5 Strategic Positioning: An Asia-Pacific Power with Great Global Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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148 150 156 160 164 167 170 173 181 182

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183 187 189 192

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201 203 204 206

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Contents

5.1.6 Strategic Design: Building China’s National Strategic System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.7 Several Notable Key Points for China’s Grand Strategy . 5.2 Framework of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order . . . . 5.2.1 China’s View of International Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Development of China’s East Asia Strategy . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Basic Framework of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Interaction Between China and Major Forces in East Asia . . . . 5.3.1 Actively Build New-Type Major Power Relations Between China and the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Stabilize and Develop Sino-Japanese Relationship at the Right Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Comprehensively Enhance China-ASEAN Strategic Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 Comprehensively Deepen the China–South Korea Strategic Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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218 222 225 226 229

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3

Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2

Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Japan-led flying geese economic order in East Asia. Source Kwan [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Industrial dynamic model of the flying geese economic order in Asia. Source Kwan [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proportion of the US investment in East Asia (1992–2012). Source Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. Note The historical stock change calculated with the data of balance of international payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of Japan’s GDP in the world economy (1990–2013). Source http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. GDP.MKTP.CD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of Japan’s foreign trade in the world economy (1990–2013). Source http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE. EXP.GNFS.ZS/countries; http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/ WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=JP . . . . . . Comparison of GDP between China and the US (1988–2012). Source World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/NY. GDP.MKTP.CD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of foreign trade between China and the US (1988–2011). Source World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org.cn/ indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD, http://data.worldbank.org.cn/ indicator/all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of defense expenditure between China and the US (1989–2012). Source SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012, http://milexdata.sipri.org . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of trade with China in Japan’s foreign trade (1979–2012). Source The Ministry of Finance (MOF) of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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88

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Fig. 5.5

Fig. 5.6

List of Figures

Percentage of investment in China in Japan’s total foreign investment (1978–2012). Source The Japan External Trade Promotion Agency (JETRO). Note Regarding the foreign direct investment, the 1978–2004 data is based on the corporate reporting statistics published by the Ministry of Finance, and the 2005–2012 data is based on the statistics from the balance of international payments. And the former is the fiscal year and the latter is the calendar year. In 1978, Japan did not invest in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Proportion of trade with China in ASEAN’s overall foreign trade (1992–2012). Source China Statistical Yearbook, per year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1

Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 4.1 Table Table Table Table

4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6

List of basic data of EAS member countries (2012) . . . . . . . Power shift, problem shift and paradigm shift . . . . . . . . . . . . Trade share of regions during the Cold War (1965–1990) . . . Changes in total trade volume in Northeast Asia (1876–1940) ($1 million, %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Japan’s annual economic growth index (1953–1990) (%) . . . Japan’s import and export presence in East Asia (1960–1980) (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction and growth periods of major industries in East Asian economies (1960–1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mutual impact of GDP of East Asian countries involved (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources of China’s FDI (1998–2013) (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of previous ARF meetings (1994–2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Process of the ASEAN FTAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference between security alliance and cooperative security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Status quo of Japan’s EPAs/FTAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Japan’s outward investment trend (1995–2013) (%) . . . . . . . . Percentage of four regions in China by major indicators (2013) (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . East Asian strategic framework based on common interests. . Sino-Japanese trade and investment relations (1995–2013) ($1 million) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defense expenditure of participating countries in Six-party Talks (2001–2013) ($1 million, fixed rate in 2011) . . . . . . . . Statistics of China–South Korea import and export trade value and growth rate (1992–2013) ($100 million) . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of South Korea’s investment in China (1992–2013) . . . .

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4 36 41

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xiii

Chapter 1

Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

Territory where the borders of several neighboring states meet is a focal region —Sun Tzu (Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Nine Battlegrounds (sun zi bing fa: jiu di pian)) The most stable factor on which a country’s power depends is obviously the geography —Hans Morgenthau [1]

East Asia is in the midst of a changing world. The construction of East Asian order is motivated by the strategic game among great powers, attracting global attention and indicating the future direction of the world.1 East Asia has a glorious ancient history which was illuminated by China’s cultural leadership. Since the 16th century, with the global expansion of European interests, the international influence of Europe has become increasingly prominent. In the 19th century, known as the European Century, the importance of Europe was so dazzling that East Asia had lost its periphery. In the 20th century, i.e. the American Century, East Asia went through twists and turns with its reactive or proactive opening up. From the 19th century to the 20th century, under the European and American influences, East Asia began its transformation by following and surpassing its counterparts. In the second half of the 20th century, especially triggered by China’s constructive rise and the Asian financial crisis, the East Asian integration accelerated and East Asia entered an era of comprehensive engagement. A rising East Asia has given scholars sufficient space to study and forecast the future of the world.2 In the 21st century, various internal and external forces gathered in East Asia, making its political, economic, security and even cultural landscapes undergo fundamental changes, and shaking up the East Asian order. The rise of China is the core force that drives the change of East Asian order. With the ongoing effect of China’s rise, the great powers in the world have made strategic adjustments around the prospects of China, especially the eastward shift of US strategic focus and Japan’s accelerated right deviation, putting the East Asian change in the spotlight of the world. Meanwhile, each country of strategic interest is paying close attention to the trend of the East Asian order. 1 Men

[2].

2 Kang[3].

© Shanghai People’s Publishing House and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Men, Order of East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4654-9_1

1

2

1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

1.1 The Importance of East Asia East Asia is both a geographic concept and a historical and cultural concept. East Asia is historically regarded from a cultural perspective. As John K. Fairbank said, “As a region culturally influenced by the Chinese culture, East Asia includes China, North Korea, Japan and Vietnam, etc.”3 Some scholars regard it as a region affected by the Confucian culture. For example, Liang Zhiming, a professor at Peking University, said, “In a narrow sense, East Asia refers to China and its islands (such as Taiwan), as well as Japanese islands, the Korean Peninsula and Mongolia, etc.; in a broad sense, in addition to the above-mentioned Northeast Asian region, East Asia also includes Southeast Asia, i.e. the countries in the Indochina Peninsula and South Sea Islands. Some ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries such as China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore as well as China’s Taiwan and Hong Kong form a community that is generally influenced by the East Asian culture best known for the heritage of Confucianism.”4 Geographically speaking, there are various definitions at present. According to the Western understanding, East Asia generally includes Eastern Siberia, China, Mongolia, the Korean Peninsula, Japan and Southeast Asia.5 Most Chinese scholars often regard China, Japan and South Korea plus ten ASEAN member states (“10 + 3”) as East Asia when discussing East Asian issues.6 This is a clear definition that has been endorsed by many scholars in other countries.7 The American academic community generally regards East Asia as the sum of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. For example, although Peter Katzenstein, a professor at Cornell University, believed that a region was more about a political concept than just a geographical one,8 he analyzed and defined East Asia mainly from a geographical perspective, stressing that “the definition of East Asia includes Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, mainly ASEAN plus China, North and South Korea and Japan, and it does not include North America, Australia, New Zealand and South Asia. For many initiatives aiming to build the Asian and East Asian regionalism, it is a fairly solid definition.”9 The Japanese academic circle, however, tends to expand the geographical scope of East Asia by incorporating some countries in South Asia and Oceania into it. As Nakamura Satoru pointed out, “East Asia refers to the region consisting of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Specifically, Northeast Asia refers to China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan, and may include Mongolia and the Russian Far East area in the future. Southeast Asia will also include Australia,

3 Fairbank

[4]. [5]. 5 Morse et al. [6]. 6 The Chinese academic circle has different opinions. For example, Chen Xiansi believed that, “East Asia is a complicated region where a political game is played by China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and the United States.” See [7]. 7 E.g. [8]. 8 Hemmer and Katzenstein [9]. 9 Katzenstein [10]. 4 Liang

1.1 The Importance of East Asia

3

New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and other parts.”10 According to South Korean scholar Baik Youngseo, “A geographical concept is an invention that changes with the experience of the cognitive subject. East Asia is not limited to a geographically fixed entity, but a product of culture and history. In a broad sense, East Asia includes Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Given the increasingly strong economic interdependence in this region, it also implies the tendency of seeking cooperation on political, security and other aspects.”11 In summary, as a geographical concept proposed by the west, the cultural and historical scope of East Asia is relatively definite (i.e. the areas affected by the Confucian culture), but the geographical scope of East Asia keeps changing. In view of the openness of East Asia, the expansion of its geographical scope is a basic trend, clearly exemplified by the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, India, the United States and Russia at the East Asia Summit (EAS). On that account, it will be wise to understand East Asia with an open and inclusive attitude, and capture its trend from the cultural and strategic perspectives (Table 1.1). East Asia has its distinct uniqueness. On the whole, East Asia is in the process of development from the periphery to the center. Still in the halfway station, it is continuously infiltrated by foreign cultures on the one hand, and faced with the common problem of cultural protection and cultural renaissance on the other. The reality is that the legacy issues are yet to be resolved while new problems are emerging one after another. As a result, a strong desire and strategic space for cooperation co-exists with all kinds of obstacles that hinder the integration and cooperation. Specifically, East Asian countries have different systems and different levels of development. “There is a huge income gap between the developed countries and the poorest countries. For one thing, East Asian countries are promoting economic growth as a whole, and for another, they maintain the order of development stage to a large extent; in the meantime, the backward countries are striving to catch up with the developed ones. Besides, this catching-up process takes place in an international combination of production, trade, investment, finance and assistance, etc., a phenomenon invisible in Latin America, Africa or the Middle East.”12 What also reflects the uniqueness of East Asia is the sharp contrast between Southeast Asia, a relatively stable sub-region featuring high heterogeneity, and Northeast Asia, a notoriously long-time powder keg.13 However, the world has never paid so much attention to East Asia as it does today.14 In the second half of the 20th century, a wave of economic rise in East Asia drew the worldwide attention and contributed to the improvement of the economic and political status of the region. Leading economies such as Japan, the Four Dragons (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), China and ASEAN countries have formed a dynamic trend and created the East Asian Miracle that impressed the whole world. East Asia has not only experienced economic development, but also 10 Nakamura

[11]. [12]. 12 Ohno and Sakurai [13]. 13 Men [14]. 14 Wu [15]. 11 Baik

4

1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

Table 1.1 List of basic data of EAS member countries (2012) Country

Territory area (km2 )

Population (million)

China

9,600,000

1,351.0

Japan

377,800

South Korea

100,210 5,765

Brunei

GDP ($100 million)

GDP per capita ($)

Value of import & export ($100 million)

Economic growth rate (%)

Military expenditure ($100 million)

82,271

6,091

42,780.9

7.8

1645.4

127.6

59,597

46,720

18,475.1

1.9

596.0

50.0

11,296

22,590

12,425.6

2.0

316.3

0.4

170

41,127

192.1

2.2

4.1

Cambodia

181,035

14.9

140

944

159.6

7.3

2.1

Indonesia

1,904,569

246.9

8,780

3,557

4,390.0

6.2

70.2

Laos

236,800

6.6

94

1,417

79.9

8.2

0.2

Malaysia

329,847

29.2

3,050

10,432

4,941.0

5.6

45.8

Myanmar*

676,581

52.8

553

1,047

168.7

6.4

18.6

The Philippines

299,764

96.7

2,502

2,587

1,626.3

6.8

30.0

Singapore

716

5.3

2,747

51,709

10,411.1

1.3

96.1

Thailand

513,120

66.8

3,660

5,480

5,438.5

6.5

54.9

Vietnam

331,210

88.8

1,558

1,755

2,446.1

5.2

34.2

India

3,201,446

1,237.0

18,417

1,489

10,129.4

3.2

442.0

Australia

7,617,930

22.7

15,324

67,556

6,436.1

3.4

260.5

268,680

4.4

1,673

37,749

987.1

3.0

18.4

9,364,000

313.9

162,446

51,749

48,733.8

2.8

6,822.7

17,075,400

143.9

20,148

14,037

10,477.0

3.4

906.7

New Zealand USA Russia

Note the statistics of China do not include Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and some data of Myanmar are estimated based on IMF data Source World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org.cn/)

witnessed significant changes in all aspects of social life. The fresh experiences and development models it has provided indicate a new way of development of modern civilization in the east.15 In particular, the rise of China has driven the regional economic development, promoted the strategic competition, and facilitated the in-depth cooperation in East Asia who is gradually gaining greater influence and autonomy. The Asian Miracle is the result of the social and economic development policies implemented by East Asian economies in the past few decades, and the active cooperation among East Asian countries is also a huge contributor.16 Promoting East Asian cooperation is a natural response of all East Asian countries to the trend of globalization, which is also in the interest of these countries. At the same time, the economic rise of East Asia has boosted its political status in the international arena. 15 Liang 16 Yu

[16]. [17].

1.1 The Importance of East Asia

5

As world trade is concentrated within and between the three regions of North America, Europe and East Asia,17 East Asia, neck and neck with Europe and America, is regarded as one of the three pillars of world economy. East Asia has always been a place of strategic importance for the great powers in the world. Firstly, the US has long seen it as the core region for ensuring its status as a world power. It even believes that if the US withdraws from East Asia, it will end up being a regional country, so it is very concerned about the future of East Asia. Secondly, Japan has always deemed East Asia as an anchor to secure its strategic interests and seek the status as a world power, regardless of the accusation of being capricious. Thirdly, in order to safeguard its own interests and the core position of East Asian integration, ASEAN has pursued a strategy of balancing the great powers by responding to the changes in East Asia with “ASEAN + 1” (“10 + 1”) as the core tactics. Fourthly, China’s rise has captured the world’s attention, and the neighboring countries are sensitive to every move of China in East Asia. The above four forces interact and restrict each other, making the radical changes in East Asia one of the most important development processes in the contemporary world.

1.2 Process of East Asian Cooperation A rising East Asia indicates one of the spillover effects of the long-term regional cooperation process which has been accelerating since the end of the Cold War. More specifically, the institutional framework for economic cooperation is gradually being established and improved, with the political drive keeping pace with the economic drive; the political dialogue and security coordination starting from low politics issue areas can not only ensure the overall peace and stability in East Asia, but also play an active role at the strategic level. Political considerations at the strategic level have become an important promoter for the East Asian integration process. As a spillover effect of the above cooperation process, East Asia has entered an era of comprehensive engagement, and the East Asian Community has been accepted as the vision of East Asian order. How to construct a widely accepted, stable and constructive regional order has become a major strategic issue that East Asian countries are facing. Before the mid-1990s, especially before the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, East Asia lacked regional and formal intergovernmental cooperation agreements. There was only Asia-Pacific cooperation, but no East Asian cooperation. As market force is a natural catalyst of East Asian integration, East Asia is regarded as a natural trade territory, and the economies within the region are gradually regarded as natural trading partners.18 The Asian financial crisis and its profound lessons have triggered the comprehensive economic cooperation in East Asia; and China’s economic rise has begun to fully demonstrate its strategic effect and become the primary 17 Katzenstein 18 Scalapino

[10, p. 27]. [18], Urata [19].

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1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

driving force for the integration of East Asia. Since then, the economic cooperation in East Asia has been on the fast track towards diversified and competitive development.19 Generally speaking, East Asian cooperation is still in the stage of dialogue mechanism, with the degree of institutionalization yet to be improved. Above all, although East Asia has entered the era of free trade areas, the initiatives of relevant countries lack the region-wide breadth and depth. In other words, East Asia has achieved substantial economic integration, but the relevant institutional framework remains to be improved and consolidated. Of course, the institutionalization of East Asian order will be impossible without external influences. For example, the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) have a huge impact on the future of East Asian order. Since politics and economy complement and influence each other, political factors play a vital role in influencing economic cooperation.20 Apart from achieving economic goals such as GDP growth, East Asian countries are also seeking to regain political control over the process of economic globalization and actively cope with the constraints of economic globalization on the choice of national policy instruments through a concerted effort to promote economic integration.21 Significant progress has been made in political dialogue and security coordination in East Asia. In particular, the “10 + 3” mechanism has begun to evolve from a market-driven one to an institution-driven one, ensuring the status of the main channel of East Asian cooperation at the insistence of China; the ten ASEAN countries have established a relatively mature sub-regional order, and the three major countries in Northeast Asia, i.e. China, Japan and South Korea, have preliminarily set up a dialogue and consultation mechanism and begun to actively promote the progress of free trade agreements; and with the success of the East Asia Summit, open regionalism will be adhered to ensure the future strategic direction of East Asia. Nevertheless, given the reality that the level of economic and social development in East Asia differs greatly and the interests of all parties are not easy to coordinate, the political dialogue and security coordination in East Asia have to start from low politics issue areas, and the achievements have also been mainly reflected in the areas of non-traditional security issues. Due to the political confrontation that still exists today and a lack of strategic mutual trust, the risk of strategic confrontation turns out to be higher instead of lower. Although in the name of regional cooperation, it is not surprising that countries concerned will think national, talk regional, but act bilateral, which seems to be typical of the dilemma of East Asian cooperation. Meanwhile, East Asian integration is faced with the challenge of quality improvement in the fields such as economy, politics and strategy, which however has not hindered East Asia from entering the era of comprehensive engagement. The integrated development of economic interdependence, coupled with the increasingly prominent non-traditional security issues, has formed a kind of community with a 19 Research Group at the Foreign Affairs Department and the Institute for International Economic Research of National Development and Reform Commission [20]. 20 Strange [21], James et al. [22]. 21 Katzenstein and Shiraishi [23].

1.2 Process of East Asian Cooperation

7

common future where countries can exist and prosper together.22 Seeking cooperation and common development has become a shared vision of East Asia, as well as the logical starting point for the construction of East Asian cooperation system. The proposal of building the East Asian Community and its extensive acknowledgement have proved that such initiative is truly in line with the trend of the times. Whether the East Asian Community is an idealistic utopia or a realistic choice, different countries have different understandings and considerations, but this does not prevent the East Asian Community from being a vision of a regional order with clear and ambitious goals. Regional order construction is a proposition that transcends the existing scope of economic cooperation while accommodating various factors and establishing a strategic framework. Since the end of World War II, the East Asian order has not been regarded as a common concept due to the historical legacy of East Asia and the fact that regional affairs have been dominated by foreign hegemony. East Asian powers, especially China and Japan, have been accustomed to exploring the international order or the global order, trying to avoid the use of the concept of regional order that is likely to be reminiscent of the history. Besides, strategists will also find it difficult to probe into the intricate East Asian order. With the end of the Cold War, the wave of regionalism has swept the world, which has not only opened up a broad road for regional economic integration, but also provided new impetus for regional political dialogue and security cooperation. East Asia is sucked into the whirlpool of regionalism, and the East Asian order is experiencing dramatic changes and even a reconstruction. In this context, the discussions on regional order begin to surface. East Asia integration begins with the natural drive of economic power, followed by combined forces inside and outside the region, which highlights that politics is separated from economy. However, the spillover effect of economic interdependence and the driving force of regionalism are irresistible. Economic interdependence and existing norms and institutions have played a role in alleviating the impact of power imbalances within the region and preventing the generalization of security dilemma.23 At the same time, a series of bilateral alliances, security dialogues, multilateral forums, ministerial conferences, track two diplomacy and other specific mechanisms have been gradually established and played an increasingly important role.24 Although political misunderstanding and security mistrust are still hindering the development of all-round cooperation, most countries have been clearly aware that the intermediary of East Asian order construction in the future will not be hegemonic war, but international coordination that is based on common interests and adopts international institutions as a major approach.25 Essentially speaking, order construction is a process of convergence and institutionalization of common interests. At present, East Asia cooperation is being expanded to a wider range of areas including economy, politics, security, society and 22 Qin

and Zhu [24]. [25]. 24 Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama [26]. 25 Dai and Zhou [27]. 23 Acharya

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1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

culture in an open, progressive and coordinated manner. The concept of joint development, common prosperity and cooperative security has been gradually enjoying popular support; and the convergence and institutionalization of common interests is paving a feasible strategic path to the construction of East Asian order.

1.3 Strategic Game and Evolution of East Asian Order The East Asian Community is a visionary design of regional order that reflects the joint efforts of East Asian countries to push the boundaries of the traditional order which always operates around a core country, with the regional inter-state relations being constantly re-defined along with the changing core status among China, Japan and the US, etc.26 Since the end of the Cold War, with the recognition of ASEAN’s leadership in regional integration by China, Japan and South Korea, etc., and ASEAN’s active implementation of “10 + 1”, a strategy aiming to balance great powers, the construction of East Asian order has been provided with a predictable goal. In active response to globalization and regionalization, two world trends that run parallel, East Asian countries are embracing the wave of globalization while fully participating in regional integration, and have begun to regard the East Asian Community as the vision of the future East Asian order. These countries pursue open regionalism, allowing great powers outside the region, especially the US, to continue to play an important role in the construction of East Asian order. All these factors constitute the main driving force for the construction of East Asian order, and their interaction determines the future path of East Asian order to a certain extent. Historically, there are three regional orders in East Asia, i.e. the tributary system dominated by the Chinese Empire, the Open Door policy pursued by the US and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere dominated by Japan.27 In ancient East Asia, China was the dominator of regional order. The neighboring countries regularly sent envoys to pay tribute to Chinese emperors and acknowledge the supremacy of the empire. China would grant gold & silver seals and tallies to the countries that accepted its imperial mandates, and provide them with public goods such as political recognition, preferential trade and security guarantees. What this tributary system advocated was that the foreign countries should submit themselves to the rule of the Chinese Empire and pay tribute despite a trek over mountains and rivers; while the Chinese Empire would treat all tributaries equally and guide them to learn etiquettes and civilization. Undoubtedly, this was the conceptual principle and ideal framework that Confucianism could construct in dealing with the Chinese Empire’s foreign relations. What this framework wanted to attain was that foreign countries 26 Baik

[28]. [29]. Japanese scholar Baba Kimihiko regarded the pre-modern Chinese-foreign order focused on the Chinese Empire in its surrounding areas, the colonialism launched by the colonial empire of Japan in modern times and the Cold War pattern under the US hegemony after World War II as a historical hegemonic structure. This inspirational view is in line with the author’s analysis. See: [30]. 27 Palmer

1.3 Strategic Game and Evolution of East Asian Order

9

should operate and progress around the Chinese Empire like a myriad of stars surrounding the moon and sunflowers facing the sun. Under this centripetal and vertical system, all nations could share the blessing of peace thanks to the Chinese model of international peace,28 also known as the “Pax Sinitica”. The tributary system was a cultural order and trade exchange system of Chinese centralism. As a natural extension of the ethical political order of China, the system implied an inclusive concept that crossed the national and ethnic boundaries.29 Of course, the supremacy of the Chinese Empire was not only reflected in culture, but also in political structure and trade. As a concentric hierarchical order, the tributary system had its intrinsic inequality. In the middle of the 19th century, the tributary system collapsed due to the colonial invasion of Western industrial countries. The US proposed the Open Door policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and Japan sought to create a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during 1930–1945, two orders suggesting unequal colonial arrangements.30 The Open Door policy, a colonial order for balance of power, demonstrated the permeability of East Asian order in a certain sense as great powers outside the region played a leading role in the order construction and maintenance. Since then, the US has always played a powerful role in the East Asian order, making open regionalism an inevitable feature of East Asian order construction. In general, both China’s tributary system and Japan’s Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere concept are characterized by inequality, with the former dominated by cultural advantages while the latter based on military invasion and conquest. In view of the historical legacy of China’s tributary system to Southeast Asian countries, combined with China’s economic prosperity since the 1980s, Southeast Asia has become increasingly suspicious of and intimidated by China’s rise.31 Of course, China’s tributary system was a naturally formed order in a certain sense, while Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was more of a deliberately pursued concept which reflected its aggressive strategy. This historical heritage has also made Japan cautious about the regional order, fearing that it would cause the aversion of other East Asian countries. Given this, both China and Japan have proposed a clear picture of the global order, rarely speaking of the East Asian order. In particular, Japan has regarded the initiative of East Asian order as an imperialist taboo.32 Therefore, both countries have acknowledged the leading role of ASEAN in the design and practice of East Asian order. Since the end of World War II, there have been three partial regional order arrangements in East Asia, namely, the US-led security system, the Japan-led flying geese economic order and the ASEAN-led sub-regional community order. To take a closer

28 He

[31]. Zhao [32]. 30 For the contradictions and conflicts between the US and Japan caused by different pursuits of East Asian order, see: Iriye [33, 34]. 31 Dai and Zhou [27]. 32 Hara [35]. 29 See:

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1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

look, the East Asian security system led by the US has the nature of hegemonic stability, still regarded by some member countries as the pillar of stability in East Asia. The flying geese pattern advocated by Japan reflects its economic strength and strategic planning capabilities. In some sense, Japan’s flying geese pattern and ASEAN’s sub-regional community order were established in a new wave of globalization and regionalization, and have further grown into a pattern of order in parallel with the US security system, reflecting the variability of East Asian order. Over the past few years, China’s overall rise, Japan’s political rise, the normative rise of Southeast Asia and the ongoing hegemonic arrangements of the US have become the new elements of East Asian order change. As all stakeholders have been endeavoring to seek their own advantages and the checks and balances on their counterparts, certain regional balance of power is in the making. Unlike other regions in the world, the balance of power in East Asia has led to strategic constraints on great powers, or it can be seen as a prerequisite for further cooperation and regional order construction. In the meantime, the spillover effect of economic integration is reshaping regional security relations, allowing all countries to benefit from the dividends of regional cooperation. As one of the political and economic centers in the world, East Asia has seen the most drastic growth and decline of global power. The region has not only the most dynamic economic form and market in the world, but also the most variable economic and social transformation that is unseen elsewhere. Almost all types of economic and political systems can be found in East Asia, resulting in the most diverse contradictions and conflicts in the world. East Asia has experienced more conflicts than any other regions in the world since the end of the Cold War. The Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan, the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between South Korea and Japan, the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories dispute between Russia and Japan, the Taiwan issue of China, the Korean Peninsula crisis, the dispute over the South China Sea and others are all existing or potential conflict sources. Given the complexity of its historical legacy, no order construction initiatives in East Asia have been furnished with a long-term and clear road map. As a result, the cooperation in East Asia lacks a strong institutional network, and all countries are engaged in arms walk, though not arms race, making the traditional security dilemma still an obstacle to further cooperation among great powers.33 Of course, the security situation in East Asia also shows that countries do not intend to acquire the military capabilities of invading or occupying neighboring countries, but want to focus on preventing the destructive consequences of intimidation and punishment by other countries.34 On this basis, East Asia will be at a strategic intersection between balance of power and community for a period of time in the future.35 At present, the biggest challenge for the construction of East Asian order is that: as the four strategic forces involving China, Japan, ASEAN and the US are playing a new game, it is almost impossible to reach an agreement on future goals; in fact, 33 Nye

[36]. et al. [37]. 35 Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama [26]. 34 Blair

1.3 Strategic Game and Evolution of East Asian Order

11

there have been more and more different considerations for regional stability and prosperity. The East Asian Community was proposed based on such underlying assumptions that: dominated by small and medium-sized countries, driven by the issue areas and based on the specific model of social interaction and practices, ASEAN is the core of East Asian cooperation and integration process. The participation of China, Japan and South Korea in this process demonstrates their willingness to play their own active role on the one hand, and to accept the ASEAN decisions made by consensus on the other.36 Admittedly, this is a more pragmatic order construction path for soft regionalism.37 Its main orientation is to start from the actual needs, continuously increase the content of cooperation in the process, gradually go beyond and break through the framework of economic cooperation, accommodate various factors such as politics, society, culture and security, cultivate a community awareness based on mutual trust, mutual benefit and interdependence, and prioritize the preferential free trade arrangements, monetary and financial cooperation and the handling of security issues, based on which a holistic macro-cooperation mechanism will be gradually established.38 One of the basic conditions for the construction of this order is that China plays a constructive role as a stabilizer, and other countries accept and adapt to China’s peaceful development. However, the reality in East Asia we have seen is that all countries are undergoing profound changes.39 In particular, since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, relevant countries have entered a period of profound strategic adjustment, primarily due to the fact that they have not adapted to the tremendous effect caused by China’s rise. Since the 1990s, with the rapid rise of China and the acceleration of the concentric circle model of the integration process with ASEAN at the center, as well as the healthy development of China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) construction and bilateral relations, Japan’s influence in East Asia has rapidly declined. In the meantime, the US has become relatively less influential in East Asia. The East Asian order has seen the “Troika” of China, ASEAN and the US taking lead respectively in the economic, political and security fronts. This emerging regional order is hugely different from the US-led East Asian order since the end of World War II, reflecting the ongoing power transfer and vibrant economic and political ecology in East Asia.40 In this context, the US and Japan are restless with anxiety. Japan’s discomfort with China’s rise has gone to a deeper level, gradually exacerbating the contradictions between China and Japan; and the US has returned to East Asia through its strategic shift eastward. The two are rippling a spring pond through overt or covert coordination, leading to a shake-up of the East Asian pattern and the emergence and intensification of all kinds of contradictions inside and outside the region.41 36 Qin

[38]. [39]. 38 Pempel [40]. 39 Campbell [41]. 40 Wei [42]. 41 Ji [43]. 37 Pempel

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1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

It is Japan that can’t fully embrace the development process in East Asia. Japan’s previous attempts to dominate East Asia by military means (the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere) and economic means (the flying geese pattern) have confirmed its clear and lasting desire for the dominance in East Asia. In the 21st century, China has been rapidly expanding its economic and political influence in East Asia, leading to a reversal of national strength between China and Japan. Faced with an increasingly powerful China in all aspects, Japan has taken a quite high-profile stance, with an evident intention to contain China by using ideology, military and other factors, especially, for example, the reckless provocation of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, which has led to the further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. In December 2012, Shinzo Abe was re-elected as prime minister of Japan. The political right deviation has further dominated the Japanese political landscape, giving rise to more aggressive foreign policies. Abe has repeatedly stressed that a more hawkish foreign policy shall be adopted with regard to territorial disputes.42 Japan keeps challenging China’s strategic bottom line over the Diaoyu Islands issue, driving the dilemma between China and Japan towards a dead end. Japan’s political right deviation has a significant adverse impact on the construction of East Asian order, and the Sino-Japan mistrust is impeding this construction.43 Japanese economic elites generally believe that the Sino-Japan competition has profoundly affected all core dimensions of the construction of East Asian economic system, such as the nature of preferential trade ties among Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian countries, the overlapping FTA networks and the inclusiveness of East Asian integration, etc.44 In the security field, the two neighbors do have a traditional perception of security dilemma, making it difficult to cultivate a community awareness based on mutual trust, mutual benefit and interdependence. The competition with China is encouraging Japan’s interest in military power,45 while the mutual distrust at the strategic level has exacerbated the security dilemma in East Asia and hindered the construction of regional institutions. American core interests in East Asia have remained unchanged since 1905 thanks to its approach to ensuring the balance of power.46 The goal of the US has contributed to the open regionalism in East Asia, so the reaction of the US must also be taken into consideration during the East Asian order construction.47 In recent years, the US has gradually defined its overarching strategic goal, i.e. to sustain its global leadership, ensure its dominance in East Asia and maintain the balance of power in the region. To sustain its global leadership, the US has established a global system consisting of ally and partner networks, regional organizations and global institutions to regulate international relations, especially relations among major powers. In line with its

42 The

Asahi Shimbun [44]. [45]. 44 Solis [46]. 45 Nye [47]. 46 Mearsheimer. [48]. 47 Yip [49]. 43 Acharya

1.3 Strategic Game and Evolution of East Asian Order

13

strategic bottom line, the US will strive to ensure its dominance in East Asia, maintain the balance of power that is in favor of it, and prevent from becoming a regional power because of the loss of dominance in Asia after its withdrawal from East Asia. However, instead of being an East Asia hegemon with an infinite ambition, the US focuses on maintaining the balance of power in the region for its own benefit. With regard to the eastward shift of strategic focus, America’s core concerns are about capturing the opportunities of the Asia-Pacific Century and addressing the challenges of China’s rise, its goal is to consolidate and develop the US leadership in the AsiaPacific region, and its core components are about how to balance China’s growing global and regional influence. What concerns the US the most is the possibility of being overtaken by China in terms of influence in East Asia and even the Asia-Pacific region, which would further lead to the loss of its dominance in these regions. While it is aware of the benefits of cooperation with China, the US is more anxious about the severe challenges posed by China’s rise and regards the regional balance dominated by it as the bottom line of its East Asia strategy. Therefore, the US spares no effort to act as an “offshore balancer” and intends to maintain moderate tensions in East Asia. It uses the suspicions between China and its neighbors, especially the latter’s concerns about China’s rise, to bring these countries closer to the US in political, economic and security cooperation, in a bid to further disrupt the pace of internal integration in East Asia. A principal axis of the US relations with China is to prevent and break the strategic dependence of Asian countries on China in economy, security the other fields. To this end, the US has taken actions to exaggerate the possible threat of China’s rise, consolidate and develop relations with its allies, especially strengthening relations with China’s neighboring countries that have disputes with China, and instigate China’s neighboring countries to stir up trouble, hence escalating the strategic containment against China in all strategic directions such as Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia.48 The strategic adjustment of the US has triggered the power recombination in East Asia, increasingly complicating the security situation in the region. As the traditional territorial disputes are intertwined with the intensifying contest for sea power, the China-US security conflict has become the focus of world attention. The US spearheads its attack at China in its strategic adjustment. To be specific, it takes sides with China’s neighboring countries on hot issues and seeks to strengthen alliances and quasi-alliances with relevant countries. Moreover, it steps up sea-air battle, forward deployment and strategic tests on China, which has exacerbated regional disputes like adding fuel to the flames. All those moves are intended to let China feel the military containment situation and overwhelming strategic pressure, and deepen the geostrategic competition between China and the US. In the process of East Asian order construction so far, ASEAN has been playing the dual role of leader and balancer, and the inherent contradiction between the two is becoming prominent, making the ASEAN-led regional order construction lack of momentum and innovation. On the one hand, ASEAN’s leadership in the process of East Asian integration has been respected by the three major countries in 48 Wu

[50], Qiu [51].

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1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

Northeast Asia, as well as the US, Russia and other countries. ASEAN’s successful experiences in dealing with sub-regional diversity and multiple contradictions have also provided examples for the construction of East Asian order. On the other hand, ASEAN is well aware of its difficulties in promoting regional integration and the fear of losing its dominance. Therefore, ASEAN has taken all measures for the sole purpose of ensuring its dominance through the balance of major powers, even at the expense of the speed and depth of regional integration. Specifically, ASEAN generally welcomes China’s rise by taking a clear stance of active adaptation, while it is bound to balance and dilute China’s increasing regional influence. Offsetting and balancing the role of the US is also an important driving force for the birth of East Asian institutional arrangements,49 so ASEAN welcomes the US military presence and hopes to use the US power to balance China and restrict Japan. Meanwhile, the regional organization is also wary of the US attempt to dominate the East Asian economic cooperation. In view of this, ASEAN can play a key role in preventing the construction of East Asian order from going astray, but it is not driven enough to promote the order construction. Of course, recent frequent moves of the US have also made troubles for ASEAN. The US strategic shift eastward has challenged the dominant position of ASEAN; at the same time, the US strategy for China has actually placed its existing and potential allies in a dilemma. Since most ASEAN countries regard the US as a tool to ease anxiety and do not completely regard China’s rise as a threat, they expect the US to play a role in balancing China over the existing territorial disputes. ASEAN countries are reluctant to make a choice between China and the US or take risks in favor of the US. Given the strategic adjustment of the above forces, there are still many uncertainties about the future of East Asia.50

1.4 China’s Peaceful Development and the Future of East Asian Order The rise of great powers and their regional strategies are one of the core issues in the study of international relations, and China’s rise is a major issue affecting the lifeline of the world. China will undoubtedly become one of the core forces leading the transformation in East Asia due to the fact that it has 68% territorial area and 65% population of East Asia, it has long occupied a special status in East Asian history and it has maintained the annual economic growth rate of 9.8% over the past thirty years. East Asia is a region where China’s political, security and economic interests are concentrated, as well as the most important stage for China’s sustainable development,51 therefore gaining a foothold in East Asia is a priority of China’s long-term foreign strategy. 49 Roy

[52]. [53]. 51 Mori [54]. 50 Wu

1.4 China’s Peaceful Development and the Future of East Asian Order

15

Geopolitics is regarded as the geographic coordinates for strategic planning of great powers.52 With the simultaneous advancement of globalization and regional integration, as well as the development of regional economic collectivization, three major economic blocs have been formed in Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America, on which major powers are relying. East Asia is the basic support for China’s regional cooperation. In general, those who have no global strategy are unable to have a regional presence. However, in view of the world trend of economic globalization in parallel with regional integration, we can also say that those who have no regional strategy are unable to have a global presence. From the perspective of geopolitics, China has never been the center of the world, but it is naturally at the center of East Asia, with direct geographical links with Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and other sub-regions. China’s core geopolitical position offers huge geographical advantages for the design of its strategic framework. Located in the heart of the Asia-Pacific region and on the edge of the world’s largest continent and largest ocean, China boasts a long mid-latitude coastline and the favorable geographical position in the Western Pacific region. When the world’s balance point is shifting from Europe to Asia-Pacific, China is given the golden opportunity at the right time and in the right place. In light of such geopolitical advantages, China should regard the Asia-Pacific region as its strategic zone and East Asia as its strategic center. China is not only at the geopolitical core of East Asia, but also serves as an economic powerhouse for East Asia, Asia-Pacific and even the world. The rise of China has driven the overall rise of East Asia, promoted strategic competition in East Asia and facilitated in-depth cooperation in the region. East Asia is gaining greater influence and autonomy over time. Looking ahead, the prospect of East Asia in 2025 is that its economy will account for 40% of the global economy again, helping East Asia regain its important position back in 1820.53 In addition to the social and economic development policies of East Asian economies, the East Asian Miracle achieved in the past few decades can also be attributed to the positive cooperation among East Asian countries. Promoting multilateral cooperation in East Asia is a natural response of all East Asian countries to the trend of economic globalization and regional integration, which is also in line with the strategic interests of all countries in the region. As Lee Soo-sung, the former prime minister of South Korea, pointed out, “The prosperity of all countries can only be guaranteed in the broader context of the co-prosperity in their respective regions.”54 In this situation, East Asian countries realize that the future of the region will largely depend on their own policies and behaviors,55 which in turn drives the comprehensive cooperation in full swing and makes the pursuit of common development a shared concept in East Asia. In this process, China’s rise has taken effect in all aspects in East Asia. As David M. Lampton pointed out, “China has become a far-sighted participant in the regional and

52 Friedberg

[55]. and Kharas [56]. 54 Lee [57]. 55 Yip [49]. 53 Gill

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1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

global order.”56 David Shambaugh believed that, “From the bilateral and multilateral perspectives, China has been acclaimed in the region for its mature and flexible diplomacy, and regarded as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a listener of different opinions and a non-threatening regional power, which is quite different from the image of China more than a decade ago.”57 Robert Ross predicted that China “does not need to adopt unstable policies to change the regional order”.58 At the same time, East Asia has made more positive responses to China’s rise to get a free ride, at least taking into consideration China’s interests and views in the decision-making process.”59 East Asian countries have more confidence in the future of China’s rise and regional relations, as Amitav Acharya optimistically pointed out that “Asia is increasingly capable of controlling insecurity through shared regional norms, economic interdependence and enhanced institutional links.”60 In the early years of the 21st century, the relations between certain East Asian countries and China were unstable due to the intensification of territorial disputes and the greater penetration of the US strategic shift eastward and other external forces. However, the majority of East Asian countries aspire to overcome the current difficulties and share the benefits of development together, and the positive effects of China’s rise are becoming increasingly visible. On the other hand, in modern times, with the expansion of western powers and the decline of China’s influence in East Asia, China focused its diplomacy on dealing with the western world and had numerous conflicts with East Asian countries. Under such circumstances, it was difficult for China to establish solid state-to-state relations in East Asia. As a matter of fact, for quite a long time, China has taken an approach to international relations, especially with its neighboring countries, on a bilateral level rather than from the perspective of region.61 China just began to embrace the concept of region and focus its strategy on the promotion of East Asian integration from the mid-1990s. In view of the two trends of globalization and regional integration, this change clearly represents the quintessence of ancient Chinese strategic thinking. Under the circumstance that all major powers are taking the promotion of or even leadership in regional integration as the basis for future international competition, it is a long-term move for China to regard East Asian cooperation as the top priority of its international strategy. However, China has not formed a complete regional strategic framework yet, therefore its regional cooperation remains unstable. With the further 56 Lampton

[58]. [59]. This view is in stark contrast to the views of China a century ago or even a ¯ decade ago. A century ago, Japanese prime minister Okuma Shigenobu pointed out in an article that, “China is such a big country that any of its moves will be huge. Once it seizes the opportunities, ¯ the dragon will fly up in the cloud. How can that be measured?” see Okuma Shigenobu: 50 Years of the Country, Tokyo Printing House, 1909, "Preface". A decade ago, the western society still regarded China as a Loch Ness monster that was huge, mysterious, powerful and unpredictable, an intimidating and fascinating presence. See: [60]. 58 Ross [61]. 59 Kang [3, 62]. 60 Acharya [25]. 61 Foot [63]. 57 Shambaugh

1.4 China’s Peaceful Development and the Future of East Asian Order

17

development of institutionalized cooperation in East Asia, China has to address a series of major strategic issues, e.g. how to understand the world’s development trend and the future pattern of East Asia, and how to strengthen the regional strategy on this basis and promote this strategy in a long-term, forward-looking and inclusive manner.62 In a sense, the strategic framework of East Asia will become an important yardstick for measuring the optimization of China’s strategy. The construction of regional order is the highest level of expression of a country’s regional strategy. From a historical perspective, a rising great power was often seen as a challenger to the existing order, inevitably followed by a war. The rise of China has also caused similar concerns among neighboring countries and other powers in the world. Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars have been pessimistic about the future of Asia, believing that Asia would become a place of strategic importance mainly because China is predicted to be a revisionist power.63 However, these concerns have been alleviated as China and its neighbors have adopted the strategy of regional integration.64 China has actively participated in a series of multilateral systems based on the principle of cooperation and consensus. “These systems are not necessarily able to meet the security needs of member states, but very suitable for promoting relations among countries that are neither enemies nor allies. They provide China and its neighbors with a mechanism for peaceful co-existence and mitigation of potential conflicts, which has greatly changed the situation where China was relatively isolated and provided China with the experience in institutionalized cooperation.”65 As one of the constructors of East Asian institutions, China has become a responsible stakeholder in East Asia in the process of mutual contact. In this regard, David C. Kang, a South Korean scholar, concluded that, “Historically, the turmoil in Asia was resulted from China’s weakness; when China was strong and stable, Asia was in good order. From a historical perspective, a rich and strong China will be powerful enough to consolidate regional stability.”66 China plays a constructive role in dealing with regional affairs. According to David Shambaugh, China has been actively participating in regional organizations in East Asia, and it can broaden regional economic ties and reduce mistrust and anxiety in the security field by establishing partnerships and deepening bilateral cooperation. From the perspective of realism, the East Asian order in the making has structural imbalance, and in this regard, it is an unstable order. From the perspective of liberal institutionalism, China’s rise is a natural phenomenon, so the economic interdependence between China and neighboring countries will shape an environment for China’s rise, and the institutional construction will play a key role in East Asian order formation. From the perspective of constructivism, China’s rise is also an internalization process involving a series of norms. China will not only peacefully 62 Many scholars have called for strengthening China’s regional strategic research. See: Men [64], Hu and Men [65], Tang et al. [66]. 63 Friedberg [55], Segal [67], Kupchan [68], Johnston [69]. 64 Kuik [70]. 65 Yahuda [71]. 66 Kang [3].

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1 Introduction Strategic Significance of Studying East Asian Order

integrate into the regional system, but also gradually become a great power that maintains the status quo as well as a constructive partner.67 In the process of regional integration, China has gradually and clearly carried out strategic adjustments based on common interests, and has reached common interestsoriented constructive cooperation with countries in the region. China advocates that on the basis of common interests, countries concerned should establish mutual trust mechanisms, strive for common security through strategic cooperation mechanisms and resolve disputes peacefully through friendly consultations; relevant countries should recognize and respect the diversity of the world, maintaining a harmonious relationship among nations and peoples with different civilizations and cultures; all countries, big or small, are equal, agree to disagree and solve major issues concerning global and regional peace through the democratization of international politics. In a nutshell, all stakeholders are expected to pursue “common interests, co-existence, joint development and common security”.68 Its moderate, pragmatic and determined acts represent what China has been thinking of to promote the East Asian order construction in a positive manner. The construction of international order is not only a question that must be answered by the diplomacy of any great power, but also a major issue that must be taken seriously by a rising power. A truly successful great power is marked by how much it can promote the shared values and stabilize the international order.69 For China, the active participation in the construction of the new East Asian order qualifies it for the possible leadership in the evolution of world order.70 China is set to play an increasingly important role in East Asian order formation. In order to change the traditional understanding that a rising power means war and turmoil,71 and promote the stable development of East Asia, China must, through regional cooperation, seek to cultivate and establish a regional order of equality, cooperation, mutual benefit and mutual assistance on the basis of common interests in the regions where it is a stakeholder. Besides, it must strive to resolve the long-term misunderstandings and complaints of other countries in the process of constructive interaction, and explore and gradually establish the new norms governing inter-state relations and international relations, so as to provide a meaningful paradigm for the change of international order. In other words, China’s exploration in the construction of East Asian order not only determines the future direction of the order, but also helps promote the world order to develop in a more fair and rational direction.

67 Shambaugh 68 Huang

[74]. 69 Buzan [75]. 70 Zhu [76]. 71 Kang [77].

[72], Khoo [73].

References

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25. Acharya, A. (2003/2004). Will Asia’s past be its future. International Security, 28(3), pp. 149– 164. 26. Ikenberry, G. J., & Tsuchiyama, J. (2002). Between balance of power and community: the future of multilateral security co-operation in the Asia-pacific. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, (2), pp. 69–94. 27. Dai, F., & Zhou, Y. E. (2005). Is East Asian order on track to unification? (zou xiang tong yi de dong ya zhi xu). Pacific Journal, (12), pp. 20–27. 28. Baik, Y. (2008). East Asian order: Beyond empire, towards East Asian community. Open Times, (3), pp. 5–15. 29. Palmer, N. (1991). The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (p. 4). Lexington: Lexington Books. 30. Baba, K. (2004). The vision of discussion on East Asia in the post-cold war era-several attempts to open regionalism. Open Times, (3), pp. 72–88. 31. He, F. C. (1998). Theories on Chinese and foreign orders (hua yi zhi xu lun). Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), (6), pp. 30–45. 32. Zhao, T. Y. (2005). World System: An Introduction to World Institutional Philosophy (tian xia ti xi: shi jie zhi du zhe xue dao lun). Nanjing: Jiangsu Education Publishing House. 33. Iriye, A. (1972). Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 34. Iriye, A. (1972). Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 35. Hara, Y. (2002). New East Asia Theory (pp. 32–33). Tokyo: NTT Press. 36. Nye, J. S. (1997/1998). China’s re-emergence and the future of the Asia-pacific. Survival, 39 (4), pp. 65–79. 37. Blair, D C., & Jr. Hanley, J. T. (2001). From wheels to webs: Reconstructing Asia-pacific security arrangements. The Washington Quarterly, 24(1), pp. 7–17. 38. Qin, Y. Q. (2005). Construction of East Asian community and the role of the United States (dong ya gong tong ti jian she he mei guo de zuo yong). Foreign Affairs Review, (6), pp. 27–28. 39. Pempel, T. J. (Ed.). (2005). Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (“Introduction”). 40. Pempel, T. J. (2006). The race to connect East Asia. Asian Economic Policy Review, 1(2), 239–254. 41. Campbell, K. M. (2001). The cusp of strategic change in Asia. Orbis 45(3), pp. 371–385. 42. Wei, Z. Y. (2012). Eastward shift of US strategic focus and its impact on East Asian order (mei guo zhan lue zhong xin dong yi ji qi dui dong ya zhi xu de ying xiang). International Review, (6), pp. 60–67. 43. Ji, L. (2011). The emotional power of the rise of East Asian community and the collective identity of East Asia (dong ya gong tong ti yu dong ya ji ti shen fen xing qi de qing gan dong li). Foreign Affairs Review, (4), pp. 69–82. 44. The Asahi Shimbun. (2013, February 8). Dispute over Northern Territories Discussed ‘With a Strong Will’ at Prime Minister Abe’s National Congress. The Asahi Shimbun. http://www. asahi.com/shimen/articles/TKY201302070654.html (May 20, 2013). 45. Acharya, A. (2005, December 9). East Asia Community: Sino-Japan mistrust obscuring shared vision”, The Straits Times. 46. Solis, M. (2006). How Japan’s economic class views china and the future of asian regionalism. JIIA Policy Report. http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/polcy_report/pr20060712.pdf. 47. Nye, J. S. (2012). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (p. 138). Beijing: China Renmin University Press. 48. Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The future of the American pacifier. Foreign Affairs, 80(5), pp. 46–60. 49. Yip, W. K. (2001). Prospects for closer economic integration. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 1, pp. 106–111. 50. Wu, X. B. (2005–2006). The end of the silver lining: A chinese view of the U.S.–Japan alliance. The Washington Quarterly, 29, (1), pp. 119–130.

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51. Qiu, H. F. (2012). Sino-US strategic dilemma from the research perspective of American scholars (mei guo xue zhe yan jiu shi jiao xia de zhong mei zhan lue kun jing). Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, (1), pp. 83–97. 52. Roy, J. S. (2005). china’s peaceful rise and East Asia cooperation: Chinese and American perspectives. Foreign Affairs Review, 6, 26–27. 53. Wu, X. B. (2013). A changing East Asia and Japan’s risk and its spillover effect (dong ya bian ju yu ri ben feng xian ji qi wai yi xiao ying). Northeast Asia Forum, (6), pp. 3–15. 54. Mori, K. (2006). East Asian Community and China. International Affairs, 551(5), 4–14. 55. Friedberg, A. L. (1993–1994). Ripe for rivalry: Prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia. International Security, (18)3, pp. 5–33. 56. Gill, I., & Kharas, H. (2007). An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth (p. 2). New York: The World Bank. 57. Lee, S. (2004).Expectation on the formation of a multilateral security cooperation system in East Asia. Japanese Studies, (6), pp. 44–47. 58. Lampton, D. M. (2004, March 28). China’s Growing Power and Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy”, http://www.nixoncenter.org/index.cfm?action=publications. 59. Shambaugh, D. (2004–2005). China engages Asia: Reshaping the regional order. International Security, 29(3), pp. 64–99. 60. Men, H. H. (2005). China’s Grand Strategy: A Framework Analysis (p. 4). Beijing: Peking University Press. 61. Ross, R. (2004). The geography of the peace: East Asia in the twenty-first century. International Security, 23(4), pp. 81–118. 62. Kang, D. (2004). Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations. International Security, 28(3), pp. 99–122. 63. Foot, R. (1995). Regionalism in Pacific Region. In Louse Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell (Eds.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (p. 239). London: Oxford University Press. 64. Men, H. H. (2005). Nationalism, regionalism and globalism: On the planning of China’s grand strategy (guo jia zhu yi di qu zhu yi yu quan qiu zhu yi: jian lun zhong guo da zhan lue de mou hua). China Opening Journal, (3), pp. 23–30. 65. Hu, A. G. & Men, H. H. (2005). Significance of study on China’s East Asian integration strategy (yan jiu zhong guo dong ya yi ti hua zhan lue de zhong yao yi yi). International Review, (3), pp. 26–35. 66. Tang, S. P., Zhang, J., & Cao, X. Y. (2005). China’s regional study: Achievements, gaps and expectations (zhong guo de di qu yan jiu: cheng jiu, cha ju he qi dai). World Economics and Politics, (11), pp. 7–15. 67. Segal, G. (1996). East Asia and the containment of China. International Security, 20(4), pp. 107–135. 68. Kupchan, C. A. (1998). After pax americana: benign power, regional integration, and the sources of stable multipolarity. International Security, 23(2), pp. 62–66. 69. Johnston, A. I. (2003) Is China a Status Quo Power? International Security, 27(4), pp. 5–56. 70. Kuik, C. C. (2004). An interest-based analysis on China’s participation in the ASEAN-led regional institutions. World Economics and Politics, (9), pp. 53–59. 71. Yahuda, M. (2005). The Evolving Asian Order. In David Shambaugh (Ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (p. 347). Berkley: University of California Press. 72. Shambaugh, D. (2004–2005).China engages Asia: Reshaping the regional order. International Security. 29(3), pp. 64–99. 73. Khoo, N., Smith, M. L. R., & Shambaugh, D. (2005). China engages Asia? A caveat lector. International Security, 30(1), pp. 196–213. 74. Huang, R. W. (2002). New security concept and the cooperation mechanism in East Asia (xin an quan guan yu dong ya he zuo ji zhi). World Economy Study, pp. 24–29. 75. Buzan, B. (2006). China–Japan and China–US relations in the process of China’s rise. World Economics and Politics, (7), pp. 15–18.

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76. Zhu, Y. H. (2001). Chinese people and world order in the 21st century. World Economics and Politics, (10), pp. 54–59. 77. Kang, D. C. (2007). China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (p. 7). New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 2

Logic of Regional Order Construction

Since the end of the Cold War, regions have become increasingly critical to contemporary world politics. —Peter J. Katzenstein [1] Regional cooperation is based on mutual participation and institutional construction. —Zhang Yunling [2]

The rise and fall of states, globalization and regional integration are currently the three main drivers of world changes. Since ancient times, the rise and fall of states has always been a fundamental driving force for the formation and shaping of the world, and globalization and regional integration have complemented each other, promoting the pace of the rise and fall of great powers and changing the form of the rise and fall of states. The development of globalization has led to the new rise and fall of states and promoted the process of regional cooperation. Globalization is changing the rules of operation of the world system, highlighting the “democratic deficit” of the existing international order, which has not only brought new opportunities to the development of all countries, but also inevitably generated destructive forces. Having both the desire to participate in the globalization and the fear of being marginalized, all states have a profound understanding that, in an era that globalization and regional integration go hand in hand, the prosperity of all countries can only be guaranteed in the broader context of the co-prosperity in their respective regions.1 Based on this, regional cooperation has been transforming toward the direction of integration, regional integration has been increasingly valued by various countries, and the construction of regional order has been put on the agenda. In the 21st century, in view of the manifestation of the statehood, the strengthening of regional integration and the deepening of global governance, “the history of mankind has ushered into an era of global politics characterized by cultural pluralism for the first time”.2 National reform, regional cooperation and global governance have promoted pluralism, and a new logic of order construction is in the making.

1 Lee

[3].

2 Huntington

[4].

© Shanghai People’s Publishing House and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Men, Order of East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4654-9_2

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2.1 Order, International Order and Regional Order Order, in the international society, refers to formal or informal arrangements between states that provide a predictable and stable international environment for states to pursue collective goals such as peaceful settlement of disputes through rule-based interactions.3 Hedley Bull points out that order refers to a pattern that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life that promotes certain goals or values;4 and international order refers to a pattern or layout of international activity that pursues the elementary, primary or common goals of the society of states, including maintaining the survival of international systems and national societies, the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, and the general peace. International order refers more to inter-state order, while world order focuses not only on international order, but also on the internal order within individual states as well as the order of the world political system that covers the system of states.5 The difference between international order and world order is that the former is an order formed by states, and the latter emphasizes the position and role of other actors in world order. Stanley Hoffman believes that world order is an idealized pattern for the establishment of harmonious inter-state relations, an important condition for friendly co-existence among states and a guideline for regularized behaviors, as well as an effective means and orderly state for reasonable settlement of disputes and controversies and international cooperation for common development.6 World order is an arrangement that sustains the main purpose of human social life, and therefore will be a continuous development process with no end. Global order is a wider concept, which not only covers the scope of international order and world order, but also incorporates low politics such as ecological environment protection, further adopting the concept of international governance, and emphasizing the integrity, globality and complex interdependence of order. Given that the international society is and will remain in the nation-state era at present and in the foreseeable future, the analysis here is based on international order. However, under the strong impact of economic globalization, the trend of global governance is emerging, so it is in line with the historical development trend to use world order and even global order as the basis of analysis. In fact, the existing analysis of order is mostly to study international order and world order at the same time without exploring the difference between the two. It is necessary to point out that, since all states live in a nation-state system, the order established after the war is generally an international (inter-state) order, not a world order.7

3 Alagappa

[5]. [6]. 5 Bull [7]. 6 Hoffman [8]. 7 Pang [9]. 4 Bull

2.1 Order, International Order and Regional Order

25

According to the existing understanding, international order includes the following aspects: firstly, international order is a pattern created in a certain period of time by various main actors based on respective strength, and is “a political and economic structure and management mechanism in the global system.”8 In other words, international order is established on the balance of forces of various actors, especially the main states. International order is the result of the distribution of power. Secondly, international order is an international behavioral rule and safeguard mechanism established by various actors of the international society in a certain period after interacting and fighting with each other around a certain goal and on the basis of interests. In other words, international order is the result of the distribution of interests among states, especially great powers. Thirdly, whether international order is stable or not in a certain period of time often depends on whether the major powers can reach and maintain a consensus, tacit understanding or necessary compromise on core ideas.9 In other words, the distribution of ideas within the international system will be a key variable in determining whether international order can be established and remain stable. Fourthly, international order refers to some kind of operation mechanism of international politics and economy established or maintained by sovereign states, groups of states, international organizations and other actors in the international society to deal with the relationship between each other according to certain principles, norms, objectives and means. In other words, international institutions are the decisive variable in the construction and maintenance of international order. In summary, the author believes that international order is the result of the distribution of power, interests and ideas among the main actors in the international society, especially among the great powers, and its main form of expression is the creation and operation of global international institutions. Based on the above understanding, it can be said that international order is a kind of international public goods, which is provided by various main actors, especially the great powers, and reflects and leads to cooperation and conflict among the great powers. The dispute over the international order is essentially a struggle for power and interests, mainly manifested in the confrontation of ideas and international institutions. In view of the fact that the wane and wax of great powers is a historical law, the distribution of interests and ideas based on the strength and the international institutions reflecting the three distribution structures and processes will also be in a state of change. Since international order is a dynamic concept, changeability is one of its essential characteristics. On the other hand, there is a certain degree of stability, and even lag, in the structure of power, interests and ideas as well as international institutions. The change from the old to the new order will be a long-term process. The process and pace of the international political and economic order depend on changes in the balance of power, while the latter will not quickly have an impact on 8 Zhu 9 For

[10]. the role of ideas in the international system, see: Wendt [11].

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the existing structures and international institutions. International order is at the top of these structures and institutions, so the lag is also regarded as one of the essential characteristics of international order. International order is the result of the distribution of power, interests and ideas among various main actors of the international society, especially the great powers. Therefore, the influence of great powers on international order must be enormous. Hedley Bull points out that the reason why great powers can influence the international order is because the powers owned by the states constituting the international system are unequal. The inequality of state power makes the pattern of international relations simpler, and great powers may also adopt policies conducive to maintaining or damaging the international order. Bull finds through analysis that the international order maintained by great powers has been widely supported by the entire international society. However, great powers always face the issue of making other states recognize their special role in the international system. The world is a place where different powers compete with each other, and no great power can establish an order that is entirely in its own interest.10 In view of this, great powers must avoid formalizing and clarifying their special status, and refrain from taking conspicuous acts to disrupt the order. Instead, they must meet or partially meet the needs of fair changes, and must coordinate with middle powers to maintain regional balance of power.11 International order can be divided into global order and regional order by its geographical area. International order, in a general sense, refers to global order, while regional order, in contrast to global order, is a result of inter-regional state interactions or can be seen as a pattern of order between global order and domestic order.12 According to the definition given by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a region is a limited number of countries linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence.13 A region is not just a geographical fact. The constitution foundation of a region is not a simple summation of neighboring countries in a certain number and to some extent, but a group of neighboring countries with interactive relationships.14 Region is an important unit in the studies of international relations. On the one hand, region is the origin of extraterritorial political objectives of a country, which often projects its objectives outside the territory through the combination

10 Fan

[12]. [7, pp. 199–222]. 12 It should be pointed out that the existing studies of international relations lack regional awareness and concept as a whole, and the mainstream theories of international relations have not given due consideration and attention to regional politics. Associated with that, international relations scholars are often devoted to studying world order or international order, but rarely regional order. People often use the concept of regional order, but without giving a definitive definition. In particular, in most cases, regional order is considered to be part of international order or international order confined to regional system (institution). See: Tang [13], Pang [14], Wang [15]. 13 Nye [16]. 14 Ma [17]. 11 Bull

2.1 Order, International Order and Regional Order

27

of strategic actions and its own influence, for the purpose of building a familiar environment that meets its objectives;15 on the other hand, most inter-state integration processes appear at the regional level,16 which is the natural supporting point for great powers to gain momentum. According to the foregoing definition of international order, regional order can be defined as the result of the distribution of power, interests and ideas among neighboring countries with interactive relations, and its main form of expression is the creation and operation of regional institutions. Regional order is an order formed in a specific regional society through the process of regionalization or arrangement of integration. Regional integration deepens the links between member states and promotes the sharing of interests and responsibilities, and the principle formed in the process of interaction provides a value concept for regional order, which can be followed by the countries in the region in the construction of a relatively stable relationship and structural state at political, economic, social and security levels.17 From another perspective, regional order is also the result of the participation of various actors in the governance of the region, and it is a model for institutional management and arrangement of political and security affairs of the region, so as to enhance regional values such as security, welfare, equality and development.18 In view of this, in the construction of regional order, national strength is one of the basic conditions, and the sphere of influence and dominance of hegemony represent the traditional view of regional order. However, with the development of globalization and regional integration, the formation of regional state bloc and the penetration and introduction of states outside the region are quite effective in balancing the existing gaps in national strength. New ideas and forms of regional order, such as region community, are gradually accepted or have become a reality. On this basis, traditional thinking and innovative thinking are undergoing intense competition, and the reconstruction of regional order is in full swing.

2.2 Historical Evolution of International Order Throughout the development process of international order, its foundation has been the co-existence of many unrelated regional orders, which are essentially featured by the dominance of a certain country. With the impact of globalization (especially with maritime revolution as an important manifestation) and the rise and fall of great powers, the European region first formed a balance-of-power order. The European powers have been the pioneers due to the industrial revolution, colonizing the world, expanding regional order to global economic order and further to global political order, and eventually forming the inter-state order of global significance after two 15 Wolfers

[18]. [19]. 17 Wu [20]. 18 Wang [15]. 16 Katzenstein

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world wars. Of course, in a certain sense, global order has not completely covered up the effort (or attempt) of regional order, as evidenced by the US trials of hegemonic order in Latin America and the hegemonic order established by the USSR in Eastern Europe during World War II. After WWII, especially since the 1960s, the prominent feature of the change of international order was that, with the self-improvement of Europe and deepening of the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the renaissance of regional order has become a trend, and, as a new form, region community order has made its debut on the stage of history and ushered into the era of global order change. Since the 1990s, the reshaping of global order and the upsurge of regional order construction have become the prominent features of international order construction. Throughout ancient history, no country has ever had the power or influence to rule the world or the interests all over the world, nor has an international system once reached the global scale. Several regional orders coexisted, of which East Asian order with China as the core reflected Chinese traditional political thoughts and political wisdom. The emergence of a truly global system depends on great geographical discoveries. Since the 15th and 16th centuries, European countries strongly expanded their power outward and created a stable global maritime system and the consequent global trading system. By the mid-19th century when China was touched by the colonial system, a global international system emerged. The industrial revolution, the transportation revolution (the railway revolution, the ocean revolution) and the communication revolution (telegraph, radio communication) arrived in succession, and the closer relations within the system ultimately created a global international economic order. Politically, the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 recognized the principle of sovereign equality of states and laid the most primitive political foundation for the international political order established later. It is worth noting that the basic condition for creating this international order is the formation and increasing stability of the balance-of-power order in Europe. International order emerged along with nation-states. From the perspective of international order, the traditional international order that started with the Treaty of Westphalia has the following characteristics: (i) the world is composed of sovereign states who do not recognize any higher authority; (ii) legislation and justice as well as the settlement of disputes are usually in the control of individual states; (iii) the purpose of international law is to establish the minimum principle of peaceful co-existence among states; (iv) the response to cross-border misconducts is the own affairs of individual states; (v) all states are equal before the law; (vi) interstate disputes are often settled by the use of military force, and there are almost no restrictions on the use of force in international law; (vii) restrictions on state freedom are reduced to a minimum.19 This traditional international order is different both internally and externally, i.e. the principles and rules applied between European countries are different from the relations between European countries and non-European countries. The former is regarded as a regional society, while the latter

19 Held,

et al. [21].

2.2 Historical Evolution of International Order

29

is a relation between colonial powers and colonies.20 It should be said that this kind of world order, with the society of states represented by Europe as one side and a large number of backward countries and regions outside Europe as the other, was the basic feature of international order from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the end of World War I in 1918.21 By the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century, a worldwide international political and economic system came into being, mainly featured by the completion of the international division of labor, the emergence of the world market and the world monetary system, and the establishment of the colonial system. In this system, European powers changed to modern nation-states, each with the strength and strong will to protect itself from the threat of aggression and for colonial expansion. The British Empire rose as a world leader, while the US became the world’s largest economic power, and Japan also successfully emerged as an Asian power through the Meiji Restoration. The most prominent phenomena in the second half of the 19th century were that the internal and external attacks from the great powers shattered the traditional East Asian order; the US abandoned isolationism, not only seeking dominance in the American order (starting with the Monroe Doctrine),22 but also beginning to intervene in the reconstruction of East Asian order (marked by the occupation of the Philippines and the proposal of Open Door policy);23 the balanceof-power order in Europe changed rapidly due to the rise and fall of continental countries, and Germany rose through unification and become a challenging force to the Westphalian system. The interaction of these great powers through war resulted in the emergence of the first global international order, which was based on the establishment of the League of Nations and marked by the establishment of the Versailles-Washington System. In fact, the establishment of this global inter-state order represented the demand for the first new order in the 20th century. On the one hand, it was the practical result of idealism and represented the sustained effort to seek world peace; on the other hand, it was both the continuation of the expansion of European international order to the world and the extension of the inter-state order established by the capitalist countries to the world, always with a strong overtone of hegemonism and power politics. Given the spoils nature and the inherent inequality of the Versailles-Washington order, the instability of the order was inevitable. With the re-emergence of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s and the spread of German, Japanese and Italian fascist ideas, the power and wish to attack the order were accumulating, and a new world war was unavoidable. The prominent phenomena during this period were that the US had the strength to become the world leader, but refused to assume the corresponding 20 Bull

[22]. [23]. 22 The Americas is the birthplace of American hegemony. Expansion in the Americas was the first step for the US to achieve its hegemony, and the American system independent of Europe was the first dream of the US to expand outward. The construction of the regional security system by the US in the Americas can also be regarded as a preliminary experiment of its institutional hegemony, providing experience, building confidence and laying foundation for its world hegemony. 23 Men [24]. 21 Li

30

2 Logic of Regional Order Construction

responsibilities, instead, it looked to grab the worldwide interests; the rise of the socialist USSR became the best excuse for great powers to maneuver among various states and prepare for war. Therefore, World War II not only was a decisive battle between the people of the world and fascism, but also represented the attempt by capitalism to use fascism to eliminate socialism. As a result of the war, fascism was wiped out, but the socialist USSR grew stronger. This seemed to be a difficult problem in how to establish a post-war international order. The efforts of great powers to establish an international order before and after the end of WWII represented the demand for the second new order in the 20th century. Based on the principles of power and interests, and in the form of carving out spheres of influence, great powers established the Yalta order with a strong geopolitical color. Comparatively, this international order had made a great progress, condensing the fruits of the bloody battle between the people of the world and the extreme rule of fascism, and added a touch of socialism.24 Its progressiveness was that, politically, the founding of the United Nations confirmed such mechanism principles as sovereign equality of states and self-determination of nations, and economically, the establishment of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), etc. represented the wish and effort to promote global economic development. This international order was the extension of the Westphalian order to the world. The principle of sovereign equality became the universal principle (and no longer the privilege of European countries), and the inclusion of the principle of sovereign equality in the Charter of the United Nations was an important milestone in the international order. However, this order was still under the shadow of hegemonism and power politics. Its main manifestation was the emergence of the bipolar pattern of the USSR and the US, which led the world into the Cold War for decades. Among them, the important basic condition for the two to contend for hegemony was the consolidation of the American order by the US and the establishment of the sub-regional hegemonic order in Eastern Europe by the USSR, but the socialist USSR had essentially slipped into the quagmire of imperialism. In addition, the dominance in the East Asian security order had helped the US ensure the geographical advantage in the struggle for hegemony. In a sense, it was inevitable for the Yalta order established after World War II to be loaded with historical burdens, and its inequality had been created as early as a century ago, therefore, it was called the old international political and economic order. To be specific, the old international economic order refers to the unequal international economic order characterized by exploitation and plunder of developing countries and less developed countries by developed countries, including the international production order based on unreasonable international division of labor, the international trade order characterized by unequal exchanges, and the monopolybased international financial order; and the old international political order refers to the international political order featuring hegemonism and power politics.

24 Cai

[25].

2.2 Historical Evolution of International Order

31

While seeing the shortcomings of the old international political and economic order, we must also be aware of the internal change that had taken place. Fundamentally, this change came from the development of economy and technology. The development of different communities and different regions around the world is uneven, which depends not only on the ways of change of technology, production and trade, but also on the ability to accept new ways to increase production and wealth. When certain regions in the world make progress, other regions will fall behind relatively or (sometimes) absolutely.25 The information revolution is the decisive force for world change, rapidly changing the contrast of international competitiveness, further widening the huge gap between states, changing the form of war and even national security, and having an important impact on the future international order. On the other hand, sustained economic growth and the world market economy have eased international relations. Nowadays, states often gain more benefits through economic efficiency, cooperation and international division of labor, rather than through war, imperialism and exclusive economic forms.26 However, the prospect of economic interdependence and mutual benefit has not eliminated the competition and mistrust between states, and trade is not always a peacekeeping force. In addition, the wealth of some states and the poverty of most people have created a huge gap in the world and become a new force that creates discord.27 Of course, this process is also an era in which global issues such as the north-south gap, environmental pollution and international terrorism become further prominent, and therefore the concept of international order and the international mechanism have entered the era of change. First of all, the power pattern that forms the basis of international order has undergone tremendous changes. After World War II, there was a dramatic change in the rise and fall of the great powers.28 The formidable Soviet Empire collapsed; the group rise of major developing countries represented by China shocked the existing global pattern of power and interests; Western European countries became pioneers in accelerating the development of regionalism through alliance and self-improvement after thinking over the bitter experience, and once again became the core force for promoting international change through the establishment of EU and eastern enlargement; Japan went through a process from prosperity to decline: Japan emerged as the world’s second largest economic power from the cold war, even showing the signs of buying the US in the 1980s, but since the 1990s, it has fallen into the lost decades and its political right deviation has been stirring up the East Asian pattern; since the 1960s and 1970s, the Third World emerged as an important political force,29 and demanded for the reform of the world political and economic order. The most prominent impact of the change in the power pattern was the reconstruction of regional order. The construction of the Western European Community order led the regional cooperation and promoted the reconstruction of other regional orders. The economic 25 Kennedy

[26]. [27, p. 216]. 27 Gilpin [27, pp. 217–218]. 28 Hu and Men [28]. 29 See: [29]. 26 Gilpin

32

2 Logic of Regional Order Construction

and political order in East Asia has been reconstructed due to the rise of ASEAN, the rise of China and the stagnation of Japanese economy. As the focus of the world economy has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region, the reconstruction of the East Asian order has attracted global attention. Since the 1980s, the development of regionalism has become a comprehensive multi-level process, and its goal is to establish a region-based free trade system or security arrangement, with particular emphasis on regional cohesion and regional identity, forming a powerful impact on international order, and gestating a trend and opportunity to establish a fair and reasonable international order.30 Contrast of strength is the precursor to changes in interests, ideas and international mechanisms. Secondly, with the changes in the power pattern, individual states have put forward corresponding interest demands, and the interest pattern has also undergone tremendous changes, which reflected not only in the conflict of interests between the North and the South, but also in the Northern states. Thirdly, with the deepening of globalization and complex interdependence, international cooperation has become a dominant international behavior, new ideas such as global governance have gradually gone deep into the hearts of the people, and the dominant ideas constituting international order have also changed quietly. Economic globalization is playing a role of double-edged sword in building global order. Interdependence has led to more intense conflicts in international competition, and interdependence itself has become a tool of sanction against each other. However, it may make the states take a sensible and rational attitude in dealing with conflicts and replace confrontation with dialogue.31 Fourthly, the international mechanisms have undergone a quiet change. Since modern times, especially since the end of World War I, the international society has been seeking cooperation and has always had the impulse to establish a supranational world order. This impulse has led to the emergence of a series of international laws and international political rules, as well as the establishment of a series of institutionalized organizations and institutions. With decentralization of power and the expansion of the influence of international governance thought, and as more states participate in the formulation and improvement of international mechanisms, the fair nature of international mechanisms is further reflected. Due to changes in the above aspects, the struggle for international order has become fierce. Before the end of the Cold War, the call for the establishment of a new international order came mainly from the Third World, with a goal of changing its disadvantaged position in the old international economic order and creating a favorable international environment for the development of the national economy. Just after the end of the Cold War, with further strengthened power, developed countries strongly advocated to establish a new order.32 The US elevated the establishment of a new world order to the height of national strategy, eager to take the opportunity to build a world order to ensure its leadership; the EU countries showed a strong desire

30 Wang

[30]. [31]. 32 Li [23]. 31 Lu

2.2 Historical Evolution of International Order

33

to restore Europe’s historical position; Japan proposed to establish a new international order with the triple pole of Japan, the US and Europe as the leader. Essentially, the new world order advocated by developed countries is the continuation and further consolidation of the old order, i.e. using the dominant position to protect their own interests to the maximum, and including all the states in the international political and economic system dominated by them by maintaining existing international rules or formulating international rules in favor of themselves. In the 21st century, the focus of each state concerning the construction of order has fallen back to the regional level, especially the global financial crisis broke out in the second half of 2008 had made many states more aware of the value of regional cooperation. While promoting global economic governance (especially represented by the activities of G20), they have focused on the consolidation of regional position, exploring new paths for the reconstruction of global order by promoting regional cooperation, and accumulating power for promoting global change. Based on this, in the 21st century, the importance of regional cooperation has become more prominent, and the construction of regional order has attracted much attention.

2.3 New Features of the Change in International Order The existing international order is a mixture of new and old, negative and positive. With the deepening of globalization, power has been further decentralized. This change will be inevitably reflected in the diversification of interest demands, and global interests will also receive more attention. The basic ideas constituting international order are also changing to adapt to this trend, while the ideas of interdependence, international governance, international cooperation and democratization of international relations are being further confirmed. Although international mechanisms tend to maintain common interests, the existing system of international mechanisms dominantly created by the West (especially the US) is characterized by injustice, inequality and instability. In this situation, a partially globalize world instead of a global order will be inevitably shaped.33 Moreover, as international mechanisms and rules have lagged behind the development of globalization, the existing international mechanisms cannot assume the responsibility for keeping world peace and promoting social and economic development. Of course, when the West used its control of international mechanisms to reconstruct an international order in line with its desire, it had also sowed the seeds of gradual boycott toward itself. In order to promote the participation of developing countries in international mechanisms, Western countries ostensibly recognized the principle that all states have equal voices, but as the developing countries are growing stronger, their right to speak and to participate in decision-making will also increase. In analyzing the change in the contemporary international order, Barry Buzan emphasizes the importance of the following factors: firstly, the ostensible end of the 33 Keohane

[32].

34

2 Logic of Regional Order Construction

war among great powers; secondly, the emergence of the huge and sustained influence of the economic system; the two combined will lead to a change in composition, i.e. “the shift from a military-political process to an economic process is the main form that can stabilize the interactions of systems”; thirdly, the emergence of environment as a key variable. He points out that the strengthening of the global market will inevitably be accompanied by the consolidation of the international society, and bring about the smooth expansion or forcible expansion of rules, norms and institutions on a larger scale, especially in economy.34 In view of the fact that power has spread to many power centers at an unprecedented rate,35 some even indulged in talking about the imminent new world order centered on global governance. However, it is worth pointing out that economic, technological and other developments have brought about tremendous and profound changes in the world, but have not changed the nature of international relations.36 The disintegration of the old international pattern has shaken the original international order. However, it takes time to shape a new international pattern, particularly for this change under the current peaceful conditions. The new pattern will be ultimately shaped after a long time of re-division and combination of various powers. Correspondingly, the construction of a new order will not happen overnight. Just as Robert Keohane points out, the currently widely-discussed new world order is actually neither new nor global, not even an order at all.37 In contrast, concerns about the end of the Cold War and the impact of globalization are more likely to bring actual effects. Globalization means that the emergence and intensification of economic, environmental and social networks will bring closer the whole world. Globalization emerged in the second half of the 19th century and has gone through a robust process recently, but far from complete. We live in a partially globalized world.38 The rise of globalization and the end of the Cold War have created a new situation of world politics, and international institutions have become the core of political, military and economic policies of major states.39 The challenge for us in the face of globalization is how to design effective institutions for a regime with unprecedented scale and diversity. Well-designed global institutions will certainly promote human well-being which is subject to the establishment of a just and reasonable international order. The high morality of this mission is beyond criticism. However, in contrast to the current international reality, such an international order simply cannot be established overnight. It is indeed worth exploring the feasible approach to this vision over time. To analyze the trend of international order, we must pay attention to the world transformation accelerated by the complementation of globalization and regional

34 Buzan

[33]. [27, p. 238.]. 36 Gilpin [27, p. 210.]. 37 Keohane [34]. 38 Keohane [32]. 39 Keohane [35]. 35 Gilpin

2.3 New Features of the Change in International Order

35

integration. World transformation is one of the core forces that promote the reconstruction of international order and has a significant influence on the future of international order. Since the end of the Cold War, especially in the first years of the 21st century, the world has entered a period of overall transformation, leading to fundamental changes in the vicissitude of great powers. Non-Western countries are rising in groups while Western countries are beginning to decline. In particular, the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis in 2008 have accelerated the world transformation. The world transformation is embodied in power shift, problem shift and paradigm shift. More specifically, power shift means great changes have taken place in the composition of actors and their powers, especially reflected in the undisputable fact that the collective rise of non-Western countries has drawn extensive attention while there has been a relative decline of Western powers’ overall strength. Traditional great powers and emerging powers have entered a period of mutual accommodation and cooperative competition, and the interaction between the two is shaping a new international core structure and strategic situation.40 Secondly, with the relative decline of the power of state actors, the rise of the power of non-state actors and the redistribution of power among states, markets and civil societies, even the most powerful states in the world have found that markets and international public opinions have forced them to follow particular norms more often. Power shift leads to problem shift that has strategic significance, which is manifested in the surge of global problems, the increasingly rich international agenda, the generalization of security, the escalation of non-traditional security as one of the leading factors in the international agenda, the signs of acceleration of the rise and fall of states, as well as the issue of democratic deficit of international institutions that has become a derivative factor of the expansion of the international agenda.41 Problem shift will also necessarily result in the adjustment of national strategy. Since survival is no longer the only core concern of a state, the importance of development and prosperity is further enhanced in the national strategy. The above power shift and problem shift lead to paradigm shift in international relations. At the macro level, international politics has begun to give way to world politics. The connotation of international relations has been greatly enriched, and complex interdependence has increasingly deepened, which, to a certain extent, has contributed to the global awareness of coexistence and common prosperity of all states in the world. The international system has evolved from anarchy in the traditional sense towards interdependence characterized by greater resilience and inclusiveness, and the awareness of global governance has been strengthened. At the medium level, economic globalization and regional integration have become the strategic straitjackets of great powers. The national interests pursued by individual states are no longer absolute, and have incorporated more relative meanings. The power relations among various states are no longer an entire zero-sum game, but may deliver positive results and even win-win results.

40 Yu

[36].

41 Keohane

[37].

36

2 Logic of Regional Order Construction

In the context of encouraged cooperation among states, those partnerships in pursuit of common interests are playing a more fundamental role in accelerating the construction of a new international order based on common interests. At the micro level, the strategic planning of individual states is more essential. Given the fact that the formation of a new international system relies mainly on the improvement of its own comprehensive national strength, it is crucial to secure the strategic national interests in such a dynamic environment where competition and cooperation coexist and competition is increasingly intense (Table 2.1).42 Table 2.1 Power shift, problem shift and paradigm shift Power Shift

Problem Shift

Paradigm Shift

State level

The rise of NGOs and the reorientation of state-society relations; multinational corporations play an important role

Reform and opening up is not a path exclusive to developing countries, but an approach shared by developed countries; state governance requires a new philosophy

Governance in place of control, open discussion on governance paradigm; political science challenges economic imperialism

Bilateral level

The change in the power comparison of two states is no longer zero-sum; traditional power comparison has become blurred due to the emergence of new power factors; the re-emergence of statism/nationalism

Bilateral issues have further expanded and become more permeable

Dialogue has replaced confrontation and become the mainstream; inter-state competition is mainly reflected at the level of soft power

Regional level

The role of region as a natural trade territory is prominent, and regionalism has become an important force

Regional problems that were originally concealed are in the spotlight; traditional security and non-traditional security work together

Regional cooperation has become the mainstream; collectivization of small states has become an important factor in balancing great powers

Global level

The rise and fall of states and the rise of former peripheral regions are prominent

Non-traditional security issues have attracted more attention; the North-South contradiction has become the most prominent issue by replacing the East-West contradiction

How to promote global governance; how to tackle the democratic deficit in international organizations; reorientation of regional and global relations

42 Men

[38].

2.3 New Features of the Change in International Order

37

The acceleration of world transformation has impacted the existing framework of international order and facilitated the reshaping of a new international order based on common interests. At the same time, thanks to the generally accepted open regionalism, the regional structure and its operating mechanism may lead to a more stable order. Coordination, compromise and cooperation are regarded as important strategic trends in the process of order construction involving great powers (of course, competition is inevitable). In view of this, world order is in the transition from the old to the new, and its transformation is increasingly based on multi-polarization, with a trend of convergence and institutionalization of common interests and sharing of common responsibilities (great powers assume important responsibilities, and other states share responsibilities), and led by regional order construction. At present, international order is embodied in three basic forms, i.e. hegemonic order, balance-of-power order and community order.43 The current characteristics of international order still exist, in other words, the hierarchical political system reflecting the interests of dominant powers is easy to join but difficult to overthrow.44 Some scholars summarize the world political characteristics of the post-Cold War era as “the international order under institutional hegemony and the international governance in cooperative competition”, believing that institutional hegemony is the main approach to dominate the interactions among great powers.45 At the same time, with the growth and decline of national power and the deepening of international cooperation (such as the BRICS Summit), the balance-of-power elements of global order has increased. According to Henry Kissinger’s analysis, “balance of power plays a role in limiting a state’s ability to dominate and control other states and the scale of conflicts. What it pursues is stability, ease, and even peace”.46 This just coincides with the idea of international economic governance adopted by great powers since the 21st century, and has an inherent appeal for a multipolar order. However, many scholars believe that the multipolar order requires more complex variables and power relations, and adopting a balance-of-power policy may bring greater instability to the international order.47 As the focus of world powers is shifting from the West to the East and from the Atlantic to the Pacific, developing countries, especially emerging powers, have been developing rapidly, with the tendency of balanced distribution of international power. Emerging countries are no longer spectators in international decision-making, instead, they have stepped forward and seized major opportunities for equal status and fair treatment.48 One this basis, the interrelation between emerging countries and developed countries has become closer and more complicated. The traditional understanding and basic logic of reshaping the international order—dominant powers establish rules of conduct for other states to follow, and the order created through 43 Ikenberry 44 Ikenberry 45 Qin

and Tsuchiyama [39]. [40].

[41].

46 Kissinger

[42]. classic theoretical analysis, see Waltz [43], Deutsch and Singer [44], Rosecrane [45]. 48 Yu [46], Le [47]. 47 For

38

2 Logic of Regional Order Construction

collective identity among states is not stable—is no longer applicable to the contemporary era,49 and the pattern of “winner-takes-all” order has gradually transformed into one of interest-sharing order.50 However, shaping international order through the change of global governance is not only a shared aspiration of developed countries and developing countries, but also a critical challenge in our era. According to Yu Keping’s understanding, global governance refers to solving problems such as global conflicts, ecology, human rights, immigration, drugs, smuggling and infectious diseases through a binding international mechanism so as to maintain a normal international political and economic order. Global governance, as the result of the thriving globalization, has a huge impact on the existing governance model by breaking the traditional mindset of dichotomy, i.e. planning and market, public sector and private sector, political state and civil society, and nation-state and international society. It regards effective management as a process of combining the two, and seeks to develop a new mechanism to govern domestic and international public affairs. However, in view of numerous factors such as the irrational status of various countries in the global governance system, the international strategy of unilateralism adopted by the US, the imperfection of the existing international governance mechanism, the difficulty in reaching a consensus on major global issues by various actors in international governance due to value divergence, there are many realistic constraints in global governance whose prospect is not too optimistic.51 Global governance reflects the awareness of pursuing common interests and sharing responsibilities, and demonstrates a new idea of order construction. However, given that the nationstate system has not been shaken fundamentally, each country has been considering its own interests from a realistic perspective, so there is still a long way to go in the future. The practice of global governance shows that the international system has reached the limit of geographical expansion, followed by a major tend of intensity enhancement.52 At a time when it is difficult to achieve a fundamental breakthrough in the exploration of global order, major powers have turned their attention to the reshaping of regional order, showing more interest in exploring regional communities such as the EU and the ASEAN. According to the understanding of G. John Ikenberry, in the community order, the binding security system, shared political interests and values can shape and constrain the way power is exercised, and the importance of power distribution is clearly lower than that of the balance-of-power order and hegemonic order.53 The above understanding also shows from another perspective that the difficulty of community order construction is also predictable. Of course, the construction of the existing regional (sub-regional) order is in full swing, which is also expressed in various forms such as hegemonic order, balance-of-power order and community order. As the result of parallel development of globalization and regional integration, 49 Organski

[48], Mattern [49]. [50]. 51 Yu [51], Huang and Cui [52]. 52 Yu [46]. 53 Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama [39]. 50 Liu

2.3 New Features of the Change in International Order

39

the community order unquestionably has its far-reaching significance, but it is not the only path. The author believes that the current topics of regional order that requires further thinking include: how to find the law of regional cooperation in combination with the characteristics of the times? How to identify the logic of regional order construction in the complicated exploration at present?

2.4 Logic of Regional Order Construction 2.4.1 Journey of Regional Integration At present, regional cooperation is in full swing. Both economy and trade and security and politics are being reorganized within the structure of regionalization. All states are making policy and strategic adjustments to promote cooperation in their respective regions. We have entered an era of regional integration. The so-called regional integration means, in order to safeguard common interests, geographically adjacent or neighboring countries or regions, through the execution of certain intergovernmental treaties or agreements, the formulation and regulation of common guidelines for actions and coordinated policies, and even through the establishment of common institutions by certain extent of government authorization, carry out long-term and stable supranational policy adjustments, and reach and achieve economic alliances and even political alliances, so as to promote regional stability and prosperity. General regional cooperation means the states in a region make a dialogue and form policy coordination on certain issues, without the problem of the transfer of decision-making power; regional integration means the states in a region transfer the decision-making power, or at least part of the decision-making power, to a common institution in relation to decisions on certain issues and issue areas.54 Regional integration is mainly expressed in such forms as customs union, FTAs, common market, monetary union, economic and monetary union, and region community, among which region community has a clear sense of identity, institutionalization, legitimacy and decision-making structure, being the core goal of many regions in promoting integrated development.55 The process of regional integration is closely related to economic and trade development. At present, the main form of regional integration is regional economic and trade arrangement, while FTA is a prominent form of expression, being regarded as a paving stone for regional porosity.56 Regional economic and trade arrangement is a form of regional economic cooperation with a high degree of legal binding and trade liberalization. Its core is to create more trade opportunities, promote the free movement of goods, services, capital, technology and personnel, and achieve the 54 Chen

and Chen [53]. and Söderbaum [54]. 56 Katzenstein [19, p. 27]. 55 Hetten

40

2 Logic of Regional Order Construction

common economic development of all states in the region by eliminating trade barriers between members. Robert Gilpin points out that “the establishment of FTAs with countries within a certain geographical range is a manifestation of regionalism in the international political economy. Participating countries seek to improve their status with developed countries or enhance their political and economic heft in the region through regional economic cooperation or alliances”.57 Historical review shows that regional integration is a sustained feature of international political economy, an inevitable result of promoting regional cooperation, and an expression of institutionalization of regional cooperation. Regional integration begins with the pursuit of economic interests, based on state contracts and with economic cooperation as its main organizational form. The Commonwealth preferential tariff zone was established in 1932 with a purpose of reducing tariffs between the UK and Commonwealth member states, while maintaining original higher tariffs for non-Commonwealth member states. EU and its predecessor, EC, and NAFTA were also established to unify and expand the international trade markets of member states and enhance their market competitiveness against states and groups outside the region. Therefore, regional integration is first and foremost a natural process of economic cooperation, in which market plays a fundamental role, and the political choice of states plays a decisive role. Regional economic cooperation has a natural geographical basis. Before World War II, regional integration was more manifested in the economic cooperation between the sovereign state and colonies. However, this cooperation was premised on politically unequal relations and was not regional economic cooperation in the true sense. After World War II, Western Europe united and strengthened itself, steadily promoting the process of regional integration from the Coal and Steel Community, and finally forming the EU and carrying out its expansion after the Cold War, all of which had represented the height of regional cooperation. Since the 1980s, the complementation of regional integration and economic globalization has become increasing prominent, and globalization has increasingly been manifested by regional integration in the horizontal direction. That is to say, while all states in the world are striving to promote the process of global multilateral trade liberalization, they have paid more attention to the economic and trade cooperation of various economies in the region (Table 2.2). In the 1990s, regional integration showed a strong momentum of development, and regional economic organizations represented by EU and NAFTA have become increasingly important in international trade and the world economy. Regional integration has entered a new stage, with outstanding features that competition among great powers has increasingly evolved into competition among regional economic cooperation organizations, and position of great powers in dealing with regional economic cooperation has changed, mainly manifested by the struggle of both sides of the Atlantic for the dominance in international economic rules,58 which has led to the development of regional grouping. It is noteworthy that the establishment of WTO 57 Gilpin 58 Li

[55]. [56].

2.4 Logic of Regional Order Construction

41

Table 2.2 Trade share of regions during the Cold War (1965–1990) 1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

East Asia

0.199

0.198

0.213

0.229

0.256

0.293

Western Hemisphere

0.315

0.311

0.309

0.272

0.310

0.285

EC

0.358

0.397

0.402

0.416

0.423

0.471

Southern Cone

0.061

0.050

0.040

0.056

0.043

0.061

Andeans Common Market

0.008

0.012

0.020

0.023

0.034

0.026

NAFTA

0.237

0.258

0.246

0.214

0.274

0.246

Source Mansfield and Milner [59]

in 1995 marked the deepening of globalization, and at the same time, various types of regional trade groups flourished around the world, setting off a wave of regional integration. All states have been deeply aware that only by strengthening cooperation in regional integration can they face the increasingly intensified international competition and participate in the process of globalization in a more favorable position. In the 21st century, multilateral trade negotiations have come to a deadlock, and the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements and regional free trade agreements has become a trend of the times. In particular, the failure of the WTO Cancun Conference in 2003 marked the failure of the promotion of globalization process through multilateral approach and contributed to the development of regional integration. Since then, in consideration of their own economic interests or strategic planning, all major states have been committed to promoting the in-depth development of regional integration and focused on bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements, allowing regional integration to enter a new era of unprecedented development. Associated with this, regional integration has further expanded from economy to politics and other areas, and the development of free trade within and among the three regions of North America, Europe and East Asia has been outstanding, promoting the diversified development of regional integration. The European integration dominated by bureaucratic organizations has no longer been seen as a universal model of regional economic cooperation.59 The East Asian process, which is not promoted by government agencies, is regarded as a new paradigm of regional integration. Throughout the development of regional integration, economic integration is not just an economic process,60 but also a political process. Economic cooperation is a political process of cooperation and coordination of economic policies among states. On the face of it, regional integration is economic cooperation, but it is actually a political decision, and the cooperation of domestic policies and the consensus on integration by all states are crucial.61 The regionalization of the world economy is not only an important driving force for accelerating the process of economic 59 Acharya

[57]. [58], Mansfield and Milner [59], Chiu [60]. 61 Tsai [61]. 60 Strange

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integration, but also a driving condition for the states to accept FTA and other regional arrangements.62 In the 21st century, all states have profoundly realized that, if they do not establish their own regional free trade system at an early date, they will inevitably be excluded from trade agreements of other states and suffer unnecessary economic and even strategic losses. For great powers, integration into regional integration is a guarantee to secure their strategic position; for small and medium-sized countries, integration into regional integration can enhance their “potential bargaining power in dealing with the relations with great powers”.63 In view of this, promoting the indepth development of regional integration and facilitating mutual benefit and strategic mutual trust through economic cooperation are becoming a new consensus to promote regional cooperation.

2.4.2 Upsurge of Regionalism Regionalism refers to a multilateral concept, system and value, by which more than three nation-states, with geographical proximity, a high degree of political and economic interdependence and many common characteristics, and on the basis of enhancing their respective interests, seek to reach a consensus on regional affairs, jointly promote the arrangement of cooperative policies, and deal with interrelationships in this framework and order. Symbolizing a combination of ideas, values and clear goals, regionalism aims to create, maintain and revise the norms of security, wealth, peace and development in a region. It is a desire of various roles with a shared ambition to reorganize their activities and relations within a specific regional space.64 As a form of multilateralism, regionalism believes in the overall idea and cooperation idea of a region. It constantly cultivates regional collective identity and organizational identity beyond the scope of state, and can provide the motive power to integrate various splits and barriers inherent in the region. Therefore, the regional order it leads to is significantly different from the traditional regional order that heavily relies on the balance of power.65 Regionalism is the result of the development of contradictions between nationalism and globalism.66 In theory, the booming globalism will inevitably lead to an impact on nationalism, and regionalism will become a buffer zone for all states to resist the penetration and erosion of globalism, with region as an organizational unit, as well as a halfway station for these states to move towards globalism. On the other 62 Frankel

[62]. [63]. 64 Schulz [64]. 65 Cox [65], Wang[66]. 66 Globalism refers to a state of the world that relates to the interdependent networks among various continents, and is linked by the flow and influence of capital, goods, information, ideas, people, military force, and environmentally and biologically-related substances; nationalism emphasizes the concept of the highest power of state in domestic society and the principle of centralism in international society. See: Keohane and Nye [67], Cai [68]. 63 Acharya

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hand, globalism has caused further development of imbalances, and the nature of states to pursue balance of power has led to different levels of regional unity, eventually converging into a torrent of regionalism. From an ethical point of view, globalism is a spontaneous behavior of market, giving priority to efficiency at the expense of fairness; regionalism is based on state contracts, with economic cooperation as the main organizational form, taking sovereign states as the core, taking into account both efficiency and fairness. In other words, globalization has both deepened the interdependence and intensified the competition among states; the alliance of states in a region to seek common development has given regionalism a basis for existence and development, or, the pursuit of a certain degree of balanced development has become the main driving force for the promotion of regionalism. In view of this, regionalism, in a practical sense, has become a bridge connecting nationalism and globalism. Specifically as follows: Regionalism is the only way for nationalism to adapt to the globalist situation and move towards openness. As Jeffrey J. Schoot points out, different forms of regional economic integration have three goals, i.e. to improve economic efficiency, to gain leverage in negotiations with third states, and to expand the space for political cooperation in the region.67 Regionalism used to be a sovereignty umbrella of developing countries. Amitav Acharya points out that, in the first years after World War II, it was not at all excessive to describe the role of regionalism in the international system as the fortress of sovereignty principle.68 Third World countries believed that regionalism has made it possible for them to avoid the intervention of great powers over their sovereignty and autonomy, and regarded it as a way to achieve common economic and political mutual trust. Shortly thereafter, regionalism became the basic path for Europe to realize strategic renaissance. Based on the successful experience of EU, regionalism has become a world trend that is parallel to globalization since the mid-1980s. In particular, for developing countries generally in the stage of transition, the double-edged sword of globalism is so sharp that unilateral nationalist acts often lead to failure or confrontational reaction.69 Only by strengthening cooperation in regional integration can the states address the increasingly intensified international competition and participate in the globalization process in a favorable position. Since 2000, there have been twists and turns in the process of globalization, as evidenced by the further strengthening of regionalism that was stimulated from the opposite. In the context of the deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations, the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements and regional free trade agreements is easier to operate and has achieved practical results. Most states have signed free trade agreements and participated in regional economic organizations. Closer cooperation among regional states is aimed to effectively reduce the negative effects of globalism, not to go against the trend of globalism. At the current stage, regional integration may build a barrier for the further development of globalization, but in the long run, it is the only way to urge all states to move towards globalism. A new phenomenon is that, with the new 67 Schoot

[69]. [70]. 69 Mansfield and Milner [71]. 68 Acharya

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development of regionalism, the increase in sovereignty transfer has highlighted the contradictions between regionalism and narrow nationalism. With the evolution of the sovereign concept, the sense of convergence of regional integration is enhancing. Regionalism has become an antidote to narrow nationalism and an effective approach to liberalism. In this context, globalism finds it easier to penetrate, and it is imperative for all states to embrace globalization. Regionalism is a helpful complement to globalism. The prerequisite for globalist expansion is the optimal allocation of resources within the state and the region, i.e. to maximize the economies of scale and division of labor within the state and the region. At the present stage, globalization is mainly manifested in the initial process rather than the economic globalization that achieves the goal. Due to the blindness and uncontrollability of its market, under certain conditions, it often leads to a financial crisis or economic crisis in a state or a region. Regional integration often adopts a strategy that is aligned with the economic development and affordability of member states, and therefore becomes a miraculous cure for containing the abovementioned disasters. Since the 1980s, the basic characteristics of world economic development have been reflected in the coexistence and development of regional integration and globalization. The failure of the WTO Cancun Conference in 2003 contributed to the development of regional integration. As Keohane points out, in the lifetime of us and our future generations, a new World Charter is unlikely to be accepted, and the political and cultural diversity of the world—and its absolute size—has made this prospect exceptionally grim. However, as long as globalization continues to deepen, states or other actors will find that their values are increasingly influenced by the behaviors of others. Therefore, they will seek to manage the impact of interdependence, i.e. manage globalization, and one of the ways is to strengthen regional cooperation and enhance the effectiveness of policies.70 Of course, there are also some beliefs accordingly that political elites have abandoned their commitments at the global level because of new regional planning.71 Regionalism is a bridge between nationalism and globalism. At present, the development of globalism and regionalism runs parallel, and regionalism is not only a complement to globalism, but also a midpoint for nationalism to move towards global openness. Regionalism expresses the construction of regional international institutions, while globalism expresses the expansion of the world market. To a certain extent, globalization is a quantitative change in the economic internationalization, and regional integration is a qualitative change in the economic internationalization.72 In other words, regionalism is an inevitable stage of global economic integration, and the only way to break through narrow nationalism and move towards global governance. As Joseph Nye believes, regionalism is the middle ground between individual states and world federation, as it can not only bring along the economic development of the vast number of small and medium-sized countries, but also enhance security

70 Keohane

and Nye [67, pp. 311–313]. [72]. 72 Tian [73]. 71 Kahler

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cooperation and create a Land of Peace in international relations.73 On the other hand, it is not regionalism that contradicts globalization, but exclusive narrow nationalism. Regionalism has realized the vision of states for cooperation and opening-up, offset the their fear of negative effects of globalism, and provided the experience of liberalism and a halfway station to globalism, thus acting as a bridge between nationalism and globalism. Therefore, regionalism is an important force driving the development of the world. Regionalism has so far experienced three major stages of development. The initial stage was the imperial group (or quasi-imperial group) formed by colonial powers such as the UK and France in the 1930s in response to the global economic crisis between 1929 and 1933. The aim of it was to form a trade barrier for self-protection, even from the global economy.74 Let us just call it “classical regionalism”. The second wave of regionalism from the end of World War II to the 1970s was marked by the formation and development of the European Common Market. Its basic feature was that, based on the summary of the practice and experience of European integration, it emphasized that the homogeneity of economics, politics, history and culture was the fundamental factor leading to the emergence of regional identity and regional integration, and regional integration was also a gradual process of overcoming nationalism. Its core goal was to seek political independence, resist hegemonism and pursue a reasonable international order. The third wave of regionalism since the late 1980s is a positive response to the acceleration of globalization, characterized by the emphasis of the cooperation and coordination between developing countries and developed countries as well as the cooperation between or in and out of regions, and the pursuit of further integration and incorporating more states into the region.75 This wave of regionalism is called “neo-regionalism” because of its active response to globalization and commitment to strengthening international competitiveness through regional integration.76 In contrast, scholars named the second wave of regionalism as “old regionalism”. The differences between neo-regionalism and old regionalism are: the latter was formed in and determined by the context of the bipolar Cold War, while the former took place in a multipolar world order; the latter was created by great powers from outside and the top, while the former is an internal process, which is more spontaneous; the latter is endogenous and tends to be protectionist, while the former is open and aligned with the world economy; the latter is evidently related to security, economy and other specific goals, while the former is a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional process including all topics about sustainability and legitimacy, such as the environment of trade and economic integration, social policy, security and democracy; the latter only focuses on inter-state relations, while the former pays attention to the relationships among various actors that drive global structural

73 Nye

[74].

74 Mansfield

and Milner [59]. [75]. 76 Oman [76]. 75 Li

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change.77 In summary, neo-regionalism has been flourishing and expanding into a comprehensive multi-level process. Guided by market and competition, it is committed to the development of the potential of regional cooperation and the participation in the global economic system, and actively promotes economic liberalization and pursues the open strategy, reflecting the “relatively positive characteristics”.78 On the other hand, neo-regionalism has promoted the liberalization of the global economy in a corrective way, curbed the negative meaning of globalization, and given the states a rightful place so that they could carry out the necessary reconstruction of sovereignty in a voluntary and consensual way while integrating into the global economy. At the same time, neo-regionalism has provided expanded territorial-political protection, thus building a bridge between the states and globalization, so that the two can support each other in an environment without significant contradictions and conflicts.79 In summary, neo-regionalism has reflected not only the sober understanding of the world political and economic pattern, but also the spirit of steady progress. And its vigorous growth is contributing to the trend and opportunity for the construction of a fair and reasonable regional order.

2.4.3 Logic of Regional Order Construction Regional order is the result of the distribution of power, interests and ideas among neighboring countries with interactive relations, mainly manifested by the establishment and operation of regional institutions. Robert Cox points out that any international order is a combination of three forces: the distribution of power, the role of institutions, and the identity of limits of regulated behaviors. If these forces are consistent and mutually compatible, there will be a stable and powerful international order. However, they are often inconsistent, which leads to the issue of order change and adjustment. Regionalism believes in the overall idea and cooperation idea of a region or sub-region, continuously cultivating the collective identity and organizational identity of the region beyond the scope of state. It can provide the power to integrate various splits and barriers inherent in the region. Therefore, the resulting regional order is significantly different from the traditional regional order that is mainly maintained by the balance of power.80 By summarizing the existing forms of regional order, we can see huge differences between and among the three major regions—Europe, America and East Asia. So far, the American order has been based on the hegemonic stability theory and has the typical characteristics of hegemonic order. The European order has evolved from the former balance-of-power order to the community order after painful experiences and become the leader of regional order construction, reflecting the combination of the common interests of European 77 Hetnne

and Andras [77]. et al. [59]. 79 Wang [78]. 80 Cox [65]. 78 Edward

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47

countries.81 The long-standing East Asian order, spanning from the traditional soft hegemonic order to the fields of security, economic and political orders, and to the predicament after the proposal of creating a regional community, has been experiencing multiple surges of resisting the hegemonic order, maintaining the balance-ofpower order and constructing the community order. It can be said that the American order is the product of the wave of classical regionalism; old regionalism has laid the foundation for the European order, and neo-regionalism has contributed to the transformation of the European order; today’s construction of the East Asian order is not only saddled with a heavy historical legacy, but also profoundly influenced by neo-regionalism, and its future direction is closely watched by the world. The in-depth development of regional integration and the rise of neo-regionalism have promoted the construction of regional order. Regional integration deepens the links between member states and promotes the sharing of interests and responsibilities. The principles formed in the process of interactions have provided a value concept that can be followed in the regional order, and the states in the region thus build a relatively stable relation and structural status at the political, economic, social and security level of the region. Thanks to the booming neo-regionalism, the construction of regional order can be based not only on the power relations and pursuit of self-interests of the states, but also on process-oriented factors such as conceptual innovation, collective identity and institutional construction. Regional order is the result of the participation of various actors in the regional governance, and a model for institutional management and arrangement of regional political and security affairs, reflecting the common will, common interests and common pursuit of regional states. In the construction of regional order, economic integration is often seen as the breeding ground for regional cooperation. In the process of integration, cooperation, coordination and mutual compromise have become the mainstream in dealing with inter-state relations. Certain rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures have gradually been accepted by all participants and institutionalized into regional soft laws. These institutionalized elements include at least: mutual benefit, i.e. all states not only pursue self-interests, but also focus on the maintenance of regional common interests; progressiveness, i.e. tolerance and patience in reaching consensus; openness and inclusiveness, i.e. accepting and welcoming the participation of forces from outside the region; coexistence of multilateral coordination and traditional bilateralism; arrangements of insurance nature, including but not limited to cooperative security arrangements starting from areas of low politics. All these elements have reflected the pursuit of common interests, and in fact, common interests are regarded as the “primary issue of the community”. Since the distribution of power is often uneven, small or weak states tend to organize alliances to balance the power of great powers, and the compromise, coordination and cooperation of great powers are crucial to the construction of regional order. Great powers often alleviate their doubts by providing regional public goods and seeking strategic trust. Based on the parallel development of globalization and 81 Huang

[79].

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regional integration, and in view of the magnificent upsurge of regional integration and the vigorous growth of neo-regionalism, the convergence and institutionalization of common interests is the only feasible way to create a constructive regional order. On this basis, the author believes that the convergence and institutionalization of common interests is the basic logic that can be applied to the construction of regional order. Specifically, neighboring states with interactive relations achieve the institutionalization of common interests on the basis of the convergence of common interests of all regional states and through the integration of regional awareness; all states share the responsibilities together and great powers take on greater responsibilities for providing regional public goods. The above basic logic behind the construction of regional order contains the following main contents: Firstly, the basis is the pursuit of common interests. Here, common interests not only refer to common benefits or shared interests, but also include common challenges and common threats. At present, the interests of all states are closely related on endless global issues, such as population explosion, international terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation and transnational drug trafficking. The international society rather than any single country is therefore faced with a terrible predicament of sustainable development, and all countries are required to work together to solve this problem. Common interests and common threats call for cooperation among all countries and lead to the establishment of international communities of shared interests. Such communities represent a process of putting into practice the understanding of common prosperity and shared risks among all states in the context of globalization, as well as regularizing and institutionalizing such understanding. For centuries, many states have been committed to establishing communities of shared interests, and traditional alliances, emerging FTAs and regional integration are all manifestations of the establishment of such communities. In summary, the construction of future regional order should achieve the institutionalization of common interests on the basis of the convergence of common interests of all regional states and through the integration of regional awareness, which, therefore, will inevitably be characterized by the community of shared interests. Globalization and regional integration are premised on the recognition and pursuit of common interests which are regarded as the “primary issue of the community” and the core foundation for the construction of regional order. For international order, it is of great significance to constrain and shape the behavior and identity of members of international society with common interests, rules and ethics.82 In the perspective of historical and realistic factors, the stability of international order depends on common interests or shared interests.83 Of course, the pursuit of common interests referred to herein focuses on the integration of the interests of member states, instead of just maintaining the balance of existing interests. For member states in a region, some common interests are inherent and objective. Just as a region objectively has 82 Qin

[80]. [81].

83 Ruan

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49

interest-sharing relations in security, stability, economic development and ecological environment due to geopolitical factors, and these interests are intrinsic and non-selective, but some common interests are not readily available and need to be generated in cooperation.84 Common interest appeals can cultivate behavioral preferences of individual states, bring benefits to the states, make state behaviors more recognized, and increase the acceptance of the states in the international system. The pursuit of common interests also means that “individual states do not put their own interests above others or at the expense of the interests of others”.85 Regional integration includes competition and sometimes the convergence of national interests. If the overall trend of a particular geographic region is the convergence and institutionalization of common interests of all states, and the convergence of common interests forms a cumulative effect,86 the construction of regional order will be put on the agenda. On the other hand, considering common interests sometimes may affect and damage national interests and there are certain contradictions between the two, we should actively identify the intersection of the two and seek the co-prosperity and coordination of the two as much as possible. Otherwise, the good wish and great efforts will end up nowhere.87 Secondly, the main form is that all states share the responsibilities and great powers take on greater responsibilities. The construction of regional order concerns the core interests of all states in the region and is the common responsibilities of all states in the region. Only when all states share the responsibilities can the smooth progress of the construction be guaranteed. Of course, given their strength and regional and global influence, great powers should actively play the role of coordinator and assume greater responsibilities in the construction. Such responsibilities should be assumed mainly through the provision of regional public goods, and the motivation for various states to provide public goods is to achieve common interests with mutual consent.88 According to the explanation of Joseph S. Nye, Jr, what maintains the operation of an order is the functional public goods provided by the main actors, which includes maintaining the balance of power within the region, promoting an open international economic system, maintaining the sharing of ‘international territory’, maintaining the effect of international rules and institutions, providing assistance to economic development, and acting as a conflict mediator.89 Charles P. Kindleberger sees international public goods as a stabilizer, believing that public goods play an important role in the stability of international order,90 and regarding hegemonic states as the sole source of public goods. In the view of Robert Keohane, even if hegemonic states do not exist, a few great powers can also share the responsibility of providing

84 Qi

[82]. [83]. 86 Matthews [84]. 87 Cai [25]. 88 Buchanan [85]. 89 Nye [86]. 90 Kindleberger [87]. 85 Ruan

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public goods, thus achieving the effect of stability.91 The successful experiences of the EU tell us that relevant states can jointly produce, provide and maintain various public goods necessary for the peace and prosperity of the region through intraregional cooperation, so that they can not only effectively overcome the undersupply of global public goods, but also adequately prevent the privatization of international public goods by great powers.92 Nevertheless, in the process of constructing the European Union, the provision of public goods by great powers such as Germany and France was taken for granted, and the supply of public goods by major states in the region directly affected the stability of the region.93 Therefore, in the construction of regional order, it may, after all, be an acceptable form that all states reach a basic understanding on the provision of public goods, with shared responsibilities among all states and greater responsibilities for great powers. Thirdly, the basic principle is the pursuit of open regionalism. Under the double impact of the trend of globalization and regional integration, no region can close the door to the rest of the world for order construction, and open regionalism has become an irresistible trend. According to APEC’s understanding, open regionalism includes the following elements: unilateral liberalization to the utmost; sustained efforts in the reduction of tariff barriers against non-member states based on the most preferential treatment and in the process of liberalization within the region; the willingness to expand regional liberalization to non-member states on the basis of mutual benefit; the recognition that any member state can provide non-member states with its commitment to regional liberalization on a conditional or unconditional basis.94 Open regionalism is a concept of multilateralism with strong inclusiveness and internationalism. On the premise of effective management of regional common interests and interactions, it embraces the participation of outside regions and states, and, by opening to the world, it creates a new order that reflects the reality of interdependence, promotes international coordination and fosters a stable and free international environment, thus revitalizing global governance and regional interests improvement.95 Open regionalism has been accepted as a more inclusive and open-minded approach beyond the traditional concept of free trade.96 It enables regional states to benefit from regional economic cooperation without excluding the sharing of positive results of economic globalization; it accepts the reality that the construction of regional order will be inevitably influenced by external forces, willing to share regional interests with non-member states on the principle of non-discrimination, while being committed to ensuring the subjectivity of regional order construction, without turning regional order into the means of creating super-national identity or creating a hard ‘United States’ to replace the current nation-states.97 91 Keohane

and Nye [67, pp. 20–30]. [88]. 93 Wang [89]. 94 APEC [90]. 95 Wang [66]. 96 Acharya [91]. 97 Kahler [92]. 92 Fan

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Fourthly, the main support is the pursuit of cooperative security. Security is a touchstone to test the construction of regional order, and an established security concept is crucial to such construction. Cooperative security is a security ideal in pursuit of common interests, and has been gradually put into practice since the mid-1990s. It developed the security dilemma from the structural concept to the processing concept, and has become a way to be tested in dealing with security dilemmas.98 According to the classic comment by Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, “Cooperative security is an extensive trend of security, which is multi-directional in scope and progressive in nature. It emphasizes assurance rather than deterrence. It is inclusive rather than mutually exclusive, with no restriction on members. It prefers multilateralism over bilateralism, and it does not prefer military solutions over non-military solutions. It believes that states are the main actors in the security system, but it also accepts the important roles played by non-state actors. It does not require nor reject the creation of formal institutions; it emphasizes the dialogue mechanism formed on a multilateral basis”.99 Cooperative security is a process-oriented strategic design that focuses on resolving issues of consensus on security dilemmas. Being non-exclusive and extensive, cooperative security include cooperation both in the traditional security field and in non-traditional security fields such as politics, economy and environment. The prerequisite for pursuing cooperative security is that all actors have the political desire to avoid confrontation and maintain regional stability and peace. The essence is that the actors conduct dialogues and negotiations on security affairs under the guidance of the spirit of cooperation, respect the opinions and interests of the counterparts, and reach a consensus through repeated consultations and great patience. Fifthly, the core path is the construction of regional institutions. Institution is a common belief reached by actors on how to play the game in the reality,100 and international institutions tend to lead the behavior of actors into a predictable orbit.101 Without the existence of international institutions, the international society will not only be in anarchy, but also have no order. Without any constraints, the actors will inevitably seek to maximize the interests at any and all margins, and we will live in the jungle of Hobbesianism.102 The role of regional international institutions is to seek a proper balance between national self-esteem and regional integration. After the establishment of the institutional framework, state behavior will be regulated and coordinated by institutional norms and rules, and the stable cooperation among states will become predictable.103 The core expression of regional order construction is the establishment of regional institutions, as the cooperation among states alone is inadequate to ensure the convergence of common interests, and only the institutionalization can sustain the common interests in the long run. All states have been 98 Men

[93]. [94]. 100 Aoki [95]. 101 Lake[96]. 102 North [97]. 103 Qin and Zhu [98]. 99 Evans

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participating in regional order construction with the goal of fostering and establishing an equal and cooperative regional order of mutual benefit and mutual assistance in regions where they are stakeholders on the basis of common interests, eliminating the misunderstanding and grudge accumulated over a long time in the process of constructive interactions, exploring and establishing guidelines for relations among regional states, and providing a paradigm for reference in the change of global order.

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21. Held, D., et al. (1999). Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture (pp. 37–38). London: Polity Press. 22. Bull, H. (1980). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (pp. 8–20). New York: Columbia University Press. 23. Li, Q. (2001). Globalization, sovereign states and world political order (quan qiu hua, zhu quan guo jia yu shi jie zheng zhi zhi xu). Strategy and Management, (2), 13–24. 24. Men, H. H. (2005). Wing of Hegemony: U.S. Institutional Strategy (ba quan zhi yi: mei guo guo ji zhi du zhan lue yan jiu). (Sect. 1, Chap. 4), Beijing: Peking University Press. 25. Cai, T. (1994). Several thoughts on establishing a new international order (guan yu jian li guo ji xin zhi xu de ji dian si suo). Nankai Journal, (3), 14–19, 45. 26. Kennedy, P. (1989). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (p. 538). Beijing: Economic Press China. 27. Gilpin, R. (1994). War and Change in World Politics. Beijing: Chinese People’s Publishing House. 28. Hu, A. G., & Men, H. H. (2002). Comparison between tangible strategic resources of China, the U.S., India, Japan and Russia-additionally on China’s grand strategy to enrich the nation and strengthen the people (zhong mei yin ri e you xing zhan lue zi yuan bi jiao: jian lu zhi zai fu guo qiang min de zhong guo da zhan lue). Strategy and Management, (2), 26–42. 29. Wang, S. Z. (Ed.). (1996). History of International Relations (guo ji guan xi shi) (Part IX). Beijing: World Knowledge Press, pp. 41–75. 30. Wang, T. D. (2003). On East Asian new regionalism (lun dong ya xin di qu zhu yi). Journal of contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, (1), 52–58. 31. Lu, P. Y. (2002). Industrial structural change and the reshaping of world order: The world order in the perspective of historical materialism (chan ye jie gou bian qian yu shi jie zhi xu chong jian: li shi wei wu zhu yi shi ye zhong de shi jie zhi xu). China Social Sciences, (3), 4–13. 32. Keohane, R. (2001). Governance in a partially globalized world. American Political Science Review, pp. 1–13. 33. Buzan, B. (2000). World orders: old and new”, collected papers of history studies, (1), 1–12. 34. Keohane, R. (1995). Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society. In H.-H. Holm & G. Sørensen (Eds.), Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (pp. 165–186). Boulder: Westview Press. 35. Keohane, R. Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society, pp. 165–186. 36. Yu, Z. L. (2010). A tentative analysis on the international strategic environment of China’s new diplomatic policy (shi lun zhong guo wai guo xin zheng de guo ji zhan lue huan jing). International Review, (3), 1–9. 37. Keohane, R. O. (2001). Governance in a partially globalized world. American Political Science Review, pp. 1–13. 38. Men, H. H. (2008). Openness and National Strategic System (kai fang yu guo jia zhan lue ti xi) (pp. 11–22). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 39. Ikenberry, G. J., & Tsuchiyama, J. (2002). Between Balance of Power and Community: the Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2, 69–94. 40. Ikenberry, G. J. The rise of China, power transitions, and the western order (unpublished paper) http://www.princeton.edu/~gji3/Microsoft_Word_-_ikenberry-beijing-paper-January2006-word%20doc.pdf. 41. Qin, Y. Q. (2002). Institutional hegemony and cooperative governance (zhi du ba quan yu he zuo zhi li). Contemporary International Relations, (7), 10–12. 42. Kissinger, H. (1997). Diplomacy (p. 5). Haikou: Hainan Publishing House. 43. Waltz, K. (1964). The Stability of a Bipolar World. Daedalus, 43(3), 881–901. 44. Deutsch and Singer. (1964). Multipolar power systems and international stability. World Politics, 16(3), 390–406. 45. Rosecrane, R. (1966). Bipolarity, multiplicity and the future. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10(3), 314–327.

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46. Yu, Z. L. (2010). On the basic characteristics of current change of international system (lun dang qian guo ji ti xi bian ge de ji ben te zheng). Forum of World Economics and Politics, (6), 1–8. 47. Le, Y. C. (2010). Some perspectives and reflections on the international situation and China’s diplomacy. Foreign Affairs Review, (6), 1–10. 48. Organski, A. F. K. (1958). World Politics (pp. 313–330). New York: Alfred Knopf. 49. Mattern, J. B. (2001). The Power Politics of Identity. European Journal of International Relations, 7(3), 349–397. 50. Liu, J. (2003). International order and its governance mechanism in the age of globalization (quan qiu hua shi dai de guo ji zhi xu ji qi zhi li ji zhi). Social Sciences, (4), 27–33. 51. Yu, K. P. (2004). Globalization and State Sovereignty (quan qiu hua yu guo jia zhu quan). Marxism and Reality, 1, 4–21. 52. Huang, P., & Cui, Z. Y. (Eds.), (2005). China and Globalization: Washington Consensus or Beijing Consensus (zhong guo yu quan qiu hua: hua sheng dun gong shi hai shi bei jing gong shi) (p. 211). Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. 53. Chen, Y. G., & Chen, X. Y. (2006). Experience of Europe and cooperation in East Asia (ou zhou de jing yan yu dong ya de he zuo). World Economics and Politics, (5), 21–25. 54. Hetten, B., & Söderbaum, F. (2000). The theoretical interpretation of the rise of regionalism. World Economics and Politics, (1), 66–71. 55. Gilpin, R. (1994). The Political Economy of International Relations (p. 330). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 56. Li, X. Y. (2006). The formation mechanism of international economic rules (guo ji jing ji gui ze de xing cheng ji zhi). World Economics and Politics, (9), 26–30. 57. Acharya, A. (2002). Regionalism and the emerging world order: sovereignty, autonomy, identity. World Economics and Politics, (2), 63–68. 58. Strange, S. (Ed.). (1995). International Relations Theory Today (p. 154). Pennsylvania University Press. 59. Mansfield, E. D., & Milner, H. V. (1999). The new wave of regionalism. International Organization, 53(3), 589–627. 60. Chiu, M.-W. (2002). Regional trade agreements and reorganization of East Asian international political and economic system. Issues and Studies (Taiwan), 41(6), 81–108. 61. Tsai, X. Y. (2003). Regionalization of Asian economy and trade and Taiwan’s response. Issues and Studies (Taiwan), 42(2), 23–49. 62. Frankel, J. A. (Ed.). The Regionalization of the World Economy (pp. 189–226). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (esp). 63. Acharya, A. (2004). Building a Security Community: ASEAN and Regional Orders (p. 73). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 64. Schulz, M., et al, (Eds). (2001). Regionalization in a Globalizing World (p. 5). Zed Book Ltd. 65. Cox, R. (1986). State, social force and world order. In R. O. Keohane, (Ed) Neorealism and Its Critics (pp. 204–254). Columbia University Press. 66. Wang, X. Y. (2002). On regionalism and its impact on international relations (lun di qu zhu yi ji qi dui guo ji guan xi de ying xiang). Contemporary International Relations, (8), 29–35. 67. Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (2002). Power and Interdependence (p. 9). Beijing: Peking University Press. 68. Cai, T. (2002). Globalism and Nationalism (quan qiu zhu yi yu guo jia zhu yi), China Social Sciences, (3), 16–27. 69. Schoot, J. J. (1991). Trading Blocs and the World Trading System. The World Economy, 14(1), 1–17. 70. Acharya, A. (2000). Regionalism and the Emerging World Order: Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity. World Economics and Politics, 2, 63–69. 71. Mansfield, E. D., & Milner, H. (Eds.). (1997). The Political Economy of Regionalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

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72. Kahler, M. (2007). Looking at Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific Region from a Comparative Perspective. In Wang Zhengyi, Miles Kahler, & Seiichiro Takagi (Eds.), Political and Economic Analysis of Regional Cooperation in Asia: Institutional Construction, Security Cooperation, and Economic Growth (ya zhou qu yu he zuo de zheng zhi jing ji fen xi: zhi du jian she, an quan he zuo yu jing ji zeng zhang) (p. 88). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 73. Tian, S. H. (2000). Economic globalization and regional economic integration. (jing ji quan qiu hua yu di qu jing ji yi ti hua). Shanghai Journal of Economics, (4), 46–50. 74. Nye, J. (1971). Peace in Part Integration and Conflict in Regional Economy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 75. Li, Y. P. (2004). Post-cold war relations between China and Southeast Asian countries in the perspective of regionalism (cong di qu zhu yi kan leng zhan hou zhong guo yu dong nan ya guo jia de guan xi). Journal of Xiamen University (Arts and Social Sciences), (5), 64–70. 76. Oman, C. (1994). Globalization and Regionalization: The Challenge for Development (pp. 11– 24). Paris: OECD. 77. Hetnne, B., Innotai, A., et al. (Eds.). (1999). Globalism and the New Regionalism (pp. 7–10). Basingstoke: Macmillan. 78. Wang, X. Y. (2004). New regionalism–building a bridge between states and globalization (xin di qu zhu yi: zai guo jia yu quan qiu hua zhi jian jia qi qiao liang). World Economics and Politics, (1), 36–40. 79. Huang, R. W. (2002). New security concept and the cooperation mechanism in east asia (xin an quan guan yu dong ya he zuo ji zhi), World Economy Study, 2002 supplement, pp. 24–29. 80. Qin, Y. Q. (Ed.). (2007). World Politics–Views from China: International Order (zhong guo xue zhe kan shi jie: guo ji zhi xu juan) (p. 20). Beijing: New World Press. 81. Ruan, Z. Z. (2006). Analysis of common interests and the stability of international order (shi xi gong you li yi yu guo ji zhu xu de wen ding). International Studies, (6), 41–46. 82. Qi, H. G. (2011). Building the Future of East Asia: the Balance of China-US System and the Transformation of the East Asian System (gou zhu dong ya wei lai: zhong mei zhi du jun shi yu dong ya ti xi zhuan xing) (p. 203). Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. 83. Ruan, Z. Z. (2007). The Rise of China and the Transformation of East Asian International Order: The Shaping and Expansion of Common Interests (zhong guo jue qi yu dong ya guo ji zhi xu de zhuan xing: gong you li yi de su zao yu tuo zhan) (p. 108). Beijing: Peking University Press. 84. Matthews, J C. III. (1996). Current gains and future outcomes: When cumulative relative gains matter. International Security, 21(1), 112–146. 85. Buchanan, J. (2009). The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (pp. 77–78). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 86. Nye, J. S., Jr. (2008). Recovering american leadership. Survival, 50(1), 64–65. 87. Kindleberger, C. P. (1988). The International economic order: Essays on Financial Crisis and International Public Goods (pp. 121–124). Cambridge: MIT Press. 88. Fan, Y. M. (2010). From international public goods to regional public goods–a new growth point in the theoretical study of international relations (cong guo ji gong gong chan pin dao qu yu xing gong gong chan pin: guo ji guan xi li lun yan jiu de xin zeng zhang dian). World economics and politics, (1), 143–152. 89. Wang, Y. Z. (2011). Regional public goods supply and transcendence of the leadership problem in East Asian cooperation (qu yu gong gong chan pin gong ji yu dong ya he zuo zhu dao quan wen ti de chao yue). Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, (6), 75–94. 90. APEC. (1994). Achieving the APEC Vision: Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific. (Second Report of the Eminent Persons Group). Singapore: Secretariat, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. 91. Acharya, A. (1997). Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the ASEAN way to the Asia-pacific way? Pacific Review, 10(3), 319–346. 92. Kahler, M. (1997). Looking at regionalism in the Asia-pacific region from a comparative perspective. World Economics and Politics, (6), 15–19.

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93. Men, H. H. (2008). Northeast Asia’s security dilemma and its strategic response (dong bei ya an quan kun jing ji qi zhan lue ying dui). Contemporary International Relations, (8), 16–22. 94. Evans, G. (1994). Cooperative security and intrastate conflict. Foreign Policy, (96), 3–20. 95. Aoki, M. (2011, November 20). Asian economic integration in progress: Institutional changes in the flying geese pattern. http://www.rieti.go.jp/cn/events/02042201/report2.html. 96. Lake, D. (2001). Beyond anarchy: The importance of security institutions. International Security, 26(1), 129–160. 97. North, D. (1994). Structure and Change in Economic History (pp. 226–227). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 98. Qin, Y. Q., & Zhu, L. Q. (2005). New internationalism and China’s diplomacy (xin guo ji zhu yi yu zhong guo wai jiao). Foreign Affairs Review, (5), 21–27.

Chapter 3

Historical Legacy of East Asian Order

China is the mother and main body of East Asian civilization. —J. K. Fairbank [1]. It is the nature of things to be of unequal quality; If you reduce them all to the same standard, that must throw the kingdom into confusion. — Mencius (Teng Wen Gong I (meng zi: teng wen gong)).

Since ancient times, human beings have always been in pursuit of order construction. International orders, global or regional, often contain profound and even heavy historical legacy, with a “time-lag” to some extent. Therefore, the study of East Asian order should start from reviewing the historical legacy to visualize its process and identify its historical logic. Overall, East Asian history is not only about the relations between China and its neighbors, but also about how East Asia engages the West. The historical legacy and the construction of a modern East Asian order are closely related to these two factors. The history of East Asia is bound up with ancient Chinese civilization. It is the cultural, religious, political and economic exchanges between China and its neighbors that have ushered this region into an age of civilization, and contributed to the formation of the tributary system with culture and trade at the core.1 Before Western Europe’s commercial capitalism infiltrated into the borderland of Southeast Asia, China boasted an unassailable advantage in East Asia. This situation changed dramatically in the nineteenth century. Back then, the modern West characterized by world trade, industry, Christianity, and Science & Technology civilization formed the first real world system, while East Asia featuring agriculture and Confucianism was rapidly declining. Ocean trade, global market and emerging industries upset the balance of the pre-modern, regional worlds, involving the world, from the West to the East, into a movement of big trade, mass production and great 1 Historian André Gunder Frank points out, “East Asia has experienced four historical periods dom-

inated by different modes of interaction: material and cultural interaction before the third century, institutional interaction from the 3rd to ninth centuries, ideological and cultural interaction from the ninth to fourteenth centuries, and multi-faceted interaction oriented by political and economic interaction after the fourteenth century. On this basis, a China-led tributary system was finally formed by the Ming and Qing dynasties.” See Frank [7]. © Shanghai People’s Publishing House and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Men, Order of East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4654-9_3

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transformation.2 In the last few decades of thenineteenth century, the subordinate status of East Asia in the structure of the Europe-centered world system fundamentally changed the East Asian regional system.3 East Asia was forcibly included in a world system with the West at the core, and the China-led tributary order collapsed. Faced with Western invasion, China and Japan have chosen two different roads to modernization. China continued its traditional closed-door policy, falling into the abyss of decay step by step; while Japan chose to build a new nation through Meiji Restoration, and became a proactive invader against China by adopting the logic of Western colonialism, which was a fatal blow to the tributary order. At the turn of the twentieth century, East Asia was invaded alternatively by Western powers. Among them, the UK and Tsarist Russia were the most advantageous, followed by Germany, France and Italy, and the emerging Japan and the US were also ready for taking a share. In the face of the East Asian change, as a rising power that was unable to gain dominance yet but unwilling to miss the opportunity, the US proposed the Open Door policy in order to leave room for the future. Due to the infiltration of multiple Western countries, open regionalism has become a lasting feature of East Asia with the Open Door policy imprinted on East Asian history as a permanent mark. Since then, the US–Japan contradictions have gradually become the core issue among the powers in their fight for the leadership in East Asia. In the 1930s and early 1940s, Japan capitalized on its advantage in East Asia to create the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, plotting to establish its regional hegemony through military coercion and forcing other major powers to integrate into its hegemonic model.4 The Japan–US conflicts culminated in the Pacific War and ended up with Japan’s humiliating failure. The above China-led tributary system, the USled Open Door policy, and the Japan-led Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere are three traditional East Asian orders, which are regarded as the typical “strong regionalism”.5 World War II completely shattered the order of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the US once again became the leader in East Asian affairs. East Asia has become the frontline of the Cold War and been divided into different camps due to the contradictions between the US and the USSR. It was difficult to establish a region-wide order that encompasses politics, economy, trade, security and culture, etc. The hedging of powers has contributed to the regional orders in different areas of East Asia, typically the US-led hegemonic security order, the Japan-led flying geese economic order, and the ASEAN-led sub-regional community political order. Specifically, as the construction of the East Asian order was eclipsed by the Cold War,6 the confrontation of the US against the USSR and China shaped the basic security pattern of East Asia during the Cold War. The US built the hub-spoke system with bilateral security alliances as the core to guide the security situation in East 2 Luo

[8]. et al. [9]. 4 Kindermann [10]. 5 Palmer [11]. 6 Kang [12]. 3 Arrighi

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Asia. Despite several evolutions of the US-led security order, the basic pattern has so far not changed fundamentally. After the 1960s, with its economic rise, Japan further drove the building of a self-centered regional economic order. And then the flying geese economic model with Japan at the head, China at the tail, and the Four Dragons and ASEAN as the body took shape in the 1980–90s, showcasing Japan’s economic strength and technological advantages. At the same time, after years of arduous exploration since its founding in 1967, and adhering to the consensus-based progressive principle, ASEAN has gradually established a community-style political order in Southeast Asia, a region rife with different political systems, uneven economic development, and diverse religions and cultures. The Japan-led flying geese economic order and the ASEAN-led sub-regional community order, both of which were developed under the dual impact of the Cold War and the American hegemony, not only reflected the efforts of East Asian countries to independently explore the construction of a regional order, but also unveiled the limitations of such exploration. The above three orders focus on different areas. None of the US, Japan and ASEAN has successfully created a holistic regional order dominated by itself yet because they have no internal and external conditions in place. After the Cold War, the East Asian order entered a new dynamic period with the rise of China and the increase of the overall strength and influence of East Asia. Whereas the previous exploration by the US and Japan was carried out when China was weak,7 China’s rise and its efforts to integrate into and promote regional integration indicate an imminent new landscape. It is true that no order can be developed in a vacuum. The aforementioned heritage of six orders will inevitably pose an important impact on the present and future East Asian order.

3.1 China and the Tributary Order Prior to modern times, the East Asian tributary order from the Han dynasty to the late Qing dynasty was “the most complete” of all the large and small regional orders ever appeared in the ancient world.8 Historically, China boasts a time-honored civilization traced back to 5000 years ago and has been a world leader in science and technology for over a millennium. It has been recorded the highest GNP worldwide until the early nineteenth century. Due to such a self-contained civilization, China has formed an imperial system of its own in East Asia, developing a Confucian social and political order reflective of a pattern of unified world that “everywhere under the sky is the king’s dominion; to the uttermost ends of the earth all men are his servants”.9 This is the so-called tributary system, the rule-of-etiquette system, the Chinese-foreign system, or known 7 Kim

[13]. [14]. 9 The Classic of Poetry: Minor odes of the kingdom—Decade of Bei Shan (shi jing: xiao ya—bei shan). 8 He

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as the “Pax Sinitica”.10 This pattern of unification constituted the tributary order, “a concentric hierarchical world system”.11 As an important form of the ancient order in East Asia,12 the tributary order regards Chinese culture as the only rule to regulate the existence of reality, advocating that the Chinese emperor governs and civilizes the whole world, i.e. the imperial China on top of barbarian nations.13 The neighboring countries regularly sent envoys to pay tribute to Chinese emperors and acknowledge the supremacy of the empire. China would grant gold & silver seals and tallies to heads of the countries that accepted its imperial mandates, conferring the title of King,14 and provide them with political recognition, preferential trade and cultural guidance. What this tributary system advocated was that the foreign countries should submit themselves to the rule of the Chinese Empire and pay tribute despite a trek over mountains and rivers; while the Great Kingdom would treat all tributaries equally and guide them to learn etiquettes and civilization. Undoubtedly, this was the conceptual principle and ideal framework that Confucianism could construct in dealing with the Chinese Empire’s foreign relations. What this framework wanted to attain was that foreign countries should operate and progress around the Chinese Empire like a myriad of stars surrounding the moon and sunflowers facing the sun. Under this centripetal and vertical system, all nations could share the blessing of peace thanks to the Chinese model of international peace.15 So to speak, the tributary order is designed with soft power as spear and hard power as shield. It not only represents an external relation that reflects national interests, though more of tributaries’ submission and respect to China, but is also a complementary international order in terms of diplomacy and trade. Moreover, it takes the shape of the cultural universalism. Therefore, it is a holistic order model that combines political, cultural, economic & trade and even security relations. The tributary order is built on China’s regional superiority, yet originated from the country’s doctrine of kingcraft and political practice. As John Fairbank points out, “Their superiority was not one of mere material power but of culture. Such things as the Chinese written language and the Confucian code of conduct were signs of this culture and so great was their virtue, so overwhelming the achievements of the 10 Kurth

and Cronin [15]. [16]. 12 Huang Chih-Lien points out, “Before the nineteenth century, or prior to the rise of Western culture, Western countries, and Western colonial imperialism, there was a prominent regional order that centered on the Chinese feudal dynasty (the so-called ‘Tianchao’), with etiquette, righteousness, rule of etiquette, and ritualism as the ways of operation and that played a role in maintaining and stabilizing bilateral and multilateral relations between China and its neighboring countries (regions) and among neighboring countries, so it was called the Tianchao Ritural System.” See Huang [17]; The Etiquette World of East Asia: The Morphology of the Relationship between Chinese Feudal Dynasty and Korean Peninsula (dong ya de li yi shi jie: zhong guo feng jian wang chao yu chao xian ban dao guan xi xing tai lun). Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1992. 13 Mencius said, “I have heard of men using the doctrines of the Central Plain to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians.” 14 Yoshinobu [18]. 15 He [14]. 11 Fairbank

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Middle Kingdom in art and letters and the art of living, that no barbarian could long resist them. Gradually but invariably the barbarian in contact with China tended to become Chinese, by this most flattering act reinforcing the Chinese conviction of superiority.”16 The surrounding nations revered Chinese culture, “admiring its prevailing custom and yearning for the annual largess it awarded”.17 The Confucianismoriented Chinese classical civilization radiated and spread all over the surrounding nationalities as the core of East Asian civilization, rendering Confucianism into a dominant cultural concept in most Northeast Asian countries for quite a long time.18 With respect for the existence of other ethnic groups, China has gradually built an international cultural circle that affected the entire East Asia and also “sinicized” vast areas of Southeast Asia.19 The tributary order is derived from the traditional doctrine of kingcraft that a country is governed by virtue to maintain peaceful borders. As a natural extension of the ethical political order of China, it implied an inclusive concept of Tianxia or “All under Heaven” beyond the national and ethnic boundaries. In practice, the concept of tributary order came from the Jifu system of Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties. According to the Rites of Zhou: Offices of Spring, “Paying respect in spring is called Chao”; and the Book of Documents: Yu Gong starts with: “Yu divided the boundaries of nine provinces naturally by mountains and rivers and made tributary policies for each based on the land.”20 The Jifu system not only represents inter-state relations in ancient China but is also an enfeoffment system. In the essence, the suburbs of the capital and strategic lands are directly ruled by the emperor, and the rest of the kingdom are delegated to feudal lords who are conferred with different titles according to the geographic position and affinity to develop a hierarchy with different ranks of nobility and status.21 Behind the Jifu system is the universal concept of Chinese and Foreign races that are discriminated mainly based on the culture rather than blood lineage, that is, “To be Chinese or Barbarian is all about the Way it follows regardless of location and race; just as stated in The Spring and Autumn Annals, the Chinese adopting the barbarian rites become Barbarian while the barbarians sinicized are Chinese.”22 This Chinese-foreign ideology was inherited through successive dynasties and embodied in practice as the very establishment of the tributary system and the tributary order. Tribute is both a symbol of political subordination and a special form of taxation or exchange economically.23 Just like a saying goes, “Grant them with big rewards no matter how much they pay tribute, and confer noble titles on them while exempting them from mumbo-jumbo.”24 For this 16 Fairbank

[19]. [20]. 18 Yu [21]. 19 Soon [22]. 20 Tribute “refers to the special local products offered by the ruled to the ruler”. See Comments on the Book of Documents (shang shu zheng yi) (Part VI). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1980. 21 Xue [23]. 22 See Chen [24]. 23 Ma et al. [25]. 24 Toqto’a et al. [26]. 17 Ma

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reason, “China” in history is a loosely defined entity, a notion of a universal kingdom and a concept irrelevant to sovereignty or border.25 So John Fairbank pointed out that China’s tributary system was a world system rather than an international system or an interstate system.26 The tributary order can be traced back to the establishment of the dominant position of the Chinese ancestors in the Central Plain region and the implementation of the Jifu system during the pre-Qin period. Then, in the Qin and Han dynasties when the Co-System of counties coexisting with kingdoms was implemented, China became a stable ethnic group and started to build the tributary order that Chinese emperors conferred titles of nobility upon submissive leaders of tributary countries by bringing most of East Asia under its unified rule through the extension of the cosystem. Afterwards, under the influence of Confucianism, it has gradually become a consensus during the exchange of China with other East Asian countries to give more and take less cherishing men from afar and to bring peace and stability to the country with the small states submissive to the great power. The Sui and Tang dynasties represent a crucial period for the development of the tributary order. The Tang, in particular, bears the salient feature of a world empire. At that time, China was powerful and magnificent with a brilliant civilization that was highly developed and had a strong influence over and appeal to countries near and far. It ascended to the peak of unprecedented prosperity in the feudal society and became the center of Asian civilization.27 It was also during that period that the tributary order was established in a more formal sense and innovated with the establishment of the Jimi system and the expansion of the Patriarchal-Vassal System. Emperors in Tang set up Jimi Prefectures in the surrounding barbarian lands at large and appointed local minority rulers as military or political governors that could be hereditary by approval of the central government and enjoying a high degree of autonomy in land, army, and taxation under the supervision of Commander-in-chief in border states and civil officials, while being obliged to fulfill the duties including sending hostage, paying homage and tributes, defending borders and going on crusade, etc. Moreover, the Tang dynasty adopted an inclusive and rational attitude towards neighbors. A great example was it acknowledged the independence of Silla, merely receiving tributes without interference with its internal affairs, which could be regarded as the extension of the Patriarchal-Vassal System. In this way, Tang incorporated the entire East Asia but Japan into its unified rule, and became a great empire dominant across the East Asian continent. To be specific, its mainland was the habitation of ethnic Han where the prefecture system was implemented; outward, the first ring was made of the six Protectorates of An’dong, An’nan, An’bei, Chanyu, An’xi and Beiting; the second ring, the national regimes with higher autonomy, such as Turks, Uighurs, Tubo, Nanzhao and Parhae; the third ring, such partially dependent states as Silla and Linyi; and the fourth ring, the sovereign countries supposed to pay tributes nominally, such as Abbasside Caliphate and Japan. 25 Luo

[27], Hsu [28]. [29], “Preface”. 27 He [14]. 26 Fairbank

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The surrounding ethnic groups and countries have followed the regime of Tang to establish similar forms of government, tributary systems, legal ideology and systems. They all relied on intensive farming as the economic basis with ubiquitous adoption of chopsticks and rice. Confucianism was the official ideology, Buddhism was popular, and literary works and academic writings were all in Chinese. The cultural circle of East Asia was thus formed formally.28 Annual tribute became a proper noun in the very Tang dynasty. Ouyang Xiu once commented: “However grand is Tang! All lands underneath the sky, at home and abroad, are its subordinate states and prefectures, so that its ruler is addressed respectfully as ‘Tengri Khaghan’. There has been no such thing since the reigns of emperors Yao, Shun and Yu.”29 It may well be said that the situation of “China pilgrimaged by all” in Tang dynasty has thrust the East Asian order into a stable, harmonious and prosperous period. After the Tang dynasty, the Central Plain regime was repeatedly invaded by the nomadic peoples such as the northern Khitan, Jurchen and Mongolia that challenged the ruling of the imperial court over East Asia through the Jimi system. Whereas the Song dynasty expanded the influence of the tributary order in Southeast Asia by opening up maritime trade routes, the Yuan dynasty went the other way around that it conquered Eurasia by force, carried out centralized administration through the Province System, and established a huge empire across Europe and Asia. However, this move, a total denial of the traditional concept of Chinese and Foreign, is obviously not in line with the Chinese ideals and traditions. And for the Ming dynasty, founder Zhu Yuanzhang overthrew the Yuan under the name of “expelling the Mongols to restore the Han Chinese rule”. After coming to power, he gave explicit instructions to his liegemen that “towards foreign countries overseas,… those that are no threat to China must not be assailed arbitrarily” and put many countries on the not-tobe-conquered list, including North Korea, Japan, Ryukyu, An’nan, Chenla, Siam, Champa, Sumatra, Pandya, Java, Pahang, Battak, Samboja and Burni and so on.30 As such, the Ming dynasty restored the Chinese reign and the traditional construction of the tributary order ushering a golden age for this system. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, the East Asian order became more systematic with both a distinct framework and ever-improving contents in place.31 Nations secondary to China in East Asia were recognized and asked only to fulfill two obligations, i.e. accepting appointment and paying tributes. Moreover, paying annual tributes often evolved into a disguised trade privilege extremely in favor of the tributary countries to entice them to acknowledge their subordination voluntarily. In this way, it enabled the Chinese to take into account not only the political philosophy of great unification but also the political reality that China cannot bring the East Asia under an integrated domination, finally striking a balance in-between.32 Emperor Yongle of Ming made outstanding contributions to the development of the tributary order. During his reign, 28 Yang

[30]. et al. [31]. 30 Precepts of Emperor Chengzu to Descendants (huang ming zu xun). 31 Ouyang [32], He [14]. 32 Yang [30]. 29 Ouyang

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the Northeast and Southeast Asia were incorporated to the tributary order, including the people and countries along the coastline from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean as part of efforts of the Seven Voyages of Zheng He.33 He did not interfere in the internal affairs of these countries or occupy an inch of their land, but instead leveraged the impact of Ming as a great power to play a significantly positive role in regulating their conflicts and disputes, drawing them closer to him to a certain extent.34 The East Asian tributary system was perfected progressively in Ming and Qing. According to the Code of the Great Ming Dynasty, the tributary states were categorized as follows: Southeastern Foreign States (I) including 18 countries like North Korea, Japan, Ryukyu, An’nan, Chenla, Siam, Champa and Java; Southeastern Foreign States (II) including 44 countries like Saltanah Sulu, Malaka and Ceylon; Northern Foreign States including 8 Tartarian tribes; Northeastern Foreign States including 2 clans of Jurchen; Western Foreign States (I) covering 58 countries with the 38 western regions beyond Lanzhou included; and Western Foreign States (II) including 14 Tubo regimes.35 This system culminated under the reign of Emperor Qianlong in Qing dynasty to evolve into a world order unprecedented in scale, extending to the Pamirs in the west and the Himalayas, Myanmar, Siam (now Thailand), Laos, An’nan (now Vietnam) and the South China Sea Islands in the south.36 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Continental Europe officially formed a regional order characteristic of sovereignty, international law and balance of power, and strived to colonize Asia. From the early sixteenth century, the Western colonial forces have continued to advance eastward, starting from gnawing away the periphery zone under the tributary order and gradually pushing their way to the Chinese coasts. During the mid-nineteenth century, the Western colonists launched two opium wars, striking a direct blow to the Qing Empire, the very hub of the tributary order, and leading to the kingdom’s fall into a semi-colony as well as the collapse of the tributary order. In the second half of the nineteenth century, China was gradually descending into a semi-colony as the Western powers began to carve out their spheres of influence within China’s territory. Yet in the same period, Japan took the lead of aggression against China shortly after the Meiji Restoration. It annexed Ryukyu in 1871, invaded Taiwan in 1874, started the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, and then forced the royal court of Qing to recognize North Korea’s independence in the next year. With the loss of the last member state, the tributary system that exists for nearly two thousand years has finally come to an end.37 Since then, the East Asian tributary order has been replaced by the colonial one. According to Japanese scholar Takeshi Hamashita, the tributary order is the major model of international relations in East Asia, and “The China-centric tributary relationship closely related to the entire Asia is the only historical system in and only in Asia. Only from this perspective and with a lot of researches can we deduce the inner 33 He

[14]. [33]. 35 Hamashita [34]. 36 Liu [35]. 37 He [14]. 34 Chen

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connection of Asian history.”38 The basic features of this order include: China does not interfere in the internal affairs of the tributary states; it engages with them on a principle of giving more and taking less; and it safeguards their national security.39 The tributary system has provided regional public goods as follows: the “worldwide” security provided by China, enabling most internal disputes among different regions to be solved without resorting to force; a special “zero tariff” trade protected by it, which has provided business opportunities for the outside world; and a system of cultural and trade exchanges, especially the preferential trade system between China and the dependent countries that was more lucrative for the weak.40 Undoubtedly, the tributary order represents a hegemonic order featured with an inequality of China in center superior to vassal states and it is an institutionalized form of the hierarchical relationship.41 But it is not mandatory nor built on the basis of power politics or territorial expansion.42 “Despite of a relationship of the ruler versus the ruled, the imperial China as suzerain does not interfere with the internal affairs of the vassal states in principle”.43 Its inequality mainly lies in the tributespecific eulogy and sophisticated rites nominally rather than practical deeds. Wang Tieya pointed out, “The role of this system is mainly, for the emperor, to maintain the security and inviolability of China as a ‘central state’. As to the tributary states, they benefit more. By nomination, the heads become rightful rulers with increased authority in front of their subjects. They are under the umbrella of the empire to defend foreign aggression and can also request assistance in the event of a natural disaster. They receive generous gifts from the emperor in return for the tribute paid, and more importantly, they are allowed to trade favorably with China. Shortly put, the tributary system offers actual economic values for the tributaries while serves as a means of governance for China”.44 As John Fairbank points out that the tributary system serves as an organization handling trade and diplomatic relations and also a religious ritual that alleges the universalism of the Confucian order. “Neither ‘internation’ nor even ‘inter-state’ is appropriate to define this relationship. We would rather call it China’s world order.”45 The construction and maintenance of the tributary order explicitly indicates that “China does not impose on its civilization such aggressive missions as to civilize other parts of the world.”46 As a rich historical legacy, the tributary system provides a historical and modern theoretical basis for the future international cooperation in 38 Hamashita

[36]. [14]. 40 Yao Zhongqiu (aka Qiufeng), “The ‘Soft Power’ behind the Rise of Great Powers” (da guo jue qi de ‘ruan li liang’), twenty-first Century Business Herald, July 10, 2006, Sect. 4; Katzenstein [37]. 41 Rozman [38]. 42 Shambaugh [39]. 43 Seizaburo, Political History of Japan (Part I), Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, pp. 7–8. 44 Tieya [40]. 45 Tao [41]. 46 Mancall [42]. 39 He

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East Asia. Eliminating the unequal tributary and patriarchal relation, it offers many historical traditions that should be inherited, such as the equality and reciprocity in economics and trade, the harmony and affinity between nations, and efforts to resolve disputes without military forces.47 The biggest revelation of the tributary order is that to be accepted, respected and even followed, the great powers must not be simply dependent on strength but commit themselves to the pursuit of moral goals based on common interests.

3.2 The US and the Open Door Order After the collapse of the tributary order, the East Asian order experienced a vacuum and great turmoil, with major powers fighting for colonial interests in East Asia in turn,48 especially the Open Door policy proposed by the United States. The United States is a newcomer among the Western powers. The rising process of the US began with the founding of the country. The American Civil War further removed the obstacles for the development of capitalism, and the technology revolution promoted its productivity and social development. It was in this era of little attention that the US was experiencing dramatic changes.49 From 1860 to 1890, its industrial output increased by nine times, far ahead of the United Kingdom, making it the largest manufacturing power in the world. Its industrial output had accounted for 30% of the world’s total by 1900, and 35% by 1907. In terms of almost every important industrial statistics, the US has obviously become the greatest power in the world.50 Rise is necessarily accompanied by market expansion. The US was faced with a world that had already been divided up by other colonial powers. To seize colonies, it was unavoidable to have sharp conflicts with the colonizer and the colonized. However, the US tried to grab overseas interests primarily by promoting free trade and indirectly controlling key markets instead of using the traditional approach to colonization. The US began to engage with East Asia through foreign trade, and it was a general strategy of the US in the mid to late nineteenth century to grab interests from East Asia in the name of “participation of interests” by following the UK, France and other colonialist powers. Of course, the US occasionally played a leading role to expand its sphere of influence in the Far East, for example, it forced Japan to open the nation in 1953. Since then, especially after the end of its Civil War, the US has emphasized the strategic significance of the Pacific region, setting expansion into Pacific and Far East as its consistent strategic goal. Through the AmericanSpanish War of 1898, a milestone in the history of American hegemony, the US not only showed its determination to maintain the American System, but also gained 47 Yang

[43]. [44]. 49 Boorstin [45]. 50 Zakaria [46]. 48 Xiong

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a springboard for expansion into East Asia, especially China, by occupying the Philippines and capturing Hawaii and Guam. From the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the Far East order experienced a structural transformation, being dominated by the UK, Russia, the US and Japan instead of only the UK and Russia previously. At that time, Asia had been reduced to a colony and sphere of influence for European powers such as the UK, France, Russia and Germany. The US rarely had its own interests in Asia, and its capital inflow was strongly restrained by these powers. How to open the door of Asia was a strategic focus of the US, while China, the traditional center of Asia which was then in the wave of being divided up, naturally became a top priority of policy considerations for the US. Taiwan was occupied by Japan in 1895. The Northeast China became part of the sphere of influence of Russia in 1896, then Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan became part of that of France, and the Shandong Peninsula of Germany in 1898. China was in danger of being dismembered, and these powers emphasized that they would not allow its sphere of influence to be encroached by any other countries. The situation seriously restricted and even damaged the interests of the US in China. Charles Denby, then US Minister to China, noted that “I have to think of the danger of dividing China to our trade and business… We disapprove the shameless crimes and plunder of other countries against China,”51 and if the US tolerated them and allowed such situation to exacerbate, “we will lose the biggest market in the world.”52 Given this, the US successively issued the so-called Open Door notes on September 6, 1899, July 3, 1900, and October 22, 1900,53 emphasizing the equal access to trade in China, and calling for maintaining the territorial and administrative integrity of China. In September and November 1899, John Hay, then US Secretary of State, ordered the US ambassador to send the same note to the governments of the UK, Germany, Russia, France, Japan and Italy. According to the note, each of these six countries, to the extent that their respective interests or influence was involved, shall meet the following requirements. Firstly, any of its “sphere of interest” in China or any treaty port or vested interest within the concession shall not be interfered in any way. Secondly, China’s current tariff rate shall apply to all goods, regardless of the country of origin, to be transported into all ports (unless free ports) within the above-mentioned “sphere of interest”, and the tax shall be levied by the Chinese government. Thirdly, no higher port taxes shall be imposed on ships of other countries at any ports within such sphere than their own ships, and no higher freight shall not collected for transporting the goods owned by citizens or subjects of other countries through the railways built, controlled or operated within such range than transporting the goods owned by their own citizens in the same distance. The US advocated that the Chinese market should be opened to all countries in the world, and opposed the Western powers to damage its vested rights in China. It required these powers not to implement discrimination treatment on tariffs, port taxes or railway freight within 51 Yan

and Fang [47], Zhou [48]. [49]. 53 Dong [50]. 52 Yang

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their spheres of influence and concessions, and these taxes shall be levied by the Chinese government in accordance with the provisions of specific treaty. Through this note that only required equal access to trade in China and did not involve other privileges, the US aimed to preserve its own strength and get prepared for the future competition and even hegemony. When the Boxer Movement broke out in 1900, the Eight-Power Allied Forces were formed to intervene in China’s internal affairs. On July 3, 1900, John Hay sent the second Open Door note to the powers involved. Specifically, the US government’s policy had always been to seek a solution that could bring lasting peace and security to China. It would take concerted actions with the powers to “provide China with permanent peace and security, maintain China’s territorial and administrative integrity, protect all rights of the friendly nations under the applicable treaties and international law, and uphold the principle of fair and equal trade across the Chinese Empire for all powers in the world”. Next to reaffirming equal opportunities in trade, this note emphasized the necessity to “maintain China’s territorial and administrative integrity”, guarantee various rights of the powers based on the unequal treaties, and extend the coverage of the Open Door policy from the spheres of influence and concessions of the powers in China to the entire China. The first and second Open Door notes were mainly aimed at the colonial powers. When Russia invaded Aihui and other northeast regions of China in 1900, the US issued the third Open Door note on October 22, 1900 to prevent Russia from damaging its rights in Northeast China. From September 6, 1899 to the conclusion of the Nine-Power Treaty in 1922, the US repeatedly emphasized the Open Door principle, and began to target Japan at a later stage. The Open Door policy reflected the conflicts between the US and other powers in Northeast Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the purpose of “solving the issues of relationship and common policies between the US and other powers invading China”.54 Essentially, the Open Door policy was designed by the US to clarify its fundamental interests in East Asia based on its position of strength at that time, prevent the dominance by the UK, Japan or Russia through the balance of power strategy in East Asia, and conceal its scheme to expand commercial interests and influence.55 The Open Door policy was the answer of the US to the threats to its economic and strategic interests,56 expressing its intention to maintain the balance of interests,57 and reflecting the different way of thinking between the US and its European and Asian counterparts in building a regional order. In addition, the Open Door policy also contained the substantial content of safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which objectively played a role in restraining or delaying the imperialist countries’ invasion into China, and containing Russia and Japan’s ambition to carve up China.58 Through the Open Door policy, the US clearly expressed its view on the 54 Dong

[50]. [51]. 56 Zakaria 46. 57 Wang [52]. 58 See Wang [53], Luo [54], Wu [55], Wang and Li [56]. 55 Gilbert

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East Asian order construction, as its first effort to compete for the world’s economic hegemony, indicating that it had developed its own Asian policy independently. The Open Door policy also represented an attempt to create a new East Asian order by the US. Although both the Open Door policy in China and the Closed-Door policy in the Philippines were part of America’s East Asia strategy, historians focus more on the forward-looking Open Door policy and the advanced concepts it contains. In a sense, America’s combination of ideals with realistic interests represents a hegemonic strategic thinking that is different from that of its European counterparts. At the end of the nineteenth century, both the US and Japan focused its diplomacy on expansion in East Asia, eventually making them two great powers in the Pacific region. Before 1905, the US clearly favored Japan in the triangular relationship involving Japan, Russia and the US. However, when the US and Japan, as two imperialist powers emerging roughly at the same time, strategically targeted East Asia and the Pacific, their collision appeared in the wake of the end of the Japan– Russia War.59 The US began to take measures against Japan, marked by its adoption of an immigration law in 1905. Akira Iriye believed that the law was a turning point for the US–Japan relations. After that, Japan decided to expand into the mainland of the Pacific region by giving up the approach to expanding its economic interests through free immigration to the region.60 However, the US was not pleased to see Japan’s expansion in the Asian continent, and further intervened in East Asian affairs. There was much hedging between the two countries in terms of the China affairs, typically as follows. During World War I, Japan sent troops to occupy Jiaozhou Bay and Jiaoji Road, capturing all the rights and interests of Germany in Shandong, China. On January 18, 1915, it proposed the Twenty-One Demands that were aimed to destroy China, “When Western powers were in a life-and-death struggle in Europe, Japan became the dominator of East Asia”.61 On May 11 of the same year, the US issued the same note to China and Japan, stating that “the US government will not recognize any agreement or treaty signed or to be signed by the Chinese and Japanese governments that might impair any treaty rights of the US and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy towards China generally referred to as the Open Door policy.” Japan’s outrageous expansion in China through war gravely threatened the interests of the US in the Far East and China, causing much anxiety to the US. On November 2, 1917, the US and Japan signed the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, according to which the US accepted the status quo of the Japan–China relations as determined by the Twenty-One Demands to recognize Japan’s special interests in China in exchange for its commitment to compliance with the Open Door policy. While conniving Japan’s aggression, this Agreement had restricted Japan’s exclusive occupation of China, which would necessarily strain the US–Japan relations.

59 Shi

[57]. [58]. 61 Rozman [59]. 60 Iriye

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After World War I, the US tried to establish a semi-institutionalized mechanism, somewhere between the League of Nations and the imperialist order in anarchy. It initiated to hold a disarmament conference, resolve the East Asia issues through the Conference of Washington, and sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as part of its effort to establish a world order beyond the League of Nations. Most obviously, it wanted to implement the Open Door policy to create an Open Door order characterized by the opposition to other countries’ hegemony and the pursuit of balance of power. In order to reshape the relationship among the powers in the Far East and Pacific region, and legitimize the Open Door policy, the US initiated to hold the Conference of Washington from November 1921 to February 1922, and adopted the Limitation of Naval Armament (or the Five-Power Treaty) and the Nine-Power Convention. Since then, the US had built a relatively safe balance of power in the Far East, and established a code of conduct based on the principles of international cooperation, major power negotiation, open door, peaceful competition and disarmament. The Nine-Power Convention stipulated, “Respect China’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity; give China the most accessible opportunity to develop and maintain an effective and stable government; leverage the influence of various powers to effectively establish and maintain the principle of equal opportunities to engage in commerce and industry across China; do not take advantage of the current China to seek privileges or special interests while impairing the rights of the people of friendly nations, and do not support actions that are harmful to the safety of friendly nations.” This treaty added some new content to the Open Door policy, which stipulated that “Respect China’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity, and ensure equal opportunities for all powers to engage in commerce and industry across China” over twenty years of evolution. The NinePower Convention was later recognized by many countries, thus turning the principle of “open door and equal opportunity” advocated by the US into a principle of international law temporarily accepted by Western powers. Charles Evans Hughes, then US Secretary of State, said: “We believe that it is due to this convention that the Open Door policy has finally become a reality in China.”62 The Washington system was the result of the competition among great powers for the strategic interests around the East Asian order construction, as well as a temporary arrangement by the colonialist powers to recognize the balance of power.63 The US successfully disrupted the Anglo-Japanese alliance through the Conference of Washington, which enabled the Open Door principle to be re-established in East Asia, temporarily restricted Japan’s foreign aggression and expansion, and created a situation in which “the US, Japan and the UK jointly maintained the order in the Far East”.64 Since then, the US has clearly adopted a containment policy towards Japan,65 62 Wang

[60]. [61]. 64 Iriye and Imperialism [62]. 65 Yoshida [63]. 63 Xiong

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71

while Japan’s pursuit of building a Pan-Asian order was in direct conflict with the US goal of promoting cooperation between China and the developed countries. In such situation, the US would be convinced that Japan intended to terminate all the influence and interests of Western countries in the East. When Japan continued to expand its aggression against China in the 1930s, the US was trying to avoid direct confrontation with Japan although it felt increasingly uncomfortable. For example, on January 7, 1932, the US announced to adopt the Stimson Doctrine, i.e. the doctrine of non-recognition, claiming that “The United States cannot and does not intend to recognize any new development that will harm the treaty rights of the US and its citizens in China, undermine China’s sovereignty and independence or territorial and administrative integrity, or damage the US international policy towards China, known as the Open Door policy.” After the July 7th Incident of 1937, the US began to adopt a new strategy to assist China and sanction Japan. From June 1938 to the end of 1941, the US supported China strongly through loans, leases, training of military personnel, and dispatching volunteers. In the meantime, it gradually tightened restrictions on Japan’s exports, and even frozen Japan’s assets in the US and imposed a total embargo on Japan. Japan was also clearly aware of the life-and-death frictions with the US on the goal towards the East Asian order. In 1938, the Fumimaro Konoe Cabinet publicly stated that the ultimate purpose of the war was to establish a new order that could ensure the permanent peace in East Asia. On November 18, 1938, it addressed a note to the US, announcing that it would stop following the Open Door principle.66 On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at the Pearl Harbor, marking the outbreak of the Pacific War, which was considered by Akira Iriye as a war between Japan and the US on the Open Door order and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere order.67 It implied an unsuccessful attempt of the US to establish the East Asian order through peaceful means such as treaty. The Open Door policy heralded the US concept of international order and “Pax Americana”. In a narrow sense, the policy was the beginning of the US attempt to establish a new order,68 which contributed to the balance of power in East Asia. In a broad sense, the policy advocated multilateral free trade rules around the world, providing the intellectual context for the creation of the US-led global economic and trade order.69 Through its efforts, the US turned the Open Door policy into a reality, contributing to an open and penetrable East Asian order, and laying a solid foundation to expand its influence in East Asia. After that, the strategic goal of the US in East Asia was to establish and maintain balance of power, and to seek and ensure its primacy in the region.

66 FRUS,

Japan 1931–1941, p. 800. [64]. 68 Wang [65]. 69 Jin [66]. 67 Iriye

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3.3 Japan and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere Scheme It has been Japan’s perpetual dream to obtain East Asian hegemony and establish a Japan-led East Asian order, which is delusional yet importunate. Japan was part of the rudimentary tributary order in Han dynasty, and was under such influence for long with embassies to Sui and Tang dynasties as proof of its admiration of the Chinese glamour. During the exchange with China, it has developed the idea of Mikado governing its downsized empire, regarding the national minority and Baekje and Silla as barbarians. On the one hand, Japan expected to establish an equal diplomatic relationship with China; and on the other, it tried to conquer the vassal states of China by force of arms and took the Korean Peninsula as a springboard for invasion of China. As an apt illustration, Toyotomi Hideyoshi tried to establish a new East Asian order centered on Japan after completing the Japanese reunification in 1590. He not only asked the Portuguese regime in Goa, India, the Spanish regime in Manila, the Philippines, Taiwan and other regions to bow down and pay tribute to it, but also sent an envoy in 1587 to North Korea to demand its surrender and dispatched 150,000 troops in 1592 to invade the Korean Peninsula. This aggression attempt was thwarted by the joint strike of China and the North Korea. Following the China-Foreigner concept, Japan proposed a God-Foreigner order and believed that “The Han dynasty had fallen after the establishment of Qing. The original ‘barbarian’ in the far backcountry in the northeast took over the central mainland, so the Qing dynasty was not ‘Chinese’ but ‘barbarian’. The center of this system should be Japan as ‘shinkoku’, the Kingdom of God, with its neighbors being ‘the barbarian’.”70 Based on this ideology, Japan set the regional goal to challenge and replace China’s leadership in the East Asian order, which was clearly demonstrated by the “Overseas Dominance Theory” at the late Shogunate, the “Conquering Korea Theory” in the early Meiji Period and the “Theory of Japan as East-Asian Leader” by Fukuzawa Yukichi, etc. A series of changes happened in the mid-nineteenth century when Japan was frequently invaded by Western powers. In 1868, it started the Meiji Restoration to promote the strategy of leaving Asia and entering the group of the European countries to develop into a prosperous country with powerful army. Shortly after, Japan proposed the expansion thought of “sovereignty line and interest line”, claiming “what has lost in the West shall be made up in the East”. It began to seize East Asian colonies, plunder resources of those countries, and challenge the Western aggressors in the name of East Asian leader. It carried out Asian Monroeism under cover of East Asian co-prosperity, bringing huge disasters to countries and people there. As stated by Wang Yi, ambassador to Japan, Japan chose to “leave Asia to join Europe”, deviating from the Asian identity in the first hand; then it aligned with the Western powers to confront Asian countries with military force and power politics; and finally it allied with the fascist states and embarked on an aggressive militarism road of no return.71 70 Historiographical 71 Wang

[69].

Institute [67]. Cited from Li [68].

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73

Starting from Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan pursued a self-centered development model, implemented the national policy of exiting Asia and the national development strategy of strengthening the nation and army, and became the only Asian country to catch up with the industrialized countries of Western Europe after the war. Japan opened its door to the West and adopted plagiarism to build everything based on model countries. For example, “The Japanese Imperial Navy was a replica of the Royal Navy, while the Army was greatly influenced by the French Army; the telegraph and railway were established in accordance with the British systems; the university modeled that of the US; the Meiji Constitution and civil law were based on German prototypes and the criminal law was based on that of France. Thus, the Meiji government became a hodgepodge of countries including the UK, the US, French and Germany… The Japanese then believed the country would get the best out of other countries by adopting the best model in each field.”72 At the same time, Japan emphasized industrial and economic growth, focused on the war industry-centered heavy industry and strongly supported the development of private enterprises with state-run industries as examples. In another word, it introduced the Western military industry and modern capitalist industrial systems at once.73 From 1877 to 1942, the Japanese economy grew at an annual rate of 4%, which could be matched up by none but the US and Sweden.74 Japan developed capitalism when the tributary order centered on China collapsed.75 It followed the western policy of aggression and expansion shortly after the Meiji Restoration. What banged the drum for its aggression were the “Leaving Asia Theory” of Fukuzawa Yukichi and the theory of “line of sovereignty and line of advantage” of Yamagata Aritomo. In 1885, Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote and published Datsu-A Ron (meaning leaving Asia), clearly putting forward the strategic idea of escaping from Asia and entering Europe. He wrote in the editorial that “We’d rather disassociate from Asia to go along with the western civilizations than waiting for the Asian neighbors to develop and working together for the rejuvenation of the continent. We can take a similar way as the West towards China and North Korea regardless of the geographic proximity”.76 The so-called Western way is colonial aggression while leaving Asia is synonymous with seizing or invading Asia. In 1890, Yamagata Aritomo, the then Prime Minister of Japan, published Memorial on Foreign Policy and Policy Address to the First Imperial Diet, declaring that “The independence and security of the nation depend first upon the protection of the line of sovereignty and then the line of advantage. The former is the territory; and the latter are regions closely related to the security of sovereignty…If we wish to maintain the nation’s independence among the powers of the world at the present time, it is not enough

72 Morishima

[70]. [71]. 74 Ahn Choong Yong, Gendai Higashi Ajia Keizai Ron (In the Modern East Asian Economy), Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 14, 15. 75 Xiong [44]. 76 Yukichi [72]. 73 Yu

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to guard only the line of sovereignty; we must also defend the line of advantage.”77 The line of advantage is similar to the sphere of influence proposed by the Western countries at late nineteenth century, yet with the hidden intention of occupation.78 He targeted the Korean Peninsula as the core of the line of advantage,79 and expanded that line after the Sino-Japanese War, advocating Japan to be the “East Asian Leader”. On this basis, lecture on the lines of sovereignty and advantage has become the basic theory of Japan’s outward expansion.80 Besides, the Asianism raised by Japan also shouted for battle cries. In history, it was the Japanese who first proposed the ideas of East Asian regionalism.81 In the midnineteenth century, some Japanese intellectuals took the lead in proposing the idea of “Asian unity”. They believed that Japan, China, and North Korea belonged to the same system of Eastern civilization and were faced with the pressure from Western powers, so that these Asian countries ought to unite to form an Asian alliance fighting against invaders. The arguments on Japanese–Chinese mutual support and Asian alliance became popular temporarily. However, the mainstream Japanese thought soon changed to the theory of escaping from Asia to Europe. The ultimate goal of such move was to defeat the West and establish its supremacy over Asia. As devised by Fukuzawa Yukichi, it identified with the West systematically, then “takes a similar way as the West towards these countries” after catching up, and eventually “rules all over Asia”.82 It can be said that as it fought against Western intruders, Japan was also breeding the idea of invading Asia.83 In The Pan-Asianism published in 1917, Li Dazhao stated that its purpose was “to cover up its imperialism under the mask of the Greater Asianism and to seize the hegemony of the East.”84 Li Dazhao stressed that “the Pan-Asianism is a lingo of annexation of China… All Asian nations take orders from Japan; and Asian issues are all solved by Japan. The Japanese are the leader of Asia, turning this continent into its own stage. By that time, Asia will not belong to the European, the American or the oriental but the Japanese. In this view, the ‘Pan-Asianism’ is not about peace but aggression; it is not democratic selfdetermination but imperialism to annex the weak nations; it is not the democracy of Asia but the militarism of Japan.”85 Sun Yat-sen also warned in a speech in November 1924 in Japan, commenting that Pan-Asianism should be based on the kingcraft and

77 Azusa

[73], Seizaburo [74]. and Yang [75]. 79 So far, Japanese elites still hold this point of view. As Iokibe Makoto points out, “The geographical condition of the Korean Peninsula is like a corridor inserted into Japan towards the mainland, which makes it an eternal ‘line of advantage’ for countries on both sides.” See Makoto [76]. 80 Mi [77], Wan [78]. 81 Zhang [79]. 82 Pastor [80]. 83 Sheng [81]. 84 Collected Works of Li Dazhao (Part I) (li da zhao wen ji, shang), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984, p. 450. 85 Ibid., p. 609, 610. 78 Lin

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the arbitrary Western culture must not be promoted.86 Japan followed the colonial strategy of the Europe and the US to invade East Asian countries while opposing their encroachment on Asia, which would inevitably lead to the expansionary militarism. Japanese scholar Shinobu Seizaburo pointed out, “The problem is that Japan is not willing to rely on Asian alliance to resist the impact of the international system of the West, but determined to be part of the Western system and attempt to dominate Asian countries.”87 The ultimate expression of this goal is the very Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.88 From the late 1970s, Japan began to adopt a strategy of aggressively occupying the legacy of the Chinese Empire by annexing Ryukyu, invading North Korea and starting the Sino-Japanese War to completely shatter the classic tributary order, in an attempt to establish a genuine empire in East Asia.89 Subsequently, Japan planned to expand into Northeast China, and then allied with the UK to launch the Russo-Japanese War. As a result, its status in the East Asian order elevated. In 1906, Yamagata Aritomo pointed out that the Russo-Japanese War “has instantly changed the world situation, with the peace in East Asia actually subject to His Majesty”.90 Due to the SinoJapanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, the hub of the East Asian international system has gradually shifted from China to Japan. Japan began to vigorously build its own self-centric empire system. After the Conference of Washington, Japan was reluctant to be suppressed. From June to July 1927, the Japanese military and political authorities convened the Oriental Conference and mapped out the Political Platform towards China, proclaiming “In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and in order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.” The proposition of separating Northeast China was identified in this meeting. After the September 18 Incident in 1931, Japan quickly invaded this region and concocted the “Manchukuo”. And in September 1932, the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol was signed, which specified the “inseparable relationship between Japan and the Manchukuo state”. The KMT Government adopted a non-resistance policy, while the US did not take any defense measures accordingly despite of its explicit objection, as represented by the “Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition”, to Japan’s military invasion into China. In this 86 The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen (sun zhong shan quan ji) (Part XI). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, p. 409. 87 Seizaburo [82]. 88 In the late 1920s, Japan abandoned the road of coordination with the Western powers. It simply went on its own to pursue its own interests in Asia. As it swayed between revitalizing Asia and invading Asia, it finally chose the transformation of invading Asia in pursuit of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. See Wang [83]. 89 Katzenstein and Shiraishi [84]. 90 Azusa [85].

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regard, Japan spied an opportunity to dominate the East Asian order, and immediately proposed to “better draw on the strength of independent diplomacy to enhance the national fate and carry out the national mission”.91 As such, it confirmed the strategic scheme and initiated the deployment of the Greater East Asia officially. After conquering Manchuria, Japan began to develop a new order called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.92 In 1934, Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota stated that “Japan cannot turn a deaf ear to anyone that takes action of any form against the peace and order in East Asia. Given Japan’s geographical location in East Asia…On the issue of China, we must not ignore the above situations regardless of any third party.”93 In 1936, Hirota Cabinet put forward the Fundamental Principles of National Policy, saying “Diplomacy and internationalism are combined to extend national influence as far as the South Seas while securing a firm diplomatic and defensive position on the East Asiatic Continent… It forms the basic policies for the continent to strive for the economic growth by bringing about the close relationship of Manchukuo, Japan and China; in our national and economic expansion to the South Seas, especially to the outer South Seas area, our influence will be extended gradually and by peaceful means.” Japan launched a full-scale war of aggression against China in the next year. On November 3, 1938, the Japanese Konoe Cabinet released the Second Konoe Statement, in which it put forward that “what is expected is to build a new order to ensure permanent peace in East Asia” and that “this new order should be set under the collaboration of Japan, Manchuria and China by establishing a relationship of mutual support in politics, economy and culture fundamentally”,94 and also required such countries as the UK and the US to “adapt to the new situation in East Asia”.95 On December 22, 1938, Japan published the Third Konoe Statement, which incorporated into this new Asian order the alleged principles of “friendly relations with neighbors, anti-communism and economic cooperation” that in fact referred to requesting China to cease confrontation against Japan and recognize Manchukuo, Japan’s stationing in China, and plundering China’s resources respectively. Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro first proposed the concept of “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” on June 29, 1940. On July 19 of the year, Konoe and Matsuoka Yosuke held a pre-cabinet meeting in Ogikubo in order to discuss the establishment of a new East Asian order. On July 26, then, the Konoe Cabinet released the Basic National Policy Outline, which focused on “the new order of Greater East Asia with the Japanese empire as the core and a strong combination of Japan, Manchukuo and China” and also pointed out that “the priority for building this new order is the completion of the Manchurian Incident”. Next day, the Japanese War Office passed the Treatment Outline for Adapting to the Evolution 91 Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Japan [86]. [87]. 93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [88]. 94 Department of History, Fudan University, Selected Historical Materials of Japanese Imperialist’s Foreign Aggression 1931–1945 (1931–1945 ri ben di guo zhu yi dui wai qin lue shi liao xuan bian), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1983, p. 278, 279. 95 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [89]. 92 Steffensen

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of the World Situation that stressed to “establish self-sufficiency based on Japan, Manchukuo and China and roughly around the ring of the South Pacific region east of India and north of Australia and New Zealand”. On August 1, the Japanese Foreign Minister made a speech and formally proposed “to establish Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed the tripartite pact in Tokyo with the German and Italian governments, stipulating that “Germany and Italy recognize and respect the guiding role of Japan in building this new Asian order”. Subsequently, Japan accelerated the preparations for a full-scale war. In October 1941, Hideki Tojo’s cabinet drafted the Imperial National Policy Implementation Essentials, stating that “in order to break the deadlock now and build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, we are now determined to wage wars against the US, the UK and the Netherlands”. On December 7, 1941, the Pacific War broke out and soon Japan quickly invaded many countries in Southeast Asia. As of May 1942, Japan has controlled an area of 3.86 million km2 , accounting to 7 million km2 in total together with the previously invaded North Korea and China’s enemy-occupied areas, and has created a huge colonial empire with a population of over 500 million from the Aleutian Islands in the north, Australia in the south, and the Indian Ocean in the west, basically meeting its goal to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With a national power of about 2.6–3.8% of global GDP, Japan controlled almost the entire eastern hemisphere for a time. Subsequently, Japan fostered the puppet regime in the colony and plundered the resources of various countries. On February 21, 1942, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conference formulated the decision on How to Use the Imperial Resource Circle. The so-called imperial resource circle means that Japan, Manchuria, China and the Southwest Pacific region strive to expand production for their own needs, with Australia, India and other places serving as supply circles. The goal of expanded production and the Greater East Asian supply relations in the next 15 years were also set in that document. As devised by Japan, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was built to form an organic unity under the authority of Japan and based on “familism”. To this end, Japan has made the zoning plan as follows: China served as Japan’s resource provider with some industries permitted; Manchuria as supplier of agriculture and basic industries; while Southeast Asia as supplier of agricultural and mineral products as well as covering specialties (such as fiber) processing industries.96 In October 1942, the Tojo Cabinet set up the Greater East Asia Province to integrate the regional implementation of political, economic, and cultural affairs. On December 8, 1942, Japan formulated the Basic Program for the Construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, claiming that “the fundamental principle of building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is to establish an order of coexistence and prosperity in common based on the imperial Japan-centered approach”.97 (Table 3.1) On November 5, 1943, the “leaders” of some countries and regions occupied by Japan gathered in Tokyo and held the so-called Greater East Asia Conference in the 96 Zhao 97 Lv

[90]. [91].

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Table 3.1 Changes in total trade volume in Northeast Asia (1876–1940) ($1 million, %) Year

Japan

China

Northeast China

Taiwan, China

North Korea

Northeast Asia in Total

World’s Total

Proportion of Northeast Asia

1876–80

53

210

–

–

1

275

13,070

2.1

1881–85

57

201

–

–

2

272

14,460

1.9

1886–90

91

238

–

–

4

345

14,850

2.3

1891–95

120

254

–

–

5

391

15,760

2.5

1896–00

201

281

–

16

8

507

18,500

2.7

1900–05

314

375

–

21

15

724

22,850

3.2

1906–10

466

505

–

38

26

1035

29,970

3.5

1911–13

669

629

–

59

44

1400

38,240

1914

685

620

–

55

44

1408

–

–

3.7

1916

1087

789

–

89

66

2031

–

–

1918

2122

1311

–

125

163

3721

–

–

1920

2551

1617

–

193

211

4580

65,800

7.0

1922

2053

1328

–

133

226

3739

45,300

8.3

1924

2249

1450

–

162

268

4129

56,828

7.3

1926

2642

1511

–

204

345

4701

62,037

7.6

1928

2532

1553

–

204

363

4652

67,380

6.9

1930

2030

1014

–

202

313

3559

55,552

6.4

1932

1132

524

201

114

178

2149

26,853

8.0

1934

1798

529

340

154

291

3111

23,314

13.3

1936

2211

490

370

197

392

3660

25,723

14.2

1938

2352

347

568

235

552

4052

27,736

14.6

1940

2360

242

564

246

582

3995

–

–

Note China trade statistics from June 1932 to 1940 did not include that of Northeast China; China trade statistics from 1895 to 1940 did not include that of Taiwan Source Satoru [3]

Japanese National Assembly Hall. The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference was passed, claiming to construct a Greater East Asia in accordance with the so-called principles of prosperity in common, friendly relations with neighbors, close cooperation and opening of resources, and stressing that “the countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate towards the prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination and assuring their self-existence and self-defense and in constructing a Greater East Asia”.

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The main purpose of Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere order, which was to be realized through invasive war, was “Pax Japonica” characterized by militarism and colonial rule. However, Japan’s target was beyond East Asia. It was intended to expand its base, launch military confrontation with the West, dominate the Pacific, and seek world hegemony. In a speech on December 26, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek summarized Japan’s construction of the “new East Asian order” as “a general term for overthrowing the international order in East Asia and enslaving China so as to dominate the Pacific Ocean and oppress the world”.98 Japan attempted not only to replace the Chinese empire as the center, but also to conquer China, fight the USSR, expel the UK and the US, and echo Germany and Italy to establish a new world order. But unlike China, Japan is not rightfully positioned to provide such values as civilization standard theoretically, so that it can only mobilize its political and military power and rely on direct colonial rule to maintain its existence. Beside, this concept also lacks economic foundation. In contrast to China that attracts neighboring countries with its own abundant economic power, Japan has plundered its neighbors for resources in order to solve the dilemma of being at the center of the imperial sphere of influence and lack of resources. The co-prosperity advertised in this order can only be achieved by military prowess and will inevitably withdraw from the historical stage with the defeat and collapse of the imperial Japan.99 As pointed out by Gavan McCormack, an Australian expert in Japanese history, the failure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere lied in that Japan did not provide a sense of belonging or an envision of a community for participation to neighboring countries.100 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is a wrong view of community that is regardless of regional property and forcibly enforced against Asian countries.101 Japan ignored the East Asian tradition and polarized the principles of the modern Western world order. In consequence, the international order in East Asia was unstable, the modern international system suffered from constant setbacks, and China–Japan relations have been in an abnormal state for a long time.102 Moreover, the “historical tensions” in East Asia have lasted until today.103

3.4 The US and the Hegemonic Security Order The future of the United States is in Asia,104 and East Asia is at the heart of Asia. East Asia has been the main support point for the American hegemony. Shortly after the end of World War II, the US leveraged its global hegemony to build a US-centered 98 Cited

from Qi and Mei [92]. [93], Hamashita [94]. 100 McCormack [95]. 101 Sakakura [96]. 102 Zhao [97]. 103 Kimihiko [98]. 104 Zakaria [46]. 99 Youngseo

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hub-spoke order in East Asia, thus securing its leadership in East Asian security affairs. In this sense, the US has inextricable links with East Asian countries although it is not located in the region. As a decisive factor to the future of East Asian security, the US plays a key role of lever in the development and prosperity of East Asia. With the collapse of Japan and the European colonial powers after World War II, the US filled in the hegemonic gap and became the new leader in the AsiaPacific region.105 In the early post-war period, the US global strategy was based on the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, while focusing on Europe. Politically, it proposed the Trumanism to contain the USSR; economically, it designed the Marshall Plan aimed at reviving Western Europe; and militarily, it organized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Meanwhile, the US also focused on containing the expansion of communism in Asia. It first tried to ensure its dominance in East Asia by fostering Chiang Kai-shek’s proAmerican administration. With the failure of Chiang, the US shifted its strategic focus from China to Japan, reflecting the major transition of its East Asian policy in the early post-war period, based on which it established a hub-spoke security order in East Asia. During World War II, US President Roosevelt had foreseen that the USSR would become a superpower in the Far East, urging it to support China to counterbalance the USSR’s threat. In the early period after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, the East Asia strategy of the US included two aspects. In terms of Japan, it asked Chiang to continue the Anti-Japanese War in order to curb the Japanese militarism, disintegrate Japan’s colonial territory, and prevent Japan from coming back as a military power after the war. In terms of the USSR, it tried to integrate China into the US-led capitalist camp after World War II to better confront the USSR.106 However, Chiang lost in the KMT-CPC civil war and left the mainland. With the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the vision of the US to support China as its strategic support point in the Far East shattered, and fostering Japan became a strategic priority of the Far East policy of the US. The outbreak of the Korean War incandesced the Cold War, and stimulated the US to quickly establish its East Asia containment strategy mainly targeting China. Because of the Korean War, China became the biggest opponent of the US in East Asia, pushing the US intensify its efforts to contain China. Japan became a key supporter for the US containment strategy during the Cold War, while Southeast Asia was the most important strategic stronghold and an essential military target of the US in the Far East.107 As the only Western country that was able to act in East Asia after World War II, the US started its strategic layout in East Asia with separate occupation of Japan. Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the US National Security Council published the NSC 48/1 and 48/2 documents in December 1949, emphasizing 105 Luo

[8]. [99]. 107 Hu [100]. 106 Zi

3.4 The US and the Hegemonic Security Order

81

that the main strategic interests and war aims of the US were not in Asia. “Currently, our strategic idea is to conduct strategic offense in the West and strategic defense in the East.”108 Based on this understanding, the US proposed the Domino Theory, in an attempt to establish a multilateral security system similar to that of Europe.109 At the same time, it tried to develop special relations with Asian countries through bilateralism, and to establish a strategic ring of encirclement to contain China and the USSR through bilateral military alliances.110 Due to the beginning of the Cold War and the failure of the China policy, the US shifted its Japan policy towards fostering Japan, rather than occupying Japan separately to eliminate its war potential. On September 8, 1951, the US entered into a peace treaty with Japan separately, and signed the US–Japan Security Treaty, indicating the incorporation of Japan into the US containment strategy as a strategic fortress and military base in the Far East to confront the USSR. On February 28, 1952, the US and Japan entered into the US–Japan Administrative Agreement, which stipulated that the US could set up land, marine and air force military bases in Japan without restrictions, and enjoyed the extraterritoriality within and outside these bases. On March 8, 1954, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed between the US and Japan to incorporate Japan into the Far East security mechanism of the US. Since then, the US and Japan formally established a special relationship, which was the result of their common need for national interests. In the context of the Cold War where the USSR and the US competed for hegemony, the US regarded Japan as a new pivot in the Far East as well as its “First Line of Defense” in the East.111 The alliance with Japan enabled the US to carry out activities in the Far East, so the US supported Japan in political, economic, military and other areas. Japan saw the US protective umbrella as the best form of security. More importantly, under the protection of the US, it could avoid direct international disputes and concentrate on economic development. This special relationship between the US and Japan could be established and maintained precisely because it served the national interests and met the strategic needs of both sides, who benefited a lot from the alliance but paid a price as well. The US obtained the privilege to station forces in Japan, enabling it to establish a strategic position to encircle the USSR and China, and gain an edge over the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the US had to be responsible for Japan’s security, and beyond its expectation, it was just creating an economic opponent in the region. With the umbrella of the US, Japan was able to develop its economy rapidly, but the cost was losing its diplomatic autonomy. It had to follow the lead of the US in international affairs, and make greater concessions than the US in all aspects of conflicts. Japan was in a subordinate position in the US–Japan relations. In 1951, the United States was aligned with Australia and New Zealand to form a peripheral barrier for its East Asia strategy. At the foreign ministers’ meeting attended by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, 108 US

Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations 1945–1967, Vol. 8, pp. 22–272. [101]. 110 Ikenberry [102]. 111 Song et al. [103]. 109 Ikenberry

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the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan in Manila in September 1954, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was officially signed, which emphasized that “The contracting parties shall severally and jointly continue to maintain and develop their individual and collective capabilities through sustainable and effective self-assistance and mutual assistance to resist armed attacks and to prevent and oppose subversive activities directed from outside against their territorial integrity and political stability.” Subsequently, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established.112 However, as a military treaty organization, SEATO has neither established a relevant military institution nor set up a joint military command or a joint armed force. Therefore, it has not played any role since the date of its establishment. “It was like a lion when its establishment was announced, but acted like a pure sheep later.”113 Due to this situation, the US had to rethink the possibility of promoting multilateralism in East Asia, and began to adopt a scepticist attitude towards the multilateral actions on East Asian security. The bilateral moves of the US in East Asia started with the US–Japan alliance, primarily for the purpose of containing the USSR and encircling China. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the US accelerated its pace to build a military treaty system focused on bilateral military alliances to encircle the Far East. The US signed an agreement on military assistance with Thailand on October 17, 1950; and signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines on August 30, 1951, leading to the building of approximately 40 military bases in the Philippines. On September 1, 1951, the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) was signed, with which the US acquired a secure strategic rear in the Southwest Pacific. On October 1, 1953, the US and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. On December 2, 1954, the US signed a similar treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek Administration. All these bilateral treaties and the US–Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, together with the multilateral Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, constitute the military alliance system of the US in East Asia that has helped build the US-centric security order in the region.114 By establishing multilateral military alliances and security mechanisms such as NATO, SEATO and CENTO, and by signing bilateral military treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan China, the US has both established a ring of encirclement to contain socialist countries, and rapidly formed a US-led alliance system. This security strategy is not only designed to “curb the expansion of Soviet Communism”, but also has a far-reaching strategic significance in terms of controlling the Eurasian situation and expanding the capitalist system. The establishment of the US military alliance system in East Asia marks the initial formation of the American hegemony in the region.

112 “The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO) established under dominance of the US was not only to cope with China, but also to coordinate the Asia policies of the UK and France.” See Yao [104]. 113 Eden [105]. 114 Mi [106].

3.4 The US and the Hegemonic Security Order

83

From the mid-1950s to the end of the Cold War, the US security layout in East Asia has undergone significant changes, especially in the following three aspects: Firstly, the US–Japan relations evolved from a principal-subordinate alliance to an equal partnership. Since 1952, the US–Japan relations have become an integral part of international politics, but their military cooperation was not developed until the Cold War.115 For Japan, it was the biggest beneficiary of the Cold War pattern thanks to the US–Japan relations. However, Japan was discontented with such alliance in which it was virtually subordinate to the US. This inequality concerning sovereignty always gave Japan a sense of dependency. Therefore, while using the “US–Japan axis” to pursue its own interests, Japan was also trying to make up for the political price it had paid. The revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty in 1960 was an epochmaking event, because the revised treaty removed the provisions stipulating that the US can suppress the civil strife in Japan, which highlighted the reciprocity between Japan and the US. Since then, Japan has gained more diplomatic autonomy, with an increasingly strong desire for independent diplomacy. With Japan rising as the second largest Western economy in the late 1960s, Japan turned into an economic rival to the US from the previous protégé, and the so-called “peer-to-peer crisis” began. After the 1970s, the US–Japan economic conflicts became public, and Japan has accelerated its goal towards independent multilateral diplomacy. After the 1980s, Japan was increasingly aware of becoming a major political power, and showed a clear intention to compete with the US for the leadership in East Asia. Of course, these conflicts and frictions have not led to the disintegration of their alliance. Their common strategy of containing the Communist Party and the USSR required them to bond with each other. Although Japan had done something harmful to the interests of the alliance by taking advantage of the Cold War pattern, the US tolerated it. Undoubtedly, with the changes in the relative strength of the two countries and the collision of fundamental interests, there was less room for them to mitigate the conflicts. Secondly, the China–US relations evolved from confrontation to informal alliance against the USSR. In the 1960s, international relations entered a stage of great divergence and combination. The strength contrast between the US and the USSR has gradually reduced, with increasingly obvious economic competition among the US, Japan and Europe. In particular, the US was stuck in the quagmire of the Vietnam War, causing to the relative decline of its hegemony in the late 1960s and early 1970s. China and the USSR became enemies, and even fought against each other at the Zhenbao Island. In this context, US President Richard Nixon, who came to power in 1969, proposed the Guam Doctrine to encourage Asian countries to deal with national security and military affairs independently. The Guam Doctrine was later formalized as the Nixon Doctrine highlighting partnership, strength and negotiation. Based on this adjustment of global strategy, US President Richard Nixon took the initiative to unite with China, who had not established formal diplomatic relations with the US yet, to jointly prevent the USSR from expansion. This was seen as an important step in changing the political and military arrangements of the US in East 115 Green

and Cronin [107].

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Asia. As Nixon emphasized, “Our obligations shall be subject to our interests, not the other way around.”116 The US actively adjusted its strategic layout in East Asia by applying to China the guidelines of establishing special relations with East Asian countries through bilateralism. The strategic adjustment jointly carried out by China and the US had a far-reaching influence because it created international conditions for China to implement the reform and opening-up policy, and provided a source of power for the future transformation of East Asian pattern. Thirdly, the US planned to integrate into the East Asian economy through the construction of multilateral institutions. The successive rise of Japan and the Four Dragons have laid a foundation for East Asian economic prosperity, and China’s reform and opening-up campaign since 1978 has provided a new opportunity for the economic booming in the region. The US began to be interested in the Asia-Pacific economic circle in the 1980s. When US President Ronald Reagan visited Japan and South Korea in 1983, he repeatedly stressed that the United States was a Pacific country. In 1984, the US established the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) bringing together government officials, congressmen, financial figures and scholars. In 1984, George Schultz, US Secretary of State, officially announced that the US government decided to promote the establishment of the Pacific Community. The US then worked with other East Asian countries to prepare for the institutionalized economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, which contributed to the establishment of APEC in 1989. The US-led East Asian security order was maintained after the Cold War, and played a role of “balancer” in the region.117 Meanwhile, the East Asian pattern was undergoing tremendous changes. The economic status in East Asia rose rapidly along with the triple waves of rise involving Japan, the Four Dragons and China. With the enhanced interdependence among economies, the process of regional economic integration has accelerated, and East Asian countries have become increasingly dependent on the Chinese market. The rise of China as a major power has become the most important factor affecting the strategic layout of the US in East Asia. China’s rising strength was regarded as the biggest threat to the US in the region.118 The ensuing China Threat Theory has pushed East Asian countries towards the US in political and security terms to seek a balance point between China and the US. This has brought certain opportunities to the US-led East Asian security order, but it will pose real challenges in the long run. As of the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the US proposal to return to East Asia in 2009, the strategic thoughts of the United States towards East Asia were mainly reflected at the economic and security levels. Economically, the US wanted to leverage APEC to promote investment and trade liberalization, integrate into the East Asian economy through multilateralism and bilateralism (including the signing of bilateral FTAs), and share the outcomes of East Asian growth. APEC has played a key role in the economic strategy of the US towards East Asia and even 116 Gaddis

[108]. [109]. 118 Brzezinski [110], Weiss [111]. 117 Snyder

3.4 The US and the Hegemonic Security Order

85

the Asia-Pacific region. The US tried to use this strategy to lead the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation and development, while avoiding the situation in which it was excluded from the economic or trade blocs in East Asia, and preventing any other countries from dominating the economic cooperation and development in the region.119 In addition, the US strengthened the inherent dependence of East Asia on it in several fields such as economy and security through multiple approaches. In terms of maintaining the security order, the US still relied on its alliance system formed during the Cold War to continue its alliance-based strategy.120 But there were some changes. Specifically, the US adjusted its existing bilateral alliances; began to strengthen the horizontal ties among its allies; participated in the activities of multilateral security mechanism; and organized a temporary alliance after the September 11 attacks according to the concept of “mission determines the alliance”. Another change was that the US took defensive measures mainly against China in East Asia after the collapse of the USSR, but its strategy towards China was not merely about containment, but a combination of defense and engagement. In summary, the US security strategy towards East Asia, with China as the main target, was built upon its military presence and bilateral military alliances, supplemented by multilateral institutional arrangements (participating in multilateral security dialogue, and exploring the establishment of multilateral strategic dialogue mechanisms with its allies). The combination of bilateralism and à la carte multilateralism was reflected at the institutional construction level.121 Firstly, strengthened bilateral military alliance was the basis for the adjustment of the US security strategy towards East Asia. Since the mid-1990s, the US has preliminarily adjusted its alliance system in East Asia and changed the model of unilateral provision of security by transforming the alliance function, extending the alliance range and expanding the cooperation fields. While ensuring its primacy, the US emphasized the sharing of responsibilities among the allies,122 and the diversification of cooperation fields and methods, with an aim to form a US-centered fan-shaped structure consisting of five bilateral alliances and several informal security relations that will involve various fields of military cooperation and reach the entire East Asia. Among them, the US–Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the US Asia-Pacific strategy, serving as a spear to deal with the “peripheral affairs”; the US–South Korea alliance is the security pillar of the US in Northeast Asia; the US– Australia alliance is the southern pillar of the US-led East Asian security order; and the US-ASEAN alliance on security cooperation has created conditions for the US to penetrate into the hinterland of East Asia. Besides, the US has also maintained a substantive paramilitary alliance with Taiwan. With all these partnerships, the US is able to build a regional security network with bilateral alliances and bilateral military arrangements as the core. 119 As

Lester C. Thurow pointed out, “The United States has no interest in a cohesive Asian trade bloc, and what really matters is to divide and conquer it.” See Thurow [112]. 120 Cossa [113]. 121 Malone and Khong [114]. 122 Zhou [115].

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The US–Japan alliance is at the heart of the US alliance system in East Asia. In the late 1990s, this alliance was redefined to extend its geographical coverage from Japan’s peripheral area to the Asia-Pacific region. The function has changed from handling “Japan’s affairs” to coping with “Japan’s peripheral affairs”. In terms of cooperation content, previously Japan provided base facilities and the US provided security, but now Japan should provide supplies, transportation, maintenance, communications, guard and other assistance for the US military operations, as well as support in a number of fields such as collection of intelligence, mine clearance in high seas, humanitarian assistance, emergency evacuation, naval blockade and space control. The seemingly vague concept of “peripheral affairs” provides a ground for the US–Japan joint military intervention in the Asia-Pacific emergencies.123 With the prevailing mentality of defending against China’s rise, the US–Japan alliance has changed from an “introvert type” oriented to protection of Japan to an “extrovert type” featuring intervention in peripheral conflicts. Secondly, the US was actively exploring ways to strengthen horizontal ties with its allies by promoting strategic dialogue on security issues among the US, Japan and Australia. The US, Japan and South Korea have worked together to coordinate and discuss the Korean Peninsula crisis. Since the US upgraded its relations with Japan, Australia and South Korea in 1996, it has made positive efforts to promote horizontal ties with its allies. At the US–Australia Defense Ministers Meeting in July 2001, the two sides discussed the establishment of a formal dialogue mechanism involving the US, Australia and Japan. The first tripartite strategic dialogue was held in October 2003, leading to the preliminary triangular security framework dedicated to the South Pacific. In order to jointly tackle the North Korean nuclear issue, the US, Japan and South Korea established a trilateral coordination and monitoring group in 1999 to harmonize understanding and policies on the North Korean nuclear issue via ad hoc negotiations. Moreover, the three sides communicated their positions through foreign ministerial negotiations and informal talks to strengthen the intelligence sharing mechanism, among others, a testament to their intention to deal with Northeast Asian security issues. Thirdly, the US took an active part in multilateral security negotiations in East Asia. It expected to establish an East Asian multilateral security order based on its military alliance and presence. This US-centered order was designed to shelter its allies and embrace other non-allies in East Asia. Therefore, the US welcomed multilateral security dialogue, and even took the initiative to incorporate security coordination into the agenda of the APEC informal summit. However, regarding the framework of the East Asian security system, the alliance strategy of the US was vastly different from the cooperative security concept advocated by ASEAN and China, and the latter would inevitably restrict and even pose a threat to the US hegemonic strategy.

123 Yang

[116].

3.5 Japan and the Flying Geese Economic Order

87

3.5 Japan and the Flying Geese Economic Order After the World War II, Japan pulled itself up from the ruins and embarked on the road of relying on the US security umbrella to achieve economic rise. In 1952, Japan formulated the strategy of “carrying out national construction by relying on trade”, emphasizing that trade is the foundation of Japan’s economic development and the country should develop domestic trade to import scarce resources, open up markets, and promote the adjustment of Japan’s industrial structure to achieve industrial modernization. In this way, Japan entered a period of rapid economic development. From 1955 to 1989, at constant prices, Japan’s GDP grew by 8.4-fold with an annual growth rate of 6.8%. In the same period, Japan’s export and import increased by 33.8-fold and 18.9-fold with an average annual growth rate of 11% and 9.2% respectively.124 Japan’s economic status has leapfrogged (Table 3.2). Japan has achieved great success by implementing new neutral policies that focus on specific industries and gaining great benefits from integration into the international economy. It showcased an alternative modernization path different from the “Washington Consensus”.125 An important factor for Japan’s economic success is that it has created a flying geese economic order through industrial shift so as to ensure economic and technological advantages while achieving shared growth with the region. The term of the flying geese order is originated from the flying geese paradigm proposed by Japanese scholar Kaname Akamatsu in 1932 after he summarized the industrial distribution in gradient among different countries. Then based on comparative advantage, professor Kiyoshi Kojima at Hitotsubahi University took this theory to the next level. Specifically, foreign direct investment played an important role in maintaining the flying geese paradigm. The investing country transferred its relatively inferior industries to the invested country that had relatively comparative advantage in the corresponding sectors. In this way, trade was expanded and the economic welfare was enhanced. C. H. Kwan, a Chinese scholar residing in Japan, pointed out that the flying geese paradigm was a structure in which Asian countries Table 3.2 Japan’s annual economic growth index (1953–1990) (%) 1953–1960 GDP (market price) Population

7.90 10.4

1960–1973

1973–1979

1979–1990

8.83

3.35

4.33

1.12

1.08

0.58

GDP per capita

6.79

7.63

2.25

3.73

GDP per person employed

5.99

7.43

2.64

3.08

GDP per hour worked

4.61

7.65

3.01

3.28

Source Pilat [4]

124 Zhou

[117]. [118].

125 Noland

Relative Advantage

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3 Historical Legacy of East Asian Order

Japan

NIEs

ASEAN

China

Vietnam/India

Time

Fig. 3.1 Japan-led flying geese economic order in East Asia. Source Kwan [2]

made and maintained a division of labor according to each other’s industrialization level, and exported products with comparative advantages while continuously improving their industrialization level. All countries, developed or underdeveloped, actively promoted structural adjustment, cultivated their own emerging industries and transferred their sunset industry overseas, thus driving the entire region to grow vigorously.126 After World War II, drawing upon its advantage in capital and technology, Japan gradually built in East Asia a production network based on its multinationals and strengthened this paradigm through investment, trade and aid as part of its efforts to create its own economic sphere of influence. As a result, the flying geese economic order with Japan as the head, China as the tail, and the Four Dragons and ASEAN as the body has taken shape (Fig. 3.1). In response to the Cold War, the US changed its policy toward Japan shortly after the end of World War II. It forced Japan to suspend its exports to China and supported Japan’s return to Southeast Asia as a substitute market.127 Besides, it strongly urged Japan to repair its relationship with Southeast Asian countries. By way of investment and trade, the US helped the economic development of nations in South Asia and Southeast Asia, turning the region into the only realistic option for Japan to trade in Asia.128 Japan regards post-war reparation as the first step in returning to the international economic society. In 1952, Japan formulated the Measures on

126 Kwan

[119]. then, both the US and Japan believed that promoting the prosperity of Southeast Asia is the most fundamental way to fight against communism. See: Yoshida [120], Kunz [121]. 128 Hu and Xu [122]. 127 Back

3.5 Japan and the Flying Geese Economic Order

89

Economic Support with Southeast Asia, emphasizing the importance of reparation.129 The compensation diplomacy in the 1950–60s eased the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia. As it opened up outlets for its dead stock, Japan has occupied the big market of Southeast Asia and obtained a large amount of cheap raw materials there.130 In the mid-1950s, the Japanese economy recovered and surpassed the prewar level, and sought to open up overseas market. Japan has seized the opportunity that the UK, French and other traditional colonial powers were declining and the US has not yet risen to superpower to “include Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaya, and Thailand into its own sphere of influence”.131 The rise of the Japanese economy has laid a solid foundation for its presence in East Asia. Japan is the only Western country that owns all industrial sectors covering iron & steel, shipbuilding, chemical, automobile, electrical machinery and fiber, etc. at a certain level, so that it is considered a “full-scale industrial structure”.132 As East Asia substitutes the US as Japan’s largest overseas market, investment and exports to the region play an increasingly critical role in the Japanese economy. With efforts over years, Japan has established close economic relations with East Asia, especially Southeast Asia. To Japan, East Asia has become a major supplier of raw materials and a major manufacturing base and market, while Japan served as an important source for East Asia in terms of capital, technology, management knowledge and development assistance. Based on this, as Japan accelerated its industrial upgrading and other countries or regions in East Asia embarked on the road of industrialization, a flying geese economic model driven by comparative advantage gradually formed (Table 3.3). There were economies at different levels of development in East Asia, such as advanced economies, newly industrialized economies (NIEs), and those just starting industrialization. This diverse and multi-leveled development offered possibilities Table 3.3 Japan’s import and export presence in East Asia (1960–1980) (%) China 1934–1936 on average

Southeast Asia

South Korea

Export

Import

Export

Import

Export

Import

23.8

14.0

49.0

35.8

–

–

1960

0.1

0.5

30.9

19.8

2.5

0.4

1965

3.0

2.8

27.7

19.5

2.2

0.4

1970

3.1

1.6

28.5

17.5

4.2

1.2

1975

4.1

2.6

22.5

18.3

4.0

2.3

1980

3.9

3.1

23.8

22.6

4.1

2.1

Source Ichimura [5] 129 Nippon

Institute for Research Advancement [123]. Cited from Mi [124]. [125]. 131 Tajiri [126]. 132 Mitsuhiro Seki, Japanese Industry in the New Age of East Asia, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 24. 130 Mi

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3 Historical Legacy of East Asian Order

Relative Advantage

for the flying geese model. Since the mid-1960s, Japan began to lose its comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries represented by the textile, and has transferred these sectors to the Four Dragons via direct investment while actively growing its capital-intensive industries such as iron & steel, chemical, shipbuilding and so on. Then, in the mid-1970s, Japan’s comparative advantage was shifted to technologyintensive industries as it began to move out the capital-intensive industries that were costly and heavy polluting. Such practices promoted the upgrading of the Four Dragons from labor-intensive to capital-intensive, and resulted in the initial formation of the vertical industrial division structure between Japan and the Four Dragons. In the 1980s, especially in the middle and later periods, in the context of an escalation of Japan–US trade friction and the rapid economic growth of Asian countries or regions, Japan has turned to knowledge-intensive industries featuring high-tech and highly added values and quickened its pace to directly invest in East Asia, which facilitated the capital- and technology-intensive transformation of the Four Dragons as well as the development of labor-intensive and partially capital-intensive industries in ASEAN countries.133 Therefore, Japan has made direct investment to Asia from the 1960 to the 1980s vertically in gradient from the Four Dragons to ASEAN and to the coastal areas of China. It strengthened its leading role in East Asia and even the entire Asia-Pacific region through direct investment, economic assistance and trade, and gradually formed a Japan-led flying geese economic order: Japan was at the first level, the Four Dragons at the second, ASEAN and China at the third, and Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar, etc. at the fourth. When it came to the 1990s, Japan took emerging countries such as India as new investment focus to help amplify its industrial transfer effect (Fig. 3.2 and Table 3.4). The formation and maintenance of the flying geese order is based on Japan’s economic, capital and technological advantages, driven by Japan’s aggressive initiative, and on the underlying premise of the descending economic development levels of other East Asian countries. However, the foundation of this order is not stable. First

Textile

Chemical

Iron & Steel

Automobile

Electronics

Time Fig. 3.2 Industrial dynamic model of the flying geese economic order in Asia. Source Kwan [2] 133 Liu

[127], Kwan [128].

3.5 Japan and the Flying Geese Economic Order

91

Table 3.4 Introduction and growth periods of major industries in East Asian economies (1960– 1980) Industry

Japan

South Korea

Taiwan, China

HK, China

Singapore

Malaysia

Fiber

1900–30, restored in 1950

1960–70s

1960–70s

Early 1950s

Early 1960s, restored in the 1970s

Late 1970s

Clothing and accessories

1950s

1960–70s

1960–70s

1950–60s

–

–

Toys, timepiece, shoes

1950s

–

–

1960–70s

–

–

Iron & Steel

1950–60s

Late 1960s & early 1970s

–

–

–

–

Chemical

1960–70s

Late 1960s

1970s

–

–

–

Shipbuilding

1960–70s

Late 1970s

–

–

–

–

Electronics

1970s

Late 1970s

Late 1980s

–

–

Mid-1980s

Automobile

1970–80s

1980s

–

–

–

Early 1990s

Computer, semiconductor

1980s

Late 1980s

–

–

–

Early 1990s

Banking, finance

–

–

–

Late 1980s

1980s

–

Source An [6]

of all, a country’s rise and fall is far from following linear logic, since the science and technology revolution has the power to break all developmental mindsets. Then, Japan’s policies are not made from the macroscopic view or for the long run. While investing in production in East Asia, Japan was not willing to transfer technology, make procurement locally or cultivate local supply networks. Instead, it chose to import domestic key components and semi-products or led Japan-based suppliers to invest in countries where large-scale Japanese enterprises made investment, in order to maintain the existing supply relationship. In other words, Japan has always treated East Asia as a supply base to process & assembly product and allocate raw materials, and deliberately maintained the technological gap, which in turn resulted in the delay of Japan’s industrial restructuring and greater competition against East Asia in traditional sectors. Over time, the inherent contradiction of the flying geese economic order of Japan gradually emerged and became obvious especially during

92

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the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Back then, neither could Japan ward off the economic recession in East Asia, with investment in the region declining significantly, nor was it able to build East Asian economic cooperation since it slumped as well. Since the second half of the 1980s, Japan has greatly slowed down its pace in foreign trade and investment restructuring and shifted the investment focus to North America and Europe, out of concerns for industry hallowing. Fully aware of the importance of technology to economic development, Japan purposefully kept twenty years ahead of China—which it regarded as a potential competitor—in technology,134 and adopted a negative or passive attitude towards investment in China. As a result, it lost out to European and American firms in competition in sectors such as automobile and communication. Since the 1980s, China’s economy has risen rapidly as the reform and opening up shaped its globalization strategy. Japan’s influence on the Chinese economy has gradually decreased. Other East Asian economies have deepened cooperation with China to form a positive interaction. And the Japanese economic bubble burst starting in the early 1990s has accelerated the change of the East Asian economic landscape. The region has gradually undergone a change from vertical industrial division to a mixture of vertical and horizontal division, with the horizontal type expanding further. As the previous gradient became blurring, Japan has lost its dominant position in East Asian economy.135 In May 2001, the Japanese cabinet passed the White Paper on International Trade (in Japanese: Tsuhaku) of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which clearly pointed out for the first time that the era of the Japan-led flying geese economic order has ended, ushering East Asia into a new competition epoch. The flying geese economic order has reflected the leading status of Japan in the economic development of East Asia.136 During its development process, Japan successfully entered East Asia, turning it into an important market for its merchandise export, foreign investment and resource import. It has received enormous profits and hefty returns and emerged as a world economic power. The flying geese model has deepened the interdependence between Japan and East Asia, and set the stage for faster regional integration. Meanwhile, the flying geese pattern has played a positive role in East Asian economic modernization, promoting both the economic take-off and the economic integration there. It showcased the dominant status and economy of Japan that has created the economically significant Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere II by means of voluntary cooperation and all-wins,137 and also laid a foundation for the country to rise as a political giant and lead regional cooperation. For Japan, the flying geese economic order in East Asia is by no means a mere economic phenomenon. In fact, the flying geese theory has infiltrated into the thinking patterns of its governments, industries and academia, affecting their proposition and

134 Liu

and Che [129]. [130]. 136 Funabashi [131]. 137 Van Ness [132]. 135 Kang

3.5 Japan and the Flying Geese Economic Order

93

action.138 Supported by its economic strength, Japan has once again expressed its wishes to build a new East Asian order, with Pacificism as a typical initiative for its ambition,139 and the status of a political power as its eager pursuit. A economically strong Japan was dedicated to promoting regional cooperation, and raised the topic of Pacific cooperation while building the flying geese order. In May 1963, the Japan Economic Survey Association released the Direction of Pacific Economic Cooperation report, arguing that the five developed countries—US, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—in the Pacific region should cooperate closely to strengthen exchanges on commodities, technology and capital, and expand the economic tie with the developing countries of the region. That was Japan’s first conception of the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. In 1964, Kiyoshi Kojima put forward the idea of Pacific Community for the first time. And in November of the same year, Kojima proposed in the Pacific Common Market and Southeast Asia report that the above mentioned five industrialized countries should establish a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA). In 1966, the Asia-Pacific Regional Council initiated by South Korea was founded and joined by countries and regions including Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan and South Vietnam. In 1967, Japan urged the businessmen of the five countries to set up the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). In 1968, the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) initiated by Japan was established in Tokyo. In June the same year, the Ministerial Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Committee was held in Japan. When it came to the 1970s, the East Asian economy represented by Japan experienced rapid growth, while the focus of the US economy gradually shifted eastward with great interest in the Asia-Pacific region. Such a move promoted Japan to pay more attention to Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. In 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda put forward the policy concept of Pacificism. In December 1977, the Nomura Research Institute (NRI) of Japan suggested the joint establishment of the “Pacific Economic Circle” by the five developed countries and the five member states of ASEAN. In November 1978, Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi proposed an idea of Pacific Rim Solidarity and called for the establishment of a “new regional society” centered on Japan, based on Japan–US cooperation and participated in by Pacific Rim nations. Then, the first meeting of the “Pacific Community Seminar” (which was renamed the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council in 1992) was hosted in 1980 with five industrialized countries, five ASEAN countries and South Korea attending. After the mid-1980s, Japan began to focus on building various Japan-centered economic circles, such as the East Asian Economic Rim, the Economic Circle around the Sea of Japan, the Northeast Asian Economic Circle, and the Economic Circle around Huanghai Sea. Japan did not receive regional support because its targets in the cooperation concept were all developed countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Promoted by Japan, however, the US and Australia have devoted themselves to the creation of regional cooperation framework, and finally founded the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. Due to the development of the NAFTA and EFTA in 138 Wang

[133]. [134].

139 Lehmann

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the 1980s and the intensification of economic friction between Japan and the industrialized countries in the West, Japan had to shift its focus from working with the developed countries to cooperation with East Asian economies, which provided an important impetus for greater East Asian cooperation in the 1990s. In the 1950 and 1960s, Japan pursued a line of “restraining the army and enriching the country”, and made economic development as the key of the national strategy. In diplomacy, it took the stance of a trading state under the rule of the US. As Japan grew into a world economic power, its national identity began to change and the Japanese government bore a strong will to turn economic advantages into security benefits and political influence.140 In the 1980s, Japan began to aim for a legal status as a major power. On July 28, 1983, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone delivered a speech, explicitly announcing the goal and slogan of rising as a political power for the first time: “To enhance Japan’s voice in global political affairs, we need to increase Japan’s weight not only as an economic power, but also as a political power.”141 In the 1990s, the Japanese politician Ichiro Ozawa proposed the “Normal Nation”, stating that in order to become a normal nation, it was necessary to do what it should do and take corresponding responsibilities in international affairs, and that Japan has made contributions to the economy but left much to be desired in the field of security.142 The goal of “Normal Nation” was that Japan tried to rise as a political and military power on the basis of economic contributions, break the constraints of the post-war system and political taboos, and acquire the right to send troops overseas. It has gradually abandoned the economic interests-focused diplomatic mode, and has taken more consideration of political and security factors in handling international relations.143 Japan was eager to play a more prominent role in global and regional affairs. On the global stage, Japan sought greater international recognition, strived to become one of the leaders of the world order, and worked hard to take a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a goal it has insisted on for 20-odd years.144 And in the regional platform, Japan sought for the leadership in defining the philosophy, framework and key features of the future East Asian Community. Needless to say, the flying geese economic order embodied Japan’s economic superiority and strategic planning capabilities. It not only helped Japan realize its long-cherished wish to dominate the East Asian economy, but also provided an 140 Dore

[135]. [136]. 142 Ozawa [137]. 143 Mi [138], Chen [139]. 144 In January 1990, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu wrote a letter to US President George W. Bush, stating that “the United States, Japan and Europe must be the main leaders to form a new world order”. Successor Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa has clearly stated that the United Nations will be the main stage for Japan to participate in the establishment of a new international order and play a global role after the Cold War. These trends indicate that since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s specific goals and strategic steps toward becoming a political power have been very clear. After the World War II, the economic centralism and the Kleinstaaterei have completed their historical missions, and Japan has formally established its strategic goal of pursuing to be a political power. 141 Liu

3.5 Japan and the Flying Geese Economic Order

95

important material foundation and international conditions for its ascendance to a political power. With the deepening of East Asian integration and the overall rise of China, this order has been disrupted, but the close economic relationship between Japan and East Asia, especially Southeast Asia, has not been weakened. Japan still boasted obvious advantages in industrial competition, capital and technology in East Asia, while other countries there were not at the same level as Japan in the most critical industrial structure.145 In fact, the hangover of the flying geese economic order still exists. However, as Ezra Feivel Vogel pointed out in 1979, “The demeanor of the Japanese in the international community is not commensurate with their newly acquired status and ability”.146 In the twenty-first century, as China rises at a faster pace, Japan’s negative influence in regional cooperation and its intention to use the legacy of this order to restrict China become increasingly prominent.

3.6 ASEAN and the Sub-regional Community Order Located at the crossroads between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and between Asia and Oceania, Southeast Asia links the sea route from Asia, Africa, Europe to Oceania, considered as one of the most strategically important regions in the world. Historically, it has been a key place contested by merchants and military strategists, with footprints left by many powers in the world. With national liberation movements emerging after World War II, there was a strong desire for alliance and self-protection among the countries in the region. After years of hedging, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 to build a stable sub-regional community order covering the entire Southeast Asian region. Beyond Southeast Asia, the ASEAN principles have been followed by East Asian countries and respected by Asia-Pacific nations. ASEAN is recognized as the most successful regional organization in the developing world.147 It took a long time for ASEAN to grow and expand. In 1967, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore established ASEAN in Bangkok, marking the start of regional cooperation in East Asia. In the beginning, ASEAN was just a highly diversified bloc because its member states varied greatly in terms of land size, ethnic composition, socio-cultural tradition and identity, colonial experience and post-colonial policies, and they also lacked the experience in multilateral cooperation,148 which made ASEAN only a forum to guarantee the collective strategic status of its members and resolve internal conflicts. At that time, the security situation in Southeast Asia was so severe that it was called a “region of turmoil” or the “Balkan of the East”. Although ASEAN did not expect too much of regional

145 Liu

and Che [129]. [140]. 147 Acharya [141]. 148 Ibid., p. 66. 146 Vogel

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peace and stability, there have been no more wars among the five founding members. When the US and the UK began to withdraw troops from Southeast Asia in the 1970s, Southeast Asia was able to make its own decisions for the first time in centuries.149 In 1970, Malaysia proposed to neutralize Southeast Asia. The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (or The Kuala Lumpur Declaration) was adopted by the Foreign Ministers at the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on November 27, 1971. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration clearly set out the ASEAN rules for the first time about handling internal and external relations, and proposed the goal of establishing a “zone of peace, freedom and neutrality” in Southeast Asia. It declared that ASEAN would be primarily responsible for the “economic and social stability in the region and its own peace and progress”, stressing that ASEAN “is determined to make initial efforts to enable Southeast Asia to be recognized and respected as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality that is not subject to any non-regional powers’ interference in any form or way whatsoever” to prevent “any form of external interference”, and calling for ASEAN states to assume responsibilities together. At the first ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia in February 1976, ASEAN states agreed that their defense cooperation should be limited to external bilateral cooperation to prevent the organization from becoming a military alliance.150 The Declaration of ASEAN Concord and The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia were signed at the summit. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord sets out the goals and principles for political stability, thus pointing out the direction to eliminate frictions among member states, promote closer cooperation, unite the entire organization, and maintain the peace and stability in the region. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia formally defines the cooperation principles of ASEAN, i.e. mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; the right of every member state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force. The above two meetings marked the transformation of ASEAN from a nominal partnership to “a real system”.151 The Kuala Lumpur Declaration and The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia are a summary of the experience of ASEAN since its launch, laying the foundation for ASEAN to handle external and internal relations. Since then, the ASEAN norms have become increasingly clear and continued to improve and optimize along with ASEAN’s practices and the interpretation of its documents.152 With the outbreak of Cambodian Conflict in 1978, competition between major powers in Southeast Asia was renewed and intensified. For a long period of time, ASEAN has made little progress in regional cooperation. Only by working with other countries could it contribute to the settlement of the Cambodian Conflict. In 149 Ibid.,

p. 74. p. 37. 151 Yamakage [142]. 152 Cheng [143]. 150 Ibid.,

3.6 ASEAN and the Sub-regional Community Order

97

1984, Brunei became independent and joined ASEAN, which was the first extension in the history of ASEAN. With the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia, ASEAN ushered in a golden era of development. On the one hand, ASEAN announced its ability to manage the regional order, and stressed that it stood ready to play a role in creating a stable order in the Asia-Pacific region153 ; and on the other, it proposed an initiative of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by leveraging the aspiration of countries to develop their economy after the Cold War, thus expanding the economic and social implications of ASEAN cooperation. Subsequently, ASEAN accepted Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar, and refused to treat a country’s domestic political system as its membership qualification, ensuring the integrity of ASEAN norms and its respect for diversity. The addition of Cambodia in April 1999 allowed ASEAN to officially form a “Greater ASEAN” covering ten countries across Southeast Asia, with an area of 4.5 million sqm and a total population of more than 500 million. The ASEAN economic integration has experienced a journey from preferential trade arrangement to free trade area and then to the creation of an economic community. ASEAN put forward the idea of economic, social and cultural cooperation from the very beginning. However, no significant progress in regional economic cooperation was made in the first two decades. ASEAN did not review the issue of economic cooperation until the 20th anniversary of its founding in 1987.154 The fundamental reason is that ASEAN expects to grow the economy of member states through economic cooperation to build national identity and safeguard their regime legitimacy. In this regard, economic integration is not the core goal of ASEAN. The main task for each government is to strengthen its own sovereignty by exploring various possibilities, instead of ceding part of its sovereignty for closer inter-state cooperation.155 At the fourth ASEAN Summit in January 1992, the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area was signed, which set out that the AFTA would be completed in fifteen years from January 1, 1993, and all tariffs would be reduced to less than 5%. Since then, in order to accelerate the internal economic integration, ASEAN has made multiple revisions to the timetable for free trade. At the third ASEAN Informal Summit in November 1999, it was decided that tariff exemption would be applied to the initial members of ASEAN by 2007 and to Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia by 2012 to realize full liberalization. The ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003 first proposed the goal of building the ASEAN Security Community, and adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II to establish the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020 to comprehensively promote and implement the initiatives of FTAs, trade in service agreements and investment areas. The ASEAN Charter was officially signed at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, and came into force on December 15, 2008. As the first constitutional document of ASEAN, the Charter helps ASEAN to create a cohesive 153 Acharya

[144]. [145]. 155 Wei and Xing [146]. 154 Nishiguchi

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regional organization based on a legal framework instead of a loose mechanism. It stipulates the establishment of a great ASEAN Community resting on three pillars: an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The ASEAN Security Community is moving towards a rule-based community of shared values and norms, aimed at promoting political stability, democracy and good governance by building a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The ASEAN Economic Community is designed to promote equitable economic development by establishing a stable, prosperous and highly competitive single market and production base favorable to economic integration. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community seeks to achieve a human-oriented and socially responsible community, and build a united, unified and common identity, as well as a sharing and caring society to promote human development.156 According to the Charter, the basic goal of ASEAN is to maintain and strengthen peace, security and stability in the region. Meanwhile, it adheres to the basic principles of non-interference in internal affairs. In terms of issues concerning common interests of ASEAN, it should strengthen the negotiation mechanism, and resolve disputes in accordance with the ASEAN treaties and international practices. Difficult issues shall be decided at the ASEAN Summit through negotiation. The Charter does not contain any mandatory provisions or sanction mechanisms for ASEAN members, who are expected to raise the awareness of compliance with the rules and obligations under the Charter. The Charter underlines that ASEAN members are committed to “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”. With this ambition in mind, they have created a stable, peaceful and prosperous sub-regional community order in the spirit of equal cooperation in the past more than forty years. ASEAN has become an international organization with a vital position in economic, political and security affairs in Southeast Asia and the pan-Asia-Pacific region. There are vast differences in natural environment, history, religious culture, political system, social economy and other aspects between Southeast Asian countries, leading to complicated relations with one another. Over the past more than forty years, ASEAN has not only prevented its members from involvement in any wars against each other, but also created a fairly stable and prosperous community order, being the most successful regional organization in the developing world. Its rules and international status are respected by the related major powers in East Asia. What is the secret behind that? Looking at the history of ASEAN in the past more than four decades, it is believed that it is the principles observed by ASEAN and its approaches to cooperation that have played a key role. Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia is to reduce or avoid conflicts by consensus rather than supranational regional institutions. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, are equal partners working together to maintain regional interests through increased regional awareness. In the decision-making process, ASEAN has always adhered to the principles of consensus and stakeholder primacy. To this end, ASEAN should alleviate and mediate the contradictions between member states, rather than constrain and enforce them with institutions, so as to 156 Zhou

[147].

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create an equal harmonious atmosphere and regional awareness, and form a unique code of conduct, i.e. the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way refers to the way developed by the ASEAN members for conflict resolution and regional cooperation, including inter-state code of conduct, and decision-making process based on negotiation and consensus. The inter-state code of conduct includes a set of widely known principles including non-interference in internal affairs, renunciation of the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, all of which constitute a framework for regional engagement. The ASEAN Way is not a structure of multilateral interaction, but a process through which such interaction can be carried out. This process contains high consistency, informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus building, and non-confrontational negotiation.157 As a unique diplomatic and security culture, the ASEAN Way includes core rules such as sovereign equality, non-interference, non-recourse to the use of force, quiet diplomacy, non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, and mutual respect.158 It highlights the decision-making model featuring informality, low institutionalization and coordination.159 In particular, informality and the tendency to avoid excessive institutionalization are the most prominent principles, in order to meet the goals of its member states in a flexible manner.160 Specifically, the main features of the ASEAN Way are: First is peaceful settlement of disputes. According to the first set of rules developed by ASEAN, member states agree to restrict the use of force to resolve interstate disputes. They have successfully prevented escalation of crises through direct or indirect suppression, pressure, diplomacy, communication and trade suspension. This approach is more suitable for conflict avoidance than conflict resolution, for the purpose of winning more time for the final resolution of disputes.161 In fact, ASEAN itself is the institutionalized product of regional conflict resolution. ASEAN countries emphasize the importance of common security, but explicitly avoid military cooperation (except for exchange of intelligence).162 Second is non-interference. This principle is closely related to the abovementioned approach to peaceful settlement of disputes. ASEAN stresses that it will never interfere in any affairs outside ASEAN or the internal affairs of its members.163 The first principle of the ASEAN Charter is to respect the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of its members, which demonstrates a strong commitment to the sovereignty concept. Former ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong pointed out that the ASEAN Charter, as the Constitution of ASEAN, has merely institutionalized the working process of ASEAN, instead of reducing the

157 Acharya

[148]. [149]. 159 Chew [150]. 160 Kahler [151]. 161 Acharya [152]. 162 Kahler [153]. 163 Acharya [154], Tsai [155]. 158 Haache

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sovereignty of each state.164 Comparing the ASEAN Way with the European integration process that began at almost the same time, we can find that the EU wants to address the sovereignty issue by establishing supranational institutions that are beyond the framework of nation-state, while ASEAN is built on the premise of protecting nation-states. ASEAN refuses to build a supranational organization at the cost of its members’ sovereignty and independency.165 ASEAN states have maintained a balanced and interactive relationship. ASEAN will only deal with the issues interested to all of its members. It will not handle general internal affairs, such as the East Timor incident in Indonesia. In the expansion process, ASEAN accepts the highly oppressive Burmese regime under the guidance of its constructive engagement policy, which is a clear proof of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs.166 ASEAN allows separate actions of its members, development of unilateralism within the framework of multilateralism, and coexistence of national decisions and regional pursuits.167 Third is an appeal for low institutionalization, which is closely linked to the principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. ASEAN prefers informality and avoidance of excessive institutionalization, explicitly opposed to establishing a EU-like supranational organization. For ASEAN, institutions are established to develop a formal but flexible framework in which governments can coordinate and cooperate with each other without ceding sovereignty to a regional authority.168 ASEAN’s incorporation document is a multilateral declaration rather than a treaty or a legal mechanism that contains certain political integration obligations. ASEAN is regarded as a mechanism for policy coordination, a forum for free trade, and a platform for information sharing and collective discussion on some functional issues,169 which is not institutionally binding and mandatory. The ASEAN Way emphasizes informality rather than a legal framework. It adopts the principle of consensus in the decision-making process to meet the needs of its members with different levels of economic development,170 and does not pursue the definition of specific policy objectives.171 Fourth is consensus. The ASEAN Way is characterized by the development of consensus-based ideas and practices. Consensus (Musjawarah in Javanese) is a decision-making method in the Javanese villages. “Instead of making arbitrary decisions or impose his own will on others, a chief should gently recommend the way to be taken by the entire community, fully consult with other participants on a regular basis to listen to their opinions, consider their emotions, and weigh the pros and cons

164 See

http://www.aseansec.org/21254.htm. Cited from Hong and Laishun [146]. [156]. 166 Acharya [157]. 167 Shibusawa et al. [158]. 168 Acharya [159]. 169 Acharya [160]. 170 Chia [161]. 171 Busse [162]. 165 Narine

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before making a decision.”172 In terms of consensus, satisfaction is an important prerequisite for successful multilateral negotiations, and to improve satisfaction, open oppositions among the negotiation participants need to be avoided.173 All ASEAN member states, regardless of size or national strength, are absolutely equal in the decision-making and execution process of ASEAN affairs. The highest decisionmaking bodies of ASEAN—the Summit and Ministerial Conference—are hosted by each member state in turn. The highest executive body—the Standing Committee—adopts a rotating system. ASEAN members obtain a balanced leadership over the subordinate executive bodies, including the Permanent Committee, the Ad Hoc Committee, and the ASEAN Secretariat, by controlling the Standing Committee alternately. Based on the principle of sovereign equality, ASEAN adopts a unique decision-making model based on consensus, which means a consensus can only be reached through negotiation and compromise by all members again and again, and no proposal will be passed unless all members have no objections. The unique features of the ASEAN Way will inevitably lead to the idea of gradualism, and the diversity of Southeast Asia will also provide a footnote for gradual development. As Robert Scalapino pointed out, “There are few other regions in the world than Southeast Asia that can so vividly show the sheer size of problems encountered in the process of seeking a consensus by countries varying so vastly. The characteristics, cultures, and economic and political systems of various ethnic groups in the region are so complex, varied and extensive that they almost cover everything human beings have ever seen.”174 On the basis of the above, ASEAN countries have successfully established regional codes of conduct based on the rules including no use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, and informality, enabling longlasting regional stability and smooth regional cooperation. The consistent adherence to these principles has also contributed to the generation of a collective identity,175 which helps shape the ASEAN Community order over time.

3.7 Summary The main purpose of this chapter is to look back at history so as to assess today and look into the future. Over thousands of years, the construction of East Asian order has undergone twists and turns, leaving behind a rich and heavy historical legacy. Amongst, the Chinese tributary order was a comprehensive one that covered multiple factors like politics, culture, trade, and security, mirrored the past glory of ancient China, and reflected features of the cultural community. Along with its inherent diverse, inclusive elements, all these have provided ideological resources

172 Faith

[163]. [164]. 174 Scalapino [165]. 175 Busse [162]. 173 Acharya

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and important revelation for us to explore alternative solution to the imperial order.176 The US-led Open Door order manifested the demand of a balance of power in the context of colonialism, which led to the inevitability of open regionalism in East Asia. Japan has kept highly sensitive to the East Asian order and persistently sought to rebuild the regional order whenever its strength increased.177 However, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere enforced by Japan by military means collapsed rapidly, and its flying geese economic order also fell apart due to the rise of East Asian countries in waves. Japan’s two initiatives to shape regional order have reflected both its strategic direction and the fundamental defects of its tactics. While the tributary order, the Open Door order, and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere might well be comprehensive, the regional order construction after World War II has more demonstrated territoriality under the shadow of the Cold War. Some scholars have keenly observed that the East Asian order was somewhat absent during the late Cold War, which meant a lack of “sharing”.178 The pursuit of the US for dominance in security created a hub-spoke system that checked the security landscape in East Asia. To ensure its continuity, the US has made major security strategy adjustment after the Cold War. Japan’s pursuit of dominance in the economic field has led to the formation of the flying geese economic order. Though this order phased out after the Cold War, Japan’s strategic inertia has lingered on and so does the influence of this order on the economy of East Asia and the world. With regard to the sub-regional community order, it has not only withstood the test of the Cold War, but also extended its influence to East Asia and other parts of Asia after the Cold War. The ASEAN-led model is respected by other East Asian countries and has become the main theoretical support and realistic driving force for the construction of a new East Asian order. It dawns onto the East Asian states that the historical legacy of the East Asian order cannot be ignored, but the future of this region lies in inclusiveness and innovation after properly learning of historical experience and lessons. Today, they retrieve the right to build regional order for the future and are determined to create a new order model different from the previous and that of the West. A new prospect known as the East Asian Community is mapped out through East Asian cooperation. And how it can be realized is a challenge facing these countries and even the entire East Asia.

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119. Kwan, C. H. (2005). Cultivate our own garden—Reflections on “China Threat Theory” (zuo hao zhong guo zi ji de shi—“zhong guo wei xie lun” yin fa de si kao) (p. 194). Beijing: China Commerce and Trade Press. 120. Yoshida, S. (1980). The exciting history of 100 years: Our decisive measures and miraculous transformation (p. 76). Beijing: World Affairs Press. 121. Kunz, D. (Ed.). (1994). The diplomacy of the crucial decade: American Foreign relations during the 1960s (p. 1950). New York: Columbia University Press. 122. Hu, D. K., & Xu, J. H. (2002). The US containment strategy in East Asia and Japan’s economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia (mei guo dong ya e zhi zhan lue yu ri ben dui dong nan ya jing ji wai jiao). World History (5), 35–42. 123. Nippon Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) and Postwar Economic Policy Information Research Institution. (1995). Headquarters for economic stabilization—Post-war economic policy information (Vol. 27, p. 274). Tokyo: Japan Economic Review Press. 124. Mi, Q. Y. (Ed.). (1998). On Japan’s centennial diplomacy (ri ben bai nian wai jiao lun) (p. 253). Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. 125. Mi, Q. Y. (Ed.). (1998). On Japan’s centennial diplomacy (ri ben bai nian wai jiao lun) (pp. 253–257). Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. 126. Tajiri, I. (1980). Nobusuke Kishi (pp. 147–148). Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House. 127. Liu, H. Z. (2000). On the relevance mechanism of East Asian economics (lun dong ya di qu jing ji de guan lian ji zhi). World Economics and Politics (5), 51–54. 128. Kwan, C. H. (2003). Yen bloc: Toward economic integration in Asia (p. 51). Beijing: China Financial & Economic Publishing House. 129. Liu, X. L., & Che, W. H. (2003). Japan’s Foreign trade restructuring and the prospect of flying geese pattern (ri ben dui wai mao yi jie gou de tiao zheng yu yan xing mo shi de qian jing). Journal of Liaoning University (Philosophy & Social Sciences) (2), 119–123. 130. Kang, D. C. (2007). China rising: Peace, power, and order in East Asia (p. 157). New York: Columbia University Press. 131. Funabashi, Y. (2000/2001, Winter). Japan’s moment of truth. Survival, 42(4), 73–84. 132. Van Ness, P. (2002). Hegemony, not anarchy: Why China and Japan are not balancing U.S. unipolar power. International Relations of Asia-Pacific, 2(1), 131–150. 133. Wang, C. H. (2004). The flying geese theory and Japan’s East Asian experience (yan xing li lun yu ri ben de dong ya jing yan). Wenti yu Yanjiu, 43(1), 1–31. 134. Lehmann, J.-P. (2000). Japan and the Asia Pacific region: Global ambitions, regional aspirations. In M. Soderberg & I. Reader (Eds.), Japanese influences and presences in Asia (pp. 158–183). Richmond: Curzon Press. 135. Dore, R. (1997). Japan, internationalism and the UN (p. 98). London: Routledge. 136. Liu, D. B. (Ed.). (2006). History of Northeast Asia (dong bei ya shi) (p. 373). Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House. 137. Ozawa, I. (1993). Nihon Kaiz¯o Keikaku (Japan remodeling plan) (p. 102). Tokyo: Kodansha. 138. Mi, Q. Y. (Ed.). On Japan’s centennial diplomacy (ri ben bai nian wai jiao lun) (p. 340). Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. 139. Chen, X. S. (Ed.). (2008). Harmonious East Asia: The essentials of East Asian security (he xie dong ya: dong ya an quan de bi you zhi lu) (pp. 117–118). Beijing: Current Affairs Press. 140. Vogel, E. F. (1980) Japan as number one: Lessons for America (trans. G. Ying, et al.) (p. 13). Beijing: World Affairs Press. 141. Acharya, A. (2004). Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia (p. 303). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House.

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164. Acharya, A. (2007). Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the ASEAN way to the Asia-Pacific way? In W. Zhengyi, M. Kahler, & S. Takagi (Eds.), Political and economic analysis of regional cooperation in Asia: Institutional construction, security cooperation, and economic growth (ya zhou qu yu he zuo de zheng zhi jing ji fen xi: zhi du jian she, an quan he zuo yu jing ji zeng zhang) (p. 136). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 165. Scalapino, R. A. (1983). Asia and Its future (p. 18). Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. 166. Kim, S. S. (2008). The evolving Asian system: Three transformation. In D. Shambaugh & M. Yahuda (Eds.), International relations of Asia (pp. 38–39). New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 167. Khong, Y. F. (2005). The elusiveness of regional order: Leifer, the English school and Southeast Asia. The Pacific Review, 18(1), 23–41.

Chapter 4

Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

Different roads lead to the same destination, hundreds of views end up with an agreement. —King Wen of Zhou (The Book of Changes (zhou yi: xi ci).) The profound changes in Asia are part of the most important development process in today’s world. —John Naisbitt [1]

The end of the Cold War has led to dramatic changes in the global order. With the acceleration of East Asian integration and the amplification of its spillover effects, the engagement between the four major powers, i.e. China, the US, ASEAN and Japan, has been at the heart of the transformation of East Asian order. Against this backdrop, East Asia is embracing a changing future. When the US withdrew troops from Southeast Asia shortly after the Cold War, the long-standing contradictions in East Asia were uncovered, and there was an increased need for cooperation between countries in the region, which was promoted by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Beyond Southeast Asia, the ASEAN framework has caused huge spillover effects across East Asia, being a major force guiding the East Asian change. In cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea, ASEAN has built a basic framework for East Asian cooperation, engaging more countries in the process of East Asian integration in the forms including “10 + 1” and East Asia Summit (EAS). China’s rise has become a core force driving the transformation of East Asian order. After several adjustments of its regional strategy, China has shaped a strategic framework based on common interests, making it possible to share growth and positively engage with the region. Japan entered a period of relative decline after 1992. It was unwilling to transfer its leading role in regional cooperation to ASEAN, while getting concerned about the regional effects in the wake of China’s rise. Therefore, the strategic focus of Japan was shifted from active participation in regional cooperation to pursuit of balance against the rising China. Although it was aware of the negative impact of its withdrawal from Southeast Asia on its global strategic position, the US was held back by the global anti-terrorist war and the changing situation in the Middle East and Afghanistan, which weakened its influence

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on the East Asian pattern. The two major trends—balancing and diluting China’s growing regional influence as well as downplaying and balancing the role of the US—are developing independently and complementing each other, and together they have contributed to new institutional arrangements in East Asia.1 At the beginning of the 21st century, East Asia witnessed a strategic situation in which China, the US, ASEAN and Japan balanced and contained each other. The goal of building the East Asian Community as a regional order was established after conflicts and compromises by various countries. The convergence and institutionalization of common interests gradually paved a viable path to the building of East Asian order. The response to the 2008 global financial crisis led to further changes in the East Asian landscape. There are several major factors behind the changes. Specifically, China’s rapid overall rise has drawn attention from major powers in the world, which is a core element in stimulating the strategic adjustment of relevant countries. Regarding East Asia as a region of strategic importance, the US has shifted its global strategic focus eastward and redefined its East Asian strategy. The China-US relations have become a key factor affecting the world pattern and future direction. At the same time, the China-US disputes over the East Asian waters were highlighted.2 With its political right deviation, Japan took strategic countermeasures against China. ASEAN continued its strategy to balance the major powers to ensure its central position in East Asia. The engagement and conflicts between the above four powers had impacted the stability, peace and prosperity in East Asia in more than two decades after the Cold War, making the evolving East Asian order a core multistakeholder issue.

4.1 East Asian Economic Integration Process and Its Spillover Effects 4.1.1 East Asian Economic Integration Process So far, East Asian economic integration has experienced four major stages of development. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, it was a market- or investment-driven stage. Regional development was mainly driven by Japan’s economic revival, the economic miracle of Four Dragons and China’s economic rise. However, the regionwide growth relied more heavily on the specific economic and trade policies of these countries rather than multilateral economic cooperation. Japan has played a key role in East Asian economic cooperation and industrial transfer. It was its investment 1 Roy

[2].

2 American scholar Robert Ross believes that America’s dominance of East Asian waters is to share

the status as a great power with China, which is a balance of power rather than a hegemony. See Ross [3].

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policy that led to the flying geese pattern, under which a vertical approach to labor division was formed among East Asian countries and different regions according to the division of labor and dynamic comparative advantages. This enabled Japan to lead East Asian integration, but Japan’s focus was on Pacific and Asia-Pacific cooperation rather than East Asian integration. During that period, East Asia achieved remarkable economic growth, with less dependence on the US and Japanese economies. With the gradual increase in intra-regional trade, the proportion of US-Japan trade in the total continued to decline.3 Trade and FDI were the engine of growth for East Asian economy, but an institutional framework for multilateral economic cooperation has not been shaped yet. Of course, the rising proportion of intra-regional trade due to regional economic development has provided a material basis for the institutionalization of regional cooperation. Some scholar believes that trade in East Asia was driven by market, and regionalization was driven by real economic force rather than any political considerations, nor a backlash against globalization after the Asian financial crisis in 1997.4 However, this crisis did play a role in promoting East Asian economic integration. With the enhanced cooperation among countries, the integration was pushed in full swing under the political and economic dual drive. In the 1990s, with the spillover effects of the ASEAN Way (especially marked by the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum), ASEAN began to replace Japan as a standard-bearer in advocating and promoting East Asian cooperation. In 1990, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad proposed the establishment of the East Asian Economic Group, an initiative representing the earliest attempt of ASEAN to actively build a regional order, followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 and the Asia-Europe Meeting in 1995. The 1997 Asian financial crisis triggered closer cooperation in East Asia. Countries in the region worked together actively to address the crisis and prepare for future challenges. The “10 + 3” (ASEAN + China, Japan and South Korea) mechanism was formally established against this backdrop. The financial crisis made East Asian countries recognize the importance of closer cooperation. With the deepening of interdependence, it was necessary for them to take measures to institutionalize the interdependence.5 Thanks to such cooperation, significant progress was made in a range of fields including trade, investment and finance, and shared growth became a major impetus for East Asian integration.6 In particular, the Chiang Mai Initiative signed in 2000 was regarded as a milestone in institutionalized cooperation in East Asia. Subsequently, relevant countries jointly promoted the establishment of the Asian bond market, marking the pragmatic financial cooperation in East Asia. Regional identity was thus enhanced. In 2001, China joined the WTO and proposed the establishment of the ChinaASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) to further stimulate economic integration in East Asia. Regional integration entered a new four-wheel driven stage covering the 3 Ohno

and Sakurai [4]. and Kharas [5]. 5 Kawai [6]. 6 Chen [7]. 4 Gill

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economic, political, institutional and strategic areas, coupled with a new round of regional formal institutional arrangements. The establishment of CAFTA triggered a wave of regional free trade areas (FTAs), making East Asia an FTA hub. Based on a constructive regional strategy, China began to play a key role in East Asian integration. The cooperation between China and ASEAN became the core force driving East Asian integration, and promoted healthy competition among partner countries around free trade agreements. Regional cooperation was gradually promoted in the fields of politics and security (especially non-traditional security). East Asian countries highly valued the role of regional agreements in tapping their own strategic advantages.7 Building the East Asian Community was a shared goal for the 13 East Asian countries. With the success of EAS in 2005, these countries deepened their monetary and financial cooperation. In 2003, the Asian Bond Fund was launched. In 2009, the East Asian foreign exchange reserve totaling US$120 billion was created to provide financial assistance to member countries with liquidity difficulties. The mechanism was widely regarded as the prototype of East Asia’s IMF.8 Amitav Acharya once had a positive outlook on East Asian cooperation as he believed that due to economic interdependence and institutionalization, the regional security dilemma would not be aggravated despite huge differences in strength.9 However, this opinion was critically challenged after 2010. In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, major economies had a short honeymoon period, but cooperation was quickly replaced by competition. In particular, the US strategic shift to the East disrupted the pace of East Asian cooperation. The US not only tried to maintain its leadership of East Asian security situation by creating a soft ring of encirclement around China, but also competed for dominance in regional trade cooperation by pursuing the Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement (TPP).10 Unwilling to be outpaced, ASEAN countries launched the Regional Comprehensive Economic

7 Gill

and Kharas [5, p. 36]. [8]. 9 Acharya [9]. 10 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) was derived in 2006 from the free trade agreement signed by Singapore, Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand, and it did not draw much attention at first. The United States officially participated in the TPP negotiations in 2009, and asked Australia, Peru, and Vietnam to join, followed by the participation of Malaysia in 2010. At the APEC summit in November 2010, US leaders vigorously promoted this initiative to increase its influence. In October 2012, Mexico and Canada joined the TPP negotiations, and later in March 2013, Japan announced its formal participation in the negotiations. The economic scale of the 12 member states accounts for more than 35% of the world’s total, and the trade volume accounts for one-third of the world’s total. Once the negotiations are successfully concluded, TPP will definitely play an important role in the Asia-Pacific and global economic and trade relations. Since 2010, there have been more than 20 rounds of TPP negotiations, covering 21 fields including agriculture, labor, environment, government procurement, investment, intellectual property protection, trade in service, origin criterion, safeguard measures, technical barriers to trade, and transparency. Agreements have been reached on 12 areas, but there are huge differences in tariffs, intellectual property rights, SOE reform, and environmental protection, with little possibility of completing the negotiations by 2014. 8 Fan

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Partnership (RCEP) negotiations with other EAS members. This showed increasingly intense competition between the two camps for the leadership of East Asian integration.

4.1.2 Institutionalization of East Asian Integration The Asian financial crisis catalyzed institutionalized cooperation in East Asia, driving countries to make positive political decisions on economic integration instead of the traditional “beggar-thy-neighbor” strategy. Regional economic integration was the basis for stability and prosperity in East Asia, and its spillover effects would in turn strengthen regional cooperation in the political, security, social and cultural aspects, facilitating the establishment of some institutional frameworks. As a new trend of competition, major powers began to strengthen cooperation with other countries in the region and provide more regional public goods and preferential conditions. In fact, competition lived with and deepened cooperation. East Asian leaders recognized that their prospects were closely related to the future changes in the region. As such, they should work together to address challenges and potential threats. The pursuit of common development and prosperity was a key factor driving regional cooperation, and the convergence and institutionalization of common interests played a leading role in such cooperation. On this basis, a multi-tier regional cooperation architecture was established gradually. The institutionalization of regional cooperation was based on the close economic ties between East Asian countries. However, before the “10 + 3” mechanism was established in 1997, it was generally believed that there was only Asia-Pacific cooperation, but no East Asian cooperation, as evidenced by the US-led APEC and the ASEAN-led ARF. The 1997 Asian financial crisis accelerated the institutionalization of East Asian cooperation which has enabled the cooperation to be driven by “four wheels” for a decade. As Prof. Zhang Yunling pointed out, “The first wheel is ‘10 + 3’, i.e. dialogue and cooperation across East Asia; the second is ‘10’, i.e. development and cooperation within ASEAN; the third is ‘10 + 1’, i.e. dialogue and cooperation between ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea, respectively; the fourth is ‘3’, i.e. dialogue and cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea. East Asian cooperation was developed and strengthened by these four wheels.”11 The “10 + 3” mechanism, as the nucleus of East Asian integration, was an open regional cooperation framework built by East Asian leaders in the process of addressing common threats.12 At the meeting celebrating the 30th anniversary of ASEAN on December 15, 1997, the “10 + 3” leaders first met informally in Kuala Lumpur, marking a new round of East Asian cooperation which quickly turned into a main channel for East Asian integration. Thanks to the “10 + 3” mechanism, East Asian countries were able to, at their discretion, fully discuss the models, principles, key 11 Zhang 12 Keller

[10]. and Rawski [11].

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areas and prospects in respect of regional cooperation in order to identify the most pressing issues or those areas that were most likely to be addressed, while taking into full account the interests of all participants. In this process, this cooperation mechanism was also improved, demonstrating that East Asia was building a regional order independently. At the third “10 + 3” leaders’ informal meeting held in Manila in November 1999, the Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation was announced, emphasizing the promotion of East Asian cooperation in major areas of interest to all parties, as well as the enhanced cooperation on addressing future challenges. It was a new start for East Asian countries to explore regional independence and seek common development. The adoption of the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000 reflected that East Asian countries began to implement the above determination. In 2001, the East Asia Vision Group first proposed in its report a regional integration vision aimed at establishing the East Asian Community (EAC).13 The report offered a relatively clear roadmap for the EAC construction. To be specific, it started with the “10 + 3” dialogue mechanism to gradually set up a regional financial cooperation mechanism along the construction of a free trade area in East Asia, and shape a social and political cooperation framework, ultimately paving the way for the creation of EAC. One of the important institutional guarantees in this process was the East Asia Summit (EAS), a meeting attended by leaders of the 13 East Asian countries on an equal footing. According to the report, it was necessary to transition the “10 + 3” meeting mechanism to the EAS in order to build and realize the EAC. At the “10 + 3” summit held in Vientiane in 2004, ASEAN suggested that the EAC be the long-term goal of East Asian cooperation, and proposed to hold the EAS in 2005. At the “10 + 3” foreign ministers’ meeting on July 1, 2004, the Chinese government representatives indicated that China would support the discussion on issues concerning the development direction of East Asian cooperation, and the leading role the EAC would play in this process; would promote East Asian cooperation by supporting the EAS to be held at appropriate time; and would adhere to open regionalism and strengthen contact and coordination with other regional cooperation mechanisms. Meanwhile, although East Asian countries had not reached a substantive consensus on the creation of EAC, they generally embraced the EAC concept, implying an increasingly strong collective identity in the region.14 According to the above report, the EAC is designed to be led by middle and small powers and driven by issue areas, with social interaction as its specific model. ASEAN was at the core of the cooperation and integration process in East Asia, joined by China, Japan and South Korea respectively who would play an active role and accept the decisions adopted by ASEAN member states.15 Under the leadership of ASEAN, the first East Asia Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. Leaders from the ten ASEAN member states as well as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand signed the Kuala 13 “Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress”, East Asia Vision Group Report, 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf, Feb. 6, 2014. 14 Ji [12]. 15 Qin [13].

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Table 4.1 Mutual impact of GDP of East Asian countries involved (%) Country

China, Japan and South Korea

China

0.30

10 + 3 0.47

10 + 6

APEC

0.64

1.46

Japan

0.43

0.48

0.53

0.81

South Korea

1.62

2.15

2.30

3.40

USA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

−0.03

−0.05

0.22

0.19

Australia

Source Shujiro Urata and Japan Center for Economic Research, eds., Mega Asia-Pacific Market Strategy: How Japan Can Use the APEC, Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2009, p. 89

Lumpur Declaration, a new start for regional integration. This “10 + 6” mechanism was the result of Japan’s vigorous promotion, the active participation by Australia and related countries, and the acceptance by all countries involved. As the US and Russia participated in the EAS in 2011, a new “10 + 8” mechanism was formed. EAS has turned into a high-level summit held in East Asia to discuss various regional and global issues and challenges, expanding its significance beyond East Asia. From the original “10 + 3” to the subsequent “10 + 6” and “10 + 8”, ASEAN has maintained its leadership in regional cooperation, while other countries have also played such an increasingly active role that there is no longer a clear roadmap for East Asian cooperation (Table 4.1). The “10 + 1” mechanism is the product of ASEAN in ensuring its leadership in regional cooperation. In the process of leading the “10 + 3” mechanism, ASEAN launched a series of “10 + 1” mechanisms in cooperation with several countries including China, Japan and South Korea, making them another pillar for East Asian cooperation. So far, each “10 + 1” mechanism has developed to a different degree, and the CAFTA has laid a solid foundation for the establishment of FTAs in East Asia, serving as a role model among such mechanisms. In November 2002, just prior to China’s accession to the WTO, the fifth ASEAN-China leaders’ meeting set the goal of establishing the CAFTA in ten years. In January 2012, the CAFTA was officially founded, representing a total population of 1.9 billion, combined GDP of nearly US$6 trillion, and total trade of US$450 million. As a result, zero tariffs would be applicable to more than 90% of the products. The average tariff imposed by China on ASEAN was reduced from 9.8 to 0.1%, and the tariff of the six ASEAN founding members on China dropped from 12.8 to 0.6%. These efforts contributed to the deeper economic interdependence between the two sides, and laid a solid foundation for the ASEAN-led RCEP negotiations. Leaders of China, Japan and South Korea began to meet during the 10 + 3 summit in 1999 in an effort to maintain close cooperation in both the northern and southern part of East Asia.16 In 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the idea of building a free trade area by China, Japan and South Korea. By signing the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among China, Japan and 16 Zheng-Jia

[14].

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the Republic of Korea in October 2003, leaders of the three countries strived to actively promote cooperation in East Asia through this tripartite cooperation. Since then, the situation of “small countries driving major powers” in East Asian cooperation began to change. From 2003 to 2009, research institutes of the three countries carried out a joint study on the building of the China-Japan-ROK FTA. The result showed that this FTA, once completed, would bring all-win macroeconomic benefits to the three countries. The joint research bringing together the political, business and academic communities on the FTA was launched in May 2010 and completed in December 2011, during which a total of seven meetings were held. In March 2012, the three countries signed an investment protection agreement, a result of 13 formal negotiations in five years since 2007. This agreement contained all the important elements normally included in international investment agreements such as investment definitions, scope of application, national treatment, general exceptions and dispute resolution. Besides, as the first investment document among China, Japan and South Korea to promote and protect the tripartite investment, it could provide investors with a more stable investment environment so that they would be interested in increasing investment. More importantly, it was an important step towards building the FTA. At the fifth trilateral meeting on May 13, 2012, China, Japan and South Korea formally signed the Investment Agreement, and reached a consensus on the launch of FTA negotiations during the year. During the fourth ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in 2012, the economic and trade ministers of China, Japan and South Korea announced the launch of the foregoing negotiations. As three of the world’s major economies, the combined GDP of China, Japan and South Korea accounted for more than 20% of the global GDP. Once put into operation, this FTA would be only second to its counterparts in the EU and North America in terms of economic scale. It is possibly a milestone in East Asian economic integration. During the first round of negotiations in Seoul in March 2013, the three parties discussed issues such as institutional arrangements, negotiation areas and negotiation methods of the FTA. During the second round in Shanghai in late July and early August 2013, the trio discussed a series of issues including trade in goods, trade in services, rules of origin, customs procedure and facilitation, trade relief, TBT/SPS, competition policy, intellectual property, and e-commerce. In the third round in Tokyo in November 2013, they held working group meetings on commodities, services, investment, competition, intellectual property, and e-commerce, as well as expert dialogues on environment, government procurement, and food. In 2014, the three countries planned to conduct three rounds of negotiations to discuss issues related to goods, services, investment, and other fields. At the interim meeting held in Beijing in February 2014, the three parties dived into the areas and scope of the model and agreement in respect of trade in goods. During the fourth round of negotiations in Seoul in March 2014, they discussed issues including how to cut tax for trade in goods and expand trade in services and investment, and the scope and areas of agreement. The three countries all promised to create a favorable environment for the negotiations to conclude them by the end of 2015. The fifth round was held in Beijing in September 2014, during which the three parties conducted

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productive negotiations on the previous issues, and agreed to hold the sixth round in Tokyo at the end of November 2014. In the meantime, in view of Japan’s estrangement from the FTA, China and South Korea officially launched the bilateral negotiations in May 2012. As of the end of September 2014, the two parties had held 13 rounds of negotiations, and heads of the two sides had repeatedly expressed their wishes to close the negotiations by the end of the year. The above institutionalization was the key mechanism driving East Asian integration. Since 2010, emerging partnerships beyond East Asia such as TPP have made the institutionalization of East Asian integration more competitive, and brought a stronger Spaghetti Effect to regional FTA construction, which impacted the existing idea of building the East Asian Community.

4.1.3 Model and Path of East Asian Cooperation With the deepening of East Asian integration, there are more interactions and closer cooperation. At present, a functional cooperation prevails in the region, mainly relating to trade, financial and sub-regional affairs as well as specific projects. The adoption of this cooperation model reflects the fact that the economic and social development level varies across the region, so it is hard to coordinate the interests of relevant parties. Complex interdependence brings East Asian countries together to make the region an economic hub, although the world market remains important.17 Meanwhile, economic interests serve as a driver for regional political and strategic policies.18 In particular, the political will and support of these countries play a key role in promoting regional cooperation.19 A wealth of free trade agreements also help improve the political security between security allies, which has changed and redefined the balance of influence, the meaning of security and political alliance,20 and gradually enhanced political dialogue and security coordination in East Asia. In fact, the current East Asian integration is both a result driven by government actions and a growing regional identity, and a natural outcome of spontaneous market-driven regionalization. The subjective intention and the objective situation complement each other and together shape the regional cooperation in East Asia. Looking forward, the aspirations of East Asian countries are expected to play a more critical role. East Asian cooperation has contributed to shaping the East Asian Community at the economic level21 by surpassing the existing models led by the US or Japan, while enhancing regional features and identity.22 Meanwhile, it has also undermined 17 Kang

[15]. [16]. 19 Ren [17]. 20 Keller and Rawski [11, p. 89]. 21 Zhuang [18]. 22 Katzenstein and Shiraishi [19]. 18 Scalapino

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the US leadership in the region, enabling regional countries to lead the East Asian order.23 Countries have been increasingly aware that regional cooperation is an effective approach to economic growth and regional stability. They started with functional areas to strengthen institutional cooperation, putting regional order construction high on the agenda. Generally, however, East Asian cooperation has been advanced pragmatically and gradually. Unique features include: (1) It is led by small countries and supported by great powers. Generally, cooperation in other regions of the world is driven by great powers, but East Asia is an exception. As countries have long been doubtful of and intimidated by the dominance of great powers, ASEAN has seized the historic opportunity to lead the regional integration, which was later joined by China, Japan and South Korea. This is one of the unique features of East Asian cooperation; (2) It tries to avoid excessive institutionalization. As a pragmatic process, East Asian integration does not focus on regional institutionalization. Although the East Asian Community has been accepted as a common vision, it is essentially an inclusive framework characterized by “strong ideas and weak institutions”. With a loose organizational structure, it focuses on the development of functional cooperation mechanisms;24 (3) It pursues soft regionalism. Unlike the strong regionalism in Europe, East Asia seeks inclusive cooperation where harmony in diversity is valued. Ambassador Wu Jianmin summarized the rules of East Asian cooperation into five “C”s and one “O”. The first “C” is consultation. East Asian countries will resolve problems and promote development cooperation through consultation. The second “C” is consensus. Initiatives to promote integration are decided by consensus, without forced acts. The third “C” is cooperation. Consultation and consensus are made to promote the development of mutual cooperation. The fourth “C” is comfort level. Some East Asian countries will feel uncomfortable with certain initiatives in the promotion of economic integration, though they have no objection. In such case, those initiatives should be held off for a while instead of being implemented immediately. The fifth “C” is closeness. The “O” stands for openness. East Asian economic integration is an open process, with the goal of promoting global prosperity through the prosperity of East Asia rather than establishing a barrier around East Asia;25 (4) Open regionalism prevails. East Asian countries deeply recognize that regional integration must be achieved in line with the principles of openness, equality and gradualism. In terms of openness, there is a need for changing the previous diplomatic mindset formed in the Cold War era, and enhancing non-discrimination and transparency in trade and economic policies. In terms of equality, members should acknowledge the diversity of economic structure, cultural traditions and political systems for the purpose of mutual benefit. In terms of gradualism, a practical and sustainable approach is needed for economic cooperation based on consensus and voluntary participation.

23 Liu

and Li [20]. [21]. 25 Wu [22]. 24 Zhang

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4.1.4 Competition and Challenges in East Asian Cooperation All parties involved has been paying close attention to and competing for the leadership in East Asian cooperation. A prominent phenomenon in the process of regional integration is competition on framework and institutions. In 1990, the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) initiative proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad was strongly opposed by the US. In response, the US immediately launched a program to strengthen Asia-Pacific cooperation and gain the leadership of APEC, which is considered as the competition between EAEG and APEC, and also the first competition for regional leadership after the Cold War. The result is that East Asian countries failed to take the initiative. The establishment of the “10 + 3” mechanism in 1997 marked the start of East Asian countries to independently explore the approach to institutionalized cooperation, followed by China’s “10 + 3” proposal versus Japan’s “10 + 6” proposal. The main reason why Japan proposed and adhered to the “10 + 6” mechanism was that it wanted to limit China’s leading role. It tried to undermine the rise of China by incorporating India, Australia and New Zealand into the East Asian cooperation framework. As a continuation of Japan’s previous concept of Asia-Pacific cooperation, this proposal was designed to create a small platform for cooperation cross the Asia-Pacific,26 which would enable Japan to better play its role in regulation, standardization and management, reduce the pressure from the East Asia FTZ process, and dedicate itself to building its pivotal position.27 After years of competition between these two proposals, Japan’s negative attitude towards “10 + 3” has slowed down the institutionalization process of East Asian integration. In 2010, this competition gave way to the race between the US-led TPP and the ASEAN-led RCEP. As the US was shifting its global strategic focus to the East, it strived to take over ASEAN’s leadership in regional integration, taking the TPP as a key tool to capture the strategic leadership in Asia-Pacific and to impact the East Asian economic order with the Asia-Pacific economic order. The TPP model has shattered the existing East Asian economic cooperation network with ASEAN as the hub and five “10 + 1” FTAs as the spokes. As more and more ASEAN member states join the TPP negotiations, ASEAN may be split into two camps, i.e. participating states versus non-participating ones, which will definitely have a huge impact on the East Asian integration process. Given this, ASEAN first proposed the framework of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2011. Under the leadership of ASEAN, the first meeting of economic and trade ministers from ASEAN and free trade partner countries was convened in August 2012, during which the Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP was adopted. On November 20, 2012, leaders from the 16 EAS members issued the Joint Statement on Launching the Negotiations of RCEP, stating the establishment of an advanced, comprehensive, high-standard and reciprocal economic partnership agreement, and the negotiations to cover trade in goods, investment, economic and technological cooperation, trade in services including communication and finance, intellectual property, competition 26 Wang 27 Shen

[23]. [24], Lu [25].

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policy, dispute resolution and other related fields. The first round of RCEP negotiations commenced in Brunei in May 2013, the second round in Australia in September 2013, and the third round in Malaysia in January 2014. The above three rounds of negotiations were followed by a substantive stage in which the parties discussed the liberalization model of market access and the documents about various fields, and reached a preliminary consensus on the tariff concession model, rules of origin, customs procedures and trade facilitation, and establishment of mechanisms. During the fourth round of negotiations in Nanning, China from March to April 2014, the parties made positive progress on a wide range of issues including trade in goods, trade in services, investment and agreement framework. During the fifth round in Singapore in June 2014, the parties discussed issues including trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic and technological cooperation, intellectual property, competition and legal rules. ASEAN expected to complete the negotiations and start the implementation stage by the end of 2015, but it seemed very difficult to meet the timetable. RCEP can be considered as the first ASEAN-led cooperation on regional integration proposed by the ASEAN countries in recent years. The current situation indicates that its competition with the TPP will continue. The above competition for leadership reflects one challenge faced by East Asian integration, i.e. consideration of leadership by small countries versus temptation of leadership by great powers. After the Cold War ended, ASEAN has become the main advocate, initiator and organizer of East Asian cooperation, creating a political miracle of small countries driving great powers towards multilateral cooperation.28 It is a rare combination of regional multilateralism led by middle and small powers, rapid rise of regional powers, and a region with a long-term goal of building a community, whether from the experience of the Westphalian System or from the mainstream theory of international relations.29 With middle and small powers at the heart, East Asian cooperation is also trying to engage and integrate great powers. Among others, China, Japan and South Korea account for more than 90% of East Asian economy. Whether these powers can be socialized and integrated into the ASEAN-led regional system is a major challenge for East Asian regionalization. But great power competition is exceptionally prominent in East Asia, home to the most dynamic economy in the world,30 therefore the temptation of leadership by great powers will remain. ASEAN has always maintained the approach to balance of power between the US, Japan, China and other major powers to prevent any of them from controlling the political and economic situation across the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to safeguard ASEAN’s discourse power and influence in the region and beyond. Meanwhile, ASEAN seeks to leverage the balance-of-power strategy to ease the regional conflicts. By playing the role of coordinator or balancer, ASEAN strives to prevent major powers from full confrontation. Besides, it can also use these conflicts for checks and balances between great powers, hence expanding ASEAN’s

28 Acharya

[26]. and Wei [27]. 30 Ross [3]. 29 Qin

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political space and maximizing its own interests.31 This long-standing contradiction between small countries and great powers is the most critical challenge for East Asian integration. In addition, the challenge is also reflected in the long-standing security dilemma, the manifestation of nationalism and the difficulty of deepening regional cooperation. Security dilemma can be found everywhere in East Asia. For example, there is security dilemma between great powers such as China, the US, China, Japan and Russia, as well as between middle powers such as North Korea and South Korea; there is both low-intensity dilemma between big and small countries, e.g. China and ASEAN members, and a certain degree of dilemma between small countries such as ASEAN members. Security dilemma does not exist between only two countries of any size. Due to different security policies pursued by different countries for containment, prevention or alliance, a certain kind of connected and complex security relationship has been formed between East Asian countries. But the region has not built a widely accepted and recognized security system, without which it will be difficult to form a relatively stable security relationship among various actors. On the other hand, regional hot issues have not been fundamentally resolved. As the superpowers pursue a hegemonic policy, these issues are still possible to escalate and even go out of control. In the history of East Asia, a regional cooperation mechanism has never been really put in place. Overall, there are no effective multilateral political organizations or regional forums and military alliances. The US hub-spoke security system is used to protect its allies, but it has also triggered suspicions from other countries, leading to serious strategic mistrust. Currently, East Asian security cooperation remains at the treaty and agreement level, and ARF, APEC and Asia Security Summit are yet to be institutionalized. Without a regional security mechanism, East Asia is in a typical state of anarchy. This has caused suspicions, fear and hostility of various powers in the region, and led to ineffective control, management and arbitration over intra-regional or potential disputes.32 America’s strategic shift eastward and its involvement in East Asian disputes have further contributed to the instability of regional security and deteriorated the security dilemma in East Asia. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect East Asian countries to transfer part of their sovereignty in the political and security fields because they are mainly faced with internal threats rather than external ones, and they are only willing to cooperate if their sovereignty can be guaranteed. The process of East Asian integration has also witnessed the upsurge of nationalism in various countries, which has an adverse impact on deepening the regional cooperation. For example, in response to the Asian financial crisis, East Asian countries have profoundly realized their common interests in maintaining financial stability in the region. As a result, they should strengthen cooperation to address similar crises in the future.33 Given this, the 13 East Asian countries signed the Chiang Mai Initiative focusing on bilateral currency swap arrangements in 2000, which is “an important step towards a regional framework for 31 Li

[28]. [15, p. 7]. 33 Kwan [29]. 32 Kang

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maintaining economic stability in Asia”.34 The official launch of the Chiang Mai Initiative in May 2001 marked the commencement of Asian financial cooperation. In order to promote the development of the Asian bond market, the central bank governors from East Asia and the Pacific region successively launched two Asian bond funds totaling US$3 billion in 2003 and 2005. In 2007, China proposed to establish a non-regional foreign exchange reserve pool. In May 2009, the 13 ASEAN members established a US$120 billion East Asian foreign exchange reserve pool, marking the launch of Chiang Mai Initiative multilateralization. In 2010, the Chinese government proposed the first phase of US$1 billion China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund Initiative to promote the transformation of Asian financial cooperation model from crisis response to diversification. When meeting with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on October 2, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the vision of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to promote regional connectivity and economic integration, and China stood ready to provide financial support to the infrastructure construction of developing countries in the region including ASEAN states. This AIIB proposal of China will not only help facilitate the reform of World Bank and IMF, but also actively promote financial cooperation in Asia including East Asia. Therefore, it was immediately echoed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and other ASEAN states. At present, China is negotiating with certain prospective Asian countries about the preparatory work for AIIB. According to China’s vision, AIIB will embrace open regionalism, welcoming the participation of Asian countries sharing the same vision first and non-Asian countries at a later stage. AIIB is built to be an important platform for cooperation and common development. On October 24, 2014, finance ministers and authorized representatives from 21 countries, the first batch of prospective founding members of AIIB, signed the Intergovernmental Framework Memorandum for Building Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, marking the launch of a China-led Asian intergovernmental multilateral development institution largely relying on developing countries. Generally, regional financial cooperation includes (i) financial regulation and bailout, (ii) monetary cooperation, particularly in terms of exchange rate mechanism, and (iii) the building of regional financial institutions. In reality, East Asia has only made progress in financial bailout. It is the political factors rather than the economic ones that have severely hindered the financial cooperation in the region. More importantly, East Asian cooperation is essentially characterized by informality and consensus, so countries in the region are generally disinclined to be bound by regional agreements or institutions; instead they want to maintain sovereign independence.35 Whether it is the expansion or institutionalization of financial cooperation, or exchange rate cooperation and coordination, participants are required to transfer part of their economic sovereignty. However, as East Asian countries are generally expanding their sovereignty in the development process of nation-state, it is difficult

34 Bai 35 Shi

[30]. [31].

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to carry out cooperation involving economic sovereignty, unless there is a strong force driving it or a breakthrough in major power relations.36 The predicament of East Asian cooperation is certainly far from this. The above situations mean that the basic idea remains unchanged, i.e. cooperation should be pursued in line with the principles of gradualism, openness and low institutionalization, but there are more and more challenges in reality. How to ensure the success of East Asian integration has become a pressing issue to be tackled.37

4.2 China’s Overall Rise and Integration into East Asia Due to its sheer size of territory and population, its relationship with countries in other regions, and its growing economic and military potential, China is deemed as a major power affecting the peaceful development of East Asia and Asia as a whole.38 Historically, the turmoil in Asia was always the result of a weak China’; while Asia was in good order when China was strong and stable. From the angle of history, a rich and powerful China contributed to regional stability. However, a weak and chaotic China in the past century and the growing influence of other countries in the world, especially the US, have shaped the current landscape in Asia.39 In modern times, one of the priorities of China’s diplomacy has been given to the relations with Western countries. China did not maintain solid strategic partnerships with nonWestern countries, especially those in East Asia, and failed to identify the interests and concerns in the region where it is located. The end of the Cold War did not change the Asian order, but China’s rise since then has become a main force driving the order to evolve.40 A powerful and wealthy China will naturally trigger doubts, suspicions and certain expectations. The rising influence of China in East Asia represents its increased strength and active participation in regional affairs, a unique feature that will run through the historical process of China’s rise.

4.2.1 Historical Process of China’s Rise The rise and fall of great powers is one of the inherent logics in the epic history of mankind. China had been playing a leading role for centuries. Over more than ten centuries of the pre-capitalist society, China had been at the forefront of the world’s 36 Li,

and Ding [32]. this regard, Professor Pempel at the University of California, Berkeley pointed out that East Asian cooperation should focus on three aspects: preferential free trade arrangements, monetary and financial cooperation, and security issues. See: Pempel [33]. 38 Ross [3]. 39 Kang [34]. 40 Shambaugh [35]. 37 In

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civilization development, with its glorious history vividly recorded. There must be ups and downs in the evolution process of a country. China began to decline in the mid-19th century due to rooted internal crises and repeated foreign aggression, but it has experienced a wave of changes since the 20th century. For China, the 20th century is a truly great era, a time of change that “has never been seen in a millennium”.41 In the first half of the 20th century, China was still at the bottom of an unstable international system, and what it wanted most urgently was to regain the independence and sovereignty lost in the 19th century. In the second half of the 20th century, China began to rise and its realistic expectation was to build a prosperous and powerful country and rejuvenate the Chinese nation. In the last twenty years of the 20th century, in particular, China took the initiative to integrate into the international system as a responsible, constructive and predictable shaper.42 The reform and opening-up campaign was the overture to the rise of modern China, followed by the rapid economic growth and modernization. China is ranked top among major economies in terms of the increase in comprehensive national strength since 1978. In 1978-2013, China’s economy maintained an average annual growth rate of over 9.6%, ranking 10th in the world in 1978, 6th in 2000, and 2nd in 2010 by exchange rate. It became the world’s second largest economy after the US as early as the 1990s by purchasing power parity (PPP). China is regarded as one of the engines of the world economy, the fourth largest pillar after the US, Japan and Europe.43 The rise of great powers will first impact the inherent interests of the international community, which in turn will affect its power structure and lead to changes in the international system. Seen from the past 25 to 50 years, China has been expanding its influence in East Asia and the world, and this process is accelerating. As China’s rise is almost synchronized with a new round of globalization and the transformation of the international order, its development prospects have become one of the determinants for the future of the world.44 In the 20th century, China transformed from a closed-door weak country to an open-door strong one. In the early 21st century, China followed a peaceful development path to pursue the Chinese Dream. China’s rise appears to be in parallel with global transformation, which has not only brought unprecedented opportunities to human development, but also posed enormous challenges to the world. From historical experience, the rise of any great power will necessarily reshape the world’s structure of power, interests and ideas. The rise of China as a non-Western power will be one of the most significant world-changing events in more than a century. Given the fact that China boasted a glorious history but had been subject to humiliation for a century, its rise may also cause Western countries to be afraid of being revenged, reflecting the huge impact of China’s rise on the world. Western scholars generally believe that an increasingly strong and rich China needs to expand its influence so that it will be more willing and better positioned to strive for its 41 Hu

et al. [36]. [37], Men[38]. 43 Broomfield [39]. 44 Men [40]. 42 Zhang

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interests. As such, the rise of China as a major power has dwarfed any comparable phenomena in the second half of the second millennium.45 In terms of the 21st century, no single strategic challenge will be more important than responding to China’s rise. With China’s full integration into the international community, China is changing its idea of the world and adjusting its strategy. By better leveraging the existing international institutions and rules to maintain and expand its own interests, China has increasingly become a more constructive participant in the international community. It has turned into an active player from a passive onlooker when it has no more ideological impulses and stops challenging the international system. China’s proposition is to build the international order in a progressive, peaceful and democratic way, rather than to start it all over again. China wants to integrate into the international system with a positive attitude, to participate in the construction and transformation of the new international order as a responsible power, and to promote the construction and transformation of the world order based on the optimization of the regional order. China advocates focusing on the modification and improvement of the established international institutions and the creation of new ones, starting from the basic rules, giving full play to the positive role of the United Nations, and actively promoting the reform of the UN. This strategy shows that China is striving to avoid being regarded as a revisionist country outside the international community. China has further intergraded into international organizations as a more positive participant than ever because it largely agrees with the international community on major global issues. With China’s further engagement in the international community, it has gained more insights into the international response to its rise, and is psychologically and strategically better prepared for the future international frictions. In this strategic context, China will continue its active involvement strategy to drive the optimization of the world system with its own changes and development. From the perspective of international environment, China has seen good results from its rise strategy, and the international community including its neighbors and the US has also turned optimistic about China after observing, feeling and accepting China’s rise. On top of that, the improvement of China’s international environment is attributed to the changing international relations and increased international exchanges and cooperation. In terms of the international acceptance of China’s rise, as China had few shared interests with the US, Japan, Russia and Germany in the mid-1990s, China’s rise was barely accepted by the international community. In the 21st century, China began to align its interests with major powers who were also further adjusting their national strategies, enabling the positive acceptance of China’s rise. The surrounding countries have never paid so much attention to China as today because they are thinking about their own destiny and future. This has provided great opportunities for China to advance its foreign policy with neighbors. With the deepening of East Asian cooperation, countries in the region have developed their own pragmatic strategy to strengthen partnership with China since China’s rise has been widely accepted as an opportunity to boost their own development. 45 Huntington

[41].

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China’s rise has been generally accepted and its rise strategy seems to be recognized by the international community. However, the doubts of the international community, especially the traditional powers like the US, about China’s rise remain unchanged, and it may not be realistic to expect such doubts to completely disappear. Besides, it is impossible for the international community to fully embrace the strategy of engaging China. In such context, China’s own response strategy has become increasingly important. For a long period of time in the future, in order to sustain China’s rise, it is necessary to advance the reform and opening-up initiative, prioritize domestic affairs, and help the people develop a healthy attitude towards being a great power. Nevertheless, with the deepening of globalization and complex interdependence, China’s integrated development will be increasingly characterized by its participation in international affairs, expansion of national interests, pursuit of international interests, and commitment to international responsibility. In fact, in the early 1980s, the international community started to debate how China would use its newly acquired power and influence.46 For more than thirty years, China’s rise has not been clearly and objectively understood by the international community. To address this, China needs to develop a constructive, transparent and predictable grand strategy to ensure its steady and confident journey into the future while preventing from overestimating itself and going astray.

4.2.2 Path and Process of China’s Integration into East Asia China’s integration into East Asia is based on the China-ASEAN relations, with the “10 + 3” mechanism as the main channel. Thanks to this mechanism, a multilateral diplomatic mechanism established by the ten ASEAN members together with China, Japan and South Korea to jointly promote the process of East Asian integration, multilateral cooperation in the region has so far covered 20 areas including politics, security, transnational crime, economy, energy, environment and technology. The formation and evolution of “10 + 3” is closely linked to the progress of the China-ASEAN relations. In a letter to ASEAN Secretary-General in May 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen proposed dialogues with ASEAN in various fields and received a positive response. In the following July, Qian was invited to attend the Opening Ceremony of the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and held informal meetings with foreign ministers of ASEAN members. China’s position as a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN has fundamentally changed the hostile relations between the largest country and the largest organization in the region, which is of far-reaching significance to the regional peace process. In July 1994, China participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a Consulting Partner of ASEAN. In July 1996, China was elevated from Consulting Partner to full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. In December 1997, China attended the first informal summit among 46 Harris

and Klimtworth [42].

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the “10 + 3” leaders. At the subsequent informal China-ASEAN Summit, Chinese President Jiang Zemin delivered a speech entitled “Towards a Good-Neighborly Partnership of Mutual Trust Oriented to the 21st Century”. During that period, China had concluded mutual trust and security agreements with neighboring countries to shift its focus from the traditional military issues in the North and West to the trade and diplomatic issues in the East and South.47 At the fourth China-ASEAN Summit in November 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the vision to establish a bilateral FTA. In November 2001, Zhu once again raised this proposal and received positive response from the ASEAN members. The two sides agreed to establish a FTA in a decade. This was the first significant action China had taken in regional cooperation. On that basis, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. believes that China’s adoption of a reconciliation policy against Southeast Asian countries since the 1990s actually has laid the foundation for the new regional order in which China is a natural leader and the US an outsider.48 At the sixth China-ASEAN Summit in November 2002, leaders of the two sides signed the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, a milestone in East Asian cooperation which defines the goal of building a FTA with the initial six ASEAN members by 2010 and with the other four members by 2015. Meanwhile, China and ASEAN also signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to state that China and ASEAN are committed to enhancing the good-neighborly partnership of mutual trust, and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, as well as reaffirming the necessity of peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea through friendly consultations. Before the dispute was resolved, the parties involved should undertake to stay calm and take no actions to complicate and expand the dispute; instead, they should seek to build mutual trust by means of marine environmental protection, search and rescue, and cracking down transnational crime, etc. in the spirit of cooperation and understanding. In the meantime, China and ASEAN also issued the Declaration of China-ASEAN Cooperation on Non-traditional Security Issues to launch the comprehensive cooperation in the field of non-traditional security. In October 2003, China joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and signed the Joint Declaration the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, indicating that China became the first strategic partner of ASEAN, and ASEAN was the first regional organization to establish a strategic partnership with China. China offered to refrain from exercising leadership on many major issues; however it encouraged ASEAN to exercise leadership as an organization.49 The signing of such agreements and instruments marked a new era of the China-ASEAN relations. In November 2004, China and ASEAN adopted the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, and signed the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on 47 Campbell

[43]. from Breslin [44]. 49 Xiao [45]. 48 Cited

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4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China, under which both parties are committed to advancing the bilateral strategic partnership for peace and prosperity by recognizing the importance of deepening comprehensive partnership. The signing of the Agreement on Trade in Goods, the Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Agreement on Investment in 2004–2009 built the basic legal framework for the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which was completed as scheduled in 2010. Since then, the two parties have updated and supplemented the free trade agreements by successively signing the Protocol to Implement the Second Package of Specific Commitments under the Agreement on Trade in Services for the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China, and the Protocol to Incorporate Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures into the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China, to further open up the field of trade in services and eliminate non-tariff barriers in the field of trade in goods. The accumulative amount of two-way investment between China and ASEAN in 2003–2012 increased by more than US$70 billion to US$100.7 billion.50 The evolving China-ASEAN relations in the past two decades after the Cold War suggest that China has always supported ASEAN’s leadership in regional integration, and leaders of the two sides have built a mechanism for regular contacts and mutual visits to promote dialogues on China-ASEAN partnership and on regional and international issues of common interest. Driven by the China-ASEAN Summit, the most successful one among the five ASEAN-led “10 + 1” mechanisms, extensive and in-depth partnerships have been carried out in 11 key areas including agriculture, information technology, human resource development, mutual investment, development of the Mekong River Basin, transportation, energy, culture, tourism, public health, and environmental protection, and 12 MOUs and framework agreements have been signed regarding agriculture, ICT, non-traditional security, intellectual property and other topics. In the meantime, the two sides also established a high-level or ministerial consultation and coordination mechanism to strengthen communication and cooperation in various fields. China and ASEAN members have carried out traditional security cooperation on UN peacekeeping, personnel training, and bilateral military exercises. In the field of non-traditional security, the two sides have conducted bilateral or multilateral cooperation to fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy and international economic crimes. At the sub-regional level, the two sides have developed several economic cooperation initiatives including the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the Pan-Beibu Gulf economic cooperation programs. The bilateral relations between China and the ten ASEAN members have also developed to varying degrees.51 The success of China-ASEAN relations has a good demonstration effect on the process of East Asian integration, and the benefits of cooperation are attracting relevant countries to actively join the 50 Li 51 Li

[46]. [47].

4.2 China’s Overall Rise and Integration into East Asia

131

integration process, during which China has transformed from a passive onlooker to an active participant and a decision-maker in regional cooperation. Over time, China has become an engine of economic and trade growth in East Asia, a stabilizer of macro economy, a provider of public goods, and a driver for East Asian integration in economic, political and security terms. Since the end of the Cold War, many neighboring countries have sought to incorporate China into regional systems and dialogues to make this rising power more predictable and less threatening.52 With the optimization and adjustment of China’s regional strategy, China has been actively promoting regional economic and security cooperation as an important force in shaping the East Asian pattern. Looking into the future, the basic framework of China’s regional strategy is to form a comprehensive partnership mechanism around ASEAN plus China’s economic integration that is also at the core of East Asian integration, with “10 + 3” as the possible framework of East Asian integration, and with the East Asia Summit as an important strategic forum. China has proposed to create an East Asian community in line with the principles of respect, mutual assistance, openness, inclusiveness, gradualism and sustainability.53 China believes that it is too early to define what such East Asian community is about. In the foreseeable future, the region will still focus on economic cooperation, while carrying out political security dialogues and cooperation in a proper manner.

4.2.3 A Rising China’s Impact on and Contribution to East Asia The rise of East Asia’s strategic status in the international community after the Cold War is partly promoted and consolidated by the power of China. China’s rise has significantly driven the economic and social development in East Asia, enabling it to become the fastest growing and most open region in the world. Above all, as China’s rise continues to create regional effects, East Asia is moving towards an era of economic recovery. While participating in economic globalization, a rising East Asia is also accelerating its process of regional integration, especially marked by the increase in proportion of intra-regional trade and the ongoing FTA negotiations. China, at the heart of East Asian integration, is the core enabler of the above two processes. As the most powerful driving force for East Asian integration, China is demonstrating the strategic effects of its rise in all aspects. First, China’s rise has contributed to and brought opportunities for the development of East Asia. The neighboring countries become the biggest beneficiaries of the huge market provided by China. After China joined the East Asian industrial chain, it has actively accelerated the industrial transfer and structural upgrading in the region, 52 Segal

[48]. Wen Jiabao Arrives in Thailand to Attend the East Asian Leaders’ Summit”, People’s Daily, Oct. 24, 2009, front page. 53 “Premier

132

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

creating enormous market space and development opportunities for Japan, the Four Dragons and other economies. Besides, China has also played a key role in expediting the process of economic integration across Asia. Prior to the WTO entry, China accounted for the second largest share of exports and imports in Asia after Japan, but there was a huge gap between them. After the accession to the WTO, China completed the FTA negotiations with ASEAN in 2002 to further reduce tariffs under the Early Harvest Program. Since 2004, China’s import and export volume of merchandise trade has accounted for more than 30% of Asia’s total, being a true Asian leader in trade growth. China’s participation in the process of East Asian economic integration has driven an increase in the proportion of intra-regional trade. It is due to China that more than half of East Asian trade takes place within the region, and East Asian integration is almost on par with EU.54 At the same time, China has also become a new active investor to East Asia, with a net direct investment in East Asia totaling more than US$100 billion. By promoting bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in East Asia, a growing China has enabled more and more East Asian economies to significantly benefit from the process of trade liberalization, promoting the sustainability of East Asian economic integration and improving the overall competitiveness and long-term development potential of East Asia. China has maintained highly close interdependent relations with neighboring economies at different development levels who have gained massive external power from the historic opportunity of China’s rise. This peaceful and cooperative development has profoundly affected the resource and investment flows, allocation of production and trade relations in the region, driving more countries towards shared prosperity based on an integration approach that is completely unlike the EU or the NAFTA. China has been increasingly recognized by its neighbors whose prosperity is driven by China’s rapid development, which has contributed to the role of China as an increasingly active and responsible regional power. Currently, a widely recognized cooperation framework featuring complex interdependence and shared prosperity has been shaped in East Asia. Second, the economic ties between China and East Asia are growing closer. China’s overall rise benefits from East Asian regional cooperation. At present, more than half of China’s foreign economic activities are carried out in East Asia, and over 60% of foreign investors in China are from East Asia. The all-round cooperation and closer economic ties have driven the spillover effects across East Asia, attracting Australia, New Zealand, India and other countries to join the future framework of East Asia. China has 26 neighboring economies. In 1995, China was the largest trade partner of four economies, the second largest of three, and the third largest of five. In 2001, China replaced the US as the growth engine of all East Asian countries, and became the primary export market for major economies including Japan, South Korea and Singapore.55 In 2005, China was the largest trade partner of ten economies, the second largest of six, and the third largest of five. In contrast, the US was the largest trade partner of eight economies, i.e. Macau, India, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, 54 Gill

and Kharas [5]. [49].

55 Ross

4.2 China’s Overall Rise and Integration into East Asia

133

the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan, in 1995; of ten economies, i.e. Cambodia, Macau, Malaysia, India, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan, in 2000; and of four economies, i.e. Cambodia, India, Pakistan and the Philippines, in 2005. Japan was the largest trade partner of seven economies, i.e. Afghanistan, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea, Thailand and Vietnam, in 1995; of four economies, i.e. Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, in 2000; and of only three economies, i.e. Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand, in 2005. China has played an active and constructive role in regional integration. It drives global economy, stabilizes regional macro economy, and accelerates East Asian integration. Its neighboring economies are becoming significantly more dependent on the trade with China but less dependent on Japan and the US, implying that China has gained the preliminary leadership in regional economic and trade (Table 4.2). East Asian countries welcome China’s rise and adopt a pro-China policy.56 David C. Kang points out, “This choice will challenge the existing theory of international relations which consistently believes that the rise of great powers will lead to instability. From the perspective of interests, great powers pose threats while providing opportunities. For China’s rise, economic opportunities and military threats are equally significant, but East Asian countries have seen more opportunities than threats. From the perspective of identity, East Asian countries regard China’s return to the center stage in East Asia a natural thing. The fact is that as a long-time Table 4.2 Sources of China’s FDI (1998–2013) (%) Hong Kong

Taiwan

Japan

1998

40.7

6.4

7.5

1999

40.6

6.4

7.4

2000

38.1

5.6

2001

35.7

6.4

2002

33.9

2003 2004

Singapore

East Asia

4.0

7.5

66.1

3.2

6.6

64.1

7.2

3.7

5.3

59.9

9.3

4.6

4.6

60.5

7.5

7.9

5.2

4.4

46.2

33.1

6.3

9.4

8.4

3.8

61.1

31.3

5.1

9.0

10.3

3.3

62.0

2005

29.8

3.6

10.8

8.6

3.7

59.2

2006

32.1

3.4

7.3

6.2

3.6

55.2

2007

37.0

2.4

4.8

4.9

4.3

55.9

2008

44.4

2.1

4.0

3.4

4.8

60.4

2009

51.2

2.1

4.6

3.0

4.0

66.9

2010

57.3

2.3

3.9

2.6

5.1

72.7

2011

60.8

1.9

5.5

2.2

5.3

76.9

2012

58.7

2.6

6.6

2.7

5.6

77.3

2013

62.4

1.8

6.0

2.6

6.1

78.9

Source China Statistical Yearbook (1998–2014) 56 Kang

[50], Shambaugh [51].

South Korea

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4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

leader in East Asia, China has consistently maintained stable relations with regional countries despite certain disputes at some time.”57 Third, China’s alignment of regional strategy based on common interests has driven regional change positively. After the Cold War, many scholars were pessimistic about the future of Asia, believing that Asia will be a place of rivalry mainly due to the predictions of China becoming a revisionist country.58 However, China and its East Asian neighbors have alleviated these anxieties by participating in the regional integration strategy.59 China has been an active participant in a number of multilateral institutions based on cooperation and consensus. “These institutions may not be enough to meet the security needs of the member states, but they are appropriate for bringing closer countries that are neither enemies nor allies. They offer China and its neighbors a mechanism for peaceful coexistence and mitigation of potential conflicts, thus greatly changing China’s previous situation where it was relatively isolated, and providing China with the experience in institutionalized cooperation.”60 As one of the builders of regional institutions, China has grown into a responsible stakeholder in East Asia in the engagement process. During the process of regional integration, China has made strategic alignment based on common interests, and reached constructive cooperation with regional countries oriented to common interests. In particular, China has a profound understanding of the status quo of the East Asian pattern, and in order to enhance mutual trust, avoid major setbacks in the process of regional integration, and realize constructive identification with ASEAN members, China supports the East Asia Summit model proposed by ASEAN and the leadership of ASEAN in building the East Asian Community, and continues to demonstrate its supportive stance towards open regionalism.61 China proposes to build a mutual trust mechanism based on common interests, seek common security through a strategic cooperation mechanism, and settle disputes peacefully through friendly consultations. On the same basis, it recognizes and respects the diversity of the world where countries and nations with different civilizations and cultures coexist harmoniously. Countries, big or small, are all equal and can address major challenges concerning global and regional peace through democratization of international politics to pursue “common interests, coexistence, joint development and common security”.62 On the other hand, China has achieved positive results from its East Asia strategy, but it is still not active enough in promoting regional economic integration and various bilateral partnerships due to lack of experience in participation in international coordination and absence of an insight into how to play the role of a great power.63

57 Kang

[15, p. 4]. [52], Segal [53], Kupchan [54], Johnston [55]. 59 Cheng-Chwee [56]. 60 Yahuda [57]. 61 Qin and Wei [27]. 62 Huang [58]. 63 Zhao and Li [59]. 58 Friedberg

4.2 China’s Overall Rise and Integration into East Asia

135

China possesses relative economic advantages in the region, but it has failed to translate them into favorable geopolitical, security and strategic advantages. With closer economic and trade ties with China, the neighbors become increasingly vigilant and doubtful about China.64

4.3 Spillover Effects and Limitations of the ASEAN Norms Founded in 1967, ASEAN represents a way of regional cooperation and alliance. After years of evolution, it has gradually formed a decision-making model with unique sub-regional features. Amitav Acharya summarizes its suite of basic principles and norms governing relations between member states as the ASEAN Way, of which informality and consensus are two major principles. Under the principle of informality, regional cooperation maintains a low level of institutionalization. As a result, few Western-style institutions guaranteed by a strict legal system were established in ASEAN. Under the principle of consensus, the decision-making mechanism of regional cooperation avoids majority voting and enforcement to ensure the comfort of participants in regional cooperation.65 All ASEAN member states, regardless of size or national strength, are absolutely equal in the decision-making and execution process of ASEAN affairs. The highest decision-making bodies of ASEAN—the Summit and Ministerial Conference—are hosted by each member state in turn. The highest executive body—the Standing Committee—adopts a rotating system. ASEAN members obtain a balanced leadership over the subordinate executive bodies by controlling the Standing Committee alternately. ASEAN adopts a decision-making model based on consensus, which means a consensus can only be reached through negotiations and compromises by all members again and again, and no proposal will be passed unless all members have no objections. For external affairs, ASEAN allows the development of unilateralism within the framework of multilateralism, and the coexistence of national decisions with regional pursuits, provided that the independence of national policies of each member are guaranteed.66 This practice of maximizing both national and regional interests not only ensures effective cooperation among members seeking different interests, but also leads to a lower level of institutionalized cooperation. The ASEAN Way has guided Southeast Asian countries to effectively and peacefully settle many bilateral and multilateral disputes. Compared with Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia has more marked features in cultural and ethnic diversity, but it has built up a stable sub-regional order. In the early years, ASEAN focused on addressing internal affairs and building sub-regional institutions to ensure the priority of internal stability. In the 1970s, ASEAN committed itself to building a neutral zone in Southeast Asia and began to develop institutional cooperation with great powers in the form of Dialogue Partners. 64 Yu

[60].

65 Acharya

[26]. [61].

66 Masahide

136

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

In the late 1980s when ASEAN expanded cooperation from Southeast Asia to AsiaPacific, it felt the fierce competition for leadership in East Asian cooperation. In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War, especially the withdrawal of the US from Southeast Asia in 1992, triggered major changes in the regional pattern. In consideration of politics and security, ASEAN began to promote the ASEAN norms on the basis of further internal integration. In fact, ASEAN has geographically covered Southeast Asia after the majority of countries in the region successively participated in it. The functions of ASEAN continue to expand from the political community to the security and economic ones, while sub-regional integration is deepening. At the same time, ASEAN has seized the historic opportunity to play an active role in the process of East Asian integration, and establish the ASEAN centrality by providing a regional cooperation platform and promoting mechanism construction at the right time. ASEAN’s amendment to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, an official document reflecting the ASEAN Way, in 1987, enabled the Treaty to welcome non-ASEAN nations, which pioneered the spreading of the ASEAN Way. The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 represented the first major attempt of the ASEAN Way to expand its external influence. The 1997 Asian financial crisis proved that ASEAN was not strong enough to address the crisis on its own, while international institutions such as IMF were unreliable; therefore the only viable option for East Asian countries was to work together closely.67 Since then, as the principal organizer of regional cooperation in East Asia, ASEAN has led the establishment of “10 + 3”, “10 + 1”, the East Asia Summit and other mechanisms. The expansion of the ASEAN Way into East Asian integration has enabled regional cooperation to develop based on the ASEAN principles.68 As a platform for East Asian integration, ASEAN has used the ASEAN Way and its experience in regional integration to promote the negotiations among countries including China, Japan and South Korea who previously lacked political mutual trust, and to secure its leading position to develop and implement rules, hence expanding the diplomatic space for ASEAN.69 So far, ASEAN’s leadership in the process of economic integration has been recognized and respected by countries in the region. It plays a key role in the institutional cooperation and the regional order construction in East Asia, and seeks to stand at the heart of all regional cooperation initiatives.70 However, the low institutionalization and the practice of avoiding commitments and obligations under the ASEAN Way have slowed down ASEAN’s internal integration and East Asian integration. Obviously, the construction of East Asian order requires not only the normative effects of ASEAN, but also new engines for integration.

67 Men

[62]. [63]. 69 Yan and Tian [64]. 70 Chairman Statement by Mr. George Yeo at the Closing Ceremony of the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, July 24, 2008. See http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/ 9789814261 1970039. 68 Cheng

4.3 Spillover Effects and Limitations of the ASEAN Norms

137

4.3.1 Creating ARF to Promote the ASEAN Way After the Cold War, ASEAN has been the main advocate, initiator and organizer of Asia-Pacific cooperation and East Asian integration, creating a political miracle of “small countries driving major powers” toward multilateral cooperation. In response to security issues, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the first and only intergovernmental multilateral security dialogue system in the Asia-Pacific region. The military withdrawal of the US from Southeast Asia in 1992 left a huge power vacuum in the region. Instability occurred in the region due to the reemergence of contradictions originally covered by the Cold War and legacy disputes over territorial waters and land, combined with the gap in economic development level as well as culture, nationality, religion and other factors. ASEAN was deeply concerned about the possible efforts by any country to fill in this vacuum; therefore it actively explored the approach to maintaining regional security and stability. Since no single country in the ASEAN region was able to dominate the security affairs, multilateralism was introduced by ASEAN.71 For ASEAN, it is faced with diversified security threats from both traditional great powers and emerging Asian powers. Given the increasingly serious disputes over, for example, territorial land and waters and oil and gas exploitation caused by competition for economic resources and maritime rights, as well as non-traditional security threats such as piracy, drug trafficking and illegal immigration, ASEAN adopts the security strategy aimed at advocating open regional security dialogues based on improvement of collective security capabilities, while establishing bilateral relations of mutual trust with great powers for effective security cooperation. Applying ASEAN’s internal way of handling conflicts to regional security has become a key point of ASEAN’s appeal to security.72 ASEAN countries regard the ARF as an important platform for multilateral security cooperation in East Asian. Established in July 1993, ARF held its first meeting in Bangkok on July 25, 1994. In terms of vision, ASEAN proposed a three-stage approach to the ARF development. In the first stage, ARF focused on confidence building measures to eliminate the threat of great powers. In the second stage, a preventive diplomacy was conducted to maintain regional stability. In the third stage, ARF will be institutionalized to provide a multilateral mechanism for regional conflict resolution and advance cooperation on confidence building measures, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping, exchange of unclassified military intelligence, maritime security and preventive diplomacy, etc. The 1995 Concept Paper set out that ARF upholds voluntary exchange of annual defense, conducts security dialogues at the bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels, maintains high-level visits and military exchanges, and encourages member states to sign into the UN Register of Conventional Arms.73 In terms of issue choice, ARF gives priority to security issues, from overall security issues in the Asia-Pacific region to specific arms control issues 71 Wu

[65].

72 Acharya 73 Acharya

[66]. [26, pp. 319–346].

138

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, from disputes in hotspots such as the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula to confidence building measures and development of a preventive diplomacy. In terms of operation model, ASEAN follows the principle of equal consultation, unity in diversity, gradual progress and consensus to ensure the smooth development of ARF. To date, ARF has held 21 sessions and brought together 27 members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Mongolia, Russia, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the European Union, covering the majority of small countries and regional powers in East Asia as well as the world’s largest regional organization and superpowers. Currently, ARF is the most important and the only official mechanism for multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region (Table 4.3). The core norm of ARF is cooperation security, aimed at establishing an institutionalized framework for nurturing habits of cooperation and characterized by open regionalism, soft regionalism and flexible consensus.74 The basic concept of ARF is to clarify the military intentions of all parties through greater security transparency; enhance mutual trust by strengthening information exchange to make inter-state relations more predictable, thereby reducing the possibility of conflicts and surprise attacks. With ARF, ASEAN seeks to build a new regional order around relatively new inclusive norms in addition to ASEAN’s own norms. Many visionaries point out that this is of prime importance for the concept of cooperative security. As former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans noted, the purpose of ARF is to build “cooperative security with others, not to confront with them”. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, then Foreign Minister of Malaysia, believed that the philosophy of ARF is “making friends instead of identifying enemies.”75 Through dialogue and consultation, ARF member states have established a collective security framework to avoid the dominance or intervention by any single power in ASEAN affairs, and have further created a special situation in which this security framework is built and managed for small countries.76 ARF has become the only “mechanism used to resolve conflicts arising from power balancing” at the East Asian regional level.77 Meanwhile, ASEAN supports bilateral security cooperation between its member states and non-regional major powers, especially the US, and regards bilateral defense cooperation as the most effective and realistic approach to security.78 Undoubtedly, ASEAN’s creation and leadership of ARF have maintained its centrality and the ASEAN Way, and effectively expanded the agenda for regional security cooperation.79 74 Ikenberry

and Mastanduno [67]. [66, p. 250]. 76 Buzan and Waever [68]. 77 Katzenstein [69]. 78 Acharya and Stubbs [70]. 79 Wei [71]. 75 Acharya

4.3 Spillover Effects and Limitations of the ASEAN Norms

139

Table 4.3 List of previous ARF meetings (1994–2014) Session

Date and place

Topic/Theme

1

July 1994, Thailand

Establish a forum dedicated to security dialogue and consultation and promoting inter-state security cooperation

2

August 1995, Brunei

Determine the goals and expectations of the Forum, as well as the process of cooperation and organizational framework, and reaffirm the Forum as “a means of ensuring lasting peace, stability and prosperity for the region and its people”

3

July 1996, Indonesia

Accept India and Myanmar as members, focus on the US-Japan alliance, and discuss security and peace issues in the Asia-Pacific region

4

July 1997, Malaysia

Discuss the Cambodia issue, and argue that “the ARF has become an important forum for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the region”, and a stable dialogue framework has been shaped

5

July 1998, Philippines

Strive to resolve regional crises, and argue that “all member states shall be subject to the collective commitment to maintaining regional peace and stability”

6

July 1999, Singapore

Accept Mongolia as a member, discuss international and regional security issues, argue that stable great power relations are essential for regional stability, and emphasize dialogue and cooperation among great powers.

7

July 2000, Thailand

Accept DPRK as a member, and discuss regional political and security situations, the overall security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, and ASEAN’s development process and direction

8

July 2001, Vietnam

Promote the development of the Forum towards the second phase of preventive diplomacy

9

July 2002, Brunei

Strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation, discuss the Korean Peninsula affairs, and coordinate the positions of participating countries on regional security and anti-terrorism issues

10

June 2003, Cambodia

Discuss issues on anti-terrorism cooperation, the Korean Peninsula situation and non-proliferation of weapons, stress that the Forum must keep pace with the times to establish a strong regional security network, and take measures to ensure lasting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region

11

July 2004, Indonesia

Explore the DPRK denuclearization issue, and promote joint anti-terrorism and military actions in the Asia-Pacific region to maintain regional security

12

July 2005, Laos

Focus on international and regional security situations, emphasize the positive role of regional coordination and cooperation in disaster reduction and emergency response assistance, promote the fourth round of six-party talks to push forward denuclearization in DPRK (continued)

140

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

Table 4.3 (continued) Session

Date and place

Topic/Theme

13

July 2006, Malaysia

Stress that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the basis for maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, support the peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue, and strengthen inter-state cooperation in the security area to maintain and promote peace and stability in the region

14

July 2007, Philippines

Promote regional security dialogue and cooperation, establish a peacekeeping mechanism, and combat terrorism and transnational crime

15

August 2008, Singapore

Reaffirm the importance of the ARF as the main multilateral political and security forum in the region, and support the ARF, as a major driving force, to advocate more clear and specific cooperation to deal with increasingly complex traditional and non-traditional security issues; propose four suggestions on how to strengthen security cooperation; and advocate denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a verifiable manner

16

July 2009, Thailand

Discuss regional political and security issues in the Korean Peninsula and Myanmar, and condemn the nuclear tests in the Korean Peninsula as such actions would not only threaten regional peace and stability, but also have a negative impact on preventing nuclear proliferation

17

July 2010, Vietnam

Discuss what role ASEAN should play in the new international community, how to strengthen its leadership and play a role of balancer and coordinator in the region; discuss the future of the Forum, including a potential mechanism for high-level talks in the Asia-Pacific region to address security issues; welcome the United States and Russia to participate in the East Asia Summit

18

July 2011, Indonesia

Agree on the implementation of the guidelines for the follow-up actions of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and adopt the action guidelines for the implementation of the Declaration

19

June 2012, Cambodia

Discuss and agree on relevant issues on building a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) by participating members; deepen the EU-ASEAN cooperation; the conference failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time since its establishment because the Philippines insisted on including the Huangyan Island dispute between China and the Philippines into the Joint Communiqué, which was opposed by Cambodia and other countries (continued)

4.3 Spillover Effects and Limitations of the ASEAN Norms

141

Table 4.3 (continued) Session

Date and place

Topic/Theme

20

July 2013, Brunei

Discuss the construction of the ASEAN Community and the cooperation framework in the region; review the recent situation and evolution in the East China Sea, and reaffirm the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East China Sea; and discuss global and regional issues including the situation in DPRK and the Middle East and the APEC cooperation

21

August 2014, Myanmar

Discuss extensive security issues including the DPRK nuclear issue, the South China Sea dispute and the situation in Ukraine, and issue the Statement on Strengthening Coordination and Cooperation on Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue

Source http://www.asean.org

4.3.2 Promoting “10 + 1” and “10 + 3” to Lead Regional Economic Cooperation Economically, ASEAN strives to maintain its leadership in the process of regional cooperation. Participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is ASEAN’s first attempt to integrate into the economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, ASEAN initially emphasized that it would not be involved in the initiative to further institutionalize APEC which was only a loose consultative meeting. In 1990, Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, proposed to establish an East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) that prevents Western countries from joining, which was the start of competition with Western countries for the leadership in regional economic cooperation. At the 1993 APEC Seattle Summit held to promote trade liberalization, US President Bill Clinton proposed the vision of building a Pacific community. With the increasingly strong desire of APEC major powers for leadership, the US began to reveal its intention to dominate Asia-Pacific affairs by means of APEC. Being marginalized, ASEAN had to adjust its cooperation strategy and look at East Asia to discuss economic and security issues with China, Japan and South Korea. Driven by the Asia-Europe cooperation, ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea needed to negotiate and agree on cooperation with the EU, and East Asian leaders met in 1995. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN began to reduce its engagement in APEC cooperation and focus on economic cooperation within East Asia because ASEAN saw when it was not strong enough to resolve the crisis alone, the US and other Western countries only paid lip service, IMF was not an organization to rely on, and APEC failed to play its due role in handling the crisis. On December 15, 1997, an informal summit of leaders from ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. After 16 sessions so far, this “10 + 3” mechanism has been gradually accepted as the main approach to East Asian cooperation.

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Arising from the Asian financial crisis and surviving the subsequent global financial crisis, the “10 + 3” mechanism has played a key role in East Asian economic stability and development.80 As to how the mechanism works, the rotating presidency of ASEAN will invite leaders of China, Japan and South Korea to attend the ASEAN summit to ensure the leading position of ASEAN. Over the past years since its creation, ASEAN has shaped a multi-level, wide-ranging and all-round favorable situation by focusing on economic cooperation and gradually expanding into political, security and cultural fields. China, Japan and South Korea have carried out trilateral cooperation within the framework. Under the “10 + 3” mechanism, summits, ministerial meetings, senior official meetings and working meetings are held each year. There are eight cooperation priorities in eight fields of economy, money and finance, social and human resource development, science and technology, development cooperation, culture and information, political security and transnational issues. Correspondingly, it has established eight ministerial meeting mechanisms that bring together ministers of foreign affairs, economy, finance, agriculture, labor, tourism, environment and health to jointly promote cooperation in more than 20 fields. “10 + 3” has consolidated the good momentum of East Asian cooperation and played an important role in promoting regional economic development, expanding regional trade and investment, realizing regional connectivity and enhancing the overall competitiveness of the region. Besides, it has proposed the strategic goal of the East Asian Community and promoted regional institutionalization, making it the main platform for East Asian cooperation. ASEAN values its centrality most, therefore it promotes the “10 + 1” and “10 + 3” mechanisms simultaneously as the main strategy for balance of power. Since the 2000s, ASEAN has signed five “10 + 1” FTAs with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, building an FTA network including all major surrounding countries for regional economic integration.81 ASEAN believes that it can only safeguard its discourse power and economic interests by leading the East Asian economic cooperation. The “10 + 1” framework of ASEAN clearly reflects a global vision beyond East Asia. As such, ASEAN has been actively promoting the ASEAN-centered “10+” model comprising several “10 + 1” FTAs to serve as the basic framework for regional economic cooperation. Capitalizing on the favorable conditions such as the impossibility of signing the China-Japan-ROK FTA and other regional cooperation frameworks due to lack of political mutual trust among major powers in the short term and the difficulty in interests coordination in several sensitive fields, ASEAN has adopted the “10 + 1” and “10 + 3” mechanisms to secure the agenda-setting power and leadership in regional cooperation and remain at the core of East Asian economic cooperation in the way that ASEAN arrives at consensus internally followed by negotiations with China, Japan and South Korea (Table 4.4).

80 “Li

Keqiang’s Speech at the 16th ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea) Leaders’ Meeting”, People’s Daily, Oct. 11, 2013, front page. 81 Bi [72].

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Table 4.4 Process of the ASEAN FTAs Negotiation participants

Name

Process

Effective

China

CAFTA

A framework agreement was signed in Nov. 2002, the Trade in Goods Agreement in Nov. 2004, the Trade in Service Agreement in Jan. 2007, and the Investment Agreement in Aug. 2009. The FTA was officially launched on Jan. 1, 2010. The launch of upgraded FTA negotiations was discussed in 2014

South Korea

KAFTA

A framework agreement was signed in Dec. 2005, the Trade in Goods Agreement in May 2006, the Trade in Service Agreement in Nov. 2007, and the Investment Agreement in Jun. 2009. The FTA was officially launched on Jan. 1, 2010

Japan

AJFTA

A framework agreement was signed in Oct. 2003, and the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in Apr. 2008, effective on Dec. 1, 2008

Australia and New Zealand

AANZFTA

Negotiations began in Feb. 2005, and a free trade agreement was signed on Feb. 27, 2009, effective on Jan. 1, 2010

India

ASEAN-India RTIA

A free trade agreement was signed in Aug. 2009. The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and India was signed on Oct. 8, 2003, the Trade in Goods Agreement in Aug. 2009, and the Trade in Service Agreement and the Investment Agreement to be signed in 2014

EU

ASEAN-EU FTA

Negotiations began in June 2007, suspended from Dec. 2008 to Dec. 2009, and the first round of negotiations was held in Mar. 2010. At present, the EU is separately negotiating with individual ASEAN members

China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India

10 + 6 (RCEP)

The first round of negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was held in Brunei in Aug. 2013. Five rounds of negotiations had been held as of Sept. 2014

Under negotiation

(continued)

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Table 4.4 (continued) Negotiation participants

Name

Process

Under study

GCC

ASEAN-GCC FTA

Singapore signed a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Dec. 2008. In Dec. 2009, ASEAN announced the preliminary completion of the feasibility study on the Framework Agreement and the Trade in Goods Agreement, but the two sides have not launched negotiations yet

Pakistan

PAFTA

Pakistan has signed a free trade agreement with individual ASEAN member states. A PAFTA feasibility study is under way, with no negotiations launched

China, Japan and South Korea

10 + 3

The Track II study has been completed in the civil feasibility study. Due to no progress made in the China-Japan-ROK FTA negotiations, the “10 + 3” FTA negotiations failed to conduct

Source Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China: http://www. mofcom.gov.cn; Shen Minghui: “Responding to the Spaghetti Effect—Also on the Role of ASEAN in East Asian Cooperation” (ying dui yi da li mian tiao wan xiao ying—jian lun dong meng zai dong ya he zuo zhong de zuo yong), Asia-Pacific Economic Review, No. 2, 2011, pp. 14–19; ASEAN website: http://www.asean.org

With the efforts of ASEAN, East Asia is embracing diversified and multidimensional economic integration. At the core of this integration, ASEAN is committed to preventing any single power from leading the process to ensure that any single process is only part of rather than all of regionalization. ASEAN’s core rules such as non-intervention, minimal institutionalization, consensus and comfort care have contributed to regional peace as a whole and maximum pragmatic cooperation between countries with different levels of development, religions, cultures and social systems.82 In this process, ASEAN has successfully dominated regional cooperation and played a proactive role in handling regional affairs.

4.3.3 Creating EAS to Boost Regional Political Cooperation Politically, as ASEAN is increasingly confident about its own model, it has begun to actively promote this model,83 dedicated itself to building regional political cooperation mechanisms, in particular, the East Asia Summit (EAS). At the first EAS in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, leaders from 16 countries including the ten 82 Wei

[71]. [73].

83 Busse

4.3 Spillover Effects and Limitations of the ASEAN Norms

145

ASEAN states together with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, opening a new chapter of East Asian integration. ASEAN has set three criteria for participation in EAS. First of all, the participant is required to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia to establish a dialogue partnership and substantive relations with ASEAN states. The East Asian Community is developed along the track of the ASEAN Way subject to the nonmilitary and non-intervention principle under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which is a powerful tool for ASEAN states to shape the future of EAS. Secondly, the Dialogue Partners shall place ASEAN at the center of EAS and control the speed of this process through “10 + 1”. Thirdly, the substantive relations will leave enough leeway and sufficient space for ASEAN’s diplomatic tact. Through these three standards, ASEAN has maintained the access to EAS and ensured its leadership in this mechanism. In fact, these three criteria have once again reaffirmed ASEAN’s primacy and redefined the East Asian region.84 Since its launch, EAS has been led by ASEAN, and hosted and chaired by the ASEAN Presidency. Its accession criteria are defined by ASEAN, and its member composition reflects the preferences of major ASEAN states. Based on the ASEAN norms, EAS has adopted the practices of common deliberation, exchange of views and consensus building. As an informal protocol, its Presidential Statement is not binding, so there are no obvious policy convergence effects among the members. EAS was originally expected to be a good opportunity for creating an East Asian family.85 However, China’s rapid rise has caused many countries to change their expectations on the process of East Asian cooperation and then to make strategic adjustments. For example, for ASEAN, it should focus its balancing strategy on dealing with the rise of China; for the US, the effects of China’s rise together with the concerns about the US decline have necessarily contributed to its decision on strategic shift to the East; for Japan, the impact of China’s rise is so strong that its economy appears to decline, which is the most important life-saving straw for Japan’s political right deviation. In this context, the expansion of EAS has become a product of compromises, and the further “non-East Asianization” of EAS seems inevitable. In July 2009, the US joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia against the backdrop of its pivot to East Asia strategy, which created conditions for its participation in EAS. The membership of the US and Russia was officially confirmed at the 5th EAS in October 2010, highlighting once again the role of EAS as a political security forum to discuss major strategic issues in the region. The US and Russia became full members at the 6th EAS in November 2011. EAS has further lost its geographical meaning as a regional forum based in East Asia; in fact, it has evolved into a strategic forum held in East Asia to discuss regional and global issues. It is the first summit-level international mechanism that brings together all major countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

84 Zhu

and Ross [74]. [75].

85 Ruan

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EAS members are gathered not based on regional identity, but on common strategic interests, making it a pioneering cooperation model in the world without geographic restrictions. By introducing non-regional powers, ASEAN has balanced the impact of China’s rise and Japan’s decline on the region, and secured the acquiescence and support from countries within the region and beyond, so that it can continue to play a leading role and sustain the influence of the ASEAN norms.86 However, EAS was in an embarrassing situation after its acceptance of the US and Russia who mainly regard EAS as a strategic platform. The US clearly wanted EAS to become a forum dedicated to nuclear non-proliferation, maritime security, climate change and other strategic and political issues. Actually, the US and Russia may become a factor against the region because their mission is to prevent the emergence of an East Asian community led by the Asians.87

4.3.4 ASEAN’s Effort to Ensure Leadership and Its Dilemma ASEAN’s effort to ensure its leadership in East Asian cooperation is an important force shaping the current East Asian order. As a regular practice since 1997, the ASEAN rotating presidency will invite leaders of China, Japan and South Korea to attend the ASEAN summit, allowing ASEAN to lead the “10 + 3” mechanism. In order to empower itself and maintain its centrality in East Asian integration, ASEAN has introduced non-regional powers including the US and India to achieve balance of power in East Asia. It is also striving to implement the Concentric Circles strategy focused on the ASEAN Community and surrounded by multiple “10 + 1” mechanisms at the first circle of periphery, “10 + 3” at the second, and EAS at the third,88 with an aim to lead East Asian cooperation. In addition, ASEAN supports the initiative of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), with the purpose of strengthening cooperation with the EU and containing the US through the EU to prevent it from over-expanding its influence in the region and dominating Southeast Asian affairs alone.89 Apparently, the core goal of ASEAN’s grand strategy is to secure its regional leadership, while balance of power is part of its principal strategy. ASEAN’s balance-of-power strategy is reflected in its relations with major powers in East Asia and beyond. Its external cooperation is basically carried out within the framework of APEC. Multilateralism and bilateralism are selectively used for balance of power in the security, political and economic fields, as well as for cooperation in different fields with different major countries, thus shaping a diversified pattern where countries involved have both gains and worries. Specifically, ASEAN has strengthened economic cooperation with China, South Korea and India to reduce economic dependence on the US and Japan; cooperated with the US and India to 86 Tian

[76]. [71], Breslin [77]. 88 Lu [25], Shen [78]. 89 Li and Wang [79]. 87 Wei

4.3 Spillover Effects and Limitations of the ASEAN Norms

147

alleviate security concerns caused by China’s rise; and partnered with Australia, New Zealand, Europe and Russia to counterbalance the political influence of China and the US. Besides, it seeks to ease the potential adverse impact of the China-US competition on East Asian stability through ASEM, so as to build the ASEAN-centered political framework with multipolar counterweights including Asia, Europe and the US. All these efforts have ensured the status of ASEAN as a “balancer”, enabling it to use the great power tensions for the benefit of itself.90 The ultimate goal of ASEAN is to realize its own security and development, in this sense, balance of power is a mean instead of an end. In this process, East Asia has not only taken advantage of the great power tensions, but also adopted the engagement strategy in major aspects. In other words, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a dual strategy in the sub-region, instead of merely making a choice between balancing and bandwagoning. In doing so, they can maintain in-depth engagement with China on the one hand, and use the soft strategy such as increasing military procurement, weaponry modernization, and maintaining the US intervention in the region on the other, in response to the possible future changes.91 Since the 2010s, ASEAN has significantly adjusted its balancing strategy due to the strategic shift eastward. ASEAN’s leadership in regional cooperation has been unanimously supported by East Asian countries, but non-regional countries are envious of its ambition. The US is not only trying to dominate the East Asian situation in security by organizing a flexible encirclement against China, but also striving for the leadership in regional trade cooperation through the promotion of TPP to pose a big challenge to ASEAN’s leading position in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the ASEAN Summit officially approved RCEP in November 2011 and launched the negotiation process in May 2013, it would be unlikely to complete the negotiations and build the economic circle covering the entire East Asia by the end of 2015. The core principle of ASEAN’s RCEP strategy is to balance the great powers and safeguard its discourse power in East Asia by deepening East Asian economic integration and building an ASEAN-centered regional economic cooperation network.92 However, in order to maintain its centrality operationally, ASEAN must accelerate and strive to build the ASEAN Community by 2015,93 but whether this goal can be duly achieved remains unknown. Besides, ASEAN finds it difficult to push East Asian cooperation to a higher level although it can launch the process.94 ASEAN has never tried to establish any institutional constraints or restraint mechanisms.95 The practices such as low institutionalization and avoidance of commitments or obligations under the ASEAN Way have not only led to slow integration within ASEAN, but also slowed down the process of East Asian integration to some extent. Due to the problems in execution 90 Liang

and Yaoshun [64], Li and Wang [79], Hu [80]. [81]. 92 Bi [72]. 93 Zhang [82]. 94 Wang [83]. 95 Zhu and Ross [84]. 91 Roy

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and other aspects caused by low institutionalization, and with the deepening of East Asian cooperation, the influence of ASEAN on the political and security order in the region through economic diplomacy may decline.96 As a pilot in East Asian cooperation, ASEAN is faced with a number of challenges such as weak leadership, an increasingly complex interests chain, and a slack process of economic and political integration, making it feel less confident in deepening East Asian economic cooperation. Moreover, as the ASEAN market is small but diversified, it is difficult for ASEAN to provide sufficient market and strategic space for East Asian integration, and it is not keen on expanding the regional cooperation, which has really slowed down the process of regional economic integration.97 To maintain its core position in regional cooperation, ASEAN’s main strategy is to incorporate more great powers into the process to have them balance each other. This strategy is highly risky because once there is collision or standoff between these great powers, the process of regional cooperation may be disrupted, and ASEAN may even face the dilemma of taking sides.

4.4 Evolution and Adjustment of the US Strategy Towards East Asia To sustain its global hegemony has been the fundamental strategic goal of the US since the end of World War II, and the significant adjustment of its strategic deployment is also a conventional action. The US is keeping a close eye on the world trend, the movement of great powers and its own domestic situation. It is good at and diligent in strategic planning, and is working on maintaining its world leadership. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been seeking for consolidation of its “unipolar moment”, to create a unipolar order with its advantages.98 However, since the Cold War, especially the 2000s, the world has entered a period of holistic transformation, and the rise and fall of great powers has changed radically. The non-western countries are rising collectively and the declining tendency of western countries have emerged. In particular, the financial crisis and debt crisis originating from the US and EU accelerated global transformation, which in turn is impacting the existing international order structure and causing the rebuilding of the global order and regional order based on common interests. In view of this, it is hard to build the US-led unipolar order. Instead, the transformation of world order increasingly shows a multipolarization trend characterized by the convergence and institutionalization of common interests and the sharing of common responsibilities (great powers assume the primary responsibilities and other countries share the responsibilities) and led by the building of regional order.99 96 Liang

and Yaoshun [64]. [78]. 98 Qin [85], Men[86–88]. 99 Men [89]. 97 Shen

4.4 Evolution and Adjustment of the US Strategy Towards East Asia

149

The US is at the heart of the world order rebuilding and the regional order change. Based on its ambition to maintain its world dominance and leadership, the US will face severe international challenges for sure. The transformation and rebuilding of international order itself is a challenge to the US, because the existing international order is basically built under the dominance of the US, reflecting more of the political interests and strategic considerations of the Western countries led by the US. As emerging countries are rising collectively, in particular, as emerging countries on every continent have mostly realized political stability and relatively rapid economic growth, their national strength and international influence is on the rise steadily, and their voice for improving the international order or even building a new order becomes increasingly stronger. The extravagant hope of the US to build a unipolar order shortly after the Cold War has failed, and its existing global interest layout is subject to more impact. Such challenge mainly comes from Asia. In the view of the US elites, the challenge to the global dominance of the US mainly comes from the change in the Asian pattern. The global power landscape is shifting from the Atlantic Age to the Pacific Age. Asia, especially East Asia, becomes the center for the growth of global economy. The economy of developing great powers is rising and thus they are expanding their international influence.100 In contrast, as the existing developed countries in the West are facing the problems of frequent economic crisis, fragile financial system and high unemployment rate, their relative decline is an undeniable fact and the shift of international political focus to the East is accelerating. On the other hand, the rise and fall of great powers in Asia is also accelerating. Japan is declining, while China, India and Indonesia are rising successively. The huge changes of the balance of power in Asia and the variation of strength comparison between Asian great powers and the US have resulted in the imbalance of the Asian pattern, making the rebalancing process in Asia unpredictable and challenging. The challenges for the US to maintain its dominance in Asia and ensure its strategic interests in Asia are also increasing correspondingly. In recent years, the grand strategic objective of the US has been gradually defined as sustaining its global leadership, achieving its strategic shift eastward, ensuring its dominance in East Asia and maintaining the power parity in East Asia. To sustain its global leadership, the US has taken steps to build a global system composed of ally & partner networks, regional organizations and global institutions, regulate and control the international relations, especially the relations with great powers, balance the regional influence of China with some East Asian countries, adjust the strategic deployment in Asia-Pacific, and increase the intervention in the East Asia affairs, thus showing the attitude of counterbalancing China and hitting the strategic nerve of various countries. The strategic bottom line of the US is to ensure its primacy in East Asia, protect the regional balance in favor of the US from being nibbled, and avoid falling back as a regional country for quitting East Asia and losing its Asia dominance. The adjustment of the US strategic layout in East Asia brings

100 Zhang

[90].

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new strategic opportunities to the countries in East Asia, as well as turbulence and challenges.

4.4.1 Evolution of the US Strategy Towards East Asia The US began to get involved with East Asia through foreign trade. However, its general strategy in the middle and late 19th century was to seize the interests of East Asia in the name of “participation of interests” following the UK and France and other colonialist countries. The US sometimes also acted as the protagonist. For example, it forced Japan to open the nation in 1853, to expand its sphere of influence in the Far East. After that, especially since the end of the American Civil War, the US has been focused on the strategic significance of the Pacific and the expansion into the Pacific and the Far East has become a consistent strategic objective of the US. The American-Spanish War in 1898 was a milestone in the hegemony history of the US. With that war, the US not only showcased its ambition to maintain the American system, but also acquired a springboard for expedition to East Asia, especially China, by occupying the Philippines and seizing Hawaii and Guam. As the old imperialist powers have carved up the world, the US submitted three Open Door notes successively, representing the formation of an independent Asia policy of the US. After World War I, the US tried to establish a semi-institutionalized mechanism, somewhere between the League of Nations and the imperialist order in anarchy, including the initiatives to hold a disarmament conference and resolve the East Asia issues through the Conference of Washington, and to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact, all of which reflected the efforts of the US to build a world order beyond the League of Nations. Among others, the Conference of Washington from November 1921 to February 1922 adopted the Limitation of Naval Armament (or the Five-Power Treaty) and the Nine-Power Treaty, building a relative safe balance of power in the Far East and establishing a code of conduct based on the principles of international cooperation, major power negotiation, open door, peaceful competition and disarmament. The Conference of Washington also designed the international monetary system based on gold standard and set up the consortium in China, preliminarily building an international economic mechanism focused on free trade and international cooperation.101 After that and before World War II, the US and its allies defended the Washington system, while Japan was estranged from this system and tried to build the Greater East Asia system. The Pacific War was the result of intensified conflicts between these two systems. As discussed above, during World War II, the US consciously fostered China as a tool against the USSR; after 1949, it regarded fostering Japan as a priority of its Far East strategy. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the US stepped up the 101 Wang

[91].

4.4 Evolution and Adjustment of the US Strategy Towards East Asia

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establishment of a military treaty system in East Asia with bilateral military alliance as the core and for the purpose of encircling the Fast East. By establishing multilateral military alliances and security mechanisms such as NATO, SEATO and CENTO, and by signing bilateral military treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, the US has built up a ring of encirclement to contain socialist countries, and rapidly formed a US-led alliance system. From the mid-1950s to the end of the Cold War, the main changes in the strategic layout of the US in East Asia were reflected in: firstly, the US-Japan relations evolved from a principal-subordinate alliance to an almost equal partnership. Japan became the second largest economy in the late 1960s, and the US changed from a protectorate to an economic rival to Japan. After the 1970s, the Japan-US economic conflicts became public, and Japan also accelerated its multilateral independent diplomatic steps. After the 1980s, the political power consciousness of Japan grew stronger, showing a clear intent to compete for East Asia dominance with the US. Secondly, the US-China relations evolved from confrontation to informal alliance against the USSR. In the 1960s, the strength gap between the US and the USSR was further bridged, the trend of economic competition among the US, Japan and the Europe became increasingly obvious and the hegemony of the US began to decline relatively; the China-USSR relations evolved from disagreement to enemy, even in war at the Zhenbao Island. In such situation, the US President Richard Nixon, who came into power in 1969, proactively engaged China, with which the US was yet to establish official diplomatic relations, to resist the expansion of the USSR together. This joint strategic adjustment of China and the US had profound influence as it provided a source of power for the future transformation of East Asian pattern. Thirdly, the US planned to integrate into the East Asian economy and share the prosperity through the construction of multilateral institutions. The successive rise of Japan and Four Dragons have laid a foundation for East Asian economic prosperity, and China’s reform and opening-up since 1978 has provided a new opportunity for the economic booming in the region. The US began to be interested in the Asia-Pacific economic circle in the 1980s. When US President Ronald Reagan visited Japan and South Korea in 1983, he repeatedly stressed that the United States was a Pacific country. In 1984, the United States established the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) bringing together government officials, congressmen, financial figures and scholars. In 1984, George Schultz, US Secretary of State, officially announced that the US government decided to promote the establishment of the Pacific Community. The US then worked with other East Asian countries to prepare for the institutionalized economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, which contributed to the establishment of APEC in 1989. After World War II, the US tried to dominate the security affairs of East Asia and establish security relations based on bilateral alliance, but it made no efforts to drive the development of regional system economically. The re-entry of East Asia into an orderly age was basically driven by economic cooperation. By the end of the 1990s, the internal trade in East Asia had been over 50%, and the internal investment and technology transfer was also booming. China became an important hub to absorb foreign investment and manufacturing, built a horizontal work division

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contact among various economies in East Asia via the production and sales networks of multinational companies, and became a contact hub and growth source for this new structure. The process of cooperation in East Asia began with and focused on economic cooperation, while developing political dialogue and socio-cultural cooperation step by step. Cooperation played a role in building strategic trust and regional institutions to realize the overall stability and development of East Asia.102 After the Cold War, the US gained the hegemony in politics and security of East Asia, also considered as a balancer in East Asia.103 However, the power pattern in East Asia had changed profoundly. In particular, with the successive rise of Japan, the Four Dragons and China, the economic status of East Asia improved rapidly. With the increased economic interdependence of the nations, the process of open economic integration has become irreversible, the dependency of East Asian countries on the Chinese market is deepened, and China’s rising strength has been considered by the US as its biggest threat in East Asia.104 The so-called “China Threat Theory” pushed East Asian countries towards the US in terms of politics and security to seek a balance point between China and the US. This has brought certain opportunities to the strategic layout of the US, but will pose real challenges in the long run. The post-war strategic objective of the US in East Asia was to maintain its hegemony in security and politics and prevent the emergence of a regional hegemonic power that will challenge and threaten its hegemony and strategic interests. Besides, it also wanted to get a free ride of the rapid economic development of East Asia and the rapid rise of China to gain economic interests by forcing East Asian markets to accept the US goods and services via market forces and sanctions. The new idea of the US East Asia strategy was mainly reflected in economy and security. Its economic strategy was to promote investment and trade liberalization via APEC, merge into and guide the economy of East Asia in a multilateral and bilateral way, share the fruits of East Asian growth, prevent the emergence of any regional economic or trade blocs that exclude the US, prevent any other countries from dominating the economic cooperation and development of East Asia,105 and strengthen the inherent dependence of East Asia on the US in terms of economy and security through multiple approaches. The main purpose of the US to control APEC is to establish an open multilateral trade system based on the US security alliances, prevent East Asia from becoming a regional economic organization like EU by promoting TPP, and ensure its own economic and security interests in East Asia. In 1992, James Baker, the Secretary of 102 Zhang

[92, 93]. [94]. 104 “In the last 20–30 years of the 20th century, the world pattern changed significantly. Among others, the influence of East Asia as a region was rising increasingly. Japan and China were regarded as great strategic challenges by the US successively, and some Americans even exclaimed that the US had mistaken the USSR as the main opponent while ignored ‘the challenges from East Asia’, which were the biggest threat to the US.” See: Hofheinz and Calder [95], Brzezinski [96], Weiss [97]. 105 As Lester C. Thurow points out, “The United States has no interest in a cohesive Asian trade bloc, and what really matters is to divide and conquer it.” See Thurow [98]. 103 Snyder

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State of the US, said that, “APEC is like an open fan, radiating westwards from the North America across the Pacific. The US-Japan alliance is the central backbone, the US-South Korea alliance is the north wing, the US-Thailand and the US-Philippines alliances are the south wing, and the US-Australia alliance is another fan rib.”106 During the early stage of the Clinton administration, the US tried to transform APEC into an institutionalized economic cooperation coordinating body to strengthen its economic cooperation and maintain its forward deployment and alliance system in Asia-Pacific, thus dominating the security and political process of Asia-Pacific. It was under the proposal of the US that annual informal summit began to hold from 1993. By proposing and organizing the first summit, the US established its dominance. However, the practice of the US in urging trade and investment liberalization was not in line with the objectives of East Asian countries. Thereafter, the development of APEC tended to be generalized, but the economic cooperation among East Asian countries began to grow like a raging fire. However, the US would not allow the development of the economic cooperation among East Asian countries to threaten its own interests. Due to the opposition of the US, the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) proposed by Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad and the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposed by Japan were both dead in the water.107 Yet, it was impossible to completely stop the economic cooperation among East Asian countries and its spillover effects. The “10 + 3” and “10 + 1” mechanisms of East Asia were still developed under the restriction of the ambivalence of the US. In view of that, the US altered its economic strategy towards East Asia: (i) It agreed to China’s entry into WTO by using its leadership in global economic system to promote the economic liberalization and grasp the broad opportunities presented by the rise of China,108 as an answer to the possibility of China rising as a world power in a so-called creative way; (ii) It promoted the institutionalization of APEC and expanded its political and security functions to ensure that APEC can play a leading role in the economic and security affairs of East Asia;109 (iii) It set out to sign bilateral trade agreements with some East Asian countries to promote the free trade cooperation in Asia-Pacific dominated by the US. At the APEC informal summit in Mexico in 2002, the US put forward the ASEAN-Oriented Plan to the leaders of ASEAN, proposed to sign an agreement on the US-ASEAN Free Trade Area, and started FTA negotiations with Singapore quickly, as well as expressed the intent of FTA negotiations to countries including the Philippines and Malaysia. On May 6, 2003, the US and Singapore signed an official free trade agreement, the first bilateral free trade agreement signed by the US with an Asian country. After that, the US signed a bilateral free trade agreement with Japan, and began talks with other regions such as Taiwan about bilateral trade agreement.

106 Baker

[99]. [100]. 108 Carter and William [101]. 109 Cossa [102]. 107 Ikenberry

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In the arrangement of security system, the US still relied on its alliance system formed during the Cold War to continue its alliance-based strategy.110 But there were some changes. Specifically, the US adjusted its existing bilateral alliances; began to strengthen the horizontal ties among its allies; participated in the activities of multilateral security mechanism; and organized a temporary alliance after the September 11 attacks according to the concept of “mission determines the alliance”. Another change was that the US took defensive measures mainly against China in East Asia after the collapse of the USSR, but its strategy towards China was not merely about containment, but a combination of defense and engagement. In summary, the US security strategy towards East Asia, with China as the main target, was built upon its military presence and bilateral military alliances, supplemented by multilateral institutional arrangements. The combination of bilateralism and à la carte multilateralism was reflected at the institutional construction level.111 Firstly, strengthened the bilateral military alliance was the basis for the adjustment of the US security strategy towards East Asia. Since the mid-1990s, the US has preliminarily adjusted its alliance system in East Asia and changed the model of unilateral provision of security by transforming the alliance function, extending the alliance range and expanding the cooperation fields. While ensuring its leading position, the US emphasized the sharing of responsibilities among the allies,112 and the diversification of cooperation fields and methods, with the aim of forming a US-centered fan-shaped structure consisting of five bilateral alliances and several informal security relations that will involve various fields of military cooperation and reach the entire East Asia. Among them, the US-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the US Asia-Pacific strategy, serving as a spear to deal with the “peripheral affairs”; the US-South Korea alliance is the security pillar of the US in Northeast Asia;113 the US-Australia alliance is the southern pillar of the US-led East Asian security order; and the US-ASEAN alliance on security cooperation (the US has traditional military alliance relations with the Philippines and Thailand, and the institutionalization of its security cooperation with Indonesia and Singapore has been strengthened) has created conditions for the US to penetrate into the hinterland of East Asia. Besides, the US has also maintained a substantive paramilitary alliance with Taiwan. With all these partnerships, the US is able to build a regional security network focusing on bilateral alliances and bilateral military arrangements. Secondly, the US was actively exploring ways to strengthen horizontal ties with its allies. Main results included, among others, the strategic dialogue on security issues carried out by the US, Japan and Australia, and the coordination and negotiation organized by the US, Japan and South Korea to address the Korean Peninsula crisis. Since the US upgraded its relations with Japan, Australia and South Korea in 1996, it has made positive efforts to promote horizontal ties with its allies. The US, Australia 110 Ibid.,

p. 197. and Khong [103]. 112 Zhou [104]. 113 The United States Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region, Washington D.C.: US Department of Defense, 1998, p. 9. 111 Malone

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and Japan held the first tripartite strategic dialogue in October 2003 to form the preliminary triangular security framework dedicated to the South Pacific. In order to jointly tackle the North Korean nuclear issue, the US, Japan and South Korea established a trilateral coordination and monitoring group in 1999 to harmonize understanding and policies on the North Korean nuclear issue via ad hoc negotiation, a testament to their intention to deal with Northeast Asian security. Meanwhile, the US also tried to drive the institutionalized negotiation involving the US, Australia, Japan and South Korea. Thirdly, the US took an active part in multilateral security negotiations in East Asia. It expected to establish an East Asian multilateral security order based on its military alliance and presence. This US-centered order was designed to shelter its allies and embrace other non-allies in East Asia. Therefore, the US welcomed multilateral security dialogue, and even took the initiative to incorporate security coordination into the agenda of the APEC informal summit. The US treated the East Asian multilateral security system represented by ARF as a supplement to its security and diplomatic objectives. However, regarding the framework of the East Asian security system, the alliance strategy of the US was vastly different from the cooperative security concept advocated by ASEAN and China (Table 4.5). Fourthly, the philosophy of “mission determines the alliance” penetrated into the security strategy of East Asia. The US not only strengthened the cooperation and negotiation with countries such as Indonesia, but also formed temporary alliances with China and Russia to deal with terrorism and the North Korean nuclear crisis. Table 4.5 Difference between security alliance and cooperative security Security alliance

Cooperative security

Objective

Win the wars and deter the opponents

Prevent occurrence of military conflicts

Nature

Strengthen the military power

Inhibit the motive to use force

System

Closed system, with defined enemies

Open system, without defined enemies

Scope

Military

Political, economic, military

Core

Support the wars of allies

Solve the conflicts without use of force

Foundation

Definite common enemies

Uncertain potential security hazard

Conflict relation

Relation between allies and non-allies

Relation between member countries

Principle

Required cooperation

Voluntary cooperation

Main cooperation method

Joint military exercise and provision of military support

Confidence building measures

Efficacy

Strong

Weak

Source Yan Xuetong, American Hegemony and China’s Security (mei guo ba quan yu zhong guo an quan), Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2000, p.98

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With the rise of overall strength and the promotion of political & economic position of East Asia in the world, the US has focused more on East Asia. The relations between the US and East Asia are becoming increasingly close and complicated. Generally, the US East Asia strategy ensured its dominance, but there were irreconcilable conflicts in the layout itself as economically the US required East Asian countries to give up their share in American market and open their own markets, and in terms of security, the US needed support and cooperation of its allies. Therefore, it is not at the sole discretion of the US about the success of its strategic objective to ensure primacy in East Asia.

4.4.2 Inertia of the US Strategy Towards East Asia East Asia is an important anchor for the hegemony of the US. The US is not an East Asian country, but is tightly bound to various East Asian countries. It is a decisive factor for the security trend of East Asia, serving as an important lever in the development and prosperity of East Asia. The US has its important strategic interests in every corner of East Asia, so it has developed formal or informal institutional arrangements to maintain such interests.114 The strategic layout of the US in East Asia is mainly based on bilateral security cooperation, supplemented by economic multilateralism, with an emphasis on the mutual empowerment of security bilateralism and economic multilateralism.115 In the field of security, the US has established official military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, and maintained a substantive paramilitary alliance with Taiwan. After the mid-1990s, the US took a series of strategic measures, adjusted and re-established the US-centered hub-spoke system consisting of formal bilateral alliances and several informal security relations that involved various military cooperation fields and reached the entire East Asia.116 In the first years after the Cold War, the US reduced its military presence in East Asia, and even withdrew from Southeast Asia in 1992, leaving a huge power vacuum there. The conflicts originally covered by the Cold War and the legacy disputes over territorial waters and land reemerged in succession, contributing to the creation of the multilateral security cooperation dialogue mechanism in East Asia and the operation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).117 After the September 11 attacks in 2001, the US returned to Southeast Asia, took an active part in the activities of ARF, and continued to influence the security of East Asia with its powerful strength. The Obama Administration coming into power in 2008 launched the strategic shift eastward to lead East Asia in security and gain the dominance of economic cooperation in

114 Blair

and Hanley [105]. [102, p. 193]. 116 Yang [106]. 117 Wu [65]. 115 Cossa

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Proportion (%)

East Asia and even Asia-Pacific by implementing the TPP strategy in economy, highlighting its intent to create America’s Pacific Century. In the field of economy, the US is an important partner of all economies in East Asia. The proportion of East Asia in American trade has been around 40% for a long time. In recent years, the proportion of the US FDI in East Asia of its total has increased to about 17–18%. The US-China and US-Japan economic relations often draw the attention of the world, deemed as a scale to measure their bilateral relations in a sense. In the 1990s, the US proposed the idea of creating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). It played a leading role in APEC, opposed the East Asian cooperation aimed at excluding the US, and coped with East Asian integration with bilateral free trade agreements.118 In recent years, the US has realigned its regional economic strategy to try to gain the initiative and dominance in regional economic cooperation by leading the TPP multilateral negotiations (Fig. 4.1).119 Meanwhile, the US has continued its cultural infiltration into East Asia. In recent years, the US has strongly promoted the value-oriented diplomacy and tried to build up a values alliance in compliance with American political norms and values, so as to shape its trinity East Asia strategy framework based on security, economy and culture.120 In conclusion, the US has enormous security, economic and strategic interests in East Asia. If a peer competitor emerged in East Asia and forced the US to exit East Asia, it means the end of its superpower position.121 This is the bottom line of its

China Japan South Korea ASEAN

Fig. 4.1 Proportion of the US investment in East Asia (1992–2012). Source Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. Note The historical stock change calculated with the data of balance of international payments 118 Chen

[107]. to Song Wei, the US was quite successul in suppressing the process of East Asian integration through its regional cooperation strategy towards Asia-Pacific, which has indirectly undermined the “10 + 3” mechanism. See Song [108]. 120 Xin [109]. 121 Buzan and Waever [68, p. 167]. 119 According

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East Asia strategy. On the whole, the US security system arrangement in East Asia has been sustained, its strategic interests have been maintained and expanded, and the US continues to play a key role in the East Asian order building. On the other hand, however, the US is not a hegemon of East Asia,122 and a balanced situation is formed between the US and the major powers in East Asia. It treats such balance as the main benchmark for the peace of East Asia,123 and seeks to realign the relations with East Asian countries. Based on that, the following describes the strategic inertia of the US layout in East Asia: First, uphold the Asia-Pacific regionalism. The US is skeptical about and resistant to any exclusive regional cooperation in East Asia. In the early 1990s, it strongly opposed Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad’s proposal to establish the EAEG. Japan’s AMF proposal after the 1997 Asian financial crisis also fell through for the reason of the US. For the “10 + 3” mechanism after 1999, the US was relatively tolerant because the mechanism itself was characterized by open regionalism, and the matched “10 + 1” mechanism and EAS were not intended to exclude the US. However, it was contrary to the Asia-Pacific regionalism followed by the US. East Asian regionalism directly competes with Asia-Pacific regionalism. The main differences lie in the countries covered by regional cooperation, the definition of the boundary of regionalism, and the ownership of the dominant power. At first, the US actively promoted and led the development of APEC and proposed the vision of a Pacific Community. When APEC failed to realize its strategic objectives, the US shifted its focus from multilateralism to bilateralism in the early 2000s, concluded bilateral free trade agreements with Singapore, South Korea and other countries, and launched bilateral FTA negotiations with Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan, etc., to dissolve the process of East Asian integration. In the meantime, the US didn’t give up the goal of leading the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. It first proposed the idea of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) at the APEC meeting in 2006,124 and then seized the opportunity to lead and drive the TPP multilateral negotiations. Second, merge into East Asia for economic leadership. The US has huge economic interests in East Asia. The economic rise of East Asia has brought great opportunities and challenges to the US. Merging into East Asia and sharing the dividends of East Asian economic growth is crucial to the continuous prosperity of the US economy. Meanwhile, the US is unwilling to be just a free rider of East Asian economy, but focuses more on the dominance of the regional economy. Unlike its influence on East Asia mostly via negative opposition and subversion in the 1990s, the US now plays a more proactive role to prevent the emergence of exclusive regional trade blocs in East Asia; increases the proportion of trade in East Asia to avoid its decline in trade status in the region; achieves political and security goals and consolidates hegemony in East Asia. The US is the most important external influencer of East Asian order, 122 “The

US hegemony in Asia is incomplete”. See Mastanduno [110]. [111]. 124 Xin [109]. 123 Yan

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and its FTA strategy in East Asia will not only bring significant influence on the process of East Asian economic integration, but also spill over to the dimension of politics and security, shaping the East Asian order profoundly.125 Third, lead the security of East Asia based on the US-Japan alliance. From the 1950s to now, the US has built and maintained the hub-spoke system based on bilateral alliances to control the security of East Asia. Since the mid-1990s, the US has taken a series of new moves, i.e. transformation of alliance functions, extension of alliance scope, and expansion of cooperation fields and methods, to preliminarily transform its East Asian alliance system. Based on the original legacy, the East Asian alliance system of the US, which had been adjusted and replenished, changed the one-way model that the US provided security unilaterally and the allies accepted protection passively, and emphasized that the allies should share more responsibilities, the cooperation fields should be wider and the cooperation methods should be more flexible and diversified while ensuring the leading position of the US. The current East Asian alliance system of the US is a fan-shaped structure consisting of five bilateral alliances and several informal security relations that will involve various fields of military cooperation and reach the entire East Asia. The US treated the US-Japan alliance as a tool to deal with various crises and conflicts in Asia-Pacific and a pivot to contain China and maintain its political influence in East Asia. Fourth, engage China and implement the hedging strategy. The US has long implemented its hedging policy towards China with engagement and containment combined to take whatever it wants. Back in the late 20th century, Joseph Nye indicated that, “Ten or twenty years later, what should the relations between an existing great power (the US) and a rising great power (China) be like? How should they cooperate? These are the most important questions beyond the debates on the two countries.”126 The establishment of China’s peaceful development road and the proposal of newtype major power relations mirror the direction of China’s overall strategy. Since the Cold War period, the US had tried to incorporate East Asia into the regional cooperation arrangement dominated by it, and directly or indirectly turn Asian cooperation into Asia-Pacific cooperation, to prevent China from becoming a great power via regional cooperation.127 In recent years, China has been rising at a faster pace, leading to more economic dependence of all East Asian countries on China and less on the US.128 This fact has upset the US and the adjustment of its East Asia strategy has become inevitable. The US won’t accept the power parity pattern in East Asia after the rise of China, and rejects any policies of marking off spheres of influence with China in the peripheral regions of China, but seeks a peaceful containment strategy towards China. On the other hand, the US continues to implement the engagement policy towards China. It does not encourage or seek direct confrontation with China,

125 Song

[112]. [113]. 127 Wang [23]. 128 Keller and Rawski [114]. 126 Nye

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but continues its pressure on China and encourages and guides China, to prevent China from making any policy choice against the strategic interests of the US.129

4.4.3 Effect of the US Strategic Shift Eastward in East Asia After the Cold War, the global leadership of the US has been eroded by the emerging multipolar pattern on the Eurasian continent and impacted by the new development in Africa and Latin America. As such, the US focuses on the ongoing geostrategic rebalancing, and the most drastic adjustment is the strategic shift from Europe to Asia-Pacific actively implemented by the Obama administration. The core issue is to seize the opportunity of the Pacific Century and address the challenge of China’s rise, with an aim to consolidate and develop the US leadership in Asia-Pacific and balance China’s ever-growing global and regional influence. What worries the US the most is that China has greater influence in East Asia and even Asia-Pacific than the US, which will eventually cause the US to lose the dominance in the regions. The US has realized the benefits of cooperation with China, but it is more worried about the serious challenges brought by the rise of China. The bottom line of its East Asia strategy is to maintain balance of power in the regions under its control. Therefore, the US has tried hard to act as an “offshore balancer” to keep moderate tensions in East Asia and leverage the estrangement between China and its neighbors, especially their concerns about China’s rise, to drive these countries to strengthen cooperation with the US in politics, economy and security, thus disrupting the internal integration of East Asia. On that account, the US began to have a negative strategic outlook on China’s rise as a whole. It treats China as a competitor and challenger. It is worried about China’s road to non-peaceful rise and its peaceful development as well. Preventing and breaking the strategic dependence of Asian countries on China in economy and security is a top priority of the US relations with China. Its main practices include: hype the China Threat Theory; consolidate and develop alliances, especially with the neighbors in conflict with China; incite China’s neighbors to stir up trouble; strengthen containment of China in all strategic directions including Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia; and encourage the peaceful evolution of China’s political system toward democratization, to push China to further merge into the international system dominated by the US.130 Based on the sober judgment and active grasp of the domestic and international situation, the US has adjusted its global strategic deployment significantly. The focus is to promote the stable domestic development in the first place whiling ensure its leadership in Asia-Pacific. Therefore, in strategic deployment, the US puts emphasis on considering how to handle the relations between the rising great powers such as China and India and the existing international order, and how to ensure its leadership in the imminent multipolar era. By overhauling its international strategy, especially 129 Zhu 130 Wu

[115]. [116], Qiu [117].

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the long-standing “Europe First” strategy, the US tries to pull away from the Middle East and Afghanistan challenges, and turns its focus on the long-term and far-reaching Asian issues. The US considers the Asia-Pacific dominance as the core guarantee for its world leadership. Therefore, it has increased the diplomatic, economic and military input in Asia-Pacific comprehensively, accelerated the value penetration, shifted its strategic emphasis from Atlantic to Asia-Pacific, and targeted China in its Asia-Pacific strategy. Meanwhile, the US is clearly aware of the relative fall of its strength, which makes it hard to maintain the dominance only by economic means and military deterrence. It needs soft power like diplomacy to complement its hard power, and economic, security, diplomatic or even ideological means to strengthen its overall power. In maintenance of its Asia-Pacific dominance, the US has leveraged the concerns of Asian countries about China’s intent and strategic trend, and further intervened in Asia-Pacific affairs by strengthening military alliances, deepening security cooperation and expanding the institutionalization of economic and trade cooperation, to be closely bound to these countries and create a flexible ring of encirclement around China. Since the end of Cold War, the US has mainly adopted a wait-and-see attitude and passive intervention policy on East Asia, and played the role of an “offshore balancer”. It could play God and increased the security dependence of its allies without assuming substantive security responsibilities. Now, the US has clearly strengthened its power presence in East Asia and taken an increasingly active part in regional security affairs. Also, it has reinforced the adjustment of its China strategy, and enhanced strategic deployment in East Asia by promoting military deployment, carrying out joint military exercise frequently, expanding military and defense cooperation with China’s neighbors, and intervening in the South China Sea issue.131 In a nutshell, its strategic deployment is about adjusting global layout, strengthening institutional hegemony and targeting China. More specifically: First, adjust global layout and shift strategic focus to the East. Since the AmericanSpanish War in 1898, the US has never been away from the Asian affairs. World War II turned the US into the leading shaper of East Asian security order. With the successive rise of Asian major powers after the Cold War, the US has always paid close attention to Asia. With the increased importance of the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War, the US has treated the Asian affairs as a priority. Since the 2000s, the US has been working on the strategic shift. In recent years, the US has shifted its global strategic focus to Asia-Pacific. It shrank globally but expanded in the Asia-Pacific to create the US-led TPP. In January 2010, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a speech on the relationship between the US and the AsiaPacific in Hawaii, kicking off the strategic shift.132 On November 19, 2011, the US attended the East Asia Summit as an official member for the first time, an important milestone during the shift process. Meanwhile, Hillary published an essay titled “America’s Pacific Century”, putting forward six goals for the strategic shift: (i) to strengthen bilateral security alliances; (ii) to deepen cooperation between the US and the emerging powers including China; (iii) to participate in regional multilateral 131 Patrick 132 Clinton

[118], Honghua [119]. [120].

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institutions; (iv) to expand trade and investment; (v) to build broad-based military presence; and (vi) to promote democracy and human rights.133 The frequent moves of the US in recent years show that the strategic shift is a comprehensive initiative that covers security, economy, values and other areas. Specifically, the US seeks to strengthen its military presence by consolidating and expanding alliance, and intervene in and dominate the Asia-Pacific economic integration by virtue of TPP; strengthen value-oriented diplomacy in Indonesia and Myanmar, encourage other emerging powers like India to compete with China, and try to benefit from the territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. On the other hand, as noted by Professor Huang Renwei, America’s strategic shift eastward is built upon its forward deployment adjustment, and there are four key factors for its military deployment in the Asia-Pacific: (i) prevent traditional allies from breaking away from the US base system; (ii) ensure access of the US strategic channel in Asia at any time; (iii) suppress China’s “anti-access” with the Air-Sea Battle; and (iv) form a US-led Asian security mechanism that includes China. The military strategic emphasis of the US in the Asia-Pacific has been shifted to the second island chain. In the process of the US strategic retreat, a huge power vacuum might emerge in between the second island chain and Mainland China. America’s adjustment of its Asia strategy is intended to prevent the domino effect in this empty space. Therefore, it stirred up trouble between other Asian countries and China. In particular, it forced China to be involved in a series of conflicts on the sea, thus increasing the security dependence of these Asian countries on the US.134 Second, reshape institutional hegemony and ensure regional leading status. Institutionalization is the main approach to its strategic shift. The US actively deepens the traditional alliance relations and expands the institutionalized cooperation with emerging powers, in a bid to build a new multilateral military cooperation system. Its main practices include: strengthen the alliance with Australia, station troops at RAAF Base Darwin, and enhance American military presence in Pacific and Indian Ocean; take the opportunity of conflict between South Korea and North Korea to deepen the military alliance with South Korea, institutionalize the US-Japan-South Korea security coordination, drive the networking of the alliance system, and launch the US-Japan-India trilateral dialogue while enhancing the US-Japan-South Korea and US-Japan-Australia trilateral security cooperation135 ; leverage the South China Sea dispute to strengthen the security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam, publicize the unshakeable assistance of the US to East Asian countries in handling and preventing the so-called “China Threat”, and try to extend its military cooperation system to the bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with ASEAN countries; guide the discussion of maritime security issue to intervene in the South China Sea dispute, and seize opportunity to station back to the military bases that it has withdrawn from. Meanwhile, the dominance of the US in the Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation is elevated to an unprecedented strategic level. With 133 Clinton

[121]. [122]. 135 Sun [123]. 134 Huang

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the increasingly hollowing-out of APEC, the US begins to promote TPP and treats it as the key approach to leading the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. It seeks to create and dominate the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), intervene in East Asian integration, and prevent China from dominating regional economy and trade. In fact, to get rid of financial crisis and drive economic recovery is a direct incentive for the US to take a high-profile part in TPP. The containment of East Asian regional cooperation and China’s rise together with the promotion of ideology are the strategic means contained in the TPP strategy to serve the maintenance of the US hegemony, while the maintenance of its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific regional system is the basic force driving the US to promote the TPP strategy.136 By strongly promoting TPP, the US is able to meet the following three goals in one shot: (i) seize the leadership of the Asia-Pacific economic rules; (ii) shift the direction of East Asian integration, disrupt the original institutional building process of East Asian integration,137 and draw the attention of various countries to the Asia-Pacific institutional architecture led by the US; and (iii) break and reduce the strategic dependence of East Asian countries on China. Third, prevent China from gaining the leadership in East Asia. The rise of China has undoubtedly exacerbated the worry about America’s decline, and China is widely seen by the American elites from all walks of life as a locked opponent. However, the so-called “opponent” here means the most important rival instead of a destined adversary. In the view of the American elites, the trend of China’s rise as a great power is unstoppable, there has been shift of economic influence between China and the US, and China may adjust its grand strategy thereby. Also, they are extraordinarily concerned about the development trend of China. In maintenance of its Asia-Pacific dominance, the US has leveraged the concerns of Asian countries about China’s intent and strategic trend, and further intervened in Asia-Pacific affairs by strengthening military alliances, deepening security cooperation and expanding the institutionalization of economic and trade cooperation, to be closely bound to these countries and create a flexible ring of encirclement around China. While expanding military alliances and promoting TPP, the US has also deepened security alliances with Japan, a strategic support for containment of China; significantly enhanced strategic partnership with India, a cornerstone in Asia to restrict China’s expanding influence; supported the Philippines and Vietnam, a tactic pivot to make trouble for China, in the territorial sea disputes with China directly or indirectly. By making use of the intent of some Asian countries to use the US to balance China’s regional influence, the US has increased its intervention in Asian affairs, especially East Asian affairs, strengthened the encirclement and pressure on China, squeezed the development space of China, and broken the dependence of Asian countries on China. But the goal of containing China is too ambitious to be achieved. Meanwhile, the US has an urgent need for China’s strong support in handling more and more global issues. Therefore, the US definitely has the intent to engage and rely on China. An important goal of its China strategy is to push China to fully integrate into the international 136 Liu

and Sun [124]. [125].

137 Wang

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system and follow the existing international rules to shape the international act of China. With the progress of the Pivot to Asia strategy, the two-sided policy of the US towards China has become increasingly obvious, and the game between China and the US has intensified. China has perceived the pressure brought by the changes in the surroundings. Many domestic experts believe that the Pivot to Asia strategy of the US is mainly deployed to contain or guard against China, and squeeze the strategic space of China. What the US has done in the regions around China has added to China’s concerns. In fact, the strategic adjustment of the US has provided an idea for the building of East Asian order, triggered the power recombination in Asia-Pacific, and complicated the regional security situation in Asia-Pacific. The long-standing territorial disputes are intertwined with the increasingly fierce maritime right competition, and the China-US security conflicts become a focal point in the world. The US has showed its muscle through the strong return. The decline of its political and economic strength is in sharp contrast to the expansion of its military and diplomatic influence, prompting speculation of various countries about its future strategic trend. The strategic adjustment of the US is directed at China. On hot issues, it will intervene and take sides with China’s neighbors. It strives to strengthen the alliance and quasi-alliance relations with relevant countries, promote sea-air battle, focus on forward deployment, conduct strategic probing on China, and heat up regional disputes, all of which has brought military containment and strong strategic pressure to China, and intensified the geostrategic competition between the two countries. It is true that the US maintains the interests of its existing and potential allies, but it has put them in a dilemma actually. Most of the Asian countries regard the US as a tool to mitigate anxiety, and don’t necessarily see the rise of China as a threat. They look to the US to balance China in the existing territorial land and sea disputes. They are unwilling to make a choice between China and the US, or take a risk to gain profit for the US. The prominent regional role of the US has weakened the centripetal force and cohesion of East Asian countries, which will more or less hinder the development of East Asian cooperation.138 The US has returned to East Asia by means of security alliance, multilateral economic agreement and values, but these means per se have structural conflicts with the existing regional order.139 On the other hand, the US now has no fundamental confidence in achieving the goal of seizing the strategic high ground of Asia-Pacific, and whether its deterrence system based on the traditional alliances can work in the long run remains to be observed.

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction To dominate East Asia has always been an objective for Japan. Given the geographical location and close economic ties, the economic growth, social stability and security 138 Wu 139 Wei

[126]. [71].

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165

of this region are all crucial to Japan. As one of the investment engines there, Japan has been a pioneer in the economic cooperation in East Asia. From the 1960s to the 1990s, the Japanese government facilitated the rolling waves of resurgence of East Asian nations with its official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment and industrial transfer, and played a relatively dominant role in regional economic development. To a certain extent, the flying geese economic order represented the economic heyday of Japan. Back then, Japan’s diplomatic focus was not on East Asia; instead, it expected to assume the role of an intermediary in AsiaPacific affairs, that is, a bridge between the US and Asian countries,140 while playing a bigger role on a global scale. Of course, from another perspective, Japan was also actively seeking to play an active and leading role in East Asian and Asian cooperation, since “Japan’s overseas investment is concentrated in Australia and Southeast Asia, displaying a strong sense of Asiacentrism.”141 Regarding regional cooperation, Japan mainly adopted open regionalism that incorporated the US, Australia and other Pacific developed countries into Asian cooperation, but at the same time, it did not cease to establish a self-centric regional cooperation model. Such a strategic vision was typically reflected by the “Asia-Pacific Concept” in the 1960s and the “Pacific Rim Cooperation Concept” in the 1980s. After the Cold War, the economic rise of East Asian countries, especially China, has changed the structure of power in the region and put the security situation in a state of flux. The rapid rise of China has led to the adjustment of Japan’s strategic deployment. It is imperative for Japan to shift economic focus to Asia, and the most critical step is to redefine and reconfirm the US-Japan security alliance, because it is the pillar stone for their interests in East Asia.142 Southeast Asia is also vital to Japan’s economic prosperity. Japan has signed bilateral or multilateral economic partnership agreements with ASEAN countries to further consolidate cooperative ties. Besides, FTAs have played an active and effective role in East Asian economic integration: they not only enhance economic growth and political and social stability in the region, but also bring positive impact on Japan.143 Doubtlessly, these adjustments will inevitably affect Sino-Japan economic relations. As the initiator of the East Asian order, Japan is not willing to fall behind China in the construction of FTAs and regional order. Its conception of East Asian Community was epitomized by the intents in playing a leading role in East Asia and balancing the growing influence of China. In consequence, Japan has carried out the third “opening” in its modern history and advanced regional integration with Asian countries.144 It can be said that 140 Deng

[127]. [128]. 142 Zhou [129]. 143 Urata [130]. 144 Japanese researchers believe that in the modern history of the nation, the first “opening” is to learn from the West and build the modern state system; the second “opening” is to transform towards democracy, export to the West and rises to be the world’s second largest economy; and the third “opening” is to foray into East Asia and build strategic support. See: Nippon Keidanren, Japan 2025: Envisioning a Vibrant, Attractive Nation in the Twenty-First Century, see http://www. keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/vision2025.pdf. 141 Ichimura

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since the mid-1990s, “Japan’s attitude toward East Asian economic cooperation can be summed up as proactive, strategic, and reactive, and the last feature implies its loath to be outdone by the proactive China.”145 Japan’s presence in East Asia was backed by its economic strength and international status. However, since Q2 of 1990 the Japanese economy has continued to slide and entered a recession with a bubble burst. And this recession that lasted the longest after the war was called “Heisei Recession”.146 Since then, Japan has plunged from the renowned World’s No.1 to the slowest growing state of all the advanced industrial countries. Japan’s GDP scale and foreign trade were all declining (Figs. 4.2 and 4.3). As Japan sought to break the predicament of economic stagnation via cooperation, it could have been a feasible path for it to promote the conclusion of bilateral free trade agreements and enhance regional economic integration on that basis.147 However, due to its domestic political right-deviation, Japan has treated China as more of an opponent rather than a partner. Especially after the late 2012 when Shinzo Abe took office as Prime Minister for the second term, the country has pursued confrontational measures often adopted by the declining powers, abandoning the East Asian Community and choosing to confront China over bilateral, regional and even global matters. On the occasion of Japan’s first “opening”, China was in dire straits; on its second “opening”, China was isolated and surrounded by formidable foes; but this time, it would be extremely difficult for Japan to realize its strategic scheme, because China has already become one of the world’s leading forces.

20.0 18.0 16.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0

Fig. 4.2 Percentage of Japan’s GDP in the world economy (1990–2013). Source http://data. worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD

145 Yoshimatu 146 Tsai

[132]. 147 Sun [133].

[131].

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction

167

Fig. 4.3 Percentage of Japan’s foreign trade in the world economy (1990–2013). Source http:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS/countries; http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/ WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=JP

4.5.1 Japan’s Conception of East Asian Community Japan has never given up its role in leading East Asian economic cooperation. Its strategies in this aspect have undergone a process from pure economic cooperation to a combination of economic cooperation and security cooperation, from promoting general economic cooperation to promoting economic integration. During this period, its sense of regional identity and the demand for regional dominance have risen simultaneously. And the conception of East Asian Community is a clear expression. Before the Asian financial crisis broke out in 1997, Japan insisted on free trade and stood against the establishment of trading blocs. It made its objection clear to Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad’s proposal of East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). At the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting in 1991, the founding of East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) under the framework of APEC was agreed, with an objective to accelerate Uruguayan trade negotiations and enhance the status of East Asian countries in international trade negotiations. Although this initiative was in line with its interests, Japan clearly declared that it had no intention to oppose EAEC but it expected for an organization acceptable to both ASEAN and the US and that it would not support any initiative that might divide the development of the Asia-Pacific region.148 After the Asian financial crisis, Japan began to actively participate in East Asian economic cooperation, promoted the internationalization of the yen, and proposed the establishment of Asian Monetary Fund. It expanded its basic strategy to: take 148 Baechinge

and Legewie [134].

168

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

the US-Japan alliance as a security valve, promote bilateral free trade agreements and multilateral economic cooperation, realize the Asianization of the yen, deal with free trade competition from China, and fully acquire the leading role in East Asian economy. Against this backdrop, on January 14, 2002, during a visit to Singapore, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi delivered a speech entitled Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A Sincere and Open Partnership, and officially put forward the East Asian Community concept with the signing of Japan-ASEAN free trade agreements as the core. Koizumi pointed out, such a community should be based on the Japan-ASEAN cooperation, make use of the framework of ASEAN + 3 (Japan-China-ROK) and absorb Australia and New Zealand as core members; it should by no means be an exclusive entity, and the role to be played by the US was indispensable; and it should value cooperation with South and West Asia, including India, and keep contacts with the Pacific nations through APEC, and with Europe through ASEM, the Asia-Europe Meeting.149 On November 28, 2002, Koizumi’s adviser External Relations Working Group presented the report Basic Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, suggesting that Japan should take the lead in East Asian integration and seek to become the core country in this Community. In December 2002, the Japan International Association of Forum Policy Committees proposed to Koizumi a policy report of Building Security Cooperation Mechanism in East Asia, stating that Japan’s medium- and long-term goal was to establish a “pluralistic security community”. It meant to strategically reorganize existing alliance relations in East Asia, coordinative security mechanism (ASEAN Regional Forum) and compound security mechanism (inter-military cooperation) and form a multi-tiered regional security network where they coexisted. It also emphasized that “the alliance between the US and East Asian countries is the cornerstone of regional security”, and the Japan-US alliance not only maintained containment in East Asia but also provided the basis for regional cooperation. In June 2003, this Association submitted another policy report titled East Asian Economic Community Concept and Japan’s Role, in which it set the goal of unifying the free trade agreements concluded separately by countries to establish the East Asian Economic Community. The report stressed that Japan, South Korea and Singapore should take the lead in building FTAs to play a central role in the economic community, while China was expected to play a partially leading role in the community and accelerate its own institutional improvement. The above two reports have reflected Japan’s strategic adjustment at a certain level.150 In December 2003, the Japan-ASEAN Special Summit was held in Tokyo. The Tokyo Declaration issued during the period officially made East Asian Community as a long-term goal of Japan-ASEAN cooperation. In June 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan proposed to build the Community by three steps: first, cooperate in such areas as trade, investment, IT, environment, and epidemic prevention; second, 149 There is a consensus that the China-ASEAN talks on free trade agreement in 2001 have prompted

Japan to take actions in one direction. See Katzenstein and Shiraishi [135]. [136].

150 Liu

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction

169

promote the regional integration in East Asia; and third, foster community awareness and construct the Community. According to Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook in 2005, the construction of such a Community should consider several key points. Firstly, in view of the diversity of East Asia, specific cooperation should be carried out first, and the results of such cooperation should be continuously accumulated; secondly, the Community should be formed around “ASEAN + 3” but does not reject the participation of other regional partners, and it practices open regionalism and ensures its inclusiveness, openness and transparency; and thirdly, cooperation should be conducted in compliance with democracy, human rights, market economy, and general rules and values of organizations like WTO. These mirrored the Japanese government’s understanding and official attitude towards the East Asian Community.151 In August 2005, the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) with a strong government background presented a report titled Status Quo & Background of the East Asian Community and Japan’s National Strategy. In this report, it stated that it was a fairly feasible way for ASEAN to provide a neutral platform for major powers to participate in the construction of the East Asian Community and advocated the establishment of East Asia Summit (EAS) on the basis of the “10 + 3” mechanism. Besides, it suggested following an easy-to-difficult approach starting off with functional cooperation: firstly, work together in the economic field, which serve as the engine, to realize regional economic integration step-by-step in sectors like trade, investment and finance; then, extend cooperation to the politics and security territories, with the non-traditional security with greater common ground as a starting point; and meanwhile, vigorously promote cultural exchanges, the foundation of long-term collaboration, so as to promote mutual understanding and regional identity. In October 2005, the Japanese government released the Opinions in the Construction of the East Asian Community, which clearly clarified Japan’s basic concept, that is, “open regionalism”, “focusing on promoting functional cooperation”, and “respecting for general values and abiding by global rules”. At the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in August 2006, Japan formally proposed the “10 + 6” East Asia economic cooperation agreement and began to implement its East Asian Community strategy. In summary, the East Asian Community concept in the Koizumi era was built on the Japan-ASEAN cooperation and gave full play to the “10 + 3” mechanism while absorbing Australia and New Zealand as core members. Meanwhile, it stressed that the role to be played by the US in East Asia’s economy and security was indispensable and Japan must adhere to the US-Japan alliance. It was characterized by openness, expansion and multi-functional cooperation. Basically, it was dominated by Japan, centered on Japan and ASEAN and operated beyond East Asia. The East Asian Community concept by Koizumi has led to debates on the definition of the East Asia scope. Most Southeast Asian countries deemed that Koizumi’s proposal was lack of new ideas and concrete contents and that his purpose was to hamper the construction of CAFTA. Moreover, it reflected Japan’s doubt on the validity of its flying geese development model. The biggest problem with this proposal was how convincing 151 The

website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/maofaj/gaiko/ bluebook/2005/html/honmon2029.html. Cited from Shichao [137].

170

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

and effective the “open regionalism” covering Oceania and the US, “smaller than APEC and larger than ‘10 + 3’”, could be to the economic development, stability and cooperation in East Asia.152 This concept has drawn great attention from the Japanese economic, industrial and academic circles. However, due to Koizumi’s insistence on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and the frequent changes of the Liberal Democratic Party’s regime, this concept has not been effectively implemented. Yukio Hatoyama, who came to power in 2009, brought up the East Asian Community strategy once again. In November 2009, Hatoyama delivered a foreign policy speech titled A New Community of Asia—Realizing the East Asian Community Concept in Singapore. He mainly touched upon several aspects as follows: elaborate on contents of the Community concept, which meant to be based on the persistent pursuit of “friendly” spirit and European experience of reconciliation and cooperation; build a multi-level, functional community network in the region through the work of relevant countries in different fields; develop economic cooperation, and hold dialogues on political cooperation in the future, too; do not set definite scope for membership, allowing countries that are intentional and competent in a field to join first and increasing members as the cooperation bears fruits. In June 2010, the Japanese cabinet secretariat officially announced the Implementation Points on the East Asian Community Concept in the Future, which explicitly defined the responsibilities of various Japanese government bodies. Yukio Hatoyama advocated Asian economic and monetary integration, a closer China-Japan-ROK cooperation, and advancing the Asian process through cooperation among major powers. However, this initiative was often regarded as a political slogan without essential contents and with the suspicion of rejecting the US. Finally, it came to nothing as the Naoto Kan cabinet took office. Naoto Kan said in a policy address that the establishment of the East Asian Community was a long-term goal of Asian diplomacy, but the priority for the cabinet was to amend the Japan-US relationship that was at a stalemate. Due to collision of the Diaoyu Islands afterwards, the China-Japan relations were falling into a low point since normalization, and the East Asian Community concept was also put on hold.153

4.5.2 Japan’s FTA Strategy Direction What is relevant and complementary to the conception of East Asian Community order is the formulation and implementation of Japan’s FTA strategy. For a long time, Japan has insisted on exclusively relying on foreign trade to develop itself, keen on world commerce yet not in flavor of signing any bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements. From the late 1990s, Japan began to reflect on and adjust the one-sided approach to WTO, paid attention to FTAs and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) systematically, and gradually developed a clear FTA strategy. In 1998, the 152 Mori 153 Sun

[138]. [139].

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction

171

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) of Japan proposed an internal report titled Promotion of Strategic Trade Policies: the Positioning of Regional Economic Agreements, to discuss the possibility of bilateral and multilateral FTAs. The same year, Japan and South Korea launched a free trade dialogue, and Japan began to explore policy changes. MITI proposed for the first time in the White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2000 that while adhering to the multilateral stance, it would strengthen economic cooperation and integration in Asia through the construction of FTA with neighboring countries. In 2001, the MITI was renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and paid special attention to the promotion of FTAs/EPAs. A landmark for Japan’s FTA strategy implementation is that it signed a bilateral EPA with Singapore in January 2002 and proposed an FTA initiative with ASEAN in the same year. Since then, Japan has ceased to be a passive participant in the FTA, marking a major shift in Japan’s foreign trade policy.154 From then on, Japan tried to change the previous WTO-centered, equal and multilateral trade policies, and began to systematically advance the construction of a self-centric FTA network in East Asia step by step. Afterwards, Japan’s related institutional improvement has been put on the agenda. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) established the FTA/EPA Promotion Headquarters in November 2002 and set up the FTA/EPA Office in the Economic Affairs Bureau to be responsible for planning and drafting the FTA/EPA strategies and participating in relevant negotiations with other countries. METI set up the FTA Negotiation Promotion Headquarters in October 2003 and the EPA Division in August 2004. Subsequently, the Japanese government decided to establish the EPA Foreign Negotiation Department in the Cabinet Secretariat in May 2005 at a cabinet meeting. In November 2002, the MOFA released Japan’s FTA Strategy report, emphasizing that the FTA agreement would strengthen Japan’s bargaining position in WTO and the FTA talks would affect and accelerate WTO negotiations. As economic interdependence deepened, it would lead to increased political trust of all parties to the agreement, thus expanding Japan’s international influence and national interests.155 The report systematically describes Japan’s stance, basic principles, target selection criteria and strategic priorities concerning FTAs, particularly emphasizing to evaluate the advancement of FTAs/EPAs by “economic standards”, “geographical standards”, “political and diplomatic standards”, “feasibility standards” and “timerelated standards”. In the same month, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s advisory body Foreign Relations Working Group submitted the Basic Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century - New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy, in which it pointed out that the most important area for the Japanese economy was East Asia, the center of the world economic growth where Japan should accelerate the creation

154 Urata

[140]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s FTA Strategy”, 2002. http://www.mofa/go/ jp/economy/fta/strategy0210.html.

155 The

172

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

of a borderless East Asian economic sphere and make ASEAN its ally to balance China’s expanding sphere of influence.156 In November 2003, the METI issued Japan’s Policy of Strengthening Economic Partnerships, stressing that Japan should conduct FTA negotiations with other countries, especially in East Asia. In December 2004, the Japan Council of Ministers on the Promotion of Economic Partnership established and released the Basic Policy towards Further Promotion of FTAs, which further clarified the significance (like being conducive to creating favorable international environments for Japan and ensuring its overall economic interests), measures, and selection criteria for negotiation objects (such as considering the state of the target country or region and the possibility of achieving FTAs/EPAs). In April 2006, the METI launched The Globalization Strategy to make explicit the importance of establishing EPAs with East Asia, resource producers and populous countries, and map out an EPA plan. In July 2006, the Outline of Economic Growth Strategy was issued at the Financial and Economic Integration Reform Conference, stressing to conclude EPAs with Asian countries as soon as possible and build an East Asian economic sphere in the mediumand long-term. In May 2007, the Timetable for EPA Negotiations was unveiled at the Economic and Financial Advisory Conference, setting the goal for Japan’s EPA negotiations. And in June 2008, the Economic Growth Strategy was released at the Economic and Financial Advisory Conference, which confirmed Japan’s EPA goals and detailed schedule for the next 2–3 years. The above documents mark the initial formation of Japan’s FTA strategy.157 While striving to build a self-centered East Asian FTA network, Japan also began to actively engage with the US, Canada, New Zealand and other countries to build a global FTA network. The core of Japan’s FTA/EPA strategies is to build a self-centered East Asian economic sphere in the medium and long terms. The basic criteria for Japan to choose FTA partners are whether it can maximize the economic and political interests and whether it is the one that takes the lead. The METI of Japan advocated such an order of priority as Singapore, Mexico, ASEAN, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and China, while the MOFA supported to entering into FTAs with South Korea and ASEAN first. And the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) released Extended Free Trade Agreements and Japan’s Choice, proposing that to conclude an FTA with Singapore, South Korea, the four ASEAN countries (the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia) and China subsequently was the best solution. In general, Japan’s approach to FTA negotiations is focusing on East Asia and making global presence. In East Asia, Japan has pursued to advance a FTA strategy of partnering with ASEAN in the south and North Korea in the north, in an attempt to gradually realize East Asian economic integration through bilateral cooperation under its leadership and build self-centered Southeast Asian economic sphere and Northeast Asian economic sphere. With a worsening relationship with China, Japan has actively participated in the US-led TPP talks while consolidating

156 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei2002/1128tf.html. 157 Li

[141].

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction

173

its EPAs with ASEAN, engaging itself in building a soft containment circle against China economically (Table 4.6). Compared with those of Western Europe & North America and East Asian countries, Japan’s FTA/EPA strategies are significantly passive and slower.158 Besides, Japan is under great domestic pressure to carry out its FTA/EPA strategies. The agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors protected by high tariffs and other trade barriers, in particular, strongly oppose the signing of FTAs.159 Such a constraint will exist for long. And protection of domestic agriculture will also be an important aspect that must be taken into account in FTA negotiations. China ranks far behind in the list of Japan’s FTA negotiating partners. Judged from its bargains with ROK and ASEAN, the main negotiating point of Japan lies in industrial tariffs. Japan believes, it is neither able to benefit more from tariff cuts on industrial goods by negotiating with China on FTAs nor rival China in agricultural products, so that it is not willing to start negotiations with China in the near future.160 Over recent years, Japan has made major adjustment on its East Asia strategy and has adopted an ever clearer hedging strategy towards China. It attempts to surround and isolate China through its FTA strategy, competing for regional leadership, but its strategic defects will hinder its long-term goals.

4.5.3 Japan’s Strategic Trend In the second decade of the 21st century, what’s in stark contrast to the overall rise of the world’s emerging powers is Japan’s entry into a relatively peaceful yet declining new phase. The decline of its comprehensive national strength is inevitable. Compared with the booming growth trend of large developing countries, both Japan’s economic growth and the relative growth of GDP have slowed down. As great powers falling into decline tend to take confrontational moves, Japan is no exception. However, because of Japan’s national traits, limitation of the US-Japan alliance and other factors, peace policy has not been ruled out as an option. And China-Japan relations are at the central stage in Japan’s strategic orientation. Now in a strategic stalemate, Japan may make strategic compromise with China in the future. Japan’s policy-making depends largely on China’s development prospect.161 To be specific: First, it holds an increasingly ambivalent attitude towards China. While taking an offensive stance on security issues, it is deeply worried about the outcome of ChinaJapan conflicts, so it expects to piggyback on China’s sustainable development and maintain the essential political ties with China. Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei who promoted the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations once said, “Japan should not only rely on the Japan-US security 158 Zhao

[142]. Nakagawa [143]. 160 Liu and Wei [144]. 161 Xiao [145]. 159 See

174

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

Table 4.6 Status quo of Japan’s EPAs/FTAs Negotiation participants

Name

Current situation

Effective

Singapore

Japan-Singapore EPA

Signed in Jan. 2002, effective on November 30, 2002

Mexico

Japan-Mexico EPA

Signed in Sept. 2004, effective on Apr. 1, 2005, revised in Apr. 2012

Malaysia

Japan-Malaysia EPA

Signed in Dec. 2005, effective on Jul. 13, 2006

Chile

Japan-Chile EPA

Signed in Mar. 2007, effective on Sept. 3, 2007

Thailand

Japan-Thai EPA

Signed in Apr. 2007, effective on Nov. 1, 2007

Indonesia

Japan-Indonesia EPA

Signed in Aug. 2007, effective on Jul. 1, 2008

Brunei

Japan-Brunei EPA

Signed in Jun. 2007, effective on Jul. 31, 2008

The Philippines

Japan-Philippines EPA

Signed in Sept. 2006, effective on Dec. 1, 2008

ASEAN

AJCEP

Signed in Apr. 2008, effective on Dec. 1, 2008

Vietnam

Japan-Vietnam EPA

Signed in Dec. 2008, effective on Oct. 1, 2009

Switzerland

Japan-Sweden EPA

Signed in Feb. 2009, effective on Sept. 1, 2009

India

Japan-India EPA

Signed in Feb. 2011, effective on Aug. 1, 2011

Peru

Japan-Peru EPA

Signed in Jun. 2011, effective on Mar. 1, 2012

GCC

Japan-GCC EPA

The second round of negotiations began in Jan. 2007.

ROK

Japan-ROK EPA

Negotiations began in Dec. 2003, was suspended in Nov. 2004, and have not resumed by the end of 2013.

Australia

Japan-Australia EPA

Negotiations resumed in Jan. 2014 after a three-month suspension.

Colombia

Japan-Colombia EPA

The third round of negotiations started in Oct. 2013.

EU

Japan-EU EPA

The third round of negotiations started in Oct. 2013.

Under negotiation

(continued)

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction

175

Table 4.6 (continued) Negotiation participants

Under study

Name

Current situation

Canada

Japan-Canada FTA

The two sides agreed to start negotiations in Mar. 2012.

Mongolia

Japan-Mongolia FTA

In March 2012, the two sides agreed to start negotiations.

China, ROK

China-Japan-ROK FTA

Negotiations were initiated in 2007; an investment protection agreement was signed in Mar. 2012; and five rounds of negotiations have been held as of Sept. 2014.

11 countries including the US

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)

More than 20 rounds of TPP negotiations have been carried out since 2010. In Mar. 2013, Japan announced its formal participation in the TPP negotiations. There is little chance to reach an agreement by 2014.

Turkey

Japan-Turkey Free Trade Agreement (JTFTA)

The university-industry-government feasibility studies began in Jul. 2012

Source Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China; http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ economy/fta/index.html

treaty, but also establish friendly relations with China. It is possible to achieve Far East peace if China, Japan and the US can form an equilateral triangle-shaped relationship. To build normal state relations with China can provide greater security for Japan than setting up a NATO in Asia.”162 From an economic point of view, it is in Japan’s interest to make full use of the vitality of the Chinese economy and build a complementary international system on labor division that draws upon each other’s advantages.163 That is the root cause for the positive development of China-Japan ties during a period after the normalization of diplomatic relations was restored. When it comes to the 21st century, their competition over leadership and dominance in East Asia becomes outstanding. “Since 2000, Japan has been competing with China in the East Asian regionalism initiative”,164 and regarded the expanded East Asian Community as an important policy concept to cope with China’s rise. Japan explicitly directed its defense spearhead to China for the first time in its New Outline of Defense Plan released in December 2004. The root cause for the worsening China-Japan ties in recent years lies in that Japan’s strategy in response to China’s rise 162 Mori

[146]. [147]. 164 Inoguchi [148]. 163 Kwan

176

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

has changed. How to deal with China’s rise is regarded by Japan as the biggest issue in its foreign relations in the 21st century, and the China-US strategic partnership is also unsettling to it.165 Therefore, Japan strengthens its military alliance with the US and consolidates its military capabilities and regional economic network; it tries to deny the historical truth in history-related issues; and it intends to further contain China politically and restructures diplomatic relations on that basis.166 Japan has gradually viewed China as a strategic opponent and contained and guarded against China in multiple fronts. As it is resolute to become a major political power, to counterbalance China has become its first and foremost strategic choice. It seems to the Japanese elite politicians that to balance China is the only way to truly become a great power in foreign and domestic affairs.167 Japan pays no less attention than China itself to China’s future direction. It deeply understands the increased importance of China. For example, in March 2011, Japan issued its first NIDS China Security Report, stating that “Many countries including Japan believe that it is in their interests to establish a stable relationship with China.”168 And in its NIDS China Security Report of March 2012, Japan sensitively kept an eye on the attitude of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and believed that “it is a new trend to have more military statements on the security issues around territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests”.169 Japan thinks that China in the future may not embrace the US-led world order framework, and to be specific, it may overemphasize its national strength and interests, abandoning the diplomatic guideline of “keep a low profile and bide our time, while also getting something accomplished”. Japan sees it an opportunity to play against China. In its China strategy, Japan will continue to be concerned with China’s strategic direction and set it a priority to balance China. For reasons like regional stability and domestic development, Japan will also continue to seek common interests, keep bilateral stability through contacts, and explore China’s strategic intentions and bottom line to maintain disputes between the two sides under control as well as its own safety in the region. Second, it is pro-American straightforwardly and deepens alliance relations with the US. The pro-American sentiment is deeply rooted in Japan. US-Japan alliance is the paramount and only security relationship for Japan.170 As the first globalizer in Asia, Japan has formed an economically interdependent relationship with the US.171 For quite a long time after war, the US provided security to Japan unilaterally and placed it to a core economic position in the East Asian security order.172 At that time,

165 Funabashi

[149]. and Przystup [150]. 167 Zhu [151]. 168 The National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan, “NIDS China Security Report 2010”, p. 34. 169 The National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan, “NIDS China Security Report 2011”, p. 33. 170 Okamoto [152]. 171 Nye [153]. 172 Katzenstein and Shiraishi [135, pp. 30–31]. 166 Manning

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction

177

Japan only had US strategy, treating Asia as a mere afterthought.173 In the 1970s and 1980s, the US remained dominant in the security front but began to compete with Japan economically. Relations between the two sides were long in a “drift” state once. Shortly after the Cold War, US-Japan ties were gradually drifting apart. Japan adopted a strategy of escaping from the US into Asia and implemented the flying geese model; and the US adjusted its Asia-Pacific policies and carried out a fanshaped strategy.174 Until the mid-1990s, the two sides have once again ganged up strengthening their allied relations in the face of the East Asian changes caused and potentially caused by China’s rise. During this period, Japan has almost completed the strategic shift from a satellite state to a supporter to the US,175 while the US-Japan alliance has changed its function from curbing both China and Japan to containing China alone at the same time.176 In front of China’s rise and the great changes in the East Asian pattern, Japan and the US have had urgent strategic needs towards each other. the US-Japan alliance has become the cornerstone for their strategic deployment in East Asia. And regarding the US intervention in the region, Japan has since changed its attitude from explicit or implicit opposition to full support. Japanese strategists believe that the most important reason behind the long-termed stability in East Asia is the participation of the US and the US will definitely play a part if major conflicts of interest arise there in the future. It is stressed in the white paper Defense of Japan 2011 that the USJapan alliance is indispensable for realizing peace and stability in Japan and the Asia-Pacific, and both countries will further promote security cooperation in a wider range to deepen such alliance. At the end of 2012 when he was re-elected as Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe made affirmative disclosure that the US-Japan alliance would be strengthened to provide a sound diplomatic and security basis for the revitalization of the Japanese economy and safeguard territorial sovereignty,177 using the US as “diplomatic card” to play. Japan is highly dependent on the US-Japan alliance in the security field. Some scholars point out that “Abe’s actions have surpassed what the US expected from Japan after it decided to pivot back to Asia, making the gesture of assuming a greater role and unilaterally expressing a strong will of uniting with the US to contain China.”178 In conclusion, the pro-American sentiment will dominate Japanese politics and public opinion for long. Japan will still put its relations with the US in the first place of its security strategy and strengthen the US-Japan alliance to cope with the ever-changing situation in Northeast Asia. Besides, it will protect its own safety, expand the room for regional security strategy and seek regional 173 Kang

[15, p. 157]. [154]. 175 Katzenstein [155]. 176 Zhang [156]. 177 “The Full Text of Prime Minister Abe’s Speech”, website of Nikkei, Jan. 29, 2013; “Abe Hopes to Defend Territory by Strengthening Japan-US Alliance” (an bei xi wang tong guo qiang hua ri mei tong meng bao wei ling tu), the Chinese website of kyodo tsushinsha, Feb. 16, 2013, see: http:// china.kyodonews.jp/news/2013/02/46820.html. 178 Xue [157]. 174 Men

178

4 Momentum and Prospects for East Asian Order

political and security interests by leveraging the American “strategic rebalancing” in East Asia. Third, the goal of its East Asia strategy is to contain China. For both China and Japan, winning regional predominance means owning the basic conditions to become a world power. This is why they have scrambled for the dominant role in East Asia since ancient times. Japan once benefited from the US-led security system in East Asia after WWII and established the flying geese economic order on that basis, thus gaining regional dominance for a while. After the Cold War, however, the rise of East Asian nations, especially China, has changed the regional power pattern and the security situation there.179 Due to changes in the balance of power between China and Japan and the international situation, Japan is no longer in a position to dominate East Asia but it is reluctant to stay down. As its core interests are more concentrated in East Asia, it is the hope of Japan to realize its goal of containing China by utilizing the changing situation in the region. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia is vital to Japan’s economic prosperity, so Japan has signed bilateral or multilateral EPAs with ASEAN members to further consolidate partnership. To Japan, FTAs/EPAs have played an active and effective role in East Asian economic integration: they not only enhance economic growth and political and social stability in the region, but also bring positive impact on itself.180 Japan has always regarded Southeast Asia as its economic backyard, a strategic rear it has managed painstakingly for decades. ASEAN is an important export market for industrial product to Japan, but more importantly, it provides Japan with the required strategic energy and raw materials for economic development. In return, Japan also funds ASEAN’s economic growth with its powerful economic capabilities. The two sides have formed, as it were, fairly stable economic interdependence. ASEAN is so special a zone to Japan that “Japan will lose its inner balance if ASEAN tilts to other countries” (Table 4.7).181 After entering the 21st century, Japan has taken a series of major measures to tighten ties with ASEAN in an attempt to turn previous economic relations into a more comprehensive partnership, especially in political and security fronts. And it has committed itself to making ASEAN its ally to balance China’s expanding sphere of influence. After Shinzo Abe came back to power in 2012, senior Japanese government officials have repeatedly paid visits to Southeast Asia, which drew great attention from the international society due to their high level and overwhelming schedule. And it has laid bare its purpose to place political and security issues under the economic cooperation framework and rope in ASEAN to play against China. However, Japan is losing its strategic control capability with the sharp decline of leadership in economy and trade. It is more likely to take advantage of the interaction between the growing interests of China in East Asia and the growing fears of ASEAN countries and “the uneasiness of East Asian members towards China’s future direction” to expand its regional influence and stir up the East Asian pattern 179 Men

[158]. [130]. 181 Tsugami [159]. 180 Urata

4.5 Japan’s East Asia Scheme and Strategic Direction

179

Table 4.7 Japan’s outward investment trend (1995–2013) (%) Asia

ASEAN

China

USA

1995

37.3

17.6

14.1

39.8

1996

41.6

22.3

9.9

47.7

1997

50.3

29.9

7.1

28.5

1998

31.7

18.1

5.3

24.4

1999

8.1

4.6

1.6

32.1

2000

6.8

0.7

3.0

44.8

2001

20.3

10.4

5.6

18.3

2002

25.5

13.3

8.2

23.2

2003

17.5

1.5

13.8

37.2

2004

34.0

9.0

18.9

24.4

2005

35.6

11.0

14.5

26.7

2006

34.2

13.8

12.3

18.5

2007

26.4

10.6

8.5

21.3

2008

17.8

4.8

5.0

34.2

2009

27.6

9.4

9.2

14.3

2010

38.7

15.6

12.7

16.1

2011

34.1

17.0

10.9

12.7

2012

27.4

8.7

11.0

26.1

2013

30.0

6.6

6.7

32.4

Source Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/japan/stats/fdi/

negatively. Therefore, Japan will keep an watchful eye on the South China Sea issue and China’s military prowess and moves, awaiting strategic opportunities brought about by occasional conflicts. Fourth, its global strategy shrinks. As global economic landscape changes, the original troika—the US, Europe and Japan—has been replaced by the US, Europe and China. With higher political demands of developing countries, the G8 has been replaced by the G20. In this context, Japan has to admit that its global influence is declining and begins to pursue more of economic benefits in global affairs. Its global ambition has shrunk. It can be seen in the following aspects. Politically, it has proactively sought a higher status as a regional power, broadening its sphere of influence in East Asia with significant cut in strategic moves in other parts of the world. Militarily, it has tightened ties with the US, focused on the interests in East Asia, and worked more closely with East Asian countries under the guidelines of the “Abe Doctrine” and “Democratic Security Diamond”, with much less enthusiasm for international peacekeeping operations. And economically, it has primarily sought to consolidate its reduced economic status in East Asia while decreasing global deeds. On the other hand, Japan does not completely abandon its pursuit of political power

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status in front of global changes, and still regards the permanent seat of the UN Security Council as an iconic global strategy goal over a period of time. Fifth, it strengthens defense deployment and military cooperation with other countries. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines from 2005 to 2010 were all aimed at North Korea with a primary task of handling ballistic missiles, guerrilla warfare and special forces attack. And in the new Guidelines announced in 2010, Japan directed its defense spearhead towards China and set the major objectives of ensuring the safety of the surrounding sea and airspace and protecting the island from attack.182 It is pointed out in the Defense of Japan 2011 (Annual White Paper) that China was taking an assertive attitude and had taken military actions to ensure its maritime rights and interests.183 And in the Defense of Japan 2012, the Japanese government declared that the US-Japan security system would be further deepened to “build dynamic defense forces and steadily carry out effective defense construction”.184 Meanwhile, it emphasized its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, Dokdo (known in Japan as Takeshima) and the South Kurils (known in Japan as the Northern Territories). By such a move, Japan actually categorized Russia, China, ROK and DPRK as threats to its security to varying degrees. It has territorial disputes with the first three countries, while constantly keeping vigilant against the last one. Of all, Japan has significantly raised military defense against China. It claimed that “the trend of China has become a regional concern” because China’s military expenditures and specific military objectives were unclear, and said it would take such actions as surveillance, maritime patrols and air defense in areas including southwestern Japan. In the Defense of Japan 2013, Japan stated that it was facing a more severe security environment, as China rapidly increased activities in the sea/air area surrounding Japan, which involved intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters, violation of Japan’s airspace and even dangerous actions that could cause emergency events, along with more active military moves of North Korea and Russia.185 In January 2013, the Japanese government decided to revise the National Defense Program Guidelines, aiming to strengthen the island defense capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces. Japan’s defense strategy has changed from “basic defense” to “mobile defense”. The basic approaches include: shift the focus of defense from homeland and northern territories to the “southwest islands” (including Diaoyu Islands); make targeted and prioritized deployment according to threat levels to enhance the responsiveness, mobility, sustainability and versatility of the Self-Defense Forces; strengthen the USJapan alliance and expand defense cooperation with countries such as South Korea, India and Australia; and take a tough stance on issues of dispute with China. Japanese 182 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond”,

website of Ministry of Defense, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011. pdf. 183 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2011 (Annual White Paper)”, http://www.mod. go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/12Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf. 184 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2012 (Annual White Paper)”, http://www. clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2012/2012/index.html. 185 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2013 (Annual White Paper)”, http://www.mod. go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/11_Part1_Chapter1_Sec3.pdf.

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defense experts unanimously believe that the Abe government’s national defense policy is basically pro-American and aimed at strengthening military cooperation with other countries. But some Chinese scholars point out that the biggest goal of the Abe administration is to revise Japan’s post-war Constitution and get rid of the constraint of the post-war order, paving the way for Japan’s use of military force against other nations.186 Looking forward, Japan bends itself to completing loose deployment to blockade China with the US-Japan alliance as the foundation, the US-Japan-ROK framework as the core, the US-Japan-ROK-Australia ties as coordination, and the Japan-India cooperation as extension.

4.5.4 Summary Few great power is as underprepared as Japan for the 21st century. As its economic miracle becomes history, global standing takes a downhill, and its regional influence drops due to the incorrect choice of “freezing history”, it has become an unstable factor in East Asian order.187 American political scientist Samuel Huntington once pointed out, “Japan’s four choices for the future are: First, it maintains and strengthens alliances with the United States, playing the role of Britain in Anglo-American relations, but this relationship will inevitably be considered to be anti-Chinese in nature in Asia and may drag Japan into certain conflicts. Second, if China’s strength continues to increase, Japan can ally with China playing the role of France in FrenchGerman relations, but this means a sharp cut in Japan’s ties with the US. Third, Japan struggles to avoid getting involved in rivalry and competition in East Asia; it does not form alliances with powers but develops its own military might for the necessary self-defense, playing the role of neutral Switzerland in Europe. Fourth, it develops cooperative relations with all other major and minor powers, actively participates in Asian diplomatic activities and eases the contradictions with them, playing the role of Germany in Europe; however, Germany is the most powerful in Europe while in Asia China is the strongest, so it is difficult for Japan to do so without playing against China.”188 Obviously, Japan has selected the first strategy, which has an important impact on the East Asian order. Of course, Japan is not a decisive force for the direction of the East Asian order but an unstable factor. As said by some scholars, Japan cannot play a decisive role in the power shift in East Asia as long as its role in the balance of power within the region still led by the US.189 East Asian countries do not expect Japan to take the lead. And it is hard to conclude that Japan is able to play a leading role in the region based on its history, systems and world outlook. Japan fails to render its economic advantages

186 Liu

[160]. viewpoints can be seen: Lehmann [161]. 188 Huntington [162]. 189 Zhu and Ross [163]. 187 Similar

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into political leadership in the region or keep its goodwill to the region at least.190 It can hardly play a more active role in East Asian integration, if it does not address historical issues with neighbors.191 More significantly, its continued decline in overall strength and influence will be an inevitable trend. And the economic recession in Japan means that it is no longer a model of Asian development, but a synonym for chaos and trouble.192 And Japan’s political right-deviation that may temporarily be eye-catching will definitely raise vigilance and strategic adjustment of East Asian countries in the long run. On the other hand, Japan calls for East Asian economic cooperation, and the ever strained ties with China are not absolutely hopeless. For one thing, it relies on East Asia to develop economically; and for another, its technological advantages and foreign investment are also indispensable to the region. It is also Japan’s long-term strategy to maintain and develop stable economic and trade relations with China and East Asia. At present, Japan has launched two negotiations, TPP and China-JapanROK FTA, simultaneously, and participated in the RCEP talks led by ASEAN. It indicates both Japan’s economic weight and opportunities amid the changing situation in the Asia-Pacific and the dilemma it faces when making strategic choice. Japan wants to maintain a balance of all parties while making them mutually restrained, so as to obtain a vantage ground. What an ambitious scheme!

4.6 Prospects for East Asian Order Construction Entering the 21st century, the East Asian order was well on its way to a better future. To build an open and inclusive East Asian community around “10 + 3” mechanism has become an important consensus of countries in the region. However, regional major powers have changed their considerations profoundly since 2010, leading to more complex prospects for the regional order. Due to the rapid rise of China, it has become increasingly important to understand China’s outlook on the East Asian order. Some scholars raise a widely influential view that China seeks a multipolar world and unipolar East Asian pattern, while the US seeks a unipolar world and a multipolar East Asian pattern, demonstrating a completely opposite understanding of the East Asian order between China and the US. In any case, the US has announced its strategic focus on East Asia where it has launched comprehensive offensive and destructive intervention to disrupt the East Asian order from outside by strengthening its alliance and leading the TPP negotiation process so that there will be a split between economic cooperation and strategic defense in the region.193 Japan has seized the opportunity of America’s strategic shift eastward to build a strategic posture against China, at the price of giving up the East Asian Community concept and disrupting the regional 190 Kang

[15, p. 7]. [164]. 192 Funabashi [165]. 193 Yu [166]. 191 Naoka

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order from inside. ASEAN should maintain its leadership in East Asian cooperation while balancing the great powers, which is a difficult thing to maneuver. The game of the above four strategic powers will inevitably have a profound impact on the prospects for the East Asian order.

4.6.1 Status Quo and Dilemma of East Asian Order Construction Since the end of World War II, the US has been trying to dominate East Asia’s security affairs by establishing security relationship based on bilateral alliances, but it has never been committed to promoting the development of regional institutions economically. It is economic cooperation that has driven East Asia once again into an orderly era. Regional cooperation process starts with and focuses on economic cooperation, in parallel with political dialogue and socio-cultural cooperation. The goal is to establish strategic trust among countries and develop regional institutions through cooperation.194 Currently, institutional arrangement in East Asia covers economic, political and security fields, mainly reflected in inter-regional, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels. At the inter-regional level, it mainly involves APEC, ARF, EAS and the ongoing TPP negotiations. APEC is the only multilateral cooperation mechanism covering the entire East Asian region, and ARF is currently the most important and the only official multilateral security cooperation dialogue mechanism in the AsiaPacific region, both of which are mainly participated by East Asian countries. The key to institutional construction at the level of East Asia is an economic cooperation framework, especially embodied in the “10 + 3” mechanism and the RCEP negotiations. Certainly, East Asian economic cooperation is not just a matter of trade liberalization; instead, it is driven by political motives, or at least severely restricted by political factors.195 After the Asian financial crisis, a turning point in East Asian integration, East Asian countries have learned lessons from the crisis and showed an increasingly strong desire for cooperation. With the expansion of cooperation fields and scope, and the diversification of cooperation forms, a multi-level cooperation mechanism has been initially shaped, basically manifested in building shared regionalism.196 The key to institutional construction at the sub-regional level is the establishment of ASEAN Community and the China-Japan-ROK FTA negotiations, while the institutional construction at the bilateral level is mainly reflected in the “10 + 1” mechanism and bilateral FTAs. In contrast to the positive construction of FTAs, the multilateral security cooperation in East Asia is in a difficult situation. The regional security pattern has two features: one is the strong adaptability of the US bilateral security protocols after 194 Zhang

[92, 93]. [166]. 196 Pang [167]. 195 Yu

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World War II, and the other is the weak multilateral security mechanism recently tried. There are various difficulties ahead of East Asian security cooperation. Military alliance is regarded as an expression of the Cold War mentality, cooperation security as a product of idealism, multilateral cooperation as an ineffective approach, and bilateral cooperation is questioned to potentially damage the balance of power. In a word, there is an urgent need for a generally accepted security mechanism in East Asia. From the perspective of the existing institutional arrangement, the traditional bilateral security cooperation model will prevail in East Asia since the multilateral model is still in the negotiation stage. In a sense, a dynamic and energetic region is marked by the coexistence of multiple cooperation mechanisms for mutual promotion and development. Generally, the institutional construction in East Asia is still in its infancy, but regional cooperation has involved political, economic, security, social, cultural, educational and other fields. As an inevitable demand for development, promoting East Asian integration has also gradually internalized as a strategic goal of each country in the region. The evolving East Asian order is characterized by openness, penetrability, coexistence of bilateralism and multilateralism, provision of regional public goods by major powers, a relatively low level of institutionalization, and balance of power to prevent the rise of regional hegemony. What makes it so unique is that the ASEAN norms remain the main force driving the construction of East Asian order when nonregional powers expect to play an important role but regional powers have not played a leading role. China, Japan and South Korea have established positive partnerships with ASEAN, which has contributed to the coexistence and common prosperity of ASEAN states and increased their awareness of a shared future, on the one hand, and caused some anxiety and doubts to these countries, on the other. In this regard, balance of power is a fundamental issue for both regional and non-regional countries to think about. In other words, balance of power is one of the preconditions for the construction of East Asian order. In a sense, it is the process rather than the power structure that plays a decisive role in building a stable and constructive East Asian order. East Asian cooperation has so far achieved fruitful results in the functional fields featuring low politics, but it is still on a bumpy road to political and security cooperation. In fact, even in the economic field, different FTA ideas and practices of different countries may also lead to the Spaghetti Effect, and increase the cost of regional integration imperceptibly. In addition, as the multilateral security system arrangement in East Asia is still in the negotiation stage, ASEAN is just a place to provide dialogue, without the “teeth” for defense arrangement.197 For nation-states focusing on self-help, the lack of multilateral security mechanisms is nothing serious; but for further regional integration, any security threat is nothing else but nightmare and obstacle. Why is the security dilemma so rooted in the process of comprehensive economic integration? In the author’s opinion, the answer lies in several imbalances that exist in East Asia. The first imbalance is the striking contrast between Southeast Asia 197 Kwa

and Tan [168].

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and Northeast Asia, marked by the unbalanced sub-regional order construction in these two regions. Although the cultural and ethnic diversity in Southeast Asia is more significant than that in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia has a stable community order in place. Northeast Asian countries, especially China, Japan and South Korea, have already achieved market-driven economic integration,198 with more cultural heritage in common, but Northeast Asia has no similar community sense to that in Southeast Asia, and it is still enveloped by the traditional security dilemma. The solution requires more innovative ideas, political foresight and strategic courage. The second imbalance involves the roles played by ASEAN, China and Japan in East Asian order construction. Till now, ASEAN has been playing a leading role, but its fears of major powers and the low institutionalization of its initiatives and the balancing strategy have partly hindered regional integration, not to mention the promotion of regional order construction. East Asia needs an engine for order construction. The third imbalance lies in the bilateral relationship among China, Japan and ASEAN. Up to now, both China and Japan have carried out active and in-depth cooperation with ASEAN states by seeking common interests, providing public goods and transferring non-strategic interests, and have built a robust cooperation framework respectively. However, the two sides have not taken similar strategic steps or strategic attitudes to seek common interests. Instead, they have been caught in the old predicament, unable to make any improvement. This imbalance implies that the political tensions between China and Japan have posed the most severe challenge to this order construction. Obviously, East Asia has established a viable institutional framework at the subregional, regional, and super-regional levels, all of which are the result of convergence and institutionalization (or in the process of institutionalization) of common interests. East Asian countries will enhance cooperation with an open attitude towards a winwin outcome. They have realized that only based on common interests can they prevent or stop major powers from placing their individual interests above others. In a sense, the core driving force for East Asian order stems from the common interests, threats and challenges in the region, which is based on the broad strategic interests rather than the narrow national interests of countries involved who stand ready to pursue common interests and tackle common challenges and threats together. As to the dilemma for East Asian order construction, currently the cooperation fields are not aligned (the separation of security and economy is particularly evident); the propositions are not on the same page, i.e. China and ASEAN shares a similar vision, while the US and Japan echo each other. As a result, there are a variety of propositions concerning the order construction. Before 2010, the East Asian Community vision had been accepted by East Asian countries. Despite the competition of different institutional designs, the ASEAN centrality is respected by regional and non-regional countries, with the ASEAN norms playing a pivotal role. There seems a cautiously optimistic outlook on the East Asian order. However, this order design 198 II Sakong, “Enhanced North East Asia Economic Cooperation towards the Ultimate Goal of East

Asia Community”, JCER Bulletin, July 2006.

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has not only inherent defects, but also conflicts with the rules sought by the US. Especially in the security mechanism, there are conflicts and competitions between the two security models, i.e. alliance versus cooperation. The result is a mixture of bilateral alliances, multilateral dialogues and special diplomacy, constituting neither military confrontation nor multilateral cooperation system,199 but natural variables remain unchanged. With the emergence and escalation of different contradictions in the region and beyond since 2010, East Asian integration has been at the crossroads, and regional cooperation has gone through a number of difficulties such as momentum shortage, unclear prospects, insufficient cohesion, and escalated disputes over territorial and maritime rights.200 Capitalizing on this opportunity, the US returned to East Asia and began to compete for the dominance of East Asian order by proposing a comprehensive idea of order building. Ashley J. Tellis writes that the basic characteristics of the US-led East Asian order include: the US economic hegemony in the world, which will be augmented by its domestic financial stability with US dollar as an international reserve currency, and its efficient national innovation system; the political aspiration of the US to assume the global leadership responsibility; the unshakable military supremacy of the US; no Asian countries can threaten the security of important neighbors with a systematic change or weaken the ability of the US to protect its allies or prevent the US from acting freely in the Asian continent, or play its role anywhere in coastal Asia.201 The aggressive return of the US has caused a turbulent situation in East Asia, i.e. Japan is reduced to a troublemaker of regional order, ASEAN’s supremacy is challenged, and China is under pressure and ready for a strategic breakthrough.202 Many scholars have made in-depth analysis of the prospects for the changing East Asian order. Realists mostly emphasize the existence of a security dilemma in East Asia and the inevitable conflicts,203 while liberalists hold that the regional order will follow its own cultural logic, and East Asia will embrace China’s leading role in maintaining regional stability.204 The existing propositions suggest that there are various possibilities of East Asian order. According to David Shambaugh, the following orders are possible to occur in Asia: (i) hub-spoke system. The US controls the affairs across Asia with the support of its Asian allies; (ii) limited co-governance model. The US and China have full cooperation in Asia to jointly lead the Asian order; (iii) normative community model. ASEAN and China advocate a new international framework as to how to handle bilateral relations, prevent and resolve regional conflicts, combat international terrorism, and strengthen international cooperation, with an aim to form a new value system in Asia that will contribute to enhancing collective identity; (iv) complex interdependence model. Countries are closely connected in the economic, technological, cultural, educational and ideological fields, national 199 Ikenberry

and Tsuchiyama [169]. [12]. 201 Tellis [170]. 202 Yu [60]. 203 See: Friedberg [171], Christensen [172]. 204 See: Kang [173], Chapter One. 200 Ji

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boundaries will become less meaningful, and goods and ideas of each country are free to flow from one to another. The evolving Asian order is a mixture of the above four models, reflecting certain characteristics of each.205 This analysis also applies to the East Asian order. Michael Mastanduno holds that there may be multiple regional orders in East Asia, including multipolar balance, pluralistic security community, hegemonic order, bipolar balance (the US versus Japan, China versus Japan), and dominance by the US and Japan.206 The author believes that the evolving East Asian order is mainly characterized by openness, penetrability, coexistence of bilateralism and multilateralism, provision of regional public goods by major powers, a relatively low level of institutionalization, and balance of power to prevent the rise of regional hegemony,207 and its future depends on the game of the above four strategic powers.

4.6.2 Foundation for East Asian Order Construction The complexity of East Asian order is attributed to the uniqueness of the region itself and the strategic considerations of the actors involved. There is a still long way to go before an inclusive and stable regional order is formed. Currently, the following basic conditions are available for the building of East Asian regional order: First, open regionalism is accepted and followed. Exclusive regional cooperation is unrealistic due to different economic development levels, political systems, social systems and interest appeals in East Asia. As an inevitable and natural choice, open regionalism is closely related to its historic accumulation, the US strategic focus and China’s opening-up policy. Open regionalism provides a interactive platform for all East Asian countries, and encourages healthy competition, which is a key basis for rebuild the regional order. Second, common interests serve as a cornerstone. The natural conflict of interests among East Asian countries is a significant obstacle to regional integration, but it can also be seen as a core element in stimulating regional cooperation. As Robert O. Keohane points out, cooperation does not mean no conflicts, on the contrary, cooperation obviously goes hand in hand with conflicts, and partly shows the necessity of successful efforts to address potential or actual conflicts… Cooperation should not be deemed as a state of no conflicts, but as a response to such conflicts.208 For East Asian countries, maintaining regional stability and development is not only in line with their common interests, but also an important basis for their smooth development. Their common interests are reflected in maintaining regional economic stability, promoting strategic mutual trust and political interaction between countries, building solid security cooperation mechanisms, and enhancing people-to-people and social

205 Shambaugh

[35, 174, 175]. [176]. 207 Men [65]. 208 Keohane [177]. 206 Michael

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exchanges, as well as in addressing existing or potential threats. Only by strengthening multilateral cooperation can East Asian countries realize common interests and tackle common threats and challenges. As Hitoshi Tanaka, former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, pointed out, “The key to a prosperous East Asia is enhancement of a community sense by identifying the areas of common interests before gradual cooperation.”209 Third, a regional cooperation model is basically in place. East Asia cooperation has developed from the dialogue stage to institutional building, covering economic, social, political, cultural, educational and other aspects. From the perspective of institutional building, regional cooperation is driven by six “wheels” simultaneously: (i) “10”, the development of and cooperation among the ten ASEAN member states; (ii) “10 + 1”, ASEAN’s dialogue and cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea, respectively; (iii) “10 + 3”, ASEAN’s dialogue and cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea, as a whole; (iv) “3”, the dialogue and cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea; (v) “10 + 6”, the RCEP negotiations; and (vi) “10 + 8”, the East Asia Summit. The six-wheel drive is line with the current reality in East Asia because successful regional cooperation is a process of balancing the political aspirations of all parties.210 To move towards the goal of East Asian integration, countries in the region should seek harmony in diversity and stay open-minded to learn from each other, and promote functional cooperation that is voluntary, flexible, open and less institutionalized. This valuable experience gained in the past has been widely recognized and supported by East Asian countries. Fourth, ASEAN’s centrality is respected. ASEAN strives to maintain its centrality and the influence of ASEAN norms on the establishment of the East Asian order, in an attempt to build up an international institutional network with ASEAN as the core, and shape a regional order led by regional international organizations consisting of small and middle Southeast Asian countries in the absence of leadership by great powers.211 This idea has been strongly supported by China and respected by other countries. Although the leadership of ASEAN has been battered by the US who has been active in promoting TPP, ASEAN is still able to maintain its leading position in the process of East Asian integration thanks to its valuable experience in dealing with APEC. Recently, ASEAN has been advancing the RCEP negotiations to consolidate and reinforce its leadership in the regional cooperation process, and to enhance regional cooperation through integration of the existing “10 + 1” mechanisms. Fifth, major power behaviors are under restrictions. Major powers have been wearing strategic straitjackets in the context of globalization and regionalization. The process of East Asian order construction shows that countries including China, the US and Japan are so aware of the diversity and complexity of East Asia that they consent to realize their own national interests by seeking common interests. On this basis, the behaviors of major powers in the region are constrained. The result is the creation of several cooperation frameworks and institutional collaboration networks, 209 Tanaka

[178]. [179]. 211 Liang and Yaoshun [64]. 210 Yu

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and the spillover effects from economic cooperation. The US is well aware that it is not a hegemon in East Asia, so compromise is required if it wants to seek a balanced pattern favorable to it. Both China and Japan have realized that a unipolar cooperation model will not work. Despite the political tensions, China and Japan are joining hands in the economic and trade fields, and they have showed the necessary interest in promoting the China-Japan-ROK FTA.

4.6.3 Path of East Asian Order Construction The evolving East Asian order is characterized by openness, penetrability, coexistence of bilateralism and multilateralism, provision of regional public goods by major powers, a relatively low level of institutionalization, and balance of power to prevent the rise of regional hegemony. It indicates that regional countries have no intention to seek a unipolar order but want to promote regional cooperation on the basis of a dynamic equilibrium. However, there is a huge economic gap, unbalanced political development, strategic mistrust, and differences in territorial limits and power distribution,212 making it difficult to build a regional order around the East Asian Community. Countries have deeply recognized that it would be possible for them to share interests but difficult to transfer sovereignty during regional cooperation. They should focus more on functional cooperation than institutional building, and follow the logic of open regionalism to promote effective interaction in the region and beyond. This situation shows that the future East Asian order will not be catalyzed by a hegemonic war but international coordination based on common interests and mainly by means of building international institutions. Based on the above, the author believes that the main approach to East Asian order building is to actively promote institutional building on top of the existing functional cooperation. Currently, the process of regional cooperation has become irreversible, but there is no strong political consensus on pushing it to a higher level. In addition to the functional cooperation, the partnership framework may be maintained and developed to improve regional relations through dialogue, communication and consultation on major issues. Efforts will be made to promote cooperation mechanisms in the relevant fields and to expand common interests, which is easier to accomplish.213 However, countries must also recognize that the existing cooperation model with a low level of institutionalization is and has been holding back the integration process in East Asia. For the building of a regional cooperation system with mandatory constraints, the ASEAN Way based on consensus and with informality as the core is

212 Research Group of Comprehensive Study of International Politics and Economy, “The Realistic

Foundation and Rational Thinking of the Building of the East Asian Community” (dong ya gong tong ti gou jian de xian shi ji chu yu li xing si wei), Forum of World Economics & Politics, No. 3, 2010, pp. 1–13. 213 Zhang [82].

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almost an insurmountable barrier, which has hindered the building of regional cooperation institutions and reduced the effectiveness of these institutions.214 At present, the US-led TPP negotiations have brought huge internal disruption and external pressure to East Asian cooperation, but from another angle, it may turn out to be an opportunity for East Asia to change its set course. Therefore, the proposal is to reinforce the regional institutional building while expanding the functional cooperation in East Asia. In view of this, here are some principles to follow: First, ensure open regionalism. Regional cooperation is vital to the future of East Asia, and open regionalism is the only viable way for East Asian countries to embrace globalization and regional integration. So far, regional cooperation has been advanced in an open manner, as evidenced by the participation of most East Asian countries in APEC, or the ASEAN-led ARF and EAS.215 Open regionalism is both an answer to free trade and a political principle of regionalism. For a region like East Asia characterized by economic, cultural, political and ethnic diversity, open regionalism is the only approach to a new regional order, as well as an inevitable path to coexistence and common prosperity for regional countries that will break away from containment. Second, have a stable outlook on common interests. A priority for regional cooperation is to develop a sense of community. If countries only consider their own interests and gains, it will be impossible to build a regional community or a solid regional order, which in turn highlights the value of common interests. The building of East Asian order is a process of balancing the political aspirations of all participants based on stable common interests. Regional countries can reach consensus and effectively implement multilateral mechanisms only if their common interests are established, consolidated and developed. Therefore, the multilateral cooperation mechanisms in East Asia should be gradually expanded from the priority areas of common interests into more areas. Only in this way can the region prevent or stop great powers from overriding most countries to seek individual interests.216 Generally, regional countries are mainly interested in prosperity, stability, development, and coping with traditional and non-traditional security threats through cooperation. An open and inclusive regional order is impossible without a stable outlook of regional countries on common interests. Third, continue to support ASEAN’s role of pilot. The pilot status of ASEAN has been formed over the past years, with profound geopolitical and economic foundation. It is also the result of the strategic game between East Asian countries. In the past, the vision of East Asian cooperation often failed, for which the root cause is that individual countries often regard their status in cooperation organizations as a primary goal.217 It is precisely because East Asian countries are well aware of it that they have clearly supported ASEAN’s role of pilot and stimulated the integration and order building in East Asia. At present, it is hard for China, Japan or South 214 Qin

and Wei [180]. [45]. 216 Huang [60]. 217 Ma [181]. 215 Xiao

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191

Korea to play a leading role. Japan and South Korea have no shortage of capital and technology, but they lack a broad market. China has great potential, a broad market and abundant financial resources, but it is still an underdeveloped country as a whole. Given its sheer size, China’s future strategic trends are observed by all parties. Although China, Japan and South Korea have great potential for cooperation, it is difficult for any of them to establish regional centrality through cooperation in good faith. America’s strategic shift eastward and TPP negotiations, together with the intention to lead the East Asian order, have widely caused vigilance of East Asian countries. Based on this, the continuous support of ASEAN’s pilot role is aligned with the strategic interests of most countries in East Asia. Fourth, adhere to the principle of gradualism. Given the diversity of development level and interest appeal in East Asia, the most likely scenario is that the regional order will be gradually established based on consensus.218 ASEAN, as the leader, is not highly motivated to integrate into East Asia; in fact, the core goal of ASEAN is to maintain its centrality, while China and Japan are difficult to spearhead. Obviously, regional cooperation is a pragmatic process, without a clear agenda or goal in place, and in a state of strong idea versus weak institutionalism.219 This situation has determined that the regional order can only be built in a gradual manner, focusing on economic cooperation, while promoting political dialogue and socio-cultural cooperation. Furthermore, the region should build strategic trust through cooperation, and create regional institutions at the right time. Unlike EU, East Asia will not be strongly driven by major power decisions. Fifth, properly handle strategic divergences. For East Asian countries, they should not only pursue their national interests during regional cooperation, but also create an open and inclusive institutional framework in the region by expanding common interests. Currently, major powers in East Asia and other regions have strategic divergences on the goal towards the future East Asian order, which has partly hindered the sustainability of the order. In response to the US adjustment of its East Asia strategy, East Asian countries are required to be strategically courageous enough to accelerate the negotiations on RCEP and China-Japan-ROK FTA together. In particular, different ideas between China and Japan have been severely affecting the interests of both countries and the future East Asian order. The wisdom of the Chinese and Japanese strategists is needed to properly ease the China-Japan tensions. In conclusion, the East Asian order in the making is faced with both opportunities and challenges, evolving from the past hegemonic orders to an equal order in progress. No previous hierarchical systems can be compatible with the pursuit of sovereignty, state equality and non-interference in internal affairs by East Asian countries.220 With the progress of the times, it has been impossible for any hegemonic order to grow, and difficult for a community order to establish as well. Therefore, East Asia will most possibly build a regional order based on balance of power, which means the region is expected to patient with regional cooperation based on the convergence of common 218 Dobson

[182]. [21]. 220 Kim [183]. 219 Zhang

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interests and the provision of public goods. As far as the status quo concerned, it will be difficult to build up a regional order that truly reflects the aspirations of major countries in the short run. Robert A. Scalapino notes that, “The viable form of an international order should include the balanced coexistence of major powers that work together to find a solution, or at least to find a compromise acceptable to all parties.”221 The future East Asian order will inevitably navigate the process of compromise and competition between the unilateralism of the US for leadership and the multilateralism of East Asia towards regional integration.222

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133. Sun, C. (2002). Analysis of Japan’s East Asian community concept (ri ben de dong ya gong tong ti gou xiang ping xi). China International Studies, No. 5, 43–47. 134. Baechinge, V., & Legewie, J. (Eds.). (2000). Facing Asia: Japan’s role in the political and economic dynamism of regional cooperation (p. 64). IUDICIUM Verlag GmbH. 135. Katzenstein, P. J., & Shiraishi, T. (Eds.). (2012). Beyond Japan: The dynamics of East Asian regionalism (p. 166). Beijing: China Renmin University Press. 136. Liu, J. Y. (2004). A preliminary analysis of Japan’s ‘East Asian Community’ strategy: A comment on the two proposal reports submitted by the Japan Forum on international relations to Prime Minister Koizumi (ri ben de “dong ya gong tong ti” zhan lue chu xi: jian ping ri ben guo ji lun tan cheng xiao quan shou xiang de liang fen xian ce bao gao). Japanese Studies, No. 3, 6–19. 137. Shichao, D. (2007). The understanding, behavior and comments on East Asian community of Japanese authorities (ri ben guan fang you guan dong ya gong tong ti de ren shi, xing wei ji qi ping shu). Southeast Asian Studies, No. 3, 71–76. 138. Mori, K. (2003). East Asian security and Non-East Asia factors. World Economics and Politics, No. 8, 52–57. 139. Sun, C. (2012). The choice of Japan’s foreign economic strategy: From East Asian community to two trade agreements (shi nian lai ri ben dui wai jing ji zhan lue de xuan ze: cong dong ya gong tong ti dao liang ge mao yi xie ding). Japanese Studies, No. 5, 95–109. 140. Urata, S. Japan’s FTA strategy and a free trade area of Asia Pacific. In T. Ito & D. E. Weinstein (Eds.), Reviving Japan’s economy: Problems and prescriptions (pp. 385–418). Cambridge: The MIT Press. 141. Li, J. J. (2009). Analysis of Japan’s FTA strategy (ri ben FTA zhan lue lun xi). Journal of Contemporary Asia Pacific Studies, No. 2, 110–128. 142. Zhao, F. (2010). Confusion of Japan’s FTA strategy” (ri ben FTA zhan lue de kun huo). Journal of Contemporary Asia Pacific Studies, No. 1, 46–56. 143. Nakagawa, J. (2007). The development of Japan’s international economic policy (Part II): From the Japan-US adjustments of industrial structure to a scheme for an East Asian community. Pacific Journal, No. 2, 6–15. 144. Liu, Z. L., & Sheng, W. (2008). A comparative study of the FTA strategies of China, Japan and South Korea (zhong ri han FTA zhan lue bi jiao). Northeast Asia Forum, No. 1, 54–60. 145. Xiao, X. (2014). The strategic trend of Japan and China’s strategic response (ri ben zhan lue qu xiang yu zhong guo de zhan lue ying dui), International Review, No. 2, 110–120. 146. Mori, K. (2009). Sino-Japanese relations: The Post-war towards New Era (p. 69). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China). 147. Kwan, C. H. (2005). Cultivate our own garden—reflections on “China threat theory” (p. 9). Beijing: China Commerce and Trade Press. 148. Inoguchi, T. (ed.). (2002). Japan’s Asian Policy (p. 2). New York: Palgrave & MacMillan. 149. Funabashi, Y. (1999). Where does Japan fit in the China-Japan-US relationship? In Japan center for international exchange, new dimensions of China-Japan-US relations (p. 79). Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange. 150. Manning, R. A., & Przystup, J. J. (1999). Asia’s transition diplomacy: Hedging against futureshock, Survival (Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 43–67), Autumn 1999. 151. Zhu, F. (2007). Power shift, identity opposition and strategic choice: The strategic future of Sino-Japanese relations (quan li bian geng, ren tong dui li yu zhan lue xuan ze: zhong ri guan xi de zhan lue wei lai). World Economics and Politics, No. 3, 16–25. 152. Okamoto, Y. (2002). Japan and the United States: The essential alliance. The Washington Quarterly, 25(2), 59–72. 153. Nye, J. S., Jr. (2000). Asia’s first globalizer. The Washington Quarterly (Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 121–124). Autumn 2000. 154. Men, H. H. (1998). Tension and relation, peace and competition: Analysis of US-Japan relations after the cold war (zhang chi you du, he dou xiang jian: shi xi leng zhan hou de mei ri guan xi). The Journal of International Studies, No. 2, 96–104.

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155. Katzenstein, P. J. (2006). China and Japan in the American imperial system. World Economics and Politics, No. 7, 7–14. 156. Zhang, J. Q. (2012). Japan-US alliance and the US’ Pivot to Asia strategy (ri mei tong meng yu mei guo chong fan ya zhou zhan lue). China International Studies, No. 5, 46–54. 157. Xue, L. T. (2013). Impact of the Diaoyu Islands Dispute at three levels (diao yu dao zheng duan zai san ge ceng mian de ying xiang), in zaobao.com, see: Retrieved March 1, 2013, from http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages8/forum_zp130301a.shtml. 158. Men, H. H. (2007). Building a strategic framework of common interests between China and Japan (fou zhu zhong ri gong tong li yi de zhan lue kuang jia). Teaching and Research, No. 10, 39–46. 159. Tsugami, T. (2003). China’s rise: What should Japan do? (p. 41). Tokyo: Nikkei Shimbun. 160. Liu, J. Y. (2013). Outlook of China-Japan relations after abe returned for power (an bei zai du zhi zheng hou de zhong ri guan xi zhan wang). Northeast Asia Forum, No. 2, 3–14. 161. Lehmann, J.-P. (2000). Japan and the Asia Pacific region: Global ambitions, regional aspirations. In M. Soderberg & I. Reader (Eds.), Japanese influences and presences in Asia (p. 181). Richmond: Curzon Press. 162. Huntington, S. (2001). Japan’s role in global politics. International relations of the AsiaPacific, 1, 131–142. 163. Zhu, F., & Ross, R. S. (Eds.). (2008). The rise of China: Theoretical and policy perspectives (pp. 407). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 164. Naoka, M. (2001). Evolution of Japan’s policy toward economic integration. RIETI Discussion Paper Series, 02-E-006, December 2001. 165. Funabashi, Y. (2000/2001). Japan’s moment of truth, survival (Vol.42, No.4, pp. 73–84). Winter 2000/2001. 166. Yu, Y. D. (2004). How i look at the world economy (wo kan shi jie jing ji) (p. 577). Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore. 167. Pang, Z. Y. (2003). Regionalization, regionality and regionalism: On regionalism in East Asia (di qu hua, di qu xing he di qu zhu yi: lun dong ya di qu zhu yi). World Economics and Politics, No. 11, 8–13. 168. Kwa, C. G., & Tan, S. S. (2001). The Keystone of world order. The Washington Quarterly, 24, No. 2, 95–103. 169. Ikenberry, G. J., & Tsuchiyama, J. (2002). Between balance of power and community: The future of multilateral security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,2, 69–94. 170. Tellis, A. J. (2012). Uphill challenges: China’s military modernization and Asian security, strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s military challenge, cited from reference information, (No. 214, pp. 1-12) (Nov. 12, 2012). 171. Friedberg, A. (1993/1994). Ripe for rivalry: Prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia. International security (Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 5–33), Winter 1993/1994. 172. Christensen, T. J. (2003). China, the US & Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia. In G. J. Ikenberry & M. Mastanduno, (Eds.), International relations theory and the Asia-Pacific (p. 12). New York: Columbia University Press. 173. Kang, D. C. (2007). China rising: Peace, power and order in East Asia. New York: Columbia University Press. 174. Shambaugh, D. (2006). Asia in transition: The evolving regional order. Current History, 105(690), 159. 175. Shambaugh, D., & Shift, P. (2005). China and Asia’s new dynamics (p. 16). Berkeley: University of California Press. 176. Mastanduno, M. (2003). The US-Japan alliance and models of regional security order. In G. J. Ikenberry & T. Inoguchi (Eds.), Reinventing the alliance: U.S.-Japan security partnership in an Era of Change (pp. 23–27). New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 177. Keohane, R. O. (2001). After Hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy (p. 64). Shanghai: Shanghai Century Publishing Group. 178. Tanaka, H. (2007). How does Japan Engage its Neighbors? Financial Times.

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179. Yu, X. T. (2004). ‘Fetal movement’ of East Asian identity: From a cultural perspective” (dong ya ren tong gan de tai dong: cong wen hau de shi jiao). World Economics and Politics, No. 6, 20–25. 180. Qin, Y. Q., & Wei, L. (2007). Socialization of structure, process, and power: Cooperation between China and East Asia (jie gou, jin cheng yu quan li de she hui hua: zhong guo yu dong ya di qu he zuo). World Economics and Politics, No. 3, 7–16. 181. Ma, H. (2003). Retrospect and prospect of regional economic cooperation in East Asia (dong ya qu yu jing ji he zuo de hui gu yu zhan wang). China Opening Journal, No. 1, 7–9. 182. Dobson, W. (2003). Deeper integration in East Asia: Regional institutions and the international economic system. Journal of Translation from Foreign Literature of Economics, No. 1, 23–34. 183. Kim, S. S. (2008). The evolving Asian system: Three transformation. In D. Shambaugh & M. Yahuda (Eds.), International Relations of Asia. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 184. Scalapino, R. A. (2000). Towards a viable international order. World Economics and Politics, No. 7, 53–55. 185. Youngseo, B. (2011). Idea on East Asia: History and practice from the perspective of the Korean Peninsula (p. 20). Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore.

Chapter 5

China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order

He who wants to be king must spread his kindness. —Sima Cuo (Intrigues of the Warring States: Strategies of Qin (zhan guo ce: qin ce) Keep a low profile and learn from each other to do good things. —Author’s note

True world powers invariably take a leading role first in affairs of their own region before growing into what they are. In general, those who have no global strategy are unable to have a regional presence. However, in view of the world trend of economic globalization in parallel with regional integration, we can also say that those who have no regional strategy are unable to have a global presence. As the most important stage for China’s sustainable development,1 East Asia is a strategic springboard for China to move from a regional power to a global power and then take on its global responsibility.2 While various nations are shifting their strategic emphasis eastward, it is natural for China to focus on this region and propose systematic strategy correspondingly.3 To China, East Asia is both a land of hope and a land of setbacks. The once homeland is now a place China relies on to realize its strategic rejuvenation. China’s historical status, land area, population, economic & trade scale, and prospect decide that no other Asian countries can replace it to be the center of East Asia. Since the 1990s, especially after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China has seized the opportunity of a new round of regional integration, starting the transition from a passive sideliner to a proactive participant and agenda setter in regional cooperation. It has become a driving force for East Asian integration in the economic, political and security fronts. China is not merely the heart of East Asia geographically. Its booming economy also powers the economic growth in East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and even the whole world at large, affording it an ever consolidated vantage-ground in the region. It has gradually become an engine to power economic and trade growth, a stabilizer for macro economy, a supplier of public goods and a coordinator of regional conflicts in East Asia, playing an ever important role of navigator in East Asian integration. As Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out, “China has gained predominance geopolitically in 1 Mori

[1]. and Zhou [2]. 3 Yu [3]. © Shanghai People’s Publishing House and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Men, Order of East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4654-9_5 2 Dai

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the Asian continent, and it becomes more and more confident in the region in a bid to meet the inherent historical, geographical and economic requirements. This is very natural.”4 The rise of a great power often incurs conflict and uncertainty over a period. Yet it remains an unsolved mystery concerning the regional peace and stability as well as adaptation to China in East Asia, since scholars of traditional international relations theory often associate the rise of great nations with war and turmoil.5 G. John Ikenberry said, “Not all power shifts will lead to security competition or war or overthrow the old international order. From an economic or political perspective, China is intended to work in collaboration with the current US-led international order. In short, China will rise in a way that is completely different from the old power shift.”6 As Ashley Tellis indicated, “The US allies and important neutral states in Asia are more and more relying on the Chinese market, capital, goods, and even technologies in various scenarios. Its neighbors’ economic growth depends more heavily on relations with China. This mutual fusion has inevitably brought about geopolitical implications, expanding China’s sphere of influence.”7 The spillover effect of China’s rise has recently become stronger. The US strategic shift to the East and Japan’s political right deviation and rearmament have become the main reasons to unsettle East Asia, which also affect the strategic orientation of other countries in the region. With new leadership in power, China has begun to adjust and improve its East Asia strategy. Chinese policymakers have proposed the Chinese Dream, i.e. the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, stressing “The goal of building a well-off society in an allround way by 2020, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) can be realized; the dream of turning China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can come true; and the dream of realizing the renewal of the Chinese nation can come true.”8 It is necessary to optimize the East Asia strategy in order to realize both the “two centenary goals” and Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. At the Work Forum on Chinese Diplomacy Toward the Periphery on October 24, 2013, President Xi Jinping put forward the need to “promote friendship and partnership with our neighbors, foster an amicable, secure and prosperous neighborhood environment, follow the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in conducting neighborhood diplomacy”, boost win-win cooperation and promote regional security cooperation.9 Under such a guideline, China has upgraded its regional strategy and actively promotes the institutionalization of 4 Brzezinski

[4]. [5]. 6 Ikenberry [6]. 7 Tellis [7]. 8 Xi [8, front page]. 9 Xi [9]. 5 Kang

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regional cooperation, which includes: build a community with a shared future with ASEAN, establish China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund to foster cooperation in this arena, jointly build the “Maritime Silk Road” in the 21st century, propose an upgraded version of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), advocate to set up Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that aims to support the development of infrastructure and connectivity in developing countries including ASEAN members in the region, put forward ideas like building the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, help neighbors adapt to its rise,10 develop region-wide open cooperation, ease misgivings, share common interests, deepen regional identity, and strive to play a powerful role in new East Asian order formation.

5.1 China’s National Positioning and Strategic Direction In the age of globalization, to identify the national positioning and on that basis, to promote state integration and participate in world affairs with an intact and clear status in the international society have become key topics for a country to maintain its dignity and accomplish its historic mission. China’s national positioning is largely a reflection of its relationship with the world. It is one of the most advanced countries in the agrarian age. The Chinese civilization with Confucian values as its core is a unique one in the world that records history with a singular writing system and lasts for 5,000 years. As such, the country has long been a cultural center. In the mid-19th century, China became a victim of international power shift that once declined to a failing state. Great powers forced their way into China with their advanced technologies represented by ships and armament and the Christianity-featured Western civilization, turning China into a semi-colony. When it came to the 20th century, the feudal monarchy in China existing for thousands of years collapsed, paving the way for its transformation. After unsuccessful trials of bourgeois constitutional system and the bourgeois democracy, the country has finally chosen the socialist system. The 20th century was truly big time to China: in the first half, China was still at the bottom of an unstable international system and sought primarily to restore independence and sovereignty lost in last century; in the second half, the historic rise of China turned the dream of building a wealthy and prosperous country and realizing national renewal into realistic expectations; and in the last two decades, in particular, China seized a new wave of globalization, took the initiative to blend into the international system, redefined its national positioning, gradually showed the willingness to act constructively and became a responsible, constructive and expectable international system builder and a beneficiary of international power shift step by step.11 Since the outset of the 21st century, especially after the global 10 According to Hadi Soesastro, regional arrangement can provide dialogues, cooperation and mutual adjustment, which will help nations inside the region adapt themselves to China’s rise. See Soesastro [10]. 11 Men [11].

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financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the US broke out in 2008, China has quickened its pace to rise, which generates positive global effects, sparks heated debate and raises great concerns all over the world. China’s national positioning is built on the understanding of its five thousand years of civilization, century of humiliation and the contemporary emergence, and reflects a distinct pursuit of a great power status. Since 1982, China’s national positioning has been in constant change, evolving from a traditional, closed, general power to a modern, open, major power gradually. Correspondingly, China’s national strategic system is constructed in order, with a future-oriented grand strategy architecture forming bit by bit.

5.1.1 Institutional Positioning: A New-Type Socialist Power China is the only socialist country among the existing major powers. This institutional positioning reflects the Chinese characteristics. But it is not a traditional socialist country. Instead, by inheriting the Chinese tradition, keeping up with global trends, reflecting on the development history of socialist countries and pursuing national development objectives, it has gradually improved the basic content of socialism with Chinese characteristics, that is, “the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the way to reach the goal, the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics offers a guide to action, and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics provides the fundamental guarantee”.12 In this way, it has established a new-type socialist power with the following characteristics: First, peaceful. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the independent foreign policy of peace represent the keynote of peace of China’s positioning. Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping has resolutely abandoned outdated strategic judgment and concept and liberated China’s strategic thinking from the framework of war and revolution, shifting it on to a new track of peace and development. As its strategic outlook shifted focus from combat to cooperation, China has completed the transition from a revolutionary state to a status quo state, from an opponent of the international system to a reformer and even a defender.13 Deng stated that we “advocate for peaceful socialism” and “the only way to respond to the anti-socialist forces is to continuously foster friendship and enhance cooperation”14 in addition to fighting necessary battles against them in a righteous, advantageous and courageous manner. Learning from the lessons of the USSR and adhering to the principle of peaceful diplomacy, China shall commit itself to peaceful development and then promote the world peace, cooperation and harmony through

12 Hu

[12, p. 13]. [13, pp. 48–53]; Men [14]. 14 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Part III) (deng xiao ping wen xuan), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, pp. 328, 349. 13 Johnston

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its self-development. This notion is conveyed by the very establishment of the road of peaceful development. Second, developing. Chinese policymakers are soberly aware that China “will long remain in the primary stage of socialism”, and that “China’s international position as the largest developing country in the world has not changed. We must bear in mind under any circumstances the paramount reality that China remains in the primary stage of socialism and will long remain so.”15 They emphasize the necessity of focusing on nation-building, and hold that the best and most important contribution a socialist country can make to the world is to develop itself and fully demonstrate institutional advantages in all aspects including politics, economy, culture, society and ecology, etc. It is of fundamentally strategic significance to dedicate to selfdevelopment and coexist peacefully with all other nations, including capitalist states, working together for world peace and development. Third, overall opening. Starting off with overcoming conceptual barriers and institutional constraints, China has transformed from an almost closed state to an active participant in the global market, establishing an all-dimensional, multi-level, and wide-ranging open pattern. As it rapidly grows into an internationally open country, China’s interdependence with the international community and its ability to shape the international system are increasing. In a sense, China’s peaceful development has started from domestic economic reforms. The influence of the reform spirit and relevant measures it advocates then has expanded to the international level. China’s open-up policy has shifted from mainly opening door to the outside world to opening up both internally and externally. It can be said that China is consolidating the basic strategic position of opening up to the outside world on the path of peaceful development while opening up an era of overall opening-up. Fourth, committed to the market economy. Chinese economic restructuring has undergone a process from planned economy to commodity economy and to market economy. Understanding and grasping market economy is a critical step to truly integrate into the international community. And to become a part of the international system is the right way for Chinese development. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping stressed in his southern tour talks that “whether the planned economy or the market economy takes up higher percentage is not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism”.16 On this basis, China has developed the theory of socialist market economy, commenced extraordinary construction of socialist market economy, and improved the socialist theory, pushing socialism into the next stage of development. Fifth, commitment to common prosperity. China’s reform and opening-up began with a theory of “allowing some regions and people to get rich first”. Deng Xiaoping realized that since China was backward and had long been under the influence of the “left-leaning” ideologies, it could not carry out overall opening up and must find a breakthrough for economic revival. In this way, the policy of adopting “some get rich first” before “common prosperity” was formulated. Deng stressed, “When we reach a 15 Jintao

[12, p. 16]. Works of Deng Xiaoping (Part III) (deng xiao ping wen xuan), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, p. 373.

16 Selected

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well-off level at the end of this century, we must underscore and solve this problem”.17 Entering a new century, the central leaders made a clear judgment about the epochal feature, that is, China was at a period when strategic opportunity for development met with various acute contradictions, specified the strategic approach to “continuously promoting social harmony”, and emphasized to thoroughly implement the Scientific Outlook on Development, build a harmonious socialist society and build a well-off society in an all-round way. With the “some get rich first” policy phased out, China has embarked on a road of common prosperity. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” is inseparable from the globalization background and the Chinese reality. China adheres to the basic principles of socialism, but not the socialism envisaged by Marx and Engels or the socialist model of the USSR. It draws on the civilization achievements and the market economy model of capitalist countries, but is not assimilated by them. Modified and improved constantly, socialism with Chinese characteristics is a pursuit of a new-type socialist power, and an institutional model that combines the advantages of socialism and capitalism. The pursuit of peace, development, cooperation and win-win represents China’s prospect of and confidence in future development. China’s positioning as a new-type socialist power is faced with domestic and international challenges, which are manifested respectively in the understanding of socialist nature and institutional arrangements for common prosperity, and Western countries’ overstressing differences in regime positioning and advocating “China Threat Theory” in ideology. While further promoting its five-in-one (i.e. economic, political, cultural, social and ecological) progress, China emphasizes to enhance interaction with the West based on the concept of “harmony in diversity”, in pursuit of unity without uniformity, difference without disputes, harmonious coexistence, and complementarity.

5.1.2 Economic Positioning: A Developing Power Generally speaking, developing countries refer to those that are still in the transition from traditional agricultural society to modern industrial society, with relatively low economic and social development and people’s living standards.18 With further study, indicators for analyzing the development level are added with international competitiveness, human development index (HDI), and balance of development, etc. rather than being limited to the traditional per capita GDP and GDP. Amongst, the per capita GDP and GDP indicate more about economic factors and the overall economic scale; the international competitiveness index is used to mainly look into a country’s efficiency, endurance and development trend instead of a fixed level of development; the balance of development emphasizes sustainability; and HDI that is made up of

17 Ibid., 18 Liu

p. 374. et al. [15].

5.1 China’s National Positioning and Strategic Direction

207

three indicators, i.e. life expectancy, adult literacy rate and per capita GDP, focuses on the comprehensive factors of social development. In the early 1980s, China and Western countries had sharp contradictions over whether China should join the GATT in the status of a developing or developed country and made negotiations for 10-plus years. In 2001, China joined the WTO. Viewed from the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, China did not gain a complete developing country status, with only limited scope of benefits.19 In the 21st century, as China became the strongest emerging economy, industrialized countries explicitly demand that China abandon its developing country status, arguing that it should no longer to be the biggest “free-rider”. After the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis, for instance, the statement that socialism saved China in 1949, China saved socialism in 1989 and China saved capitalism in 2009 spread like wildfire. The international community has at large sung the praise of China and expressed strong demands, stressing that China has become a world power and a quasi-superpower, proposing the concept of Group 2 (G2) and constantly calling for China to abandon the developing nation status. In light of the conventional definition of the WTO, a country with GDP per capita less than US$3,000 can be called a developing country. In 2008, China’s per capita GDP reached US$3,315, ranking the 106th in the world. And in the next three years, its per capita GDPs were US$3,678, US$4,520 and US$5,414 respectively, ranking the 97th, the 90th and the 89th in the world.20 The fast rising of the amount is as striking as its low ranking. On the one hand, we should see the overall rise in the world average GDP per capita (which for example was US$8,985 in 2010, almost twice as much as China); and on the other, we should be aware of the severity of China’s unbalanced development—according to the UN’s poverty line US$1 per day, there are still 150 million people in China who need to be lifted out of poverty. On this account, China has soberly positioned itself as a developing power. It is reaffirmed in the report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC that “China’s international status as the largest developing country in the world has not changed”. Undoubtedly, China is well on its way towards industrialization. Yet it is not a smooth course but with complex processing characteristics. For a developing country, to achieve industrialization and modernization is to eliminate poverty, shake off backwardness and improve development level. In the case of China, it is an accelerating process and a process where underdeveloped and developed phenomena coexist. It consists of two parallel courses: one is to rapidly reduce undeveloped phenomena and then quickly break away from features of an underdeveloped economy; and the other is to rapidly augment the industrialized phenomena and significantly enhance the corresponding characteristics. It is a dynamic process where small efforts are constantly made to achieve big goals, and it represents the endeavor of China as it grows from a developing country to a moderately developed country and then to an advanced country.

19 Xu

[16]. http://wenku.baidu.com/view/d0bd643531126edb6f1a10b9.html, Dec. 22, 2012.

20 See:

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China has become the world’s second largest economy since 2010. With regard to the international competitiveness, it is the only member state of BRICS that has enlisted Top 30 in the world, ranking the 30th in 2008, the 29th in 2009, the 27th in 2010–2011, the 26th in 2011–2012, and the 29th in 2012–2014. By the two indicators, China’s economic status is at the forefront of the world, so that it is unlikely to position as a developing nation in a general sense. But other indicators show that China is lagging behind in development. Take the HDI as an example. China not only ranks low in this index but also tends to drop further. It ranked the 81st in 2008, the 92nd in 2009, the 89th in 2010, and fell down to the 101st in 2011 and 2012, which is categorized into the middle and lower levels. In terms of the economic and social development balance, the developed does a fairly good job with a narrower gap between urban and rural and amongst different regions; while China is at a stage of lopsided development and bears the typical features of the developing that there are of great and even widening discrepancy between urban and rural areas, different regions and social classes. In China, numerous features of an underdeveloped economy can still be found in its countryside and many regions, while certain characteristics of the advanced are prevailing in urban and coastal areas, enabling it to compete with the industrialized countries in an ever larger scope (Table 5.1). In summary, China possesses salient features of socialism at the primary stage that is reflected in economic, social, political, and cultural development. Based on the above analysis, the characteristics of the primary stage are not static. China today is no longer a typical developing country, nor is it a developed or moderately developed country. It has both underdeveloped and developed features, with the Table 5.1 Percentage of four regions in China by major indicators (2013) (%) Indicators

East (10)

Central (6)

West (12)

Northeast (3)

Land area

9.5

10.7

71.5

8.2

Population

38.1

26.5

27.0

8.1

Urban working population

49.1

21.0

21.6

8.3

GDP

51.2

20.2

20

8.6

Local fiscal revenue

53.3

17.4

20.9

8.4

Local fiscal expenditure

39.6

21.3

29.7

9.4

Export turnover (by the location of the business unit)

81.7

6.2

8.1

4.0

Export turnover (by domestic destination and source of goods)

85.1

5.9

5.8

3.2

Import turnover (by the location of the business unit)

86.0

4.2

5.1

4.7

Import turnover (by domestic destination and source of goods)

83.9

4.3

6.5

5.3

Source National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2014, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2014

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former shrinking and the latter expanding. China is a developing country, but it is growing into a core country. Therefore, simply viewing it as a developing nation is inadequate and may even affect the formulation and implementation of its major economic and financial policies. As the people live a modern life in the 21st century, China is trying to rapidly go through the “intermediate point” of the primary stage at a steady pace. At present, it is undergoing an overall transformation in economy, politics, society and culture, etc., with definite objectives of establishing a modern state system and realizing modernization. It is challenging for China to achieve the above goals under the current national condition and it becomes more urgent to improve the development concept, optimize the development model, and adjust the development strategy. In particular, it is essential for the country to alter its course from unsustainable, unfair, unbalanced development to the other way around.

5.1.3 Cultural Positioning: A Great Power with Rich Cultural Legacy Culture is the lifeblood, soul and character of a nation. Cultural positioning is the source of national cohesion and the cornerstone of the national positioning. Generally speaking, national modernization is a combination of economic modernization, institutional modernization and cultural modernization, while the last is an uphill battle for China. As Tu Weiming pointed out, “the true rise of China must be the rise of culture”.21 Globalization has brought about both cultural fusion and cultural fission and shock. Traditional culture or cultural tradition is often regarded as the core symbol to confirm the positioning of a country. Culture is of greater significance to China. As the British philosopher Bertrand Russell stated, China is not so much a political entity as a cultural entity. Instead of a country name, the term China marks the geographical center of the world, stands for advanced civilization and education, and represents the common value orientation of the Chinese nation. With nearly forty years of reform and opening up, cultural modernization is lagging behind economic modernization in China. Its cultural restructuring has just started, and cultural security hazard is the top security threat we are facing now. As shown by the historical evolution of Chinese culture as well as its changing international influence, Chinese cultural soft power is bestowed with an innate advantage. This is reflected in not only the superiority of the Confucianism-centric culture in ancient China and its great impact on surrounding areas, but also the catalytic role of Confucian culture in the consecutive rising of East Asia countries (such as Japan, the Four Dragons, ASEAN, and China). Western civilization has launched and posed a huge challenge to the Eastern civilization for over a century. But now the Chinese tradition is carried forward actively while the Western civilization enters a stage of reflection and adjustment, which are symbolized respectively by the great success of 21 Du

[17].

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China’s reform and opening up and international powers’ pivot to the Asia-Pacific. As cultural fusion enters a new phase, China is becoming the center for cultural interchange between East and West. As Wang Meng indicates, the Chinese traditional culture has risen up to severe challenge, walked out of the shadow of lagging behind the world trend and become more vigorous and vital by the day, so that it is a living culture that keeps abreast with the time and communicates and complements with the world’s mainstream, modern and advanced cultures.22 On the other hand, Chinese culture is baffled with inherent problems, too. China has missed the opportunity of modern industrialization, and the physical support of Chinese traditional culture was gradually worn off, especially after a series of fiasco in the mid-19th century. Under such a situation, cultural introspection and reconstruction were initiated. Why did this great nation fall so badly? The patriots asked. They imitated the West by manufacturing guns and ships in the first place, and then started reflecting on the Chinese traditional culture. Since then, this kind of introspection has never ceased. Amongst, a mostly debated topic is whether it is “Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application” or “Western learning as substance, Chinese learning for application”. When it came to the 20th century, China launched the modernization process heralded by the Chinese Revolution and the May 4th Movement. And the attitude towards traditional culture has become a dividing line. For one thing, people thoroughly criticized the traditional culture and proposed indiscriminate westernization in the New Culture Movement. This critical view was vividly depicted in the practice of “condemning Lin Biao and Confucius” during the Great Cultural Revolution of China. The proposition of indiscriminate westernization intermittently appeared in China’s development process, setting off political storms time and again in China. For another, the traditional culture school represented by Liang Shuming emphasized that “the future of world culture is the revival of Chinese culture”,23 which has been persistent and everlasting in pure, non-political academic discussions. However, due to a history of decline in the overall strength, there were copycat and even xenomania behaviors culturally, and self-denial has always been a tradition of the Chinese anyway. Since the reform and opening up in 1978, China has begun to open door to the Western material civilization on a large scale and has also actively brought in spiritual civilization. From the Western point of view, China’s reform and opening up is the process of westernization; yet to China, it is a process in which Chinese and western civilizations meet and mix. On the top, harmony in diversity is still the future of the world. China has caught up with a new wave of globalization through the reform and opening up. And reform and innovation have become prominent cultural traits of the country. It has realized economic rise. Such a rise echoes with the rapid development of the Asian economy, which has led the world to review the gigantic energy hidden in Chinese traditional culture with Confucianism at the principal position. As described in a classical Chinese poem: “A thousand sails pass by the wrecked

22 Wang 23 Liang

[18, Sect. 6]. [19].

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ship; ten thousand saplings shoot up beyond the withered tree.”24 Chinese traditional culture began to show positive value in the approach to the global issues, including reshaping the international political and economic order, resolving escalating international conflicts, getting rid of the cultural shackle of omnipotence of substance, and coping with the greater crisis of faith. Policymakers of China are clearly aware of the core values of culture in the country’s positioning, emphasizing to utilize it to guide social trend, educate the people, serve society, and boost development. Culturally, China is still a “big but not strong” country though. How to realize the traditional culture modernization remains an open question. How to inherit and develop rich traditional cultural resources is a major strategic issue we are facing. The inherent risks of Chinese culture are mainly reflected in: social values have lost completely; traditional social ethics have lost and brought about severe social problems; the essence of traditional culture is not fully inherited; and the fine tradition needs to be further explored. China faces an urgent task to modernize its traditional culture. While eagerly absorbing foreign civilizations, we often neglect to carry forward the characteristics of ethnic culture and even keep the tradition of criticizing ethnic culture. However, a nation that loses its cultural identity loses support for its national independence. Never has a country achieved modernization by fully borrowing from others. When going global, to preserve and develop China’s own cultural power is equally important to increasing its economic and military strength. Now in China the possibility of total westernization is basically negated, with disputes around two major viewpoints. One is the Confucianism Renaissance Theory, a continuation of “Chinese learning as essence, Western learning for function” which emphasizes the fundamental value of Chinese traditional culture, especially the Confucianism; and the other is the concept of both Chinese and Western learning as essence, proposing Chinese traditional culture and Western culture enhance and learn from each other. All in all, not a single great power is rooted in foreign culture no matter where or when. It is essential to conduct scientific analysis of, inherit with a critical attitude, and carry forward the traditional culture. But the traditional culture, unique to the homeland, is indispensable to the modernization. We need to emphasize the concept of “Chinese learning as essence, Western learning for application”, abrogate the parts that belittle the Western culture, keep open-minded to absorb useful ingredients and discard the dregs to prevent a mingling of both good and bad. The external risks for Chinese culture are mainly reflected in the fact that Western culture has the impulsion to infiltrate and transform “others”. It is one of the main goals of the West to promote values through cultural infiltration. In the process of transforming into a modern industrial society, China is consciously or unconsciously accepting Western culture and its values. In particular, the negative side of the Western culture—such as extreme self-interest and money worship, distorted value concepts, and propensity to amorality—is subverting the fine traditions of Chinese ethnic culture, exerting a strong impact on the appeal of Chinese traditional morality and the cohesiveness of national culture, and endangering cultural security.

24 Liu

Yuxi, “A Rely to Bai Juyi’s Gift Poetry at the Banquet of Our First Meeting in Yangzhou”.

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In recent years, Chinese policy makers have deeply recognized the backwardness, urgency and strategic significance of cultural construction, and put a lot of effort into promoting cultural development. In the report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the government stressed to open a new horizon in promoting China’s cultural advance: the Chinese nation’s cultural creativity would continuously to burst forth; people’s basic cultural rights and interests would be better protected; and the international influence of Chinese culture would steadily increase. China has begun to establish the strategy of establishing a nation based on culture, which involves abiding by cultural heritage, carrying forward traditional culture, promoting cultural industry reform, developing a strong socialist culture in China, and advocating cultural dialogues, to usher in a big era of Chinese cultural modernization and construction.

5.1.4 Political Positioning: A Responsible Power Taking global responsibility is a fundamental requirement of all countries in the era of globalization. Due to a surge in global problems and solutions, each country must bear responsibilities, including but not limited to providing domestic public goods, complying with international norms, maintaining international standards and fulfilling international obligations, no matter whether it is strong or weak, big or small. As the world’s second-largest economy and a big oriental country with a leading comprehensive national strength, China shoulders an important responsibility for safeguarding the common interests of mankind. “A responsible power” is a national appeal and effort in voluntarily taking responsibilities in conformity with the trend of time. Assuming bigger international responsibilities meets China’s need to realize its own national interests, helps it play a greater role in the international society and serves an important path to expand its national interests all over the world. Emphasis on this point demonstrates a new positioning of China in the international community. Sun Yat-sen pointed out, “If China becomes strong, we must not only restore the status of the nation, but also bear a big responsibility for the world.”25 Building China into a responsible power is related to the process of reform and opening up, corresponds to the depth of China’s integration into the international community, complements with the process of China’s participation in the international system, and goes along with the expansion of national strength and international influence. In the 1980s, China changed its old judgment of “war and revolution” for world theme and initiated the process of integrating into the international community, shifting its role from an opponent and bystander to an active participant and builder.26 China has played an active and cooperative role in building a fair and rational new international order, blended into the international system continuously, and worked to build pragmatic partnerships with major countries in the world. 25 Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen (sun zhong shan xuan ji), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981, p. 691. 26 Johnston [13, p. 52], Qin [20].

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As opening up to the outside world and further participation in the international system work in tandem, China has experienced a progressively adaptive and deepening process along with domestic development and requirement. Since the early 1980s, China has actively participated in the activities of international economic organizations and has generated positive spillover effects, which brought in new ideas, influenced the Chinese diplomatic decision-making model, and promoted China’s participation in other international systems.27 In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour talks heralded the arrival of an era of China’s full participation in the international system. Since then, China has begun to engage with international institutions in a comprehensive, strategic, and long-termed manner, with almost all important institutions in today’s international system recognized by it. After the Cold War, China has assumed an increasingly important role in the globe as its economic development entered the fast lane and the process of political democratization sped up. As it develops, its wish and ability to assume international responsibility also increase. In November 1997, Jiang Zemin delivered a speech at Harvard University, emphasizing that China and the US “share extensive common interests and shoulder common responsibilities” on many major issues concerning human survival and development.28 Chinese leaders have often referred to the positioning of a big responsible country ever since. For example, on March 14, 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao announced to the world that “China has become a responsible power”.29 On April 29, 2010, Wen said at a joint press conference with European Commission President Jose Barroso that “China will assume more international responsibilities, which is not only the expectation of the international community, but also in the interests of China”.30 In addition, “China will participate in international affairs with a more positive attitude, play the role of a responsible power and address global challenges together”, wrote in the report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC. The positioning of a responsible power signifies a tremendous change in the national positioning of China. The traditional positioning of a big sovereigntycentered, independent country is linked to the new positioning, while state act is increasingly regulated by the international institutions. China considers itself an active and responsible participant in the international system, further building the image of a big responsible country and actively providing global and regional public goods. In the meantime, the international community, especially the Western countries, demands greater responsibility from China. Such voices become an international 27 Men

[21]. Works of Jiang Zemin (Part II) (jiang ze min wen xuan), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2006, p. 64. 29 “Premier Wen Jiabao Answers Questions from Domestic and Foreign Journalists at the 4th Session of the 10th National People’s Congress” (wen jia bao zong li zai di shi jie quan guo ren da si ci hui yi ji zhe zhao dai hui shang da ji zhe wen), Guangming Daily, Mar. 15, 2006, front page. 30 “Wen Jiabao: China Will Certainly Assume More International Responsibilities” (wen jia bao: zhong guo yi ding hui cheng dan geng duo guo ji ze ren), see: http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-04/ 29/c_1264446.html. 28 Selected

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pressure. And “China Responsibility Theory” becomes a strategic discourse the US and other Western countries use to require a change in China’s role. According to Chinese American scholar Huang Jing, the international responsibility that Western countries demand from China is mainly in three levels: First, the economic and material-based responsibility, requiring China to contribute more to international affairs; second, the responsibility of opening up financial market, requiring the Chinese government to give up control of the financial market and allow for the access of foreign companies; and third, the moral responsibility, requiring China to gradually follow the Western values and play by rules of the game.31 Some scholars believe that China Responsibility Theory is a new form of soft containment, which creates both opportunity for joining international cooperation and greater deception and difficulty.32 Meanwhile, China is a rising power and the only big socialist power. This determines that China must be particularly prudent in assuming international responsibility. When a rising power is taking on international duty, it is easy to be interpreted negatively by other major powers. “Responsibility theory” and “threat theory” often come hand in hand. And the identity of a large socialist country is more likely to meet with hostility from the West. What’s more, there are domestic misunderstandings for this positioning, with arguments on conspiracy theory, lack of capability, and emphasis on domestic issues, etc. The future and fate of contemporary China are connected with that of the world more tightly. China’s development cannot be separated from the world, and vice versa. China bears its own role in the international community. Taking the initiative to assume moderate international responsibilities is of positive significance to a growing country like China. This is not purely because China is capable and responsible in making more and greater contributions to mankind, or it is necessary for all powers to overcome the difficulties and cope with global crises together in an era of global governance. A deeper reason is that being responsible helps enhance the international image. China persistently pursues the national positioning of “a responsible power”. Theoretically, it has set forth a series of concepts, including new security concept, mutual benefit and win-win, practicing democracy in international relations, harmonious world, and path of peaceful development. Practically, it strengthens constructive engagement with the international community, emphasizes on sharing, co-prosperity and win-win in the handling of international affairs to avoid zero-sum game, actively supplies global and regional public goods, assists developing countries within its power, increases material input to international organizations, turns from a recipient country into an active donor country, and proactively participates in international security maintenance. Associated with the awakening to major power responsibility is the further revelation of its awareness in active participation. It can be said that in China state rationality has taken root, while opening-up and the sense of participation are irresistible. Facing the future, China shall calmly estimate its international status, actively assume and rationally expand its international responsibilities, advance common 31 Huang 32 Guo

[22, Sect. 10]. [23].

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interests with other nations, keep the balance of capabilities and responsibilities in international affairs, and actively demand the corresponding international rights. As it promotes international cooperation with others, China should continue to emphasize the strategic layout with domestic construction as the core, facilitating a balanced development.

5.1.5 Strategic Positioning: An Asia-Pacific Power with Great Global Influence Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values, wrote Henry S. Kissinger.33 Many Chinese and foreign elites tend to classify China in the 21st century into this category, with the “China–US Group” (G-2) proposed by the US strategic community as a typical example. China has been a major power in history, a status that it has never lost even in the declining Qing dynasty. As Napoleon said, China is a sleeping lion and “when she awakes, the world will shake”.34 Since the reform and opening up in 1978, China’s national strength and its international influence have been on the rise. China’s rising becomes a widely acknowledged reality in the international community, and its world positioning is an important factor for the international community to predict its strategic direction. Most strategic analysts believe that it is only a matter of time for China to grow into a world power. After the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China began to actively shoulder international responsibility and received more attention for its function as a major power. Since 2006, the G-2 theory has been hyped, labeling China as a world power initially. And this topic has consupport zone, and defines itself tinuously fermented especially after China overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in 2010. The controversy about China’s world positioning mainly lies in how big China is in the world. At present, there are several major judgments including an East Asian power, an Asia-Pacific power with global influence, and a world power. The Chinese in ancient times have explored and set forth basic standards for a great power. For instance, political strategist Zhang Yi in the Warring States Period pointed out, “the Qin state occupies half of the land and owns an army strong enough to rival four states. With steep mountains on all sides and the Yellow River to the east, it boasts solid frontiers. It has a fierce troop made of millions of warriors, thousands of chariots, ten thousands of horses and tons of grains that pile up like a mountain. The law is strict, so that soldiers go through fire and blood composedly and sacrifice their lives heroically. The Lord is strict yet wise, and the generals are resourceful and valiant. Therefore, if it dispatches troops, they would conquer the strategic passes of 33 Kissinger 34 Khanua

[24]. [25].

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Mount Heng so easily as if rolling up a mat. In this way, the key places of feudal princes will be controlled, and those who still put up a stubborn resistance will inevitably be destroyed firstly.”35 The above analysis unveils the perceived criteria to be a great power at the time: vast in territory (occupy half of the land), strong enough to contend against other allied states (own an army strong enough to rival four states), secure and stable in terrain (boast solid frontiers), militarily mighty, wealthy, politically righteous, advanced in institution (the law is strict, the Lord is strict yet wise, and the generals are resourceful and valiant), and with great deterrent force (those who still put up a stubborn resistance will inevitably be destroyed firstly). Many references can be found in the academic world about the yardsticks of a world power. German historian Leopold von Ranke pointed out that a world power must “be able to fight against all other powers without being defeated even if they unite”.36 In the opinion of Shi Yinhong, a great power has a wide range of political, economic and strategic interests overseas in a certain region or the entire world, and owns national strength strong enough to effectively safeguard these interests in peace time and resist the combined forces of at least two regional or world powers during war. Generally speaking, it is recognized by other countries to be entitled to deal with all major international issues in the region or globe and domestic issues that affect the security of other nations. It usually shares with other major countries in the region and the world the basic common ground, common international values, common rules and common international operating mechanism, so as to be viewed a member of the community of great powers. It has recognized rights to participate in and address all major international issues in the region, and is powerful enough to participate extensively in international affairs in the region or the world and to carry out coordination and collaboration with other powers.37 According to Wang Jun, director of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), a world power should be characterized by: (i) a great national strength that it boasts more developed economy, mightier army, more flourishing culture and larger territory in comparison with other countries at the same historical stage; (ii) an extensive influence covering economic, political, military, cultural and other fronts, which can make a big difference to the times and strongly influence and even shape the process of world civilization; and (iii) a far-stretched historic impact that is not limited to some place or some time but endures beyond time and space.38 Michael Oksenberg, et al. point out that the basic requirements of a world power are that it is world-leading in terms of economic development and military prowess and globally influential in the cultural and political arenas.39 And a world power “means an absolute advantage in the global military might, a significant international influence in finance and economy, a clear leading position in technology and an attractive social lifestyle—all these must

35 Intrigues

of the Warring States: Strategies of Chu I. (zhan guo ce: chu ce). Ranke [26]. 37 Shi [27]. 38 Wang [28]. 39 Funabashi et al. [29]. 36 von

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be combined together to potentially create a worldwide political influence”, quoted Zbigniew Brzezinski.40 With reference to the above criteria, we come to the conclusion that China has always been a major power in East Asia and even Asia at large. The concept of Tianxia (all under heaven) and the tributary system represent the historical glory of China. Yet, the country was never a world power, since there were only regional powers before the 19th century. The real world powers only came into being afterwards amid the contest for supremacy. And the rise of European powers posed a sharp contrast to China’s decline. Such a century-long drop in international status was halted until the founding of the People’s Republic of China, which rapidly established its status as a political and military power. Since the reform and opening up in 1978, China’s economic status has risen rapidly and the overall strength has continued to grow. Alongside, the country becomes more concerned with maritime interests and extends its global influence so rapidly and widely to the entire Asia-Pacific region that today it is difficult to achieve satisfactory results in all regional matters of importance if without its active participation. China has what it makes to become a world power: In terms of resources, China has the third largest land area and ranks No.1 by population, making it a veritable great power rich in natural resources; in terms of political influence, it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and makes a big impact in such organizations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the G20, making it a veritable political power; in terms of economy, trade, and foreign investment, it is a veritably world power; and in terms of military forces, it is qualified as a big country with remarkable defense expenditure and military modernization. Due to shortage in per capita resources, imbalanced economic development, limited influence of cultural values, and being a typical military defense-oriented nation, however, China still lacks sufficient overseas interests and world-wide privileges recognized by the international community. Therefore, China’s strategic positioning is an Asia-Pacific power with global influence, which is basically regional yet with certain global character as well. As a representative of the oriental countries, China is at the heart of Asia in the traditional geopolitical sense. With the deepening of economic interdependence with its neighbors, China has become the geo-economic center of the Asia-Pacific region, surpassing the US and Japan to become leader in the economic development. In recent years, China has taken East Asia, the hinterland of Asian Continent, as the primary area to assume responsibilities of a great power according to its own national strength and strategic arrangement, and expanded its global reach along with the extension of its benefit frontier. A peaceful and stable regional environment is the primary prerequisite for China’s modernization drive. China focuses on collaboration in East Asia and the neighboring areas where it will continuously fulfill and appropriately expand its global responsibilities. This positioning is challenged at home and abroad. Firstly, domestic challenge is mainly reflected in impulsive nationalism and lack of mature great-power mentality. Basic signs of a mature great-power mentality are: Clearly define the boundaries of 40 Brzezinski

[30].

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national interests; respond to criticism calmly, able to hold candid discussions on issues in question; and keep an eye on other countries’ concerns about core interests and look at national interests from a long-termed perspective. Frankly speaking, such mature mindset has not yet formed in China, which will affect China’s national positioning in general. Then, international challenge is mainly showcased in the fact that existing major powers not only scramble for the Asia-Pacific interests but also worry about and restrain the trend of China’s rising as a world power, such as the US’ returning to East Asia and Japan’s strengthening strategic cooperation with the US. In addition, from the northwestern and central Asia via South Asia, Southeast Asia, South China Sea to the Korean Peninsula, a U-shaped circular turbulence zone is around China, posing as the primary national security challenge facing China now. China is committed to promoting sound regional cooperation in its neighborhood and takes great efforts to keep stability there as a large part of its strategic moves. In another word, it reaffirms the core position of East Asia in the national strategy, works to build East Asia into a strategic support zone, and defines itself to be a great power in Asia and a maritime countries, expanding the overseas interests from both land and sea.

5.1.6 Strategic Design: Building China’s National Strategic System As it rises, China is fully integrated into the international system, unleashing its strategic power there in a peaceful manner.41 Since the global financial depression broke out in 2008, China has been gradually thrust to the center of the world stage. The discomfort of the world’s major powers to China’s rising has resurged and manifested in various ways like worries, doubts and even fears. Barry Buzan stated that it was reasonable to be concerned with China’s rising whether from the perspective of realism, liberalism or the British school.42 At present, China is on a journey of moving from a regional power to a global power and then to a global great power. And the interaction between domestic and international factors is enhanced, as the national strategic interests of China are rapidly extended to the world while the country is paid more attention and further infiltrated by the international community, plus the overall transformation in China is accelerating. The international environment is becoming more complex, the national interests are expanding and the ability to secure national interests is relatively weak—all these constitute the structural contradiction when China maps out strategies. The complexity of national strategy emerges. In this sense, it is crucial to construct a national strategic system.

41 Men Honghua, “Contemporary International System and China Grand Strategy” (dang dai guo ji ti xi yu zhong guo da zhan lue) (an academic report delivered in Jilin University on April 9, 2010), see: http://adm.jlu.edu.cn/theme1/info.php?id=3505. 42 Buzan [31].

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Economic globalization and regional integration runs parallel. Under this world situation, a scientific and complete system of national strategy should be built on the coordination of national and international strategies, and include at least three complementary levels: national strategy, global strategy and regional strategy. National strategy is the foundation of the system. It is based on the basic national conditions and aims to improve the domestic strategic layout. The pursuit is to build a strong and wealthy country and seek social goods based on people-oriented ideology. It is made to build up the national strategic resources and comprehensive strength, improve the modern state system, and target political integrity, social harmony, completeness of legal institution, and cultural prosperity and ecological balance. Global strategy mirrors the big picture of the national strategic system. As an irreversible trend worldwide, globalization brings huge opportunities for development and also poses challenges to the economic and social security of all nations. In order to develop, however, a country must seize the opportunities and cannot afford to deny this “double-edged sword”. China is no exception. All countries need to make appropriate global strategies according to their national conditions and interests, so that they can seize the development opportunities, share the dividends of globalization and guard against the risks. At the meantime, globalization is yielding global governance to address global issues such as ecology, human rights, immigration, drugs, smuggling and infectious diseases through binding international organizations. Global governance is an actual requirement of the international community and a realistic option to counterbalance hegemony and power politics. And it is the moral force of the international community to advocate a kind of democratic, just, transparent and equal global governance.43 In making global strategy, a nation seeks participation and sharing, while actively taking on international responsibilities and obligations. Regional strategy is the geographical support of the national strategic system. From a historical point of view, true world powers invariably take a leading role first in affairs of their own region before growing into what they are. Conventionally, the regional strategy of a large country is based on the national strength and aims to gain regional dominance. Yet under the trend that economic globalization and regional integration go hand in hand, it shifts to a different track in pursuit of regional common interests, employing open regionalism as a strategic instrument and regarding construction of regional institution and order as a main part and vision of regional cooperation respectively. The basic principle of constructing a scientific and complete national strategic system is “good timing, geographical convenience, and support of people”. At present, the best “timing” for China is economic globalization when China is integrating into the international system, becoming an active and constructive participant within and rising as an advocator and collaborator in development matters of great importance to the world. The best “geographical convenience” for China refers to East Asia integration, a trend promoted mainly by the country. The best “support of people” for China is the construction of a harmonious society, in order to achieve harmony 43 Yu

[32].

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between man and nature, domestic social harmony, peace and development towards foreign states, and a harmonious world. As Mencius said, “The weather is not as important as the terrain, and the terrain is not so important as the support of the people.” Its basic meaning coincides with the basic structure of the national strategic system, with the national strategy as the foundation, the regional strategy as the support, and the global strategy as the pillar.

5.1.6.1

Strategic Direction: The Guiding Principle of China’s Grand Strategy

Backed by the construction and improvement of China’s national strategic system, China begins to implement the active and sound grand strategy. This includes three aspects. Firstly, in the economic front, China should actively participate in economic globalization, strive to become the dominant force in East Asian economy and the core engine to the world economy, promote the world economy with its own sustained economic growth, vigorously expand economic and strategic interests, and guarantee economic development to be the nucleus of China’s overall rise. The goal of economic strategy is not only limited to creating an international environment for economic construction and expanding economic interests, but also including fostering abilities to create and carry out agendas, so as to facilitate the maturity of international strategies as a whole through the achievements of economic strategy. Secondly, in the security front, it should build on the foundation of the general security concept, steadily promote national security and actively maintain international peace to secure and expand China’s security interests. And thirdly, in the cultural front, while adhering to the diversity of civilization, it should promote traditional culture, strengthen foreign cultural exchanges, absorb the advanced achievements of human civilization, promote the recognition of universalistic culture, enhance the international influence of Chinese culture, and regard culture as a solid foundation for China’s rise. The guiding principle of China’s grand strategy should be centered on defensive realism. To all countries, realism is the basic factor to think about in making grand strategy. Defensive realism emphasizes security cooperation and self-restraint, values the important role of the international institutions, and also underlines the basic principles of national self-defense. Seen in this light, the grand strategy oriented by defensive realism stresses both the importance of cooperation among states and the basic trend of self-restraint, providing rational guidance for China to fully integrate into the international community and play a positive, constructive role. The guiding principle of China’s grand strategy should make economism a top priority. The so-called economism not only includes domestic strategic arrangements with economic construction as the core, but also indicates the international strategic design of using economy as an instrument to extend the national strategic interests. China should actively participate in economic globalization and vigorously expand economic strategic interests. And economic means is perhaps the most important to achieve a win-win situation through interaction with the international community.

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The guiding principle of China’s grand strategy should focus on regional primacy. As a great power with both regional and global characteristics, China should take East Asia for the base for its rising. It is necessary for China to focus on East Asia’s development, vigorously promote regional integration, create region-based international institutions helpful to the local economy and further economic opening, and provide chances for other nations to piggyback on China’s development.44 The East Asian cooperation mechanism driven by China represents a new path of its grand strategy, that is, to foster and build a regional order of equality, cooperation, mutual benefit and mutual assistance in areas of vital importance to its interests based on the common ground, to eliminate the long-termed, piled-up estrangements and grievances during constructive interaction, and to explore and gradually establish new standards for inter-state and international relations.45 The guiding principle of China’s grand strategy should employ institutionalism as the main means. With international system regarded as a means to achieve the national strategic goals, it is a preset strategic choice for the country to fuse into the international community and extend national strategic interests through the participation, creation and even guidance of the international institutions. In the process of China’s rising, an international institutional framework to take in newly rising powers has been gradually established in the world. This is one of the basic prerequisites for China to fully integrate into the international community. The plurality of international relations is not in disorder or in chaos. The vertical diversification process is kept company by the process of institutional integration.46 In the process, China has experienced a change from a passive participator to an active player. Like a scroll painting with interwoven lines and light-to-dark coloring, China takes on a bigger role of enthusiastic participant and voluntary creator in its interaction with the international institutions. This is not only a positive expression of its integration into the international community, but also an important sign that China’s rise is accepted globally. The guiding principle of China’s grand strategy should adopt policy coordination as the main approach. Since the end of Cold War, the international community has entered a period of transition when all major powers seize opportunities to compete for the realization of their own strategic goals. A outstanding feature is the continuous strengthening of cooperation and policy coordination among them.47 When mapping out the grand strategy, we should emphasize the importance of policy coordination of great powers, avoid conflicts in non-core strategic interests and pursue to meet strategic goals in a cooperative and constructive manner. The guiding principle of China’s grand strategy should set forth the major objective of image buildup. To realize the goal of the grand strategy, it is critical to create a responsible, constructive, cooperative and predictable international image. Strengthening inter-state cooperation and coordination and upholding international morality 44 Kang

[33]. [34]. 46 Yu [35]. 47 Gilpin [36]. 45 Men

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and the basic principle of international laws are not only an important channel to establish a moral and just image of a great power, but also a prerequisite to expand its national interests globally.

5.1.7 Several Notable Key Points for China’s Grand Strategy First, strengthen the coordination between domestic and international strategies. They complement each other, and the latter is based on the realization of the former. To ensure mutual coordination, it is necessary to strive for the right to formulate and interpret international rules externally, and committed to shaping China’s policy environment for sustainable development internally by focusing on coordination of conflicts of interest and maintaining social stability. To be specific, we should put efforts in three aspects as following. We should emphasize to make it a top priority to get domestic affairs done. China’s development in nature is to rely on its own strength, seek and explore the driving force for development through reforms, select the proper strategies in politics and development, foster a strong economy and align with the strategy that centers on strength enhancement. We should emphasize the importance of clean governance and social progress in China to the achievement of international strategic goals, along with further promoting the great momentum of domestic development. And we should emphasize to avoid the traditional practice of setting apart domestic politics and international strategy, but seek for a comprehensive and coordinated development driven by the positive impetus of the international community such as international resources, markets, capital and technologies. Second, regard strength buildup as the strategic core. The pedestal of China’s rising is the increase of national strength. According to George Modelski, a world power is first and foremost a world economic leader, that is, it is featured with a large economic scale, a high level of affluence and flouring dominant industrial sectors under the condition of technological innovation, actively participates in the world economy and serves as the hub of global growth.48 China is the most promising world market, but it still takes time to become the hub of global growth. Due to the inherent logic defect of economic globalization itself, China is in an unprecedented era where development coexists with instability. In this era, the priority of development by logic should be self-improvement. The increase of national strength is due to not only the development and cultivation of the domestic market, but also the acquisition of strategic resources in the context of globalization. China cannot rely entirely on domestic resources to support the huge economic scale and achieve sustained high growth, or meet the growing economic and cultural needs of over one billion people. So China must go global while taking root in homeland to acquire more of international resources, capitals, markets and technologies on a larger scale and optimize allocation of resources worldwide.49 What’s equally important is that 48 Modelski 49 Hu

[38].

[37].

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the increase of national strength should be marked not only by the steady rise of hard power but also by the growing soft power. To grow soft power, especially the international influence of the Chinese culture, should be a key part of strength buildup. As China has long concentrated on the development of hard power and neglected soft power, the mismatching in-between has undermined the potential of the country to a considerable extent. At the international level, China is at a disadvantage in multiple aspects such as attracting other countries to follow and shift grounds, and introducing topics, setting agendas and guiding public opinion in international affairs. It has not yet gained its own say in international affairs. Soft power construction is closely related to how China will coordinate the domestic and international situation and show its charm on the two platforms. On one hand, it requires China to publicize its excellent culture, development model and diplomatic philosophy to the world in an attempt to get understood and recognized by other countries; and on the other, it attaches greater importance to China’s efforts and innovation in shaping mainstream social values, improving governance and cultivating a civil society. And the latter is more of a fundamental topic for discussion. Third, establish and improve the National Security Council (NSC). With fiercer competition and a volatile international environment, China that has become an integral part of the international community is gradually coming into the spotlight and facing with various challenges in national security. Only by placing importance to national security can it achieve peaceful development. This requires coping with world changes and competition systematically to ensure continued growth in the wrestling between major countries. There is a Chinese saying, “Mapping out a strategy within a command tent determines the victory on the battlefield thousands of miles away.” Can we consider both reality and future in major national security and diplomatic matters and brainstorm core issues at critical moment to finally make the right strategic decisions, through coordination of domestic and international activities and all-round security-specific arrangements for the nation as a whole? It is a matter of core interests and even of life and death to the country. From a global view, major powers all attach great importance to national security, and often establish a National Security Committee (NSC) responsible for the overall formulation, coordination and implementation of national security and foreign policy decisions. As a central organization in this sector, the NSC is regarded a sign of state institution driving to maturity. China needs to have the charter and regulations in place and integrate diplomatic, military, economic, intelligent and publicity forces to set up its own NSC. This organization shall then focus on studies of major strategic issues related to national security in sectors such as territory, territorial waters, diplomacy, military forces, resources, economy, and people’s livelihoods, make significant strategic decisions, oversee the implementation of national security strategies, and respond efficiently and strongly to emergencies at home and abroad. Fourth, forge a great-power mentality. It is about China’s future whether it can adjust and abandon the mindset of “Century of Humiliation” and respond to changes in the international situation with a mature great-power mentality. In recent years, China has coped with external stresses more enthusiastically and gradually built a strategic framework with an ever clearer strategic thinking pattern. Based on a white

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paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development, in a world seemingly “smaller” due to close connection of nations and in a period of dramatic changes in the benefits pattern, the convergence, frictions and even conflicts of interests among different nations are more common; the interaction between China and the outside world is mutually reinforcing; and China works hard to clarify its core interests and development orientation.50 It is pointed out in the report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC that China will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit and strive to uphold world peace and promote common development; it will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and firmly pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a win-win strategy of opening up; and it is committed to growing friendship and cooperation in all fields with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It can be said that a mature great-power mentality is taking shape in China. Its basic signs include: clearly define the boundaries of national interests and firmly safeguard the core interests; respond to criticism calmly, able to hold candid discussions on issues in question; and keep an eye on other countries’ concerns about core interests and look at national interests from a long-termed perspective. Frankly speaking, such a mature mindset has not yet formed in China. Fifth, develop inter-state relations based on strategic goals. First of all, we should emphasize the pivotal role of major power relations. The distribution of power and interests of the existing world powers will be the first to bear the brunt of China’s rise, and they are also more sensitive and capable to see what is coming from small clues. Therefore, China must establish strategic relations with the major powers in the world, especially the hegemonic US, promote the normalization and institutionalization of the coordination and partnership among major powers, actively participate in the current strategic coordination, and establish constructive ties with them in terms of strategic interests. To handle major power relations, China should strengthen its diplomatic ability. To this end, it needs to not only promote Sino-US strategic cooperative relations, China–Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation and the realization of Sino-Japan reconciliation, but also further strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU (as well as France, Germany and other European countries); and meanwhile, it ought to establish a strategic balance between major powers to better serve the international strategic interests.51 Secondly, reinforcing cooperation and coordination with neighboring countries is the primary goal of China’s geostrategy. China should establish its leading position in the economic cooperation with neighbors, promote East Asian integration through economic cooperation, and put emphasis on long-term strategic interests, so as to turn the neighborhood into its strategic economic belt and strategic stretch zone. Thirdly, China should adjust relations with developing countries. It is an underdeveloped country by itself. The political cooperation with developing countries has been and will continue to be an 50 The Information Office of the State Council, white paper on “China’s Peaceful Development” (zhong guo de he ping fa zhan) (September 6, 2011), see: http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/ 15598619.html. 51 Men [39].

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important guarantee for it to rise as a world power. China should take active measures to strengthen South–South cooperation and promote North–South dialogue. Moreover, it should deepen relations with developing countries through economic cooperation, share with them the fruits and experiences of China’s economic prosperity and reform and opening up, and aim for mutual prosperity and win-win during relationship development. Developing countries remain strategically important to China, but such importance bears different dimensions. While it was more about political support in the past, the relationship with the underdeveloped today is significant in a broader category with economic cooperation playing a bigger role. The main contradiction and characteristics of the current world pattern are the results of the interaction between developed and developing countries. Halfway as it is, China can be called a bridge between the two worlds.52 On this basis, it will play a more active role in the globe, which also shows the process of China’s national identity in another sense. Fourthly, it should provide the world’s poorest, failing or failed states with greater economic, diplomatic or other assistance, in order to shoulder the responsibility of a great power, gradually meet the goal of expanding national strategic interests, and extend its tentacles of interests worldwide.53 In general, as it fully participates in international affairs, China should further stress the common ground in interests of all parties, improve ability of setting regional and global agendas, and on this basis build community of shared interests in different areas and at different levels conducive to the realization of common interests, thus increasing its international influence.

5.2 Framework of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order To help build a stable international order is regarded as an important symbol for the real success of a great power.54 Regional order construction is an unavoidable strategic and diplomatic issue for any emerging powers. How China will look at and play a part in the construction of East Asian order as it rises has become a big question concerned by the world and an important indicator for East Asian states and even the world’s major powers to observe the effects of its rise. The order construction in East Asia is closely bound with China’s strategy.55 Since the mid-1990s, China has begun to embrace the concept of region, focused its international strategies on driving East Asian integration, and played an active role in building a new order, setting the stage for leading changes in world order.56 Rooted in the neighborhood, China has strived to help set up the institutional framework for 52 Li

[40]. [41]. 54 Buzan [42]. 55 Xiao [43]. 56 Zhu [44]. 53 Men

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comprehensive cooperation in East Asia and foster the ability to shape geopolitics and geo-economics over recent years. The East Asian cooperation mechanism actuated by China represents a new approach to Chinese diplomacy, which means to develop and build a regional order of equality, cooperation, mutual benefit and mutual assistance based on common interests in critical areas, to eliminate piled-up estrangements and grievances during constructive interaction, and to explore and gradually establish new guidelines for inter-state and international relations. China’s positive moves in regional cooperation have not only enabled countries in this region to share China’s development experience and achievements, but also boosted its own agenda-setting capability. Its efforts in regional order construction offer a paradigm for the reform of the international order. With the accelerated transformation of East Asian order, countries inside and outside the region all work to form an architecture in line with their own interests and compete fiercely over its future direction. It is right on time for China to propose its own complete strategic framework for regional order.

5.2.1 China’s View of International Order Prior to the middle of the 19th century, China was in a relatively closed regional order in East Asia all the time and acted the role of creator for long. Then, it stood still and ceased to make progress in the Ming and Qing dynasties, when its tributary order reached the peak. In contrast, Europe, freed from the shackles of the Middle Ages, experienced rapid emergence and quickened its pace of external expansion. From the mid-19th century, Western powers launched a series of wars against China and forcibly dragged China into their international order. In this way, China has experienced a transition from Tianxia system to nation-state in the modern sense, that is, from the “world of China” to “China of the world”. As the international order expanded from region to globe, China was more willing to be a part. It participated in the founding of the United Nations as a major power and became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. For the first time, it became an active player in the international order. However, after the PRC was founded in 1949, the new China was not recognized by the US and other major Western countries and excluded from the international political order. It was not until October 1971 that China resumed its permanent seat in the UN. Based on its experiences of participating in post-war international order building and being excluded from decision-making, the Chinese authority firmly stood for the establishment of new-type international relations and order. During his meeting with the Indian government delegation at the end of 1953, Premier Zhou Enlai systematically proposed the Five Principles of Peace, namely, mutual respect for each nation’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It is a great contribution of China to the basic principles of international relations, and also the first important attempt by the PRC to improve the principles of international order.

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Regarding China’s participation in the construction of international order, it started off with the planning of the UN and culminated especially in the 1970s, 1990s and early 2000s. China has consistently supported the proposition that third world countries create a new international economic order and has made outstanding contributions to this end. In 1974, Deng Xiaoping elaborated on China’s proposition in the establishment of a new international political and economic order systematically for the first time at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly. It included: Firstly, political and economic relations among countries should be built on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; secondly, international economic affairs should be managed by all countries in the world together; thirdly, world trade should be based on equality, mutual benefit and mutual exchange; fourthly, economic assistance to developing nations should not be attached with any political and military requirements, and the sovereignty of the recipient countries should be respected; and fifthly, the international community should provide more technical assistance to developing countries.57 In 1978, China began to implement the policy of opening up to the outside world and gradually quickened its pace of integration into the international community. Instead of trying to start all over again, it pitched into the existing international rules and became a part of the existing international system. It joined most global international institutions, began to adopt a constructive attitude towards regional international systems, and made explicit its desire to further align with the international community. Since Deng Xiaoping proposed establishment of a new international economic order on behalf of China at the special session of UN General Assembly in 1974, China’s view of global order has been continuously enriched, developed, evolved and improved. After the end of the Cold War, the international pattern entered a period of transition, during which the confrontation between different international order views escalated. Amongst, China was constantly deepening the dimensions of its own. As early as the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping made scientific analysis on the major and profound changes in the international situation, promptly proposed the establishment of a fair and rational new international political and economic order, and emphasized particularly to do this based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. On December 24, 1990, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in a conversation with several comrades in charge of the central committee that “It is impossible to do nothing on international issues. We need to do something. What do we do? I think we must actively promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order.”58 And this topic was invariably mentioned in subsequent important speeches and political reports by Jiang Zemin and other major leaders. As its status comes up in the world, China adopts a more dialectical view of the global order. The Chinese realize that the current international order is dominated by the West with injustice and irrationality existing in many aspects, but China’s position in it is on 57 Pei

and Wang [45]. Works of Deng Xiaoping (Part III) (deng xiao ping wen xuan), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, p. 363.

58 Selected

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the rise. Further on, after an objective assessment of the pros and cons of the existing international order, they find that in the existing UN-led global institutional system, China has got an obvious inside track in politics, with benefits more than disadvantages in the economic arena. The current global order is a double-edged sword to China: it promotes China’s national strength buildup and interests protection with the all-round involvement of the state in the international society; but being a result of the established powers and interest pattern, it also restricts China’s strength growth and interests expansion. Under this circumstance, China should participate in the construction and reform of the international order as a big responsible country, and change its unjust and irrational parts in a progressive, peaceful and democratic way. At the same time, China gains a better understanding of the challenges in global order construction, pursues to build the East Asian order from a pragmatic perspective, and considers new approach to developing the international order. In the white paper China’s Peaceful Development published in December 2005, the idea of “bringing about a more just and equitable international political and economic order” was put forward for the first time. It was a new proposal that demonstrated China’s willingness to participate in the reform of the international political and economic order as a big responsible country and bring about changes in a progressive, peaceful and democratic way. And later, “(we will) work to make the international order and system more just and equitable” was once again written in the report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC. To sum up, the PRC has been a positive reformer of the international order ever since the foundation. It was once left out of the decision making of the international order. And it has experienced the change from a bystander to a participant, from a negative player to a positive keeper and developed a better understanding about the global order. The emergence of China has impacted and changed the international landscape in terms of power and interests. China’s propositions including the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the new outlook on security and the concept of comprehensive security, democracy of international relations, diversity of civilizations, and a harmonious world all become important conceptive factors affecting the transformation of the international order. As it fully integrates into the international community, China not only becomes a full-fledged participant in the international system, but also plays an active role at the regional level, thus forming positive interaction and facilitating the construction of the international order. Shortly put, China’s rising will inevitably impact the existing international order, and it also synchronizes with the reform of the international order that is now in a period of transition. It is necessary and opportune for China to make its voice heard about how to improve the international order and strive to be an important creator. In the process of advancing international order construction, we should realize that the current global order is a double-edged sword to China: it promotes China’s national strength buildup and interests protection along with the all-round participation of the country in the international society; but being a result of the established powers and interest pattern, it also restricts China’s strength growth and interests expansion. Still on the rise, China should take an active and steady pace and work

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to make the international order more just and equitable with a constructive, cooperative and expectable attitude. Politically, China should promote respect for diversity in world civilizations, actively advance democracy of international relations, stand for multilateralism, support the concept of comprehensive security, and propose to resolve international disputes through dialogues. Economically, it should promote common prosperity and development, narrow the gap between the North and the South, and promote the balanced and sustainable development of global economy and society. And in terms of specific deployment, it should advocate the concept of comprehensive security and consolidate cooperative security norms and institutional assurance at the global level; and foster capabilities and build a new order at the regional level to provide both foundation and paradigm for the formation of a new international order.

5.2.2 Development of China’s East Asia Strategy From a historical point of view, true real world powers invariably take a leading role first in affairs of their own region before growing into what they are. Conventionally, the regional strategy of a large country is based on the national strength and aims to gain regional dominance. Yet under the trend that economic globalization and regional integration go hand in hand, it shifts to a different track in pursuit of regional common interests, employing open regionalism as a strategic instrument and regarding construction of regional institution and order as a main part and vision of regional cooperation respectively. In modern times, the expansion of Western powers has run parallel with the decline of China’s influence in East Asia. China made it a diplomatic priority to make contact with the West, but found itself stuck in persistent conflicts with East Asian nations instead. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for China to establish strong interstate cooperation in East Asia. It can be said that over a long period China has handled relations with other countries, especially those in the neighborhood, at the bilateral level rather than from the perspective of region.59 Since the mid-1990s the country has begun to embrace the concept of region and placed strategic emphasis on promoting East Asian integration. Against a background that the trends of globalization and regional integration go hand in hand, such a change apparently gets the knack of the ancient Chinese strategic thinking.60 Under the circumstance that all major powers regard promoting or even leading the regional integration as the basis for future international competition, it is farsighted for China to take East Asia cooperation as a top priority of its international strategy. China has been a leader in political, cultural, economic and even security orders in ancient East Asia. Its prosperity and openness are closely related to the region. It 59 Fawcett

and Hurrell [46]. written in Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Nine Battlegrounds that “territory where the borders of several neighboring states meet is a focal region”.

60 It’s

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has a time-honored civilization that creates a system of its own. Through the natural expansion of China’s ethical political order, it has developed the tributary system, a self-contained imperial architecture in East Asia. After the 16th century, China entered the declining stage of its traditional political system, and confined itself to the traditional way behind closed door. When it came to the middle of the 19th century, the Western powers resorted to force and launched a series of wars against China after all their attempts to establish a broader and more direct connection with the Qing dynasty by diplomatic means were thwarted. They smashed China’s unification thinking with ships and armament and forced China into a compulsive free trade system. The imperial China was completely reduced to a semi-colony of these powers. And the Chinese-Foreign order lasting for almost two thousand years came to an end. Ever since, China has long been bullied by the foreign powers, with its territory carved up arbitrarily, let alone secure its status in East Asia. The eventual collapse of the traditional order in East Asia is directly correlated to Japan’s resurgence and its pursuit of the aggressive “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”. The root of the Sino-Japan dilemma was so planted. WWII and the Cold War protracted the hostility between the two states. The surrender of Japan in 1945 did not bring about regional reconciliation and East Asian integration. Nor did it bring about a universal and profound understanding among its people of the crimes it had committed.61 After the end of WWII, East Asia was shrouded by the shadow of the Cold War and overwhelmed by the wave of East Asian nationalism. Back then, nations in Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula were occupied with decolonization and national reconstruction, while China was committed in domestic revolutionary construction and breaking through the Western blockade. Founded in 1967, ASEAN had limited abilities in promoting East Asian cooperation because of constraints from external forces and lack of internal cohesion. Institutional framework for region-wide economic cooperation has not yet taken shape in East Asia until the 1990s. Japan’s investment in East Asia boosted the prosperity of regional economy and became an important impetus behind waves of economic development. East Asia has been serving as the investment engine for the economic rise of China since it implemented the policy of reform and opening up. For quite a long time, 70% of China’s foreign economic activities were carried out in East Asia, and 85% of foreign investors in China came from the same region.62 Meanwhile, China’s foraying into the East Asian industrial chain also played a positive role in accelerating East Asian industrial transfer and structure upgrading, providing huge market space and development opportunities for Asian economies. But before the mid-1990s, China held a negative and indifferent attitude toward East Asian cooperation. The Chinese authority never aired systematic opinions in Asian economies and security before 1999.63 Back then, there was only Asia-Pacific cooperation but no East Asian cooperation due to the lack of regional, formal, intergovernmental cooperation agreements; 61 Pei

[47].

62 Research

Group at the Foreign Affairs Department and the Institute for International Economic Research of National Development and Reform Commission [48]. 63 Pang [49].

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and market forces were the natural driver of East Asian integration.64 East Asian integration then was in a market- or investment-driven phase. The economic revival of Japan, the economic miracle of the Four Dragons and the economic rise of China all served as driving forces for East Asian development. However, the economic growth there relied mainly on the separate economic and trading policies of each nation, rather than economic cooperation under the multilateral framework. The 1997 Asian financial crisis catalyzed East Asian cooperation, which urged countries to make positive political decisions on economic integration. As a result, the traditional “beggar-thy-neighbor” strategy was avoided. Member states in the region actively took cooperative measures to address the crisis and planned for the future. On that occasion, China announced “to be a big responsible country in the international community” and went to great lengths to support its currency renminbi not to depreciate. It has become an important pillar for East Asia to get out of the financial crisis faster, and has been highly acclaimed by the international community for its positive measures. It quickly became the most important promoter for East Asian cooperation and began to shift its East Asia strategy from passive observation to positive integration. East Asian economic integration has ever since entered a stage driven by both economy and politics. In 2001, China joined the WTO and proposed the establishment of the CAFTA, which added new momentum to deepening East Asian integration and took it to the quad-driver (economy, politics, institution and strategy) stage. The construction of CAFTA triggered a boom of setting up regional FTAs. Economic integration is the basis of East Asian stability and prosperity. Its spillover effect has in turn enhanced regional cooperation in the political, security, social, and cultural sectors. Some institutional frameworks began to take shape, and the concept of the East Asian Community has been recognized to be the vision of regional cooperation. Competition among powers in East Asia is constantly present, but does not necessarily create tension and crisis.65 It has become a new trend of competition for major powers to work more closely with member states in the region and provide more regional public goods and favorable terms. Inter-state cooperation coexists with competition, and competition in turn deepens cooperation. The convergence and institutionalization of common interests have gradually become the dominant factors in East Asian cooperation. China’s participation in regional cooperation is evolutionary. After the Cold War, the relationship between China and its neighbors, especially Southeast Asian countries, was normalized in succession and economic globalization developed rapidly. These formed the historical context for the change. The challenges and hidden perils of China’s peripheral security, its closer relationship with the world, especially the surrounding areas, and the outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis provided the opportunity and motivation to initiate regional cooperation. In the report to the 16th National Congress of the CPC, the top policymaker of China firstly and explicitly mentioned to strengthen good-neighborly friendship and regional cooperation. 64 Urata

[50]. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century”, pp. 81–118.

65 Robert

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Afterwards, China adopted this move as an effective way to achieve a win-win situation in Asia and actively explored new ways of cooperation. China’s positive moves in regional cooperation have not only enabled countries within this region to share China’s development experience and achievements, but also boosted its own agenda-setting capability. In the process of engagement, China has become a responsible stakeholder in East Asia, and its leading role in East Asian economy and trade has also been initially confirmed. During its participation in the East Asian integration, China has made regional strategic adjustment based on common interests and realized constructive cooperation oriented by common interests with countries inside the region. It has actively participated in the construction of a series of East Asian institutions based on cooperative principles and consensus, supported the ASEAN-initiated East Asia Summit model and ASEAN’s leadership in building the East Asian Community, and repeatedly stated its stance in support of open regionalism. East Asian countries pay much attention to China’s regional strategy. They are willing to draw China over to participate in regional cooperation, but generally worried that China would dominate regional cooperation.66 Besides, the US and other countries with important interests in this region are also sensitive to China’s moves. In view of this, China’s East Asia strategy, especially the deployment in the construction of the East Asian order, has attracted much attention inside and outside the region. Since 2012, China has put forward a series of innovative initiatives in this regard, upheld the cooperation concept of “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in conducting neighborhood diplomacy”, boosted win-win cooperation and promoted regional security cooperation. Moreover, it has upgraded its regional strategy, putting forward the concept of the “Maritime Silk Road” in the 21st century, and actively promoted the institutionalization of regional cooperation. It strives to work with ASEAN to build a China-ASEAN community of a shared future and an upgraded version of the CAFTA, build the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, and advocate setting up Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). By guiding the direction of regional arrangements, it works to develop region-wide open cooperation, ease misgivings, share common interests, and deepen regional identity, in an attempt to play a powerful, leading role in shaping East Asia and even Asia-Pacific new orders. In general, China has achieved positive results in its East Asia strategy. Due to lack of experience in how to effectively participate in international coordination and how to secure and expand international interests, however, China has not yet developed a comprehensive and deep understanding about playing the role of a great power at the macro level; it has failed to take enough initiative in advancing regional economic integration—there were not even overall strategic framework and roadmap for promoting FTAs in East Asia—at the meso level; and it has left much to be desired in handling bilateral ties at the micro level.

66 Zhang

[51].

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5.2.3 Basic Framework of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order 5.2.3.1

Core Objectives of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order

The core objectives of China’s strategy towards East Asian order are as follows: Fully understand the effects of China’s rise on region, effectively reduce the negative impact of China’s rise, promote regional stability and common development, improve the “Chinese discourse” of the East Asian Community, promote the top-level design of regional institutional development, strive to build an open and transparent East Asian Community based on the common interests,67 develop a Community of Shared Interests through institutional cooperation, create a Community of Shared Responsibility where all nations assume responsibilities together and major powers shoulder more, contribute to the formation of an East Asian Community of Common Destiny, and cultivate and consolidate an East Asian order of equality, cooperation, mutual benefit, mutual assistance and openness on the basis of common interests. The deepening of China’s East Asia strategy is reflected in that it aims to achieve a higher level of strategic design and operations, from advancing diversified East Asian integration and cooperation to building an institutional East Asian Community. To China, a Community of Common Destiny is achieved mainly through the creation of a Community of Shared Interests and a Community of Shared Responsibility. Since 1997, through the efforts of all countries in the region for more than ten years, effective institutional frameworks have been established in East Asia at the subregional, regional and super-regional levels. These are the results of the convergence and institutionalization (or in the process of institutionalization) of common interests. At the arrival of an era of institutional construction and identity building in East Asia, common interests have become the first and foremost the member states in the region will take into account. Along with its further integration into regional cooperation and increasing regional influence, seeking and expanding regional common interests have become the strategic direction of China, and the basic conditions for China to lead and advance the construction of East Asian Community of Common Destiny are becoming mature. In our opinion, China should envisage the East Asian strategic framework based on common interests at the macro level and join hands with East Asian member states to advance the creation of a Community of Shared Interests (Table 5.2). It is the very time for China, as a key stakeholder in East Asia, to make greater contribution to regional peace and development. It is an inevitable strategic choice for the country to assume responsibility as a regional power. In doing so, it aims to make a difference, doing everything within its power and following the principle of gradual progress. Nevertheless, regional affairs are complicated and the interest demand varies from nation to nation. Only by gradually creating a Community of Shared Responsibility can a stronger institutional foundation be laid for regional 67 Mori

[1].

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Table 5.2 East Asian strategic framework based on common interests National level

Bilateral level

Regional level

Global level

Political field

East Asian countries adhere to the “One China” policy

Establish a regular mechanism for high-level dialogues and mutual visits

Strengthen political dialogue and coordination; and uphold open regionalism

Strengthen consultations and play a constructive role in the handling of global affairs together

Security field

Both China and Japan adhere to the path of peaceful development

Maintain and strengthen strategic dialogue; Promote inter-military exchanges and establish mutual trust in terms of security

Work together to tackle regional hotspot issues such as the North Korean nuclear crisis and prevent regional conflicts

Collaborate on a variety of non-traditional security issues

Economic field

Promote the sound development of economic and trade relations and expand the shared economic interests

Promote the macroeconomic prosperity and financial stability of the region

Maintain the stability of the world economy

Cultural field

Enhance cultural and academic exchanges and respect cultural diversity

Enhance cultural and academic exchanges and respect cultural diversity

Enhance cultural and academic exchanges and promote cultural prosperity in the world

Social field

Promote tourism and other people-to-people exchanges and reinforce communication mechanisms among young people

Promote people-to-people exchanges and reinforce communication mechanisms among young people

Promote people-to-people exchanges and reinforce communication mechanisms among young people

Source Men [34]

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cooperation and the awareness in a Community of Common Destiny be gradually reinforced. Therefore, China should deepen its understanding of regional public goods, set forth goals for regional peace and development together with others, and objectively evaluate the fundamental interest demand of member states, so that it can provide timely help and achieve co-prosperity at once, thus deepening awareness in the East Asian Community of Common Destiny and re East Asian order formation.

5.2.3.2

Principles of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order

The basic principles for China’s strategy towards East Asian order are as follows: First, pursue open regionalism. In East Asia, a region with economic, cultural, political and ethnic diversity, open regionalism is the only way towards the creation of a community. It requires all to abandon the Cold War mentality, make nondiscriminatory and transparent policies, be open-minded towards the participation of countries outside the region in regional order construction, respect all forms of cooperation between member states and foreign countries outside on the basis of reciprocity and openness, be willing to listen and respond to the voices of all parties, and work together to redefine the openness of the regional order. To China, it is to take root in East Asia while being equipped with an ambition and horizon far beyond, adopt a moderate attitude towards different regionalism that coexists, endorse diversity and diversification, and stay open-minded to the attitude and practices of the US, Russia, India, Australia, New Zealand and other countries in playing a more active role in East Asia. Second, adhere to the road of common interests. To create order in East Asia, we should start from areas with common interests before gradually expanding to a larger scope. Only by this way can we prevent or stop major powers from placing their individual interests above the common good of the majority.68 It can be seen from the China-led tributary order in history that China is strong but not hegemonic, large but not arbitrary, wealthy but not arrogant, which making it a model that adheres to the path of common interests. During the 20 years of participation in regional cooperation in East Asia since 1994, China has unswervingly adhered to the path of common interests and reached strategic cooperation oriented by shared interests with East Asian countries. The East Asian order should be rebuilt on the basis of common interests. Of that China owns precious experience. Third, take the responsibility of a great power proactively. East Asian nations are at different levels of economic and social development and have varied strategic appeals, so that they are increasingly yearning for regional public goods. China should seize the historical opportunity to actively provide public goods, cede nonstrategic interests and carry out foreign aid (both open assistance and strategic assistance), so as to deepen the understanding of common interests and the Community of Common Destiny and provide predictable returns for the building of regional

68 Huang

[52].

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order. Public goods for the East Asian order cover multiple areas including market, financial cooperation, security cooperation and FTA construction.69 Providing public goods within the framework of multilateral cooperation is the most effective way to alleviate doubts of member states in the region about China. Following the principle that “a just cause brings abundant support”, China has actively developed financial cooperation (with AIDB being a typical example) with East Asian countries and facilitated the construction of FTAs together while providing them with a broad market to grow. Plus, it has been dedicated to conducting and deepening security cooperation step-by-step. Its role as a navigator in the construction of regional order becomes more and more apparent. Fourth, advance regional institutional construction in a timely manner. Seen from the development of different regions in the world, the basic feature of furthering regional cooperation is to set up institutions, and it is a feasible paradigm to meet national strategic goals through regional institutional improvement. Regional institutional construction serves as the main means to shape regional order for China.70 Rooted in the neighborhood, the country has strived to help set up the institutional framework for comprehensive cooperation in East Asia and develop the ability to shape geopolitics and geo-economics over recent years. China’s positive moves in regional cooperation have not only enabled countries within this region to share China’s development experience and achievements, but also boosted its own agenda-setting capability. Its strategies towards regional institutional construction are achieved through three basic ways, namely, participation, agenda-setting and taking lead. Since the mid-1990s, China has changed its previous negative attitude toward regional cooperation, joined all East Asian multilateral cooperation organizations it is qualified to be a part, and begun to play an active role as a member.71 Taking initiative to establish regional multilateral organizations and playing a leading role are strategic manifestations of China’s efforts in the last few years. While continuously promoting the construction of cooperation frameworks of “10 + 1” and “10 + 3”, it has also actively advanced the RCEP process and the construction of the China-Japan-ROK FTA, and tried to expand the room for maneuver in regional cooperation,72 in order to lay a solid foundation for shaping regional order. Fifth, follow the principle of gradual and orderly progress. In East Asia there are great differences among countries in political, economic and cultural backgrounds and it is difficult for them to cede sovereignty. Therefore, the regional order reconstruction is inevitably a gradual process. An easy-to-difficult approach that starts off with functional cooperation should be adopted. To be specific, we should conduct cooperation firstly in the economic sectors like trade, investment and finance to 69 Fan

[53].

70 Abramowitz

and Bosworth [54]. scholar Kuik Cheng-Chwee pointed out, “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEANChina cooperation (10+1) and ASEAN plus China, Japan and S Korea (10+3) have some features different from other international organizations. Without China’s participation, the aforementioned institutions can still exist but will lack substantive meanings in their existence. This gives China a huge space to play a role inside.” See: Cheng-Chwee [55]. 72 Jiang [56]. 71 Malaysian

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restructure economic order step-by-step; then extend to the political and security territories firstly from the non-traditional security front with greater common ground, such as establishing cooperative mechanisms related to energy, environment and maritime security; and meanwhile vigorously promote it in cultural areas as the basis for long-term collaboration in order to promote mutual understanding and regional identity. This situation has actually provided an opportunity for China to achieve regional strategic goals through a progressive approach. On this account, China should look into the historical basis and basic characteristics of East Asia. It is not suitable to hesitate to move forward or rush for quick results. Nor should it try to “carry the banner”. Instead, it should make progress step by step, capitalize on the trend, take an open and inclusive approach, and realize its own strategic goals while putting forward multiple processes all at once.73 Sixth, keep strategic patience. China should be keenly aware that multiple regional organizations, multi-level participation, and diversified development in East Asia are in China’s interests,74 thus requiring it to make long-termed strategic plans. Meanwhile, East Asian countries still hold an ambivalent attitude towards China. On the one hand, they are strongly reliant on China at the economic level and hope to benefit from China’s growth; and on the other hand, they have conflicts with China in territorial disputes, historical issues and ideologies, which aggravate their concerns about China’s rise. Under this circumstance, some states have tried to strengthen their political and military relations with the US, which provides an excuse for this great power to strengthen its political influence and military presence in the region.75 With these problems, it is not easy for China to reach treaty-like institutional arrangements with East Asian countries and it takes more strategic patience and time to reserve strategic room for the future.

5.2.3.3

Deployment of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order

The deployment of China’s strategy towards East Asian order mainly centers around politics, economy, security and culture. In the political domain, China should work to promote the political consultation mechanism for regional cooperation, take an active approach to making joint efforts and contributing more, strengthen political identification, and alleviate and help resolve existing or potential inter-state conflicts. It should adhere to the current regular meeting mechanism of leaders (such as “10 + 1”, “10 + 3” and East Asia Summit, etc.) and deepen the coordination of relevant political issues in the region. And it also needs to strengthen the regular exchange mechanism of officials at the transaction and ministerial levels and develop department cooperation among nations, thus providing channels and support for leaders’ regular meeting mechanisms and coordination of major issues. Plus, China should

73 Men

[57], Jin [58], Shi [59]. [51]. 75 Liu [60]. 74 Zhang

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vigorously strengthen exchanges and cooperation with East Asian countries on matters of the world and other regions, so as to deepen mutual political trust and cultivate regional identity and regional awareness. In the economic field, China should actively promote cooperation in investment, finance and energy with East Asian countries, and vigorously promote the construction of bilateral and multilateral FTAs. Economy is the most important engine for regional collaboration. Economic integration is the basic condition for cooperation in the political, security and cultural sectors. China should make full use of its economic influence, actively promote talks in macroeconomic policies and coordination and consultation of major economic affairs, promote the construction of macroeconomic communication and coordination mechanism in East Asia, make efforts to address the imbalanced regional economic development and trade growth, and gradually improve the economic cooperation framework. On this basis, China should invest more in East Asian countries, seize the moment when they expect to develop financial cooperation, deepen economic interdependence through the construction and development of AIIB, and contribute to regional financial stability through provision of public goods.76 It should develop closer economic cooperation via projects like working with East Asian countries on the construction of “Maritime Silk Road” in the 21st century. And it should adopt a flexible and pragmatic attitude and actively move forward various FTA negotiations, which include strongly supporting ASEAN-led RCEP negotiation, facilitating the building of an upgraded CAFTA, striving to finish the China-ROK FTA negotiation by 2014, accelerating talks of the China-Japan-ROK FTA and making preparation for participating in the TPP negotiations. In the security field, China should emphasize the guiding role of common interests and utilize it to solve safety-related problems, address strategic concerns and stabilize security expectations of other countries, thus advancing East Asian security cooperation in order. East Asian countries have different security pursuits. The US seeks unilateral hegemony; China and Japan pursue multi-polarization explicitly or implicitly; while other nations look forward to establishing multilateral security coordination mechanism. In consequence, there are numerous security arrangements under different names with a series of seemingly contradictive security options coexisting to varying degrees, such as hegemony, balance of power and cooperation security. And East Asian security order is seen as the overlay of various relevant security models.77 With the positive effects exerted by China’s rising, the security order in East Asia has taken on really different characteristics from what it was before the end of the Cold War. As bilateral alliances, multilateral dialogues and special forms of diplomacy mix together, it does not incur military competition or develop into a multilateral cooperation system, but leads to a pattern halfway between balance of power and an order of community.78 In a sense, East Asian security is a wrestle of the American alliance order concept versus the East Asian cooperative security concept. Looking forward, it is difficult to reproduce the traditional zero-sum game in East 76 Yu

[3].

77 Shambaugh 78 Ikenberry

[61]. and Tsuchiyama [62].

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Asia. In the multilateral cooperative security framework, balancing China’s growing regional influence and balancing the role of the US in East Asia will jointly generate new security institutional arrangements,79 while strategic constraints—especially strategic self-constraints—have become an issue that must be seriously considered by great powers like China and the US. It is necessary for China to seek the combination of common interests, cooperative security and outlook on comprehensive security and go to great lengths to enhance cooperative security in East Asia. In the low-politics field such as cultural and people-to-people exchange, China should strengthen non-governmental communications with foreign countries, further expand the scope of international cooperation in East Asia, and establish platforms for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Given the diversity of cultures, religions and values in East Asia, China should carry out abundant and colorful activities, especially among young people from all over the world, encourage different cultures to communicate and learn from each other, and give full play to the business circles, civil bodies, academic institutions and news media, to further consolidate the folk foundation for East Asian order restructuring.

5.2.3.4

Path of China’s Strategy Towards East Asian Order

To make strategy towards East Asian order, we must not only fathom and conform to the basic path selection of East Asian integration, but also realize our own innovation in concept and path, thus injecting vitality into East Asian cooperation and further consolidating the strategic effects of leading East Asian institutional construction. Specifically, we should actively promote neo-unilateralism, neo-bilateralism, and neo-multilateralism based on open regionalism, and make them complement each other. Open regionalism is seen as the only way to establish regional order in an area featured with economic, cultural, political and ethnic diversity. China should regard openness as the basic values of regional cooperation and achieve positive collaboration with other countries inside and outside the region through open regionalism. Specifically, it should keep an open mind to the interference of the US, Australia, New Zealand and other countries outside the region in the process of East Asian integration, actively approve of the APEC cooperation framework and hold an open attitude towards its further institutionalization. It should keep an open mind to the participation of non-East Asian countries (such as India, Australia and New Zealand) in the discussion on East Asian integration (such as the East Asia Summit) and relevant economic and trade activities, and actively explore the possibility of entering into bilateral free trade agreements with related countries. It should keep an open mind to the inter-state activities in the region and promote healthy competition for regional cooperation. And it should keep an open mind to cooperation between some of its bordering provinces and neighboring countries to promote its overall opening-up.

79 Roy

[63].

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On the basis of open regionalism, China needs to implement neo-unilateralism, neo-bilateralism and neo-multilateralism. Great powers usually follow a tradition of unilateralism. Many ideologies and practices of China in handling East Asian relations have been largely unilateral diplomatic indicators and have failed to develop into multilateral shared ideas. The so-called neo-unilateralism means that as it abolish some traditional ideologies and practices, China will cede unilateral interests (especially non-strategic interests) all the more and strengthen unilateral assistance with deepening East Asian cooperation kept in mind, to improve China’s regional image and show its demeanor as a great power. Bilateralism is a traditional form of international cooperation adopted by China. In general, the application of regional bilateralism is primarily based on political rather than economic consideration.80 Given that the East Asian preferential arrangement was characterized in recent years by being bilateral and geographically open (especially reflected in the bilateral FTAs promoted by the US and Japan), it is necessary for China to add the economic and strategic hefts of bilateralism and pursue neo-bilateralism, though it cannot abandon the basic consideration of regarding bilateralism as a transitional instrument to regional multilateralism. Specifically, China should further deepen bilateral cooperation with ASEAN; actively advance bilateral FTAs with countries inside and outside the region such as South Korea, Russia, India and Australia, etc.; strengthen bilateral collaboration with EU and other blocs outside the region; develop new-type major power relations between China and the US, raise the level of bilateral strategic dialogue and render it into a global platform for strategic coordination; and conduct deeper bilateral coordination with major East Asian countries like Japan through strategic dialogues in security and economy. Since the reform and opening up, China has become an important beneficiary and keeper of multilateralism by way of joining multilateral international institutions. But because China, a new-comer in the international community, is not proficient in the employment of the multilateral international system, it generally pursues an instrumental multilateralism strategy, regarding the multilateral international institution as an instrument to realize national interests. It shows a selective or instrumental feature. In the last few years, China adopted an increasingly active and open attitude in the participation and creation of the East Asian international institutions. With the deepening of the vision of East Asian Community, the region has ushered in a new era of institutional construction. And it is the right time for China to sum up and reflect on the existing international institutional strategy and promote neo-multilateralism. The so-called neo-multilateralism is a combination of principled multilateralism and instrumental multilateralism. In other words, it is required to further underline the strategic and moral values of the multilateral international institution while abandoning the existing instrumental multilateralism strategy, with conviction that the national interests of China can be secured and expanded through international institutional construction. China should promote East Asian cooperation in an all-round way under the principle of neo-unilateralism, neo-bilateralism and neo-multilateralism based on the 80 Kwei

[64].

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idea of open regionalism. With an increase in national strength and international prestige and deeper engagement in the international community, China develops a better understanding of the international system. It is an inevitable strategic choice to actively propose and create regional institutions and better safeguard and expand national interests. While the East Asian institutional construction is still in its infancy, China should focus on the following aspects in its regional institution strategy: Firstly, give priority to enhancing the economic and trade integration of four regions across the Strait, laying the domestic foundation for China’s rising and East Asian institutional construction; secondly, around the building of an upgraded version of the CAFTA in practice, actively advance the RCEP negotiation and take substantive measures to promote infrastructure cooperation among Asian countries and consolidate the East Asian economic cooperation mechanism; thirdly, vigorously boost the construction of China-Japan-ROK FTA by making breakthrough in China-ROK FTA; and fourthly, help establish the East Asia Security Forum based on the ASEAN Regional Forum, promote the strategic trust among member states in the region and deepen cooperation in the field of non-traditional security together with ASEAN. At the macro level, China should place East Asian order construction at a commanding height in its regional strategy and emphasize the convergence and institutionalization of common interests to be the only way of order construction, so that it can stabilize and further develop strategic interaction with East Asian countries and gain the initiative in regional strategy. Besides, it should employ open regionalism as a strategic instrument for strategic self-constraints and constraints of other countries, stabilizing the strategic expectations of East Asian countries for China. Specifically, we should practice open regionalism to deepen the East Asian economic interdependence and add the strategic value of China’s economic leadership; we should practice open regionalism to enhance East Asian political cooperation and security coordination, proactively outmaneuvering the soft strategic encirclement around China; and we should practice open regionalism to bring in more non-East Asian forces to strategically refrain the US–Japan alliance. In a certain sense, the future of East Asia depends on China’s strategic direction. So China should fully participate in various regional consultations in a constructive and responsible manner, and provide regional public goods to the best of its ability. China must play a leading role in the process of building the East Asian order and focus on the following aspect at the meso and micro levels. Firstly, it should formulate medium- and long-term strategic plans for free trade, free investment, financial cooperation and energy cooperation in East Asia. Secondly, it needs to stabilize and develop bilateral relations with East Asian countries, and seize the opportunity to make bilateral trade, investment and transportation easier. Thirdly, it can utilize traditional relations to strengthen the integration of inland areas with neighboring countries. Since the Southwest region of China is quite complementary to South Asia and Southeast Asia in terms of resources and the combination of productive factors, it can build international highways and railways and deliver goods from Southwest China to South Asia, West Asia and Africa through the southern Silk Road; and the Northeast region and Japan have built traditional economic and trade ties with closer cooperation in sectors like software development and machinery

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manufacturing, and there are more to be explored. And last, it should carry out the overall schedule of the FTA strategy, strengthening negotiations with countries in East Asia and the neighborhood, especially South Korea, Australia, India and Russia, and raise its importance to the height of countering strategic encirclement.

5.3 Interaction Between China and Major Forces in East Asia Since the beginning of the 21st century, the East Asian order has seen the “Troika” of China, ASEAN and the US taking lead respectively in the economic, political and security fronts. The influence of Japan in the region has declined across the board. And the power shift in East Asia has undergone tremendous changes. In this regard, both the US and Japan are restless and anxious. Japan’s inadaptability to China’s rise is worsened aggravating the contradictions between them, while the US has returned to East Asia through its strategic shift eastward. These two countries collaborated explicitly or implicitly to stir up troubles, bringing about dramatic changes to the East Asian pattern. At present, the biggest challenge in building East Asian order is that four strategic forces involving China, Japan, ASEAN and the US are playing a new game and they cannot reach an agreement on the objectives of future order and hold split opinions even in regional peace and development. Balance of power is the key to understand the changes in East Asia’s situation.81 From the 1980s to today, discussions on Japanization, Americanization and Sinicization have represented the understanding of all nations inside and outside the region on the rise and fall of big-power influence,82 while the attention to Aseanization has indicated the extended influence of the bloc of small countries. On the positive side, the game of the four strategic forces has promoted open regionalism in East Asia, guided regional order to move forward in the direction of shared interests of all, urged major powers to provide regional public goods more actively, and also pointed out a strategic orientation to prevent a certain force from taking dominance. With the aggressive strategic shift of the US eastward and Japan’s urgent measures for balance, the key point of China’s East Asia strategy is to hold its ground, analyze calmly and respond properly. It is written in the Wei Liao Zi that “all battles are won by tactics, deterrence or fighting capabilities”.83 China should make good use of the checks and balances of various forces, creating a counter-balance stance to gain a strategic edge. For example, it can take advantage of the regional instability caused by the US’ strategic shift to the East to deepen cooperation with ASEAN and further integrate into Southeast Asia. It should adhere to the principle of bottom-line thinking combined with tactical flexibility in its Japan strategy, and seize the chance of South 81 Breslin

[65]. and Shiraishi [66]. 83 The Wei Liao Zi Art of War: Chapter IV Fighting Capacity (wei liao zi bing fa: zhan wei di si). 82 Katzenstein

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Korea’s greater dependence to it to deepen bilateral strategic partnership in an allaround way, curb the US’ impact on the Northeast Asia and restrict Japan’s regional strategic plan. As to the order of precedence, China focuses on Sino-US relations at the global level, China-ASEAN relations in Southeast Asia and China–South Korea relations in Northeast Asia. And it will concentrate on deepening institutional cooperation with ASEAN and preventing vicious competition with the US over a period, while appropriately handling relations with Japan on that basis. In addition, it is necessary for the country to profoundly understand the current strategic positioning of the Asia-Pacific powers, give top priority to improving peripheral strategy, and build good relations with its neighbors by reinforcing their strategic dependence to fight against the checks and balances.

5.3.1 Actively Build New-Type Major Power Relations Between China and the US Throughout the history of international relations, it is often the most turbulent and unstable period when the strength of an emerging power is getting close to that of an established one. About this security dilemma there is a classic discourse from Thucydides, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” This is the so-called “Thucydides’s Trap”. Currently, the China–US relations are on the brink of the “Thucydides’s Trap”. On the one hand, China is approaching America faster in terms of national strength. As calculated by Professor Hu Angang, the relative gap of GDP between China and the US has narrowed from 8.25 folds in 2000 to 1.90 folds in 2012, and the relative trade gap from 4.30 folds in 2000 to 1.03 folds in 2012; and they are becoming the two nations with the strongest comprehensive national strength in the world: in 2012 they accounted for 33.6% of the world’s GDP, 21.3% of the world’s total foreign trade volume, 39.8% of the world’s total primary energy consumption, 44.0% of the world’s total carbon dioxide emission, and 38.8% of the world’s scientific and technological strength.84 On the other hand, throughout the world and the waning and waxing of great powers, China is most qualified to be the imaginary enemy of the US. The US once worried China would rise in a violent way and is still concerned about the peacefully rising China; and it is also the only nation most capable and most likely to do great harm to China. Both countries have their own considerations for the power parity, with rich strategic significance reflected in planning and deployment. Based on this, both sides have keenly felt the strategic pressure from the other. The lack of strategic trust is quite self-explanatory. And China–US relations are more and more recognized as a core element that influences the general trend of international relations and determines whether mankind will embark on a peaceful road or not.85 84 See

Hu [67]. [68].

85 Men

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Fig. 5.1 Comparison of GDP between China and the US (1988–2012). Source World Bank, http:// data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD

From the perspective of comprehensive national strength, the US is undoubtedly the most powerful country in the world. China has the potential to surpass the US in economic scale in the next ten to twenty years, but will continue to fall behind in terms of comprehensive national strength for a long time. Although some optimists believe that a vivid comparison in strength between the US and China is an exhausted superpower versus a skyrocketing star,86 most elites keep sober on the gap in-between knowing that the US still has significant and numerous advantages over China despite of the hegemonic recession it faces (Figs. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). The US is still the only comprehensive superpower in the world. Since it became independent, the absolute value of its comprehensive national strength has been on the rise.87 After the collapse of the USSR, America has maintained its overall leading position relative to other major powers, especially in the sci-tech and military fields where none is able to pose a serious challenge to it, and the absolute value of its current comprehensive national strength is still climbing.88 However, our world is experiencing an overall restructuring, one basic condition of which is the accelerated rise and fall of great powers. Relatively, the US has not only experienced a decline 86 For

example, Hu [69], Gao [70]. [70]. 88 The total GDP of the United States increased from US$5.7508 trillion (current US$) in 1990 to US$15.6848 trillion in 2012, an increase of nearly 1.63 folds. Except for the significant 2009 decline affected by the international financial crisis, the total GDP has maintained steady growth in other years. Compared with other major powers excluding China, the US records the biggest actual growth in GDP, enlarging the absolute gap with Russia, Canada, Germany, Japan, France, Britain, Italy and India, etc. See Ping [71]. 87 Gao

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Fig. 5.2 Comparison of foreign trade between China and the US (1988–2011). Source World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org.cn/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD, http://data.worldbank.org. cn/indicator/all

Fig. 5.3 Comparison of defense expenditure between China and the US (1989–2012). Source SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012, http://milexdata.sipri.org

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in its economic share, but will also see a similar drop in the political, cultural and even military strength inevitably in the long run. A series of events in the 21st century have signaled the relative decline of this nation: the Iraq war and the Afghan war have exposed the limitations of its military capabilities; the global financial crisis has shaken its economic base; and the rise of emerging powers has heralded its inevitable relative fall. The inherent dilemma of American power lies in that it cannot achieve the desired outcome without the help of other countries even if it is the most powerful country in the world, nor can it solve any global issue on its own. It can be said that cooperation of great powers is indispensable, though unable, to solve all the problems in the world. When dealing with regional issues, the US also needs to seek substantive cooperation with other major powers. In fact, it can no longer make regional arrangement unilaterally but participate in it more frequently. This is another sign of the relative decline of US power to a certain extent. If the rise of China was a world concern in the past, it is the same with the decline of the US now, because it means a greater uncertainty not only in the world pattern but also in the American strategic trend. How it will make strategic choices becomes a matter of great concern to all. To secure hegemony and its world leadership is the major strategic goal of the US since the end of WWII, and to adjust the strategic deployment dramatically according to the changing situation is commonplace. It keeps an eye on the world trend, major powers’ move and domestic circumstance and is adept at and diligent in strategic planning, striving to maintain its world leadership. In recent years, its grand strategy objectives have gradually become clear, that is, to secure global leadership, ensure dominance in East Asia, and maintain the balance of power in East Asia. To secure global leadership, the US has built a global system made of network of allies & partners, regional organizations and global institutions to coordinate international relations, especially major power relations. And it is the strategic bottom line of the US to ensure dominance in East Asia, protecting the balance of power in the region beneficial to it from tilting and avoiding descending into a regional state because of exiting East Asia or losing primacy in Asia. Nevertheless, it is not a hegemon of East Asian. Its goal is not infinite but focuses on maintaining the balance of power that is in line with its interests. Regarding the Asia-Pacific dominance as the core guarantee for its world leadership, the US increases its diplomatic, economic and military investment in this region, steps up infiltration of values, shifts its strategic focus from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, and locks China as its opponent in the Asia-Pacific strategy. To maintain such dominance, it has exploited Asian states’ concerns about Chinese intentions and strategic direction and interfered with Asia-Pacific affairs by strengthening military alliances, deepening security cooperation and expanding institutionalization of economic and trade cooperation to bind together with these states and form a soft encirclement of China. The US strategic adjustment has triggered power restructuring in the Asia-Pacific region, which brings forth a more complicated security environment. The traditional territorial disputes are compounded by an ever fiercer competition for sea power. The Sino-US security conflict is put in the spotlight. The US has directed its spearhead of strategic adjustment to China. It takes an obviously one-sided stance in favor of China’s neighbors

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in its intervention in hot issues to strengthen the alliance and quasi-alliance relations with relevant states. And it advocates air-sea battle, focuses on forward deployment and makes strategic probing on China. It fuels the escalation of regional disputes, creates military containment and great strategic pressure against China, and intensifies the geostrategic competition between them. Since 1972, the Sino-US relationship has gone through ups and downs and marked with both cooperation and competition. It has been a long journey. It is now the most important, most complex and most challenging bilateral tie in the world and has been put on the central stage of world change. Its prospect not only determines the current well-being of both countries, but also profoundly influences and shapes the future of the world. The Sino-US relation is also good enough to be a model for peaceful coexistence and common prosperity of major powers with different social regimes and civilization forms at different development stages. Since the outset of the 21st century, especially after the September 11 attacks, the two countries have pursued common interests, strived to shape new-type major power relations in the 21st century and actively promoted mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation. They have established more than 90 bilateral organizations (including the iconic Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue and China–US Strategic Security Dialogue), held regular annual meetings, formed specific mechanism for mutual visits at selected dates, and reached a series of strategic consensuses. At present, there are structural, strategic and interest-based conflicts and contradictions and strategic cooperation at the bilateral, regional and global tiers between China and the US. Such a situation not only reflects the universal complexity of greatpower relations in the context of globalization, but also indicates the special collision caused by different strategic thoughts of China and the US in coping with the current situation and planning for the future. On the whole, their connection and cooperation are getting closer, but the stability of bilateral ties has dropped notably. The lack of trust becomes acute. Both sides are skeptical about each other’s capabilities and intentions, and keep a watchful eye on the other’s moves. While previous conflicts are relatively simple in terms of scope and contents, the current wrestle involves almost every aspect of the Sino-US relationship. It was time-intensive and frequent, with various issues linked with one another. To be specific: In the political and security fields, they have close contacts but limited trust for each other; in the economic and financial fields, they have both extensive cooperation and endless disputes & conflicts; in the cultural and social fields, they have conducted a bundle of exchanges, greatly affecting yet guarding against each other; and in the field of international affairs, they assume similar responsibilities but often stand against each other in terms of stance, proposition and interests.89 In recent years, the public foundation for the benign interaction between the two countries has been shaken. Pessimistic arguments in the academic circle and press reviews on the future development of Sino-US relations are increasing instead of decreasing.90

89 Yu

[72]. [73].

90 Fan

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On the other hand, the development of Sino-US relations in the past few years has proven that competition among major powers does not necessarily lead to crisis and war. Sino-US relations begin to show complementary, cooperative, constructive, competitive and creative features. And we are glad to see that a bilateral relationship of complex interdependence is taking shape.91 Of course, we should be soberly aware that the US policy towards China has two sides. On the one hand, it promotes the development of bilateral relations in hope of expanding Sino-US cooperation; and on the other hand, it is obviously on guard against China in security strategy and constantly makes requests and even exerts pressure to push Chinese policies to evolve in the direction as it expects. To China, it is paramount to stabilize and develop Sino-US relations. As David Lampton pointed out, “Predictably, the US will continue to dominate the next 20 years. Therefore, Beijing’s top priority is to handle the relationship with Washington properly, while persistently building its military, economic and conceptual strength.”92 And to the US, managing relations with China is also a core test for its strategic planning and implementation capabilities. It can be said that it is their common goal to beat the odds of major powers fighting for supremacy and usher in an era of new-type major power relations. Since 1972, China and the United States have been able to find a way to transcend differences at critical moments and made innovations frequently in the creation of new-type major power relations. Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the release of the Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué were important attempts of the two sides to establish new-type major power relations during the Cold War. In 2005, Robert Zoellick, the US Deputy Secretary of State, delivered a speech on expecting China to become a responsible stakeholder, which was a classic expression of the US government for the new-type relationship with China after the Cold War. Since 2012, Chinese leaders have proposed and elaborated on the proposition of establishing a new-type major power relations. On May 3, 2012, Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the 4th round of the China–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, calling for innovating the traditional thinking pattern about the doomed confrontation and conflicts of major powers and exploring the new path of developing major power relations in the era of economic globalization. And he raised for the first time to strive to “develop new-type major power relations that let peoples of both countries and the rest of the world rest assured”. On July 19, 2012, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the World Peace Forum, stating “China and the United States are actively exploring and building new-type major power relations of mutual respect, cooperation and mutual benefit.” On April 13, 2013, Xi met with US Secretary of State John Kerry and pointed out that China and the US should “blaze a new path of major power relations with mutual trust, tolerance, reciprocity and win-win cooperation”. On June 7–8, 2013, Xi met with Barack Obama at the Annenberg Retreat in California. The two sides agreed to work together to build new-type major power relations, respect each other and cooperate for win-win results, bringing 91 See

Men [74, 75]. [76].

92 Lampton

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benefits all peoples in the world. When he met with US Vice President Joseph Biden on December 4, 2013, Xi expressed that “Strengthening dialogue and cooperation is the only correct choice for the two countries. The two sides should stay committed to the right direction of bilateral relations, respect each other’s core interests and major concerns, actively expand pragmatic cooperation, properly handle sensitive issues and differences, and ensure the sustained, sound and steady development of Sino-US relations.” On December 5, Biden delivered remarks at a breakfast with the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing and the US–China Business Council, responding positively to the new-type relationship between China and the US: “We’re trying to build new-type major power relations, one that’s different, one that is defined by constructive cooperation, healthy competition, and a shared respect for an agreed upon new set of rules of the road and international norms for the 21st century.” On July 9, 2014, in the remarks at the opening ceremony of the 6th round of the China–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the 5th round of China–US High-level Consultation on People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges, President Xi stated that China and the United States should “strengthen dialogue, increase trust and dispel doubts, promote cooperation, and ensure that Sino-US relations never deviate from the track of building new-type major power relations”. China emphasizes that the new-type major power relations begins with, but is not limited to, Sino-US relations. Its goals are to safeguard the peaceful transformation of the international system, surpass the historic foreordination that the emerging and established powers are bound to be in conflict, avoid and overcome the negative elements of mutual distrust, mutual hostility, mutual repulsion and mutual rivalry within the old big-power relations, enhance mutual trust and mutual respect, pursue cooperation and win-win, establish a new mode of cooperation and win-win, improve the risk management mechanism, and inject positive energy into the development of international relations. HE Cui Tiankai, Chinese ambassador to the United States, pointed out that down the exploration path of new-type major power relations, China and the US need to address five thorny problems: “lack of strategic mutual trust”, “the bottleneck of core interests”, “truly implementing the principle of treating each other as equals”, “restructuring the trade mix”, and “ensuring healthy interactions in the Asia-Pacific”.93 Building new-type major power relations is a new topic for the international political theory and practice. It requires both sides to constantly develop common understanding, carefully maintain the overall situation, and work hard to realize innovation. China should make efforts in the following areas: First, make objective judgment about the national strength and adhere to the peaceful development road. China must objectively and calmly evaluate its national strength and international influence. It should recognize that being the world’s second largest economy is not equivalent to being the second largest world economic power and being an economic power does not necessarily mean being a world power. Do not underestimate the strategic advantages of the US; and do not overestimate its own strategic standing. The only way for China to grow into a world power recognized 93 Cui

and Pang [77].

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and respected by the international community is to keep to the peaceful development road, show America that it is not a challenger to hegemony and show the world that it is not a saboteur of the international system, reject the old big-power behavior pattern of the big bullying the small,94 follow the constructive principle of “keeping a low profile and striving for greater achievements”, exert influence in a peaceful way, and actively take on international responsibilities. Second, strengthen the building of strategic trust and strive to eliminate misunderstandings and misjudgments. The biggest problem in Sino-US relations is lack of strategic trust. Chinese policymakers have profoundly realized the importance of fostering strategic trust to Sino-US relations and emphasized on many important occasions that cultivating and deepening strategic trust is an important prerequisite for the smooth development of the Sino-US ties. For example, Xi Jinping said in his speech in Washington on February 15, 2012 that “Strategic trust is the foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation, and greater trust will lead to broader cooperation.”95 Mutual trust is a two-way street. Both sides should enhance mutual understanding and strategic trust continuously, maintain close high-level exchanges, increase dialogue and exchange of views by making full use of various channels of communication, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogues, cultural and people-to-people exchanges and military-to-military exchanges. By doing so, both can appreciate each other’s strategic intentions and development goals, avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment, build up mutual understanding and strategic trust, and on that basis, fully tap the enormous cooperation potential. All in all, both should strengthen communication, deepen mutual understanding, reduce misunderstandings, and coordinate to reduce relevant risks. Third, firmly safeguard core interests and actively expand common interests. Common interests are the endogenous dynamics for the development of Sino-US relations. Their participation and contribution are indispensable when dealing with major world issues. If they work together, there will be a mutually agreed solution; if they diverge, the rest of the world will have to make a choice between contradictory approaches. China and America have more and more common interests in many sectors such as addressing global economic crisis, shaping the international financial order, mutual investment, new energy development, and maintaining Asia-Pacific stability, creating a broad space for cooperation. While reinforcing and expanding the foundation of shared interests, we must wake up to the profound differences and confrontational factors between the two powers, and realize that the US is the nation that can bring the biggest damage to China’s core interests. We must clearly define China’s strategic bottom line in core strategic issues concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity and resolutely safeguard core interests of the country. Fourth, strengthen healthy interactions in the Asia-Pacific and affirm the willingness to grow together. China and the US have their interests more converged and intertwined in the region than anywhere else, and are most likely to have conflicts there. They embark on the path of building a new-type relationship between 94 Huang 95 Xi

[78]. [79, front page].

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major countries from the Asia-Pacific. Whether they can achieve success perhaps depends on the region, too. So both should work together to explore an interactive model of peaceful coexistence, healthy competition and win-win cooperation there. While both of them are proactive in reshaping the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape, China should clearly indicate that it has no intension to adopt the Asian version of Monroeism against the United States. Instead, it is committed to establishing an Asia-Pacific community in which the countries involved in the region live in harmony. China welcomes the efforts of the United States in promoting regional peace and development as a Pacific country. At the same time, it urges the United States to adopt an objective and fair attitude in promoting relevant countries to take practical actions and play a positive role in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Fifth, strengthen awareness regarding strategic management and properly handle major differences. Sino-US relations are characteristic with a mixture of both comprehensive contacts & cooperation and big differences & contradiction. Given that a strategically competitive relationship between the two countries is formed, it becomes crucial as to how they properly handle differences, strengthen crisis management and control and prevent risks at certain scope from spreading to the overall relationship. China and the US have serious differences on many issues. What is most important to Sino-US relations is to strengthen strategic management awareness, planning highlevel exchanges, cooperation in functional areas and crisis management respectively at the macro, meso and micro levels as a whole; while tightening control over major divergences in case that escalated conflicts would cause security dilemma. The foundation for properly handling the differences in-between is mutual trust. Both sides need to strengthen mutual understanding, insist on the principle of seeking common ground while reserving differences, and firmly believe that the vast Pacific Ocean and the vibrant globalization have ample space for their legitimate demand for interests.

5.3.2 Stabilize and Develop Sino-Japanese Relationship at the Right Time China and Japan are the core powers of East Asia. China’s overall rising and Japan’s political right deviation and strategic adjustment are the crucial variables of East Asian order, while lack of mutual trust serves as an obstacle that is difficult to overcome for East Asian integration. Today, both countries are increasingly strong. From the perspective of traditional wisdom, it is extremely difficult for them to seek and reach common interests, since “two tigers cannot live on one mountain”. Judged from the objective situation, Sino-Japanese competition has profoundly affected all key aspects of East Asian economic order construction. In the security field, the two countries have their traditional understanding of security dilemma, so that they cannot cultivate the community awareness based on mutual trust, mutual benefit,

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and mutual dependence. This mutual distrust at the strategic level has intensified the security predicament in East Asia and hindered the construction of regional order. In the 21st century, China’s rapid emergence runs parallel with Japan’s relative decline,96 which has brought ever greater impact on the direction of regional order construction. Japan has purposefully driven Sino-Japanese relationship to change from strategic reciprocity to “strategic scrimmage”, and used the island disputes with China, Russia and South Korea as an excuse to advance the overall social right deviation; meanwhile, it has actively leveraged the US strategic shift to the East to balance and suppress the influence of China, and even taken the initiative to “align with countries outside the region and tackle China’s rising outside the region”, in an attempt to create encirclement of China.97 As a result, the political, security and strategic relations between China and Japan have deteriorated, which has aroused great concern from the international community. The Sino-Japanese relationship might be the most complicated bilateral ties in the world. As near neighbors separated only by a strip of water, friendly cooperation between them is not only an objective requirement of history and reality, but also in their fundamental interests. From mutual hostility to restoration of friendly diplomatic relations and to the establishment of strategic reciprocal relations, the Sino-Japanese relations have undergone a long and tortuous evolution since World War II. In this process, this bilateral relationship has developed amid twists and turns, moving forward and backward at times. It is featured with both amity & mutual benefits and competition & rivalry. At present, China and Japan rely heavily on each other but also compete fiercely in many fields, forming a very sensitive tie. In the economic and trade sectors, they have formed an inseparable relationship of mutual benefits and win-win, with ever greater mutual dependence. The capital, technology and investment from Japan are crucial to China; and the development of China provides an indispensable opportunity to Japan. A closer economic and trade cooperation in-between has brought tangible benefits to the enterprises and peoples of both countries. They have matched up over 300 pairs of friendship cities, and conducted frequent exchanges at various levels. Interdependence has become an important leverage to prevent long-term vicious conflicts between them. However, in the political and security fields, China and Japan have deep-rooted distrust and even hostility against one another. The Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea dispute have made existing political disputes even nastier. In this regard, Japan is more inclined to actively draw upon the US’ strength, and Sino-Japanese strategic competition is intensified.98 China and Japan were never strong simultaneously in history. Both being powerful now, the bilateral strategic state presents a dynamic balance. This will naturally result in a process of psychological and strategic adjustment and adaption, which may put on the disguise of competitions at certain fronts.99 With the changes in national strength 96 Sutter

[80]. [81]. 98 Men [82]. 99 Men [57]. 97 Hughes

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over recent years, China and Japan have carried out a series of strategic competitions and gradually learnt they must consider bilateral issues in a broader category. Since the second half of 2006, they have established and developed bilateral relations of strategic reciprocity, demonstrating good intention of both sides in facilitating a stable relationship. After 2012, the Diaoyu Islands issue heat up constantly due to Japan’s provocative moves, deepening the political disputes between China and Japan. The political right deviation of the Abe Cabinet seriously affected the direction of SinoJapanese relations. Many observers believed that there were small odds for China and Japan to break war on the Diaoyu Islands, but even if this crisis was resolved, the far-reaching consequences caused by it would last for years.100 Without formal negotiation mechanism, the Sino-Japanese stalemate will sustain.101 Meanwhile, the governments of both countries are deeply aware of the importance of bilateral relations. While he said that Japan would not make concessions on the issue around Diaoyu Islands, Abe also repeatedly stated that maintaining friendship with China was in line with Japan’s national interests and he hoped both states could resume dialogue and return to relations of strategic reciprocity. On the Chinese part, the policy of valuing the development of Sino-Japan relations does not change and it is willing to develop the strategic and mutually beneficial relations with Japan continuously based on the principle and spirit defined in the four political documents. All in all, the two countries are faced with complicated historical problems that are intertwined with the modern reality and will affect the future of each other tremendously. The explicit or implicit competition will be the basic characteristic of Sino-Japan relations for quite a long time. Therefore, we believe that Sino-Japan relations have stepped into strategic stalemate, with the following basic features: First, in terms of economic and social development, China has surpassed Japan in the economic scale and volume of import and export. It has become the world’s second largest economy and the No.1 in manufacturing production, export of goods and the number of R&D talents in the world.102 Looking ahead, China will continue to develop at a relatively high speed, but its economic structure and development model remain extensive and need to be improved. In comparison, Japan’s leadership in economics and trade has fallen sharply with its economic scale and total trade volume in a long down trend, but its quality will still keep a leg up. Its import of capital and technology contribute to the growth of China, and its experience in foreign trade and overseas market exploitation as well as social construction can be valuable lessons for China. They compete in the economic and social development level, but are also highly complementary in this area. Their economic and trade relations have been seriously impacted by the further development of Japan’s political right deviation since 2012. Under the pressure from the business circle, Japan has to seek to improve relations with China in order to get out of economic plight (Table 5.3; Figs. 5.4 and 5.5).

100 Auslin

[83]. [84]. 102 Hu [85]. 101 KYODO

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Table 5.3 Sino-Japanese trade and investment relations (1995–2013) ($1 million) China exports to Japan

China imports from Japan

Japan’s investment in China

China’s investment in Japan

1995

35,922.3

21,930.8

3,183

–

1996

40,550.0

21,889.8

2,317

–

1997

42,066.0

21,784.7

1,862

–

1998

36,895.7

20,021.6

1,301

–

1999

42,880.2

23,335.6

360

–

2000

55,303.4

30,427.5

934

–

2001

58,104.7

31,090.7

2,158

–

2002

61,691.6

39,865.6

2,622

–

2003

75,192.8

57,219.2

3,980

–

2004

94,228.6

73,818.0

5,863

–

2005

109,104.8

80,340.1

6,575

11

2006

118,516.3

92,851.7

6,169

12

2007

127,643.6

109,060.3

6,218

15

2008

142,337.1

124,035.3

6,496

37

2009

122,545.1

109,630.4

6,899

−137

2010

152,800.7

149,086.4

7,252

314

2011

183,487.4

161,467.3

12,649

109

2012

189,019.0

144,686.0

13,479

72

2013

182,192

129,851.0

9,104

140

Source The Japan External Trade Promotion Agency (JETRO), http://www.jetro.go.jp/cgi-bin/nats/ cgi-bin/search.cgi; http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/

Second, in terms of strategic direction, Japan has gone downhill on the whole but is not reconciled to this fact. It does not hesitate to take advantage of the chance that China has not yet risen in an all-around way to snatch certain key benefits, including its deliberate confrontation around the Diaoyu Islands. China has strengthened its dominance in the region and even the world, forming a complex interdependence relationship with East Asian countries. As China moves forward in the peaceful development road, Northeast Asian states, including Japan, all make forward-looking strategic deployment based on their prediction of China’s strategic direction in the future.103 However, China’s overall strategic framework remains extensive, and a holistic strategic design is in short. Strategically checked and inflexible in specific policy adjustment, China is not steadfast and resourceful enough when coping with Japan’s strategic direction. Third, in terms of strategic layout, China shifts its eyes to the globe and expands its international influence rapidly as it makes foray into every important corner in the world. Nevertheless, China remains a regional power basing in East Asia, and fails to 103 Xiao

[86].

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Fig. 5.4 Percentage of trade with China in Japan’s foreign trade (1979–2012). Source The Ministry of Finance (MOF) of Japan

Fig. 5.5 Percentage of investment in China in Japan’s total foreign investment (1978–2012). Source The Japan External Trade Promotion Agency (JETRO). Note Regarding the foreign direct investment, the 1978–2004 data is based on the corporate reporting statistics published by the Ministry of Finance, and the 2005–2012 data is based on the statistics from the balance of international payments. And the former is the fiscal year and the latter is the calendar year. In 1978, Japan did not invest in China

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make robust response to East Asia’s mal-adaption to its rising as well as certain hostile measures. How to coordinate domestic and international strategies and regional and global strategies is a significant strategic issue for China. In contrast, Japan has developed in East Asia for years, regarded Southeast Asia as its strategic backyard and attempted to ascend to a world power based on its economic edge and relations with Southeast Asia, but it has not yet achieved any gains, especially in its pursuit of the permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Looking forward, China has looked beyond East Asia at the entire Asia and even far, and begun to shift strategic focus to Asia; while Japan has increasingly narrowed its strategies down to East Asia and Northeast Asia, and fixed the center of its security strategy in East Asia. Fourth, in terms of relations with the US, each side has had its gains and losses. The relationship with the US is the most important bilateral tie for each except that of their own. Sino-US relations have entered a new sensitive period now, because US policymakers target China as a strategic rival. But the US is gradually dawned on the fact that a peacefully developing China is unstoppable. Besides, it also needs China’s help in global and regional affairs. The steady development of Sino-US relations is the common aspiration of Beijing and Washington. As to the Japan–US strategic relationship, it is getting closer as Japan’s pro-American sentiment deepens. Over a long period, Japan saw its alliance with the US as a “capping” that suppressed and restricted its growth. But with the changes in the pattern of East Asian powers, it begins to regard the bilateral alliance more of an important support to ensure its own national security and increase its international influence.104 Therefore, America has become a ring holder. It leads and influences where Sino-Japan relations will go. And the multilateral and bilateral interaction among the three is an important part that must be considered for the future development of Sino-Japan relations. Fifth, in terms of people’s sentiment, the favorability towards each other has dipped. Either of them is equipped with a mature big-power mentality. Along with the rapid increase of China’s national strength, the Japanese are more stressed out and even worried about China’s military expansion. The Japanese right-wing forces spared no efforts to make an issue of the historical problems and the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan to incite public opinion. The Japanese Cabinet Office poll shows that in recent years, Japanese people have been deeply affected by specific events and realistic interests, and so hold lower views of China. On the Chinese part, the domestic nationalistic sentiment is climbing, and it has not yet developed a rational and mature mentality towards Japan. With a bundle of problems around the Diaoyu Islands and the extension of the continental shelf after 2012, public opinions about Japan in China has soured and the image of Japan is getting worse by the day. According to the above analysis, dramatic changes have taken place in the strength of China and Japan, leading to the advent of strategic stalemate and fierce confrontation period. And the competitive factors come out on top in their bilateral relations. The power parity between them will last for quite a long time and its result will be

104 Buzan

[33].

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subject to both the enhancement of China’s peaceful development and the strategic direction and deployment of both sides. The Sino-Japan relations have important regional influences. Zhou Enlai pointed out, “In the Far East, Sino-Japan relations play a decisive role in peace. Being friendly is beneficial to both sides, leading to coexistence and common prosperity; and being unfriendly does harm, exerting impact on survival and prosperity of both sides.”105 How to stabilize Sino-Japan relations is an important question the policymakers must answer. Deng Xiaoping stressed that “we should consider and develop China–Japan relations in the longer term”.106 In combination with the maintenance and expansion of China’s national strategic interests, we should grasp the following aspects: First, at the bilateral level, we should handle Sino-Japan relations with a long-term perspective and the big-power demeanor, and keep strategic patience. In a moment of building up national strength, China will not allow Japan to occupy the future strategic space or challenge its core strategic interests. Meanwhile, it should handle their relations with a positive attitude and adhere to both the bottom line and brinksmanship on historical understanding and the Diaoyu Islands issue.107 Moreover, it needs to explore overlapping interests with great efforts, reconcile bilateral relations through the convergence and institutionalization of common interests, coordinate geopolitical positioning, keep poised in territorial disputes, deal with emergencies with caution, and respond more rationally to Japan’s adjustments and challenges. This mainly includes: be firmly convinced that the future direction of Sino-Japan relations basically depends on China’s prospects; get a better understanding of Japan’s historical progress and future goals, thus knowing the enemy; reinforce the mechanism for solving historical problems between China and Japan and promote future-oriented mechanism building; increase non-official exchanges with Japan to consolidate the stable civil foundation of Sino-Japan relations; and learn from Japan’s successful experience and hard lessons during its modernization and development, like how to manage the appreciation of the local currency or expand overseas business.108 But China should also look into Japan’s core interest-related appeals, strengthen the interaction on Track Two, and promote strategic understanding between the two sides. Second, at the regional level, we should properly handle the relationship between China–Japan ties and the future of East Asia to establish a more targeted East Asia strategy. Pursuit of balance of power will be a keynote in East Asia for some time. In view of this, China should face up to the concerns of ASEAN and Japan, reflect on the inherent defects of its regional strategy, and establish a more targeted strategy towards East Asia. While the US, Japan and South Korea intensify strategic coordination and 105 Zhou

[87]. Works of Deng Xiaoping (Part III) (deng xiao ping wen xuan), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993, p. 53. 107 As stated by Some Japanese people, “Japan as the perpetrator of the harm should take the initiative to establish a correct historical understanding and avoid the words and deeds that raise concerns or distrust of neighboring countries. This is the precondition. As long as Japan can have a correct understanding of the past, China will not dwell on historical issues either.” See Kohara [88]. 108 Men [82]. 106 Selected

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US–India relations and Japan–India relations are getting closer, China should also adjust the concept of regional cooperation, applying more of multilateral strategies while continuously focusing on the employment of bilateral strategies. Through bilateral dialogues, we can enhance multilateral arrangements conducive to China while guarding against those doing it harm. Third, at the global level, we should cultivate the ability of setting global agendas and shaping global landscape, and give due consideration to Japan’s core interest concerns. As it probes the antenna of interests to all corners of the world, China should set priorities first and then consider the overall presence. With East Asia at the center of its national security strategy, China should take roots in East Asia (crucial to China at present), increase its presence in the Asia-Pacific (crucial to the world in the future), and take on a global view (especially in the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America). It should spare no efforts to manage the territorial sea and exclusive economic zones, make good use of resource-rich countries and rely more on developing states. It should assume international responsibilities and turn it into an opportunity to play a more active role in global hot issues and actively expand national strategic interests. At the same time, China should further stress to expand the overlapping interests with all other parties and seize the initiative in international cooperation to build communities of shared interests in different fields and at different levels. Looking into the future, it should pay special attention to the strategic orientation of both existing and emerging powers, especially the institutionalization of new-type major power relations between China and the US, so as to calmly judge Japan’s core concerns about interests and maintain the stability of China–Japan relations.

5.3.3 Comprehensively Enhance China-ASEAN Strategic Ties Bilateral cooperation between China and ASEAN is of fundamental significance to the reshaping of East Asian order. Since the end of the Cold War, China-ASEAN relations have evolved from dialogue partners to strategic partners. The two sides have gradually established a more comprehensive dialogue and cooperation mechanism and a mature strategic partnership. Especially in the 21st century, China-ASEAN relations have been constantly innovated, and become an example of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit inside the region through political mutual trust development and bilateral FTA construction. At present, ASEAN’s role of pilot in regional cooperation is challenged, so it is in desperate need of China’s support; whereas China also encounters with difficulties in restraining the potential trend of containment and building a framework for the balance of powers, to which ASEAN as a crucial regional stabilizer also plays a critical role. On this basis, both parties

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have captured the impetus and opportunity for an overall improvement of their strategic relationship, and reached the strategic consensus to create a “Diamond Decade” of bilateral cooperation in the future on the basis of the “Golden Decade” in the past. China-ASEAN cooperation has a solid foundation. China and ASEAN share a similar history of being dominated by imperialist countries and have common cultural traditions, values and living habits. What’s more, China’s acceptance of ASEAN norms and its respect and support for the dominant position of ASEAN in regional integration play a crucial and fundamental role in deepening their strategic relations. As the first state outside Southeast Asia to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the first to execute FTA agreements with ASEAN and the first to establish strategic partnership with ASEAN, China has demonstrated a high-level acceptance and respect for ASEAN norms and emphasized that the norms are “patterns and principles that really work”. Since the early 1990s, China has endorsed all East Asian cooperation initiatives proposed by ASEAN (including the East Asian Economic Forum advocated by Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad), and then proposed establishing the CAFTA. It not only takes a clear-cut stand to support ASEAN’s dominant position but also makes innovations repeatedly in this bilateral relationship. By this way, it expresses its urgent hope for East Asian cooperation and earnest support for the ASEAN’s dominance, meets ASEAN’s strategic interests and wins its trust.109 Strengthening political trust lays the foundation of China-ASEAN relations, and economic and trade cooperation backs the deepening of bilateral ties. On the basis of fully considering the economic development level and market affordability of all parties to the agreement, the CAFTA has realized the sharing of economic integration benefits by expanding market access and eliminating trade and investment barriers. And China has made important contributions to it by actively opening up its domestic market to ASEAN.110 The CAFTA covers 13 million square kilometers, benefits 1.9 billion people, and reaches US$6 trillion of total economic output and over US$4.5 trillion of annual trade. It is China’s first FTA and the first FTA built by ASEAN as an entity. It is also the largest and the most populous FTA in the world built by developing countries. Since its establishment in 2010, both sides have practiced zero tariffs on more than 90% of the products. Economic and trade cooperation has grown rapidly. China has become ASEAN’s largest trading partner and the most important source of investment and assistance111 ; while ASEAN is China’s third largest trading partner, the fourth largest export market and the second largest source of imports (Fig. 5.6). China understands and pays close attention to ASEAN’s response to its economic impact,112 and is committed to deepening bilateral strategic trust. For example, it supports an open East Asia Summit mechanism and accepts ASEAN’s rules in member selection and institutional construction, even though increasing East Asia Summit

109 Zhang

[89], Sun and Chen [90], Zhang [91]. and Zeng [92]. 111 Li [93], Cao [94]. 112 Keller and Rawski [95]. 110 Wu

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Fig. 5.6 Proportion of trade with China in ASEAN’s overall foreign trade (1992–2012). Source China Statistical Yearbook, per year

members is not entirely in line with its national interests.113 Besides, China holds an objective attitude to ASEAN’s balance of powers strategy, thinking that this strategy has prevented ASEAN from leaning to one side, especially the US, and it is in reality helpful to China in reducing security pressure and maintaining national security.114 With the US strategic shift to the East and the implementation of the TPP strategy, ASEAN has felt the serious challenge endangering its dominant position and realized the necessity of China’s strategic support. Both have shared interests in the RCEP negotiations. Based on this, they have laid a solid foundation for cooperation in all aspects and kept steady and sound bilateral relations despite changes in regional situation. Of course, there are also many aspects that need to be improved in China-ASEAN cooperation. First off, the balance of great power adopted by ASEAN has a profound strategic impact on China. ASEAN’s China policy after the Cold War can be summed up as making full contact, taking full advantage, and strengthening checks and balances. Of course, ASEAN deeply understands the necessity to benefit from and piggyback on China’s economic development, realizing anti-China is not in the interests of ASEAN and guarding against China is the strategic baseline for ChinaASEAN relations.115 From expanding the presence and influence of the US, Japan, India and other big countries in Southeast Asia to strengthening security cooperation with the US, all can be regarded as part of ASEAN’s strategic efforts to balance China.116 Secondly, ASEAN has repeatedly stressed on different occasions that it will continue to maintain its pilot role, which reduces the possibility of the West to take lead in East Asian affairs on one hand, and counterbalances China all the more

113 Qin

and Wei [96]. and Wang [97]. 115 Zhang [98]. 116 Qi [99]. 114 Li

5.3 Interaction Between China and Major Forces in East Asia

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on the other.117 Besides, it is also in conflict with China’s goal in deepening regional cooperation. Since its strategies are oriented by its dominant position, ASEAN slows down regional cooperation in both width and depth, fails to power the integration of East Asian order, and so is suspected to be “a dog in the manager”. China is faced with potential constraints in terms of objectives and regulations when it seeks to enhance regional institutionalization on the basis of respecting and supporting the predominance of ASEAN. Thirdly, the legacy issues with China, combined with China’s thriving economy, have fueled doubts and fears of Southeast Asian countries.118 While it hopes to enhance its competitiveness through economic cooperation with China, ASEAN is also afraid of the negative economic impact brought about by the continued economic expansion of the country. China Threat Theory and China Opportunity Theory coexist. And fourthly, the economic cooperation between China and ASEAN is exposed to the pressure of upgrading and challenge from competitions. The current CAFTA is still in its infancy, requiring both to not only increase bilateral trade and investment but also take cooperation into the next level.119 Based on this, China deeply understands the value of deepening strategic cooperation with ASEAN and begins to adjust and optimize its strategies. Standing at the strategic vantage point is a consistent feature of China’s strategic optimization. And the core contents of improving China’s ASEAN strategy include: setting the priority to strengthen the good-neighborly friendship and cooperation, continuously consolidating and deepening their strategic partnership, and properly handling differences and problems through friendly consultation and mutually beneficial cooperation. Important milestones in China-ASEAN relations are listed in the following. On September 3, 2013, Premier Li Keqiang delivered a speech titled “Bring the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership of Long-term Friendship and Mutually Beneficial Cooperation to a New High” at the 10th China-ASEAN Expo and ChinaASEAN Business and Investment Summit. In the remarks, he proposed to “build an upgraded version of the CAFTA” and build a “Diamond Decade”. On October 3, 2013, President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech in the Indonesian Parliament on Working Together to Build the China-ASEAN Community of Shared Future, putting forward to “become ASEAN’s good neighbor, good friend and good partner who will stick together through thick and thin, and work together to build a knit China-ASEAN community of a shared future to bring more benefits to both sides and the people in the region”. Xi also proposed the initiative of building a “Maritime Silk Road” of the 21st century to promote China-ASEAN free investment and develop a great marine partnership.120 On October 9, 2013, Premier Li Keqiang attended the 16th China-ASEAN Summit and signed the Joint Statement on the Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership with ASEAN leaders. In this statement, China reiterated its continued support for ASEAN Community-building, ASEAN inter-connection, ASEAN solidarity and maintaining 117 Qin

and Wei [96]. and Zhou [2]. 119 Zhang [100, Sect. 16]. 120 Duan [101, Sect. 11]. 118 Dai

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ASEAN Centrality in the evolving regional architecture; while ASEAN reaffirmed that China’s development was an important opportunity for the region and it supported China’s peaceful development. Premier Li Keqiang pointed out in his remarks that “China and ASEAN should further deepen the two-point political consensuses. First, the fundamental issue for promoting cooperation lies in deepening strategic trust and exploring good-neighborly friendship. Second, the key to deepening cooperation is to focus on economic development and to expand mutual benefit and win-win outcomes.” He raised a seven-point proposal on the framework of China-ASEAN cooperation for the next ten years: first, to actively discuss the signing of the treaty of good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation between China and ASEAN countries so as to provide legal and institutional guarantees for China-ASEAN strategic cooperation; second, to launch negotiations on upgrading the China-ASEAN FTA and strive to bring bilateral trade volume to US$1 trillion by 2020; third, to accelerate the construction of connectivity infrastructure, advance the construction of Trans-Asian Railway and other projects, and prepare for the establishment of the AIIB in order to provide a financing platform for connectivity in ASEAN and in the region; fourth, to enhance financial cooperation and risk prevention in the region; fifth, to steadily promote maritime cooperation, join hands building the “Maritime Silk Road” in the 21st century, and focus on implementing cooperation on maritime economy, maritime connectivity, environmental protection, scientific research, search and rescue as well as fishery; sixth, to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the security field, improve the China-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting mechanism and deepen cooperation in the non-traditional security fields including disaster prevention and relief, cyber-security, combating transnational crime and joint law enforcement; and seventh, to keep close exchanges in the fields of people-to-people and cultural contacts, sci-tech and environmental protection so as to consolidate the foundation of friendly cooperation. Besides, Li Keqiang also proposed for the first time to establish a regional security framework to meet the needs of all parties, and achieve regional cooperation security and common security.121 The above “2 + 7” strategic framework represents the announcement of Chinese government’s strategy towards ASEAN in the next decade. At the Work Forum on Chinese Diplomacy Toward the Periphery on October 24, 2013, President Xi Jinping put forward the need to “promote friendship and partnership with our neighbors, foster an amicable, secure and prosperous neighborhood environment, follow the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in conducting neighborhood diplomacy”, boost win-win cooperation and promote regional security cooperation.122 Under this guiding principle, China vigorously enhances the upgrading of its ASEAN strategy and the institutionalization of regional cooperation. Looking into the future, the main direction of China’s ASEAN strategy will be:

121 “Economic Diplomacy Shifted to Security Diplomacy, Li Keqiang Advocated Asia-Pacific Secu-

rity Architecture” (jing ji wai jiao zhuan an quan wai jiao, li ke qiang chang ya tai an quan jia gou), xinhuanet.com, Oct. 11, 2013. 122 Xi [9].

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First, it should continuously support the leading role of ASEAN in regional cooperation and promote the construction of the China-ASEAN Community of Shared Interests, the Community of Shared Responsibility, and the Community of Common Destiny. The dominant position of ASEAN in regional cooperation is a historical result. China’s respect and support for this status serves as an important prerequisite for the stable development of their bilateral relations. The US strategic shift eastward and the promotion of TPP negotiations not only restrict the rising of Chinese power, but also challenge ASEAN’s predominance in regional cooperation. In this regard, ASEAN nations by no means want to be forced to take sides in the confrontation between Beijing and Washington,123 but China needs to work with ASEAN to effectively respond to America’s strategic shift and achieve strategic breakthrough. Both sides have shared interests and responsibilities in terms of the East Asian stability and RCEP negotiations, whose prospects in turn will affect the regional strategic layout of both sides. To this end, China and ASEAN should strengthen the awareness in a Community of Common Destiny, pull together in the times of trouble and seek cooperation to meet the diversification-led challenges and achieve inclusive development. Second, it should vigorously improve the level of cooperation with ASEAN. Cooperation between China and ASEAN is not conducted at high levels. The CAFTA is mainly involved in commodity trade, with low-leveled trade in services and limited scope for bilateral economic and trade cooperation.124 Hence, there is pressure in terms of enhancing the depth and level of cooperation. With the advancement of TPP, RCEP and China-Japan-ROK FTA, the wrestling of major powers in ASEAN continues to upgrade, posing a big challenge to the advantageous CAFTA. Therefore, there is an urgent need to further increase the level of free trade in various sectors such as trade in services and investment, consolidate the leading edge of the CAFTA and lay the foundation for jointly advancing RCEP negotiations afterwards.125 China should join hands with ASEAN to promote the upgrading of CAFTA, deepen the opening-up in commodity, services and investment, advance sub-regional cooperation, strengthen institutional construction, and facilitate the establishment of cooperation council.126 Given that nine out of the ten member states of ASEAN are coastal countries, in addition, China should start off with high-level, institutional cooperation to strengthen the construction of the “Maritime Silk Road”, thus providing new impetus for the CAFTA upgrading. Third, it should increase investment in and assistance to ASEAN. China should regard ASEAN as a key area of its outbound investment and increase investment in ASEAN countries. It ought to invest more in the labor-intensive industries of underdeveloped regions such as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, so as to create more local jobs while helping transfer and upgrade domestic industries; moreover, it needs to strengthen investment in capital- and technology-intensive industries and services 123 Keller

and Rawski [95]. [102]. 125 Li [103]. 126 Zhang [51]. 124 Zhang

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in relatively developed areas such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, leveraging local advantages in information and technology, etc. to bolster enterprise development.127 In this process, it should enhance economic interdependence with ASEAN with efforts, and provide greater assistance to Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and other countries to help them grow.128 Fourth, it should figure out intra-ASEAN relations and effectively manage the relationship with individual member state and ASEAN as a whole. When developing overall strategic relations with ASEAN, it is necessary to clearly recognize the diversity of ASEAN itself and the huge difference of member states in their attitudes toward China. For example, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore trust China comparatively; the Philippines and Vietnam challenge China’s South China Sea interests from time to time; and Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia have strong demand for China. As it develops overall relations with ASEAN, China should focus on developing bilateral relations with Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia to provide more aid; strengthen cooperation with Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore purposefully and carry out tit-for-tat struggle against Vietnam and the Philippines, to prevent ASEAN from reaching unconscionable consensus on the South China Sea issue and against China unanimously.129

5.3.4 Comprehensively Deepen the China–South Korea Strategic Partnership Northeast Asia is a place that gathers the geopolitical difficulties and sensitive points of China and an important strategic area for defending sovereignty and promoting economic development.130 Since the mid-19th century, it has been the intersection of the strategic interests of great powers such as China, Japan, the US and Russia, and so naturally become a hotly contested spot, especially for the control of Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula. It was the battlefront of the confrontation of the two camps during the Cold War. Afterwards, it is still an unstable zone where old and new hotspot issues kept emerging, or rather an area most likely to see great power conflict. The Six-party Talks have not been resumed yet, causing multiple concerns about the regional security. This situation decides that relevant countries in Northeast Asia are all security-oriented, since their pressure in this aspect is much higher than the rest of the world. The formation of multilateral security mechanism there is beset with difficulties. Compared with the increasingly relaxed international environment, the security situation in Northeast Asia is particularly complex and has impacted the regional economic cooperation, cooperation in the field of energy and even the normal inter-state relationship (Table 5.4). 127 Ding

and Zhou [104], Wang [105]. [106]. 129 Li [93], Chen [106]. 130 Huang et al. [107]. 128 Zhang

5.3 Interaction Between China and Major Forces in East Asia

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Table 5.4 Defense expenditure of participating countries in Six-party Talks (2001–2013) ($1 million, fixed rate in 2011) Year

World

USA

Chinaa

Japanb

Russiac

ROKb

DPRKc

2001

1,144,000

397,334

45,422

60,250

33,700

20,609

3.2

48.70

2002

1,213,000

446,142

52,832

60,701

37,300

21,177

3.3

51.00

2003

1,286,000

507,781

57,390

61,460

39,100

21,898

50.8

53.50

2004

1,359,000

553,441

63,560

61,201

40,870

22,859

54.4

54.60

2005

1,416,000

579,831

71,496

61,288

46,446

24,722

64.5

55.40

2006

1,463,000

588,837

83,928

60,892

51,404

25,613

67.1

55.40

2007

1,520,000

604,292

96,782

60,574

55,954

26,773

68.5

55.60

2008

1,598,000

649,003

106,640

59,140

61,484

28,525

71.3

56.60

2009

1,705,000

701,048

128,734

59,735

64,504

30,110

76.3

57.70

2010

1,732,000

720,282

136,239

59,003

65,807

29,912

82.6

58.40

2011

1,739,000

711,338

147,268

60,452

70,238

30,884

89.8

58.80

2012

1,736,000

671,097

159,620

59,571

80,995

31,484

99.1

57.80

2013

1,702,000

618,681

171,381

59,431

84,864

32,352

106.0

56.80

Share of the six parties in world’s total (%)

Note a estimative figure; b pension and consolation money not included; c uncertain figure (billion KPW) Source Website of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): http://www.sipri.org/ research/armaments/milex/milex_database

In stark contrast to Southeast Asia which has formed a sub-regional community order, countries involved in Northeast Asia vary greatly in strategic interests and lack of awareness regarding a community. The high economic interdependence has not brought good news for regional cooperation. Despite many a difficulty in the construction of low institutionalized FTAs, China, Japan and South Korea are engaged in the reconstruction of regional order mainly by participating in the process of East Asia integration (such as “10 + 1”, “10 + 3”, East Asia Summit and RCEP negotiations) led by Southeast Asia. In recent years, as the unusual strategic moves of the US and Japan have caused high tension on the security situation in Northeast Asia, it is increasingly necessary for China to adjust its Northeast Asia strategy and Sino-Korean relations have become more important. Decision makers of both countries have reached important consensus on comprehensively deepening their strategic partnership. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992, China and South Korea have achieved remarkable results in various fields based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence and good neighborly friendship.131 As substantive bilateral cooperation becomes more and more frequent, their strategic partnership has steadily deepened and broken away from the state of 131 “China-ROK Joint Statement for the Future” (zhong han mian xiang wei lai lian he sheng ming),

see: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1053915.shtml.

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being subordinate to relations with the US and completely restricted by the Korean Peninsula affairs, starting to develop towards the goal of becoming a pillar of regional prosperity, stability and peace. This cooperative partnership “has brought tangible benefits to both governments and peoples and made significant contribution to the regional and world peace and stability”.132 With a long history of friendly exchanges, China and South Korea are close to each other geographically and intimate in their people-to-people bonds, and enjoy similar cultural backgrounds and close economic cooperation.133 In reality, they have both overlapping interests and completely different development conditions, making their cooperation a model of bilateral ties in Northeast Asia. The Chinese and South Korean governments are committed to maintaining close communication on common concerns and medium- and long-term issues at all levels based on mutual trust to actively promote regional cooperation. In the ChinaROK Joint Statement for the Future issued on June 28, 2013, both sides raised that they would “jointly contribute to the development of China-South Korea relations, the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, promoting the regional cooperation, and addressing global problems”. As an important framework guiding the East Asian integration, the China-Japan-ROK cooperation plays a very important role in the regional development. The consolidation of China–South Korea relations has promoted the communication and coordination of the three countries in regional and international affairs. And a positive initiative of “promoting the steady development of the trilateral cooperation mechanism led by the Leaders’ meeting” was also proposed in the Joint Statement.134 Under the strategic partnership, China and South Korea have achieved progress in economic and trade cooperation by leaps and bounds, continuously tapping on new cooperative fields and projects while expanding the existing ones. Currently, South Korea is China’s third largest trading partner, third largest export destination and second largest source of imports, while China is South Korea’s biggest trading partner, export market, source of imports and overseas investment target (Table 5.5). The two countries have sailed towards building a pragmatic cooperation mechanism, and the investigation and talks about China-ROK FTA are typical examples in this regard. From April 2013 to September 2014, the two sides carried out nine rounds of talks and made progress in multiple sectors like commodity trade, trade in services, and investment and rules. The China-ROK Joint Statement issued on July 4, 2014 emphasized, “Both sides have positively evaluated the progress made to reach a high-level and comprehensive free trade pact and promised to make further efforts to complete the negotiations by the end of the year (Table 5.6).”135 132 Xi

[108, front page]. Jinping Meets with South Korean President Park Geun-hye” (xi jin ping hui jian han guo zong tong piao jin hui), People’s Daily, June 29, 2013, front page. 134 “China-ROK Joint Statement for the Future” (zhong han mian xiang wei lai lian he sheng ming), People’s Daily, June 28, 2013, Sect. 2. 135 “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea” (zhong hua ren min gong he guo he da han min guo lian he sheng ming), People’s Daily, July 4, 2014, Sect. 2. 133 “Xi

5.3 Interaction Between China and Major Forces in East Asia

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Table 5.5 Statistics of China–South Korea import and export trade value and growth rate (1992– 2013) ($100 million) Year

Value of export (growth rate)

Value of import (growth rate)

Total value (growth rate)

Trade surplus (deficit)

1992

24.4 (11.9%)

26.2 (144.9%)

50.6 (55.7%)

−1.8

1993

28.6 (17.2%)

53.6 (104.6%)

82.2 (62.5%)

−25.0

1994

44.0 (53.8%)

73.2 (36.6%)

117.2 (42.6%)

−29.2

1995

66.9 (52.0%)

102.9 (40.6%)

169.8 (44.9%)

−34.0

1996

75.0 (12.1%)

124.8 (21.3%)

199.8 (17.7%)

−49.8

1997

91.3 (21.7%)

149.3 (19.6%)

240.6 (20.4%)

−58.0

1998

62.5 (−31.5%)

150.1 (0.5%)

212.6 (−11.6%)

−87.6

1999

78.1 (25.0%)

172.3 (14.8%)

250.4 (17.8%)

−94.2

2000

112.9 (44.6%)

232.1 (34.7%)

345.0 (37.8%)

−119.2

2001

125.2 (10.9%)

233.9 (0.8%)

359.1 (4.1%)

−108.7

2002

155.0 (23.8%)

285.7 (22.2%)

440.7 (22.8%)

−130.7

2003

201.0 (29.4%)

431.3 (51%)

632.3 (43.4%)

−230.3

2004

278.2 (38.4%)

622.5 (44.3%)

900.7 (42.4%)

−344.3

2005

351.1 (26.2%)

768.2 (23.4%)

1119.3 (24.3%)

−417.0

2006

445.3 (26.8%)

897.8 (16.9%)

1343.1 (20.0%)

−392.5

2007

561.4 (26.1%)

1037.6 (15.6%)

1599.0 (19.1%)

−476.2

2008

739.5 (31.0%)

1121.6 (8.1%)

1861.1 (16.2%)

−382.1

2009

536.8 (−27.4%)

1025.5 (−8.5%)

1562.3 (−16.0%)

−488.7

2010

687.7 (28.1%)

1384.0 (35.0%)

2071.7 (32.6%)

−696.3

2011

829.2 (20.6%)

1627.1 (17.6%)

2456.3 (18.6%)

−797.9

2012

876.8 (5.7%)

1686.5 (3.7%)

2563.3 (4.4%)

−809.7

2013

911.8 (4.0%)

1830.7 (8.5%)

2742.5 (7.0%)

−918.9

Sources The 1991–1999 data are quoted from Li Yan, Du Yang and Zhang Bingzheng, “Analysis of China-ROK Trade: Comparison of Trade Statistics in 2000” (zheng li zhong han mao yi: 2000 nian zhong han mao yi tong ji shu ju dui bi), China Customs, No. 2, 2002, pp. 32–36; the 2000–2010 data are quoted from the “Concise Statistics of China-ROK Trade (1992–2010)” on the website of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Korea, http://kr.mofcom. gov.cn/article/zxhz/tjsj/201002/20100206776027.shtml, June 16, 2013; the data of 2011 are quoted from the website of the General Administration of Customs of China, http://www.customs.gov. cn/publish/portal0/tab44602/module108994/info412938.htm; the data of 2012 are quoted from the website of the General Administration of Customs of China, http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/ portal0/tab44602/module108994/info412938.htm; the data of 2013 are quoted from the website of the General Administration of Customs of China, http://www.customs.gov.cn/tabid/2433/InfoID/ 690424/frtid/49564/Default.aspx

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Table 5.6 List of South Korea’s investment in China (1992–2013) Year

FDI (number of projects)

Percentage in China’s total (%)

Actual utilization of FDI ($100 million)

Percentage in China’s total (%)

1992

650

1.33

1.19

1.09

1993

1,748

2.09

3.74

1.36

1994

1,849

3.89

7.23

2.14

1995

1,975

5.34

10.43

2.78

1996

1,895

7.72

13.58

3.25

1997

1,753

8.35

21.42

4.73

1998

1,309

6.61

18.03

3.97

1999

1,547

9.14

12.75

3.16

2000

2,565

11.48

14.90

3.66

2001

2,909

11.13

21.52

4.59

2002

4,008

11.73

27.21

5.16

2003

4,920

11.98

44.89

8.39

2004

5,625

12.88

62.48

10.31

2005

6,115

13.89

51.68

8.57

2006

4,262

10.28

39.93

6.07

2007

3,452

9.12

36.78

4.92

2008

2,226

8.09

31.35

3.39

2009

1,669

7.12

27.00

3.00

2010

1,695

6.18

26.92

2.55

2011

1,375

4.96

25.51

2.20

2012

1,306

5.24

30.38

2.74

2013

1,371

6.02

30.54

2.60

Sources The 1992–2000 data are quoted from the Report on Foreign Investment in China 2007 (2007 zhong guo wai shang tou zi bao gao) on the website of the Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wzyj/yjbg/ zgwstzbg/2006chinainvestmentreport/t20061226_71594.htm; the 2001–2010 data are quoted from Department of Foreign Investment Administration and Investment Promotion Agency of the Ministry of Commerce, Report on Foreign Investment in China 2011 (2011 zhong guo wai shang tou zi bao gao), Beijing: Economy & Management Publishing House, Edition 1, 2011, p.46; the 2011–2012 data are cited from Intertrade, Beijing: China Commerce and Trade Press, No. 2, 2013, p. 69; the 2013 data are quoted from International Trade, Intertrade, Beijing: China Commerce and Trade Press, No. 2, 2013, p. 69

Cultural and people-to-people exchange is a very important part in the strategic partnership. China has become South Korea’s largest source of international students and its largest overseas travel destination, with the percentages of South Korean students and tourists in China at the top of the list persistently. The China-ROK Joint Statement for the Future issued on June 28, 2013 pointed out, “Promote various forms of exchanges between the two peoples and actively carry out activities to tighten the

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people-to-people ties… Enhance the mutual understanding and trust between the two peoples and consolidate the foundation for the long-term stable development of bilateral relations.”136 The China-ROK Joint Statement issued on July 4, 2014 further emphasized that both sides should “strengthen the emotional bonds of the two peoples and build a relationship of mutual trust through the two-way people-topeople exchanges that can be directly perceived by the people”.137 To enhance such ties, the China-ROK Joint Committee on People-to-people Exchanges was founded as an intergovernmental coordinating body to guide and implement exchange and cooperation programs. In terms of tourism, China and South Korea identified 2015 and 2016 as the “China Tourism Year” and “South Korea Tourism Year” respectively, trying to realize the objective of reaching 10 million person-times in personnel exchange by 2016. In terms of educational exchanges, on September 24, 2014, the 20th Confucius Institute was inaugurated in Wonkwang University. South Korea has long been the country with the most Confucius Institutes in Asia and Africa.138 However, it is impossible to deepen the China–South Korea strategic partnership overnight. Bilateral relations are disturbed by many external factors, the level of strategic trust needs to be increased, and more importantly, misunderstanding needs to be cleared up. Specific problems are as follows: (i) External interference leads to low mutual political trust. The nuclear issue and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula are the top concerns of South Korea. And it is a touchstone of the strategic partnership in the eye of South Korea whether China can keep a strategic balance between the two Koreas. From China’s point of view, if South Korea maintains its foreign strategy inclined toward the US and fails to develop a symmetrical balance between the three parties, the security dilemma and lack of trust will persist; (ii) The bilateral military exchange and security cooperation lag behind, resulting in lack of mutual trust and reducing their strategic partnership to pure political declaration; (iii) People of both countries have serious nationalist sentiment, which not only affects the sound development of bilateral ties, but also shakes the foundation of social exchanges and mutual trust; (iv) Trade frictions between them are likely to rise and China trade deficit with South Korea has existed for long; (v) Both sides have different interpretations of shared culture and major disagreement on some historical issues. As such, it is necessary to emphasize the common concepts and deepen the shared philosophy in the Chinese and Korean cultures with an open and tolerant attitude, to realize the cultural strategic integration. In recent years, the changing situation in Northeast Asia has provoked the decision makers to think more deeply and greatly bolstered the reciprocal demands of Beijing and Seoul. To South Korea, it cannot meet its goals in the Korean Peninsula reunification and its domestic economy renewal without the understanding and support 136 “China-ROK Joint Statement for the Future” (zhong han mian xiang wei lai lian he sheng ming),

People’s Daily, June 28, 2013, Sect. 2. Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea” (zhong hua ren min gong he guo he da han min guo lian he sheng ming), People’s Daily, July 4, 2014, Sect. 2. 138 See the website of Confucius Institute, http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/node_ 10961.htm. 137 “Joint

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of China. The continuous development of Chinese economy and the close economic and trade relationship with China are the primary external factors to help the Korean economic revival. Meanwhile, China has significant influence on both Koreas and its policy adjustment will directly affect the process of peaceful settlement and reunification of the Korean Peninsula, so its understanding and support is particularly important. To China, in the face of the US strategic shift eastward and strained ties with Japan, it needs to partner with South Korea to strengthen its strategic advantage in the wrestling with Japan; and it needs to draw upon South Korea to balance its relationship with the US, containing the strategic input of the US in the Peninsula and mitigating regional security pressure.139 On this basis, China and South Korea should further strengthen the strategic mutual trust and comprehensively deepen the bilateral strategic partnership. To be specific: First, develop the China–South Korea strategic relationship into a core pillar for the stability and development of Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia lacks the tradition of multilateralism all along, and military alliance and bilateralism are the most prevailing there. The security architecture in Northeast Asia is mainly composed of the US–Japan alliance, the US-ROK alliance and traditional bilateral friendly relations between China and North Korea, as well as the unilateral structures of China, Russia and North Korea, etc. The bilateral military alliances established by the US are relatively complete. However, the exclusive military alliance has led to mutual suspicion of members strategically, failed to realize full coverage geographically, and been prone to incur adversarial thinking and balancing acts consequently, thus hindering the conclusion of security cooperation in Northeast Asia. In the short term, there is little chance that a regional organization will emerge in Northeast Asia. So it is necessary to attach importance to sub-regional cooperation. China and South Korea should construct a mechanism to promote multilateral relations based on bilateral relations and highlight the common interests in cooperation. Both should upgrade and institutionalize their bilateral relationship on the current basis, building it into the core pillar for the stability and development of Northeast Asia. Second, raise the China–South Korea strategic relationship to a higher level. China’s Northeast Asia strategy can be described as: strengthen national strength but not seek hegemony, value cooperation but not give up seeking regional preeminence, emphasize institutional constraint but not give up enlarging strategic space, and utilize the institutional force to facilitate the construction of basic framework that serves the strategic interests of China and the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.140 To extend this regional strategy to China-ROK relations, China needs to both enrich the strategic partnership with South Korea and keep its dominant position in it, so as to play an institutional role to the stability and development of the entire Northeast Asia. From the perspective of ROK, how to handle relations with China and the US is an important point in its diplomatic strategy. The Sino-Korean relationship is not a byproduct simply for solving North Korea issues; instead, it should be 139 Men 140 Men

and Han [109]. [110].

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regarded as an independent variable with geopolitical value,141 and explored at the same strategic level as US-ROK ties. It should abandon the strategy of developing relations with China under the framework of US-ROK ties and deeply understand the strategic value of China in the Korean Peninsula issue. Cooperation with China can not only change the forward-looking policies of the US towards North Korea, but also reduce the security concerns of North Korea. Third, actively boost the construction of China-ROK FTA and promote the formation of awareness in Northeast Asian Community. China-ROK FTA is a critical step for promoting trade between the two countries and cultivating awareness in Northeast Asian Community. By taking the lead in building a bilateral FTA, both sides can not only promote the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia, but also strengthen the regional political mutual trust. In this way, they can develop community awareness based on common interests and advance the process of Northeast Asian integration. Fourth, strengthen multi-level strategic dialogue between China and South Korea, deepen understanding and clear up misunderstanding. The two countries have established institutionalized strategic dialogues on foreign affairs and national defense, which play a constructive role in promoting political exchange and security cooperation between them. Both should strengthen the exchange and cooperation between their think tanks to provide intellectual support for promoting and deepening the strategic partnership; increase and expand the people-to-people exchanges at multiple levels, so as to help create an atmosphere of mutual tolerance, mutual appreciation and mutual learning regarding each other’s values, deepen understanding and clear up misunderstanding in this process, and consolidate the emotional foundation for the mutual trust of the peoples.

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