Operation Bagration: The Soviet Destruction of German Army Group Center, 1944 (Casemate Illustrated) 9781612009230, 1612009239

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OPERATION BAGRATION

OPERATION BAGRATION THE SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN ARMY GROUP CENTER, 1944

IAN BAXTER

CIS0021 Print Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-9230 Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-9247 © Casemate Publishers 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the publisher in writing. Design by Battlefield Design Maps by Battlefield Design Color profiles by Johnny Shumate Printed and bound in the Czech Republic by FINIDR, s.r.o. CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (US) Telephone (610) 853-9131 Fax (610) 853-9146 Email: [email protected] www.casematepublishers.com CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (UK) Telephone (01865) 241249 Fax (01865) 794449 Email: [email protected] www.casematepublishers.co.uk Title page: Red Army troops charging into action during the Bagration offensive. Contents page: Well-armed panzergrenadiers pass a stationary command Panther during operations on the Eastern Front during mid-1944. In an attempt to stem the Soviet drive westward, the bulk of the Panther battalions were committed to the Bagration operation in a desperate struggle to try to contain the enemy offensive, if only temporarily. Map: In total, Army Group Center comprised some 400,000 troops with a further 400,000 in support and in non-combat units. Opposing the Germans the Red Army had mobilized some 1,7000,000 troops for the offensive. All images are from the author’s collection, unless stated otherwise.

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Contents Contents

From the Creation of the SS Deutschland RegimentoftoEvents Fall Weiss ............................... 7 Timeline .............................................6 Campaigns in France and Yugoslavia ...........15 Prelude to Disaster ............................................8 1941–1942: The.................................................11 Das Reich Division in the German Forces Soviet Union.....................................................23 Soviet Forces ....................................................24 The 1943 Russian Campaign: Kharkov, The Eve of Battle ..............................................30 Kursk, the Mius................................................35 Operation Bagration Begins: June 23–28, 1944–1945: The Years of Defeat .....................47 1944 ..............................................................42 Fighting for Survival: June 29–July 6, 1944 .. 64 Operations in the North: July 7–13, 1944 ....85 Operations in the Center and the South: July 14–26, 1944 .........................................96 Soviet Triumph ..............................................111 Aftermath .......................................................121 Further Reading .............................................126 Index ...............................................................127

Operation Bagration

Timeline of Events Named after Pyotr Bagration, the Russian general in the Napoleonic Wars, Bagration was the codename for the Red Army’s 1944 summer offensive that led to the destruction of German Army Group Center, the greatest military defeat experienced by the Wehrmacht during World War II. On June 22, 1944, over a million Soviet troops poured across the German lines. What ensued was a swift and bloody battle of attrition. In the days and weeks that followed, German units fought and hemorrhaged under the constant hammer blows of Soviet ground and aerial bombardments, and the endless armored and infantry attacks. As the Soviet might punched a massive hole in the German lines, it sent shock waves through Army Group Center forcing it to retreat. However, the Russian offensive was so fast that many of the German units with their precious panzer and infantry divisions quickly became encircled and destroyed, its remnants retreating west in order to save themselves. By the end of the offensive the cataclysm was bigger than that experienced at Stalingrad. It saw the German Army being pushed out of Byelorussia into Poland with the loss of over 300,000 men and most of its weaponry.

May 1–31, 1944: Soviet planning for a major offensive against the German Army in the East.

MAY May 20, 1944: The Red Army’s launch date for the new summer offensive, Operation Bagration, is set for June 22.

June 19, 1944: Soviet partisan groups go into action against German supply and communication.

June 22, 1944: Operation Bagration is opened under General Zhukov. Over 1.2 million Soviet troops go into action along four fronts.

JUNE June 23, 1944: 1st and 3rd Byelorussian Fronts advance northeast of Minsk, surrounding the 4th Army. June 26, 1944: Hitler orders the 9th Army to retreat westward to take up further blocking positions.

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June 28, 1944: Hitler replaces Field Marshal Busch with his “troubleshooter,” General Field Marshal Model.

June 29, 1944: The Soviets capture Bobruysk. The 1st and 2nd Byelorussian Fronts close in on Minsk, attempting to link up with the 3rd Byelorussian Front.

Timeline of Events

Russian riflemen charge a German defensive position during the initial phase of the offensive. In a number of areas along the front Wehrmacht soldiers were quickly surrounded or overwhelmed.

July 4, 1944: Minsk falls as 100,000 German troops are caught in the Soviet encirclement of the city.

July 13, 1944: Vilnius is captured by Soviet troops. The 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts launch a fresh offensive toward southern Poland against German Army Group North Ukraine.

JULY July 11, 1944: The 9th Army is almost annihilated, and the remnants withdraw toward Lithuania.

July 28, 1944: Lvov is captured. The following day Brest-Litovsk falls to the Soviets. The drive westward by the Red Army continues with unabated ferocity.

AUGUST July 17, 1944: Byelorussia is cleared of all German forces. Some 57,000 German PoWs are paraded through the Moscow in a victory parade. German Army Group Center is annihilated.

August 15, 1944: The Red Army is forced to temporarily halt its westward advance due to overstretched supply lines.

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Crew inside an Sd.Kfz. 251/3 communications vehicle fitted with extra radio equipment for command, converse with a soldier out in the field. This photograph was taken in early 1944 on the Central Front. Army Group Center during this period comprised the 3rd Panzer Army, 2nd Army, 4th Army, and 9th Army.

Prelude to Disaster Following the catastrophe of the last German offensive on the Eastern Front, Operation Citadel, or the battle of Kursk, in the summer of 1943, German tactics would now consist of a series of withdrawals with its forces fanatically contesting every foot of ground. The war in the USSR had taken its toll on the German war machine and losses in both men and equipment were vast. However, in spite of the reverse in fortune for the German forces along the battered front, troops continued to hold their positions against overwhelming odds. Whilst a number of areas simply cracked under the sheer weight of the Russian onslaught, there were many places where German units continued to demonstrate their ability to defend the most hazardous positions against well-prepared and highly superior enemy forces, particularly in German Army Group Center.

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Prelude to Disaster

By late 1943 Army Group Center’s front, covering some 180 miles, had more or less stabilized, becoming relatively static with a strongly fortified defensive line. Much of the German success along the Central Front was due to the winter weather, and the fact that the Soviets had slowed their advance in order to bring up reinforcements and to regroup, and replenish its units for the spring the following year. Hitler made full use of the situation along the Central Front and ordered reinforcements to the area, deploying panzer and infantry divisions, and assault gun brigades from other army groups and from Germany to bolster the front. Although this could only be achieved at the cost of weakening other fronts in Russia, he was determined that no yard of ground should be given up without a fight, and that every officer and Landser in Army Group Center should be instilled with the iron will to hold firm. In his eyes, if his forces could hold the enemy, this would prevent the Central Front from collapsing and the Soviet armies using it as a springboard into Poland. Hitler was under no illusion that the war in the East could be won employing these types of tactics. But what could be achieved was a war of attrition where his troops could wear down the enemy and stagnate the front into a fourth Russian winter. Sd.Kfz. 251 halftrack personnel carriers and late variant Panzer IVs on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1944. The halftrack, especially the Sd.Kfz. 251, was a very versatile vehicle and could travel across some of the most rugged terrain. Whilst these halftracks were primarily used to transport troops to the forward edge of the battlefield, they were often tasked for reconnaissance missions because of their speed, versatility, protection and useful firepower.

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Operation Bagration

By June 1944, German strategy was faced with a two-front war. More than 53 percent of the army was fighting in Russia, whilst the other 47 percent was in Western Europe trying to stem the Allied invasion along the Normandy coast. On the Eastern Front the German Army strength had reached a new low of some 2,242,649 against more than 6 million Soviet troops. German commanders in the field were well aware of the seriousness of the military situation and looked ahead to the coming battles, knowing that that they were bound by Hitler’s orders with which they could not successfully comply. In front of them stood a vast enemy army whose strength was almost three times their own.

Sd.Kfz. 2s—or what the Wehrmacht called the Kleines Kettenkraftrad HK 101 or Kettenkrad—towing ordnance on the Eastern Front. Initially, the Kettenkraftrad was a motorcycle tractor for airborne units and Fallschirmjäger. With its overlapped and interleafed road wheels, it was used extensively throughout the war, mainly in Russia. There were two variants of the vehicle: Sd.Kfz. 2/1 and Sd.Kfz. 2/2. Both were used with a trailer and had field communication gear mounted behind the driver. It was primarily tasked with laying communication cable from a mounted wire spool. However, because of its versatility, it could be used for a variety of other tasks such as pulling heavy loads, and carrying troops. Later in the war the Kettenkrads also appeared in reconnaissance patrols and independent scout detachments, and were used especially where roads were almost impassable or in dense forests.

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German Forces

German Forces The German soldiers of 1944 had gone through radical changes since they began their war with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. They had fought across hundreds of miles of steppe, an environment alien to them, against a growing and hostile army. Initially, the Germans fought a series of victorious offensive operations attacking more or less simultaneously across large areas of enemy terrain in order to pin the enemy forces ahead of them, while mobile formations were concentrated to attack along narrow sectors of the front, breaking through to the enemy rear and surrounding him. Yet, due to the vast distances initially covered by the Wehrmacht, coupled with that first winter, and a strong defensive enemy strategy, the German soldiers’ tactics and the way they survived on the Eastern Front changed irrevocably. Through 1942 and 1943 the German soldier was no longer fighting simultaneously across an entire front. Instead, there were vast areas that had stagnated, like Army Group North. On the Southern Front, German PaK 35/36 guns being towed by horses toward the front in the early spring of 1944. Contrary to popular belief, even by the latter stage of the war, much of the Wehrmacht still made use of animal draft.

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Operation Bagration

forces had unleashed their summer offensive and fought a bloody battle of attrition in and around Stalingrad. Although Hitler said that the 6th Army had provided a valuable service by tying down almost three quarters of a million enemy troops, the loss of the 6th Army was so significant that it marked the turning point of the war in the East. The German soldier was now faced with a relentlessly growing and improving Red Army. Apart from the lastgasp Operation Citadel, German tactics in a number of areas now altered from offensive to defensive operations with infantry formations deployed across the front to hold the main defensive lines. Mobile formations were then concentrated in small numbers in various locations from where they launched focused counterattacks against enemy forces who had broken through the infantry’s defensive belts. Many of the armored vehicles too, notably the Sturmgeschütz III, which had been initially deployed as an infantry support vehicle, were now compelled to support other armored vehicles—panzers—due to the telling shortages. This not only deprived the infantry of additional fire support, but it weakened their lines and made them vulnerable to constant enemy attack. Thus by 1944, the German soldier found himself in a vulnerable and fluid situation. With a lack of proper armored fire support, additional men, and weaponry, soldiers were compelled to dig in and defend positions often with only an array of machine guns and antitank PaK (Panzerabwehrkanone) guns.

On the Central Front in April 1944 is a Hummel mounting its powerful 15cm howitzer. These vehicles served in armored artillery battalions—Panzerartillerie Abteilungen—of the panzer divisions, forming independent self-propelled artillery batteries, each with six Hummels and one ammunition carrier. Whilst primarily designed for offensive operations, they were successful in defensive roles as well.

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German Forces

As a result of the lack of supplies, a sense of futility and gloom gripped the German soldier. On the Central Front, countless thousands of soldiers had been killed since the summer of 1943, and almost a year later the Germans found themselves pushed back, holding parts of a front almost reminiscent of World War I—with a string of defensive positions, trenches and shell holes—in which gains and losses could be measured only in yards.

A late variant Sturmgeschütz III. By early 1944, about 55 percent of the Panzerwaffe was comprised of assault guns. In February 1944 the organization of an assault gun battery was changed to four platoons, one with three 10.5cm assault howitzer 42s, and three with three 7.5cm assault cannon 40s each. With the battery leader’s two assault guns, this amounted to 14 vehicles per battery. The alteration was supposed to make the gun batteries more effective on the battlefield. Whilst it increased the firepower, crews still found they were outnumbered and as a consequence still suffered heavy losses. Yet, despite the setbacks, by the time the spring thaw arrived in March and early April 1944, there was a genuine feeling of motivation within the ranks of the assault gun units. Yet, these vehicles would have to be stretched along a very thin Eastern Front, with many of them rarely reaching proper operating levels.

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Operation Bagration

In Profile:

Panzergrenadier and MG 42 machine-gunner A panzergrenadier in the summer of 1944. The Wehrmacht were slow in the development of camouflage clothing and it was not until the spring of 1942 that the first camouflage smock appeared. This soldier, an NCO, has donned a lightweight camouflage smock with matching helmet cover. He is armed with a 9mm MP40 and is holding two M24 stick grenades. Attached to his black leather belt is his MP40 magazine pouch. Note the entrenching tool in his belt. (Johnny Shumate)

A light machine-gunner with his MG 42 machine gun with folded bipod. A common method of carrying ammunition was the ready-to-use belt—two linked-together 50-round belts—which is draped around the machine-gunner’s neck with bullets pointing outward to prevent them from digging into the body. Though not seen, the soldier will have carried all the relevant issued equipment for a machine-gunner including the standard infantryman’s personal equipment used to sustain himself on the battlefield. (Johnny Shumate)

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German Forces

A German forward communication post in the early summer of 1944. The position is out in the open, and a Zeltbahn shelter has been erected to help protect the men from the elements and enemy detection.

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Operation Bagration

The German Infantry Division in 1944 Surprisingly, the organization and composition of the standard infantry division had remained virtually unaltered since 1942. A typical division was still made up of three infantry regiments of three battalions plus an artillery component also being a regiment of three battalions. Other units in the division comprised a battalion each of anti-tank artillery, reconnaissance, signals, and pioneers. Initially, the total strength of a division was supposed to be 17,200 of all ranks, but by 1944, this number varied wildly and mostly never reached this figure. The bulk of the weapons and equipment in a typical infantry division hardly changed throughout the war. By 1944 the Wehrmacht was supplied with a huge variety of weaponry, everything from small arms to heavy tanks. Weapons of foreign origin also saw considerable use in Wehrmacht units, especially captured Soviet machine guns and anti-tank guns due to the never-ending shortages and dwindling resupplies. In order to support the shortfall of a typical infantry division during the last year of the war, there was a large influx of mobile artillery vehicles and armored personnel carriers, so that entire panzergrenadier battalions could be carried into battle. A typical panzergrenadier division was comprised of two motorized infantry regiments, each of three battalions, all armored and with artillery, anti-tank, and engineer units.

An assortment of German vehicles is purposely spread out across a field in the early summer on the German Central Front. The vehicles are spaced apart like this to minimize the risk and effective impact of enemy aerial and ground attacks.

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German Forces

German soldiers setting up a defensive position with infantrymen in their foxholes.

Along the Front In mid-1944 Army Group Center was relatively static along its prepared defensive positions in the Byelorussian sector and had been for a number of months. In that time the Germans had managed to construct extensive field fortifications and miles of trench lines, often to a depth of some 3 or 4 miles. Spread along the front was a German force totalling some 34 infantry divisions, two Luftwaffe field divisions, two panzergrenadier divisions, including components of Panzergrenadier Division Feldherrnhalle, one panzer division and seven security divisions. Supporting these forces were some severely depleted Hungarian units that were undermanned and lacked adequate weaponry to withstand any enemy attacks for any appreciable length of time. In total, Army Group Center comprised some 400,000 troops, with a further 400,000 in rear-echelon roles and non-combat units. Whilst on paper the numbers appeared to confirm that the Germans could hold their positions, units were in fact dispersed and overstretched along their lines, and lacked sufficient heavy weapons. Each division had to cover a front of about 25 miles, double the length of what it should have been defending. Each mile of front was supported by some 80 to 100 troops with two or three artillery pieces and a motley collection of assault guns. Some local towns and villages that fell in the path of these defensive belts had already been evacuated. Thousands of women, children, and old men had been removed from their homes with some pressed into service to construct massive antitank ditches and other obstacles. A typical strongpoint deployed along the front contained light MG 34 and heavy MG 42 machine-gun sections, an anti-tank rifle company, a sapper platoon equipped with a host of explosives, infantry guns, an anti-tank artillery company with a number of anti-tank guns, and occasionally a self-propelled gun. Operating at intervals were Pz.Kpfw.IVs (Panzer IVs), Tigers, and a few Panthers, as well whatever StuG III assault guns that could be scraped together. This front-line defensive belt was designated as a killing zone where every possible anti-tank weapon and artillery piece would be used to ambush Soviet tanks: whilst an enemy tank was subjected to a storm of fire within the kill zone, special mobile engineer detachments equipped with anti-

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Operation Bagration

In Profile:

The German Commanders General Field Marshal Ernst von Busch General Busch had an exemplary record as commander of the 16th Army during Operation Barbarossa in 1941. On February 1, 1943, he was promoted field marshal. On October 28, 1943, following a vehicle accident in which Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, the commander of Army Group Center, was injured, Busch was named as his replacement. He would control 76 divisions across four field armies, including five panzer divisions and 54 infantry divisions, with six from Hungary. By June 1944, his command had been whittled down to 38 infantry divisions. General Field Marshal Walter Model General Field Marshal Model was commander of the 3rd Panzer Army during the invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941. Model’s character as a great military tactician saw him go from one success to another, instilling vigor and determination into his units. In January 1942 he was placed in charge of the 9th Army where he again achieved great success occupying the Rzhev salient. By the summer of 1943, he assumed command of the offensive against the northern Kursk salient. Although Operation Citadel failed, soldiers in the field looked upon Model as the “Führer’s troubleshooter.” As a result of his energy and brilliance on the battlefield, he took command of Army Group North in January 1944. On March 30, he was placed in command of Army Group North Ukraine in Galicia, which was withdrawing under relentless attack from Zhukov’s 1st Ukrainian Front. It  was here during bitter fighting that he introduced the “shield and sword” doctrine, which stated that retreats were tolerable, but only if they paved the way for a counterstroke later. Out on the battlefield he was not only courageous and innovative, but was friendly and popular with his troops. By the early summer of 1944, he simultaneously became commander of both Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group Center.

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German Forces

General Walter-Otto Weiss General Walter-Otto Weiss, of Prussian aristocracy, quickly advanced through the ranks as a dedicated, loyal and determined officer. He took part in Operation Barbarossa and soon earned the respect of his troops. In July 1942, Weiss took command of XXVII Army Corps, before being given command of the 2nd Army on the Eastern Front in February 1943. He continued to command the 2nd Army on the Central Front into the summer of 1944.

General Hans Jordan General Jordan saw extensive success on the Eastern Front in 1941 commanding the 7th Infantry Division and later VI Army Corps. On 20 May 1944, he was given command of the 9th Army in Army Group Center. He was a recipient of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords.

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Operation Bagration

General Kurt von Tippelskirch General Tippelskirch was commander of the 30th Infantry Division, Army Group North, during the invasion of Russia in 1941. A great military tactician, his skill and obstinacy earned him the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross on November 23, 1941. He saw extensive action around the Demyansk Pocket. By the summer of 1942, as the 6th Army began arriving outside Stalingrad, Tippelskirch was assigned as the liaison officer to the Italian 8th Army near the River Don. On February 18, 1943, he became commanding general of XII Army Corps, retaining this position until June 4, 1944, when he assumed command of the 4th Army, Army Group Center, from General Gotthard Heinrici. 

General Georg-Hans Reinhardt During Operation Barbarossa, General Reinhardt commanded XLI Panzer Corps. As a dedicated and enthusiastic commander, his successes in the field saw him assuming command of the 3rd Panzer Army, Army Group Center. He led the advance on Moscow during Operation Typhoon. Following the German defeat at the gates of the Russian capital, Reinhardt’s forces operated in the Smolensk and Vitebsk regions. He assumed command of Army Group Center in August 1944.

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German Forces

personnel and anti-tank mines would quickly deploy and erect new obstacles, just in case other tanks managed to escape the zone. If the crew from a disabled tank survived the initial attack and bailed out, special sapper units would pick off any survivors. Behind these defensive positions at varying depths were anti-tank defenses, including mortars, Panzerschreck, Panzerfaust, 7.5cm and 8.8cm PaK guns, all ready to counter any enemy armored vehicle that managed to break through. Yet supply levels of these weapons were thinly stretched, and would be unable to deal with a massive offensive. There was also little in the way of a strategic reserve on which to fall back if the front caved in during an attack. The Germans did partly strengthen a number of towns along the defensive line in what Hitler outlined in his “Blocking Formation” order, but again these fortified areas were overstretched and weakly held by rear-echelon troops. Although the soldiers at the front hoped that their meager defensive positions would hold out for an appreciable length of time, they never had the proper support weaponry to contain a significant attack. Assigned to these units along Army Group Center was an assorted concentration of armor, comprising of 553 armored vehicles, of which 480 were Sturmgeschütz IIIs. The largest contingent of armor was in the 4th Army, concentrated in and around the town of Orsha. Its units were comprised of 40 panzers including 29 Tiger Is, and 246 Sturmgeschütz IIIs. In addition, were a number of panzerjäger (tank destroyers) and self-propelled guns such as the Hornisse. Further support consisted of 15cm and 10.5cm howitzers, various PaK guns, MG 34 and MG 42 machine guns, and mortars of all sizes. In the skies, support was provided by Luftflotte 6, comprising two fighter groups which by mid-June could only muster 40 Bf 109K Messerschmitt fighters, due to massive losses already sustained on the Eastern Front. Bomber strength totalled some 312 aircraft, mainly Heinkel He 111 bombers and a small fleet of Junkers Ju 88s. Ground-attack aircraft were limited to a few Ju 87G Stukas and Fw-190 fighter-bombers. A light MG 34 machine-gunner in a defensive position along the Central Front during the early summer of 1944. His foxhole has been partially concealed by the camouflaged waterproof cape, or Zeltbahn.

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Operation Bagration

Army Group Center Order of Battle June 15, 1944 ARMY GROUP CENTER Reserves 707th Infantry Division 14th Infantry Division

OKH Reserves Panzer Group F 221st Security Division 391st Security Division

2ND ARMY

9TH ARMY

(General Walter-Otto Weiss)

(General Hans Jordan)

Reserves

LV Army Corps

5th Hungarian Reserve Division

102nd Infantry Division

23rd Hungarian Reserve Division

292nd Infantry Division

4th Cavalry Brigade 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division

XXXXI Panzer Corps 129th Infantry Division

VIII Army Corps

35th Infantry Division

5th Jäger Division

36th Infantry Division

211th Infantry Division 12th Hungarian Reserve Division

XXXV Army Corps 45th Infantry Division

XX Army Corps

383rd Infantry Division

3rd Cavalry Brigade

6th Infantry Division 296th Infantry Division

XXIII Army Corps

134th Infantry Division

7th Infantry Division

129th Infantry Division

203rd Security Division

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German Forces

4TH ARMY

3RD PANZER ARMY

(General Kurt von Tippelskirch)

(General Georg-Hans Reinhardt)

Reserves

Reserves

286th Security Division

201st Security Division 95th Infantry Division

XII Army Corps 57th Infantry Division

VI Army Corps

267th Infantry Division

256th Infantry Division

18th Panzergrenadier Division

299th Infantry Division 197th Infantry Division

XXXIX Panzer Corps 31st Infantry Division

LIII Army Corps

12th Infantry Division

206th Infantry Division

337th Infantry Division

6th Luftwaffe Field Division

110th Infantry Division

4th Luftwaffe Field Division 246th Infantry Division

XXVII Army Corps 260th Infantry Division

IX Army Corps

25th Panzergrenadier Division

Division Group 252

78th Sturm Division

A sudden downpour of rain on the Eastern Front during the summer months could bring wheeled vehicles to a standstill. In this photograph taken in the early summer of 1944 on the Central Front, artillerymen are attempting to get their 15cm howitzer gun carriage out of the mire. Due to the bad road system in Russia, operations were severely hampered by mud.

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Operation Bagration

Soviet Forces Although the opening months of the war in the East were a complete catastrophe for the Russian troops, their commanders knew that ultimately geography would aid them. Operating in Russia was unlike anything the Germans had experienced before. Just a year earlier in 1940 they had fought a Blitzkrieg campaign with good roads and an excellent infrastructure. In the Soviet heartland dirt tracks often linked cities and towns, which could be vast distances apart. Dust, mud, and later the extreme arctic weather would take a heavy toll on the German war machine. Coupled with overconfidence and a lack of knowledge, the Germans were slowly drawn into a protracted war of attrition. In spite of the huge losses that the Red Army incurred in 1941, they held firm and fought back in what became the Great Patriotic War. The German soldier had totally underestimated his foe, and the resources he had with which to defend his country. Following the German disaster at Kursk in the summer of 1943, the Red Army rolled onto an unstoppable offensive from which the Germans would never properly recover. By the fall of 1944, the Russian soldier had beaten his adversary back to the borders of Poland, in spite of massive losses. However, these were losses that could be replaced. Soviet forces were overwhelming both numerically and in the quality of their troops and weaponry. The Red Army achieved a ratio of 10 to 1 in tanks and 7 to 1 in aircraft over the Wehrmacht. It was only a matter of time before the enemy would be destroyed.

The Soviet Divisions in 1944 When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Russian ground forces opposing them had 303 divisions and 22 separate brigades (5.5  million soldiers), including 166 divisions and brigades (2.6 million) garrisoned in the western military districts. A typical basic infantry division during this period consisted of 14,500 men. However, the Red Army divisions were totally unprepared for the German attack, despite various warnings from a variety of sources. As a result, the Red Army was hit hard and suffered massive losses in the field, mainly due to being only partly mobilized, disorganized, and poorly trained. In spite of this, within months, Soviet infantry divisions had managed to improvise even though there were some that deployed without weapons, vehicles, and other critical equipment. Fortunately for the Russian infantryman, the German war machine soon overreached itself, and, with the advent of the Russian winter, was brought to a grinding halt. This gave the Russian infantry divisions time to regroup. By 1944, with a string of successes on all fronts, the very backbone of the Red Army had proved to be the rifle armies. Each contained three rifle corps, each of three rifle divisions. Similarly, to support these divisions in the field was the tank army, which contained a large proportion of mechanized infantry.

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Soviet Forces

In Profile:

Red Army infantryman and T-34 tanker A Soviet infantryman wearing the ShapkaUshanka, the ear-flapped cap. Over his standard army uniform he wears the Telogreyka, the Red Army quilted padded jacket. Attached to his brown leather infantryman’s belt is a PPSh-41 SMG 71-round drum magazine canvas pouch for his sub-machine gun, which he is holding. An entrenching tool can be seen on his belt, so he can access it at a moment’s notice whilst in the field.

A T-34 tanker standing in front of his vehicle. He wears the standard canvas tank helmet complete with Soviet shirt tunic, breeches, boots, and belt. Before the war, the tank helmet was made from black leather, but later replaced by black or gray canvas. The earflaps are designed to allow an intercom headset to be worn. In the summer, tank crews often wore one-piece coveralls.

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Operation Bagration

In Profile:

The Soviet Commanders General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov  General Zhukov was regarded as the most successful Russian general in World War II. Throughout the entire campaign in the East he was known as “the man who did not lose a battle.” His first real test was to save Moscow. He then used his expertise to destroy the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, which led to the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus. Zhukov then took full advantage of Germany’s deteriorating military situation, utilizing the fast-moving spearheads of the T-34 tanks to smash through the enemy defenses. His victory at Kursk provided him with a huge advantage over the Germans in terms of armored warfare, which the German war machine never managed to balance. For Bagration, Zhukov coordinated the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian Fronts, and later the 1st Ukrainian Front too.

Army General Ivan Bagramyan General Bagramyan was one of the greatest military commanders of World War II. He distinguished himself as a fine leader, especially in the early part of the war during Soviet counteroffensive operations in the battle of Moscow during December 1941. He was given his first army command in 1942 as commander of the 16th Army. Later this army was redesignated as the 11th Guards Army following successful operations during the Bryansk offensive in February 1943. Bagramyan then led the 11th Guards Army at the successful battle of Kursk in July 1943 where he was promoted colonel general. In November 1943 he assumed his most prominent role as the commander of the 1st Baltic Front.

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Soviet Forces

Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky By 1944 General Rokossovsky had established himself as one of the greatest commanders in the Soviet Union. His place in history was recognized during the German invasion of Russia in 1941, in what the Soviets called the Great Patriot War. It was in September 1941 that Stalin personally appointed Rokossovsky as commander of the 16th Army which successfully defended the approaches to Moscow, due in no small part to Rokossovsky’s tactical abilities and stubborn attitude in defense. In July 1942, with his growing stature as a great military commander, he was awarded his first operational-level command in charge of the Bryansk Front. Later that year, as the Red Army fought to the death defending the besieged city of Stalingrad on the Volga River, Rokossovsky assumed overall command of the 65th Army (4th Tank Army), the 24th Army, and the 66th Army, that were all brought together as the Don Front. Following successful operations around Stalingrad, during Operation Winter Storm and Operation Little Saturn, Rokossovsky was tasked with mopping up the remnants of the defeated German forces at Stalingrad. In January 1943, with the Red Army on the brink of victory at Stalingrad, he was promoted colonel general. A month later he assumed command of the Central Front where he was entrusted with a key role during the battle of Kursk. Later the Central Front was renamed the 1st Byelorussian Front. In the spring of 1944, Rokossovsky was ordered to prepare his front with the objective of smashing through German Army Group Center that had built a string of defensive positions, and advance through Byelorussia into Poland.

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Operation Bagration

General Georgy Zakharov General Zakharov was regarded as a great strategist and brilliant defensive tactician. His skills and determination as a commander saw him very quickly advancing through the ranks. In late 1941 he became deputy commander of the Western Front, which participated in defensive operations during the battle of Moscow. During the spring thaw of April 1942, he assumed command as chief of staff of the North Caucasian Strategic Direct, and the following month became commander of the North Caucasian Front. By August, as the German 6th Army approached the banks of the Volga River outside Stalingrad, he was promoted chief of staff of the Stalingrad Front. Later that year, as the battle inside Stalingrad intensified, he became deputy commander of the Stalingrad Front, where he directed a number of successful actions defending the city. By January 1943 he was appointed deputy commander of the Southern Front before being promoted commander of the 51st Army. Zakharov then went on to command the 2nd Guards Army during defensive operations along the Mius and Molochnava. In the early summer of 1944, he assumed command of the 2nd Byelorussian Front. (Photo credit: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/ encyclopedia/heroes/USSR)

General Ivan Chernyakhovsky General Chernyakhovsky was a young, determined, and competent tank commander who had quickly risen through the ranks and by June 1942 he was commander of the 18th Tank Corps. The following month he was promoted again, assuming command of the 60th Army which, in July 1943, he led during the battle of Kursk. Following the liberation of Kiev in 1943, and the great strategic advances through the Ukraine in early 1944, he was placed in command of the Western Front, which in April 1944 became the 3rd Byelorussian Front.

28

Soviet Forces

Establishment of a rifle division comprised some 9,000 men, with a rifle regiment totaling about 2,000 men; each of the three rifle companies in a battalion comprised around 110 soldiers. Also included in the rifle battalion order of battle was a medium machine-gun company of three platoons, organized on the lines of the machine-gun platoons of the rifle companies. Supporting the rifle and infantry divisions were mortar companies and artillery batteries. A typical artillery battery comprised a gun troop, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and heavy machine guns and the Katyusha multiple-rocket launcher. The Katyusha had proved so successful in the field that by January 1943 some 57 regiments were in service, together with smaller independent battalions. This was the equivalent of 216 batteries, a staggering amount of firepower. These rocket battalions were used extensively to support the infantry, rifle, and tank divisions which ultimately brought success on all fronts.

Along the Front Opposing the German Army, spread out between the Pripet marshes in the south to the Dvina River east of the city of Vitebsk in the north, was the Red Army, a formidable force totaling eight tank and mechanized corps, 118 rifle divisions, six cavalry divisions, 13 artillery divisions and 14 air defense divisions. In all, there were some 1,700,000 troops and support personnel bearing down on a front with a force more than double the size of the enemy’s. Spread out along the front were hundreds of thousands of fully equipped riflemen, with massed artillery and armor in support. Some 2,715 tanks and 1,355 assault guns were assigned to the front, supported by vast amounts of artillery of all calibers. Most of the tanks deployed to the combat zone were T-34s and the newer T-34-85s that had entered service earlier that year. There were also some lend-lease American M4 Sherman tanks as well as T-70 and British-Canadian Valentine light tanks. Supporting the armor was a vast array of artillery, totaling some 10,563 pieces distributed across four fronts on the Central Front. The largest concentrations of firepower were found in the 5th Artillery Corps, attached to the 3rd Byelorussian Front, and the 4th Artillery Corps attached to the 1st Byelorussian Front. Additional firepower comprised 4,230 anti-tank guns, plus 2,306 multiple-rocket launchers. The capabilities of the ground firepower were immense. If this was not enough, in the air the fronts were supported by 21 fighter divisions comprising 2,318 fighters, eight bomber divisions of 655 medium bombers, 16 strategic bomber divisions totaling 1,007 bombers, six night-bomber divisions of 431 light bombers, and 179 reconnaissance aircraft. In total the Soviet Air Forces boasted a staggering 5,327 combat aircraft, just on the Central Front alone, outnumbering the Luftwaffe by more than 7 to 1. The Soviet forces opposing German Army Group Center were gargantuan, yet the Germans still underestimated their opponents. Whilst they sat in their trenches, overstretched and lacking in weaponry and armor, they believed that their extensive fortifications and minefields would be enough to hold back a large Soviet attack. However, the German tacticians had wholly overlooked the massive array of Soviet engineer support and logistics. In the field the Red Army was reinforced by specialized engineer tank units specifically assigned to mine-sweeping operations, including flame-thrower tank regiments and assault pioneer battalions. The Soviets would use these support units to wrench open parts of the front in order to allow armor and troops to pour through.

29

Operation Bagration

The Eve of Battle By the early summer of 1944, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH)—the German high command—began receiving reports of a pending large-scale offensive against Army Group Center. They anticipated that Soviet forces would attack the Central Front in order to smash through the fortified German lines, wrench open the front, and pour vast quantities of men and equipment toward the Polish frontier and then onto German soil. Hitler, for one, believed that there was a strong possibility that the Red Army was preparing such a large-scale offensive against the center. His intelligence had for some time been intercepting various radio transmissions relating to enemy movements and the buildup of troops and armor in the area. German reconnaissance too, both on the ground and in the air, was also closely monitoring the Soviets and the intelligence gathered from these missions confirmed that the Russians were indeed preparing an offensive of considerable size. Yet, in spite of this, much of the information was limited and unreliable. German radio inceptors could not always attain significant intelligence due to strict Russian radio silence. Aerial reconnaissance too was often limited due to heavy Russian flak and aircraft activity. Furthermore, the Russians had already taken into consideration that the Germans would be trying to deduce their movements and plans. In view of this, Soviet intelligence purposely prepared special plans to deceive Army Group Center in order to dupe them into believing that they were actually going to attack on the southern front, and not in the center. These large-scale deception plans, using a variety of false radio transmissions together with dummy ground movements, led to German intelligence believing that while there would be an attack on the Central Front, the main assault would actually be in the south. In view of this, Hitler and his commanders felt they had the initiative. With this in mind, the Führer stripped essential Army Group Center units of armor and troops to create a reserve strike force in North Ukraine. This consequently starved a number of formations in Army Group Center of their panzers, self-propelled and anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft capabilities, in many cases the majority. Whilst Army Group North Ukraine prepared its positions for the main Soviet thrust, by early June 1944, German intelligence services began receiving worrying reports that Red Army formations, including substantial troop and armored concentrations, were moving northward to face the fortified lines of Army Group Center. Yet, even at this stage, when it seemed that German intelligence had indeed been duped, Hitler still remained resolute during the first week of June that the main attack would be unleashed in the south. However, it was not until around June 10 that he received reports of four large Soviet armies deploying opposite Army Group Center. German intelligence then sent a string of reports concluding that they now predicted the main attack was against the center. One of the last German reports, sent on June 19, indicated that enemy attacks were expected against Army Group Center’s sector around Bobruysk, Mogilev, Orsha, and possibly southwest of Vitebsk. The report highlighted that the sheer scale of the Soviet armies indicated that the Russian objective was to bring about the total destruction of Army Group Center’s salient by penetration on several sectors.

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The Eve of B attle

In Profile:

Luftwaffe and Heer soldiers This Luftwaffe field soldier is part of the 3rd Panzer Army, LIII Army Corps of the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division, June 1944. In late 1942 the Luftwaffe created its own field divisions and within a year these had grown substantially. This soldier surveying the battlefield through a pair of 6x30 Zeiss binoculars, wears the M-43 field cap. For additional protection against the elements such as wind and rain, he wears his cotton drill Zeltbahn shelter as a parka over his standard service field uniform. Worn over his Zeltbahn are the leather Y straps and leather belt to which are attached his MP40 9mm magazine pouches. He is armed with the MP40, which was normally supplied to troop leaders.

This Heer soldier is armed with the 1m optical Em.1m R.36.B rangefinder, complete with tripod mounting and support harness consisting of a V-shaped shoulder and back support that hooks into the ammunition pouches on the front of the belt. Attached to the back of the V support is a flat triangular steel case for the rangefinder scissors supports and cross tie. The soldier is signaling to what is probably a flak position, and shouting instructions on the location of an enemy target. He wears the M-43 field cap and wears a summer uniform, comprising a two-pocket German Army camouflage field service tunic. Attached to his leather belt is an MP40 9mm magazine pouch.

31

Operation Bagration

Preparing for battle The Red Army was determined to smash German Army Group Center. Facing the German lines the Soviets had collected some 1.7 million troops for the massive assault. The offensive was codenamed Bagration; initially Soviet planners had wanted the attack to coincide with the Normandy landings on the Western Front on June 6, 1944. However, due to logistical problems, radio silence, and extensive deception plans to fool the Germans that they would attack farther south, Bagration was temporarily postponed. Instead, planners decided that they would commemorate the German invasion of the Motherland with the offensive commencing on June 22, 1944, exactly three years to the day. For the “great summer offensive” the Red Army looked upon their attack as the last great push on the Eastern Front. The principal objective was to crush Army Group Center and advance westward at speed, annihilating the remaining German forces withdrawing into Poland. Along the front every German soldier defending the area was aware of the significance of their being overrun and destroyed. Hitler had made it quite clear that all remaining Heer, Luftwaffe, Fallschirmjäger and rear-echelon personnel defending the lines were not to evacuate, but to stand and fight, to wage an unprecedented battle of attrition. He was determined not to allow the Red Army to spill out and reach Poland. Since March 1944, Hitler had issued what was known as the “Fester Platz” or “Fortified Area” order, to establish defensive fortified positions—literally fortresses—in a number of Russian towns and cities to be manned by German forces that were ordered to fight to the death. This order was probably the most significant directive made by Hitler in 1944, but it was a desperate measure. All along Army Group Center the order was drilled into the men, and in the towns and cities of Bobruysk, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk these defensive policies were taken very seriously with soldiers fortifying these urban centers. What Hitler was trying to avoid that summer, was the destruction of Army Group Center and then a desperate defense along the frontier of Poland. For this reason, he wanted to draw as much of the main Soviet force away from its concerted effort toward Poland. It was for this reason he made it known to his commanders in the field that their troops would have to defend their meagre positions with every drop of blood if they were to avert a complete disaster on the Eastern Front. During the early morning of June 22, 1944, the Red Army sent out reconnaissance missions in the Byelorussia area and began making a series of company- and battalion-sized infantry raids along defensive positions in Army Group Center. Initially, for the Germans there was no major concern of an imminent large-scale Soviet attack. Over the last few months there had been a number of escalating enemy raids against the Germans’ defense and commanders in the field were not duly threatened by them. However, what the Germans were not aware of was that these attacks were probing missions to identify weak spots along the front, being undertaken so that selected parts of the front could be targeted for the mass artillery bombardment preparatory to the main attack, which would commence in less than 24 hours.

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The Eve of B attle

Red Army Order of Battle, June 23, 1944 1ST BALTIC FRONT

4TH ASSAULT ARMY

Army Artillery

83rd Rifle Corps

8th Guards Artillery Division

16th Rifle Division

21st Breakthrough Artillery Division

119th Rifle Division 332nd Rifle Division

43RD ARMY

360th Rifle Division

1st Rifle Corps 179th Rifle Division

6TH GUARDS ARMY

306th Rifle Division

2nd Guards Rifle Corps 9th Guards Rifle Division

60th Rifle Corps

166th Rifle Division

357th Rifle Division 235th Rifle Division

22nd Guards Rifle Corps

334th Rifle Division

90th Guards Rifle Division 47th Guards Rifle Division

92nd Rifle Corps

51st Guards Rifle Division

145th Rifle Division 204th Rifle Division

23rd Guards Rifle Corps 51st Guards Rifle Division

1st Tank Corps

67th Guards Rifle Division

89th Tank Brigade

71st Guards Rifle Division

117th Tank Brigade 159th Tank Brigade

103rd Rifle Corps 29th Rifle Division

3RD AIR ARMY

270th Rifle Division

11th Fighter Aviation Corps 5th Guards Fighter Aviation Division 190th Fighter Aviation Division (includes independent air units)

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Operation Bagration

3RD BYELORUSSIAN FRONT 5th Artillery Corps

65th Rifle Corps

2nd Guards Breakthrough Division

97th Rifle Division

20th Guards Breakthrough Division

144th Rifle Division

4th Guards Gun Artillery Division

371st Rifle Division

11TH GUARDS ARMY

72nd Rifle Corps

8th Guards Rifle Corps

63rd Rifle Division

5th Guards Rifle Division

215th Rifle Division

26th Guards Rifle Division

277th Rifle Division

83rd Guards Rifle Division

2nd Tank Brigade 153rd Tank Brigade

16th Guards Rifle Corps 1st Guards Rifle Division

Army Artillery

11th Guards Rifle Division

3rd Guards Breakthrough Artillery Division

31st Guards Rifle Division 36th Guards Rifle Corps 16th Guards Rifle Division 18th Guards Rifle Division 84th Guards Rifle Division

31ST ARMY 36th Rifle Corps 173rd Rifle Division 220th Rifle Division 352nd Rifle Division

2nd Tank Corps 25th Guards Tank Brigade 26th Guards Tank Brigade 4th Guards Tank Brigade

39TH ARMY 5th Guards Rifle Corps 17th Guards Rifle Division 19th Guards Rifle Division

Army Artillery

91st Guards Rifle Division

7th Guards Mortar (Multiple Rocket) Division

251st Guards Rifle Division 84th Rifle Corps

5TH ARMY 45th Rifle Corps 159th Rifle Division 184th Rifle Division 338th Rifle Division

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158th Rifle Division 164th Rifle Division 262nd Rifle Division 28th Tank Brigade

1ST AIR ARMY

3rd Guards Tank Corps

1st Guards Bomber Corps

3rd Guards Tank Brigade

3rd Guards Bomber Aviation Division

18th Guards Tank Brigade

4th Guards Bomber Aviation Division

19th Guards Tank Brigade

5th Guards Bomber Aviation Division

The Eve of B attle

5TH TANK ARMY

6th Guards Bomber Aviation Division

3rd Guards Cavalry Corps 5th Guards Cavalry Division 6th Guards Cavalry Division 32nd Guards Cavalry Division

113th Guards Bomber Aviation Division 334th Guards Bomber Aviation Division 213th Guards Bomber Aviation Division (includes Fighter Aviation Corps)

3rd Guards Mechanized Corps 7th Guards Mechanized Brigade 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade 35th Guards Mechanized Brigade 2ND BYELORUSSIAN FRONT 33RD ARMY

81st Rifle Corps

70th Rifle Division

32nd Rifle Division

157th Rifle Division

95th Rifle Division

344th Rifle Division

153rd Rifle Division 42nd Guards Tank Brigade

49TH ARMY 62nd Rifle Corps 64th Rifle Division 330th Rifle Division 369th Rifle Division

43rd Guards Tank Brigade 50TH ARMY 19th Rifle Corps 324th Rifle Division 362nd Rifle Division

69th Rifle Corps

38th Rifle Corps

42nd Rifle Division

110th Rifle Division

222nd Rifle Division

139th Rifle Division 385th Rifle Division

76th Rifle Corps 49th Rifle Division 199th Rifle Division 290th Rifle Division

121st Rifle Corps 238th Rifle Division 307th Rifle Division 380th Rifle Division (includes the 4th Air Army)

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Operation Bagration

1ST BYELORUSSIAN FRONT 4TH ARTILLERY CORPS 3RD ARMY

28TH ARMY 3rd Guards Rifle Corps

35th Rifle Corps 250th Rifle Division 323rd Rifle Division

50th Guards Rifle Division 54th Guards Rifle Division 96th Guards Rifle Division

348th Rifle Division 20th Rifle Corps 40th Rifle Corps 120th Guards Rifle Division 269th Guards Rifle Division 41st Rifle Corps 129th Rifle Division 169th Rifle Division 46th Rifle Corps 82nd Rifle Division 108th Rifle Division 413th Rifle Division 80th Rifle Corps 5th Rifle Division 186th Rifle Division 283rd Rifle Division 9th Tank Corps 23rd Tank Brigade 95th Tank Brigade 108th Tank Brigade

48th Guards Rifle Division 55th Guards Rifle Division 20th Rifle Division 128th Rifle Corps 61st Rifle Division 130th Rifle Division 152nd Rifle Division Army Artillery 5th Breakthrough Artillery Division 12th Breakthrough Artillery Division 48TH ARMY 29th Rifle Corps 102nd Rifle Division 217th Rifle Division 42nd Rifle Corps 137th Rifle Division 170th Rifle Division 399th Rifle Division

8th Mechanized Brigade 53rd Rifle Corps Army Artillery 5 Guards Mortar Division

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17th Rifle Division 73rd Rifle Division

1st Mechanized Corps

194th Rifle Division

19th Mechanized Brigade

The Eve of B attle

96th Rifle Division

35th Mechanized Brigade Army Artillery 22nd Breakthrough Artillery Division 61ST ARMY 9th Guards Rifle Corps

37th Mechanized Brigade 219th Tank Brigade Army Artillery 26th Artillery Division

12th Guards Rifle Division 212th Rifle Division

FRONT UNITS 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps

89th Rifle Corps 23rd Rifle Division 55th Rifle Division

3rd Guards Cavalry Division 4th Guards Cavalry Division 17th Guards Cavalry Division

397th Rifle Division 415th Rifle Division

4th Guards Cavalry Corps 9th Guards Cavalry Division

65TH ARMY 18th Rifle Corps

10th Guards Cavalry Division 30th Guards Cavalry Division

37th Guards Rifle Division 44th Guards Rifle Division

7th Guards Cavalry Corps

69th Rifle Division

14th Guards Cavalry Division 15th Guards Cavalry Division

105th Rifle Corps

16th Guards Cavalry Division

75th Guards Rifle Division 15th Rifle Division

Dnieper Combat Flotilla

193rd Rifle Division

1st Riverine Brigade

354th Rifle Division

2nd Riverine Brigade

356th Rifle Division

3rd Riverine Brigade

1st Guards Tank Corps

(includes 6th & 16th Air Armies & independent units)

1st Guards Mechanized Brigade 15th Guards Tank Brigade 16th Guards Tank Brigade 17th Guards Tank Brigade

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Operation Bagration

In Profile:

Soviet anti-tank rifleman and infantryman A Soviet anti-tank rifleman armed the PTRD-41 (Degtyaryov Single Shot Anti-Tank Weapon System Model of 1941). This single-shot weapon fired a 14.5x114mm round, and although unable to penetrate the frontal armor of German tanks, it could penetrate the thinner sides of lighter tracked vehicles such as half-tracks, self-propelled guns and similar vehicles. He is wearing the SSh-40 steel helmet. Slung over his back is his standard-issue rolled groundsheet, and a canvas backpack or veshmeshok, but known by Soviet soldiers as a “sidor.”

A Soviet rifleman going into battle. He wears the regulation infantryman’s steel helmet with the gimnasterka two-pocket jacket complete with shoulder boards. Attached to his portupeya black belt are ammunition pouches for his Mosin Nagant M1891/30 rifle. By 1944, the Soviet rifleman had become a highly mobile, lightly equipped, hardened and experienced soldier. Often carrying little more than field rations, ammunition, his greatcoat or plash-palatka, and whatever he could fit in his canvas rucksack or myeshok (which can be seen slung over his shoulder), he undertook his task with steely determination. He was a very different soldier from the early days of the war on the Eastern Front.

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The Eve of B attle

In total, Army Group Center comprised some 400,000 troops with a further 400,000 in support and in non-combat units. Opposing the Germans the Red Army had mobilized some 1,7000,000 troops for the offensive.

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Operation Bagration

Army Group Center Order of Battle June 23, 1944 General Field Marshal E. Busch General Field Marshal W. Model (from 28 June 1944) ARMY GROUP CENTER Reserves 707th Security Division 14th Infantry Division 20th Panzer Division Panzer Grenadier Division Feldherrnhalle

2ND ARMY

9TH ARMY

Reserves

LV Army Corps

5th Hungarian Reserve Division

102nd Infantry Division

23rd Hungarian Reserve Division

292nd Infantry Division

4th Cavalry Brigade 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division

XXXXI Panzer Corps 35th Infantry Division

VIII Army Corps

36th Infantry Division

5th Jäger Division

12th Infantry Division

211th Infantry Division 12th Hungarian Reserve Division

XXXV Army Corps 6th Infantry Division

XX Army Corps

45th Infantry Division

3rd Cavalry Brigade

134th Infantry Division 129th Infantry Division

XXIII Army Corps

296th Infantry Division

7th Infantry Division

383rd Infantry Division

203rd Security Division

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The Eve of B attle

Later that day, in front of the German lines, Soviet artillery batteries began preparing for a massive fire mission. Almost 22,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 Katyusha multiplerocket launchers were readied for action. In the surrounding woods and hedges assault teams begun moving up to the front to wait at their jumping-off points. These units were composed of sappers and infantry, supported by heavy machine guns, mortars, and a number of tanks and self-propelled guns. Behind the assault teams came advanced battalions, which were heavily supported by tanks and battalions of self-propelled guns.

4TH ARMY

3RD PANZER ARMY

Reserves

Reserves

286th Security Division

201st Security Division 95th Infantry Division

XII Army Corps 18th Panzergrenadier Division

VI Army Corps

57th Infantry Division

197th Infantry Division

267th Infantry Division

256th Infantry Division 299th Infantry Division

XXXIX Panzer Corps 12th Infantry Division

LIII Army Corps

31st Infantry Division

4th Luftwaffe Field Division

110th Infantry Division

6th Luftwaffe Field Division

337th Infantry Division

206th Infantry Division 246th Infantry Division

XXVII Army Corps 25th Panzergrenadier Division

IX Army Corps

78th Sturm Division

Division Group 252

260th Infantry Division

41

42

Operation Bagration Begins

Soviet 152mm M-10 artillerymen preparing for a fire mission against German positions. On the morning of June 23, the Red Army unleashed a massive artillery bombardment along the German Central Front.

43

Operation Bagration

Operation Bagration Begins: June 23–28, 1944 During the early morning of June 23, 1944, the stillness of German Army Group Center was shattered by a massive Soviet preparatory ground and aerial bombardment as its batteries attempted to soften up some of the strongest German defensive positions, lines that comprised intricate systems and mazes of blockhouses and trenches. However, whilst it appeared that the Germans were prepared for the offensive, much of their matériel employed was too thinly spread. Commanders too were unable to predict precisely where the strategic focal point of the Soviet attack was.

Red Army riflemen charge German positions during the early phase of Bagration.

44

Operation Bagration Begins

One of the strongest defensive lines was on the northern flank of Army Group Center, held by the 3rd Panzer Army, which had dug in across marshy terrain through a salient round the city of Vitebsk, and it was being pounded by devastating Soviet artillery fire and a rain of Katyusha rocket fire. To the sector north of the main Moscow–Minsk road was the 4th Army. It was opposed by the 1st Baltic Front and 3rd Byelorussian Front, which were given the task of breaking through the defenses to the north and south of Vitebsk and cutting off the salient. Along the 4th Army’s front shell after shell thundered into its strongpoints. In some sectors of the front German soldiers, fearing complete destruction, scrambled out of their trenches to save themselves. As the Soviet artillery barrage subsided in some sectors, Red Army units began attacking German blocking units that had dug in along a series of fortified positions. Around Vitebsk Soviet reconnaissance assaults were undertaken. However, German forces in the area were not going to give up ground that easily and on the main road and in the fields toward Vitebsk heavy fighting broke out as parts of the 3rd Panzer Army tried to contain enemy units moving west along the main thoroughfares. Vitebsk came under Hitler’s “Fortified Area” order: the Führer had already made it perfectly clear to his commanders that it should be held at all costs. It was imperative, he said, because if the city fell into enemy hands it would become a springboard for the Red Army to carve its way west toward Poland. Without the city he was concerned that it would become almost impossible to re-establish a sustainable connection between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army. Throughout the day of June 23, the German LIII Corps tried to hold out against heavy Soviet attacks. However, in spite of a number of successful engagements against the enemy, the situation was drastically changing for the worse and it soon became clear that “Fortress A Soviet anti-tank unit goes into action with their 45mm M-1937. Soviet ordnance proved very effective during the opening attacks along the German Central Front.

45

Soviet troops advance through enemy shelling, all with the basic kit of a Red Army infantryman, including greatcoat or blanket, haversack, entrenching tool, and rolled groundsheet.

46

Operation Bagration Begins

47

Luftwaffe Flak gunners using their weapon against a ground target. By 1944, the size of the Luftwaffe field divisions far surpassed the aerial strength. Including the elite Herman Göring Division, the Luftwaffe eventually boasted 21 field divisions plus countless smaller regiments. For Bagration, the 6th and 4th Luftwaffe Field Divisions came under the 3rd Panzer Army.

Vitebsk” could no longer hold. In spite of drastic attempts to close the gap north and south of the city to help relieve the fortress, it made no difference whatsoever. Despite the appalling conditions and the chaotic nature of the situation, the German defenders continued mercilessly resisting enemy attacks for as long as possible. By the next day, the 1st Baltic Front was pushing north, forcing the German IX Corps over the Dvina, while simultaneously encircling LIII Corps around Vitebsk.  German defenders that had not been trapped or annihilated in and around the city then withdrew in panic and disorder while Soviet forces began exploiting the area. As the defense of Vitebsk continued under the command of General Friedrich Gollwitzer, commander of the “strongpoint,” the bulk of the 1st Baltic Front bypassed the city and tore a massive 25-mile hole in the front. Red Army units then exploited this gash in the front in depth, attacking and bombarding the retreating Germans. To the south of Vitebsk, the situation along the front was as grim. Elements of the 3rd Byelorussian Front had smashed headlong into the German VI Corps. The Soviet attack was so powerful that it pushed the corps so far south that it came under the command of the 4th Army. Along the German front held by the 4th Army, units were also experiencing defensive problems in many areas. In spite of strongly fortified positions, which were manned with PaK guns and lines of machine-gun pits, the Red Army moved forward in their tens of thousands regardless of the cost in lives. Wehrmacht reserves were already dwindling in an effort to bolster the struggling Heer, and Luftwaffe forces.

48

Operation Bagration Begins

All along the battered front German troops tried in vain to hold their positions against overwhelming odds. The 4th Army’s XXVII Corps, which was holding Orsha and the main Moscow–Minsk highway, took the brunt of the main attack. General Traut’s 78th Assault Division was given the unenviable task of holding the main highway along with the wellequipped 25th Panzergrenadier Division. Although Traut boasted heavy artillery support, which included some 31 StuG III assault guns and 18 Nashorn self-propelled anti-tank guns, his division was dwarfed by enemy superiority. Despite tenacious German defense, his units simply cracked under the sheer weight of the Soviet onslaught. In some areas where the fighting was at its fiercest, German officers reported that they were outnumbered by at least 10 to 1. As a consequence, German units that had not been surrounded and destroyed were forced to withdraw westward leaving the city of Orsha to fall to the Soviet 11th Guards Army.

In a typical defensive position on the German Central Front in the summer of 1944, a German soldier peers across the parapet of his trench. He is wearing a mosquito net draped over his steel helmet. Mosquitoes were a constant menace, especially in swamps and boggy terrain during the summer months.

49

Concealed in a well-camouflaged trench is a soldier armed with M24 stick grenades and the new Panzerschrek tank destroyer. The popular name for this weapon was the Raketenpanzerbuchse or rocket tank rifle, abbreviated to RPzB. It was a reusable anti-tank rocket launcher developed during the latter part of the war. Another nickname was “Ofenrohr” or “Stovepipe.” Later in the war German tactical doctrine called for Panzerschreck and/or Panzerfaust teams to set up in staggered trenches no further than 400 feet apart. In this way, attacking armor would face anti-tank fire from multiple directions.

Concealed in what appears to be a small bomb crater are two German soldiers watching Red Army artillery saturating the area in front of their advance with high explosives.

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Operation Bagration Begins

In a trench, probably at a forward observation post, is a group of soldiers more than likely on a reconnaissance mission. Note the signalman with his portable radio— Tornisterfunkgerat or TornFu. This radio was the standard radio system used at battalion and regimental level. Inside a foxhole a light MG 34 machinegun crew prepare their position.

51

Two German soldiers, complete with standard infantry equipment including gasmask canister, canteens, mess kit, folding entrenching tools and bread bags, prepare to move out.

52

Operation Bagration Begins

The German withdrawal west of Orsha was one of unimagined dimension. Exhausted and depleted, Wehrmacht units trudged from one fixed position to another. The journey was sometimes one of disorder and terror with the roads west jammed by thousands of soldiers and armored vehicles. Soviet Air Forces pilots had easy pickings and regularly bombed and strafed the long columns. Carnage and death filled every foot of ground. By June 26, mechanized forces of the 3rd Byelorussian Front were able to penetrate deep into the German rear and advance at speed toward the Berezina River. A sense of futility and gloom now gripped many units of the 4th Army as it fought its way out, trying to hold back the Soviet onslaught toward the river. The 4th Army was now tenaciously holding the tip of the Byelorussian bulge, with the bulk of its panzer and infantry forces on a shallow bridgehead east of the Dnieper River. Since June 23, General Robert Martinek’s XXXIX Panzer Corps had been attempting to hold its positions east of the city of Mogilev against the Russian 49th Army. However, due to overpowering Russian firepower and infantry attacks, he was granted permission to pull back to the Berezina River west of Mogilev. By the evening of June 27, the Russian 49th Army forced the Dnieper crossings and fought its way into Mogilev during the night, while mobile units enveloped the garrison from the northwest.

An MG 42 machine-gun crew with their weapon on a sustained-fire mount with optical sight. A couple of well-sighted machine guns could inflict heavy casualties on an entire regiment and hold a frontage for several miles.

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Operation Bagration

Two photographs taken in sequence showing a Panzer IV complete with side skirts or Schürzen, approaching a German defensive position. During Bagration panzer divisions were broken up and distributed between hastily assembled battle groups, or Kampfgruppen, drawn from a motley collection of armored formations.

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Operation Bagration Begins

Whilst the northern flank of Army Group Center desperately tried to stave off being overrun on the southern flank the 9th Army initially had some success in holding its positions and preventing the 1st Byelorussian Front from penetrating a number of strongly fortified positions. As a result, Red Army units suffered heavy losses. The 1st Byelorussian Front boasted that they had the Germans outnumbered on average by 10 to 1 in tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 9 to 1 in artillery and troops. It had more infantry, tanks, and artillery than the entire German Army on the Eastern Front. In order to penetrate the German lines, the Red Army launched a number of heavy systematic bombing and artillery missions to soften up the enemy defenses. It then launched

An Sd.Kfz.10 towing a Nebelwerfer rocket launcher to the front. This halftrack’s main role was as a prime mover for smaller towed guns, such as the 2cm FlaK 30, the 7.5cm lelG, the 3.7cm PaK 36 anti-tank gun, and the Nebelwerfer.

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A photograph taken the moment a Nebelwerfer goes into action. This weapon fired 2.5kg shells over a range of 7,000 meters. The projectiles screamed through the air, the noise unnerving the enemy. Initially these fearsome weapons served in independent rocket-launcher battalions. A panzergrenadier moves through a cornfield carrying his 9mm MP40 machine pistol over his right shoulder.

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Soldiers having a break next to what appears to be an Sd.Kz.251/3 command halftrack. Two soldiers on the left are armed with Karabiner 98k rifles. Note the troop leader armed with the MP40 slung over his shoulder. He is also wearing a map/ dispatch case attached to the left side of his belt. Russian troops with a captured German 5cm PaK 38 antitank gun being towed by a prime mover to the front. This weapon was more than capable of penetrating the 45mm sloped armor of a T-34 hull at close range. It also fired the Panzergranate 40 APCR tungsten-core round that could penetrate the thicker armor of the heavier KV-1 tank.

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Soviet troops including women marching to the front. The majority are wearing the standard infantryman’s steel helmet, but some wear Pilotka caps. The standard-issue rifle that can be seen is the M1891/30 Mosin Nagant. Note the ankle boots with legs wrapped in puttees made from cloth from worn-out uniforms. A well-concealed Panther tank. Note the logs festooned on the side of the turret, used if the vehicle experienced difficulty traversing boggy terrain.

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further infantry and armored attacks with so much weight and fury that defenses soon cracked under the strain. The vast tide of the 1st Byelorussian Front soon swallowed up large parts of the battlefield, and within days it had torn a breach over 20 miles wide, leaving the smouldering German front lines in tatters. The attack was so vigorous that the Soviet 3rd Army smashed through into the German northern sector, trapping the German XXXV Army Corps near Berezina. The Soviet 65th Army then bulldozed its way through to XXXXI Panzer Corps  in the south. Heavy fighting ensued, but Soviet units then encircled both German corps in a pocket east of Bobruysk on June 27. As the German corps tried to escape the encirclement, the Soviets bombed their positions from the air. Elements of the 9th Army managed to break out of Bobruysk on June 28; what followed was intense street fighting with a number of German units frantically trying to fight their Two grenadiers armed with the deadly Panzerfaust. In order to help deal with the Soviet armor, German infantry, especially panzergrenadiers, were supplied with new hand-held anti-tank rocket launchers, known as the Panzerfaust. This weapon was an inexpensive, single-shot, recoilless weapon comprising a small, disposable preloaded launch tube which fired a high-explosive warhead. The launch tube was made of low-grade steel and comprised a charge of black powder propellant. Along the side of the tube were a simple folding rear sight and a trigger. The edge of the warhead was used as the front sight, and the user would aim the weapon at his target, holding it in the crook of the arm. The Panzerfaust had an impressive penetration capability compared to the American Bazooka; on impact it created a large hole that produced an explosion quite capable of killing the crew inside an armored vehicle. These were used extensively during the Russian offensive in the summer of 1944.

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His face plastered with dust, a motorcyclist halts in a field to drink from his canteen. He is typically dressed in the familiar motorcycle rubberized coat. Motorcyclists were found in every unit of an infantry or panzer division, especially during the early part of the war. They were even incorporated into the divisional staffs, which included a motorcycle messenger platoon. Wehrmacht infantrymen survey a deserted Russian foxhole. Along some parts of the front, in spite the overwhelming strength of the Red Army, some areas were recaptured by the Germans, but were then soon retaken.

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A Hummel on a flatbed railcar destined for the front. By this stage of the war the rail system was severely threatened by partisan activity, often delaying reinforcements in reaching the front.

Troop reinforcements at a rail siding in Poland in mid-1944, destined for the front.

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Panzergrenadiers hitching a ride on a Panther during operations in the summer of 1944. This panzer belongs to 31st Panzer Regiment of the 5th Panzer Division. Throughout its operations on the Eastern Front the division was seen by their Soviet counterparts as one of the best German units. For Bagration the 5th Panzer Division was dispatched directly from the Ukraine by rail to help block the advancing Russian forces on the Moscow–Minsk highway.

A Soviet SU-85 and T-34 crossing the Dnieper River. Note the abandoned German halftracks in the water. By evening of June 27, the 49th Army had forced the Dnieper crossings and fought its way into Mogilev.

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way out. During the course of 24 hours a number of fierce engagements transpired, but the situation had drastically deteriorated, and it soon became clear that many of the soldiers inside the city were doomed. In and around Bobruysk some 70,000 German soldiers were killed or taken prisoner. The next day the 1st Byelorussian Front liberated the city. By June 28, the entire defense of Army Group Center had been breached or totally destroyed. Both the Dnieper and Dvina had been reached. Along the whole of the German northern sector the Red Army had penetrated the German lines, sending thousands of troops reeling. Those who stood firm were surrounded or annihilated. By this stage of the Soviet attack, the Germans had finally deduced that this was not a diversionary action, but a genuine full-scale Red Army offensive. German commanders, now fully aware of the seriousness of the situation, had already urgently appealed for reinforcements. By June 26, the vaunted 5th Panzer Division was rushed by rail from the Ukraine to Minsk. It was the most powerful panzer division Army Group Center would have. It comprised 55 Panzer IVs, 70 Panthers, as well as a formidable group of 29 Tiger I tanks that were part of the powerful schwere Panzer Abteilung 505, the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. The main objective of the 505th was to act as a blocking force along the Berezina River line, and allow units of the 4th Army to withdraw to safety. A T-34 belonging to the 44th Guards Tank Brigade, 11th Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army, crossing the Dnieper River.

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Fighting for Survival: June 29–July 6, 1944 With the situation in Army Group Center looking very precarious, Hitler needed his troubleshooter, Field Marshal Walter Model, to rescue the front from catastrophe. Prior to his new posting on the Central Front, Model had been commander of Army Group North. His “shield and sword” policy saw a series of successful engagements and tactical withdrawals. Now, as commander of Army Group Center, he was given the task of trying to minimize the extent of the disaster that was unfolding along the front.

Field Marshal Model conferring with his commanders in the field.

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As a great improviser, Model immediately sent out an order to all commanders in the field that they were not to take a step backward. They were also to uphold the Führer’s demand to build defensive lines where they stood, and to fight to the bitter end. If they were to fall back, then it would be a planned withdrawal. When Model took command of Army Group Center on June 28, he was quite aware of the gravity of the situation. The 5th Panzer Division was fighting for its existence, and was in utter disarray between the Berezina River and the town of Borisov. Thousands of troops trudging west along the roads were demoralized, exhausted and often without weapons. Stocks of supplies were almost non-existent and many of them had not eaten in days. The 9th Army, Model’s old command, and the 4th Army were struggling to hold their lines, and the Red Army was poised to liberate the city of Minsk. Despite the catastrophic position, Model knew he had to straighten the line and prevent panic, disorder, and a full retreat. One way of holding the line was to adhere to Hitler’s “Fortified Area” order. He was aware that Minsk was strategically important to the conduct of operations in Army Group Center, and the city came under Hitler’s order. However, it was defended by a mixture of ill-equipped troops, and was cracking under the overwhelming might of the Red Army. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps had already made good progress toward Minsk, and by July 2, began breaking into the city limits. Almost immediately Soviet units became bitterly embroiled in fierce fighting, causing massive German casualties. Yet, in spite of the Soviet attacks, Model, nonetheless, still believed his troops could hold Minsk. Fighting continued A Soviet 57mm M1943 anti-tank crew in action during a fire mission. During Bagration the Red Army constantly evolved, employing new tactics. When an area was captured, Russian soldiers would frequently construct anti-tank belts comprising a number of anti-tank guns. This method essentially prevented stronger German formations from undertaking counterattacks using armor, which the Germans could least afford losing in battle.

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A column of T-34 tanks with riflemen hitching a ride. This type of travel was extensively used by the Red Army. Normal practice was for the soldiers to dismount as the tank attacked.

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A Panzer IV Ausf.J with an Sd.Kfz. 251/3 Ausf.C in a field in late June 1944. The halftrack has a 2m Sternantenne attached to a mount on the rear plate for the FuG8 radio set. A group of StuG III Ausf.Gs take on precious fuel from a single Maultier (Mule) cargo truck. Note that the process is being undertaken by hand using a simple pump, which is inserted into a 200-liter fuel drum. The engine deck of the StuG is opened for access to the fuel filler port.

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Wehrmacht soldiers aid a wounded comrade. The man on the left has brought up a stretcher. The man second from left seems to be wearing a Soviet helmet. Army Group Center losses in the first week of the offensive were massive. The crew of a Russian SU-85 assault gun extensively apply straw over the hull, turret and barrel of this vehicle in order to conceal it from both ground and enemy surveillance. Once done, the gun will reverse back into the wooden outbuilding.

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Panzergrenadiers advancing on foot toward the front. They are all armed with the Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifle, the standard weapon for all German infantrymen through the war. A Caterpillar Tractor East, more commonly abbreviated as RSO (Raupenschlepper Ost), tows a PaK gun through a ford during operations in June 1944.

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for a number of hours as an assortment of German soldiers engaged in a bitter battle, trying in vain to repulse the never-ending stream of Red Army troops. The 5th Guards Tank Army and 65th Army then made sweeping advances to the west of Minsk, trapping the entire German 4th Army, and much of the remnants of the 9th Army in a large pincer movement. To the north of the city, units of the 3rd Panzer Army also bore the brunt and became isolated as a result of the rapid enemy advance on Minsk and fought a fierce defensive rearguard action. Over the next few days as fighting continued, the pocket east of Minsk was slowly reduced. More and more troops and armor were deployed to the city to try and alleviate the deteriorating situation. The 12th Panzer Division, comprised of some 12,000 troops, with around 700 auxiliaries, and supported by 35 Panzer IV tanks, nine Panzer III tanks, 91 armored personnel carriers, and 12 self-propelled Wespe vehicles, was deployed to the area southwest of Minsk in order to try and reinforce units that were struggling to hold their positions. A Soviet battery of ISU-152 self-propelled guns moving to the front with infantrymen on board. This vehicle was unofficially nicknamed “Zveroboy” or “Beast killer,” and was built in response to the heavier and more powerful German tanks and guns being introduced onto the battlefield, including the Panther and Tiger. Since the ISU-152’s gun was mounted in a casemate, aiming was often difficult, and had to be done by repositioning the entire vehicle using the tracks. Therefore, it was used as mobile artillery to support more maneuverable infantry and armor attacks. 

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In Profile:

Panzergrenadier and PaK gunner A panzergrenadier wearing the full reversible splinter camouflage parka complete with splinter slacks. The parka has white cotton on the inside and is fully reversible to plain white. He also wears the M35 steel helmet that is also covered with camouflaged splinter material. Secured on his back is his entrenching tool and gasmask canister, which by 1944 often contained rations and supplies other than a gasmask. Attached to his infantryman’s black leather belt is his bread bag and ammunition pouch for his 9mm MP38/40 machine pistol. He can be seen carrying the 20l Kraftstoff Kanister Heer or German Army issue jerry can.

An 8.8cm FlaK gunner holding an 88 x 571mm shell during a fire mission. Many of the defensive positions utilized 8.8cm FlaK guns to defend in a duel role against aerial and ground attacks.

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A column of Sturmgeschütz IIIs advance along a dusty road in June 1944. Note how these assault guns are spaced apart to reduce the impact of an air strike. Russian airpower was the most dangerous opponent armored crews faced. By this period of the war the Soviet Air Forces dominated the skies.

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The German hand-held anti-tank 8.8cm Panzerschreck. The soldier kneeling at the front is the aimer and the one who fired the weapon. Behind him is the loader who stabilized the back blast. This deadly weapon was shoulder-launched and fired a finstabilized rocket with a shaped-charge warhead. Although a popular and effective anti-tank weapon, it was produced in smaller numbers than the Panzerfaust.

A column of StuG.III Ausf.G assault guns transporting panzergrenadiers, who appear to be fresh reinforcements. Of interest, these vehicles are fitted with special wide tracks for better movement on soft ground and improved traction in deep snow. The assault gun is a command vehicle and is fitted with the 2cm Sternantenne behind the loader.

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Infantry rest at the side of a dirt track armed with their Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifles and ammunition boxes. The troops often had to endure long marches interspersed with heavy fighting. The Soviet offensive was so swift that the front was constantly changing with the Germans continuously at risk of being outflanked and encircled.

Soviet PoWs being forced to bury dead draft horses, one of which is still attached to its cart.

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German infantry picking their way around a knocked-out Soviet IS-2 tank in a rubble-strewn street in Minsk. The IS-2 first saw action in the Ukraine in early 1944, equipping elite Guards heavy tank regiments of the Red Army. It was used for breaking through heavily fortified positions such as anti-tank defenses. It would then leave the lighter and more mobile tanks to mop up.

The 12th Panzer Division had formed what became known as the Bergen Blocking Formation, named after their commander, General Bergen. This formation saw extensive defensive action in and around Bobruysk. Another force in the area to support Bergen was Battle Group Lindig. However, commitment of these forces saw only limited success due to enemy strength, and during early July their situation developed ominously. It was predicted that due to their overwhelming strength, the Red Army’s advancing formations could be delayed, but not prevented. Model was all too aware of the situation. He also realized that holding Minsk had become futile. In order to try and avert a catastrophe, he ordered a rescue mission by opening up the pockets with the 4th and 9th Armies trapped inside. By pulling the troops out, he hoped to withdraw them to establish new defensive lines farther west. He proposed that additional forces were required to wrench open the western approaches to the city in order to allow the evacuation of troops trapped inside. To the north of the city, the main railways lines were to be kept open for evacuation, which would be undertaken by the powerful 5th Panzer Division, the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, and the 31st Panzer Regiment.

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As the Germans began their evacuation of Minsk, the 1st Guards Tank Corps was determined to destroy as many German units still trapped inside the city as possible, and those trying to break out. As a result, only a fraction of the 100,000 soldiers inside the rubble-strewn city managed to escape. The majority of the troops that escaped were infantry, marching on foot, towing what guns they had managed to salvage, but having limited mobility. This was in stark contrast to the Russians, who had thousands of pieces of armor in the area, supported by hundreds of armored personnel carriers, all enjoying considerable superiority in strength and mobility. The ultimate worry for Model was the lack of troops. The Soviet offensive had been quick and brutal, and unless Army Group Center received sufficient numbers of reinforcements and armor, then his task of holding the Central Front in Russia was doomed to failure. During a situation briefing held on the evening of July 3, the field marshal outlined that the Central Front had to man a position some 300 miles wide against 116 enemy rifle divisions and six cavalry divisions, 16 motorized infantry brigades and 42 tank brigades— with only eight combat formations. To make matters worse the 1st Baltic Front had successfully pursued the retreating remnants of the 3rd Panzer Army back toward Polotsk, causing huge gaps in the front. Model suggested that in order to counter the Russian offensive with any degree of success, the OKH had to siphon off units from Army Group North to support Army Group Center, or it would collapse into a rout all the way back to the borders of Poland.

A Soviet SU-85 assault gun advancing through Minsk. The city had come under Hitler’s “Fortified Area” order, but was defended by ill-equipped troops. On July 2, the Red Army’s 2nd Guards Tank Corps broke through into the city limits.

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A column of Russian SU-85 assault guns advances during the liberation of Minsk. For the Germans the defense of the city was a gruelling battle of attrition. By July 3 units of the 65th Army and 5th Guards Tank Army had closed the route west of Minsk, trapping the bulk of the German 4th Army, and remnants of the 9th Army.

A T-34-85 advancing near Minsk following the capture of the city.

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For this reason, whilst he waited for several divisions to be hurried from the northern sector, he reshuffled parts of his front. First, he subordinated the remnants of the 9th Army, as Group von Vormann, to the 2nd Army, and the 35th Infantry Division of XXXXI Panzer Corps and three divisions of LV Army Corps to XXII Army Corps. These corps were tasked with occupying positions east of the town of Sluch and establishing a new defensive line. The towns of Luniniec and Baranowicze were then arranged into a “fortress” position. However, these blocking troops were still under strength and lacked sufficient arms. Yet, they were ordered to try and inflict as many losses as possible against the advancing Soviet troops. Over the next few days, the Germans dug in. Special blocking units were set up on all the main roads and rail lines to slow the enemy. In order to block the Soviet attacks, Hungarian troops were brought up to the front line. The Hungarian 4th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to capture Lachowicze and then to advance against weaker Soviet units south and west near Swojatycze. The 4th Panzer Division, along with 35th Panzer Regiment and the 12th Panzergrenadier Regiment, was to establish contact with the 4th Cavalry Brigade near Swojatycze. Tigers from the 507th Panzer Battalion supported the Hungarian drive. On July 4, Hungarian units were embroiled in fierce fighting, stemming Russian attacks near Swojatycze. However, the Red Army did not let off and neighboring German formations became compelled to support their Hungarian allies, the German formations consisting of the 507th Panzer Battalion, and two companies of the 474th Panzerjäger Battalion, to help repel Red Army units that had captured the town of Kleck. Although Kleck was finally recaptured by the Hungarians and the Germans, the Soviets had thrown the Hungarian cavalrymen into complete disarray. In order to try and support the Hungarians, the German 28th Jäger Division was promised for the front. An unarmed Russian soldier appears to have left his foxhole for another position, crouching as he moves.

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However, the division was unable to reach the Hungarian lines and as a result the defensive line began to cave in, leaving German blocking units exposed to further Soviet pressure. Near Kleck the 4th Panzer Division was able to repulse a number of Russian thrusts, and even eject Soviet forces from several towns and villages in the area. Yet, in spite of this local success, it did not prevent further Russian attacks for any length of time. As a result, parts of the defensive line were ripped open with insufficient German divisions to establish a continuous line to prevent further Soviet attacks.

Wehrmacht soldiers armed with Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifles—the one in the foreground has his bayonet fixed—advance across a field during operations in Belarus.

Red Army troops were then able to force German units to give up sectors of the front, often without a fight. This compelled German commanders in the field to split divisional forces into smaller battle groups, or Kampfgruppen. These battle groups did have some effect, especially against the flanks of marching Red Army columns; however, these successes were

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not sustainable. Many sectors of the front were being starved of weapons and ammunition. As a consequence, Soviet armor could not be stopped from penetrating the gaps in the German lines. Often, when these highly mobile Red Army units threatened one sector, German battle groups were rushed from one part of the line to another, consequently robbing one area for another and creating a vast vacuum, which allowed Soviet units free to further their advance, often unmolested. In the confusion, the Germans still tried to hold their lines with whatever means they had at their disposal. Russian commanders in the field, however, took full advantage of the situation and began changing their close-combat tactics in order to deal with some of the stronger German blocking formations that were trying to bridge the holes punched into the

Soviet SU-85 assault guns and T-34 tanks advancing across a field in early July 1944. There were two versions of this assault gun comprised of the basic SU-85 with a fixed commander’s cupola with a rotating periscope and three vision blocks. The improved SU-85M had the same casemate as the later SU-100, with a commander’s cupola as used on the T-34-85.

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In Profile:

Red Army machine-gunner and infantryman A Soviet infantry machine-gunner armed with his Degtyaryov machine gun, or DP-27, pauses during battle to have a much-earned cigarette. This relatively effective light support weapon was nicknamed the “Record player” (Proigryvatel) because the disc-shaped pan magazine resembled a gramophone record and its top cover revolved while the weapon was fired. The machinegunner wears the Telogreyka, the Red Army quilted padded jacket, and is wearing the SSh-40 steel helmet. Attached to his infantryman’s leather belt is his combat knife and canteen.

Embroiled in action, a Soviet soldier is wearing a camouflaged all-inone sniper and scouting garment over his standard army uniform. This infantryman is armed with a PPSh-41 sub-machine gun. His kit is limited, but he wears the popular Pilotka summer hat complete with Red Star.

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front. During an attack Soviet troops often fired furiously to simulate greater troop strength, which would regularly cause panic among the German defenders. Soviet artillery would also take advantage of the situation by bombarding the defenses with the Katyusha multiplerocket launchers that instilled such terror in the German troops. This type of tactic often saw towns, important tactical strongpoints, and main roads being evacuated by German blocking formations. The Soviets were then able to push forward assault troops to take advantage of the situation and conduct not only further reconnaissance missions, but saturation fire from a number of directions to further confuse withdrawing enemy columns. When an area was finally cleared of the enemy, the Red Army would frequently establish anti-tank belts comprising several anti-tank guns. This method essentially prevented any stronger German armored formations from counterattacking. The Russian were well aware that the Panzerwaffe had only limited use of tanks and used them economically in trying to avoid anti-tank defenses. As a consequence, the Germans could not organize a continuous defensive line, and therefore could not stop the Soviet advance.

This photograph was taken from inside an Sd.Kfz. 251 halftrack and shows two grenadiers behind their mounted MG 34 machine gun, used for local defense. The vehicle is approaching a knocked-out Soviet T-34.

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An Sd.Kfz.10 mounting a shielded flak gun. The sides of the vehicle are folded down in order for the gun to rotate freely and allow the crew to work effectively.

The backbone of the Panzer divisions was the Pz.Kpfw.IV, the Panzer IV, which saw active service throughout the war. These vehicles were found extensively in every panzer division. This variant is an Ausf.H with complete summer camouflage and intact Schürzen.

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Operations in the North: July 7–13, 1944 With the situation further deteriorating for the Wehrmacht, the Red Army exploited Army Group Center’s position by executing wide flanking maneuvers north, driving its powerful 1st Baltic Front toward Baranowicze, then Molodechno, and onto the city of Vilnius, the capital of the Baltic state of Lithuania. The attack, the Vilnius Offensive, was conducted by units of the 3rd Byelorussian Front and was opposed by the remnants of 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army. Model was aware that the northern sector of Army Group Center was more vulnerable and more likely to collapse than the south. He knew that the Red Army was now conducting a large, sweeping drive northward into the Baltic states with the sole intention of crushing the 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army that were in the process of withdrawing, before going on to capture Lithuania and the rest of the Baltic states. On July 7, in spite of considerable German reinforcements in the area, the Red Army captured Baranowicze and the focus of effort immediately shifted north to Vilnius. The Soviets attacked toward Slonim and Vilnius, widening the deployment of its forces, Fallschirmjäger troops using a knocked-out T-34 tank as cover during fighting near the city of Vilnius. Fortress Vilnius was under the command of Luftwaffe General Rainer Stahel, and would soon comprise elements of the 3rd Panzer Army under General Reinhardt.

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German troops have just knocked out a T-34 with a Panzerfaust.

Taken from inside a German Sd.Kfz. 251 armored personnel carrier.

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especially against German blocking units. However, Wehrmacht forces in the area were not about to surrender ground that easily. On the Baranowicze–Berezovka road heavy fighting broke out as elements of the 4th Panzer Division halted, and tried to contain Red Army units moving west along the road. The 507th Heavy Tank Battalion counterattacked at Leipciani; what followed was a brutal tank battle between the battalion’s Tigers and the enemy. After a successful engagement, the battalion withdrew east of the Berezovka forest which enabled the Soviets to advance at breakneck speed toward Vilnius. The Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army had already bypassed the 5th Panzer Division, which was attempting to reach the city. Vilnius came under Hitler’s “Fortified Area” order— the Führer had already made it abundantly clear to his commanders that it must be held at all costs. Hitler was hoping to defend the city with four panzer divisions, but was advised that these could not be assembled before July 23. It was imperative to hold Vilnius, he said, because without the city it would become a springboard for the Red Army to carve its way through Lithuania, down the Baltic coast and then into East Prussia. Without the city, he was concerned that it would become almost impossible to re-establish a sustainable link between Army Group North and Army Group Center. The fortress of Vilnius was under the command of Luftwaffe General Rainer Stahel, with elements of the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of General Reinhardt. The garrison comprised a battalion from the 16th Fallschirmjäger Regiment, the 399th Grenadier Regiment, the 1067th Grenadier Regiment, the 240th Artillery Regiment of the 170th Infantry Division, an anti-tank battalion of the 256th Infantry Division, and various other smaller units. Over the next few days, the German garrison tried to hold out against heavy attacks from the 5th Guards Tank Army. During the night of July 10/11, Luftwaffe combat formations with 8.8cm flak guns reported that they had successfully destroyed 30 enemy tanks. However, in spite of a number of localized successful engagements, the situation was A Soviet Maxim 1910 machine-gun team hurrying across a road during the battle for Vilnius. This machine gun was mounted on wheels with a gun shield. In spite of its weight, the weapon was robust and used effectively throughout the war.

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An MG 34 machine-gun squad during the battle for Vilnius. Under battlefield conditions the bipod would invariably be extended when carried with the belt loaded for immediate action. A column of T-34 tanks advancing in Lithuania. Two of the supporting infantry are armed with the PTRD-41 anti-tank rifle. Although unable to penetrate the frontal armor of a German tank, it could pierce the thinner sides of lighter armored vehicles such as self-propelled guns.

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A Soviet ISU-122. This powerful vehicle’s primary role on the battlefield was as a tank destroyer. However, although its 122mm gun had great potential, its ability was limited by availability of projectiles and its lack of accuracy. 

drastically changing for the worse and it soon became clear that the fortress could no longer hold. Model’s drastic attempts to close the gap north and south of the city to help relieve the fortress had made no difference whatsoever. Despite the appalling conditions and the chaotic nature of the situation, the defenders continued to stubbornly resist, but with the position deteriorating by the hour, General Stahel proposed to break out west during the night of July 12/13. On July 11, General Stahel received reports that Army Group North was in the process of closing the gap between Army Group Center and itself. Stahel was aware that this linkup would allow the relatively safe evacuation of the garrison from the city. During the night July 1944, along the frontier of East Prussia, German soldiers pose with their motorcycle combination.

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Grimy German troops being withdrawn from the front to take up positions farther west. The speed of the Soviet advance saw many German units outflanked, outmaneuvered, then decimated.

of July 12/13, after destroying all their heavy weapons, some 3,000 troops broke out in a westerly direction, with many frantically swimming the river to reach lead elements of the 6th Panzer Division. Over the next 48 hours Russian infantry began driving back the remaining German defenders, pulverizing the city street by street. However, as the Soviet bombardment intensified, it soon became apparent that the fortress was doomed. By the evening of July 13, what remained of the garrison capitulated after more than five days of continuous combat. Altogether, some 13,000 German troops were killed or wounded in the defense of Vilnius. An Sd.Kfz. 251 crew, July 1944. The 2m Sternantenne attached to a mount on the rear plate was used for the FuG8 radio set.

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Passing a column of soldiers is an Sd.Kfz. 251 camouflaged with foliage.

Fighting in the area continued with unabated ferocity. The 6th Panzer Division fought to open a route through to Zysmory, whilst remnants of IX Army Corps were embroiled in bitter fighting near Anyksciai. Losses were terrible. The destruction of so many troops prompted Model to form “corps detachments” out of the pulverized units, organize them into divisions, and re-arm them. The 3rd Panzer Army was allocated remnants of the 95th Infantry Division, the 197th Infantry Division, and the 246th Infantry Division. The 4th Army was supposed to receive what was left of the 110th Infantry Division, the 299th Infantry Division, and the 267th Infantry Division, whilst elements of the 9th Army were to receive remnants of the 296th Infantry Division, the 134th Infantry Division, and the 383rd German soldiers in a trench during a lull in the fighting light up.

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A common scene in Army Group Center: a vehicle column withdraws behind a prime mover towing a 15cm howitzer secured on its gun carriage.

Infantry Division. The 2nd Army was to receive what was left of the 35th Infantry Division, the 129th Infantry Division and the 232nd Infantry Division. As for the other badly depleted divisions, these were redeployed to defend other parts of the Reich and to relieve the pressure on the Western Front, which was also causing the OKH considerable headaches. With Lithuania now under serious threat, Model appealed to Army Group North to come to his assistance and help stabilize the deteriorating situation for what was left of Army Group Center. However, Army Group North could not help as it was already fighting for its own survival against the onslaughts of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts.

A defensive position along the front. Supporting the line are armored vehicles, mainly Sd.Kfz. 251 halftracks. The barrel of a camouflaged Panzerjäger is foreground right.

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Wehrmacht troops advancing cautiously across a field, attacking an enemy position.

In spite of the dire military situation in defending Lithuania, the 3rd Panzer and 4th Armies managed to halt on a line that ran from Ukmerge south of Kaunas and along the Neman south of Grodno. The 2nd Army had fought bitterly and was brought back toward Bialystok. The 9th Army, almost annihilated, was licking its wounds along the borders of East Prussia. As for the Red Army, it had covered more than 200 miles without pause, but for the time being had outrun its supplies. This allowed what was left of Army Group Center to regain some of its strength and reinforce its position in Lithuania and in the provinces east of Poland. But the Soviets were now deep in territory ravaged by the recent battles against Army Group Center. With Byelorussia almost liberated, the Baltic states were now under serious threat of being overrun as well. More than likely a staged propaganda photograph of Red Army troops charging into action during the Bagration offensive.

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In Profile:

Fallschirmjäger, machine-gun rifleman, Panzerfaust operator and Soviet rifleman A Fallschirmjäger grenadier of the 16th Fallschirmjäger Regiment from Fortress Vilnius in July 1944. Worn over his fieldblue tunic he wears the standard jump smock in a splinter pattern which has a hard edge pattern of brown and green over a pale green or tan base. His helmet is painted in dark blue. Tucked into his black leather belt are two M1924 stick grenades. Another stick grenade can be seen in his smock pocket. He is armed with the Sturmgewehr 44, “assault rifle 44,” commonly known as the StG44.

A machine-gun rifleman belonging to the 170th Infantry Division in early July 1944. The soldier is wearing the waterproof Zetlbahn as a parka. His M35 steel helmet has wire attached in order to fasten foliage for additional camouflage. Over his shoulder is his Kar 98 bolt-action rifle. The leather Y straps and ammunition pouches can be seen. Tucked into his standard-issue black leather belt are three M1924 stick grenades. He is heavily laden with MG 34/42 ammunition boxes and carries one in each hand, suggesting he probably is the ammunition feeder or number 2. A light machine-gun troop consisted of a machine gunner (number 1) and two machine-gun riflemen (numbers 2 and 3) to carry ammunition.

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A soldier from the 1067th Grenadier Regiment wearing the waterproof Zetlbahn as a parka during operations in July 1944. His M38 gasmask canister, entrenching tool, and binoculars case can be seen along with an S84/98 bayonet for his 98K bolt-action rifle. He is armed with a Panzerfaust 30. This deadly anti-tank weapon was developed in 1943 for use by infantry against Soviet tanks.

A Soviet rifleman belonging to the 20th Guards Breakthrough Division directs his unit into action during operations in early July 1944. He wears the Soviet plash-palatka or rain cape to protect him from the rain. He is armed with a PPSh-41 sub-machine gun with a box magazine. Attached to his tan leather belt is his PPS-43 canvas magazine and grenade pouch.

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Operations in the Center and the South: July 14–26, 1944 By July 14, Army Group Center was tactically in the most dangerous position it had ever faced. The front was badly scarred and critically depleted, the bulk of its forces had withdrawn westward, and were already being threatened by overwhelming attacks. The next hours and days would see vicious fighting on both the central and southern sectors of the front as the Wehrmacht tried in vain to hold back the Red Army from reaching Poland. Model had anticipated the Soviet drive in the south and had already set about trying to establish an effective defense. Hitler, on the other hand, had diverted his attention away from operations in the center and south and was paying more heed to the unfolding nightmare What appears to be a relatively new Panzer IV complete with Schürzen rolling through a village in July 1944.

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on the northern sector of the front, fearing that the Red Army would soon be approaching the borders of the Reich. The field marshal, however, saw the southern sector as the most vulnerable, but struggled to convince the Führer to send additional reinforcements to the area. On July 12 and 13, intelligence reported an anticipated major Soviet offensive against Army Group North Ukraine, which would see Red Army troops reaching the city of Brest on the strategically important River Bug. With its wide-open bridges and good roads, Soviet motorized columns would be able to advance at speed, pushing back an already depleted XXIII Army Corps. Since the opening of the Bagration offensive, Soviet forces had been pressurizing Army Group North Ukraine, trying with various degrees of success to draw off attention from their main effort in the center and the north. Now, with German forces in disarray, the Red Army set about undertaking a large-scale attack, the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive. The bulk of Red Army and Soviet Air Forces resources were allocated to the area. The Russians were aware that the offensive would create a crisis on the German southern sector, which would then force the powerful German panzer divisions back to the Central Front, leaving the Soviets free to then pursue their objectives in seizing the western Ukraine, Vistula bridgeheads, and gaining a foothold in Romania.

From a trench, a grenadier wearing a Wehrmacht green splinter-patterned helmet and armed with a 9mm MP40 surveys the battlefield through a pair of 6x30 binoculars.

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The offensive began with a serious push westward in the Lublin–Brest area on July 14. The 1st Ukrainian Front broke through near the town of Horokhiv. The weakened German XLII Army Corps managed to withdraw relatively intact using reinforced rearguard detachments. By nightfall, the 1st Ukrainian Front’s 13th Army had penetrated the German lines to a depth of more than 15 miles. The breakthrough occurred north of XIII Army Corps, with the main objective of liberating Lwow. The assault on Lwow opened to the south of XIII Army Corps, near the town of Brody. In front of Brody, XXIII Corps fought a number of successful engagements to try and contain enemy forces from breaking through. The corps was supported by a powerful battle group of the 4th Panzer Division. Luftwaffe attacks maintained aerial cover and assisted in containing advancing Red Army units. The Russians, undeterred by the resistance, pushed forward, determined to crush the German 2nd Army in front of them. The Soviet objective was to wrench open the German front and pour troops unopposed through to the Bialowiezer forest from the southwest, bypassing the left flank of XXIII Army Corps and driving west for some 50 miles to the Muchowloki line on the Muchawiec–Zomismy–Charki–Krywlany– Czemery axis, where it would stop and wait for its rear echelons to catch up.

A German anti-tank gunner surveys his handiwork on a knocked-out T-34 tank that is still smouldering.

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A Panther being resupplied with ammunition. All the ammunition for the main armament was stored in the hull, with a significant amount stored in the sponsons. Three rounds were kept under the turntable of the turret.

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Army Group Center Order of Battle July 15, 1944 2ND ARMY Reserves

LV Army Corps

5th Hungarian Reserve Division

28th Jäger Division

23rd Hungarian Reserve Division

367th Infantry Division

1st Hungarian Cavalry Division

12th Panzer Division

52nd Security Division

Battle Group Demme of 20th Panzer Division

XX Army Corps Group Harteneck

3rd Cavalry Brigade

4th Panzer Division

March Battalion of 7th Infantry Division

4th Cavalry Brigade

35th Infantry Division (being transported)

Part of 129th Infantry Division

XXIII Army Corps 292nd Infantry Division 102nd Infantry Division 4TH ARMY VI Army Corps 50th Infantry Division 5th Panzer Division Group Florke Group Gottberg

XXXIX Panzer Corps Remnants of 221st Security Division 131st Infantry Division 170th Infantry Division 7th Panzer Division

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3RD PANZER ARMY XXVI Army Corps

57th Infantry Division

201st Security Division

267th Infantry Division

Battle Group of 6th Panzer Division

296th Infantry Division

69th March Battalion Parts of 196th Infantry Division

XXV Army Corps 390th Security Division 707th Infantry Division

IX Army Corps 212th Infantry Division March Battalion of 252nd Infantry Division Parts of 391st Security Division Panzergrenadier Brigade von Werthern

LIII Army Corps 4th Luftwaffe Field Division 6th Luftwaffe Field Division 14th Infantry Division 206th Infantry Division 246th Infantry Division

XXVI Army Corps

286th Security Division

Parts of 134th Infantry Division Parts of 299th Infantry Division Parts of 337th Infantry Division Parts of 383rd Infantry Division

XII Army Corps Panzergrenadier Division Feldherrnhalle 18th Panzergrenadier Division 6th Infantry Division 12th Infantry Division 31st Infantry Division 36th Infantry Division 45th Infantry Division

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Grenadiers in a slit trench during a lull in the fighting. Behind them is a modified Sd.Kfz. 251/10 which mounts the 3.7cm PaK 35/36 anti-tank gun. By replacing the front machine gun with this light anti-tank gun, panzergrenadier troops could rely on good fire support to deal with lighter enemy tanks.

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A Panther Ausf.G complete with a coating of Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste coating has stopped next to an Sd.Kfz. 251 halftrack for the vehicle commanders to confer over their maps, July 1944.

A StuG.III Ausf.G assault gun. The crew has applied foliage over parts of the vehicle in order to break up its distinguishing shape. The crewmember on the front plate is armed with a StG 44 (Sturmgewehr 44 or assault rifle 44).

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Two photographs taken in sequence of a Luftwaffe 8.8cm FlaK crew during a fire mission. Along some sectors of the front, units barely had enough panzers to oppose the Soviet armor and called upon flak battalions to assist.

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In order to support the German units taking the brunt of the Red Army offensive, the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking was assigned to the area between the 2nd and 4th Armies. It was also reinforced with elements of the 9th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment Germania. However, this regiment did not have sufficient firepower to oppose the superior enemy armor. Instead, the 2nd Panther Battalion of the 5th Panzer Regiment was compelled to join battle and assist in containing the Red Army. In spite of support from the Waffen-SS, the 1st Ukrainian Front continued to advance toward the towns of Zolochiv and Sasiv, driving a wedge between XIII Army Corps and XLVIII Panzer Corps. As the battle unfolded, the 1st Panzer and 8th Panzer Divisions, supported by formations of the Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division (1st Galician) became embroiled in a series of heavy contacts. Both the 1st Panzer Division and the 14th Grenadier Division (1st Galician) acquitted themselves well, but in the thick of battle the 8th Panzer Division lost communications and got lost, finding itself in the area of XIII Army Corps. Cut off from the XLVIII Panzer Corps and the 1st Panzer Division, it was unable to take part in the attack. With the 8th Panzer unable to support the main defensive efforts, the Germans were unable to contain the enemy. The panzer formations that were able to hold back the main Russian drive were then attacked by the Soviet 2nd Air Army which dropped some 17,000 bombs on the panzer units. In a drastic measure, in order to support the 1st Panzer Division, the commander of the 8th Panzer Division decided to take his armor on a shortcut. Instead, confused and unable to maintain cohesion, the division found itself in disarray and strung out on the Zolochiv–Zboriv line of the Lwow–Ternopol road. As a result, the tanks and supporting troops were attacked from the air and suffered significant losses. Wiking SS troops examine a knocked-out Russian ISU-152 self-propelled gun. With excellent armored protection from most German anti-tank guns, this gun was often able to advance into direct anti-tank fire, while its large, low-velocity, high-explosive rounds were able to blast open even the most heavily fortified enemy strongpoints.

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A Wiking grenadier surveys the terrain from beside a stationary StuG.III Ausf.F/8.

Whilst the 8th Panzer was being attacked, the Soviet 3rd Guards Tank Army took advantage of the lack of armored defense and made a series of successful advances in the direction of Lwow. As the Soviet tanks pushed forward under fierce German counterattacks, XIII Army Corps was compelled to retreat, or face being encircled, falling back onto a series of unmanned defensive positions that had been built in June 1944, and which ran along the Strypa River about 20 miles west of Ternopol. Through July 17, elements of the 1st Ukrainian Front made a number of telling assaults against the German defenses, with elements of the 14th SS Grenadier Division trying in vain to support the disintegrating lines. The following day, the Soviets renewed their attack in the direction of Lwow. The thrust was so rapid that advance units penetrated enemy positions near the town of Busk. As a consequence of their speed and firepower, the Soviets were able to encircle some 45,000 troops of XIII Army Corps around Brody. A 170-mile breach had been torn open in Army Group North Ukraine, and the Germans had nothing substantial with which to fill it. In spite of a number of desperate attacks by depleted units of the XLVIII and XXIV Panzer Corps to relieve XIII Army Corps in and around Brody, the trapped soldiers were doomed. However, there were some successful breakouts, including 3,500 troops of the 1st Galician SS, but these soldiers escaped with no armor and were exhausted. The consequences of lost ground in the southern sector of German Army Group North Ukraine had significant repercussions across the entire front. The 4th Panzer Army was now compelled to withdraw at speed to the Vistula River, and the 1st Panzer Army, along with the 1st Hungarian Army, retreated to the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains where it hoped to dig in and resist.

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German motorcycle combination units in a burning Polish village. A late-variant StuG.III Ausf.G assault gun advancing across a field in July 1944. The vehicle has been up-armored with concrete reinforcement projecting out around the driver’s visor. Note how the intact Schürzen has been fitted backwards. Normally the side-skirt plates were installed lapping each other front over back in order to prevent snagging whilst driving through dense brush.

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A column of Panzer IVs stopped on a congested road, during the withdrawal to Poland.

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A Maxim 1910 machine-gun team supporting a Soviet T-34 armored attack in midJuly 1944.

As for the city of Lwow, this was captured by the Russians on July 26. The Germans had now been completely vanquished in Western Ukraine. The success of the 1st Ukrainian Army sent shockwaves of such magnitude through the German Central and Northern Fronts that they were never to recover. A Luftwaffe FlaK crew outside a town destroyed during the Red Army’s LvovSandomierz Offensive.

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Army Group Center Order of Battle July 19, 1944

4TH ARMY

2ND ARMY XX Army Corps

AA 19th Panzer Division

7th Infantry Division

AA 20th Panzer Division

242nd Security Battalion

Group Gottberg

258th Security Battalion

Blocking Group Weidling

315th Security Battalion

Group Florke

3rd Cavalry Brigade

Remnants of 14th Infantry Division

930th Security Regiment 42nd Jäger Division

XXIII Army Corps 102nd Infantry Division with remnants of 7th Infantry Division 292nd Infantry Division

50th Infantry Division with AR 12th Panzer Division

3RD PANZER ARMY Group Tolsdorf IX Corps

1st Battalion of 46th Hungarian Infantry Regiment

Regiment Group 347 with 2nd Battalion of 197th Infantry Division

66th Panzer Jäger Abteilung

Blocking Group Rothkirch

Group Harteneck

206th Infantry Division

Group Merker

245th Infantry Division 4th Luftwaffe Field Division

LV Army Corps

6th Luftwaffe Field Division

Remnants of 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division

286th Security Division

Remnants of 35th Infantry Division

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Soviet Triumph Without the deployment of additional German forces, it was not possible for the blocking formations to slow the Soviet advance. In spite of promises of reinforcements, especially armor, many of these formations did not arrive in sufficient numbers to stop the enemy threat. The defending troops had been in constant combat for weeks and were depleted of supplies, and exhausted. When reinforcements did finally arrive along certain sectors of the front, often from the Reich, the fresh troops were inadequately equipped and had no combat experience. Their journeys to the front, invariably delayed, had been perilous due to partisan activity and the Soviet Air Forces. Partisan activities had already caused the Germans considerable problems. What made the situation even worse, retreating German troops had already blown bridges, forcing those units behind them to adjust their routes along secondary roads and through forested Overloaded with grenadiers who have hitched a ride, two Kettenkrads passes a wellcamouflaged 5cm PaK 38 anti-tank gun position.

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areas. Lurking in these forests and hiding along the roads were groups of partisans, some as large as battalion strength. Even small groups of partisans could prove effective, engaging individual vehicles, and ambushing couriers and rear-echelon personnel. Telephone lines were cut, severely disrupting German command and control. Railway lines were heavily targeted too. Because of acute fuel shortages, the Germans relied heavily on rail transport for both infantry and motorized troops, as well as armor. Since the German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941, much of the transportation of the panzer divisions had relied extensively on the railway system. Now, three years later, in 1944, rail sabotage had become so widespread that it was severely impacting operations along the entire Eastern Front. With parts of the front starved of reinforcements, OKH issued orders for blocking formations to use natural obstacles to secure positions. This included a number of rivers, which were chosen as running north–south with partially marshy banks. Other suitable terrain was also identified such as the boggy tracts of the Pripet Marshes. One major line of

A machine-gun rifleman or MG number 2, in July 1944. He wears the Zeltbahn, has several MG belts around his neck, and is carrying two ammunition boxes.

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defense selected was the Bug River. This fast-flowing river was regarded by Model as the last bastion of defense before the Reich. The Soviets, however, regarded the Bug as their main objective, in spite of it being a considerable geographical obstacle. The Germans considered the Bug so important to their defense that Model created a new command in Warsaw—IX Army Corps, formerly Group von Vormann. This new blocking formation was instructed to establish a defensive position on the Vistula–Narew line in East Prussia. It was considered that as German formations were pushed west they would be able to fall back on this fresh defensive line and hold the Red Army. Model knew that it was only a temporary measure, but he had few other tactical options. The German high command was more unrealistic and sought to convince the field marshal that the Bug would see the Soviets halted, and bring to an end their summer offensive. Yet, over the coming days and weeks, in spite of the dogged determination and resilience of the German soldiers in their frantic attempt to stem the Soviet drive into Poland, nothing could stop the deteriorating situation. Army Group North Ukraine tried its best to maintain its slender position on the Bug, whilst remnants of Army Group Center attempted to create a solid front along the Kaunas–Bialystok–Brest axis and assemble the remnants of its forces on the flanks. Grenadiers armed with Panzerfaust 30s assemble prior to establishing an anti-tank roadblock.

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But between Army Group Center and Army Group North, German positions were severely depleted. The mauled 3rd Panzer Army had been fighting continuously and had even managed to capture and secure a number of villages in the area. In late July it captured Schaulen and then advanced on Mitau. The 7th Panzer Division pressed on farther and attacked the Soviet 6th Guards Tanks Army in the area south of Kovno. The operation was risky, but the Panzerwaffe once again demonstrated its effectiveness on the battlefield. The 3rd Panzer Army desperately tried to hold Kovno, fearing that losing this Russian province would ensure the collapse of the Baltic states. On July 31, the Red Army pushed forward again, using their newly won freedom of maneuver, in the direction of the East Prussian border. Meanwhile, the 6th Panzer Division blocked the route toward Griskabudis, whilst Panzergrenadier von Werthen blocked the south bank of the Memel near Zapyskis. A few days later the Red Army unleashed a considerable number of tanks on either side of Nova where the 6th Panzer Division was operating. What followed was the battle of Kovno. Although German commanders were fully aware of the fruitless attempts by its forces to establish a defensive line, troops followed instructions implicitly in a number of areas to halt the Soviet drive. Infantry, together with panzerjäger and panzer units, despite their deficiency in men and equipment, fought a hard, defensive battle, temporarily slowing the Red Army drive. Yet, despite their doggedness, the remnants of Army Group Center were steadily ground down and pushed westward across the Polish border in late July 1944.

Passing a stationary Tiger I, captured or knocked-out, a column of German PoWs is led away into captivity.

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The Bug River was a major German line of defense. However, the Soviet advance during August was so swift that many of the Bug’s defensive positions collapsed. By the third week of August, the 2nd and 3rd Byelorussian Fronts were fighting on the upper Vistula between Army Group Center and Army Group North. Farther north, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Baltic Fronts were advancing through the Baltic states. In Poland, German units tried desperately to hold the Soviets from moving on Warsaw.

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In Profile:

SS tanker, Soviet sniper, panzergrenadier and Soviet NCO A dramatic battle scene showing members of the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking during defensive operations in mid-July 1944. The panzer commander wearing his distinctive black panzer uniform and M43 field cap is armed with a 9mm MP40 and is poised to throw an M1924 stick grenade. He is supported by two SS grenadiers, one armed with a Gewehr 43 or Karabiner 43 7.92x67mmcaliber Mauser semi-automatic rifle, and the other with an MG 42 machine gun. The grenadier armed with the rifle wears the green summer camouflage tunic, whilst the machine-gunner wears standard Waffen-SS uniform.

A Soviet NCO belonging to the 6th Guards Tank Army near Kovno in late July 1944. He wears an army greatcoat and the Pilotka summer hat complete with Red Star. Connected to his tan leather infantryman’s belt is a canvas grenade satchel. He is armed with a TT30 Russian semi-automatic pistol that he is reloading.

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A female Soviet sniper wearing a camouflaged all-in-one sniper and scouting garment over her standard army uniform. She is armed with the Nagant sniper rifle with telescopic sight copied from German Zeiss optics. Her kit is limited and she wears the popular Pilotka summer hat. On the Eastern Front the Red Army included squad-level snipers, who were designated marksmen. By the end of the war, there were over 1,500 female snipers on combat operations.

A panzergrenadier dismounted from the Sd.Kfz. 251 halftrack that is halted in a field. He is wearing the summer green splinterpattern camouflage suit over his infantryman’s uniform during operations near the East Prussian border in late July 1944. He is armed with the Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifle. Attached to his black leather infantryman’s belt is his entrenching tool and S84/98 bayonet. Slung across his back is his gasmask canister.

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Two destroyed Marder III Panzerjägers. The Marder was not designed as an assault vehicle nor as an interim solution to a tank. Its sole purpose was to operate in a tank-hunting role in urban areas or other close-quarter combat situations where it could bring fire to bear against armored enemy vehicles. However, these vehicles were too lightly protected, and large numbers were lost in battle.

Operation Bagration was the greatest Red Army victory of World War II. It was one of the largest operations of the war that saw some 2.3 million troops involved, three Axis armies eliminated, and vast amounts of Soviet territory recaptured. The Russians had undoubtedly suffered immeasurable losses at the hands of the Nazi occupiers. The Red Army had liberated their country at massive cost, both in terms of troops, weaponry, and the systematic killing of millions of innocent civilians. Abandoned vehicles litter the area on the road to Bobruysk, the remnants of the once-vaunted 9th Army that suffered some 80,000 casualties. It limped back into Poland to take part in the defense of Warsaw.

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Also on the road near Bobruysk, the magnitude of destruction that befell the 9th Army is clear. Among the ruined and abandoned vehicles are motorcycle combinations, light and heavy support vehicles, a Panzer IV, and an 8.8cm FlaK gun still on its gun carriage.

For the German war machine, it was never to recover from the matériel and manpower losses. Some one-quarter of its Eastern Front fatalities, exceeding even those in the battle of Stalingrad, were suffered by Army Group Center. The Soviet victory saw many experienced German PoWs being marched into captivity following the Soviet victory. Some 57,000 German survivors of Bagration were paraded in Moscow on July 17, 1944.

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A lightly wounded German soldier is being escorted by two Red Army soldiers armed with PPSh-41 machine guns. Around 6 million PPSh-41s were manufactured during the war.

high-ranking commanders captured or killed. In fact, 31 of the 47 German divisional commanders were captured or killed during the offensive, which gives an indication of the magnitude and speed of the offensive. Of the German generals lost, 22 were captured and nine were killed, including two corps commanders. For example, Major General Hahne, commander of the 197th Infantry Division was lost in battle on 24 June, while Lieutenant Generals Zutavern and Philipp of the 18th Panzergrenadier and 134th Infantry Divisions committed suicide. The enormity of the losses suffered by the German Army in the summer of 1944 can never be precisely calculated. But what is known is that some 400,000 casualties in total were sustained with the loss of some 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles. Soviet losses were colossal, far greater it is suspected than the Germans’: 180,000 killed or missing, and 590,000 wounded, some never to recover from their injuries. In terms of weaponry the Red Army lost nearly 3,000 tanks, 800 aircraft, and 2,500 artillery pieces. The grave of a German soldier, buried by his comrades during the latter part of the offensive.

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Aftermath The destruction of Army Group Center in July 1944 saw a chain reaction that led to a succession of collapses on the Eastern Front. In the central sector, what was left of Army Group Center had steadily withdrawn westward across the Polish border, its exhausted troops forced back from Kaunas, the Neman River, and Bialystok. By early August the Red Army was advancing in a spearhead toward Warsaw. The German XX Army Corps immediately deployed a battalion from the newly formed IV SS Panzer Corps to the SS Panzer Division Totenkopf supporting the right flank of the 2nd Army in the direction of the Vistula. The Red Army was now preparing to establish a bridgehead across the Vistula to the west and hoped that a rapid drive on the Polish capital, Warsaw, would bring a quick conclusion to the war. In many areas east of the Vistula the Russians met no resistance. During their almost unhindered drive, they were able to cross the Warsaw–Lukow–Brest and Warsaw–Siedlce rail lines and cut the 2nd Army’s all-important supply lines, severely delaying the 4th Panzer Division from receiving reinforcements and ammunition. Consequently, much of the ammunition had to be brought up by road, risking attack from the Soviet fighter-bombers prowling the skies. During operations east of Warsaw in August 1944 is a Panther tank from the 8th Company, 5th SS Panzer Regiment next to a halftrack from the 3rd Battalion, 9th SS Panzergrenadier Regimen Germania. The tall soldier standing next to the tank is SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl Nicolussi-leck, commander of the 2nd Company, 5th SS Panzer Battalion.

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Early August 1944 on the Central Front during the defense of Poland, a battery of Wespe self-propelled howitzers fires on enemy positions. These vehicles were issued to panzer-artillery regiments in the panzer and panzergrenadier divisions.

The Hermann Göring Panzer Corps in Poland in the late summer of 1944. Unit commanders and staff officers receive their orders. Behind them is a 7.5cm Sturmgeschütz III. It was not until October 1944 that this panzer corps was involved in heavy defensive fighting near Gumbinnen.

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The 4th Panzer Division had been given the role of trying to stem the advance of the Soviet 2nd Tank Army. The division was divided into two battle groups with a total of 98 combat vehicles available for action, only 69 of which belonged to the division. During initial clashes in early August the division claimed few successes. However, German losses were kept to a minimum but the strength of the battle groups was now down to only 2,325 men. On August 11, with the Red Army on the upper Vistula between Army Group Center and Army Group North, the remnants of the 4th Panzer Division were hurriedly transferred to the Kurland Peninsula for another defensive battle. In Poland the situation had become grimmer for the Germans as the Soviets moved on Warsaw. The 4th, 2nd and 9th Armies were engaged in bitter fighting as units tried desperately to hold the Vistula line and prevent the Soviets from entering Warsaw. Repeatedly, formations from other sectors of the Polish front were redeployed and immediately inserted into the frontal sectors to help bolster German infantry and armor units in front of the city. Elements of the 19th Panzer Division were one of a number of units brought up as reinforcements. Although the Germans stiffened the defensive line east of the city, it did not prevent heavy fighting in the vicinity of Praga. It was here in these suburbs almost five years earlier that the Wehrmacht had been victorious against the Poles during the invasion of Poland. Now the Germans were fighting for their lives against a hardened, well-equipped, and motivated Red Army. By September 1944, the entire German position in Poland was on the point of disintegration. Fortunately for the surviving German forces, the Soviet offensive had run out of momentum. The Red Army’s troops were also exhausted, and their armored vehicles were in great need of repair and maintenance. It seemed the Germans were spared from being driven out of Poland for the time being. Hermann Göring panzergrenadiers listen to their company commander addressing them from the engine deck of an assault gun.

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Panzerkorps Hermann Göring commanders’ briefing.

In the north, Army Group North was in an equally grim situation. Its Baltic Front was battered and depleted. The bulk of its forces had withdrawn from Estonia, and were already being threatened in Latvia and Lithuania by overwhelming offensives. In early October Riga fell, which bitterly angered Hitler. As a direct result of its loss, the Führer ordered the evacuation of thousands of troops and 100,000 tons of matériel to the Kurland bridgehead. In total some 30 divisions were moved to the Kurland area where they were ordered to dig in and fight to the death in order to defend what Latvian territory was still in German hands. Over the months to come, the fighting in Kurland raged with unabated ferocity as German and Latvian troops waged an unprecedented battle of attrition against a relentless enemy. The Red Army had assembled some 60 divisions for a final assault, to coincide with the massive offensive being prepared against remnants of Army Group Center on the banks of the Vistula in Poland. Farther southwest, in mid-October 1944, the Soviets launched an attack into East Prussia, known as the First East Prussian Offensive (also known as the Gumbinnen operation). The 3rd Byelorussian Front and the 1st Baltic Front were met by stubborn resistance in a number of areas. As a result, it took them four days to penetrate the initial tactical defenses, while the second defensive line was so strong that the Red Army was forced to bring up the 2nd Guards Tank Corps to try and punch a hole in it. By October 20, the second line was finally prized open by the 11th Guards Army and 2nd Guards Tank Corps east of Gumbinnen. The

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defensive line was heavily defended by the guns of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Division and the Fallschirmjäger Panzer Division Hermann Göring, which had been redeployed to counter the Soviet advance. On October 21, following particularly ferocious attacks, the Soviets were compelled to commit their reserves, but the offensive in the north was fought to a standstill in the region of Ebenrode due to a stubborn German defense. However, in spite of Soviet losses, Gumbinnen was taken on October 22, but retaken by the Germans on the October 24, after the Germans had brought up powerful elements of the 5th Panzer Division, and the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion equipped with the new Tiger IIs. The town changed hands several times thereafter until a stalemate was achieved. No further action would transpire until the Soviet winter offensive was opened in January 1945. In the southern theater of operations Army Group North Ukraine was fighting for its very existence between the Carpathians and Galicia. On August 20, the 2nd Ukrainian Front broke through powerful German defenses supported by heavy armor, and reached the Bulgarian border on September 1. Within a week, Soviet troops were massing along the Yugoslav frontier. On September 8, Bulgaria and Romania declared war on Germany. Two weeks later, on September 23, Soviet forces arrived at the Hungarian border and immediately raced cross-country for the Danube, finally reaching the river to the south of Budapest on October 24 when it commenced a 50-day encirclement of the Hungarian capital.

A Panther advancing during operations in the late summer of 1944 in Poland. Following Bagration the German army never recovered from the matériel and manpower losses sustained during the massive Soviet offensive.

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Further Reading Adair, Paul, Hitler’s Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Center, June 1944, Weidenfeld Military, London, 1994 Baxter, Ian, Kursk, 1943, Casemate, Oxford, 2019 Beevor, Antony & Luba Vinogradova (eds.), A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the Red Army, Pimlico, London, 2006 Bruoygard, Terje, “Operation Art in Theory and War: A Comparison of Soviet Theory and the Red Army’s Conduct in Operation Bagration, 1944,” USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2013 (retrieved January 29, 2017) Dunn, Walter S., Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944, Lynne Riener, Boulder CO, 2000 Fey, Will, Armor Battles of the Waffen-SS 1943–45 (translated by H. Henschler), J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Manitoba, Winnipeg, 1990 Glantz, David M. & Harold S. Orenstein (eds. & translators), Byelorussia 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study, Routledge, London 2004 Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, E.P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1952 Jentz, Thomas, Panzer Truppen: 1943–1945, Schiffer Publishing Ltd. (U.S.), Atglen 1998 Krivosheev, G. F., Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, Greenhill Books, London, 1997 Mazower, Mark, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe, Allen Lane, London, 2008 Mellenthin, F. W. von, Panzer Battles: A Study of Employment of Armor in the Second World War, University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1956 Merridale, C., Ivan’s War: Inside the Red Army, 1939–45, Faber, London, 2006 Naud, P., Operation Typhoon: The Assault on Moscow 1941, Casemate, Oxford, 2018 Niepold, Gerd, Battle for White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Center, June 1944. (translated by R. Simpkin), Brassey’s, London, 1987 Raus, Peter Erhard, Panzer on the Eastern Front 1941–1945, Greenhill, London, 2002 Zaloga, S., Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Center, Osprey, Oxford, 1996 Zetterling, Niklas & Anders Franksson, “Analyzing World War II Eastern Front Battles” in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Oxford, 1 March 1998

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Index

Index Bagramyan, Gen Ivan, 26 Berezina River, 53, 59, 63, 65 Berezovka, 87 Bergen Blocking Formation, 76 Bialystok, 93, 113, 121 Bobruysk, 6, 30, 32, 59, 63, 76, 118–119 Borisov, 65 Bug River, 97, 113, 115 Busch, FM Ernst von, 6, 18, 40 Byelorussian Front, 17, 53 Chernyakovsky, Gen Ivan, 28 deception plans, 30, 32 Dnieper River, 53, 62, 63 Dvina River, 29, 48, 63 East Prussia, 87, 89, 93, 113–114, 117, 124 First East Prussian Offensive see Gumbinnen operation Fortified Area Order, 21, 32, 45, 65, 77, 87 Gumbinnen operation, 122, 124–125 Harteneck Group, 100, 110 Hitler, Adolf, 6, 9–10, 12, 21, 30, 32, 45, 64–65, 77, 87, 96, 124 Hungarian divisions, 17, 22, 40, 79–80, 100, 106, 110 Jordan, Gen Hans, 19, 22 Katyusha (multiple-rocket launcher), 29, 41, 45, 83 Kaunas, 93, 113, 121 Kleck, 79–80 Kurland, 123–124

Lindig Battle Group, 79 Lithuania, 7, 85, 87–88, 92–93, 124 Luftwaffe, 17, 23, 29, 31, 32, 41, 48, 85, 87, 98, 101, 104, 109, 110 Lwow, 98, 105–106, 109 Martinek, Gen Robert, 53 Minsk, 6, 7, 63, 65, 71, 76–78 Model, FM Walter, 6, 18, 40, 64–65, 76–77, 85, 89, 91–92, 96, 113 Mogilev, 30, 32, 53, 62 Moscow–Minsk road, 45, 49, 62 Orsha, 21, 30, 32, 49, 53 Panther (tank), 17, 58, 62, 63, 71, 99, 103, 105, 121, 125 Panzer III (Pz.Kpfw.III), 71 Panzer IV (Pz.Kpfw.IV), 9, 17, 54, 63, 68, 71, 84, 96, 108, 119 Panzerwaffe, 13, 83, 114 partisans, 6, 61, 111–112 Poland, 6–7, 9, 24,27, 32, 45, 61, 77, 93, 96, 108, 113, 115, 118, 122–125 Polotsk, 77 Red Army, 6, 7, 12, 24–25, 27, 29–30, 32, 33, 39, 43, 44–46, 48, 50, 55, 60, 63, 65–66, 71, 76–77, 79–81–83, 85, 87, 93, 96–98, 105, 109, 113–114, 117–118, 120–121, 123–124 1st Baltic Front, 26, 33, 45, 48, 77, 85, 124 1st Byelorussian Front, 27, 29, 36, 55, 59, 63 2nd Byelorussian Front, 6, 26, 28, 35 3rd Byelorussian Front, 6, 28–29, 34, 45, 48, 53, 85, 115, 124 5th Army, 34 5th Tank Army, 35 11th Guards Army, 26, 34, 49, 124

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28th Army, 36 43rd Army, 33 48th Army, 36 49th Army, 35, 53, 62 61st Army, 37 65th Army, 27, 37, 59, 71, 78 2nd Guards Tank Corps, 124 Reinhardt, Gen Georg-Hans, 20, 23, 85, 87 Rokossovsky, Gen Konstantin, 27 Sluch, 79 Slonim, 85 Soviet Air Forces 29, 53, 73, 97, 111 1st Air Army, 35 2nd Air Army, 105 3rd Air Army, 33 4th Air Army, 35 6th Air Army, 37 16th Air Army, 37 Stalin, Joseph, 27 Sturmgeschütz III (StuG), 12–13, 21, 73–74, 103, 106–107, 122 Swojatycze, 79 T-34 (tank), 25–26, 29, 57, 62–63, 66, 78, 81, 83, 85–86, 88, 98, 109 Ternopol, 105–106 Tiger (tank), 17, 21, 63, 71, 79, 87, 114, 125 Tippelskirch, Gen Kurt von, 20, 23 Along a typical defensive position on the Central Front showing a heavy MG 34 machine gun mounted on a sustained fire mount. The MG 34 not only had superb offensive capabilities on the battlefield, but impressive defensive ones too. Indeed, a couple of well-sighted MG 34 machines guns could inflict heavy casualties on an entire attacking regiment and could hold a frontage of several miles.

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Totenkopf Division (Waffen–SS), 121 Vitebsk, 20, 29–30, 32, 45, 48 Vilnius, 7, 85, 87–88, 90, 94 Vilnius Offensive, 85, 87 Von Vormann Group (blocking formation) 79, 113 Warsaw, 113, 115, 118, 121, 123 Wehrmacht, 6–7, 10–11, 14, 16, 24, 48, 53, 60, 69, 80, 85, 87, 93, 96, 97, 123 Army Group Center, 6–9, 17–22, 27, 29–30, 32, 39, 40, 44–55, 55, 63–65, 69, 77, 85, 87, 89, 92–93, 96, 100, 113–115, 119, 121, 123–124 Army Group North, 11, 18, 20, 64, 77, 87, 89, 92, 114–115, 123–124 Army Group North Ukraine, 7, 18, 30, 97, 106, 113, 125 2nd Army, 8, 19, 22, 40, 79, 92–93, 98, 100, 110, 121 3rd Panzer Army, 8, 18, 20, 23, 31, 41, 45, 48, 71, 77, 85, 87, 91, 101, 110, 114 4th Army, 6, 8, 20–21, 23, 41, 45, 48, 53, 63, 65, 71, 78, 85, 91, 100, 110 9th Army, 6–8, 18–19, 22, 34–35, 40, 53, 55, 59, 62, 65, 71, 78–79, 91, 93, 118–119 VIII Army Corps, 22, 40

Weiss, Gen Walter-Otto, 19, 22 Wiking Division (Waffen-SS), 105–106, 116 Zakharov, Gen Georgy, 28

Zhukov, Marshal Georgi, 6, 18, 26