One Faith No Longer: The Transformation of Christianity in Red and Blue America 9781479808694

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One Faith No Longer

One Faith No Longer The Transformation of Christianity in Red and Blue America

George Yancey and Ashlee Quosigk

NEW YORK UNIVERSIT Y PRESS New York

NEW YORK UNIVERSIT Y PRESS New York www.nyupress.org © 2021 by New York University All rights reserved References to Internet websites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor New York University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared. Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Yancey, George A., 1962– author. | Quosigk, Ashlee, author. Title: One faith no longer : the transformation of Christianity in red and blue America / George Yancey and Ashlee Quosigk. Description: New York : New York University Press, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020041623 (print) | LCCN 2020041624 (ebook) | ISBN 9781479808663 (hardback) | ISBN 9781479808687 (paperback) | ISBN 9781479808717 (ebook) | ISBN 9781479808694 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: United States—Church history—21st century. | Christianity—United States. | Christianity and politics—United States. Classification: LCC BR526 .Y36 2021 (print) | LCC BR526 (ebook) | DDC 277.3—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020041623 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020041624 New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability. We strive to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the greatest extent possible in publishing our books. Manufactured in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Also available as an ebook

I dedicate this book to the love of my life, Andromeda Yancey, and the “little loves” that have come from our union—George Leonard, James Mitchell, and Charles Lyndon. —George Dedicated to my God, my family, and my country (I Corinthians 1). —Ashlee

Contents

Preface

ix

Introduction

1

1. The History of the Modernist-Fundamentalist Conflict

19

2. Politics and the American Christian

38

3. I Am Pro-life but . . .

57

4. In or Out? How Christians Justify Their Acceptance or Rejection of Believers with Differing Faiths

77

5. Conservative Christians as Theologically Rigid and Socially Diverse

95

6. Progressive Christians as Theologically Flexible and Politically Optimistic

137

7. Boundaries of Progressive Christians’ Social Identities

163

8. Do Red and Blue Christians Belong Together?

190

Conclusion

207

Methodological Appendix

229

Notes

245

References

255

Index

281

About the Authors

291

Preface

The idea for this book emerged as the lead author, George Yancey, worked on research concerning religious attitudes among academics. George noted that academics from mainline Christian denominations had more sympathy toward non-Christian groups than they did toward their more conservative religious peers. Simultaneously, Ashlee’s research happened upon a similar finding. Investigations using national data reinforced this finding, and qualitative work by both of us helped produce a deeper understanding of this phenomenon. What began as a serendipitous finding has turned into what we argue is an important insight regarding Christianity, politics, and cultural conflict. This insight is that progressive Christians and conservative Christians have diverged so much in their core values that they ought at this point to be thought of as practitioners of two separate religions. The issues we are touching upon here go to the core of much of the cultural divide in US society. The research in this book can fairly be seen as an examination of the culture war as situated within the largest religious group in the United States. In our role as scholars, we attempt to fairly report the perspectives of both sides of that divide. We do not intend for this book to be a weapon in that debate, but rather a guide to help members of one group better understand those with contrasting religious understandings. Our argument that progressive and conservative Christians have become distinctive religious groups is an observation much more than a prescription. It is up to the leaders of both groups to decide whether such a development is desirous or whether attempts at reconciliation are warranted. It is beyond the ability of researchers to accurately predict the future of a religion or social group. We can only analyze what has happened in the past with the group, and its current state, and speculate about what might occur in the near or distant future. American Christianity is in a situation it has never experienced before. As the culture enters what has ix

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been called a “post-Christian” era, there are new pressures on adherents. How they address these new tensions is one of the differences between progressive Christians and conservative Christians. As we will explain, many of the divisions among contemporary Christians emerged more than a century ago with the conflict between modernist Christians and fundamentalist Christians. But those divisions originally occurred in a society that was arguably more supportive of Christianity. It is quite possible that being dislodged from being a more dominant force in shaping the larger culture is a viable explanation for an increase in the level of conflict between the two Christian groups. At the end of the day, it has become clear that at this historical point it is no longer accurate to talk about Christian culture, Christian politics, a Christian nation, or Christian anything in order to imply a group with a high level of agreement. In many ways Christians reflect the same cultural split in the rest of society, and they may have even exacerbated that split. It is vital to ask the question “what type of Christian are we talking about?” before we so freely use “Christian” as an adjective. We want to thank several individuals who helped to make this book a reality. We thank Marie Eisenstein and Ryan Burge for help in publishing one of the early articles based on our quantitative analysis. We are grateful to the two churches that allowed us access to their members for interviews. We appreciate the many Christian leaders who gave us their viewpoints. Andromeda Yancey, Michelle Zier, Benedikt Quosigk, Emily Woodhull, Gladys Ganiel, and Jamie Santa Cruz looked over drafts of the work and provided useful feedback on how we could strengthen our presentation of the subject matter. These individuals directly aided us and we are forever grateful to them. We are also grateful for those in our support networks who helped us to do this work. It starts with our spouses, Benedikt Quosigk and Andromeda Yancey, who have been encouraging from the very beginning of our project. Ashlee thanks her three joyful and brave sons whom she treasures beyond words; and her loving parents, John Douglas Baldes and Mabel Elvina Baldes; as well as her friend and brother, John Ashley Baldes. Our current universities, the University of Georgia and Baylor University, have also supplied us with resources that helped this project come to completion. Our acquisitions editor, Jennifer Hammer, not only provided great advice but also was an important source of

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encouragement. We also are grateful for the two reviewers who provided valuable ways we could improve the manuscript. It is our hope that this book can be used to produce clarity and understanding of the phenomenon we describe here. If that occurs, then we will consider the book a success. While we both identify as Christians and have certain presuppositions about both progressive and conservative Christians, we did our best to limit those presuppositions from impacting our research and findings. Any shortcoming of our effort to maintain that distance and of the analysis of this material is ours and should not be attributed to the individuals who supported us in this endeavor.

Introduction As a Christian, I believe the Bible, which defines homosexuality as sin, something to be repentant of, not something to be flaunted, praised or politicized. —Franklin Graham

Because of statements like the one above, Franklin Graham is not well liked by much of New York City. The son of the famous evangelist Billy Graham is known for his political conservatism. If that was not bad enough for most New Yorkers, he has also developed a reputation for what the intelligentsia has termed “homophobia” and “xenophobia” within certain populations of the United States. Yet when New York was hit by COVID-19 in 2020, perhaps initially worse than any other city in the United States, Graham responded. He utilized his humanitarian organization called Samaritan’s Purse to set up a sixty-eight-bed emergency field hospital to help victims of the virus. Soon afterward, the organization was criticized by several New York citizens, the most prominent of whom was Mayor Bill de Blasio (Offenhartz 2020). The mayor made it clear that the city would keep a “close eye” on the organization to make certain it did not engage in prejudice due to its rigid belief in conservative sexual mores and its negative view of Islam. Also suspicious of Graham was writer Jonathan Merritt (2020). Like Graham, Merritt is the son of a prominent Christian: his father, James Merritt, was once the president of the Southern Baptist Convention (the largest US Protestant denomination). However, Jonathan Merritt has left Evangelicalism, which he claims he outgrew, to pursue new avenues of Christianity, and today he calls himself a “liberal Protestant.” Merritt wrote an online article expressing a distrust of Graham similar to that noted by de Blasio, even as he acknowledged some of the good that Graham’s organization has achieved. Merritt closed his article by sharing a desire for the actions of Samaritan’s Purse, but without all the 1

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beliefs attached to the humanitarian organization, stating that “New Yorkers can admit that Samaritan’s Purse should have a role to play in this vital work, and they can also acknowledge the many valid reasons that might make vulnerable and marginalized residents a little more than nervous.” In addition to the charges of homophobia and xenophobia, Merritt also criticized Graham for limiting his employees to self-professed Christians who must agree to a statement of faith. Merritt clearly indicated his distaste for the imposition of such a requirement as part of his Christian faith. Merritt’s faith and his vision of Christianity are dramatically different from that of Graham. These two figures illuminate “traditionally” conservative Christianity, as exemplified by Graham, and “liberal,” more progressive Christianity, as exemplified by Merritt.1 Of course, there are also stances in between. But Merritt’s comments indicate a social distancing from Graham that is as great as that exhibited by de Blasio, who describes himself as spiritual but not religious (Bailey 2014). In a similar way Merritt indicates that he is in a separate spiritual space than Graham. When evaluating the depth of Merritt’s comments condemning Graham, one is right to question whether these two figures are within the same religion in the first place. There are those who talk about a generalized Christian presence in the United States (Bowman and Small 2012; Jacobs and Theiss-Morse 2013; S. Edwards 2017). However, it must be asked which type of Christianity is part of this presence? Most who talk about the United States as a Christian nation seem to be talking about the Christianity of Graham. They envision a Christianity based on notions of intolerance of other religions and conservative sexual attitudes. Images of right-wing Christian nationalism may appear in their minds. But does this expectation not shortchange the Christianity of Merritt? Have we too often ignored the Christian faith of those who do not fit the stereotype of the Christian conservative who believes in the Bible as the inerrant Word of God? This type of essentializing stereotype brings with it an assumption of unity among Christians that simply does not now exist. There is a social, political, and theological diversity among Christians that often goes unrecognized. To understand the schisms that exist between Christians, we have to appreciate how different Christians construct their own social identities.

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Those identities help them to determine whom to include and whom to exclude as part of their social circles. Individuals in smaller minority religions may construct social circles that include everyone in their faith tradition since their low numbers dictate a need for inclusion.2 But in a religious group as large and expansive as Christians in the United States, there is not just one single social circle but rather multiple social circles that each have their own social identity that they attempt to project to the larger society. In such a situation it is feasible for some Christian groups to be at odds with other Christian groups. This conflict may be so intense that the social enmity between them can be as strong as— or perhaps stronger than—social enmity between Christians and nonChristians. Work on religious heresy (Luria 2005; Givens 2013) suggests that those close to one’s own faith tradition may be more threatening to one’s acceptance of that tradition than hostile outsiders. A key distinction that some Christians make in setting themselves apart from others concerns questions of theological importance. It is natural that arguments over theological concerns (such as how to obtain salvation, or the nature of spiritual gifts) would be central to how Christians construct their religious identity since answers to theological questions lie at the heart of how individuals understand the implications of their faith traditions. Christians who greatly differ from each other on their theological priorities can find themselves estranged from fellow Christians with different theological priorities. Indeed, given the decreasing importance of denominational identity (that is, the desire an individual has to be part of a given denomination) for American Christians (Wuthnow 1989), it is reasonable to argue that theological beliefs are the key factor in determining the type of Christian identity one will develop. Previous literature has documented the attitudes of theologically conservative Protestants toward religious out-groups (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; R. Williams 2009; Merino 2010; Gelernter 2015; Johnston 2016). Religious progressives are an understudied group (R. Williams 2017; Braunstein, Fuist, and Williams 2019), but recent quantitative research suggests that political conformity matters more than theological agreement in the assessment of theologically progressive Christians toward theologically conservative Christians (Yancey 2017; Yancey, Eisenstein, and Burge 2017). This research found that theologically progressive Protestants exhibit more social distance

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from conservative Christians than from politically progressive nonChristians. In this book, we look deeply into this important divide among Christians. However, we do not merely examine the political and theological conflict between progressive and conservative Christians but also assess the contrasting social identities within each group. Previous comparisons of progressive and conservative Christians have focused on such differences (J. Hunter 1992; McAdams and Albaugh 2008b; Savage 2008; Wellman 2008; Machen 2009; Thomas and Olson 2012; Edles 2013; Ganiel 2016; Quosigk 2021). Building on this body of research, we examine how progressive and conservative Christians develop contrasting social identities. While there are political and theological dimensions to these social identities, we will document that, particularly as they pertain to progressive Christians, certain social boundaries have developed that are only tangentially related to theological or political dimensions. Discerning the contrasting identities between progressive and conservative Christians can get us closer to their essential differences in ways that have escaped previous efforts to document theological and political contrasts between the groups. Our research offers a mixed-methods approach combining data from a probability sample with qualitative research that allows us to more fully explore the differing ways progressive and conservative Christians create their social identities and how they distinguish themselves from each other. Based on this research, we highlight here that progressive Christians emphasize political values relating to social justice issues as they determine who is part of their in-group; they tend to be less concerned about theological agreement. Conservative Christians, however, do not put strong emphasis on political agreement in order to determine if you are one of them—their major concern is whether you agree with them on core theological points. The bottom line we seek to illuminate in this book is that progressive and conservative Christians use entirely different factors in determining their social identity and moral values. Indeed, we argue that the ways in which these two groups deal with questions of meaning are so different that it is time to regard them as distinct religious groups rather than as subgroups under a single religious umbrella. While there are many ways to look at the divisions within Christianity (racial, political, theological, denominational, etc.), we will start with the theological divide to explore other implications of the split between

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Christians. Our aim is to show both how theologically progressive and conservative Christians define their social and political priorities and how those definitions differ from each other. We also examine how differing social and political aspirations emerge from these theological distinctions. This will get at the question about the nature of the theological divide within Christianity and the degree to which this disagreement leads to distinctive religious groups. That theological divide is related to political divisions among Christians, but it is possible that the issues that separate theologically progressive and conservative Christians are even more fundamental than those political disagreements. As noted earlier, after examining the data, we argue that the divide between theologically progressive and conservative Christians is so great that one can realistically think of them as completely different religious groups.

Divisions in American Christianity The early twentieth century in the United States saw the emergence of a modernist-fundamentalist schism among Christians. Protestant fundamentalism developed largely in reaction to innovations in science, such as Darwinism, and new social changes emerging from modernity (Hofstadter 1963; Numbers 1982; E. Davis 2005; Marsden 2006; Kruse 2015). Perhaps the Scopes trial best illustrated this attitude. In 1925 a high school teacher, John T. Scopes, attempted to teach human evolution to his students. In doing so he purposefully violated Tennessee’s Butler Act, which outlawed the teaching of evolution. Such laws had been pushed by fundamentalists who prioritized biblical fidelity over the latest scientific theories. However, not all Protestants embraced fundamentalism, as many progressive Christians affirmed the modern social changes and the new scientific theories while still attempting to retain their Christian beliefs (Wuthnow 1989; Hulsether 2007; Dorrien 2008). Many modernists argued that evolution is not inconsistent with religion (Cotkin 2004) and that Christians should embrace, rather than push away, new science. The schism that developed in the 1920s persists to this day (Hofstadter 1963; Numbers 1982; E. Davis 2005; Marsden 2006; Kruse 2015). Although the modernist-fundamentalist split of the early twentieth century played out largely among Protestants, Catholicism has also been influenced by divisions based on conservative versus progressive

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theology (Starks 2009). While in the past the division centered on birth control and women’s ordination, current conflict among Catholics often fits in with cultural war issues in general society (Starks 2009). Conservative, or traditional, Catholics are uncomfortable with the questioning of the Church’s authority while progressive Catholics believe that such questions are important in modern society, creating a key distinction in how Catholics can find separate sources of meaning. In many ways the conflict in Catholicism mirrors that in Protestantism because rebels in both groups question whether to rely on traditional authority or to accept modern interpretations of their religious traditions. It is thus useful to think of a general progressive-conservative division among US Christians that transcends denominational barriers.

Previous Work on Progressive and Conservative Christians Quite often we see news coverage about conservative Christians. But while some news outlets publish stories about progressive Christianity, these stories largely do not help one achieve a deeper understanding about the nature of progressive Christianity and where the root differences lie between it and conservative Christianity. While occasionally we hear about resistance to politically conservative Christians (Bush 2019; Farber 2020; Harber 2020; Mazza 2020), generally our understanding about the nature of progressive Christians is lacking. There has also been relatively little scholarly work that examines the nature of progressive Christianity. There has been work outlining the history of progressive Christians (Gasaway 2014) as well as primary documents by progressive Christians that enunciate their stated beliefs (D. Brown 2008; Peters and Hinson-Hasty 2008; Progressive Christians Uniting and Cobb 2008; Felten and Procter-Murphy 2012; Lee 2015). Recent attempts to explore progressive religious groups have utilized a case-study approach (Slessarev-Jamir 2011; Braunstein, Fuist, and Williams 2017; Krull 2020) and interviews with congregants at a progressive church (Streyffeler and McNally 1998). This work is valuable but not generalizable. Stenger (2005) does use a national survey to argue that potential members of liberal Christian groups may be more than indicated by the sizes of these groups. Her work provides some insight into why progressive Christians are less effective in their political activism

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than conservatives, but it does not illuminate how these two groups prioritize their social, theological, and political values. Perhaps the best systematic study on progressive Christians was conducted by Burge and Djupe (2014), who investigated the degree of inclusiveness among clergy in the Emergent Church movement, but this work does not inform us about the attitudes of the average progressive Christian. There is much more research on conservative Christians than on their progressive counterparts. There is also more work concerning the social identity and social boundaries of conservative Christians. For example, research has documented that theologically conservative Christians are relatively likely to exhibit particularism (J. Green 1993; R. Williams 2011; Yancey, Shaler, and Walz 2019).3 Conservative Christians are relatively unwilling to accept religious out-groups (T. Smith 1999; Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; D. Smith 2011; Jung 2012; Kidd 2013; Yancey and Williamson 2014) and have a preference for other Christians (Smidt and Penning 1991; Bobkowski and Kalyanaraman 2010). Their particularism tends to focus upon the maintenance of theological distinctions. But it remains to be seen if the theological particularism of conservative Christians is reflected in other social dimensions. While conservative Protestant colleges and universities maintain strong theological expectations of conformity, they are relatively tolerant on political matters (Yancey et al. 2019). Furthermore even their religious particularism can be moderated by political alliances (D. Smith 2016). Although we have a reasonable level of research on the social boundaries of conservative Christians, questions about the relative role of political and theological concerns are not settled.

Religious Orientation and Political View In one of the progressive Christian discussion groups we studied, we found a lady who recounted her experience as someone who describes herself as very liberal and a charismatic.4 She talked about attending her denominational conference and being uncomfortable when “hints of right-wing politics” emerged from speakers or in comments of members at the conference. She found herself in a difficult situation as she saw her charismatic Christian friends as those who “stare at their spiritual navels and forget about refugees or homeless needing shelter unless they

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can preach in their faces,” and yet she perceived her liberal Christian friends as those who try to live by the teachings of Jesus but become cynical or bitter when they “run out of steam without the power of the Holy Spirit.” This is a woman who appeared to have a strong belief in the power of God to intervene, more of a theological conservative than theological progressive position, and yet she is a political progressive. It seems rare to be politically liberal and theologically conservative (or vice versa) in the United States. This woman went on to note that her liberal friends were surprised at how “religious” she was and did not take her views on topics seriously. Their reaction indicates the degree to which we expect Christians to match theological progressiveness to political progressiveness. There is no social law that states that individuals with a conservative theological perspective must also share a conservative political outlook or that individuals with a progressive theological perspective must share a progressive political outlook. However, in the United States there is a strong correlation between theological and political orientation (Regnerus and Smith 1998; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Jelen and Wilcox 2003). Theological conservatives tend to be political conservatives, and theological progressives tend to be political progressives. This relationship takes on new meaning in the current polarized society as one would expect allies between conservative Christians and political conservatives as well as between progressive Christians and political progressives. There is much debate as to why this theological orientation–political viewpoint relationship exists. Froese and Bader (2008) argue that the way Americans conceptualize God may help explain this propensity in the United States, in that US Christians are more likely than Christians in other countries to envision God as active and authoritarian. Furthermore, Regnerus and Smith (1998) argue that while some conservative Protestants have reversed their earlier desires to keep their religious voices privatized, progressive Protestants have sought to maintain a more private religious approach. Such a difference could help account for progressive Christians’ tendency toward political progressivism, since political progressive ideals are sometimes envisioned to espouse a stronger notion of church-state separation (privatization). Manza and Brooks (1997) offer yet another argument, which is that progressive Christians’ increasingly liberal views on social issues push them toward

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political progressivism. Interestingly, these scholars indicate that the link between theological orientation and political viewpoint is more common among Christians in the United States than elsewhere and may be a distinctive feature of American culture. Fully exploring the reason behind the relationship of theological orientation and political viewpoint is not the purpose of this book. We take this relationship as a given. But a key question is just how strong are the bonds between Christian conservatives and political conservatives relative to those between Christian progressives and political progressives? Is it possible that the political orientations of the allies of a theologically progressive or conservative Christian perspective have influenced those in the religious subculture? Indeed, Margolis (2018) and Bean (2016) have argued that the political orientation of Christians has sometimes shaped their religious faith rather than vice versa. If interactions of Christians with their political allies support their political presuppositions about social reality, then it is indeed possible that the political ideas of Christians powerfully shape their theological beliefs. Many have criticized conservative Christians for substituting their political loyalty for their religious values (French 2019; Gettys 2019; Howe 2019). But the relationship between religious faith and political values has received less attention among progressives. It is possible that this type of substitution occurs between progressive Christians and political progressives as well. Thus, we are more interested in understanding the outcome of this type of theological-political alliance than in attempting to explain why the alliance exists in the first place.

Religion and Social Identity Religion is an important source of social identity (Seul 1999; Joseph 2004; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). The highly religious determine answers to questions of meaning, purpose, and social position largely through their religious beliefs (Petersen and Roy 1985; Fry 2000; Dogan 2004; Verkuyten 2007; McAdams and Albaugh 2008a). These are questions that help us to make sense of our lives. For example, we may ask ourselves if and why our lives have meaning. Is there some greater purpose in our lives beyond merely existing? Who are we in the larger scheme of things? Does what we are doing in our lives have

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any real lasting value? A shorthand way to representing such questions is to talk about “questions of meaning,” and we will use that phrase in the remainder of the book. A vital part of how we understand meaning is tied to how we interpret our values and what we see as important. Social pressures, factual knowledge, and metaphysical presuppositions can all impact how we understand our purpose, meaning, and identity. How people answer questions of meaning can be shaped, in varying degrees, both by objective information and by sociocultural contexts. Differing interpretations of identical information in the same sociocultural context can lead to contrasting perceptions of what humans envision as their identity, their purpose, and what they believe to be moral. For many people, religion is the most important way they find answers to their questions of meaning. Because the answers from one religion are often mutually exclusive to answers offered by other religious groups, religious identity can facilitate intergroup religious conflict. Yet sometimes religious groups perceive other religious groups as quite similar to themselves, perhaps even as allies. Alliances among groups with similar religious epistemological beliefs and social interests can develop to achieve political (Marsh 2006; Rieger and Pui-Lan 2012; D. Williams 2012), social (Clark and Mason 2001; Johnson 2014), or even religious (Clark 2007) goals. Such allies likely have similar answers to questions of purpose and social position, making it easier for members of the different religious groups to identify with each other. However, a given religious group identifying another religious group as an out-group can cause religious conflict due to contrasting interpretations of meaning and purpose. An individual’s in-group is important in shaping that person’s social identity (Branscombe et al. 1993; Brewer 1993; Stets and Burke 2000). In-groups influence the values and characteristics we perceive as important (Schmader and Major 1999; Pagliaro, Ellemers, and Barreto 2011). Brewer (1999) argues that in-group loyalty can exist separate from any motivations that individuals have to maintain prejudice toward outgroups. Favoritism toward those recognized as part of the in-group is more likely to occur when the commonalities one has with the in-group are highly salient to a particular situation (Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992). Our social identity is tied to our membership within in-groups, resulting in a powerful tendency to defend and confirm the rightness of

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the in-group (Aberson, Healy, and Romero 2000; Scheepers et al. 2006). Such loyalty can lead to distorted evaluations of one’s in-group and willingness to inflate the perceived benefits of the group. Although in-groups play a powerful role in shaping our social identities, out-groups also play important roles in this process. Conflict against outgroups enables a group to define itself by establishing group boundaries (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990; Ting-Toomey 2005; Voci 2006). Out-groups also provide examples of what are perceived as dysfunctional behaviors. The negative interpretation of such behaviors helps illustrate the implicit values of the in-group. Whom group members select as out-groups is generally associated with a given social identity (Price and Oshagan 1995; Ledgerwood and Chaiken 2007; Zou, Morris, and Benet-Martinez 2008), in that this selection allows those group members to define what they are not. To reinforce the distance that members of an in-group perceive between themselves and an out-group, they may develop antipathy toward members of that out-group. Out-group members are stereotyped to possess extreme differences, while in-group members are perceived to be similar (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Bano and Mishra 2014). Religious identity by itself does not determine group loyalty. Individuals generally use religious identity in conjunction with other social characteristics to determine their in-groups and out-groups. Hawkins and Nosek (2012) argue that perceived political allegiance is the major reason why conservative Christians support religious charities more than liberal Christians do. Liberal Christians tend to perceive religious charities as more politically conservative and opt not to support them because of that perceived contrasting political allegiance. Religious ingroups are often contextualized by political and social conflicts with other religious groups. The modernist-fundamentalist split was one of the most important religious conflicts in the United States. Fundamentalists sought to redeem the nation by converting all to Christ. Modernists were focused more on political concerns while fundamentalists sought out religious solutions. Some research has found conservative Christians to have a relatively strong propensity to reject Christians who are not sufficiently “strict” in their interpretation of Christianity (Kelley 1972; Ammerman 1987; Jelen and Wilcox 1992). However, Christians who do not prioritize theological purity may be alienated from theologically strict Christians while accepting other

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individuals they perceive as more open and welcoming. Progressive Christians distinguish themselves politically from conservative Christians, especially on culture-war issues, such as abortion or sexual minorities (L. Jensen 1997; Hoffmann and Johnson 2005; J. Burke 2012). Meanwhile, the humanist approach to faith that is characteristic of progressive Christians is often seen to be similar to the epistemological understandings of secularists (Metzger 2013). Consequently, progressive Christians could find more in common with atheists who reject Christianity’s theology but who share similar social values of social justice than they do with conservative Christians. Do these political alliances indicate that progressive Christians have greater affinity for secular individuals who share their political and social values than for more conservative Christians? If so, what are the values, political or otherwise, that unite progressive Christians with secular non-Christians? It is quite possible that progressive Christians are willing to work with those of different religious traditions, or no religious tradition, but still have higher loyalty and affection for other Christians. Maybe the political goals of progressive Christians outweigh their need for theological agreement? However, there are complaints by progressive Christians about the political activism of conservative Christians (Dias 2018; Ansell 2019; Wallis 2019). How important are the political priorities of conservative Christians? Do those priorities outweigh their stated religious goals? If so, can it be argued that political accomplishments are more important for conservative Christians than otherworldly concerns? These are some of the questions we will tackle in this book.

Methodological Approach The findings in this book are based on three distinct but collaborating sources of data. First, we utilize data collected from the American National Election Studies (ANES). This is a national probability survey that comes out during every midterm and presidential election year. The second data source is a series of blogs written by progressive and conservative Protestants. Because our interest is on how Christian groups deal with potential disagreements with their political allies, we focus on a collection of blogs written by authors who deviate from the political tendencies usually associated with their religious group. Our third

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data source is a series of lengthy interviews with over seventy American Protestants. Almost all interviews in this data set were with Evangelicals, but interviewees included both theological conservatives and theological progressives. Twenty-nine of the interviews were with Evangelical leaders; the rest were with congregants from two different Evangelical congregations. All three of these data sources point to an interesting answer to our research questions about theological and political priorities of progressive and conservative Christians. While the survey illustrates a preference for political, instead of theological, allies among progressive Christians, the content analysis of the blogs and the results of the interviews suggest that the goals of progressive Christians are not fully grounded in partisan politics. Rather, progressive Christians seek to support certain social goals tied to an ideal of social justice, and those ideals of social justice appear to be the basis of their religious beliefs. Political activism is one way to meet that goal, but it is not the ultimate goal itself. For conservative Christians, we reinforce previous work suggesting that such Christians build their identity around an adherence to certain traditional theological beliefs. Other social values become subservient to the final goal of what they conceptualize as biblical obedience. Our work on conservative Christians in many ways reinforces previous findings concerning this group with some fresh insights. Regarding progressive Christians, we break new ground in understanding their motivations.

Outline of the Book In the next chapter, we discuss the historical development of the conflict that exists among conservative and progressive Christians in the United States. We provide an overview of the origins of the historical modernist-fundamentalist conflict that emerged in the early twentieth century. That historical analysis puts the current conflict between progressive and conservative Christians into proper context. Furthermore, it allows us to understand how these groups distinguish themselves from each other and define their own values. Based on our examination of this history, we theorize that the priorities of theologically progressive and conservative Christians have fundamental rather than superficial

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differences, with progressive Christians prioritizing political values and conservative Christians prioritizing theological values. In chapter 2, we use the ANES to quantitatively explore how theologically progressive and conservative Christians envision their in-groups and out-groups. We find that progressive Christians tend to be more accepting of groups that are traditionally politically progressive (such as Muslims and atheists) than they are of conservative Christians. They reject political conservatives, regardless of whether or not the individuals in question are Christians, as out-group members. By contrast, conservative Christians tend to reject Muslims and atheists as part of an outgroup, but they do not necessarily reject political liberals. This evidence suggests that progressive Christians tend to use political values to establish their social identity, while conservative Christians tend to use theological values to accomplish that task. But we also question whether it is simply differential political values that drive this distinction or whether there are other underlying core values at play. Chapter 3 focuses on situations where an individual’s political outlook is different from what would normally be expected from a member of his or her religious group. Specifically, we examine the blogs of theologically progressive Christians who define themselves as pro-life and the blogs of conservative Christians who support immigration reform. Content analysis of these blogs indicates that pro-life progressive Christians use ethical appeals to challenge fellow progressives to live up to their political values on the issue of abortion, and they also stress the ideals of compassion and justice. However, they do not tend to advocate legislative changes to support their pro-life values. Progressive Christians appear to prioritize caring for the marginalized more than they prioritize raw political victories regarding abortion. But conservative Christians approach issues of immigration by using biblical legitimization to argue for legislative changes. They also do not hesitate to call for legislative reform. Ultimately, they do not perceive it to be important to placate their political peers, but rather they make demands based on their theological concerns. We observe not only the reverence conservative Christians have for their theological values but also some of the larger social justice values of progressive Christians. Chapter 4 is based on findings from a qualitative study of primarily Evangelicals, who are the largest (and arguably the most dynamic)

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Christian group in the United States. The data for this study were gathered from lengthy interviews with seventy-eight different US Christians, mostly Evangelicals, including leaders as well as lay congregants. Our findings articulate that the most serious divide within US Evangelicalism is the divide between progressive Evangelicals and conservative Evangelicals. The nature of the deep divides between these two groups is not isolated to Evangelicalism but can be seen across various Christian groups. Thus, the findings within the qualitative chapters shed light not simply on the nature of the divides within Evangelicalism, but also on the enormous divides within other non-Evangelical Christian groups. We look at how these Christians evaluate fellow Christians with theological views opposed to their own, and we also examine how they evaluate members of another religion altogether—in this case, Islam. Thus, we dissect how Christians’ inclinations toward either conservative or progressive theology affect their evaluations of other Christians and of non-Christians. Theologically conservative Christians see themselves as more closely aligned with theologically progressive Christians than with Muslims, and they are more likely to surround themselves with heterogeneous Christian peers (that is, peers who are Christians but who hold a variety of theological perspectives). Progressive Christians, by contrast, see themselves as more closely aligned with Muslims than with conservative Christians, and they are more likely to surround themselves with homogeneously thinking Christian peers (that is, fellow Christians who hold theological perspectives similar to their own). Conservative Christians rely primarily on a more rigid and traditionalist type of theology to determine who is in their in-group. Progressive Christians determine their in-group by relying primarily on a more flexible, progressivist type of theology. Chapter 5 delves further into the data surveyed in chapter 4 by focusing specifically on theologically conservative Evangelicals. This chapter empirically addresses two key questions: (1) How do theologically conservative Christians justify their acceptance or rejection of other Christians? and (2) How do theologically conservative Christians justify their acceptance or rejection of Muslims? Using rich quotes, we illustrate the fact that conservative Christians are overwhelmingly theologically exclusive, adhering to what we have termed a “historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines.” Many see themselves as more closely aligned with

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progressive Christians than with Muslims. This is because they are more apt to see Muslims as members of a completely separate religion from their own, and because they tend to perceive that Islam is opposed to Christianity’s core tenets, including doctrines relating to the person of Jesus, the cross, and the Trinity. In contrast to their views of Muslims, conservative Christians are able to see progressive Christians as part of their in-group because they perceive that progressive Christians agree with them on the major issues of who Jesus is, the importance of the cross, and the Trinity. Therefore, Muslims are not part of the in-group of conservative Christians, while progressive Christians are part of that in-group, and conservative Christians’ justifications for this categorization are focused on theological distinctions. Theologically conservative Christians are more likely to have a heterogeneous Christian social circle, and they have overwhelmingly moderate views of progressive Christians. Chapter 6 examines the views of progressive Evangelical interviewees. Using qualitative methodology, we look at how these progressive Christians construct their social identity and empirically address the philosophies, values, and beliefs that emerged as commonalities among theologically progressive Christian interviewees. These commonalities point to progressives having a flexible, Jesus-centric theology, which stresses what we have conceptualized and termed a “humanistic ethic of social justice.” With this ethic, progressive Christians maintain, in varying proportions, a high view of Jesus but distinguish themselves from their conservative counterparts in their willingness to learn from and accept non-Christians, and even embrace many of their beliefs, particularly individuals and beliefs perceived as marginalized in Western culture. Their identity is not simply based on partisan loyalty, but it is established through an adherence to their humanistic ethic of social justice, which contains important political implications that significantly separate them from conservative Christians. Namely, it is clear that progressive-leaning Christians were more optimistic about politics and political solutions than conservative Christians. Still, politics itself does not drive their political optimism, but rather their political optimism is a consequence of their flexible theology that stresses a humanistic ethic of social justice. In chapter 7, we explore more deeply how progressive Christians create their social boundaries. We unpack why many progressive Christians see themselves as more closely aligned with Muslims than with

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conservative Christians and how their more flexible, progressivist theology allows for this in-group and out-group phenomenon. Their progressivist theology stresses a humanistic ethic of social justice, which partially emerged as a response to colonialism. This ethic seeks to serve and learn from those perceived to have unequal access to power in Western culture, such as religious minorities like Muslims (progressive Christians, more so than conservative Christians, tend to believe Muslims are marginalized and face discrimination in the United States). Progressives do not feel that Muslims need to accept traditional Christian doctrines in order to share in their humanistic ethic of social justice; in fact, they feel that rigid Christian doctrinal beliefs sometimes get in the way of that ethic. Whereas conservative Christians hold relatively moderate views of progressive Christians, progressive Christians hold much more negative views of conservative Christians. A substantial part of how progressive Christians identify themselves is by exposing clearly what they are not—namely, conservative Christians. We argue that the progressive Christians’ strongly negative views of conservative Christians are tied to progressive Christians’ belief that conservative Christians’ beliefs and behaviors have numerous moral deficiencies, and that conservative Christians are not taking seriously biblical principles of social justice. We find that, in contrast to the theological conservatives, progressive Christians are more likely to surround themselves with a homogeneous Christian peer group that think like they do on the topic of Islam. Chapter 8 builds on our observations of the distinctive priorities and the out-grouping tendencies of progressive versus conservative Christians. It is not only that these groups are distinct from each other, but that they also, in varying degrees, view each other with suspicion. We first briefly look at the construction of the distinctive social identities and cultural toolkits of progressive and conservative Christians. These social mechanisms illustrate the enormous gap in the goals and direction of both groups. We then look at the Buddhist-Hinduist split to gain a better perspective on the depth of the differences between progressive and conservative Christians. We argue that differences between progressive and conservative Christians resemble Buddhist-Hinduist distinctions, indicating a possible split into two distinct religious entities. Ultimately, we come to the conclusion that it is no longer useful to consider progressive and conservative Christians as members of the same religion.

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We conclude the book by making a few closing statements about the implications of a polarized Christianity. We speculate about how such a split in Christianity could occur and what may be the end result. We then speculate about Christians who are neither progressive nor conservative. Finally, we look at potential extensions of this work and call for further research efforts to understand how progressive and conservative Christians shape their cultural identity.

1

The History of the Modernist-Fundamentalist Conflict But for many other Americans, modernity was exactly the problem. A group of Christian leaders, anxious about the chaos that seemed to be enveloping the globe, recalibrated the faith and gave it a new urgency. They knew that the time was right for a revolution in American Christianity. In its own way, this new movement—fundamentalism—was every bit as important as the modernity it seemingly resisted, with remarkable determination. —Matthew Sutton, Washington State University

The diffusion of Christianity into so many cultures naturally works against any notion of it being a religion of monolithic believers. Christianity can take on many forms and be built around distinct values. This is particularly the case in a multicultural nation such as the United States. Christians have a numerical majority in the United States, but the country contains many subcultures. These subcultures allow Christians to have multiple social places where they can match their own unique understanding of Christianity to the values within a particular social group. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a great deal of debate among Christians about the true nature of their faith (Beeke 1994; Niebuhr 1996; Buchak 2017; J. Wallace 2017; Fuist 2018). Such social, political, and theological diversity would be less likely to occur for a smaller religion since the need for social unity and survival would outweigh concerns over internal squabbles. While there may be hundreds, or even thousands, of Christian subcultures that offer their own unique interpretation of Christianity, some divisions are more central in the battle to define the faith. In the United States, what may be the most salient battle has occurred since the early twentieth century between those who envisioned a more modern version of the religion and those who attempted to hold on to traditional 19

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ideals surrounding Christianity. This debate pitted those who have been termed “modernists” against those who have been termed “fundamentalists.” The modernist-fundamentalist battle is the direct ancestor to the current progressive-conservative division. In this chapter, we will explore the history of this battle and what it means for the contemporary progressive-conservative split.

Religious Intergroup Conflict Rosaria Butterfield fell in love with words at an early age. Raised in a liberal Catholic family, she went on to earn a PhD in English from Ohio State University. While there she became attracted to feminism and lesbianism. Her primary field was in critical theory with a specialization in queer theory. In 1997 as part of her activism she began to research the religious right, in particular the Promise Keepers. During that time, she began to read the Bible for her research. This reading had an unexpected outcome. She converted to Christianity. Thus, she moved from lesbianism to conservative Christianity. She made a commitment to “bring the gospel to our lost friends and neighbors.” She married a pastor, homeschools her children, has a ministry to college students, and speaks out on her transformation. Butterfield moved from a person who found purpose in activism for the rights of sexual minorities to one who finds purpose in furthering the “Kingdom of God.” As we see in the case of Butterfield, religion is a valuable source of social identity and group affinity. Some scholars argue that religion is the primary source of purpose, meaning, and morality (Geertz 1957; Fry 2000; McAdams and Albaugh 2008a; Preston, Ritter, and Ivan Hernandez 2010; Park, Edmondson, and Hale-Smith 2013). Religious individuals can see those of other faiths as proponents of competing systems of meaning. Consequently, individuals from different religions have an incentive to envision each other as out-groups. However, if other religious groups share similar, although not identical, ideals about purpose, meaning, and morality, then those groups can become allies—working together so that both groups have more societal resources at the expense of other social groups. Theoretically, a Christian identity may provide enough commonality among subgroups within this religion that it can act as a natural bridge for gaining allies. For example, Christian

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particularism was a trait of early religiously based political movements, but later incarnations of these movements have resulted in broader Christian coalitions (Wilcox, Rozell, and Gunn 1996). Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege (1993) point out that various Christian religious identities create a perception of a common fate, which may promote political advocacy. Because of the importance of religion in addressing questions of meaning and purpose, religious identity may be one of the most important sources of one’s social identity. Those who identify as Christians may use their Christian beliefs as a core part of their social identity, depending on how important it is to them to be a Christian. But how that Christian faith shapes their social identity depends on how they interpret that faith. Differing interpretations of Christian tenets can provide an especially threatening reality for individuals invested in making their Christian beliefs a core part of their social identity. Having another Christian contradict the values of one’s interpretation of a religion can be much more challenging than having a non-Christian outsider contradict their faith, as it is other Christians who can internally tear down stated religious values. It makes the conflict with Christians possessing different interpretations even more urgent. The conflict is not merely about intellectual agreement but also about a defense of the core social identity for certain Christians. Given the importance of social identity to our well-being, one would expect conflict within religious groups to be especially fierce and difficult for members of conflicting Christian groups to find areas of compromise. Given these dynamics, one can understand conflicts such as the historical modernist-fundamentalist schism in the United States as more than a battle for religious and institutional power. It was a battle to determine the identity of Christians and the social image of Christianity. With so much at stake, it is not surprising that an intense conflict where the combatants would not easily give up their fight would develop. We would expect that the effects of this conflict would last well after the initiation of this battle and impact the relationship between progressive and conservative Christians today.

The History of Progressive and Conservative Christian Conflict Our modern culture war can best be understood in the context of the historical US modernist-fundamentalist conflict that raged in Christian

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circles in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The modernistfundamentalist dispute pitted Christians who emphasized personal evangelism and traditional morality against those who emphasized the need to accept new values of modernity, social change, and social justice. The former group justified its stances with traditional sources of authority, most notably the Bible. For fundamentalist Christians, the Bible, and other traditional religious sources, represented an external foundation for knowledge on how to live one’s life. They dismissed morality determined by individuals’ desires as unreliable since humans are vulnerable to subjective decision making. Since their interpretation of these sources indicated a need for traditional morality and proselytizing, they tended to focus upon these individualistic virtues instead of challenging the larger societal order. According to such individuals, that social order must be one informed by the values found within their religious faith (Kruse 2015). Additionally, in the early portion of the twentieth century many conservative Christians also directed their anger at the science of evolution, perceiving theories of natural selection as a threat to their conventional religious beliefs (Marsden 2006). Modernists emphasized what they acknowledged as the “social gospel.” One of the recognized founders of the social gospel movement is Washington Gladden (1877), who argued that Christian religion covers all aspects of life and thus cannot be reduced to mere private actions. Walter Rauschenbusch (1917) built on these insights to develop what he called a “theology for the social gospel.” He argued that individualistic religion was sufficient for dealing with individuals’ repentance and sin, but that Christianity was to go beyond those individual concerns to deal with institutional failings. As such, he contended that it was important for Christians to play major roles in reforming the social institutions in our society. The social gospel that he articulated helped to fuel social movements such as liberation theology (Sanks 1980; Maimela 1989; Nelson 2009), and it impacted Christian activists such as Martin Luther King Jr. (Rathbun 1968; Garrow 2007; Jackson 2008). The social gospel brought to Christians an emphasis on altering social structures. While Rauschenbusch did not dismiss the value of personal transformation, the development of the social gospel movement did lead to less emphasis upon personal salvation for adherents of this philosophy relative to Christian fundamentalists.

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In addition to the move toward a focus on institutional problems, Christians motivated by modernity moved away from positions of theological absolutism toward an acceptance of theological flexibility. There was less certainty that salvation came only through the Christian religion, which helped them to focus more on societal improvement rather than on personal sin (Wuthnow and Evans 2002; McAdams and Albaugh 2008b; Andrain 2009; Olson 2011). This freed such Christians from being concerned about converting others to Christianity and allowed them to more aggressively critique social and economic inequities. Experience and science became dominant tools of legitimization for the types of social actions and attitudes they adopted (Wuthnow and Evans 2002; Marsden 2006). Thus, these Christians prioritized modern values more than their conservative Christian peers did. The role of humans to create their own morality was emphasized over the application of an external, transcendent, overarching moral authority. In time, the character of both sides of this conflict began to change. Among many fundamentalists there was a retreat from engagement of the social world (Ringenberg 1984; Noll 1994). They sought to protect themselves from what they perceived as “ungodly” cultural influences in the larger society. This led them to send their children to religious schools and limit their social interaction outside of their religious community, unless they were seeking to proselytize. The social identity of being identified as a fundamentalist developed through the sharing of “The Fundamentals,” a series of writings between 1910 and 1915 that defined the basic beliefs of these traditionalists. This identity transcended denominational identity but also established social boundaries by which the newly named “fundamentalists” could exclude those who did not share their traditional beliefs (Lienesch 2007). Along with this new type of theological emphasis, there was a focus on evangelism and bringing salvation to the lost. Christians were warned not to waste time in worldly pursuits, such as politics and social movements, but rather to reach out to the lost. For fundamentalists, one of the primary focuses remained maintenance of the values and mores they had associated with a traditional interpretation of their Christian faith. Among the modernists, acknowledgment of religious influence became less relevant to their perspectives and organizations. The modernists began to support politically and culturally progressive reforms for

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nonreligious reasons at least as much as for religious justifications. Religious justifications became an important part of social reform movements, but not, with the possible exception of the civil rights movement, a central legitimating force within these movements. The actions and activism of Christian modernists became nearly indistinguishable from their secular allies. Furthermore, their methodology in bringing about the “Kingdom of God” was quite similar to secular efforts for social change. It is probable that many modernist Christians personally maintained their religious justification for their activism, but the movements they participated in become shaped more by secular legitimation (Sherkat and Ellison 1991; Aminzade and Perry 2001; Chase-Dunn and Gills 2005; Friesen 2015) and replaced traditional religious justification for societal change with justification based on the ideas of reason and science. Because the fundamentalists retreated from political and social engagement, the conflict between these two groups was largely reduced to ignoring each other. However, in the 1950s this began to change. Carl F. H. Henry (1947) wrote about the need for Christian traditionalists to become more engaged in the larger society. He supplied the intellectual undergirding that enabled some fundamentalists to rethink their separatist mentality. Henry’s basic argument was that there are no separate sacred and profane spheres in our larger society. All our society and culture are to be shaped according to the designs of God.1 Therefore, the Christian voice should be part of the political process. Henry was not advocating a radical takeover of the government or a theocracy, but he did contend that Christians must work to influence the larger society and not merely just impact their own communities. This call for reengagement occurred in a society that was already primed for religious legitimation (Kruse 2015). Thus, conservative Christians were able to shape cultural elements in society to reflect an importance of religiosity, even if not always specifically Christian religiosity. In the other camp, there was an emergence of new left movements in the 1960s. These movements gained great visibility and challenged the taken-for-granted racial, sexual, and religious assumptions in the larger society (Lyons 1996; Klatch 1999; Hampton 2013). The image of the United States as a benevolent nation was disputed, and a demand developed for a new society built on egalitarian values rather than the hierarchical structure supported by cultural conservatives (Lyons 1996;

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MacFarlane 2015; R. Jensen 2017). Alternative lifestyles and religious practices beyond those supported by conservatives became popular within many of these progressive subcultures. Furthermore, traditional religion was labeled as racist, sexist, oppressive, and hierarchical. Some advocates in the new left movements adopted a Marxian approach in which they desired to see a withering away of traditional religion so that its ability to influence the larger culture was negated (Kent 1993; Hampton 2013). The viability of the new left movements coupled with an emerging desire of Christian traditionalists to become engaged with the larger society inevitably led to conflict. Conservative Christians found themselves horrified by progressive activism and what they perceived as overt flouting of traditional Christian beliefs. They also became concerned over Supreme Court cases that supported abortion and that removed school prayer, perceiving these cases as signs that the culture was deteriorating (Parsons 1988; Reimer 2003). This attitude is seen not just in sociological research but is easily picked up in the actual writings of conservative Christians (Alexander 2005; Grudem 2016; Strang 2017). Conservative Christians became a major part of a backlash that developed against the new left movements in the late 1970s and 1980s, especially on the issue of abortion (Strickler and Danigelis 2002; GresléFavier 2009; Flowers 2019). This backlash helped to establish a Reagan administration that placed some brakes on the progressive movement of the larger culture. But while the 1980s represented some movement in American politics toward conservative economic and foreign policy, cultural progressive positions such as support of evolution and acceptance of homosexuality continued to become more popular (Hicks and Lee 2006; Andersen and Fetner 2008; Freeman and Houston 2009). Attempts to energize mainstream cultural conservatives might also have helped to consolidate the power of cultural progressives at a time when they were growing in influence over the past few decades (Yancey 2018), because those appeals to cultural conservatism alienated the growing segment of society that rejected cultural conservatism. Toward the end of the twentieth century, previous battles over denominational prestige began to wane and were replaced by the culture battles seen today. Many of those battles reflected the larger social struggles in society. David Swartz (2012) argues that an Evangelical left

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began to organize in the early 1970s, before the full emergence of the Christian right. He contends that discord within the ranks of a Christian left as well as the ability of conservative Christians to organize Christians around issues that they found relevant explains the growing power of the Christian right. The movement of conservative Christians that emerged began to change its focus away from denominational opponents and toward ideological enemies. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, non-Protestants, such as Catholics, Jews, and Mormons, were viewed with deep suspicion. However, in the later part of the twentieth century some conservative Protestants began to perceive non-Protestants who shared their traditional values as allies instead of as enemies (Wilcox and Robinson 2010; McVicar 2016; N. Young 2016). They were especially open to linking with Catholics on issues of abortion.2 The numbers of Protestants and Catholics dwarfed the numbers of other traditional religious perspectives, but an appreciation of the contributions of traditional, conservative Jews, Mormons, and Muslims, and others developed over time.3 While denominational and faith differences may have remained important in the theological arguments among members of traditional faiths, those differences appear to have had little impact when they concerned social and political issues.

Modern Differences between Progressive Christians and Conservative Christians Alisa Childers was raised in a solid Christian family. A lover of music, she became part of the music group Zoegirl, a “girl Christian group” that won the Gospel Music Association Dove Award for New Artist in 2002. Childers married the drummer of the band and after the original group disbanded she joined a church that differed from the conservative Christian churches in which she grew up. This church was more progressive in nature and for a time it forced her to reconsider her previous ideas about her Christian faith. The experience eventually led her to recommit to her conservative Christian upbringing, and today she heads up an apologetics podcast and has recently written a book (Childers 2020) about what she sees as the dangers of progressive Christianity. In her book Childers argues that progressivism is not always obvious to conservatives and can be mixed with a historical theology

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emphasizing biblical doctrines and with much “traditional phraseology” (to use Gresham Machen’s descriptor): “Identifying the signs [of progressive theology] is not always obvious—sometimes they are subtle and mixed with a lot of truth. Progressive Christianity can be persuasive and enticing. . . . We shouldn’t be surprised to find some of these ideas infiltrating our churches.” Childers discussed her personal experience at the church, including the unique qualities of the pastor and how the pastor’s conversion to agnosticism broke apart her own beliefs. Importantly for the question of whether conservatives could be unaware of being led by a progressive, Alisa did not purposefully “deconstruct” her conservative faith. Rather, she felt confident she was at a conservative Bible-believing church and thus was more vulnerable to accepting the teaching as orthodox. It was not until the pastor’s private admission to an intimate group of congregants that he was an agnostic that she realized the depth of difference between progressive Christianity and what she calls “historic Christianity”: He would open the scriptures and have these insights I’d never had before. . . . I found it very interesting and intellectually stimulating. . . . He was a masterful speaker. He knew how to say just enough for Christians that were raised in the church to not get their ears perked too much. But he was introducing new ideas. The pastor invited me to be a part of a study group that was very small . . . and it was in the context of this group that he revealed that he was an agnostic. This was different than what he was preaching on Sunday. . . . I realize now I was going through a process called “deconstruction” where you start picking apart all your beliefs. . . . I was deconstructing, well, not on purpose. I wasn’t trying to but everything I believed had just been thrown out.4

According to Alisa, the references to scripture, the familiar lingo, and nods to a conservative Christian culture are enough to keep many conservatives from becoming defensive and uneasy. However, she perceived the basics of “historic Christianity” and “progressive Christianity” to be utterly opposed in every way. Childers’s struggle is reflective of the continuing battle between progressive and conservative Christianity. Arguments developed in the early twentieth century continue to be relevant in the

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modern conservative-progressive debate among Christians. But they have morphed into discussions beyond the original traditionalistmodernist conflict to be assertions about the very nature of Christianity itself. For Childers, the argument is not about Evangelicalism versus the social gospel. Rather, in many ways it is about whether we are to follow the true path to Christ versus a theological openness to multiple paths toward salvation. She contends that progressive Christians have warped the nature of what it means to be a Christian with their compromising acceptance of modern secular values. Of course, progressive Christians see this quite differently. Some progressive leaders (Spong 1992; McLaren 2005) have criticized conservative Christians as judgmental and bigoted. There are also progressive Christian leaders (Spong 1992; Borg 2009; Kania 2010; Felten and Procter-Murphy 2012) who believe that conservative Christians rely too much on literal definitions of the Bible. How Christians view the Bible is a theological issue that progressive Christian authors (Spong 1992; Progressive Christians Uniting and Cobb 2003; D. Brown 2008; Gamwell 2010) have brought up as an important dividing line between themselves and conservative Christians. Overreliance on a holy text is seen as both authoritarian and contrary to modernist perspectives of truth. Assertions of whether the Bible is inerrant are a key dividing issue between progressive and conservative Christians. Beyond issues of tolerance and judgmentalism, progressive Christians also prioritize notions of humanistic rationality (Clatworthy 2010; Newlands 2012). The ideals of rationality are often used to support progressive social and political changes (Fisher and Strauss 1978; Franklin 1986; Baker 1992; Ford 2003). Consequently, progressive Christianity has been tied to historical movements of the social gospel (Cobb 1995; Progressive Christians Uniting 2008; Gamble 2014) and contemporary movements of social justice (Peters and Hinson-Hasty 2008; Slessarev-Jamir 2011; Felten and ProcterMurphy 2012; Todd 2012; Gasaway 2014). These critiques are tied to the political and social desires of Christian progressives to create what they perceive to be a more tolerant and accepting social order. Benjamin L. Corey illustrates how a progressive Christian’s critiques of conservative Christians are linked to political activism. Having grown up in a conservative Christian environment, he became active in antipoverty initiatives, antiwar activism, and Vote Common Good, a

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faith-based organization dedicated to the defeat of President Trump in 2020. In a blog where he outlines why he left the religious right (Corey 2019), he first attacks the manner in which conservative Christians interpret the Bible. He then goes on to argue that those Christians are on the wrong side, theologically as well as politically, on issues that include poverty, protection of children, the death penalty, immigration, and gun control. He ends the blog by directly admonishing conservative Christians who want to keep their faith out of politics. He says of the Christian left, “Instead of telling me to keep Jesus out of politics, they were the ones who insisted we put him at the center of all of it.” The seeds of Corey’s progressive activism are planted in the soil of his critique of conservative Christians. The critiques made by progressive Christians reflect their desire for Christianity to be one of the vessels that bring about social justice. Progressive Christians propose a positive vision for what they want out of society. Progressive churches envision Jesus as a model of radical inclusiveness (Wellman 2008; Krull 2020). They argue that since he exhibited inclusion, Christians should work toward creating an inclusive society. Christians who fail to participate in this type of radical acceptance can be envisioned as not fully living up to the message of their faith. The theological flexibility among progressive Christians does not tie them to a given outcome and allows them to accept perspectives outside a Christian belief system. Progressive Christians can put forth a vision of a society whereby no single lifestyle or religion is preferred. This stance comports with the general politically progressive value of multiculturalism and pluralism. One of the aspects of progressive Christianity that cannot be overlooked is the grounding of their efforts with interfaith mechanisms (Jones 2008; Diaz-Edelman 2017; Fulton and Wood 2017). These interfaith efforts are understandable among those who soften notions of absolutes and ethnocentrism. Activists from progressive congregations have been known to downplay elements of their faith to create an atmosphere that welcomes those of different faiths (Lichterman and Williams 2017). This makes it easier for them to fashion multifaith political coalitions than their conservative peers. Progressive Christian theology has been supportive of other efforts toward progressive political change. Sometimes this support comes through providing a moral language by which political progressives are

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able to articulate their desires (Fuist 2017) or tell the stories of the marginalized (Braunstein and Williams 2017; Braunstein 2018). Christian progressive theology can also be a source of strength that helps progressive groups to endure oppression, as seen in a comparison of the Plowshare movement, a social movement that emphasizes pacificism, in the United States and Sweden. The distinctively religious nature of the Plowshare movement in the United States better prepared it for repression in comparison to the more secular Plowshare movement in Sweden (Nepstad 2017). Finally, it should be noted that the activism of progressive Christians is not limited to efforts within their congregations. Progressive Christians have utilized national advocacy organizations and faith-based community organizing in addition to their congregational efforts to promote their activism (Braunstein, Fuist, and Williams 2019). Nevertheless, there are challenges progressive Christians face in their efforts to politically mobilize. There is a decentralized nature in their movement that often makes it harder for them to organize (Sager 2017). While narratives within the progressive faith community can build cohesion, they can also damage that cohesion, particularly if majority-group members take on an oversize role in leadership (Delehanty 2018). The potential formation of multifaith coalitions increases the potential of intergroup conflict. Contemporary conservative Christians base their morality on evangelism and God-given absolutes (Sherkat and Ellison 1997; McVeigh and Sikkink 2001). Both values continue from the individualistic, theological approach of the early fundamentalists. While there has been more political activism in contemporary conservative Christianity than was exhibited by the older fundamentalists, there still is a greater focus on otherworldly pursuits than we see in their progressive counterparts (D. Brown 2008; Wildman and Garner 2009). Theologically, Christian conservatives rely on notions of biblical inerrancy and exclusive truth claims, with less concern with systematic societal improvement and more focus on individualistic sins. For Christian conservatives, the Christian faith is one that focuses on helping others to find salvation and to live the “right” type of lifestyle. Under such a definition of faith, the tolerance of progressive Christians is to be rejected since such tolerance leads individuals away from the path of traditional morality and biblical inerrancy prioritized by conservative Christians. But

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conservative Christian political activism has nevertheless grown since the days of acceptance of fundamentalist separatism. This activism has provided conservative Christians a stable position in the Republican Party (Green and Guth 1988; O. Smith 1997; Bendyna et al. 2001; D. Williams 2012). Much of the power in the Republican Party comes from members’ money, power, and willingness to vote (Bednar and Hertzke 1995; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Many conservative Christians envision the Republican Party as the vehicle by which they can achieve their political goals (D. Williams 2012). While conservative Christians originally had little interest in issues such as tax policy and foreign policy, they supported the efforts of Republicans as long as the party was supportive of their moral absolutism (Green and Guth 1988; Bednar and Hertzke 1995; Sherkat et al. 2011; A. Lewis 2017). The ability of conservative Christians to use their churches as sites of political organization, and the presence of charismatic leaders, contributes to their loyalty to conservative political causes. The image of conservative Christians as political conservatives is so powerful that some individuals have difficulty envisioning conservative Christians as not being political conservatives (Patrikios 2013; Yancey and Williamson 2014). Theories of right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1988, 1996; Hunsberger 1996) suggest that conservative political and religious attitudes are compatible since they are ideologies that support the suppression of human rights and a submission to authority.5 It is possible that there is an aspect of traditionalism among both Christian and political conservatives that helps them to become natural allies. For different reasons, Christian and political conservatives may be hesitant to promote social change, and this aversion to societal change facilitates their development of political alliances. Regardless of the source of these alliances, clearly Christian conservatives remain a powerful force within political conservatism, as seen in their support for the election and presidency of Donald Trump. In fact, the presence of conservative Christians may be essential for the success of political conservatives. Despite this increase in political activism, conservative Christians generally focus upon centering their religion on theological concerns. They seek to define a Christian morality linked to their particular interpretation of the Bible. This is also how they set up the social boundaries of who can be considered a Christian. Lamont (1992) extended

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boundary work to include the use of morality beliefs in the construction of boundaries. Since religion is often used to justify moral beliefs (Finke and Adamczyk 2008; Desmond and Kraus 2014), theological distinctions between progressive and conservative Christians are important sources of social boundaries between the two groups. Beliefs about biblical inerrancy and Christian particularism may be symbolic, but Lamont (1992) points out that symbolic borders are a necessary condition for social boundaries. Different ideas about inerrancy can lead to claims about the moral deficiencies of Christians on the other side of the biblical inerrancy debate and a justification to socially separate from those who technically identify with the same religious faith. It is important to recognize not only what values motivate conservative Christians, but also what values they find abhorrent. For conservative Christians, those who violate their particular biblical interpretation can be guilty of heresy and unacceptable as part of their in-group. They define their Christianity by those theological interpretations, using them to filter out what they perceive as antithetical to their religious tradition. Knowing how different religious groups draw their boundaries informs us greatly about the way individuals in these groups legitimate their religious beliefs and identities. It is well established that progressive Christians distinguish themselves politically from conservative Christians (L. Jensen 1997; Hoffmann and Johnson 2005; J. Burke 2012; Yancey et al. 2017). Their concern about social justice and desire to participate in social movements indicate a strong interest in altering our political systems and might produce a stronger priority to enforce political values than conservative Christians. Their lower emphasis on individual salvation and willingness to tolerate non-Christian beliefs indicate less concern for theological conformity than their conservative counterparts. The inclusiveness that is part of their theological orientation can make them less likely to embrace a particularism that motivates attempts at religious conversion. Some progressive Christian leaders (D. Brown 2008; Bell 2011) argue that non-Christians may find salvation just as certainly as Christians. These ideas greatly lower the motivations of progressive Christians to engage in theological debates with those from other religious traditions. Given their relative desire for progress toward certain political goals, political agreement can be more important for progressive Christians than theological agreement. If progressive Christians

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prioritize political priorities over theological priorities, then political alliance is likely more important than religious identity in explaining their social attitudes and actions. The values embraced by conservative Christians showcase that they have more loyalty to theological conformity than progressive Christians. Their beliefs about biblical inerrancy (Woodberry and Smith 1998; Hempel and Bartkowski 2008) and moral absolutes (Greeley and Hout 2008; Moslener 2015) make it harder for them to accept theological deviations. Their concerns about being unduly influenced by a creeping modernity, or postmodernity, may persuade them to avoid engagement with the larger society for reasons other than proselytization. Furthermore, the attention of conservative Christians toward the salvation of individuals can make them less concerned about addressing macro social and political structural forces. Also, the potential authoritarian nature of the conservative Christians’ theological values may also make them more sympathetic to political authoritarianism (Ramet 2005; Starks and Robinson 2007; Davis and Robinson 2012; Djupe and Calfano 2013). But it is possible that the focus of conservative Christians upon individual spiritual reform may distract them from engaging in political activism as much as progressive Christians. Historically, modernist Christians exhibited more interest in political activism. It is quite plausible that the same difference exists between contemporary progressive and conservative Christians. Theological intolerance does not automatically produce political intolerance; indeed, recent research suggests that conservative Christians are more tolerant toward political out-groups than theological out-groups (Yancey 2017; Yancey et al. 2019). There are likely different social pressures on progressive and conservative Christians shaping their theological and political goals.

Understanding Theological and Political Influences within Progressive and Conservative Christians Ideas and concerns of social actors are not always easily broken down into discrete categories. Religious and political ideals can mix with the overall social philosophy of individuals in ways where it is not clear what is religious and what is political. For example, the inclusiveness

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of progressive Christians toward sexual minorities can find its legitimation in either their religious or political ideals (Krull 2020). They may use values embedded within their religious tradition of tolerance to justify support of sexual minorities or base that support on a progressive political philosophy. Of course, this support may emerge equally from both religious and political sources of justification. However, the value of inclusiveness itself that buttresses their religious and political values can act as an external source of legitimation. Likewise, conservative Christians can assert that their opposition to abortion is tied to their religious values, but those attitudes may also be tied to their social positions (Luker 1984; A. Lewis 2017). It is possible that they have built their religious opposition to abortion in reaction to external social factors that shape their aversion to that practice. For example, Luker (1984) argues that opposition to abortion can be reflective of the vested interest of women with few resources who feel the need to protect notions of motherhood. It is not always clear how religious, political, and social values interact with each other and we should be careful not to quickly attribute the differences of progressive and conservative Christians to theological distinctions. Even as we assess the relationship of theological and political values within progressive and conservative Christians, care must be taken to make sure that we do not reduce them down to discrete categories and ignore the nuanced ways they interact with each other within distinct Christian groups. Perhaps a better way to consider distinct theological, political, and social dimensions is as interrelated bundles of values that correlate with each other and likely create an ideological core that caters to a unique religious group. Swidler best conceptualizes this process with her discussion of cultural toolkits. She defines the cultural toolkit as “habits, skills and styles from which people develop ‘strategies of action’” (1986, 273). Thus, within cultures and subcultures certain values and ritualistic ways of thinking inform members of those groups how to act and think about their actions. Theological and political beliefs are elements that contribute to the cultural values possessed by a social group. They can reinforce and influence each other so that the central cultural values of a group are strengthened. But in doing so they can create a sense of inevitability in how members of a group are supposed to act, making it difficult for those with a given cultural toolkit to accept those with different cultural toolkits.

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The inability of individuals to understand and accept those with different cultural toolkits is content specific. Thus, if one’s cultural toolkit includes notions of acceptance and inclusivity, then it is easier to accept those with cultural toolkits that are different in other ways but appear to share these concerns about acceptance and inclusion. But that toolkit can also make it harder to accept those with toolkits who do not exhibit, in a culturally appropriate manner, notions of acceptance and inclusivity. For progressive Christians this can mean it is relatively easy to accept those who reject a Christian construction of their faith, especially since they do not place a high priority on theological absolutes. The key is whether those they accept also do not prioritize theological absolutes or may be perceived to be the victim of larger systems of exclusion and thus deserving of acceptance. Their cultural toolkit with its tools of inclusivity dictates to them to accept such individuals. But the ability of progressive Christians to use that toolkit of acceptance may be limited when considering relationships with conservative Christians. The tools of absolutes and biblical inerrancy within the toolkit of conservative Christians can make it harder for them to exhibit the inclusion that progressive Christians desire to observe. For conservative Christians, they may have a toolkit based upon theological purity. Thus they would find it difficult to accept those who do not match up to that purity and then feel the need to proselytize such individuals. This attempt at conversion can signal a lack of inclusiveness, which is seen as problematic within a progressive Christian cultural toolkit. But in the cultural toolkit of conservative Christians, they are attempting to point the way to a better life for those who have not accepted their religious values, and they have difficulty understanding why progressive Christians do not aid them in converting others. Cultural toolkits sufficiently distinct from each other can produce social situations where two groups are likely to become out-groups. The history discussed in this chapter, and analysis of their contemporary conflict, suggests that theoretically progressive and conservative Christians have dramatically different cultural toolkits emerging from distinctive social identities. The theological beliefs of each group may interact in ways that create toolkits so oppositional to each other that social distance between the two groups is a natural outcome. One possibility is that there is a conventional match of political and theological

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orientations so that theological progressives develop toolkits that fit with political progressives, and the same process occurs with theological conservatives and political conservatives. This match may have begun with Christians utilizing their theological answers to ultimate questions of meaning to formulate satisfying political answers. Or political answers may precede theological attachments. Perhaps these social constructs interact with each other or are driven by a separate source of ideological commitment. No matter how these cultural toolkits have developed, sufficient areas of conflict of cultural values between progressive and conservative Christians exist to explain potential intergroup hostility between the two groups.

Conclusion As we have seen, the pulling away of modernist Christians from their traditional religious homes was tied to their acceptance of a modernist critique of religion and society, resulting in a desire for social reform, especially reform of institutional structures. To promote that social change, they began to emphasize political activism. This political activism can become more central to their construction of Christian beliefs than theological issues. Or their changing political allegiances can become altered due to previous theological priorities. Either way, there is a prioritization of political activism within the early modernists that evolved to develop the ideology of contemporary progressive Christians. The development of a morality ethic built on tolerance and rationality has made contemporary progressive Christians quite compatible with modern political progressive values in the United States. It is possible that these progressive political concerns have become an intrinsic part of their theological understanding, making it nearly impossible to separate their theological and political priorities. In furthering their political goals, progressive Christians further their particular theological understanding of Christianity as embedded in their cultural toolkit. Although contemporary conservative Christians have been criticized for their political activism (Martin 1999; Herman 2007; Wakefield 2009; Gasaway 2019), their fundamentalist ancestors were more concerned with individual souls than presidential elections. Have today’s conservative Christians walked away from the historic focus on evangelism to

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focus on political activism, or is there still a basic willingness on the part of such Christians to forego political accomplishments to achieve otherworldly goals? Historically, fundamentalists claim to have disentangled theological and political concerns. The emergence of abortion as a political issue has become an important moment as that was an issue where conservative Christians explicitly tied their theological values to social activism (A. Lewis 2017). But it remains to be seen whether contemporary Christians have tied their political activism closely to their theological interpretation of their Christian faith. Does their Christian faith lead to political activism or is the political activism the driving force for conservative Christians? Given the focus such individuals have placed on absolutes and conversion, it seems more likely that the former is true. If the cultural toolkits of progressive and conservative Christians are sufficiently oppositional to each other, then the differing values in these communities help to explain the conflict between them. Clearly Christianity is a religion with different adherences possessing contrasting interpretations. But are the contrasting differences between progressive and conservative Christians merely minor alterations of the same basic belief system, or are they manifestations of fundamentally different belief systems? Have progressive and conservative Christians developed belief systems so drastically different from each other that contrasting values and answers to questions of meaning and purpose have emerged from them? Over the next five chapters, we will empirically examine the degree to which progressive and conservative Christians have differing values systems. Only after an empirical assessment of the differences between progressive and conservative Christians can we assess how we should consider the relationship between progressive and conservative Christians.

2

Politics and the American Christian My marriage to Chasten has made me a better man. And, yes, Mr. Vice President, it has moved me closer to God. That’s the thing I wish the Mike Pences of the world would understand: That if you have a problem with who I am, your quarrel is not with me. Your quarrel, sir, is with my creator. —Pete Buttigieg, former Democratic presidential candidate

Earlier we discussed how the concepts of in-groups and out-groups play important roles in the formation of our social identities. Those whom we include in our social circles play a vital role in shaping how we see ourselves. However, to understand the social identity of individuals in a group, it is important to consider not only whom they consider allies, but also whom they considered enemies. Only by understanding both whom individuals include and whom individuals exclude can we gain a sense of the identities those individuals have assigned to themselves and an appreciation of the types of social values adopted by those individuals. Progressive and conservative Christians have different social and ideological pressures that play a part in how they select the groups they support and those they oppose. The ideological match of theological orientations and political preference makes it reasonable to assume that conservative Christians would be more likely to ally with conservative political groups and reject progressive political groups, and that the reverse would be true for progressive Christians. But our historical analysis of the modernist-fundamentalist split suggests that conservative Christians have more interest in theological issues while progressive Christians place more of an emphasis on political concerns. That analysis also suggests that much of the motivation that led progressive Christians to separate from conservative Christians was rooted in their contrasting political goals. They may use political criteria as much, or 38

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perhaps even more, than theological criteria in their selection of ingroups and out-groups. Despite their potential claims to the contrary, conservative Christians might also utilize political criteria to assess potential allies or enemies. They may envision themselves as having an overarching commitment to their interpretation of the Bible, but those interpretations can manifest themselves in ways that legitimate their political desires. Their stated goals of promotion of their theological aims can mask spoken and unspoken political desires. In this chapter, we use survey data from a probability sample to explore these questions. With these data from a national representative sample, we explore the differences in the in-groups and out-groups chosen by progressive and conservative Christians. We focus on the different ways progressive and conservative Christians construct their out-groups. After an examination of systematic patterns by which different groups of Christians establish potential allies and foes, we then explore the nuances behind those differences. This chapter relies on statistical analysis to enable us to investigate potential differences between progressive and conservative Christians. Some level of complexity in this discussion is unavoidable. However, we will relegate the more sophisticated analysis and discussions on how we conducted this analysis to our appendix.

Analytical Strategy To investigate how progressive and conservative Christians define themselves in the larger American culture, we compare the attitudes of both groups toward Christian fundamentalists, atheists, Muslims, political conservatives, and political progressives. Specifically, we assess their affinity or antipathy toward these groups to learn the potential values that progressive and conservative Christians place on their general Christian identity relative to their theological, social, and political attitudes. This helps determine whom progressive and conservative Christians envision as members of their in-group and out-group. In this way we can begin to assess the weight of theological or political conformity in the shaping of the social identity of progressive and conservative Christians. To capture affinity, and antipathy toward Christian fundamentalists, we replicated a technique used by one of us (Yancey and Williamson

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2014) with the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES).1 The ANES asked the respondents to describe their affection or disaffection for twenty-seven distinct social groups by using a thermometer scale of 0 to 100. With our technique, we can assess how much the respondents like or dislike members of certain groups. These groups represent opportunities for the respondents to indicate potential political and religious in-groups and out-groups. So, we used this technique to create the variables Anti-Fundamentalist, Pro-Fundamentalist, Anti-Atheist, Pro-Atheist, Anti-Muslim, Pro-Muslim, Anti–Political Conservative, Pro–Political Conservative, Anti–Political Liberal, and Pro–Political Liberal. Table 2.1 utilizes the raw thermometer score, but for the rest of the analysis in this chapter we use these Pro and Anti measures to assess the attitudes of the respondents.2 The ANES allowed us to assess attitudes toward these groups but does not determine how individuals define these groups. This is particularly problematic as it concerns Christian fundamentalists. It is possible that respondents perceive fundamentalists as a mere fringe group, such as Westboro Baptist Church members, or a larger group making up a significant percentage of the United States, such as the 35 percent of Americans who claim to be “born-again” (Hackett and Lindsay 2008). While there are scholarly attempts to define fundamentalism (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Emerson and Hartman 2006; Antoun 2008), those efforts may not correlate to how Americans generally view this concept. Nevertheless, previous attempts tend to define this term by focusing upon the notion of a strict religion that attempts to remove itself from the impact of modern society. This makes them a useful group for testing the willingness of progressive Christians to accept Christians with decidedly conservative theological perspectives.3 The problem of definition also surfaces as we investigate attitudes toward Muslims. It may be the case that many respondents automatically associate stereotypes about engaging in violent terrorism with any assessment of Muslims. If given an opportunity to consider most American Muslims, such respondents may offer a different level of acceptance. However, even if a different image would provide a reassessment from the respondents, the fact that some of them use images of terrorists to understand their affinity or antipathy toward Muslims can be valuable in determining whether such respondents see Muslims as potential

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in-group or out-group members. There is a propensity to attach unflattering stereotypes to out-groups (Harasty 1997; Alexander, Brewer, and Hermann 1999; Scharrer 2002) and thermometer variables can help capture this tendency. This propensity to attribute positive and negative stereotypes is also likely to impact the political thermometer variables. We chose to use a general variable of conservative or liberal rather than specific political groups such as feminists or the Tea Party, so that the respondents could project their generalized perceptions into the thermometer questions. It is quite possible that one or two political issues dominate a respondent’s ideas about either political conservatives or liberals. For example, a conservative Christian could easily channel his or her political concerns into the issue of abortion. Assessments of the Tea Party, which does not tend to primarily focus on issues of abortion, may fail to accurately capture that respondent’s affections, or lack thereof, toward political groups. Many respondents are not singleissue voters and use multiple issues to come to their conclusion about these political identities. Given the prevalence of political stereotyping within our current political economy (Elder and Greene 2007; Winter 2010; Crawford et al. 2011), one would expect that these respondents will form some degree of emotional attachments or disattachments to political conservatives and progressives. An important theological dividing line between progressive and conservative Christians is the accepted approach to authority of the Bible. There is also reason to believe that Catholics have a meaningful theological division based on their definition of the Church, and that division is equivalent to the theological divisions within Protestantism.4 Previous research has used attitudes toward biblical inerrancy as the sole measure to operationalize potential theological fundamentalism (Sherkat and Darnell 1999; Sherkat 2011), Evangelicalism (J. Hunter 1983), and orthodoxy (Freeman and Houston 2011; Roy 2016) within the Christian faith. Kellstedt and Smidt (1993) contend that biblical authority has relevance in America. Unfortunately, the ANES does not provide us with any other usable theological questions. It is reasonable to consider beliefs such as whether salvation comes only from Christ or particularism, whether hell is real, whether miracles occur, or other possible theological contrasts between progressive and conservative Christians as possible theological

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measurements, but the ANES does not enable us to do that. While these tend to be correlated with each other, at least among Protestants, an instrument with multiple measures would be more ideal.5 Nonetheless, we define progressive Christians as Christians who do not envision the Bible as the literal Word of God. Christians who define the Bible as the Word of God are defined as conservative Christians.6

Results Table 2.1 shows some of the potential social, demographic, and political differences between progressive and conservative Christians as operationalized by belief in the Bible as the Word of God. We note that progressive Christians are more likely to be male, white, highly educated, wealthy, and politically progressive but less likely to regularly attend a religious service in comparison to conservative Christians. There was no significant difference by age. We noted that on issues of same-sex Table 2.1. Comparison of Progressive and Conservative Christians on Selected Demographic, Social, and Political Characteristics. Progressive Christians

Conservative Christians

Age (on 13-point scale)

7.894 (2,075)

7.913 (1,291)

% Female

52.5% (2,092)

57.9%** (1,309)

% White

67.1% (2,086)

48.3%*** (1,307)

Education (on 5-point scale)

3.217 (2,079)

2.628*** (1,300)

Income (on 5-point scale)

3.598 (1,952)

2.971*** (1,150)

Political Conservatism (on 7-point scale)

4.223 (1,957)

4.717*** (1,072)

Religious Service Attendance (on 5-point scale)

2.731 (2,090)

3.592*** (1,303)

% Support Same-Sex Marriage

39.3% (2,072)

20.2%*** (1,289)

% Support Abortion for Any Reason

64.9% (2,079)

36.9%*** (1,291)

Source: 2012 ANES. **—p < .01; ***—p < .001; only Christian in sample: N in parentheses.

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marriage and abortion, issues that many conservative Christians have prioritized as important, progressive Christians are decidedly more progressive than conservative Christians. It is possible, although beyond the scope of this volume, to explore whether these social issues drive the political wedge between progressive and conservative Christians. Nonetheless, none of the results in table 2.1 are particularly surprising. With this initial determination of who is a conservative Christian and who is a progressive Christian, we are now able to see how individuals perceive the five groups listed above. In table 2.2 we introduce the raw scores for progressive and conservative Christians to see whether we can observe any propensity for them to use theological and political differences to influence their ratings of other groups. As expected, conservative Christians are especially warm to Christian fundamentalists with a thermometer score significantly higher than that for progressive Christians (67.886 v. 46.761: p < .001). Even though many conservative Christians do not characterize themselves as fundamentalists, this is the group that would most closely match their general theological desires. Theoretically, atheists and Muslims have distinctly different theological beliefs than either progressive or conservative Christians. Yet the rankings of progressive Christians for both Muslim (45.735 v.

Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics of Thermometer Measures for Selected Social Groups of Progressive and Conservative Christians. Progressive Christians

Population without Progressive Christians

Conservative Christians

Fundamentalist Thermometer

46.761 (1,903)

59.077*** (1,877)

67.886 (1,153)

46.289*** (2,627)

Atheist Thermometer

37.839 (1,929)

34.364*** (1,926)

26.882 (1,176)

40.15*** (2,679)

Muslim Thermometer

45.735 (1,927)

44.863 (1,936)

41.731 (1,180)

46.867*** (2,683)

Political Conservative Thermometer

53.788 (1,928)

57.8*** (1,936)

62.61 (1,186)

52.782*** (2,678)

Political Progressive Thermometer

47.373 (1,930)

48.504 (1,923)

43.889 (1,174)

49.712*** (2,679)

Source: 2012 ANES. ***—p < .001; means or proportions are entries, N in parentheses.

Population without Conservative Christians

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41.731: p < .001) and atheists (37.839 v. 26.882: p < .001) was higher than the rankings given by conservative Christians. It is noteworthy that the distance of the rankings between the two groups is higher for atheists as opposed to Muslims.7 Given that Muslims and Christian at least share a belief in a monotheistic deity, one can argue that they are closer in theological agreement than between Christians and atheists. The greater distance for atheists suggests that theological distinctions matter more in establishing the differences between progressive and conservative rankings. When comparing the rankings of these religious groups by progressive and conservative Christians to the general population we find that progressive Christians are less supportive of conservative Christians than the rest of the population (46.761 v. 59.077: p < .001). But this is influenced by the addition of conservative Christians in the control group. When they are taken out of the sample, then progressive Christians do not differ from the rest of the sample (46.761 v. 45.048: ns.). Given the in-group nature of conservative Christians to fundamentalists, this is not surprising. Progressive Christians did show more support for atheists and less support for political conservatives than the rest of the population. The findings for conservative Christians fit with our expectations and are significant with all five groups. Conservative Christians accepted Christian fundamentalists and political conservatives while rejecting non-Christian groups and political progressives more than the rest of the population. We now look at the evidence about those who substantially rank these groups higher or lower than other groups. This is measured with the Pro and Anti variables. The results of this comparison are seen in table 2.3. As expected, conservative Christians are significantly more likely to accept fundamentalist Christians and political conservatives while rejecting atheists, Muslims, and political progressives. Conservative Christians are significantly less likely to reject fundamentalist Christians and political conservatives or to accept political progressives. The anticipated findings as they concern the religious groups are of interest since one could predict that progressive Christians would be significantly more likely to accept atheists and Muslims than conservative Christians, yet that is not borne out in our findings. This is due to the extremely high unwillingness of either progressive or conservative

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Table 2.3. Percentages of Progressive and Conservative Christians for Affinity or Antipathy toward Selected Groups. Progressive Christian

Conservative Christian

Anti–Fundamentalist Christian

25.2% (1,903)

6.1%*** (1,153)

Pro–Fundamentalist Christian

4.9% (1,903)

20.5%*** (1,153)

Anti-Atheist

37.8% (1,929)

59.6%*** (1,176)

Pro-Atheist

.8% (1,929)

.5% (1,176)

Anti-Muslim

22.0% (1,927)

31.4%*** (1,180)

Pro-Muslim

1.6% (1,927)

.9% (1,180)

Anti–Political Conservative

18.7% (1,928)

10.0%*** (1,186)

Pro–Political Conservative

10.2% (1,928)

15.9%*** (1,186)

Anti–Political Progressive

27.1% (1,930)

31.2%* (1,174)

Pro–Political Progressive

6.5% (1,930)

2.3%*** (1,174)

Source: 2012 ANES. *—p < .05; **—p < .01; ***—p < .001; N in parentheses.

Christians to rank either group high in comparison to their rankings of other groups. Conservative Christians clearly showed a stronger preference for fundamentalist Christians and political conservatives. The more powerful effect was seen in the percentage of conservative Christians in the Pro–Fundamentalist Christian group, which was 14.4 percent more than those in the Anti–Fundamentalist Christian group. But this difference was only 5.9 percent for conservative Christians between the Pro–Political Conservative and Anti–Political Conservative groups. The loyalty of conservative Christians appears to be more strongly tied to their theological concerns than their political ones. An important way progressive Christians differ from conservative Christians is their unwillingness to envision atheists and Muslims as out-groups. They are less likely to reject atheists (37.8% v. 59.6%: p < .001) or Muslims (22.0% v. 31.4%: p < .001). It is not that progressive

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Christians feel more affinity toward non-Christians than conservative Christians but that they are less willing to reject non-Christians than conservative Christians do. Progressive Christians do not necessarily envision these non-Christian groups as members of their in-group. But neither do they envision conservative Christians as members of their in-group. Progressive Christians showed more propensity to reject political conservatives and to accept political progressives relative to conservative Christians. This is not surprising given the previous establishment of the relationship of Christian theology to political preference. However, it is also worth noting that progressive Christians are less accepting of all groups. For progressive Christians there were more individuals who fell into the Anti groups than the Pro group for all five groups. This was only true for three of the groups with conservative Christians. But this may be due to the groups asked about in this research. It is possible that none of these groups clearly reflect the unique interests of progressive Christians in the way fundamentalist Christians, and to a lesser extent political conservatives, reflect the unique interest of conservative Christians. More insight can be gained by comparing progressive and conservative Christians to the rest of the population. In table 2.4 we compare progressive and conservative Christians to all other individuals as it concerns the percentage of individuals who rank the five groups a standard deviation above or below the average. Progressive Christians are significantly more likely to reject fundamentalist Christians, political conservatives, and political progressives than the rest of the population. They are significantly less likely to accept fundamentalist Christians and atheists, but they are more likely to reject atheists and Muslims than the rest of the population. So, while they are more likely to reject atheists and Muslims than to accept them, they are less likely to reject these non-Christian groups than the general population. These findings suggest an overall relative mistrust of both political conservatives and progressives by progressive Christians. This helps to account for the findings in table 2.2, where progressive Christians tend to conceptualize members of these five groups more as out-groups than in-groups. However, they did not differ from the rest of the society in their willingness to support both of those political groups. The religious findings indicate a

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Table 2.4. Comparison of Progressive and Conservative Christians to the Rest of the Population. Progressive Christians

Population without Progressive Christians

Conservative Christians

Population without Conservative Christians

Anti– Fundamentalist Christian

25.2% (1,903)

15.8%*** (1,877)

6.1% (1,153)

26.9%*** (2,627)

Pro– Fundamentalist Christian

4.9% (1,903)

14.2*** (1,877)

20.5% (1,153)

4.7%*** (2,627)

Anti-Atheist

37.8% (1,929)

46.2%*** (1,926)

59.6% (1,176)

34.3%*** (2,679)

Pro-Atheist

.8% (1,929)

2.5%*** (1,926)

.5% (1,176)

2.1%*** (2,679)

Anti-Muslim

22.0% (1,927)

26.2%** (1,936)

31.4% (1,180)

20.9%*** (2,683)

Pro-Muslim

1.6% (1,927)

1.5% (1,936)

.9% (1,180)

1.8%** (2,683)

Anti–Political Conservative

18.7% (1,928)

14.2%*** (1,936)

10.0% (1,186)

19.3%*** (2,678)

Pro–Political Conservative

10.2% (1,928)

12.0% (1,936)

15.9% (1,186)

9.0%*** (2,678)

Anti–Political Progressive

27.1% (1,930)

24.0%* (1,923)

31.2% (1,174)

23.1%*** (2,679)

Pro–Political Progressive

6.5% (1,930)

5.6% (1,923)

2.3% (1,174)

7.7%*** (2,679)

Source: 2012 ANES. *—p < .05; **—p < .01; ***—p < .001; N in parentheses.

relatively greater distancing of progressive Christians from fundamentalist Christians than from either atheists or Muslims since they were less likely to reject those groups than the rest of the population. Conservative Christians were significantly more likely to accept fundamentalist Christians and political conservatives and to reject atheists, Muslims, and political progressives than the rest of the population. They were significantly less likely to reject fundamentalist Christians and political conservatives or to accept atheists, Muslims, and political progressives. These results are to be expected from a group that is religiously

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and politically conservative. However, it is worth noting that the greatest disparities between conservative Christians and the rest of the population concerns differences with rejecting atheists (59.6% − 34.3% = 23.3%), rejecting fundamentalist Christians (26.9% − 6.1% = 20.8%), and supporting fundamentalist Christians (20.5% − 4.7% = 15.8%). None of the four political variables had a disparity greater than 10 percent. Conservative Christians distinguish themselves from the general population more on religious differences than political ones. The uniqueness of conservative Christians is more likely to be driven by religious beliefs than their political loyalties although it is quite possible that their religious views and political views are conceptually tied together. One difference between progressive and conservative Christians is the degree to which they distinguish themselves from the rest of the population. The average difference between the scores of progressive Christians and the rest of the population on all ten Pro or Anti measures is 4.34 percent. The average difference between the scores of conservative Christians and the rest of the population on all ten Pro or Anti measures is 10.46 percent. Furthermore, conservative Christians were significantly different on all measures in table 2.3. Progressive Christians are not significantly different from the rest of the population in their acceptance of Muslims, political conservatives, and political progressives. As it concerns these particular groups, conservative Christians distinguish themselves from the general population in ways that escape progressive Christians. The initial examination of conservative Christians indicates that they differ from the general population in ways that are expected. They are more supportive of fundamentalist Christians and political conservatives while being less supportive of atheists, Muslims, and political progressives. But much of the difference between conservative and progressive Christians may be due to racial differences. As seen in table 2.1, there is a significant racial difference between progressive and conservative Christians, with the latter being much less white. To test the possibility that some of these differences are due to racial effects, we conduct separate analysis on white and nonwhite respondents. In table 2.5 we compare the propensity of only white respondents to rank the five groups a standard deviation above or below the mean. In

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Table 2.5. Percentages of White Progressives and Conservative Christians for Affinity or Antipathy toward Selected Groups. White Progressive Christians

White Population without Progressive Christians

White Conservative Christians

White Population without Conservative Christians

Anti– Fundamentalist Christian

26.7% (1,280)

19.2%*** (957)

4.4% (569)

30.0%*** (1,668)

Pro– Fundamentalist Christian

4.5% (1,280)

16.9*** (957)

26.5% (569)

4.1%*** (1,668)

Anti-Atheist

34.3% (1,298)

42.3%*** (982)

59.9% (574)

30.2%*** (1,706)

Pro-Atheist

1.1% (1,298)

2.6%** (982)

.2% (574)

2.3%** (1,706)

Anti-Muslim

23.5% (1,290)

32.7%*** (976)

41.3% (576)

22.7%*** (1,690)

Pro-Muslim

1.5% (1,290)

.7% (976)

.5% (576)

1.4% (1,690)

Anti–Political Conservative

15.0% (1,296)

10.0%*** (982)

3.1% (577)

16.1%*** (1,701)

Pro–Political Conservative

13.0% (1,296)

19.2%*** (982)

26.3% (577)

12.1%*** (1,701)

Anti–Political Progressive

32.7% (1,294)

33.5% (978)

46.2% (573)

28.6%*** (1,699)

Pro–Political Progressive

5.7% (1,294)

5.5% (978)

0.9% (573)

7.7%*** (1,699)

Source: 2012 ANES. **—p < .01; ***—p < .001; N in parentheses.

table 2.6 we compare the propensity of only respondents of color to rank the five groups a standard deviation above or below the mean. Examining only white conservative Christians in comparison to other whites did not disclose any real differences from white conservatives in general. The significant difference found with Pro-Muslim in table 2.4 is not duplicated, but otherwise the same effects are found in table 2.5. Higher percentages of white conservative Christians were more likely to reject atheists, Muslims, and political progressives and to accept fundamentalist Christians and political conservatives than conservative

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Table 2.6. Percentages of Progressives and Conservative Christians of Color for Affinity or Antipathy toward Selected Groups. Progressive Christians of Color

Population of Color without Progressive Christians

Conservative Christians of Color

Population of Color without Conservative Christians

Anti– Fundamentalist Christian

22.0% (617)

12.1%*** (914)

7.7% (582)

21.3%*** (949)

Pro– Fundamentalist Christian

5.8% (617)

11.4*** (914)

14.4% (582)

5.9%*** (949)

Anti-Atheist

45.4% (625)

50.4% (938)

59.5% (600)

41.5%*** (963)

Pro-Atheist

.2% (625)

2.2%** (938)

.8% (600)

1.8% (963)

Anti-Muslim

18.9% (631)

19.4% (954)

21.8% (602)

17.6%* (983)

Pro-Muslim

1.7% (631)

2.2% (954)

1.3% (602)

2.4% (983)

Anti–Political Conservative

26.3% (627)

18.6%*** (948)

16.6% (607)

24.8%*** (968)

Pro–Political Conservative

4.3% (627)

4.5% (948)

5.9% (607)

3.5%* (968)

Anti–Political Progressive

15.5% (631)

14.2% (939)

16.7% (599)

13.5% (971)

Pro–Political Progressive

8.2% (631)

5.8% (939)

3.7% (599)

8.7%*** (971)

Source: 2012 ANES. *—p < .05; **—p < .01; ***—p < .001; N in parentheses.

Christians in general. But while white conservative Christians exacerbate the general political and religious tendencies found among conservative Christians, the same was not completely true for conservative Christians of color. They did accept fundamentalists and political conservatives while rejecting Muslims and atheists significantly more than other people of color. However, they do not significantly reject political liberals more than other people of color. Conservative Christians of color do not tend to reject others due to their political values, but they do reject non-Christians.8

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There are no real differences between white progressive Christians and other progressive Christians when examining comparisons of their attitudes toward the religiously based groups of fundamentalist Christians, atheists, and Muslims to the rest of the country. However, there were powerful effects when exploring political groups. In the general population, progressive Christians do not significantly differ in their willingness to accept political conservatives, but white progressive Christians are significantly less likely to accept political conservatives. In the general population, progressive Christians are more likely to reject political progressives, but when we look at only white progressive Christians this difference disappears. As such there are key political differences between white progressive Christians and progressive Christians in general. There is also evidence that white progressive Christians distinguish themselves from other whites more than progressive Christians of color from other people of color. Progressive Christians of color did not significantly differ from other people of color in whether they accepted political conservatives, political liberals, and Muslims as well as reject political liberals, atheists, and Muslims. They were significantly more likely to reject fundamentalists and political conservatives as well as being less willing to accept fundamentalists and atheists. But generally progressive Christians of color did not differ from other people of color to the degree that white progressive Christians differ from other whites. These results suggest that there are potential racial differences in that conservative Christians of color and white progressives have different political priorities than their racial counterparts. Of course, there are other factors that may help to explain the differences between progressive and conservative Christians. Differences in income, education, and sex ratio may factor into these different attitudes. To investigate this possibility, and to affirm that our general findings are not explained by these variables, we conducted regression analysis controlling relevant social and demographic variables. We utilized regression analysis to control for all those variables. Our results, discussed more fully in the appendix, suggest that conservative Christian theology tends to move conservative Christians away from non-Christian religious groups and toward like-minded Christian groups. However, progressive Christian theology

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tends to move progressive Christians away from political conservatives and toward political progressives. This is of particular interest as it concerns Christian progressives as it suggests that the antipathy they have toward political progressives disappears once we control for important social and demographic differences between them and the general population. That antipathy is better explained by their unique social and demographic characteristics. Their religious identity does not lead to rejection of political progressives but it does impact their rejection of political conservatives. The description and in-depth discussion of the results are in the appendix. Our statistical findings indicated that for conservative Christians acceptance is tied to their theological concerns. The way they determine their social in-groups and out-groups may also be shaped by those they perceive as conforming to their theological ideals. Christian progressives’ decisions about whom to reject may be anchored to political concerns. It is worth noting that at the bivariate level progressive Christians did not differ as much as conservative Christians from other individuals on political matters. It can be the case that progressive Christians tend to adopt the larger cultural political values, and this shapes their propensity to create political in-groups. However, when the proper regression controls were applied, the theological effects tend to move Christians toward findings we would expect from predictions connected to progressive Christians if our suspicion about the importance of political matters for their social identity is accurate. This suggests that there is more of a political impact for progressive Christians than for conservative Christians. A key difference between progressive and conservative Christians may be the priorities emphasized in their faith traditions. Conservative Christians emphasize theological compatibility while progressive Christians focus on adherence to a political viewpoint that conforms to larger societal concerns. This is not to say that conservative Christians do not care about political outcomes or that theological concerns are irrelevant to progressive Christians. For example, the evidence in table 2.3 clearly shows that conservative Christians prefer political conservatives over political progressives. But our statistical analysis shows that conservative Christians are more likely to favor religious allies than political ones and that progressive Christians do not place theological concerns above political concerns.

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Conclusion This research suggests that conservative Christians have an affinity toward like-minded religious groups while rejecting non-Christian religious groups. These relationships remained after the application of social and demographic measures. Progressive Christians accept those non-Christian groups at a similar level as the rest of the nation, but they do reject conservative Christians at a higher rate than the general population. Progressive Christians, after application of social and demographic measures, do support political progressives and reject political conservatives. This type of political loyalty appears to be missing among Christian conservatives as their theological orientations do not remain supportive of political conservatives or reject political progressives after the application of social and demographic controls. This survey cannot determine why progressive Christians reject their more conservative peers or at least do not accept them at higher levels than the non-Christian population. But it is notable that we have more evidence about the rejection of conservative Christians rather than acceptance of non-Christian groups. Theologically progressive Christians do not necessarily feel any strong affinity toward atheists; they simply do not have a powerful antipathy toward them. It is possible that rejecting atheists conceptually violates the progressive Christians’ notion of inclusiveness, even if their disagreements on otherworldly matters inhibit the development of affinity toward them. Atheists are rejected more than any religious group (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan 2011; Yancey and Williamson 2014). But atheists are less likely to be rejected by those exposed to a diversity of worldviews (Bowman et al. 2016). Progressive Christians can have an openness to different perspectives, enabling them to possess a higher acceptance of atheists. Among progressive Christians, openness to alternate ideas can be a valuable tool to differentiate themselves from conservative Christians, and so politically progressive Christians find political alliances with atheists more important than religious disagreements. The mistrust of Muslims is more profound among highly religious Christians (Yancey and Williamson 2014). Our results suggest that theological effects shape this mistrust. Just as progressive Christians define themselves as having an openness to atheists, they can also define

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themselves as being open to Muslims. This would account for their comparative acceptance of Muslims relative to conservative Christians. However, if this openness is not merely the acceptance of those who dispute the existence of a deity, but also to accept those who worship a different deity, then it has become even clearer that progressive Christians do not tend to use theological concerns in the creation of their out-groups.9 Conformity to a particular set of theological answers does not seem to shape the social identity of progressive Christians or their willingness to establish in-groups and out-groups. Rejection of both atheists and Muslims by conservative Christians indicates their willingness to prioritize theological contrasts when determining social out-groups. If progressive Christians use political filters to determine whom they will accept, the same cannot be said for conservative Christians. The religious groups they expressed the least support toward do not have any claim toward a Christian identity. This finding is in keeping with previous work (Ackerman 2007; Siddiqui 2013; Dowland 2015; Firmin et al. 2017; Yancey, Eisenstein, and Burge 2017; Watson et al. 2018) suggesting that theological concerns are a primary motivating force for conservative Christians. But a Christian identity is something that progressive Christians, by definition, claim. Thus, if we are correct in that it is theological agreement that drives the attitudes of conservative Christians, then we should see more acceptance of other Christians, even progressive Christians when compared to non-Christian groups. Unfortunately, this current data set does not allow us to yet assess the attitudes of conservative Christians toward progressive Christians since none of the groups asked about in the ANES can be seen as representing progressive Christians. There is a special relative hostility that progressive Christians have toward fundamentalist Christians that may produce a unique capacity to reject them. One way to understand this rejection is to look at the concept of the heretic. A traditional definition of heresy in the Christian context is that it “consisted of misreading Scripture of one’s own free will, and publicly teaching, professing, and stubbornly adhering to this misrepresentation after correction” (Michael 2006, 54–55). This definition generally fits the fundamentalist’s emphasis on inerrancy (the view of the Bible as free from error) and absolutes; however, it is also a viable concept for progressive Christians. Theologically progressive Christians

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are not as tied to obedience to the Bible (as in the case of Protestantism) or the Church (as in the case of Catholicism) as their more conservative counterparts, so definitions of heresy that rely on obedience to a sacred book are not accurate for them. For theologically progressive Christians, a literal reading of the Bible and exclusive versions of Christianity may not be a source for heresy. Instead there can be political definitions of heresy that are applicable for progressive Christians. These definitions may not be directly tied to partisan political loyalty but perhaps to social or moral values correlated with a politically progressive agenda. These findings indicate information that helps us to better understand the social identity of progressive and conservative Christians. The propensity of progressive Christians not only to reject conservative Christians but also, relative to conservative Christians, to reject political conservatives suggests that political priorities weigh more for progressive Christians than conservative Christians in determining a reaction to other social groups. The social identity of progressive Christians may be tied more to political loyalties, or at least the attributes connected to political loyalties, than theological agreement. An individual who identifies as a progressive Christian must define what it means to be progressive and Christian. If political attitudes are an important part of the progressive element of that definition, then they can also factor into what it means to be a Christian for such an individual. In their cultural toolkit, the progressive Christian may rely upon certain political and social understandings, more than traditional theological traditions, to answer questions about his or her role in society and the proper actions that must be taken. These findings also have implications for understanding the identity of conservative Christians. If theological concerns reign supreme in the heart of political conservatives, then they can see themselves as workers or messengers from an eternal deity. Their morals and self-esteem emerge from the belief that they are working with this deity toward a better world. From their perspective, they have a foundational belief about this deity and what the deity wants. This allows them to shape their attitudes and direct their actions toward fulfilling their understanding of the desires of this deity. They have developed a cultural toolkit whereby the answers to what they should do come from their particular interpretation of their theological tradition. To understand the actions

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and ideas of conservative Christians, we must consider the implications of those actions and ideas within that theological framework. Comprehending the social priorities of progressive and conservative Christians requires going beyond quantitative assessments to hear progressive and conservative Christians speak in their own words. To this end we will spend the next few chapters doing just that. First, we will look at blogs written by progressive and conservative Christians on political issues that go against the stated positions of their relevant political party. Then we will interview progressive and conservative Christians and allow them to explain their perspectives in person.

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I Am Pro-life but . . . For evangelical Christians, our ultimate authority is the Bible. Too often, though, we’ve not looked to the Scriptures as our primary authority when it comes to forming our views toward immigrants and immigration. —Statement from the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission

As we have seen, there are strong ties between religious identities and political beliefs (Manza and Wright 2003; Brooks and Manza 2004; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Kaufmann 2004; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). The data in the last chapter reinforce earlier research documenting the link between Christian theology and political viewpoints (Utter and True 2004; Guth et al. 2005). But these findings also suggest that although both progressive and conservative Christians are connected to their respective political subcultures, these connections may not be qualitatively identical. Assertions have been made about how active conservative Christians are in politics (Martin 2005; Domke and Coe 2007; D. Williams 2008; Lienesch 2014). However, progressive Christians may be motivated more by political agreement than conservative Christians. The previous chapter suggests that progressive Christians are more likely than conservative Christians to consider who belongs in their in-group or out-group because of political allegiance and less likely to use theological concerns for that purpose. Having documented the quantitative differences of the importance of political alliances between progressive and conservative Christians, it is now vital to closely inspect the attitudes that support those alliances. Qualitative work is needed in order to gauge these attitudes, for it will allow Christians to concretely express their relative political and religious priorities. From these expressions we can learn how progressive and conservative Christians prioritize and link their political and theological beliefs. 57

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In this chapter, we will begin that inquiry by looking at how progressive and conservative Christians discuss political issues when they disagree with the general opinion of their respective political groups. Most previous work on the political backing offered by religious groups focuses on how those groups support the ideals of their political allies (Miller and Schofield 2008; D. Williams 2008; Olson 2011). While understanding the reasons why religious groups support certain political positions is important, such research focuses on the relationship between political and religious groups when that relationship is at its strongest. In other words, most researchers study the issues where Christians and their political allies agree with each other. But issues where the theological and political desires of potential in-groups differ can test the loyalty of Christians to their political allies. By analyzing examples of this potential conflict, we can assess the strength of the linkages connecting religious and political groups and how those linkages are maintained. To this end, we will examine the relationships of conservative Christians to political conservativism and of progressive Christians to political progressivism at one of each alliance’s weakest points. We seek to understand how individuals handle the tension of criticizing a political in-group that may be salient to that person’s religious identity and the need to remain a member of good standing within that in-group. To accomplish this task, we look to blogs from each group of Christians that disagree with their respective political parties on a specific issue. Generally, political progressives support abortion, and political conservatives oppose immigration reform (Saad 2011; Capps and Fix 2013; Jelen 2017). Thus, we will examine writings of those who oppose these typical positions: progressive Christians who define themselves as pro-life, and conservative Christians who support immigration reform.

Religious and Political Alliances In theory, Christian theology and political ideology do not have to correlate with each other. While there are theologically conservative Christians (most notably Christians of color) who support progressive politics and theologically progressive Christians with conservative political leanings, these individuals tend to be exceptions rather than the rule. It is reasonable to assume that social networks of conservative

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Christians are likely to include a high percentage of political conservatives, while the opposite is true for progressive Christians since social networks are an important part of social or political identity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Walsh 2004; Jones and Volpe 2011). Advocating political positions that conflict with political attitudes held by most within one’s network can be psychologically costly, since doing so can violate the political-religious alliances that are part of the network’s fabric. Perhaps both progressive and conservative Christians alter their theological interpretations to placate their political allies. However, there may be some issues on which those priorities simply do not easily conform with the norms of the associated political worldview for each group. For example, the rubric of social justice among progressive Christians may not include supporting the reproductive rights typically championed by political progressives. Some well-known progressive Christians, such as Anthony Campolo and Ron Sider, talk of a “consistent life ethic.” This focus on a consistent life ethic leads them to support progressive causes, such as systematic issues of financial inequality and racism, and eliminating the death penalty. But that ethic also includes challenging abortion, which is obviously a minority opinion among political progressives. Conservative Christians have also expressed theologically based differences with the political conservative party line. In 2016 several conservative Christians (for example, Matt Lewis, David French, Rod Dreher, and Marvin Olasky) with solid conservative political leanings broke with the Republican Party when President Trump was nominated to be their candidate for president. There were many issues on which they diverged with the presidential nominee, such as immigration policy and his perceived willingness to kill the families of terrorists. In addition, they saw him to be lacking in moral leadership regarding sexuality, racism, and sexism. But the immigration issue is of particular importance, as there has been a continuing disagreement among politically and some theologically conservative Christians about the proper biblical stance on immigrants, with some of them taking a decidedly pro-immigrant stance against political conservative norms (Sonderegger 2010; Soerens and Yang 2018). Such areas of disagreement provide an opportunity to observe how progressive and conservative Christians negotiate disagreements with

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their political allies. Examining the way in which progressive and conservative Christians interact with their political in-groups is also a helpful way to understand the political and religious priorities within each group’s social identities. The more salient an attribute is to an individual’s social identity, the more commitment that individual has to that attribute (Haslam et al. 1999; Stryker and Burke 2000). The findings in the previous chapter suggest that progressive Christians are more likely to have in-group loyalty based on political values than conservative Christians. Our findings also indicate that progressive Christians have lower regard for those with whom they politically disagree but that theological disagreement matters less to them. Hypothetically, political disagreements should create less tension among conservative Christians, who prioritize theological agreement, and free them to be harsher political critics. If progressive Christians give more weight to political agreement, then they may endanger their standing in a prioritized political in-group if they offer a strong political disagreement. One way to gather information about how progressive and conservative Christians understand their political alliances is by examining the material that representatives of these two religious positions have put online. Social media and blogs tend to encourage individuals to seek out information that reinforces their own ideological preconceptions (Jonas et al. 2001; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Del Vicario et al. 2016). Rather than attempt to reach out to all readers, it is advantageous for writers to craft the material so that it expresses the desires of selected subgroups. Those writing to a religiously conservative audience would take care to make sure that the material presented is designed to attract and sustain the interest of those conservative Christians. Likewise, those writing to a progressive audience will write to maintain the interest of progressive Christians. In both cases, the writers will become experienced in how to shape arguments acceptable to either conservative or progressive Christians and to avoid ideas unpalatable to their respective subcultures. The knowledge of how to address a given subculture is especially important when dealing with an issue on which many members of that subculture will disagree with the writer. Religious writers who disagree with the political stances of the dominant political ideology of that subculture likely learn how to address their concerns in ways that can be accepted by the blog’s readers. Examining how they engage in this image

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management can inform us about the limits of acceptable ideological deviance from the political norm of a religious group. The need to express divergent viewpoints in ways that can still appeal to the target audience gives us the context to understand how religious groups negotiate potential ideological disagreements with their political allies. Online articles and blogs are not representative samples and will not inform us of the systematic attitudes of all conservative or progressive Christians. But they are the manifestations of how select individuals manage their public image, particularly on issues controversial to many of their readers. To gain a following, writers of blogs must learn about their audience’s preferences and then fashion material that appeals to a sufficient number of members in that audience. Those unable or unwilling to write in a way that allows members of a particular subculture to feel represented are unlikely to gain a large-enough following to sustain the blog. Likewise, generally, authors of online articles have also learned how to reach their particular subculture. Those who are not successful in doing so will usually not gain opportunities to put forth their articles. For this reason, blogs and online articles are excellent sources of information about the public persona encouraged by conservative or progressive Christians. The nine progressive Christian blog posts and twelve conservative Christian blog posts used in this study are listed in box 3.1. In the appendix, we explain why we chose these articles.

Findings: Progressive Christians on Abortion Here, we share the ideas found in the writings of several progressive Christians (Rachel Held Evans, Benjamin L. Corey, David Gushee, Jim Wallis, Hilary Yancey, Sarah Bessey, Shane Claiborne, Anthony Campolo, Kirsten Powers, and Matthew Paul Turner) who disagree with the prominent political progressive stance on abortion. Much of the literature written by these progressive Christians must be understood in the context of two national events bringing the issue of abortion to public light. This first was the Kermit Gosnell trial. Gosnell specialized in providing abortions to poor and minority women in Philadelphia, and he was accused of using unethical and unsafe medical procedures. He was convicted in 2013 of murdering three infants who were born alive and of involuntary manslaughter of a woman during an abortion. The publicity

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Box 3.1. List of Progressive Christian Pro-life and Conservative Christian Pro–immigration Reform Blog Posts Progressive Christian Pro-life Blog Posts “Why Progressive Christians Should Care about Abortion” by Rachel Held Evans https://rachelheldevans.com/blog/why-progressive-christians-should -careabout-abortion-gosnell “You Don’t Have to Be Afraid to Be a Pro-life Progressive” by Benjamin L. Corey www.benjaminlcorey.com/you-dont-have-to-be-afraid-to-be-a-pro-life -progressive/ “Don’t Blame Planned Parenthood for Our Abortion Culture” by David Gushee www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/dont-blame-plannedparenthood-for-our-abortion-culture-commentary/2015/07/22/a0f7563430a2-11e5-a879-213078d03dd3_story.html?utm_term=.2fe1ee0fd972 “Abortion—From Symbol to Substance” by Jim Wallis www.huffpost.com/entry/abortion-from-symbol-to-s_b_46422 “On Planned Parenthood and the Language We Use around Pregnancy and Abortion” by Hilary Yancey www.rageagainsttheminivan.com/2015/07/on-planned-parenthood-andlanguage-we.html#ixzz3gmA6e77m “A Voice for the Voiceless” by Sarah Bessey www.facebook.com/sarah.styles.bessey/posts/new-post-a-voicefor-the-voiceless-httpsarahbesseycoma-voice-for-the-voiceless-i /991420264242706/ “A Dialogue on What It Means to Be Pro-life” by Shane Claiborne and Anthony Campolo www.redletterchristians.org/a-dialogue-on-what-it-means-to-be-pro-life/ “Crush Planned Parenthood” by Kirsten Powers www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/07/21/ planned-parenthood-abortion-fetus-parts-kirsten-powers/30426475/ “I Don’t Know When Life Begins. But I Know It Begins . . .” by Matthew Paul Turner http://matthewpaulturner.com/2015/07/15/i-dont-know-when-life-begins -but-i-know-it-begins/

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Conservative Christian Pro–immigration Reform Blog Posts “A Christian Case for Immigration Reform” by Derrick Lynch et al. www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/14/a_christian_case_for_immigration_reform_732.html “Evangelical Support for Immigration Reform Is Biblical, Not Political” by Matthew Soerens www.patheos.com/blogs/philosophicalfragments/2013/03/13/ evangelical-support-immigration-reform-biblical-not-political-soerens/ “Not Fit for Dinner: Evangelicals, Immigration, and Mitt Romney” by C. Ryan Knight https://christandpopculture.com/ not-fit-for-dinner-evangelicals-immigration-and-mitt-romney/ “Citizenship Confusion: Illegal Immigration and the SBC” by Alan Noble https://christandpopculture.com/citizenship-confusion-illegal-immigra tion-and-the-sbc/ “Why Immigration Reform Is a Christian Cause” by Samuel Rodriguez www.patheos.com/blogs/hispanicevangelicalsandthelambsagenda /2013/08/why-immigration-reform-is-a-christian-cause/?repeat=w3tc “What Would a Biblical Immigration Policy Be?” by Jeff Cavanaugh https://christandpopculture.com/what-would-a-biblical-immigration -policy-be/ “There’s No Such Thing as an Illegal Human Being” by Paul Louis Metzger www.patheos.com/blogs/uncommongodcommongood/2017/02/theres -no-thing-illegal-human/#lAzf1jkYR21V89Qo.99 “Illegal Immigration: Seeking a Christian Perspective” by Mark D. Roberts www.patheos.com/blogs/markdroberts/series/illegal-immigration-seeking -a-christian-perspective/ “Just Mercy: Why Christians Should Support Immigration Reform” by Bruce Ashford http://dailycaller.com/2016/11/30/just-mercy-why-christians-should-support-immigration-reform/ “Richard Land Interview on Immigration Reform and the Rule of Law” by Alan Cross http://Alancrosswrites.com/Richard-Land-Interview-on-Immigration -Reform-and-the-Rule-of-Law/

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“Immigration and the Gospel” by Russell Moore www.russellmoore.com/2011/06/17/immigration-and-the-gospel/ “Immigration Rights and Wrongs” by Ralph Reed www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/02/12/ralph-reed-immigration -rights-and-wrongs/1914813/

created by his crime and trial provoked conversation not only about abortion, but also about the mistreatment of marginalized women. The second event was the controversial undercover videos about Planned Parenthood by the Center for Medical Progress. The Center for Medical Progress is an anti-abortion organization that posed as a buyer of fetal tissue and approached several Planned Parenthood organizations. In 2013, they shot hidden videos in which officials at Planned Parenthood indicated a willingness to profit from the fetal tissue collected through abortion. The videos convinced some conservative politicians to seek a criminal investigation of Planned Parenthood; however, it was the Center for Medical Progress that was taken to court for civil lawsuits and criminal charges of purchasing human organs and invasion of privacy. Both events produced an emotionally charged atmosphere for both prolife and pro-choice political groups in the United States.

“I Do Not Trust Most Right Wing Pro Life Groups. I Think They’re Dishonest”: Separation from Political Conservatives The emotional anxiety created by these public events is palpable in comments within the blog posts. For example, Powers says of the Planned Parenthood video, “This is stomach turning stuff. . . . There is no nice way to talk about any of this.” Rachel Held Evans said in response to the Gosnell event, “Not surprisingly, I couldn’t think of anything worthwhile to say. I was, truly, speechless.” The events that spurred many of these progressive Christians discussions’ about abortion clearly evoked strong emotions. The response of pro-life progressive Christians is not limited to emotional venting, however. Indeed, certain thought patterns are put forth by these bloggers and authors as they defend the pro-life cause. For

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example, while each author to varying degrees claims a status as a prolife individual, each is also quite critical of the pro-life movement. And here’s where the pro-life movement I grew up with went wrong— they often hold their belief in a highly obnoxious, rigid, and unsympathetic way. Don’t do that! Instead of shouting people down with signs and comments you got off a bumper sticker somewhere, articulate your pro-life view with humility and dignity. (Corey) I waited until now to speak up because I do not trust most right wing pro life groups. I think they’re dishonest. I think the makers of the video in question were being dishonest in how they sold their narrative. (Turner)

These authors attack the character, and even the morality, of those in the pro-life community. Given the general image of the pro-life movement as being led by conservative Christians, it is likely that these bloggers and authors want to make certain that they separated themselves from this movement. Even progressive Christians who agree with conservative Christians on abortion perceive the need to criticize conservative Christians. Perhaps tied to this tendency to criticize conservative pro-lifers is the lack of willingness of these bloggers and authors to advocate for political changes to limit or end legal abortion. Of the nine entries, only two (Powers and Claiborne; Campolo) indicate a clear desire for political reform and one (Yancey) is not quite clear on whether pro-life political reform is desirable.1 The other six writings indicate to some degree that abortion restriction should not be sought. Jim Wallis represents this attitude: “We have supported a ‘consistent life ethic’—which seeks a dramatic reduction in the actual abortion rate in America, without criminalizing what is always a tragic choice and often a desperate one. Others also question if total abortion bans are really pro-life because of the likely consequences of back-alley abortions, especially for poor women.” To advocate for legal change can put the bloggers and authors more directly in conflict with their political allies. Perhaps for that reason, even though they disagree with political progressives on this issue, they remain supportive of the progressives’ general political stance on this issue.

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Wallis’s comments bring into the conversation another key element of the progressive Christian approach to abortion. Several writers promote a “consistent life ethic” approach, which addresses not just abortion but also issues such as poverty, racism, pacificism, and global warming. In this “culture of life” approach, these progressive Christians can situate their distaste for abortion within the larger politically progressive framework. It allows them to talk to other progressives in a way that substantiates their common political and social values. To be clear, these progressives do differentiate themselves from pro-choice progressives, though, even while appealing to common values. They critique the pro-choice movement as being too dismissive of the humanity of the fetus, such as the criticism articulated by Evans (“What frustrates me about the pro-choice movement is the lengths to which advocates go to dehumanize unborn children and sanitize the abortion procedure, reducing life to nothing more than a cluster of cells and the implications of pregnancy to little more than a choice”) or making too little effort to reduce abortion as stated by Gushee (“And by the way, whatever happened to ‘safe, legal, and rare’? Where is your energy for seriously driving down abortion rates?”). The critique that the pro-choice movement lacks compassion is not dissimilar to some of the criticism that progressives level at political conservatives. In this way, pro-life progressive Christians imply that their pro-life stance stems from their progressive values. They can tie those political values to certain social values such as compassion. Thus, they critique other progressives based not on their political goals, but on their failure to live up to the social values they see tied to a progressive political orientation.

“This Is Incredibly Complex and I Offer Only My Deep Compassion to the Women Who Find Themselves Here. I Carry No Easy Solutions, There Are None”: The Nuances of Abortion There are other ways the writers present their arguments to fit within a progressive political framework. For example, the authors often cited concern for women in their arguments, whether it is a concern for prenatal care, low socioeconomic status, minority women, or other help for women facing an unplanned pregnancy. The framing of women as a marginalized group is presented as a progressive-friendly reason

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for a pro-life stance. This is not the only way authors showed sensitivity to feministic concerns, as Turner talks about his hesitancy to speak out on this issue as a male. Awareness of a possible feminist critique may be part of what motivates these assertions that a pro-life stance is a pro-women stance. To this end, several writers describe abortion as a nuanced issue and not quite as black and white as either the pro-life or pro-choice groups represent. As a woman, as a mother, as a Christian, as a feminist, my entire being revolts against abortion and the Orwellian language with which we excuse ourselves. I carry no judgment, how could I? This is incredibly complex and I offer only my deep compassion to the women who find themselves here. I carry no easy solutions, there are none. (Bessey) And I know this issue is layered and involves a multitude of stories, most of which I’ve never heard. But at some point, abortion is an issue that involves a person who has no voice. She’s not a liver. Or a heart. Or a pair of lungs. She’s a life. (Turner)

This nuanced approach to the issue of abortion situates these speakers, with the few exceptions mentioned above, in between the pro-life and pro-choice movement. They will not define themselves as prochoice due to their powerful distaste for abortion. But they are not generally pro-life in that they usually do not support legislation that would directly outlaw abortion. Indeed, their hesitation to speak more directly against abortion has been noted and criticized by conservative Christians for not being willing to take the steps necessary for ending it (Vicari 2018). Their position on abortion pushes them out of politically progressive mainstream thought on this issue, but not so far out of that mainstream that they would be outright political heretics. It appears that there is a certain level of accommodation among political progressives that allows these progressive Christians to express their concerns about abortion in ways that do not seriously challenge the political goals of progressives. Pro-life progressives demonstrate a tendency to fit their opposition to abortion within a progressive political framework and value system. Their disagreement with other progressives is presented as a contrasting way to apply their shared progressive values, and not

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as disagreement with the overarching values themselves. Asserting that their dissenting opinions stem from shared values limits the attacks to issues of moral principle instead of questions about legal measures. Such a tactic provides them an avenue to remain in good standing with progressives by avoiding direct attacks on governmental policy.

Findings: Conservative Christians on Immigration Reform We now turn our attention to the ideas presented by conservative Christian bloggers and online article writers (Derrick Lynch, Matthew Soerens, C. Ryan Knight, Alan Noble, Samuel Rodriguez, Jeff Cavanaugh, Paul Louis Metzger, Mark D. Roberts, Bruce Ashford, Richard Land, Russell Moore, and Ralph Reed) supporting immigration reform. Like the response to abortion, the discussion about immigration also occurs within a social context that helped shape this conversation. In the past few years, concerns about immigration have been addressed by certain factions of conservative Christians. Much of this conversation began as the Obama administration struggled to resolve how undocumented individuals should be handled. For example, in 2010 the Evangelical Statement of Principles for Immigration Reform was created by the Evangelical Immigration Table, which was a coalition of Evangelical leaders and institutions. The statement supported a comprehensive approach to immigration and talked of both securing borders and establishing pathways to legal status or citizenship for those undocumented individuals already living in the United States. But this comprehensive approach ran counter to the disapproving sentiment of many political conservatives who believed offering citizenship to immigrants living in the country illegally would be a reward for unlawful behavior. Indeed, some research suggests Trump used anti-immigration rhetoric to help him win the Republican nomination and eventually the presidency (J. Brown 2016; Collingwood, Reny, and Valenzuela 2017; Kellner 2017), and white conservative Christians turned out to be one of his biggest groups of supporters. One effect of this support appears to be a general unwillingness of white conservative Christians to support illegal immigration as well as immigration from certain Muslim-majority countries (Fea 2019).

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“The Bible Repeatedly Emphasizes That Christians Should Exhibit Mercy”: Biblical-Based Support for Immigration Reform Like the pro-life progressives, conservative Christians seeking a comprehensive immigration solution stand in contrast to their normal political allies. They oppose most white conservative Christians who support the immigration policies of President Trump. Yet their methods and arguments are not the same as the pro-life authors. One difference that becomes immediately clear is that they are eager to present a biblical rationale for their argument. The Bible says nothing about treating people with respect who are documented immigrants, but that we can dismiss in sweeping terms undocumented immigrants as criminals. It simply tells Israel to care for people who are aliens in their midst because they themselves were once aliens in the land of Egypt. (Metzger) I believe that the primary reason that most have spoken out is not, as Mr. Tooley hints, an embrace of sentimental, liberal theology, but rather an orthodox commitment to the authority of Scripture. (Soerens) At the same time, the Bible repeatedly emphasizes that Christians should exhibit mercy. While our nation should enforce its immigration laws, we should demand that it does so in a humane and compassionate manner. Immigrants are not sub-human. They are created in God’s image (Gen 1:26–27) and are the recipients of Jesus’ love (Jn 3:16). The Bible instructs us not to oppress immigrants (Mal 3:5) or to treat them in ways that we would not want to be treated ourselves (Mt 7:12). (Ashford)

Indeed, the titles for about half of the articles framed immigration as a biblical (“What Would a Biblical Immigration Policy Be?”) or Christian (“Why Immigration Reform Is a Christian Cause”) issue. These conservative Christians exhibit a strong need to root their ideas about immigration in religious legitimation. The average blog entry among these conservative Christians quotes scripture an average of 4.08 times in comparison to progressive Christians who only quoted scripture an average of 0.44 times per post in their blog entries about abortion.

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This need for biblical legitimation is also tied to their concern for what they interpret as Christian values, most notably the preservation of the family. For example, comments about the importance of family maintenance come up in five of the twelve blogs. For example, “First and foremost, immigration should strengthen the family. Today, there are an estimated 1 million spouses and children of legal U.S. residents awaiting green cards. It could take three to 10 years before they can join their loved ones. This delay is needless and heart-wrenching” (Reed). Furthermore, other authors express concerns about violating biblical values by rejecting foreigners: “Psalm 94:6–7 reveals God’s displeasure with Israel’s treatment of vulnerable people and cites mistreatment of the sojourner as an example” (Lynch et al.). Still others appeal to biblical instruction to love one’s neighbor: “We are commanded to love our neighbors (Lev. 19:18)—immigrants explicitly included (Lev. 19:33–34)” (Soerens). Widely accepted Christian values based on a fairly inerrant reading of the Bible drive many of these authors’ concerns. In another significant difference, none of the conservatives’ articles criticized the immigration reform movement like the pro-life progressive Christians criticized the pro-life movement. Some did see fault in both Democrats and Republicans. For example, Rodriguez states that “both political parties in Washington D.C. have played the proverbial political football with the issue of comprehensive immigration reform.” However, criticism is generally aimed more at Republicans than Democrats. This indicates perhaps the most important difference between these authors and the pro-life authors: they did not hesitate to call for changes that directly countered the political narrative adopted by many conservative Christians. They did not shy away from calling for legislative solutions as well as attitudinal changes. On immigration there is little to no attempt to nuance their disagreement with Republicans. They clearly want political change, and the Republican Party is in the way of that change. They are not afraid to point this out. However, the ideas advanced by the writers do not completely match the most progressive ideas on immigration reform. Some, although not all, argue for a pathway to legalization instead of focusing on citizenship. Noble argues, “We must be just and compassionate. We must provide a path to legal status with appropriate restitutionary measures.” Furthermore, while there is an emphasis on compassion for undocumented

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individuals, eight of the twelve blogs explicitly discuss either securing the border or not allowing amnesty. For example, Rodriguez states, “Justice is not amnesty. Justice secures the border and stops illegal immigration but also builds a bridge where the undocumented can qualify through a strict regimen of metrics, can pay fines and can begin a process of fully embracing the American dream.” A fair summarization of the position of these bloggers and online writers is endorsement of a policy that is significantly more progressive than the stance of the current Republican administration but not as radical as the most leftist immigration reformers. It is a position that pushes them, on this issue, out of the mainstream Republican Party position and into an acceptable range of the Democratic Party.

Analysis Key differences and similarities can be found in the analysis of progressive Christian pro-life blogs and conservative Christian pro–immigration reform blogs and online articles. Perhaps the most important similarity is that both groups engage in arguments intended to alter the perspectives of those in their respective political parties. Progressive pro-life writers attempt to move other progressives to be more respectful of the potential life in a pregnancy and to work toward reducing the number of abortions through social action. Conservative pro–immigration reform authors challenge the Republican political emphasis on “deportationonly” immigration policies. The two groups of authors are also similar in that neither accepts the most radical position of the opposing political group. The progressive pro-lifers are hesitant to propose legislative solutions to abortion. The conservative pro–immigration reform advocates still want a strong border and to avoid amnesty. But the differences between the two groups are quite relevant. Pro-life bloggers and online authors are very critical of the pro-life movement, while there is not corresponding criticism against the immigration reform movement. Furthermore, most of the pro-life authors do not significantly challenge the Democratic legislative agenda on abortion, whereas the pro–immigration reform writers argue for legislation that directly contradicts the stated Republican platform on immigration. Pro-life writers generally focus on changing attitudes toward abortion

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while the pro–immigration reform authors focus on changing legislation and official Republican policy. Finally, the pro-life bloggers and online authors attempt to legitimate their argument with appeals to a consistent life ethic that fits within a progressive political framework of compassion for the marginalized. The pro–immigration reform authors rely more, but not exclusively, upon an appeal to Christianity and biblical values to justify their desire for reform. These differences suggest contrasting relationships of the two groups of writers to their respective political parties. Progressive pro-lifers may have a stronger need to remain in good standing with their chosen political group. If their social identity is closely tied to their political community, then there can be a higher social cost to directly calling for political alterations. However, if they are motivated to combat abortion, they can do so by appealing to the progressive political and moral values of their allies. Those values can go beyond simply voting the right way but also touch on social values of compassion and social justice that these authors envision as part of their political philosophy. For progressive Christians, political loyalties may represent an identity much deeper than winning political races. There is a larger value system they adhere to, which they use to make their pro-life appeal. But it is an appeal that is made carefully so that they continue to be included within their political subculture. The way pro-life progressives articulate their disagreement may reflect the larger process by which they formulate their political opinions. Their dissent on this issue demonstrates that they do not simply adopt the entire agenda of a party, so their ideological motivations must run deeper than partisan politics. They conceptualize the relaxed attitudes many of their political peers have toward abortion as a violation of values larger than partisan politics. They see those pro-choice attitudes as both a betrayal of the marginalized and a lack of compassion. This critique suggests that it is not necessarily specific issues that draw progressive Christians to political progressive stances, but that there is a larger value set promoted by progressive Christians. When other political progressives deviate from that larger set of values, such as these authors believe they do on abortion, then they find it quite appropriate to dissent in a way that calls progressives back to those values. Conservative Christians, however, are more apt than progressives to directly challenge their political allies. If political concerns are not core

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to their social identity, then it is less costly for conservative Christians to challenge political conservatives. The appeal to scripture suggests that conservative Christian writers envision their audience motivated more by biblical arguments than political arguments. This comports with the notion that conservative Christians utilize their theological interpretations as the major source of their social identity. If one answers questions about what actions to take by attempting to obey the direction of a deity, then the most effective way to alter that person’s actions or ideas is by arguing about the desires of that deity. Like the progressive pro-lifers, they are calling their political allies to adhere to a larger set of values outside of partisan politics—the values they stipulate are biblical. In doing so, they attempt to maximize their chances of obtaining the support of other conservative Christians for immigration reform. But they have little to no concern about driving away political conservatives in this process. This suggests that, unlike the pro-life bloggers, they may not view their value system as being completely compatible with political conservatism. A conservative political system may be only beneficial to the degree that it serves their larger theological concerns. Given that blogs and online articles are public documents and that presentation of a given public image is likely to be important, it is vital that these authors know what types of arguments motivate their readers. If progressive Christian authors attract progressive Christian readers and conservative Christian authors attract conservative Christian readers, these results indicate how each group justifies what information to accept. The writers seem to believe that progressive Christians are more likely to accept information tied to larger progressive political values while conservative Christians are more likely to accept information tied to perceived biblical values. Of course, we have no way of knowing whether the bloggers and article writers are correct, but given the results in chapter 2, we are inclined to consider their assessment to be accurate.

Conclusion This study illuminates how progressive and conservative Christians present themselves when they have political positions contrary to their larger political in-group. We found that such individuals will present ideas contrary to the dominant narrative but generally do not totally

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adopt the narrative of the political out-group. Even pro–immigration reform bloggers and article writers, while challenging the immigration agenda of political conservatives, did not tend to accept the most radical immigration proposals, such as open borders or amnesty. While individuals are often willing to challenge the dominant narrative of their in-group, there are limitations to how far such challenges will go. Ingroups have boundaries that can be stretched but ultimately cannot be totally broken. When constructing the original design of this research, there were multiple political issues by which we could have tested conservative Christian bloggers and online authors. There were examples of conservative Christians challenging the conservative political orthodoxy on issues such as on the organization Black Lives Matters, racism, environmentalism, and poverty. Yet when looking for progressive Christian bloggers and online authors, the only political issue where multiple bloggers differed from the general political progressive orthodoxy was abortion. Such a lack of variety of differences may be another indicator of the difficulty progressive Christians have distinguishing themselves from the political expectations of their in-group relative to conservative Christians. Their ability to challenge their political in-group appears to be limited to one major political issue, whereas conservative Christians feel a freedom to challenge Republicans over a wide variety of political differences. There are more paths by which conservative Christians defy conservative political ideology than paths by which progressive Christians defy progressive political ideology. The differences between the pro-life and pro–immigration reform authors indicate that the elasticity of the boundaries can vary depending on what values are most important to a group. Since political values may be more important than religious values for in-group formation among progressive Christians, it is reasonable to assert that they have less political flexibility than conservative Christians. This allows conservative Christians to put forth a more substantial confrontation of the political ideals of their in-group, as long as that confrontation can be seen as based on arguments about biblical values. (If we tested the willingness of Christians to question the theological boundaries of their in-group, then it is quite possible, and perhaps even probable, that progressive Christians would have been more likely to push those boundaries.) These

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observations indicate that willingness to challenge one’s in-group is contextualized by which values are considered core values of that group. We also gain insight into image management among Christians and the way progressive and conservative Christians interpret the priorities of their Christian in-groups. We find evidence reinforcing the differing political and religious values of progressive and conservative Christians. Even though members of both groups claim the mantel of “Christian,” they have developed value systems based upon distinct elements of their faith. Conservative Christians are tied to notions of absolutism that comes from their adherence to sacred scripture (Osmer 2011; C. Wallace 2016; Sherkat and Ellison 1997), while progressive Christians tie much of their ideology to humanistic rationality and a desire for social justice (Clatworthy 2010; Newlands 2012; Gasaway 2014). By appealing to these larger social values, progressive and conservative Christians attempt to motivate other members of their in-group. This qualitative assessment indicates how those differences can play themselves out in intragroup social interaction. The quantitative evidence of chapter 2 suggests that political values drive the social identity of progressive Christians. However, this chapter opens up the possibility that progressive Christians locate their political ideals within a larger set of social values. Progressive Christians do not focus on theological matters in a similar manner as conservative Christians, but they do exhibit a larger set of values that drives them to progressive political ideology. So it is not important to the pro-life bloggers and online authors that they win the legislative battle to reduce abortion, but they do find it important that other progressives begin to see abortion through the lens of their perceived progressive social values. It is this set of values they use to appeal to other progressives and promote a consistent life ethic. Defining further what constitutes a consistent life ethic and identifying the larger progressive values that progressive Christians emphasize are tasks that will better help us to understand the social values and identities of progressive Christians. In chapter 2, we quantitatively documented the differing theological and political priorities of progressive and conservative Christians. In this chapter we noted the different ways progressive and conservative Christians approach political disagreements with their potential allies. Bloggers and online authors are to some degree public figures. It is fair

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to ask whether the attitudes exhibited by these authors reflect the perspectives of the average conservative or progressive Christians. There is value, then, in directly assessing the attitudes and priorities of nonpublic progressive and conservative Christians as well. In the next few chapters, we will examine qualitative research conducted on public and nonpublic Christians that provides a more nuanced understanding of conservative and progressive Christian differences, particularly in the way they prioritize their political and theological concerns.

4

In or Out? How Christians Justify Their Acceptance or Rejection of Believers with Differing Faiths I wish we taught more in our schools about the Islamic faith. . . . It’s one of the great confessional faiths. What people don’t realize is . . . one of my advocations is theology. [They] don’t realize that we all come from the same root here in terms of our fundamental, basic beliefs. . . . Hadith from the prophet Muhammad instructs, “Whomever among you sees wrong, let him change it with his hand. If he is not able, then with his tongue. If he is not able, then with his heart.” —Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, speaking at the Emgage Action’s Million Muslims Voters Summit, July 20, 2020 The god of Islam and the God of the Bible are not the same. The god of Islam wants you to die for him. The God of the Bible sent His Son to die for us. Jesus said, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.” Only if we put our faith and trust in Him, can we spend eternity in Heaven. I wish all Muslims could know the truth. They can find what their hearts are searching for only through Jesus Christ. —Franklin Graham, Facebook post in response to a terrorist attack on May 5, 2015, in which two gunmen opened fire outside the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas, which was hosting a contest featuring cartoons of Muhammad

In the attack referenced above for the Graham quote, one of the Muslim gunmen in Garland, Texas, said he had come there to die, believing that this would please his god and he would go to heaven.1 When Christians encounter other people who hold beliefs different from their own—whether those other people are fellow Christians or members 77

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of a different religion altogether—they must make a decision: can we accommodate these alternative views within our community, or must we exclude these views and those who represent them? Clearly, Joe Biden, a Catholic, expressed a familial warmth toward Islam, and he even quoted Muhammad, believing Muslims to hold the same fundamental religious beliefs as he does. However, Franklin Graham, a conservative Evangelical, believes Muslims hold oppositional beliefs to Christianity and that they are in desperate need of the truth of Jesus Christ. How did Biden and Franklin come to such conflicting positions? This chapter examines how Christians draw boundaries and decide what differences they are willing to embrace versus those they are not willing to embrace. In other words, it examines how Christians define their in-groups and how they decide which groups are out-groups. More specifically, this project examines how theologically conservative and theologically progressive Christians differ in how they conceptualize their in-groups and out-groups. It relies on qualitative survey data to explore how both types of Christians—those that lean theologically conservative and those that lean theologically progressive—justify their acceptance or rejection of other Christians, as well as how they justify their acceptance or rejection of Muslims, who are included in the study because they are an example of a group often considered outside of the boundaries of Christianity. Our focus is on how Christians legitimate conflicts with other Christians and with Muslims as we explore how Christians decide whether rival groups are part of their in-group or whether they represent an out-group, and we also dissect how Christians establish the boundaries that shape their social identity. Lastly, we also examine the extent to which Christians’ political values may or may not influence how they build their theological identity, depending on their theological outlook (conservative versus progressive). As we saw in chapter 1, the key historical moment in the divergence of American theological conservativism from theological liberalism was the modernist-fundamentalist controversy within American Christianity in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The controversy forced Christians to choose between fundamentalism—an emphasis on the message of eternal salvation through trust in Christ’s atoning work—and modernism, which tended to emphasize a social gospel that concentrated on political action and sought to realize the

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kingdom of God on earth by aiding the progress of civilization (Marsden 2006, 120). Previously, Christians had been primarily divided along denominational lines, but this new split happened within denominations rather than simply between them. This division set the foundation for a conservative-progressive split that continues to divide denominations today. While the earlier modernist-fundamentalist split reflected real differences between the two camps, the differences between today’s progressive and conservative Christians have increased over time. For instance, whereas both modernists and fundamentalists used to see lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) sexual orientations as sinful, progressive Christians of today now generally affirm these sexualities, whereas conservative Christians typically continue to take a hard-line stance condemning them. This is just one of many illustrations of how the rift between the two camps has grown. It is vital to explore the rift further, which we will accomplish by focusing on how progressive and conservative Christians differ on the topic of Islam and Muslims. The examination of how Christians’ theological orientations shape their attitudes toward Muslims is useful not solely for improving our understanding of domestic issues; it can also improve our understanding of global dynamics. The specific focus of this portion of our research—the question of how US Christians view Islam—is important on a global scale because Christianity and Islam are already the world’s largest religions and are projected to keep increasing their respective shares of the world’s population relative to other religions. Thus, we are studying how the largest faith group in the world views the second largest faith group in the world. We believe religious beliefs motivate people to act and that their actions have consequences for themselves and society at large. Studying religious beliefs helps us better understand the world. As we have already argued, much work has been done on the political priorities of conservative Christians, looking, for example, at the fervency of the religious right in trying to outlaw abortion. But there is a need for more research in order to better understand the relationship between the political priorities of progressive Christians and their religious beliefs. A 2014 Pew Research Center study found that the majority of the members of the Democratic Party identify as Christian. Many

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progressive Christians are closely aligned with the social justice principles of the Democratic Party, and some openly defend their political positions by discussing their understanding of their faith (E. Green 2019). At the same time, however, a separate Pew study on American attitudes toward religious groups found that Democrats in the United States rated Evangelical Christians, who are typically theologically conservative, at a cooler temperature than Muslims on the “feeling thermometer” (Pew Research Center 2017a; Sacks 2018). The fact that the Democratic Party is majority Christian, but that Democrats exhibit more warmth toward Muslims than toward Evangelical Christians, could seem surprising. But this work will help to explain why Islam—a traditional theological alternative to Christianity—is seen by some progressive Christians today as more appealing than conservative and Evangelical Christianity, which, in theory, should be a closer political match to progressive Christianity than Islam. This examination of the divisions between theological progressives and conservatives focuses on a population of US Christians, mostly Evangelicals. We are using the Evangelicals in a qualitative manner to support the overall quantitative findings in this book as a whole, which are in no way specific to Evangelicals (non-Evangelical Christians are represented in our quantitative work). We have selected this group as the focus of our qualitative research partially because there is substantial theological diversity within Evangelicalism. Also, Evangelicals are an important Christian group to explore as they are the largest (and arguably the most dynamic) Christian group in the United States (Berger 1999, 2008). The national media tends to present all Evangelicals as one and the same: they are often typecast as backward, conservative Christians. While most stereotypes of Evangelicals present them as conservative theologically and politically, there is actually strong division among Evangelicals, with some Evangelicals identifying as either theologically progressive, politically progressive, or both. Thus we are able to explore conservative-progressive divides even within this traditionally “conservative” Christian group. By focusing on Evangelicals in the next few chapters, we illustrate well the dynamic of changes taking place within denominations. For many decades the differences between progressive and conservative Christians have been supplanting the differences between denominations within Christianity (J. Hunter 1992; Quosigk

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2021). In other words, Evangelical Baptist progressives are more at odds with Evangelical Baptist conservatives than they are with, for example, Episcopalians. Progressives are siding with progressives of other denominations and even followers of other religions. The divides articulated between progressive and conservative Evangelicalism are the same types of divides taking place in other non-Evangelical Christian denominations. Thus, exploring divides within one Christian group provides a representative exploration of divides occurring within and between all Christian groups. Below we will briefly explore the characteristics of the Evangelical Christian community followed by an explanation of the methods used in this chapter and the following two chapters. After explaining these methods, we will briefly offer some key findings that will be unpacked further in the following pages.

Evangelical Christians The Evangelical movement is a transnational movement within Protestant Christianity. In the past it was known for its emphasis on conversion (stressing the importance of being “born again”), proselytization (sharing faith with others), and holding a high view of the Bible as the inspired Word of God. Evangelicals were also known to emphasize the atoning sacrifice of Christ on the cross as a historical event necessary for salvation. Early American Evangelicalism took on a unique emphasis on the Holy Spirit and revival during the first and second Great Awakening movements. This emphasis on the Holy Spirit is still evident in portions of American Evangelical Christianity today.

Baptists in America: A Case Study of Progressive-Conservative Battles within an Evangelical Denomination American Evangelicalism has come to be dominated by Baptists. American Baptists are usually thought to originate from a seventeenth-century Protestant sect with roots in England. Baptists were originally a minority group in both England and America, but from the seventeenth century on, the group grew steadily in America. Today, there are several different groups of Baptists in America, but the term often refers

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to members of the Southern Baptist denomination, which is the largest Protestant denomination in the United States, comprising 47,456 member churches (Southern Baptist Convention 2019). Baptist history is long and sometimes convoluted, but we will provide some highlights here that will illustrate how the modernist-fundamentalist divide played out in this denomination and how that divide has now developed into the progressive-conservative divide.2 In the 1700s, Evangelical Baptist preachers from the North began to travel to the outskirts of towns in the southern countryside to minister to the settlers living there (Kidd 2008b). This wave occurred as part of the Great Awakening, a revival movement that began in the 1730s and continued until the 1780s and the closure of the American Revolution (Kidd 2008a). The steady conversion of these settlers to Christianity began what became known as the Bible Belt, a region of the US South known for its abundance of “born again” Christians and numerous Evangelical churches (Dillon and Savage 2006; Kidd 2008b, 17–18). During this movement, preachers made use of large fields and parks to deliver emotional open-air revival messages on the basics of the Christian faith. These messages were heard by all classes of people, including blacks, poor whites, and Indians, leading to many conversions and confusing the established hierarchies of race and class. Since the beginning of the Baptist movement, the group was discriminated against by the local government church leaders of the established churches, and this discrimination continued into the eighteenth century, even as the movement was experiencing significant growth. Understandably, Baptists in Virginia were for the “disestablishment of religion,” meaning they opposed the state-sponsored religious establishment of either the Congregational Church in the North or the Church of England in the South. They petitioned the government to do away with mandatory religious duties (James 1899, 71–73). Baptist Evangelicals desired a type of separation of church and state that still allowed for a “combination of public religion and religious freedom,” in which the government would protect public worship according to one’s own faith (Kidd 2008b, 2010; Sandstrom 2017). Although Baptists were generally united in their views on religious freedom, there was some division on other matters. One such issue was slavery. By 1860, almost 75 percent of all churches in the United States

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were Evangelical, but many were divided over the issue of slavery, including the entire Baptist denomination (Noll 2006, 14–15). An increasing number of Americans had decided slavery was immoral, and at the forefront of the movement against slavery were northern Evangelical abolitionists—both black and white (Kidd 2010, 147–165). Accordingly, Baptists in the North generally favored abolition. Many Baptists in the South, however, believed the Bible sanctioned slavery, and they affirmed the righteousness of slaveholding. Thus, they believed Baptists could own slaves within certain parameters without sinning (Heyrman 2013). Church leaders in the South also had a tendency toward separatism and were willing to divorce their fellow believers over disagreements. Accordingly, Southern Baptists split from the Triennial Convention in 1845 over the issue of slavery (Reimer 2003, 26), with Baptists in the South forming a new convention, namely, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). The name of the new denomination still stands today, although the denomination has substantially revised its views on slavery and race.3 The division among Baptists that is most relevant to the theme of this book is the division over the issue of missions, which was directly related to the modernist-fundamentalist controversy. An internal conflict developed as some Baptists were willing to agree with modern ideals more than other Baptists. Some Baptists aligned their mission more along the lines of the social gospel, prioritizing social services and general education, while more fundamentalist Baptists continued to embrace a more traditional mission style, relying on direct proselytization, evangelism, and conversion. More conservative Baptists, meanwhile, believed the principles of the social gospel to be contrary to the mission of historic Protestantism. These fundamentalists believed that Christian efforts should focus not on the achievement of economic equality, but rather on spreading the message of eternal salvation through trust in Christ’s atoning work (Marsden 2006, 120; Kidd and Hankins 2015, 170–172). The disagreement over this issue culminated with a split in the Northern Baptist Convention (formerly known as the Triennial Convention, but which had undergone a name change in 1907). Fundamentalist leaders in the Convention, most famously William Bell Riley, left to form the Conservative Baptist Association. In reaction to the growth of modernism and its influence within the Baptist church, fundamentalists founded

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new missionary agencies, periodicals, and schools with fundamentalist leadership. But while fundamentalist Baptists protested the nonconversionist developmental education espoused by the modernist Baptists, the modernist approach had influence over time, and many moderate and liberal Baptists shifted to abandon conversion ministry altogether. The divide persists to this day. By the mid-1900s, there were a plethora of Baptist groups in America, and by the end of the twentieth century, Baptists were experiencing new divides over issues like the ordination of women, abortion, the Bible, and eschatology, to name a few. Beginning in 1979, the SBC experienced a major conflict begun by conservative Christian Baptists who believed liberalism had taken root in Baptist institutions and who sought a renewed emphasis on an inerrantist view of the Bible (Ammerman 2019). Many of the theologically conservative Baptists, led by men such as Al Mohler, Paul Pressler, and Paige Patterson, feared that the seminaries and educational institutions were being taken over by those with more progressive theological stances. Issues of biblical inerrancy and women in leadership shaped much of the debate they had with moderate or progressive Baptists. They organized in 1979 to win the presidency of the SBC. The president could appoint leaders in key leadership positions. Eventually they were able to place conservative Christians in leadership positions for seminaries, publishing houses, mission boards, Sunday school boards, and state conventions. This movement came to be known as the “conservative resurgence” by its supporters and as the “fundamentalists’ takeover” by its opponents. The resurgence was successful in the sense that it not only resulted in the systematic election of conservative Christians, but also led to the ousting of moderate or liberal Baptists from places of leadership within the Convention and its institutions. In this process, views on scripture were used as a test of orthodoxy. The resurgence was “one of the most significant religious events of the twentieth century” (Kidd and Hankins 2015, 228), and it mirrored the shift toward conservatism in broader US culture, exemplified in the 1984 reelection of Ronald Reagan (Kidd and Hankins 2015, 230). There were political ramifications of this movement, such as an interest in opposition to abortion, but the main focus of the conservative Christians was a theological purification rather than a push for political power. While clearly most of the new Southern Baptist leadership tended to support conservative politicians, it was theoretically

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possible to be a Democrat and a leader in the SBC. However, nonaffirmation of biblical inerrancy was, and remains today, automatically disqualifying for leadership. However, the resurgence did not result in uniformity: Southern Baptists who were unhappy with the conservative resurgence, many of whom supported the ordination of women, created new bodies, namely the Alliance of Baptists and the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship (Ammerman 2019). The Alliance of Baptists split away in 1987 and joined the National Council of the Churches of Christ. The Alliance of Baptists adopted a theology that called people not only to salvation but also to social justice. The denomination also practices ordination for women and it affirms LGBTQ sexualities as orthodox. The Alliance of Baptists is highly politically involved and frequently criticized President Trump and conservative policies during sermons. The Cooperative Baptist Fellowship was formed in 1990 and was a more moderate expression. Ordination of women was a major issue that led to the split, and there is also a higher level of affirmation and inclusivity for individuals sexually identifying within nonheterosexualities. But there is not a strong political voice within this denomination, and the leaders are hesitant to take political stances. These two organizations represent groups that no longer were willing to abide by the conservative theological stances of the SBC. They operate politically differently from each other. The Alliance of Baptists represents well the more dramatic distinctions between conservative and progressive Christians discussed in chapter 2. The timing of the SBC split coincides with the rise of the religious right. The modernizing and secularizing trends of the 1970s led some conservative Christians to become more politically mobilized in order to protect conservative values that had been called into question in areas like family, sexuality, and religion in public life. These conservative Christians founded organizations like the Moral Majority and Focus on the Family, both of which mixed faith and politics. One of the dividing lines among Christians that determine whether one is progressive or conservative is one’s views on whether transgenderism, homosexuality, and other nonheterosexualities, such as bisexuality and pansexuality, are condoned by God and are consistent with the Bible. In 2014, David Gushee, professor of Christian ethics at Mercer University, a Baptist college and divinity school in Georgia, announced his

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approval of LGBT relationships. His 2015 book, Changing Our Mind, argued for LGBT affirmation on biblical, historical, and philosophical grounds.4 In his revised understanding of Christian sexual morality, Gushee appealed to his distrust of traditional Christian teachings partially due to what he viewed as sins of the past Christian Church. From previous study, he asserted that past Christians used interpretations of the Bible to justify social wrongs, such as maltreatment of Jews (2017, 128–38; also see Merritt 2014). He also drew attention to verses in the Bible condemning nonheterosexualities and attempted to weaken the impact of these passages by contextualizing them and displacing them as central for understanding the issue. Additionally, in Gushee’s explanation for why he changed his mind he highlighted the impact of personal experiences with those identifying as LGBTQ, calling them “transformative encounters” and arguing that the Bible details believers changing their older beliefs in light of encounters (2017, 105). However, Albert Mohler, president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, disagreed with Gushee’s reassessment, appealing to biblical authority and stating “that the normalization of LGBT behaviors and relationships and revisions of human identity is incompatible with a commitment to biblical authority and the historic faith of the Christian church defined by Holy Scripture” (Mohler 2016). The division over such issues as sexuality is no minor scuffle but rather represents a fundamental division going to the heart of faith. The disagreement between Gushee and Mohler is an excellent illustration of the progressive-conservative division happening within denominations given that both men come from Baptist backgrounds and remain active in the Baptist community today. According to Mohler, we “were seminary students together and we were for some time colleagues on the same theology faculty. Our daughters went to kindergarten together and played together” (Mohler 2016). But while they had these things in common, Mohler also notes that “it was also clear that we inhabited different theological worlds and had very different visions of evangelical identity and conviction.” Gushee articulates the division between religious conservatives and liberals on issues such as these as follows: “Culture warriors who criticize me believe they are defending the True Faith from compromising liberals like me. I believe I am defending the Religion of Jesus from intolerant ideologues like them. We will never, ever agree. Only God can judge” (Gushee 2016).

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Sociologist James Hunter argued in his book Culture Wars (1992) that divides between progressive and conservative Christianity within denominations have become more important than long-standing differences between denominations (Starks and Robinson 2009). Kidd and Hankin similarly argue that denominational labels no longer provide a clear indication of one’s social or political alignment. Instead, they believe the most important determining factor “is not the name of the denomination but whether the group, congregation, or individual identifies as theologically conservative, moderate or liberal within those groups” (2015, 210). Hunter’s thesis suggests that the divisions between progressive and conservative Christians ultimately center on questions of moral authority: progressives are committed to the superiority of looking to “personal experience,” or “the spirit of the modern age,” or “self-grounded rational discourse” (J. Hunter 1992, 44, 125). Conservatives (whom Hunter labels as “orthodox”) are committed to transcendence, which is a type of “reality that is independent of, prior to, and more powerful than human experience,” such as scripture (1992, 120). The enduring usefulness of Hunter’s moral authority argument is evident in recent work regarding the varying ways US Evangelicals view Islam, finding that Evangelicals were drawn either to a progressivist impulse that reasons based on personal experience and subjective intuition, or to a traditionalist impulse that reasons with a commitment to divine revelation (Quosigk 2021). This contrast of moral authorities is evident in the differences in reasoning often found between progressives and conservatives, with progressives often appealing to personal experience and using a humanistic ethic of social justice to view scripture and conservatives often appealing to a historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines in defense of their views. The type of divide this book explores was previously examined in the work of Gresham Machen, a Presbyterian minister working in the early nineteenth-century United States. His work, based not primarily on sociological analysis, but rather on theological analysis, Christianity and Liberalism, first appeared in 1923 and clearly articulated what he perceived to be foundational differences between “orthodox Christianity” and “liberal Christianity” (2009). Machen argued that liberal forms of Christianity were directly opposed to, in his view, the true gospel in that liberalism (i.e., progressivist Christianity) holds to a view of God and

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man that is completely opposite to biblical Christianity (i.e., conservative Christianity). Machen also held that liberalism and biblical Christianity hold opposite views of sin: “According to the Bible, man is a sinner under the condemnation of God; according to modern liberalism, there is really no such thing as sin” (2009, 55). While liberalism employs a similar Christian vocabulary or “traditional phraseology,” Machen contends that “traditional language is being strained to become the expression of totally alien ideas” (2009, 100). Clearly, Machen was a conservative Christian, and his emphasis on a traditional view of the Bible is consistent with his rigid stance. Machen wrote, “It is no wonder, then, that liberalism is totally different from Christianity, for the foundation is different. Christianity is founded upon the Bible. It bases upon the Bible both its thinking and its life [Hunter calls this a commitment to a “transcendent basis” for morality]. Liberalism on the other hand is based upon the shifting emotions of sinful man [Hunter terms this “personal experience”]” (2009, 67). Thus, the divides taking place within Christianity have been perceived by other, albeit biased, scholars in other fields, even if called by different names. The types of progressive-conservative divides that have arisen were perceived by both Machen (1923) and Hunter (1992). This exploration of Baptists in America, and especially the Southern Baptists, provides a micro view into understanding the broad progressive-conservative battles that have taken place within the numerous Evangelical denominations. These battles within Evangelicalism offer examples of a group divided between those who lean progressive and those who lean orthodox, to use Hunter’s terminology (1992). Just as within the Baptist denominations, other denominations have been embattled as well. Most recently the United Methodist Church signed an agreement aimed at separation. This action was taken due to the intense disagreements in the church over sexuality (Mulenga 2020). Previously, Episcopal conservatives split with Episcopal liberals over the issue of gay ordination. Thus, we are observing a general splitting of progressive and conservative Christians regardless of denominational identity.

Methods and Data Collection In the following two chapters we utilize a qualitative approach, combining interviews and observations on the grounds that such an approach

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allows interviewees to speak for themselves rather than confining them to a preset list of survey responses. This is important because we wanted to give our participants the opportunity to explain how they think about those around them and how they justify their views and their behavior. In-depth interviews also allow for more complexity and depth in participant responses than would a quantitative approach. In interviews, a researcher is able to ask “how” and “why” questions, which uncover issues that could easily be overlooked in a simple quantitative survey. And an interview format allows for follow-up questions to probe participants’ views in more depth. This is fitting for our research, given that a key goal of this study is to decipher how Evangelicals perceive themselves as well as how they perceive various outsiders (out-groups). Since there are many different ways in which individual Evangelicals might understand their own identities and many different ways in which they might perceive others, we thought it beneficial to use an approach that allowed people to define their views in their own words. As part of this approach, we refrained from defining Evangelicalism based on doctrinal requirements. Instead, interviewees were allowed to self-identify by asking them whether they were comfortable being categorized that way. When the sample of interviewees was asked whether they were comfortable with being called an Evangelical, all but two answered affirmatively. Still, as would be expected, many of the interviewees added qualifiers, definitions, and additions in their responses. Many of the self-identified Evangelicals in this study expressed views that diverged from the dominant historical Evangelical perspectives on Christianity and Islam (traditional perspectives). For example, Evangelicals have historically taken a harshly critical view of Muhammad, but some progressives questioned or even condemned such criticism (i.e., they cannot judge Muhammad negatively because they did not know him, or because they had had an elevated view of Muhammad and found no fault with him).5 In total, we interviewed seventy-eight individuals. To gain a broad perspective on how Evangelicals think, we interviewed both Evangelical leaders as well as “people in the pews.” The thirty leaders we interviewed were all individuals with prominent voices in the United States on the topic of Islam. These interviews with leaders were important because they gave insight into the views of those who exert influence and

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authority in the Evangelical community. But there can be divides between the leaders and the lay congregants in any given faith community, and the average Evangelical congregant in a church does not necessarily share the same views as the leaders of his or her community. Thus, we conducted an additional forty-eight interviews with lay congregants to provide a more complete picture of how Evangelicals think. To guide our election of leaders to interview, we relied on methodological literature that speaks to the unique considerations involved in interviewing leaders (Silverman 2000; Miller and Brewer 2003; Conti and O’Neil 2007; Lindsay 2007). Our main strategy for identifying leaders to interview was to search for individuals whose names appeared in academic books and articles dealing with the topic of Evangelicalism and its relationship to Islam. We also looked for leaders whose names were referenced in media outlets, and we were given some additional names through word of mouth. A key technique that turned out to be very useful in winning interviews with Evangelical leaders was snowball sampling—a method that relies on existing participants to recruit additional new participants from among their acquaintances. Snowball sampling proved to be an invaluable technique for accessing leaders because those leaders tend to be difficult to reach. Some leaders use pseudonyms in published material for security reasons; many have assistants who serve as gatekeepers; and many are simply very busy. For congregant interviews, we recruited participants from two different Evangelical congregations. One congregation is a conservativeleaning Southern Baptist congregation that appears in this study under the pseudonym “Adams River Baptist Church.” Adams River is a mega church located on the outskirts of a major city in the US South. As a member of the Southern Baptist denomination, Adams River represents the largest Protestant denomination in the United States. The congregation is known for its active engagement with the local Muslim community, so we spent three months with the congregation engaging in observation and conducting interviews (twenty-five interviews in total). The other congregation from which we recruited participants is a progressive-leaning nondenominational congregation that appears here under the pseudonym “Mercy Family of Churches.” The Mercy Family of Churches is an Evangelical cluster of multiple church campuses, but these campuses do not belong to any larger denomination. Although

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linked together under the Mercy umbrella, each campus has its own leadership team. Most of the campuses are located in and around the capital city of a southern US state, and, as with Adams River, the congregation is actively engaged with the local Muslim community. Again, we spent three months observing the Mercy congregation and conducting interviews (in this case, a total of twenty-three interviews). With both the Adams River and Mercy congregations, the observational portion of our research consisted of attending Sunday morning services, attending conferences that each congregation offered on Islam, and spending hours in the two churches’ coffee shops. In addition, we also attended church meetings at Mercy and took a class on Islam that was offered to congregants at Adams River. These observations of the congregations as a whole were an important part of our strategy for exploring the social boundaries of Evangelicals and how they conceptualize their ingroup as opposed to out-groups. After all, congregational settings such as church services and church-sponsored conferences are key environments where Evangelicals discuss the content of their faith and where they hash out cultural issues that are confronting their faith community. Congregations also provide space for “people to give voice to their discontents, and organizations through which they can mobilize for action” (Ammerman et al. 1998, 8). To recruit interviewees within these congregations, we used snowball sampling and word of mouth. In addition, about one-fourth of the interviews arose out of participant observation, during which we got to know people and then asked for interviews directly. Of our seventyeight interviews, thirty-three were with women and forty-five were with men. All interviewees considered themselves Christians in one form or another, and the majority of interviewees were comfortable with taking on the Evangelical label discussed eariler. Additional methodology that will help one understand chapters 5, 6, and 7 is found in the appendix, and it explains the determining criteria for how we established subjects’ theological and political leanings as well as how we determined whether interviewees had a homogeneous social circle or heterogeneous social circle with respect to their views on Islam. In addition, we clarify how we established subjects’ views of Christians who differed from themselves as well as how we determined views of Muslims.

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Words to Know: “Insider Movements” and “Chrislam” Two terms will help with understanding the vast differences between progressive Christians and conservative Christians. These terms are used in the following three chapters. These terms are “insider movements” and “Chrislam.” Both these concepts are missiological concepts and thus seem at first glance to be small issues. However, to be an Evangelical is usually thought of as to be one with missionary zeal and a desire to share the gospel with others. These two terms get at the heart of the divide between conservative and progressive Christians, and how a given Evangelical relates to these two concepts helps one to understand the identity crisis within Evangelicalism. Generally speaking, an insider movement (IM) consists of persons from non-Christian backgrounds who have come to believe in Jesus but who nevertheless remain (and are often encouraged by their Christian mentors to remain) part of their original religious communities (Azumah and Riddel 2013). An example is a group of individuals who grew up in a Muslim community, subsequently embraced certain Christian truths, and now consider themselves followers of Jesus, yet they still retain their Muslim identity and continue to participate in Muslim religious life. It is difficult to define IMs precisely because the concept is adapted in different ways in different contexts, but Rebecca Lewis suggests that an IM is “any movement to faith in Christ where a) the Gospel flows through pre-existing communities and social networks, and where b) believing families, as valid expressions of the Body of Christ, remain inside their socioreligious communities, retaining their identity as members of that community while living under the Lordship of Jesus Christ and the authority of the Bible” (R. Lewis 2007, 75). Thus, those who embrace the legitimacy of IMs consider it possible to maintain some religious beliefs and practices associated with another religion and still follow Christ. The degree to which individuals may choose to remain “insiders” in their original religion varies due to a number of factors, including the desires of the believers themselves as well as what kind of guidance they receive from their Christian mentors about how much continued involvement in their original religion is acceptable. The second term is “Chrislam.” This term elicits emotion from both progressive and conservative Christians who are involved in missions to

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the Muslim world. The term refers to a syncretistic blending of Christianity and Islam, and it was proliferated by a number of Evangelicals who were growing increasingly concerned about missiological teachings coming out of certain places where missionaries are trained, particularly Fuller Theological Seminary in California. Leaders at Fuller and similar seminaries were increasingly advocating for IMs and teaching that Christian converts from other religions could legitimately stay inside their original religious group even as they embraced faith in Christ. Concerned conservative Christians, however, believed these missiological methods were producing a heretical amalgamation of Christianity and Islam, and they began employing the term “Chrislam” to describe this amalgamation (Lingel, Morton, and Nikides 2012). Critics of socalled Chrislamist approaches hold that these methods are partially rooted in a postmodern rebellion of traditional Christianity, encourage dishonesty among missionaries and new believers, and are inappropriate regardless of the context, even in difficult-to-reach Muslim-majority countries where Christianity is outlawed. Progressive Evangelicals adamantly  disagree, arguing that the accusation of Chrislam is misguided and that missionaries to Muslims have been wrongfully centering their mission efforts around a Western understanding of the Bible and culture.

Preliminary Findings While dominant stereotyping tends to present Evangelicalism as monolithic, our study demonstrates that there is significant division among Evangelicals in terms of how they define their in-groups and how they conceptualize out-groups. Ultimately, we find that theologically conservative Evangelical Christians see themselves as more closely aligned with theologically progressive Christians than with Muslims; however, progressive Evangelical Christians see themselves as more closely aligned with Muslims than with conservative Christians. Theologically conservative Evangelical Christians in our study are more likely to surround themselves with heterogeneous peers (that is, peers who hold a variety of theological perspectives), and they hold overwhelmingly moderate views of progressive Christians. By contrast, theologically progressive Evangelical Christians are more likely to

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surround themselves with homogeneously thinking peers (that is, peers who hold similar theological perspectives), and they hold overwhelmingly negative views of conservative Christians. Lastly, conservative Evangelical Christians rely primarily on a more rigid, traditionalist form of theology to determine who is in their in-group. Progressive Evangelical Christians, by contrast, determine their in-group by relying primarily on a more flexible, progressivist form of theology to determine who is in their in-group. Conservative Christians tend to emphasize the importance of correct theology, and they hold a number of distinct theological beliefs that mark them as separate from progressive Christians and all other religious groups. But when defining their in-group, conservative Evangelicals break from the stereotype of being theologically rigid, and they are ironically willing to overlook theological differences with progressive Christians and consider those progressives as part of their in-group, on the grounds that they perceive progressives are within the Christian fold and share similar goals. Regarding progressive Evangelicals, this chapter demonstrates just how far many progressives have journeyed from historical Evangelical perspectives on Islam, how open they are to Islamic peoples and their beliefs, and how critical they are of the conservative Christianity many of these progressives left behind.

Conclusion This chapter has introduced our qualitative study of progressive and conservative Christians. We have provided demographic details of our sample, the overall methods for data analysis, and a brief summary of our findings. Now that we have given an overview of the study, the next task is to further analyze the data from this sample of progressive and conservative Christians and to continue to see how these ideas work themselves out in practice.

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Conservative Christians as Theologically Rigid and Socially Diverse How dieth the wise man? As a fool! . . . And now you have an extraordinary opportunity, a day wherein Christ has flung the door of mercy wide open, and stands in the door calling and crying with a loud voice to poor sinners; . . . many that were very lately in the same miserable condition that you are in, are in now a happy state, with their hearts filled with love to him that has loved them and washed them for their sins in his own blood, and rejoicing in hope of the glory of God.  .  .  . Therefore let everyone that is out of Christ, now awake and fly from the wrath to come. —Jonathan Edwards, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” July 8, 1741

“In Christ Alone” is a well-known hymn sung in Christian churches of various denominations. Christian Copyright Licensing International estimates that around forty to fifty million people sing “In Christ Alone” in church services each year. The song was written by Keith Getty and Stuart Townend, both conservative Christians, in 2001.1 Getty and his wife, Kristyn Getty, are self-described modern hymn writers who strive to recharge the art of congregational singing within churches. They incorporate centuries-older Christian hymns and have created a catalogue of songs specifically focused on articulating Christian doctrine (teachings derived from the Bible). Unsurprisingly, for conservative Christians Townend and Getty, the lyrics to “In Christ Alone” were written to proclaim what they believe is the true Christian doctrine. Speaking for himself and Townend, Getty noted their theological goals: “As artists, we both brought to the table a conviction that rich theology greatly matters in the songs we sing on Sunday morning, that what we sing week after week ultimately makes its 95

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way into every part of our faith and life.”2 The song’s lyrics, unlike many more contemporary Christian songs sung in churches, have tremendous doctrinal breath, which helps to explain why the song is so cherished by some, especially conservative Christians who value traditional doctrines they believe to be biblical. However, the clear doctrinal articulation leaves the song vulnerable to questioning by progressive Christians, who appreciate much of the song but hold differing doctrinal views on some points. The progressivist impulse toward revisionism and the conservative impulse to hold fast to traditional doctrines came to a head in 2013 when the Presbyterian Church (USA), a denomination that has shifted toward progressivism, requested permission from Townend and Getty to print a revised version of the hymn “In Christ Alone” in its new hymnal, Glory to God. The Presbyterian Church (USA) desired to change the second verse, which read as follows in its original form: In Christ alone, Who took on flesh, Fullness of God in helpless babe! This gift of love and righteousness, Scorned by the ones He came to save. Till on that cross as Jesus died, The wrath of God was satisfied; For ev’ry sin on Him was laid— Here in the death of Christ I live.

Due to the evolving progressivist belief that emphasizes the divine love of God as being devoid of anger and judgment, and a rejection of the traditional conservative Christian belief that God’s wrath actually is his love in action against sin, the church hoped to change “Till on that cross as Jesus died, the wrath of God was satisfied” to “Till on that cross as Jesus died, the love of God was magnified.” Getty and Townend rejected the request of the Presbyterian Church (USA) to drop the mention of the “wrath of God” and would not allow the modification of the lyrics. This uncompromising emphasis on adhering to historically defined correct doctrines fits well within the stereotypical conservative Christian character. The Presbyterian Church (USA) saw the rejection of its request as unfortunate, believing the

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proposed alteration to be a very minor one in comparison to all the two groups could affirm. In contrast, the conservative Christian songwriters felt it unthinkable to erase the “wrath of God,” which they argued is an integral part of true Christianity, explicitly and repeatedly found in the Bible. Getty articulated that his position regarding the importance of keeping the lyrics appeals to the Bible holistically. His response also hints at a widely held conservative Christian belief that sinful and deceiving ideas will threaten to infiltrate correct doctrine, but one must hold fast to the truth, and the belief that some will walk away from the truth even if by simply ignoring certain attributes of God: The two hymnal committees wanted to change the lyrics to focus on how Christ’s death on the cross magnifies God’s love for the world. And indeed, God’s love was magnified on Calvary’s hill. Yet the way this occurred was through Christ doing for us what we could not do for ourselves—shedding his own perfect blood to atone for our sins. . . . His sovereign power, grace, love, justice and wrath all are intertwined. And we shouldn’t turn away from exploring his wrath, because through understanding God’s righteous anger toward sin, we understand his desire for justice and peace . . . we must sing wholeheartedly about concepts such as penal substitution [refers to Jesus substituting Himself in humans’ place, taking the punishment for their sin], as well as the many other attributes of God that unfortunately go ignored in some churches today. . . . Speculation and questioning about theology will come and go, but truth remains. . . . Songwriters need to demonstrate a grasp of the whole biblical context.

The conflict regarding “In Christ Alone” illustrates some of the most fundamental differences between progressive and conservative Christians, and the songwriters’ stance and statements reflect several common characteristics of conservative Christians. These and other patterns within conservative Christianity are explored in this chapter. The data from our extensive interviews, introduced in the previous chapter, provide a great deal of insight into the specific beliefs of both progressive and conservative Christians. In this chapter, we focus on Christian conservatism. Using rich quotes, we illustrate the fact that conservative Christians are overwhelmingly theologically exclusive. They see Islam as a

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false belief system that prevents Muslims from accepting the “truth,” as conservative Christians define it. We also demonstrate that conservative Christians see themselves as more closely aligned with progressive Christians than with Muslims. They are more apt to see Muslims as members of a completely separate religion from their own and tend to perceive that Islam is opposed to Christianity’s core tenets, concerning the person of Jesus, the cross, salvation, and the Trinity. In contrast, conservative Christians tend to see progressive Christians as part of their in-group because they perceive that progressive Christians agree with them on major doctrinal issues. Therefore, Muslims are not part of the in-group of conservative Christians, while progressive Christians are part of that in-group, and conservative Christians’ justifications for these categorizations are focused on theological distinctions. Theologically conservative Christians are also more likely than progressive Christians to have a heterogeneous (diversified) Christian social circle in regard to views of Islam and also overwhelmingly have moderate views of progressive Christians (usually seeing progressive Christians as wrong but with pure motivations). Known for their distrust of government, conservative Christians are also more apt than progressive Christians to see the world mainly through a religious lens, rather than a political lens. This chapter is based on interviews conducted with thirty-six different individuals who were identified as theologically conservative Christians. The majority of interviewees were Evangelical Christians, who have historically been known to have unique characteristics that separate them from non-Evangelicals. However, the Evangelical distinctness that previously marked Evangelical denominations as separate from non-Evangelical congregations has diminished. Today the most serious divide within US Evangelicalism can be described as a divide between the “moral authorities” of progressive Evangelicals and conservative Evangelicals and this trend of separateness can be seen across various types of Christianity, including Catholicism and other Christian groups that do not identify with Evangelicalism (J. Hunter 1992; Quosigk 2021). The findings within this chapter shed light on the nature of the divides within Evangelicalism as well as divides within other non-Evangelical Christian groups. The categorization of these interviewees as conservative Christians was based in part on their views of the Bible and Islam, since interviewees’ views of Islam are a window into their conception

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of Christian particularism (a traditional marker of Evangelical Christianity in early America). Of the thirty-six progressive Christian interviewees, thirteen were females and twenty-three were males. Fourteen of the thirty-six interviewees were national leaders in the Evangelical movement. These leaders represented various areas of specialty (including missiology, Islam, and/or interfaith dialogue) and also functioned in a variety of different roles: some were mega-church pastors, others were best-selling authors, and still others were university professors or government consultants on faith relations. The additional twenty-two interviewees were recruited from the two Evangelical congregations described in chapter 4. We conducted a handful of interviews with individuals of color who immigrated to the United States from Muslimmajority countries. All of them fell into the conservative Christian category, and they tended to hold harsher views on Islam than other conservative Christian interviewees. The majority of the remaining conservative Christian interviewees in our sample were born and lived in the in the United States and would be considered “white.”

Conservative Christians’ Theological and Political Views Our interviews included questions relating to the way conservative Christians defined themselves, and we will start our analysis there. We will first gauge respondents’ general feelings toward common defining terms. After reviewing how this group prefers to define themselves, we will delve deeper and explore the most common ideologies and beliefs reflected in the responses. We will conclude by exploring how these values and philosophies impact conservative Christians’ political opinions and involvement. Finally, we will examine the criteria they rely on to define their in-groups and out-groups.

“I’m a Christian First and Foremost”: Comfort Level with the Terms “Evangelical” and “Christian” For the most part, conservative Christians were more than happy to be called an Evangelical, and in the course of their responses to various questions, it also became clear that they usually felt comfortable with the Christian label. Some conservative Christians even said they were

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proud of the Evangelical and/or Christian label. Regarding how he feels about being called an Evangelical, Bob said he “would be uncomfortable not being called [an Evangelical].” And Umar said, “I am an Evangelical, and I do not mind [being called an Evangelical]. I’m proud of it.” While some conservative Christians added qualifiers to their acceptance of these labels, more conservative Christians affirmed the identification without added qualifiers than did progressive Christians. Conservative Christians had a greater likelihood to share more about their theology in addition to affirming their comfort with the term “Evangelical.” For many conservative Christians, the labels of “Evangelical” and “Christian” go hand in hand. For example, Grant highlighted his strong conservative and Evangelical identity and offered unprompted details about his Christian theology and doctrines: Oh, absolutely. I would call myself an Evangelical and I’m very conservative. And we come from the Brethren in Christ tradition, which is similar to the Mennonite. . . . I’m strongly Arminian . . . we’re Wesleyan . . . and I’m pacifist. We are also for a simple lifestyle. Those are all the traditions that I come from. Anabaptist means that we don’t believe in child baptism and we baptize believers.

Christianity is not a dirty word for conservative Christians, but rather a precious term. They have a more positive outlook on the Christians of today than progressive Christians do. Conservative Christians also carry a gratefulness for “Christian” missionaries that came before them in centuries past, even if they acknowledge that past Christians were imperfect. Conservative Christians’ esteem for their predecessors is partially due to biblical scriptures that they believe describe Christians of past, present, and future around the world as part of a family of saints and members of a “holy city on a hill.” This sense of history and purpose provides further positive association with the term “Christian.” In addition, while conservative Christians do not believe themselves to be more intelligent, or better in terms of merit, than non-Christians, they do believe they have been entrusted with the truth of God, and that their action of knowing and accepting the truth is what makes them a Christian. For example, when I asked Hermann, a retired author and professor, what he says when someone asks what he does, he shared

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that he typically says, “I didn’t teach you, God’s been teaching for the last sixty years.” Hermann demonstrated a clear tendency within conservative Christianity to express a high level of certainty regarding their beliefs about God and to describe their doctrines as coming directly from God. Given their responses, it is also apparent that conservative Christians have a high comfort level with words having certain stationary definitions. They believe they must both accurately understand and accurately convey the singular correct meaning of Christianity and other key terms when explaining their beliefs to others. Maintaining these traditional beliefs regarding articulation shows that conservative Christians do not share progressive Christians’ postmodern distrust of language or progressives’ comfort in altering definitions.

“The Word of God”: Conservative Christians’ Emphasis on the Bible The ultimate source of conservative Christian theology is the Bible, and nearly every trait of conservative Christians discussed in this chapter can be tied back to their view of the Bible as the ultimate source of truth. Conservative Christians believe the Bible is true in all it affirms, including spiritual and historical affirmations. Almost all conservative Christians stated the “Bible” or the “Word of God” to be the source from which they draw their highest moral authority. For example, John followed his proclamation that the Bible is his highest moral authority by stating, “According to my way of thinking, there is no other place to go [than the Bible]. Absolutely none. All righteous laws are based on the biblical laws.” Affirming this, Ben said his “highest moral authority is the Word of God” and Maria also identified the “Word of God” as her moral authority. Kayleigh felt God’s word (the Bible) helped her to know the truth and “to make good choices.” Hayden discussed his identity as being someone who is “Evangelical” and who viewed the Bible as the primary lens that colored his worldview: “As an Evangelical I believe that the Bible is the true divinely inspired Word of God. The way that I shape my view of the world is based on what the Bible teaches. When I think about Islam or any other world religion I have to interpret through that lens.” While some conservative Christians brought up the law of God revealed in the conscience in addition to scripture, even the natural law

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was substantiated using scripture. For example, James recognized the value of reason, but this in no way diminished in his mind the authority of the Bible, which he continued to view as the “Word of God” and “inspired.” Rather, he believed the Bible itself speaks to the importance of reason, and he gave the example found in Romans 1–2, where Paul “seems to talk about conscience and the common light that God gives everybody in the world.” Hermann also used scripture to undergird his belief that the law of God has been revealed in scripture and conscience: My Highest moral authority is, of course, the law of God, and the law of God as he revealed it in the scripture, and the law of God as he’s revealed it in conscience. The two overlap, and don’t conflict, but they’re not identical, because the scripture is more definitive and detailed than a natural law is. The natural law is broader in that it’s common to all men, because everybody has a conscience. Everybody can see that the heavens declare the glory of God. Psalm 19:11. “His law is written in our hearts,” Romans 2:15 declares to us.

The centrality of the Bible in conservative Christians’ mindset is readily apparent, and that serves as the foundation to other conservative Christian beliefs.

Historical Theology Emphasizing Biblical Doctrines In light of conservative Christians’ high esteem for the Bible, it is not surprising that their theology is heavily based on it. They also favor a specific approach to interpreting those scriptures. The vast majority of Christian conservatives are theologically exclusivist and affirm a type of historical theology that values doctrines perceived to be directly derived from the Bible. Conservative Christians hold their beliefs to be correct and view differing or contradictory beliefs as false. They also describe their beliefs as being rooted in actual historical events, hence our usage of the term “historical.” They also ascribe particular meanings to those historical events, and these meanings compose their doctrine. Theology, made up of such doctrines, is being used here to encompass Christian truth claims about the God they worship. Since their theology is built on doctrines, which are based on what they perceive to be

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biblical historical events, conservative Christians perceive their theology as coming directly from the Bible. Conservative Christians’ adherence to a historical theology is not meant to suggest that conservative Christians are all experts in “historical theology” as an academic field (i.e., the discipline of narrating the development of Christian theology).3 In contrast to the academic discipline, the description of “historical theology” for the purpose of describing conservative Christianity here is more generally meant to convey conservative Christians’ impulse to hold their beliefs about God to have real historical precedence and backing. A century ago, Machen, in his theological analysis, helpfully described Christian conservatives’ view of how history, doctrine, and certainty combine: What is it that forms the content of the [primitive church]? . . . “Christ died for our sins,” said the primitive disciples, “according to the Scriptures; he was buried; he has been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures.” From the beginning, the Christian gospel, as indeed the name “gospel” or “good news” implies, consisted in an account of something that had happened. And from the beginning, the meaning of the happening was set forth; and when the meaning of the happening was set forth then there was Christian doctrine. “Christ died”—that is history; “Christ died for our sins” —that is doctrine. Without these two elements, joined in an absolutely indissoluble union, there is no Christianity. (Machen 2009, 23)

Conservative Christians’ historical theology, with its emphasis on biblical doctrines, holds a high view of God as all powerful and immutable, and a low view of humanity as fallen and sinful. According to conservative Christians, obedience to an unchanging God means not altering one’s beliefs according to shifting cultural attitudes and/or new social problems. For most conservative Christians, similar to the view of the fourteenth-century monk Thomas à Kempis, obedience to God is seen as superior to speculation about God (McGrath 2012). Within this emphasis on obedience can be found an enduring emphasis on “orthodoxy” (sound or correct doctrine). Conservative Christians believe that biblical accounts support rigid distinctions between correct and incorrect beliefs. Not only do they make these types

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of distinctions, but they also place value on them. They think highly of properly enunciating and emulating the beliefs and practices found in their scriptures. Hermann explains his position regarding what “orthodox Christianity” means to him and the importance of being obedient to the biblical command to proclaim the gospel, considered by Hermann to be universally applicable to everyone: My personal beliefs are, of course, evangelical. I believe in orthodox Christianity, as expressed in the early creeds of the first four or five centuries of the church, the trinity, the deity of Christ, the virgin birth, the atonement of Christ’s death, the resurrection of all mankind, and the gospel as he commissioned us to proclaim, which was that God offers salvation to everyone . . . all over the world.

Conservative Christians’ contemporary adherence to a historical theology means they are similarly interested in preserving their truth and rejecting perceived false beliefs (also known as heresies). Due to these qualities, we have determined conservative Christians to hold to a historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines. With the importance of doctrine for conservatives now established, we move on to some of the specific doctrines that were cited most frequently during our interviews.

“The Problem That Keeps Us Separated from God”: Belief in the Sinfulness of Man One important belief among conservative Christians is the innate sinfulness of all humans. Sometimes referred to as the “depravity of man” or the “fallenness of man,” the idea that humans are inherently sinful, or radically corrupt, is deeply embedded in conservatives’ understanding of humanity. They believe that, as a result of “the fall” of Adam and Eve in the garden, all of humanity is inclined by nature, at the core, to serve individual wills and desires, which often run contrary to the will of God. As conservative Christian theologian R. C. Sproul (2017) put it, “We are not sinners because we sin. We sin because we are sinners.” Conservative Christians accept a high level of dependence on God and the Bible to direct how they should live, particularly because they have such a low

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view of their human ability to make correct choices. Hedaya, a former Muslim who fled her family for fear of death due to her conversion to Christianity, looked at her own sinfulness with great weight, sharing that “the sin that’s in me, that’s around me, is so bad that it separates us from God.” Hayden, a university graduate student, believes “all cultures are full of people who sin,” and he referenced the Bible, sin, separation from God, Jesus, and his work on the cross when sharing his understanding of scripture: “For me, what I see in the Bible is that the only way for people to be cleansed of our sin, the problem that keeps us separated from God, is through Jesus, his death on the cross and putting our faith in him.” Being “cleansed from sin” and the “fall of man” also came up when Douglas shared his view of what he believes will happen when Jesus returns to set up his kingdom on earth (as many conservatives believe he will). According to Douglas, sin, or the redemption from it, plays a role in the restoration that ensues: “So the Book of Revelation, which talks about this, and the prophecies of Jesus, and the prophets talk about this, the Messiah coming and reigning from Jerusalem. But it’s essentially a restoration of Eden at the end of the age where God restores and redeems the earth from sin, and from unrighteousness, and from the curse that came because of sin.” Conservative Christians insist on man’s sinfulness and need for God and his wisdom, and they are much more inclined than progressive Christians to believe that one is hopeless under the load of sin, one is wretched and guilty, and even one’s good works are utterly insufficient; the only way to change this circumstance is to “throw [one’s] self unreservedly on [Christ’s] mercy and trust [Christ] for all” (Machen 2009, 21).

“God Shows Wrath but He Does Everything in Justice and Love”: Belief in the Wrath of God and a Reliance on the Cross for Reconciliation to God Alongside conservative Christians’ belief in the sinfulness of humanity is the belief that sin evokes God’s righteous anger. As illustrated in the story of the “In Christ Alone” controversy, conservative Christians are not opposed to an image of a wrathful God. In fact, the idea of God being angered by sin, resulting in a separation between God and humanity, is

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an essential part of their faith narrative. In a blog, conservative Christian pastor Gavin Ortlund appealed to the Bible to substantiate his argument for divine wrath and seemed to be responding to the progressivist rejection of a God of anger: If we want to move away from the notion of an angry God while retaining an authoritative Bible, we have some pretty heavy revisionist lifting to do. I would say the effort is roughly comparable to Thomas Jefferson’s attempt to scissor-cut the supernatural out of the Bible. Just type in “Lord wrath” or “God angry” to a Bible Gateway [online Bible] search. There are more than 600 references to divine wrath in Scripture. (Ortlund 2018)

Similar to Ortlund, Kristy, a member of Adams River, believed that “God shows wrath but he does everything in justice and love.” Kayleigh, also a member of Adams River, held that she was previously, as other unbelievers are, “under the wrath of God”: “He opened his arms to us and took us in when we were in darkness and whenever we were under that wrath of God and lost in our sin and suffering and shame and he brought us in.” Many conservative Christians expressed a fear of God. For many conservative Christians, God’s wrath is both a motivator for obedience and the condition that necessitates the saving work of Christ. Considering this, the majority of conservative Christians are supremely interested in the reconciliation of God and humankind, both in their own lives and in the lives of others. They usually believe that when Jesus was on the cross, he, as John said, “had all the sins of the world on him” and that he was the “atoning sacrifice for our sins.” This was echoed in what Ashleigh held to be true, stating, “I believe that as believers in Christ . . . the blood of Jesus covers us.” Kristy said, “Then there’s always forgiveness for anyone through Jesus.” So powerful is this doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement (that Jesus reconciled sinners to God by being their substitute punishment) for conservative Christians that Grant said, “I cannot even talk about salvation unless God has died on the cross and taken away my sin.” Hermann also brought up the atonement, saying he believed in “the Trinity, the deity of Christ, the virgin birth, the atonement of Christ’s death, the resurrection of all mankind, and the gospel as he commissioned us to proclaim.” And Ben proclaimed that “one of the core doctrines of

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the Gospel” is “Jesus d[ying] on the cross for our sins.” If conservative Christians see sin and the resulting separation from God as the ultimate problem facing humanity, then Jesus’s death and the resulting reconciliation is the ultimate solution.

“Because of God’s Righteousness and Justice”: Their View of Hell and Proselytization While conservative Christians believe that Christ’s death offers the possibility of reconciliation with God, they also hold that only those who believe in Christ as savior will enjoy its benefits. Those who do not believe, according to most conservative Christians, are destined for hell. For them, hell is “real” and “biblical.” Hermann, for example, argued that hell is real, anyone who takes the Bible seriously has to say that. Anyone who takes Jesus seriously, because, in the gospels, he had more to say about hell than he did about Heaven. Hell is a real place. Hell is an eternal place. Hell is a place that Jesus came to save us from. To say that there is no hell robs Jesus’s death of its significance, because it says, “Hell doesn’t exist. Hell is nothing.” Jesus died to save us from nothing. Which, to me, totally diminishes what he died to save us from.

Conservative Christians are also more likely to speak of hell to outsiders for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most compelling is the belief that Jesus warned those around him of the eternal punishment for those who reject him. Ashleigh held “God’s word [to be] very clear . . . that he gives us, each one of us . . . the choice to turn away from hell.” Escaping hell can happen only if one “bow[s] their knees to the one that will save them from your sins.” For conservative Christians, hell is interrelated with key scriptural doctrines, including sin, wrath, the cross, and atonement. Douglas explained this view, and went on to talk about why, according to him, hell is necessary if one is to hold the Bible, and the doctrines perceived to be within it, as authoritative: But I believe [unbelievers] go to hell . . . because of sin and because it’s the judgment of God, and because there’s no sin that can enter the presence of God. Because of God’s righteousness and justice, there is hell, and he

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must judge based on his righteousness and justice. That’s why he provided Jesus Christ to die for us and take that judgment upon himself to save us from hell. I believe in hell, but I believe God is actively saving people from hell, and his heart is that no one would go there.

Douglas’s view that God must judge based on his “righteousness” and Hermann’s earlier view that hell “is a place that Jesus came to save us from” line up with the historical Evangelical position on hell, such as the view expressed in the eighteenth century by American theologian Jonathan Edwards in his “Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners.” In it, Edwards argues that God is “of infinite greatness, majesty, and glory” and thus “sin against God, being a violation of infinite obligations, must be a crime infinitely heinous, and so deserving of infinite punishment” (Edwards 2016, 5–6). This view of hell can also be seen in that of Charles Finney, given about a century after Edwards, in his sermon entitled “God’s Anger against the Wicked”: “He is so good that He never can let sin unrepented of pass unnoticed and unpunished. It would be an infinite wrong to the universe if He should! If He were to do it, He would at once cease to be a good and holy God” (Finney 1999). Due to their view of hell, conservative Christians are more likely to support traditional Evangelical proselytization. There is an urgency for conservative Christians to share their beliefs with others and convert others to Christianity, as without a conversion, they are in imminent danger of spending eternity in hell. Sharing faith is thus seen as offering both a more meaningful life now and eternal security. Many conservative Christians see sharing their faith with others as an act of love toward others and obedience to God. Conservative Christians view Christians as privileged in their understanding of God and as having a special role to play in sharing truth. They usually believe the greatest gift they can give is the “good news” of their Christian faith, and they prefer to give assistance and donations either directly to those in need or via Christian nonprofits, rather than via the government. While they have biblical support for and interest in meeting the physical and emotional needs of people, they would prefer that such efforts be accompanied by attention to spiritual states as well. This conservative Christian emphasis on the eternal over the temporal informs their engagement with the US political system, and the next section will explore this relationship in greater depth.

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Political Views Our research confirms what previous studies have found regarding conservative Christians’ political leanings; namely, that conservative Christian theology, what we call a “historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines,” tends to align them more closely with the US Republican Party than the Democratic Party. The majority of interviewees in our conservative Christian sample were categorized as politically right-leaning (as defined in the appendix). However, our research also finds that conservative Christians are becoming increasingly unhappy with the Republican Party, citing corruption and abandonment of conservative and founding principles of small government within a Judeo-Christian framework. They tend to respect the impact of Christian founders on American society and to be interested in promoting Christian ideals that they perceived as central to the early republic. They are very protective of the right to free speech, including speech critical of Islam. Our research also shows that conservative Christians are very likely to defend their political affiliations and actions by citing their faith. Conservative-leaning Evangelicals are not as optimistic about political solutions to society’s problems. Often conservative Christians see others as being more motivated by theology, seeing the world through a religious lens. For example, when it comes to the issue of Islamic terrorism, many conservative Christians believe that the root of the problem lies in the religion of Islam, as opposed to other political or social causes. Identifying the problem within the realm of religion implies a religious solution, and conservative Christians tend to view Christian proselytization, and to varying degree Christian polemics, to be the best potential solution. Overall, the appeals to the Bible and historical theology that conservative Christians used when discussing their religious views carried over into their discussion of their political views.

“The Government Is Failing Right, Left, and Center”: Negative Views of Government Intervention to Address Societal Issues Because conservative Christians see sin and the resulting separation from God as the ultimate problem facing humanity, the ultimate solution is found in Jesus’s death and the resulting reconciliation. Given this

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perception of the root cause of societal issues, it is not surprising that conservative Christians are unlikely to see the government as the ultimate solution (since they perceive the government to not provide the “gospel”). For this reason, most prefer to give either directly to those in need or via Christian nonprofits, which often include the gospel message with their assistance, rather than contributing via taxes to government aid, which lacks any Christian message. In other words, most conservative Christians were not optimistic regarding government as a force for positive change. In addition, conservative Christians usually have a low view of the government’s ability to be efficient with tax money and believe that the government usually fails. They are also suspicious of government officials’ motives and question their likelihood to act in the best interest of constituents. Some directed this suspicion toward both the Republican and Democratic parties, and some focused it solely at the Democratic Party, which most conservative Christians believe has gone too far in supporting policies perceived to be unbiblical, such as abortion on demand and increased socialist-style redistribution of constituents’ income through taxation (often for programs conservative Christians feel are not ultimately beneficial to society, some even opposing their beliefs). Many believe that regulation at the state and local levels is far superior to the ruling of the country from Washington, DC. For example, Grant brought up his time living in socialist Europe and said the government is failing there: What I don’t agree with is socialism when the governments control everything. Having previously lived in Europe, I’ve seen . . . the government is failing. . . . And that’s why I think there are some things that need to be done more privately, or locally. I am excited by the fact that you have fifty states, and every one of your fifty states has its own government that is not dictated by a central government that does everything, as a diktat, especially if that diktat is controlled by the cities. I’m appreciative of the American Electoral College which gives checks and balances. . . . The cities will always dictate liberal policies. But most of . . . that which keeps the nation running comes from outside of cities in the rural areas, and that’s why our founding fathers put together the Electoral College, to protect the vote and the voice of the rural constituencies.

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Conservative Christians are generally weary of “big government” and “socialism” and are unhappy with newer governmental acts they believe to go against the Bible (e.g., same-sex marriage). Though the Democratic Party is more often cited as supporting these unbiblical stances, conservative Christians frequently describe both parties as having abandoned true Christian conservatism. Bob pointed to Congress and noted that he believed the conservatives are not representing the large Christian populace in the United States. He later referenced as examples the Affordable Care Act (also known as Obamacare, which he believes grew the government’s role in the personal lives of the people by taking on healthcare to a greater extent) and a recent court case about same-sex marriage (which mandates all states to allow same-sex marriage, which he said was a direct attack “on the church and Evangelicals”): I’m a Christian conservative and I think both parties have abandoned me. I think both parties are masters at trying to sell to their audience and as long as they can divide the people . . . I’m not sure that the Rs and the Ds don’t go to the same locker room with the same agenda and just package it differently. I’ve heard a lot of talk recently about some of the things that are allowed to pass in Congress and the people are infuriated by it, but somehow the conservatives aren’t standing up and doing the things that they can governmentally.

Marianne, like many conservative Christians, also felt discontent with US governmental leadership for similar reasons: government overreach and corruption. In addition, she believed Americans are no longer encouraged to seek truth but are rather seeking to be perceived as politically correct: I am not a Democrat or a Republican. . . . When I vote I feel like I’m voting for the lesser of two evils. I don’t feel like we have honest politicians that are free from corruption and seeking to uphold our Constitution. . . . It was clear that the framers wanted us to enjoy the freedoms this country was founded on and the framers wanted the government to have as little control over people’s lives as possible. . . . We’re not doing that any longer . . . [and] are not looking at truth anymore. . . . We are now providing for what’s detrimental to society. . . . We are at a place in our country

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where Christians can’t even comfortably place our children in public schools because of the social engineering that’s taking place.

Rather than seeing the government as the cure for society’s ills, conservative Christians like Marianne were likely to implicate the government in contributing to these problems.

“Christianity Thrives on Openness; We Thrive on the Truth”: Views on Free Speech Despite expressing general distrust of the current government, conservative Christian interviewees had a relatively positive outlook on the United States particularly when framing it as a nation built upon “JudeoChristian traditions” and freedoms. In particular, many addressed the importance of First Amendment freedoms. The majority affirmed free speech, even if it is potentially offensive speech. Interviewees wanted to safeguard all First Amendment freedoms, including freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, as well as freedom of religion. They felt it important to teach the appreciation of free speech to immigrants, especially Muslims who come to America, since they saw blasphemy laws (laws against critical speech of a religion) as most common in Muslimmajority countries. Conservative Christians are more interested in debating religious truths than are progressive Christians, which could be perceived by some Muslim immigrants as a hate crime against their religion worthy of prison or death. The historical traditional conservative Christian stance of having something valuable to share (e.g., the gospel) with other non-Christians is often seen as oppressive by progressivists. This is because progressive Christians view Christianity as the dominant form of religion in the United States and thus seek to promote other non-Christian ideologies in an effort to shift power to the perceived marginalized. Joe, a professor and author, expressed fear that First Amendment freedoms are disappearing: Evangelicals really believe in First Amendment freedoms because they are so much a part of our life: freedom of the press because we want to print things, freedom to assemble because we want to worship together, freedom of religion. It’s telling that virtually no Muslim-majority country

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has real religious freedom and that in many Muslim-majority countries, rights that we think are important for minorities and for women aren’t held. Evangelicals have really been on the front lines about articulating that these freedoms really matter. . . . The worldview of the founders and really of most Americans up until at least World War II accorded with the Judeo-Christian tradition. This is influenced by Greco-Roman thought, the Old Testament, and the New Testament. That value scheme was very important for most of the people who were the critical founders of this country. . . . We have, as Christians, a really strong basis for understanding the value of human rights. When we look at the problems like blasphemy laws in Pakistan or this lady in Sudan who was thrown in prison . . . they said that she was an apostate; when we look at all of these things what we say is we as believers believe that every human being is a child of God. They’re made in God’s image and that they all have inherent dignity. . . . Groups who come to the US who have an affinity for that part of Islamism, that concerns us greatly.

Hermann also expressed concern about the implications of curtailing free speech and explicitly said that the First Amendment gives Americans the right to critique other religions even if that means offending its adherents. For Hermann, as with other conservative Christians, critiquing another religion is not hate speech. Hermann distinguished between speech and acts, and he believed violent acts should continue to be prosecuted: [Saying something against another religion is] what the First Amendment gives you the right to do. It gives you the right to be offensive. We should be involved in protecting [speech], and not calling it hate speech. On the other hand, if somebody . . . is performing acts in that direction because they are a certain race or color, we should get involved. Otherwise, we’re not protecting the civil liberties of the people.

Ben, who was neither a Republican nor a Democrat, also raised the issue of free speech and expressed frustration with the way he believed media outlets are kowtowing to the demands of Islamic terrorists and self-censoring their speech about Islam. He was himself an outspoken critic of Islam and had been previously temporarily banned from

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YouTube for what he considered to be an honest video where he addresses the persecution of Christians in Pakistan. For some conservative Christians, Ben’s intense critiques of Islam are viewed in a positive light partially because his unapologetic condemnation of the Qur’an and Muhammad has led many Muslims to question the traditional Islamic narrative, leading them to convert to Christianity. In our interview Ben referenced the 2015 Islamic terrorist attack on the offices of the French publication Charlie Hebdo in which a dozen people were killed. The killers, Muslim French citizens who belonged to the Islamic terrorist group Al-Qaeda, were seeking revenge for the dishonoring of their prophet after the magazine published derogatory cartoons featuring Muhammad. Ben expressed frustration about how Western media adapted after the attack. Instead of holding the line on their right to criticize Islam and Muhammad, he noted that some media outlets responded by saying they would no longer post cartoons about Muhammad. Opting to place Islam above criticism in that manner, he said, gives Islam a privileged status. This argument can be found in other Christian literatures exploring Islamic privilege (Durie 2010; Janosik 2019). Ben felt that responding to a terrorist attack with such deference actually encourages violence because it “sends a message that, in the West, terrorism and violence is an effective strategy for Muslims to get what they want.” Similar to Ben, Grant also brought up the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo employees when discussing free speech and criticism of Islam. He brought up the fact that Charlie Hebdo had made “absolutely heinous” depictions of Jesus and the Trinity. Still, in spite of the publication’s irreverence, Grant said Christians have not responded with violence. Grant perceives that accusations of “hate speech” are targeted disproportionately against Christians that publicly question or reject Islam. This is particularly concerning for Grant, because, according to him, in 2006 a “religious hatred law” almost passed in the United Kingdom, which would have made “confronting Muhammad and the Qur’an” punishable with either seven years in prison or, for foreigners like himself, deportation. He told me that because of his desire to see Muslims come to salvation in Christ, “all I do is confront Muhammad and the Qur’an.” It was very personal for Grant to talk about hate speech since he himself has been called a “hate preacher” and has been prohibited from speaking at certain universities because of his critiques against Islam. In

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spite of these rejections, Grant was confident that his message is good and concordant with facts. He implied that those who are confident that their faith is true would be open to discussion and criticism, while those who attempt to shut down critiques do so because their beliefs are false and unable to withstand debate. Grant argued that Christianity “thrives on openness” and the “truth”: I am called a hate preacher, and I have been thrown out of university after university. I was to do an academic talk on the Qur’an. Muslims heard about it. . . . They went to the authorities. . . . The place was crowded, over two hundred people were in there. They were all seated, I was ten minutes into my talk, the authorities came and shut down the meeting, and we had to leave. . . . Now, what was the claim against me? I was a hate preacher. The very next year we went to another university, again, the same talk, but with a lot more new material. It was all academics. The same thing that I teach everywhere. I was going to confront the Qur’an historically. . . . We couldn’t even get into the university . . . because one student who is a Muslim went to the university and said, “This man is a hate preacher.” They never phoned me. The authorities never talked to me. No one even asks me to look at what I was going to teach. We were not even allowed to go on campus. . . . As Christians, I absolutely don’t want censorship. There’s no such thing as hate speech when it comes to religion. You have to have open dialogue; you have to have criticism. Christianity thrives on openness; we thrive on the truth.

Though they based their opinions on differing experiences, conservative Christian interviewees were consistent in emphasizing the importance of their freedom to point out what they see as the fallacies of Islam and the truths of Christianity.

“[Muslims] Believed That Beating Me Up Was Actually an Act of Obedience to God”: Views on Political versus Religious Motivation Conservative Christians see themselves and others as being more motivated by religion, and they see the world through a religious lens, whereas progressive Christians see others as being more motivated by political and socioeconomic factors. This difference is highlighted in the

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debate around why Muslim terrorists commit acts of violence. Conservative Christians are more apt to believe that religious principles motivate terroristic behavior. This tendency to attribute behavior to religion is not applied only to the stereotype of “devoutly religious.” Some conservative Christians believe even atheists and agnostics are motivated mainly by their religious viewpoint (i.e., atheists and agnostics are still within a particular system of faith and worship, even if faith and worship lies in their own intellect or humanity, and devotedly pursuing the interests to which they ascribe to be of supreme importance). For example, conservative Christians believe the Bible to be authoritative in their lives and are more apt to believe the precepts within a holy book would be influential in the life of an adherent of another religion. Similarly, they believe the Qur’an to be authoritative in the eyes of Muslims. They tended to associate a greater likelihood of violence with a more devout Muslim faith, believing that devout Muslims are compelled to violence by the Qur’an and Hadith, and that nominal Muslims (those that are Muslim by name but know little to nothing about the Qur’an and their faith) are more peaceful toward non-Muslims. Grant offers a unique perspective on Muslims, having grown up in a Christian missionary family in India. Later, he spent many years living in the United Kingdom and now resides in the United States. He shared the conservative Christian propensity to point to religious beliefs as the motivation for behavior and violence. As someone who has lived in both Asia and the West, his discussion of the relationship between Islam and terrorism references the Qur’an and the perceived Western failure to comprehend Islam correctly. During our interview he recited more suras from the Qur’an than all of the progressive Christian interviewees combined. His correlation between a religious group’s holy book and their behavior is not surprising since he holds religious beliefs to be more influential on behavior than socioeconomic position. Grant told me he had been beaten up multiple times by Muslims. He recounted one time when he was “beat up, slammed, and knocked unconscious” while critiquing Islam and sharing the Christian gospel at Speakers Corner in London. He told me “the police were concerned because one time sixty of these Muslims knocked me out . . . kicking me on the ground [and] I went unconscious.” Later, the police told Grant that while he was unconscious “a black man came and laid on

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top of [him] and took all the blows for [him].” Grant believes the type of violence he has experienced is committed by Muslims that have a very good understanding of Islam: “[Muslims] believed that beating me up was actually an act of obedience to God. . . . This is quite legitimate because that’s what Muhammad did. Muhammad destroyed anybody that stood against them. These guys have read the Qur’an. . . . They knew exactly how to deal with anybody that stood against the prophet.” The below quote further highlights Grant’s belief that the Qur’an requires violence and expresses his frustration that the UK and US media and leadership allow only, according to Grant, a false narrative framing Islam as a religion of peace: So the only narrative we have in Britain is that terrorists are not Muslims. . . . Remember Obama used to say this: “these [terrorists] are not Muslims. True Islam is peaceful.” They don’t know how to get past that narrative because they want to believe that Islam is not violent. But if you want to find if Islam is violent, just read the book [Qur’an], look and see where their authority comes from.

Grant continued his argument that Islam motivates Muslims to violence, pointing out that the doctrine of abrogation within Islamic doctrine stipulates that this specific verse and other more peaceful verses are actually overridden within Islamic teaching. The doctrine of abrogation holds that the Qur’an is a progressive revelation, meaning essentially that when verses contradict one another, the early verses (the Meccan suras) are overridden by the latter verses (the Medinan suras). Other interviewees also brought up the Islamic doctrine of abrogation and believed this doctrine to be important when trying to understand Islam and how Muslims make sense of their scriptures. According to Ashleigh, the earlier suras are more peaceful, and the presence of these earlier chapters is the reason why some say that Islam is a peaceful religion. But as the Qur’an continues, she said, the teachings become less peaceful and more jihadist: “that’s where you see the death and the killing and the infidels and all that kind of stuff.” Marcus also brought up the doctrine of abrogation, saying that Muhammad “first preached peace and got little results. Later, he changed and preached that violence

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could be used, and then [he] said that God gave him the right to abrogate earlier revelations with later revelations that were contradictory.” Grant said, “There’s 166 verses in this side [the later Medinan side] that abrogate chapter 109:6.” He specifically referred to one Medinan verse and quoted it out loud: “Slay the unbelievers wherever you find them. Besiege them. Lay in wait for them, have every kind of ambush.” He then went on to mention other “supposedly peaceful” verses but refuted them by suggesting the following verses are being taken out of context and are rather placed within calls for violence. Similarly, Tim highlighted how Islamic beliefs necessarily impel Muslims toward violence or at the very least make them “slightly empathetic to it.” For example, Tim mentioned that some polls find that 15–25 percent of Muslims in Europe are “entirely sympathetic” to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS; sometimes referred to as Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant [ISIL] or Daesh in Arabic). He found that absolutely logical and unsurprising, because, according to Tim, the Qur’an, the Sirat Rasul Allah, and the Hadith all encourage conquering by violence. Tim also brought up Muhammad in his discussion of Islam and violence, saying that based on his reading of early Islamic sources, Muhammad would be “leading ISIS” if he were alive today. Furthermore, Marianne said non-Muslims should look to the Qur’an and the life of Muhammad in order to make sense of the violence of ISIS, the Taliban, and other violent Islamic groups. Marianne spent extensive periods of time working with refugees in Muslim-majority regions in Central Asia and the Middle East, and she shared the opinion that the Qur’an teaches violence. She also wanted to highlight, as did Tim, that many Muslims are sympathetic to Islamic terrorism. Marianne perceived “large parts of the world” such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan to be sympathetic to it. She noted that some of those countries demonstrate their dedication to a literal interpretation of the Qur’an by imposing Sharia law and, for example, enforcing blasphemy laws that affect anyone who insults Islam with punishments ranging from fines all the way to death. She was appalled by what she considered to be the poor treatment of women, and she ultimately expressed her belief that “true” Islam, as opposed to “moderate” or “cultural Islam,” is an “evil religion” that motivates terrorism:

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There is a discussion about how it treats women. . . . Go to Sura 4. . . . This is talking about the man has a wife and he is afraid she is going to disobey. She hasn’t done anything wrong. This is what the Qur’an tells them to do: “You should admonish them and forsake them in beds apart, and beat them.” You know, this is clear teaching. When I’m in Afghanistan, they are under Sharia law and they believe in the literal translation of the Qur’an. Saudi Arabia does too. . . . If we don’t take it literally, what about the fact that Saudi Arabia takes it literally? What about the fact that Pakistan takes it literally and has a blasphemy law? You’ve got large parts of the world that are taking it literally and enforcing it and making it part of their law.

Marianne, as did most conservative Christians, clearly believed Muslims were motivated to terroristic violence due to the Qur’an.

Boundaries of Conservative Christians’ Social Identities We have established an idea of how conservative Christians define themselves theologically and politically, namely that they rely on a historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines and thus prefer Christian solutions to human problems. To that end, they highly value free speech, which allows for vocal proselytization. They are generally suspicious of government intervention and tend to attribute political issues, such as terrorism perpetrated by Muslims, to religious causes. Previous chapters have suggested that conservative Christians see themselves as more closely aligned with progressive Christians than with Muslims, and this chapter’s findings support that conclusion. For the most part, conservative Christians primarily see Muslims both as being in need of conversion to Christianity and as followers of a religion alien to their own. While conservative Christians’ more rigid theology causes them to see themselves as “set apart” from Muslims, they are less likely to apply such a rigid distinction between themselves and progressive Christians. In other words, in conservative Christians’ eyes, progressive Christians’ theological errors are not perceived to be sufficiently severe to necessitate a separatist response, and for the most part, progressive Christians are not considered part of their out-group. This phenomenon is explored below. The upcoming sections focus on conservative Christians’ views of

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Islam, but questions about Islam tended to draw out how conservative Christians viewed progressive Christians as well.

“Islam Was Created to Refute Christianity”: Negative Views of Islam, Allah, Muhammad, and the Qur’an Conservative Christians maintain clear boundaries between Islam and Christianity. Black-and-white judgments are seen as necessary when it comes to this distinction. Christian conservatives believe that Christian believers should fully reject Islam. Conservative Christians are more likely to focus on the brokenness of Islam and Islamic cultures in light of their belief that Muslims are not only lost and bound for hell, since they reject Jesus as savior, but also actively promoting the Qur’an, which conservative Christians believe is explicitly against the Triune God of Christianity. This belief, in combination with conservative Christians’ historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines, results in a religious impulse to spread what they believe is the universally true gospel for everyone, thereby saving Muslims from an untrue and deceptive religion. For example, Marianne and Ashleigh believed Islam to be a false belief system. Both women have founded separate ministries that bring people to the Middle East or East Asia to aid Muslim communities with the ultimate goal of sharing the Christian faith. While both mentioned some similarities between Christians and Muslims, both women ultimately presented Islam as a false religion that keeps believers from knowing the true God. They saw Islam as a religion that encourages violence and the mistreatment of women. Marianne went so far as to say that the only way “[Islam] can co-exist with the West [is] if they don’t take it [Islam] literally.” Inherent to their poor view of Islam are negative views of Allah, Muhammad, and the Qur’an. For example, Henry, a church leader and missionary, felt that Islam is a “religion that has kept billions of people captive to false teaching that leads them to hell in spite of what they think they can possibly achieve in order to earn God’s favor.” Henry went on to share that he believed Islam is directly opposed to the Christian faith: “The God of Islam is not the true God, the God of Islam is a false God. That is the underlying assumption that I work from. I believe that Islam was created to refute Christianity, essentially.”

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Because conservative Christians adhere to a historical theology that emphasizes biblical doctrines, they were consistently interested in comparing Islamic teachings with their Christian beliefs. For example, Hermann listed some commonalities between Islam and Christianity but quickly moved into the core differences between the religions, arguing that Islam embodies beliefs that are directly against the “essential doctrines to salvation” with Christianity: There’s some crucial differences [between Islam and Christianity]. Christians believe that Jesus died on the cross for the sins of the whole world, and raised again three days later. That’s called the gospel. Islam rejects that. The problem is that the similarities are in many nonessential areas, and the differences are in crucial areas, like is God one person, or is there three persons in God; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? Is Jesus God, or was he only a prophet? . . . Somebody said that it’s the differences that make the difference. Christianity and Islam can never be, in their official orthodox forms, reunited, because they clearly deny there’s three persons in the Godhead. They clearly deny that Jesus was the son of God. They clearly deny that he died on the cross and rose from the dead. Christians believe that these are essential doctrines to salvation.

Hermann also spoke against Muhammad being a “true prophet of God,” arguing that if he “believed he was a true prophet of God, [he] would be a Muslim.” Rather, he told me, “I’m a Christian.” Umar, a former Muslim, cited his view that Muhammad is not a prophet of the true God and backed up his view using the Bible and the words of Jesus: I think Muhammad was a businessman, a political leader, and a military leader. . . . I do not call him a prophet. The Lord Jesus said on the cross, “It is finished.” . . . If I say there is somebody else with a new message, then I’m denying my Lord. People want to believe in [Muhammad] being from God; my Bible doesn’t tell me anything like that.

To a group that espouses a Christian historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines, there is much to critique within Islam, particularly in its rejection and condemnation of the most essential doctrines of the Christian faith.

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Conservative Christians’ Complicated Views toward Relationships with Muslims Conservative Christians often express complicated views toward Muslims, stating both positive and negative thoughts. They view Muslims as part of their out-group because their religion directly conflicts with what conservative Christians perceive to be the truth. In many conservative Christians’ eyes, Muslims are ultimately bound for hell and are in need of conversion to Christianity. Yet, despite their negative opinion of Islam and its dire eternal prognosis, conservative Christians usually expressed warmth toward Muslims. For example, Hermann said, “Christians should make friends with Muslims, and discuss freely and openly,” and Paul said, “I think that we should be as charitable and kind as we possibly can.” Ashleigh explained: “We may have a different culture, we may speak a different language, we may have different beliefs, but deep inside we are the same. . . . Now I see Muslims in a different light. I see each one as, first of all, I look at them as created in the image of God, just like everyone else.” While most of these conservative Christians said that they “love Muslims,” they were also interested in preserving freedom in the United States for Christian proselytization (which is punishable by prison or death in some Muslim countries). This, according to them, sometimes means making Muslims uncomfortable. This group expressed a willingness to be upfront about their rejection of Islam’s truth claims (for example, regarding the Qur’an and Muhammad); they also expressed their disapproval of some Muslims’ violent acts in order to censor the American public from drawing Muhammad. Thus, their expressed “love” for Muslims was a love of a more confrontational nature. This “confrontational nature” leads into the second point regarding conservative Christians’ complicated attitudes toward Muslims, which is that conservative Christians describe working very hard, through trial and error, to appeal to Muslims and accommodate their preferred communication style in an effort to be relevant to them. While they do consider Muslims as part of their out-group, many conservative Christians I spoke with are involved with helping Muslims, particularly refugees, and many are also spending social time with and/or debating Muslims. They want to appeal to Muslims in order to be relevant and ultimately

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persuade them to accept their perceived truth in Christ. Their high level of interest in and accommodation of Muslims stem from their conservative Christian emphasis on biblical doctrines of salvation. Like several conservative Christians, Ben, Marcus, and Ashleigh were wary of letting immigrants and refugees from Muslim-majority countries resettle in the United States. Ben indicated he was more comfortable with immigration in general than most US political conservatives would be, but he did not approve of a policy of “just open[ing] wide the doors.” As an illustration of problems associated with immigrant communities, he brought up the UK issue of “rape gangs, where it’s perfectly acceptable in Pakistani communities, if you get a non-Muslim girl, to use her however you want.” Ben brought up the importance of “vetting” immigrants by asking questions such as, “Do you believe Muslims are superior to non-Muslims?” and “Do you believe that violence is okay?,” even though the questions themselves could be considered “bigoted or racist.” Ashleigh had a similar view on the topic of refugees, saying she approved of letting refugees enter the United States, but she added that “we need to protect our country” because terrorists could easily slip in among refugees, whom she described as an “innocent group of people that are sadly being marginalized right now.” Marcus preferred to keep out Muslim refugees altogether, saying he thought it would be best to create “refugee havens” within war-torn Muslim countries, “where they could be cared for and stay within their own linguistic and cultural communities,” and so they would not have to “come to Europe or the United States, where there will be all kinds of cultural dislocations that may have effects for centuries to come.” Interestingly, while such opinions on refugees seem to demonstrate a relatively unaccommodating approach to Muslims, Ben, Marcus, and Ashleigh all had solid relationships with Muslims, and Ben and Ashleigh both claimed to have Muslim friends. Marcus said he “doesn’t have a lot of friends, period,” and his “main friend is [his] wife,” but he said very admiring things about Muslims he has debated, and even said he loved Zakir Rashid (a pseudonym for a famous Muslim debater). Debates have drawn him into warmer relations with Muslims. Ben, though usually a black-and-white communicator who is happy to point out faults in Islam, also had many Muslim friends, and for years Ben’s best friend was Usman, a devout Muslim. Ben’s relationship with Usman

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was, in fact, one of the closest relationships to a Muslim described by any interviewee in the entire leadership sample, comparable to some of the friendships with Muslims described by those who were born in Muslim-majority countries and have Muslim family members. Similarly, Ashleigh has worked hard to improve relations between Christian women and Muslim women and to “humanize” Muslims in the eyes of Christians. For example, she had been engaged in teaching Christian women how to reach out to Muslim women that they see around town, such as at the grocery store, and coaching the Christians to make eye contact and ask the women about their day, their families, and other topics. Her disapproval of the way many women are treated in Islam had led her to proactively try to improve the lot of Muslim women. She has done so by leading seminars that require participants to engage with Muslim women in an effort to make sure they feel “seen” and valued by Christian women, and she also leads overseas trips to the Middle East focused on that same goal. The conservative Christians Hedaya, Umar, Nadeem, and Ahmed were from Muslim-majority countries. Three of the four were themselves former Muslims. These four held the harshest views on Islam and were the least likely of all interviewees to express inclination to accommodate Muslims, a fact that they usually blamed on their insider knowledge of Islam—the “real” Islam as practiced by the Muslims closest to them. As Christians, they have consistently had to contrast their faith against the faith of Muslims. Each of the four tended to assume that devout Muslims will imitate Muhammad at his most violent—that is, they will imitate the final phase of Muhammad’s ministry, the Medinan phase in which he made his strongest calls for the killing of infidels. Despite their lack of willingness to accommodate Islam, each of these four leaders indicated being highly engaged with Muslims, with the exception of Hedaya, who renounced her former Islamic faith and has relocated to an undisclosed location in the United States out of fear that her family, also in a US location, might want to physically harm her. Hedaya told me that her view on how Christians should interact with Muslims has changed as her relationship with God has grown deeper and she has grown older. As she has gotten older, she increasingly senses “urgency” for Muslims and is more keenly aware of how Muslims are a part of “God’s heart” and that they are her “people” and “people who Jesus loves and died for.”

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One of the four, Umar, is a good illustration of the negativity this group espoused with respect to Muslims. Umar expressed frustration with how some Muslims are “using the Constitution of the United States and the freedom of the free world to their advantage.” He cited as an example the case of the Muslim teenager in Irving, Texas, who in 2015 was arrested after he brought to school an invention he had created that had the appearance of a bomb. After it was discovered that the invention was actually a clock, his Muslim family sued the City of Irving for $15 million, and the student inventor received an invitation to the White House. Umar felt the reaction to the student’s arrest was unreasonable, because if the situation were reversed and Umar were a Christian who had caused a bomb scare in a Muslim-majority country, he would be “shot with fifteen bullets.” He mentioned that the White House should instead have met with “some of those 125,000 or 250,000 Iraqi Christians that have [had] to flee ISIS in Mosul.” When I asked Umar how he felt about Muslims in the United States, he said, “Some are wonderful. Some are not.” Umar described some Muslims awakening to the true God but said others “sit around and get benefits and don’t work,” thus using the American system to their advantage. Nadeem echoed Umar’s concern that some Muslim immigrants are deliberately taking advantage of US governmental programs: “Some refugees want to just . . . get benefits . . . and use the system, SSI or food stamps and what have you. Just to say, ‘Okay, I’m living in this culture. How can I use this culture to my advantage?’ Also take advantage of Christians.” Conservative Christians tended to qualify negative anecdotes and viewpoints about Muslims with the acknowledgment that they do not believe all Muslims share these negative characteristics. Their attempts to balance their statements reflect their conflicted viewpoint, in which Muslims are, on the one hand, loved by God and themselves, and, on the other hand, potentially threatening to the religious freedom of Christians and the stability of the United States.

“It’s a Mixed Bag”: The Heterogeneity of Conservative Christians’ Peer Groups with Respect to Views of Islam Not only do progressive Christians and conservative Christians view Islam very differently, but they also differ in terms of how much those

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viewpoints matter to them. This conclusion was reached by analyzing how likely members of each group were to include people with divergent views on the matter in their social circles. Those with heterogeneous social circles may find the topic to be less important, as they are willing to accept individuals who disagree on these matters into their circles. Those with homogeneous social circles require a like-minded viewpoint on Islam, suggesting that they place a higher value on these issues. The classification of interviewees’ social circles as homogeneous or heterogeneous depended on their answers to the question “Do the Evangelicals you are close to—that is, the Evangelicals that you share life with—share most of your sentiments about Islam?,” along with natural follow-up questions. The responses allowed us to reach conclusions regarding interviewees’ perceived degree of unity among their social circles regarding Islam as well as how differing opinions on the topic impacted inclusion or exclusion in those circles. Ultimately, we found that conservative-leaning Evangelicals are relatively likely to surround themselves with Christians of diverse persuasions with respect to views of Islam (that is, peers who hold a variety of theological perspectives on the topic of Islam). Most conservative Evangelicals perceived themselves to be surrounded by fellow believers who held a wide variety of viewpoints (see table 5.1). While conservative Christians prefer black-and-white boundaries in so many areas, they demonstrate more flexibility regarding multiple perspectives on Islam. Their tolerance of heterogeneous groups shows that they are not drawing a hard line between their beliefs regarding Islam and progressive-leaning Christians’ more progressive ones. Rather, and perhaps contradictorily, conservative Christians profess both to hold to a tight view of scripture yet also to hold moderate views of progressive Table 5.1. Conservative Christians’ Views of Differing Christians by Social Circle. Homogeneous

Heterogeneous

Total

Negative

1

1

2

Moderate

4

26

30

4

4

5

31

36

Positive Grand Total

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Christians. It is true that conservative Christians tend to emphasize the importance of correct theology, and they hold a number of distinct theological beliefs that theoretically should mark them as separate from progressive Christians as well as other religious groups. But when defining their in-group, conservative Christians break from their typical theological rigidity and are uncharacteristically willing to overlook theological differences with progressive Christians, and they even consider those progressive Christians as part of their in-group. This inclusion is based on conservative Christians’ perception that, based on very broad theological grounds, progressive Christians still fall within the Christian fold and share similar goals (e.g., they all care and pray for Muslims; they all want to strengthen the Muslim understanding of Jesus). Reasons for this phenomenon are explored in the following section. When we asked Paul “Do the Evangelicals you are close to—that is, the Evangelicals that you share life with—share most of your sentiments about Islam?,” he responded by describing diversity: “I would say that at my church, it’s probably pretty mixed [opinions regarding Islam]. I mean, I go to a pretty standard, down the line, Evangelical congregation in [a US city]. . . . I would say that at my church, and at churches I’ve been affiliated with, there’s probably a lot of different kinds of opinions that reflect the range of opinions among Evangelicals.” Marianne described her in-group as made up of people with different viewpoints on Islam. She said that some of the people closest to her are similar in desiring to share “true peace through Jesus Christ,” but others do not share her view because it “puts people in a position of persecution, and of being accused of hating” and they do not want to take such an “extremely unpopular position.” Mabel also said, “I don’t think everybody shares my view.” Ben said his friends at church have little interest in Islam and have never asked him to speak on the topic, even though he travels around the country to do just that. He also viewed his in-group to be diverse. Samantha responded by talking about her children, who are in her immediate circle, holding different views than hers because they were learning things about Islam in the school system that is completely foreign to what she was learning in a class on Islam at church. She also brought up her husband who she said “honestly doesn’t really care to hear” about Islam. Billy, like Ben, believed his church was made up of people with diverse perspectives on Islam. He came to this conclusion

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while taking the Perspectives on the World Christian Movement course at his church (a fifteen-week course usually referred to as simply “Perspectives,” designed to help individuals gain “a deeper understanding of [God’s] ultimate purpose in the world,” according to its website). He noticed that classmates differed in opinion regarding Islam as they discussed various scenarios and problems each week. Likewise, Luke said of his in-group that “it’s a mixed bag” regarding views on Islam. Some conservative Christian interviewees, particularly those recruited from the Adams River Baptist Church, explained the heterogeneity of their peer group by pointing to the diverse voices allowed to teach within their congregation. For example, many of the interviews with leaders at Adams River revealed a sense of conflict regarding appropriate missiological methods for approaching Muslims, but in spite of these disagreements, a consistent platform was offered to opponents deemed to share the ultimate goal of bringing Muslims to a saving faith. For example, Nadeem did not believe that the Qur’an should be used for the purposes of introducing Muslims to the true Jesus, nor did he agree that believers in Christ with a Muslim background should continue to attend their mosques. Others at Adams River believed that both of these approaches make being a “Christ follower” more accessible to Muslims, and they attempted to change Nadeem’s opinions. In spite of the conflict, church leadership has continued to grant both sides the opportunity to present their perspectives rather than adopting one perspective or the other as the church’s stance. While some within the church leadership are more progressive-leaning, they are the minority, and that is likely why Nadeem is still allowed to teach his more conservative Christian ideas. The most conservative Christian leaders that disagreed with more progressive-leaning Christian leaders did not completely reject them due to perceived theological errors, but rather they sought to emphasize what they did have in common, often suggesting that those in disagreement had good intentions, even if misguided. We found this display of tolerance to appear inconsistent with the more rigid biblicist Evangelicalism and the historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines that conservative Christians adhere to. Kristy likewise explained how Adams River actually welcomes diverse teachings, citing the “Perspectives” class. Kristy explained that the course is taught by numerous mission experts and that “Perspectives”

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will actually tailor the instructors based on how far your congregation is willing to contextualize the Christian gospel for Muslims. (As illustrated by some of the conflicts among the Adams River leadership, there is a wide range of opinions among Evangelicals regarding the degree to which Islamic texts, traditions, and practices should be used to introduce Christian beliefs, and to what degree Islamic practices should remain in place for Muslims who profess faith in Christ.) Since conservative Christians are known for, and often express, their historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines, it is significant that they financially support and allow a curriculum to be taught in their church that is provided by an organization willing to teach concepts that conservative Christians would consider heretical and antibiblical. They are willing to support an organization that, according to Kristy, is comfortable instructing others to blend Christianity and Islam in a way that much of Adams River disagrees with. Church leadership determined, however, that “Perspectives,” while imperfect, will better equip their members to interact well with Muslims. It seems that, when it comes to interacting with Muslims, conservative Christians’ impulse to share their faith overrides their usual doctrinal rigidity, making them more willing to overlook “flaws” in progressive Christians’ approaches and accept those with differing viewpoints.

“We Can Be Different Sorts of Christians . . . Because There Are Different Kinds of Muslims”: Views of Progressive Christians As we will see in later chapters, when progressive Christians shared their views regarding how Christians should act, their answers tended to include heavy critiques of conservative Christians. While conservative Christians usually adhere to a historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines, they were more apt to draw group boundaries against groups perceived to be outside of the Christian fold. Conservative Christians ended up implicitly, and even sometimes explicitly, blurring the lines between conservative Christians and progressive Christians. For example, Kristy talked about her and her husband’s experiences while working with refugees in Frankfort, a US city where many Muslim refugees reside. Kristy participated in a Bible and Qur’an study mostly comprising theologically progressive Christians, and she knew that she

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and her husband were the only theologically conservative Christians. She expressed disagreement with the more progressive-leaning Christian attendees but said that ultimately she and her husband continued to attend because they perceived the progressive Christians to be “praying the same way.” She was also comforted by her belief that they “all talk about wanting to glorify Christ.” Kristy even pondered whether or not the theological distinctions that they disagreed upon were “that big of a deal to [Jesus]” and questioned her own motivations, suggesting that perhaps “it’s just us” that makes the differences a big deal: Then for a while, a small group in Frankfort which all the people were from Mercy [a progressive-leaning congregation] except for my husband and me. We did a Bible and Qur’an study a couple months ago. . . . It was hard because we were the only ones that believed the way that we did [the only conservative Christians]. One night all the husbands got into a big debate. I don’t like controversies, so I was like dying. . . . They’re just entrenched in their belief and we are in ours, but we continue to go because when we pray for our Muslim neighbors, we’re all praying the same way. We all talk about wanting to glorify Christ. I just wonder what Jesus thinks because we’re all trying and maybe it’s not even that big of a deal to him and it’s just us that makes it big. I don’t know.

Just as Kristy refrained from criticizing the progressive Christians in the group, conservative Christians generally did not express critical opinions on progressive Christians. Some conservative Christians shared their belief that Christians should refrain from “fighting other Christians.” Arguing with fellow Christians, whether they be progressive or conservative, can be seen in a negative light by conservative Christians. For Ahmed, this is partially because he is busy fighting Islam and Islamic terrorist organizations, which seems to Ahmed to be a much more justifiable effort. As he explains, Muslims do not profess to be “followers of Christ” and are therefore a more worthy target of his attention than fellow Christians with whom he disagreed: A few years ago, I spoke against the insider movement tactics . . . , and I gathered people together and told them we need to do something about it. I decided to drop it later, because it’s . . . going to be fighting other

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Christians. It’s not my cup of tea. . . . I’m already in a fight [referring to his work on polemics against Islam and Islamic terrorist organizations].

Grant expressed a different reason for avoiding conflict among Christians. He brought up a number of individuals who disagree with his approach to interacting with Muslims and talking about Islam as well as his usage of “historical criticism.” Grant calls these individuals his “friends” alongside whom he worships God. Grant was not being sarcastic. He really sees Christians who disagree with his traditional way of evangelizing as an important part of Christianity, even though they publicly condemn his evangelistic efforts with Muslims. He went on to compare his methods, and those of other confrontationalists like him, to Paul’s methods as described in the Bible. In addition to seeing his condemners positively, Grant brought up a handful of other confrontationalists (individuals with a similar communication style as himself) but proceeded to make distinctions between his limits and theirs. Regarding one of his fellow conservative Christian confrontationalist friends, he said, “He mocks, I refuse to mock.” But rather than condemning his friend for it, he rather said, “But we still need that [mocking].” Grant felt that the means of mocking, if one feels capable and called to do it, is acceptable. He went on to rationalize his opinion by drawing attention to the success of his fellow conservative that does mock: “look at how many Muslim men and women he’s bringing to the Lord.” Grant’s form of evangelism is in alignment with many Christian leaders through the decades that have similarly aligned themselves with a historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines. Still, he is suggesting that those that see him as in error and too verbally strong, and even those that go farther than he is willing to go verbally, are still “friends” of his with good intentions and that all approaches are “needed” in order to bring all the different types of people into the Christian fold. This was a pattern with conservative Christians, who seemed reluctant to speak against other Christians but rather tried to find commonalities in the mission to share their religion with non-Christians. Grant further explained his stance that both progressive and conservative Christian approaches are valuable: The majority of Evangelicals in Europe do not like what I do. . . . We’re still Evangelicals, we still worship together, we sing the same songs . . . [but]

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they will not confront and they will not use historical criticism [when proselytizing]. . . . And there are many groups of Evangelicals that I get along with who I have no problem with, who are part of that camp. So most of our missionaries in Britain would be in that camp. I would suggest the vast majority of missionaries in the Evangelical realm here in the United States would also be in that camp. The other side are the confrontationalists and that’s where I fit. I find there are others of us who believe that we need to confront Islam head-on. . . . And you remember what Paul [referring to Apostle Paul in the Bible] did, he confronted. There’s a few of us who are now doing that. . . . I won’t even do what Ben does. Ben mocks, I refuse to mock, but we still need that. We still need Bens, because look at how many men and women he’s bringing to the Lord.

Grant is typical of conservative Christians in our sample, in both their defense of their own approach and their more accepting and accommodating stance regarding other Christians’ approaches.

“I Was Deconstructing, Well, Not on Purpose”: An Openness to Blurring Boundaries between Conservative Christianity and Progressive Christianity Why are conservative Christians willing to lay down their rigidity regarding theology when it comes to progressive Christians and missions? Why are conservative Christians willing to allow progressive Christians into their in-group? Why would they choose a progressive Christian curriculum like “Perspectives” to be taught when there are ample conservative Christian alternatives? Why would they attend studies of the Bible and the Qur’an put on by a progressive congregation rather than attend studies in theological alignment to their own? Have conservative Christians retained their emphasis on orthodoxy in rhetoric more so than in practice? Could it be that pluralism is having a diminishing effect on conservative Christians’ rigid theological impulse that has so defined the group previously? Pluralism can be defined as a system in which multiple religions, principles, and sources of authority coexist and in which minority groups, instead of adapting, participate in the dominant society while maintaining their differences in beliefs and practices. Christian Smith

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(1998) argued that it was because of pluralism that Evangelicalism has thrived, as Evangelicals have seen themselves as “embattled” and this had emboldened their faith. This theory has been useful and helpful in a number of ways. But that theory is now well over twenty years old. A lot more “pluralism” has occurred in the United States since Smith’s theory surfaced; beyond the LGBTQ revolution, 9/11 happened, which actually bolstered Islam in America, leading to the formation of the Council of American-Islamic Relations, a prominent advocacy organization for Muslims in the United States. In addition, the building of Park51 (also known as the Ground Zero Mosque near the 9/11 Twin Towers site) was a nod to Islam’s strengthening presence in America. And by 2010, the number of Muslims in America more than doubled since 9/11 and three in ten Muslim immigrants have arrived in the United States since 2010 (Neal 2012; Pew Research Center 2017b). And in 2019 two Muslims, Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib, became the first Muslim women in Congress. Berger (2016, 201) argued that we are entering into an age of pluralism with the world as religious as it ever was, with the exception of western Europe and the international “intelligentsia.” That intelligentsia is a group with important comparisons to Goodhart’s “Anywhere” people in that both make up the dominating class and are the types with “portable, achieved” identities established by their educational and career accomplishments. “Anywhere” people see less value in what Goodhart calls “faith, family, flag,” whereas “Somewhere” people spend their lives in service for faith, family, and flag (Berger 2014, 2016; Goodhart 2017). Berger argued that the process of pluralism influences believers to distinguish between the absolute essentials of one’s faith and the less central aspects of it. According to Berger, interacting with people of diverse religious convictions inevitably “relativizes” one’s faith in a process he calls “cognitive contamination” (Berger 2014, 2–11; Quosigk 2016). In other words, being exposed to examples of widely diverging beliefs can make minor distinctions seem less important, even if those distinctions were previously seen as significant. This can lead to individuals and groups giving up certain elements of faith that they at one time deemed very important to retain and protect. If Berger was correct, conservative Christians may be loosening their theological boundaries with progressive Christians, believing that the inner core of their beliefs

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are shared, in spite of numerous non-essential differences (Berger 2016). Perhaps the effects of pluralism penetrated into conservative Christianity in ways that soften conservatives’ reactions to theological differences between progressive Christianity and conservative Christianity. This acceptance marks a significant shift from the bitter battles fought within Christianity a century ago in the United States during the modernistfundamentalist divide. In addition to the impact of pluralism, we are curious as to how well conservative Christians truly understand progressive Christian theology and whether their accepting attitude stems, at least in part, from unawareness of how vastly progressive Christians’ core theology and social priorities differ from their own. In 1923, Machen argued that liberal Christians (whom we refer to as progressive Christians) often seek out leadership roles in churches much more theologically conservative than themselves and that they purposefully make use of “traditional phraseology,” such as biblical references and theological lingo, in order to appear orthodox. According to Machen, they repurpose the traditional phrases and teach new interpretations, which Machen said “mean[s] a complete reversal of the meaning” (2009, 133). This results in core theological changes in the existing conservative churches but these changes are implemented in a way that is not blatantly oppositional. Thus, according to Machen, “Christianity is being attacked from within” by progressivism, which “proceeds from a totally different root, and it constitutes, in essentials, a unitary system of its own” (2009, 146). Machen believed this progressivist method of penetration effective partially because of the growing theological illiteracy among Christians. As previously discussed in chapter 2, the story of Alisa Childers is a contemporary example of someone who had difficulty pinpointing precise areas of difference between the theology of conservatives and the theology of progressives. Importantly for the question of whether conservative Christians could be unaware of being led by a progressive Christian, Alisa did not purposefully “deconstruct” (asking questions that lead to a dismantling of one’s previous beliefs) her conservative faith but rather she felt confident she was at a Bible-believing church and thus was more vulnerable to accepting the teaching as orthodox. Alisa said, “I was deconstructing, well, not on purpose” (Childers 2020).

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If Machen is correct in his analyses, then many conservative Christians are outsourcing their theology without a clear understanding of what exactly is taking place. In other words, conservative Christians may be, to a certain extent, ignorant of the differences between themselves and progressive Christians, and to a certain degree also of the differences between their former conservative theology and their new, more progressive theology. This possibility is strengthened by a recent study of US Evangelicals that suggested most interviewees’ moral authorities were in fact more progressive than they themselves realized or felt comfortable expressing outright (Quosigk 2021). Perhaps, in addition to pluralism, the reason conservative Christians are more apt to consider progressive-leaning Christians as part of their in-group and/or use progressive Christians’ resources is that their theology has been gradually becoming more progressive without their full realization. Future research might help determine the extent to which conservative Christians understand progressive Christianity.

Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated how conservative Christians define their in-groups and out-groups. Our conservative interviewees’ responses regarding their perception that Muslims are part of their out-group and that progressive Christians are part of their in-group shed light on the state of contemporary conservative Christianity in the United States. While viewing Muslims as part of their out-group on theological grounds is beneficial for understanding the intact exclusionary boundaries of conservatives, the finding is largely anticipated for an audience familiar with conservative Christianity. However, our finding outlining the conservative Christians’ tendency to relax their theological boundaries when it comes to progressive Christians is an empirical advancement, and particularly curious when contrasted with progressive Christians who, as we soon will see, consistently differentiated themselves from conservative Christians and were highly critical of them in general. Overall, this chapter confirms that conservative Christians hold to a historical theology emphasizing biblical doctrines but shows that their theological strictness was most evident in their views of Islam and not as strongly held in their views of progressive Christians. Accordingly,

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this chapter concluded with an exploration as to reasons why this may be the case, asking why conservative Christians are less theologically exclusionary toward progressive Christians. And it explored the loosening of theological boundaries and how this can happen without conservative Christians’ being cognizant of the theological alterations or implications. The following chapter will explore the more flexible theology of progressive Christians, which will further illuminate the stark differences between conservative Christians’ commitment to a historic theology emphasizing biblical doctrines and the progressive Christians’ commitment to a humanistic ethic of social justice.

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Progressive Christians as Theologically Flexible and Politically Optimistic You have nothing to fear from God. God is not mad at you. God has never been mad at you. God is never going to be mad at you. . . . Today my handmade copy of “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” is stored safely away among other memorabilia. . . . The monster god has faded away, and today I preach the beauty of God revealed in the face of Christ. But that doesn’t mean there are no monsters. The monsters of war, violence, greed, exploitation, oppression, racism, genocide, and every other form of antihuman abuse continues to inflict our species with unimaginable suffering. . . . Viewing the cross as payment to God for our personal debt of sin ignores the deep problem of systematic sin. When we turn the cross into a payment for our personal sin debt to an offended God, we leave unchallenged the massive structures of sin that so grotesquely distort humanity. —Brian Zahnd, Sinners in the Hands of a Loving God (2017, 20–22, 106)

Understanding progressive Christianity can be challenging. How does one accurately describe a group of people who resist confining their doctrines and philosophies to stationary definitions or established categories? Determining identity descriptors and core goals of a group who, in many ways, consider themselves to be beyond blackand-white boundaries can be an intimidating task. However, in this chapter on progressive Evangelicalism, using qualitative methodology, we empirically address the philosophies, values, and beliefs that emerged as commonalities among theologically progressive Christian interviewees. These commonalities point to progressive Christians having a flexible, Jesus-centric theology, which stresses what we have 137

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conceptualized and termed a humanistic ethic of social justice. We unpack what it means to have a flexible theology that emphasizes social justice. This chapter also addresses the political implications to progressive Christians’ flexible theological views that stress a humanistic ethic of social justice, namely, that it is clear that progressive-leaning Christians were more optimistic about politics and political solutions than conservative Christians and were more apt to see the world through a political, rather than religious, lens. In other words, politics itself does not drive their political optimism, but rather their political optimism is a consequence of their flexible theology that stresses a humanistic ethic of social justice. This chapter is based on interviews conducted with forty-one individuals who were identified as theologically progressive Christians. The categorization of these interviewees as progressive was based in part on their views of the Bible but also in part on their views of Islam, because interviewees’ views of Islam are a window into their conception of Christian particularism (a traditional marker of Evangelicalism in early America). Of the forty-two progressive Christian interviewees, twenty were females and twenty-two were males. Sixteen of the interviewees were national leaders in the Evangelical movement. These leaders represented various areas of specialty (including missiology, Islam, and/or interfaith dialogue), and they also functioned in a variety of different roles: some were mega-church pastors, others were best-selling authors, and still others were university professors or government consultants on faith relations. Besides the sixteen leaders, an additional twenty-six interviewees were recruited from the two Evangelical congregations described in chapter 4. Four progressive Christian interviewees belonged to the conservative-leaning Southern Baptist congregation known in this study as Adams River Baptist Church. The remaining twenty-two progressive Christian interviewees belonged to the progressive-leaning nondenominational congregation that appears here as the Mercy Family of Churches. The majority of progressive Christian interviewees in our sample were born and lived in the United States and the majority of interviewees would be considered “white.” We conducted a handful of interviews with Evangelicals who immigrated to America from Muslim-majority countries, but all of them fell into the conservative category, and they

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tended to hold harsher views on Islam than other interviewees, even within the conservative category (their views are discussed in chapter 5).

Progressive Christians’ Theological and Political Views We begin our review of progressive Christians’ interview responses by exploring how they define themselves—or, perhaps more importantly, how they resist defining themselves. Starting with progressive Christians’ attitudes toward defining terms, we then move to the philosophies, values, and beliefs that emerged as commonalities among the interviewees. Finally, the section concludes with an examination of how progressive Christians view themselves in the political sphere.

“I’ve Changed My Views. A Lot of Evangelicals Don’t”: Comfort Level with the Term “Evangelical” Almost all interviewees answered in the affirmative when asked if they were comfortable being tagged with the label “Evangelical.” However, progressive Christians were much more likely than conservative Christians to supply modifications to and critiques of the label. Furthermore, two of the progressives in our sample, Richard and Matt, rejected the label outright, saying they are no longer comfortable calling themselves Evangelicals. Although they do not self-identify as Evangelicals, we chose to include their perspectives because of their strong influence in Evangelical circles and because they both identify as followers of Christ. They train Evangelical pastors and congregations, they were recommended as interviewees by other Evangelicals who have been influenced by them, and many Evangelicals consume their books and blogs and listen to their podcasts and presentations. An entire sector of Evangelicals gives heavy weight to their opinions, considering them to be spiritual mentors. As for why Richard and Matt are no longer comfortable identifying as Evangelicals, Richard said that he has changed with age, unlike a lot of Evangelicals, who, according to Richard, do not change. He added, however, that Evangelicalism “is my background, it is my heritage, and I care about Evangelicals a lot, whether or not I’m considered one.” When we asked Matt about his religious identity, he said he “grew

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up Evangelical” but had left Evangelicalism and is now a member of a non-Evangelical denomination of Christianity. He went on to say that he speaks predominantly to Evangelical audiences, that Evangelicals are actually his “target audience,” and that his book sales and “[his] invitations are typically coming from open-minded Evangelicals,” that is, Evangelicals who are willing to change in doctrine and/or practice. Both of these interviewees left Evangelicalism because they changed their views on certain doctrinal matters, especially doctrines relating to hell, sin, and redemption, and also because of their perception that their pursuit of social justice issues put them outside the bounds of Evangelicalism. Both indicated they were happy to leave—a happiness that stemmed from their feeling that Evangelicalism was stagnant and dying, and that leaving would allow them to go forward to a place that Evangelical beliefs and community could not take them. Matt offered this analogy: It’s like taking a train through Paris. You can’t get a train all the way through. So Evangelicalism takes us halfway through Paris and so the train stops. It’s like, now what? And so, some people are staying on the train singing, “Give me that old time religion,” and dying of the fumes. And then there’s other people like, “Well, if we want to keep going, what’s the next train?” And I don’t think it’s about finding a new movement but it’s more like, what are the signs of the thing that will take us forward? And it would be like preaching on forgiveness. You know? If Christianity has anything to say, it’ll have to do something with forgiveness, and it’ll be loaded with Jesus stuff. So that’s what we’re trying to discover, for Evangelicals who want to keep going forward but don’t want to really be Evangelical anymore.

Richard similarly perceived his departure from Evangelicalism as a move forward. He believed conservative Evangelicals to be too connected to American nationalism and uninterested in caring for all people, regardless of their race, class, nationality, gender, or sexual orientation. Although Richard and Matt were exceptions to the majority that accepted the Evangelical label, their reasons for leaving reflect many of the qualifiers and concerns that other progressive Christians expressed about the Evangelical label before ultimately accepting it.

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“We’re Not the Insiders with God”: Comfort Level with the Term “Christian” As detailed, progressive Christians mostly embraced the term “Evangelical,” but they did so with some reservations and caveats. Similar reservations and caveats extended to the term “Christian.” For progressive Christians, “Christianity” can be a dirty word associated with moral deficiency. This is in part because many progressives in our study perceived “Christian” to be a socioreligious category, not a term to describe whether or not one believes in Christ for forgiveness of sin. Progressives tended to tie Christianity to the Western world and often specifically to American nationalism and Republican political ideology. Progressive Christians put high value on the concept of culture, believing culture to be, at times, more powerful than religious conviction in influencing behavior. For the most part, they offered negative assessments of both Western culture and Christianity, usually back to back. They described Christians in the West as either power-hungry, capitalistic, individualistic, aggressive, or as exhibiting a combination of these traits. Thus, progressives’ perception of a strong connection between Western culture and Christianity produced negative associations with the term “Christian.” In some cases, progressive Christians preferred to avoid describing themselves as Christians because the word holds too much negative baggage due to colonialism, imperialism, and/or Christians who have demonstrated bad morals or bad politics; in other cases, they distrusted the term “Christian” because one can be labeled as a Christian while not necessarily taking any meaningful action toward furthering the kingdom of God. The progressive Christians we spoke to also strove to distance themselves from the historical “us versus them” mentality, which they felt to be characteristic of historical Christianity. They rejected the mentality that would pit, for example, Islamic beliefs against Christian beliefs. Rather, they were open to the possibility of someone from a different religion having greater insights than they did regarding truth. As Nick put it, “We’re not the insiders with God and other people are the outsiders. . . . We’re doing it [following God] mutually with other people [Muslims].” For progressive Christians with views like Nick’s, the term “Christian” has been irredeemably associated with particularism and divisiveness that is not compatible with their beliefs.

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The Humanistic Ethic of Social Justice If our progressive Christian interviewees took exception to being labeled as Christians, it should not be surprising that their core beliefs differ significantly from those of conservative Christians. Progressive Christians in our sample determined their in-group by relying primarily on a flexible, Jesus-centric theology that emphasizes what we are terming a “humanistic ethic of social justice.” This ethic seeks not only to serve those perceived to have unequal access to power in Western culture, such as religious minorities, but also to learn from them and give equal space to their beliefs. The humanistic element means they aspired to live a life based on personal self-fulfillment and individual values. In line with humanism, they believe the understanding of truth and best practices is on an upward trajectory, and more flexible, and that humans are emerging with better interpretations of scripture than the humans before them. Consistent with the elevated view of humanity inherent in humanism, the traditional Christian concepts of the “fallenness of man” and divine judgment for sinfulness were not focused on among the progressive Christians we interviewed. The social justice element of the ethic means that they strive to both serve and learn from those perceived as marginalized in Western culture. However, for many progressive Christians, social justice goes beyond serving and caring for the physical needs of the marginalized—it also includes treating their beliefs with equality. The humanistic ethic of social justice values the agency of the perceived marginalized, which allows for an openness to be felt toward traditional out-groups. To dismiss the religious beliefs of a traditionally marginalized person, or, worse, to try to change their beliefs to conform to the beliefs of the majority, would represent social injustice. Progressive Christians see conservative Christians as following the dominant form of theology in the West, which progressive Christians see as oppressive to marginalized groups and associated with Western colonialism. Progressive Christians’ overwhelmingly negative views of conservative Christians have partially emerged as a response to colonialism and has some commonalities with postcolonial theology, which arose in the 1970s. It explored representation and power within colonized peoples, and it values the agency of the marginalized as they worked to resist the dominant forms of theology

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of their colonizers (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2007, 168; Kwan 2014, 9; Heaney 2019). As upcoming quotes will show, progressive Christians generally reject the idea of conversion-oriented interfaith interaction, which is another manifestation of their social justice ethic. We now unpack each of these elements more thoroughly.

“I Think a New Expertise Is Emerging”: Flexible Theology Progressive Christians hold a flexible theology. They see value in acknowledging the perceived complexity of situations and exploring the various contexts and lenses that people use in order to reach a decision. They talk about “the tension between” and the “layers of meaning.” The majority of progressive Christians have had to be flexible as they experienced significant theological changes in their own lives and have become unconvinced by black-and-white answers. Some saw definitive answers as contributing to a negative “us versus them” mentality, while others saw nailing down specific beliefs as less important than focusing on addressing societal issues. Many were less likely to reach firm conclusions because of their understanding of biblical interpretation as a dynamic process, rather than a static set of truths. This interpretive approach allows for doctrines found in the Bible to progress and to mean something different today than they did, for example, one hundred years ago. This idea that Christian understanding of truth and best practices is on an upward trajectory aligns with social gospel leader Rauschenbusch’s thought that the “social gospel is a permanent addition to our spiritual outlook and that its arrival constitutes a stage in the development of the Christian religion” (1917, 2). The Christian religion is thus “developing.” Progressive Christians are much more apt to change their stances on modern societal issues, such as same-sex marriage and divorce, because of this more flexible theology. The upward trajectory for Michael, for example, meant he needed to forsake his theological conservativism that he described as “arrogant,” and rather shift to the left, partly because he feels a commitment to joining alongside the younger, more progressive, generation: “I think there is a generational difference [regarding theology]. I think your [younger] generation will be more Evangelical center, or left, and progressive. I just happen to be an older guy who is over there as well, maybe because of

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my commitment to the next generation.” Just as Michael has changed, progressive Christians, in general, are suspicious of previous “timeless” interpretations handed down and are more willing to acknowledge having been wrongfully blind to the most just interpretation of Scripture. There is also a belief that the majority of Christians have failed to understand the Bible correctly and generally distrusted people’s ability to discern the Bible for themselves. Some believe that Christians have allowed the Bible itself, or trusted interpreters of the Bible, to lead them toward evil and to act against humanistically defined principles of peace and love, which has “gotten [them] into a lot of trouble.” Richard mentioned this possibility and offered a solution: namely, for Christians to enter into a community of experts who have emerged as good interpreters and who do not read the Bible simplistically or literally: “I think what Evangelicals need is . . . a different way of interpreting their texts so they won’t be guided by their texts toward hostility and hatred and violence. The longer-term strategy has to be to replace this literalistic, simplistic, highly selective and inconsistent but very popular and well-reinforced way of reading the Bible with a better approach.” Richard was then asked what type of approach should be used instead (e.g., replace with something manmade like a guide or something divine such as the Holy Spirit?). He responded by sharing the need for one to be flexible and offer new responses to changing conditions: . . . [Y]ou’re asking a question that is, I mean there are many, many layers to it . . . and it is very intelligent and it’s a fascinating question. . . . [T] hose ways [what was done in the 1990s or the early twenty-first century] may have worked well enough, but now we need new responses. Because sometimes if a response works it changes the conditions. Now you need to take things to the next level.

Richard lamented the degree of confidence that conservative Evangelicals have in their understanding of exactly what the Bible says. This understanding, according to Richard, is often based on what their faulty and antiquated “interpreters” say the Bible says. He wishes they would gain a greater level of humility. In their humbler position, according to Richard, they would be open to thinking as an intellectual and learning from the emerging experts of biblical interpretation:

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But one of the things I think Evangelicals don’t understand is when they say, “The Bible says,” what they really mean is, “Our interpreters say the Bible says.” Helping people to get a little bit of light in between the Bible and their interpretation of the Bible, if you can just help people see that those two things aren’t the same, then they are in a position to think intelligently and critically about the interpretation. . . . You asked for what would be a better way of interpreting the Bible?. . . . How does somebody know what a good wine tastes like? You enter into a community of people who are experts in wine tasting and you learn what they know, and I think there’s kind of expertise like that in reading the Bible in different ways. I think a new expertise is emerging that allows us to read the Bible in respectful, reverent ways but not the literalistic, simplistic ways that had gotten us into a lot of trouble.

Matt, for example, has also found past interpretation of the Bible to be problematic and describes biblical interpretation as following a trajectory. As an example, he suggested that the principle of freedom for oppressed peoples is present in the Bible, although this ideal was obscured in the past and it took Christians a long time to come around to recognizing this teaching. He argued that Christians throughout history have been on a “trajectory” of growing in their understanding of the depth of biblical teaching on matters of social justice, but that the principles are in the text (and always have been). He explained: “What has Christ through the Spirit shown the Body of Christ over the centuries consistently? And is there a trajectory in that too? Like it took a long time to figure out slavery is a bad idea. But then once we did, we’re like, Oh yeah, look at that, Moses says, ‘Let my people go.’ That’s vital.” Here, Matt speaks of the evolution in Christian thinking regarding slavery: in his view, the biblical teaching against slavery was always there (in the words of Moses), but it took Christians a long time to recognize that teaching. In the same way, he implies that modern Christianity may still be failing to grasp the full implications of biblical teaching but should be constantly pressing toward greater understanding. This openness to changing interpretations of scripture enables progressive Christians to adopt a much more flexible theology than conservatives and to more easily depart from traditional beliefs toward the humanistic social justice ethic that many now favor.

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“An Identity Given by God”: The Humanism of Progressive Christians Humanism is a philosophy that stresses human value and agency, emphasizes the commonality of human needs, and seeks to use reason to solve human problems. Thus, belief in the capability of humanity is characteristic of humanism. Consistent with this elevated view of humanity, the traditional Evangelical concepts of the “fallenness of man” and divine judgment for that sinfulness were mostly absent among the progressive Christians we interviewed. Daniel was an example of a progressive Christian in our sample who demonstrated humanistic esteem for humanity. Daniel put a great deal of stress on finding one’s identity and then living it out. He also emphasized the worthlessness of finding one’s identity in one’s religious label, a mindset that is commonly encouraged and even required within conservative Evangelicalism. In his view, real worship of God depends less on alignment with the right doctrinal beliefs and more on recognition of one’s dignity and value as a human being: This is my philosophical position: that each human is born, and when they’re born, their unique identity is given to them by God. That’s their soul, and the goal of life is to understand that identity and live it out in all of its beauty and fullness and uniqueness. And to be led by the Spirit, in my mind, is my soul joining together with God in the release and discovery of that true identity. That’s what I think Jesus is all about. . . . The greatest act of worship is to be the identity that God gave you, whatever that is, to be it and to live it out and use it to help other people and all that kind of thing. . . . Their [others’] false view of themselves [is], “I’ve got to self-protect, and I’ve got to self-promote because me, by myself, being who I am is not good enough.” . . . That’s called sin in the Bible. That means you’re separate from yourself. You’re separate from the universe that’s actually for you and so you’ve got to separate from other people. That’s it. So whether I’m talking to a Muslim or a Mormon or an Evangelical, it all ends up being the same question: “Who are you apart from all of this crap?” That’s who I want to talk to—the true you . . . the part that thinks the universe is for you, that little piece of you that was there when you were a kid, but’s been stomped out of you . . . because that’s

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the invincible, creative part and it’s actually who you are. This defensive, critical, cynical [person], that’s not you. That’s the fake you. And it’s a waste of time talking to the false person. Jesus won’t do it. He won’t talk to a false identity.

Daniel employed traditional Evangelical language in this statement; for example, he spoke of identity as being “given . . . by God,” referenced “sin in the Bible,” and made mention of “Jesus” and being “led by the Spirit.” But the view he expressed was not a traditional Evangelical view. Instead of emphasizing humanity’s depravity and God’s anger at human sin, he spoke of humanity in elevated terms, and he rejected the religious labeling that he perceived as obscuring individuals’ real identities. Jim also spoke of humanity in elevated language. Whereas conservatives would be inclined to stress the human need for salvation from sin and the need to evangelize non-Christians in order to bring them salvation, Jim did not see human beings as needing to be “fixed.” Instead, he approached his fellow humans with a sense of curiosity and with a desire to learn from them: When I became a new Southern Baptist Christian in high school, we were taught to evangelize everybody aggressively. For a while, I and all of my church mates felt this extraordinary pressure to get everybody converted really quickly that we knew, so they wouldn’t go to hell and burn forever, and all that. You may be familiar with it. That was an extraordinary way to live, that I sloughed off a long time ago. I think that it does not lead to good human-to-human encounters when everybody you’re encountering you have some kind of evangelistic agenda for. I want to encounter human beings as human beings. Learn and receive, teach and learn, and undoubtedly, good things happen when there’s that posture of humble openness. . . . I don’t have an agenda of trying to fix everybody and make them just like me.

The humanistic principle of valuing all humans as they are, perfect even without particular religious understandings, dissuades progressive Christians from viewing themselves or others as “fallen” or as needing to be converted to become acceptable in God’s eyes.

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“Don’t Bail on Jesus. That’s Not the Problem”: A Jesus-Centric Theology Although humanism can imply a rejection of the supernatural as the source of one’s being and purpose, the progressive Christians in our sample described a form of humanism that allowed for Jesus to occupy a central position. Their Christian humanism included a view of Jesus as the way to achieve, perhaps in some ways paradoxically, both selffulfillment or self-realization and altruistic unselfishness to serve others. This form of humanism advocates for the self-fulfillment of humanity, but this goal is housed within a framework of certain distinctively Christian doctrines and ethics. Progressive Evangelicals talked about Jesus a lot, and they spoke of him as being highly significant. For example, Jenny said, “I think he’s incredibly important, the most important.” Some progressive Christians explicitly noted their propensity to view the words of Jesus as being more authoritative and trustworthy than the rest of the biblical text (these individuals sometimes referred to themselves as “red letter Christians,” reflecting the fact that the words of Jesus are printed in red in many Bibles). That said, the degree to which progressive Christians embraced a traditional Evangelical conception of Jesus varied. Since judgment was not a major theme for progressive Christians, they tended to not mention the view of Jesus that focuses on his ability to redeem one from hell. Instead, they tended to focus on the here and now and to conceive of Jesus as the way to true peace in this life and the ultimate example of how to live a life of love. In addition, while some interviewees emphasized the idea that Jesus was divine, others chose to focus on his earthly life and what one could glean from his example for humanity; in other words, these latter progressive Christians viewed him as an exemplary model for what a human should look like rather than focusing on any divine characteristics. For the most part, interviewees who were in lower positions of power within congregations tended to espouse a humanism that incorporated more traditional Evangelical concepts and ideas, such as the divinity of Christ. In contrast, those in high leadership positions espoused a form of humanism that acknowledged traditional Evangelical concepts and

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ideas less, even while, at times, using Christian terminology to express their beliefs that were different than traditional Evangelical beliefs. They repurpose the traditional terms in new ways. Matt talked about how people do not want Evangelicalism anymore, as it is too exclusivist and has been driving people out. Yet, according to Matt, they still want to retain one thing—Jesus. When Matt works with Evangelical churches that are experiencing a decline in attendance, he begins by asking them to introspect: How has our message been driving people out? Is there still an anchor? . . . So, I think the kind of churches I end up in, they’re like, when somebody in the church, or let’s say the pastor, will read the book [Matt’s book], they’re like, “Oh, this is what we’re missing. This is where we, not just where we had it wrong, but where we could move forward.” Because I’m a real advocate for, yeah, don’t bail on Jesus. That’s not the problem. . . . I’ve become one of the guys, the go-to pe[rson] for people who are experiencing deconstruction [the critical analysis of philosophical and literary language and the assumptions implicit in forms of expression], who don’t want to lose their anchor in Jesus. It’s like, how do you not throw the baby out with the bath water?

Most progressive Christians also had a desire to communicate their view of Jesus with others—one of the rare traditional characteristics of Evangelicalism that progressive Christians shared with conservative Christians. However, their views of Jesus and motives for sharing differed, with progressive Christians sometimes taking a nonexclusivist view of Jesus. Most progressives genuinely wanted to share their perspective of who Jesus is; for them, this was not an exercise in trying to compel belief or conversion. For example, Dylan described how he arrived at the approach of sharing Jesus with Muslims rather than trying to win conversions per se: “With that new mindset, I’m not trying to rip you out of your world, or even stop you from being Muslim. . . . I just want to talk about Jesus. That new mindset opened up everything. Suddenly conversations became much, much better.” Simply having conversations about Jesus is important to many progressive Christians. This theme was repeated in various ways by many of the interviewees, no matter their degree of progressiveness. But,

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according to progressive Christians, talking about Jesus will not mean talking about Jesus exclusively. Progressive Christians usually desired to share their views of Jesus with other individuals only after building a relationship with those individuals and after listening to and learning from them. To varying degrees, progressive Christians hoped to strengthen Muslims’ understanding of who Jesus is, and some hoped to encourage Muslims to become “Muslim followers of Jesus” and to accept Jesus as God, but they always held that Evangelicals also have much to learn from Muslims. Many interviewees also commented that Evangelicals have done a poor job of correctly sharing Jesus in the past, contrasting their own two-way sharing approach with the conversionoriented sharing that occurred in the past. Progressive Christians clearly hold Jesus in high esteem, seeing him as important to talk about, but not necessarily for the purpose of eternal salvation.

“I Think about It More as a Present Reality”: Views of Hell Consistent with their de-emphasis on salvation from God’s judgment, the progressive Christians in our study were much less focused on or convinced of a traditional Evangelical view of hell. Some expressed the belief that God would not condemn people to eternal damnation and punishment. Progressive Christians’ fixation is instead on present possibilities and “the Kingdom now.” For example, when Daniel was asked what he thought about the idea of hell, he described his belief that hell is “that separateness that we’re in right now.” He also implied that God would not allow those that have suffered much on earth to continue suffering simply because they do not “know Jesus.” Hell, to me, is that separation, that separateness that we’re in right now. I work with a lot of people that have been in hell ever since they were born, so when they die, you’re going into deeper hell? I have a hard time with believing that. My wife, she’s Jewish, so her question to Evangelicals is, “You’re saying that we went through the hell of the Holocaust and then when we die, we go to hell again because we didn’t know Jesus.” That’s pretty hard to believe when you’re reading the . . . when you’re looking at the life of Christ.

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In addition, Daniel expressed the idea that hell is a human construct, created due to fear, and consoling to believers because it assures them that their enemies will indeed suffer. When asked if there is something one would need to believe about Jesus in order to get into heaven, he expressed uncertainty that Jesus was the only way: I’m not sure. I’m on a journey with that question. Of course, I was raised that you have to ask Jesus into your heart or it’s over. The problem is, Jesus never tells anyone to do that and neither does Paul or any of them. . . . It’s just not in the Bible, that concept. We’ve made passages into that . . . based in fear. I don’t think Jesus is in any way exclusive, no, I don’t. . . . If Jesus is my model of what a human is supposed to look like, then I would say Jesus is the way to being fully, truly human as a human should be in connection with a God, that if you were in connection with Him, you would love your enemy. You would do good to those who hate you. You would care about the immigrant. Jesus is the way to the God of that and is not the way to the God that sends people to hell forever because you didn’t say the right magic prayer.

Justin also expressed his uncertainty about hell. He also shared his belief that hell is ultimately “separation from God” and he thinks of it more now as a “present reality” rather than “a place you go”: I think to quote Rob Bell [a progressive Christian former pastor and author of Love Wins], “we can have all the hell we want.” Every day you’d choose hell. I don’t know, I feel like I move back and forth. Someone said to me the other day that the punishment of sin is inherent through the sin, so much of the punishment of the sin is like implicit in the sin, meaning to be punished by sin is to sin. It carries punishment in it because Paul says the wages of sin are death and it’s not just death one day. It’s death now. You’d literally sow death every time you sin. . . . Just like you can bring heaven to earth, you can bring hell to earth.

Uncertainty, a trait of postmodernism, is not something shied away from but is rather embraced by progressive Christians. An example of this can be seen in Justin, who previously said, “I don’t know, I feel like

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I move back and forth,” regarding the topic of hell. Still, he went on to share how he preached on the topic: I preached on this, that it’s something like the potential for heaven and the potential for hell exists in the space between you and me always. . . . But I would say I haven’t discounted an eschatological understanding of that, whether it’s literally a place of torment or literally a place of complete oneness with God. I think we get to choose union or separation with God at the end of the day, and I think hell is separation from God. I would say I used to think about it a lot more as a place you go and now, I think about it more as a present reality.

Similarly, Eli expressed his belief that some are living in their own perceived hell on earth: In Detroit right now, if I were to do a middle school ministry, and I [hypothetically] go to a guy named Ben, “Ben, if you don’t honor your parents you’re breaking God’s commandment. You’re going to go to hell when you die.” He can then tell me, “I’m already living in hell. I am being threatened every day, I have no peace, I have no joy, I have no hope. I am already in hell.”

Uncertainty about hell could provide another reason why some progressive Christians are less motivated to engage in traditional evangelization and are more interested in social justice. Many progressive Christians were more interested in overcoming the perceived “hells” individuals are experiencing in the present and in addressing the pain of injustices. They saw these present injustices as highly important and were appalled by what they perceived as the lack of attention among conservative Christians to these injustices.

“Red Letter Stuff ”: An Insistence on Social Justice Progressive Christians in our sample tended to be very interested in social justice, meaning they were deeply interested in addressing the unequal distribution of wealth, opportunities, and privileges within societies and restoring these things to marginalized groups. Some areas

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of concern included support for immigrants, financial care for the poor, policies promoting racial equality, interfaith initiatives, and peacemaking foreign-policy efforts. Progressive Christian interviewees, more so than conservative interviewees, tended to believe Muslims are marginalized and face discrimination in the United States. Cindy, for example, showed concern for immigrants in response to a question about Muslims. She said, “I’m good with [Muslims being in the United States]. I feel sorry for them because I think it’s not an easy place to immigrate to.” This sentiment is taken further by Jenny, who stated that Christians should be especially hospitable to Muslims, particularly in light of Americans’ fearful attitudes, which marginalize them: “I think probably, especially for Muslims to live in America, we need to be more proactive in making Muslims feel at home, at ease, welcomed, [and] loved. . . . [Muslims] know [that] people, if you’re wearing a hijab or are covered in any way, that people are just automatically terrified of you.” Claira also allied herself with marginalized groups as a civil rights activist. She believed she was meant to care for minorities and that being a civil rights activist was in her blood. She said: [My father was a] very ultra right-wing, extreme conservative, so you would think I would share more views like him. But I don’t know. I really think it’s God. Ever since I’ve been young my mom has always said I’m going to be a civil rights activist. It’s just me. That’s always been in my head. I don’t know how to explain. . . . It’s just never crossed my mind to treat people differently.

Here Claira suggests that God is the reason why she has such a strong inclination toward social justice—this is a religiously motivated drive. She also sees her interest in social justice as a distinctively progressive interest, one not shared by conservatives. She draws a contrast between her father’s conservative views and her own desire to treat people equally, implying that her father was not “treating people equally.” To be a conservative, then, was in opposition to being a civil rights activist, working to secure equal opportunities for members of minority groups, in Western culture. A number of progressive Christians referred specifically to the Sermon on the Mount, interpreting the sermon as promoting social justice

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and care for the marginalized. Again, Matt’s words are illustrative. He observed that the time he spent in Anabaptist communities drew his attention to the Sermon on the Mount (and the Gospels more generally) in a new way, and he suggested that these texts were the source of his thinking on how to characterize right and wrong: I noticed, unlike mainstream Evangelicals, they [Anabaptists] spent a lot more time preaching from the Gospels and the Sermon on the Mount. And so, if I were to say how [I determine] right and wrong, I’m not just using the Bible as a flat text. That in terms of my Christian ethic [it’s] coming . . . heavily from the Sermon on the Mount [and the] teachings of Christ. Red letter stuff.

As noted previously, the reference to “red letters” refers to the words of Jesus; thus Matt perceives his ethic as deriving directly from Jesus. Progressive Christians tended to focus on the teachings of Jesus that promoted what they viewed as loving and kind and did not focus on what they would deem his more harsh or divisive words, such as when Jesus is cited in the New Testament as declaring that some will be cursed “into the eternal fire” (Matthew 25:41) and that he did not come to “give peace on earth,” “but rather division” (Luke 12:51) and that some who “honor [God] with their lips” worship in vain as they teach as orthodox beliefs “the precepts of men” (Matthew 15:7). In rare mentions, references were usually used to call out perceived sins of conservative Christians. Otherwise, progressive Christians generally cited teachings promoting positive treatment of others in support of their humanistic ethic of social justice. For many progressive Christians, social justice goes beyond caring for the physical needs of the marginalized—it also includes treating their beliefs with respect. To dismiss the religious beliefs of a traditionally marginalized person, or, worse, to try to change their beliefs to conform to the beliefs of the majority, would represent social injustice. As previous quotes have shown, and as later sections will demonstrate, progressive Christians generally reject the idea of conversion-oriented interfaith interaction, which is another manifestation of their social justice ethic.

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Political Views Previous research has found that many progressive Christians’ commitment to a humanistic ethic of social justice tends to closely align them with the Democratic Party, and some openly defend their political positions by discussing their faith (Sacks 2018; E. Green 2019). In this sense, there are political implications to progressive Christians’ theological views. Our findings are consistent with that previous research, in that thirty-one of the forty-two progressive interviewees in our progressive sample were categorized as politically left-leaning (as defined in chapter 4). It is difficult to untangle the theological and political impulses of progressive Christians and to determine which impulse is most influential and motivational when taking a certain position. However, it is clear that progressive-leaning Christians were more optimistic about politics and political solutions than conservative Christians. Progressive Christians were also more willing than conservative Christians to acknowledge how factors outside of religion impact others’ conclusions regarding politics. For the most part, progressive Christians see others as being more motivated by political and socioeconomic factors, seeing the world with a political lens, whereas conservative Christians see others as being more motivated by theology and see the world through a religious lens. These data indicate that many progressive Christians believe politics has created the problem of Islamic terrorism and thus imply that if political circumstances were different, Muslims would not be motivated toward violence. Identifying the problem as political implies a political solution, and progressive Christians were indeed more likely than conservative Christians to view government intervention as potentially helpful.

“Transcend[ing] the System”: Avoidance of Party Allegiance At times, the political leanings of interviewees were expressed outright; for others, political positions were only implied. In a few cases, progressive Christians in our sample chose to express a right-leaning political stance due to their belief that the political left is wrong on the issue of abortion. Although progressive Christian interviewees generally

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leaned to the left politically, for the most part, those who aligned themselves with the Democratic Party did so only grudgingly, and often after expressing both a dislike of being categorized and unhappiness with the two-party system. Many were very averse to identifying themselves with any political party or making any clear statement about their political alliances. Matt, for example, was very comfortable talking about politics and mentioned that he has actually written books on political philosophy. However, he also said his politics “are so complex” and that he rejects the “left-right matrix” due to the fact that such a polarized matrix is a “world system committed to ‘othering.’” Matt considers himself “not of that system” and desires to “transcend the system.” He also acknowledged the trouble his transcendence gives to others. During the interview, he said, “When you ask a simple question, I give you these convoluted answers and I hope it doesn’t mess things up for you.” Here Matt showed recognition of his difficulty with offering blackand-white answers about his political identification. Similarly, Martha expressed dissatisfaction that has developed over time: “I used to be of the mindset that I would work for the greater good of the party. . . . Over time I think as you grow older and wiser you realize that nothing’s as black and white as you maybe would like it to be so I kind of had to abandon the party system, although I think I might still be registered as a Democrat.” This avoidance of clear answers about politics, evident from Matt and Martha, was a consistent trait of progressivism.

“That Politics Have Driven Them [Muslims] to That [Violence] Would Be My Fear Rather Than Anything about Islam”: Views on Political versus Religious Motivation The divide between the Christian left and right regarding the motivation of Islamic terrorists is undeniable. Former Democratic president Barack Obama refrained from using the term “Islamic terrorism” to describe terrorist acts of violence against civilians committed by violent Muslims who claim a religious motivation. However, during Republican president Donald Trump’s 2020 State of the Union address, Trump assigned the “Islamic” descriptor to terrorism, saying that his administration is combating “radical Islamic terrorism.” This description linked the violent acts to the terrorists’ religion. However, when terrorism was

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discussed with the progressive Christians in our sample, there was usually little to no talk of potential religious motivations, such as the Qur’an or Muhammad. These would be serious omissions to conservative Evangelicals, who consider religious beliefs to be highly motivational. But progressive Christians very rarely attributed any negative motivations to Muhammad or the Qur’an. More often, progressive Christians instead attributed the motivation of terrorists to economic difficulties or to revenge for Western interference. Generally, our quantitative (see chapter 3) and qualitative (this chapter, along with chapters 5 and 7) data suggest that conservative Christians see others as being more motivated by religion and see the world through a religious lens, whereas progressive Christians see others as being more motivated by political and socioeconomic factors and seeing the world with a political lens. Nick, for example, explicitly stated his belief that Muslims, even “radical” ones, are motivated to commit acts of violence due to their politics, not Islam. Nick also esteemed Islam and believed that if the Muslim he was interacting with was a “religious person”—more motivated by their Islamic faith—then Nick and that individual would be friends and have “great conversations.” [I]f you genuinely honor Muslims, even the radical ones, typically, unless they’re just killing you as a surrogate because they hate America, they don’t even want to do that after you start to talk to them [Muslims] and are genuinely honoring them and wanting to help Americans learn more about Muslims. . . . I’d have more fear about ethno-nationalist violence. Whenever we’re going to Kosovo, . . . they’re just mad at some Serbian nationalists who are just mad at the United States and they’re wanting to take me as an example. That’s very rare. That would be the fear. . . . It’s not really about Islam. It’s more about the politics of the whole situation. That the politics have driven people to that would be my fear rather than anything about Islam.

Similarly, Matt focused on how politics and culture affect behavior far more so than religion: I think the underlying thing of violence is not Christian or Muslim, it’s the culture and politics of the place in question. . . . I lived among Indonesian

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Muslims, they were . . . very gentle people, whether Muslim or Christian. Indonesians are gentle. I’ve been to some places in Africa where, whether Christian or Muslim, the people are just aggressive and in your face. I would say I don’t feel one [Muslims or Christians] are more violent than the other: it’s the culture and the politics that underlie the people in question.

And when Katrina had the opportunity to discuss Islamic terrorism, rather than focusing on violent Quranic content or the violent acts of Muhammad found in the Hadith, as the conservatives so often do, she instead focused on how the War on Terror encourages people that do not know Muslims and are not aware of the diversity of Islamic sects to increasingly stereotype. This encouragement, she believes, will inevitably lead to more violence: [T]he War on Terror, on Islam, is just stereotyping Islam as though everybody is a terrorist. People who don’t know any Muslims or don’t know that the religion is multifaceted, yeah, it’s creating a lot more problems and animosity for future generations because we’re starting to implant this animosity in households with kids. That’s all they hear. [We’re] just going to have future wars. It’s really caustic and really irresponsible on an international diplomacy level.

A number of progressive Christians suggested that the political motivation for violence stemmed from Americans’ exploitation of Middle Eastern countries and initiation of wars for their own economic interests. They see this as an injustice that, more so than anything religious, motivates some Muslims to seek violent revenge for Western interference and/or exploitation. Matt made that argument: “How do we remove the desperation that leads to terror? And who’s creating that desperation right now? You’d go in on the ground and, let’s say even the Taliban, you ask them, ‘What would make you this violent?’ Inevitably we find that it’s often something the West has done in terms of exploitation and injustice. That’s why they’re [Islamic terrorist groups] targeting us.” In addition, Nick sympathized with the negative view Arabs have of America and shared his belief that the 9/11 terrorists were motivated by the desire for revenge after America’s previous intrusion in a Muslimmajority country:

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“I would say, “You’re right [Arabs]. I’m sorry.” I’m sorry that that’s [US foreign policy] reflected . . . badly on Jesus. . . . The Muslim world, the radicals in the Muslim world would say the terror attacks on September 11th were in response to, I forget which country that [Americans] killed a lot of citizens as well as some military leaders or something. They’re basically like, “We got them back. They attacked us. We got them back.”

Bridget also shared the view that America’s foreign policy, often supported by conservative Evangelicals, is in many ways unjust and oppressive and that the flawed policy to some extent justifies Muslims’ behavior: How does American foreign policy come into play here [as motivating terroristic activity]? . . . They [Muslims] have a problem with American foreign policy, and we don’t want to ever talk about this. They [Americans] just think that, “Oh, they don’t like us because of our values,” and that’s not what their people are saying. It’s like, “No, we don’t have a problem with your values. We have a problem with your foreign policy,” and they perceive our foreign policy as being unjust, and as a result, to some extent, they’re justified, some of them and responding in a way that’s against that because they see us as kind of oppressing the world, if you will, and they still talk about our involvement in Iraq and what they consider perceived wrong reasons for being involved in Iraq, and they have problems with our support of Israel.

Like the interviewees quoted here, many progressive Christians imply that if the political circumstances were different, Muslims would not be motivated toward violence. Progressive Christians believe there is nothing uniquely violent about Islam as a religion. From these data, we can conclude that many progressive Christians suggest that politics carries more motivational power than religion.

“I Don’t Have Fear of Government Control”: Positive Views of Government Intervention to Address Issues of Social Justice Since progressive Christians emphasized politics and socioeconomic factors as the most influential motivators for behavior, it follows that

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progressive Christians are more willing to consider political policies as the best viable solutions to both issues of domestic terrorism and issues of social inequality. In other words, most progressive Christians were optimistic regarding government as a force for positive change. It has been documented in previous chapters how central social justice issues are among progressive Christians, and our interviews supported those conclusions. Principles of social justice are the reason Katrina said she is “fiscally very left.” She went on to say that she was “not quite social Gospel left” (emphasizing social reform regarding issues of inequality, often by way of governmental policies) but was “getting there” because she can “see a lot of potential for the US to do good with its impoverished.” Bridget also appreciated the principles of social justice associated with the political left, particularly equality. She expressed it like this: I think probably [my] most important [political positions] have to do with how we treat people, social justice issues. I mean, equality, those kinds of ideas of treatment. How I dispense social justice . . . [has] more to do with righting wrongs, making sure people have what they need to have, opportunities, those kinds of things, how we treat . . . immigrants, those kinds of ideas. I think in things like racial equality, understanding the issues between racism are things that are important and needing to try to reconcile those things. And then countering what I consider to be prejudices.

In addition to agreeing on the importance of social justice issues, progressive Christians also largely pointed to government as the vehicle for achieving social justice goals. Jenny, who describes her views as mostly left, despite disagreeing with the political progressives’ stance on abortion, had no qualms about the government playing a large role in effecting the social changes she would like to see: I would say [I am] socially liberal as far as I don’t have fear of government control. I wish we had more socialized healthcare and equal rights for people. [I’d] be conservative on issues like abortion. But then I am very opposed to the death penalty and politically, as far as military, it’s very tricky, because personally, what I feel like Jesus was trying to promote is nonviolence. I am not really pro-war, pro-military action.

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Jenny’s value of social justice overrode her concerns about abortion, and to her, government control was an important means of progressing in that area. Matt had a similar belief in the government’s ability to counter injustices in the context of addressing terrorism. After suggesting terrorist groups like the Taliban are motivated by Western injustice and exploitation, Matt brought up his belief that if Western governments would contribute developmental aid to countries where terrorist impulses are high, that would solve the problem of terrorism: “To overcome terrorism, you have to stop doing the things that create the terrorism. . . . If you were to provide clean water and to provide hospitals and so on. Why is it our job to provide that? I don’t know. Why is it our job to have military bases there?” Sam was also optimistic about the government’s ability, specifically regarding its ability to prevent hurtful speech against Muslims. Unlike political conservatives, he felt the US government should take more control regarding punishing what he termed “hate speech” against Muslims. As an example of hate speech, he specifically referenced the Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest of 2015 in Texas, where people competed for a monetary prize by drawing cartoon images of Muhammad (physical depictions of Muhammad are considered blasphemous to most Muslims): I believe there are limits to free speech, and I believe there is a difference between free speech and hate speech. . . . I think our country has to come to terms with the fact that just because we believe in free speech and the First Amendment doesn’t mean that we allow all speech. Some free speech is actually hateful and hurtful, so I believe these things about the “draw Muhammad” contest [Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest] and stuff, I believe that is hate speech; I believe it needs to be prevented by the government. Yes, I do.

Whether regarding the specific issue of hate speech or more general issues of healthcare and equal rights, progressive Christians regularly showed confidence in the potential of government intervention. Taken together, progressive Christians were much more optimistic than conservatives regarding the government’s ability to help resolve social problems such as intergroup conflict and injustices surrounding equality.

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Conclusion The findings we have presented in this chapter, that progressive-leaning Christians rely on a flexible, Jesus-centric theology that emphasizes a humanistic ethic of social justice, and that progressive-leaning Evangelicals were more optimistic about politics and political solutions than conservative Christians, illustrate the ways in which progressive Christians describe their personal theology, ethics, and philosophies, as well as how they articulate the motivations of others. The implications of our conceptual advancement regarding progressive Christians’ allegiance to a humanistic ethic of social justice will be developed more fully in the following chapter, which sheds additional light on the vast differences between progressive and conservative Christians.

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Boundaries of Progressive Christians’ Social Identities I had dinner a couple nights ago with a Muslim scholar. She at one point leaned over and she said, “I travel all over the world trying to help bring peace.” She’s a specialist going into very tense situations, and conflict situations to be a peacemaker. She said “I’m a peacemaker because I’m a Muslim. My Muslim faith is what drives me to work in situations for peace and justice and reconciliation.” Who’s against that? And I think the really pressing question with America, or for people who are Christians, is what does it look like to bless Muslims? What does it look like to work together for a common good? —Rob Bell, November 29, 2015, http://whatiwannaknow. com/2015/11/rob-bell/

Now that we have established an idea of how progressive Christians define themselves theologically and politically, we move to their opinions of and relationships with other groups. Previous chapters have suggested that progressive Christians see themselves as more closely aligned with Muslims than with conservative Christians, and this chapter’s findings support that conclusion. For the most part, progressive Christians see Muslims as marginalized in Western culture. Their more elevated view of Muslims is partly due to progressive Christians’ humanistic ethic of social justice, which seeks to learn from those deemed as having unequal power in Western culture and also believes that Muslims live in accordance with the principles of Christ more than conservative Christians do. Progressive Christians expressed a focus on accepting Muslims, learning from them, and journeying toward the kingdom of God alongside them. In other words, most progressive Christians viewed Muslims with admiration, believing they could learn about God from them. This perspective contrasts sharply with the traditional Evangelical tendency to attempt to 163

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convert Muslims, of which progressive Christians are highly critical. A substantial part of how progressive Christians identify themselves is by exposing clearly what they are not—namely, conservative Evangelicals. Most progressive Christians’ critiques of conservative Christians identified numerous perceived moral deficiencies in conservatives’ beliefs and behaviors. While progressive Christians’ flexible theology allows for an openness to be felt toward traditional out-groups, this attitude is not equally applied to conservative Evangelical Christians. In progressive Christians’ eyes, conservative Christians’ errors, in the realm of theology and practice, are sufficiently severe to necessitate an unwelcoming and negative response that is otherwise uncharacteristic of progressive Christians.

Progressive Christians’ Views of Muslims and Islam The upcoming sections focus on progressive Christians’ views of Islam, but questions about Islam tended to draw out harsh criticism of conservative Christians as well. Many progressive Christians defined their stance on Islam by contrasting it with that of conservative Christians and calling attention to the perceived flaws in conservative Christians’ beliefs and approaches.

“Gosh, We Have a Lot to Learn from Them”: Positive Views of Muslims In response to questions about their general view of Muslims, progressive Christians consistently expressed admiration. They esteemed Muslims for their devotion to God, their hospitality, and, perhaps most surprisingly, their practice of da’wah (the willingness of Muslims to invite others to convert to Islam and their willingness to engage with non-Muslims about their Islamic faith). They routinely suggested that Christians had a lot to learn from Muslims. In fact, some progressive Christians identified learning from Muslims as the end goal of their interactions with Muslims, as dialogue does not necessarily need to lead to some type of change within the Muslim but rather the Christian. To hope for a conversion experience is seen by some progressive Christians as pretentious. Jane, a leader involved with facilitating cross-cultural

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experiences for women in her congregation, put it like this: “It’s using that engagement opportunity [with Muslim women] as a chance to learn about Islam. It’s not about studying up on our own faith so that we can go and defend it and make converts.” Part of this desire to learn from Muslims is due to some progressive Christians’ perception that Muslims’ faith impacts all areas of their lives, whereas Christians compartmentalize. Eli was an example of a progressive Christian who welcomed the growing presence of Muslims in America and thought that American Christians could greatly learn from them. Eli believed that Muslims allow God more control over their lives than Christians do. Eli saw this as a positive trait that leads Muslims to live in accordance with what is good and just, more so than Christians: I think that we have a lot to learn from Muslims. They’re very devout. The thing that Christianity really messes up with, I think Muslims get it. God inhabits everything. Your whole life. The way that you talk, your language, everything. God impacts all of their [Muslims’] life. Sometimes I tell people Christians have all the right beliefs but live wrong. Muslims have all the wrong beliefs, but live right. It’s kind of a joke, kind of a kick to Christians. Because they [Muslims] have some of the most devout people, and gosh, we have a lot to learn from them. So, I’m very glad that Muslims are in the US.

Meagan also praised the Muslims she knew as people who desire to honor God in all aspects of life. She said, “All of my Muslim friends, that’s just always their top priority in everything they do, is to give God glory, to be obedient to God.” Jenny also expressed admiration for the lifestyle of Muslims. She believed the Muslims she encountered demonstrated more Christ-like actions than most Christians she knew: “We’ve traveled the Middle East several times and just encounter[ed] the most beautiful people and learned. [We’ve] received more hospitality, and generosity, and kindness, and servanthood, that was more of an expression of Jesus to us, than most Christians ever do. . . . [I]t was so powerful.” For the most part, progressive Christians praised the Muslims in their lives, and often times, this praise was expressed by drawing a contrast between Muslims and conservative Christians. Muslims were described as exhibiting warmth and hospitality, having a more inclusive orientation

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than conservative Christians. Progressive Christians perceived the inclusive orientation of Muslims as being more in alignment with their view of Jesus. For example, Matt found it easier to sit and share a meal with a Muslim than with a fundamentalist Christian: I am finding [it] easier [to share a table] with [Muslims] than I am with fundamentalist Christians right now. . . . It’s not really about their faith; it’s about their orientation towards relationship. The Muslims I happen to be meeting seem to be the ones reaching out and the fundamentalist Christians I know that are just angry and exclusive or even hateful, I’m like, yeah, I have a rougher time giving them space.

This emphasis on relational attitudes over religious doctrine helps to explain progressive Christians’ tendency to admire Muslims while criticizing conservative Christians.

“Even More Insight in Some Stories of God’s Heart”: Views of the Qur’an Progressive Christians’ acceptance of Muslims extends beyond admiration of their lifestyle to a generally positive view of their holy book, the Qur’an. In some cases, this view was a result of intentional church teaching. Mercy Family of Churches, where a number of progressive Christian interviewees attended, puts on a number of conferences throughout the year with the intentional goal of inspiring a paradigm shift away from thinking of the Qur’an as demonic or evil and toward thinking of it as positive and, in some ways, even beautiful. The conference leaders give each Christian attendee a Qur’an with gold foil decorations on the cover, along with the seventy-page conference handbook, which includes a two-page spread in the handbook of sura 1 of the Qur’an in both English and Arabic. Sura 1 is praised during the conference as beautiful, and the content of the sura is exalted as irrefutably true. The sura is presented as an example of common ground between Christians and their Muslim neighbors and promotes the idea that Christians can and should find beauty within the Qur’an. The Mercy Family of Churches felt the need to host a conference like this because they believed Christians that held

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conservative positions on Islam as a false religion to be ignorant and fearful about Islam and the beauty of the Qur’an. Jenny believed the Qur’an to offer more insight into “God’s heart” than Christians would have without using the Qur’an: [Some Evangelicals] have true hatred and prejudice [regarding Islam]. . . . [Others] feel quite helpless and just have no understanding of the beauty of the religion [Islam], and the practices, and the devotion [of Muslims]. . . . There’s a lot of ignorance, I think, . . . or letting fear about the Qur’an, and what may be in it, and how it might just make you stray, instead of being able to find tons of common ground, and even more insight in some stories of God’s heart [found in the Qur’an] that’s kind of beautiful to discover. I think there’s just a lot of fear, a lot of fear and just a lot of ignorance.

Dylan also saw beauty and truth in the Qur’an. He keeps on his desk a Qur’an that was given to him by a Muslim he met while visiting London. He thinks of the Qur’an positively, and as a result of the Muslim who gave him the Qur’an, as well as other experiences with Muslims, he decided to attend a weekly class at the local mosque that taught the Qur’an verse by verse: My first exposure to Muslims was in London.  .  .  . This Qur’an [lifts Qur’an up from his desk] was from one of the first guys [Muslims] I met in London. . . . He went to the central mosque and he bought me this Qur’an, gave it to me. I still have it today and it’s a really sweet memory to me. . . . We took another couple of trips to Lebanon and to Syria. . . . Then we went to Jordan to learn about Muslim Followers of Jesus. . . . When we came home from that, we started to go and visit mosques. Not to attack but just to listen and learn. I attended a Friday night Qur’an class that taught the Qur’an verse by verse in the mosque. I remember knowing the imam, he’s still an imam here. . . . He’s a good man.

These interviewees do not see the Qur’an as a threat to their faith in Jesus, but rather as a tool for deepening their faith and extending their understanding of God.

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“A Really, Really Remarkable Reformer”: Views of Muhammad In addition to valuing the Qur’an, most progressive Christian interviewees also had an elevated view of Muhammad when compared to conservatives. In response to questions about Muhammad, many commented that voicing negative opinions about people that others esteem is wrong. Perhaps this belief that one should not criticize a person that others esteem is why one interviewee, Jacob, rejected conservative Christian pastor and author John Piper’s conservative position on Islam as “ignorant” while stating that “it’s not my job to judge” when asked about Muhammad’s status as a prophet of God. In line with this thinking, when asked about Muhammad or the Qur’an, progressive Christians often ended up shifting seamlessly into critiques of Evangelicalism. For example, when I asked Dylan if he considered Muhammad a prophet, he said that Muhammad likely would meet the New Testament criteria for a prophet; however, the idea of Muhammad as a prophet “is such an offensive idea [in Evangelical circles] because they don’t even have a grip to understand it.” He also said that he “kind of hate[s] these dichotomous either/or questions.” When Daniel was asked about Muhammad, his response was to critique how Christians try to overlook or make excuses for the shortcomings of those they believe are on their side. As an example, he brought up Trump and the willingness of conservatives to refrain from condemnation of his alleged “abuse of women.” He also pointed out that major figures in both Islam and Christianity have done things many conservative Christians consider sinful. In doing so, he attempts to illustrate the double standard that he believes conservatives use and to propose a paradigm shift away from negative views of Muhammad and rather to considering Muhammad as a strong and remarkable reformer in line with prophets found in the Bible: Whatever we think about Muhammad, he united the Arab people under the belief in a single God. The only other person I know that did that was Abraham. How he [Muhammad] did that’s pretty impressive. Was he a conquering soldier? Yeah, he was. So was David. So was Abraham. David, King David, who we revere as a man after God’s own heart, was known for

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killing tens of thousands of people. He was known for sleeping with young virgins, King David our great hero, but Muhammad can’t do any of that or he’s from Satan. This is how duplicitous our thinking is. . . . This is the same thing with Trump. “Well, he’s on a journey. So he abuses women. He’s on a journey. He’s learning,” but if our enemy does it, we give no breaks. No breaks, no gray area. I think Muhammad was a really, really remarkable reformer. Did he have multiple wives? Yep. So did David. So did Solomon. So did all of our guys. Did he kill people? Yep. So did our guys.

Daniel went on to express the belief that Christians who speak negatively about Muhammad do so sinfully. Historically, traditional Evangelicals, including influential leaders, had no qualms about harshly criticizing Muhammad. The revered eighteenth-century revivalist Jonathan Edwards, for example, disparaged Muhammad during the earliest years of Evangelicalism. He described Muhammad as “a crafty man” who took advantage of his ignorant followers (Edwards 1793, 436– 439) and claimed that Muhammad only pretended to have received the Qur’an’s contents from the angel Gabriel (McDermott 2000, 167–175). Some progressive Christians took issue with such criticism because they found it inappropriate to judge someone without knowing them personally. (Perhaps one reason progressive Christians feel it acceptable to critique conservative Christianity is because many progressive Christians in our sample felt they knew conservative Christians and conservative theological thought well enough to form a critical opinion. Many interviewees who critiqued conservative Christian beliefs had grown up in conservative-leaning families and had chosen to leave those beliefs behind.) Daniel cited this reason for his dislike of Christians publicly criticizing Muhammad: I don’t think we know a lot about Muhammad. His past is debated and obscure and all that stuff, so I like what my friend . . . says: “As a follower of Jesus, when I don’t really know someone, I give them the benefit of the doubt.” He said, “To just publicly criticize someone that I actually don’t really know is called sin, and God hates it when we slander other people. I don’t understand why Christians think they can just slander people publicly and think God likes it or He’s proud of you.”

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Progressive Christians were more likely to outright praise Muhammad than were conservative Christians, and they clearly opposed the idea of condemning or judging him.

“If We Just Treated [Islam] as a Religion, We Won’t Ever Get It”: How Islam Is Viewed as a Culture Part of the reason progressive Christians felt so positively about Islam, the Qur’an, and its prophet is that they view Islam as something bigger than a religion. Most progressive Christians contemplate and acknowledge cultural elements of faith. Instead of viewing faith as the driver of culture, culture rather drove faith. Many envisioned Islam as an entire cultural form, rather than simply a religion. When I asked Daniel how he felt about Muslims in the United States, he said, “Love them. We need all cultures.” This response from Daniel automatically equated “Muslim” with “culture” rather than first responding to “Muslim” as a “follower of the religion of Islam.” Another example comes from Michael, who views Islam as a culture one is born into: I see Islam as . . . well, as a people. It’s the people and the culture too. Like you don’t choose Islam like an Evangelical goes forward at a Billy Graham crusade. You’re born in this [Muslim] culture and it’s your entire culture. Everything you do. . . . I say this because I’m not an exclusivist . . . I don’t believe that my Christianity, that my approach to Christianity excludes those outside the faith from knowing Jesus. . . . Yeah, if we just treated it as a religion, we won’t ever get it. It’s more embedded than that.

In part then, for progressive Christians, many of the differences between Islam and Christianity are seen as differences of culture. Since progressive Christians tended to value culture (and, as previously shown in chapter 6, think less about hell), this is an important distinction, and it arguably contributes to having less of a desire to convert Muslims out of Islam. Because progressive Christians were able to divorce much of Islam from its religious doctrines, they were happy to incorporate more of “cultural Islam” into their methods for building relationships with

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Muslims and even into their own personal worship. For example, some interviewees expressed esteem for the Qur’an and the beauty of its suras, some regularly attended their local mosques, and some were willing to participate in the Islamic call to prayer. In doing so, they saw themselves as practicing and learning about a different culture, a Muslim culture that has been viewed unjustly by Western culture, more so than practicing a different religion.

“There’s Probably More That Links Us Together as Humans”: Views of Interfaith Relationships with Muslims Perhaps not surprisingly, then, progressive Christians were more apt to see beauty and truth in other religions outside of Christianity than conservative Christians, as they viewed Christianity more negatively as the dominant form of faith that has in recent history had monopoly on power in Western culture. Progressive Christians were also far more likely to seek out commonalities between themselves and Muslims and reject the idea of converting them. This practice reflects progressive Christians’ definition of social justice, which values the agency of the perceived marginalized and includes a greater acceptance of marginalized groups’ beliefs. Some insight into the mentality focused on finding common ground with outsider religions can be gained from the scholarship of David Cheetham (2013), who contributed to theories regarding interfaith relations and argued for the possibility of creating “spaces” for religions to meet. Cheetham suggested that one could see meeting not as a discussion forum of differences or similarities between the faiths, but rather as a place to emphasize “understanding above agreement” and “collegiality above consensus” (2013, 179). While conservative Christians largely rejected this type of ecumenical activity and see less beauty in other religions, progressive Christians are much more willing to meet in these kinds of spaces that focus on human community rather than a correct relationship with God, and some of the interviewees in our sample even facilitate meetings similar to the type Cheetham described. Nick, a congregant from Mercy, in some ways shared this perspective in that he believed that the concept of a “mission” as connected with

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interfaith dialogue should be abandoned. Instead, he felt the goal should be to pursue ideas more aligned with pursuing agreeable qualities within oneself, such as the art of making peace and mutuality. He preferred other labels, such as “interfaith dialogue for peacemaking” and “transformative dialogue for peacemaking.” He went on to add that his hope within the next two generations would be that “Christian ministry will be . . . more mutual interaction trying to pursue God’s kingdom with a deeper level of humility” with members of other religions. Katrina said, “I feel like Islam . . . there’s just so much more overlap with Christianity than not. There are obviously distinct differences. I tend to see the commonalities rather than differences.” Bridget also expressed her desire that people should spend time focused on finding common ground with people that hold truths different than their own. Questions of which truth is the correct truth should not be discussed, as she explained: It’s quite contextual, I think, and that’s how I’ve kind of evolved, is people are a product of their culture, their environment, and their experiences, and therefore, you have to take that into account when you interact with somebody as, yes, I have my truth, but my truth is my truth, and it may not be someone else’s truth. And part of what the challenge, I guess, for me is to figure out how we interact with people of different truths and try to come at some kind of common ground between that. And what I guess I’m finding is there’s probably more that links us together as humans than keeps us apart, and we just need to spend the time focusing on those things to find the way to build those types of bridges.

Progressive Christians’ descriptions of positive interfaith relationships often referenced common ground, allowing for personal growth in areas of agreeability and humility, and specifically rejected the idea of attempting to assert the superiority of one belief set over another.

“This Sounds Like God to Me”: Blurred Boundaries between Islam and Christianity Progressive Christians do not simply choose to focus on similarities over differences, however; they actually see the two belief systems as being much more similar to each other. Progressive Christians were

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considerably more comfortable blurring the boundaries between Islam and Christianity and between Christians and Muslims and were less comfortable making black- and- white judgments about Islam. For example, Sam expressed difficulty with black- and-white responses when I asked him for his thoughts on Islam: “The truth of the matter is some days I wake up, and I think one thing about Islam, and some days I wake up, and I think the opposite. . . . My personal beliefs about Islam are, it’s a religion; it’s a worldview; it’s a culture.” This sense of ambiguity extends beyond opinions about religious beliefs to the words and language we use to discuss it. Progressive Christians expressed distrust of language to relay concepts correctly, including authentic belief in God. Daniel had serious concerns about using language to describe God: “As soon as you’ve pulled God down into language, you’ve limited the reality of what God actually is. . . . I just don’t think God cares about English words or Arabic. He’s above it. He’s above language. . . . I don’t even like to use ‘He,’ the pronoun. Even that’s kind of limiting.” In line with their postmodern tendency to distrust language, progressive Christians exercised more flexibility in how they defined words. This flexibility has tremendous theological implications. For example, some progressive Christians use this linguistic flexibility to support their claim that one can remain a Muslim and still be a follower of Jesus. By abandoning the common dictionary definition of “Muslim” (an adherent of Islam) and instead using the Arabic root to define a Muslim as “one who submits,” they saw it as completely possible to be a Muslim follower of Jesus. As mentioned, progressive Christians also generally frowned upon the terms “Christian” and “Christianity.” While the idea of being a follower of Jesus is inherent in the dictionary definition of the word “Christian,” progressives preferred to refrain from the term “Christian” on the grounds that the word holds too much negative baggage. Some progressives distrusted the term “Christian” on the grounds that one can be a Christian while not being a true follower of God. If someone labeled as a Christian can be outside the kingdom of God and if a Muslim can follow Jesus, it is quite possible that, according to progressive Christians, such a Muslim could well be closer to God than many Christians. Whether for linguistic reasons or otherwise, many progressives affirmed that one could be a Muslim and follow Jesus simultaneously, like Jenny:

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“Do I think that someone could practice Islam—maybe not 100 percent, but a good portion—and follow Jesus at the same time? Yeah, I do.” The belief that Muslims and Christians can both legitimately pursue the kingdom of God, together with the belief that language does not adequately define religious concepts, raises the question of just who this “God” may be. To varying degrees, most progressive Christians were willing to affirm that Allah of Islam is the same God as their own. Jenny shared that she had for a long time felt close to her Muslim friends and even to Islam, particularly since taking a world religions course in college and learning about how Christians and Muslims have many similar views of God. Then, she attended a conference put on by progressive Christians that confirmed her suspicion that Allah of Islam and God of the Bible are actually the same: We’re all worshipping the same God. . . . It was such a paradigm shift from doing a different religion to “we are all pursuing God,” and just learning. . . . I think I’ve always, just me personally, when I had some of those revelations, it was sort of like, “This is kind of what I’ve thought and sort of hoped. . . .” That’s more of my tendency, is that God’s bigger than what we paint him to be, especially in certain denominations and just Western Christianity in the South. . . . I think for me . . . rather than a hard transition . . . , it was more of, “This sounds like God to me. Of course, he would be revealing himself to people all over the world in all kinds of different ways.”

Due to their flexible language and boundaries, progressive Christians are able to view God and Allah as one and the same and accept the idea of a Christ-following Muslim.

“A Term Developed by Narrow-Minded, Ignorant Christians”: The Dislike of the Term “Chrislam” Conservative Christians are far less open than progressive Christians to the philosophy that it is possible to be both an orthodox follower of Jesus and a Muslim at the same time. As this idea grew more common, conservative Evangelicals adopted the term “Chrislam” in reference to a syncretism or blending of Christianity with Islam. The term was

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originally employed in a derogatory sense to deride what critics believed to be a heretical hybrid of the two religions. Progressive Christians labeled as promoting Chrislam are usually proponents of insider movements (IMs), which describes a movement advocating that “believers in Christ” who are from Muslim backgrounds be allowed and encouraged to remain relationally, culturally, and, to varying degrees, religiously a part of Muslim communities. Interviewees promoting IMs often believed that Muhammad is a prophet of God, that God speaks truth through the Qur’an, and that Muslims and Christians are on equal footing in pursuit of the kingdom of God; thus, their beliefs on Islam are more progressive than the historical Evangelical perspective that most conservatives espouse. No progressive Christian felt warmly toward the term “Chrislam.” One reason for this is likely due to their dislike of conservatives’ rigid theology (since conservatives deemed the term “Chrislam” to have utility). When I asked one of the leaders at Mercy, Dylan, what he thought about Chrislam, he said, “I think it’s a term developed by narrowminded, ignorant Christians who like to compartmentalize things and put them in boxes.” When I asked Daniel what he thought of Chrislam, he said he felt it was degrading to Muslims and racialized the conversation around Chrislam, suggesting that conservatives that feel the term has important utility are doing so to self-preserve their “race.” For Daniel, the religious and theological distinctions Chrislam represents are not valuable, but rather pretentious and racist: It’s [Chrislam] insulting to people. . . . I don’t even entertain that question when people ask me “Are you part of Chrislam?” It’s saying that Christianity is the highest level and Islam is the worst level and you’re mixing the two. First of all, I don’t think Christianity is the highest level and I don’t think Islam is the lowest level . . . ridiculous. It’s a fear-based competitive question. It’s a branding of “Oh, yeah. You’re syncretistic. You’re deluding our purity as the race that really understands God and you’re mixing it with Islam and so you’re Chrislam.” . . . It’s like they sit in their own groups and come up with these ideas and then say this is what other people believe. I always tell our people, my teams, “. . . The whole thing about Chrislam is Christians telling people what you believe and it’s wrong.”

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The debate over the term “Chrislam” clearly stems from the larger philosophical differences between progressive and conservative views on religion and culture.

“I Wouldn’t Work with Anyone That Thought Differently”: The Homogeneity of Progressive Christians’ Peer Groups with Respect to Views of Islam In addition to holding vastly different perspectives on Islam, progressive and conservative Christians also appear to attach different degrees of importance to those views. By analyzing whether interviewees had a heterogeneous or homogeneous social circle with respect to views on Islam, we were able to glean insight into what groups found to be acceptable and whether agreement on this issue was essential to in-group inclusion. Again, to determine whether interviewees had a homogeneous social circle or heterogeneous social circle in this respect, we asked each individual, “Do the Evangelicals you are close to—that is, the Evangelicals that you share life with—share most of your sentiments about Islam?” Depending on their answer, we sometimes followed up with additional questions. In this way, we were able to examine how unified interviewees perceived their social circles to be on the topic of Islam, and the degree to which differences of opinion affect how close individuals are to each other. Ultimately, we found that progressive-leaning Evangelicals are more likely to surround themselves with a Christian peer group that thinks like they do on the topic of Islam (which inherently rejects conservative Christians as their positions are vastly different). Most progressive Evangelicals perceived themselves to be surrounded

Table 7.1. Progressive Christians’ Views of Differing Christians by Social Circle. Homogeneous

Heterogeneous

Total

Negative

17

9

26

Moderate

8

5

13

Positive Grand Total

1

2

3

26

16

42

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by like-minded Christians, and many of them explicitly stated that they cultivated their peer groups in this way on purpose.1 Our first example comes from Martin, a missionary who supports IMs. Martin said the people that he has “gravitated toward on the field are people who’ve come to the same conclusion” he has about Islam and Muslims, and he affirmed that he had surrounded himself with “a community of people who believe the same thing” he does. Some progressive interviewees, particularly the leaders and congregants recruited from the Mercy Family of Churches, explained the homogeneity of their peer group by pointing to the shared faith journey of their church as a whole. For example, many of the interviews with leaders at Mercy revealed a real sense of congregational unity. When we asked Jacob, one of the pastors at Mercy, whether the Evangelicals he was close to shared most of his sentiments about Islam, he said, “Yes, because the journey that we have gone on in respect to the Muslim world is not just our journey, it was a church journey. We’ve always felt that we move as a church; we don’t move as individuals. There is much more American tendencies to individualism [and] that [individualism] really is not a biblical concept.” In addition, Christopher, a long-time member at Mercy said, “Yes. We [the church leadership] regularly even say this phrase: ‘It’s part of the DNA of the church’ [referring to the conciliatory way the church views Islam and Muslims]. Almost like, if you’re not on board with this, you might want to find a different church, because we’re going to keep harping on it.” Another interviewee, Meagan, also explained her answer by pointing to her church community. When asked whether the Evangelicals that she is close to share most of her sentiments about Islam, she said, “Yes. It doesn’t mean it’s everyone, but it’s a lot of the church. It’ll almost like, if you’re not on board with this . . . , why do you go to this church?” From Christopher and Meagan, one can gather that they belong to a congregation where people think of themselves as generally aligned in purpose, and one can also gather that they perceive there to be an “other,” a group that thinks differently that should either get “on board” or go somewhere else. This “if-you-don’t-like-ityou-can-leave” language sounds similar to the stereotype of traditional Evangelical rhetoric toward out-groups. While progressive Christians resist black-and-white boundaries in so many areas, this unambiguous response shows that progressives draw a hard line between themselves

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and traditional-leaning Christians and their traditionalist beliefs on Islam. The homogeneity of beliefs of the leadership at Mercy revolved around their acceptance of IMs and their more progressive approach to Islam and Muslims, including approaching Islamic beliefs humbly, with utmost reverence, and interacting with Muslims as listeners and learners. Similar ideas were not expressed toward Christians with differing beliefs about Muslims, however—disagreement on this front was grounds for exclusion. Interestingly, the higher an individual was on the leadership ladder, the more likely it was that he or she was surrounded by like-minded people. One example of this phenomenon is Daniel, the man credited by many for guiding Mercy’s paradigm shift toward a more inclusive approach to Islam. He has trained Evangelicals across the United States as well as internationally. On the question of whether his closest circle of Evangelical friends shares his beliefs about Islam, he said: “Oh, yeah, because I wouldn’t work with anyone that thought differently, yeah. It’s a small group, but they do. Absolutely.” As a point of contrast, the other, more conservative-leaning congregation where we recruited interviewees, Adams River, allowed leaders to present competing missiological approaches and competing evaluations of IMs, which may be one reason congregants of Adams River largely reported a heterogeneous peer group in relation to beliefs on Islam. By the end of our study of Mercy, however, it was clear that the leaders there were primarily of a single voice on the topic of Islam, and they did not allow for more traditional perspectives to compete. Clearly, the issue of how to understand and respond to Islam and Muslims strikes a deep chord with progressive Christians. Some intentionally build in-groups where like-mindedness on this front is a requirement for entry and a difference of opinion warrants exclusion. This action represents an act of distinctive self-separation on the part of progressive Christians, demonstrating a desire to distance themselves from conservative Christians. As we transition from progressive Christians’ views of Islam to progressive Christians’ views of conservative Christians, many more instances of vehement self-differentiation will be seen, giving further evidence that progressive Christians should be, and even want to be, classified in a separate faith group from conservative Christians.

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Progressive Christians’ Views of Conservative Christians Although conservative Christians hold relatively moderate views of progressive Christians, progressive Christians hold much more negative views of conservative Christians. In our interviews, when progressive Christians shared their views regarding how Christians should act, they tended to simultaneously share heavy critiques of conservative Christians. In other words, progressive Christians were apt to contrast their definition of “good” against the “bad” of conservative Christians. While progressive Christians disliked the “us versus them” mentality when applied to non-Christian faith groups, they ended up implicitly, and even sometimes explicitly, drawing bold lines between themselves and conservative Christians. A substantial part of how progressive Christians identify themselves is by exposing clearly what they are not—namely, conservative Evangelicals. There are a number of faults progressive Evangelicals find with conservative Evangelicals. Most progressive Christians’ critiques identified a number of perceived moral deficiencies in conservatives’ beliefs and behaviors. Some of the most common negative descriptions depicted conservative Christians as inflexible, insufficiently concerned with social justice, prone to immoral political compromises, and swayed by irrational fear. Progressives’ disapproval of conservative Evangelical missionary impulses is also clear. While progressive Christians’ flexible theology allows for an openness to be felt toward traditional out-groups, this attitude is not applied to conservative evangelical Christians. In progressive Christians’ eyes, conservative Christians’ errors are egregious enough to warrant an unwelcoming and negative response that is otherwise uncharacteristic of progressives.

“It Comes Mostly Out of Ignorance”: Conservative Christians Are Unlearned and Inflexible Progressive Christians tended to see certainty and decisiveness as negative traits and sometimes as signs of ignorance. If someone has already made up their mind, it seems unlikely that they will truly listen to others or be willing to learn.2 Bridget believed that black-and-white thinking, which she associates with traditional Evangelicalism, is hurting

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American society rather than helping it. This also lines up with our observation that progressive Christians believe conservatives are not flexible enough. Bridget discussed politics, Evangelicalism, and America as intertwined concepts, bringing out these negative traits in traditional Evangelicals: Eighty-six percent of supposedly Evangelicals voted for [Trump]. Obviously, he’s very anti-Muslim, and so a lot of those people I think kind of lean towards that camp, but it comes mostly out of ignorance, not necessarily out of actually knowing Muslim people. That’s one of the things I have a problem with in our current Evangelicalism, is this kind of black-and-white mentality about the world. . . . It’s very binary in America.

In addition to critiquing the attitudes of the general Evangelical population, some interviewees also critiqued high-profile Evangelicals as ignorant, mainly on the topic of Islam. For example, Jacob felt conservative Christians’ positions on Islam to be uninformed, and attributed this at least in part to the ignorance of their leaders. He specifically mentioned conservative John Piper, a reformed Baptist pastor and founder of desiringgod.org, who has said that the attributes of Allah and the attributes of the Christian God are incompatible, and that Islam is not a religion of peace. Regarding Piper’s positions, Jacob said, “When it comes to the issue of Islam, he’s just . . . completely ignorant, and by that, I mean uninformed. His understanding of Islam is misinformed.” Another interviewee, Richard, called out the famous Christian conservative Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham and president of the humanitarian aid organization Samaritan’s Purse. Graham has called Islam a religion of hatred and war. Based on comments like this, Richard characterized Graham as uneducated and damaging regarding Islam and inter-religious relationships: “Franklin Graham in my mind had said some incredibly ignorant and harmful things, and I have no indication that he won’t say more of those things tomorrow, and to what degree Franklin really believes what he’s saying to a degree it just rallies money and support, I don’t know. But he is an influential person who says ridiculous things.” Islam is an issue that illustrates well the frustration that progressive Christians feel toward conservative Christians.

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Many consistently stated that conservative Christians who criticize Islam must not understand it or are ignorant or too stubborn to change their opinions, showing inflexibility.

“Let’s Change Their Whole Religious Structure Entirely to Ours”: Conservative Christians Value Conversion over Social Justice Following directly from the perception that conservative Christians are inflexible, progressive Christians also fault conservatives for failing to respect or accept others’ belief systems. To progressive Christians, this is a violation of their humanistic ethic of social justice, which values the agency of the perceived marginalized, which allows for an openness to be felt toward traditional out-groups such as Muslims. They see conservative Christians as following the dominant form of theology, which progressive Christians see as oppressive to marginalized groups and associated with Western colonialism. Progressive Christians’ overwhelmingly negative views of conservative Christians have partially emerged as a response to colonialism and has some commonalities with postcolonial theology, which arose in the 1970s. It explored representation and power within colonized peoples, and valued the agency of the marginalized as they worked to resist dominant forms of theology of their colonizers (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2007, 168; Kwan 2014, 9; Heaney 2019). Postcolonial theology’s focus on validating the perspective of the marginalized lines up well with the progressive Christians’ humanistic ethic. As previously discussed, this ethic seeks not only to serve those perceived to have unequal access to power in Western culture, such as religious minorities like Muslims, but also to learn from them and give equal space to their beliefs. (As discussed, progressive Christians, more so than conservative Christians, tend to believe Muslims are marginalized and face discrimination in the United States.) Trying to impose the beliefs of a dominant culture onto a marginalized culture, then, is a violation of the humanistic ethic of social justice in the eyes of some progressive Christians. Some of the Mercy leaders made clear their view that a few of their fellow congregants were too conservative in that they struggled to simply engage in social justice activities without having the ulterior motive of sharing their faith. When participating in community service

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with Muslim refugees, these Evangelicals still felt they needed to share the gospel. To varying degrees, this is seen by progressive Christians negatively, as having ulterior motives when building relationships and helping the community. According to these progressive Christians, if a conservative Christian is spending time with a Muslim with the hopes of telling them about their faith, they are failing to care for them authentically and are not fully listening to the marginalized. Instead, they have alternative goals and an immoral desire to dominate with their more culturally pervasive form of religious beliefs. Nick, a member at Mercy and a self-described peacemaker, believes many Evangelicals immorally feel they are on “team Christian and Islam is the wrong team.” He disagreed with the conservative Evangelicals who believe they are “still right and we [Evangelicals] need to get them [Muslims] more like us.” Nick believes this demonstrates conservative Christians’ belief in their spiritual superiority, and he thinks that belief reflects negatively on others, like himself, who are interested in peacemaking and social justice. Katrina, an outreach leader at Mercy, expressed similar concerns over some of the interactions she’d had while working in the church’s refugee ministry with people she perceived to be more conservative-leaning Evangelicals. Her concerns stemmed from the appearance that some Mercy congregants still wanted to “tell them [Muslim refugees] about Jesus.” She said the leadership at Mercy has “trained [congregants] out of the word [conversion], but it’s very much like they need Jesus . . . [and] let’s change their whole religious structure entirely to ours.” Katrina felt these proselytizing conservative Christians were disingenuous, and she felt uncomfortable working alongside them. Katrina said she personally feels uneasy even saying the name “Jesus” to others because she feels like it comes across as too preachy. She had a negative view of previous Christian missionary work, stating, “You may know that Christianity hasn’t had a great track record in history with moving to different cultures and trying to share faith.” She then described her own approach to interacting with Muslims as an example of a better way to follow Jesus than attempting to change Muslims’ beliefs and religious structures: In college, and the past couple of years, when I have conversations with Muslims, it’s just not that important to me to talk about [Jesus]. . . . We’ll talk about other things. Then when I see myself working with them in

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the future, it’s more like how do we pursue a common goal of bringing the kingdom of God to the world in community development? How can we work together on these common projects? Which essentially is the following Jesus part rather than the Christology part.

Katrina had a strong desire to follow Jesus, but she clearly believed that she can follow him without talking about him. This belief reflects the general consensus among progressive Christians that social justice is more important than, and in fact, not compatible with, converting others to Christianity. Conservative Christians who persist in such efforts are not practicing true social justice as progressive Christians define it.

“I Kind of Feel Like They’re Losing Their Soul”: Conservative Christians Are Making Immoral Compromises in the Political Sphere One of the direst failings progressive Christians saw in conservatives was their political activity. Progressive Christians see conservative Evangelical political influence and support for conservative policies as real threats to the well-being of humanity and the reputation of Christians globally. Part of this is due to the belief that conservative Christians restrict the freedom of others (e.g., the conservative stance against same-sex marriage), and some felt the conservative stance on immigration, foreign policy, and government-run social programs to be lacking sufficient care for the marginalized. Daniel’s current dislike of conservative Evangelicals’ political positions was inevitable due to his belief that when Christianity became a “state religion,” perhaps referring to the reign of Constantine in the fourth century, it lost God’s presence and the church lost its identity: It all changed when it [Christianity] got politicized and became the state religion; then it became a power base and Jesus went out the window [and] with it and the Holy Spirit . . . so then it became the moral majority, instead of love your neighbor and love God and learn to love yourself, it got into all this other “You got to vote this way and you got to think this way and you got to dislike these people and Satan’s coming to get us and God’s going to rescue us and kill all of them.” The church lost its identity.

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Daniel went on to compare Wahhabi Muslims (Muslims who follow a more violent form of Islam that is entangled with the state, particularly Saudi Arabia) with conservative Christians: he felt that Wahhabi Muslims were like heavy-duty, fundamentalist Christians. There was a lack of toleration for any variations from their view and they would kill for it. Daniel equates both Islamic and Christian fundamentalisms as equally violent and dangerous. This dislike for the mixing of political power and Christianity continues to be an area of concern for progressive Christians, especially now, as they consider the conservative Evangelical support for Donald Trump to be an immoral compromise. For example, Bridget shared her view that Christianity and all of America is being damaged by right-wing politics, specifically the presidency of Donald Trump. She referenced her travels and her global perspective (as compared to the more limited nationalistic perspective she perceives conservatives hold) in discussing the negative impact the Trump presidency has had on international relations: I think he’s doing a lot of damage to the American . . . political system, but I think he’s [also] doing damage geopolitically. . . . I arrived in the UK . . . not long after he [Trump] got elected, and I remember walking up to immigration, handing my passport to the agent, and the person asked me, “So what are you doing in a PhD?” And I said, “International Politics.” She goes, “Oh, did you hear Donald Trump’s speech at the UN?” And I was like, “Oh, it’s going to be a long three years.” I don’t think most Americans appreciate the damage that’s being done [by Trump] in the geopolitical world because they’re quite limited, and the Trump supporters watch Fox News, and Fox News doesn’t talk as much about what’s happening around the world.

Bridget also believed being pro-life with one’s vote (referring to Trump’s appointment of pro-life judges) might perhaps cost one “their soul”: I think it is even damaging the perspective on Christianity in the United States because people associate Trumpism with Christianity. . . . They [conservative Christians who voted for Trump] stacked the court with what they consider to be more pro-life justices, but at what cost? I mean,

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I kind of feel like they’re losing their soul, and this is what is happening in America that I find most disconcerting. . . . I almost feel like the country is going to need psychiatric care after he [Trump] leaves just to sort of refocus our mindset on what’s humane behavior.

When Matt was asked how he felt about Donald Trump as president he also echoed the belief that Trump-supporting Evangelicals are unethically compromising in order to achieve better access to political power. Matt pointed out the social justice goals of the gospel and how the political goals of Evangelicals who supported Trump run counter to these: The gospel itself is about erasing the walls between Jews and Gentiles, male and female, but also these economic, social advantages and disadvantages, leveling off the table, and then, it’s like, following the Prince of Peace in the way of peace. That includes nonviolence and peacemaking. When I watched the news . . . I get angry when I see children in cages. . . . [H]ow could this [be], and where Evangelicals have married, and have married a political party platform. I’m like, well, that’s the end of that movement. I feel worse about the Evangelical compromises. Like he’s [Trump] a president. Presidents do what presidents do. . . . But the bigger thing is how will the church relate to the emperor? . . . It’s the worst compromise that I’ve seen in terms of the church getting in bed with political power.

Richard also lamented the conservative Evangelicals’ warm relationship to the Republican Party: Because I think Evangelicalism and the Republican Party . . . are so deeply entwined and invested at this point, I think it’s very hard to separate what is Evangelical motivation and what is neo-conservative political motivation. This sort of neo-conservative role of Islam, endless war doctrine, I think is deeply embedded and Evangelicals can carry on not even being aware of how deeply embedded it is in their minds.

Progressive Christians lamented not only the general intertwining of Christianity and politics, but also the specific platform with which they perceive conservative Christians have aligned themselves.

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“Conservatism, Right-Wing Islamophobia, All the Terms You Want to Use, Are Alive and Well”: Conservative Christians Are Swayed by Irrational Phobias Some progressive Christians in our sample described conservative Christians as being “phobic.” For example, some employed terms like “homophobia” and “Islamophobia” to describe the perspectives of theologically conservative Evangelicals. Some progressive Christians tend to refrain from black-and-white judgments about sexuality and Islam alike. Thus, when conservative Christians object to homosexuality or make harsh judgments regarding Islam, some progressive Christians perceive these judgments as representing phobia—irrational fears. Using the term “phobia” carries a connotation of a medical condition; the conservative Christian is thus “ill” and in need of a cure. Michael was so convinced Islamophobia was a significant problem within the Evangelical community that he spent years working to combat it: [My] role was to speak out against Islamophobia here in the States. . . . It’s probably more conservatives are harder and more fearful [of] Muslims in the Bible Belt et cetera, [however,] it is not restricted to that area in the US. . . . Conservatism, right-wing Islamophobia, all the terms you want to use, are alive and well throughout the US. . . . Your generation gets what I am all about. They totally do. There are some higher ups that are convertible, they are open and there are others on that side of the belt that I don’t address at this point.

“Islamophobia” was often used to describe conservatives who criticize Islam strongly. For example, Richard said, “After September 11, I became very disturbed by the rise of what seemed to me to be homophobic—I’m sorry, Islamophobic language. Plenty of homophobic language too. But Islamophobic language in America in general but among conservative Catholics and Evangelicals especially. It just was stunning to me how a lot of the old language of the Crusades from the Middle Ages seemed to be coming back.” Meagan also brought up conservatives’ fearfulness in the context of terrorist attacks. When she was asked about the War on Terror, she

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focused her response on her view that Muslims receiving unjustified hate due to fearful Christians. She felt that in response to the attacks by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), conservatives were becoming even more defensive of Christianity and, in turn, becoming more hateful to Muslims: “One big thing especially that’s happening right now because of ISIS . . . Christians are clinging more to Christianity and every time a Christian is killed, it’s this self-justification that we can hate Muslims even more because Christians are being killed by them. It’s just dividing. . . . It’s just this whole culture of fear that’s being developed because of [the War on Terror].” The belief that conservatives are unnecessarily fearful of Muslims and Islam is also evident in the views expressed by James, a pastor at a megachurch in a city with a metro area population of over six million people. This large city leans conservative. His response reflects how well connected he is to the Islamic royalty and imams in foreign countries, the imams in his area of the United States, and the prominent Evangelical pastors in his local state. It also reflects a poor impression of conservative Evangelicals. He is known both for calling out what he considers to be Islamophobia in the Evangelical church and for his efforts to combat the perceived phobia. When a foreign Muslim prince challenged James to work with Muslims in the United States, James said, “Your highness, that’d be like you focusing on Baptists in Mecca.” His words are telling, as Mecca is the city regarded as the holiest place in Islam, which Christians are prohibited from entering and where there are no non-Muslim places of worship.3 In contrast, a quick Google search landed thirty mosques or Islamic centers or schools in James’s conservative city. While James’s comparison is clearly an exaggeration, it does offer insight into how negatively James believed his conservative city viewed Islam. Due to James’s real concern that conservative Evangelicals lacked the ability to be civil and understanding toward Muslims, he has spent much time mentoring young pastors on how to interact with and honor Muslims. Though James’s Evangelical church continues to thrive even after reaching out to Muslims and hosting interfaith events (i.e., pairing Christian and Muslim families together to get to know each other outside of the church or mosque environment, promoting participation in Muslim traditions, and allowing Muslims to teach classes on understanding Islam at his

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church), he still considers fighting Islamophobia within his Evangelical tribe to be one of his biggest battles, if not the biggest. Consistent with the theme of the irrationality of conservatives’ reactions to Muslims, James uses the words “hype” and “hysteria” to describe conservatives’ views, implying that these views stem from overwrought emotion rather than clear-headed logic: We are to be humble. We are to be the humblest of all. We ought to be serving them [Muslims]. We shouldn’t allow ourselves to get caught up in a lot of the hype, in hysteria that we see taking place here in America. I would say treat them with love and respect. Friendship . . . I hate it when people demonize people of another religion or even a philosophy, even if we disagree with it. There is a little saying I teach from Winston Churchill, but I changed the last two words. But I teach our young pastors and I’ve taught our church, and it’s simply this: “Never, never, never vilify another religion.” My premise is, just lift up what you believe about Jesus. You don’t need to trash somebody else’s religion to bolster yours.

When conservatives judge Islam to be inherently evil and culpable for motivating Islamic terrorism, James sees this as an attempt to assert their faith’s superiority by criticizing others’ beliefs. When conservatives critique Islamic theology, debate the authenticity and accuracy of the Qur’an, express their dislike of Sharia law, and challenge the morality and prophethood of Muhammad, James sees these actions as vilifying the religion of Islam, setting it up as something to be feared and fought against.

Conclusion Our interviewees’ responses describing a high regard for Muslims and their negative views of conservative Christians line up with the quantitative data presented in chapter 3. We find this dynamic is due to progressive Christians’ reliance on a more flexible, progressivist form of theology, which stresses a humanistic ethic of social justice, to determine who is in their in-group. This moral criterion results in the belief shared by many progressive Christians that Muslims are morally superior to conservative Christians.

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While Evangelicalism is often presented as monolithic, our study demonstrates that there is significant division between progressive and conservative Evangelicals in terms of how they define their in-groups and how they conceptualize out-groups. While interviewees did not conform to a strictly progressive Christian identity or strictly conservative Christian identity, the dividing lines between the two groups were consistently apparent. Generally, progressive Christians reject conservative Christians and prefer to live life with like-minded Christ followers who agree with them on the topic of Islam. Progressive Christians were heavy critics of Christianity, and overall, they saw themselves, in many ways, as more closely aligned with Muslims than with conservative Christians. Overall, these chapters demonstrate just how far many progressive Christians have journeyed from historically traditional Evangelical perspectives on Christianity and Islam, how open they are to Muslims and their Islamic beliefs, and how critical they are of the conservative Christianity many of these progressive Christians left behind.

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Do Red and Blue Christians Belong Together? Conservative and progressive evangelicals need to let each other go their separate ways, acknowledging that despite shared faith in Christ we have become two separate religious communities. Our fighting is doing no one any good at all. —David Gushee, a professor at Mercer University

Previous chapters documented the distinctive priorities and outgrouping tendencies of theologically progressive and conservative Christians. Conservative Christians build their faith on attempts to follow the dictates of the Bible. Their conviction that the Bible is inerrant makes that text sacred to them, and attempts to deviate from its teachings are viewed with strong suspicion. This does not mean that conservative Christians agree on everything. There is some flexibility regarding acceptable interpretations of the Bible. But arguments to persuade conservative Christians generally must be centered on the Bible and legitimated as being scripturally sound. The core of their religion begins and ends with whether they can justify the tenets and morals of their faith with a Bible perceived to be errorless. The idea of the Bible being without error can lead to a particularistic approach to faith.1 There is a strong tendency to envision their religion as the only valid way to salvation. The ramification of such belief is motivation to “share” the religion with others, which often takes the form of proselytization efforts on an individual or group level. This desire to share their religion also carries over to their interactions with society on a macro level, where they also hope to exert influence to produce beliefs and behaviors consistent with their biblical interpretation (C. Smith 2002). We are not claiming that most conservative Christians endeavor to force others into their faith, although some may possess such desires. Conservative Christians socialized in the United States are likely to adopt values of religious 190

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freedom too deeply for such a perspective to gain much strength among them. But many conservative Christians believe that individuals, and the larger society, would be better off adopting their values and so they seek to replace the faith of others with their particular version of Christianity. This level of deference to the Bible is not the same for progressive Christians. Most progressive Christians do not base their religion on strict obedience to the Bible, nor do they feel a strong need to encourage others to accept their interpretation of the Bible or even to accept a Christian faith. The core of their religion is built upon a value set of inclusiveness, tolerance, and social justice. It is what we have conceptualized and termed a humanistic ethic of social justice. This value set helps determine their interpretations of the Bible, which they then use to define their faith. Unlike conservative Christians, progressives do not center their spirituality upon a certainty that Christianity has all the answers. Instead, Christianity is just one of many paths to achieving a society of inclusion and justice for the marginalized. It is not necessarily a superior path compared to other religions and nonreligious philosophies that seek similar purposes. Indeed, many of our interview respondents argued that Christianity as it is practiced in the United States represents an inferior path to some other religions or philosophies. Thus, it is not surprising that progressive Christians do not have the same incentive as conservative Christians to convince others to adopt their faith. But it is a mistake to think that progressive Christians do not want to reach out to others. Given progressives’ lower reliance on the Bible, one would not expect progressive Christians’ outreach to include, for example, the more conservative “four spiritual laws.”2 But there is a sense of mission among them that they are to promote a social order of justice and kindness. Reaching out is not about promoting the acceptance of certain religious doctrines, but rather about an implementation and exportation of social justice values. Being that progressives perceive different non-Christian religious beliefs as similarly able to produce these values, they do not view non-Christians as being in need of outreach, in terms of theological proselytization. Instead, a major focus of outreach for progressive Christians is toward other Christians. In the view of progressive Christians, it is conservative Christians who tend to be farthest away from adopting a theology that allows for the humanistic ethic of social justice, which values compassion,

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tolerance, and social justice. Regardless of whether they also follow the same Christ figure, progressives see conservative Christians as heading away from inclusiveness, respect for other cultures, and care for the marginalized. Furthermore, progressive Christians are concerned that the actions of conservative Christians can damage the reputation of the Christian label that they share. So when the progressive pro-life bloggers and online authors in chapter 3 talked of the need to encourage more compassion in society, they also critiqued conservative Christians for not displaying kindness in their pro-life efforts. In this sense, while they promote their interpretation of a social justice ethic by challenging abortion, an issue where they agreed with conservative Christians, they also implored conservative Christians to adopt a larger ethic of compassion. Likewise, many of the progressive Christians we interviewed also talked about teaching conservative Christians how to understand, accept, and have compassion for Muslims. They seek to lead those Christians toward a greater goal than the tribalism they attribute to them. Many indicated a greater desire to “convert” fellow Christians than to convert Muslims. Such desires sometimes result in attempts to convince conservative Christians to alter their paths (many used the language of “paradigm shift”), but they have also resulted in frustration and anger at those Christians for their failures to live up to the expectations embedded in the humanistic ethic of social justice. Given their lower reliance on the Bible, it is unrealistic to expect progressive Christians to find value in something such as biblical inerrancy but there is a sense of mission among them that they are to facilitate bringing in a social order of justice and kindness. In this way, progressive Christians are attempting to shape society in the image of their religious values. Their humanistic ethic allows support for their vision of society to come from a variety of religious and nonreligious traditions. Conservative Christians, however, are less likely to promote these values than Christian progressives and those in other religions. Thus, it is not surprising that progressives are more likely to see conservative Christians as an out-group than non-Christians who share the progressives’ ethic. The particularistic philosophy of conservative Christians conflicts with the ideological interests of progressive Christians much more than the beliefs of non-Christians who value the humanistic ethic of social justice.

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New Identities, New Toolkits Social boundaries inform us a good deal about the way a social group shapes its identity. Those boundaries tell us what values the group embraces and, conversely, what values it wants to avoid. Consequently, our research on social boundaries informs us about the social identities of both progressive and conservative Christians. For example, the fact that progressive Christians reject conservative Christians more than the opposite indicates that progressive Christians feel a greater desire to separate themselves from conservative Christians and their values than vice versa. The progressive Christians interviewed explained why this is the case with their assertion of values built into their humanistic ethic. Progressive Christians have a social identity built upon notions of compassion for the marginalized, tolerance, and inclusion.3 This is a focus that they do not envision themselves as having in common with conservative Christians. As a result, they can reject conservative Christians more than those in other religious groups or even more than those with no religious faith. This social identity is more than mere acknowledgment of a certain set of values. It also helps determine interpretation of day-to-day realities. It helps provide individuals with a certain type of cultural toolkit (as discussed in chapter 1) by which they can make sense of society. For progressive Christians, that toolkit indicates that efforts that move society toward inclusion and social justice are to be supported, and efforts that move in the opposite direction should be resisted. The validity of any social movement needs to be measured by the rubric set up by their humanistic ethic. While scholars and social observers may talk about Christians in general and lump progressive Christians in with all Christians, the cultural mindset of progressive Christians is not centered on a uniquely Christian task. It is centered on solving the problem of lack of compassion and social justice in our society. With this toolkit, they perceive themselves as promoting tolerance and social justice, and they feel self-esteem when making society better by strengthening those social justice values. Conservative Christians have a social identity that leads to a cultural toolkit as well. Their social identity is built upon attempting to be faithful to a more traditional and often more literal interpretation of biblical

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teaching. There is not universal agreement on how to interpret the Bible, but it is agreed that the Bible is the ultimate authority in shaping the values of conservative Christians. Thus, the conservative pro–immigration reform authors attempt to persuade their conservative audience by putting forth an interpretation of the Bible that supports this reform. They argue not against pragmatic politicians, but against other conservative Christians with different interpretations of the Bible. The way individuals interpret what they believe to be a sacred document will often be driven by external social values and motivations. Therefore, the way conservative Christians are likely to understand their sacred documents is going to be linked to their own social interest. Yet they still perceive a need to justify their claims and arguments with assertions that can be based on their interpretation of an infallible Bible, since their social identity is built on the idea that they are obeying their deity. Like progressive Christians, conservative Christians’ social identity has led to the construction of a certain cultural toolkit. Because their social identity is based on obeying God and the Bible, they have developed a cultural toolkit of evaluating others based on how close they are to accepting traditional Christian spirituality and whether they have a “relationship” with Christ. Work by Emerson and Smith (2001) indicates one possible path for this toolkit. They find that white Christians utilize a toolkit of individuals’ relationships in their attempt to, for example, understand race relations. For these white Christians, the solution to racism is to convince individuals in relationships to alter their propensity toward racism. This notion is built upon desires for proselytization, as it is assumed that when individuals become good Christians they will no longer be racist. This fits with our findings that conservative Christians value the notion of their particular religious expression being the right one that others would benefit from adopting. With this toolkit they can perceive themselves as faithful to God and can feel self-esteem at improving society by bringing it closer to God. Both progressive and conservative Christians have cultural toolkits to buttress their strong social identities. But they are identities in direct opposition to each other. The concentration on lifting up the marginalized and accepting other religious frameworks does not fit with promoting “one way” to heaven. In fact, efforts at proselytizing by conservative Christians are usually characterized by progressives as the type

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of intolerance that progressive Christians reject. Identity is an important meaning question, and religion has an important role in answering questions of meaning. If progressive and conservative Christians have such disparate social identities, it is realistic to contend that the two groups provide differing, and even conflicting, answers to the meaning questions such as those about not only identity but also morality and purpose. Although they share the same name, progressive and conservative Christians pull in distinctive directions. These differences are not small deviations but completely different routes to dealing with issues of meaning. This makes it worthwhile to ask the question of whether they should remain under the same religious name.

What Unifies a Religious Group? Christians are a very diverse group not only in the global sense but also here in the United States. It is important to consider why we categorize such a diverse population as a single religious group and whether it is useful to continue to do so. Clearly it is not Christian practices or rituals that unite Christians as a group. The ways Christians ritualistically express their devotion to their core beliefs is quite divergent, and that has been so for much of American Christian history, as seen in our discussion in chapter 1. There is disagreement as to which rituals should be incorporated. Some Christians baptize and others do not. And even within the same rituals there is great variation. Baptism can be a complete immersion of an adult or sprinkling water on a baby. But differing rituals could still serve to represent beliefs that Christians have in common. Naturally, we are not assuming that all beliefs must be held in common, as differences of opinions are part of what has created the many different Christian denominations and sects we see today, but perhaps Christians have core beliefs in common. Even when there is diversity of beliefs, it is useful to ask whether there are certain unifying beliefs that tend to be accepted by all, or at least most, factions of that group. Such unifying beliefs allow the members of that group to have common perceptions that can act as a binding force. Interpretations of those unifying beliefs can vary, but the members of the religious group still can acknowledge certain values and priorities tied to their religious group. So, if we get past the questions of pre- or postmillennium

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theology or complementarianism versus egalitarianism, is there something at the core of what this religion is supposed to represent that can unify Christians? We have historically recognized a certain degree of ideological diversity among Christians but acknowledged that there are certain common symbols and beliefs generally adopted by Christians. But even within the beliefs that are assumed to be central to Christianity, the opinions of Christians can dramatically vary. For example, it can be argued that there is no tenet more central to Christianity than the belief in Jesus. But are Christians linked together because of their beliefs in Jesus? And what exactly do they believe about Jesus? Conservative Christians tend to envision him as having the qualities of a deity. While some progressive Christians openly acknowledge Jesus as God, others see him as an exemplary model for how a human should live rather than focusing on any divine characteristics. There are even Christians who challenge the idea that Jesus even existed.4 Even this most central belief varies widely, as do beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible, heaven and hell, and the definition and means to salvation. Beliefs by themselves, then, do not appear to be the factor that unifies Christians as part of the same group. Unity in and of itself may be what is required for members to belong to a religious group. It is possible that individuals belong to a religious group simply because they believe themselves to be part of that group. Of course, the flip side of this is that other members of the group must accept to some degree the membership of the potentially deviant group. It becomes hard to acknowledge that a person is a member of a group that does not consent to including him or her. A racial parallel helps illustrate this point. When Rachel Dolezal, a white woman, claimed to be black, she was not well received by the black community. She may well believe herself to be black, but she has not been accepted as such. Thus, one can question whether she is truly a part of the African American community, no matter how deeply she believes herself to be black. Likewise, there are groups that claim a Christian identity—Mormons, some Unitarians—but are generally not accepted by Christian groups. Under those circumstances, it is fair to question whether they are part of the larger Christian group or if they are more properly categorized as nonChristians. Progressive and conservative Christians both make claim to a Christian identity. Yet progressive Christians often do not accept

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conservative Christians as members of the same group while conservative Christians are more willing to accept progressive Christians. Discussions about what creates unity in a group are not simply theoretical. A major way scholars attempt to study religious groups is to look for ways that membership in those groups predicts behaviors, attitudes, and social outcomes. Shared experiences and perspectives play important roles in such predictions as it can be expected that individuals with common experiences and perspectives are likely to also share behaviors, attitudes, and social outcomes. Historically, having a Christian identity indicated a certain social position in American society. Clearly not everyone equally shared that social position, but Christianity proved to be at least somewhat of a useful predictor, in conjunction with other characteristics, such as political attitudes (Wilcox 1990; J. Green 2004; Pantoja 2010; Wozniak and Lewis 2010; McKenzie and Rouse 2013) and pro-social behaviors (Park and Smith 2000; Djupe and Grant 2001; Lam 2002; Brooks 2003; Hardy and Carlo 2005). Furthermore, Christians with higher levels of religiosity have been found to experience more effects, positive and negative, of “being a Christian” in the United States (Burn and Busso 2005; Hardy and Carlo 2005; Pantoja 2010; Johnson, Rowatt, and LaBouff 2012), suggesting that there is some commonality among Christians that grows stronger as an individual accepts more elements of that faith. As we consider theoretically what holds a religious group together and makes it sensible to talk about them as a single group, a combination of factors can figure into this determination. Rather than considering what defines the in-group of Christianity, we need to consider what it takes to move a group from in-group status to out-group status. We argue that two factors have to be present for this to occur. First, there have to be sufficient differences in the core beliefs to warrant a potential separation. The core goals or essences of the groups must differentiate from each other to the extent that it is reasonable to believe that they are working toward divergent objectives. Second, there has to be sufficient out-grouping from each other. Even if there are important distinctions in beliefs, it is unlikely that the groups will truly separate from each other as long as they see each other as members of the same group. But if new categories can be created that enable individuals to place others into an out-group, then those distinctions allow for the formation of

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out-groups (Turner 1982; Tajfel et al. 1971). It is possible for a shared social identity to bond the members of the group together powerfully despite ideological differences. This acknowledgment of common bonds can keep members in that group in a similar social position and make it reasonable to make predictions about the group. In such cases, ideological differences would not result in out-grouping because the groups continue to share similar social experiences and view one another as in-groups. For out-grouping to occur, both of the following factors need to be present: substantive difference in core beliefs, and conscious separation or nonacceptance between the two groups. In general, out-grouping from certain members or sects of a religious group will follow when their belief systems become sufficiently different from each other. It is difficult to think of a religious group where significant differences in the core values developed, but the two religious groups that rose from that controversy maintained strong bonds of identity with each other. It is possible, however, for groups to engage in out-grouping but still have core theological beliefs in common with each other. Out-grouping by itself is not sufficient for separating religious groups. Out-grouping may produce horrendous wars and conflict, but if the theological goals remain similar, the conflicting groups should not be categorized as separate religions. With similar goals, it is quite possible for those subgroups to make peace and be recognized as different parts of the same religion. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that shared theological goals would result in certain comparable social effects upon all members of a religion, which makes it rational to group them as part of the same religion despite the intergroup conflict. But what if there are distinctive core values between the two groups? It is at that point that we begin to see the process by which a single religious group can be separated into distinct religious groups. To see an example of how two religions can emerge from a single religion, we can look at the emergence of Buddhism from Hinduism. Hinduism dates back to more than four thousand years ago. Within the Hindudominated society, Buddhism was founded in the sixth century BCE by Siddhartha Gautama, or the Buddha. Buddha was reportedly the son of a great ruler, and it was prophesied that he would become a great ruler or the savior of his people. When he saw the suffering in the world around him, he began to establish what would come to be called

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Buddhism. Buddha used many of the similar concepts found in the dominant Hindu religion around him. He talked about karma, dharma, and reincarnation as Hinduism did, but he rejected much of the caste system and formal rituals of Hinduism.5 He sought to reform the dominant religion of his day, but his reforms went beyond merely shaping the existing religion and instead became a new way of answering questions of meaning. For example, reincarnation in Hinduism is shaped by one’s karma and is the process by which individuals can move closer to reunification with the ultimate reality of Brahman. Eventually one is released from the cycle of birth, death, and reincarnation though merging with that reality. But the focus of Buddhism is the end of suffering. According to the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism, humans suffer because of their desires. If they can overcome their desires, then they have a cure for suffering. Thus, Buddhists are not concerned with obtaining unification with ultimate reality as much as they are seeking to be free of the cycle of rebirth and reincarnation by extinction. Only in annihilation can a person truly end desire and thus suffering. Although Buddhism and Hinduism utilize similar terms, they have different metaphysical goals. For the Hindu, the goal is to lose one’s individuality by merging with ultimate reality. For the Buddhist, the goal is an ending of his or her existence. These goals are not identical. Buddhists and Hindus are not fighting over the best ways to serve a particular deity or reach a similar otherworldly position. They are seeking different outcomes even if some of the concepts used in their religions are similar. While some can argue that the history of violence between Buddhism and Hinduism does not appear to be as extensive as the history of other religious groups such as Protestant/Catholic or Shi’ite/Sunni, the development of Buddhism did result in strong outgrouping between the two groups.6 Indeed, Buddhism virtually became extinct in India in large part to the power of Hinduism to crowd it out of that country. This led to Buddhism becoming prominent in East and Southeast Asia. While both Hinduism and Buddhism are religions that reject the notion of an exclusive deity and allow for a certain degree of theological inclusion, they are perceived as distinctive religions by most inside and outside their religions. They are rarely categorized as different emphases of the same religion. This division is not based on the degree of hostility between different groups but rather on the two key factors

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identified previously. First, the two groups clearly conceive of themselves as separate religions. The second key factor is whether the reform groups are merely attempting to find new ways to accomplish a similar ultimate goal or whether the reform movement set into motion a desire for a distinct goal. The former leads to the formation of different factions within the same religion while the latter can set the stage for the emergence of a new religion. We have now established a context by which we can understand the differences we have documented between progressive and conservative Christians. The contemporary understanding is that they are different factions of the same general religion. Is that true today? And if it is true today, will it be true in the foreseeable future? Based on our findings, is it accurate to say that these groups merely represent different paths to the same theological goal, or have they created distinct goals? If they have done so, do the two groups envision one another as out-groups?

Christian Diversity or Two Different Religions? The quantitative findings in this book suggest that while conservative Christians are willing to accept progressive Christians into their social circles, progressive Christians display strong tendencies to reject the political actions and social values of conservative Christians. Their social identity motivates them to distance themselves from conservative Christians more than from other religious groups. It has also influenced them to develop social networks largely devoid of conservative Christians. There is clear evidence of a powerful tendency of the groups to see the other as an out-group, and this tendency is especially strong among progressive Christians. However, that type of rejection can happen between subgroups within a religion without a split developing that is so encompassing that it results in the emergence of two new distinct religious expressions. To assess this possibility, we cannot merely explore the level of hostility individuals within religious groups have for each other. But the lack of a true separation of their metaphysical goals provides the framework by which most outside those religious traditions still group those combating groups together into the same religion. What would it look like if progressive and conservative Christians are merely different divisions under the same religion? How would we

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reconcile the different emphases of political concerns by progressive Christians and theological concerns by conservative Christians? It is entirely possible that these are different emphases with a similar or even an identical goal in mind. Although conservative Christians seem to focus on theological concerns more than progressives, this does not mean that all goals of progressive Christians are secular. The way progressive Christians approach those political issues appears to be motivated, at least to some extent, by their desire to fulfill otherworldly goals. There is evidence that progressive Christians are about as likely to state that their political activism is driven by their religious faith than are conservative Christians.7 Progressive Christians can simply envision their political activism as a superior path to accomplishing a similar goal. This different emphasis would make them two warring religious subgroups within the same Christian belief system. However, as we examine the qualitative information in our work, we see evidence that this is not the best way to interpret the differences between progressive and conservative Christians. Our research suggests a new dynamic beyond partisan politics. We find evidence that progressive Christians have not merely a different emphasis on politics, but that they also bring a distinct value set to their differences with conservative Christians. Progressive Christians seem to adhere to a flexible theology that stresses a humanistic ethic of social justice as a goal in and of itself. This can produce a different ultimate goal than the one that motivates conservative Christians. If that is the case, then what we may be witnessing is an emerging split into two separate religious expressions. The counterargument is that the distinct value system being promoted by progressive Christians is an outgrowth of their belief that political activism is the way to honor Christ—in other words, to reach similar goals to conservative Christians. They have a contrasting interpretation of what it means to support and honor Christ, and this comes out in the differing values they support. But perhaps they still share the ultimate goal of reverence for Christ with conservative Christians. This is a fair interpretation if the major contrast in social values can be tied to support for a similar or identical religious goal. But if progressive Christians’ new values are centered on a humanistic ethic of social justice while conservative Christians center their values on their interpretation of the Bible, then the fact that religious groups use similar concepts

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(such as salvation or faith) will not prevent them from being distinctive religious groups. For insight into this distinction, we return to the example of Hinduism and Buddhism. There was a definite shift of values when Buddhism emerged from Hinduism. Even though both groups retained the concept of Nirvana, the definition of Nirvana shifted from being merged with ultimate reality to extinction. This change has important ramifications for the value system of each religious tradition. While the merging with Brahman would entail the loss of individuality, it is not an erasure of one’s existence. To address suffering, the Buddhist moves from a value in seeking Brahman to a value in losing one’s ambition. This is a clear distinction of values, as one’s actions would be focused upon one’s elimination rather than learning how to be merged with ultimate reality. There are a variety of interpretations of the distinctions between the two religions, and perhaps some can argue that they do not lead to contrasting value systems. However, we assert that such claims cannot hold up to serious scrutiny. Consider the reforms of Buddhism toward the caste system in light of these different value systems. A complex and rigid caste system makes sense in Hinduism, as it denotes the efforts needed to make one’s way to reunification with Brahman. Reunification with the ultimate reality requires a step-by-step process up the caste system so that one can increase one’s comprehension of that complex reality as one moves toward reunification. But with the emphasis on elimination of suffering through erasure of ambition, Buddhists have no need for a deliberate caste system. Recognition of the need to end suffering can be more instantaneous than understanding a Brahman who is perceived to be beyond comprehension to mere mortals. It is not surprising that Buddhism reacted so harshly toward the type of caste system that developed in Hindu societies. Buddhist reforms were not merely tinkering around the margins of the Hindi religious value system. They were an upending of that value system. Distinction of values also impacts other ways in which religion can attempt to answer vital questions of meaning. Buddhism developed into a new way to address systems of meaning in contrast to Hinduism. For example, purpose changes in light of the new Buddhist reforms. Instead of purpose being embedded into a desire of reunification with ultimate reality, purpose became the need to eliminate the suffering created by

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our ambition. The new value systems linked to Buddhism are naturally linked to the new ways Buddhists use religion to address ideas of purpose and identity. Distinct value systems between religious groups can represent distinct ways to deal with questions of meaning. This type of distinction is a key characteristic of the formation of separate religious expressions that can no longer be assumed to be connected to the same faith tradition. With this understanding, we are now in a position to put the qualitative findings of this work into context. Beyond the use of similar terminology—Christ, sin, salvation, and so on—are we looking at progressive and conservative Christians becoming, or having become, two distinctive religious groups, or do they have enough in common to still be considered subgroups within the same religion? Our data indicate that they are in the process of becoming, or perhaps already have become, two distinctive religious expressions. The distinctions are so powerful that it is indeed no longer feasible to consider them in the same religious category. Our data showed that for progressive Christians, a humanistic ethic of social justice is an important end in itself. For conservative Christians, obedience to traditional interpretations of scripture is an important end in itself. These are not compatible goals in many ways. For example, the particularism and proselytizing valued by conservative Christians violate the progressive Christian values of their humanistic ethic. That ethic would envision such attempts at conversion as a violation of the dignity of non-Christian groups such as Muslims. Thus, we have differing values leading to contrasting answers to questions of meaning. It can be argued that progressive Christians are merely using their value system to promote a traditional Christian ethic of serving Jesus. In contrast, conservative Christians are using their loyalty to traditional Christian interpretations of scripture to support that same value of serving Jesus. Yet when we go beneath the surface of what is meant by “serving Jesus,” we observe that this same term has dramatically distinctive meanings for progressive and conservative Christians. These meanings are tied to the contrasting value structures for members of each group. The value structures are not simply the means to the end of serving Jesus—they define what serving Jesus means to each group. The average progressive Christian may state that serving Jesus is more important

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than a social justice ethic. But our work suggests that the intermingling of progressive Christians’ social justice ideals with their desire to serve Jesus leads to different conclusions about meaning and identity than conservative Christians’ efforts to merge their particular biblical interpretation with their desire to serve Jesus. The meaning and identity connected to the humanistic ethic of social justice lead to a different conclusion about purpose than the meaning and identity connected to attempts to follow an infallible Bible. Even if each group states that serving Jesus is the objective, serving Jesus means something very different to each group, and these different definitions lead each group to find meaning and identity in different, incompatible places. Ultimately, that is the important factor in measuring the degrees of distinction between the two groups. To put it another way, the Buddhist will state that he or she desires to escape the path of rebirth and reincarnation so that Nirvana can be achieved. That statement can also be made by the Hindis. But what it means to achieve Nirvana is distinctively different between the two groups, and, as we have argued, that difference between extinction and merging with reality is tied to the contrasting values between the two expressions. We are not impressed by arguments that both progressive and conservative Christians intend to serve Christ, if what they mean by serving Christ is tied to dramatically different value systems and ways to answer questions of meaning. Given that our research suggests that the contrasting value systems of social justice for progressive Christians and biblical particularism for conservative Christians do exist, we assert that progressive and conservative Christians are not part of the same religious group. They are groups that utilize similar terms but have contrasting ultimate goals attached to those terms.

Conclusion The research in this book supports our argument of an emerging religious split within Christianity. We do not expect this research to be the final statement on this development. In presenting this idea, we hope to stimulate a much-needed debate on the nature of progressive and conservative Christianity. But we do challenge the pervasive assumption that progressive and conservative Christians can be lumped together, as

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we contend that they cannot be grouped together in any meaningful way. Previous research has already documented that they cannot be grouped together politically (Guth et al. 1996; Hall 1997; Greeley and Hout 2008), theologically (Cha 1986; Wellman 2008; C. Hunter 2010; Ezigbo 2016), or demographically (DeYoung et al. 2004; Bielo 2011; Grant 2017). We have shown that they do not include each other as in-group members and that their ultimate spiritual goals are dramatically different from each other.8 Thus, they cannot be grouped together as reaching similar answers to questions of meaning. In essence, other than being called Christian, it is difficult to make any argument that progressive and conservative Christians belong in the same religious group. Whether progressive and conservative Christians officially become separate groups will happen regardless of whether this separation is recognized by academic observers. However, paying attention to the nature of the divide between progressive and conservative Christians can provide us with a more accurate understanding of our current religious reality. For example, we can develop a more accurate understanding of the culture war that is not merely between religious and secular individuals, but also between supporters of religions focused on modernist values, such as progressive Christians, versus supporters of traditionalist religions that place a high value on otherworldly concerns, like conservative Christians. Furthermore, an accurate understanding of the split between progressive and conservative Christians allows us to better gauge the level of social, political, and cultural power that Christians in general have in the United States. Claims about Christians’ numerical advantage in obtaining and maintaining social power must be adjusted in light of the degree of separation between progressive and conservative Christians. For example, when one discusses “Christian” politicians, it is vital to ask what type of Christian the politician appeals to. Clearly, those who serve conservative Christians are not going to be appreciated by progressive Christians and vice versa. In these and other ways, there is important information to be gained by understanding the true nature of the progressive-conservative Christian split, and much to be lost by failing to acknowledge it. The United States has become a socially and politically polarized culture, and it is reasonable that Christianity in the United States would be shaped by this polarization. Some might suggest that progressive

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Christians’ rejection of conservative Christians is partially attributable to Donald Trump’s presidency. His presence may have provided progressive Christians with more justification to reject their conservative counterparts. However, the quantitative research was conducted with data from the 2012 American National Election Studies survey, so the election of President Trump cannot be the sole source of the greater propensity of progressives to reject conservative Christians rather than vice versa. It is likely that progressive Christians generally have a lower willingness to accept conservative Christians regardless of the political structure of the country for the value-related reasons discussed in chapter 7. As such, one would expect more progressive hostility toward conservative Christians, no matter which political party has control of the federal government. We have spent most of this book exploring the evidence of the nature of the split between progressive and conservative Christians. But we have not speculated about how such a split might take place or fully explored the ramifications of this division. In the final chapter we will engage in such speculation.

Conclusion The difference between me and you is you use scripture to determine what love means and I use love to determine what scripture means. —Nakedpastor.com

The United States has become a heavily polarized country (Galston 2005; Beckmann and McGann 2008; Baumer and Gold 2015; Persily 2015; Iyengar et al. 2019). If religion reflects our larger society, then it is likely that members within the numerical majority religion would reflect the polarized nature of that society. It is possible that our religious beliefs have contributed to our country’s polarization. At the very least, it is not unreasonable to assert that the battle between contrasting systems of meaning is a major factor, even if it is not the only factor, buttressing the level of animosity among members in our society. However, it is also possible that religious beliefs only reflect, and do not create, the ongoing societal tension. Regardless of whether Christians are influenced by or influencing societal polarization, the red-blue split in the larger society is also occurring in American Christianity. This split is based on more than just political preference, as it is linked to distinct lifestyles between the “red” and “blue” group (Bishop 2009). As we have seen, it is also reflective of contrasting expressions of Christianity. The split between Christians is also driven by differences of salient social values and understandings of morality. Conservative Christians’ rigid loyalty to their sacred book suggests a desire to apply a welldefined, explicit set of rules not only in their own lives but also to the larger society. This desire may relate to the promotion of a social order that resists social change, and a politically conservative stance best supports those values (Jost 2017; Sterling, Jost, and Hardin 2019). But the source of this wish is theological rather than partisan—the political affiliation is chosen to serve theological goals. For example, progressive 207

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Christians value a humanistic ethic of social justice that downplays the notion of an exclusive truth. Indeed, this ethic can envision exclusive truth claims as efforts to theologically colonialize marginalized groups. Progressive Christians’ value system can make them more comfortable with a progressive political framework that challenges the wisdom of using tradition to shape our current society. This preference is less about partisan loyalty than about adherence to the moral values of social justice for progressive Christians. Nonetheless, differences in sources of morality reflect the observations of Lamont (1992) on how symbolic differences in morality create important social boundaries. Those boundaries can be represented in political struggles even though the conflict is much more about how a given group has defined what is moral or immoral. Thus, while differences between progressive and conservative Christians often play out in political struggles, the real conflict emerges more from a clash of core values and moral authorities than a Democrat versus Republican conflict. In line with this observation, it is also possible that, outside of Christianity, political differences in the United States are based on contrasting core values (Haidt 2012). The religious flexibility in America that political progressives and conservatives make use of may enable them to better elaborate on the core values driving these political struggles. For example, some political conservatives have argued that the concept of private property is one substantiated by Christian teaching (Schansberg 2004; Richards 2009; Sirico 2012). Prohibitions on stealing and the idea of rewarding productive behavior are argued to support this conservative political position. But some political progressives use Christian teachings to assert that capitalism has done tremendous damage to our society and to those who are marginalized (Wallis 2005; Van Til 2007; Sider 2008). The debate over the advisability of capitalism and private property is but one of many ways Christian theology has been used for moral justifications of multiple sides of a political issue. Non-Christians may use arguments of Christians to provide a moral justification to their particular political stance. There are important implications of a polarized Christianity for the larger society. We now reflect on some of these implications. At the end of the day, we should consider this division to represent two different religions because failure to do so will not account for important social and cultural dynamics. A lack of acknowledgment of the depths of the

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differences between progressive and conservative Christians by scholars can exacerbate a misunderstanding of the nature of these differences in the general public who consumes the products of scholarly work.

Conflict between Progressive and Conservative Christians The goals of progressive and conservative Christians are not merely different from each other. They are oppositional goals that interfere with one another’s ability to accomplish their desired purposes. For example, the efforts of conservative Christians to promote their particularistic version of Christianity have contributed to the stereotype of Christians as intolerant of other religions and cultures (Moen 1994; Bolce and De Maio 1999). These stereotypes can make it harder for progressive Christians to identify as Christian since they do not want to be linked to those images of intolerance. The efforts of conservative Christians can also make it harder for progressive Christians to use their faith as a vehicle of social justice since non-Christian groups may be hesitant to work with them due to fears of being proselytized. By contrast, as progressive Christians promote a humanistic ethic of social justice, they may weaken justification for conservative Christians’ proselytization. This ethic emphasizes goals of self-fulfillment, service and learning from the marginalized, and the notion that Christianity is merely one of many viable paths toward those goals. If progressive Christians promote such a perspective, then they create an environment where is it is unseemly for Christians to “witness” to others. This philosophy not only denies the priority of promoting religious change in nonbelievers, but also makes the evangelistic efforts of conservative Christians more difficult as such activity can be more easily stigmatized. These are two examples of how the groups’ central goals not only differ but also deter one another. Timothy Kurek’s movement from being a conservative Christian to a progressive Christian reflects the incompatible values between the two groups (Merica 2012). Raised as a conservative Christian, he encountered a lesbian friend who had been rejected from her family. He found that all he could think about was how he could convert her. Disgusted at those feelings, he decided to fake being gay for a year. He “came out” to his family, had a friend pretend to be his boyfriend, and got a job as a barista at a gay café, although he avoided physical

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intimacy with other men. The experience made him reconsider his views on not only homosexuality but also his Christian faith. No longer considering himself an Evangelical, Kurek still considers himself a Christian. He focuses on taking care of the marginalized, not just sexual minorities but of course including them, rather than seeking a home in a religious organization. Ultimately Kurek could not reconcile his former identity as a conservative Christian seeking to proselytize with his new progressive Christian focus on affirming those he deemed marginalized in Western culture and a humanistic ethic of social justice. Those goals, as laid out by the adherents in each Christian group, do not fit together. It is not surprising that progressive and conservative Christians find themselves in conflict. This tension can be seen in several of the statements of the respondents in chapters 5, 6, and 7. But it can also play itself out in public discourse. We began this book discussing the conflict between Jonathan Merritt and Franklin Graham. This conflict was not merely political. It was a conflict driven by competing ideas of morality. Both men desired to care for those sick with COVID-19. But although we do not have evidence of direct proselytizing at the field hospital set up by Graham’s organization, Samaritan’s Purse, he mixed his desire to care for the sick with a notion of his version of Christianity being the one true path. His decision to not hire those who do not adhere to this conservative understanding of Christianity reflects this worldview. It is precisely that worldview that Merritt reacts against. He does not argue that Graham should not be allowed to serve but it is noteworthy that he thought it necessary to pen an article criticizing Graham before begrudgingly acknowledging that Graham’s organization should be allowed to serve. It is as if he wanted to make certain that Graham was differentiated from the type of Christianity Merritt practices, and thus Graham’s Christianity must be branded as not living up to the social justice values Merritt likely sees as desirable for our society: “Graham’s hate speech is also often aimed at LGBTQ people. He has called samesex marriages ‘detestable’ and has drummed up fear toward gays and lesbians—whom he believes should burn in hell—by claiming they want to ‘drag an immoral agenda into our communities.’” Additionally he takes Graham to task for his critical view of Islam: “Graham seems to harbor a special level of disdain for followers of Islam, which

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he characterizes as a ‘wicked and evil religion’ that encourages adherents to beat their wives and murder their disobedient children” (2020). Merritt’s issue is not just that Graham is reacting to Muslims in a manner he perceives as hateful. He also finds it offensive that Graham refuses to acknowledge the value of the Muslim faith itself, but instead sees it as inferior to Christianity. “During the first Gulf War, respected U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf publicly criticized [Samaritan’s Purse] for trying to coerce American troops serving in Saudi Arabia to covertly distribute Arab-language Bibles under the guise of humanitarian work” (2020). Merritt indicates, in a similar way as our progressive Christian interview respondents, that it is not acceptable for Christians to envision their particular faith as the true, or even best, way to know God. Merritt also implies that distributing Bibles, what conservative Christians perceive to be the “Word of Life,” does not qualify as a humanitarian effort. To be inclusive is to accept other paths as equally valid as, and sometimes superior to, the Christian path. Graham’s failure to do so (e.g., implying a need for conversion by covertly distributing Bibles to Muslims) creates some of the ire Merritt feels toward him. Of course, Merritt’s criticism drew its own criticism from defenders of Graham. One such defender is Chelsen Vicari (2020). She defends the emphasis of Samaritan Purse’s on sharing Christian materials: “It’s bizarre to read this line of reasoning from a professing Christian. It’s bewildering to me that Merritt attempted to undermine the integrity of Samaritan’s Purse because their Operation Christmas Child shoeboxes include materials that seek to share the Gospel.” For Vicari the idea that a Christian group would not take an opportunity to share such materials is confusing. In her social world this is simply what Christians do, and she does not understand why another Christian would be critical of such an action. She also defends Graham’s organization’s desire to define their faith with adherence to pre-1960s US sexual values: “Many liberal-leaning Christians have seemingly decided that to maintain traditional Biblical teachings on sex and marriage is equivalent to discrimination and hatred of LGBTQ people.” Vicari represents the desire of conservative Christians to hold off the power of humanist values to shape their faith. They are concerned with efforts they see among progressive Christians to accommodate to those values and to “water down the faith” with an acceptance of non-Christian beliefs. It

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is not surprising that she concludes that “an eternal lens is sadly what is missing from Merritt’s article.” If the social identity of progressive Christians is built around a humanistic ethic of social justice, then Merritt illustrates important elements of that ethic. His distaste for the lack of affirmation of sexual minorities and the beliefs of non-Christians illustrates the values of the humanistic ethic. The rejection of Graham’s attempt at proselytization indicates a rejection of religious particularism common among progressive Christians. Even though Graham was well known for his support of President Trump, Merritt does not waste any space in his criticism of Graham on partisan concerns. Graham’s violations are his moral failings to uphold the personal values of the humanistic ethic of social justice, such as uplifting and defending beliefs held by those deemed to have less power in Western culture. The basis for the social identity of conservative Christians is also illuminated in this exchange. For Graham, and Vicari for that matter, proselytizing the lost is a natural and essential duty for Christians to perform. Vicari appeals to “traditional Biblical teachings” as she argues that Merritt lacks an “eternal lens.” Thus, she ties her counterattack to an otherworldly acceptance of biblical traditions, as part of her critique of Merritt is that he does not seem to have such a linkage of his faith to an inerrant Word of God. Her implication that salvation in the afterlife is the Christian’s foremost priority also points to the basis upon which conservative Christians build their social identities. In the end Merritt states that this effort is needed and welcomed but also that it is acceptable to look at this effort with great suspicion. To be sure, Merritt was not the only progressive Christian who criticized Graham. Bishop Andrew M. L. Dietsche of the Episcopal Diocese of New York refused to allow Samaritan’s Purse to set up inside the Cathedral of St. John due to Graham’s beliefs about sexual minorities. Graham for his part did not directly attack either his Christian or non-Christian detractors but rather defended the policies of Samaritan’s Purse and stated that he did not hate others even if he did not agree with their lifestyle. Graham’s relative defensive posture is informative in an important way. Clearly Merritt and Dietsche are, with other progressive politicians and activists, the instigators of this conflict. While Graham has defenders, he himself is hesitant to counterattack his Christian detractors. This

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may reflect another reality about the conflict between progressive and conservative Christians: that progressive Christians are more likely to reject conservative Christians than vice versa. This tendency showed up consistently in our data. The rejection of conservative Christians by progressive Christians in chapter 2, the critique of the pro-life movement by pro-life progressive Christians in chapter 3, and the reluctance of progressive Christians to have Christian friends who disagree with them on the topic of Islam in chapter 7 all provide evidence that progressive Christians distance themselves from conservative Christians in ways that do not happen in the opposite direction. Of course, conservative Christians are willing to criticize progressive Christians or progressive Christianity. Both groups have a tendency to view each other with suspicion (Spong 1992; McLaren 2005; Kania 2010; D. Jensen 2017; Young 2019). However, it appears that for many conservative Christians, the adversary requiring their attention is not progressive Christians, but non-Christians such as atheists, Muslims, and secularists. Conservative Christians believe that progressive Christians are mistaken on theological issues, but they still see progressives as theologically closer to “the truth” than non-Christian groups. But for progressive Christians there is much more of a tendency to reject more conservative Christians than to reject non-Christian groups. Given how progressive Christians interpret the value of social justice, conservative Christians may be seen as more than merely wrong. Progressives can envision them as lacking the compassion and tolerance needed to build an honorable society. The greater willingness of progressive Christians to reject other Christians can be understood in light of these different perceptions. If there is a civil war within Christianity, it is progressive Christians who understand that fact and have reacted accordingly. They are the ones who are most likely to take the initiative to condemn conservative Christians. They are the ones more isolated from other Christians and thus most likely to direct negative stereotypes toward other Christians. To be sure, critiques of progressive Christianity by conservative Christians exist (D. Jensen 2017; R. Smith 2018; Young 2019; Childers 2020), but there is not the sense of war against other Christians that is more common among progressive Christians. While progressive Christians may lack diversity of other types of Christians in their social circle, conservative Christians may lack a diversity of non-Christian individuals in

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their social circles.1 The particular type of diversity that each group lacks reveals whom they envision as out-groups and provides insight about who their potential allies are. Differing social networks can reflect contrasting visions and goals of progressive and conservative Christians. As we have shown, the issue of how to understand and respond to Islam and Muslims strikes a deep chord with progressive Christians. Some intentionally build in-groups with Muslims. Progressives often saw Muslims as automatically part of their in-group because of Muslims’ minority status in the West and because they perceive them to lack power in Western culture. This action represents an act of distinctive self-separation on the part of progressive Christians, demonstrating a desire to distance themselves from political and religious conservatives. Religious diversity does not guarantee ideological diversity within a social network. Such homogeneous social networks can reduce tolerance for opposing viewpoints (Mutz 2002; Ikeda and Richey 2009; Stroud 2010), which could perpetuate even greater animosity toward conservative Christians. As we also compared progressives’ views of Islam to progressives’ views of conservatives, we pointed out many more instances of vehement self-differentiation, giving further evidence that progressive Christians should be, and may even want to be, classified in a separate faith group from conservative Christians. Beyond the different core goals of progressive and conservative Christians, and the propensity of especially progressive Christians to out-group conservative Christians, it should also be noted that conservative Christians may not experience the effects of secularization to the same degree that progressive Christians do.2 More than thirty years ago, data emerged indicating that mainline, or more progressive, Protestant denominations were declining at a faster rate than conservative Protestant denominations (Kelley 1986). Furthermore, churches with conservative theology are more likely to grow than churches with progressive theology (Haskell, Flatt, and Burgoyne 2016; Schnabel and Bock 2017). Finally, the loss of Christians to the “nones” (those who do not identify with any religious group) tends to come from moderate or progressive Christians more than from conservative Christians (Hudnut-Beumler and Silk 2018; Stanton 2019). These trends can result in progressive Christians feeling more threatened than conservative Christians in our changing religious economy. Progressive Christians may apprehend that

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it will become harder to maintain their own version of Christianity in the light of the relative growth of conservative Christians. As such, their fears can play out in their aggressive stance toward conservative Christians. Future research may investigate the degree to which such concerns motivate the animosity of progressive Christians toward conservative Christians. Ultimately, these issues reinforce only the reality of a polarized Christianity. This polarized Christianity in some ways reflects the polarization occurring in our society, but it also reflects the different paths toward meaning and identity that progressive and conservative Christians have taken. It may be the case that progressive Christians recognize this conflict more easily because conservative Christians conceptualize progressive Christians as being closer to them than vice versa. However, the reality of this polarization can become more evident to conservative Christians over time, and with this realization it is possible that the Grahams of this society will take a more proactive approach to that conflict.

Implications of a Polarized Christianity Christianity has often been seen as the dominant religion in the United States. However, groups with a dominant social status also tend to share a social identity that allows them to express their social power (McIntyre 1997; Scott and Robinson 2001; Gushue and Constantine 2007). We have little reason to believe that such a strong overarching social identity is part of modern US Christianity. A numerical majority advantage means little in a culture where the majority is not unified. As scholars consider the religious environment in the United States, understanding progressive Christianity as an all-but-separate religion from conservative Christianity calls into question notions about the dominant status of Christianity in the United States. The propensity to consider Christianity the majority group becomes even more problematic when considering the ideological foundation upon which progressive Christianity is built. John Pavlovitz (2015) talks of leaving American Christianity. The Christianity he says he has outgrown is one that attacks atheists and Muslims and that exhibits God in a box as well as a God wrapped in the flag. In its place he wants a religion that includes the marginalized and where diversity is valued.

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The religion Pavlovitz is endorsing is not one willing to work with other Christians to obtain majority status. To the degree that those in progressive Christian spaces would attempt to create a majority-group status, it would be done by cooperating with non-Christians and those whom they perceive to be marginalized social groups, such as sexual minorities. The barrier between progressive Christians and a Christian majority status is not merely that they do not identify with conservative Christians. It is not even the fact that progressive Christians conceptualize conservative Christians as members of their out-group. The real barrier is the willingness of progressive Christians to develop connections with non-Christians and to work at cross purposes with the development of a Christian majority status. The humanistic ethic of social justice demands that those in a majority position give up power to the marginalized, mandating that they relinquish any power that a majority status might provide them. It is not clear how much conservative Christians crave a majority position, but even if that is their desire, they are at a disadvantage sharing the name of their religion with many individuals who directly work to undermine such a goal. It is tempting to consider differences between progressive and conservative Christians to be limited to political, and possibly theological, goals. But this research suggests that the way each group answers questions of meaning is dramatically distinct. Generally, for conservative Christians, meaning is found within obedience to a supernatural God as described in the Bible. They believe that God, much interpreted through the lens of the Bible, determines our value, meaning, and worth. In their epistemological framework, humans look for direct guidance by the Christian deity in how to live their lives and shape their society. Progressive Christians believe in the Christian deity with varying degrees of certainty, but that is not the complete source of their purpose. Their purpose is the alteration of society toward one that embodies a humanistic ethic of social justice. To this end, they value empowering those defined as marginalized and accepting those of non-Christian faiths and beliefs. The adherence of conservative Christians to a more rigid and, in some cases, more literal, interpretation of the Bible, and the adherence of progressive Christians to a humanistic ethic of social justice, create differing priorities toward political activism, acceptance of non-Christians, and the role of culture in understanding truth. These differences are not

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incidental and reveal religious groups with distinct goals and core perspectives. The essential goals of each group are diametrically opposed to each other. Progressive and conservative Christians have distinct systems of belief that use similar terms infused with contrasting meanings. These epistemological differences also make it quite difficult for conversation to occur between progressive and conservative Christians. While members of both groups use similar symbols, they will attach distinct meaning to those symbols. With such contrasting goals, agreement will be difficult. We expect that there will be some efforts by progressive and conservative Christians to engage in conversation with each other, but we do not consider it likely that such conversations will lead to reunification. What is more likely to occur is that such efforts at conversation lead to more of an acknowledgment of the gulf between the two groups. One only needs to look at the recent efforts of the United Methodist Church to see this dynamic take place. For decades the denomination has argued about the role, and acceptance, of sexual minorities. Finally, it became clear that reconciliation between the two factions was not possible. In 2020, the United Methodist Church drew up terms for a “divorce” that allowed the conservative churches, organized as the Wesleyan Covenant Association, to retain their assets and for them to receive $25 million with the promise that no future financial claims will be made on the mother organization (Mulenga 2020). The new upstart conservative organization contains 125,000 individuals in about 1,500 churches. This is contrasted with the seven million members who remain in the denomination. In time we will be able to observe the fate of both the conservative Christian upstarts as well as the progressive Christian denomination they left behind. To some degree we have also seen similar steps taken with the Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran, Presbyterian Church USA, and American Baptist Church USA (D. Burke 2020). We suspect that similar processes of splitting between progressive and conservative Christians are occurring outside of formal denominations as well. Another important implication of this gulf relates to the way cooperation efforts are approached. Cooperation between progressive and conservative Christians cannot be seen as merely reconciliation between members of the same religious group; rather, it should be seen as

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similar to interfaith efforts between those of different religious groups. This does not mean that it is impossible, or even unlikely, that progressive and conservative Christians can work together. Indeed, interfaith efforts on issues where theological agreement is not necessary are well documented (Herrera and Pepper 2003; Harris 2005; K. McCarthy 2007; J. Smith 2007). However, issues where there would be cooperation between progressive and conservative Christians would have to be those that both touch upon the social justice concerns of progressive Christians and align with biblical mandates as interpreted by conservative Christians. Perhaps issues such as disaster relief or combating human trafficking can bring these two groups together. Yet we suspect that such cooperation is more difficult between progressive and conservative Christians than between progressive Christians and members of other religions. Indeed, some progressive Christians do not like working with conservatives. For example, in chapter 7, one of our respondents, Katrina, clearly enunciated that she feels discomfort when working with conservative Christians to assist Muslim refugees. Battles over shaping what it means to be a Christian are likely to make it harder for a progressive to cooperate with a conservative Christian than with a Muslim, Jew, atheist, or those outside of conservative Christianity. Given the progressive Christians’ values of inclusion, those interfaith alliances are likely to be the best opportunities for conservative Christians to work with progressive Christians. However, while conservative Christians are less likely to reject progressive Christians than vice versa, conservative Christians tend to enter into interfaith social relationships less than progressive Christians (K. McCarthy 2007). Even though conservative Christians are more likely to include progressive Christians in their in-group and should be more willing to work with them than other religious groups, their relative unwillingness to engage in interfaith efforts will make even working with progressive Christians more difficult. If progressives’ inclusive values mean they will rarely be working in isolation, but instead with members of other religions, conservatives’ reluctance to participate in interfaith groups will also limit their opportunities to cooperate with progressive Christians. In sum, it is likely that progressive and conservative Christian cooperation will only sporadically occur.

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As it concerns interfaith cooperation, some of the divisions among Christians noted in this research have implications for each group’s likely allies when cooperating with other faiths. Some faiths, or secular ideologies, more clearly fall into a dimension of advocating social justice, while others prioritize obedience to a deity. Interfaith cooperation may be more likely to occur between groups with similar epistemological goals. Progressive Christians, then, can find themselves allied with groups that align with their humanistic ethic, such as humanist organizations, spirituals, secular Jewish groups, and Muslim groups they perceive as marginalized. Conservative Christians, though, may on political, but not theological, issues work with politically like-minded groups such as socially conservative Mormons, Jews, and Muslims. These potential alliances can flourish because of the comparable sources of meaning among each set of groups. The type of polarization documented in this book does not apply to just Christians, but, as argued by James Hunter (1992), could impact the entire religious framework in the United States. It bears watching to see whether interfaith organizing along a divide like the one we noted among Christians in our research is normalized in the United States. Finally, if we conceptualize progressive and conservative Christians as different religious groups, then there is value in exploring the institutional structures within each group. Work on the institutional organization within different Christian denominations is fairly commonplace (Scherer 1980; Cantrell, Krile, and Donohue 1983; Chaves 1993; Guth et al. 2003; Sullins 2004; Barnes 2010; A. Lewis 2011; Ammerman 2014). However, denominational identity has decreased in importance for shaping the social identity of Christians (Wuthnow 1989). Given the rise of nondenominational institutions and the relative ease with which some Christians move between denominations, we cannot be content to merely investigate denominational organizations as separate entities. There is value in the investigation and analysis of organizations that link together either progressive or conservative Christians in a larger manner. Organizations such as the Progressive Christian Alliance and Samaritan’s Purse are interdenominational and respectively serve the larger progressive and conservative Christian communities. Learning how progressive and conservative Christians utilize a larger institutional

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organization to facilitate their goals will greatly further knowledge about the larger religious culture in the United States. We have considered some of the theoretical implications of treating progressive and conservative Christians as two different religious groups. We discussed the polarization and some implications of thinking of progressive and conservative Christians as two different groups. We now explore some of the practical implications and what we might expect in a society with a red and a blue Christianity. Our comments are speculative in nature, but they prompt us to consider new research questions and understand the changing dynamics of Christianity in the United States.

Will One Group Retain an Explicit Christian Identity? If progressive and conservative Christians are heading toward a split, one may ask whether one or the other groups will eventually be less likely to identify as being Christian. It is possible that one of the groups would adopt a new social label that distinguishes itself from the other group. But it is also possible that both groups could cling to the Christian label even as they both seek social distance from each other. In that scenario they continue to fight against each other for the right to be the “authentic” Christian group. This issue is valuable to consider as it acknowledges the potential power of a progressive-conservative split to create new religious groups. It is reasonable that progressive Christians would more quickly disassociate from the larger Christian group. They have shown a stronger desire to separate themselves from conservative Christians than vice versa. They are also less likely to define their Christian status as tied to traditional Christian teachings. In addition, chapter 6 detailed how progressive Christians were also more likely than conservatives to express reservations and caveats regarding the term “Christian.” For progressive Christians, “Christianity” may become, or has already became, a word associated with moral deficiency. However, conservative Christians appear to have more desire to accept other Christians and to tie themselves to what they perceive as historical Christian traditions. If progressive and conservative Christians decided to fight for the label of “Christians,” it is likely that conservative Christians would battle harder for that honor.

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However, it is true that progressive Christians, in varying degrees, believe that their religion has been corrupted by conservative Christians. So, they have incentive to fight to retain their identity as Christians and create a religion that better reflects their humanistic ethic of social justice. There is evidence that this is already taking place, as chapters 6 and 7 give examples of progressive Christian leaders who consider it their main mission to help conservative Christians experience a paradigm shift away from conservative theology to a more progressive theology. These same leaders vehemently self-differentiate themselves from the same conservative Christians they are teaching, viewing themselves as individuals that have progressed rather than remained stagnant in their worldview and theological understandings. However, their efforts show a desire to redirect these conservative Christians and redeem the Christian moniker rather than abandoning them to what they see as outdated beliefs. Given that progressive Christians tend to be better educated and wealthier than conservative Christians, if they decided to fight to produce a Christian identity in accordance with their social values, they have resources to put into that fight.3 For example, recent efforts of progressive members of the Episcopal church to reclaim property from more conservative members indicate a willingness of some progressive Christians to use legal means to police their denominational expressions (Montgomery 2002). It is possible that they also use similar legal and political methods, which would usually require a solid understanding of legal possibilities and wealth, to police their understanding of a Christian identity. Of course, this process does not happen in a vacuum but rather in a society that has been increasingly characterized as “post-Christian” (Isherwood and McPhillips 2008; Meacham 2009; Hunt 2012; Gray and McPhillips 2016; Dreher 2017; Yancey 2018). Research suggests that such a society can be driven by individuals hostile toward conservative Christians (Yancey and Williamson 2014). These hostile individuals tend to be wealthy, white, and educated, and it can be fairly argued that they have more per-capita social power than the average American. Some of the stereotypes promoted by those with this type of anti-Christian hostility are that Christians are intolerant, ignorant, and bigoted. These are similar arguments that progressive Christians use against conservative

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Christians. The presence of powerful individuals with such stereotypes against conservative Christians may motivate progressive Christians to be more zealous about creating a more pluralistic image of Christians that rejects imperialism, American nationalism, and Republican political ideology. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the theological passion and, at this historical point, sheer number of conservative Christians will allow them to hold onto a Christian identity despite any efforts of progressive Christians to project a more liberal, less particularistic, image for Christians. Conservative Christians will be unlikely to be moved by efforts of progressive Christians to adopt an alternative identity. This leaves progressive Christians with a choice of holding onto a Christian identity soiled by those they consider to be intolerant and uncompassionate or to seek a new religious identity. To retain a Christian identity could be painful to their own personally constructed social identity as “people of tolerance.” It is quite possible that many would choose to remain loyal to the idea of being Christian despite the linking of that identity to perceptions of intolerance and proselytizing. But the more likely outcome is that progressive Christians will become less willing to openly identify as Christian, as many of the progressive Christians we interviewed have already distanced themselves from the “Christian” label. While some progressive Christians may retain their Christian identity in any effort to change it from within and no matter how costly it is to their social identity, others may become spiritual but not religious, join other religions, or simply become nonreligious. There can be those who maintain fidelity to their basic Christian beliefs that complement their humanistic ethic of social justice, but find ways to identify themselves in ways that differentiate them from a conservative Christian identity. They may create a new term to describe their new religious position. If significant numbers of progressive Christians follow that path, then they may start the process of constructing a religion separate from what is today recognized as Christianity. If there were an exodus of progressive Christians from Christianity, would they create totally new religious structures, or would they merely be absorbed by alternate religious or humanist groups? We suspect both would occur. Some progressive Christians may find the violations of the values embedded within their humanistic ethic of social justice by other Christians to be so egregious that they would rather join some other

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religious or humanistic organization than to be known as a Christian. Religions like the Unitarian church or Baha’i faith may provide them with the spirituality they crave without the baggage of their previous religious identity. Others may attempt to establish new religious structures that keep certain elements of Christianity (i.e., reverence for Christ) but also distance themselves from traditional Christianity. The organizations may allude to their Christian roots but also assert that they are not beholden to that religious tradition. It would not be surprising if individuals like our interview respondents created a Christ-Follower religious movement that eventually evolves into an organization separate from recognized Christianity. Finally, attitudes of progressive Christians may contribute to their inability to grow at the rate of conservative Christians. For example, we put a link to a study (Haskell, Flatt, and Burgoyne 2016) concerning the lack of growth of mainline churches with progressive theology in a Facebook group of progressive Christians. One of the most common responses was an aversion to large churches. Such churches were seen as shallow, and individuals in those churches were seen as wanting shallow religion rather than the spiritual growth offered in progressive Christian communities. Several other individuals argued that it was easier to accept conservative dogma and that the value of progressive ideals was not going to be appreciated. Such explanations fit into the reasoning given by declining mainline churches noted by Flatt and colleagues (2017). Those reasons focus on the failure of those outside, rather than potential internal problems within, progressive churches. While we have nothing to say about the wisdom of these responses, it occurs to us that these responses are not likely to persuade progressive Christians to look for internal solutions to their problem of declining numbers. Such external attributions would make it less likely for progressive Christians to find solutions to the potential internal problems that inhibit their growth. Progressive Christians may fight to maintain Christian identity for some time but will ultimately be unable to maintain their congregations or parachurch organizations while doing so. Conservative Christians might not take the identity of “Christian” away from progressive Christians, but progressive Christians simply might disappear over time. Stetzer (2017) predicts that mainline denominations have only a few decades left. If he is correct, the time when progressive Christianity would become nearly extinct can be sooner than we realize. In due time there

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simply may not be enough progressive Christians to protest the image put forth by conservative Christians.

What about Christians in the Middle? We have used theological criteria to distinguish between conservative or progressive Christians. These theological differences have significant impacts on the vision and direction of progressive and conservative Christians. Yet there are many Christians who do not fit neatly into either category.4 Their Christianity may be based more on a generalized social identity and they have not done much thinking about the larger theological issues outlined in this book. Regardless, these are Christians in the middle between the progressive and conservative positions on the spectrum. Although we do not have sufficient data to fully explore this group, it is worth considering how they may react to any movement of progressive and conservative Christians to separate into distinct religious groups. Unfortunately, there is not a lot of scholarship done on moderate Christians, and it is difficult to find research focusing solely upon them. But it is plausible that Christians who have not strongly identified with either progressive or conservative versions of Christianity are likely to have a social identity of being a Christian that is not heavily tied to their theological, social, and political beliefs. In other words, Christians who tie their interpretation of their faith to a given theological, political, or social ideology may be more likely to further identify themselves as either progressive or conservative Christians. If the United States is moving toward a post-Christian society (Benne 2012; Corrigan 2020) with anti-Christian attitudes becoming more influential (Yancey and Williamson 2014; Yancey 2018), then it is quite possible that Christians not deeply tied to a theological, political, or social ideology will be unlikely to remain latched to the Christian label. In such a situation it is quite possible that moderate Christians significantly decline in population.

Approaches to Studying American Christianity Our argument that we should no longer consider progressive and conservative Christians to be in the same group has important implications for the study of American Christianity. While most scholars recognize

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the ideological diversity within American Christianity, as we noted at the outset of this book, there still is a tendency to lump Christians together in research. When there is a decision to divide Christians into subgroups, denominational tools generally are utilized to accomplish this task. We contend that subgroup division is better accomplished by taking into account the type of meaning distinctions we have considered in this book. We support efforts such as those by Lehman and Sherkat (2018) to decouple religious identity from denominational affiliation as they constructed a new religious categorization system. Rather than relying on Protestant denominational identity, their system divides Protestants into Liberal, Moderate, and Sectarian Protestants using factors such as a belief in biblical inerrancy to create such categories. Reliance on how Christians identify themselves should be more explanatory than historical denominational designations. We also suggest that differences between progressive and conservative Christians are treated as discrete variables whenever possible. Key theological differences between the two groups include belief about the Bible, the importance of proselytization, and whether Jesus is the only path to heaven.5 These are questions often set up as continuous variables.6 We suggest that it is a mistake to consider them continuous variables. Particularistic conservative Christians who envision the Bible as without error are not different in degree from other Christians, but in kind. Likewise, progressive Christians who are neither particularistic nor accepting of the Bible as without error also qualitatively distinguish themselves from other Christians. Future research should test whether treating those groups as distinct groups rather than deviations from a larger Christian group is more predictive. If that research confirms that it is more accurate to measure Christians as unique subgroups rather than variations within a larger group, then we will more accurately capture the social reality of US Christianity. Finally, as our analysis has shown, it is important for scholars to refrain from talking about Christians in terms of a monolithic group. Terms such as “Christian nation” or “Christian privilege” are rather hollow in light of the reality of a polarized Christianity. When discussing US Christianity, it is important to denote what type of Christianity is being discussed. As future research more clearly distinguishes progressive and conservative Christians into discrete categories, we will gain

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more understanding about the characteristics and ideologies of those in each group. That will enable researchers to talk more knowledgably about the divisions in US Christianity. Of course, this will not prevent politicians and activists from making sweeping generalizations about Christians and Christianity. Often such individuals have political and ideological reasons for promoting broad general stereotypes of all Christians. But when scholars publicly discuss US Christianity, we should be careful to discuss the topic with proper nuance and appreciation of the lack of a Christian monolithic culture. The way academics discuss the nature of US Christianity can eventually impact even those politicians and activists who create definitions of this religion that fit their own ideological desires.

Extensions The degree of division between progressive and conservative Christians is much larger than generally understood. It is beyond the scope of this book to conduct in-depth analysis of specific institutional progressiveconservative Christian conflicts (such as denominational splits) and to explore what those conflicts mean concerning the distinct ways these groups address questions of meaning. We hope that future research will locate case studies of such conflicts to further our understanding of this religious conflict. Such case studies will provide real-world examples of the out-grouping documented in this work. We have also noted that there is a dearth of research into Christians who are neither progressive nor conservative—the so-called moderate Christians. This deficiency creates an incomplete understanding of Christians in the United States. While most of the energy has been expended on examining either progressive or conservative Christian causes, there may be ways moderate Christians impact the larger Christian community that go unnoticed. It is quite possible that moderate Christians will decline in a post-Christian society. At this point, we have insufficient data to determine whether we are correct in making that argument. Future research can either confirm or refute this assertion. We also argue that it was difficult to indicate whether the source of progressive Christians’ adherence to social justice was tied to their particular biblical interpretation or if their reading of the Bible was informed

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by their loyalty to a humanistic ethic of social justice. The experiences of individual progressive Christians may be a key factor in their scriptural interpretation. However, the interviews conducted for this book were not designed to tease out the answers to that question. Future research may provide potential answers to the directionality of influences between biblical text and humanistic values of social justice. Research with questions calibrated to assess how progressive Christians come to their conclusions about social justice issues, and the role their Christian traditions play in driving them to those conclusions, will be quite valuable. Such questions can also determine if, and how, progressive Christians use the humanistic ethic of social justice to inform them about their interpretations of the Bible. There is also value in examining the tenets of the social justice that drive progressive Christians. Are there areas of social justice where progressive Christians deviate from their secular peers? Or does a progressive Christian’s ethic of social justice look identical to ideas of social justice derived from more secular origins? The disagreement of some progressive Christians on abortion might provide a useful starting point for this examination. It also can be useful to determine whether this disagreement on abortion is a systematic difference between progressive Christians and other political progressives. If the difference is real, then is it an aberration from a generally universal agreement by a few progressive Christians while accepting all other elements of the humanistic ethic or does it represent an ideological element that is unique to progressive Christians in comparison to other proponents of social justice? As we noted in chapter 2, there appear to be political contrasts between progressive white Christians and conservative black Christians of color with their religious counterparts. Although the basic conclusions about quantitative sources of separation survive in regression models, there still is value in looking at whether the divisions of progressive and conservative Christians look different when we peek inside specific minority ethnic groups. While we did not choose to focus on just white Christians, the influence of the dominant racial group in Christian discourse cannot be denied. Undoubtedly that influence has helped to shape much of the intramural debate among progressive and conservative Christians. Given our racial history it would be surprising if that debate did not differ for racial ethnic Christian communities. Future research should investigate this possibility.

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Finally, we look forward to research that documents the continuing potential of progressive and conservative Christians to define themselves as distinct from each other. While it is reasonable for scholars to conceptualize progressive and conservative Christians as different religious groups, more work remains to be done to better understand the actual identity split between the two groups. Is our speculation about progressive Christians creating a space for a new religious group correct, or will both groups keep fighting to determine what it means to be a Christian? We envision future scholarly work that examines these questions. Documenting the continued relationship between progressive and conservative Christians will be valuable for those of us interested in the changing dynamics of religion in the United States.

Methodological Appendix

The purpose of this appendix is to discuss in more detail some of the methodology used in this book. In particular we wanted to provide an explanation of the work we did in chapter 2 for those who want to understand how we arrived at our conclusion about the political effects on progressive Christians and the theological effects on conservative Christians. We also will touch on some of the methodological issues regarding the content analysis in chapter 3. In addition, to help with chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, this appendix also explains the determining criteria for how we established subjects’ theological and political leanings as well as how we determined whether interviewees had a homogeneous social circle or heterogeneous social circle with respect to their views on Islam. In addition, we clarify how we established subjects’ views of Christians who differed from themselves as well as how we determined views of Muslims.

Methodology for Chapter 2 We utilized the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES) to collect data for our quantitative research. As discussed in chapter 2, the ANES is a national probability survey that is conducted during every midterm and presidential election year. In presidential election years, the survey contains thermometer questions about the emotional warmth or coolness the respondent has toward selected social groups.1 These questions allowed us to explore whether individuals have positive or negative feelings toward a group and the strength of their positive or negative feelings. The ability to measure the degree of positive or negative affect made it possible to compare two or more groups’ attitudes toward those social groups. For our purposes, we used this survey to explore whether progressive and conservative Christians have differing levels of emotional warmth or coldness toward various other religious groups and political groups. 229

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We argued that an important theological distinction between progressive and conservative Christians is their attitude toward the Bible. The ANES contains a question that asks the respondent whether the Bible is the actual Word of God to be taken literally, word for word; whether it is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word; or whether it is a book written by men and is not the Word of God. We coded those who take the Bible literally as conservative Christians, and those who chose the other two categories make up the reference group.2 Applying the ANES question on biblical inerrancy to Protestant, Catholic, and “other” Christians captured an important theological division between conservative and nonconservative Christians, with the caveat that this study can explore only certain, but not all, theological distinctions among Christians.3 The results in chapter 2 may be due to social and demographic differences between progressive and conservative Christians. Therefore, we constructed logistic regression models for each of the ten Pro and Anti measures as the dependent measures. We only included Christians in the models that included a variety of independent variables. AGE is measured with a 13-point scale. Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, North Central, North East, and West are dummy variables.4 Education is measured with a 5-point scale, and Income is measured with a 28-point scale. Higher values indicate higher levels of educational attainment and socioeconomic status (SES). We labeled the political viewpoint variable Political Conservatism since higher values indicated more conservatism. We captured potential denominational effects with three dummy variables. One assesses whether a respondent is a Catholic, another whether the respondent is in a black Protestant denomination, and another whether the respondent is in a conservative Protestant denomination. This made mainline and liberal Protestant denominations the reference group. Attendance indicates religious service attendance on a 6-point scale, with higher values indicating more attendance. To assess possible effects of Christian theology, we used Progressive Christian, which is a dummy variable where Christians who do not accept the Bible as the Word of God are coded as 1. Those who accept the Bible as the Word of God are coded as 0. Table A.1 contains models with the religious-group dependent variables and models with the political-group variables.5

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Table A.1. Betas and Odds Ratios of Progressive Christians on Whether a Respondent Has Affinity or Antipathy toward Religious Groups. AntiProFundamentalist Fundamentalist Progressive Christian

AntiAtheist

ProAtheist

AntiMuslim

ProMuslim

.898*** (2.455)

–1.091*** (.336)

–.530*** (.589)

.458 (1.581)

–.450*** (.637)

.754 (2.125)

N

2,537

2,537

2,570

2,570

2,570

2,570

Nagelkerke R2

.265

.255

.138

.177

.123

.088

–2 Log Likelihood

2070.800

1346.129

3261.481

169.454

2790.448

315.674

***—p < .001; Betas are entries, odds ratios in parentheses. Independent variables include Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, Age, Education, Political Conservatism, Income, Black Protestant, Conservative Protestant, Catholic, North Central, North East, West, and Religious Attendance.

For simplicity’s sake, we did not include the independent variables that do not directly bear on the research question.6 After applications of controls, a progressive Christian has almost two and a half times the chance of having cool feelings toward fundamentalist Christians when compared to the rest of the sample (Exp(B) = 2.455). But they are about a third as likely to have affinity toward fundamentalist Christians as the general population of Christians (Exp(B) = .336). They are also about a little less than three-fifths as likely as conservative Christians (Exp(B) = .589) to reject atheists and a little more than three-fifths as likely (Exp(B) = .637) to reject Muslims. The Exp(B) in these models suggests that, while significant, the relative lack of rejection of these non-Christian groups is not as powerfully explained by Christian theological differences in comparison to the ability of those theological beliefs to explain attitudes toward Christian fundamentalists. We did not find significant effects as it concerns support for atheists and Muslims. Support for Christian fundamentalists as well as rejection of atheists and Muslims are attitudes one would expect from conservative Christians. Thus, three of the four findings reflect what is expected from conservative Christians in comparison to progressives. Table A.2 explores the power of Christian theology to predict acceptance or rejection of political groups. After applications of controls, a progressive Christian is almost twice as likely to reject political

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Table A.2. Betas and Odds Ratios of Whether a Respondent Has Affinity or Antipathy toward Political Groups. AntiConservative

ProConservative

AntiProgressive

ProProgressive

.690*** (1.993)

–.166 (.847)

.030 (1.031)

.839** (2.314)

N

2,584

2,584

2,574

2,574

Nagelkerke R2

.332

.361

.433

.302

1676.026

1477.429

2253.361

764.372

Progressive Christian

–2 Log Likelihood

**—p < .01, ***—p < .001; Betas are entries, odds ratios in parentheses. Independent variables include Female, Black, Hispanic, Other Race, Age, Education, Political Conservatism, Income, Black Protestant, Conservative Protestant, Catholic, North Central, North East, West, and Religious Attendance.

conservatives (Exp(B) = 1.993) and more than twice as likely to accept political progressives (Exp(B) = 2.314) when compared to conservative Christians. There are no significant effects for Pro–Political Conservative or Anti–Political Progressive.7 These findings reflect what is expected from progressive Christians.8 In other words, we expect progressive Christians to have progressive political values and thus to reject political conservatives and to accept political progressives. The expectations that conservative Christians accept political conservatives and reject political progressives, however, are not borne out by any significant amount. Results indicated that whether a Christian is conservative or progressive affects their opinion of all religious groups, except as it concerns support of atheists or Muslims. These are the predictions that one would expect if conservative Christians’ theology is impacting their preference for religious exclusivity. As it concerns the two political groups, whether a Christian is conservative or progressive impacts their willingness to reject political conservatives and to accept political progressives. Given the linkages that previous work has shown between the relationship of Christian theological orientations and political ideology, theological attitudes shape religious feelings in ways we would expect for Christian conservatives (i.e., acceptance of Christian fundamentalists, rejection of atheists and Muslims) and political feelings in ways we would expect for Christian

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progressives (i.e., rejection of political conservatives, acceptance of political progressives). Controlling for social and demographic factors indicates that theological differences among Christians impact conservative Christians’ religious opinions and progressive Christians’ political opinions. Based on those results, we argue that political considerations significantly impact the construction of social in-groups and out-groups for theological progressives, and theological considerations significantly impact the construction of social in-groups and out-groups for theological conservatives. The only result that goes against this trend is the finding that theological progressiveness is significantly correlated with rejection of Christian fundamentalists. Progressive Christians reject both political and religious conservatives, but they do not reject nonChristians. This “exception” is in keeping with the conclusions we discussed in chapter 2 regarding the importance of theological concerns for conservative Christians and the importance of political concerns (except when rejecting conservative Christians) for progressive Christians.

Methodology for Online Articles and Blog Research In chapter 3, we discussed our content analysis of online articles and blogs. At this point we want to expand a bit on the methodology connected to that research. We sought out blogs or online statements from progressive Christians who oppose abortion and conservative Christians who support comprehensive immigration reform. We found nine examples of progressive Christians describing themselves as pro-life and twelve examples of conservative Christians supporting immigration reform. A listing of the blogs and authors is in box 3.1. We took care to make sure that the progressive authors were Christians who had, in the blog the sample came from or somewhere else, identified as either a theological or political progressive. Of course, we could not use our criteria for acceptance of the Bible as literal, since it would be difficult to verify that belief for all of the authors. But if the authors are presenting themselves as promoting a progressive version of Christianity, then they are likely to present themselves in ways that allow them to connect with Christians who do not believe in biblical literalism. We also made certain that the authors perceived themselves as Christian. Many of them

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describe themselves as Christian on the homepage of the blog. Others make their social identity as a Christian clear in their articles and blogs. Other bloggers and online authors were well known as being progressive Christians (i.e., Kirsten Powers), so that fact was easily verified in other sources. Indeed, many of them positioned themselves as proponents of an alternative Christian expression to conservative Christianity. It was a little harder to confirm conservative writers’ identities on the progressive-conservative spectrum, as many simply identify themselves as Christian. There is an assumption among some conservative Christians that to merely identify oneself as Christian is to automatically subscribe to the beliefs tied to conservative Christianity. Some authors did openly define themselves as conservative Christians either on their blog or in some other written article or blog. The remaining writers’ works were found either at the Patheos Evangelical blogging website or the Christ and Culture website. Since both websites promote themselves as being loyal to conservative Christianity, we assumed that authors at these websites are either theologically conservative Christians or must write to attract and sustain a conservative Christian audience. Thus, even if we could not absolutely verify that these individuals recognized themselves as conservative Christians, we are confident that they are attempting to reach a conservative Christian audience and must adhere to the norms accepted by that audience. There are only twenty-one entries in this sample of data. The disadvantage of so few entries is that it is harder to document strong systematic patterns. However, these blogs and articles are well-thought-out arguments for their particular topics. Furthermore, the authors realized that they had to convince individuals who did not politically agree with them on the topics of abortion or immigration. With few exceptions, the writings were generally nuanced and informative in their expression of the authors’ concerns. This allowed us to gather a good amount of details and information from each article or blog. Short of being able to interact with the respondents in an in-depth interview, it is hard to conceive how we could have gained more detailed information from them on a particular topic. It was a clear case of quality over quantity as it concerns qualitative data. To code the material, the blogs were read with a search for key themes and a focus on how the author legitimates his or her stance on the issue.

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Special attention is paid to how far the author is willing to deviate from the political norms of liberals, for progressive Christian authors, or of conservatives, for conservative Christian authors. This focus exposes how the author attempts to negotiate the tension of writing to religious peers who disagree with the political assertions in the articles. Ideas and techniques used multiple times are particularly noteworthy, as they can indicate which mechanisms Christians on either side of the political spectrum perceive as socially acceptable ways to deal with political disagreements. With so few sources in our sample, multiple instances of a certain idea or concept take on more importance.

Establishing Subjects’ Theological Leanings As noted in chapter 4, the determination of whether an interviewee quoted in chapters 5–7 was progressive, conservative, or centrist was based in part on his or her views of the Bible and in part on his or her views of Islam. To determine each interviewee’s theological leaning, we asked each interviewee the following series of questions: (1) How do you view the Bible? What do you think of the idea of looking at the Bible literally?; (2) Do you think Muhammad was a prophet? What do you think about him?; and (3) Have you ever read the Qur’an? What do you think about it? The first set of questions (about the Bible) helped to determine the extent to which interviewees were aligned with the traditional, conservative Evangelical perspective on the Bible. If an individual described the Bible using terms like “inerrant,” “Word of God,” “God-inspired,” “Godbreathed,” or “authoritative,” we categorized him or her as theologically conservative. By contrast, when an individual avoided traditional descriptors of the Bible or emphasized humanity’s role in the construction of the Bible over God’s sovereign inspiration, we categorized him or her as more theologically progressive. Asking Christians how they view the Bible is an important starting point for understanding their theological leanings, but the weakness of relying on this question alone is that the answer is often conditioned in Evangelical communities. A standard response to the question “How do you view the Bible?” is to say that the Bible is the Word of God, that it is God-breathed, and so on. Thus, and in keeping with the discussion in

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chapter 2 on particularism, we needed questions that would give a more holistic perspective of interviewees’ theological views. For this reason, we also asked interviewees about their views of Muhammad and the Qur’an. These questions offered a glimpse into the interviewee’s perception of Christian particularism—that is, the traditional view among Christians that Christianity is exclusive truth and that alternative belief systems (including Islam) are false. If an interviewee expressed views consistent with Christian particularism and spoke about Muhammad and the Qur’an in a critical or dismissive manner, we categorized that individual as leaning theologically conservative. Likewise, if interviewees spoke positively about Muhammad and the Qur’an, or if they refrained from expressing disapproval about ideas in Islam that contradict Christian doctrines, we categorized those individuals as being on the progressive end of the theological spectrum. Relevantly, according to the 2008 Henry Institute National Survey of Religion and Public Life, belief in Jesus Christ as the only path to salvation and belief that the Bible is literally true were significantly correlated (r = .355). Interviewees were categorized by assessing their responses to the three themes of questions (regarding the Bible, Muhammad, and the Qur’an). If an interviewee leaned conservative in responses on two or more of the three themes, then he or she was ultimately categorized as theologically conservative. By the same token, if the interviewee leaned progressive on two or more of the three themes, he or she was assessed as progressive. The pseudonym and demographics of each respondent can be seen in tables A.3 and A.4.

Table A.3. Demographic Information for Progressive-Leaning Sample. Name

Sex

Education

Age

Adrianna

Female

Bachelor

35 to 60

Andria

Female

Graduate

35 to 60

Bridget

Female

Graduate

35 to 50

Cindy

Female

Graduate

35 to 60

Claira

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Emily

Female

Graduate

Under 35

Jane

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Methodological Appendix

Education

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237

Name

Sex

Jenny

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Age

Julia

Female

Graduate

35 to 60

Katrina

Female

Graduate

Under 35

Lucy

Female

Graduate

35 to 60

Martha

Female

Graduate

Under 35

Meagan

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Miranda

Female

Graduate

Under 35

Nadia

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Rosie

Female

Bachelor

Over 60

Sara

Female

Graduate

35 to 60

Sheila

Female

Graduate

35 to 60

Shelby

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Virginia

Female

Some college

Over 60

Anthony

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Charles

Male

Bachelor

Under 35

Christopher

Male

Bachelor

Under 35

Daniel

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Donald

Male

Bachelor

Under 35

Dylan

Male

Graduate

Under 35

Eli

Male

Graduate

Under 35

Jacob

Male

Bachelor

Over 60

James

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Jim

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Justin

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Kenneth

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Martin

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Matt

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Michael

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Nick

Male

Graduate

Under 35

Richard

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Sam

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Terry

Male

Bachelor

Over 60

Tom

Male

Bachelor

35 to 60

Walterv

Male

Graduate

Under 35

William

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

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Table A.4. Demographic Information for Conservative-Leaning Sample. Name

Sex

Education

Ashleigh

Female

Some college

35 to 60

Age

Candace

Female

Bachelor

35 to 60

Hedaya

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Kayleigh

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Kristy

Female

Graduate

Under 35

Mabel

Female

Graduate

35 to 60

Maria

Female

Some college

Over 60

Marianne

Female

Some college

35 to 60

Rita

Female

Bachelor

Over 60

Samantha

Female

Bachelor

35 to 60

Shantyl

Female

Graduate

Over 60

Sophie

Female

Some college

Over 60

Tina

Female

Bachelor

Under 35

Ahmed

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Ben

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Billy

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Bob

Male

Bachelor

35 to 60

Douglas

Male

Some college

Under 35

George

Male

Bachelor

Under 35

Grant

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Hayden

Male

Graduate

Under 35

Henry

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Hermann

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Joe

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

John

Male

Bachelor

Over 60

Lazarus

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Liam

Male

Bachelor

Under 35

Luke

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Marcus

Male

Graduate

Over 60

Nadeem

Male

Bachelor

Over 60

Paul

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Peter

Male

Bachelor

Under 35

Samuel

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Sandy

Male

Some college

35 to 60

Tim

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

Umar

Male

Graduate

35 to 60

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Homogeneous or Heterogeneous Social Circle It is useful to determine what kind of social circle interviewees have because this can give insight into whom they find acceptable. To determine whether interviewees had a homogeneous social circle or heterogeneous social circle with respect to their views on Islam, we asked each individual “Do the Evangelicals you are close to—that is, the Evangelicals that you share life with—share most of your sentiments about Islam?” This question was helpful in exploring how unified interviewees perceived their social circles to be on the topic of Islam. The question also gave insight into how differences of opinion on this topic affect how close individuals perceive themselves to be to each other.

Establishing Subjects’ Views of Christians Who Differed from Themselves To obtain interviewees’ views of Christians who differed from them, we used their responses to a series of questions about issues that are contentious within Evangelicalism. Specifically, we asked the following: (1) Are you comfortable with being called an Evangelical?; (2) Do you feel Evangelicals are unified on the topic of Islam?; (3) If no, what are some of the main areas of disagreement?; (4) How do you think Christians should interact with or minister to Muslims? Have your views on this changed over time? If so, when did you see major shifts?; (5) Have you heard of Chrislam? If so, what do you think about it?; (6) How do you approach interfaith dialogue?; (7) In general, do you think Christians are more or less violent than Muslims?; (8) What do you think about the idea of hell?; (9) Do you think Islam is equally as logical as Christianity?; and (10) Do you have any personal experiences with ministry and Islam? These questions did not ever directly ask interviewees to articulate how they viewed fellow Christians who differed from themselves, but the queries did invite interviewees to both share their own perspectives on the issues under discussion as well as compare their perspectives to the views of other Christians they knew. Thus, the questions provided a unique opportunity to capture interviewees’ candid, unscripted views of their fellow Christians. Interviews were lengthy (usually over one hour

240

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Table A.5. Views of Differing Christians. Conservative

Progressive

4

3

7

Moderate

30

13

43

Negative

2

26

28

36

42

78

Positive

Grand Total

Total

and sometimes up to two hours) and incorporated open-ended questions, increasing the opportunities for participants to share their opinions at length. If interviewees made multiple negative comments about other Christians whose perspectives differed from their own, and if the interviewee refrained from making positive comments to balance their negative comments, we categorized those interviewees as having “negative” views of Christians whose opinions differed from their own. Interviewees were placed into the “moderate” category if they made neither negative nor positive comments about those with differing Christian perspectives, or if they made both positive and negative comments. Interviewees were placed into the “positive” category if they shared only positive comments about Christians with differing perspectives and omitted any negative remarks.

Establishing Subjects’ Views of Muslims To determine interviewees’ views of Muslims, we relied on the following set of questions, some of which are the same as the questions used to determine interviewees’ views of differing Christians (because some answers gave insight into both questions): (1) Could you describe your own beliefs about Islam?; (2) Do you have Muslim friends?; (3) Do Christians and Muslims worship the same God?; (4) How do you think Christians should interact with or minister to Muslims? Have your views on this changed over time? If so, when did you see major shifts?; (5) Have you heard of Chrislam? If so, what do you think about of it?; (6) How do you approach interfaith dialogue?; (7) In general, do you think Christians are more or less violent than Muslims?; (8) How do

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you feel about Muslims in the United States?; (9) Do you think Islam is equally as logical as Christianity?; (10) Do you have any personal experiences with ministry and Islam?; (11) Do you think Muhammad was a prophet? What do you think about him?; (12) Have you ever read the Qur’an?; (13) What do you think about it?; and (14) Do you fear Islam? Even when answering questions about unrelated topics, interviewees often brought up Muslims in their answers. Interviewees were placed into the “negative” category if they made multiple negative comments about Muslims, especially in the absence of positive comments to balance their negative comments. Interviewees were placed into the “complicated” category if they made neither negative nor positive comments about Muslims, or if they made comments that demonstrated they have both positive and negative perspectives of Muslims. Interviewees were placed into the “positive” category if they avoided any negative judgments about Muslims and instead shared only positive comments about them. Most interviewees fell into the “complicated” category on the grounds that they shared concerns about Muslims but also had positive things to say about Muslims. In some cases, we classified interviewees as “positive” in spite of the fact that they made one or two negative comments about terrorist groups such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda. We did not judge negative comments about terrorist groups to be a negative critique of Muslims in general, especially if the comments critical of terrorists were shared in a way that minimized the influence of terrorists within the Muslim fold, or if these comments were shared in a way that suggested the radicals and fundamentalists within Islam are a consequence of Western interference, or if these comments arose in the context of interviewees discussing what they find heterodox within conservative Christianity.

Table A.6. Views of Muslims. Conservative Positive Complicated Negative Grand Total

Progressive

Total

5

32

37

30

10

40

42

78

1 36

1

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Establishing Subjects’ Political Views To establish the political views of interviewees, we relied on their answers to the following questions: (1) How would you describe your political views?; (2) Do you vote for a particular political party?; (3) Do you feel there is a connection with the War on Terror and Islam? If so, in what ways are they connected?; (4) Should the US government be involved or intervene in dealing with citizens who insult or question Islam?; (5) How do you feel about Muslims in the United States?; and (6) In general, do you feel Christians are more or less violent than Muslims? Interviews were conducted between 2015 and 2019. Most interviews were conducted before Donald Trump was elected president. However, in the interviews that were conducted after the election of Trump, we asked some or all of the following additional political questions: (1) Broadly, what are some of the policies or characteristics of the political right or political left that you appreciate or prefer?; (2) What are the most important political or social issues to you?; (3) How do you feel about Donald Trump as president?; and (4) How do you feel Trump has handled issues concerning Muslims? Interviewees were categorized as either “right-leaning” or “leftleaning” in regard to their political views. Sometimes interviewees made their political stance clear, but if they did not overtly share their political preferences in regard to party politics, we categorized them based upon their opinions on the issues they were most opinionated and passionate about. If their political passions were aligned with causes currently championed by the political right (for example, if they viewed the United States as a nation founded on Judeo-Christian values, if they talked about traditional marriage as superior to samesex marriage, or if they believed a broadly capitalistic system to be the most compassionate), we placed them in the “right-leaning” category. If interviewees’ political passions aligned with causes currently championed by the political left (for example, if they hoped for easier immigration procedures for Muslims to come to the United States, if they supported LGBTQ affirmation, or if they affirmed a broadly socialistic system to be most compassionate), we categorized them as “leftleaning.” Table A.5 contains a brief description of the left-leaning and right-leaning respondents.

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243

Table A.7. Political Views by Gender. Female

Male

Total

Left-Leaning

16

14

30

Right-Leaning

17

31

48

Grand Total

33

45

78

Reflexivity An earlier era of social science research stressed the importance of the researcher’s dispassionate objectivity regarding his or her subjects. However, newer generations of social scientists have recognized that researchers cannot be totally objective and cannot remain wholly “outside” their research. This generation still recognizes the importance of a certain critical distance: researchers must not be too attached to their subjects and must be willing and able to offer critical perspectives on those subjects. However, instead of trying to maintain the appearance of total neutrality, researchers are now encouraged to exercise reflexivity—to forthrightly acknowledge how their own identities affect their research. The field now acknowledges that researchers “work together [with participants] to produce the data and how they perceive each other impacts the data that is gathered” (Ganiel 2016, 166). Thus, the practice among social scientists today is to explicitly identify the ways in which their personal backgrounds and experiences affect the process of producing information, including both the collection and analysis of data. One important aspect of reflexivity is to identify the ways in which the researcher is both an insider and outsider in the communities he or she is studying. I (Ashlee) identify as an Evangelical Christian, and thus I am an insider when studying Evangelicals.9 I share many of the beliefs of the individuals whose views I am studying, and I understand their vocabulary because it is my own vocabulary. More specifically, I am an insider among both progressive Evangelicals and conservative Evangelicals. I grew up in relatively conservative Evangelical circles, attending a variety of Baptist, Methodist, Church of Christ, Church of God, Catholic, or nondenominational churches. But in the last two decades I have

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moved in more progressive circles as a result of my educational journey in five different universities. Because of this personal background, I understand the logic and the worldviews of both of these ends of the Christian spectrum. However, I am an outsider to the specific congregations I observed for this study in the sense that I had never been involved in either community as a congregant. My involvement with these congregations was as a researcher, and in that sense, there was distance between me and the communities I was studying. The risk of my Evangelical insider status is that I might be tempted to take too much at face value, not probing deeply, in my analysis of Evangelical thought and behavior. I could also lapse into advocacy and defense of my subjects. My challenge as a researcher was to take advantage of the knowledge and understanding I have as an insider and use that to good effect in my research while also maintaining professional distance. Conducting formal congregational observations was an important part of cultivating that professional distance. During my observations, I was keenly aware of my role as a researcher, which gave me a different perspective on what I witnessed. I consciously reflected on aspects of congregational life that I might normally have taken for granted—aspects such as how gender roles operate in various congregations, how the Bible is used, the types of authors that are referenced from the pulpit and in conversations among congregants, and how mainstream media is referenced. In these ways, I worked to maintain balance between my statuses as both insider and outsider.

Notes

Introduction

1 In this book we use the descriptor “traditional” to describe views broadly aligning with those of Jonathan Edwards, the highly influential eighteenth-century American revivalist preacher who lived and worked during US Christianity’s earliest years. Edwards was a Puritan preacher perhaps most noted today for his “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” sermon. Many of his views on the Bible and theology, while not necessarily attributed to him, have become dominant among more traditional-leaning Christians. In this study, Edwards’s views serve as the benchmark of the traditional (conservative) perspective on theological issues, as well as on views of Islam. Concepts are judged “traditional” if they are roughly in accord with Edwards’s views. Regarding theology, Edwards was much in agreement with Reformation principles. He, in direct opposition to many humanistic principles, deeply believed people to be fallen, sinful, and in need of a savior. Edwards believed that reason could prove the existence of God and the credibility of scriptures. He spent much time articulating correct doctrines and believed doctrinal ideas needed to be clear and distinct. Regarding Islam, Edwards proclaimed that Islam had been set up by the Devil to combat the kingdom of Christ (McDermott 2000). Although Muslims believed that Muhammad was “as the head next under God,” Edwards maintained that Muhammad was actually a charlatan—“a crafty man” who took advantage of his ignorant followers (Edwards 1793, 436–439). He also criticized Islam for its “intellectual regression,” for its “suppression of free thought,” and for the religion’s lack of verifiable miracles (McDermott 2000, 167–175). 2 For example, research about multiracial churches (Emerson 2010) indicates that such churches are more likely to occur with groups that are smaller sects and cults. Those religious institutions often do not have the luxury of developing specialized congregations made up of members of one racial group. Instead, they must create an environment to incorporate those of all races, so that they can remain large enough to survive. 3 In the study of religion, “particularism” refers to the idea that one’s religion has exclusive authority. Salvation is often seen as being offered only to members of that particular religious tradition. 4 She gave us permission to share her story.

245

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| Notes

1. The History of the Modernist- Fundamentalist Conflict

1 In some ways Henry’s arguments that Christianity was to take over all parts of our society were not that different from Gladden’s concerns about limiting the religion to certain spheres in the United States. But for Henry the purpose of moving into different institutions was to pave the way for a unique Christian influence whereas Gladden fashioned Christian involvement more as a way to make the secular institutions more humane. 2 Ironically it is possible that this type of political alliance might have led to lower levels of anti-Catholicism among Protestant Christians relative to political progressives (Jenkins 2003). 3 The acceptance of Muslims as potential allies into this new traditional coalition was likely true in the 1980s and 1990s. However, today, with the event of 9/11 so fresh in American minds, it is unclear how much Muslims remain a significant part of that coalition. Recent work has indicated that traditional Muslims show a preference for the Democratic Party (Ayers 2007; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009), the party of the cultural progressives. 4 Alisa Childers, “Progressive Christianity Is Dangerous,” May 25, 2020, Capturing Christianity YouTube channel, www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQ6doQsSQLU&t =1020s&fbclid=IwAR0CEG7ogliXLPIp-pWDddJoHtvcLFJnFwRyM6piu7juRpB pZhlvThf-N88. 5 However, evidence of the characteristics of authoritarianism has been found among nonconservatives (Ray 1983, 1984; Yancey 2013), casting doubt on this assertion that authoritarianism is largely limited to conservative groups.

2. Politics and the American Christian

1 We wanted a methodology that allows us to get a sense of how respondents perceived selected groups in relation to other groups. To do this we averaged the thermometer scores of all twenty-seven social groups in the 2012 ANES survey and compared the thermometer score for Christian fundamentalists, atheists, Muslims, political conservatives, and political progressives to the mean. If the respondent indicated a thermometer score for any of the groups that was a standard deviation above or below the mean, then we noted them as being significantly inclined to having affection or disaffection toward that group. For example, if a respondent ranked Christian fundamentalists a standard deviation below the mean of all thermometer scores, then they were designated as Anti-Fundamentalist and operationalized as having antipathy toward Christian fundamentalists. If the respondent indicated a thermometer score for Christian Fundamentalist a standard deviation above the mean of all thermometer scores, then they were designated as Pro-Fundamentalist and operationalized as having affinity toward Christian fundamentalists. We explored the possibility of using the 2016 ANES survey. However, that survey contained Muslims and Jews as religious out-groups only. It is questionable

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247

whether Jews serve as a useful out-group since some conservative Christians envision Jews as part of their general religious tradition (Kalmar 2009; Sonderegger 2010) and progressive Christians may find common political priorities with politically progressive Jews. Furthermore, we wanted to include atheists since they are the religiously affiliated group, even though they reject traditional religion, that is most likely to be rejected (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Yancey and Williamson 2014; J. McCarthy 2015). 2 The value of using those measures is that they control for the tendency of some individuals to rank all groups relatively high or relatively low. Since we are interested in the respondent’s affinity or antipathy toward these five groups, this is a superior technique to merely noting the respondents’ objective thermometer score. No matter the actual respondents’ score, it is reasonable that those who score any of these five groups a standard deviation above the mean of the other social groups are more likely to perceive them with more relative affinity. The reverse is true for those who score any of these five groups a standard deviation below the mean of the other social groups. It is fair to argue that those who find themselves in one of the Pro groups are relatively likely to envision members of that group as part of their in-group. At the very least they would be more likely than average to see that group as part of their in-group than the other groups in the list of twenty-seven groups since their favorability toward that group is significantly higher than their average favorability toward groups. Likewise, those who find themselves in one of the Anti groups should be relatively likely to envision members of that group as part of their out-group. 3 Ideally, we would also like to test the affinity and antipathy of conservative Christians toward progressive Christians. However, it is difficult to think of a group term that represents individuals with a progressive Christian theology to the degree that Christian fundamentalist represents a strict conservative theology. Consequently, the ANES does not ask about a group that serves as a useful proxy of progressive Christians. 4 Catholicism is also characterized by what can be called conservative and progressive ideology (Starks 2009). Past arguments centered on issues of birth control and women’s ordination (Manning 1997; Weaver 1999), but present disagreement generally reflects current culture-war issues (Starks 2009). Much of the theological conflict is about how much Catholics should conform to the teachings of the larger Roman Catholic Church. Conservative, or traditional, Catholics do not want to question the Church’s authority while progressive Catholics desire to engage in the questions emerging in a modern society (Manning 1997; Starks 2009). The conservative versus progressive debate for Catholics is often one of either accepting traditional authority or incorporating modern interpretations. There is a conceptual difference between authority to the church and authority to the Bible. This is indicated by the fact that, among Christians, non-Catholics are more likely to see the Bible as the literal Word of God than Catholic Christians (47.5 percent v. 22.4 percent; p < .001). Catholics who place a great deal of

248

5

6

7 8

9

| Notes

authority in the Church should be more likely to place a great deal of authority on the Bible. As such, Layman and Green (2006) legitimate the use of a Bible as a Word of God measure across religious traditions due to the strong correlation between it and their Catholic traditionalism index. Since the ANES lacks a question about church authority, the best substitute is using the question on biblical authority to operationalize progressive Catholic Christians. The third wave of the Baylor Religion Survey (2011) possesses measures of belief in the Bible as the Word of God, having doubts about God, whether God is concerned with the well-being of the world, and whether hell exists. The Cronbach’s alpha of these four variables when looking only at Protestants is .738, indicating that these variables are powerfully correlated to each other. This definition also matches up well with what we would expect with denominational measures. In the 2018 General Social Survey we find that belief in the Bible as the Word of God is significantly positively correlated with those in Black Protestant (r =. 068: p < .05) and Catholic (r = .198: p < .01) denominations but significantly negatively correlated with those in mainline Protestant denominations (r = -.188: p < .01). Interestingly, that measure was not significant in the measure of those in Evangelical Protestant denominations (r = .045: ns). However, given the declining saliency of denominational measures (Wuthnow 1989), theological measures are better means for operationalizing differences between progressive and conservative Christians. The distance between the average scores of conservative and progressive Christians on atheists is 10.957 while for Muslims this difference is only 4.004. Part of this effect can be due to the fact that conservative Christians of color are more politically progressive (3.901 v. 5.241: p < .001 on a 7-point scale where lower numbers indicates more political progressiveness) than white Christians of color. Thus, it is easier for them to find agreement with political progressives and they do not have to “reject” them. There are those who envision the Christian and the Muslim God as the same (Neusner, Chilton, and Graham 2002; Volf 2011), however; generally speaking, most who analyze these groups argue that they are distinct (Levenson 2004; Catherwood 2007; Griswold 2010).

3. I Am Pro- life but . . .

1 Hilary Yancey is not related to the lead author of this book.

4. In or Out?

1 The 2015 “Draw Muhammad” contest in Garland, Texas, was an event where contestants submitted and were judged on their drawn images of Muhammad (an act considered by some Muslims to be wrong and worthy of vengeance). The event was largely organized by Pamela Gellar, president of the American Freedom Defense Initiative, which seeks to curtail the Islamization of America as well as Marxist and socialist impulses. During the event, a shootout occurred between

Notes

2 3

4 5

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onsite security and two incoming shooters who were Muslim and offended by the event’s disrespect toward their prophet. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. Data from the 2018 General Social Survey sample show that 54.33 percent of all Baptists (of all kinds) accept the Bible as the Word of God. In 1995 the Southern Baptist Convention issued an official in-depth apology for the denomination’s compliance with racism and slaveholding, and in 2017 its flagship institution, the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, issued a detailed “Report on Slavery and Racism in the History of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.” Also, in 2012 the SBC elected its first black president, Fred Luter Jr. However, controversy within this denomination on racial issues continues as seen in the debate over a recent proposition endorsing critical race theory (Allen 2019). Limited to what Gushee asserts are conventional-marital LGBT relationships (2017, 103–4). For a discussion about “traditional” perspectives, see note 1 of this book’s introduction.

5. Conservative Christians as Theologically Rigid and Socially Diverse

1 Townend’s hymnody has been compared to that of Charles Wesley, the prolific eighteenth-century conservative Christian hymn writer who led the Methodist movement within Christianity. 2 See www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/keith-getty-on-what-makes-in-christalone-beloved-and-contested/. 3 Historical theology as an academic discipline has been traced back to either the eighth century with the work of Venerable Bede, particularly his Ecclesiastical History of the English People, or to the sixteenth-century reformation period, when Catholic and Protestant believers fervently debated Christian authenticity. The continuity of the truth claims these groups proclaimed with the actual early church was viewed as of great importance.

7. Boundaries of Progressive Christians’ Social Identities

1 Haidt (2012) found that political progressives do not understand the perspectives of political conservatives as well as political conservatives understand the perspectives of political progressives. Our findings about the social networks of progressive Christians suggest a possible reason for this difference. If political progressives avoid relations with political conservatives in the same manner that progressive Christians avoid interaction with conservative Christians, then it would not be a surprise to find them to lack understanding about the perspectives of political conservatives. 2 Ironically, however, progressive Christians were willing to draw clear and decisive boundaries between themselves and conservative Christians, trying to make sure they were not associated with the stereotype of conservative Christians as unlearned and inflexible. 3 See www.cia.gov and www.britannica.com.

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8. Do Red and Blue Christians Belong Together?

1 Although particularism and belief in biblical inerrancy are distinct concepts, they are not mutually exclusive. According to the 2005 Henry Institute National Survey of Religion and Public Life, belief in Jesus Christ as the only path to salvation and the Bible being word for word literally true were significantly correlated (r = .355). 2 The four spiritual laws is a proselytization tool used by some conservative Christians. They are to be used to help a Christian to more easily guide a non-Christian toward accepting the Christian faith. Those laws are as follows: Law 1: God loves you and offers a wonderful plan for your life; Law 2: Man is sinful and separated from God; Law 3: Through Him you can know and experience God’s love and plan for your life; and Law 4: We must individually receive Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord; then we can know and experience God’s love and plan for our lives. 3 While progressives were more likely to give limiters and critiques of the “Christian” label, they still, for the most part, identify with that label. In a working paper, one of us found that Christians who did not believe the Bible is inerrant or that Christ was the only way to salvation were willing to identify as Christians on a closed-ended question. But when individuals with similar beliefs were interviewed in this research project, they often placed qualifiers on their identity as Christians (see chapter 7). 4 While there are few, if any, public examples of progressive Christians who are Jesus mythers, we have had conversations, online and otherwise, with Christians who questioned the existence of Christ. They generally claim that their Christianity is not based on whether Christ actually existed but rather on the principles and values attached to Christ as a mythical figure in history. 5 Karma is defined as the idea that a person’s actions in this life and previous lives will decide what happens to them in future lives. Dharma is defined as the nature of reality. In Hinduism, it is seen in a cosmic law that determines our behavior and sets up our social order. In Buddhism, it is tied to the truth taught by the Buddha. Reincarnation is defined as being reborn into existence. 6 But this should not be taken to indicate that there has been no violence between Hindus and Buddhists. It is clear that violence between these two groups can and does occur. A notable example of this is the conflict between the Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka (Hollup 1992; Schissler, Walton, and Thi 2017). 7 In a paper by the lead author (Yancey 2020), progressive and conservative Christians were asked whether their political concerns impacted their religious beliefs. Progressive Christians were only slightly more likely to state that their political beliefs are more likely to impact their religious beliefs than conservative Christians (14.5 percent vs. 11.1 percent). While the sample is not representative, it is unwise to assume that progressive Christians are more likely to prioritize their political ideals above their religious beliefs until there is some empirical evidence to back up this assertion.

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8 However, as we noted in chapter 5, conservative Christians are more willing to include progressive Christians in their social network than vice versa. We do not have an equal propensity between progressive and conservative Christians to engage in out-grouping, as progressive Christians are more likely to exclude other Christians than conservative Christians. It is possible that conservative Christians assume more commonality between the two groups than progressive Christians.

Conclusion

1 We searched for a study or data from a probability sample to either confirm or refute these assertions. We could find neither. We see the social network results of our interview sample as preliminary and hope that future research may be conducted to see if those results can be generalized. 2 Secularization theory is the idea that society is transforming from one built upon religious values and institutions to one with nonreligious values and institutions. As this process occurs, the number of religious individuals and organizations will theoretically decrease in number. The secularization theory has been challenged by a number of studies: the most noteworthy are Berger (1999) and Oliver-Dee (2015). 3 According to the 2016 American National Election Survey, 20.6 percent of Christians who believe that the Bible is the literal Word of God have a bachelor’s degree. But 42.5 percent of Christians who do not believe the Bible is the Word of God have a bachelor’s degree, which was significantly different at p < .001. Furthermore, a higher percentage of Christians who do not believe the Bible is the Word of God lived in a household that earned $75,000 or more (39.0 percent vs. 20.8 percent: p < .001). 4 For example, according to the 2008 Henry Institute National Survey of Religion and Public Life, 40.1 percent of all Christians do not accept the Bible as the Word of God but still accept the particularistic notion of Jesus Christ being the only path toward salvation. That percentage outnumbered the percentage (31.7 percent) of those we would have categorized as conservative Christians who accept the Bible as the Word of God and are particularistic and the percentage (26.5 percent) of those we would have categorized as progressive Christians who do not envision the Bible as the Word of God and reject particularism. These data suggest that Christians who are neither consistently conservative nor progressive outnumber those in either of the two groups. 5 We also found stark theological differences between conservatives and progressives on the question of whether individuals are inherently good or sinful, and whether or not Jesus reconciled sinners to God by being their substitute punishment on the cross. 6 Continuous variables allow for researchers to measure the degree to which individuals hold to certain beliefs. However, for progressive and conservative Christians a dichotomous either/or measure, or discrete variable, is more useful

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since it is more important to know whether a respondent perceives the Bible as inerrant or that Christ is the only way to heaven rather than the degree to which one has such beliefs.

Methodological Appendix

1 The actual question is “We’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. We’ll show the name of a person or group and we’d like you to rate that person or group using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the person and that you don’t care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the person.” 2 In our regression models we only include Christians, and we use conservative Christians as the reference group. 3 The question about biblical inerrancy is reverse-coded so that higher numbers indicate more adherence to the Bible as the Word of God. According to the 2012 ANES, Christians who do not accept an inerrant interpretation of the Bible outnumber those who do by more than two to one (61.5 percent vs. 38.5 percent). 4 For Other Race, WHITE is the reference group. For West, SOUTH is the reference group. 5 We checked to see if missing values may be a potential problem. Most of the independent variables have percentages of missing values under 5 percent and are not of great concern. However, the percentage of missing values in Political Conservative (9.2 percent) and Income (8.0 percent) warrant some effort to test to see if these results may be altered by missing data. We used Multiple Imputation to replace the missing variables for all dependent variables. There are no differences in whether Liberal Christian was significant, or the direction of significant findings, in any of the ten models in tables 2.5 and 2.6. It is extremely unlikely that these results are impacted by missing data. 6 Full models are available upon request. 7 See note 1 in chapter 2 for instructions on how we developed variables such as Pro–Political Conservative and Anti–Political Progressive. 8 It is possible that these findings are artifacts of the way the dependent variables are constructed. To assess this possibility, we ran Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models using the actual thermometer numerical score of the respondent, and we found that progressive Christians are negatively related to the fundamentalist thermometer score (t = -12.745), positively related to the atheist thermometer score (t = 4.591), positively related to the Muslim thermometer (t = 6.193), negatively related to the politically conservative thermometer (-5.896), and was not significantly related to the political progressive thermometer (t = 1.353). These results support the basic findings of the logistic models. However, the logistic models allowed us to investigate whether acceptance or rejection of the religious

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and political groups drive those findings; thus, it is valuable for us to use them in the main text of this book. 9 Given that Ashlee conducted the interviews, this section of reflexivity will focus on her. I (George) did conduct the quantitative work and the content analysis of the online blogs and articles. I too identify as an Evangelical, which I believe aided me in understanding the bloggers and article writers.

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Index

Evangelical; 81–82; in America, 81–88; Southern; 1, 82–84, 86, 90, 138, 147 Bell, Rob, 151, 163 abolitionism, 83 Berger, Peter, 133–134 abortion, 14, 25, 41; and progressive Christian opponents, 59, 61–62, 64–67, 71–72, Bessey, Sarah, 61, 67 75, 155, 192, 227; tied to religious values, 34 Bible, 1, 20, 27, 77, 82–83, 88, 93, 95, 98, 131, 151, 174, 233, 236, 244; and authority, 28, Abraham (patriarch), 168 31, 41, 69, 86–87, 92, 101–102, 106–107, abrogation, 117–118 116, 132, 148, 194; belt, 82, 186; and absolutism, 23, 31, 75 historical theology, 102–104, 109, 121, affinity, 39–40, 53 129; interpretation of, 22, 29, 31, 39, 86, Afghanistan, 118–119 134, 143–145, 190–192, 194, 201, 216, 226– agnosticism, 27, 116 227; obedience to, 55, 103, 191, 216; and Allah, 120; seen as same as God of the Qur’an, 116, 129–130, 132, 168; and red Bible, 174, 180 letters, 148, 152, 154; and sexuality, 1, 20, Al-Qaeda, 114, 241 42, 85–88, 111, 143, 211; and sin, 1, 83, 86, American dream, 71 88, 97, 103–107, 146–147, 168; as without American National Election Studies, 12, error/inerrant, 2, 28, 54, 70, 84, 190, 196, 40–42, 206, 229–230 204, 212, 225; as “Word of God,” 2, 42, 81, American nationalism, 140–141, 222; 101–102, 230, 235; and wrath, 97, 105–107 Christian, 2 Biden, Joe, 77–78 Anabaptist, 100, 154 birth control, 6 “anywhere” people, 133 blasphemy laws, 112–113, 118 apologetics, 26 blogs, 12, 60, 70–71; used as research, 14, Arminianism, 100 58, 61, 233–234 Ashford, Bruce, 68–69 blood, 95, 97, 106, 153 Asia, 116, 118, 120, 199 Atheist/atheist, 12, 14, 39–40, 43–51, 53–54, Body of Christ, 92 born-again, 40, 81–82 116, 213, 215, 218, 231, 232 boundaries, 4, 11, 31–32, 78, 135, 193, 208; atonement, 78, 81, 83, 97, 104, 106–107 blurred by conservative Christians, 132; blurred by progressive Christians, 137, Baha’i, 223 172–174; social boundaries of conservaBaptist, 40, 84, 87, 180, 187; Alliance of Baptive Christians, 7, 23, 74, 91, 119–120, 126; tist, 85; American Baptist Church USA, theological, 74, 133, 135–136 217; Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, 85; 9/11, 133, 158

281

282

| Index

Brahman, 199, 202 Brethren in Christ, 100 Buddhism, 198–199, 202–203 Butler Act (Tennessee), 5 Butterfield, Rosaria, 20 Buttigieg, Pete, 38 call to prayer, 171 Campolo, Anthony, 59, 61 capitalism, 208 caste, 199, 202 Catholicism, 5–6, 26, 41, 55, 78, 98, 186, 199 Center for Medical Progress, 64 charismatic, 7, 31 Charlie Hebdo, 114 Childers, Alisa, 26–28, 134 children, 20, 23, 29, 70, 112, 127, 185, 211; unborn, 66, Chrislam, 92–93, 174–176 Christ and Culture website, 234 Christian fold, 94, 127, 129, 131 Christ-Follower movement, 223 Christian identity, 20, 54, 189, 196–197, 220–223 Christian nation, 2, 225 Christian nationalism, 2 Christianity and Liberalism (Machen), 87 Christians of color, 48, 50–51 church-state separation, 8, 82 Church of England, 82 city on a hill, 100 Claiborne, Shane, 61–61, 65 class, 82, 133, 140 clergy, 7 coexist, 132 cognitive contamination, 133 colonialism, 17, 141–142, 181 compassion, 14, 70; of progressive Christians, 72, 192; seen as lacking in conservative Christians, 66, 191, 213; social identity of progressive Christians, 193 complementarianism, 196

compromise, 21, 179, 183–185 congregation, 13, 30, 87, 98; as methodology, 90–91, 95, 98–99, 127–132; conservative flexibility within, 127–132; progressive, 30, 138–139, 148, 165, 177 Congregational Church, 82 confrontational nature, 122 conservative Christians, 6; accepts being labeled Christian, 99–101; accept progressive Christians, 47, 98, 119, 128–135, 200; belief about hell, 107– 108, 122; belief about salvation, 30, 33, 81, 83, 190; conflict with progressive Christians, 4, 195, 209–215, 227; critical of Islam, 99, 109, 113–125; criticized by progressive Christians, 28–29, 65, 152, 163–166, 169, 179–188, 191–193, 213; defined, 99; distrust government, 109–112, 155; do not emphasize political agreement, 4, 57, 73–74; finds contrasting meaning than progressive Christians, 201–205, 216–217; focus on theological concerns, 13, 32–33, 35, 43–45, 52–54, 75, 97–98, 101–104, 190, 194, 201, 203, 207, 211–212, 216, 222; heterogenous networks, 125–129, 200; previous research, 7, 11; prioritizes religious motivation, 98; rejected by progressive Christians, 46, 53, 55, 94, 206, 216, 221; reject interfaith efforts, 218–219; and Republican party, 31, 109; resist progressive politics, 25, 37, 109–111; and sin, 104–108; support immigration reform, 58, 68–72, 194 conservative theology, 135, 214, 221 consistent life ethic, 59, 65–66, 72, 75 conversion, 27, 108, 154, 164, 181–182; as violation of dignity; 32, 35, 211; emphasized by Evangelical Christians, 81–83, 119, 122, 143, 151 Corey, Benjamin, 28–29, 61, 65 Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), 133

Index

COVID-19, 1, 13, 210 critique, 115, 241; by conservatives, 113–114, 121, 188, 212, 213; by modernists, 23, 36; by progressives, 28, 29, 66–67, 129, 139, 164, 168–169, 179–180, 188,192, 213 cultural conservatism, 25 cultural toolkit, 34–36, 55, 193; conservative Christian, 193–194; definition, 34; progressive Christians, 193 culture war, ix, 6, 21, 205; book, 86 Daesh. See Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) Darwinism, 5. See also evolution da’wah, 164 death penalty, 29, 59, 160 de Blasio, Bill, 1–2 deconstruction of faith, 27, 132, 134, 149 deity, 44, 54–55, 73, 104, 106, 194, 196, 199, 216, 219 Democratic Party, 71, 79—80, 109–111, 155–156 disciple, 103 diversity, 2, 19, 53, 80, 127, 158, 195, 200, 213–215, 225 divine, 87, 96, 144, 148, 196, 260; judgment, 142, 146; wrath, 106 doctrine, 95–97, 100–101, 106–107, 117, 185, 236; historical theology emphasizing, 15–17, 27, 102–104, 109, 119–123, 128– 129, 131, 135–136; progressive willingness to change or deemphasize, 137, 140, 143, 148, 166, 170, 191 Dolezal, Rachel, 196 dominant form of theology, 112, 142, 171, 181, 215 doubt, 169 Edwards, Jonathan, 95, 108, 169 egalitarian, 24, 196 embattled, 88, 133 Emergent Church movement, 7 enemy, 151, 169

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283

Episcopal Church, 88, 212, 217, 221 eschatology, 84, 152 eternal, 55, 78, 83, 107–108, 122, 150, 145, 212 Evangelical, 68, 80–81, 88, 92–94, 98–101, 139–141; left, 25, 146–149; Baptist, 81– 83; being interviewed, 13, 89–91, 138; disapproval of progressive Christians, 139–140, 144–146, 150, 176–179 182–187; view of Islam, 87. See also Patheos Evangelical website evangelicalism, 22–23, 36, 83, 131 Evangelical Lutheran Church, 217 Evangelical Statement of Principles for Immigration Reform, 68 Evans, Rachel Held, 61, 64, 66 evolution, 5, 22, 25, 145 exclusive truth, 30, 208 fallenness of man, 103–104, 142, 146–147, feminist, 67 fidelity, 5, 222 First Amendment, 112–113, 161 First Great Awakening, 81–82 flag, 133, 215, flexible theology, 16, 136, 138, 142–145, 164, 174, 179, 201; belief that conservatives lack, 179–181 food stamps, 125 foreign policy, 25, 153, 159 four spiritual laws, 191 Frankfort, 129–130 free speech, 109, 112–115, 119; challenged by progressive Christians, 161; supported by Christian conservatives, 109, 112–114, 119 friendship, 124, 188 Fuller Theological Seminary, 93 fundamentalism, 5, 19, 40–41 Fundamentalist Christians, 5, 19, 22, 36, 40–41, 78, 83–84; compared to Wahhabi Muslims, 184 “The Fundamentals,” 23

284

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Index

Garland, Texas, 77 Getty, Keith, 95–97 Gladden, Washington, 22 God, 30, 38, word of, 2, 42, 69; power of, 8. See also Kingdom of God good news, 103, 108 Gosnell, Kermit, 61, 64 government, 109; and Carl F. H. Henry, 24; distrust of conservative Christians towards, 98, 108–112, 119; relationship with Baptist movement, 82; seen as helpful by progressive Christians, 155, 159–161 Graham, Franklin, 1–2, 13–15, 77–78, 170, 180, 210–212; support of Trump, 212 Ground Zero Mosque, 133 Gushee, David, 61, 66, 85–88, 190 hate, 168; of Muslims, 187; preacher, 114– 115; speech, 113–114, 161, 210 hell, 41, 120, 210; conservative Christian view, 107–108, 120, 122; progressive Christian view, 140, 147–148, 150–152, 170 Henry, Carl F. H., 24 heresy, 3, 32, 55; traditional definition, 54 heterodox, 241 heterogenous social network, 15–16, 93, 98, 126 Hinduism, 198–199, 202 historical theology, 15, 26, 102–104, 109,128–129, 131; In relationship to Islam, 119–121 Holy Spirit, 8, 81, 121, 144, 183 homeschool, 20 homeless, 7 homogeneous social network, 17, 126, 214 homophobia, 1–2, 186 honor, 157, 165, 187, 201, 220; in Scripture, 154; in society, 213; lack of, 114, 152 human depravity, 147; of man, 104 humanism, 142, 146; Christian, 148

humanistic ethic of social justice, 16–17, 138, 142, 154–155, 162–163, 181, 191–192, 201, 203–204, 208–210, 212, 216, 221– 222, 227 Hunter, James, 87–88, 219 ignorance, 179–180 ignorant, 135, 167–169, 174–175, 180–181, 221 image, 2, 21, 24, 31, 40, 60, 65, 69, 75, 105, 113, 122, 161, 192, 209, 222; public, 61, 73 immigration, 59, 69–70, 123 immigration reform, 123, 233; supported by Christian conservatives, 58, 68–72, 194 immoral, 83, 179, 182–182, 208, 210 imperialism, 141, 222 In Christ Alone, 95–97, 105 inclusiveness, 32, 34–35, 192; core value of progressive Christians, 191; of Emergent Church Movement, 7; radical, 29 India, 116, 199 individualism, 177 Indonesian, 157–158 in-group, 4, 38–39, 58, 74–75, 78, 91, 178, 197, 214; of conservative Christians, 15–16, 32, 94, 127, 218; political, 60, 73–74; of progressive Christians; 15–17, 46, 52, 94, 142; shaping social identity; 10–11, 44 insider movement, 92, 130, 175 intelligentsia, 1, 133 interaction, 153–154; relations, 171 interfaith, 29, 143, 187, 218–219; asked about in interview, 239–240; dialogue; 99, 138, 172 intergroup conflict, 10, 20, 30, 36, 161, 198 internal conflict, 19, 83 interpretations, 32, 39, 59, 86, 190, 195; differing, 10, 21, 194, 202–203, 227; modern, 6; new, 134, 142, 144–145, 191 irrationality, 179, 186, 188 Irving, Texas, 125

Index

Islam, 78–80; and apostasy, 124, 113; and blasphemy, 112–113, 118–119,161; and US schools, 77,125,127; conferences on, 91, 174; conservative Christians critical of, 99, 109, 113–118, 124; conservative Christian warmth towards, 122–123; cultural, 118, 170–174; fear of, 124, 156– 157, 159, 167, 175, 186–188,210–211; not seen as different from Christianity by progressive Christians, 159, 167–168, 180; offers insights to progressive Christians, 141, 164–165; seen as separate from Christianity, 16, 97–98, 120– 121; used as question for interview, 235, 239–242 Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), 118, 125, 187–188, 241 Islamophobia, 186–188 Israel, 69, 70, 159, Jesus, 16, 105–106; conversations about, 149–150; model of radical inclusion, 29, 151; serving, 203–204; as source of self-fulfillment, 148; warns of punishment, 107 Jesus-centric theology, 16, 137, 142, 148, 162 Jews, 26, 86, 185, 218–219 jihadist, 117 karma, 199 Kempis, Thomas à, 103 Kermit Gosnell trial, 61 kindness, 165, 191–192 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 22 Kingdom of God, 20, 24, 79, 105, 150, 163, 172–175, 183 leadership, 30, 84, 91, 117,124, church allowing for diversity within, 128, 129; political, 59, 85, 111, 117; progressives seek out positions within, 134, 148–149, 177–178, 182 legitimation, 24, 34, 69–70 LGBTQ, 79, 86, 133, 210–211

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285

liberal, 1–2, 6–7, 11, 14, 20, 40–41, 20–51, 69, 78, 84, 86–88, 110. 134, 160, 211, 222, 225, 230, 235 liberalism, 78, 84, 87, 88 liberation theology, 22 linguistic flexibility, 173 Machen, Gresham, 27, 87–88, 103, 105, 134–135 mainline denominations, 223 manslaughter, 61 marriage, 38, 42–43, 111, 143, 183, 210–211, 242 Mecca, 117, 187 media, 60, 80, 90, 113–114, 117, 244 Medinan, 117, 118, 124 mega-church, 90, 99, 138, 187 Mercer University, 85, 190, 181–182 mercy, 69, 95, 105 Mercy congregation, 90–91, 130, 138, 166, 171, 175, 178,188 Merritt, Jonathan, 1–2, 210–212 Metzger, Paul, 68–69 Middle East, 118, 120, 124, 158, 165 missiology Islam, 99, 138 missionaries, 93, 100, 182 missionary, 84, 92, 116, 120, 177, 179, 182 moderate Christians, 224, 226 modernism, 78, 83. See also postmodernism modernist, 28, 84, 205; Christian, 5, 11, 24, 33, 36, 84 modernist-fundamentalist conflict, 5, 11, 20–22, 38, 78–79, 83, 134 modernity, 5, 19, 22–23, 33 Mohler, Al, 84, 86 monotheism, 44 moral authority, 23, 87, 101–102 Moral Majority, 85 Mormons, 26, 196, 219 Muhammad, 78; cartoons, 77, 114, 161; Evangelicals critical of, 89, 114, 118, 120–122; used as interview question, 235–236, 241

286

|

Index

Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest, 161 Muslim, 105, 114, 128, 173, 187, 211; community, 90–92, 120, 175; culture, 170– 171; defended by progressive Christians, 157–158, 168–170, 175; drawing of, 122, 161; fear of, 105, 112, 124, 153, 156–157, 159, 167, 175, 186–188; followers of Christ, 150, 173; friends, 123, 174–175; hospitality, 164–165; identity, 92, 125; immigrants, 112; majority countries, 68, 93, 99, 112–113, 118, 122–125, 138; progressive Christians seek to learn from, 164–166; ranking of, 43; refugees, 123, 129, 133, 182, 218; seen as better than conservative Christians, 166; term used in research, 240; terrorists, 116, women, 113, 124, 133; multiculturalism, 19, 29 new left movements, 24–25 Nirvana, 202, 204 Noble, Alan, 68, 70 nondenominational institutions, 219, 243 Obama, Barack, 68, 156 Omar, Ilhan, 133 ordination, 88; women, 6, 84–85 orthodox Christianity, 87, 104 Ortlund, Gavin, 106 out-group, 10–11, 35, 38–39, 41, 78, 190, 197–198, 200, 214; of conservative Christians, 3, 7, 91, 119, 122, 135; of progressive Christians, 46, 54, 164, 179, 181, 214; political, 33, 74; theological, 33 Pakistan, 114 paradigm shift, 166, 168, 174, 178, 192, 221 Park51 (Ground Zero Mosque), 133 particularism, 41, 141, 203, 212, 236; Christian, 7, 21,32, 99, 138, 204 pastor, 27,99, 106,138, 168, 177, 180; training of, 139, 149, 151, 187–188 Patheos Evangelical website, 234

Pavlovitz, John, 215–216 peace, 97, 116–118, 127, 144, 148, 152–154, 163, 180, 185, 198 peacemaking, 153, 172, 182, 185 penal substitutionary atonement, 97, 106 Pence, Mike, 38 persecution, 114 Pew Research Center, 79–80, 133 phobias, 186–187 Piper, John, 168, 180 Plowshare movement (Sweden), 30 pluralism 29, 132–135 polarization, 207, 219; of Christianity, 205, 215, 220; of the United States, 205 political activism, 33, 36–37, 216; of conservative Christians, 12, 30–31; of progressive Christians, 25, 28, 201 political conservatism, 31, 73 political motivation, 115, 158 political orientation, 8–9 post-Christian, 229; society, 224, 226 postcolonial theology, 142, 181 postmodern, 33, 93, 101, 151, 173 postmillennialism, 195–196 power, 17, 142, 163, 171, 181, 185, 212; within congregations, 148; and conservatism, 26. 31, 45, 184–185, 211; of culture, 141; of God, 8, 97, 103, 106, 220; of Hinduism, 199; of hospitality, 165; and humanistic ethic of social justice, 17, 142, 163, 181, 203, 212, 216, 221–222; and politics, 9, 51, 84, 159, 183; and progressives, 25, 53, 222; social, 10–11, 198, 200, 203, 205, 215, 221; as something to give, 112, 171, 181, 214, 216; of theology, 231; of transcendence, 87 Powers, Kirsten, 61, 64, 234 prayer, 25, 151, 171 Presbyterian, 87; Church, 96, 217 premillennialism, 195–196 privilege, 114, 152, 225, 260 progressive Christians, 135–136, 227; accepted by conservative Christians,

Index

47, 98, 119, 129–135, 197, 200; accepts sexual minorities, 79; approves of government action, 155, 159–161; attitudes about Jesus, 148–150, 154, 196; blur differences between Christians and Muslims, 172–174; contrasting meaning from conservative Christians, 201– 205, 216–217; criticize conservative Christians, 28–29, 65, 152, 163–166, 169, 179–188, 191–193, 200, 213, 221–222; deemphasis theological agreement, 69, 75; defends Muhammad, 157–158, 168– 170, 175; defined, 42; dislike of term Chrislam, 174–176; endorses Humanistic ethic of social justice, 142–143, 155, 162–163, 201, 203, 209; opposing abortion, 59, 61–62, 64–67, 71–72, 75, 155, 192, 227; prefer non-Christians to conservative Christians, 44, 53, 191, 218; reject conservative Christians, 46, 53, 55, 94, 206, 213–214, 216, 221; research about, 6–7; seek to learn from Muslims, 164–166; self-differentiation from conservative Christians, 178, 214; supportive of humanism, 12, 28, 75, 146–147; supportive of social justice, 4, 13, 29, 59, 80, 140, 160, 171, 204, 208, 218; theological flexibility, 29, 35, 96, 135, 140, 143–145, 191, 201; tolerance, 36, 193; uncomfortable being labeled Christian or Evangelical, 100, 139–141, 209, 220, 222; value compassion, 72, 192; value political agreement, 32, 38, 52, 72–74, 201; views of hell, 147–148, 150–152, 170; view world through political lens, 155 Progressive Christian Alliance, 219 progressive theology, 27, 30, 135, 214, 221 pro-life, 14, 58, 62, 64–67, 69–75, 184, 192, 213, 233 prophecy, 105 proselytization, 23, 35, 122, 194, 209–210, 225; rejected by progressive Chris-

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tians, 191, 212; valued by conservative Christians, 33, 81, 83, 108–109, 119, 122, 190 Protestantism, 6, 41, 55, 83 punishment, 97, 106–108, 118, 150–151 questions of meaning, 4, 37, 195, 199, 203, 205, 207, 215–217, 219, 226; religious answers, 9–10, 20–21, 202–204 Qur’an, 114, 128; gain insight about God by progressive Christians, 166–167, 171; not seen as source of violence by progressive Christians, 157–158; rejected by conservative Christians, 120, 122; seen as authoritative to Muslims, 116; seen as source of violence by conservative Christians, 116–119; studied with Bible, 129–130, 132 racism, 83, 175; white Christian solution, 194 radical, 24, 29, 71, 74, 104; Islam, 156–157, 159, 241 Rauschenbusch, Walter, 22, 143 Reagan, Ronald, 25, 84 reason, 24, 28, 102, 146 redemption, 105, 140 red letter Christians, 148, 152, 154 Reed, Ralph, 68, 70 reflexivity, 243–244 refugees, 7, 118, 122–123, 125, 129, 182, 218 reformed, 180 reincarnation, 199, 204 relativism, 133 religion, 5, 190; and social identity, 9–12, 20; conservative Christian and progressive Christian not in same religion, 17, 203–204; freedom, 112; modernist critique of, 24–25, 36; motivations provided by, 115–116, 156–157; source of meaning, 20–21; traditional, 25; unity in, 198–203 religious freedom, 82, 112–113, 125

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religious identity, 3, 10–11, 21, 33, 58, 222– 223 religious motivation, 115–116, 156–157 religious nones, 214 religiosity, 24, 197 Republican party, 31, 59, 70–72, 109, 141, 185, 222 repurpose, 149 resurrection, 104, 106 Revelation, 87, 117–118, 174; Book of, 105 revival, 81–81, 169 revolution, 19, 133 right-wing authoritarianism, 31 rigid theology, 15, 17, 94, 103, 127, 129, 119, 132, 175 rituals, 195; in Hinduism, 199 Rodriguez, Samuel, 68, 70–71 salvation, 23, 28, 78, 123; conservative Christians and, 30, 33, 81, 83, 190; progressive Christian and, 32, 147 Samaritan’s Purse, 1–2, 180, 210–212, 219 same-sex marriage, 111, 183, 210 schism, 2, 5, 21 Scopes, John, 5 Scopes Trial, 5 Second Great Awakening, 81–82 secular, 12, 24, 28, 30, 85, 201, 205, 213–214, 219, 227, 246, 251, 255, 257, 261, 278 September 11 attacks, 159, 186 Sermon on the Mount, 153–154 sexuality, 59, 86, 186 sexual minorities, 12, 210, 216; not affirmed by Franklin Graham, 212; supported by progressive Christians, 34 Sharia law, 118–119, 188 sin, 23, 30, 86, 88, 95–97, 121, 137, 140–142, 146–147, 151, 154, 168–169, 201; and death, 96–97, 105–107, 109, 151; conservative Christian view, 103–108 sinner, 88, 95, 104, 106, 108, 137 Sinners in the Hands of a Loving God (Zahnd), 137

Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God (Edwards), 95, 6 slavery, 82–83, 145 Smith, Christian, 132 social boundaries, 7, 16, 23, 32, 91, 119, 193, 208 social gospel, 82–83, 143, 145; and Baptists, 83 social identity, 4, 7, 38–39, 55, 60, 193–195, 198, 212, 215, 224; and religion, 9–11, 20–21, 219; Christian influences, 21, 78, 222; conservative Christian, 119; political influences, 52, 55, 72, 75; progressive Christian, 163–164; theological influences, 73; social justice, 12, 22, 80, 140, 142, 204, 218, 227; contemporary movements; 28, 32; core value of progressive Christians, 4, 13, 72, 152–154, 171, 191–193; not taken seriously by conservative Christians, 17, 179, 181–183, 210; use government for, 159–161. See also humanistic ethic of social justice socialism, 110–11 Soerens, Matthew, 68–69 “somewhere” people, 133 Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 86 Sproul, R. C., 104 subjectivism, 22, 87 supernatural, 106, 148, 216 Supreme Court, 25 sura, 116–117, 119, 166, 171 symbolic differences, 32, 208 syncretism, 93, 174–175 Taliban, 118, 158, 161 taxation, 31, 110, 125 Tea Party group, 41 Tennessee, 5 terrorism, 123, 158, 160–161; seen as connected to Islam, 109, 114, 118; seen as created by politics, 155–156, 158

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terrorist attacks, 77, 114, 159, 186–187 theological purity, 11, 35 Tlaib, Rashida, 133 tolerance, 30, 34, 214; core values of progressive Christians, 28, 36, 191–193, 222; of progressive Christians by conservative Christians, 126, 128–131; progressive Christians criticism of conservative Christians, 213 Townend, Stuart, 95 traditional phraseology, 27, 88, 134 Trinity, 16, 98, 104, 106, 114, 120 Trump, Donald, 59, 156, 206; criticized by progressive Christians, 85, 168–169, 180, 184–185; immigration policies, 68–69; supported by Christian conservatives, 31, 212; used in interview questions, 242 Turner, Matthew Paul, 61, 65, 67 Twin Towers, 133

Vicari, Chesen, 211–212 violence, 137, 185, 199; and conservatives Evangelicals, 144; and Islam, 114, 116, 118–120, 123, 155–160 Vote Common Good, 28

uncertainty, 151–152 Unitarians, 196, 223 United Kingdom, 114, 116 United Methodist Church, 88, 217 unity within Christianity, 14, 196–197

xenophobia, 1–2

Wahhabi Muslims, 184 Wallis, Jim, 61, 65 war on terror, 158, 186–187 wealth, 42, 152, 221 Wesleyan, 100 Wesleyan Covenant Association, 217 West, 116, 120, 142, 214, 230–232 Western culture, 16, 171, 181; Muslims lack power in, 212, 214; negatively assessed by progressive Christians, 93, 141–142, 163, 210; Western interference, 157, 241 white Christians, 48–49, 51 wrath of God, 95–97, 105–107

Yancey, Hilary, 61, 65 Zahnd, Brian, 137

About the Authors

Dr. George Yancey is Professor of Institute for Studies of Religion and Sociology at Baylor University. He has published several research articles on the topics of institutional racial diversity, racial identity, atheists, cultural progressives, academic bias, and anti-Christian hostility. Dr. Ashlee Quosigk is Visiting Scholar at the University of Georgia. She writes with an interdisciplinary perspective about Christianity, Islam, conservative-progressive divides, and issues of conflicting moral authority. She is the author of American Evangelicals: Conflicted on Islam.

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