On the Nature of Syntactic Irregularity

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66-14,849 LAKOFF, George Philip, 1941ON THE NATURE OF SYNTACTIC IRREGULARITY. Indiana University, Ph.D., 1966 Language and Literature, linguistics Please note: This is Copyright Registration No. A 845841, by thePresident and Fellows of Harvard College. University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

0

1965 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

Use, reproduction or publication, in whole or in part, is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.

ON THE NATURE OF SYNTACTIC IRREGULARITY By George PV Lakoff

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School in p a r t i a l fulfillment of the r e q u i r e m e n t s for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of Linguistics, Indiana University June, 1966

We, hereby, indicate acceptance of this dissertation.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ix

Abstract Preface

XI

0. G r a m m a r s and the Theory of G r a m m a r

0-1

0.1 Adult Language Learning

0-1

0. 2 Child Language Learning

0-2

0. 3 Linguistic Theory

0-4

0.41 Vocabulary

0-6

0. 42 The Types of Rules

0-7

0. 5 Some Assumptions

0-9

0. 51 P o s t a l ' s Lexical Substitution Rule

0-10

0. 52 Violation and Contradiction

0-14

0. 53 Other Assumptions

0-15

1. P r e v i o u s Work

1-1

1.1 A r b i t r a r y Subcategorization

1-1

1. 2 The Chomsky-Halle System for Exceptions in Phonology

1-5

2. Simple Exceptions

II-1

2.1 Items that Do Not Undergo Regular Rules

II-l

2. 2 The D i r e c t Generation of Deviant Sentences

II-3

2. 3 A P a r t i a l F o r m a l i s m for Simple Exceptions

II-5

3. Rule Government

III-l

4. Minor Rules

IV-1

4.1 Rules that Apply Only to Exceptions

IV-1

4.11 Not-transportation

IV-1

4. 12 Object Nominalization

IV-2

4.13 Instrumental Nominalization

IV -3

-v-

4.14 -Able

Substitution

IV-

4.15 Inchoatives

IV-4

4.16 C a u s a t i v e s

IV-14

4 . 2 A P a r t i a l F o r m a l i s m for Minor Rxtles

IV-18

4 . 3 P a r t l y Minor R u l e s

IV-21

4 . 4 A P a r t i a l F o r m a l i s m for P a r t l y Minor R u l e s

IV-24 V-A

5. Absolute Exceptions 5.1 Items that Must Not Meet Structural D e s c r i p t i o n s

V-l

5. 2 Items that Must Meet Structural D e s c r i p t i o n s

V-3

5. 3 A P a r t i a l F o r m a l i s m for Absolute E x c e p t i o n s

V-4

5. 31 P o s i t i v e Absolute Exceptions

V-5

5. 32 Negative Absolute Exceptions

V-6

5. 33 Absolute Exceptions to Minor Rules

V-8

5. 4 Hypothetical L e x i c a l Items

V-9

5. 41 Background

V-10

5. 42 The B a s i c Argument

V-13

5. 43 A b s t r a c t Nouns

V-16

5. 44 Agent Nouns

V-20

5. 45 Object Nouns

V-22 VI-1

6. B o o l e a n Exceptions

VII-1

7. Optionality 7.1 Optional E x c e p t i o n s to Obligatory R u l e s

VII-1

7. 2 Exceptions to Optional Rules

VII-2

7. 3 Canonical F o r m of Irregularity R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s

VII-9 VIII-1

8. L e x i c a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n 8 . 1 The Structure of L e x i c a l I t e m s

VIII-1

8. 2 Idiolectal Variations in the L e x i c o n

VIII-4

-vi-

8.3 Lexical Base and Lexical Extension

VIII-6

8.4 Historical Change in Lexical Extensions

VIII-8

9. Hypothetical Causatives and Inchoatives

IX-1

9.1 Causatives

IX-1

9. 2 Inchoatives

IX-9

9. 3 Justification

IX-21

10. Some Speculations on Universal G r a m m a r

X-l

Appendix

A-l

A. Adjectives and Verbs

A-l

A. 1 G r a m m a t i c a l Relations

A-l

A. 2 Selectional Restrictions

A-7

A. 3 Stative and Non-stative Verbs and Adjectives

A~9

A. 4 The Adjective Shift

A-ll

A. 5 Nominalizations

A-14

A. 6 Subject-Object Interchange

A-15

A. 7 Object Deletion

A-17

A. 8 Agent Nominals

A-17

A. 9 Complements

A-19

B . P o s s i b l e But I n c o r r e c t Analyses

B~l

C

C-l

Markedness C . l Markedness in Phonology

C-l

C. 2 Markedness in Syntax

C-4

D. Contextual F e a t u r e s

D-l

D . l Lexical Similarities

D-2

D. 2 Regularities Involving Contextual F e a t u r e s

D-2

•Vll-

D. 21 Subjects of Transitive Verbs

D-2

D. 22 Objects of Stative Transitive VERBS

D-3

D. 23 Abstract Subjects and Objects

D-4

E. On the Form of Lexical Items

E-l

E . l Unanalyzeable Contextual Features

E-l

E. 2 Definition of Multiple Analysis

E-3

E. 3 Conjunction of Contextual Features

E-3

E. 4 Boolean Functions of Features

E-3

E. 5 Suppletion

E-6

F. P a s s i v e s , Adverbs, and Quantifiers

F-l

F. 1 P a s s i v e s and Manner Adverbials

F-l

F. 2 The Source of Manner Adverbials

F-3

F. 3 Pseudo-Passives

F-6

F. 4 Further Remarks on Manner Adverbials

F-13

F. 5 Locative Adverbials

F-15

F. 6 Reason Adverbials

F-18

F. 7 instrumental Adverbials

F-20

F. 8 Frequency Adverbials

F-21

F. 9 Quantifiers

F-22

F. 10 Multiple Adverbials

F - 34

F. 11 Cleft Sentences and Adverbs

F-40

Remarks

R-l

Bibliography -viii-

ON THE NATURE OF SYNTACTIC

IRREGULARITY

by George JLakoff ABSTRACT Generative g r a m m a r a s s u m e s that a natural language is based on a system of rules that apply recursively, and it is only in t e r m s of such rules that we can produce and understand the new sentences that we utter and h e a r every day.

Recent studies in generative g r a m m a r have made it clear that

many of such rules must take the form of grammatical transformations. Originally it was thought that all grammatical transformations were ' r e g u l a r ' — that their applicability was determined solely by the occurrence of natural g r a m m a t i c a l categories.

In such a system, ' i r r e g u l a r i t i e s ' w e r e

impossible, and any apparent i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were assumed to reflect the existence of hitherto undiscovered natural grammatical categories.

Recent

attempts to account for apparent i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , however, have resulted in the postulation of a large number of grammatical categories that a r e anything but 'natural. ' A great many of them have had to be postulated only to account for the pecularities of individual lexical items in their interactions with isolated rules in a single language.

These results suggest that the original

assumption was wrong, and that i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a r e a normal p a r t of language. Such facts have led to a conception of g r a m m a r in which i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a r e not only possible, but play a l a r g e r o l e .

In this notion of g r a m m a r , the

statement of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s is taken out of all transformational r u l e s , and

placed in the lexicon—and arguments a r e given a s to why this m u s t be done. This p e r m i t s the following constraints to be placed on g r a m m a r s : (1) g r a m matical transformations may mention only natural g r a m m a t i c a l categories and not p r o p e r t i e s that indicate i r r e g u l a r i t i e s ; (2) transformations may not mention individual lexical i t e m s ; (3) the possible i r r e g u l a r i t i e s in a language a r e defined by the set of rules of the language. This study attempts to define p r e c i s e l y the notion "possible exception to a set of transformational r u l e s . " It shows that the s e t of such exceptions may be defined by the set of r u l e s , and that the notion of an exception depends on a p r i o r notion of 'rule government: 1 in each p h r a s e m a r k e r on which a transformational rule may operate, t h e r e exists one lexical item which governs that rule and only that item may be an exception to that rule. There a r e two types of transformational r u l e s : major and m i n o r . Major rules apply in normal c a s e s , but do not apply to exceptions. rules apply only to exceptions, but do not apply in normal c a s e s . a r e simple exceptions.

Minor These

There a r e also absolute exceptions, lexical items

which m u s t , or m u s t not, meet the s t r u c t u r a l description of some t r a n s formational r u l e . We a s s u m e that each lexical item is subcategorized with r e s p e c t to each rule and each s t r u c t u r a l description.

We call these categories rule

features and s t r u c t u r a l description f e a t u r e s .

Some lexical i t e m s m u s t be

r e p r e s e n t e d with Boolean functions of t h e s e .

In this way, each g r a m m a r

may be said to define the set of possible exceptions to its r u l e s .

O.

a/AQ/^ *

/Lfc

PJXAA/I^J

£ auce

After IT-DEL, a transformation, which we will call CAUSATIVE, will s u b s t i tute "thicken" for the causative p r o - v e r b .

When the verb of the embedded

sentence is deleted in the process of substitution, the nodes V P a n d S a r e also deleted, and no t r a c e of the complement is left.

(4-35)

NP thickened

/ \

the sauce

Note that inchoative sentences cannot be derived from subjectless c a u s a t i v e s , as has been proposed by B . Hall (Hall, 1965). If they could be so derived then any adverbial which could occur with a causative sentence could also occur with its corresponding inchoative.

This is not t r u e , particularly in the c a s e of

manner a d v e r b i a l s . F o r example, 1. John broke the window cleverly. 2.

(4-3M

* The window broke cleverly.

Note also that according to our analyses of the inchoative and causative, "the sauce" b e a r s the same relation to "thick" in all of the sentences:

IV-18 1. The sauce is thick. 2. The sauce thickened. 3.

(4-37)

John thickened the s a u c e .

The deep s t r u c t u r e for (3) would contain the deep s t r u c t u r e for both of the former sentences: NP NP

VERB

John

+V + PRO + .CAUSATIVE

the sauce thi

+ V + PRO + INCHOATIVE

Note that CAUSATIVE operates on inchoative verbs - - usually on the p r o duct of the inchoative r u l e . And CAUSATIVE, like INCHOATIVE, is a minor r u l e . 4 . 2 A P a r t i a l F o r m a l i s m for Minor Rules If we w e r e i n t e r e s t e d only in generating the fully g r a m m a t i c a l sentences of a language, we could account for exceptions of this s o r t by use of our i n t e r p r e tation of the Chomsky-Halle conventions (see 1.2) for handling minor r u l e s . Since we a r e i n t e r e s t e d in also generating the partially g r a m m a t i c a l sentences and marking them as such, we will need to employ m o r e a p p a r a t u s . There is a clear sense in which minor rules work in just the opposite way from the way in which major r u l e s work.

Major rules apply to all regular c a s e s ,

IV-19 but not to exceptions. Minor rules do not apply to regular c a s e s , and applyonly to exceptions.

Compare the table of (4-3) to that of (2-2). Note that

wherever t h e r e is a u for an R - F e a t u r e in (2-2), t h e r e is an m in (4-3). And wherever there is an m in (2-2), t h e r e is a u in (4-3). This suggests that there is a very simple relation between major and minor r u l e s , namely, in minor rules the polarity of markings is r e v e r s e d : u's act like m ' s and m ' s act like u*s. Assume that rule 88 is a minor r u l e .

(1) in (4-3) contains exceptional

lexical i t e m s : the rule must apply if the s t r u c t u r a l description is m e t .

(2)

contains ordinary lexical i t e m s : the minor rule must not operate on t h e m . This table defines all the possibilities that can occur when a minor rule is in the g r a m m a r .

In (a), the s t r u c t u r a l description for rule 88 has not been met,

and of course the rule has not operated.

In b), the s t r u c t u r a l description has

been met, but the rule has not operated.

In c), the s t r u c t u r a l description has

been met, and the r u l e has operated. 1.

2.

(4-3)

a. [ -SD(88) (G) ] [-R (88) (G) ]

u SD(88 L (D ] mR (88]> (L) ] no violation

b.

[+SD(88) (G) ] [ -R (88) ( G ) ]

u SD(88] (D ] mR (88 (D ] VIOLATION

c.

[+SD(88) (G) ] [+R (88) (G) ]

u SD(88] (D ] mR (88] (D ] no violation

a . [-SD(88) (G) ] [-R (88) (G) ]

u SD(88] (D ] u R (88) (D ] no violation

b.

[+SD(88) (G) ] [ -R (88) (G) ]

u SD(88) (D ] u R (88) (L) ] no violation

c.

E+SD(88) (G) ]

u SD(88] (D ] u R (88) (L) ] VIOLATION

[+R (88) (G) ]

IV-20 Since rule 88 applies to exceptional (marked) lexical item, if the s t r u c t u r a l description has been met, we get a violation in (lb) since the rule has not applied when it should h a v e . Since rule 88 may not apply to normal (unmarked) lexical i t e m s , we get a violation in case (2c) since it operated when it shouldn't have. Since minor rules differ from major rules only in that the polarity of markings is r e v e r s e d for them, we need not set up an entirely new set of m e t a r u l e s to map m ' s and u's into pluses and m i n u s e s . Instead, we need only introduce rules that change m ' s to u's and u's to m ' s in rule features that correspond to minor r u l e s .

Then minor r u l e s can be t r e a t e d a s major r u l e s ,

and we can apply the m e t a r u l e s of ( 2 - 3 , 4, and 5) to yield the c o r r e c t r e s u l t s . F o r each minor rule of a language, we will have a rule of the form: [ y R(i) (L) ]

> [ ~

Y

R(i) ( D ] . where y = u or m />*.- u = m ~^- m = u

(4-4)

R(i) is the minor rule in question, thus the rule [

Y

R(88) (L) ]

> [,~

YR(88)

(L) ]

(4-5)

will map each of the cases indicated on the chart of (4-3) into the corresponding c a s e s on the chart of (2-2) (with ' 8 8 ' substituting for

»89' ) . The METARULES

1. 3, and 5 of ( 2 - 3 , 4, and 5) will map those c a s e s into the corresponding c a s e s on the chart of (2-6) (again with '88' substituting for the c o r r e c t result in each c a s e .

'89' ).

This will yield

IV-21 Rules of the form (4-4) a r e roughly equivalent to Chomsky-Halle r u l e s of the form (1-4) with a null environment; namely, the special Chomsky-Halle rules which, under our interpretation of them, can indicate when a following rule is m i n o r . Rules like (4-4) a r e language-particular r u l e s , whose symbols would be counted in an evaluation procedure - - which would mean that g r a m m a r s with m o r e minor rules would be valued l e s s highly. However, rules of the form (4-4) have no direct linguistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

If one does not consider these

rules together with METARULES 1, 3, and 5, it is not clear what it means to change an m into a u or a u into an m . Rules like (4-4) make sense only when combined with METARULES 1, 3, and 5. Since this is the c a s e , it might be wise to employ an equivalent formalism in which rules of the form (4-4) a r e considered as m e t a r u l e s . the formalism, a g r a m m a r may contain a list of minor r u l e s .

In

Since each rule

of the form of (4-4) contains the s a m e number of symbols (say that the number is n), our evaluation procedure will evaluate the list by considering each rule number on the list to count n s y m b o l s .

Our linguistic theory would then include

a mechanical procedure which takes the list of minor rules as input and p r o duces a sequence of m e t a r u l e s of the form of (4-4). For instance, if "88" w e r e on such a list, the mechanical procedure would produce (4-5) as a metarule.

These m e t a r u l e s would, of c o u r s e , apply before METARULES 1,

3, and 5. 4 . 3 P a r t l y Minor Rules T h e r e not only exist minor rules in English, but t h e r e also exist rules that a r e major for one subcategory of lexical items and t minor for another.

IV-22 Consider WH-DEL (See Section A - 4 ) . WH-DEL applies to almost all adjectives, with a few exceptions, such as ready, glad, s o r r y , etc. WH-DEL

ADJ-SHIFT

(4-6)

a.

The boy who is ready ==> *the boy ready ===> *the ready boy

b.

The boy who is glad ===> *the boy glad == = > *the glad boy

c.

The boy who is s o r r y ===> *the boy s o r r y ===> *the s o r r y boy

d.

The boy who is content ===> *the boy content ===> *the content boy

These adjectives seem to be exceptions to WH-DEL, not to ADJ-SHIFT, o t h e r wise the intermediate expressions in (4-6) would be g r a m m a t i c a l . T h e r e a r e also a number of verbs which can undergo WH-DEL.

For

example, beat, m u r d e r , control, capture, e t c . (4-7) a.

The man who was beaten ==> the man beaten ==> the beaten man

b.

The man who was m u r d e r e d ==> the man m u r d e r e d ==> the m u r d e r e d man.

c.

The experiment which was controlled ==> the experiment controlled ==> the controlled experiment

d.

The bird that was captured ==> the bird captured ==> the captured bird

But the great bulk of verbs cannot undergo WH-DEL: a.

The man who was shot = ==> *the man shot = ==>*the shot man

b.

The boy who was hit ===> *the boy hit ===>*the hit boy

c.

The store that was robbed = ==> *the store robbed ===>*the robbed store

d.

The man who was killed ===>* the man killed ===> *the killed man

e.

The food that was eaten ===> *the food eaten ===> *the eaten food

f.

The bird that was caught == = > *the bird caught = ==> *the caught b i r d

g. The h o r s e that was tied ===> *the h o r s e tied ===> *the tied h o r s e

IV us Thus, WH-DEL is a rule that is major for adjectives and minor for v e r b s .

That

i s , W H - D E L i s major for [+V, +ADJECTIVAL] and minor for [+V, -ADJECTIVAL] (This analysis is somewhat i n c o r r e c t . See R e m a r k 7-1.) Another rule of the s a m e s o r t is object deletion (OBJ-DEL; see Section A-7). A number of transitive verbs allow unspecified objects to be deleted. a.

John is eating something ==> John is eating

b.

John is drinking something ==> John is drinking (4-9)

c.

John is writing something ==> John is writing

However, most transitive verbs cannot delete unspecified objects. a.

John is robbing something =^=> * John is robbing

b.

John is touching something =^=> * John is touching

c.

John is explaining something =^=> * John is explaining (4-10)

d.

John is wearing something =#=>* John is wearing

e.

John is controlling something =^=> * John is controlling

Adjectives, on the other hand, normally may delete unspecified (derived) objects. a.

Skiing is beneficial to people ==> Skiing is beneficial

b.

His r e m a r k was suggestive of something ==> His r e m a r k was suggestive

c.

That was amusing to someone ==> that w a s amusing

d.

John was wary of someone ==> John was wary

e.

John was b r u t a l to someone ==> John was brutal

f.

H a r r y was afraid of something ==> H a r r y was afraid

(4-11)

g. Cigarettes a r e harmful to people ==> Cigarettes a r e harmful h.

John was s o r r y about something ==> John was s o r r y

H o w e v e r , there a r e a few exceptional adjectives that cannot delete unspecified objects.

IV-24 a.

John is fond of something =/=> *John is fond

(4-12)

b.

His action was equivalent to something =/=> *His action was equivalent

c.

John was cognizant of something =/=> *John was cognizant

d.

Bill was d e s i r o u s of something =/=> *Bill was desirous

Thus, OBJ-DELi is major for adjectives and minor for v e r b s . 4. 4 A P a r t i a l F o r m a l i s m for P a r t l y Minor Rules We can handle situations of this s o r t by using rules of the form of (4-4) with environment s t a t e m e n t s .

F o r instance, the c a s e s in the previous section

might be handled by the rules :

(A i*\

a. [ y R[WH-DEL]J - [ ~ y R [WH- DEL].]/[ + V, -ADJECTIVAL, ] b. £ y R [OB J - D E L ] ] ^ [ ~ Y R [OBJ-DEL] ]/[ + V,-ADJECTIVAL, ] (a) says that R (WH-DEL) is minor for v e r b s ; (b) says that R (OBJ-DEL) is minor for v e r b s . We can extend our formalism in which m i n o r rules a r e given in a list which is converted into a sequence of m e t a r u l e s in the following way: Instead of having a simple list of rule names (or n u m b e r s ) , we will have a list of o r d e r e d p a i r s , the first m e m b e r of which will be a rule name, the second m e m b e r of which will be an environment statement.

Given these, our r e v i s e d mechanical

procedure will convert list e n t i r e s like "WH-DEL; [+V, -ADJECTIVAL, and "OBJ-DEL; [+V, -ADJECTIVAL,

]"

]" into m e t a r u l e s such as (4-13).

Note that (4-13) is of the same form as (C-8) and (C-17).

Thus, using

our notion of m a r k e d n e s s we have found c a s e s involving rule features which a r e parallel to cases involving ordinary syntatic features (C-17) and to c a s e s involving phonological features (C-8).

5. Absolute Exceptions So far we have considered two types of exceptions: 1. a.

c a s e s in which an item meeting the s t r u c t u r a l description of a rule may not undergo the rule

b.

c a s e s in which most i t e m s which meet the s t r u c t u r a l description of a rule must not undergo it, but a few i t e m s m a y .

We will now consider two further types: 2. a.

c a s e s in which an item must not meet the s t r u c t u r a l description of some rule

b.

c a s e s in which an item must meet the s t r u c t u r a l description of some rule

We will call (2) absolute exceptions.

V-1A

5.1 Items that Must Not Meet Structural Descriptions Consider the following sentences: 1. a. I begged John to go. b. I begged to go. 2. a. I implored John to go. b. *I implored to go. c. #1 implored myself to go. d. *I implored for m e to go. 3. a. I yelled for John to go. b. *I yelled to go. c. #1 yelled for m e to go. d. *I yelled myself to go. 4. a. I shouted for John to c o m e . b. *I shouted to c o m e . c. *I shouted for me to come. d. *I shouted myself to come. 5. a. I besought John to leave. b . *I besought to leave. c. *I besought for m e to leave. d. *I besought myself to leave. 6. a. I bade him go. b. *I bade go. c. #1 bade myself go. d. #1 bade for m e to go.

(5-1)

V-2 In (1-a), "beg" has undergone the widespread rule that deletes the subject of an embedding when it is identical to the subject of the m a t r i x sentence (ID-NP-DEL).

The other (b) sentences show, however, that "implore, "

"shout, " "yell, " "beseech, " and "bid" m a y not undergo this r u l e .

If these v e r b s

were simple exceptions that could not undergo I D - N P - D E L when they m e t its s t r u c t u r a l description, one would expect the subject of the embedded sentence to appear, even though it was identical to that of the m a t r i x sentence. (c) and (d) sentences in (5-1) show, this is not the c a s e . subjects may

neither appear, nor be deleted.

As the

The identical embedded

Not only can these verbs not

undergo ID-NP-DEL, they may not even meet its s t r u c t u r a l description. Irreflexive verbs also exemplify this phenomenon (see R e m a r k 5-1). Consider the following: 1. a. I will meet Bill.

(5-2)

b . *I will meet myself. c. #1 will meet m e . 2. a. You will follow Bill. b . *You will follow yourself. c. *You will follow you. 3. a. You will precede Bill. b. *You will precede yourself. c. *You will precede you. 4. a. I a s s a s s i n a t e d H a r r y . b. #1 a s s a s s i n a t e d myself. c. #1 a s s a s s i n a t e d m e . The (b) sentences demonstrate that these verbs m a y not undergo the reflexive transformation.

If they were simple exceptions to the reflexive, we would

V-3 expect the (c) sentences to occur.

They do not.

In e s s e n c e , these verbs may

not have an object which is identical to t h e i r subject. this is to say that they may

A natural way to e x p r e s s

not meet the s t r u c t u r a l description of the reflex-

ive transformation. 5. 2 Items That Must Meet Structural Descriptions It is usually the case that when a s t r u c t u r a l description of a rule is not met, no violation of the rule is possible.

F o r example, consider:

1. #1 wanted for m e to go. 2.

I wanted to go.

3.

I wanted for John to go.

4.

I wanted John to go.

(5-3)

In (1) the m a t r i x and embedded subjects a r e identical, and the SD of ID-NP-DEL is m e t .

If I D - N P - D E L does not operate, we get a violation as in (1). If it does

operate, we get (2) as a g r a m m a t i c a l sentence.

If the SD of ID-NP-DEL. is

not met, as in (3) then, of c o u r s e , the rule need not o p e r a t e , and so we get the g r a m m a t i c a l sentences of (3) and (4).

This is the usual situation.

However, the sentences of (5-4) do not work this way. 1. a. b. 2. a.

3.

4.

John refrained from doing that. *John refrained from Bill's doing that. John t r i e d escaping.

b.

*John tried Bill's escaping.

c.

*John tried Bill escaping.

a.

John was c l e v e r in leaving early.

b.

*John was clever in Bill's leaving e a r l y .

a.

John was wise in

b.

*John was wise in Bill's c o r n e r i n g the m a r k e t on schmoos.

cornering the m a r k e t on schmoos.

(5-4)

V-4 In each of the (a) sentences, the embedded subject has been deleted, since it was identical to the m a t r i x subject.

But if, as in the (b) sentences, the

m a t r i x subject is not identical to the embedded subject, that i s , if the SD of ID-NP-DEL is not met, then no g r a m m a t i c a l sentence can r e s u l t .

Those

VERBS must meet the s t r u c t u r a l description of I D - N P - D E L . N e c e s s a r i l y reflexive v e r b s may be looked upon a s having to m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description of the reflexive transformation.

F o r example,

1. a. John behaved himself.

(5-5)

b . *John behaved H a r r y . 2. a. John prided himself on being faster than a speeding bullet, b . #John prided Bill on being faster than a speeding bullet. (Note that if one adopted such an analysis of these reflexives, one would have to explain why there is no reflexive in the nominalizations of these v e r b s . We get "John's behavior" and "John's pride in being faster than a speeding bull e t " instead of «"*John's behavior of himself" and "*John's pride in himself in being faster than a speeding bullet. " At this time we can offer no wellmotivated explanation of this phenomenon.

Of c o u r s e , one can always describe

the facts by postulating a minor rule which deletes the reflexive object in only these v e r b s .

But this is at least as bad a s considering the v e r b s to be in-

transitive and postulating a minor rule applying only to these v e r b s which places a copy of the subject in the object position, providing that the v e r b s a r e not nominalized.) 5. 3 A P a r t i a l F o r m a l i s m for Absolute Exceptions So far, we have seen that there exist verbs that m u s t m e e t the SD of some rule, or that must not m e e t thgJohn benefacted H a r r y .

V-22 6. i. a. John is a good w r i t e r , b . John is a good poet, ii.

a. John w r i t e s well, b. #John poetizes well.

The same g r a m m a t i c a l relations seem to. hold in the (i-a) sentences as in the (i-b) sentences. F o r example r " H a r r y " in (S'-i-a) b e a r s the same r e lation to "helper" as it does to "benefactor" in (5-i-b).

Since " H a r r y " b e a r s

the s a m e relation to "helper" as to "help" in (5-ii-a), namely, d i r e c t object, it therefore b e a r s the relation of direct object to "benefactor " in (5-i-b). If we hypothesize the verb "to benefact" and m a r k it so that it must meet the SD of AGNT-NOM, we can derive (5-i-b) in the same way a s we derive (5-i-a) and thereby account for these facts. Moreover, we can account for the fact that we understand (5-ii-b) and know that in that non-sentence " H a r r y " is the object of "benefact" and "John" i s the subject of "benefact. " In (6-i), "good" s e e m s to modify " w r i t e r " in the s a m e way a s it m o d i fies "poet".

But (i-a) m u s t be derived from ( i i - a ) , which shows that "good"

in (i-a) m u s t have an adverbial s o u r c e .

This would s u g g e s t that

in (i-b) m u s t also have an adverbial s o u r c e .

L

'good"

We can account for this if we

hypothesize the existence of an underlying v e r b for "poet, " a s in (6-ii-b). It is difficult to see how any of these facts could be accounted for without hypothesizing underlying v e r b s for the agent nouns of the (i-b) sentences. 5. 45 Object Nouns There exist a number of nouns which a r e understood in the same way as certain object nouns (see 2.412).

For example,

V-23 A. 0.

What John aimed for was to conquer the world.

(5-27)

1. a. John's aim was to conquer the world, b. John's goal was to conquer the world. 2. a. John aimed to conquer the world. b. *John goaled to B. 0.

conquer the world.

What Greg intended was to overthrow the government.

1. ;a. G r e g ' s intention was to overthrow the government, b. G r e g ' s purpose was to overthrow the government. 2. a. Greg intended to overthrow the government, b. *Greg purposed to overthrow the government. C. 1. a. I read all of John's writings. b. I read all of John's p o e m s . 2. a. I read all of what John wrote.

^

b. *I read all of what John poetized. D. 0.

What John believes shocks m e .

1. a. John's beliefs shock m e . b. John's ideas shock m e . 2. a. John believes that there is no God. b. *John ideates that t h e r e is no God. In the (1-a) and (1-b) sentences, the same g r a m m a t i c a l relations hold. In A, B, and C, the (1-a) sentences a r e systematically related to the (2-a) sentences and the g r a m m a t i c a l relations in (1-a) must be accounted for in t e r m s of those in (2-a).

But in o r d e r to account for the g r a m m a t i c a l relations in the

(1-b) sentences, we must hypothesize underlying verbs ("to goal, " "to p u r pose, " "to poetize")^ m a r k them so that they m u s t meet the SD of OBJ-NOM,

V-24 and derive the (1-b) sentences from s t r u c t u r e s underlying partially g r a m m a t i c a l sentences like those in (2-b).

Thus, we could a l s o explain the facts that we

understand the (2-b) sentences and can make g r a m m a t i c a l judgments about them, for instance, that "John" and "that there is no God" b e a r the same relations,

/

respectively, to "believe" and to "ideate" in D. Again it is difficult to see how these facts could be accounted for without setting up hypothetical underlying verbs.

VI-1 6.

Boolean Exceptions So far, we have considered lexical i t e m s as having simple conjunctions

of SD-features and R - f e a t u r e s . respects.

But this assumption is inadequate in c e r t a i n

Consider the case of " a g g r e s s . " Note that "aggression" and ' a g g r e s -

sor " may both occur, although " a g g r e s s " may not.

"Aggress " m u s t , t h e r e -

fore, be considered an absolute exception to both NOMINALIZATION and AGNT-NOM. That i s , " a g g r e s s " m u s t meet the SD of NOMINALIZATION to yield "aggression" or it must meet the SD of AGNT-NOM to yield " a g g r e s s o r . " But if we were to r e p r e s e n t " a g g r e s s " in the lexicon with a conjunction of the features [ mSD (NOMINALIZATION) ] and [ m SD (AGNT-NOM)], we would be a s s e r t i n g that in each derivation in which " a g g r e s s " could occur it would have to meet the s t r u c t u r a l descriptions of both r u l e s .

This is c l e a r l y i m -

possible—the environments in which the rules can occur a r e mutually exclusive.

Moreover, it does not accord with the facts, namely, that " a g g r e s s "

must be t r a n s f o r m e d either into "aggression" or into "aggressor."

That i s ,

it m u s t meet either the SD of NOMINALIZATION or_that of AGNT-NOM.

We

can account for these facts if we allow the lexicon to contain Boolean functions of SD- and R - f e a t u r e s .

The entry for " a g g r e s s " could then contain the

disjunction of f e a t u r e s : ( m SD (NOMINALIZATION) (L)] V [m SD(AGNT-NOM) (L)]

(6-1)

which would be conjoined to the other features of "aggress. " Our m e t a r u l e s would convert (6-1) into (6-2): [+SD (NOMINALIZATION) (L)] V [+SD (AGNT-NOM) (L)]

(6-2)

If we maintain the definition of a violation that we have already established (see Sections 0. 52 and E-4), the representation of "aggress " in (6-2) will

VI-2 yield violations whenever the SDs of neither of the rules have been m e t .

If

either SD has been m e t , t h e r e will be no violation ( See R e m a r k 6-L ) Note that in o r d e r to handle Boolean exceptions such a s this one we need- P o s t a l ' s lexical substitution rule and a definition of a violation like the one given in Section 0. 51. Given a condition on a lexical item such a s (6-2), there i s in general only one way of telling whether a lexical item which has been substituted into a given deep s t r u c t u r e will m e e t this ndition- -namely, by applying the transformational r u l e s and c a r r y i n g out all possible d e r i v a tions.

That i s , Boolean exceptions state conditions which m u s t be m e t in the

course of an entire transformational derivation, r a t h e r than in the application of a single r u l e .

The only way of handling exceptions of this s o r t i s ,

therefore, to keep t r a c k of what happens in the course of a derivation and then check to see whether the conditions on individual lexical items have been violated. Since it is in general impossible to tell on the b a s i s of deep s t r u c t u r e alone whether or not the choice of a given lexical item will lead to a violation, and since we must c a r r y out a transformational derivation to discover this, t h e r e will, of necessity, be c a s e s in which deviant sentences m u s t be directly generated and m a r k e d as to the degree and nature of their deviance. Thus, we find that our choice of the P o s t a l lexical substitution rule i s wellmotivated on factual as well as aesthetic grounds. Let us look at some other c a s e s of Boolean exceptions.

The following

examples a r e s i m i l a r to the a g g r e s s o r - a g g r e s s i o n p a i r : c r i m i n a l - c r i m e , a d u l t e r e r - a d u l t e r y , aviator-aviation, felon-felony, etc. A somewhat different example is the verb "to t r a n s f o r m . " Compare "transform" and "change" in the following examples:

VI-3 1. a. Bill changed John into a werewolf.

(6-3)

b. Bill transformed John into a werewolf.'. 2. a. Bill's changing of John into a werewolf. . . b. Bill's transformation of John into a werewolf- . . 3. a. John's change into a werewolf. . . b. .John's transformation into a werewolf. . . 4. a. John changed into a werewolf. b . *John transformed into a werewolf. " T r a n s f o r m " and "change" a r e synonymous in these examples. Each (a) example is understood in the same way as its corresponding (b) example--and the same g r a m m a t i c a l relations and c o - o c c u r r e n c e r e strictions hold in each p a i r . only as a deviant sentence, which is fully g r a m m a t i c a l .

This is true even in (4). Although (4b) occurs it is understood in the same way as (4a), In both (1) and (2), "change" and "transform"

have both undergone the CAUSATIVE transformation. In (3) and (4), neither of them has undergone that rule.

The fact that (4b) cannot occur reflects the

fact that "transform" has the following r e s t r i c t i o n associated with it in the lexicon: "transform" m u s t either m e e t the SD of CAUSATIVE or it m u s t m e e t the SD of NOMINALIZATION: a violation r e s u l t s if "transform" occurs in a sentence without having undergone one of these two r u l e s . "We would r e p r e sent this r e s t r i c t i o n i n the lexicon with the following disjunction of m a r k e d SD-features: [m SD(CAUSATIVE)] V [ m SD (NOMINALIZATION)]

(6-4)

Thus, • 'transform" is a Boolean exception in much the same way a s " a g g r e s s " is.

VI-4 Another such example is the pair " s h a r p " and "sharpen" Consider the following: 1. a. The m e t a l is hard.

(6-5)

b . The knife is s h a r p . 2. a. The m e t a l hardened, b . #The knife sharpened. 3. a. John hardened the m e t a l , b. John sharpened the knife. The (2) sentence is derived from the (1) sentence by the INCHOATIVE t r a n s formation. The further application of the CAUSATIVE transformation yields the (3) sentences. (See Sections 4.15 and 4.16. ) Although (3a) and (3b) a r e derived in the s a m e way, (2b), the intermediate step in the derivation of (3b), is somewhat deviant, while (2a) is fully g r a m m a t i c a l .

Still, we u n d e r -

stand (2b) and we know that it is related to (lb) and (3b) in the s a m e way as (2a) is related to (la) and (3a).

The fact that (2b) does not occur s e e m s to

indicate that " s h a r p " is r e p r e s e n t e d in the lexicon with the following r e s t r i c tion: if " s h a r p " undergoes the INCHOATIVE transformation, it m u s t also m e e t the SD of the CAUSATIVE t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (and, of c o u r s e , undergo the CAUSATIVE rule).

We would r e p r e s e n t this r e s t r i c t i o n in the following way:

[m SD (INCHOATIVE)] J

[m SD(CAUSATIVE)]

(6-6)

Our m e t a r u l e s will change this into: [+SD ([ INCHOATIVE)]3

[+SD (CAUSATIVE)]

(6-7)

which is simply a statement of the r e s t r i c t i o n . (See Section 7. 3.) These examples indicate that Boolean exceptions a r e by no means r a r e and that one does not have to s e a r c h far to find a wide variety of them.

VII-1 7.

Optionality

7.1 Optional Exceptions to Obligatory Rules There exist c a s e s in which an item may optionally undergo a rule that is normally obligatory.

Consider Rosenbaum's pronoun-(JeJietiion t r a n s f o r m a -

tion, which we will refer to a s I T - D E L (see Rosenbaum, 1965, Chapters 1 and 4).

It is normally the c a s e that an unspecified pronoun ("it") is deleted when

it immediately p r e c e d e s an embedded sentence.

Consider the following:

1. a. It is believed by Bill that John loves Mary.

(7-1)

b. *Bill believes it that John loves Mary. c. Bill believes that John loves Mary. 2. a. It is known by everyone that John loves Mary. b. ^Everyone knows it that John loves Mary. c. Everyone knows that John loves Mary. In the (a) sentences, the p a s s i v e has been applied and the embedded sentence "that John loves M a r y " has been shifted to the end p r i o r to the application of IT-DEL.

Since the environment for I T - D E L is not m e t , that i s , since "it"

does not immediately p r e c e d e an embedded sentence, the "it" does not d r o p . In (b) and (c) the passive has not applied, and "it" occurs before an embedded sentence.

If it does not drop, we get a violation, as in the (b) e x a m p l e s .

If

"it" does drop, the result is the fully g r a m m a t i c a l (c) sentences. The v e r b "hate, " however, i s exceptional in that the "it" may or m a y not be deleted. a. I hate it for John to do that.

(7-2)

b . I hate for John to do that. Although IT-DEL is an obligatory r u l e , "hate" m a y optionally undergo that rule.

VII-2 Optional exceptions like "hate " can be handled within the framework that we have a l r e a d y set up.

The basic fact about optional exceptions to some

rule is that the application or.non-application of that rule can never produce a violation in these c a s e s . In t e r m s of p l u s - and minus-valued rule features, this m e a n s that neither a p l u s - nor a minus-valued g r a m m a t i c a l rule feature can produce a contradiction in conjunction with the lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the exceptional i t e m .

This will be true if the lexical item contains the p l u s -

minus r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : |j>R(IT-DEL)]

V

[-R(IT-DEL)]]

(7-3)

This simply says that I T - D E L m a y freely apply or not apply without yielding a violation.

Note that (7-31 is equivalent to (7-4).

|T-R(IT-DEL)]3

[~R(IT-DEL)T|

(7_4)

And our m e t a r u l e s will produce (7-4) from (7-5). f[m R(IT-DEL)] 3

[m R(IT-DEL)]]

(7-5)

Thus, we can account for the facts of (7-2) if our lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of "hate" contains (7-5).

Other optional exceptions to obligatory rules can be

handled in the same way. 7. 2. Exceptions to Optional Rules In our discussion of exceptionsto obligatory r u l e s , we found it n e c e s s a r y to postulate two types of binary exception f e a t u r e s : SD-features and R - f e a t u r e s . These f e a t u r e s , combined in Boolean functions, provided a well-defined and fairly n a r r o w specification of the range of possible exceptions to syntactic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s - - c o m p a r e d to the infinite range of possibilities p e r m i t t e d by a r b i t r a r y subcategorization.

F o r each major r u l e , J., our binary exception

features defined four b a s i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s :

VII-3 1. u SD(i) and u R(i): the unmarked or ' n o r m a l ' c a s e :

(7-6)

the item may or may not m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description of J^, but if it d o e s , it m u s t undergo i. 2. u SD(i) and m R(i): simple exception: the item may m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description of_i, but may not undergo i_. 3. m SD(i) and u R(i): positive absolute exception: the item m u s t m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description of_i and, t h e r e f o r e , must undergo i. 4. m SD(i) and m R(i).'negative absolute exception: the item must not m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description of J.. However, in the case of optional r u l e s t h e r e seem to be not four, but five logical p o s s i b i l i t i e s :

VII-4 1. The ' n o r m a l ' c a s e for optional r u l e s :

(7-7)

the item may or m a y not m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description, and if it does not, it may or m a y not undergo the r u l e . No violation is possible. 2. Obligatory exception: s a m e as (7-6-1): the item may or may:.* not meet: the s t r u c t u r a l description of

rule_i, but if it does

it m u s t undergo i_. 3. Negative exception: s a m e as (7-6-2): the item m a y m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description of_i, but may not undergo i_. 4. Positive absolute exception: s a m e as (7-6-3). 5. Negative absolute exception: s a m e as (7-6-4). (7-7-1): any 'normal 1 item to which an optional rule can apply. "look up" is n o r m a l with r e s p e c t to the p a r t i c l e shift r u l e .

F o r instance,

Thus, we can

get either "John looked up the information" or "John looked the information up. " Or consider "tall" with r e s p e c t to WH-DEL: we can get either "the boy who is tall. . . " or "the tall boy. . . " (with the subsequent obligatory application of AD J-SHIFT). (7-7-2): An example is any v e r b that t a k e s a p a r t i c l e and m u s t undergo the particle shift rule if the SD of that rule is m e t : "bring t o " and "put on"(meaning "to t e a s e , joke with, or kid").

We get "The doctor brought the patient

t o " but not "#The doctor brought to the patient. « Similarly, we get "John was putting Bill on" but not "*John was putting on Bill. ' '

VII-5 (7-7-3): There seem to be no examples of this phenomenon.

In Section 4 . 4 ,

we claimed, for the sake of exposition of a different point, that adjectives like "content" w e r e examples of this phenomenon, that i s , that such adjectives could not undergo WH- DEL. We considered the examples "the boy who is content" but not "#the boy content" or "*the content boy. " However, the fact that we can get "the boy content with his lot!' shows that this analysis is wrong. (For discussion, see R e m a r k 7-1. ) If we could not get "the boy content with his lot, " then we might have a c a s e for the existence of this phenomenon. (7-7-4): Some examples a r e "gala, " "late" (meaning "deceased") and "poor" ( m e a n i n g "unfortunate"). These m u s t m e e t the SD of WH-DEL and undergo that r u l e . They m a y never occur in simple sentences or in relative c l a u s e s , but only in pre-nomihal. p o s i t i o n .

Thus, if "poor" has the meaning

"unfortunate" we get only "the poor man, " not "*the man who is p o o r " or "*the man is poor. " Similarly we get "a gala event, " but not "*an event which was gala" or "#the event is gala. " (7-7-5): We have found no examples of this phenomenon.

It would be easy to

see what such an example might be like, w e r e one to exist. Imagine an adjective '.'zilch, " which could occur only in simple sentences, but never in relative c l a u s e s or as a noun modifier, either p r e - n o m i n a l or p o s t - n o m i n a l . "Zilch" could then be d e s c r i b e d a s unable to m e e t the s t r u c t u r a l description of WH-DEL, and would be a negative absolute exception to an optional r u l e . Since our two binary exception features define only four basic c a s e s , they a r e not sufficient to define the five logically possible c a s e s of (7-7). In o r d e r to incorporate a t r e a t m e n t of optional r u l e s into the descriptive framework we have set up so far, we will m a k e use of the fact that only t h r e e

VII-6 of the five possibilities have actually been found, and we will a s s u m e that only these t h r e e a r e possible.

Should one of the two c a s e s we have excluded ever

t u r n up, then the m e t a r u l e s that we will give below will have to be r e v i s e d . Should both of these c a s e s t u r n up, our entire descriptive framework (two types of exception features) would prove to be inadequate and would have to be broadened. Of the possibilities described in (7-7-1, 2, and 4), (1) is the ' n o r m a l ' c a s e , while (2) and (4) a r e l e s s so.

We can account for this by assigning values

of exception features to these c a s e s in the following way: a. u SD(i) and u R(i): n o r m a l c a s e (7-7-1)

(7-8)

b. u SD(i) and m R(i): obligatory exception (7-7-2) c. m SD(i) and u R(i): positive absolute exception (7-7-4) d. m SD(i) and m R(i): does not exist Note that obligatory c a s e s work in optional rules just as n o r m a l c a s e s work in obligatory r u l e s (compare 7-7-2 and 7-6-1).

And positive absolute e x -

ceptions work the same way in both obligatory and optional rules (compare 7-7-4 and 7-6-3) . We will account for this in the following way.

We will

set up m e t a r u l e s that will operate on exception features that c o r r e s p o n d to optional r u l e s .

These m e t a r u l e s will apply p r i o r to the application of m e t a -

rules 1 through 5.

They will m a p n o r m a l c a s e s for optional rules into the

appropriate pluses and m i n u s e s , and they will map the other optional rule c a s e s into the corresponding obligatory rule c a s e s . Metarules 1 through 5 will then operate on the output of these m e t a r u l e s . M e t a r u l e s for optional rule c a s e s : F o r optional r u l e s , i: A. [u R (i) (L)] - [a R(i) (L)] /

u SD (i) (L) « R (i) (G)

B. [m R(i) (L)] - [ u R(i) (L)]

(7~9)

VII-7 As with minor rules (see Section 2.42), we can consider the optional rules to be given in a list, each m e m b e r of which is to be assigned the s a m e integer by our evaluation p r o c e d u r e .

Our theory would include a mechanical

procedure which takes the list of optional r u l e s as input and produces specific m e t a r u l e s of the form of (7-9).

F o r instance, if " 7 3 " were on the list of

optional r u l e s , t h e r e would be a set of m e t a r u l e s of the form: A. [u R(73) ( L ) H « R(73) (L)] /

u SD (73) (L) a R(73) (G)

(7-10)

B. [m R(73) (L)] - [u R(73) (L)] These m e t a r u l e s operate in the following m a n n e r . (A) captures the fact that in n o r m a l c a s e s , optional rules can never yield a violation. In our s y s t e m , we have defined a violation as a contradiction between g r a m m a t i c a l and lexical R-features.

(A) guarantees that for n o r m a l optional rule c a s e s such a c o n t r a -

diction can never occur.

What (A) does is to a s s i m i l a t e the value of the l e x i -

cal R-feature to that of the g r a m m a t i c a l R-feature, that i s , it m a k e s s u r e that their values will always be the s a m e .

Thus, if the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of the

complex symbol in question contains u SD ( 73) (L) •R(73)(G)

,

(7-11)

uR(73)(L)

That i s , if rule 73 has not applied, (A) will m a p (7-11) into (7-12). u SD(73) (L) •R(73) (G)

(7-12)

-R (73) (L)

If on the other hand, rule 73 has applied, the complex symbol will contain: u SD (73) (L) +R(73) (G)

+R (73) (L)

(7-13)

VII-8 (B) m a p s obligatory exceptions to optional rules (7-8-b) into n o r m a l c a s e s for obligatory rules (7-6-1).

F o r example, (B) will m a p :

u SD (73) (L)

(7-15)

m R(73) (L) into uSD(73)(L)

(7-16)

u R (73) (L) Note that (B) will also m a p the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m SD (73) (L)

(7-17)

m R (73) (L) into the positive absolute exception c a s e : m SD (73) (L )

(7-18)

u R (73) (L) Since the lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the form m SD (73) (L)

(7-19)

u SD (73) (L) a r e unchanged by m e t a r u l e s A and B, we have two s o u r c e s of positive absolute exceptions: those which s t a r t out in the lexicon in the form (7-19) and those which s t a r t out in the lexicon as (7-17).

That i s , these different lexical r e p r e -

sentations will be indistinguishable as to the way they will operate in any grammar.

Since our evaluation m e a s u r e will always p r e f e r lexicons with the few-

e s t rn_'s, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the form (7-17) will never occur in any g r a m m a r defined by our theory to which our evaluation m e a s u r e has been applied.

This

effectively r u l e s ou:fc r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the form (7-17) for optional r u l e s . Just as in the c a s e of our f o r m a l i s m for minor r u l e s , m e t a r u l e s of the form of (7-9) have no direct linguistic interpretation and make sense only in the context of the other theoretical apparatus that we have set up.

VII-9 7. 3 Canonical F o r m of [Irregularity Representations We must impose m o r e s t r u c t u r e on lexical items than simply allowing them to contain Boolean functions of m a r k e d and unmarked features.

"We will

consider the canonical form of that p a r t of a lexical item that indicates i r r e g u l a r i t i e s to consist of a conjunction of four p a r t s : 1. a. m a r k e d SD p a r t b. m a r k e d R p a r t

/ |

m a r k e d p a r t (unpredictable part)

2. a. unmarked SD parti b. unmarked R p a r t J

unmarked p a r t (predictable part)

The m a r k e d S D p a r t will be a Boolean function of m a r k e d SD features.

The

m a r k e d R p a r t will be a conjunction of: (a) m a r k e d R-features and

(b) implications of the form: [mR (X)] 13 [mR(X)], where R(X) is not in (a),

(b) is the form which optional exceptions to obligatory rules take. The unmarked SD p a r t will consist of a conjunction of unmarked SDfeatures, for all of the SD features defined by the g r a m m a r - -including those mentioned in the m a r k e d SD p a r t . The unmarked R p a r t will consist of a conjunction of unmarked R - f e a t u r e s , for all R-features defined by the g r a m mar!- -jexcepjt those mentioned in the m a r k e d R - p a r t . We will refer to these m a r k e d and unmarked p a r t s together as the i r r e g u l a r i t y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the lexical item (IR).

Note that given the

m a r k e d p a r t of an IR, the unmarked part is entirely predictable. is the c a s e , we need not mention

Since this

the unmarked part of the IR in the lexicon,

but can have it filled in by a mechanical procedure after each lexical item has been substituted into a deep s t r u c t u r e defined by the g r a m m a r .

VII-10 Consider the following example.

A s s u m e (for the sake of simplicity)

that we have a g r a m m a r with seven r u l e s .

Assume that the lexicon contains

the following i t e m : glok and ([m SD(2)]2>[m SD(4)]) and ([mR(5)]3 [mR(5)]) and [mR(6)] Marked SD part: [m SD (2)]^) [m SD (4)] Marked R p a r t : ([mR ( 5 ) ] 3 [mR(5)]) and [m R (6)] We could now predict that "glok" would have the following unmarked p a r t s : Unmarked SD p a r t : [u SD (1)] and [u SD(2)] and [u SD (3)] and [u SD(4)] and [u SD(5)] and [u SD(6)] and [u SD (7)] Unmarked R p a r t : [u R(l)] and [uR(2)] and [u R(3)] and [u R(4)] and [u R(7)] in the canonical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n that we have just given, SD-features and R-features play r a t h e r different r o l e s .

R - f e a t u r e s r e p r e s e n t only simple

e x c e p t i o n s - - c a s e s where an item m a y not undergo a major rule or may u n d e r go a minor rule.

The implications of the form ( m R ( X ) 3

only optional exceptions to obligatory r u l e s . stated in t e r m s of SD-features.

m

R(X)) r e p r e s e n t

All other r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e

The m o s t interesting of these r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e

those that involve constraints between r u l e s : lexical i t e m s that m u s t undergo one rule if they have undergone another (see 6-6).

F i r s t we will show that

such constraints can be given in t e r m s of SD-features alone, and then we will show why they cannot be stated in t e r m s of R - f e a t u r e s .

VII-11 Recall that our m e t a r u l e s a r e 1. [m R(i) ( L ) H - R ( i ) (L)]

R (i) CD

2. [m SD (i) ( L ) H - S D ( i ) (L)] /

3. [u SD fi) ( L ) H « S.D(i) (L)] / ; ^ S D 4. [m SD(i) (L)]-[+SD (i) (L)]

5. [u R (i) [ a R

(i) (L) ] /

a S D (i) (G)

That i s , we could a s s i m i l a t e the unmarked R - f e a t u r e s to their corresponding grammatical SD-features.

Note that we could still not eliminate the unmarked

SD-part, since its p r e s e n c e is n e c e s s a r y if we a r e to state rules such as (VII) in R e m a r k 7 - 1 . We will a s s u m e the latter solution.

We will adopt m e t a r u l e 5' above

instead of m e t a r u l e 5. Let us now consider c a s e s 2 and 3. Case 2 . Before any mjs and JL'S have been converted to - ' s and + ' s , and before the unmarked part has been predicted, we would have: ( [ m S D (i) (L) ] 3 [ m S D ( 2 ) (L) ])

+SD(1) (G) +R (1) (G) -SD (2) (G) ^ R (2) (G)

,

gurk

After predicting the unmarked part: +SD(1) (G)

([m SD (1) (L) ] 3 [m SD (2) (L) ]

+R (1) (G)

u S D (1) (L)

-SD (2) (G)

u SD (2) (L)

-R (2) (G)

u R (1) (L) u R (2) (L) gurk

VII-15 Metarules 1 and 2 a r e i r r e l e v a n t and don't o p e r a t e .

Metarules!3a,nd4 yield: :

+SD (1) (G)

([+SD(1) (L)]^[+SD(2) (L)])

+R(1) (g)

+SD(1) (L)

-SD(2) (G)

-SD(2) (L)

-R(2) (G)

uR(l) (L) uR(2) (L) gurk

Our new m e t a r u l e 5' will, now give u s : +SD(1) (G)

([+SD(1) (L)]D[+SD(2) (L)])

+R(1) (G)

+SD (1)(L)

-SD(2) (G)

-SD(2) (L)

-R(2) (G)

+R(D (D -R(2) (L) gurk

This yields a violation. Case 3. Before any m ' s and u ' s have been converted to - ' s and +'s, and before the unmarked R p a r t has been predicted we would have: +SD(1) (G)

[mSD(l) ( L ) ] 3 [ m S D ( 2 ) (L)]

+R(1) (G) +SD(2) (G) +R (2) (G)

£urk

VII-16 After the unmarked R p a r t has been predicted, we would have: +SD(1) (G)

[m SD(1 ) (L)]D [m SD(2) (L)]|

+R(D (G)

u SD (1) (L)

+SD(2) (G)

u SD(2) (L)

+R(2) (G)

uR(l) (L)

i

uR (2) (L) gurk Metarules 3 and 4 yield: +SD (1) (G)

([+SD(1) ( L ) ] ^ [ + S D (2) (L)])

+R(1> (G)

+SD (1) (L)

+SD(2) (G)

+SD(2) (L)

+R(2) (G)

u R (1) (L) u R(2) (L) gurk

Metarule 5 1 yields: +SD(1) (G)

[+SD(1) (L)]3 [+SD(2) (L)]

+R(D (G)

+SD (1) (L)

+SD (2) (G)

+SD(2) (L)

+R(2) (G)

+R(1) ( D +R(2) (L) gurk

Result: no violation. So far we have shown that a r e s t r i c t i o n of the form ([m SD(1)]

J

[m SD(2)]) is a r e s t r i c t i o n on rules t h a t s t a t e s t h a t if rule 1 applies, rule 2 must also apply.

We have not yet shown that this is not a statement about s t r u c -

tural descriptions.

To show this we would have to show that if both s t r u c t u r a l

VII-17 d e s c r i p t i o n s ' w e r e met, we would still get a violation unless both rules also applied.

This is true since m e t a r u l e 5' r e q u i r e s a rule to apply if its SD has

been m e t .

F o r example, suppose both s t r u c t u r a l descriptions were met,

but neither rule had applied.

After the prediction of the unmarked R p a r t of

"gurk" and the application of m e t a r u l e 4, we would have: +SD(1) (G)

([+SD(1) (L)]3[+SD(2) (L)]) '

-R(l) (G)

+SD(1) (L)

+SD(2) (G)

+SD (2) (L)

-R(2) (G)

u R(l) ( D u R(2) (L) gurk

Metarule 5' yields: +SD(1) (G)

[+SD(1) (L)]D[+SD(2) (L)]

-R(l ) (G)

+SD(1) (L)

+SD(2) (G)

+SD(2) (L)

-R(2) (G)

+R(1) ( D +R(2) (L) gurk

Result: violation.

VII-18 Our r e v i s e d m e t a r u l e s a r e : 1.

[m R(i) (L)] - [-R(i) (L)]

2.

[m SD(i) (L)] - [-SD(i) (L)] /

-R(i) ( D

3.

[uSD(i)(L)]-[aSD(i) (L)]/

~a SD(i) (G)

4.

[m SD(i) (L)] - [+SD(i) (L)]

5*

[u R(i) (L)] - [r negatives.

In sentences that contain negatives, but

not any other conditioning environment for "any, " "any" may occur only after the v e r b in the sentence.

It m a y not occur in subject position.

Thus, we can

get John didn't see anyone.

(9-10a)

but not *Anyone didn't see John.

(9-10b)

This condition is quite general throughout the language, with c e r t a i n apparent exceptions, among them "dissuade. " Since "dissuade" is inherently negative, we would c o r r e c t l y predict that we would get sentences like

IX-7 John dissuaded H a r r y from seeing anyone.

(9~11)

However, one would also predict the o c c u r r e n c e of the following sentence: *John dissuaded anyone from seeing H a r r y .

(9-12)

But "any, " unpredictably, may not occur with the (surface) direct object of "dissuade, " u n l e s s , of c o u r s e , "dissuade" also undergoes n o r m a l negation: John didn't dissuade anyone from seeing H a r r y .

(9~13)

We can account for the n o n - o c c u r r e n c e of (9"12) and for the relation between ' 'dissuade" and " p e r s u a d e " if we hypothesize the following lexical item for "dissuade." It will be negative in the ordinary sense and -will, like the corresponding sense of "persuade, " be assigned the lexical reading .

The resultant lexical meaning will therefore be "to not intend"

Thus, it will be the ordinary negative of the lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of " p e r suade " (9-6).

Like its opposite, "dissuade" will also be an absolute e x c e p -

tion to the causative transformation and to ID-NP -DEL.

Thus, we would have

the following lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for " d i s s u a d e : " dissuade and and [NEGATIVE] and [from-ing-COMP] and [m SD(CAUSATIVE)] and [m R (CAUSATIVE )] and [m SD(ID-NP-DEL)]

(9"14)

The deep s t r u c t u r e underlying "John dissuaded H a r r y from leaving" would b e :

IX-8 (9-15)

+CAUSATIVE +PRO

it

NP-

VP

J

arry dissuade

NEGATIVE] From-Ing-COMP] m SD(ID-NP-DEL)] m SD(CAUSATIVE)] m R(CAUSATIVE)]

from H a r r y ING leave

After the application of ID-NP-DEL, I T - D E L , and CAUSATIVE, the d e rived s t r u c t u r e would b e : (9-16)

NPr"^

John from leaving Note that the derived direct object of "dissuade" in (9~16) is the underlying subject of "dissuade" in

(9-15).

The rule which produces "any" after a nega-

tive applies cyclically, from the most deeply embedded S to the highest S . If a deep s t r u c t u r e like (9-15) is given as input to a transformational cycle containing this rule, the rule, on the second p a s s of the cycle, will apply to the s u b t r e e :

IX-9 (9-17)

[NEGATIVE]

from someone

leaving

Since N P 2 is the subject of "dissuade 1 ' at this point in the derivation, " s o m e " cannot be converted to "any. " Since N P ? ultimately winds up a s the surface direct object of "dissuade, " it follows that the surface d i r e c t object of "dissuade" m a y not contain "any. " 9. 2 Inchoatives Consider the words "kill, " "die, " and "dead. " What do these words have in common and how.are they r e l a t e d ? "Kill" m e a n s "to cause ( s o m e one) to die. " Thus, we can look upon "kill" as having the same lexical m e a n ing a s "die, " but to be an absolute exception to the causative transformation. But what about "die" i t s e l f ? How is it r e l a t e d to "dead?" "Die" essentially means "to come to be dead. " Thus, we can consider "die" as having the same lexical meaning as "dead" and to be an absolute exception to the inchoative t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (see Section 4.15). con

We can r e p r e s e n t "die" in the lexi-

as follows: die and and [m SD(INCHOATIVE)] and [m R(INCHOATIVE)] (9-18)

The deep s t r u c t u r e underlying "John died" would then b e :

IX-10 (9-19)

+V -Adj +INCHOATIVE +PRO

N ilt for John to be die

+V +Adj m SD(INCHOATIVE) m R(INCHOATIVE) The derivation would proceed as in (4-19 through 23).

The derived s t r u c t u r e

would be: (9-20)

NP'

John

-VP

1

died

If we r e p r e s e n t "kill" a s having the same lexical meaning as "die.

!l

but as being an absolute exception to the causative transformation as well, we would have the following lexical i t e m : kill and and [m R(INCHOATIVE)>nd [m SD (CAUSATIVE)] and [m R(CAUSATIVE)] The deep s t r u c t u r e underlying "John killed B i l l " would then b e :

(9-21)

IX-11

(9-22)

+V + CAUSATIVE + PRO

VP

I

V

_

I

+v + ADJ + INCHAOTIVE + PRO f o r B i l l t o be

Kill

+V + ADJ m R (INCHO) mSD(CAUS) mR(CAUS)

T h e d e r i v e d s t r u c t u r e would be:

(9-23)

NP

killed

Bill

IX-12 In this way, "kill," " d i e , " and "dead" could be r e p r e s e n t e d as having the s a m e lexical reading and lexical b a s e , but different lexical extensions. Consider the following s e n t e n c e s : 1. The c a r is near the g a r a g e . (9-24)

2.

v

The c a r n e a r e d the g a r a g e .

'

3. The c a r approached the g a r a g e . " N e a r " in (1) is usually analyzed as a preposition.

Yet p h r a s e s such a s "the

c a r ' s n e a r n e s s to the g a r a g e " would seem to indicate that " n e a r " is an adjective, since it can be nominalized and can take the adjective ending " - n e s s . " If we a s s u m e that " n e a r " in (1) is a transitive adjective, as it s e e m s that we must, then we can r e l a t e (1) and (2) in a very natural way: we can derive (2) from an underlying form containing (1) by the inchoative transformation.

The

underlying s t r u c t u r e of (2) would then b e : S NP

(9-25)

-VP !

N it

r-l

the garage for the c a r to be near

m R(INCHO)

—

+v +INCHOATIVE +PRO

The derivation of (2) would then be parallel to (4-19 through 23). Since INCHOATIVE is a minor rule, " n e a r " would have to contain the feature [ m R(INCHOATIVE)] . Now consider (3). (3) is synonymous with (2), and the verb "to approach" s e e m s to be synonymous with the verb "to n e a r " in (2). Since the verb "to n e a r " in (2) must be derived via the inchoative transformation from the adjective " n e a r " in order to r e l a t e (1) and (2), it

IX-13 does not s e e m unreasonable to derive "approach" in a p a r a l l e l way from a hypothetical lexical item with the same lexical meaning a s the adjective "near. " Thus, the lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for " approach" might be: approach and and [m R(INCHOATIVE )] and (9-26)

[m SD(INCHOATIVE)] Thus the deep s t r u c t u r e of (3) would b e :

(9-27)

S

N

.1

it the garage for the c a r to be Spproach

m R (INCHO) m SD(INCHO)

+V +INCHOATIVE +PRO

Before proceeding, we ought to counter an obvious argument considering " n e a r " an adjective.

against

Consider the sentence

John shot Bill near the house.

(9-28)

In (9-28) " n e a r " is usually analyzed as a preposition and "near the h o u s e " a s a locative prepositional p h r a s e modifying "shot Bill. " The following analysis of (9"28) is often given: (9-29) NB N

John

IX-14 But such an analysis cannot explain how we understand the question: Did John shoot Bill near the h o u s e ? (with n o r m a l intonation)

(9-30)

i

It is normally the c a s e in questions that the uppermost VP(or perhaps the entire P r e d . P . - - i f such a node exists) is what is questioned.

Thus in

"Does John like ice c r e a m ? " a "No" answer a s s e r t s that John does not like ice c r e a m .

In "Did John shoot B i l l ? " (normal intonation) a "No" answer a s -

s e r t s that John's shooting of Bill did not take place.

However, in (9-30) what

is being questioned is not whether or not the shooting took place. sumed that the shooting did takeiplace, location of the event.

It is a s -

and what is being questioned is the

A "No" answer to (9-30) only denies that it was n e a r the

house that the shooting took p l a c e .

Considerations such as this (and others

mentioned in Appendix F) lead one to postulate that sentences like (9-28) a r e derived from deep s t r u c t u r e s like: (9-31) NPV

_ I . near house John Structures like(9 - 31) underlie not only sentences like (9-28), but also sentences like (9-32), It was near the house that John shot Bill.

(9-32)

Note that the negative of (9-28), namely, John didn't shoot Bill n e a r the house. is synonymous with

(9~33)

IX-15 It was not n e a r the house that John shot Bill.

(9-34)

(9~33) does not deny that the shooting took place, but only denies that it was n e a r t h e . house.

Note that (9-33) is not synonymous with the non-sentence:

*It was near the house that John didn't shoot Bill.

(9~35)

The n o n - o c c u r r e n c e of (9-35) is due to the fact (however, it is to be r e p r e s e n t e d formally) that one cannot a s s e r t the location of an event which did not occur. These considerations would lead us to believe that the " n o t " of (9~33) is a s s o ciated in the deep s t r u c t u r e of that sentence with the VP "near the h o u s e " in (9-31) and not with the VP "shoot Bill. " Although this by no means proves that " n e a r " is an adjective, it does show that the existence of sentences like (9-28) is i r r e l e v a n t to the question. Consider the following s e n t e n c e s : 1. a. John is in the room.

(9"36)

b. John entered the r o o m . 2. a. John is out of the room, b. John left the room. "In " and "out" a r e intuitively felt to be opposites in some s e n s e .

" E n t e r " and

"leave" a r e opposites in a s i m i l a r s e n s e . And " e n t e r " is related to "in" in the same way as "leave" is related to "out. " Moreover, each of the above (b) sentences entails its corresponding (a) sentence . "We can account for these facts if we a s s u m e that "in " and "out, " like "near, " a r e t r a n s i t i v e adjectives.

This m a k e s some sense since "in" and

"out" in (9-36) have independent cognitive content and can be looked at semantically a s two-place p r e d i c a t e s relating "John" and "the room. " By the same arguments that we used with "near," all other o c c u r r e n c e s of

IX-16 locative "in" and "out" can be reduced to the above case in underlying a n a l y ses.

Thus, it is not implausible to consider these words as transitive ad-

jectives.

If we do so we can set up the following hypothetical lexical i t e m s

for " e n t e r " and "leave. " enter and and [+V] and [+STATIVE] and [m SD(INCHOATIVE)] and m R (INCHOATIVE)] leave and and [+V] and [+STATIVE] and [m SD(INCHOATIVE)] and [m R(INCHOATIVE)]

(9-37)

Like "approach, " "enter" and "leave" can be considered absolute exceptions to the inchoative transformation, with "enter" having the meaning of "in" and "leave" having the meaning of "out. " Thus, "John entered the r o o m " would have the following underlying s t r u c t u r e :

IX-17

Note that the embedded S in (9-38) is semantically equivalent to the underlying s t r u c t u r e of "John is in the room. " In this way we can explain the fact that in (9-36) (lb) entails (la). Consider the following: 1. a. John has the book.

(9-39)

b. John doesn't have the book. 2. a. John gained the book, b . John lost the book. In these sentences, (2a) entails (la) and (2b) entails (lb).

"Gain" and "lose"

a r e opposites in the same way as "have" and "not have" a r e . And "gain" is related to "have" as " l o s e " is related to "not have. " We can r e p r e s e n t these facts by considering "gain" and " l o s e " as absolute exceptions to the inchoative transformation and by setting up appropriate lexical i t e m s in which "gain" has the lexical meaning "have" and "lose" has the lexical meaning "not have. "

IX-18 gain and and [+V] and [+STATIVE] and [m SD( INCHOATIVE)] and [m R(INCHOATIVE)] lose and[HAVE]and [NEGATIVE] and [+V] and [+STATIVE] and m SD(INCHOATIVE)] and [m R(INCHOATIVE)]

(9-40)

The deep structure underlying "John lost the book" would then be: (9-41) -VP

I

V +INCH.OATIVE +PRO

[NEG] +V +STATIVE m SD(INCHO) mR(INCHO)

Det the

book

Note that the embedded S is semantically equivalent to the deep s t r u c t u r e of "John doesn't have the book. "

IX-19 "Gain" and "lose" a r e typical examples of a change on the one hand and a change in a r e v e r s e direction on the other.

Given the above r e p r e s e n t a -

tions for these words, we can r e p r e s e n t the notion of " r e v e r s e change" in t e r m s of the m o r e primitive notions of "inchoative" and "negative. " A m o r e complicated example is the following: 1. a. John activated the bomb.

(9~42)

b. John deactivated the bomb. 2. a. John nasalizes his vowels (when he imitates a Frenchman), b. John denasalizes his vowels (when he i m i t a t e s an a c t o r ) . I 1 . a. John caused the bomb to become active. b. John caused the bomb to become inactive. 2'. a. John m a k e s his vowels become nasal (when he i m i t a t e s a F r e n c h man) . b. John m a k e s his vowels become non-nasal (when he imitates an actor). 1. a. The bomb activated (when the fire reached it).

(9-43)

b . The bomb deactivated (during the r a i n s t o r m ) . 2. a. John's vowels nasalize (before voiced consonants). b . John's vowels denasalize (before unvoiced consonants). 1'. a. The bomb became active (when the fire reached i t . ) b. The bomb became inactive; (during the r a i n s t o r m ). 2 ' . a. John's vowels become n a s a l (before voiced consonants). b. John's vowels become non-nasal (before unvoiced consonants).

IX- 20 The p r i m e d sentences (') in each of the ^preceding examples a r e synonymous with t h e i r corresponding unprimed sentences.

(Recall that we a r e using

the word "cause" in the sense we defined in 4.16. ) We can account for this synonymy and for the various relationships between the sentences if we derive the unprimed from the s t r u c t u r e s underlying the p r i m e d sentences.

F o r exam-

ple, (9-42, 1. b . ) would be derived through the causative and inchoative t r a n s formations from the following underlying s t r u c t u r e : (9-44)

NP John

+V +C AUSATIVE +PRO

VP

NP th/

VP bomb

V +V +Adj +Neg active

+V +INCHO +PRO

IX-21 Note that the s t r u c t u r e starting with the second highest S would underlie (9-43, L b . ) Using such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s we can derive r e v e r s e p r o c e s s e s and their causatives.'in a.very n a t u r a l way.

We can also state a very simple rule in

English for the addition of the prefix

f,

de-" in the above e x a m p l e s : " d e - " is

added to adjectives that a r e negative and that undergo the inchoative t r a n s f o r mation. 9. 3 Justification When we incorporated the notion of absolute exception into our theory of g r a m m a r , we i n c r e a s e d the c l a s s of possible lexical items to include the hypothetical ones discussed in this section.

defined by the theory Although we have

shown that causatives and inchoatives can be adequately r e p r e s e n t e d by the use of absolute exception features, we certainly have not ruled out other possible ways of r e p r e s e n t i n g them.

What we have shown is that, by using the independ-

ently motivated notion of an absolute exception and the independently motivated causative and inchoative transformations,we can d e s c r i b e many facts about causatives and inchoatives.

We can a l s o simplify our theory of g r a m m a r by

eliminating the possible primitive notion: " r e v e r s e p r o c e s s . " Other t h e o r i e s m a y exist in which it is possible to account for all of these facts with equal generality and to make the same simplification. To m y knowledge, no other such theory has yet been proposed. (See R e m a r k 9-2. )

x-i 10. Some Speculations on Universal G r a m m a r As r e s e a r c h in the transformational g r a m m a r of various languages has turned up base components which look m o r e or less alike, speculation has grown that the base components of all n a t u r a l languages m a y t u r n out to be i d e n t i c a l - - a t least in the g r a m m a t i c a l relations that they define.

That i s , the

base component, r a t h e r than being an idiosyncratic p a r t of the p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a r s of individual languages, m a y be p a r t of the theory of language, namely, that which c h a r a c t e r i z e s n a t u r a l language and that which every child has inherent knowledge of p r i o r to learning his native language. Similar speculation has centered on the possibility that the semantic component may also be u n i v e r s a l .

In view of the paucity of our knowledge in

these a r e a s , both proposals m u s t r e m a i n in the r e a l m of speculation for some time to come.

Yet they form e m p i r i c a l hypotheses of considerable i n t e r e s t ,

and point the way to what m a y be useful r e s e a r c h . Of c o u r s e , the proposal that the base component is u n i v e r s a l is totally empty in the absence of any other strong constraints on the form of g r a m m a r . However, given p a r t i c u l a r constraints on the form of transformational rules and on other a s p e c t s of g r a m m a r , it becomes an e m p i r i c a l question a s to whether a theory of language constrained in such a way will define adequate g r a m m a r s for two languages, such that those g r a m m a r s have the same base component.

F o r instance, given the constraints on the form of g r a m m a r

that we have proposed so f a r - - ( l ) ' t h a t a r b i t r a r y subcategorization be ruled out, (2) that g r a m m a t i c a l transformations not be permitted to refer to p a r ticular lexical i t e m s , and (3) that possible exceptions be defined in the way that we have specified--it may be the c a s e that these constraints a r e not

X-2 compatible with the hypothesis of a u n i v e r s a l base component (if, indeed, they a r e compatible with one another).

On the other hand, if these independently

motivated constraints were to t u r n out to be compatible with the u n i v e r s a l base hypothesis, it would be an interesting fact about natural language. The e m p i r i c a l hypothesis of a u n i v e r s a l base component and a u n i v e r s a l semantic component--if they can be maintained together with well-motivated constraints on the form of g r a m m a r - - c o u l d help explain such phenomena a s a child's ability to l e a r n his native language.

If it could be a s s u m e d that the

child had in advance a built-in mechanism that defined the set of possible deep s t r u c t u r e s with which he had to a s s o c i a t e the a b s t r a c t representations that he perceived of the speech sounds that reached his e a r s , then the child's job of formulating a theory to m a t c h surface s t r u c t u r e s with deep s t r u c t u r e s might be conceived of as being within the r e a l m of the possible.

The assumption

of a fixed base s t r u c t u r e would greatly limit the number of g r a m m a r s defined by the theory, that i s , the number of g r a m m a r s available to the child.

As

things now stand in the study of g r a m m a r , the number of g r a m m a r s defined by our p r e s e n t t h e o r i e s is so large that it is inconceivable that a child could choose among them and find an adequate one within the short span of time in which he actually l e a r n s his native language. In Section 8. 3, we considered another possible constraint on the g r a m m a r s of natural languages: that lexical b a s e s be predictable from the s e m a n tic readings of lexical i t e m s .

By "semantic reading" we mean only one of

the many s e n s e s of a lexical i t e m : in Fodor-Katz t e r m s , a single path through the t r e e of semantic m a r k e r s .

We could, of c o u r s e , consider a stronger hy-

p o t h e s i s - - t h a t each feature of the lexical base associated with a sense of a

X-3 lexical item be predictable from a single semantic m a r k e r of that s e n s e . For example, the syntactic feature [+animate] might be predicted from the s e m a n tic m a r k e r , or the syntactic feature [-stative] for verbs might be predicted from the semantic m a r k e r .

Such a hypothesis would state,

among other things, that if two lexical i t e m s had partially s i m i l a r lexical m e a n ings, and if the s i m i l a r i t y lay in those semantic m a r k e r s like from which syntactic features could be predicted, then the two lexical i t e m s would have partially s i m i l a r lexical b a s e s . but we will not consider it h e r e .

This may well be a feasible position,

We mention it only to distinguish it from the

weaker hypothesis which is under c o n s i d e r a t i o n - - t h a t the collection of the features in the lexical base associated with a single sense of a lexical i t e m i s predictable from the collection of semantic m a r k e r s that make up that sense. (See R e m a r k 1.0-1. ) This hypothesis--which we will call the lexical base h y p o t h e s i s - - i s , of c o u r s e , not obviously true and could be falsified. [

Observe that the feature

NP] m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y be a possible lexical base feature, no m a t t e r how

narrowly one construes the notion "lexical b a s e . " Therefore, one way in which the lexical base hypothesis could be falsified would be for someone to find two synonyms, one of which was t r a n s i t i v e and the other intransitive (in the deep s t r u c t u r e , of c o u r s e ) .

It i s hard to imagine what such a pair of synonyms would

be like (since this phenomenon does not appear to occur in natural language), but it is certainly logically possible that such a phenomenon could exist. Note that since the features of the lexical base a r e in p a r t introduced in the base component (inherent features) and in p a r t defined with r e s p e c t to the base component (contextual features), such a hypothesis can make sense only

X-4 within the context of a theory in which the base component is universal.

Since

the lexical b a s e hypothesis must a s s u m e the u n i v e r s a l base hypothesis, it is at least as likely, a p r i o r i , to be incompatible with other constraints on the form of g r a m m a r .

It would be an interesting fact should it turn out to be

compatible with such c o n s t r a i n t s . Whether or not the lexical base hypothesis should be maintained is at this time an open question which, for lack of knowledge, can hardly be sensibly d e bated.

What we would like to do is to point out what some of the consequences

of this hypothesis would b e - - t h e facts it could explain, the c l a i m s it would make, and the sort of r e s e a r c h it might lead to. A s we pointed out in 8. 3, one immediate consequence of the lexical base hypothesis would be that synonyms would have the same lexical b a s e s - that i s , they would have the s a m e deep s t r u c t u r e distribution and any differences in surface s t r u c t u r e distribution would be due to differences in their lexical extensions.

This would account for our intuition, which has long

been articulated by g r a m m a r i a n s , that meaning in some sense d e t e r m i n e s distribution, though it by no m e a n s does so p r e c i s e l y . In a theory in which the lexical base hypothesis is assumed, we can p r e sent c e r t a i n formal arguments to account for our intuitions.

Consider the

following: 1. a. Writing papers is difficult for m e .

(10-1)

b. Writing p a p e r s is hard for m e . 2. a. My difficulty at writing p a p e r s . . . . b. *My h a r d n e s s at writing p a p e r s . . . . As we observed in A-6, F L I P and NOMINALIZATION a r e mutually exclusive.

Therefore, in VERBS that can undergo F L I P , the underlying

subject shows up in the genitive when NOMINALIZATION applies.

We can e x -

plain the relationship between (la) and (2a) if we a s s u m e that F L I P has o c c u r r e d in the derivation of (la), but that, as one would expect, it has not o c c u r r e d in the derivation of (2a).

There does not seem to be any other well-motivated

way of explaining the relationship between (la) and (2a),

Thus, (2a) shows

that "I" is the underlying subject of (la), even though it a p p e a r s in object p o s i tion.

However, because of the n o n - o c c u r r e n c e of (2b)', we cannot make the

same argument for "hard" a s we did for "difficult. " But if we a s s u m e the l e x i cal b a s e hypothesis, we can argue that since "hard" and "difficult" a r e synonymous, in (1), they have the same lexical b a s e .

We could then a r g u e , on

this b a s i s , that " I " is the underlying subject of (lb), since it is in (la).

This

would reflect our intuition that (la) displays the same g r a m m a t i c a l relations a s (lb). Since our intuitions about lexical synonymy a r e usually better than our intuitions about underlying g r a m m a t i c a l r e l a t i o n s , the lexical base hypot h e s i s - - i f it could be maintained--would p e r m i t us to use the former to gain insight about the l a t t e r . The lexical base hypothesis would make claims not only about synonyms within a language, but about synonyms a c r o s s languages.

Thus, if a lexical

item in language A is synonymous with one in language B, the lexical base hypothesis would claim that the two i t e m s have the same lexical b a s e . Thus, g r a m m a t i c a l information about one language would be quite relevant to the g r a m m a t i c a l analysis of another language.

This would be completely con-

t r a r y to the methodological t h e o r i e s (though not the p r a c t i c e s ) of m o s t m o d e r n linguists, including transformational g r a m m a r i a n s . Yet, in this. case,, the lexical b a s e hypothesis would explain, a v e r y deep fact about language (which

X-6 was pointed out by Postal in personal communication).

When an adult learns

a foreign language and is taught what a new word means, there are certain facts about that word that he knows immediately and that he does not have to be taught. An English speaker learning the Mohawk verb meaning "to try" does not have to be taught not to say the Mohawk equivalents of "The idea tried the rock" or ''The rock tried to go" or "That Bill went there tried. " Instead, he knows automatically that a verb meaning "to try" must take an animate subject and an abstract object.

This is the sort of thing that a language

teacher never has to teach, and it is something that one will never find in a pedagogical grammar.

One simply does not have to learn that the Turkish word

for "table" i s inanimate and concretej one knows it in advance, and it is inconceivable that it could be otherwise.

Someone (for instance, the author) who

does not know a word of Hungarian can be completely certain that the Hungarian verb meaning "to hate" takes animate subjects and that the Hungarian verb meaning "to believe" takes animate subjects and abstract objects.

This is a

very deep fact about language which the lexical base hypothesis could explain. Note that the lexical base hypothesis does not make a claim about which features may compose a lexical base, just as the universal base hypothesis is quite distinct from a proposal that a particular set of base rules is universal. Indeed, any proposal that lexical bases may be composed of a given set of features would depend strongly on a proposal for a particular set of base rules, and vice versa.

Because the set of base, rules and the features of possible

lexical bases are intimately bound up with one another, it is quite conceivable that evidence about syntactic features of lexical bases could shed some light on what the universal base rules should be (if they exist). (See Remark 10-2.)

APPENDIX

A-l

A A d j e c t i v e s and V e r b s We w i l l t r y t o p r e s e n t a c a s e for t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t adjectives

and v e r b s a r e m e m b e r s of a s i n g l e l e x i c a l c a t e g o r y (which we will

c a l l V E R B ) and t h a t t h e y differ only by a s i n g l e s y n t a c t i c f e a t u r e (which we will call ADJECTIVAL). Of t h e following a r g u m e n t s , 1, 4 , 5, 7, and 9 w e r e w o r k e d out by P o s t a l and by t h e a u t h o r , w o r k i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y . 2, 6, and 8 a r e due s o l e l y t o P o s t a l . 3 w a s p o i n t e d out b y L e s t e r R i c e . A - l Grammatical Relations T h e r e a r e a g r e a t m a n y p a i r s of s e n t e n c e s w h i c h a r e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e s a m e way, i n w h i c h one c o n t a i n s a v e r b w h e r e t h e o t h e r c o n t a i n s an a d j e c t i v e . For example, (1) a. I r e g r e t t h a t .

(A-l)

b . I a m s o r r y about t h a t . (2) a. I like j a z z . b . I a m fond of j a z z . (3) a. I forgot t h a t f a c t . b . I w a s o b l i v i o u s of t h a t fact. (4) a. I know about t h a t . b.

I a m c o g n i z a n t of t h a t .

b 1 . I a m a w a r e of t h a t . T h e r e a r e o t h e r p a i r s of t h e s a m e s o r t , w h e r e t h e a d j e c t i v e a n d v e r b s e e m to be the s a m e l e x i c a l i t e m .

(1) a. I d e s i r e that.

(A-2)

b. I a m desirous of that. (2) a. John hopes that peace will come soon. b . John is hopeful that peace will come soon. (3) a. I fear that the Dodgers will win. b. I am fearful that the Dodgers will win. (4) a. John considers M a r y ' s feelings. b. John is considerate of M a r y ' s feelings. (5) a. That will please John. b. That will be pleasing to John. (6) a. That excites m e . b. That is exciting to m e . (7) a. Our actions in the Dominican Republic appal m e . b. Our actions in the Dominican Republic a r e appalling'to m e . (8) a. Massachusetts politics amuses m e . b. Massachusetts politics i s ' a m u s i n g to m e . • (9) a. Cigarettes h a r m people. b. Cigarettes a r e harmful to people. (10) a. The P r e s i d e n t ' s decision s u r p r i s e d m e . b. The P r e s i d e n t ' s decision was s u r p r i s i n g to m e . In m o s t of the above c a s e s , the (a) and (b) sentences differ only in that the (b) sentences contain be + adjective + preposition where the (a) sentences contain a verb.

These differences a r e quite superficial.

The auxiliary v e r b , be,

s e r v e s only to c a r r y the tense m a r k e r before adjectives, in just the same way a s do c a r r i e s the tense m a r k e r before verbs in negative and question

A-3 sentences.

Although no preposition appears after the verb in the surface struc-

ture of the (a) sentences, there is good reason to believe that the preposition is there onr some level of analysis, since prepositions do show up when verbs are nominalized. Thus we get: a. My fear of_rain.. -I fear rain.

(A-3)

b. My liking for jazz. . .^->I like jazz. c. John's desire for Mary. . .4-^.John desires Mary. d. John's consideration of Mary's feelings. . .-^-^.John considers Mary's feelings. It appears that there is a late rule in English which drops prepositions after verbs that have not been nominalized.

It is a moot question whether

such prepositions appear in the deep structures of the above sentences or whether they are introduced by "spelling rules" which insert them before the object noun phrase as a kind of case marking.

I will assume that the latter

is the case, though this assumption will not matter in any of the following arguments.

Similarly, it is not clear at present whether tense markings should

be introduced as part of an auxiliary constituent or as features of verbs and adjectives, which are later inserted before the adjective or verb by spelling rules.

I will assume the latter, though again the arguments to follow will be

independent of this assumption. It seems highly significant that the (a) and (b) sentences of (A-l and 2) are understood in the same way and this fact seems to be a consequence of the presence of the same grammatical relationships in each pair of sentenc e s . For example, in the sentences

H

I like John" and MI am fond of John, "

A-4 "fond" s e e m s to bear the same relation to "John" as "like" b e a r s to "John. " And "John" s e e m s to b e a r the same relation to "like" as it does to "fond. " But, in order for "like" and "fond" to be involved in the same g r a m m a t i c a l relations, they would have to be m e m b e r s of the same lexical category. Of c o u r s e , just because the (a) and (b) sentences of (A-l and 2) a r e synonymous and seem to be understood in the same way, it does not n e c e s s a r ily follow that the same g r a m m a t i c a l relations hold in each pair of sentences. It might very well be the case that the semantic component of a g r a m m a r of English might have projection rules that i n t e r p r e t two different sets of g r a m m a t i c a l relations as though they were identical. Thus, it might be the c a s e that the projection rules of English i n t e r p r e t the following two s t r u c t u r e s in exactly the same way: (a)

S,

(A-4)

y^

NP BE

FRED ADJ

PP P

NP

NSIP

VP V

NP

Though we do not rule this alternative out as a possibility, we would argue that the semantic component would be simpler if it had to contain only projection rules to i n t e r p r e t one of these s t r u c t u r e s .

Still, such a s i m p l i -

fication in the semantic component could be offset if our assumption were to hopelessly complicate the syntactic component of a g r a m m a r of English.

As

A-5 we will try to show below, this does not seem to be the case.

We will argue

that, just as we do not lose anything semantically by making this assumption, so : we do not lose anything syntactically either.

On the contrary, it seems that

this assumption points the way to greater syntactic generalization. We -ought to present some examples of the kinds of grammatical analyses that we have in mind.

We would represent the derivations of "I like John" and

"I am fond of John" as in (A-5).

Note that the deep structures of these senten-

ces (a-i and b-i) are nearly identical. *. (i) DEEP STRUCTURE

(A-5)

NP

(ii) PREP-SPELLING

(Note, If nominalization occurred at this point in the derivation, we would, get "my liking of_ John. ")

(iii) P R E P - D E L E T I O N S NP

like b. (i) D E E P STRUCTURE S NP

(ii) TENSE-SPELLING

John

A-7 (iii) PREP-SPELLING

NP N

John (iv) BE-ADDITION NP_ NP N

A-2 Selectional Restrictions P e r h a p s the m o s t striking syntactic s i m i l a r i t y between adjectives and verbs is the fact that they take almost all of the same contextual r e s t r i c t i o n s . Taking into account, as we did in the preceding section, that the p r e s e n c e of "be" in front of adjectives and prepositions after them is a superficial phenomenon, we can speak of transitive adjectives, just a s we can speak of t r a n s itive v e r b s , as having the feature [+= a r e examples.

NP). All of the adjectives in (A-1 and 2)

Similarly, we can speak of intransitive adjectives, just a s we

can speak of intransitive v e r b s . F o r example,

A-8 a. John is alive.

(A"6)

b . John walks. Both have the feature [+ .44§. Moreover, adjectives and verbs can take the s a m e kinds of subjects and objects. a. Animate subject:

(A-7)

I know that fact. I am aware of that fact. •The rock knows that fact. •The rock is aware of that fact. D

- Physical object subject: The box weighs a lot. The box i s very heavy. •Sincerity weighs a lot. •Sincerity is v e r y heavy.

c. Abstract subject: His running away meant that we would have to leave. His running away was equivalent to t r e a s o n . •The rock meant

that we would have to leave.

•The rock was equivalent to t r e a s o n . d. Animate objects: Bill hurt John. Bill was brutal to John. •Bill hurt the rock. •Bill was brutal to the rock.

A-9 e. Abstract objects: Bill understood the idea. Bill was receptive to the idea. *Bill understood the rock. *Bill was receptive to the rock. Adjectives and verbs also take many of the same types of adverbials. a. Time adverbials.

(A-8)

They were noisy all night. They caroused all night. They were noisy till 4 a . m . They caroused till 4 a . m . They were being noisy at midnight. They were carousing at midnight. They are often noisy. They often carouse. b. Locative adverbials. They were being noisy in the living room. They were carousing in the living room. c. Manner Adverbials. They were being noisy deliberately. They were screaming deliberately. A-3 Stative and Non-Stative Verbs and Adjectives Both adjectives and verbs can be subcategorized with respect to the feature STATIVE (or NON-ACTIVITY) and as a result, both can undergo, or fail to undergo, rules conditioned

by that feature.

>

A-10 a. Imperative:

(A -9)

Look at the p i c t u r e . *Know that Bill went t h e r e . Don't be noisy. #Don't be tall. b. Do-something: What I'm doing is looking at the p i c t u r e . #What I'm doing is knowing that Bill went t h e r e . What I'm doing is being noisy. *What I'm doing is being tall. c. P r o g r e s s i v e : I'm looking at the p i c t u r e . *I'm knowing that Bill went t h e r e . I'm being noisy. *I'm being t a l l . The subcategorization of these verbs and adjectives with r e s p e c t to the feature STATIVE is the following: look at STATIVE

-

know +

noisy

tall +

Note that if we do not a s s u m e that verbs and adjectives belong to the same major category, the rules that yield (a), (b), and (c) above will all have to refer to both v e r b s and adjectives in the same place in the s t r u c t u r a l description of each r u l e . r verb •> ^adjective * •

^or

That i s , one t e r m of the SD in each rule will b e :

t h r e e rules to have the same disjunction of different

A-ll major c a t e g o r i e s in their s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s would be somewhat c o i n c i dental. A s we shall s e e below, there a r e m o r e than three such r u l e s . Indeed, there a r e s o many m o r e that we can effectively rule out c o i n c i d e n c e . A - 4 The Adjective Shift There a r e two r u l e s in English which a r e n e c e s s a r y to d e r i v e the c o m m o n adjectival c o n s t r u c t i o n that appears in "the tall m a n " from r e l a t i v e c l a u s e s like "the man who i s tall. " The first rule, c a l l it WH-DEL, d e l e t e s the s e quence WH + PRONOUN*

+ B E when p r e c e d e d by a noun and followed by either

an adjective or a v e r b ( { , verb

}

).

WH-DEL w i l l convert "the m a n who

i s tall" into "the m a n tall," "the child who i s sleeping soundly" into "the child sleeping soundly, " and "the m a n who i s in the yard" into "the man in the yard. " Following WH-DEL, there i s an obligatory rule which c o n v e r t s "the m a n tall" into "the tall man. "Call this A D J - S H I F T . ADJ-SHIFT p e r m u t e s a noun with a following adjective or v e r b ( {

>,

}

) when both are dominated by a

noun p h r a s e which i m m e d i a t e l y dominates the noun. The following derivations r e s u l t from applying WH-DEL and ADJ-SHIFT in that o r d e r . The m a n who w a s murdered===£ the m u r d e r e d m a n

(A-10)

The m a n who i s dead===^the dead m a n The child who i s sleeping===^the sleeping child The child who i s quiet===^the quiet child The dog that i s barking-==) the barking dog The dog that i s noisy===^the n o i s y dog Thus, we have e x a m p l e s of two m o r e rules that apply to {

^erb

^

A-12 Note, by the way, that ADJ-SHIFT as we have described it is not a d e quately formulated.

The rule that we gave will not account for the following

derivations: The child who is soundly sleeping==y the soundly sleeping child

(A-ll)

The boy who is occasionally obnoxious===) the occasionally obnoxious boy Our first guess as .to how these might be derived might be that instead of p e r muting phrase.

{

* ,

v

}

in ADJ-SHIFT, we should permute the entire verb

If this is so, it would nullify our argument that

appear in the s t r u c t u r a l description of ADJ-SHIFT.

{

J

,

}

must

However, if we adopt this

suggestion, we cannot account for the non-occurrence of the following d e r i v a tions : The child who is sleeping soundly=/=^#the sleeping soundly child (A-12) The boy who is obnoxious occasionally=/=^*the obnoxious occasionally boy To account for this phenomenon we must hypothesize that the permuted element in ADJ-SHIFT is a verb p h r a s e which ends in ^

{

* , verb

}

. In fact, we '

m u s t modify this proposal to include the condition that the verb p h r a s e m u s t immediately dominate the final

{

v

}

in o r d e r to account for the fact

that we can have derivation (A-13 a) but not (A-13 b or c). a. John is a m a n who is hard to pleaee===^ John is a hard man to please b. John is a man who is able to run=/£=)>!Crohn is an able m a n to run c. John is a m a n who is able to run=/=^ *John is an able to run m a n (A-13)

A-13 ADJ-SHIFT would apply to a t r e e of the farm

x

IP

N

r

^ rp ^ ^ X . X

v 2 and would map such t r e e s into t r e e s of the form

(where X,, X 2 , and X , a r e variables). The fact that we get (a) but not (b) is due to the fact that the derived constituent s t r u c t u r e s of the two sentences is different. (a) s t a r t s out in the embedded clause a s :

VP

verb 1L

det N>

L

for someone to please some man

This gets transformed to: VP NF

NP N I It

is

This becomes

hard for someone

to

verb

De

please

sonic

N

I man

adj is

hard

A-14

_VP e't

N

/ \adj

some man is

/

N

/verb

h a r d for soifneone t6

please

w h i c h , a f t e r t h e d e l e t i o n of "for s o m e o n e , " b e c o m e s ,

r T/t

Det

some ne m a n is hard

T h i s w i l l m e e t t h e c o n d i t i o n s for

our r e v i s e d A D J - S H I F T , a f t e r t h e r e l a t i v e

clause embedding rule p r o n o m i n a l i z e s " m a n " and WH-DEL applies,

(b), on

the o t h e r h a n d , s t a r t s out a s : S

VP_

NP Det

N

some

man is

/

adj able

/

Det

fcvr s o m e

N m a n tc

which is t r a n s f o r m e d into: c

yp

NI Det

tf

some m a n is able

tc

T h i s s t r u c t u r e w i l l not m e e t t h e s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of o u r r e v i s e d A D J - S H I F T r u l e , a f t e r the r e l a t i v e c l a u s e r u l e and W H - D E L a p p l y . A-5 Nominalizations A d j e c t i v e s and v e r b s b o t h u n d e r g o t h e s a m e f a c t i v e , a c t i o n , a n d m a r i n e r nominalizations.

Since the s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h r e s u l t f r o m t h e s e r u l e s look

A-15 identical, it is not c e r t a i n whether t h e r e is a single rule which operates to produce these s t r u c t u r e s , or whether t h e r e is a battery of s e p a r a t e , but p a r tially similar r u l e s .

If the former is the c a s e , then there is at least one m o r e

rule in a g r a m m a r of English which r e f e r s to

{

^ ,

}

. If there is

m o r e than one such r u l e , then our case is that much s t r o n g e r . The following a r e some examples of such nominalizations: John knows that fact===^ John's knowledge of that fact

(A-14)

John is cognizant of that fact==A John's cognizance of that fact John yelled===y John's yelling John was noisy===/John's noisiness John distrusted Bill===\ John's d i s t r u s t of Bill John was wary of Bill===^ John's w a r i n e s s of Bill A-u Subject-Object Interchange It s e e m s n e c e s s a r y to postulate a transformation which interchanges the subject and object of some adjectives and v e r b s , in o r d e r to account for the relationships between p a i r s of sentences like the following: a. What he did amused m e . I was amused at what he did. b. What he did s u r p r i s e d m e . I was s u r p r i s e d at what he did. c. What he had done pleased h e r . She was pleased at what he had done. d. His explanation satisfied m e . I was satisfied with his explanation. e. I enjoy movies. Movies a r e enjoyable to m e .

(A-15)

A-16 We will call this transformation F L I P .

In (a)-(d), F L I P has applied to

the sentence containing the v e r b . In (e),it has applied

to the sentence contain-

ing the adjective. We know this from our intuitions about what the underlying subjects and objects a r e , and these intuitions a r e strengthened by the fact that they a r e m i r r o r e d in actual data, since the underlying subject-object r e lation is unchanged under nominalization.

This is c l e a r in the following ex-

amples. a. My amusement at what he did

(A-16)

b. My s u r p r i s e at what he did c. Her p l e a s u r e at what he had done d. My satisfaction with his explanation e. My enjoyment of movies The F L I P rule can also account for the fact that in (A-17) a. What he had done pleased her

(A-17)

b. She liked what he had done " s h e " s e e m s to bear the same relation to "like" as " h e r " b e a r s to "please. " We can d e s c r i b e this fact easily if we a s s u m e that either (a) or (b) has undergone FLIP. F r o m the nominalization of (b) Her liking of what he had done

(A-18)

it is c l e a r that (a), not (b) has undergone F L I P . F L I P is then another rule of English which applies to either adjectives or verbs and which .must refer to

{adjective} verb

in i t s structural

description.

A-17 A-7 Object Deletion Object deletion is a common phenomenon in English.

There is a rule

which deletes indefinite direct object pronouns . optionally after c e r t a i n v e r b s . For example, a. John is eating something===) John is eating

(A-19)

b. John is drinking something===v John is drinking There is also a rule that optionally deletes a preposition and an indefinite p r o noun after c e r t a i n adjectives. F o r instance, a. The movie

was enjoyable to someone===^ The movie was enjoyable

b. The r e s u l t s a r e suggestive of something===^ The r e s u l t s a r e suggestive c. The movie was objectionable to someone==^> The movie, was objectionable.

(A-20)

Considering that the o c c u r r e n c e of a preposition after an adjective

is a

superficial feature of English (see A-1), then the indefinite prounouns deleted in (A-20) a r e actually in d i r e c t object position,

and the rule which deletes

them is actually the same as the rule which deletes such pronouns in (A-19). Here is another rule that applies both in the case of adjectives and v e r b s . A-8 Agent Nominals Both adjectives and verbs may be transformed into agent nouns. For example,

A-18 a. She is beautiful.

(A-21)

She is a beauty. b. He is idiotic. He is an idiot. c. John is foolish. John is a fool. d. John cooks. John is a cook. e. John kills men. John is a killer of men. f. John destroys houses.

r

John is a destroyer of houses. (I assume that the adjective endings "ful, " "-ic, " "-ish, " are added by late spelling rules onto adjectives that have not been transformed into nouns.) Note that adverbs that modify verbs and adjectives are transformed into adjectives when the AGENT rule applies. For instance,

A-19 a. She is r e a l l y beautiful.

(A-22)

She i s a r e a l beauty. b . He is u t t e r l y idiotic. He is an u t t e r idiot. c. John is completely foolish. John is a complete fool. d. John cooks well. John is a good cook. e. John kills men m e r c i l e s s l y . John is a m e r c i l e s s killer of m e n . f. John destroys houses professionally. John is a professional d e s t r o y e r of h o u s e s . Thus, AGENT is another rule that applies to both adjectives and v e r b s . A-9 Complements Both adjectives and v e r b s seem to be able to take the same variety of subject, object, and predicate complements, and the same complement rules seem to apply r e g a r d l e s s of whether an adjective or v e r b is p r e s e n t .

A de-

tailed justification of this a s s e r t i o n is impossible h e r e , and though none has yet appeared in the l i t e r a t u r e , a discussion of some of the s i m i l a r i t i e s between adjectives and verbal complements a p p e a r s in (Rosenbaum, 1965, Chapter 6). I will instead t r y to make a c a s e for the plausibility of the a s s e r t i o n by presenting some examples of sentences with v e r b and adjective complements that seem to have the same underlying s t r u c t u r e and seem to have undergone the s a m e r u l e s .

A-20 a. John wants to go.

(A-23)

John i s e a g e r to go., b. John knew that B i l l had done it. John w a s aware that B i l l had done it. c. John feared that B i l l would c o m e . John w a s afraid that B i l l would c o m e . d. John can hit a ball 400 feet. John i s able to hit a ball 400 feet. e. John h e s i t a t e d to do that. John w a s reluctant to do that. f. It happened that John left. It i s l i k e l y that John will l e a v e . g. John happened to l e a v e . John i s likely to l e a v e . A m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d e x a m p l e i s the following: a. I need to know that.

(A-24)

b. It i s n e c e s s a r y for m e to know that. (a) i s

straightforward.

D e l e t i o n of embedded subject under identity:

(ID-NP-DEL)

A-21 (ii)

VP

NPN

need

IT-Deletion (iii)

to know

that

A-22 FOR-DELETION (iv)

to know

that (A-26)

(i)

necessary 1

A-23 (ii) ID-NP-DEL

necessary

it for

(iii) FLIP:

necessary

to know that

A-24 (iv) EXTRAPOSITION

necessary

I

to know that

(v) For-Deletion

NP

VP

S

t

y\

I

N

V

NP

"

it necessary I to know that (vi) TENSE-SPELLING

NP

it [+PRES] necessary

1 /JL ±

A-25

it [+PRES] n e c e s s a r y for I

to

know

that

(viii) BE-ADDITION

NP N

k

_

4

+PRES BE n e c e s s a r y ior m e

/

\ N to know that

Conclusion We have seen that t h e r e a r e at least 10 very general rules of English in which adjectives and v e r b s a r e t r e a t e d identically. This hardly s e e m s accidental. If it w e r e , we would expect to find just a s many transformational rules in which verbs and nouns were t r e a t e d identically—or in which nouns and adjectives were t r e a t e d identically. This is not the c a s e . Moreover, the fact that adjectives and v e r b s , but not nouns, have selectional r e s t r i c t i o n s s e e m s to be a very deep fact about language and the fact that they have the same selectional r e s t r i c t i o n s is m o r e than one can reasonably attribute to accident.

A-26 These considerations a r e m i r r o r e d by considerations of generality. If we postulate- a single category, VERB, we will save one symbol for each occurrence of

{

^ ,

}

in the transformational rules of English, and so

achieve some g r e a t e r generality.

Thus, our a s s e r t i o n not only simplifies

the semantic component somewhat, but also does the same for the syntactic component.

B-l B P o s s i b l e but Incorrect A n a l y s e s The definition of a violation given in 0. 51 w i l l have to be extended s o m e what.

Suppose the c h o i c e s of ( 0 —4) w e r e made in the context: I saw the

.

The c h o i c e s would then yield: (a) I saw the r o c k , and

(b) I saw the boy.

Note that in this situation our conventions would m a r k (a) as containing a v i o lation.

A l s o note that the rules of (0-3) a l s o generate the following c o m p l e x

s y m b o l -: (c)

NOUN

+N

'

+SINGULAR +CONCRETE +PHYS.OBJ. -ANIMATE -HUMAN -PRO +COUNT

,

P

There w i l l be a derivation in which (c) w i l l a l s o occur i n the context "I saw the

, " and s o the g r a m m a r w i l l a l s o define derivations in which "rock"

and "boy" a r e substituted for the l e x i c a l m e m b e r of (c).

Thus, the g r a m m a r

w i l l , in t h e s e c a s e s , generate the t e r m i n a l s t r i n g s (a) and (b), but with the g r a m m a t i c a l features of the object noun being (c) rather than (0-1).

In this

c a s e , our convention would m a r k p ), not (a), a s containing a violation. This m a y s e e m strange at first, but it actually m a k e s v e r y good sense.

R e m e m b e r that we required the following of a theory of g r a m m a r :

B-2 given a p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a r and given a sentence, the theory should tell us all of the s t r u c t u r a l descriptions that the g r a m m a r a s s i g n s to that sentence (that i s , all of the g r a m m a t i c a l analyses of that sentence that a r e defined by the given g r a m m a r ) .

But this does not m e a n that we should r e q u i r e the

metatheory only to yield analyses which a r e completely c o r r e c t relative to the g r a m m a r . It is also reasonable to require that the metatheory yield p a r tially c o r r e c t g r a m m a t i c a l a n a l y s e s , which a r e m a r k e d in the way in which they deviate from c o r r e c t n e s s .

F o r instance, it would be i n c o r r e c t to analyze

"rock" in (a) as being animate and human, though it would be c o r r e c t to analyze it as being inanimate and non-human . Similarly, it would be i n c o r r e c t to analyze "boy" in (b) as inanimate and non-human, while it would be c o r r e c t to analyze it as animate and human.

Thus, P o s t a l ' s adaptation of Chomsky's

lexical substitution rule not only partially defines the notion of a "violation, " but also partially defines the m o r e general notion of "possible, but i n c o r r e c t g r a m m a t i c a l analysis. " In this s e n s e , (b) r e c e i v e s a c o r r e c t g r a m m a t i c a l analysis if its object noun is analyzed as having the features of (0-1)* it r e ceives an i n c o r r e c t g r a m m a t i c a l analysis if its object noun is analyzed as having the features of (c).

Thus, i n c o r r e c t analyses occur when there is an

incompatibility between g r a m m a t i c a l and lexical f e a t u r e s . P e r h a p s instead of " i n c o r r e c t " analyses, we should speak of" p a r tially i n c o r r e c t " a n a l y s e s .

After all, (c) does not give a completely i n c o r r e c t

analysis of "boy" in (b). It c o r r e c t l y analyzes "boy" a s being [ +N, (-SINGULAR, + CONCRETE, +PHYS. OBJ. , -PRO, +COUNT]; it e r r s only in the animate and human features.

Note that we can define the notion "degree

of i n c o r r e c t analysis " as the number of incompatibilities in the sentence. Now

B-3 we can define the notion "partially g r a m m a t i c a l " in t e r m s of "partially i n c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s , " and we can define " d e g r e e of g r a m m a t i c a l i t y " in t e r m s of "degree of i n c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s . " We will say that a sentence, S, is fully g r a m m a t i c a l with r e s p e c t to a g r a m m a r , G, if it has at least one c o r r e c t analysis with r e s p e c t to G(that i s , if it has at l e a s t one derivation in G with no incompatibilities ). No m a t t e r how many possible i n c o r r e c t analyses a sentence may have, we will still consider it fully g r a m m a t i c a l if it has one correct analysis.

We will say that a sentence is "deviant" or partially g r a m -

matical with r e s p e c t to G if it has no fully c o r r e c t analysis in G.

Further-

m o r e , we will define the degree of g r a m m a t i c a l n e s s of a sentence as the lowest degree of i n c o r r e c t analysis that it h a s .

This is simply a r e s t a t e m e n t

and an extension of long-accepted notions in transformational linguistics. In actual p e r f o r m a n c e , s p e a k e r s usually attempt to give sentences the most c o r r e c t analysis that they can.

Speakers usually understand a sentence

in t e r m s of the best analysis that they can give it, though in c e r t a i n v e r y natural situations they can provide other, l e s s c o r r e c t , a n a l y s e s .

A good

example of this comes about in punning. Consider the following dialogue: "My, you look sheepish today.' " "You boar m e . " "Ugh.' That leaves m e colt." "Oh, stop horsing around. " "Why, am I getting your goat ?" "Oh, I can't b e a r any m o r e of this! " As is quite obvious, such puns depend upon our being able to find possible, but partially i n c o r r e c t analyses of these sentences in which the names of

B-4 animals appear.

Thus, "bear" in the last sentence must be analyzed as a

noun meaning "a large furry animal!•' in order for the pun to be understood.

C Markedness

C-l

C-l Markedness in Phonology Chomsky and Halle have recently revived and extended the P r a g u e school notion of m a r k e d n e s s for distinctive features in an attempt to account for a number of phenomena in phonology involving the " n a t u r a l n e s s " of phonological elements.

As the theory of generative phonology had previously been formu-

lated, all phonological elements had equal s t a t u s .

This led to the inability of

that theory to form an adequate b a s i s for the explanation of c e r t a i n facts. 1. Such a theory would give us no r e a s o n to believe that c e r t a i n phonological elements would occur a s systematic phonemes in almost e v e r y natur a l language, while others would be exceedingly r a r e . case.

Yet this is the

Voiced vowels and voiceless stops usually occur" voiceless

vowels and l a t e r a l affricates /very r a r e l y occur. 2. A theory in which all combinations of distinctive features a r e on a par would give us no r e a s o n to guess that children would have a h a r d e r time learning some sounds than o t h e r s .

Yet this is the fact.

Most

children, for example, m a s t e r liquids, quite late , and before they m a s t e r them they tend to substitute glides for them. 3. Neutralization of stop consonants in word-final position is a fairly widespread phenomenon.

P r e s e n t generative phonology would give

us no r e a s o n for supposing that the voiceless stop would show up in such c a s e s m o r e often than the voiced stop. Yet the voiceless stop almost always shows up. 4. It is common for languages to have only two nasal consonants as systematic phonemes.

An a l l - f e a t u r e s - a r e - e q u a l theory would give

one no r e a s o n for thinking that one of the logically possible p a i r s

C-2 would be more likely to occur. Yet m and n almost always turn up in this situation, while n and n, mand n, n_ and nf e t c . , almost never do. This wide range of facts seems to correlate with the fact that certain speech sounds are inherently more difficult to produce than othersj lateral fricatives and clicks are much harder to produce than voiceless stops) liquids are more difficult than glidesj palatalized stops more difficult than unpalatalized onesj and so on. Chomsky and Halle have produced the beginnings of a theory which may eventually explain such phenomena.

In this theory, the phonological repre-

sentation of an item in the lexicon is a distinctive feature matrix, but not with plus and minus values for the features J rather, each feature may be marked or unmarked. The unmarked form represents the 'normal' state of the feature with respect to that segment* the marked form of a feature represents the •non-normal' state. guages.

Thus, vowels will be unmarked for voicing in most lan-

Since vowels in their normal state are voiced, there would be a

universal rule stating that a vowel unmarked for voicing is voiced.

We will

adopt the following arbitrary convention for writing such rules: [u voice]--*[+voice] / [

, + vocalic, -consonantal]

(C-l)

In languages where there are voiceless vowels, these vowels would be marked for voicing in their lexical representation (see Remark C-l). This marking would be interpreted as voicelessness by a universal rule [m voice] —*[-voice] / [ In

the

Chomsky but

evaluation and

thatji's

procedure

Halle

propose

should

not

be

such a s :

. +vocalic,- consonantal] which is part that

of this

m 's should

counted.

Thus,

be

(C-2) theory counted,

a grammar which

C-3 has m o r e m a r k e d features, m o r e deviations from the "normal" state, would be valued l e s s than a g r a m m a r that had fewer deviations from the "normal" state. This is an interesting hypothesis, not only because it can account in some m e a s u r e for facts like those mentioned above,but even m o r e so b e cause it is not immediately obvious that it will lead to the choice of e m p i r i cally c o r r e c t g r a m m a r s .

Consider the case of voicing in consonants. H e r e ,

what happens is just the r e v e r s e of what happens in vowels.

In t h e i r n o r m a l

state, consonants a r e v o i c e l e s s . (See R e m a r k C-2. ) Thus, consonants unm a r k e d for voice will be v o i c e l e s s , while consonants m a r k e d for voice will be voiced. Thus, we might have the r u l e s : [u voice] [m voice]

• [-voice] / [ > [+voice] / [

, +consonantal, -vocalic ]

(C~3)

, +consonantal, -vocalic]

(C-4)

Since all unpredictably voiced consonants will be m a r k e d for voicing in the lexicon, each one will count one feature m o r e in t e r m s of the evaluation m e a s u r e than will the corresponding unvoiced consonant. count one feature m o r e than / t / ' s .

Thus, / d / ' s will

A p r i o r i , t h e r e is no r e a s o n why a theory

which incorporates such an evaluation m e a s u r e should be able to c h a r a c t e r i z e adequate g r a m m a r s . Yet, to the extent that the theory can be applied in i t s p r e s e n t tentative s t a t e , it s e e m s to be able to do so. Note that (C~l through 4) have a great deal in common, and can be generalized in a number of ways. Though there is usually no point in generalizing rules which a r e p a r t of linguistic theory, r a t h e r than any p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a r , it may shed some light on the nature of m a r k e d n e s s to look into the p a r t i c u l a r ways of generalizing such r u l e s . following:

One obvious way is the

C-4 [u voice] -+[ at v o i c e ] ! *

/ [

, a vocalic, ~ a consonantal]

(C-5)

[m voice]-*•['"»•' a voice]! This c h a r a c t e r i z e s the interpretation of markings a s a kind of assimilation. However, t h e r e is a non-obvious way of generalizing these r u l e s which also has an interesting interpretation.

We will a s s u m e that after all the rules

for the interpretation of markings t h e r e will be two r u l e s to i n t e r p r e t all m a r k i n g s which have not been interpreted up to that point: The unmarked value for all features is m i n u s .

(C-6)

The m a r k e d value for all features is plus.

(C-7)

Now we can accomplish the same work a s (C~5) by the following rule which applies before (C-6 and C-7): [ V voice] -* [ ~ Y voice] / [

, + vocalic, -consonantal]

(C-8)

where "Y=m or u, and u= ~ m, m = ~ u. This essentially states that in vowels the polarity of markings - changes for the feature "voice"--unmarked becomes m a r k e d and vice v e r s a .

Thus,

a vowel unmarked for voice in the lexicon first becomes m a r k e d for voice by (C-8), and then becomes [+voice] by (C-7).

Similarly, a vowel m a r k e d

for voice in the lexicon first becomes unmarked by

(C "8), and then

becomes [-voice] by (C-6). C-2 Markedness in Syntax The notion of m a r k e d n e s s not only has a history inphonology, but has been widely discussed in questions of morphology and syntax as well. Benveniste speaks of the third p e r s o n singular a s being the unmarked form of the p e r s o n a l pronoun.

(See Benveniste, 1946.) Similarly, o t h e r scholars

have pointed out that the p r e s e n t s e e m s to be the unmarked tense and that

C-5 the historical p r e s e n t s e e m s to be a syntactic neutralization between p r e s ent and p a s t in which the p r e s e n t - - t h e unmarked form--always shows up. And it has often been observed that in questions such as "How big is he ?" "big" is neutral. Thus, if we a s s u m e that "big " differs from " s m a l l " in a feature which we will call Positive d e g r e e , "big" having the value plus, " s m a l l " having the val

m i n u s , and if we furthermore a s s u m e that plus

is the unmarked value for that feature, then the use of "big" in questions can also be looked upon as a case of syntactic neutralization in which the unmarked form shows up. Thus, it s e e m s that the notion of m a r k e d n e s s should play a significant role in syntax as well as in phonology.

Although no theory has yet

been devised which will account for the above phenomena in t e r m s of some form a l notion of m a r k e d n e s s , some p r o g r e s s has been made toward incorporating the notion of m a r k e d n e s s into p r e s e n t syntactic theory. P o s t a l has observed (M. I. T. course 23. 752 , 1965 ) that c e r t a i n p h e nomena involving number and countability in English nouns can be handled in t e r m s of m a r k e d n e s s as Halle has defined it. Consider the words "boy, " "chalk, " " p a n t s , " and "people. " a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.

one boy two boys *a lot of boy a lot of boys *one chalk *two chalks a lot of chalk #a lot of chalks

i. *one pant (C-9) j . *two pants k. * a lot of pant 1. a lot of pants m . *one people (meaning "person") n. two people o. *a lot of people (singular) p. a lot of people (plural)

"Boy" may be either singular or p l u r a l .

If it is singular, it is countable j

if p l u r a l , it is either countable or uncountable.

"Chalk" can only be

C-6 uncountable and singular. "Pants" can only be uncountable and plural. "People" may be only plural, but may be countable or uncountable. these, "pants" is the least normal (most irregular),

Of

"boy" the most

normal (least irregular), and "chalk" and "people" somewhere in between. Note that a lexical representation of these items in terms of pluses and minuses fails for these items in two ways. 1. We would have to represent "pants" as being [-SINGULAR, -COUNTABLE]. However, there seems to be a general rule of English (and, perhaps,a universal rule of some sort) that uncountable nouns are singular. In English, as in most other languages, there are a handful of exceptions to this rule, e. g . , "pants, " "scissors, "

binoculars, " "spectacles, " etc. In a plus-minus system,

these exceptions would represent counterexamples, and cause the abandonment of the rule.

In a marked-unmarked system, the rule could be stated

as referring to normal (non-exceptional) nouns.

The rule would be: Nouns

unmarked for SINGULAR become +SINGULAR if they are -COUNTABLE. (See (C-ll c ) . ) 2. In a plus-minus system we could not represent the fact that "pants" is more irregular than "chalk. " "Chalk" would have to be represented [+SINGULAR, -COUNTABLE], since the value of the SINGULAR feature could not be predicted from the value of the COUNTABLE feature once the rule of (1) above was abandoned. Thus, both items would have to be represented with unpredictable values for both features. Postal has noted that both of these failures can be remedied with the lexical representation of (C-10) and the rules of (C-ll). Note that an evaluation measure would count m ' s , but not u's.

s

C-7 boy

chalk

pants

people

SINGULAR

u

u

m

m

COUNTABLE

u

m

m

u

(C-10)

Thus, "pants" with two m a r k e d values is most deviant, "people" and "chalk" with one m a r e next, and "boy" with none is completely regular with r e spect to these features.

To account for the facts in (C-9), Postal has p r o -

posed rules like the following for the interpretation of m a r k i n g s : a.

[m singular] —»• [-singular]

(C-ll)

b.

[m countable]--* [-countable]

c.

[u singular] — • [+singular]/[

, - countable]

d. [u s i n g u l a r ] - - | t ; S j 3 a r | e. [u countable]--* [+countable]/[ r r 4. i-i i J[-countable]l f. [u countable] - ^ [ + c o u n t a b l e j j Note that ordering is crucial in these r u l e s . feature [-countable], rules b and f.

, + singular].

There a r e two sources for the

Rule c operates in the environment

[-countable] which is supplied by rule b , not that supplied by rule f.

Order-

ing in this case allows us to r e f e r to the uncountable nouns which w e r e originally m a r k e d (the products of rule b).

Rule c handles ordinary m a s s nouns

like "chalk, " which m u s t be m a r k e d in the lexicon for countability since that uncountability is not predictable. a r e predictably singular.

Rule c s a y s , essentially, that m a s s nouns

P l u r a l s may function like uncountable nouns.

As

rule f s t a t e s , the normal state for plural nouns may be either countable or uncountable (e. g., "a lot of boys" or "two boys. ") Note that plural nouns have two s o u r c e s , rules a and d. is a product of rule d. (C-9-b, d, n, a n d p ) .

"People" is a product of rule aj

Both a r e subject to rule e, which accounts for

"boys"

C-8 The notion of m a r k e d n e s s can shed light on a number of other p r e viously unexplained problems in syntax.

Consider, for example, the c a s e

of stative and non-stative adjectives and v e r b s . It has long been observed that adjectives normally indicate s t a t e s , p r o p e r t i e s , or conditions, while verbs usually indicate activity.

That i s ,

it is n o r m a l for an adjective to be stative, while it is n o r m a l for a v e r b to be non-stative.

However, there a r e exceptions, and in previous work in formal

linguistics the exceptions forced us to abandon the r u l e .

Given a theory like

that presented in Chomsky's A s p e c t s , the fact that there exist stative verbs and non-stative adjectives in fairly random distribution in English would force us to conclude that the features STATIVE and ADJECTIVAL were c r o s s classified and that one could not, for the great majority of c a s e s ? predict the value of one feature from that of the other.

In such a theory, the VERBs

"hit, " "know, " "noisy, " and "tall" would be r e p r e s e n t e d in the lexicon in the following way: hit STATIVE ADJECTIVAL

-

know

noisy

tall

+

-

+

+

+

(C~12)

Since only non-stative VERBs can form imperatives and p r o g r e s s i v e s , we get (C-13a), but not (C-13b). Don't hit him.' Don't be noisy'. They a r e hitting him. They a r e being noisy.

(C"13a)

C-9 *Don't know that fact.'

(C-13b)

•Don't be tall.' *They a r e knowing that fact. *They a r e being tall. Given the concept of m a r k e d n e s s , we can easily state the generalization that adjectives a r e normally stative and verbs normally non-stative. (See Remark C _ 3) Where there a r e exceptions, we can m a r k them in the lexicon. Suppose that we know the value of the feature STATIVE in t e r m s of pluses and minuses for each lexical item.

We can then m a r k the abnormal

c a s e s , the stative verbs and non-stative adjectives, with the feature [ m ADJECTIVAL^], and leave the n o r m a l c a s e s unmarked. hit ADJECTIVAL

know

noisy

m

m

u

tall

(C"14)

u

The following rules will i n t e r p r e t these markings c o r r e c t l y : a. [u ADJECTIVAL]—[-ADJECTIVAL] / [

, -STATIVE]

b. [u ADJECTIVAL]—•[+ADJECTIVAL] / [

, +STATIVE]

c. [m ADJECTIVAL]—*[+AD J EC TIVAL] / [

, -STATIVE]

d. [m ADJECTIVAL]~»[-ADJECTIVAL] / [

, +STATIVE]

(C-15)

It is interesting that these rules a r e almost identical in form to rules (C-1, 2, 3, and 4), respectively, which interpreted the markings for voicedness in vowels and consonants.

Like those r u l e s , (C-15) a r e sub-

ject to generalization of the same sort: [u ADJECTIVAL]—[ a ADJECTIVAL]

"1

[m ADJECTIVAL] — [~ a ADJECTIVAL])

(C-16) / [

, a STATIVE]

or [V ADJECTIVAL] --> [~Y ADJECTIVAL] / [

, -STATIVE]

(C-17)

C-10 assuming that all m ' s

will later be interpreted as pluses and all u's as

minuses. Thus, our use of the concept of markedness reveals that this case in syntax is exactly parallel to a case in phonology.

D-1 D. Contextual F e a t u r e s In(Chomsky, 1965 b), Chomsky discussed two positions en contextual features: 1. Selectional r e s t r i c t i o n features (e. g. , on verbs) r e fer to individual features in preceding or following items (e. g. nouns). F o r example, a verb that takes animate subjects and a b s t r a c t objects would be represented with a conjunction of two selectional features: [ + [+ANIMATE]

,] and [+

[+ ABSTRACT] ],

(D-1)

each r e f e r r i n g to individual features in surrounding i t e m s . 2. Selectional r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e single unanalyzeable features. The facts r e p r e s e n t e d by the two features of (D-1) would instead be r e p r e s e n t e d by a single, entirely different feature: [+[+ANIMATE]

[+ABSTRACT] ]

(D-2)

Though, in notation, (D-1) and (D _ 2) look s i m i l a r , they would be i n t e r p r e t e d as totally different. (D-2), as an unanalyzeable unit, could share nothing with either feature of (D-1). Chomsky eventually chose the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of (D-2) (for discussion, see E. 1 below).

This position s e e m s untenable to m e for two r e a s o n s :

a. M a n / verbs have partially s i m i l a r p r o p e r t i e s j they can take the same subject, while taking different objects--and vice versa . Representing selectional r e s t r i c t i o n s as unanalyzeable features does not allow for the description of these s i m i l a r i t i e s . b. There a r e a nun.Ler of rules involving selectional r e s t r i c t i o n s that cannot be stated in t e r m s of unanalyzeable contextual features.

D-2 D-l Lexical Similarities Consider the words "run" and "throw. " Both m u s t take animate subjects, and any native speaker of English knows that they have this p r o p e r t y in common.

However, "throw" is transitive and takes a physical

object object, while "run' ' is intransitive (in the sense of "John r a n a c r o s s the s t r e e t . ") If we consider contextual features as unanalyzeable, these words will have the following feature specifications: run: [ + [+ANIMATE] throw: [+[+ANIMATE]

]

(D-3) [+PHYS. O B J . ] ]

That i s , "run" and "throw" will not be r e p r e s e n t e d as though they had anything in common. For this r e a s o n , unanalyzeable contextual features fail to d e s c r i b e a significant p a r t of our linguistic knowledge. D-2 Regularities Involving Contextual F e a t u r e s D-21 Subjects of Transitive Verbs Hall (Hall, 1965) has observed that in an overwhelming number of c a s e s , the subject of a transitive verb is animate. As she pointed out, there a r e many apparent exceptions to this rule which a r e indeed only a p parent. F o r example, in John broke the window with the bat.

(D-4)

The bat broke the window.

(D-5)

the logical relation of "bat" to "break" s e e m s to be the s a m e - - t h a t of an instrumental. Hall suggest that "bat" is an instrumental in the deep s t r u c ture of both sentences, and that (D-5) is r e a l l y subjectless or has isome sort of indefinite subject. Thus, (D - 5) would be derived from Broke the window with the bat.

(D-6)

D-3 This a n a l y s i s , b e s i d e s accounting for the instrumental s e n s e of "bat" in ( D - 5 ) , would allow us to maintain the above rule by c l a i m i n g that when "break" takes a subject, it m u s t be an animate one. In Appendix A a b o v e , we saw that, on independent grounds we had to hypothesize that v e r b s like " s u r p r i s e , " "amuse, " e t c . , that appeared to take abstract subjects and animate objects r e a l l y took animate s u b j e c t s and a b s t r a c t objects in the deep structure. Thus, we r e m o v e d another c l a s s of apparent e x c e p t i o n s . However, there a r e s o m e real exceptions to H a l l ' s generalization. V e r b s like p r e c e d e , follow, imply, m e a n , indicate, entail, . . .

(D>7)

m a y take both abstract subjects and a b s t r a c t o b j e c t s . I s u g g e s t that t h e s e e x c e p t i o n s not be v i e w e d a s c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s to the generalization! instead, I would v i e w the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a s a s t a t e ment about the n o r m a l or unmarked form of subject of t r a n s i t i v e v e r b s . If we a s s u m e the notion of m a r k e d n e s s and .if we a s s u m e that contextual features are not unanalyzeable, we c a n state the rule e a s i l y : [u ANIMATE}

] —»[+ANIMATE

B y (C-7 ) above, [m ANIMATE

] / [+

NP,

]

] w i l l b e c o m e [-ANIMATE

(D-8) ].

Thus,

v e r b s like (D-7) can be viewed quite r e a s o n a b l y a s being n o n - n o r m a l c a s e s that contain the feature [m ANIMATE

].

D - 2 2 Objects of Stative T r a n s i t i v e V e r b s It i s n o r m a l l y the c a s e that a stative t r a n s i t i v e VERB with an animate subject m a y take a non-PHYSICAL OBJECT object.

D-4 E x a m p l e s : a. v e r b s : s e e , h e a r , f e e l , know, b e l i e v e , c o n s i d e r , bother, a m u s e , s u r p r i s e , a m a z e , . . . .

(D~9)

b. a d j e c t i v e s : good for, e a g e r for, anxious about, fond of,. . . E x c e p t i o n s : angry at, fearful of, sympathetic toward, r e s p e c t , a d m i r e , A rule to state this might look l i k e : [u

PHYS. OBJ. (L) ]---*•[ a

PHYS. OBJ. ( L ) ] /

a P H Y S . OBJ. (G +NP (G) +STATIVE (G) (D-10)

D . 23 A b s t r a c t Subjects and Objects Given t h e s e r u l e s , a rule can be stated about a s u b c l a s s of the e x c e p tions to the rule of D - 8 .

V e r b s that take inanimate subjects and non-

PHYSICAL OBJECT objects m u s t take non-PHYSICAL OBJECT s u b j e c t s . [ u P H Y S . OBJ.

(L) ] - - - • [-PHYS. OBJ.

(L)]/

-ANIMATE (G) - PHYS. OBJ. (G)

(D-11) Examples are: p r e c e d e , follow, imply, m e a n , indicate, e n t a i l , . . .

(D-12)

These a r e just the v e r b s mentioned in (D-7) above which a r e exceptions to (D-8).

H o w e v e r , there m a y be other exceptions to (D-8) that do not fail

within the domain of (D-11), n a m e l y , any stative VERB exceptions to ( D - 8 ) .

E-l E On the Form of Lexical Items E. 1 Unanalyzeable Contextual Features Chomsky's reason for adopting the position that features are unanalyzeable was the fact that in some c a s e s there is a dependency between the contextual features involving the subject and those involving the object. The e x ample he cites is the following (Chomsky, 19 65 b, p. 119): (i) He

the platoon.

(ii) His decision to resign

(E-l) the platoon.

(iii) His decision to resign

our respect.

Chomsky points out that "command"may occur in (i) and (iii), but not in (ii), while "baffle" may occur in (i) and (ii), but not in (iii). He concludes that if we allow contextual features to refer separately to subjects and to objects, then we would have to specify "command" as having the features: [ [+ANIMATE] Aux Aux

] , and

], [

Det [+ANIMATE]], [[+ABSTRACT]

Det [ + ABSTRACT ] ] .

(E-2)

However, such a specification would not show the dependency between subject and object, illustrated by the inability of "command" to occur in (ii). On these grounds Chomsky concludes that the proper way to express such a dependency is to require each contextual feature to refer both to the subject and to the object restrictions. He would have the lexical entry for "command" contain the unanalyzeable features: [ [ + ANIMATE] Aux [ [ +ABSTRACT] Aux

Det [+ANIMATE]] and Det [+ABSTRACT]]

(E-3)

E-2 However, there is another way to express dependencies between subject and object without requiring unanalyzeable features, namely, to allow lexical entries to be Boolean functions of features. Using such a formalism we can represent the contextual restrictions on "command" in the following way: ( ([ [ +ANIMATE] Aux [ [+ABSTRACT] Aux

] and [ ] and [

Det [+ANIMATE] ]

V

Det [+ABSTRACT] ] ) )

(E-4)

The use of disjunctions in lexical representation is by no means new. Fodor and Katz's lexical items employ Boolean functions of semantic markers. (See Fodor and Katz, 1964a.) In fact, since the lexical meaning of "command" differs in (E-l (i) and (iii) ), a lexical representation for "command" which took account of semantic markers as well as syntactic features would be phrased essentially in Fodor-Katz form, and the, question of disjunctions among purely syntactic features would never arise in the case of "command. " (See Remark E - l . ) However, the point in question is relevant in other c a s e s . Consider a. John prevented Bill from assassinating Bundy.

(E-5)

b. John prevented Bill's assassination of Bundy. Some transformational linguists would analyze these sentences as having rather different underlying structures, while assigning "prevent" the same lexical meaning in both c a s e s . In this case, the problem of the dependency between object and complement a r i s e s - - a s s u m i n g that this analysis and others of the same sort are correct. I propose that we handle all such cases by allowing lexical items to be represented as Boolean functions of features.

E-3 £ - 2 Definition of Multiple Analysis When a lexical item has a disjunction of syntactic features associated with a single lexical meaning, we will say that that lexical item has a multiple analysis with r e s p e c t to that meaning.

When a lexical item has only a simple

conjunction of syntactic features (with negation allowed only over individual feat u r e s ) associated with a lexical item, we will say that the lexical, item has a single analysis with reppect to that meaning. E - 3 Conjunction of Contextual F e a t u r e s Note that we can i n t e r p r e t Chomsky's notion of a conjunction of contextual features as being r a t h e r different than his notion of a conjunctiono f im „ herent features.

F o r example, on page 85 of (Chomsky, 19 65b), Chomsky

p r e s e n t s a s a sample lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for "sincerity: " [+N, -COUNT, +ABSTRACT]. Such a lexical item could be inserted only into a complex s y m bol that had all of the features +N and -COUNT and +ABSTRACT.

However, a

conjunction of contextual features is interpreted r a t h e r differently. On page 94, Chomsky gives as a sample lexical representation for "grow:" [+V, +

NP, +

^j +

Adjective].

This does not mean that "grow" can be i n s e r t -

ed only into a complex symbol containing all of the features +V and + +

ffiand

exist.

+

ADJECTIVE.

NP and

Obviously, such a complex symbol does not

Rather, the representation for "grow" m e a n s that "grow" m a y be in-

s e r t e d into a complex symbol that has the feature +V and has either + or 4-

dfcor +

Adjective.

NP

Under this interpretation, conjunctions of con-

textual features r e p r e s e n t disjunctions each of which may be conjoined to inherent features.

However, conjunctions of inherent features r e m a i n con-

junctions under this interpretation, E - 4 Boolean Functions of F e a t u r e s Boolean functions s e e m to be n e c e s s a r y not only for contextual feat u r e s , but for other types of syntactic features as well.

A c l e a r c a s e of this

E-4 can be found in Latin (as well as in other case languages) in kinds of i r r e g u l a r forms called h e t e r o c l i t e s .

Bennett (Bennett, I960, p . 32) list the following

as an example of this phenomenon: Several nouns have the entire singular of one declension, while the P l u r a l is of another; a s , - vas, vasis (vessel);

Plu. , vasa, vasorum, vasTs, etc. (E-6)

jugerum, jugeri (acre);

Plu. , j u g e r a , jugerum, jugeribus, etc.

If we do not allow Boolean functions of syntactic features, it is not at all c l e a r that one can state facts like this at all in lexical items as they a r e presently conceived.

One could, of c o u r s e , w r i t e ad hoc rules for each such case, for

instance, [3 Declension]

*• [2 D e c l e n s i o n ] /

Singular vas

(E-7)

Such a solution is unsatisfying for two reasons: 1. Declension does not seem to be a feature that can change in a transformational rule, and it is only in c a s e s like this that one would need to change the declension of a noun.

2.

This is a

fact about an individual lexical item, not a regularity of the g r a m m a r , and therefore, should be represented in the lexicon. With Boolean functions of syntactic features, such facts can easily be represented in the lexicon.

We would associate with vas the entry

vas ((3 Declension and +singular) V (2 Declension and -singular)) (E-8) Suppose such a lexical entry w e r e i n s e r t e d into the lexical m e m b e r of a complex symbol with the following g r a m m a t i c a l features:

+N 3 Declension - singular

Noun I ,

(E-9)

E-5 We a s s u m e t h a t [3 D e c l e n s i o n ] and [ 2 D e c l e n s i o n ] b e l o n g t o an a n t o n y m o u s s e t (that i s , t h e i r conjunction i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) .

Note t h a t e a c h b r a n c h of

the d i s j u n c t i o n of ( E - 8 ) i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of ( E - 9 ) . When t h i s i s t h e c a s e , we w i l l s a y t h a t we h a v e a v i o l a t i o n . T h i s i s a n a t u r a l e x t e n s i o n of the notion of a v i o l a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d in S e c t i o n 0. 51 a b o v e . S i m i l a r l y , we c a n e x t e n d o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s s y s t e m in t e r m s of

the s e n -

t e n t i a l c a l c u l u s ( s e e S e c t i o n 0. 52) i n an o b v i o u s way so t h a t s u c h a

notion

of a v i o l a t i o n i s e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e l o g i c a l n o t i o n of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . In (E.-10), a.

Noun +N

(E-10)

3 Declension + singular

, Noun

+N 2 Declension - singular

,

the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of ( E - 8 ) .

of b o t h (a) and (b) i s c o m p a t i b l e with one b r a n c h

In t h e s e c a s e s t h e r e i s no v i o l a t i o n , a s i s c o n s i s t e n t with o u r s e n -

tential calculus analogy. Note t h a t we c a n now t h i n k of the B o o l e a n function of f e a t u r e s t h a t c o m p r i s e s a l e x i c a l i t e m a s s t a t i n g a s e t of c o n d i t i o n s t h a t the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of the c o m p l e x : s y m b o l m u s t m e e t . Note a l s o that the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r i s not a B o o l e a n function, but s i m p l y a c o n j u n c t i o n of f e a t u r e s . One q u e s t i o n t h a t m i g h t be r a i s e d i s : How will r u l e s apply to c o m p l e x s y m b o l s c o n t a i n i n g B o o l e a n s f u n c t i o n s ? T h a t i s , s u p p o s e we h a v e a r u l e that a p p l i e s only to a [+ S i n g u l a r ] s e g m e n t , would it apply to a c o m p l e x s y m b o l

E-6 whose lexical m e m b e r had [+Singular] in one branch of a disjunction and [-Singular] in the o t h e r ? The answer, of course, is that the rule will not even look at the lexical m e m b e r , but will operate only on the grammatical m e m b e r . Since the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r is a simple conjunction, this question will simply never a r i s e . E - 5 Suppletion Suppletion is a common phenomenon and occurs in m o s t languages.

A

widely discussed example of it in English is the alternation between "go" and "went!1 In (Chomsky, 19'57), Chomsky suggested that suppletion be handled by rules, for example, go + PAST

» went

(E-11)

The addition of syntactic features to the theoretical apparatus of t r a n s f o r m a tional theory does not change this very much. [+PAST, g o ] ---» [went]

Instead of (E-11) we might have: (E-12)

or [goj " - [went]/[+ PAST, (E-11 and E-12) a r e equivalent. possible violations.

]

(E-13)

Formulations like these can c h a r a c t e r i z e some

Thus, if (E-11 or E-12) is not applied when it should be, we

could get such violations as *John goed to the s t o r e .

(E-14)

However, g r a m m a r s incorporating either (E-11 or E-12) could not in any natural way yield the violation. * John went ed to the s t o r e .

(E-15)

A g r a m m a r incorporating (E-13) could generate (E-15), provided that went w e r e introduced with a m a r k e r indicating that it normally could not undergo the rule that places -ed_ on past tense v e r b s .

However, no English g r a m m a r

E-7 in p r e s e n t linguistic theory that introduces went only by rules such as ( E - l l , 12 or 13) can naturally c h a r a c t e r i z e the very common violation: #John has went to the s t o r e .

(E-16)

(E-16) is understood as being an i n c o r r e c t form of John has gone to the s t o r e .

(E-17)

and a descriptively adequate g r a m m a r of English should provide that information. Moreover, violations such as (E-16) seem to reflect not a misapplication of a rule, but r a t h e r an i n c o r r e c t lexical selection. This would indicate that perhaps suppletion should be r e p r e s e n t e d in the lexicon r a t h e r than by r u l e . This m a k e s good s e n s e , since suppletion always r e p r e s e n t s facts about individual lexical i t e m s , r a t h e r than generalizations about the language. If suppletion is to be represented in the lexicon, we will have to further extend our notion of what a lexical item i s . So far, we have c h a r a c t e r i z e d a lexical item as having a single phonological m a t r i x conjoined with a Boolean function of syntactic and semantic features. We can handle suppletion by allowing the phonological m a t r i c e s to enter into Boolean functions with syntactic features. Thus, a (very simplified) version of the entry for go-went might b e : [ [ gp_and +PRESENT] or [ went and -PRESENT] ] and [ all other features]

(E-18)

However, such a representation p r e s e n t s difficulties that a Boolean function of syntactic features does not p r e s e n t . If we a s s u m e ,

as is done

at p r e s e n t , that phonological rules operate on the phonological features in the lexical m e m b e r of the complex symbol, then we cannot simply i n s e r t an entire lexical item such as (E-18) into the lexical m e m b e r , since it would not be c l e a r whether the phonological rules should operate onjjo o r went.

E-8 If we want to maintain the assumption that phonological rules operate on the phonological features of the lexical m e m b e r , then w e would have to find an appropriate way of choosing one phonological m a t r i x . We can do this quite easily.

We incorporate into linguistic theory a mechanical procedure

which converts each lexical item into some disjunctive n o r m a l form with r e spect to phonological m a t r i c e s , that i s , a disjunction, each m e m b e r of which contains only one phonological m a t r i x .

For example, such a n o r m a l form for

(E-18) would b e : [ [ go and +PRESENT and all other features ] or [ went and -PRESENT and all other features ] ]

(E-19)

We would then r e v i s e our lexical selection r u l e to choose at random one branch of a lexical i t e m ' s disjunction of f e a t u r e s .

Then, if the branch con-

taining went w e r e chosen, and if it were incompatible with the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of the complex symbol, we would get a violation. If it w e r e c o m patible, we would get no violation.

The s a m e would be t r u e if we choose

the branch containing go. Of c o u r s e , we need not a s s u m e that the phonological rules apply to the phonological features of the lexical m e m b e r . We might instead a s s u m e the following: Let the base component randomly generate a phonological matrix as part of the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of the complex symbol.

Let a

lexical item of the form of (E-18) be i n s e r t e d in the lexical m e m b e r , and check to see if the phonological m a t r i x of the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r is c o m patible with any phonological m a t r i x in the lexical m e m b e r .

If not, we get

a violation. If so, we then apply the phonological rules to the features of the grammatical member of the complex symbol.

With such conventions,

we can extend our interpretation of the lexical m e m b e r as a set of conditions that the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r must m e e t .

E-9 The latter solution has c e r t a i n advantages. One of the difficulties that Halle has experienced in utilizing his notion of m a r k e d n e s s is that, although he can now easily e x p r e s s c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l constraints on morphemes(such a s (C-5) ),

his system can no longer easily e x p r e s s the morpheme s t r u c -

ture rules of a p a r t i c u l a r language.

That i s , his system in its p r e s e n t in-

completely formulated state, cannot capture the notion of a well-formed morpheme of English.

Now we can add this notion in a fairly simple way.

Let the base generate a random m a t r i x of phonological features as p a r t of the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of the complex symbol. features will contain values of "+" and " - " .

These

Apply the m o r p h e m e

structure rules of English to this m a t r i x , interpreting the rules not as filling in blanks, but as substituting features under identity. , That i s , the rule will be applicable if the randomly generated m a t r i x m e e t s the s t r u c t u r a l description of the rule.

It will apply only if

the features to be inserted by the rule a r e identical to the c o r r e sponding features of the randomly generated m a t r i x .

If this is not so,

we will say the rule is violated, and the randomly generated m a t r i x is not a well-formed morpheme of English. rules will apply before lexical insertion.

The morpheme s t r u c t u r e

Now i n s e r t a lexical item

as the lexical m e m b e r of the complex symbol.

Its features will have

values in "u" a n d " m " not in "+" and " - " . Now apply the u n i v e r s a l r u l e s to convert the "u"s and "m"s into "+"s and " - " s .

Then check to see

if the g r a m m a t i c a l m a t r i x is compatible with any phonological m a t r i x in the lexical m e m b e r .

(E~20)

F-l F P a s s i v e s , Adverbs, and Quantifiers F - l P a s s i v e s and Manner Adverbials In Section 2, we claimed that verbs like "owe, " " r e s e m b l e , " "weigh, " e t c . , were exceptions to the passive transformation. that this is so.

It is not obvious

In (Chomsky, 1965 b , p. 104), Chomsky m a k e s the opposite

claim . He proposes that the fact that such verbs do not undergo the passive transformation can be predicted from the fact that they do not take manner adverbials freely.

He p r o p o s e s to d e s c r i b e this by introducing a passive

morpheme as an optional constituent of the node Manner,

Thus, he would

have the r u l e : Manner •• by Ipassive . The passive transformation would be obligatorily t r i g g e r e d by the passive m o r p h e m e . It would follow, then, that only verbs which could take m a n n e r adverbs freely (that i s , could occur in the same simplex S as the constitutent Manner ), could undergo the passive transform.

Those verbs which could not take manner adverbials freely

(that i s , could not co-occur with the constituent Manner ) could not conceivab ly undergo the p a s s i v e , since they could ' never occur in a simple sentence in which the morpheme passive was introduced. Chomsky's analysis does not account for such verbs as know, believe, consider, think, see, h e a r , p e r c e i v e , . . . . These v e r b s , like other stative v e r b s , may not take m a n n e r adverbials freely, but m a y undergo the passive t r a n s f o r m a t i o n Consider the following sentences:

F-2 a. Everyone knew that Bill was tall.

(F4A)

•Everyone knew cleverly that Bill was tall. That Bill was tall was known by everyone. b. Bill believed that H a r r y was president. •Bill believed cleverly that H a r r y was president. It was believed by Bill that H a r r y was president. c. John considered H a r r y a fink. •John considered H a r r y a fink with great enthusiasm. H a r r y was considered a fink by John. d. John thought that H a r r y d e s e r t e d J i l l . •John thought masterfully that H a r r y d e s e r t e d J i l l . It was thought by John that H a r r y deserted J i l l . e. John saw H a r r y . •John saw H a r r y industriously. H a r r y was seen by John. f. John heard the m u s i c . •John hear d the music carefully. The music was heard by John. If we were to m a i n t a i n Chomsky's analysis and extend our g r a m m a r of English to account for these c a s e s , we would have to introduce the passive m o r p h e m e in some other constituent as well as in Manner.

This would m e a n

introducing the passive m o r p h e m e twice in different p a r t s of the p h r a s e s t r u c ture.

Such a solution would lack generality.

Moreover, it would fail to p r e -

dict the fact that r e s e m b l e , owe, have, e t c . , do not undergo the p a s s i v e . Note that all these verbs a r e stative, as a r e those of (F-1A).

To p e r m i t

the v e r b s of (F-IA)to undergo the passive transformation, we would have to

F-3 introduce our second occurrence of the passive morpheme so that it, unlike Manner, could freely co-occur with stative verbs. To avoid the passivization of resemble, owe, e t c . ,

we would have to indicate in the lexicon that

these verbs could not occur with the passive morpheme.

Thus, these verbs

are exceptional, even considering Chomsky's analysis of the passive construction. F-2 The Source of Some Manner Adverbials It seems possible to predict the occurrences of many manner adverbials from occurrences of another, more basic construction.

Many manner adver-

bials correspond exactly to adjectives that take predicate complements.

For

example, 1. i. a. John hangs from trees. b.. John hangs from trees recklessly, c. John is reckless in hanging from trees, ii.a*. Moss hangs from trees. b. *Moss hangs from trees recklessly. c. *Moss is reckless in hanging from trees, iii. a. John was tall. b. *John was tall recklessly. c. *John was reckless in being tall. 2. i. a. The tailor fit me. b. The tailor fit me carefully. c. The tailor was careful in fitting me. ii. a. The suit fit me. b. #The suit fit me carefully. c. *The suit was careful in fitting me.

(F-2A)

F-4 i i i . a.

3.i.

ii.

The tailor knew about s u i t s .

b.

*The tailor knew about suits carefully.

c.

* T h e tailor was careful in knowing about s u i t s .

a.

John sharpened knives.

b.

John sharpened knives cautiously.

c.

John was cautious in sharpening knives,

a.

The machine sharpened knives.

b.

*The machine sharpened knives cautiously.

c.

*The machine was cautious in sharpening knives,

i i i . a.

John r e s e m b l e d his m o t h e r .

b.

*John r e s e m b l e d his mother cautiously.

c.

* John was cautious in resembling his m o t h e r .

As these sentences i l l u s t r a t e the adjectives in the (c) sentences s h a r e c o - o c c u r r e n c e r e s t r i c t i o n s with the adverbs in the (b) s e n t e n c e s . Note that all the adjectives in the (c) sentences a r e r e s t r i c t e d in that the complement which follows them may not have a verb (or adjective) which is stative, as is illustrated by the (iii) s e n t e n c e s . Note also that each of the adjectives in the (c) sentences must meet the SD of I D - N P - D E L . If we derive the (b) sentences from (c) sentences, we cannot only account for the relationship between them, but can simplify the g r a m m a r of English in a number of w a y s . F i r s t , we can eliminate the constituent Manner from the phrase s t r u c t u r e . Secondly, we can account for the c o o c c u r r e n c e r e s t r i c t i o n s between subjects and manner adverbs without any new selectional a p p a r a t u s .

These r e s t r i c t i o n s will follow from the s e l e c -

tional r e s t r i c t i o n s between subjects and adjectives.

Thus, the fact that

F-5 we don't get " The suit fit m e carefully" will follow from the fact that we don't get "The suit was careful in fitting m e . " Thirdly, we will be able to account for the fact that many adjective complements may not contain m a n n e r a d v e r b ials.

Consider the following s e n t e n c e s . 1. a. John was careful at playing gin r u m m y .

(F-2B)

b. fcjohn was careful at playing gin r u m m y well. c. *John was careful at being good at playing gin rummy. d. John was good at playing gin rummy. e. John played gin r u m m y well. 2. a. John was clever at making decisions. b. *John was clever at making decisions wisely. c. *John was clever at being wise at making decisions. d. John was wise at making decisions. e. John made decisions wisely. The non-occurrence of the (b) sentences follows from the non-occurrence of the (c) sentences. The (c) sentences do not occur since the m a t r i x adjectives (i. e . , careful, clever) may not take stative verbs or adjectives in their complements ( i . e . , good, wise).

However, there do exist c a s e s in which

m a n n e r adverbs m a y occur in adjective complements. 1. a. John was good at playing gin r u m m y carefully.

(F-2C)

b . John was good at being careful at playing gin r u m m y . 2. a. John was wise in making decisions cautiously. b. John was wise in being cautious at making decisions. The g r a m m a t i c a l n e s s of (a) follows from the grammaticalness of (b) in each example. The (b) sentences a r e g r a m m a t i c a l since good and wise must take

F-6 non-stative verbs or adjectives in their complements.

Careful and cautious,

a r e non-stative, as can be seen by the fact that they occur in i m p e r a t i v e , p r o g r e s s i v e , and do-something constructions. F o r example, 1. a. Be careful.

(F-2D )

b. Be cautious. 2. a. We a r e being careful, b. "We a r e being cautious. 3. a. What we a r e doing is being careful, b . What we a r e doing is being cautious. F-3 Pseudo-passives Suppose we adopt our proposed derivation of manner adverbs and t h e r e by do away with the constituent .Manner of the v e r b p h r a s e .

Chomsky's

analysis in which the passive m o r p h e m e is a constituent of Manner will then have to be abandoned. Since that analysis is inadequate anyway, as. we have seen, our p r o posal should not hurt our ability to d e s c r i b e the n o r m a l passive construction. However, one of Chomsky's major r e a s o n s for adopting his analysis of the passive is that it supposedly accounts for the pseudo-passive construction as well as for the n o r m a l p a s s i v e .

We can maintain Chomsky's analysis of

the pseudo-passive by allowing an optional passive constituent to be i n t r o duced in the v e r b p h r a s e in the same position where Manner had previously been introduced.

However, it s e e m s that Chomsky's analysis of pseudo-

passive is also open to question--no m a t t e r how we analyze m a n n e r adverbials. Among the pseudo-passives that Chomsky attempts to account for a r e :

F-7 1. The proposal was vehemently argued against.

(F-3A)

2. The new course of action was agreed on. 3. John is looked up to by everyone. 4. This job is being worked at quite seriously. 5. The boat was decided on by John. Chomsky a s s u m e s that these sentences have deep s t r u c t u r e s containing intransitive v e r b s followed by prepositional p h r a s e s within the v e r b p h r a s e . For example: (1)

N:

Pred. P. anner

Aux

John P a s t

(F-3B)

on the boat

decided

by passive

(2)

-Pred P ./

NP Aux Someone

\

1^?*^

"""Manner

P r e s Be lhg work at the job b y p a s s i v e

He then postulates that the passive transformation has the following s t r u c t u r a l description: N P - A u x - V - . . . - N P - . . . -by p a s s i v e . . . .

(F-3C)

(where the left m o s t . . . does not contain an NP) (F-3B) will meet this s t r u c t u r a l description, Chomsky a r g u e s , even though it contains an intransitive v e r b . This will account for the pseudo-passives (F-3A, 4, 5). P s e u d o - p a s s i v e s , in general, Chomsky c l a i m s , come from

F-8 prepositional p h r a s e s dominated by VP. following intransitive v e r b s , and preceding the constituent Manner (and, hence, the passive m o r p h e m e ) . Under these general conditions, the s t r u c t u r a l description of (H) will be m e t . Such an analysis, Chomsky maintains, will also account for the nonoccurrence of c e r t a i n p s e u d o - p a s s i v e s . F o r example, "Someone i s working at -the',office" does not passivize to become "The office is being worked at. " Moreover, "John decided on the boat" is ambiguous and m e a n s either (a) "John chose the boat" or (b) "John decided while he was on the boat. " With the meaning (a), it has the s t r u c t u r e of (F-3J3-1) and passivizes to become (F3A-5). But (F-3A-5) is not ambiguous--it corresponds only to the meaning of (a), not to that of (b). Chomsky accounts for this by hypothesizing that the following s t r u c t u r e c o r r e s p o n d s to the (b) meaning: (F-3D) PRED. P .

IP John

past

decide

on orf the the boal boat

Note that "on the boat" in (F-3D) is a locative p h r a s e which i s not constituent of VP.

a

It , t h e r e f o r e , could never occur to the left of Manner

(and, hence, passive) and so could never meet the s t r u c t u r a l description of the passive a s given in (F-3D). at the office. "

The same is t r u e for "Someone is working

F-9 (F-3E)

NP

Someone

PRES BE ING

work

at the office

This analysis depends strongly on the existence of a passive morpheme i n t r o duced within the VP constituent and at the end of it.

We will t r y to show that

the facts accounted for by this analysis can be accounted for by an analysis . which does not make this assumption.

Then we will attempt to show that

Chomsky's analysis is inadequate in that it predicts the existence of pseudop a s s i v e s which do not, in fact, exist. Chomsky views "work" and "decide" a s intransitive verbs which m a y optionally be followed by a prepositional p h r a s e .

If we a s s u m e that all v e r b s

a r e followed by prepositions at some point in their derivations (see Appendix A-1), then "work" and "decide" can be looked on as transitive v e r b s which do not undergo the rule which deletes prepositions that follow v e r b s .

Under this

analysis we can consider "They decided on the boat" and "They chose the boat" to have the s a m e deep s t r u c t u r e s .

In Chomsky's analysis their s t r u c -

t u r e s a r e entirely different.

(F-3F-1)

NP THE.Y

DECIDE THE BOAT

F-10 (F-3F-

AUX

THEY

PAST

CHOOSE THE

BOAT

After prepositionrspelling we would have:

(F-3G-1)

(F-3G-2)

NP

THEY

PAST

OOSE OF THE BOAT

Note that "decide" is i r r e g u l a r in taking the preposition "on. " This i r r e g u larity would have to be handled in either Chomsky's analysis or in ours. If nominalization occurred at this point we would get "their choice of_ the boat. " Preposition deletion l a t e r applies to "choose" but not to "decide, " yielding "They decided on the boat" and "They chose the boat. " Sentences like They decided.

(F-3H-1)

They worked.

(F-3H-2)

can now be looked at as reduced forms of They decided on something.

(F-3I-1)

They worked at something.

(F-3I-2)

F-ll "Decide on " and "work at" would then be c o n s i d e r e d a s v e r b s like "eat" which allow unspecified objects to be deleted. Thus, "John worked at the office" and "John decided on the boat" (meaning "while he w a s on the boat") might have the s t r u c t u r e s (after p r e p o s i t i o n spelling): (F-3J-1) NR.

AUX

•—VP 4 OC

NP John

DECIDE ON SOMETHING ON THE BOAT (F-3J-2) VP

NP-

LOC

NP

NP John

1

*

\

P R E S B E ING WORKED

AT SOMETHING AT

THE

OFFICE

(Our a n a l y s i s of the p s e u d o - p a s s i v e d o e s not require LOC to be dominated by a s p e c i a l predicate p h r a s e node rather than V P .

That node m a y be

n e c e s s a r y for other r e a s o n s , such a s c o r r e c t l y subcategorizing v e r b s , but since it i s not c r u c i a l h e r e we omit i t . ) We can now define the p a s s i v e transformation to have the following structural d e s c r i p t i o n : NP-AUX-V-. . . NP-. . . (where the left m o s t . . . does not contain an NP and where the right m o s t N P i s d i r e c t l y dominated by VP.)

1

(F-3K)

F-12 We could then allow the" passive to be an optional rule, or we could have it triggered by some passive m a r k e r , which might, for example, be a feature of the v e r b , but which need not be a constituent of Manner o r V P .

If we

a s s u m e that the rule which deletes an unspecified object comes after

our

passive transformation, we can account for all the facts that Chomsky accouit s for.

Suppose the passive is an optional r u l e .

If it applies to ( F - 3 J - 1 and 2)

we will get "something was decided on on the boat" and "something is being worked at at the office. " If the passive does not apply, then the object deletion rule can apply to yield "John decided on the boat" and "John is working at the office. " Chomsky's analysis of the passive yields some i n c o r r e c t r e s u l t s which our analysis does not yield.

In stating his "strictly local subcategori-

zation" principle, (p. 102-3), Chomsky points outthat prepositional

phrases

of direction and place m u s t be introduced as constituents of VP since they determine the s t r i c t subcategorization of v e r b s .

F o r example,

d a s h - - i n t o the room (V--Direction)

(F-3L)

r e m a i n - - i n England (V-Place) * d a s h - - i n England * r e m a i n - - i n t o the room Note that "dash" and "remain" both take manner adverbials. 1. John dashed into the room [impatiently. with great enthusiasm. 2. John remained in England

F o r example, (F-3M)

P patiently. \ with some r e g r e t .

Each of these sentences could, therefore, m e e t Chomsky's proposed s t r u c t u r al description for the passive (H), and we would get:

F-13 1. *The room was dashed into by John.

(F-3N)

2. ^England was remained in by John. Note that since the SD of our passive transformation r e q u i r e d that V P d i r e c t l y dominate the object NP, these non-sentences will not be generated under our analysis. F - 4 F u r t h e r R e m a r k s on Manner Adverbials We a r e now p r e p a r e d to offer further evidence that many manner a d verbials a r e derived from adjectival complements. Consider the following sentences: a. Do you beat your wife enthusiastically?

(F-4-1)

b. I don't beat m y wife enthusiastically. In (a), we a r e not asking whether you beat your wife.

We a r e assuming that

you do, and we a r e asking whether you a r e enthusiastic in doing so.

Note

that (a) is synonymous with: Are you enthusiastic in beating your wife?

(F-4-2)

If we derive (F-4-la) from the s t r u c t u r e underlying ( F - 4 - 2 a ) , we can account for the synonymy of the sentences. could do so.

Otherwise, it is difficult to see how we

In questions, it is usually the highest VP that we a r e questioning.

If (F-4-la) had the underlying s t r u c t u r e of ( F - 4 - 3 ) , (F-4-3) Q

""

NP

•—VP. V*r

Ybu

NP

beat your wife

^MANNER enthusiastically

we would expect the (F-4-la) would be questioning whether the beating took place.

Instead, it questions only the enthusiasm with which the beating o c c u r s .

F-14 S i m i l a r l y , ( F - 4 - l b ) d o e s not d e n y t h a t I b e a t m y wife. t h a t I d o , and only d e n i e s t h a t I do s o w i t h e n t h u s i a s m . u s u a l l y n e g a t e the u p p e r m o s t V P , one would

It a s s u m e s

Since n e g a t i v e s

g u e s s t h a t if ( F - 4 - l b ) had t h e

d e e p s t r u c t u r e of ( F - 4 - 4 ) , t h e n t h e b e a t i n g would b e d e n i e d . (F-4-4) Neg MANNER I

beat

m y . wife

I

enthusiastically

Note t h a t ( F ~ 4 - l b ) i s s y n o n y m o u s with ( F - 4 - 5 ) . (F-4-5)

I ' m not e n t h u s i a s t i c i n b e a t i n g m y wife. (F -4>T 5) h a s the d e e p s t r u c t u r e :

(F-4-6) Neg-

m y wife We c a n a c c o u n t for the m e a n i n g of ( F - 4 - l b ) if we a s s u m e t h a t it a l s o h a s the d e e p s t r u c t u r e of ( F - 4 - 6 ) . The s a m e a r g u m e n t c a n be m a d e i n t h e c a s e of i m p e r a t i v e s .

Con-

sider the sentence: Drive carefully.

(F-4-7)

F-15 (F-4-7) is not a command to drive. It is a command to be careful. Observe that (F -4-7) is synonymous with (F-4-8). Be careful at driving.

(F-4-8)

We can account for these facts if we derive (F-4-7) from the structure underlying (F-4-8). If we derive manner adverbials from adjectival complements, we can also account for the non-occurrence of such commands a s : *Drive well.

(F-4-9)

We would predict the non-occurrence of (F-4-9) from the non-occurrence of (F-4-10). *Be good at driving.

(F-4-lpi)

(F-4-10) does not occur because "good at" is a stative adjective, and statives do not take imperatives.

Note that "careful" in (F-4-8) is non-stative.

One of the most interesting things about these examples is that embedded verbs, which are not associated with the question, negative, and imperative markers in the deep structure, come to be associated with them by transformation and then undergo the question, negative, and imperative transformations. Thus, underlying embedded verbs may come to be surface main verbs. As we shall see in the succeeding sections, this is an extremely common phenomenon. N-5 Locative Adverbials Just as we brought forth arguments to show that manner adverbials are derived from a 'higher' simplex sentence than the one that appears as the main clause in the surface structure, so we can bring forth the same arguments for deriving locative adverbials in this manner. Consider the sentence:

F-16 Do you beat your wife in the yard?

(F-5-1)

(F-5-1) is not questioning whether the beating takes place. It assumes that it does, and it is questioning the location of the beating. (F-5-1) is synonymous with (F-5-2). Is it in the yard that you beat your wife?

(F-5-2)

In (F-5-2) it is clear in the surface structure that it is the location that is being questioned. The same arguments hold for negatives. Consider I don't beat my wife in the yard.

(F-5-3)

In (F-5-3) it is agains assumed that the beating does take place. What is denied is that the location of the beating is in the yard. Note that (F-5-3) is synonymous with (F-5-4). It is not in the yard that I beat my wife.

(F-5-4)

In (F-5-4) it is clear in the surface structure that the location of the event is being negated, not the assertion that the event occurs. (See Remark F-l). We can account for all these facts if we derive (F-5-1 and 3) from the abstract structures underlying (F-5-2 and 4),respectively underlying (F-5-3 and 4) would, for example, be:

The deep structure

F-17 VP

(F-5-S)

NEG

yard

t

my

wife

(As to the question of whether "in" i s an a d j e c t i v e , s e e Section 9. 2 . ) O b s e r v e that if EXTRAPOSITION o p e r a t e s and the embedded J> i s shifted to the end, we get ( F - 5 - 4 ) .

Since EXTRAPOSITION i s an optional rule, it m a y not o p e r a t e ,

in which c a s e IT-DELETION obligatorily applies and y i e l d s ( F - 5 - 3 ) .

If this

a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , the derived structure o f ' ( F - 5 - 3 ) would b e : (F-5-6) X* :

NPI

X--,1

don 't'

V .1

in

V

beat

•NP t h / yard

m yv wi wife

This differs substantially from the traditional surface a n a l y s i s of the s e n t e n c e , but it i s by no m e a n s i m p l a u s i b l e , and s e e m s quite defensible. Note that we a r e c l a i m i n g - - a l s o c o n t r a r y to both traditional and r e cent transformational a n a l y s i s - - t h a t the cleft s e n t e n c e structure i s b a s i c and

F-18 not derived in these c a s e s .

If the cleft sentence

were derived, then we would

expect the cleft sentence corresponding to "I don't beat m y wife in the y a r d " to be *It is in the yard that I don't beat m y wife. Instead it is ( F - 5 - 4 ) .

(F-5-7)

Note that we can account for the non-occurrence of

(F-5-7) by the deep s t r u c t u r e r e s t r i c t i o n (however

it is to be formally stated)

that one cannot a s s e r t the location of an event that did not occur. F - 6 Reason Adverbials Reason adverbials s e e m to be derived from 'higher' simplex sentences in the s a m e way as m a n n e r and locative adverbials a r e . C o n s i d e r the question: Do you beat your wife because you don't like h e r ?

(F-6-1)

(1) a s s u m e s that you beat your wife and is questioning your r e a s o n for doing so. (1) is synonymous with (2). Is it because you don't like her ithat you beat your wife?

(F-6-2)

We can account for this if we derive (1) from the a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e underlying (2). Only by deriving the because - clause from the VP of a higher_S

can

we account for the ambiguity of: I don't beat m y wife because I like h e r .

(F-6-3)

The two senses of (3) a r e synonymous with those of (4) and (5): It is because I like h e r that I don't beat m y wife.

(F-6-4)

It is not because I like her that I beat m y wife.

(F-6 -5)

F-19 The only way that we could reasonably account for the ambiguity of (3) would be to derive it from the a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e s underlying (4) and (5) (see R e m a r k F-2).

These s t r u c t u r e s a r e : (F-6-4')

because I like m y wife

I beat my wife (F-6-5») NEG because I like m y wife

I beat my wife (See R e m a r k F - 3 for some discussion of the internal s t r u c t u r e of the because clause.) Note that if EXTRAPOSITION does not take place, IT-DELETION occurs and, as a r e s u l t , the s t r u c t u r e s will look a l m o s t identical. S

(F-6-4" rp

^v. I beat my wife

because I like my wife

F-20 (F-6-5' NE I beat my wife

because I like m y wife

"Beat" will now be interpreted a s the m a i n v e r b of the sentence, and NEG will attach itself to "beat" in both c a s e s . Observe that in o r d e r for "beat" to be c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s the m a i n v e r b in these sentences, we will have to r e v i s e our notion of main v e r b . Rather than defining the m a i n verb a s the highest V in the P - m a r k e r , we will define it a s the highest V that has a noun p h r a s e subject. F - 7 Instrumental Adverbials The same arguments that we have given in the preceeding sections apply to instrumental adve r b i a l s . Consider the question: Do you beat your wife with a whip?

( F - 7 -1)

(1) a s s u m e s that you beat your wife and is questioning whether you use a whip in doing so. (1) is synonymous with (2). Is it with a whip that you beat your wife?

(F-7-2)

We can account for the way in which we understand (1) if we derive it from the a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e underlying (2). Now consider the sentence: I don't beat my wife with a whip.

(F-7-3)

(3) a s s u m e s that I beat my wife and only denies that I use a whip to do so. (3) is synonymous with (4). It is not with a whip that I beat m y wife.

(F-7-4)

We can account for the way in which we understand (3) by deriving it from the s t r u c t u r e underlying (4). ing to (3).

Note that (4) not (5) is the cleft sentence c o r r e s p o n d -

F-21 *It is with a whip that I don't beat my wife.

(F-7-5)

The non-occurrence of (5) follows from a deep structure restriction (however it is to be stated) that one cannot assert that one uses an instrument in an activity which one doesn't perform. F-8 Frequency Adverbials Consider the question: Do you beat your wife often?

(F-3-1)

(1) assumes that you beat your wife and questions whether the occurrence is frequent. (1) is synonymous with (2). Is it often that that you beat your wife?

(F-8-2)

We can account for the way in which we understand (1) by deriving it from the abstract structure underlying (2). Now consider: I don't beat my wife often.

(F-8-3)

(3) assumes that I do beat my wife, but denies that I do so frequently. (3) is synonymous with (4). It is not often that I beat my wife.

(F-8-4)

Again, we can account for our understanding of (3) by deriving it from the structure underlying (4). And again observe that (4) and not (5) is the cleft sentence corresponding to (3). *It is often that I don't beat my wife.

(F-8-5)

(5) does not occur because one cannot assert the frequency of an event that does not occur.

(6) is ruled out for the same reason.

#1 don't beat my wife seldom.

(F-8-6)

F-22 We would set up the following deep s t r u c t u r e for (1) and ( 2 ) : (F-8-7)

You beat your wife

+V + ADJ often

If EXTRAPOSITION o c c u r s , we get (2). Otherwise, IT-DELETION o c c u r s and we get (1). Note that IT-DELETION yields the following s t r u c t u r e : (F-8-8)

NP

+V +ADJ yo/ \ u r wile Note that the deletion of the node NP dominating "it" now m a k e s "beat" the beat

m a i n v e r b according to our definition in F - 6 . Thus, "beat, " the embedded v e r b in the deep s t r u c t u r e , will undergo the question transformation. F - 9 Quantifiers So far, we have shown that what have been called m a i n clauses in traditional g r a m m a r very often a r i s e a s embedded clauses and a s s u m e their stature a s main c l a u s e s only through transformational derivation. The e x a m ples that we have dealt with thus far have all contained what have traditionally been called a d v e r b i a l s . We have p r e s e n t e d evidence to show that these 'adv e r b i a l s ' a r e derived from v e r b p h r a s e s of simplex sentences which a r e higher in the base p h r a s e m a r k e r than the supposed m a i n c l a u s e s . We will now consider another case of the same s o r t .

F-23 In t r a d i t i o n a l s t u d i e s , a s w e l l a s i n r e c e n t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l o n e s , q u a n t i f i e r s h a v e b e e n a n a l y z e d a s b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e n t s of t h e noun p h r a s e s t h a t t h e y quantify.

A

typical recent

a n a l y s i s i s t h a t given in the M i t r e

G r a m m a r . The M i t r e g r a m m a r i a n s a n a l y z e q u a n t i f i e r s a s b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d in a p r e a r t i c l e c o n s t i t u e n t , w h i c h i s i t s e l f a c o n s t i t u e n t of the d e t e r m i n e r .

That

i s , t h e y p r o p o s e t h a t quantified n o u n p h r a s e s h a v e t h e following u n d e r l y i n g constituent s t r u c t u r e :

J ^ DET PREARTICLE,of

(F-9-1) ^N

ARTICLE

T h i s s t r u c t u r e would u n d e r l i e "two of the b o y s " and "How m a n y of t h e b o y s " w h e n t h e a r t i c l e i s d e f i n i t e . When t h e a r t i c l e i s i n d e f i n i t e , t h e M i t r e g r a m m a r i a n s a s s u m e , it and "of" a r e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l l y d e l e t e d .

Thus, the

s t r u c t u r e i n (1) w i t h a n indefinite a r t i c l e would u n d e r l i e "two b o y s " a n d "how many boys.

M

The M i t r e g r a m m a r i a n s a l s o a s s u m e t h a t " m a n y " a l w a y s a p p e a r s

i n the u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e w h e n e v e r a n i n t e g e r a p p e a r s .

T h u s , t h e y would

h a v e t h e p r e a r t i c l e c o n s i s t i n g of a d e g r e e c o n s t i t u e n t followed by " m a n y . " PREARJTICLE DDECi

(F-9-2) "MANY

T h u s , " t w o of t h e b o y s " would be d e r i v e d f r o m "two m a n y of t h e b o y s " by t h e d e l e t i o n of " m a n y " and s o it would b e c o m p l e t e l y p a r a l l e l t o "how m a n y of t h e b o y s , " w h e r e the " m a n y " i s not d e l e t e d . The i n a d e q u a c y of t h e v i e w t h a t q u a n t i f i e r s a p p e a r in t h e d e e p s t r u c t u r e a s c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h e n o u n p h r a s e s t h a t t h e y quantify c a n b e s e e n c l e a r l y i n t h e c o m p a r a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n . A s R o b e r t L e e s p o i n t e d out ( L e e s , 1961), a sentence such a s

F-24 This airport is further from New York than from Chicago.

(F-9-3)

must, at some point in its derivation, have as its terminal string: This airport is more far from New York than this airport is far from Chicago.

(F-9-4)

By a transformational rule, the second occurrence of "this airport" will be deleted if it is identical with the first occurrence of "this airport. " This is in general the case in the derivation of comparatives. Whenever we have NP is more far from New York than NP is far from Chicago.

(F-9 - 5)

the second NP can be deleted only if it is completely identical with the first NP--identical in both determiner and noun. Now consider the sentence: How many airports are further from New York than from Chicago? (F-9-6) If "how many" is introduced as a constituent of the noun phrase containing "airports, " then (6) must, at some point in its derivation, have the terminal string: Q how many airports are more far from New York than how many airports are far from Chicago.

(F-9-7)

The noun phrase containing "airports" must appear twice in the deep structure underlying the comparative sentence (6). Thus, it follows from the assumption that quantifiers are introduced as deep structure constituents of the noun phrases they quantify that the quantifier "how many" must occur twice in the deep structure of (6). This is clearly absurd. There should be only one occurrence of "how many" in the deep structure of sentences like (6). We can provide an analysis of (6) that meets

F-25 this condition if we treat "many" as an adjective of the same sort as "long, " "numerous, " etc. Consider the following sentences: How long are the airports that are further from New York than from Chicago?

(F-9-8)

How numerous are the airports that are further from New York than from Chicago?

(F-9-9)

Observe that (9) is synonymous with (6). Also observe that the parallel sentence with "many" sounds more archaic than ungrammatical. How many are the airports that are further from New York than from Chicago?

(F-9-10)

(IP) is'l similar to such archaisms as (11) and (12). How many are the stars in the sky?

(F-9"H)

Many were the times that I held her in my arms.

(F~9~12)

If we assume that the rule which accounts for the generation of (6-) rather than (10) was once optional and is now obligatory, we can account for these familiar archaisms. Such a rule would assume a deep structure like (13). S NP-^

^~~^~^—VP

Det' The

(F-9-13)

are how many $-

airports

these airports are more far from N. Y. than these airports are far from .Chicago Exactly what such a rule would look like would depend upon the analysis of predicates containing measure adjectives and their quantifiers that we choose to adopt. We do not take any position on that matter here. But given any

F-26 adequate analysis of predicates containing measure adjectives and their quantifiers, we can treat "many" as a measure adjective and set up a rule that shifts the constituent containing QUANTIFIER + many into the determiner of the subject noun phrase.

(The same analysis would hold for "much. ") Observe

that since measure adjective quantification must be accounted for anyway, we can reduce noun phrase quantification to a case of measure adjective quantification. And rather than having two sources of quantifier (in noun phrases and with m e a s ure adjectives), we would now have only one. This analysis of noun phrase quantifier is corroborated by the way that we understand sentences like (14). Not much shrapnel hit the soldier.

(F-9-14)

(14) has the passive (15). The soldier was not hit by much shrapnel. These sentences do not deny that the soldier was hit. that the soldier was hit by some shrapnel.

(F-9-15) Rather, they assert

They only deny that the amount

of shrapnel that hit the soldier was much. Similarly, consider the questions, (16) and (17). Did much shrapnel hit the solidier?

(F-9-16)

Was the soldier hit by much shrapnel?

(F-9-17)

These sentences do not question whether or not the soldier was hit.

They

again assume that the soldier was hit by some shrapnel, and they question the amount. We can account for the way in which we understand these sentences, if we derive (14) and (15) from (18) and if we derive (16) and (17) from (19).

F-27 (F-9-18)

some shrapnel hit the soldier (F-9-19)

was much

some shrapnel hit the soldier Since all quantifiers will now occur in p r e d i c a t e s we should not be s u r p r i s e d to find quantifiers occurring in embedded clauses a s well as in m a t r i x c l a u s e s . F o r example, c o n s i d e r : . The firing squad executed two students. (20)would have the deep s t r u c t u r e :

(F~9~20)

F-28 (F-9-21)

the tiring squad

the students were two many Since noun p h r a s e quantifiers may be derived either from 'higher' sentences containing quantifier p r e d i c a t e s or from embedded relative c l a u s e s of the same sort, one would expect to find c a s e s of ambiguity--where a single noun p h r a s e quantifier can be derived from two such underlying s o u r c e s . Consider the sentence: Did many inmates e s c a p e ?

(F-9-22'

(22) may either be questioning whether an escape by many inmates took place or it may be assuming that some inmates excaped and questioning whether the number that escaped was great.

In the former c a s e , (22) would have the

deep s t r u c t u r e of (23). In the l a t t e r c a s e , it would have the underlying s t r u c t u r e of (24). (F-9-23

escape the inmates were many

F-29 (F-9-24)

were many

some inmates escaped Observe that an ambiguity like (22) is possible only in the case of quantified noun p h r a s e s that a r e superficial subjects. Consider the following sentences: 100 soldiers shot two students.

(F-9-25)

Two students were shot by 100 s o l d i e r s .

(F-9-26)

(25) has the following i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s : (a) A group of s o l d i e r s , who were 100 in number, shot a total of two students . (b) 100 soldiers (perhaps out of a l a r g e r group) shot two students apiece, though not the same two s t u d e n t s . (26) has interpretation (a), which we might p a r a p h r a s e a s : (a1) A total of two students were shot by a group of s o l d i e r s , which numbered 100. But (26) is not open to interpretation (b). Instead it has interpretation (c). (c) Two p a r t i c u l a r students (out of all those that were shot) were each shot by 100 soldiers (though not n e c e s s a r i l y by the same 100). These correspond to the following underlying s t r u c t u r e s :

F-30 (F-9-27a) VP

NP

Indef

shot the soldiers w e r e 100 many the students w e r e two many

(F-9-27b)

Indef

soldiers the students were two many

F-31 (F-27-c)

Indef Indef

students

the soldiers were 100 many

Before concluding, we would like to point out a fallacious argument in the literature on this subject.

In (Katz and Postal, 1964, p. 73), there

is an argument attributed to Chomsky which makes a claim equivalent to the false claim that (25) is open to interpretation (c).

The sentence in

question i s : Everyone in the room knows two languages.

(F-9-28)

The claim is that (28) is open to the interpretation that everyone in the room knows two particular languages, say, Mohawk and Hebrew.

The argument

proceeds as follows: The assumption is made, though not explicitly written down, that quantifiers are introduced in the deep structure as constituents of the noun phrases that they quantify. sidered:

The following sentence is then con-

F-32 There a r e two languages which everyone in the room knows.

(F-9-29

In (29) t h e r e is no question that two p a r t i c u l a r languages a r e r e f e r r e d to. The assumption is then made that "which" in (29) m u s t have been derived from an underlying "two languages, " that i s , a noun p h r a s e with a quantifier inside of it.

The s t r u c t u r e they a s s u m e i s : (F-9-30 There, a r e languages

veryone in the room Knows

NF

Det

N

/

I

P r e a r t i c l e lantwo guages They then r e a s o n that since the uppermost o c c u r r e n c e of "two languages" r e f e r s to p a r t i c u l a r languages, so the embedded o c c u r r e n c e of "two languages" must do the s a m e . The flaw in the reasoning is the assumption that quantifiers a r e deep s t r u c t u r e constituents of the noun p h r a s e s they quantify.

Note the

consequences of this line of reasoning for sentences like (29). Consider (31), the question corresponding to (29). How many languages a r e t h e r e which everyone in this room knows. (F-9-31)

F-33 Since "how m a n y " m u s t be introduced in the same constituent as "two, " "how many" must be a deep s t r u c t u r e constituent (say, p r e a r t i c l e ) of the noun p h r a s e "how many languages. " Since "which" in (29) is a reduced iform of the noun p h r a s e "two languages, " it follows that "which" in (31) is a r e duced form of the noun p h r a s e "how many languages. " That i s , the deep structure of (31) m u s t contain two o c c u r r e n c e s of "how m a n y : " (F-9-32)

Everyone in the room knows Det tei-

I

*r

Prekrticle iaI_ how/many 8 u a « e s This is just as absurd as the claim that there a r e two o c c u r r e n c e s of "how m a n y " in the deep s t r u c t u r e underlying (6). Actually the deep s t r u c t u r e s underlying (29) and (31) a r e (33) and (34), respectively.

F-34 (F-9-33

Everyone in the room knows

A, NP

Det Inde f

language s

(F-9-34

the Everyone in the room knows K Det Inde'f

N

I

language s

F-10 Multiple Adverbials It has often been noted that in sentences with m a r e than one adverbial a change in the o r d e r of the adverbials may produce a considerable change in the meaning of the sentence.

Consider the following sentences:

I beat m y wife often because she s e r v e s red wine with fish.

(F-10-1)

I often beat my wife because she serves red wine with fish.

(F-10-2)

F-35 in (1) I am telling the r e a s o n why I beat m y wife often. In (2) I am telling the frequency with which I beat m y wife because she s e r v e s red wine with fish. This distinction shows up quite clearly in the corresponding questions: Do you beat your wife often because she s e r v e s red wine with fish? (F-10-3) Do you often beat your wife because she s e r v e s red wine with fish? (F-10-4) (3) a s s u m e s that you beat your wife often and i s questioning your r e a s o n for doing so. (4) a s s u m e s that you beat your wife because she s e r v e s red wine with fish and is questioning how often you do s o . As we pointed out in the preceding sections, r e a s o n and frequency adverbials m u s t be introduced a s the v e r b p h r a s e s of 'higher* simplex s e n tences than the superficial m a i n clause.

Recall that the m a i n clause of the

surface s t r u c t u r e was embedded in the deep s t r u c t u r e subject of the v e r b p h r a s e which became a derived adverbial.

We can account for the occurrence

of multiple adverbials and for the way that we understand them if we a s s u m e that sentences containing adverbials may be embedded into the subjects of other 'adverbial' v e r b p h r a s e s .

Thus, we can account for the different

questions of (3) and (4) by assuming that they a r e derived frqm the following deep s t r u c t u r e s :

F-36 F-10-3')

because my wife s e r v e s red wine with fish

I beat my wife (F-10-4') .VP V

^-\

VP

-

+V +Adj often

because m y wife s e r v e s red wine with fish

I beat m y wife Observe that it is only when "often" is the highest VP in the t r e e that it can be moved to the position following the superficial subject. F o r example, (5a) and (5b) a r e synonymous with each other, but not with (6). a. I beat m y wife in public often. b. I often beat m y wife in public.

(F-10-5)

F-37 I beat my wife often in public.

(F-10-6)

(6) a s s e r t s the place where I beat m y wife often. (5) a s s e r t s the frequency with which I beat my wife in public.

They would have the following deep

structures: (F-10-5')

I beat m y wife (F-10-6')

I beat m y wife Note that in (5a) and in (6) the linear o r d e r of the adverbs reflects their relative heights in the underlying P - m a r k e r s . the superficial

subject.

In (5b) "often" a p p e a r s after

Since (5b) is synonymous with (5a) but not with

(6), we can only conclude that "often" can be moved to this position when it is the highest VP in the P - m a r k e r and that the transformation which shifts "often" to this position is p o s t - c y c l i c a l .

F-38 The occurrence of many adverbials within a sentence often reflects a rather deep level of embedding. Consider the following sentences: Do you beat your wife enthusiastically ?

(F-10-7)

Do you beat your wife enthusiastically in the yard?

(F-10-8)

Do you beat your wife enthusiastically in the yard because she serves red wine with fish?

(F-10-9)

Do you often beat your wife enthusiastically in the yard because she serves red wine with fish?

(F-10-10)

We can account for what is questioned in these sentences if we assume that they have the following deep structures: F-10-7')

You beat your wife

F-39 (F-10-8')

enthusiastic it

You beat your wife (F-10-9')

because your wife s e r v e s r e d wine with fish

enthusiastic it

You beat your -wife

F-40 (F-10-101)

a

J

J-

fou b e a t y o u r wife it Yol O b s e r v e t h a t in (7) t h r o u g h (9) t h e l i n e a r o r d e r of the a d v e r b i a l s e x a c t l y m i r r o r s t h e i r r e l a t i v e d e p t h s of e m b e d d i n g . F - l l Cleft S e n t e n c e s a n d A d v e r b s C o n s i d e r the s e n t e n c e s : John drank beer.

(F-ll-1)

It w a s J o h n who d r a n k b e e r .

(F-ll-2)

It w a s b e e r t h a t J o h n d r a n k .

(F-ll-3)

It h a s g e n e r a l l y b e e n a s s u m e d by p e o p l e who h a v e s t u d i e d cleft s e n t e n c e s w i t h i n a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t (2) a n d (3) s h o u l d h a v e t h e s a m e d e e p s t r u c t u r e . L e e s a s s u m e s t h a t b o t h (2) a n d (3) a r e to be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e u n d e r l y i n g (1) ( L e e s , 1960a). J . R. R o s s ( p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) h a s a r g u e d t h a t (2) a n d (3) a r e both to be d e r i v e d f r o m (4).

F-41 (F-ll-4)

/p J( drank

beer

Ross considers / \ to be a dummy constituent into which either "John" or "beer " m a y be substituted. Both of these claims s e e m inadequate in the light of the following example s: It was not John who drank b e e r .

(F-ll-5)

It was not beer that John drank.

(F-ll-6)

Was it John who drank b e e r ?

(F-ll-7)

Was it beer that John d r a n k ?

(F-ll-8)

(5) a s s e r t s that someone drank b e e r , but that that p e r s o n was not John. (6) a s s e r t s that John drank something, but that the liquid was not b e e r . (7) p r e supposes that someone drank b e e r and questions whether the p e r s o n was John. (8) presupposes that John drank something, and questions whether it was b e e r that he drank. These questions and negatives cannot possibly be accounted for if we a s s u m e that (2) and (3) have the same deep s t r u c t u r e . We can account for these only if we a s s u m e that (2) and (3) have deep s t r u c t u r e s something like (9) and (10), respectively.

F-42 (F-ll-9)

NP

John someone drank beer

(F-ll-10) VP

NP be

NP

N it

yp^

NP V

beer NP

John drank something Then (5) and (6) would have deep s t r u c t u r e s like (11) and (12), respectively, and we could account for the meanings of the questions. (F-ll-11) S Q ,—-~~~~~~ •'

•—-——yp NP

John

drank

beer

F-43 (F-ll-12)

r

aranK sometmng We could account for the negatives (7) and (8) in the same way. If we derive cleft sentences involving noun p h r a s e s as in (9) through (12), we will be treating these constructions as r a t h e r different than the cleft sentences involving adverbs that we discussed in F - 5 through F - 8 .

In those

sections we claimed that with adverbials, the non-cleft sentences have the same deep s t r u c t u r e s as the cleft sentences.

However, J. R. Ross (per-

sonal communication) has pointed out some examples which make it c l e a r that the claim we made in those sections is not quite a c c u r a t e . Consider the following sentences: John p r o m i s e d to m a r r y Mary in the yard.

(F-ll-13)

It was in the yard that John p r o m i s e d to m a r r y Mary.

(F-ll-14)

Both (13) and (14) a r e ambiguous. We can account for the ambiguity of (13) by positing the following underlying s t r u c t u r e s :

F-44 (F-ll-15)

John m a r r y Mary (F-ll-16)

John m a r r y Mary (15) r e p r e s e n t s the sense of (13) in which the location of the promising is a s s e r t e d . (16) r e p r e s e n t s the sense in which the p r o m i s e i s a s s e r t e d and "in the y a r d " r e f e r s to the place where the m a r r i a g e was to take place. In (14) "in the y a r d " has the s a m e ambiguity as in (13). We can derive one sense of (14) from the s t r u c t u r e of (15), but we cannot derive (14) in its other sense from the s t r u c t u r e of (16).

This difficulty could a r i s e

from one of two s o u r c e s . Either we were wrong in proposing that adverbs come from 'higher' sentences than the p r e d i c a t e s they modify, or we were wrong in claiming that for a d v e r b s , cleft and non-cleft sentences have

F-45 the same deep s t r u c t u r e . The latter is actually the c a s e , a s the following examples show. Did John p r o m i s e to m a r r y M a r y in the y a r d ?

(F-ll-17)

Was it in the yard t h a t John p r o m i s e d to m a r r y M a r y ?

(F-ll-18)

John didn't p r o m i s e to m a r r y Mary in the yard.

(F-ll-19)

It wasn't in the yard that John p r o m i s e d to m a r r y Mary.

(F-ll-20)

All of these sentences a r e ambiguous. But (17) and (18) a r e not a m biguous in the same way, nor a r e (19) and (20).

(17) is open to interpretations

(a) and (b): (a) It is presupposed that John p r o m i s e d to m a r r y Mary, and it is questioned whether the place where he did the p r o m i s i n g was in the yard. (b) It is questioned whether John made the p r o m i s e that he would m a r r y Mary in the yard. (18) is a l s o open to interpretation (a), but it is not open to interpretation (b) --that i s , (18) in all c a s e s presupposes that the p r o m i s e was made and cannot question whether John did any p r o m i s i n g . (18) can only question location. In addition to (a), (18) is also open to interpretation (c). (c) It is presupposed that John p r o m i s e d to m a r r y Mary, and it is questioned whether the m a r r i a g e was to take place in the yard. We can account for these facts if we postulate (21) and (22) as underlying s t r u c t u r e s for (17) and (23) and (24) a s underlying s t r u c t u r e s for (18).

(F-ll-21)

it

John marry Mary (F-ll-22)

NP

VP

John promise

in the yard it

John m a r r y Mary

F-47 (F-ll-23)

promised

if

I John m a r r y Mary (F-ll-24)

John m a r r y Mary Note that in (23) and (24) we a r e deriving cleft sentences in the same way as we did in (9) through (12). Note also that (23) and (21) will be interpreted in the same way even though they do not have the same underlying s t r u c t u r e . The r e a s o n for this is that the meaning of the second highest predicate "in some p l a c e " is contained within the reading for the highest predicate

F-48 "in the yard, " The s a m e will be true for (25) and (15).

(25) is the underlying

s t r u c t u r e for (14) in the reading that (14) ^shares with (13). (lJ-11-25)

N it

iS NP

in some place "yp

John

John m a r r y Mary We can account for the negatives (19) and (20) in essentially the s a m e way as we accounted for the questions (17) and (18).

REMARKS R-l RO-1 The feature PRO in the grammatical member of a complex symbol indicates whether or not a lexical item is to be chosen. +PRO indicates that a lexical item is not to be chosen. -PRO indicates that a lexical item is_to be chosen. R3-1 My use of the term "government" should not be confused with the traditional usage of that term.

I mean it only in the special sense that I define.

R4-1 This account of it-substitution does not exactly accord with that given by Rosen baum in (Rosenbaum, 1965). However, the facts which motivate my treatment of this phenomenon are largely the same as those which motivate his.

His

discussion of the topic is most enlightening and I refer the reader to his work. R4-2 By hypothesizing an abstract inchoative pro-verb, we are making a weaker claim than if we were to suppose that an actual lexical item (sac h as "get" or "come about") appeared in the deep structure of these sentences.

The

abstract nature of this pro-verb will be crucial if we want to maintain the claim that a transformation may not substitute one lexical item for another, except under identity. R4-3 For the sake of exposition, we have included in our 'underlying' structures items that really are transformationally introduced, for instance, the "for-to" complementizer.

If we were to be precise in using our notion of

underlying structure, we would represent (4-19) as follows:

R-2

NP

VP

N

NP

i A

I

T

VERB

I

+v —• +PRO +INCHOATIVE

J

VERB

it t h e sauce th:ick R4-4

Let us consider the operation of the inchoative transformation in some g r e a t e r detail. (4-23), with relevant details included, would appear a s follows: _. .. -.-. S-. NP-

VP- '""""'

VP

le ssauce the

V "+V -ADJ -STATIVE +INCHO +PRO

1

1

+v +ADJ +STATIVE -INCHO -PRO

+v +ADJ +STATIVE -INCHO -PRO thick

Note that, by this t i m e , a l l of the m ' s and u ' s that appeared in the lexical entry for "thick" have been converted into pluses and m i n u s e s .

We a s s u m e

that this p r o c e s s took place before any transformations applied, that i s , that the above features determine deep s t r u c t u r e distribution and that p o s sible violations with r e s p e c t to these features a r e determined on the deep s t r u c t u r e level.

Note also that no lexical item has been chosen for the

lexical m e m b e r of the inchoative p r o - v e r b .

The inchoative transformation

will substitute the lexical m e m b e r of the adjective into the slot for the lexical m e m b e r of the inchoative p r o - v e r b . deleted, yielding:

The adjective will then be

R-3

V /

+V -ADJ -STATIYE +INCHOATIVE +PRO

+v

—

+ADJ +STATIVE -INCHOATIVE -FRO thick

Note that, although m o s t of the features of the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r no longer match those of the lexical m e m b e r , t h e r e will be no violation, since possible violations for those features a r e defined only on the level of deep s t r u c t u r e . R5-1 These c a s e s were pointed out by Emmon Bach in "Irreflexive V e r b s , " a paper presented before The Linguistic Society of A m e r i c a , December, 1964. R6-1 Consider the disjunction of lexical f e a t u r e s : [+SD (A) (L)] V [+SD (B) (L)]

(1)

If neither the SD of rule A nor that of rule B has been m e t , the g r a m m a t i c a l m e m b e r of the complex symbol containing (1) will contain: [-SD (A) (G)] and [-SD (B) (G)]

(2)

By the conventions of Section0< 52, we conjoin (1) and (2). This yields: [-SD(A) (G)] and [-SD (B) (G)] and

|T+SD(A) (L)] V [+SD(B) (L (3)

By the distributive law of elementary logic, we get: [-SD (A) (G)] and [-SD (B) (G)] and [+SD(A) (L) ] | I [-SD(A) (G)] and [-SD(B) (C)] and [+SD(B) (L) ]J

V (4)

)|

R-4 If we map the G-features into the L - f e a t u r e s , we will obliterate the distinction at this point and get: [ j - S D ( A ) ] and [-SD (B)] and [+SD(A)j]

V U-SD (A)] and

[-SD (B)] and [+SD(B)fJ Recall that [-F]

s

(5)

~ [+F] for all f e a t u r e s , F . Thus (5) is equivalent t o :

| ~[+SD (B)] and ~[+SD (A)] and [+SD (A)J]

V

(6)

| H>SD (A)] and ~[+SD (B)] and [+SD(B)ri Each m e m b e r of the disjunction contains a contradiction of the form: ~ [ F ] and [F]. Hence we get a contradiction for the entire disjunction, and by Section 0. 52, a violation.

Note that if (2) had contained a plus-valued SD-

feature, no violation would have resulted. R7-1 The fact that we can get "the boy who is content" but not either "*the boy content" or "*the content boy" s e e m s to indicate that "content" is a simple exception to the optional rule W H - D E L - - that i s , it may not undergo that r u l e . However, this analysis cannot be maintained in the face of examples such as "The boy content with his lot" which m u s t be derived from "the boy who is content with his lot. " This shows that "content" may undergo WH-DEL. "Content" is surely an exceptional lexical item. Let us r a i s e the question of just what kind of exception "content" i s . Consider the following sentences: I-A Exceptional adjectives 1. a. I know a boy who is content with his lot. b. I know a boy content with his lot. c. I know a boy who is content. d. *I know a boy content. e. *I know a content boy.

R-5 2. a. I knew a m u r d e r e r who was s o r r y about what he had done. b . I knew a m u r d e r e r s o r r y about what he had done. c. I knew a m u r d e r e r who was s o r r y . d. *I knew a m u r d e r e r s o r r y . e. *I knew a s o r r y m u r d e r e r . 3. a. I know a g i r l who is ready to enter college. b . I know a g i r l ready to enter college. c. I know a girl who is ready. d. #1 know a girl ready. e. *I know a ready g i r l . I-B Ordinary Adjectives 1. a. I know a boy who is satisfied with his lot. b. I know a boy satisfied with his lot. c. I know a boy who is satisfied. d. *i know a boy satisfied. e. I know a satisfied boy. 2. a. I knew a m u r d e r e r who was repentant about what he had done. b . I knew a m u r d e r e r repentant about what he had done. c. I knew a m u r d e r e r who was repentant. d. #1 knew a m u r d e r e r repentant. e. I: knew a repentant m u r d e r e r . 3. a. I know a g i r l who is anxious about entering college. b . I know a g i r l anxious about enterhig_ college. c. I know a g i r l who is anxious. d. *I know a girl anxious. e. I know an anxious girl.

R-6 As we pointed out in Section 4 . 3, ordinary adjectives do undergo ADJ-SHIFT, while exceptional ones do not.

On the other hand, ordinary verbs do not

undergo ADJ-SHIFT, while exceptional ones do. II-A Ordinary Verbs 1. a. I knew the m a n who was shot in the subway. b. I knew the m a n shot in the subway. c. I knew the m a n who was shot. d. *I knew the m a n shot. e. #1 knew the shot m a n . 2. a. The b r a c e l e t that was bought by H a r r y was r e t u r n e d . b. The b r a c e l e t bought by H a r r y was returned. c. The b r a c e l e t that was bought was returned. d. *The b r a c e l e t bought was returned. e. *The bought b r a c e l e t was r e t u r n e d . 3. a. Looney was an official who was chosen by a large majority. b . Looney was an official chosen by a large majority. c. Looney was an official who was chosen. d. #Looney was an official chosen. e. *Looney was a chosen official. II-B Exceptional Verbs 1. a. I knew the m a n who was m u r d e r e d in the subway. b . I knew the m a n m u r d e r e d in the subway. c. I knew the m a n who was m u r d e r e d . d. *I knew the m a n m u r d e r e d . e. I knew the m u r d e r e d m a n .

:

"

R-7 ,2.

3.

a.

The b r a c e l e t that was s t o l e n by Harry was returned.

b.

The b r a c e l e t s t o l e n by Harry was returned.

c.

The b r a c e l e t that was s t o l e n w a s returned.

d.

*The b r a c e l e t s t o l e n w a s returned.

e.

The s t o l e n b r a c e l e t w a s returned.

a.

Looney w a s an official who w a s e l e c t e d by a l a r g e majority.

b.

Looney w a s an official e l e c t e d by a l a r g e majority.

c.

Looney w a s an official who w a s e l e c t e d .

d.

* Looney was an official e l e c t e d .

e.

Looney w a s an e l e c t e d official.

Recall from Section A - 4 that ADJ-SHIFT applies to s t r u c t u r e s of the form: NP

III-A

and m a p s them into s t r u c t u r e s of the form: NP X1

III-B

VP X*

N

~"X3

V 1 2

where

X , X , and X

3 a r e (possibly null) v a r i a b l e s .

Note that in the (b) s e n t e n c e s the SD will not be m e t s i n c e the v e r b s and a d j e c t i v e s in question a r e not the final constituents of VP.

What happens in

the c a s e of exceptional a d j e c t i v e s and ordinary verbs is that if the structural

R-8 description of ADJ-SHIFT is met at all, a violation Results whether or not ADJ-SHIFT actually applies.

Hence, the (d) and (e) sentences of (I-A) and

(II-A) a r e all u n g r a m m a t i c a l . We can account for these facts in the following way. A s s u m e that ordinary and exceptional verbs and adjectives a r e r e p r e s e n t e d in the following fashion:

ADJECTIVAL

1 ordinary adjectives +

2 exceptional adjectives +

ordinary verbs

CJV) 4 exceptional verbs

SD (ADJ-SHIFT)

u

u

u

u

R (ADJ-SHIFT)

u

m

u

m

Note from I and II above that exceptional verbs act just like ordi nary adjectives, and that ordinary verbs act just like exceptional adjectives. We can e x p r e s s this fact by considering ADJ-SHIFT as a rule which is minor for v e r b s . The following rule will state t h i s : [V R (ADJ-SHIFT) ] -

[~Y R (ADJ-SHIFT) ] / \- ADJECTIVAL] (V)

(V) will map the values given in (IV) into those given in (VI). X

ADJECTIVAL SD (ADJ-SHIFT)

ordinary adjectives + u

exceptional adjectives + u

ordinary verbs

m

m

u

exceptional verbs u

u (VI) In o r d e r to account for the fact that ordinary verbs and exceptionaladj ectives R(ADJ-SHIFT)

u

act as though they were negative absolute exceptions to ADJ-SHIFT, namely, that they may not meet the SD of ADJ-SHIFT, we need the following additional rule: [u SD(ADJ-SHIFT)] -

[m SD (ADJ-SHIFT)] / \ m R (ADJ-SHIFT)I (VII)

/

R-9 (VII) will map the values given in (VI) into those given in (VIII). 1 2 3 ordinary exceptional ordinary adjectives adjectives verbs ADJECTIVAL + +

4

exceptional verbs

SD (ADJ-SHIFT)

u

m

m

u

R(ADJ-SHIFT)

u

m

m

u (VIII)

By m e t a r u l e s 1 through 5, exceptional adjectives and ordinary verbs will be t r e a t e d a s negative absolute exceptions to ADJ-SHIFT, while ordinary adjectives and exceptional verbs will be t r e a t e d as n o r m a l c a s e s with r e s p e c t to that r u l e . R9-1 As we noted above, "convince" and "persuade" a r e p a r a l l e l c a s e s . In both traditional and transformational t r e a t m e n t s of E n g l i s h , these verbs have regularly been grouped together, and it is assumed that they a r e to be t r e a t e d in the s a m e way.

We a g r e e with these observations and our analysis is in

accord with them.

Note, however, that "convince" a p p e a r s in a form that

" p e r s u a d e " does not appear in: 1. John is convinced that t h e r e is no God. 2. *John is persuaded that there is no God. (1) does not entail that someone has convinced John) that i s , t h e r e is no causative agent p r e s e n t . Thus (1) cannot have been derived from a sentence like (3), which contains the causative sense of "convince, " by m e a n s of the passive transformation. 3. Someone convinced John that there is no God.

R-10 Moreover, the fact that (1) a p p e a r s in the p r e s e n t tense provides an independent argument against its derivation by m e a n s of the passive transformation from the causative sense of "convince, " since neither non-stative v e r b nor its passive m a y occur in the simple p r e s e n t . Thus, we get neither (4) nor (5)(except in the h i s t o r i c a l p r e s e n t ) . 4. *Someone convinces John that t h e r e is no God. 5. *John is convinced by someone that there is no God. Thus, "convince" in (1) s e e m s to be an underlying form. Its meaning is "to believe s t r o n g l y " - - e x a c t l y the s a m e underlying meaning that we had to postulate for the causatives "convince" and "persuade. " If we p e r m i t the existence of hypothetical v e r b s , then we can maintain our analysis of " c o n vince" and " p e r s u a d e " as being synonyms that enter into p a r a l l e l derivations. We can account for the o c c u r r e n c e of (1) by representing "convince" with a slightly different lexical extension than "persuade. " Since "convince" may undergo the causative transformation, but need not do so, it will not be r e p r e sented as an absolute exception to causative. "Convince" will differ from "persuade" in that "convince" will contain the feature [u SD (CAUSATIVE)] where persuade contains the feature [m SD(CAUSATIVE)]. In any theory of g r a m m a r that excludes hypothetical lexical items "convince" and " p e r s u a d e " will have to be given strikingly different lexical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , and sentences like 6. Bill convinced John that t h e r e is no God. and 7. Bill persuaded John that there is no God. will have to be derived in entirely different ways. In o r d e r to show thp obvious relationship between (6) and (1), we will have to derive (6) by the

R-ll causative transformation from a deep s t r u c t u r e with causative p r o - v e r b a s main v e r b and with the underlying s t r u c t u r e of (1) embedded within it.

If

no hypothetical lexical i t e m s a r e permitted, then " p e r s u a d e " will have to be r e p r e s e n t e d in the lexicon as some sort of lexical causative. (7) will have an entirely different deep s t r u c t u r e than (6) and will be derived in an entirely different m a n n e r . R9-2 Suppose that someone were to devise a theory of language that would somehow exclude hypothetical lexical i t e m s . Then, as we pointed out in R e m a r k 9~1, presumably p a r a l l e l sentences containing "convince" and " p e r s u a d e " ( e . g . , (6) and (7) of R e m a r k 9"1) would have to be derived from entirely different deep s t r u c t u r e s in any g r a m m a r of English. This m e a n s that the semantic component of English would need to contain, in general,

two different rules

of semantic interpretation for j©au'satives--one for lexical causatives ("persuade" would have to be analyzed as such) and one for derived causatives (such as "convince'').

Moreover, the semantic component in a g r a m m a r

defined by such a theory would have to contain special 'entailment r u l e s ' to account for such typical facts a s : "Bill persuaded John to go" entails that at some point in time John intended to go. Such facts a r e accounted for a u t o matically in our treatment of causatives, since a n S with the meaning of "John intended to go" occurs embedded in the underlying s t r u c t u r e of "Bill persuaded John to go. " We have been assuming that it is possible to constrain a theory of language in a well-motivated way so as to rule out the occurrence of hypothetical v e r b s while still maintaining descriptive adequacy.

In Sections

R-12 5 and 9, we argued that this is not possible.

But even if our arguments there

were wrong, it is not apparent that one could find a well-motivated formal mechanism for ruling out hypothetical lexical items.

Since any descriptively

adequate theory must contain devices like SD-features for handling absolute exceptions (see Sections 5. 1 and 5.2), any such theory will automatically define a host of hypothetical lexical items other than the particular cases that the SD-feature theory was set up to handle.

Of course, it is always possible

that one could rule out hypothetical lexical items by defining an evaluation measure of some kind that would make SD-features very costly.

Yet the mat-

ter of ruling out all hypothetical lexical items on principle (if one could ever find a justification for doing such a thing) seems to be a matter of restricting the form of a linguistic theory, rather than a matter of choosing the best grammar defined within a theory of a certain form.

It is not at all clear how

restrictions of form might be placed on a theory of language to exclude hypothetical lexical items, while permitting other sorts of absolute exceptions. R10-1 The lexical base hypothesis is a reformulation of an earlier position of mine that certain (not all) features introduced in the base component are predictable on a one-one basis from semantic markers. ABSTRACT,

_NP, ANIMATE

,

Among these, I included ANIMATE,

ABSTRACT, STATIVE, etc.

This

position, like my present one, was designed to account for the fact that the meaning of a word provided some (but by no means all) syntactic information about the word.

However, since the nature of semantic markers is not well

known, and since out intuitions about what constitutes a semantic marker are not clear, it s e e m s desirable to state this position without tying it to any specific concept of semantic marker.

In the formulation of the lexical base

R-13 hypothesis, we have elitninated reference to semantic m a r k e r s and have r e t r e a t ed to the notion of lexical synonymy--something that we have much c l e a r e r intuitions about.

At the same t i m e , we have moved from the position of listing

one by one the features that we think a r e predictable from semantic information to the stronger position that all lexical base features m u s t be predictable from semantic information.

This latter position is probably much too strong.

The feature ADJECTIVAL is a good case in point. cognizant of"

"Know about"

and "be

a r e probably synonymous, but one is a v e r b , while the other

is an adjective.

If it is reasonable to a s s u m e that ADJECTIVAL is a lexical

base feature, this case would constitute a counterexample to the lexical base hypothesis.

This indicates that the hypothesis will probably have to weakened

in the following way: There will be two kinds of lexical base features—those that a r e semantically rooted and those that a r e not.

At p r e s e n t , t h e r e

s e e m s to be no general principle to determine which features a r e semantically rooted, and which a r e not. In this c a s e , the semantically rooted ones will simply have to be listed in our linguistic theory.

This is unfortunate from

an aesthetic point of view, but certainly not without p a r a l l e l .

In phonology,

certain feature values ( e . g . , +STRIDENT) may not occur in any language with c e r t a i n combinations of other feature values (e. g . , +VOCALIC, -CONSONANTAL).

There seem to be no general principles about the nature of

phonological features or about the form of g r a m m a r s from which we could predict t h i s .

It is simply a fact, and all such c a s e s m u s t be listed in our

theory of language.

The same would be the case with semantically rooted

lexical base features.

Our position then would be that two synonyms - would

have to have the same semantically rooted lexical base features.

This po-

sition, like the lexical base hypothesis, avoids any dependence on a p a r t i c u l a r view of what semantic m a r k e r s a r e like.

R-14 RIO-2 Let u s c o n s i d e r a n e x a m p l e of the type of l e x i c a l b a s e e v i d e n c e that m i g h t have s o m e bearing on the choice of one particular s e t of b a s e r u l e s o v e r another. Rosenbaum (Rosenbaum, 1965) proposed that the b a s e component of E n g l i s h should c h a r a c t e r i z e the following predicate c o m p l e m e n t s t r u c t u r e s : (I)

a. /

\

b.

VP r

/

Verbs appearing in the configuration of (a) would contain the feature: [+

S].

Verbs appearing in the configuration of (b) would contain the f e a t u r e s : [+___NP] and [+

[+N, +Abstr] ] .

A s it turned out, R o s e n b a u m ' s a r g u m e n t s for the e x i s t e n c e of the (a) c o m p l e m e n t s w e r e far from o v e r w h e l m i n g .

His major argument for

the e x i s t e n c e of (a 1 ) c o m p l e m e n t s depended on the e x i s t e n c e of a handful of v e r b s in English which can take predicate c o m p l e m e n t s but not object nouns. Note that we c a n account for t h e s e v e r b s i n another way.

We can a s s u m e

that they take c o m p l e m e n t s of type (b) and that they a r e absolute e x c e p t i o n s to I T - D E L .

Since they would have to m e e t the SD of I T - D E L , they cculd

not take object nouns, and s i n c e the node NP in (b) would be deleted in the application of I T - D E L , the d e r i v e d structure containing t h e s e v e r b s would

R-15 be exactly (a).

Thus there a r e at l e a s t two ways of accounting for this hand-

ful of v e r b s , and there s e e m s to be little to choose between them. Now suppose that we a s s u m e d the lexical base hypothesis.

Suppose,

also, that for each verb that appeared to take an (a) complement, there existed a synonymous verb (-either in English or in some other language) that could take both predicate complements and object nouns.

That v e r b would have

to appear in the configuration of (b) and would have to contain the lexical b a s e features: [+

NP] and [+

[+N, +Abstr] ]. By the lexical base hypothesis, the

corresponding English verb would have to contain the same features and so would have to be analyzed as occurring in (b) configurations and as being an absolute exception to I T - D E L .

If one could make the same c a s e for each such verb in

each language that appeared to occur

in (a) configurations, then one could

eliminate configurations like (a) from the universal base component.

Thus,

it is possible that the u n i v e r s a l base hypothesis, coupled with interlingual e v i dence about lexical base f e a t u r e s , could provide arguments in favor of one p a r t i c u l a r u n i v e r s a l base over another. All of this i s , of c o u r s e , s h e e r speculation. The lexical base hypothesis may be totally false, as may be the universal base hypothesis. But if these hypotheses were to turn out to be t r u e , they would explain a great deal about n a t u r a l language and would undoubtedly involve us in rethinking a g r e a t many of the g r a m m a t i c a l analyses that have been c a r r i e d out to date. RC-1 P r e l i m i n a r y studies within a generative phonological framework of languages with voiceless vowels have shown that voicelessness in vowels s e e m s to be predictable by phonological r u l e s , and that therefore these languages do not have voiceless vowels a s systematic phonemes.

If further study should

R-16 show that no known language has voiceless vowels a s systematic phonemes, then this would t u r n out to be a bad example for our p u r p o s e s . An adequate example for our p u r p o s e s , though one which is l e s s obvious and by no m e a n s certain, would concern compactness in vowels and consonants. So far a s we can tell at p r e s e n t , vowels unmarked for compactness a r e compact, vowels m a r k e d for compactness a r e non-compact, and the opposite is t r u e for consonants.

The evidence we have is of the following

s o r t : The neutral position of the vocal t r a c t in the production of vowels is compact.

In the production of stop consonants, the n e u t r a l position is non-

compact. Corresponding to t h i s , is the fact that children l e a r n to produce compact vowels before non-compact ones, and they l e a r n to produce noncompact stops before compact ones (hence, m a - m a , pa~pa, d a - d a , e t c . ) . Moreover, in positions of neutralization, vowels tend to become compact (schwa). One can make a weaker c a s e for the tendency of neutralized consonants to be non-compact.

In languages where t h e r e is only one nasal s y s -

tematic phoneme, it is common for that n a s a l to a s s i m i l a t e before stop consonants, but for it to appear as n in n e u t r a l position : intervocalically and at the end of w o r d s .

Oaie can a l s o cite the example of Finnish, where

final consonants become dental.

However, a l l the facts a r e by no means

in, and those that a r e a r e by no m e a n s conclusive. RC-2 P e r h a p s we ought to r e i t e r a t e what we m e a n by "normal. " We can speak of the n o r m a l value of a feature only with r e s p e c t to other given values of other features.

Thus, given that a segment is a vowel, we say that it

is 'normal 1 for it to have the value "+" with r e s p e c t to the feature VOICED. Given that a segment is a consonant, we say that it is 'normal 1 for it to

R-17 have the value " - " with r e s p e c t to the feature NASAL.

Given that a segment

is a consonant and -CONTINUANT, we say that it is n o r m a l for it to have the value " - " with r e s p e c t to the feature STRIDENT.

Thus, the notion of

normality a s s u m e s the existence of a h i e r a r c h y of features such that for any given feature normality can be defined only with r e s p e c t to some combination of features higher up in the h i e r a r c h y . As the development of t h e o r y of generative phonology is now visioned,

en-

distinctive features should be made to c o r r e l a t e m o r e and m o r e

closely to the significant deformations of the human vocal t r a c t for the production of speech sounds.

In e s s e n c e , features should be physiologically

a s well as acoustically based, with "significant : deformation" to be defined with r e s p e c t to the phonological phenomena found in e m p i r i c a l studj.es of natural languages.

The notion of

"normality" is envisioned as c o r r e l a t i n g

with the physiolggfccal notion of "ease of production" with r e s p e c t to the human vocal t r a c t in general, r a t h e r than the ease of an adult speaking of a p a r t i c u l a r language.

Thus, when we say that it is "normal" for a vowel

to be voiced and for a consonant to be v o i c e l e s s , we consider the following physiological c o r r e l a t e s : Given that the vocal t r a c t is in position to p r o duce a vowel, it is e a s i e r to produce a voiced vowel than a voiceless vowel. In the production of a vowel, the rush of a i r past the vocal chords tends to make them vibrate (cf. Bernoulli's Law), and it takes some effort to keep them from vibrating.

In the production of a consonant, there is a con-

striction in the vocal t r a c t , and any r u s h of a i r c r e a t e s a back p r e s s u r e , which tends to keep the vocal chords from vibrating. to force a i r through and cause vibration.

It takes an e x t r a effort

Needless to say, all the

R-18 physiological c o r r e l a t e s for features have not been worked out and undoubtedly there a r e many features that a r e i n c o r r e c t l y or incompletely specified. S i m i larly, the notion of m a r k e d n e s s for phonological features is

by no m e a n s

entirely c l e a r or completely specified. Since the facts about the ease of production of various speech sounds a r e nowhere near complete, we must depend upon other evidence to provide clues as to which feature values a r e "normal, " given c e r t a i n other values. We consider the following kinds of evidence: 1. The e a r l i e r acquisition of the use of e a s i e r sounds. Children seem to acquire the ability to use of e a s i e r sounds before the ability to use h a r d e r o n e s .

(See R e m a r k C~l and example 2 of Appendix

C-l) (See also Jakobson, 1962.) 2. The g r e a t e r frequency of o c c u r r e n c e in phonological s y s t e m s . Systematic phonemes corresponding to e a s y - t o - p r o d u c e speech sounds seem to occur m o r e frequently in the languages of the world than do those that correspond to sounds that a r e h a r d to produce. Thus, it is a r a r e language that does not have an / a / or an / n / , and I have never come a c r o s s a language that did not have a / t / (that i s , a non-compact, n o n - g r a v e , voiceless stop consonant). L a t e r a l fricatives, clicks, rounded front vowels, and other relatively m o r e difficult sounds occur l e s s frequently. 3. The g r e a t e r frequency of occurrence in individual languages. It s e e m s to be the case that systematic phonemes corresponding to relatively easy-to-produce sounds occur m o r e frequently in the lexicon of individual languages.

F o r example, / j / , / o / , and /9 / occur in fewer

English worde than do / p / , / t / , o r / k / .

The principle of counting

marked

R-19 phonological features , but not counting unmarked ones is meant as a b a s i s for the explanation of such phenomena. 4. In phonological neutralization, the unmarked m e m b e r of the neutralized set of sounds is m o s t likely to occur. See examples of R e m a r k C-l and example 3 of Appendix C. When various e m p i r i c a l observations of this s o r t all seem to point to

the

choice .of.a>particular^eaturer vJalueiin some environment a s being "normal" (unmarked), then we feel we have e m p i r i c a l support for hypothesizing that that feature value is indeed unmarked. RC-3 Just as phonological features seem to be tied to the physiology of the human vocal t r a c t , so syntactic features s e e m to be tied to our conceptual s y s t e m . Our notion of VERB s e e m s to c o r r e s p o n d in p a r t to the logical notion of "predicate^ " non-stative VERBS correspond i n p a r t to activity p r e d i c a t e s , while stative VERBS correspond in p a r t to p r o p e r t y or state p r e d i c a t e s . Thus, though the notion " n o r m a l " for syntactic features has no physiological b a s i s , it is (as we shall see below) a notion which is useful for explicating c e r t a i n of our intuitions about language and one which may eventually help us to understand what the .human conceptual apparatus is like. We feel justified in extending the notions of "normal state " and " m a r k e d n e s s " directly from phonology Since 'the same sort 'of e m p i r i c a l evidence on which we base our conclusions about m a r k e d n e s s in phonology s e e m s to be p r e s e n t in syntax.

F o r example:

1. Children seem to l e a r n concrete nouns before they l e a r n a b s t r a c t onesj they s e e m to l e a r n countable nouns before they l e a r n uncountable ones J

R-20 and so on.

This would tend to make us hypothesize that - ABSTRACT and

+COUNT, a r e the unmarked values of those features. We would then look for other evidence to confirm this. 2 - 3 . Non-stative v e r b s and stative adjectives occur m o r e frequently in the lexicons of individual languages than do stative verbs and non-stative adjectives. 4. In examples of syntactic neutralization, one feature value s e e m s to turn up again and again wherever the given phenomenon o c c u r s . This would t e n d t o m a k e us hypothesize that that value was the unmarked one. (For example s, see Appendix C - 2. RE-1 Note that Fodor and Katz p e r m i t disjunction in lexical i t e m s only if each branch of the disjunction has at least one semantic m a r k e r . Their lexical representation does not p e r m i t disjunctions of syntactic features. RF-1 It has been brought to m y attention by Robin Lakoff that sentences v e r y similar to (F-5-1) may be i n t e r p r e t e d in an entirely different way. Consider the sentences: a. Did they build the statue next to the courthouse ? b. Did they build a statue next to the c o u r t h o u s e ? The only difference in these sentences is that (b) contains an indefinite a r t i c l e where (a) contains a definite a r t i c l e .

Yet (a) a s s u m e s that some

statue was built and a s k s about the location of it, while (b) asks whether a statue was built in a p a r t i c u l a r location. for this phenomenon.

We have no idea how to account

R-21 RF-2 We are not arguing that there is no other way of accounting for the way in which negative and interrogative sentences containing adverbs are interpreted. It may very well be the case that one could find