On the Edge of Truth and Honesty: Principles and Strategies of Fraud and Deceit in the Early Modern Period (Intersections, 2) [Illustrated] 9004125728, 9789004125728

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ON THE EDGE OF TRUTH AND HONESTY

INTERSECTIONS YEARBOOK FOR EARLY MODERN STUDIES VOLUME 2 - 2002

Editorial Board K. A E. ENENKEL (University of Leiden) W Th. M. FRljRoFF (Free University of Amsterdam)

AJ. GELDERBLOM (Utrecht University) G. C. A M. VAN GEMERT (University of Nijmegen) J. L. DEJONG (University of Groningen) H. F.K. VAN NIEROP (University of Amsterdam) M. SPIES (Free University of Amsterdam) M. VAN VAECK (Catholic University of Louvain) B. WESTERWEEL (University of Leiden) Advisory Board

K. van Berkel (University of Groningen), B. Blonde (University of Antwerp) F. Egmond (Algemeen Rijksarchiefj, A. Grafton (University of Princeton) A. Hamilton (University of Lei den), C.L. Heesakkers (University of Amsterdam) H. A. Hendrix (Utrecht University), F.]. van Ingen (Free University of Amsterdam) ].1. Israel (University of Princeton), M. Jacobs (Free University of Brussels) W Neuber (Free University of Berlin), K.A. Ottenheym (University of Utrecht) K. Porteman (Catholic University of Louvain), EJ. Sluijter (University of Amsterdam) E.G.E. van der Wall (University of Leiden)

ON THE EDGE OF TRUTH AND HONESTY Principles and Strategies if Fraud and Deceit in the Early Modern Period EDITED BY

TOON VAN HOUDT JAN L. DEJONG ZORANKWAK MARIJKE SPIES MARC VAN VAECK

BRILL LEIDEN· BOSTON 2002

Illustration on the cover. 'Fraud' (from the Iconologia by Cesare Ripa), depicted as a woman with two faces: the one young and handsome, the other of an ugly old woman, having the feet of an eagle, and a tail like a scorpion. In her right hand she holds two hearts; and in her left hand, a vizard (mask). The two hearts are significant signs, of to will and not to will in the same thing. Her vizard signifies that deceit propounds the thing otherwise than in truth it is, and by this to arrive to her intention. The tail of the Scorpion, and the feet of an Eagle signify the hidden poison, which nurses her always as a bird of prey, to make havock of other men's goods and good name. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnalune On the edge of truth and honesty: Principles and strategies offraud and deceit in the early modern period / ed. by Toon van Houdt ... - Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2002 (Intersections; Vol. 2) (ISBN 90-04-12572-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is also available

ISSN 1568-1181 ISBN 9004 12572 8

© Copyright 2002 by Koninklijke Brill.Nv, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part if this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in a'!)' form or by a'!)' means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate.fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations .............................................. ................... ..... Notes on the Editors of this Volume List of Contributors ........... ............. ...................... ......................

VII

Xl

XlII

INTRODUCTION

Word Histories, and Beyond: Towards a Conceptualization if Fraud and Deceit in Ear?J Modem Times TooN VAN HOUDT ................................................................ ..

I. DISCOURSES

33

Erasmus on Lying and Simulation JOHANNES TRAPMAN

Cymbalum Politicorum, Consultor Dolosus. Two Dutch Academics on Niccolo Machiavelli ....................................................

47

PAUL VAN HECK

The Hidden Self if the Hypocrite JACQ.UES Bos

65

Dissimulation et Secret chez Vauvenargues ........................................

85

DANIEL ACKE

Spinoza and the Idea WIEP VAN BUNGE

if Religious

Imposture

105

CONTENTS

VI

II. PRACTICES

Perceptions if Deceit and Innovation in the Antwerp Textile Industry (Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) ......................... ....................... ALFONS K.L. THIJS The Seventeenth-Century Antwerp Elite and Status Honour. The Presentation if Self and the Manipulation if Social Perception

127

149

BERT TIMMERMANS

III. REPRESENTATIONS

Testing or Tempting? The Limits Modern English Drama

if Permissible

Deceit in EarlY

PAUL J.C.M. FRANSSEN ............................................................

167

T romper 1es Plus C1air-Voyans. The Counterfeit if Precious Stones in the Work if Rbny Belleau ................................................

183

EVELIEN CHAYES

'Taste the Fare and Chew it with Your Eyes': A Painting by Pieter Pieters;:. and the Amusing Deceit in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Dutch and Flemish Kitchen Scenes ......................

223

ZORAN KWAK

A Singing Siren, Enchanting Men to Sleep. Musical Deceit in Dutch Renaissance Drama ........................................................................

253

NATASCHA VELDHORST

W'ho Do Beggars Deceive? Adriaen van de Venne, Recreational Literature and the Pleasure if Forging Texts ....................................

269

MARC VAN VAECK - JOHAN VERBERCKMOES

Index Nominum

289

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures 1 and 2 (belonging to the article by Paul van Heck) can be found between pages 58 and 59: 1. Titlepage of Daniel Heinsius, De politica sapientia oratio (Leiden: 1614). 2. Titlepage of Caspar Barlaeus, Dissertatio de bono principe (Amsterdam: 1633).

Figures 1-12 (belonging to the article by ;:'pran Kwak) can be found between pages 236 and 237: 1. Pieter Pietersz, Selj-portrait as a Cook) with the Journey to Emmaus, monogrammed and dated 1571, panel, 118 X 155 cm., present whereabouts unknown. 2. Monogrammist TG, Allegory if Painting) Architecture and Sculpture, 1576. Engraving, 243 X 151 mm., Florence, Gabinetto disegni e stampe deg1i Uffizi. 3. Pieter Aertsen, Peasant Kitchen, ca. 1560, panel, 110.5 Copenhagen, Statens Museum for Kunst.

X

213 cm.,

4. Jan Sanders van Hemessen, The Prodigal Son in a Bawdy House) 1536, panel, Brussels, Musees Royaux des Beaux-Arts de Belgique. 5. Pieter Cornelisz van Rijck, Kitchen Scene with the Supper at Emmaus, signed and dated 1605, pen and brown ink, brown wash over traces of black chalk, 267 X 410 mm., St Petersburg, Hermitage Museum. 6. Jacob Matham, Kitchen Scene with the Supper at Emmaus, 1603. Engraving, 200 X 330 mm., Amsterdam, Rijksprentenkabinet. 7. Abraham Bloemaert, Kitchen Scene, canvas, Germany, private collection. 8. Circle of Joachim Wtewael, Kitchen Scene, canvas, 125 present whereabouts unknown.

X

170 cm.,

Vlll

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

9. Peter Wtewael, Kitchen Scene, 1625-1628, canvas, 113.7 cm., New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art. 10. Abraham Bloemaert, Kitchen Scene, canvas, 91 terdam, private collection.

X

X

160

125 cm., Ams-

11. Floris van Schooten, Kitchen Scene, 1621, canvas, 108 Washington D.C., private collection (in 1991).

X

162 cm.,

12. Simon de Vos, Kitchen Scene with Fortune Teller, 1639, copper, 44 X 62 cm., Antwerpen, Koninklijk Museum voor Schone Kunsten.

Figures 1- 4 (belonging to the article by Natascha Veldhorst), and figures 1-8 (belonging to the article by Marc van Vaeck - Johan Verberckmoes) can befound between pages 268 and 269: [Veldhorst] 1. Pieter Dubbels/Michel Lambert, Siren's song in the play Toneelspel zonder Tooneelspel (Amsterdam: 1671). 2. Jacques Callot, Un sirene entre deux vaisseaux. Engraving from series Lux C1austri ou La Lumiere du C10itre (Paris: 1646). 3. Johannes Serwouters, Singing and music-making sirens. Engraving in J. van Heemskerck, Boeck vande Minne-kunst (Amsterdam: 1626). 4. Pieter de Bailliu (1623-1660) after Anthony van Dyck, Armida and sleeping Rinaldo, in company with the singing siren. Engraving 61,2 X 42,8 cm. Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum. [Marc van Vaeck - J ohan V erberckmoes] 1. Biographical sketch of Adriaen van de Venne from Jean Meyssens' Image de divers hommes desprit divin (Antwerp: 1649) (C. de Bie, Het gulden Cabinet van de edel vry schilderconst [Antwerp: 1661-1662]) (Photo: University Library Leuven). 2. Adriaen van de Venne, T afereel van de Belacchende Werelt (The Hague: 1635) 5 (Photo: University Library Leuven). 3. Adriaen van de Venne, T afereel van de Belacchende Werelt (The Hague: 1635) 133 (Photo: University Library Leuven). 4. Adriaen van de Venne, T afereel van de Belacchende Werelt (The Hague: 1635) 145 (Photo: University Library Leuven).

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

IX

5. Adriaen van de Venne, Tafereel van de Belacchende ~Verelt (The Hague: 1635) 158 (Photo: University Library Leuven). 6. Adriaen van de Venne, Tafereel van de Belacchende Werelt (The Hague: 1635) 138 (Photo: University Library Leuven). 7. Ghent, University Library: Ghent).

IDS.

1816, 73 (Photo: University Library

8. Ghent, University Library: Ghent).

IDS.

1816, 74 (Photo: University Library

NOTES ON THE EDITORS OF THIS VOLUME

Toon VAN HOUDT teaches Latin in the Department of Classics at the Catholic University of Leuven. His research focuses mainly on verbal and non-verbal strategies of communication in classical antiquity and early modern times. He is co-editor of Self-Presentation and Social Identification: 17ze Rhetoric and Pragmatics if Letter Writing in Early Modem Times (Leuven, 2002). Jan L. DE JONG, Ph.D. (1987) in Art History, Leiden University, is assistant professor of Italian Renaissance Art at Groningen University, The Netherlands. He has published numerous articles on Italian Renaissance painting. Zoran KWAK carried out research on the pictorial tradition and meaning of Dutch kitchen scenes (c. 1590-1640) as a Ph.D. student at Leiden University since 1997. At the moment he works at the Dutch University Institute for Art History in Florence and prepares the publication of the volume dedicated to Latium and Rome of the Repertory if Dutch and Flemish Paintings in Italian Collections. Marijke SPIES, Ph.D. in Literary History (1979) is professor emeritus in pre-l 770 Dutch literature at the Free University, Amsterdam, and in the History of Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam. She has published monographies and articles in both disciplines. Her writings in English are collected under the title Rhetoric, Rhetoricians and Poets. Studies in Renaissance Poetry and Poetics (Amsterdam UP, 1999). Marc VAN V AECK is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Literature at the University of Leuven and has published on 16th- and 17thcentury Dutch literature, and Dutch emblem literature. His doctoral dissertation was published in 1994: Adriaen van de Vennes T afereel van de Belacchende Werelt (Den Haag, 1635). 3 vols. (Gent: Koninklijke Academie voor Nederlandse Taal- en Letterkunde, 1994).

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Daniel ACKE is Professor of French Culture and History of French Literature at the Free University of Brussels (v'U.B.). His research focuses on the tradition of the French moralists, especially of the 18th century. He is the author of Vauvenargues moraliste (Kaln: 1993) and is currently finishing a critical edition of the Caracteres et portraits by the Prince de Ligne (Champion: Paris). His further research interests include philosophical approaches to French postwar poetry and he has published a book on Yves Bonnifoy essqyiste (Amsterdam-Atlanta: 1999). Jacques Bos teaches Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and History at Leiden University, where he will defend his Ph.D., Reading the Soul. The Concept if Character and Theories if Personality, 1550-1750, in the course of 2003. Wiep VAN BUNGE is Professor of the History of Philosophy at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. His publications in English include From Stevin to Spinoza. An Essqy on Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic (Leiden: Brill, 2001). Evelien CHAVES (1968) is preparing her Ph.D. at the Department of French Language and Literature and the Institute of Culture and History of the University of Amsterdam. PaulJ.C.M. FRANSSEN teaches British literature at Utrecht University. He has published various articles in this field, mainly on the earlymodern period, and has coedited The Author as Character. He is currently working on a full-length study of appropriations of Shakespeare as a literary character. He also edits Folio, the journal of the Shakespeare Society of the Low Countries. Paul VAN HECK is Associate Professor of Italian Literature at Leiden University. In recent years he has published, among other things, a series of articles on Machiavelli and on (Dutch) Machiavellism, and Dutch translations with extensive commentary of Machiavelli's Discorsi and II Principe. At present, he is preparing a critical edition of Pietro Giannone's Discorsi sopra gli Annali di Tzto Livio.

XIV

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Alfons K.L. THIJS obtained his Ph.D. in 1978 with a dissertation on the Antwerp textile industry (15th-19th centuries). He is Professor of Social and Contemporary History at the University of Antwerp (UFSIA) and studies the transition from commercial to industrial capitalism in the Southern Netherlands, with special focus on the social, economic, cultural, mental and religious shifts involved. Bert TIMMERMANS graduated in History at the University of Leuven. He is currently Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific ResearchFlanders, associated with the Department of Art History at the University of Leuven. He is preparing a Ph.D. thesis on the patterns of art patronage in 17th-century Antwerp. Johannes TRAPMAN is Senior Research Fellow at the Constantijn Huygens Institute in The Hague. He specializes in Erasmus and his influence in the 16th and 17th centuries. Natascha VELDHORST studied at the University and Conservatory of Amsterdam. She has published on 17th-century music and song, and is currently preparing a Ph.D. on music in the Amsterdam theatre of the seventeenth century. She is also a practising performer and singer of 17th-century Dutch music. Johan VERBERCKMOES teaches history of early modern culture from a world history perspective in the Department of History at Leuven University. He is the author of Laughter, Jestbooks and Sociery in the Spanish Netherlands (1999) and the co-editor of Brasil. Cultures and Economies if Four Continents. Cultures et Economies de Qyatre Continents (2001).

WORD HISTORIES, AND BEYOND: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF FRAUD AND DECEIT IN EARLY MODERN TIMES Toon van Houdt

One of the most powerful myths which early modern man inherited from the ancient Greeks and Romans was the myth of the golden age. Although, in the course of time, it generated slightly different meanings and messages for different people, it contained a number of elements which reappeared in a clearly recognizable way in the various versions of the myth that occurred during the early modern period. One of its core elements was, of course, the idea of effortless prosperity and affluence. Equally important was the idea of peace and concord uniting people as well as creating a strong and affectionate bond between mankind and nature as a whole. A closely related motif was the notion of transparency and truthfulness. In both ancient and early modern times, the golden age was considered to have been an age of simplicity and sincerity. Words meant what they were designed to mean, a man was as good as his word, no one had recourse to fraud or deceit. In Cervantes's wellknown novel, Don Quixote delivers a long speech on the attractive features of the golden age to a group of doubdessly puzzled goatherds: Happy the age and happy the times on which the ancients bestowed the name of golden, not because gold, which in this iron age of ours is rated so highly, was attainable without labor in those fortunate times, but rather because the people of those days did not know those two words mine and thine. In that blessed age all things were held in common. No man, to gain his common sustenance, needed to make any greater effort than to reach up his hand and pluck it from the strong oaks, which literally invited him to taste their sweet and savory fruit [.. .]. All was peace then, all amity, all concord. [...J Nor had fraud, deceit, or malice mingled with truth and sincerity. Justice pursued her own proper purposes. I I Quoted from Bouwsma W j., The Waning qf the Renaissance, 1550-1640, The Yale Intellectual History of the West (New Haven-London: 2000) 208. On the survival of the myth of the golden age in the early modern period, see Levin H., Ike Myth qf the Golden Age in the Renaissance (Oxford-New York: 1972).

2

TOON VAN HOUDT

The notion of the golden age derived from a mythical retrospection which placed the ideal of innocence and simplicity in a past so distant that it had left no historical record whatsoever. Throughout the early modern period, however, attempts were made to restore the ideal at least to some degree. With this end in view, several people made serious efforts to gain a better understanding of deceit, distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable, pleasant and unpleasant, wicked and virtuous forms, and seeking to unravel its principles, strategies, and functions. As a result, various discourses emerged which offered different, often contradictory, conceptualizations of the phenomenon. In the present article, I will briefly discuss the most influential of these discourses. As such, my article serves as an introduction to the casestudies collected in this volume. Some contributions will offer the reader a more penetrating analysis of the discourses presented. Other articles focus more on the actual use of deceptive strategies in the early modern period, as well as on its representation in various literary and artistic genres. Some of these case-studies will be mentioned in the following paragraphs; a complete overview is to be found at the end of this article.

Fraud and deceit: vices of the tongue or vices of the hands? Acutely aware of the all-pervasive presence of such concomitant vices as fraud, deceit, and lying in early modern society, various persons of moral authority, such as teachers and preachers, sought to present and impose models of behavior in which the lofty principles of honesty and truthfulness were reconciled with the exigencies of modern life. By far the most important educational work at the time was the ancient collection of distichs transmitted under the name of eato the Elder. The Dicta or Disticha Gatonis contained numerous maxims covering almost all aspects of human life and behavior. Not surprisingly, it includes various remarks on the proper use of the tongue. Honesty and truthfulness are presented as important social and moral qualities. Thus, duplicity is said to be something to be shunned: "Sperne repugnando tibi tu contrarius esse: / conveniet nulli qui secum dissidet ipse". 2 Flattery is considered a despicable form of 2 "Avoid the clash of inconsistency: Who fights with self, with no one will agree" (I, 4). The English translation of the distichs is taken from Minor Latin Poets, II, trans!' ].W. Duff - A.M. Duff, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.-London: 1935).

FRAUD AND DECEIT IN EARLY MODERN TIMES

3

deception: "Sermones blandos blaesosque cavere memento: / simplicitas veri forma est, laus ficta 10quentis".:1 Above all, a man is recommended to speak his mind and avoid hypocrisy: "Vera libens dicas, quam quam sint aspera dictu"; "Laudaris quodcumque palam, quodcumque probaris, / hoc vide ne rursus levitatis crimine damnes". 4 Yet at the same time stress is laid on the need for prudent self-control and circumspection. Thus, one should not be so naive as to speak one's mind under all circumstances: "Virtutem primam esse puto, compescere linguam: / proximus ille deo est qui scit ratione tacere".5 One's own words and deeds should always be reliable, but one should never forget to be on one's guard and, if necessary, strongly distrust the words and deeds of others. To begin with, one has to be suspicious of babblers: "Nolito quaedam referenti credere saepe: / exigua est tribuenda fides, qui multa loquuntur"." Furthermore, one should not believe praise bestowed by others: "Cum te aliquis laudat, iudex tuus esse memento; / plus aliis de te quam tu tibi credere noli".7 And although one should keep one's own promises, it would be imprudent to rely too heavily on promises made by others: "Spem tibi polliciti certam promittere noli: / rara fides ideo est, quia multi multa 10quuntur".8 The Disticha Catonis enjoyed an exceptionally wide readership throughout the early modern period. The booklet was edited by Desiderius Erasmus in 1514, and many other editions as well as translations and paraphrases would be issued until well into the eighteenth century.9 Humanist pedagogues recommended the work for the moral and grammatical instruction of children commencing their education at the Latin school. One of these pedagogues was Antonius a

:3 "Beware of softly whispered flatteries: Frankness is mark of truth, flattery of lies" (III, 4). I "Speak the truth freely, though the truth be hard" (Monost. 64); "vVhat you've approved and lauded openly, Shun the reproach of damning flightily" (IV, 25). 5 "To rule the tongue I reckon virtue's height: He's nearest God who can be dumb aright" (I, 3). h "Trust not those who for ever news relate: Slight faith is due to tongues that glibly prate" (II, 20). 7 "vVhen someone praises you, be judge alone: Trust not men's judgement of you, but your own" (I, 14). H "Think not hopes built on' promises are sure: Much said by many seldom proves secure" (I, 13). " For the survival of the Disticha Galanis, see the numerous contributions by M. Boas listed in his standard critical edition Disticha Galanis, eds. M. Boas - HJ. Botschuyver (Amsterdam: 1952) 287-98. See also Buuren F. van, Levenslessen van Gala: he! verhaal van een schoolboek, Van Selm-Lezing 3 (Amsterdam: 1994).

4

TOON VAN HOUDT

Burgundia, a canon of the chapter of St Donatian at Bruges, who in 1631 composed a small emblem book on the vices of the tongue which was clearly meant to be used by schoolboys. In his Linguae vitia el remedia, the author pays considerable attention to dishonest, deceitful behavior. Duplicity and mendacity are strongly condemned. However, Antonius does not want his pupils to wear their heart on their sleeve; they should not indulge in a free and spontaneous flow of words. For the tongue is a rebellious organ which is bound to lead us astray unless it is tightly curbed. Combining the practical, if not commonsensical, rules and guidelines of the Disticha Calonis with the down-to-earth biblical wisdom expressed in Ecclesiastes, Stjames and the Book of Proverbs, Antonius aimed to inculcate his readers with those moral and social qualities which were a necessary condition for success in both public and private life: tact, caution, deliberation, and even suspicion and distrust were called for, if one wanted to preserve oneself in a threatening, ruthless world, a world full of prying ears and malicious tongues. Developing an idea of wisdom entirely based on moral integrity and self-preservation, Antonius a Burgundia strongly appealed to the values and norms which prevailed in the bourgeois society of his days. 10 Antonius managed to 'spiritualize' this bourgeois ideology, insofar as it was put in a specifically Christian, if not eschatological, perspective. II The same holds true for the preachers, both Catholic and Protestant, who sought to keep their flock to the straight and narrow path by vividly depicting the terrors of hell that awaited the person who allowed himself to be sidetracked. Since, as a result of the Protestant and Catholic Reformation, preachers came to play an increasingly important role in moulding and controlling the behavior of ordinary people, they felt obliged to remind their audiences of issues that were deemed crucial to Christian life and thoughtthe need for honesty and fairness, for openness and truthfulness, the rejection of duplicity and hypocrisy, fraud and deceit. 12 10 See especially Vandenbroeck P., "Stadscultuur in de Nederlanden, ca. l400-ca. 1600: ideologische zwaartepunten, evenwichtsmechanismen, dubbelbinding", Tijdschrifl van ket Gemeentekrediet 44 (1990) 17-41 and id., Jheronimus Bosch tussen volksleven en stadscultuur (Berchem: 1987) 151-59. 11 Houdt T. van, "Introduction" in Antonius a Burgundia, Linguae vitia et remedia (Antwerp, 1631), Imago Figurata. Editions I (Tumhout: 1999) 37. 12 For the moralization of everyday life in the Protestant Reformation and postTridentine Catholicism, see e.g. Delumeauj., "Prescription and Reality", in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. E. Leites, Ideas in Context (Cambridge-Paris: 1988) 150-55.

FRAUD AND DECEIT IN EARLY MODERN TIMES

5

It is no coincidence, therefore, that Augustinus Valerius, bishop of Verona, in his widespread and much copied manual on preaching explicitly recommended preachers to lecture their audience on the vices of the tongue, in general, and on lying and deception, more particularlyY The BavarianJesuit Hieremias Drexel is another case in point. In 1629 he published Orb is Phaelhon) hoc est de universis vitiis linguae. Just as his other, more devotional, treatises, the work immediately became immensely popular in both the Catholic and the Protestant world. It was printed time and again in Munich, Cologne, Douai, and other cities; thousands of copies were released and distributed all over Europe. In 1643, the Augustinian friar Petrus de Vos added a series of indices to the work in order to make it more accessible to catechizers and preachers. 14 Orbis Phaelhon consists of a series of fairly long-winded sermons on the various vices of the tongue which are arranged in alphabetical order. No less than forty-three vices are tied to the twenty-three letters of the Latin alphabet, with a plate at the beginning of each chapter. Fraud and deceit are treated at length in the work. Drexel 'created' a number of tongues in order to show the manifold appearances of these vices and demonstrate the detrimental effects they have: apart from the fraudulent (ftaudulenta), fallacious (fallax) , and feigning or counterfeiting tongues (focata lingua), the author also pays attention to the exaggerating (fz:yperbolica) and hypocritical (fz:ypocritica) tongues, the exaggerating tongue bearing some resemblance to the boasting or ostentatious tongue (iactantia). Still more vices of the tongue can be mentioned here, as they too contain an element of deceit; this is notably the case with flattery (adulatio), calumny (calumnia), and the so-called political tongue (lingua politica)-another wicked tongue specifically devised by Drexel to characterize the verbal behavior of calculating courtiers and machiavellian politicians. 15 13 See his list of 'digressionum loci' in the synopsis attached to his De rhetorica ecclesiastica libri Ires (Verona: 1583) 925 sq. 14 For a general overview of the Orbis Phaiilhon, see Latham J., "Text and Image in Jeremias Drexel's Orbis Phaethon", in Emblematik und Kunst der Jesuiten in Boyern: Eitifluss und Wirkung, eds. P.M. Daly, G.R. Dimler and R. Haub, Imago Figurata. Studies 3 (Tumhout: 2000) 85-105. For the diffusion of Drexel's emblem books in the Netherlands, see Begheyn P., "The Emblem Books of Jeremias Drexel SJ in the Low Countries. Editions between 1622 and 1866", in Emblematik und Kunst der Jesuiten in Boyern: Eitifluss und Wirkung, eds. P.M. Daly, G.R. Dimler and R. Haub, Imago Figurata. Studies 3 (Tumhout: 2000) 269-88. 15 The political dimension of Drexel's emblem book is discussed in Houdt T. van, "Hieremias Drexel's Emblem Book Orbis Phae'thon (1629): Moral Message and Strategies of Persuasion", in Mundus Emblematicus. Studies on Neo-Latin Emblem Books, eds. K. Enenkel and A. Visser, Imago Figurata. Studies (Tumhout: forthcoming).

6

TO ON VAN HOUDT

The distinction between lingua fraudulenta, lingua fallax, and lingua fucata is somewhat artificial and is primarily meant to support the author's claim of having produced the definitive work on the subject-matter, covering all existing vices of the tongue. Although the fraudulent, fallacious, and feigning tongues are called three separate daughters of lying (mendacium), they are also represented as three different aspects of yet another vice, the cunning or deceitful tongue (lingua dolosa).16 The fraudulent tongue is defined as doing one thing while feigning another ("Aliud agit, aliud simulat"). The fallacious tongue is said to cloak the truth with the intention of harming someone else or gaining some personal advantage ("Fallacia est veritas palliata, quae vel alterius odium vel commodum suum attendit"). The counterfeiting tongue always tries to look more beautiful than it really is ("Hoc satagit, ut nunquam non picta sit et cerussata"). According to Drexel, the main difference between the three tongues is that the counterfeiting tongue does not primarily aim to harm other people as long as it steals the show, whereas the fraudulent tongue does not want to look pretty but rather shrewd and cunning. 17 It is altogether easier to understand what is meant by the hypocritical tongue. It is the tongue of a person who says one thing but thinks something else ("aliud pectore clausum, aliud ore promptum habet"). In other words, it is the tongue of the dissembler who never reveals his inner thoughts or emotions. 18 Drexel had enjoyed a thorough-going theological training and was well acquainted with the works of medieval and early modern scholastic theologians. However, his categorization of fallacious behavior and his definition of deceitful tongues lack the precision that was expected in theological treatises of a more technical kind. For one thing, Drexel deliberately blurs the distinction between verbal and non-verbal strategies of deception, subsuming fraud under the broader category of (illicit) verbal behavior, whereas late scholastic theologians unanimously followed the lead of St Thomas Aquinas who had defined it as a form of cunning behavior (astutia) performed through deeds. 19 In his De iustitia et iure ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus, a wellknown treatise on the cardinal virtues first issued in 1605, the Jesuit

16

17

IB 19

Orbis Phaethon (Munich: 1629), I, 22, 458. Orbis Phanhon, I, 22, 447. Orbis Phaelhon, I, 24, 505. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, lUI, 55, 4 ad 2 and 5.

FRAUD AND DECEIT IN EARLY MODERN TIMES

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Leonardus Lessius neatly summarized the scholastic categorization of fraud and deceit. According to the scholastic theologians, deception (dolus) can be executed by means of either words or deeds. If deceit is committed through words, it is labeled fallacia. If the words are accompanied by an oath, the deceit is turned into perjury (periurium). Deception does not necessarily entail the use of words. It can also be executed through actions. The term 'fraud' (fraus) is reserved to cases of deceit centering around an object or a job that is to be carried out. If the deceit is directed against a particular person, the scholastic theologians speak of treason (proditio).20 Apart from blurring the distinction between verbal and non-verbal strategies of deception, Drexel also applies a rather vague and broad concept of lying (mendacium) , thereby failing to make a neat distinction between a liar (mendax) and a deceiver (follax). Lying, as the moral theologians understood it, was a false statement intended to deceive. Lies could be expressed through words or any other act to which convention had assigned meaning, such as gestures. Nonverbal lying was labeled simulation (simulatio). According to the theologians, saying something false was not synonymous with telling a lie: a liar was a person who said something he did not believe to be true. Hence the pseudo-etymological explanation of'mentiri' ('to lie') as being derived from 'contra mentem ire' ('to go against one's mind'). However, not every lie should be considered a false statement intended to deceive. In order to prove this, Lessius refers to a person who tells a lie lest he be convicted on account of his own confession, although he realizes that his opponent will not believe him.2! However, Drexel readily admits that the fraudulent, fallacious and feigning tongues are so similar that it is very hard to discern them in actual practice. Despite the subtle differences only a well-trained observer like Drexel is able to perceive, the three sisters, as he calls them, turn out to follow the same guidelines and principles of conduct, which are diametrically opposed to the basic values and tenets

20 Lessius L., De iustitia et iure ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus (Antwerp: 1632 (1605)), II, 47, 8, 60; cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, lUI, 118, 8, cone!. 21 Lessius L., De iustitia et iure (note 20), II, 47, 6, 33. The distinction between mendax andfollax goes back to St Augustine, Solil., II, 9: "Omnis fallax adpetit fallere; non autem omnis vult fallere, qui mentitur". See further Sommerville JP., "The 'New Art of Lying': Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry", in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modem Europe, ed. E. Leites, Ideas in Context (Cambridge-Paris: 1988) 160-62.

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of Christianity. The first domestic law of the sisters ("domestica trium sororum lex") is to trust nobody and accept no one as a friend. Conversely, they make a serious effort to be pleasant and agreeable to others, while never allowing themselves to establish a bond of genuine friendship or love. As Drexel sadly remarks, the sisters aim to destroy the very foundation of Christian social ethics, charity (charitas) , the Christian virtue par excellence, which was widely believed to be the mother of all other virtues. 22 Central to the sisters' concerns is self-interest. They are eager to gain more glory, power, and especially more money, for "it seems inhumane to neglect oneself and one's purse".23 More often than not, it proves to be more efficient to promote one's own interest through fraud and deceit than through overt aggression. 'To deceive and not to be deceived' appears to be the sisters' main motto. As a consequence, they are willing to flatter a person, and blacken him as soon as he has turned his back. By the same token, they have no qualms about making promises without keeping them. For "who despairs to gain a victory by means of weapons, should have recourse to artifices. Fraud achieves more in one night than open violence in nine years".24 In other words, not the lion but rather the fox serves as a model for the sisters. Inspired by Cicero's moral treatise De qfficiis, Drexel chooses the fox as the emblematic representation of the fallacious tongue. Following Cicero's lead, he strongly condemns the application of 'fox-like' strategies in economic, social, and political life, as he is convinced that in the long run more success is to be expected from being honest than from seeming honest. 25 Drexel's account is typical of a traditional moral discourse on fraud and deceit in which biblical, classical, and patristic elements are blended. On a conceptual level, fraud and deceit are closely associ-

22 Orbis Phanhon, I, 21, 448-49. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, LII, 62, 4, 63, 5 and passim. 23 Orbis Phanhon, I, 21, 451-52. 24 Orbis Phaelhon, I, 21, 449: "Qui ab armis desperat victoriam, ad fallacias se conferat. Plus patrat fraus nocte una, quam aperta vis novem annis". 25 Orbis Phaelhon, I, 21, 447. Cf. Cicero, De qfficiis, I, 13, 41 and II, 3, 10. On the distinction between the lion and the fox, see Barlow JJ., "The Fox and the Lion: Machiavelli Replies to Cicero", History qf Political 7hought 20 (1999) 627-45, and Heck P. van, "Burgerdeugd en christendeugd. Over het voortleven van Cicero's De qfficiis", in De mensen van vroeger, de hoven van weleer. Over de receptie van de klassieken in de Europese literatuur, eds. K. Enenkel - P. van Heck (Voorthuizen: 2001) 74-77.

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ated with lying, which is considered the most commonly practised and most basic form of intended deception. All forms of deception are invariably wrong. Being the execution of cunning or shrewdness (astutia), fraud and deceit are strongly condemned as perversions of the cardinal virtue of prudence (prndentia), which is held to be the source of all other virtues, since it allows a man in any given circumstance to perceive what is just and what is wrong. 26 Being derivatives of lying (mendacium), they violate the principle of honesty and truth-telling (veritas). On a practical level, fraud and deceit are criticized as being detrimental to social life and to the instruments of communication on which the social life is based. Indeed, both a liar and a dissembler make abuse of the signs which we have at our disposal to express our inner thoughts and emotions and, by doing so, to enter into a meaningful communication with others. They corrupt the natural function of language and body language which consist of a number of signs which enable us to signify or indicate something. According to the moral theologians, these signs have not been given to us for our own sake but rather for the sake of our fellow menY While truthfulness entails simplicity or open-heartedness (simplicitas), lying and deceit create discord and duplicity (duplicitas). Indeed, both a liar and a dissembler bear one thing in their heart but show something completely different. In short, they create a gap between signifier (words, gestures, facial expressions, etc.) and signified (thoughts and feelings, character and moral disposition), and pervert the natural function of speech and body language. By doing so, they destroy mutual trust and sympathy which are deemed essential to any society.28

26 See e.g. Lessius's definition of prudentia which is indebted to Aristotle and Cicero: "Prudentia est virtus intellectus, qua in quovis negotio occurrente novimus quid honestum sit, quid turpe" (De iustitia et iure (note 20) I, 1, 1). 27 Cf. Lessius L., De iustitia et iure (note 20), II, 47, 5, 30: "(Veritas) versatur circa signa quibus aliquid alteri intendimus significare. Signa enim non sunt data homini propter se, sed propter alium, cui aliter mentem suam aperire nequit". 28 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, lUI, 109, 2, ob. 4 and ad 4. For a more detailed analysis of the traditional discourse on lying and deceit, see Dorzinsky j.A., Catholic Teaching about the Morality qf Falsehood, The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, Second Series, 16 (Washington D.C.: 1948).

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Mental reseroation and the reallocation

if truth

The traditional moral discourse on fraud and deceit was propagated by teachers and preachers alike in an attempt to control and regulate the economic, social, and political behavior of early modern people. As we will see, it co-existed with other discourses which offered a different conceptualization of the relationship between 'reality' and 'appearance', abandoning the simple dichotomy between 'truth' and 'falsehood', and allowing for a more positive attitude towards the use of deceit in particular contexts. At the same time, however, the moral discourse was subject to change from within. Without questioning the validity of the conceptual framework as such, several thinkers made serious efforts to overcome the practical problems posed by a far too rigorous application of the general and absolute prohibition on lying and deceiving. Although the traditional discourse was built on various biblical, classical, and patristic sources, it was primarily based on the teaching of St Augustine. In his two treatises De mendacio (On lying) and Contra mendacium (Against lying), he argued that all acts of lying were always wrong, even in cases when telling a lie would prevent disaster. Augustine's viewpoint ran counter to the position of early church fathers such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Stjohn Chrysostom who had maintained that it was licit, perhaps even obligatory, to lie in special circumstances. In order to corroborate their relaxed position they referred to the Bible which not only contained general prohibitions on lying (Deutoronomy 5:20 and Matthew 5:37) but also presented examples of 'heroic' mendacity for a just cause (Genesis 27:30-37 and Exodus 1:20). The passage from Exodus inspired the Dutch philosopher and theologian Dirk Volckertszoon Coornhert to write Vande Egypsche vroryvrouwen (The Egyptian midwives), an allegorical drama from 1582 in which he asked whether lying could be justified in particular circumstances. Rejecting Augustine's massive authority, he answered in the affirmative. 29 Many years before, Desiderius Erasmus had already experienced just how dangerous it was to reject 29 Cf. Fleurkens A.C.G., "Leven met lust. Coornherts toneelspelen", in Dirk Volckertszoon Coornhert. Dwars maar recht, eds. H. Bonger, ].R.H. Hoogervorst, M.E.H.N. Mout, I. Schnffer and]]. Wolqer (Zutphen: 1989) 92. Coornhert's preoccupations with truth-telling and lying are equally apparent in his engravings; see Veldman I.M., De Wereld tussen Coed en Kwaad. Late prenten van Coomhert (The Hague: 1990) 90-105.

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Augustine's authority and question his uncompromising attitude towards lying. In his Laus Stultitiae (Praise of Folly), the humanist made Folly ridicule those theologians who contended that even when the salvation of mankind is at stake, not one lie, however innocent, is permitted. 3D As J. Trapman shows in his contribution "Erasmus on Lying and Simulation", he was soon forced to defend himself against the attacks of Alberto Pio, one of his many Catholic critics. In his Lingua, a long-winded diatribe against the abuse of language and speech, Erasmus drew a clear distinction between telling a lie, which he deemed unchristian, and withholding or concealing the truth, which he found acceptable and in certain cases even prudent. 31 This was perfectly in line with scholastic doctrine. According to the scholastic theologians, it was strictly forbidden to tell blatant lies, but there were several occasions on which it was considered permissible to conceal the truth by keeping silent. 32 However sharp the borderline between lying and dissimulation may have been on the level of definition, in the realm of moral problem-solving things turned out to be much more complex and confusing. The confusion was largely due to the introduction of the category of mental reservation or restriction. A statement that was strictly speaking a lie ceased to be a lie as soon as the mental reservation made by the speaker was taken into consideration. In other words, the inner qualification was believed to preserve an apparently untrue spoken expression from being a lie. This theory was based on the distinction between spoken and written language, on the one hand, and mental language, on the other-a distinction ascribed to Aristotle by medieval philosophers and theologians. A statement was held to consist in part of vocal enunciation and in part of mental enunciation. If, for example, someone said aloud 'God is not [...]', then the vocal element of his statement would be false, but since he said with his mind, and immediately after his vocal utterance, '[...] an angel', his statement in its entirety was true. 33 Erasmus, Moria, ASD IV, 3, 148.414~16. Erasmus, Lingua, ASD IV, lA, 98.371~75. 32 See e.g. Dorzinsky J.A., Catholic Teaching about the Morality qf Falsehood (note 28) 20. :l:l C( Jonsen A.R. ~ Toulmin S., 1he Abuse qf Casuistry. A History qf Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: 1988) 195~215; Sommerville J.P., "The 'New Art of Lying'" (note 21) 159~84; Zagorin P., Wqys qf Lying. Dissimulation, Persecution, and CorifOrmity in Early Modem Europe (Cambridge, Mass.-London: 1990); Stone M.F.W., 1he Subtle Arts qf Casuistry: An Essqy in the History qf Moral Philosophy (Oxford: forthcoming). :lO

31

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The doctrine of mental reservation was devised in order to reconcile the prohibition on lying with the obligation of keeping a secret. Thus, it applied first and foremost to confessors questioned about sacramental matters as well as to persons interrogated under oath in legally dubious circumstances, such as English Catholics in the last decades of the sixteenth century, many of whom were haled before a magistrate and examined about their behavior and beliefs. However, its field of application was gradually expanded so as to include cases of private persons who were interrogated by other private persons, e.g. businessmen making enquiries about goods offered for sale in order to determine a just price. If a businessman feared to suffer a serious loss by revealing the truth, he was allowed to have recourse to mental reservations. The Louvain Jesuit Leonardus Lessius played an important role in the generalization of the use of mental reservations, whereas his former teacher Francisco Suarez contributed to its internalization by introducing the notion of implicit intention. According to the latter, someone who makes a false statement but does not consciously apply a mental reservation, should not be condemned as a liar. Rather it is to be assumed that he has the implicit intention of adding a mental reservation to his vocal enunciation, and this implicit intention suffices to excuse him.34 It is altogether clear that Lessius's and Suarez's unjustifiably broad use of mental reservation inevitably leads to a perversion of language as a means of communication. Words lose their natural, conventional meaning; any false statement can be presented as truthful. There is no way left for human beings to discern truth from falsehood, deceit from honesty, as the speaker gives no clues whatsoever to make it clear to the listener that his statement should not be taken literallyor rather 'vocally'. 35 In this respect, the use of mental reservation differs from other types of 'false statements' which include hints or indications about the true intention of the speaker or writer, as is for example the case with fables and parables, and the use of irony which was often defined as saying the opposite to the intended meaning. 36 It 34 Lessius L., De iustitia et iure (note 20), II, 42, 9; Suarez F., De religione, V, 3, 9-10, in Opera omnia (Paris: 1856), vol. 15. 3.5 This was one of the major points of criticism made by Blaise Pascal in his Provincial Letters; cf. Cariou P., Pascal et la casuistique, Questions (Paris: 1993) 134-37. :lli These hints could, of course, be so subtle as to be overlooked or misinterpreted. As ironia was often deliberately used to deceive, it was considered by some Renaissance authors as a form of lying. However, this does not seem to have been the common opinion. See Knox D., Ironia. Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 16 (Leiden: 1989) 42-52.

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comes as no surprise, then, to see that a heated debate about truthtelling, lying, and dissimulation arose in the Spanish Netherlands and abroad. Lessius's lax opinions met with severe criticism and were eventually condemned by the Roman authorities in 1679. 37

Literature, music, and the visual arts: manipulation if the ryes and the ears? In his Republic, Plato proposed a blueprint for a political community in which there was no place for poets. The accusations brought against them were well-known to early modern readers after the dissemination of Plato's works in Latin translation. According to the philosopher, poets are to be considered as liars. To begin with, they tell false and scandalous tales about the gods. More generally, they pretend to offer a representation or imitation of reality that actually remains very far removed from it, as they fail to perceive and represent the world of timeless Ideas and Truths, a world that lies behind the world of sensory appearances and can only be recognized by an elite of trained people-the so-called guardians-through dialectic. Last but not least, poets seduce listeners through the pleasures of verse or song, thereby corrupting and effeminating their souls. Plato's viewpoints had a strong impact on early modern debates about the epistemological and ethical status of literature. His allegations were repeated time and again, often in a more christianized form. 38 One of the ways to counter Plato's allegations was to revive the medieval concept of literature as allegory. By carefully distinguishing the literal from the allegorical sense, literature could be defended against the accusation of deceptive and corruptive falsehood. This strategy was adopted by, among others, Giovanni Boccaccio in his Genealogiae deorum gentilium, an encyclopedic study of myth, which turns out to be a defence of the art of poetry. Following the lead of Macrobius, Boccaccio draws a clear distinction between the surface and the core of a tale, thus establishing a dichotomous structure 3i The morality of falsehood was not only discussed by Catholics but also by Protestants. According to P. Zagorin, Protestant casuists were stricter than their Catholic counterparts insofar as they placed much tighter restrictions on the licit use of dissimulation; see Ways if Lying (note 33) 253-54. 'jB See Weinberg B., A History if Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago: 1961) I, 255-59 and passim. For a brief account of Plato's viewpoints on poetry, see c.g. Russell D.A., Criticism in Antiquity, Classical Life and Letters (London: 1981) 25-28.

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which prompts the reader to discover the metaphysical or ethical truth hidden behind the narratological veil of the text. This hermeneutic approach enables Boccaccio to categorize both literature and readers. While some literary-or rather 'sub-literary'-works are simply insignificant in that they do not have any other dimensions beyond the literal and are exclusively aimed at entertainment or pleasure, other works are first and foremost didactic and conceptual, their symbolic meaning being wrapped in a narrative that is clearly of secondary importance. This is for instance the case with Plato's own literary-philosophical works. There is, however, a middle category consisting of literary works whose surface can be regarded as deceitful as it tends to divert the reader's attention from the allegorical meaning to the superficial narrative itself. As a corollary, Boccaccio makes a distinction between the unlearned (female) reader who lets herself be absorbed by a text's external appearance and the experienced (male) reader who is capable of grasping a text's hidden truth. 39 In the course of time, a more radical defence of literature was launched in which, paradoxically enough, Platonic concepts played a crucial role. Eager to raise himself to a position equal to the philosopher's, Sir Philip Sidney argued in his Apologie for Poetry of 1595 that the imagination of the poet penetrates the appearances of this world to reach the real truth of things, and that by doing so it can inspire virtue. This sublime task cannot be performed without divine inspiration. 40 Two Platonic concepts appear to lie at the root of this more radical defence. On the one hand, there was an internalized concept of 'Ideas'. The Platonic 'Ideas' were no longer considered as metaphysical substances existing outside the world of sensory appearances as well as outside the human intellect, but rather as conceptions in the mind of man himself. The Platonic concept of poetic fury, on the other hand, enabled poets to present themselves as the holy prophets of the gods, and as inspired teachers of morality.41 A similar strategy could be adopted to revalue the visual arts which Plato had held in very low esteem-at least from an epistemological point of view. 42 According to the philosopher, 39 See Lev Kenaan V., "Fabula anilis: the Literal as a Feminine Sense", in Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History, Collection Latomus 254 (Bruxelles: 2000) 388-91. 40 Bouwsma W]., Ike Waning qf the Renaissance (note I) 248-49. 41 Vickers B., "Rhetoric and Poetics", in Ike Cambridge History qf Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, Q Skinner, E. Kessler, and J. Kraye (Cambridge: 1988) 737-38. 42 Not necessarily from an aesthetic point of view; see e.g. Deugd C. De, From

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the painter will paint a shoemaker, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, without knowing anything about their trades; and notwithstanding this ignorance on his part, let him be but a good painter, and if he paints a carpenter and displays his painting at a distance he will deceive children and silly people by making them think that it really is a carpenter.+ 1

Once again, Plato's criticism centers upon the problematic relationship between 'appearance' and 'reality'. Indeed, painting is regarded as a humble art which provides a naIve imitation of the natural world without reaching the real world of Ideas. Not unlike a poet, the painter remains far removed from the truth, as he can only offer an imitation of an imitation. For by painting for example a bed, he only imitates the imitation of the Idea of bed made by the carpenter when constructing a bed. J\;loreover, a painter deceives the spectator by means of a trompe-l'oeil which confounds representation and (visual) reality: when people see the picture of a carpenter, they are led to believe that they really see a carpenter before their eyes. Plato's scornful opinion was based on arguments which early modern painters could retort against him in various ways. For one thing, they could proclaim to be proud of their skill to create an illusion which seemed real, perhaps even more real than nature itself. Thus, in his writings on art, Leon Battista Alberti occasionally endorsed a strong naturalistic view on art, contending, among other things, that "the function of the painter is to render with lines and colours, on a given panel or wall, the visible surface of any body, so that at a certain distance and from a certain position it appears in relief and just like the body itself".~4 As a matter of fact, the power of a painting could be so strong that its symbolism did not protect it from a more direct appraisal. Alluding to the well-known story of Pygmalion told by Ovid in his A1etamorphoses, Leonardo da Vinci claimed that the painter could even induce men to fall in love with a picture that did not portray any living woman: It once happened to me that I made a picture representing a sacred subject which was bought by one who loved it-and then wished to remove the symbols of divinity in order that he might kiss it without Religion to Criticism, Utrechtse Publikaties voor Aigemene Literatuurwetenschap (Amsterdam: 1971) 55-56. +l Plato, Republic X, 598b. Translation quoted from Blunt A., Artistic Theo~7! in Italy, 1450-1600 (Oxford: 1962) 51. H Della Pittura libri tres, in Leon Battista Albertis kleinere kunsuheoretische Schrijien, cd. H. Janitschek (Vienna: 1877) I +3. Translation borrowed from Blunt A., Artistic Theory in Italy (note 43) 14.

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mlsgwlllgS. Finally his conscience prevailed over his lust and he [... ] removed the picture from his house altogether. 45

However, an unqualified naturalism was rejected by many artists and theoreticians of art. Instead, they drew on the Platonic concept of 'Idea' to elevate the painter's position. Indeed, making a clear distinction between material beauty and the idea of beauty, artists presented themselves as being in possession of a glorious prototype of beauty in their own mind, a beauty that could not be fully realized in the finished work but would nonetheless permeate it with a beauty that was more than a mere copy of reality. As a result, painting was no longer regarded as a naIve imitation of nature but as the work of imagination or even of divine inspiration. 46 The tension between imagination and representation continued to dominate the discussion about the arts in the early modern period, although some kind of balance was reached in the theoretical works of those poets and painters who endorsed the Neoplatonic idea of a correspondence between the structure of human creation and that of the cosmos. As a consequence, artists were charged with the honorable task of imitating the divine creativity underlying all things. It is on the basis of such a conception that Joseph Justus Scaliger was led to make his bold statement that the poet "maketh a new Nature and so maketh himself, as it were, a new God" Y A similar aspiration was attributed to composers who were believed to create music reflecting the harmony in the heavens, the music of the spheres. As a result, a reassessment of music was made possible. Traditionally, it had been considered a dangerous art capable of enchanting and intoxicating people-either for good or for bad reasons-, an art aptly symbolized by the siren who had tried to seduce Odysseus in a well-known passage from Homer's Orfyssee. As Natascha Veldhorst demonstrates in her contribution to the present volume, the image of music as a deceitful art was very persistent in Dutch Renaissance drama. 48 " Quoted from Hale j., 1he Civilization if Europe in the Renaissance (New York: 1994) 434. It should be noted that Pygmalion fell in love with the statue he erected himself; see Ovid, Metamorphoses X. Leonardo deliberately attributes a greater 'deceptive' power to painting than to sculpture. ,6 Vickers B., "Rhetoric and Poetics" (note 41) 738. 47 Quoted from Bouwsma W j., 1he Waning if the Renaissance (note I) 248. 411 In early modern versions of the Homeric story, Odysseus or Ulysses was told to have bound himself to the ship's mast and to have waxed his ears to remain deaf to the siren's song. See Vredeveld H., '''Deaf as Ulysses to the Siren's Song': The Story of a Forgotten Topos", Renaissance Qyarterly 54 (2001) 846~82.

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Zoran Kwak's analysis of a painting by the sixteenth-century Dutch painter Pieter Pietersz., entitled Self-portrait as a Cook with the Journey to Emmaus, makes it quite clear that the issue of truth and deceit in the visual arts was not limited to theoretical discussions. He demonstrates how Pietersz. in his picture gave visual expression to certain ideas pertaining to the ability of the painter to deceive the eye and kindle desire, manipulating and misleading the viewer by means of illusion. Taking this intriguing painting as a starting point, Kwak delves more deeply into the related genre of kitchen scenes. Interestingly enough, the illusionistic qualities of the paintings discussed appear to be closely connected to the subject-matter, which is frequently illustrative of seduction, misguidance, and other forms of deceit.

Rhetoric, contingent truth, and strategic self-presentation While Plato left no place for poets in his ideal state, he fulminated a perhaps even more severe ban against sophists. According to the philosopher, they shamelessly boasted that mastery of rhetoric provided the greatest of human goods-the ability to persuade-and enabled the individual to rule over others in the city. As is well known, the sophists' educational program relied to a large extent on the teaching of techniques for setting out arguments on public issues. This program seemed to imply that either position in a debate could be held with equal confidence. Accordingly, Plato accused them of manipulating words to the effect of turning white into black, and vice versa, thus making people believe whatever they wanted them to believe in any given situation. 49 Rhetoric versus philosophy; the deliberate deception of people versus the honest search for absolute and timeless Truths. Following the lead of the Greek orator and teacher Isocrates, Cicero spent a lifetime trying to bridge the gap created by Plato. Supported by Aristotle's writings on rhetoric and dialectic, on the one hand, and vastly popular rhetorical handbooks, such as the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Quintilian's Institutio oratoria, on the other, Renaissance humanists endorsed Cicero's program and aimed to put it into practice. It is a program firmly based on belief in the social nature of man, the

1'1

See e.g. Russell D.A., Criticism in Antiquiry (note 41) 26.

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centrality of language to human exchange, the orator's ability to influence people, and his unfailing dedication to truth and virtue. 50 According to the humanists, an orator is not to be considered a wicked manipulator of words. Following the lead of Cato the Elder, they prefer to define him as a good man skilled in speech.51 Constantly keeping the 'common good' in mind, the orator tries to persuade people into accepting what is true and doing what is right. Moral philosophy provides the subject-matter for his art, and is also its goal. Conversely, philosophy cannot do without persuasion. For all human communication in language is ultimately aimed at persuading people, as Julius Caesar Scaliger argued in his Poetices libri VII of 1561: Is there not one end, and one only, in philosophical exposition, in oratory, and in drama? Assuredly such is the case. All have one and the same end-persuasion. [...] The soul of persuasion is truth, truth either fixed and absolute, or susceptible of question. Its end is to convince, or secure the doing of something. 52

Renaissance humanists were primarily concerned with the field of human action, a field which did not allow for absolute truths as it depended upon particular, contingent circumstances. By developing and applying the notion of contingent truth, humanists were able to transcend the sterile contrast between (absolute) truth and (absolute) falsehood, leaving room for probable certitude which could and should be reached through dialogue and discussion. Indeed, contingent truth was seen as the result of a dialectic reasoning of two or more persons involved in a debate. Each of them held a viewpoint which could be defined as 'probable': a statement or proposition which the participant accepted as true although he was not entirely sure about its truth. The 'probable' but contradictory opinions upheld by the participants were the starting-point for a discussion which took the form of a 'probable' argumentation, that is an argumentation which was apt to produce persuasion, to convince the opponent. 53 As Vickers B., In Dqimce qf Rhetoric (Oxford: 1988) 285. Cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria XII, 1-2: 'vir bonus dicendi peritus'. J2 "An vero omnibus his, Philosophicae, Civili, Theatrali, unus finis propositus sit? ita sane est. Unus enim idemque omnium finis, persuasio. [...J Forma persuasionis, veritas: sive certa, sive ambigua. Finis, opus vel intellectionis, vel actionis". Quoted from Vickers B., "Rhetoric and Poetics" (note 35) 736. 53 Jardine L., "Humanistic Logic", in The Cambridge History qf Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, Q Skinner, E. Kessler, and]. Kraye (Cambridge: 1988); Spranzi Zuber M., "Rhetorique, dialectique et probabilite au XVI" siecle", Revue de Synthese, Quatrieme Serie, 122 (2001) 297-317. j(}

Ji

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Aristotle and Cicero had already shown, persuasion had three different sources which were to be exploited by the skilful orator: the proof of one's contentions (logos), the winning of the hearers' favor (ethos), and the rousing of their feelings (pathos). All these sources were of equal importance; none of them could be omitted or neglected. 'i4 Although humanists allowed the use of rhetorical strategies aimed at conveying an impression of trustworthiness and stirring the hearers' emotions, they strongly rejected any allegations of deliberately distorting the truth and manipulating people. They presented themselves as being strongly committed to the truth which they honestly sought to pursue through dialogue and discussion. In such a discussion, each party was supposed to make his case as strong as possible. It is clear, however, that the introduction of non-logical means of argumentation opened the door for abuse. Unsurprisingly, several humanists involved in a debate in which their own reputation was at stake, accused their opponents of having recourse to slanderous lies.">1 Gradually, an ethics of debate was developed which stipulated in some detail the rules to be followed and the code of conduct to be adopted. Not infrequently, however, the rules were violated by the very persons who formulated them or claimed to subscribe to them.'i(} As Jacques Bos rightly stresses in his contribution "The Hidden Self of the Hypocrite", early modern rhetoric attached at least as much importance to delivery or performance (actio) as its ancient -," See e.g. May j.YI., Trials (if' Character, TIe Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos (Chapel Hill-London: 1988) 1-5, -,-, For the humanists' almost obsessive preoccupation with the issue of calumny and slander, see Houdt T. van - Papy J, "l\lod