On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy 9042007885, 9789042007888

Citation preview

ON ACTIONS, PRODUCTS AND OTHER TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY

POZNAN STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES VOLUME67

EDITORS Krzysztof Brzechczyn (assistant editor)

Krzysztof Lastowski

Jerzy Brzezmski Robert Egiert (assistant editor) Andrzej Klawiter

Leszek Nowak (editor-in-chief) Katarzyna Paprzycka (Pittsburgh) Marcin Paprzycki (Hattiesburg)

Piotr Kwiecmski (assistant editor)

Piotr Przybysz (assistant editor)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE Joseph Agassi (Tel-Aviv)

Wladyslaw Krajewski (Warszawa)

Etienne Balibar (Paris) Wolfgang Balzer (Milnchen) Mario Bunge (Montreal) Nancy Cartwright (London) Robert S. Cohen (Boston) Francesco Coniglione (Catania) Andrzej Falkiewicz (Wroclaw) Dagfinn F!!!Uesdal (Oslo)

Witold Marciszewski (Warszawa) Ilkka Niiniluoto (Helsinki) Gflnter Patzig (Gottingen) Jerzy Perzanowski (Torun) Marian Przelt;cki (Warszawa) Jan Such (Poznan) Jerzy Topolski (Poznan)

Bert Hanuninga (Tilburg) Jaakko Hintikka (Boston)

Jan Woleli.ski (Krakow)

Jacek J. Jadacki (Warszawa) Jerzy Kmita (Poznan)

Georg H. von Wright (Helsinki)

Theo A.F. Kuipers (Groningen)

Max Urchs (Torun/Konstanz) Ryszard Wojcicki (Warszawa)

This book has been partly sponsored by the Committee for Scientific Research (Komitet Badan Naukowych)

The address:

prof. L. Nowak, Cybulskiego 13, 60-247 Poznan, Poland. Fax: (061) 8477-079 or (061) 8471-555 E-mail: [email protected]. pl

POLISH ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY Volume I Editors: Jacek Juliusz Jadacki (editor-in-chief) Leszek Nowak Jan Wolenski Jerzy Perzanowski Ryszard Wojcicki

KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI

ON ACTIONS, PRODUCTS AND OTHER TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY Edited by Johannes L. Brandl and Jan Wolenski Translated and annotated by Arthur Szylewicz

AMSTERDAM-ATLANTA, GA 1999

@ The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of "ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence". ISSN 0303-8157 ISBN: 90-420-0788-5 (bound) ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1999 Printed in The Netherlands

TABLE OF CONTENTS

7

Introduction . Translator's Note

15

Self-Portrait ( 1926/91) Biographical Notes

17 33

I. On Mind, Psychology, and Language Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy (1897) On the Classification of Mental Phenomena (1898) . The Essence of Concepts (1903/24) . On Idio- and Allogenetic Theories of Judgment ( 1907) Actions and Products (1912) . The Humanities and Psychology (1912/76). On the Logic of Adjectives (1923/27) . .

41 65 73 99 103 133

141

II. On Truth and Knowledge On So-Called Relative Truths (1900) A priori, or Rational (Deductive) Sciences and a posteriori, or Empirical (Inductive) Sciences (1923) . Theory of Knowledge. A Lecture Course (1925/75)

147 171 181

III. On Philosophy Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy (1895) The Historical Conception of Philosophy (1912) . On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style (1920) . Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia (1921) Address at the 25th Anniversary Session of the Polish Philosophical Society(l929/31) . On the Dignity of the University (1933)

243 255 257 261

Bibliography

287

271 277

INTRODUCTION

Kazimierz Twardowski played a variety of roles as a philosopher. Born in 1866, he studied philosophy in Vienna just at the time when Franz Brentano, in his lectures, was spreading the idea of a precise and scientifically oriented philosophy. When Twardowski became Professor in Lw6w in 1895 he took this conception of philosophy to Poland with the intention, as he says in his "Self-Portrait," "to disseminate among my countrymen the style of philosophizing that I had learned from Brentano, and in particular to initiate the academic youth into the spirit and method of this philosophy" (p. 26). 1 Twardowski carried out his mission as a philosophy teacher with the greatest success. More than thirty of his students became heads of university departments, more than ten of which were strictly philosophy chairs. Beyond that, he was also an important organizer of Polish philosophical life. He collaborated with W. Weryho in starting the journal "Przegl. Following p. 51 of the lectures in epistemology from 1917/18." See note in Lecture 11 concerning this gap. The missing synopsis probably contained an account of Kant's position as contained in the Critique ofPure Reason ("Transcendental Dialectic," II, 3, 4), as well as a proof that existence is not an absolute characteristic, since Lecture 13 begins with an argument (suggesting] that neither is existence a relative characteristic. [I. D.)

Theory ofKnowledge. A Lecture Course

207

all that is, is). It would seem, then, that we have to restrict the claim, and say that to exist is tantamount to being the object of a true affirmative judgment. But this restriction is also untenable, as follows from. Argument II: If "to exist" were to mean nothing other than "to be the object of a true affirmative judgment," then it would be a contradiction for something to exist and not be the object of a true affirmative judgment. But this would make it unthinkable without contradiction that an object could exist that could never be the object of a true affirmative judgment. Specifically, it would be impossible to think without contradiction of there existing only some single non-thinking object about which no one ever makes, nor could make, a true affirmative judgment, because no one who could judge existed. Yet the thought of such an object contains no contradiction. In a word, neither is existence a relative characteristic consisting of a particular relation of certain objects to us as beings who make judgments. This result is already implied by the following, quite simple consideration. Argument Ill. If an object's existence were to be a relative characteristic, then this characteristic, as relative, can only exist in some object if this object maintains some relation to another object - i.e., if this relation exists. Therefore, existence so conceived already presupposes existence. One must make use of the concept of existence in order to define existence. This whole claim to the effect that existence is a relative characteristic of certain objects relies on a transparent enough misunderstanding in representing the relation of certain objects to our judgment about them. For there is no doubt whatsoever that objects whose existence we affirm do enter into a particular relation with our mind, with our judging, and our judgments. Nor is there any doubt that these objects acquire a certain relative characteristic as a result, just as do all objects that enter into some relation with any other objects. That relative characteristic, however, is not their existence, but rather precisely this: that whether they exist or not, they are the objects of judgments. One might term this relative characteristic of those objects their affirmedness [uznanosc], insofar as affirmative judgments are concerned, or their rejectedness [zaprzeczanosc], insofar as negative judgments are involved. Comprehensively, we might say that the object takes on the characteristic of being judged about [osqdzanym] -judgedness [osqdzanosc]. That, and not existence, is the relative characteristic that the object takes on insofar as we make judgments about it. And in this lies the analogy to "desiredness." The existence of a judged object is something independent of our judging about it, and regardless of how we might conceive existence, that existence will always be intrinsically independent of our judging. That "objectivity," that "objective" validity, lies precisely in this independence of existence from our judging; this "objectivity," in being independent of us, is simultaneously identical for all judging beings.

208

JI. On Truth and Knowledge

Judgedness is something subjective - it is that we make a judgment about the given object; likewise with desiredness, i.e., it is that we desire the given object. Lecture 14: 5/14/25 (The analogy can be pursued further: Franz Brentano admits an objective correlate for desiredness, just as he does for judgedness. In the case of judgedness it is existence, actuality; in the case of desiredness it is the goodness of the object, the objective value, that the object is good. One might submit yet another analogy: aesthetic attractiveness and beauty.) 35 Let us return once more to the terrain of our question proper. We have shown that, since we cannot treat existence as a characteristic (not even as a relative one), neither can we by any stretch of the imagination accept the view that the ascription to some objects, and the denial to others, of the characteristic of existence constitutes the essence of judgment - that is that its essence consists in some sort of combination or separation of concepts. Hence, the truth of a judgment can likewise not consist of our combining in thought what is connected in reality or of our separating in thought what is disconnected in reality, and the falsehood of a judgment cannot consist in the opposite behavior, as Aristotle once put it. That agreement between thinking and reality which is accepted by theories of correspondence that conformitas, adequatio, or consensus iudicii cum re repraesentata (as Wolff puts it) - must consist of something else, despite the views of so many philosophers, Russell included. And what it does consist of can be captured in the following definition of a true judgement: An affirmative judgment is true if its object exists, a negative judgment, if its object does not exist. An affirmative judgment is false if its object does not exist; a negative judgment, if its object does exist. In principle, it is the first of the definitions we cited from Aristotle: To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true ... 36

In this way, we have a perfectly clear definition of truth, unencumbered by vague expression and in accord with a theory of agreement. The truth of a judgment, then, consists in a certain correspondence between what is termed its quality (that is, its affirming or negating character) and an object, in respect of the theme of the judgment (that is, the actuality of the object). An affirmative judgment is true when it acknowledges the existence of an existing object, and 35 An annotation to the text enclosed in parentheses reads: "ad cf. 34 verte." The remarks contained on the reverse of this page are included at the end of Lecture 14. [I. D.) 36 See Lecture 5, n. I. [Tr.]

Theory of Knowledge. A Lecture Course

209

a negative Liudgment is true] when it denies the existence of a non-existent, but merely conceived object; an affirmative judgment is false when it acknowledges the existence of a non-existent object, or denies the existence of one that exists. For we can divide all objects into the existing, actual ones, and those that are merely thought of, represented, [but are] non-existent. And the crux of the matter is for the quality of the judgment to correspond to the object in respect of whether it belongs to the class of existing objects, or to the class of non-existing ones. This, then, is the way the definitions of true and false judgments would look according to a theory of agreement between thought and reality. According to this definition, "to be the object of a true affirmative judgment" and "to be an existent object" have the same referent, though not the same meaning. The concept of an existent object and the concept of an object of a true affirmative judgment are interchangeable concepts. The truth and falsehood of a judgment are its relative characteristics. But that does not mean that truth is relative! [There is an] analogy between a true (correct) judgment and an appropriate desire or aesthetic attractiveness. "Objectivity" of Good and Beauty. It is worth noting that, as an instance of judgments that affirm the agreement between judgments and a so-called reality, this definition of truth is in a way applicable to itself. For this truth does indeed depend on a certain relation, and the judgment that states this truth affirms the occurrence of that relation. Lecture 15: 5/18/25 5. Critique of the Correspondence Theory of Truth (of Transcendent Correspondence)

This definition has met with objections in the past, and continues to do so. We are not at the moment concerned with defending the theory against objections which we could presume are held by many philosophers, given that they reject this definition of truth and seek and propose other definitions ones which are in turn criticized by others. (The meaning of objections against definitions in general.) 37 But the most frequent objection against this definition of truth is that it is inapplicable - that is to say, that it cannot serve as a criterion of truth. The correctness of this objection is quite apparent, no matter which formulation of this definition we accept. Taking the version according to which the truth of a judgment consists in our combining in our thinking what is connected in reality, and separating in our thinking that which is disconnected in reality, we must concede that 37

The point of this parenthetical insertion is unclear. [Tr.]

210

JI. On Truth and Knowledge

we really cannot compare our connected or disconnected thoughts with what is beyond our thoughts, since we know nothing about the latter, at least not directly. And if we take the definition of truth in the formulation we have advanced - that is, when we call an affirmative judgment true if its object exists and [call] a negative judgment true if its object does not exist - then once again relying only on this definition we have no way of knowing which object exists and which does not, hence which affirmative and which negative judgments are true. But this objection, though substantively valid, is not an objection against the definition, for a definition and a criterion are two different things. Sometimes a definition provides a criterion, that is a trait, by which we may distinguish the defined entity from some others (for example, "An even number is a number that is divisible by two," and the like); but not always. "A murderer is a person who kills another person with premeditation" is a clear definition. But what is the criterion for a murderer? The prosecutor and the jury try to seek out criteria on the basis of which it would be possible to determine whether the given person falls under the concept. In our case it is a matter of learning whether the object of the judgment exists. (Analogy: whether a number is divisible by two, whether someone has committed a murder.) This sort of difficulty with providing a criterion shows up especially38 where the definition of a relative characteristic is at issue, and with definitions based on relative characteristics. Such is the case in defining a murderer, as also in defining a father. A father is a person who produced an offspring. But what is the criterion that someone is a father, the criterion by means of which it is possible to distinguish a father from a non-father? The search for paternity! It is easier with maternity where certain anatomical changes serve as a criterion for whether a woman is a mother. Our case is similar to the ones involving the father and the murderer. That is so because the definition of truth, based on agreement of judgment with object, also relies, in virtue of the theme, on a relative characteristic. An affirmative judgment is true if it acknowledges the existence of an existing object. The truth of an affirmative judgment depends on its pertaining to an existing object. The truth of an affirmative judgment is that relative characteristic of a judgment which consists in this judgment's pertaining to an existing object. Thus a definition of this sort does not contain a criterion if it is impossible to ascertain whether a particular relation to another object obtains - specifically that relation of which the relative characteristic consists (that is to say, [if it is impossible to ascertain] whether our judgment pertains to an existing object - that is, whether the object of the judgment exists). And that may be impossible because 38 The word "especially" was written in by Twardowski above the word "ordinarily," which was in the text originally. [I. D.)

Theory ofKnowledge. A Lecture Course

211

the relation, being short-lived, has passed, as in the case of the murderer (killing with premeditation), or because it cannot be ascertained for other reasons. Whatever the case, these examples prove that one may have perfectly good definitions which nonetheless are no kind of criterion. I have discussed this objection since it can also be raised against some of the other definitions of the truth of judgments. That is, it does not apply specifically to the theory of correspondence. Quite specific objections are sometimes very superficial, for example, the objection that the theory of correspondence does not embrace the truth of "practical" judgments (an objection leveled by Dewey in his logic). 39 For example, "The United States should fortify the Panama Canal." Here, the retort runs, it is not a question of the existence of something, of something that is, but of something that should be. Here it is not a matter of ascertaining a fact, but a plan of action. An extremely superficial objection [by Dewey]. It is quite clear that this judgment affirms the "oughtness" [powinnosc = das Solien] of fortifying the Panama Canal by the United States. If only there were no objections that were any more serious! Along with the complaint about its inability to provide a criterion, the objection that seems to me to most threaten the theory of correspondence is that it involves certain metaphysical assumptions. Specifically, it presupposes that, apart from our passing judgments, there exist (at least in certain cases) the objects of these judgments. These existing objects can be conceived in various ways, but in any case they are something independent of us. Now, what right do we have to assume that one or another sort of objects exists at all? And most importantly, what is the meaning of that existence, of that actuality? These are strictly metaphysical problems and presuppositions, but all of the vagueness that shrouds these problems also transfers to the theory of correspondence. It is for this reason - hold many philosophers that it cannot satisfy us. And so they search for a different theory. 6. The Coherence Theory of Truth (I'he Theory ofImmanent Correspondence) and its Critique

One of the other theories owes its genesis precisely to the quest for total emancipation from all metaphysical presuppositions. The previous theory was reaching beyond our Ego, beyond our judgments, and toward some sort of objects existing independently of them. It could be termed the theory of external, object-oriented, transcendent correspondence. Might it be possible to construct a theory that does not refer at all to these sorts of objects? A theory of this sort is one that could be labelled an inter-judgmental, immanent, 39 [J. Dewey, "The Logic of Judgments of Practice," in: Essays in Experimental Logic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916, p. 336.) Cited in G. Boas, op. cit., p. 224. [I. D.)

212

II. On Truth and Knowledge

inner theory of correspondence. It takes its departure from the fact that in encountering conflicting judgments, be they contrary or contradictory, we say that not both are true together. It might easily follow from this that indeed no other meaning could be assigned to the term "truth" than that it is a characteristic of judgments that are in agreement, that form a system free of contradictions. If conflict does away with the truth of at least one of the incompatible judgments, then truth does in fact consist of agreement. That, for example, is the way S. H. Hodgson defines truth. 40 Similarly, Windelband states that "truth for man does not consist in the agreement of our41 representations with things, but in the agreement of representations amongst themselves." 42 Obviously, we know that it is not a question of representations, but of judgments. Windelband here expresses himself rather colloquially. Hence, according to this theory, too, the truth of judgments would be a relative characteristic, yet one that consists not of the relation of judgments to objects, but of the relations of judgments to other judgments. Lecture 16: 5/19/25 This [coherence] theory [of truth] admits of various interpretations; for a variety of questions emerge. If this inner agreement is understood to mean that these judgments form a coherent, unified system by virtue of all the judgments' membership in the system following from certain internally consistent premises - that is, from our having certain definitions and axioms from which we derive a series of judgments that form a system of non-contradictory judgments - then these judgments, insofar as they follow from those definitions and axioms, will undoubtedly be formally true (each with respect to its premises, in the sense that we assigned to formal truth at the very beginning). But the proponents of this theory cannot possibly be concerned with formal truth, otherwise they would not set up their theory in opposition to the transcendent theory of truth. Besides, this theory would only be applicable to judgments that follow from others, not to the axioms themselves. We must therefore adopt a broader concept of the agreement of judgments, and a broader range of judgments that are [required to be] compatible, if for no other reason than because otherwise one could arrive 40 S. H. Hodgson, The Philosophy of Reflection, London: Longmans & Green, 1878, II, p. 213: " ... the agreement ofthought with itself... "; quoted in Moritz Schlick, "Das Wesen der Wahrheit nach der modemen Logik," Vierteljahrsschrift far wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Sozifllogie, 34, 1910, p. 430. [K. T.] 41 The word "our" is Twardowski's insertion. [Tr.) 42 W. Windelband, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. I, Leipzig: Vreitkopf & Hatzel, 1878, p. 252; quoted by M. Schlick, op. cit., pp. 429-30. [K.T.)

Theory of Knowledge. A Lecture Course

213

at a rather bizarre consequence. Specifically, two systems of judgments can be const11-;ted such that in each of them certain judgments will follow from certain definitions and axioms; but if we select incompatible axioms, the judgments that follow from them will be likewise incompatible. The axioms and judgments of one system [would be] incompatible with the axioms and judgments of a second system, though in each system the judgments that follow from the axioms will be formally true (e.g., Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries?). Therefore the whole thing needs to be expanded, and we have to say that the immanent agreement of judgments, considered as their truth, must be an agreement that is somehow more broadly conceived, and at the same time the scope of compatibility of judgments needs to be more broadly understood. Specifically, judgments are to be considered "in agreement" with each other not just if they have the relation of premise and conclusion, but more generally, whenever they are neither contrary nor contradictory; furthermore, what is at issue is such agreement among all judgments. According to this, every judgment that is compatible with all other judgments is true, meaning every judgment that is neither contrary to, nor in contradiction with, any other judgment. Therefore, the most general judgments concerning ideal objects, such as mathematical objects, are just as much at issue as judgments concerning sensible, physical objects and those pertaining to inner experience. This claim may appear to be a bit curious, but it is easily understood nonetheless. Primarily, this theory wants to divorce itself from all metaphysical assumptions. It knows nothing concerning objects beyond us - at least it presupposes nothing about them. But it does reckon with the fact that we accept certain judgments as true and reject others as false. At this stage therefore we can take the truth of a judgment to mean nothing other than that it can be integrated into the corpus, into the totality, of judgments -

that it constitutes a member of this totality on an equal footing with all the others. Once again I ask you to detach yourself from the concept of formal truth that continually intrudes here. After all, we are talking about judgments that are related in a way that precludes formal truth from coming into play. Analogy: just as we speak about what accords with our desires, preferences, entire emotional Gestalt, as being agreeable to us; and just as we call what pleases us pleasant, nice; so, that which we find somehow intellectually suitable - which responds to the convictions that we already harbour within ourselves, which accommodates itself to our judgments - is true. The truth of judgments consists in nothing else. How things may be beyond · us, in the so-called reality that is independent of us, provided one exists at all, does not matter to us in the least. Even a so-called solipsist, who claims that nothing at all exists apart from his mind and its functions and products, can subscribe to this theory. It is in this way that this theory can be made somewhat intelligible.

214

JI. On Truth and Knowledge

But objections do surface. This definition of the truth of judgments is not a criterion either. In order to be able to assert that judgment X is true, we would have to ascertain its compatibility with all the other judgments that come into play. This may be impossible either on account of the great number of judgments involved, or because not all the consequences of judgment X are easily discernible, and some of those may be contradictory to the already accepted judgments, even though judgment X itself fails to exhibit this contradiction. But as we have seen, this objection says nothing against the definition itself. What is worse is that this definition contains a number of elusive elements. If the previous definition is reproached for operating under metaphysical presuppositions such as "existence" and "a reality that is independent of us," then here we have items like that "corpus of judgments" - those judgments with which every judgment must be in agreement. It is, after all, the crux of the matter for each judgment to agree with all the other judgments. The question then arises: What are all of these judgments? Is it [a matter of agreement] with all judgments that have ever been made by anyone, at anytime? Or with all possible judgments in general - that is, with any judgments that anyone may ever make? Or perhaps in abstracto with all judgments that are at all conceivable as capable of being made? Suppose we take the simplest case: namely [, that of agreement] with all judgments that have thus far in fact been made. But in that case no judgment would be true, for no judgment can fall under such a concept of true judgment, or at least almost none. 43 After all, a great many judgments that are incompatible with each other have already been made, so that almost no judgment is such as to be compatible with all the judgments that have preceded it. This consequence is even more striking if we take all possible judgments into consideration. If, on the other hand, we confine ourselves to judgments made by some individual, then - in the ideal case - every judgment made by this individual may be compatible with every other judgment made by that same individual. But this compatibility, limited to an individual, will then also yield a truth that is limited to just that individual - for a different individual other judgments may fall under the concept of truth so defined. 44 Now, if a definition is to be such as to specify unequivocally the extension of the concept of a true judgment, it cannot contain those indeterminacies. But if one wishes to eliminate these indeterminacies, new difficulties are encountered. For example, what if one wishes to somehow determine in 43 The expression "or at least almost none" and the word "almost" in parentheses [in the next sentence) are crossed out in pencil, but then again as if restored by having been underlined with a dashed line. I therefore leave them in the text, having merely noted this vacillation. [I. D. J [The word "almost" does not appear in parentheses in the printed text. Tr.] 44 In the margin of this passage appears the annotation: "(two systems ofjudgments)." [I. D.]

Theory ofKnowledge. A Lecture Course

215

advance the judgments among which this compatibility is supposed to hold. Can we say that [at issue is compatibility] with those judgments that have already been generally accepted? By an individual? - No. By mankind? No. Clearly, judgments that are accepted by mankind up to some given moment may later be abandoned. And then judgments that were compatible with the previously accepted judgments will cease to be compatible with them, once those judgments cease to be accepted and are rejected. It is impossible to confer on this definition a tangible and satisfactory sense. But that is not all; there are still other difficulties. According to this theory, the concept of "a solitary true judgment" is a self-contradictory concept. But perhaps this does not seem quite right to us. Finally, and most importantly, the definition is flawed, if for no other reason, because it contains the fallacy called circulus in definiendo; it makes use of the concept which it is supposed to define. For, what does it mean for judgments to be compatible with each other? It means that those judgments may be simultaneously true; they are judgments such that if one is true, the second need not necessarily be false. For example judgments such as "Steinbeck wrote The Grapes of Wrath" and "San Francisco is in California" are compatible. 45 On the other hand, judgments such as "Paul here is my brother" and "Paul here is my father" are incompatible. Thus by defining truth as compatibility we are making use of the concept of compatibility, and this concept presupposes the concept of truth. This definition is therefore unsatisfactory. It would have been possible to dispose of it more expediently by pointing out this last defect immediately - but occasionally it is good to realize how very perfunctorily definitions are sometimes made. Lecture 17: 5/20/1925 7. Rickert's Theory of Truth and Its Critique

The two theories with which we have become acquainted are starkly opposed with respect to their metaphysical assumptions. There is another theory that could be regarded as a sort of compromise between these two. It is a theory formulated by Heinrich Rickert, among others. We shall come to understand why I consider it a compromise, once we get acquainted with it. Rickert takes as his point of departure a view of the essence of judgment in which there is only truth and falsehood, consequently - also cognition. For him, too, the act of judging consists in affirmation or negation [Bejahung

45

I have substituted examples that will be more meaningful to English-speaking readers. [Tr.]

216

JI. On Truth and Knowledge

oder Verneinung], in accepting or rejecting [Anerkennen oder Verwerfen]. 46 He conceives these functions by analogy to the functions of wanting something or turning it away [begehren oder verabschauen], of desiring or abhorring. Just as in the case of wanting or turning away, so here too we adopt a certain stance in the face of a pair of alternatives: a certain approval or disapproval (Billigen; Mif3billigen) 47 (164). This notion already appears in Descartes, in the Notae, 1647 48 : Ordines, modi cogitandi, quos in nobis e generales referri possunt, quorum unus est perceptio sive operatio intellectus, alius vere volitio sive operatio voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari et pure intelligere sunt tantum diversi modi percipendi, ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare sunt diversi modi volendixperimur, ad duos. (For all the modes of thinking that we observed in ourselves may be related to two general modes, the one of which consists in perception, or in the operation of the understanding, and the other in volition, or the operation of the will. Thus sense-perception, imagining, and con· ceiving things that are purely intelligible, are just different methods of perceiving; but desiring, holding in aversion, affnming, denying, doubting, all these are the different modes of willing.)

But the adoption of this sort of stance [is] only possible vis-a-vis something that constitutes a positive or negative value, Wert-Unwert (165). Hence, the very act of judging, as an affirmation or negation, has to be set on a par with adopting a stance vis-a-vis a positive or negative value (165). It is not here a matter of a positive or negative value possessed, respectively, by a true or false judgment, but of something else, of a value with respect to which we take a certain stand in the [act ofj judging. The definition of a true judgment at once follows from this: it is the acceptance [Anerkennen] of a positive value or the rejection [Verwerfen] of a negative value; a false judgment is the rejection of a positive value or the acceptance of a negative one (16 7, 171). But that will not do for us. We have to take up in greater detail that value which we accept or reject. Rickert clarifies this issue by reference to the true affirmative judgment. The point is to avoid the misunderstandings that might attach to the term "value" (172, 174). "Value" should not be taken to mean something actual, some sort of real object or subject, although colloquial speech is conducive to this sort of interpretation - for example, certain objects are called "economic values." In view of this, we must bear in mind that these objects possess value, but are not the value itself. It 46 H. Rickert, Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 4.5 ed., Tiibingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1921, pp. 154 and 158. [Additional references to this book will be given by page number only, within the body of the text. Tr.] 41 A literal translation of Twardowski's Polish correlates aprobowanie and reprobowanie would correspond to the English "approbation" and "reprobation." [Tr.) 48 This reference is mistaken. The quotation is actually Principle XXXII from the Principles of Philosophy, Part I. The English rendition is from the translation by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, in: The Philosophical Works ofDescartes, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 232. [Tr.]

Theory of Knowledge. A Lecture Course

217

would be better to refer to objects that possess value as "goods" [Giiter] (172). But value is bound up in a particular way not just with objects, but also with subjects. And some hold that an object becomes a "good" - that is, acquires value - only because some subject confers a particular value on it. But the very function49 of valuing, of conferring value, does not in virtue of this become identical with the value. Hence, even though value is linked with the object and with the subject and its functioning, goods and valuation must nonetheless be distinguished from values. Values are neither objects nor subjects - they constitute the domain of yet another concept. For one cannot even ask about the existence of a value ( 17 3), but rather only about its validity [walor = Ge/tung]. Values display a great diversity of types. For example, the value possessed by sensory pleasure has validity for us insofar as we approve of it - we confer value on pleasure insofar as we approve of that value. But at some other time this pleasure may have no value for us, we may disapprove of that pleasure, so that this value too ceases . 1 have validity for us. Hence the value of pleasure possesses validity only for a particular individual, at a given time and place (17 4). This value depends on the individual. The situation is different with the value we acknowledge in a judgment. To be sure, just as with pleasure, here too the value is linked to a particular state, to a particular subjective function. Just as the value of pleasure is bound up with a feeling, the value of a judgment is bound up with that subjective state which we might call a sense of assuredness, with certainty (Gewissheit). But in acknowledging or approving this value, we are approving a value that is independent of my momentary subjective state, a value whose validity is not constrained by any time. It is for this reason that the value acknowledged in every true judgment is ... independent of every individual, real, content'" of consciousness [BewujJtseinsinhalt], which, as a temporal entity, always has a beginning and an end (198).

Lecture 18: 5/25/25 And although this value is something independent of us, having a validity that is independent of us, nevertheless, from the other direction, we, in the passing of the judgment, are dependent on it. For instance, having heard sounds and having to pass a judgment about them, I am necessarily bound to make the judgment that I heard them, and I cannot admit that I could ever make a correct judgment to the effect that I had not heard them. Here I have translated Twardowski 's funkcja literally; Rickert uses Akt. (Tr.] Twardowski's [or D