Official Governance and Self-governance: The Reconstruction of Grassroots Social Order in China 9811966001, 9789811966002

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Official Governance and Self-governance The Reconstruction of Grassroots Social Order in China

Qingzhi Zhou

Official Governance and Self-governance

Qingzhi Zhou

Official Governance and Self-governance The Reconstruction of Grassroots Social Order in China

Qingzhi Zhou Institute of Political Science Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing, China Translated by Shixi Wu World Internet of Things Convention Beijing, China

ISBN 978-981-19-6600-2 ISBN 978-981-19-6601-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9 Jointly published with Social Sciences Academic Press The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: Social Sciences Academic Press. © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

1

Foreword

1

Part I The Transformation of Traditional Grassroots Social Order and Significance of Its Modern Construction 2

3

4

The Cognitive Paradigms for Understanding Traditional Grassroots Social Order 2.1 Self-Governance or Official Governance 2.2 Different Cognitive Paradigms for Understanding Self-Governance and Official Governance 2.3 The Theoretical Origin of the Cognitive Paradigms Rules of Order: Structure of Social Authorities at the Grassroots 3.1 Rules and Order 3.2 Public Sphere and Private Sphere 3.3 Rule of Rituals: A Method or Something Else The Structure of Social Order and the Relationship Between Society and State 4.1 Order Through the Rule of Rituals and Law and the Relationship Between the Society and the State

11 11 13 20 25 25 28 32 37

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4.2 4.3 5

6

The Order Dimension of Tax System: Relationship of Personal Bondage in the Imperial Society The Structural Pattern of Social Authority and Power at the Grassroots

Grassroots Governance by Local Government Clerks and Runners and Its Modern Transformation: Social Restructuring and Remolding of Social Order 5.1 Rectification of Grassroots Governance by Local Government Clerks and Runners 5.2 Social Restructuring and Modernization of Grassroots Authority 5.3 From Order Through the Rule of Rituals and Laws to Order Through Modern Authority The Significance of Modern Construction of Grassroots Social Order 6.1 The Historical Evolution of Social Order Transformation 6.2 Social Authority Order System at the Grassroots 6.3 The Nature and the Changes of Public Social Relationships

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57 58 62 64 67 67 71 73

Part II The Contemporary Authority Structure and Governance System of Grassroots Social Order 7

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The Historical Basis of the Governance Order in Rural Society 7.1 The Order of Governance in Rural Society 7.2 The Principle of Order and the Form of Authority in Rural Society 7.3 The Ruling Characteristics of Governance in Rural Society Finance and Governance (1): The Nature of Government Power and Its Boundaries 8.1 Changes of Power Boundaries Reflected in the Fiscal Account 8.2 Functions of Public Finance and Public Demands

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Finance and Governance (2): The Significance of Public Finance Restructuring at the Grassroots for Social Governance Transformation 9.1 Public Finance and Its Significance for Modern Governance 9.2 Between Imperium and Dominium 9.3 The Significance of Institutional Reform for Public Finance Construction 9.4 Construction of Public Finance and Transformation of Social Governance Rules and Order: The Transformation of Grassroots Social Governance 10.1 Order of Governance and Authority 10.2 Structure of Grassroots Governance by Authority 10.3 From Order Under Rule by Government Authoritative to Order Under Self-Rule 10.4 Public Rules and Their Implications for Social Order Grassroots Public Political Culture 11.1 The Significance of Public Political Culture for Governance 11.2 The Public Sphere and Public Political Culture 11.3 Transformation of the Public Sphere and Evolution of Public Political Culture 11.4 Building a Public Political Culture Based on Political and Cultural Ties Forms of Rights for Members of the Rural Society: From Primary Community to State-Based Community 12.1 From Small Community to Large Community 12.2 Foundation of Rural Governance: Lack of Civil Rights 12.3 Full Civil Rights and Transformation of Rural Governance 12.4 Democratization and Legislation for Rural Governance

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139 141 147 152 157 171 172 175 181 188 191 191 196 201 203 213 214 219 225 230

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The Rights Distribution System for Urban Residents 13.1 Urbanization and Grouping of Urban Population by Household Registration Status 13.2 Rights Under a Dual Structure: Household Registration in Urbanized Areas 13.3 Identity Groups and Authoritarian Governance 13.4 From Identity to Contract, and the Granting of Civil Rights 13.5 Urbanization and the Entitlements

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Social Organizations in Historical and Social Contexts 14.1 Civil Social Organizations or Governmental NonGovernmental Organizations? 14.2 Social Organizations in Historical Context 14.3 The Changing Import of Traditional Forms of Social Organization in Modern China 14.4 Mirroring of Social Organizations in Contemporary China 14.5 Definition of Social Organizations in Contemporary China

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Documentary Governance: How Authority Is Exercised and Its Significance for Order and Rules 15.1 Documentary Governance: A Form of Governance Between Democracy and Autocracy 15.2 Origin of Formalized Rules and Form of Authority 15.3 Documentary Governance and Public Social Relationships 15.4 Documentary Governance and Law-Based Governance: Authority, Rules and Others Co-governance by Officials and the People 16.1 Official Governance or Self-Governance: Different Narratives 16.2 Interlocking Power System: A Hybrid Governance System 16.3 Construction of Social Power and the Changing Nature of Public Social Relationships

235 239 245 251 260

265 269 272 278 287 293 294 298 303 308 311 312 316 322

CONTENTS

17

Restructuring Order: Forty Years of Grassroots Governance Reform in China 17.1 Structural Changes: Public Social Relationships 17.2 Changes in the Grassroots Governance System 17.3 Reform and Transformation of Grassroots Governance

References

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327 327 331 333 345

About the Author

Qingzhi Zhou, Doctor of Laws (sociology major), Director and Researcher of the Research Office of Political Culture of the Institute of Political Science, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Postdoc cosupervisor, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor of the Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. His research areas include political sociology, social anthropology and history. He has published six monographs, including The County-level Administrative Structure of China and Its Operation: A Sociological Survey of County W , Grassroots Social Autonomy of China, County Politics: Authority, Resources, and Order, Between the Government and the Society: Issues of Grassroots Governance. Over 100 of his papers have been published in a wide range of academic journals such as Journal of Political Science, Journal of Nanjing University, Journal of Wuhan University, Journal of Central China Normal University and more than 50 have been reprinted in Xinhua Digest, Chinese Social Science Digest, and the database “Newspapers and Periodicals Reprinted by Renmin University of China”.

xi

List of Figures

Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5 Fig. 8.6 Fig. 8.7 Fig. 8.8 Fig. 8.9 Fig. 8.10

The composition and trend of fiscal revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou The composition and trend of tax of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou The composition and trend of non-budget revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou The composition and trend of earmarked revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou The composition and trend of fund revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou The composition and trend of fiscal budget of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou The structure and trend of fund and expenditure The structure and changes in tax revenue as a share of local GDP Comparison of the structure and trend of local fiscal and tax absorption ability in different periods Comparison of year-on-year changes in annual growth rates of total government fiscal revenue and of GDP

101 103 105 107 108 110 111 120 121 121

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List of Tables

Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6 Table 8.7 Table 8.8

Table 8.9 Table 8.10

Table 8.11 Table 8.12

Tax revenue in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 Non-tax revenue in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 General fiscal expenditure in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 Tax refund revenue in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 Revenue from general transfer payment in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 Expenditure under balanced budget in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 The situation of tax revenue of Xiangcheng of Suzhou and its districts and towns from 2001 to 2006 The proportion of tax revenue, business tax, corporate income tax and individual income tax in Xiangcheng of Suzhou from 2001 to 2016 Tax revenue, business tax, corporate tax and individual income tax in Xiangcheng of Suzhou from 2001 to 2016 A Year-on-year increase of tax revenue, business tax, corporate income tax and individual income tax in Xiangcheng of Suzhou from 2001 to 2006 The scale of government debt and debt burden of sample townships The government debt purpose of sample townships

115 116 117 118 119 120 125

126 127

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CHAPTER 1

Foreword

Traditional grassroots social order in China, which is described by Fei Xiaotong as “a social order based on rule of rituals”, features “selfgovernance by the gentry” in structure and form, according to the dominant paradigm. That means, traditionally, Chinese society has been governed in a form of dual-track politics, which suggests the existence of two distinct administration and support systems—rule by officials and rule by the people. Rural society is acquaintanceship-based. In this connection, Fei said, “The possibility of rule of rituals presupposes that tradition is sufficient for effectively dealing with people’s everyday life. Since this condition is met in rural/local society, order there can be maintained through rituals”.1 In other words, the maintenance of public order depends entirely on “adherence to traditional rules” and does not require national laws. As regards the rule of rituals, Fei argued, “Rural/local society… is a society ‘without laws’… if we define laws as principles upheld by state power. However, the absence of law does not detract from its social orderliness, because rural society is ruled by rituals and… rituals do not require any concrete structure of political apparatus. Instead, ritual norms are maintained by tradition”.2 That is to say, rural society has a

1 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. From the Soil. The Foundations of Chinese Society—The Institutions for Reproduction. Peking University Press (53). 2 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. From the Soil. The Foundations of Chinese Society—The Institutions for Reproduction. Peking University Press (9).

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social order based on rule of rituals, which is shaped by what maintains it (traditions and customs) and that on which its normative justification is based (rituals). Moreover, some historical and political science studies maintain that traditional Chinese society is “society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners” under imperial despotism or monarchism, where real grassroots self-governance did not exist at all. “Self-governance by the gentry” is only a schema of social order conceived based on the Confucian classics, and modeled on the autonomous rule of Western society. In other words, the “dual-track politics” is a political ideal type instead of social reality. Historically, the so-called “self-governance by the gentry” was in fact an exception. An in-depth investigation into the changing nature of the transition of traditional public social relationship at the grassroots in China shows that the traditional Chinese grassroots communities were neither a selfgoverned society either under or beyond the reach of imperial power, nor a society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners under a “single-track politics” system of imperial rule. In other words, there is no order or rule that must be followed jointly or respectively between rule by officials and rule by people. If we look at the sources of legitimacy and institutional forms prevalent in grassroots communities in imperial China, we see a complex web of both official and non-official structures, as well as both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms, including bureaucratic officials, proxies and mercenaries serving at the county-level government. The last of these three in turn included xuli (local government clerks and runners) class, village officials like sanlao (county official in charge of culture) or the grassroots organizations like the community-household administrative systems including lijia and baojia authorized by the government, as well as gentry and clans. “Self-governance by the gentry”, which has garnered a good deal of attention, is merely a method for the imperial power to rule the grassroots communities indirectly. The nature and feature of such public social relationships speak to the symbiotic, mutually complementary coexistence of imperial power (official governance) on one hand and local authorities (rule by the people) on the other, a relationship that helps to sustain the imperial hereditary system (jiatianxia) as a logic of state governance or order of governance by authority. For this reason, the traditional grassroots social order cannot be simply explained as the “order of rule of rituals” dominated by the gentry, as

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we cannot ignore “external order” of the state authority as a factor of influence. In fact, according to a view that has long been a widely recognized and considered self-evident, the reason there is space in rural society for “self-governance” is the limited scope and reach of imperial powers. That is to say, to a large extent, the state either did not, could not or would not stipulate a set of rules, institutions and organizations needed to regulate people’s daily lives. In the meantime, (and consequently), rural self-governing organizations dominated by either the gentry or lineages formed their own organizational structures, pursued their own goals, promulgated their own charters and instituted their own rules of self-legislation beyond the purview of the state bureaucracy.3 This observation and interpretation presuppose the state and society relationship taken for granted by scholars that assume the Western perspective. On this view, the separation between the state and the society is not based on specific rules or regulations, i.e., certain statutes, but a consequence of the central government’s inability to govern grassroots communities. These studies often describe grassroots communities as a self-governing body by reference to the role of external elements (the state). While this explanation may seem sensible, it is inconsistent with the governance logic of imperialism (absolutist or monarchical), and those who propose it contradict themselves insofar as they are unable to explain how it is that rural Chinese society has a highly developed set of social control institutions, including the baojia system and other grassroots civil service systems. In some sense, this view mistakes the ideal society described in Confucian classics or the social pattern active in regional clans for reality, and overlooks the homogeneity, self-consistency and political ethics of state and society in a traditional China. That is to say, the inherent political ethics of a traditional Chinese society pursues joint governance by officials and the people that features “streamlined administration with limited litigations” and “governance without unnecessary governmental interference”, and is manifested by the legislation of morality and the penalization of laws. In other words, traditionally in China, there doesn’t exist selfgovernance in grassroots communities, but there is “spontaneous order”. These are two completely different concepts. The former indicates a social form in which the local community governs itself, while the latter is a self-sufficient but introverted and closed form of social order featuring 3 H.B. Morse. 1995. The Gilds of China. Collection of Historical Materials of Gilds or Chambers of Commerce of China (First Volume), Zhonghua Book Company: pp. 70–71.

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household as its basic social unit, which was fostered by the social homogenization based on the order of “law and discipline rite”. That is to say, the traditional Chinese civil society is neither an affiliated existence controlled by the state, nor a self-improving space of order that is independent from the state. Instead, it is a continuum connected to the state system by a shared belief in order.4 To put it more specifically, we can understand such relationship between traditional state and civil society in this way: the state seldomly interferes with the order of life in civil society as long as the corvee and taxation are guaranteed, and the regional stability is maintained. Therefore, a variety of nongovernmental organizations and groups have formed independently, not restrained by the government. They have developed their own systems, targets, and well as the rules and regulations, governing themselves on their own terms.5 Regardless we address it as “gentry society”, “literati society” or “official examination society”,6 the essence of basic social order is a form of state’s power control: petty officials represent the rule by officials, and rural gentries speak for the patriarchal clan system; while the common people are the registered population under the rule of imperial power where household (the family or patriarchal clan) is a fundamental unit. The structure that power dominates society came into place. It is these legitimate resources and institutionalized powers that consist of the basic relationship and structure of traditional grassroots communities in China. The modern evolution of state system has transformed the already established and integrated rules at the grassroots communities, and the basic social order has then been restructured. This is the result of a topdown transformation of the society by state power. As how Fei Xiaotong points out, a “planned alteration of society” doesn’t mean that the nature of public social relationship at grassroots level has also been adapted. Namely, “it is an important task for the endeavor of government power building to establish citizenship (identity), public relations (the connection between citizens, and between citizens and public organizations), 4 The observations of Yuzo Mizoguchi, cited from Liang Zhiping. Customary Law of

the Qing Dynasty: Society and State. China University of Political Science and Law Press. 5 Liang Zhiping. 1996. Customary Law of the Qing Dynasty: Society and State. China University of Political Science and Law Press (28). 6 Qian Mu 1991. Methodology in the Study of the Chinese History. Taipei Grand East Book Co., Ltd. (40); John King Fairbank. 1995. China: A New History. Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Company: pp. 104–106.

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and public rules among members in the society. It is a manifestation of relations in modern society, and also the basic element that consolidates the constitutional governance”.7 In other words, the key problem is that, although the state has overhauled the old social structure and cognitive system at the grassroots, it failed to build a structure of social self-governance and a system of regulation as replacement. That is to say, even though the foundation of the traditional grassroots social order has changed, the new social order has not generated modern public relations that could replace the structure in traditional society where grassroots seeking protection and shelter from the rural squires and the clan. “The formation of civil society in modern China was not meant to confront the authoritarian state power, but meant to harmonize the relationship between the people and the government, to complement the rule by officials by and the rule by the people, and to build a new type of state–society relationship. During this process, eager to fix the economic development so as to stand up to the rest great world powers, the government of the Qing Dynasty (official) even showed greater motivation. In fact, the mushrooming of new-type civil groups and the expansion of the related public field as well as the development of civil society in the early twentieth century were to a large extend promoted by the government”.8 The order in the grassroots communities is still based on the dominance of state political and administrative power. The transformation of grassroots social order in China since the modern period is magnificent and structural, characterized by the founding of a political state and the institutional evolution from the imperial period to the modern era in politics, economy, society and culture. However, different from how the revolutionaries and social reformers expected, neither political revolution nor social reform had fundamentally has remolded the main contents of the grassroots social practices, and the norms and principles that folks followed therein. To put it more specifically, after all these radical political revolutions and social reforms, the basic consolidation unit and the ethical norms of grassroots communities have not changed, and the established social structure and cognitive system of rural society have not been completely replaced by the power 7 Zhang Jing. 2006. Contemporary Public Rules and Rural Society. Shanghai Bookstore Press (5). 8 Ma Min. 1996. “A Piece of History Overlooked: Civil Society in the 20th Century Suzhou”. The Orient, Issue 4.

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structure and cognitive system of the state. Historically speaking, the driving mechanism that prompted development of grassroots social order derives from two approaches: first, the top-down political governance by the norms and principles stipulated by the state authority which incorporates the grassroots social influencers into the national governance regime; second, the normative rules of spontaneous social order that still serve as the fundamentals in grassroots social life. In modern times, the change of former approach was driven by modernization, namely, building a modern nation-state required the improvement in resource extraction and capabilities of social mobilization and control. For the latter, although it has always been a target of reformation, the rudimentary habits, customs and norms have never been lost, and remain fundamental for the development and growth of autonomous order in the grassroots communities of China today. By focusing on/tracing the changes of nature of public social relations and taking a perspective of theoretical analysis, this study aims at reinterpreting the transformation of grassroots social order from the traditional to the contemporary period and its significance to modern construction in an approach different from the previous cognitive paradigm. The study believes that the traditional grassroots social order is an order governed jointly by the officials and the people. It not only shares the characteristics of spontaneous order, but also serves as a functional tool for the state authority to fortify its power. And thus, there configures a status of social governance and schema of social order where the rule by officials and the rule by the people are embedded and intertwined in terms of power dominance. The rules of such traditional grassroots social order have been passed down alongside the formation of nation-state during the modern period, and integrated into the latest changing social structures, under the framework of modern all-powerful politics. Therefore, to learn about and understand how today’s grassroots social order is functioning and structured, and what is the significance of this system, we should look at the continuity and connection of the past and the present. Moreover, it is important to understand and promote the modern transformation of the grassroots social order by taking into account of the construction of public social relations and the development of the self-governing system at the community level, which means, the public relations and rules of the social order at the community level should be built on the combination of the historical tradition of legitimate rules and the contemporary social norms at the grassroots. By thoroughly reviewing the historical

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logic of transformation of China’s grassroots social order and its modern construction, this study is academically and methodologically significant in the following aspects. First, it revisits the main cognitive paradigm of the traditional Chinese grassroots social order and discusses the related rules and norms system from the perspective of grassroots communities, instead of the state. Second, it applies modern analytical theories to the local context. The analysis begins with the interpenetrating/interlocking nature of the state and society in China and combines modern analytical theories with the contents that are closely linked to the local history and culture, because that the distinctive characters of Chinese society consists of the homogeneity and isomorphism between home and state, quite different from the state–society relations experienced in the Western countries. As an object of observation, they both have their own cognitive system. Third, during today’s process of authority-rebuilding in the grassroots communities of China, the study reflects on the social order system at the grassroots from the perspective of consolidation of state political power, which will help to understand the social structures supporting the transformation of grassroots social order, the factors that promote and restrain it, and its capacity of development and where it will head to. Such exploration will look at the foundation and form of existence of public relations, public rules and public authoritative influence in grassroots communities. The point is that the configuration of grassroots social order needs to be based on the continuity of tradition and reality. The historical and practical significance of the topics discussed in this study are as follows. Firstly, grassroots social order has always been on the agenda of modern state-building, and the reformation of social public relations and public rules at the grassroots never stops, despite the political revolutions and social transformations since modern times. Secondly, to find out what are the historical and cultural resources for the modern construction of grassroots social order, or how to explain the nature of the complicated relationship between the state and society (cooperative rather than antagonistic, interrelated rather than separated) traditionally in China, and to put it in the context of the rule of law of the contemporary Chinese society, because this is the historical cornerstone and precondition to prompt modern transformation of grassroots communities. Thirdly, how to ameliorate the social nature of grassroots authority is not only related to the legitimacy of state governance and the reconstruction of subject society, but also related to the systemization of social

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interests and the change of the way people in modern society are associated. In the final analysis, it is related to the normative rules the local community and the social public order at the grassroots are built on.

PART I

The Transformation of Traditional Grassroots Social Order and Significance of Its Modern Construction

Regarding the transformation of traditional grassroots social order and the significance of its modern construction, the mainstream view holds that in the era of the imperial system, “the imperial power didn’t reach below the county”, where communities practiced “self-governance”, namely, selfgovernance by the gentry or the clan through rituals. And this is how the imperial government maintained its autocracy, by relying on a “dualtrack politics” consisting of the top-down imperial governance and the bottom-up gentry governance. In this view, in the traditional Chinese society, there existed two separate management and support systems, known as official governance and self-governance by the people. Proponents of this view hold that this kind of self-governance, which had been built on the smallholding peasant economy since the Middle Ages, underwent systematic disintegration throughout the most formidable transformations in the modern era, which replaced “dual-track politics” with “single-track politics”, and led to the overall decline of the rural society. Therefore, proponents of this view argue that the reconstruction of grassroots social order in China essentially requires rebuilding the “dual-track politics” (similar to that of the imperial era), and this is something important for China’s modernization. This cognitive paradigm has become a fundamental theoretical approach to understanding the transformation of grassroots social order in China since modern times, and it is adopted by most scholars in political science, sociology and anthropology. In Part I of this book, I will try to re-interpret the issue from a completely new perspective. I argue that the traditional grassroots social

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PART I:

THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITIONAL …

order is co-governance by officials and the people. This model not only has the characteristics of spontaneous order but also allows state authority to be effectively exercised. It constitutes a model of governance and social order that is sustained by a dynamic mutual influence between official governance and self-governance by the people. The rules underpinning such traditional grassroots social order have been passed down in the state-building process and incorporated into the new social structure under the framework of political omnipotence.

CHAPTER 2

The Cognitive Paradigms for Understanding Traditional Grassroots Social Order

2.1

Self-Governance or Official Governance

Among studies on the evolution of grassroots social order in China, there have been some widely accepted cognitive paradigms. According to the mainstream view, grassroots social order traditionally in China is a kind of self-rule, that is, a structure and form of self-governance by the gentry. It follows from this that two different managing and supporting systems— official governance and self-governance—have traditionally coexisted in China. Besides, historical studies have often argued that the traditional Chinese society is a “society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners” under despotism or monarchism, and that self-governance in the grassroots communities did not exist; the concept of self-governance by the gentry is a model conceived on the basis of Confucian classics and informed by the idea of self-rule associated with the Western society. Indeed, self-governance by the gentry is a historical exception. Since the Republic of China (1912–1949), studies on the traditional grassroots social order in China have been built and expanded on this cognitive paradigm. For instance, sociological and anthropological studies in the first half of the twentieth century or even after the reform and opening up have basically assumed “self-governance by the gentry” or clan self-governance. And they have also focused on certain regions, such as the southeast, where patriarchal clans are well developed. However, these studies have either produced supporting evidence for and new © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_2

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discoveries of clan-based ethical society or made use of and tested modern analytical concepts. In-depth studies on “society in which civilians serve as local government clerks and runners” have mostly been done by historians and scholars who study the history of political theories, but the expansion of research in this field is attributable to the adoption of new historical paradigms (e.g. research on the history of social life) and official documents, bamboo tablets or slips (for writing in ancient China), archives and new archaeological discoveries, and all these provide strong proofs for the theory that imperial Chinese society was one in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners. The emergence of the afore-said cognitive paradigms is focused on a common social and historical background: as the system and culture of Western industrial civilization are introduced, transforming and restructuring the traditional Chinese society since the late Qing Dynasty have always been the theme for the construction and modernization of a nation-state. This social transformation movement is known as the “Planned Social Change”.1 Not only are traditional national structure and social patterns the objects of social transformation, they also constitute the historical backdrop and social condition for the occurrence and development of social transformation movement. That is to say, in modern times, especially since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, one of the historical trends in social transformation has been for grassroots social order in the country to be folded into a national social order established under the rule by government authority. This national social order manifests itself in the total control the state authority exercises over the country’s social resources and political, economic and social planning. In this process, “the building of grassroots political power” (including the establishment of local administrative system) is closely connected with the construction of a modern country, and it is the extension of the state’s control over the grassroots communities. It is the process in which rule by government authority 1 In his work Peasant Life in China, Fei Xiaotong pointed out that the establishment of local administrative system in the period of the Republic of China (1912–1949) was the “Planned Social Change”. Zhang Jing made an explanation from the viewpoint of the construction of national political power. In other words, the country tried to turn local authority into the branch of political authority set up by the state, and the local authority was gradually changed into an organization of serving national goals—military conscription and taxes collection. For more details, please see “The Change of Passage: Correlation of Individual and Public Organizations”. Xuehai: 2015 (1).

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integrates and covers the autonomous order and the one where the state authority replaces the local authority or nongovernmental authority. Thus, this constitutes one of the goals for “modern transformation” in the entire grassroots communities. The explanation of changes of social structure mentioned above is generally made from the perspectives of political power construction and modernization of a modern country. The research on this is very exhaustive and incisive.2 Almost all studies center on the theme, i.e. the transition from traditional to modern, and it involves all aspects of history, society, culture and value. Until today, the research like this still attracts much attention, partly due to the fact that China’s modernization or transition of modern society is far from being achieved and is constantly evolving.

2.2 Different Cognitive Paradigms for Understanding Self-Governance and Official Governance There is a popular view among domestic and international scholars as to the grassroots social order traditionally in China: the imperial power does not take hold in rural society and the latter is the clan-based ethical autonomous order dominated by the gentry.3 There are two

2 The outcomes achieved in this field are mainly from studies conducted by Chinese scholars during the period from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China as well as domestic and international scholars in the recent 30 years. The former’s research areas cover a broad spectrum, including many aspects such as history, society, culture, and economic life. And representative scholars include Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, Wu Wenzao, Fei Xiaotong, Lin Yaohua and Zhang Zhongli. But the latter’s research mainly consists of two fields, one is about history, especially the field of history of social life since the late Qing Dynasty, represented by Philip Kuhn, Prasenjit Duara and others; the second is about the research on economic and social changes in China in recent 30 years, represented by Jean Oi, Zhang Jing, Huang Zongzhi, Helen Siu, Zheng Zhenman, Wang Mingming and others. 3 Max Weber once put forward the view of “limited bureaucratic system” traditionally in China: “In fact, the official governance of imperial power is only exercised in urban areas and sub-urban areas. Out of the city walls, the validity of governing authority is then reduced to a larger degree, or even disappears”. (Please see Max Weber’s Konfuzianismus und Taoismus translated by Hong Tianfu, Jiangsu People’s Publishing House: 1993, p. 110). Take another example, Goode, W.J, an expert of family history, said: “Under the imperial rule, the management of administrative agencies is not yet infiltrated into the

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main reasons: first, the limitation of national ability, and second, the homogeneity and oneness of family and state. Therefore, (it is certain that) there is a non-state, “nongovernmental” social autonomous space, and sociological and anthropological studies (at home and abroad) also support such cognition. In his books Reconstruction of Villages, Imperial Power and Gentry Power and From the Soil—the Foundations of Chinese Society and other works, Fei Xiaotong introduces the concept of “dualtrack politics”, believing that the traditional Chinese society has two tracks, with one being the top-down track featuring centralized authority and the other the track characterized by the self-governance of grassroots organization. The order form of the latter is described as an unorganized, harmonious natural society.4 The formation of dual-track politics gives us the inspiration for constructing autonomous factors through pattern—for example, the gentry is a dominant force which ensures self-governance, and the grassroots social order during the period of imperial system is built on the form and rule of self-governance by the gentry. In his book China’s Gentlemen, Zhang Zhongli is of the opinion that gentlemen or gentlemen bloc share such relationship with the country: on the one hand, the country needs to rely on gentlemen to control and manage the society and develops officials necessary for this purpose; on the other, the country also controls how social members enter this bloc through imperial examination and selection of officials so that it can contain gentlemen with the help of system. It is true that gentlemen have played a very big role in maintaining local atmosphere and Confucian belief in the Chinese society in the nineteenth century. At the same time, as a prerogative class, gentlemen also undertake some duties of managing the country and often act as an intermediary between the government and the grassroots communities. For one thing, they help government officials to govern the local. For another thing, they also seek some rights and interests

rural level, while the inherent forces of patriarchal clans maintain the stability and order of villages”. (Please see the book Family by Goode, W.J, translated by Wei Zhangling, Social Sciences Academic Press [China]: 1986, p. 166). In most times, Chinese scholars also regard the traditional rural society as an ethical society under and beyond the imperial power. 4 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. Native China and Family Planning System. Peking University Press: p. 63.

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for ordinary people from the government.5 Based upon comments from researchers such as Fei Xiaotong and Zhang Zhongli, some Chinese and foreign researchers argue that there are two kinds of order and force: one is the bureaucratic order or national force and the other the local order or nongovernmental force. The former is centered on the imperial authority and creates the “Trapezoid-structure” that is clearly hierarchic in a topdown way. But the latter focuses on the family (patriarchal clan) and generates natural villages of different sizes where people live in concentrated groups. Each and every family (patriarchal clan) and village is a natural “autonomous entity”, and these “autonomous entities” form the “honeycomb-structure”.6 As far as cognitive paradigm is concerned, these views are significant to the studies on rural society at that time and in later years: traditionally in China, imperial power only has the powerfully symbolic importance for the rule of rural society. The rural society is an autonomous order, and the so-called ethical society, ethical order, and order of patriarchal clan are just different features and forms of this autonomous order. This “ideal” model especially conforms to the schema of the grassroots social order described in Confucian classics and folk texts, and is understood as a kind of social space and autonomous order not directly controlled by and beyond the control of state power. The regional studies since modern times have shown that in villages where prosperous families live in southeast China, the existence of “clan-based ethical social order” seems self-evident.7 In particular, in recent over 20 years, anthropological and ethnological studies on the fields of rural society in southeastern regions have provided a body of empirical materials that support this

5 Zhang Zhongli. 1991. China’s Gentlemen: Research on Their Role in China Society in the 19th Century. Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press. 6 Vivienne Shue. 1988. The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic. Stanford University Press. 7 Family communities in China’s southeastern regions are always very active. In spite of this, whether regional or local social form can represent the social form of the Chinese society is greeted with skepticism due to more in-depth historical studies over the past decades. At that time, the center of Chinese culture or civilization emerged in the reaches of the Yellow River, but the culture or civilization of South China was just the result of cultural and geographic transfer that began in North China (during the Song Dynasty). This is the secondary form. The last point can be seen in the book China’s Culture and Geography written by Chen Zhengxiang, which was published in SDX Joint Publishing Company in 1983.

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idea. For instance, through the research on family organizations in southeastern regions, some researchers view that the traditional Chinese society is governed by the “double rules of state and rural clans”.8 The problem is that the regional research is limited, and the local research on community is based on the micro perspectives of community, village and family, so it is very difficult to use regional research to summarize the whole grassroots social order traditionally in China.9 In fact, the presupposition of studies and explorations like these certainly comes from the understanding of the social nature of traditional China. Moreover, this research’s academic background as well as social and historical backdrops take as the reference theoretical and ideological systems of the Western society. As a matter of fact, this is the opinion that began after China encountered the Western world and made a comparison with the latter in modern times. To put it in a simple way, that is, the traditional Chinese society is an ethical society based on personal relationship, and different expressions of personal relationship can include specialism, ethicality and others. In truth, the above-said ideas are constantly restated, and extended discourse paradigms include gentry society, local self-governance, the dichotomy of state and society, denationalization of rural society, citizen’s society and the like (all these take the concepts of state and society as the analytic tools). Most studies are conducted according to this basic paradigm, and the exception is rare.10

8 Zheng Zhenman. 1992. The Change of Family Organization and Society in FuJian

during the Periods of the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Hunan Education Publishing House: p. 242. 9 The research on the power of villages in China’s rural areas reflects two features: first, with a detailed analysis of the power structure of villages by entering the inner part of villages, all structural factors of village power by so doing are discovered, so the research on rural politics then becomes an academic growth point that accounts for the social nature of the present society; second, the research on the village power of rural areas in present China is mostly conducted according to the framework of dualist analysis featuring state and society, the research based upon this framework mainly focuses on the extent and performance of state power entering villages, the reaction of rural society as well as the interactive situation of the two. For more details, please see A Review of Studies on China’s Village Power in the 20th Century. Academics: 2006 (4). 10 The deepening development of social science in recent few decades, especially the development of sociology-folklore-cultural anthropology of focusing on field investigation brings people’s attention to the micro society as the target of field investigation. Thus, concepts such as “tiny community”, “local knowledge”, “little tradition” and “local worship and worshipping circle” become the focus of discussion.

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But historical studies on documents and historical materials, especially those authenticated by such historical materials as inscriptions on the bones, bamboo slips, official documents and archives, cannot prove that self-governance by the gentry or clan-based ethical autonomy is the normal order of grassroots communities traditionally in China. As regards the research on the history of the late Qing Dynasty, particularly the research on social history in recent more than 20 years, the most convincing part restores the traditional order pattern of grassroots communities. In his work Local Government in the Qing Dynasty, Qu Tongzu has made an in-depth research on the local system and culture of traditional China. Different from the authoritative view of self-governance by the gentry (held by the likes of Fei Xiaotong and Zhang Zhongli: gentlemen have a close relationship with local ordinary people11 ), Qu Tongzu thinks that gentlemen are neither the representatives elected by local ordinary people nor the ones appointed by the government. They are nothing but the spokesmen of local community (customarily) accepted by people on the strength of their privileged position.12 That is to say, the gentry is the unofficial agent beyond the imperial power. For local community, country gentlemen can achieve something or nothing, since they just take into consideration the common interests of the community without the prejudice of their own immediate interests while mediating between county and prefectural officials and local ordinary people. But the state power represented by county and prefectural officials below the county is not indispensable in terms of controlling role. The above-mentioned views are confirmed in recent historical studies: the order of grassroots communities under the imperial power is a “society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners” and “not clan-based”. In other words, the most time of the Chinese history based on the so-called consanguineous community of family or clan cannot provide or is not allowed to provide effective rural “autonomous” resources, let alone using these to counterbalance the imperial power. For instance, through studies on Bamboo Slips of the Wu State successively unearthed from 1999 to 2000 in Zoumalou House 11 Fei Xiaotong. 2006. China’s Gentry (translated by Hui Haiming). China: Social Sciences Academic Press; Zhang Zhongli. 1991. China’s Gentlemen: Research on Its Role in China Society in the 19th Century. Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press: p. 70. 12 Qu Tongzu. 2003. Local Government in the Qing Dynasty. China: Law Press: pp. 307, 337.

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in Changsha (known as “Bamboo Slips of the Wu State”13 or “Wujian”, containing records of the Wu State during the period of “Three Kingdoms” in ancient China), the historical scholar Qin Hui proves that the activity and control of “national political power” below the county reflected by bamboo slips are very active. At that time, and in local areas, there were not only developed organizations of village, neighborhood, valley as well as permanent and section-level accountability system and all patterns of official document are embodied in bamboo slips.14 Take another example. With textual studies on “official households” of Bamboo Slips of the Wu State conducted by scholars, it is known that in the Wei and Jin States during the period of the Southern Dynasties, people based on household system undertook some duties for the country; from the period of the Northern Dynasties to the Sui and Tang dynasties, people based on individual assumed some obligations for the country. The former is hereditary, whereas the latter involves only one person, not his family members and later generations. Whether depending on household system or on individual, all these are designed to ensure a batch of permanent people undertake these duties lest they cannot be performed due to the scarcity of personnel. From the Tang and Song dynasties to the Yuan Dynasty, this kind of level-based and classificational management approach is strengthened again. It suggests that traditionally in China, the relations between the country and the ordinary people and between government officials and ordinary people have always occupied a predominant position in all social connections, whereas the relationship between people has given way to the secondary position. The so-called “official household” (which bears corvee according to household unit) is exactly the microcosm of this relationship.15 Take one more example. There are very rich materials associated with “village officials” recorded in the Bamboo Slips of the Wu State in Zoumalou House in Changsha. But 13 Translator’s note: Bamboo slip or tablet is a special writing material made of wooden tablet or bamboo slip in ancient times. 14 Qin Hui. 2004. The Rural Grassroots Control of the Traditional Chinese Empire (published in the Ten Arguments: The System, Culture and Their Change of Local Society). Fudan University Press. 15 Meng Yanhong. “Sons and Younger Brothers”. Seen in “Bamboo Slips of the Wu State” and Official Household System in the State of Wu—On the System of Labor Based on Household System during the Periods of the Wei and Jin Dynasties. From materials of the Wei and Jin dynasties in the periods of the Southern and Northern Dynasties as well the Sui and Tang Dynasties, 2008.

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these “village officials” have special identity and position: for villagers, they are the representatives of the imperial court, the emperor and the country; for prefectural and county government offices and higher officials, they represent the interests of villagers to some degrees. Seen from the scenes of “weibi” (penalties), “bianzhang ” (whipping) in the bamboo slips found in Zoumalou House, these village officials play a social role as a go-between between the bureaucratic bloc and the ordinary people. In other words, “village officials” are placed somewhere between the social upper class (the state) and the social lower class (the village) in an interlinked way, and they are the middle links that allow the governing and the governed in the society to connect with each other.16 The above historical studies bring our discussion to this question: it is probable that the so-called “self-governance by the gentry” is just an “autonomous space” without much self-governance and independence under the framework of imperial rule. In addition, studies on the history of political thought traditionally in China do not support the view of “self-governance by the gentry”. There is a case in point. The idea of “power dominating over society” held by Liu Zehua is that “monarchism does not indicate the social form, nor is it limited to what we usually call power system. Instead, it refers to a type of controlling and operating mechanism in the society. Roughly speaking, it can be divided into three levels. The first level is the power system centering on monarchic power; the second is the social structure based upon the framework of this power system; and the third is the conceptual system that corresponds with the above conditions”.17 In line with the concept of “power dominating over society”, the structural characteristics of the traditional grassroots social order can be observed and understood from the three aspects of power system, social structure and conceptual system that can be combined with each other. In this sense, it corroborates Qu Tongzu’s view.

16 Wang Zijin. 2015. “The Special Role of ‘Official’ Seen in the Bamboo Slips in Zoumalou House in Connecting Both Cities and Villages”. Zhejiang Social Sciences (5). 17 Liu Zehua. 2000. China’s Monarchism. Shanghai People’s Publishing House: p. 2.

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2.3 The Theoretical Origin of the Cognitive Paradigms The main reason why “self-governance by the gentry” or “clan selfgovernance” becomes an almost universally accepted cognitive paradigm is that after the late Qing Dynasty, analysis and observation were made (by Western Sinologists and later local scholars) by reference to Western concepts such as “state” and “society”. People were not yet methodologically self-conscious about how to understand the historical and cultural limitations of these concepts. According to the Confucian classics of Chinese culture and self-evident familism (from the observational viewpoint of standard culture or foreign culture), with the inference of macro history and micro (selective) regional empirical materials, a “selfgovernance by the gentry” or “clan-based ethical autonomy” that is compatible with a Confucian ideal society is characterized. In addition to this, in the subsequent studies on China’s traditional grassroots communities, “self-governance by the gentry” or “clan-based ethical autonomy” has almost emerged as an unquestionable cognitive paradigm, which is constantly fleshed out by new evidenced materials of later researchers and is surely discussed under the analytical framework built on the relationship of modern state and society. The sociological and anthropological studies in recent 20–30 years serve as the continuous part of those studies in the 1930s–1940s because in the latter’s years, while there appeared a number of celebrated scholars and high-quality academic books, this only marked a fledgling stage either for the social science or for the humanities. After 1949, China’s humanistic social science became ideological, and this was completely replaced by a new explanatory framework—historical materialism. In this connection, the continuous work of research from 1978 to the present time should be carried out from two aspects: first, sorting out research outcomes and cognitive paradigms in the 1930s to the 1940s; second, adopting the way of bring-ism to have a dialogue with the foreign research of that time. Thanks to the combined efforts of these two aspects, both sociology and anthropology have come a long way, but it needs to be pointed out that such studies remain in the process of continuously corroborating the previous cognitive paradigms and at the same time remain on its way to bring in the studies of Western theory and conceptual system. Moreover, these studies take place in the context of economic, social and systematic changes—market-based reform and change of rural governance.

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Therefore, strictly speaking, the cognitive paradigm of self-governance by the gentry or clan self-governance popular today is only an expansion and extension of studies done in the 1920s–1930s. And it largely utilizes such concepts as the state–society relationship central to studies done in the West to analyze traditional Chinese rural society, with little attempt at local adaption of the conceptual tools themselves. Foreign scholars from the same period also held this kind of “bias”, according to which (traditional or even modern) China is a lineage-centered society, and that self-governance by the gentry was a dominant mode of social order. The widespread uncritical acceptance of this cognitive paradigm among China studies scholars is one of the reasons why this view of the dominance of self-governance by the gentry or clan self-governance is perpetuated and more and more deeply entrenched. There is an alternative cognitive paradigm, according to which traditional grassroots social order is “not based on lineage” but rather on “society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners”. But self-governance by the gentry or clan self-governance is also an exception. These ideas are largely from the studies of historiography especially China’s traditional political thought history and social history. Of course, in the background of academic substitution of fundamental influence resulting from the above (after 1949) politics, economy and ideology, there is also no exception to historical research. Since the early period of the twentieth century, influenced by the theory of Western social science especially the thinking tide of “new history”, historical researchers have changed the system of ancient history mainly characterizing the activities of emperors, ministers and generals, giving birth to several historical schools embracing modern science. Meanwhile, this triggered a major war of contention on China’s social history, with the essence and core of contention lying in figuring out China’s social nature, namely the social nature of real China, ancient China and China’s

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village.18 Despite this, from the 1950s to the 1970s, under the guidance of Marxism, as historical research became ideological, researchers often used abstract theoretical logic and deduction to observe the development sequence of China’s ancient history, which led to the divorce of people’s knowledge from the development realities of Chinese history and thus deprived academic research of its original appearance.19 Since the 1980s, China’s historical circle has reintroduced social historical theories of other countries, which are not only manifested in a multitude of studies on historical issues but in the reflection and reconstruction of historical

18 The so-called major war of contention on China’s social history took place in the period from the 1920s to the 1930s. This was closely linked with the specific theoretical and historical background of the time. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Marxism enjoyed a wide circulation and was given universal attention, which provided a theoretical precondition for the contention of social history. The failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924–1927) directly led to this major war of contention, and “where does China go” had become an issue that was reconsidered by all works of life. The content of the war of contention on China’s social history can be divided into three essential parts: first, whether China has gone through the slavery society in history; second, what is the time of the beginning and ending of China’s feudal society and its features; third, the Asiatic mode of production. The essence of contention is about whether China’s historical development stage is consistent with the basic laws of mankind’s historical development summed up from the Marxism and whether Marxism is applicable to China. As agriculture is the mainstay of China, and rural areas cover most of the country, if we can made clear the social nature of China’s rural areas, it is then easy to figure out the social nature of the whole China. Therefore, the war of contention on the social nature of China’s rural areas as an extended part emerged. In this war of contention, the “Chinese economic school” which regarded the journal “China’s Economy” as the battlefield held that China’s rural areas have been a capitalist society. As for the issue of productivity and productive relations, Marxists maintained the need to focus on analyzing productive relations, but Chinese Trotskyite believed that analyzing productivity should be prioritized. As the war of people’s resistance against Japanese aggression went into full swing, the major war of contention on social history basically ended in 1937. Generally, both the war of contention on the nature of China’s society and the war of contention on the nature of the nature of China’s rural society feature realistic issues, and they contain more political elements; the war of contention on China’s social history extends from realistic aspirations to historical issues, which is of high academic significance. Through war of contention, the nature of semi-colonial and semi-feudal society in modern China is widely recognized. In this war of contention, Marxism is broadly applied in the studies of Chinese realistic and historical issues. It can be said that the major war of contention on China’s social history directly results in the emergence of Marxist historical science. 19 Wang Jilu. 1999. The Misunderstanding of Studies on Historical Research in the New Period (published in The Chinese Historical Science at the Turn of Century: Young Scholars Forum). China Social Sciences Press: pp. 86–87.

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development theory. With the influx of new Western social historical theories and the reflections on the past studies, starting from the research of this area or dynastic history, historical researchers reexamine the development course of ancient history in China and its logic to create new theories and doctrines.20 Included in these is the discussion on the nature of traditional rural society, but studies on political thought history and social history pose a challenge to the traditional cognitive paradigm of rural social order. For example, they investigate the trajectory of historical evolution in ancient China according to the aspects such as the structure of monarchic power, the shift of social class, the change of economic structure and the control of social organization, and from these, they sort out and randomly select such categories as monarchic power (despotic power and king’s politics), organization-based clans and landlord ownership and the economic structure of agriculture and commerce and rich people class. And they depend on these concepts inherent in China’s ancient history to build a unique discourse system. A good case in point is that there are both researchers relying on a single clue to organize the theoretic framework, including theories of “monarchism”, “agricultural and commercial society” and “rich people society” and the like, and those employing several clues to build the academic system, involving theories of “landlord society” and “agricultural and commercial society under the imperial system”. The archaeological discoveries and the progress of archaeological studies in recent years in particular, in the “Bamboo Slips of the Wu State in Zoumalou House in Changsha” that were successively made public for example, there were many archives and official documents of local authorities of prefecture and county, including rich records of village-level officials. As for the determination of their identity and the

20 In this perspective, there are already numerous summaries and evaluations of academic historical works, with relatively systematic representative books involving The Evolution of “Feudal” Concept and the Formation of Theory of “Feudal Landlord System” in China by Li Genpan, “Research and Proof of ‘Feudal’” (including two books, please see later quotes) by Feng Tiaoyu, The Transition of China’s Ancient Society: New Exploration of the Issue of History Period Division, Social Sciences Frontier Studies in China (2006–2007) [Social Sciences Academic Press (China) (2007)] by Zhang Guogang, The Construction and Reconstruction of Ancient History System: A Theoretical Study on the Period Division and Social Pattern of Ancient History, Henan University Press (2010). These academic historical books provide discussions relating to the development situations of the above-mentioned first, second and third stages, and offer comments on new theories of the third stage, but the comment on it from a whole perspective is rare.

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scope of their jurisdiction, analyses of three types of village-level clerk— Quannong yuan (in charge of farming), Diantian yuan (in charge of land pawning or mortgaging) and Shi yuan (in charge of the market) that were mentioned in the Bamboo Slips of the Wu State in Zoumalou House in Changsha suggest that these local government clerks were responsible for rural affairs at the village level, which account for only a part of their job duty. Or in other words, in terms of their identity, they were auxiliary county government clerks. Besides, those village-level government clerks in Bamboo Slips of the Wu State are the country’s ordinary people incorporated into the household system, and although some of them have superior economic conditions, there is a declining trend in their social status, and they need to pay a special tax.21 From the perspective of historical research, this is to pay attention to the relationship between officials and common people, especially the attention to those insignificant officials at the lower class in local administrative agencies who are always passed into oblivion by historical records. It, to a certain extent, restores the controlling organizational structure of imperial rule in the grassroots communities, and shows that the order under government authority of imperial power is established in all grassroots organizations in rural society and covers the whole rural society but there are few exceptions. But on the whole, the explanation for the history of social life and form of rural social order in this aspect that the historical research provides does not receive deserved attention (in the fields of sociology and anthropology). This is partly because in terms of academic tradition, there are no more intersections of historiography and social science, particularly sociology and anthropology, and partly because the historiography favoring grand narration and the sociology and anthropology focusing on micro society have their own very prominent limits; whether it is for the methodology or for the scientific principle, the two have their own cognitive paradigms, all of which cause an inevitable situation where two parallels appear regarding their explanation of the same historical phenomenon. Nevertheless, this situation has not changed much until now.

21 Shen Gang. 2010. “A Tentative Discussion on Village—Level Officials in the Bamboo Slips of the State Wu in Zoumalou House in Changsha”. Hunan Museum Journal (07).

CHAPTER 3

Rules of Order: Structure of Social Authorities at the Grassroots

Whether it be “self-governance” or “official governance”, the views or cognitive paradigms pertaining thereto are believed to explain the social order at the community level traditionally in China, but they actually make such explanations based on their different angles from the perspective of different disciplines and different analytical concepts. For all descriptions and analyses of the grassroots social order traditionally in China, the extent to which they are true and reliable and distorted because of their special experience in a specific time–space has become a question. Therefore, with new social theories and practices, proceeding from the traditional grassroots communities, starting from the perspective of wholeness, and based upon historiographic, sociological and anthropological studies, it is undoubtedly a rewarding attempt to reexamine the structure of social order at the community level traditionally in China and to test whether the above-mentioned cognitive paradigms are persuasive for the social reality when systems, norms and rules that constitute the social order are regarded as the analytical dimensions.

3.1

Rules and Order

By using the formative principle or standard of social order to analyze the grassroots social order, we can relate to the social origin of grassroots authority. That is to say, it is about how social forces form political authority, and how political authority gathers and changes interest groups © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_3

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and powerful connections. Thus, the unit for analysis is the operating mode of power or force or the systematic structure of authority in the social distribution. The methodological significance of such discussion lies in the following. On the one hand, a different mode of authority is seen as a kind of special organizational or structural arrangement; it serves to promote the organization of social interests and constitute the order of social control and obedience. This “structural order” presupposes the fact that politics and society are connected as a whole and mutually constructed into an integrated order after the decentralization of power, and it is the result of interaction of multiple action units (individuals, organizations, etc.). Their agreement, exchange and trade constitute the contracted order. The presupposition of structural order is that it is multilateral input and output, the influence, involvement and agreement of multilateral forces that constitute the order.1 On the other, if we start from the local background or if we understand and explain the social order at the community level in China from the perspective of local history and culture and its evolution, the relationship between society and state, and if we discuss the legitimate basis of rural social order by using the formative principle or standard and then dissecting the relationship between grassroots communities and state on the basis of social relations (relation network) reflected in norms or rules, it will have more targeted and standard importance. Based upon above-said concepts and categories, the analysis focuses on the relationship between rule and order. That is about what rule will generate what order and how the rule produces the general social order. The order is formed by the rule, and the rule is reflected by the standard practice and the system. So, how to achieve the cause-and-effect connection between abstract rule and general order? Friedrich August von Hayek, a renowned economist and political philosopher, believes that all social orders configurated in the society are either generated or constructed: the former refers to “Spontaneous Order”, while the latter means “An Organizational or A Made Order”.2 But the crucial difference for the rules that form the two social orders is that the former uses mandatory power or law to realize the order, whereas the latter is a general 1 Zhang Jing. 1998. “Political Sociology and Its Main Research Direction”. Social Research (3). 2 Deng Zhenglai. 1999. “The Dual Concept of Social Order and Rule—Research on Hayek’s Law Theory”. Peking University Law Review. Vol. 2 (2).

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rule, which has three characteristics. First, it sees the society as the result of human action based upon the limited knowledge of the environment rather than the result of human design, hence it is a “spontaneous rule”. Second, those spontaneously evolving rules clearly seen in shared customs can be promoted by people to explore and improve themselves, thus it is an “improved rule”. Third, spontaneous social orders are some orders of rules dominating action, so it is a “designed rule”.3 In other words, a made social order is an order under government authority while a spontaneous social order is an autonomous order. In terms of this research task, we first make the following analysis from the angle of the legitimate origin that constitutes the social order at the community level, also the principle or rule that forms such a social order and conduct a systematic analysis of the structure of grassroots social order from the perspective of the function and significance of the implicit rules generally followed by people in their actions except for state legislation or law. Before discussing orders and standard rules, we need to make a necessary demarcation between legal order and spontaneous order and try as much as possible to discern their pattern and form as well as their way of function and role. For one thing, the standard system that develops among the people is the basis for the formation of a spontaneous order. The standard system among the people includes adjusting all kinds of standards in the world of people’s daily life, of which the customary law is its major standard form. “The customary law is still such a set of local standards and gradually emerges in the process of long life and work of rural people. It is used to allocate the rights and obligations among rural people while adjusting and resolving their conflict of interests, and the change is mainly carried out in a set of relationship networks”.4 The other end closer to the customary law is the tradition, custom, habit and law and others, all of which in the same way constitute the basis of spontaneous order. The customary law that constitutes the spontaneous order and the relationship between other standard forms and state laws are expressed by distinct historical differences because of the differences in the separating and combining relationship between state and society. For example, the duality for the separation of state from family is the 3 Quoted from Liang Feng, who wrote an article called “Rule and Spontaneous Order: The Formation of Hayek’s Social Theory”. Academia Bimestrie 2004 (2). 4 Liang Zhiping. 1996. The Customary Law in the Qing Dynasty: Society and State. China University of Political Science and Law Press: p. 01.

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crucial feature of its form of “legal order”, whereas traditionally in China, the characteristic of oneness for the combination of family and state is expressed by the mutually built-in complex relationship of customary law and state–family law. In addition, in contrast with the country’s law-based governance, the so-called relationship between rule and order is far from being simple because of the “nature of rich local color” in China’s grassroots communities. This suffices to say that the local knowledge tradition for the dimension of order and the origin of standard among the people is profound. And we are better able to observe the structural changes from the order and standard among the people including the customary law. This is a question that will be further discussed in the next parts.

3.2

Public Sphere and Private Sphere

As for the relationship between rule and order, the public sphere and the private sphere of China’s traditional grassroots communities show striking features that are ambiguously defined and free of fixity of fields and reveal the complicated relationship between officials and people that is mutually infiltrated and converting. In other words, the order of grassroots communities traditionally in China possesses both the characteristic of “spontaneous order” that develops among the people (e.g. the meaning of general principle of clan ethical standard from “self-governance by the gentry” and community of patriarchal clan) and the feature of “organizational order” of imperial power system (the order of rule achieved by using mandatory power or law, for example, mandatory interaction (no coverage) between officials and people (centering on tax and safety reflected by the traditional social order at the community level. The traditional grassroots communities include “self-governance by the gentry” or clan self-governance depending on the tradition, custom and convention and so on. When they are linked with the distribution of right and obligation and the adjustment of interests of mutual conflicts and after they have objective statements and specify habits used for judgment that are different from simplicity, they can provide the order for civil society—a set of local standards.5 Therefore, they form some basic rules that are generally followed by the people at the community level and merge into the acts of daily life. The (public) organizational forms resulting from this, 5 Liang Zhiping. 1996. The Customary Law in the Qing Dynasty: Society and State. China University of Political Science and Law Press: pp. 162–166.

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including gentry class, community of patriarchal clans as well as spontaneous organization among the people, actually undertake lots of local public affairs, which effectively serve as a supplement to the “failure” of traditional national administrative function at the community level. But another very important and crucial feature is that traditional country and rural society are isostructural and homogenous, for they regard clan rule, funeral robe and ancestry temple as the system of rites and take the hierarchical relationship between relatives and elderly ones as the principle to establish the logic correlation between monarchical rule and clan rule. Thus, the involvement of state power is mainly reflected by tax and safety and it is a kind of intervention of “external rule” (or law) and is normal. Despite this, this external involvement will, in a sense, not be necessarily destroyed or changed. It means that the integration of (state) external order with (nongovernmental) internal order dampens and stifles the pattern construction and expansion of spontaneous social order within the grassroots communities—the grassroots social order.6 Even it borrows the force of social organization at the community level (e.g. country gentlemen or forces of patriarchal clan) to complete the integration of social order. In this connection, the boundary of (state) external order and rule and (nongovernmental social) internal order and rule can be differentiated. That is to say, the supporting systems of state and civil society are different, but the latter is never a self-independent and self-sufficient local standard system, and instead it gradually emerges when it interacts with other rules or knowledge traditions and social systems. As a matter of fact, state power and grassroots social order are constructed based on a kind of in-built relationship of structural support. For example, family (patriarchal clan) is the basic unit of relational structure in traditional rural society, which is built on consanguinity and geographic position. People from the same group and clan living together can be seen as a basic form of expression in rural society, which has been inherited until the late Qing Dynasty and even till today. The governing power of family or patriarchal clan in the grassroots public relations and public rules are reflected like this: the judgment of civil disputes within and between families, the handling of properties of other established families, the punishment of slight faults for family members, the disposition of properties among patriarchal clans (e.g. establishing clan fields and 6 Friedrich Hayek. 2000. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Translated by Feng Keli et al. China Social Science Press: p. 32.

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schools to help poor members of the clan study further and take part in the imperial examination), the education of village officials, all kinds of power related to the affairs of family sacrifice, and the election of the patriarch as well as helping the government to manage the levy of taxes and corvee, advancing and funding rural public undertakings and protecting the village, to name a very few. As such, in light of the structure of social relations at the community level, the family or the patriarchal clan can be regarded as a self-organizing form of the grassroots social order. Take one more example. Village gentlemen (also known as gentry, gentlemen, squire, etc.) are a special group in the grassroots communities, an intermediary of officials and people and an important force of making up for the loss of “official governance” in the traditional country. The role played by the gentry are embodied in the following. First, it can serve as the representative of village who can communicate with the government office and convey people’s wishes to the latter. According to historical records, in the late Qing Dynasty, butchers from Nijing Town in north China refused to pay taxes and fight against the tax collectors sent by the government. The butchers suspended their businesses, which resulted in a run on meat in the market. The local gentry intervened and helped the butchers reach an agreement with the government. In some sense, the gentry represents the interests of the people, but in most times, they represent their own interests, both individual and collective. Second, the role played by the gentry is also reflected in such aspects as the education of village, social welfare and relief, the creation of social public undertakings and the mediation of grassroots contradictions. For example, the fund and management of welfare and relief organizations in the aspects of charitable funeral and baby nursery are usually undertaken by the gentry. In many places, the gentry is also responsible for building and managing the barn, stabilizing the price of agricultural products in most times and helping the affected through relief funds during a disaster. Therefore, based on the grassroots public relations and rules, the gentry class can be seen as “quasi-formal structure”, and it can be also perceived as the form of informal system of imperial politics at the community level. The mutually penetrable and convertible relationship of public and private spheres revealed by the above-mentioned relation structure is essentially different and even totally unrelated to the connotations of public and private spheres formed in the European history. The autocratic country in Europe, which is closely connected with the emergence of modern nation-state, is divorced from a bigger society and has risen

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to a special realm where specialized political figures and functions are concentrated. The separation of state from society not only produces no personified public state power but also the society as a private sphere where individuals use their private identity to pursue their own interests (first and foremost economic interest). From the beginning, the society as a private sphere is merely the object of rule, and it is insignificant in the political field. But gradually, through free formation of society between individuals, and through the discussion of public topics as well as the attention and involvement of public affairs, a “public sphere” beyond the individual level emerges. That is to say, the society will develop a special kind of social recognition of its own and begin to have an impact on the issue of public decision-making. Through free formation of society, the whole society can realize self-building and self-coordination, and can, to a large extent, decide or influence the formation of national policy. In other words, the social pattern and the state–society relationship that start to emerge in the Western world in modern times is quite different from the state–society relationship in the officials-civilian structure in traditional Chinese society. In many differences, the former focuses on the autonomous and independent nature of society for the state and reflects the demarcation between public sphere and private sphere as well as state and society. However, for the latter, “state” and “society” are never well-defined and mutually rejective fields. Needless to say, the two aspects represent two ends of an inherently linked continuum and are connected with each other by emphasizing the duties of officials and people and rulers and subjects.7 Accordingly, proceeding from the historical and social realities of local public and private spheres as well as their subsequent social replacements, we can make an observation and analysis of the social order at the community level on the basis of the following two meanings: the order pattern of shared community for the grassroots communities from the perspective of people and the controlling power of the state over the society and its organizational and structural forms from the angle of officials. This is because whether we adopt the idea of a society based on “the rule of people” (according to politics) or the concept of a society based upon “the rule of rites” (according to sociology), we cannot avoid making the understanding of the grassroots social order more simple and such a concept more absolute. Or rather, 7 Liang Zhiping. 2003. “‘Civil’ (Minjian), ‘Civil Society’ (Minjian Shehui) and Civil Society—Reexamination of Concept of Civil Society”. Yunnan University Journal (1).

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when looking at the basic elements of public and private spheres traditionally in China, we find that there is no space of private activity which goes beyond a public authority (market, family, etc.), that there is a public sphere gradually generated from private activities (from cafes in early time to later political parties and mass media in the Western society), and that there is a society beyond and independent of a country and a highly independent “Civil Society”, etc. So, the questions to be discussed in the next part will mainly revolve around the pattern featuring the relationship between officials and people, for such association always represents the core part of grassroots social order in China. Perhaps, it can be otherwise said that only when the relationship between people is linked with the “self-governance by the gentry” or “clan self-governance” under the control of state power can it be theoretically significant.

3.3 Rule of Rituals: A Method or Something Else Fei Xiaotong sums up the above-said social order and tradition at the community level as the “order ruled by rituals”. The local society is a society of acquaintances, but “the possibility of rule of rituals must be premised on the fact that the tradition can be used effectively to deal with living issues. The local society meets this requisite, so its order can be maintained depending on the rituals”.8 To put in a different way, the maintenance of a public order does not necessarily rely on the state law but only depend on “the obedience of traditional rules”. This is what we call “rule of rituals”. Mr. Fei said, “The local society… is a society ‘free of law’. It seems as if we confine the law to the principle that the state power upholds. But ‘free of law’ does not affect the order of this society because the local society is a society based on the ‘rule of rituals’… Therefore, the rituals are not necessarily maintained through tangible power authorities, and it is the tradition that upholds such rituals”.9 This means that this is an “order ruled by rituals”, which is determined depending upon the forces used for the maintenance of order (tradition and habit) and the nature of standards followed (rituals). 8 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. Native China and Family Planning System. Peking University Press: p. 53. 9 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. Native China and Family Planning System. Peking University Press: p. 9.

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As for the methodology, the so-called “order ruled by rituals” is an “Ideal Type” of descriptive social order schema. As Mr. Fei has pointed out, “It is not a description of specific society, but means some concepts extracted from the specific society”.10 These concepts can help us generally understand the “Chinese grassroots and traditional society”, its special feature and structure and its “inherent systems” dominating all aspects of social life.11 In other words, the so-called “order ruled by rituals” is more a descriptive concept than an analytical idea. This concept has a feature which is lauded to the skies by scholars: in traditional grassroots communities, there are no “laws” but only “rituals and customs”, and correspondingly, there is no “country” but only “society”. In traditional China, there is a “local society”, a society of “self-governance by the gentry” or “clan self-governance”. It has a supporting system of what is called “rule of rituals” and “the order ruled by rituals” can summarize rare changes of China’s social orders from the periods of the Qin, Han Tang and Song dynasties to the eras of the Ming and Qing dynasties. But from another perspective, the “order ruled by rituals” does not generalize the distinct social patterns of the periods of the Qin and Han dynasties and the Tang and Song dynasties as well as the eras of the Tang and Song dynasties and the Ming and Qing dynasties. More and more studies from historiographic, sociological and anthropological fields have suggested that the Chinese traditional rural society can not solely be maintained through the traditions, habits and customs. For example, in light of the self-independent and self-sufficient characteristics of “order ruled by rituals”, the self-governance by the gentry or the clan self-governance is not a fully independent and autonomous system, and its function is mostly attached to its affiliated organizations. Besides their primary tasks of levying taxes designated by the state, these affiliated organizations also perform the functions of integrating local society, including harmonizing neighborhoods, mediating civil conflicts, carrying out services of mutual help, upholding security in rural communities, punishing the idlers, and supervising and urging farmers to work, and so on. Historically, the relation between the “rule of rituals” and the traditional rural social order must be associated with many levels of relational questions pertaining 10 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. Native China and Family Planning System. Peking University Press: p. 2. 11 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. Native China and Family Planning System. Peking University Press: p. 2.

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to ritual and law and the grassroots communities and national and local customary laws and state laws. The question will be further discussed in other chapters. As of the foregoing, it seems that we cannot simply interpret the traditional grassroots social order as a kind of “order ruled by rituals”. Nor can we explain it as a “spontaneous order” proposed by Hayek. The reason for this is that when it comes to the formation of Chinese grassroots social order, we cannot pay no attention to the in-built factors of “external order” from the state authority. As a matter of fact, there is a universally accepted and self-evident idea: the reason why the rural society possesses an “autonomous” space is that the function and ability of imperial power are out of reach. That is to say, the public order of selfgovernance by the gentry or clan self-governance can develop and grow largely because the state fails to or can self-consciously provide a set of rules, organs and organizations specific for people’s daily life. Meanwhile, the result is that self-governance by the gentry or clan self-governance and society form its own organizations out of the government to pursue its own goals and make its own chapters while constraining and governing itself with its ways.12 The observation and explanation are made from a perspective of the relationship between state and society in the Western world, and in particular, the separation of state from society is not based upon a certain rule or standard (like the law). This is because the rule of state is not enough to cover the grassroots social order. The research like this has always been carried out in terms of the role of external factor (state) in order to explain the grassroots communities as an autonomous pattern, but this plausible explanation does not correspond with the logic of state governance of imperial rule (monarchism or monarchism) and does contradict with those who hold such a view. The reason for it is that the latter cannot explain how there are all kinds of developed institutionalized social controlling organizations and forms in rural society (e.g. household system and other enslaved organizations through job). In some sense, it is likely that the ideal society described in Confucian classics or the social pattern of active regional religious activities is mistaken as the true schema of grassroots communities, thus ignoring the homogeneity and self-governance of state and society traditionally in China and political 12 Ma Shi. 1995. Textual Research on China’s Industrial and Business Associations, quoted from Peng Zeyi’s Historical Record Collection of Chinese Industrial and Business Associations (Vol. 1). Zhonghua Book Company: pp. 70–71.

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ethical views. That is a kind of relationship centering on the shared governance of officials and people featuring “simple administration and light penalty” or “governance of no action” required by the political ethics inherent in the nature of traditional Chinese society. As for the characteristics of order, it is reflected by moral legislation and legal penalty and punishment. The so-called “order ruled by rituals” inspires us through research with the following aspects. First, the feature of ethical and cultural order in traditional Chinese society is a fundamental supporting system of the grassroots social order. Or otherwise, the inherent correlation of the order and function of ritual and the ethics of family shared community is at the core of our understanding of the grassroots social order. Second, the “order ruled by rituals” is a refined and abstracted model of social governance, which is descriptive without analytical nature. Thus, Fei Xiaotong’s summary of the traditional grassroots social order is widely applicable in terms of time and space.13 But the question is that Fei’s generalization is limited to a specific time–space, after all. Therefore, the summary of order ruled by rituals can be applied to the explanation of China’s traditional grassroots social order only when the precondition for the restricted demarcation of line is made. In addition, the extent to which the “order ruled by rituals” can be employed in the description of the traditional grassroots social order becomes a question that needs to be confronted straightly, especially when we face today’s social theory and practice. In other words, we are still unable to randomly and simply explain the traditional grassroots social order as a kind of “society of low officials and people” centering upon the household system built on the power dominating over the relationship, and on the basis of this, we assert that the gentry groups with autonomous feature and other grassroots social organizations are stifled by the state power without exception, leading to the general structure and pattern of “a made social order” similar to what Hayek refers to. This requires us to bring the discussion of question back to the state nature of traditional China and the relationship of state and society.

13 Liang Zhiping. 2013. The Perspective of Law History. Guangxi Normal University Press: pp. 79–81.

CHAPTER 4

The Structure of Social Order and the Relationship Between Society and State

The state nature of traditional China and its relationship between state and society can be roughly summed up as the despotism of imperial power and the dominating and attaching relationship between state and society. This view is mainly supported by studies of history, politics and law. But the opposite idea is that the range of imperial power and the space of society can be clearly defined: the former can extend its power to the county level and below the county level, there is a social supporting system of self-governance by the gentry or clan selfgovernance. With authoritative comments from the sociological field, this cognitive paradigm proves to be very convincing. In particular, based on the reference of modern analytical concepts, such as “rule by people” or “rule by law” and the relationship between state and society in modern times, personal right concept and social right concept are combined with this explanative background and analytical approach. By making a comparison between local reality and materials and modern analytical concepts, we have found the explanation difficult, such as coexistence of the organization of controlling imperial power and autonomous form, co-governance of official structure and unofficial structure and mixed pattern of systematic form and unsystematic form, all of which quite differ from the relational form of state and society in the modern Western world, especially for local autonomous concepts. In view of the analysis of these systematic facts, we must trace the connection between society and state traditionally in China, idea of social order and © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_4

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its unique social order structure. For this aspect, on the one hand, it is necessary to start from the local category and concept in order to find out the source of its standard and the essence and meaning of order; on the other hand, we need to understand the continuity of history and the fact that the tradition with continuity is also in the midst of change before making clear the realistic structural issues that are faced by us and the modern significance of transformation that makes the tradition more appropriate.

4.1 Order Through the Rule of Rituals and Law and the Relationship Between the Society and the State The way to observe the Chinese concept of state or the Chinese view of state and society from a comparative perspective was dated back to the late Qing Dynasty and found its origin after the Western concept of modern nation-state was introduced to China. When comparing with the Western world, Mr. Liang Qichao, a modern scholar, believes that in China, there has been no such thing as a concept of “state” which regards the state as the highest society of mankind. In other words, China has a concept of “world”, but the state, like the family, is looked on as a stage that constitutes the world. From this point of view, there is a concept of historical and cultural community in China instead of a concept of political community. But the latter is linked together with the development of sovereign concept.1 In the recognized Confucian concepts of individual–family–state–world, individual(self), family (consanguineous and clan-based family) and world (moral order seeing benevolence and righteousness as the core values) are viewed as being most important. The modern scholar Liang Shuming pointed out, “What the Chinese people have in mind firstly involves self and family and secondly the world; in addition to this, most of other things are ignored”.2 What is ignored is the state (the dynasty). For the crucial decision to save the state and the world, the latter is regarded as being most important. “What everyone

1 Liang Qichao. 1984. Selected Works of Liang Qichao’s Thesis on Philosophical Thoughts. Peking University Press: p. 400. 2 Liang Shumingg. 1987. The Essentials of Chinese Culture. Xuelin Publishing House: p. 163.

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is responsible for safeguarding is neither the state nor the ethnic group but a kind of culture”.3 In a nutshell, in the cognitive systems of individual–family–state–world, the demarcation line between state and society is blurred, the concept of state and society is mixed and the state merges into the society. In the Customary Laws of the Qing Dynasty: Society and State, Liang Zhiping extracts and summarizes several basic categories that can sort out and extend the relationship between state and society, including such basic concepts as family–state–world, public–private and officials–people. As for the concept of family–state, “family” and “state” can be likened to “society” and “state”, but this sort of relationship is not opposite like that of the Western concept, for the structural principle of family and state has something in common, and this common nature is finally integrated into the concept of “world” in an abstract way. When it comes to the public– private idea, it has the systematic significance, so we can divide the ruling system of traditional Chinese society into two major systems of “public” and “private”. The two are respectively opposite and may be used as the benchmark of differentiating state and society. By taking the “public” and “private” concepts as the lens of understanding the relationship between state and society, we can see there is no total opposition among different areas but there is a mutually infiltrated and convertible complex relation. With respect to the concept of officials–people, roughly speaking, “officials” represent the state while “people” represent the society. But for us to use this concept to describe the relationship between state and society, we need to take into account its coherence and consistence with concepts of state–family and public–private categories. This is because the three basic concepts or categories refer to the different aspects relevant to the traditional relationship between state and society.4 The above-mentioned studies inspire us with the following discussions: the society and the society possess the nature and characteristic of interlocking. This is to say, the order and standard of state (in the form of state law) and the nongovernmental (community level) social order and standard (the customary form) share the complicated relationship

3 Liang Shumingg. 1987. The Essentials of Chinese Culture. Xuelin Publishing House: p. 162. 4 Liang Zhiping. 1996. Customary Laws of the Qing Dynasty. China University of Political Science and Law Press: pp. 22–23.

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that is mixed and mutually infiltrated. They reveal the unique relationship between state and society. In the book Seeking the Harmony in the Natural Order, Liang Zhiping mentioned: “The family is both the basic unit of society and the smallest entity of culture. Without them, the society would be hard to be held together and the tradition could not be maintained. As a result, the ethics of running the family extended to the guidelines of governing the country; correspondingly, the state law becomes the tool of implementing the moral codes. When rituals are combined with punishment, the law of ritual or propriety thus comes into being. The law of ritual concerns morality and law; it is all-embracing and constitutes an integral whole in which there is no demarcation line between state and family, between the internal and the external and between private and public”.5 On the systematic level and from the viewpoint of civil society traditionally in China, it is neither existing by only being dominated by the state nor establishing itself beyond the state in a self-improving order space. Instead, through the concept of common order, it is a continuum connecting with state system. In other words, in the continuum of family–state–world, the consistency that we see, which is expressed in the system, is the order of rituals by introducing rituals to the law, merging the law with the customs, forming an integral whole and encompasses everything.6 In a different perspective, when observing the traditional grassroots social order, we should look at the relations that constitute all powers and forces. In other words, what we observe is not merely the organizational form of “spontaneous order” or the control and influence of state power over the community level. Instead, we should see the grassroots order as a whole so as to know about the patterns of political life and social life traditionally in China. This is because the relations of all powers or forces can form the structure and entire form of grassroots social order. From the perspective of grassroots social order, how to understand the relationship between “state” and “society” is a very controversial and complicated issue. Roughly speaking, “imperial power” is interpreted as the state, involving royal family or court and bureaucratic bloc, hence also known as monarchism. The so-called monarchism dominating the 5 Liang Zhiping. 1997. Seeking the Harmony in the Natural Order. China University of Political Science and Law Press: p. 23. 6 Liang Zhiping. 1991. Seeking the Harmony in the Natural Order: Research on China’s Traditional Law and Culture. Shanghai People’s Publishing House: pp. 40–44.

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society7 justifies this statement. As for the corresponding “nongovernmental” concept in the society, it contains a social idea; in this sense, what it refers to can be a “society” which differs from “state”. To put it in a different way, the nongovernmental order not only comprises “intermediary organizations” or “new form of social groups” but also involves traditional social organizations, such as the community of consanguinity, religious group and all “nongovernmental” organizations and activities including clan groups.8 By paying attention to the state and society through the connection of “nongovernmental” organization and activity, especially the complex interaction of many levels and dimensions of the two, we can associate the concepts of nongovernmental order and modern society. Therefore, the concept of “nongovernmental order” covers multiple meanings. But we think it has analytical significance because it is a concept of despotic society under imperial power. That is, it has the meaning of order of imperial power and is a nongovernmental part of order of imperial power. On top of that, the nongovernmental concept is consistent with such views of “humble people” (caomin in Chinese) and “ordinary people” (baixing in Chinese); there is a nongovernmental position when it comes to the meaning of subjective actionist of people. Thus,

7 In China’s Monarchism and Autocratic Power and Chinese Society, Liu Zehua analyzed the dominance and influence of monarchism on economic movement from three facets. The first facet is the decisive role of political factors in the emergence of the first batch of feudal noble clans and landlords and the important role of redistribution of political power in the reemergence of feudal landlords. The second facet is the decisive role of political factors in the formation of the first generation of minor peasants. The third facet is to see the special way of power grabbing, seizure of power and social wealth distribution based on the commonality of emperor’s favor given by all in the world and officials’ corruption. It is clearly seen that political power played an important role in the emergence, evolution and development of feudal economy relationship, and it even played a decisive role in a specific condition. But the economic mandatory behavior and exorbitant looting by powerful and privileged class also played an essential role in the distribution of social wealth. It was just the interference of despotic power that destroyed simple laws of production and value. And then it led to the long-term and delayed nature of feudal society in China. The dominance of monarchism over economic activities is importantly reflected by the dominance of administrative power over society, and in turn the formation of economic relations, power system, social structure and ideology as well as corresponding social control and operating mechanism resulting from this fact provided the most fundamental support for monarchism. 8 Liang Zhiping. 2003. “‘Civil (Minjian)’, ‘Civil Society’ (Minjian Shehui) and CIVIL SOCIETY—Reexamination on the Concept of CIVIL SOCIETY”. Yunnan University Journal (Social Science Edition) (1).

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in a simple sense, as for the relationship between imperial power and nongovernmental society, for the latter, the former is a kind of traditional idea; the so-called order ruled by rituals is explained in the Confucian classics as a sort of dominant and obedient relationship; for the former, the latter is obedient to the former. This nongovernmental (civil) order is established on the basis of personal relationship. To put it further, it is impossible to understand the Chinese society and its essential feature and stipulation if we use Western concepts and ideas of society. Or we can say that in any way, we cannot find the real compatibility of China’s social concepts and ideas and Western social concepts and ideas.9 For recent twenty or thirty years of research, the analytical perspective that foreign scholars have adopted is based on an “external position”, but we have not seen Chinese scholars observe the grassroots communities in China by proceeding from the history and reality of Chinese society. The ideal description and the application of concept only make clear the difference of Chinese society and Western society, but they fail to understand the essence of Chinese society from the “internal position”. Or we can say that the analytical concept is a political concept and even an ideological idea, which impedes the understanding and interpretation of the Chinese society especially the grassroots communities. This is particularly because this fails to place the explanation of traditional Chinese grassroots social order in the continuity of history and the mixed and mutually embedded feature of society and state. Besides, there is another inclination of narration: just observe and analyze the pattern of grassroots social order based on the stance of state. A case in point is that after the reform and opening up especially since the 2000s, studies on state or social governance have been conducted mainly from the standpoint of state and their preselected goal is how to improve the efficiency and ability of a political state covering its society and realize economic development and social stability. Even in a context where economic system sees transition and social structure witnesses transformation and given the social realities of diversification of interest-based groups and social diversity, there is no much improvement as to the stance of the above-mentioned studies and the analytical logic that remains to be discussed still systematizes both state and society. Moreover, in particular, 9 Liang Zhiping. “‘Civil (Minjian)’, ‘Civil Society’ (Minjian Shehui) and CIVIL SOCIETY—Reexamination on the Concept of CIVIL SOCIETY”. Yunnan University Journal (Social Science Edition) (1).

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some macro research perspectives still reflect the traditional consciousness of state rule. The micro-research perspectives on the community level is just an interpretation of the state’s authoritative consciousness. In reverse, few people examine and know the relationship between state and society by taking the community level as the starting point. International scholars mostly use analytical concepts from the Western world to study the society of the Ming and Qing dynasties, whereas domestic scholars have made their efforts to do the research especially anthropological research, but most of analytical concepts aim to connect those research methods and thoughts dating back to the period from the 1930s to the 1940s and employ the analytical concept of relational model of state and society from the Western countries to explain China’s historical experience and social reality.10 So, there are very few comparative studies from horizontal (among different cultures) and vertical (among different times) angles. Either for the role of state power or for the self-governance of clan-based villages, we can just say there is something or nothing. From what is said above, an analytical concept can be selected to discuss the above-mentioned view on the order of rural society: the imperial power, nongovernmental society and the ruled ethical relationship between the two (homogeneity). The two concepts have a homologous connection with the concept of state and society from the Western world (linked with the process of modern nation-state). The former is mostly believed to be a kind of opposite relationship while the latter has a homogenous nature in terms of configurational principle. This homogeneity is integrated into the concept of “world” in an abstract way and gives birth to the complicated relations between officials and people, the public and the private and state and society which are mutually integrated, interwoven and convertible. That is to say, there is no social concept existed to explain that the grassroots social order traditionally in China and the state coexist and at least under the direct control of state. Taking the existing analytical concept as the comparative reference (that is, making a comparison regarding the relationship state and society 10 Since the period from the 1930s to 1940s, China’s anthropological research on villages has attracted international attention. After 1949, anthropological investigation and research on villages once grinded to a halt. But with the reform and opening up and the building of anthropological discipline, another wave of anthropological research on villages was rising. The subject, content and method of anthropological research on villages became rich and varied, but all these still paled in comparison with those studies carried out by old generation of scholars like Fei Xiaotong, Wu Wenzao and Lin Yaohua.

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in the traditional Chinese society and that of the Western world) suggests that as for the feature of order in the traditional China, there are characteristics and differences listed as follows. Firstly, society and state share the same trait of formation. In other words, when speaking of the rule of order, state and society have mutually mixed and homogenous features, so the society beyond the state does not exist, and vice versa. Secondly, the demarcation line between public rule (from the law) and social rule (from the deed) has indefinite and nonstandard features and they can be mutually convertible. Therefore, this inevitably causes the demarcation line in public areas to be subjectively defined by the social actionist. Thirdly, as for the relationship between officials and people and the relationship between state and society, what it reflects is the basic feature of grassroots social order, namely a dominant relational feature. In this sense, the traditional grassroots social order is “generated” and “constructed”. Or we can say that the grassroots social order cannot be built on “officials” or the “organizational order” of the government, nor it can be built on “people” or based on the spontaneous order formed among the people.

4.2 The Order Dimension of Tax System: Relationship of Personal Bondage in the Imperial Society In a certain sense, the “order ruled by rituals” share the general feature of spontaneous order or “internal order”. But to discuss the grassroots social order traditionally in China, there is an extremely important dimension of system: the system of tax and corvee in the imperial society, which has the general characteristic of order of law or “external order”. In truth, the system of tax and corvee can more importantly manifest the essence of order for the relationship between officials and people or the traditional relationship between state and society because the nature of property right directly reflects the relationship between the property of social order and social interest. At the same time, it can reveal the essential aspects for the form of sign of the grassroots social order, e.g. the form of ethical order in the imperial society owned by the “self-governance by the gentry” or the form of power domination and the form of law order protected by officials and people. In fact, what these seemingly different order forms embody the substantial significance of upholding the system of tax and

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corvee combing the ruling right of imperial power and property right. To put it in a different way, when discussing the grassroots social order traditionally in China, whether for “order ruled by rituals” or for “order of ritual code” or even for “society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners”, we must introduce the dimension of tax and corvee system in the imperial society, partly because the system of tax and corvee is the core part of grassroots social order traditionally in China and partly because the feature of this system always leads the Chinese grassroots social order toward a circle of collapse and rebuilding. From this point of view, using the system of tax and corvee under imperial power to examine the pattern of traditional grassroots social order, we can enter into the essential discussion on the relationship between officials and people in traditional grassroots communities based upon the dimension of law order. In terms of law order, it is the system of tax and corvee (known as “system of ordinary people based on household”) running through several thousand years traditionally in China that firmly holds together farmers and imperial power. In essence, the relationship between law and right in this system contains no significant meaning of right. In other words, farmers hold their identity not as free men but as individuals “in the system of “managing the people according to household” as the basis of imperial rule—it reveals the relationship of personal bondage to the imperial power. The system of “ordinary people based on household” as the basis of tax system under imperial power (with the arbitrary nature of “imperial law” or “official law” and without the connotation of right/obligation reflected in modern law) firmly ties individual farmers to the personal bondage under the authoritative (imperial) order. In other words, the connection between land and individuals embodied in the system of tax and corvee under imperial power constitutes the essential part of officials–people relationship in traditional community society and is the fundamental for the order of imperial despotic rule. Looking through all codes, regulations and systems in the past dynasties, we find the system of tax and corvee is the core system of imperial rule and concerns the rise and fall as well as the change of dynasties. Even in those poems, poetic songs and essays of previous dynasties, we fail to sense the form of (gentry) autonomous social order which is idyllic but feel the wail and sigh of peasants who are weighted down by cruel administration and heavy tax. As for the basic nature of tax system under imperial power, the following summary brings home the fact: “The

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ruler is the maker of decree; the ministers are the ones who carry out the decree among the people. And people plant rice, make silk, produce utensils and trade properties and goods to serve the higher levels. When the ruler fails to issue the decree, he will lose his authority as a ruler; nor can his ministers implement his decree. People do not work to plant rice, make silk, produce utensils, and trade goods and properties to serve the higher levels. In this way, people shall be subjected to death penalty”. Here, the fiscal power first belongs to the imperial family; of course, there is a set of very complicated comments on the relationship between property and tax which is imperial and private, like the essential nature of state-owned land and privately owned land as well as the intricate legal relationship of the two with a complicated form. Historically, despite the fact that the fiscal power objectively shares the “public” feature, it is only the derivative form of royal family’s ownership for the reason that private ownership of land under the state-owned system possesses the political trait of integrating power of rule and power of property. Furthermore, both state-owned and privately owned land situations coexist, and that is to say, the situation of land owned by ruler and people always exists, but the imperial ownership of land has always been nominally regarded as the highest system concept and is the private system of land under the system of imperial (state-owned) land system. The arbitrary nature of this fiscal power has not yet been changed after more than two thousand years. The system of tax established on the power of rule and the power of property is the “system of ordinary people based on household”, which sheds light on the fundamental nature of traditional political social structure over the past two millennials since the Qin and Han dynasties. “Ordinary people based on household system” are the people with equal status who are registered in the national household system”, but “the socalled ‘equal’ is mentioned for the government and the ruled and only has the politically and legally ruled significance, and more importantly, it has no bearing on personal social status and economic wealth”. “Ordinary people based on household system” are not entitled to right of personality and right of property. First, under the imperial rule, ordinary people enjoy no right of becoming free men by separating them from the system of “ordinary people based on household”. If they intend to break away from the system of “household registration”, they will commit a severe crime, for which the government will severely punish them and their family members. Even though ordinary people become powerful “privileged households” after freeing from national household system in time

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of declining imperial power, what is changed is just the attached object rather than the attached relationship. Second, the nature of the above-said “personal right” is in parallel with the legal philosophy of right of property for national citizens. The core idea is that in the world, any wealth is possessed by the emperor from the source. Accordingly, “people based upon household system occupy a small piece of land and even can trade land. In spite of this, the highest ownership of land always belongs to the emperor. As the Tang period scholar Lu Zhi said, ‘The land is owned by the king and the farming is done by farmers.’ When the personal ownership of people based on household system is possessed by others, the meaning of their land ownership will not exceed their personal meaning”. In a generalized way, for farmers under the system of “ordinary people based on household”, their personal ownership and personal ownership of other households belong to the emperor. The emperor can enslave, impose tax on, transfer and imprison them. As long as they are personally attached to the household system, they will live, produce and provide labor for the emperor; without registration of household, it means going against the decree of emperor. Because of the personal bondage of people based on household system, their tax or corvee is inevitably despotic and plunderous. In fact, the change of dynasty and the system of people based on household are directly linked or the former is directly reflected in the essential feature of the latter. That is to say, “system of ordinary people based on household system” is a structural system of finance and tax in which the power of making tax policy belongs to the imperial power. But as agents of imperial power and bureaucratic system, government office of county and its county head enjoy the power of making and implementing tax policy. The result is that the item and amount of tax and corvee are accumulative day by day as the network of officials extends and their number increases. One of the major features of this tax system is reflected like this: “With reckless policy and abusive tax system, the tax is collected at inopportune times and the policy is made mornings but changed evenings” (Vol. 24, first part of Chronicle of Food and Goods, Book of the Former Han Dynasty). Moreover, the abusive and malicious taxation has become a common practice of this tax system. “For village officials and higher officials, their salary, carriage and horse are from the people. The modest collect enough amount, but the greedy enrich their family. They often do this and never stops”. (Vol. 91, Biography of Zuo Xiong, Book of the Latter Han Dynasty). This causes “Chinese farmers to plunge into a miserable life. There is not so much

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standard heavy taxes as exorbitant claims and excessive and unpredictable items. Unlike those serfs in medieval time in Europe who are directly exploited by just one ‘leading’ suzerain or landlord…. All bureaucratic and feudal leaders of all levels in their society as well as profiteers can find opportunities and excuses to do damage to them in a separate or combined way”. Under this tax system, grassroots governance leads to all kinds of official or unofficial controlling organizations; based on the logic of imperial politics combining right of rule and right of ownership, they form the power system of interlocking of both officials and people and the pattern of grassroots social order. Therefore, by making clear the dimension of tax system in grassroots social order, we aim to steer the research on traditional social order toward more in-depth discussion: what are irreplaceable functions and roles played by the rule of order under government authority (imperial power) and form of realization in maintaining the grassroots social order. This is because whether it is for the proposition of “self-governance by the gentry” or the cognitive paradigm of “society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners”, they must account for how the grassroots social order meets the requirement of order under government authority (imperial power) and the extent to which the existence and disappearance of grassroots social order are connected with “self-governance by the gentry” or “society in which qualified civilians serve as local government clerks and runners” and how they are linked. We might go so far as to say that when considering what principle or norms co-governance by officials and the community and the interlocking structure of power should be based on, we must not leave out either the dimension of tax order or the order under government authority (imperial power). An indisputable historical fact is that the system of tax and corvee under imperial power denies ordinary people of personal rights and private property rights, which is the exact opposition of the modern constitutional tax system, under which personal rights are recognized and private property rights are considered unalienable. So, along with the land annexation of powerful force and the reckless policy and abusive tax system that are despotic and plunderous, the way of “officials press hard and people rebel” appears over and over again, and without exception, the scene repeatedly emerges: large-scale farmers rebellion causes the traditional grassroots social order to enter another cycle. As a result, given the order dimension of tax and corvee system under imperial power, the despotic and plunderous feature linked with “reckless policy and

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abusive tax system” is viewed as the general form of order under government authority (imperial power) in the grassroots communities. But the opposite way is the knowledge about the relational form of officials and people of the so-called “simple administration and fair penalty law” or “governance of non-action”, which is even a historical exception.

4.3 The Structural Pattern of Social Authority and Power at the Grassroots There is a popular view in the fields of politics, sociology, anthropology and social history that imperial system contains the officials–people relationship featuring “simple administration and fair penalty law” or “laissez-faire”, which makes possible the spontaneity and self-governance in grassroots social order. Nevertheless, historical studies especially studies which accept the paradigm of new historiography show that this is not a genuine reflection of traditional relationship between state and society. Nor is it surely the true schema of traditional social order at the community level. Or we can mention that making a corresponding comparison between the pattern of state and society based on social relation in the Western world and dual concept of officials–people enables us not to correctly reflect the political structure of Chinese society because there is a class of qualified civilians serving as local government clerks and runners and various controlling organizational forms that cover the whole community level. With these, the connotation of officials and people relationship is not that simple. Thus, if we think grassroots governance is led by country gentlemen and is not linked with the government, it is very likely that we may have a biased idea that unrealistically believes self-governance by the gentry is “local self-governance”. In other words, here, when we attempt to analyze the class of civilians serving as local government clerks and runners and other official and unofficial grassroots organizations, we can perhaps gain a new knowledge of traditional grassroots social order and can reveal some important characteristics of society and state. The class of qualified civilians serving as local government clerks and runners constitute a significant political force of grassroots social order in China, which owns the substantial power of grassroots communities. But from the standpoint of imperial power, the rural society under centralized power is a “society of people based on household system” or a “society of officials and people” that is not clan-based. This is not merely a ruling

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concept, and it is reflected in the political practice of grassroots communities. As a matter of fact, there is a situation exactly opposite to the imagination of autonomous order at the community level as described in Chinese “The world is vast, and the emperor is far”. Most administrative staff are distributed in rural areas, but they are not officially registered in the bureaucratic system (known as “important officials at the court”); they are working personnel “recruited” by county officials, namely local government clerks and runners and their adherents. According to the calculation of the book Comprehensive Statutes, during the middle period of the Tang Dynasty, the number of officials and local government clerks and runners totaled 349,863, of which the former numbered 18,805. Take for example Wujiang County during the reign of Emperor Qianlong, below county leaders there were only 11 auxiliary officials, but the number of other local government clerks and runners reached three to four hundred. As Gu Yanwu noted, “Today, seize the power of all the officials and all of it is in the hands of local government clerks and runners. So, officials have power only nominally while the real power is in the hands of local government clerks and runners”. Though remarks like this may seem like an exaggeration, it is perhaps true that local government clerks and runners manipulate the administration at the community level. From the perspective of institutional history, local government clerks and runners are an organic component of the bureaucratic system and are a part of the unofficial system, but from the perspective of the public, though local government clerks and runners are unlike officials, they are also clearly in a different category from ordinary people. That is to say, local government clerks and runners are the foot soldiers of the bureaucratic system; although they do not count toward the national officialdom, they do the grunt work on the front line of administration and governance, interface with ordinary people at the community level and are essentially the face of the power associated with officials. In history, the class of local government clerks and runners has formed its own system, but it has all along been a group recruited as an unbureaucratic bloc and has been structurally excluded from the bureaucratic system. It is true that the local government clerks and runners constitute the nexus connecting imperial power and grassroots communities and supporting the operation of the dynasty undertakes two “public affairs” of tax and security-playing an irreplaceable role in levying tax and maintaining local order. Among officials at the county level, county head,

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deputy county head, county secretary and county security chief are officials registered in the state system, but other officials such as Zuoshi (assistant), Lushi (scribe), Lizheng (household and tax coordinator) are not officially registered officials. The importance of local government clerks and runners among county officials cannot be replaced. In the thirty-fifth volume of “General Investigation of Literature”, there are comments quoted from Su Shi, a renowned scholar in the Song Dynasty, “local government clerks and runners write official documents, manage criminal cases and prison and deal with money and grain affairs”. After the decision is made by county officials, the draft of official documents, the urge of taxation and the arrest of thieves and other matters are specifically undertaken by these officials according to the assignment of tasks. In a nutshell, local government clerks and runners at the community level play an important role in measuring the land, sorting out fiscal affairs and allotting tax, so abusing power often occurs, including acts of disrupting administration and disturbing people like the manipulation of tax and labor, the oppression of ordinary people and the collusion with local powerful forces such as businessmen and military personnel. However, these local government clerks and runners beyond the bureaucratic system can become grassroots administrative manipulators of imperial power for the following reasons. Firstly, the recruitment system of officials at the community level exposes drawbacks. According to Gu Yanwu: “Because of unreasonable official appointment system, local government clerks and runners are given too much power”. As a result, on the one hand, county officials have to rely on local government clerks and runners, hence called “consigning their destiny to these officials”; on the other hand, there exists a situation: “high officials have no tenure, but local government clerks and runners do”, which causes these officials to dominate the affairs of administrative management in a department or a region. Secondly, by virtue of their familiarity with laws and regulations and official documents, they obtain the power of some officials; and in this way, locals are selected to undertake the role of local government clerks and runners, thus having a substantial connection with local region. Thirdly, the finance of the dynasty is limited, it is thus financially enough for “bureaucratic” or systematic governance in the grassroots communities, but the dynasty’s money and tax source from the community level and they must be transferred by these local government clerks and runners to the royal family. Moreover, these local officials deal directly with every ordinary taxpayer in the system of “ordinary people based on

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household” representing the basis of imperial rule. In this connection, because of these reasons, local government clerks and runners become “intermediaries of exchange” between officials and common people. If officials and civilians want to deal with one another, they must rely on local government clerks and runners to do the work. This means that local government clerks and runners become an indispensable role in this section. To summarize, in spite of the fact that local government clerks and runners undertake humble posts in official world, they play roles as “real agents of government” who are familiar with a variety of government affairs and are capable of handling complex tasks. Conversely speaking, the tasks of tax collection and public security in the dynasty are absolutely linked with the operation and support of local government clerks and runners. Although its power greatly exceeds the scope of stipulations as specified in “codes and regulations” (national laws), these local government clerks are praised by Gu Yanwu like this: “The governance of the world starts from local government clerks and runners and finally comes to the emperor”. As a special social and political group, the local government clerks and runners form the role of combining the rule of order by officials and the rule of order by the people when the imperial power prevails in the grassroots communities. Meanwhile, as for the affairs of government office in provinces and counties, the governments at the primary level must do the work with the help and coordination of the contingent of local government clerks and runners. Furthermore, local government clerks and runners perform their function and role of imperial dominance in ensuring the success of imperial dominance and keeping the order of grassroots communities. In addition to local government clerks and runners as the derivative group of bureaucratic system, there are many developed agencies at the community level, which are actually the derivative organizations formed after the imperial power penetrates the community level. A typical case is the household system under military governance, which is the controlling form of imperial power in the grassroots communities and is the extension of duty of provincial and county officials. At different times, the household system is respectively known as township system and village and community system as well as neighborhood system and so on, but its most essential feature is that it regards “household (family)” as the basic unit of social organization and it has seen no big change in its basic function during the period of the whole imperial system. Back in the Qing Dynasty, the household system under military governance has performed

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a number of functions that already break the tradition of past dynasties, thus becoming an administrative organization that is mainly responsible for upholding the autocratic system, implementing local government tasks, managing villages and coordinating with government offices. The scope of work is “At the same time, “once classified into the household system under military system, it then becomes the enslaved target of officials. Any matter under the jurisdiction of it shall be responsible for local officials”. This system arrangement has lasted until the early period of the twentieth century. In his work Xijiang Inspection Records (Xijiang Shinie Jishi), Ling Chou, the Inspector of Justice of Jiangxi in the Qing Dynasty, provides many materials about the governance of rural grassroots communities including the roles of village agreement, chief of precinct and elder of a clan. Recording the roles of chief of precinct and village agreement is a major approach of governing rural society; new phrase like “agreement chief” (yuebao) that reflects the local organizational system appears. In some areas, there is a “village chief” (xiangbao) in charge of handing out tax document and dealing with litigation”; “headmen or constables” (dibao) refer to “local officials in the Qing and early Republic of China”. The headmen or constables for public security, the village agreement for culture are combined with the village chief responsible for traditional tax collection and rural management system, and they are infiltrated with each other. Meanwhile, the clan is also included in the precinct chief system; the village agreement is further organized and a security system involving “elder of a clan and clan agreement emerges. This suggests that the measures of organization taken for governing rural society in the Qing Dynasty contributed to a complete system of grassroots social organization and influenced the social structure at the community level. It is a manifest of a complex and interactive relationship between state and society in the Qing Dynasty. In short, historical documents, bamboo slips for writing in ancient time as well as archaeological findings, on the one hand, show that the clan-based feature of village is unclear, and one the other, indicate that the traditional community level cannot reflect the socalled “self-governance by the gentry” because there is no shortage of all organizational and controlling forms supported by imperial power in the grassroots communities. Take a further look at the role of countryside gentlemen in integrating the social order at the community level, and you will find there is no essential connection between the former and local government clerks and runners or other extended organizations under imperial power. The

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gentlemen are local elites who play an important role in carrying out the power at the community level. As Qu Tongzu believes, the position enjoyed by gentlemen in local administration is in the same way that local government clerks and runners are recruited. Although there is a big regional difference within the realm of dynasty, administrative laws and regulations are extremely rigid, for there are no different rules for different regions at all. Therefore, leaders of prefecture and county find it necessary to solicit opinions from local gentry due to the fact that they are not natives and have little or no knowledge of local situation. In this way, gentlemen become “ears and eyes” of knowing about local information. That is to say, if leaders of prefecture and county refrain from seeking information and suggestions from gentlemen, they will have no choice but to resort to another local group, namely scribes and government office assistants whom most officials consider to be unloyal and unreliable local government clerks and runners. In this sense, gentlemen not only involve themselves in government decision-making but also act as communicators and intermediaries of officials and ordinary people by often performing a role as mediators between them. Qu Tongzu’s view is almost similarly shared by Fei Xiaotong, who says though gentlemen are not in the court, they have someone to rely on there. They have no political power, but they have powerful force and privilege. This means that gentlemen and bureaucratic officials can give play to the role of dividing power only when they are combined. From the perspective of order of rituals, gentlemen amass privilege and fame and play up social influence so that they can lead the trend of village and maintain rural order on the strength of their accomplishments, academic character or rank as well as the past posts that they have taken. By depending on these political and social resources, they serve as communicators and intermediaries of ordinary people and officials; because their privilege is rooted in rural society, they become centric to reach and gather social consensus. By virtue of tier cultural and clan-based advantages, gentry performs the function and role of unofficial system in social order at the community level. In other words, gentlemen represent the nongovernmental privilege supported by imperial power. In essence, there is no difference between countryside gentlemen and local government clerks and runners in terms of playing the function and role of maintaining the social order at the community level, but the sole difference is reflected in the nongovernmental component of gentry authority and lies in the fact that since gentry is the best coordinator and communicator of government rule and nongovernmental

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rule, it reflects two positions of government and people. “For Chinese gentry, one important feature is: they are the group which only represents local community in a legitimate way, joins the discussion of local affairs and engages in political process”. In comparison with the official power owned by local officials, gentry stands for unofficial power. Both depend upon each other, but they also perform their power in their own differing ways. As far as the monarchism of imperial power is concerned, the class of local government clerks and runners (agent of imperial power), grassroots controlling organization and gentry bloc (gentry power) or clan-based force (clan power) are not inherently different in terms of keeping the dynasty’s fiscal revenue and rural social order. Or to put it in a different way, state power (county-level government), local government clerks and runners, countryside gentlemen or clans jointly control and separate the power at the community level and maintain a rural social system similar to self-governance. Qu Tongzu’s research shows that prefectures and counties in the Qing Dynasty regarded all things related to public welfare as the scope of their own job, including welfare, customs, morality, education, agriculture, etc. For one thing, county government and local government clerks and runners form one end of order; for another, when the government cannot or fails to perform some functions, local gentry are entrusted to play these roles. Therefore, there is a traditional division of job function between local government and gentry. In other words, a gentleman is indispensable to make possible some of the government’s goals. That is to say, gentlemen are local elites who co-govern local affairs and real members or alternate members of bureaucratic bloc. But the difference is that local government possesses official power while gentlemen have unofficial power. The social basis of this order is a shared community of clans. The clan is the basis and basic unit of Chinese society, and it is the core element that prevents traditional society from disintegration. On the basis of the above-mentioned legitimate resources and systematic forms, the structure of basic order in traditional grassroots communities has not seen fundamental change prior to the perish of imperial system. By combining what is said above, we can hold that there are no views of social self-governance, sovereignty among the people or social deeds at the community level traditionally in China, but the latter belong to the essential meanings of social self-governance. There is no social selfgovernance, but a “spontaneous order” exists. So we cannot conflate these two aspects. The former means that local community governs itself

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and has its own social form of autonomous right, but the latter forms a closed pattern of order which takes family as the basic unit of society based on the social homogeneity of order of rituals. To put it further, the nongovernmental society traditionally in China is neither a self-built presence merely dominated by the state nor a self-improving order space out of the state. Instead, it is a continuum linked with state system through common order. Or we can say that in view of the relationship between traditional, it is understood that while ensuring the tax is levied and the security is maintained, the state seldom interferes in people’s life order. As a result, nongovernmental organizations and groups of all kinds appear and develop out of the confines of government. Meanwhile, they form their own smaller organizations, seek after their own goals, draw up their own rules and regulations and constrain and manage themselves in their own way. Whether this kind of society is called “gentry society” or “scholar-official society” and “society of imperial examination”, the nature of the composition of social order at the community level is the pattern dominated by state power. That is, the class of local government clerks and runners represents the rule of government and the class of gentlemen represents the powerful force of the patriarchal clan. And the people are the ones who are registered under the household system and governed by imperial power, with family (clan or patriarchal clan) as the basic unit. With that, a structural connection featuring the domination of power over society has taken shape. These legitimate resources and systematic powers constitute the basic relational pattern and organizational form of grassroots social order traditionally in China.

CHAPTER 5

Grassroots Governance by Local Government Clerks and Runners and Its Modern Transformation: Social Restructuring and Remolding of Social Order

Transforming and considering the “modernity” of grassroots social order traditionally in China can be dated back to the construction of nationstate and modernization. After a thorough historical analysis is made, we can find that in the period of late Qing Dynasty and early time of Republic of China, the building of political power ( the establishment of county and township organs) and social transformation at the primary level, including the so-called arguments and practices of “local self-governance” are actually focused on an old issue—the abuse of power shown in officials’ governance (mainly for local government clerks and runners) and corruption. Additionally, there are a variety of propositions and practices relevant to institutional reform in the name of “local self-governance”, in any way, aimed at strengthening the system of centralism. That is to say, the conceptions associated with the building of grassroots-level political organization and local self-governance fail to represent fundamental changes, nor do they mean a revolution. It’s goal points to “a

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more vibrant and strong centralized country”,1 which entails a grassroots social order characterized by a clean and honest system of officials under modern centralized system. Accordingly, the further question is how much meaning it contains for the building of public political power by taking public social relationship as the basic task when it comes to such “modern” reflection and design of institutional reform on traditional grassroots social order.

5.1 Rectification of Grassroots Governance by Local Government Clerks and Runners As was noted before, in response to the chronic problem of governance of grassroots communities by local government clerks under traditional imperial system, a problem concerning the abuse of power of local government clerks and runners, scholars who lived during the periods of the Tang and Song dynasties once reflected upon and discussed the solution, but there were no improvements at all. Part of reason for this is that intellectuals involved have their historical limitation. For example, Ye Shi, a scholar from the Southern Song Dynasty, believed that local government clerks and runners abused power, which led to recurrent problems of official’s governance. This is due to the fact that under the imperial system, officials keep themselves aloof from administrative rule and regulations, but local government clerks and runners are exactly acquainted with laws and regulations. The difference in knowledge structure between officials and their poor ability of administration are the important reasons why low officials can arrogate the power of high officials. Furthermore, local government clerks and runners are very familiar with local habits and customs while enjoying a wide network of friends, all of which revealed greater difference of knowledge structure and administrative ability among officials. The solution suggests selecting scholars as officials, that is, “making a change by selecting new candidates who have passed the highest level of imperial examination and those who seek official path”.2 Then, in the Qing Dynasty, the reflection on the issue of local government clerks and runners basically tallies with what Ye Shi discusses 1 Kong Lifei. 2013. The Origin of Modern Countries in China. SDX Joint Publishing Company: p. 43. 2 Ye Shi. 1961. Collected Essays of Ye Shi 3rd Volume (revised by Liu Gongchun, Wang Xiaoyu and Li Zhefu). Zhonghua Book Company: pp. 808–809.

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and relevant views also bear much resemblance to his points. In the late years of late Ming and early Qing dynasties, Gu Yanwu, an outstanding philosopher, introduced a countermeasure that was a bit different from that of Ye Shi. By contrast, Ye Shi and others place the focus of selecting scholars as officials on “Li (local government clerks and runners)” while Gu Yanwu puts emphasis upon “Guan (officials)”. The latter considers that the way of addressing the problem of local government clerks and runners is to allow locals to serve as local officials, with no term set for them in their life. In this way, “High and low levels can tell apart right and wrong and in turn people will have fixed mind”; government red tapes can be reduced and in turn things related to official become all the simpler. For the high-rank official, imperial censor is able enough to deal with all things within his scope while the local government clerks and runners cannot control what is done by the officials and go his own way.3 It is seen from historical documents that people from the Qing Dynasty gave more comments on local government clerks and runners, but these comments mostly focused on the reasons for the drawback of local government clerks and runners and the provision of solutions and strategies. But one important point is that the discussions mentioned above almost focus on the rectification of official governance in connection with bureaucratic system without taking into consideration the aspect of grassroots communities and shifting the view toward the reconstruction of legitimate basis of grassroots social order. Until the late Qing Dynasty, reflections and discussions on the issue of grassroots governance by officials were contrastive with those in the past. This is mainly because of an external referenced system for the introduction of external concepts and forces—Western constitutional government system and ideas attached to the system. The “local self-governance” emulating Western constitutional democracy has triggered discussions on state system and expansion of ruled basis (e.g. political involvement) and is verified in the historical practice of modern state construction. The modern scholar Liang Qichao argued that the ineffectual problem of centralized power system is exposed in the appointment system of local officials. “Sending officials from afar to replace locals to deal with their matters of drinking, food, litigation and prison; they have ability, but how many of them can be equal to the task”. Thus, the question is examined 3 Gu Yanwu. 1983. Collection of Poems by Gu Tinglin (Vol. 1)—Comment on Counties (Revised by Hua Danzhi). Zhonghua Book Company: p. 16.

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from the perspective of centralized power system and is not associated with local self-governance. And he also proposes to “restore ancient style, study western approaches and value the power of village” and raises the idea of establishing local parliament and selecting local people to govern other matters. By the same token, his comment on the reform of local political system by carrying out “local self-governance political system”, which proves to be not novel when compared with Gu Yanwu’s ideas of tackling the problem of local government clerks and runners. Yet the difference is that he cites “western approach” as the reference. But he finally changes the original meanings of self-governance (self-rule and selfadministration) into self-legislation and self-control. This is also to say, locally interpreting personal self-rule in political sense as personal self-rule (self-control) in the ethical sense.4 Although the definition of “local selfgovernance” contains the changing meaning of limiting imperial power, which bears resemblance to “feudal” (against centralized power). (Since the Tang and Song dynasties, there have been many discussions on this aspect). Nevertheless, the meaning of this “self-rule” is essentially distinct from that of “self-rule” introduced from other countries. In other words, it is not the self-rule based on the meaning of modern state construction. Should we focus on the superficial knowledge of “local self-governance” in the Western world, we cannot address the grassroots problem of local government clerks and runners abusing power that has gone unresolved for a thousand years in China. For example, some scholars have pointed out that from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, “in spite of great changes taking place in taxation system, there is no substantial alternation at the bottom level and tax collectors are still having their own way without the control of state”.5 So, as a result, they can just restate the old path of the bureaucratic system of strengthening the centralization of power. Therefore, comments on “local self-governance” made since the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China are still linked with the category of official–civil relationship and remain based upon the prerequisite of grassroots ruled order through the strengthening of centralized power. In this sense, the local self-governance advocated in modern times is by 4 Yang Zhende. 2004. “Freedom and Self-Rule: ‘Individual’ Reflected in Liang Qichao’s Political Philosophy”. Printed in the Journal of Century (84). 5 Prasenjit Duara. 1996. Culture, Power, and State: Rural Areas in North China from 1900 to 1942. Jiangsu People’s Publishing House: p. 225.

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no means the one defined by the Western world. For instance, the shift of view by Liang Qichao from preaching local governance to centralized power and nationalism merely means that he then wanted to get people involved in political power through local self-governance and adopted a bottom-up way of seizing power, but at the time he desired to take the power by following a top-down approach. In this connection, it is consistent with the kingly way of traditional Confucianism. So, in this perspective, self-governance is the expression of the meaning of limiting imperial power. As Kong Lifei said, “For Liang Qichao, the power of constitution and constitutionalism is neither expressed in the election mechanism that they specifically represent nor in the clauses of power separation and limitation but in its role of spiritual encouragement. This said, the idea of separating power, it can be more significant only when further promoting the final centralization of power and the strengthening of power.6 Generally speaking, these views and practices of “self-governance” in the late Qing Dynasty have not been connected with the original meaning of the foreign concept of “self-governance” (right of self-rule and self-government). Instead, it is integrated with the dynasty’s inherent rule or strategy of governing the people and emerges in a way of localized narration of modern nationalism. As a matter of fact, with regard to the idea of “self-governance”, it is linked with the discourse of nationalism during the process of Chinese nation-state shaping and modernization. At the same time, it is the tool and means of political control. Accordingly, such self-governance has few connections with the self-governance at the community level, nor does it have any bearing on individual concepts and rights. Given those discussions on the independence of nation-state featuring “self-governance through combined provinces” and the centralization of power, the concept of modern self-governance has been deprived of its original meaning.

6 Philip Kuhn. 1995. Feudalism, Counties, Self-Governance and Constitutionalism: LateQing Scholars’ Understanding and Advocacy of Chinese Government System, printed in Research on Modern History in Other Countries by Modern History Research Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (27th edition). China Social Sciences Press: p. 10.

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5.2 Social Restructuring and Modernization of Grassroots Authority The above-mentioned discussions for the change in the idea of social order are internally and externally linked with the practices of social restructuring. In fact, the social transformation movement occurred in the twentieth century has become a major political characteristic accounting for the transition of China from tradition to modernity. This means that “strengthening the building of grassroots political power” has become a goal of China’s national modernization since modern times. The change of traditional political, economic and social structures provides conditions for the construction of nation-state and modernization drive. However, the biggest change for the social order at the community level, as we see, is the fact that as the class of local government clerks and runners with old political power collapses and the gentry class declines, the political power of state penetrates downwards, as shown by the standardization of organizations in village and town. Conversely, without the imperial system, the class of local government clerks and runners and the class of gentlemen, how grassroots social order could function—this is an issue of great importance. The mainlines for a series of social transformation movements appear after traditional grassroots ruling forces are eliminated. In order to extract resources as many as possible and strengthen the ability of social mobilization, it is necessary to restructure the primary-level social order and determine the position of local authority in the bureaucratic system through the establishment of organizations, thus promoting the bureaucracy and legitimacy of political power. As state power further spreads to rural society, the governing structure and operating logic of traditional rural governance starts to change. Despite the fact that grassroots politics has taken place, “the systematic power in grassroots communities has not been put in place; neither has the jurisdiction and rule representing state power been established nor implemented through the setup of organizations; and the country has no controlling principle of transforming local authority or controlling power of replacing it. Thus, local society is incorporated into the governing scope of national rules”.7 That is to say, old systems and old order principles remain unchanged. Still worse, the social order at the community level is remodeled by copying 7 Zhang Jing. 2000. Political Power at the Community Level: Questions on Rural System. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House: p. 31.

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old systems and new agents. This will lead to two direct consequences: one is the phenomenon of “involution”8 in the building of state political power and the other is the fact of old grassroots social order increasingly plunged into a disorderly form. A multitude of researchers have always held a view that one big characteristic of state political power building since the late Qing Dynasty is reflected by the constant infiltration of state power into the grassroots communities. It alters the governing pattern of “imperial power not delegated to the county” and represents a trend for the standardization and legitimacy of national bureaucratic system. The superficial meaning is right, but in essence, state power has never been divorced from the grassroots communities (as mentioned before). The so-called “imperial power not delegated to the county” is not a historical fact, and state power is expressed by massive relegation. This is partly due to the disintegration of grassroots social order while state power needs to be centralized and strengthened again and partly because the abstract of more resources from rural society and the strengthening of ability for social mobilization are required in the modernization drive of state. The household system under military governance (known as “baojia system” in Chinese). The failure of spreading local self-governance by attempting to imitate “western practice” and the rebuilding of conventional grassroots systems like the “baojia system”9 can just show the shifts of authoritative recreation of grassroots order or new official governance and reshaping of political power agents.

8 Prasenjit Duara. 1996. Culture, Power, and State: Rural Areas in North China from 1900 to 1942. Jiangsu People’s Publishing House: pp. 66–68. (This is introduced by Du Qizan, who said that although official state power can depend on unofficial organizations to implement its policy, it cannot control these organizations—referred to as “involution of state political power”). 9 Wang Mingming. 1996. The Development Course of Community. Tianjin People’s

Publishing House: pp. 83–89. For example, when the baojia system was carried out during the period of Republic of China, political system in rural areas became standard. Officials were appointed for implementing this system, and clan chiefs could not naturally take this post. The power of neighborhood and district is demonstrated by directly interfering in society, economy and politics in villages and is responsible for the higher level organ.

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5.3 From Order Through the Rule of Rituals and Laws to Order Through Modern Authority The propositions and practices made for the restructure of society since modern times eventually turn into dominant trends of social development in China. These are mainly influenced by external concepts,10 but for both revolution and reform, the change of primary-level social order has not yet altered the social foundation and social organization form of traditional grassroots order but intensifying the consistent tendency existed from the period of imperial system, as it suggests, the grassroots social order is totally included in the controlling system of a modern state. In other words, the order principle at the community level is still the old principle of power dominating over society. However, there is actually a fundamental change in the logic of state governance—changing from imperial power to political power of a modern country. The latter is not “governance of nonaction” anymore, but it means redesigning the social order in the name of social transformation. The views as well as rules and regulations related to such social transformation roughly contain the following. The first is the idea of nationalism. From the concept of “world” characterized by universalism during the time of popular imperial system to the idea of “nationstate” in modern times, they are the essential symbol of China’s entrance into modern country. The concept of nationalism which goes hand in hand with nation-state is parallel with the idea of “loyalty to the ruler and assistance to the people” and is linked with modern nationalism and view of collective rights. The orientation of these concepts is not local self-governance or social self-governance, and of course, the situation is unable to help the self-ruling idea of modern society to develop and grow. The second is the modern system of centralized power. The system of centralized power is the inevitable trend for the building of modern society and is rooted in the historical evolution of China’s traditional society-political system.11 The social order model for the system

10 Yan Shuqin. 2016. “Contention on the Research Paradigm of Politics in the Period of Republic of China—On Academic Origin of Politics during the Time of Republic of China”. Wuhan University Journal (2). 11 Philip Kuhn. 2013. The Origin of Modern Country in China. SDX Joint Publishing Company: p. 7.

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of centralized power is the governance model centering on the dominance of administrative power. For China, the establishment of top-down controlling system of state power is the inevitable result of imperial system development. In other words, the power structure of vertical distribution has remained unaltered. Different from the bottom-up concentration of state power in European countries, the former (China) reflects the logic of state power: finance and taxation and control, but the centralization of power for the latter is consistent with the two-sphere law of modern citizens’ right.12 The third is the integration of state and society. From traditional self-governance to modern governance, it pertains to the change in the relationship between public authority and citizens’ right; it is a process of qualitative change, a process of “modern construction”, including the confirmation and definition of citizens’ right and self-rule right, that is the problem of construction of self-rule right related to individuals and community. This entails the clarification of rights relationship between state and society and the regularity of law and this is the reform of concept and system building. But as for the transition of traditional and so-called self-governance of gentry into the integration of state–society, what it involves is just the adjustment of state rule model, and it is made possible by just finishing the authoritative building and jurisprudent proof of nationalism. All in all, based upon the historical perspective of the above-said system innovation and thought, the biggest change in China’s state pattern and social structure in modern times, in particular in 1949, is the fact that the traditional imperial country has given way to the modern total country. The latter’s logic of state governance is established in totalism politics. “The power of political organs can invade and control the guiding thought of every class and field with no limit at any time and in any place”.13 Therefore, the state is infiltrated into all aspects of social life and undertakes great responsibility for people’s welfare, education, sanitation and livelihood,14 hence the integration of state and society. This is actually a developing and evolving process of transforming from the order of rituals and law during the period of imperial system to the order 12 Zhang Jing. 2001. “The Construction of State Political Power and Unit of Rural Self-Governance—Questions and Reviews”. Kaifang Shidai (Opening Era) (9). 13 Zou Tsou. 2000. Chinese Politics in the 20th Century—Seen from the Perspective of Macro-History and Micro-Action. Oxford University Press (Hongkong): pp. 206–224. 14 Carl J. Fredrich, ed. 1964. Totalitarianism. University Library Edition: p. 52.

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under government authority of taking modern nation-state as the structure model. Thus, the integral parts of order under government authority involve the idea of nationalism, system of centralized power and integration of state and society, and all of these can be placed in the political system of deciding the development of grassroots social order.

CHAPTER 6

The Significance of Modern Construction of Grassroots Social Order

In terms of “modernity”, the evolution and reform from traditional social order to modern social order can be traced back to the late Qing Dynasty, and till today, during which tremendous and profound changes have taken place in China. From the perspective of change in grassroots communities, we should first understand this question: what is the essence of change in the rule of traditional social order? Is it the modern construction form of public relationship in the new grassroots communities or the traditional recreation pattern of old social relationship structure? This is the precondition and essential condition for thinking about and discussing the construction of grassroots social order in present-day China.

6.1 The Historical Evolution of Social Order Transformation Prior to the mid-1950s, people consciously adopted the concept of “social self-governance” from the Western world to interpret new social transformation movement so that traditional nongovernmental organizations and activities were attributed with new meaning of being helpful for the prosperity and strength of a modern country. For example, stimulated by a raft of laws and regulations made and issued by the government regarding chamber of commerce, agricultural association, company and local selfgovernance, all kinds of organized “new type of social self-governance

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_6

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organizations are found everywhere in grassroots communities”.1 But the significance for the construction of modern order contained in these changes in society is very limited, and old systems and old concepts have affected and restricted the process of qualitative change of new social organization. The grand vision of “reforming future society” is far from developing a new form of social organization or a single model of modern state–society relationship.2 As studies have indicated, “The original aspiration of civil society in modern China doesn’t mean confronting the power of a despotic country and mediating the relationship between people and government. Besides, it means assisting the rule by officials through the rule by the people and trying to establish a new model of state-society relationship”. In this process, “The government of the Qing Dynasty eager to address the issue of economic development in an effort to compete with imperial powers even demonstrated greater initiative. In the early years of twentieth century, the emergence of many new type of nongovernmental societies as well as the expansion of public areas pertaining thereto and the growth of civil society were largely stimulated by the government”.3 That is to say, transforming the traditional “nongovernmental” social order and the effort to build new social order fail to realize the purpose of fundamentally changing the structure of traditional grassroots social order. The political upheavals that broke out in the 1950s and a number of social transformation movements accompanied made it possible for the country to accomplish radical reform unseen in history in the grassroots communities, namely the reorganization of social structures. In cities, unit system and street system are carried out, while people’s commune

1 Compilation of Social Investigation Materials (Thirteen in total). National Library Press, 2013. 2 During the period of the Republic of China, a big “social investigation movement” appeared, and a large amount of social investigation materials were left behind. In the eyes of sociologists at that time, social investigation was an important tool through which people saved the country, a crucial instrument through which we “reform future society according to the scientific procedure and a trailblazing way through which the Chinese nation found a way out”. Li Jinghan. 2013. The Necessity of Social Investigation in Today’s China, printed in Tsinghua Weekly, Vol. 138 (7 and 8). If you want to know about the situation of social organization, please see Compilation of Social Investigation Materials during the Period of Republic of China by National Library Press. 3 Ma Min. 1996. “One Page Ignored in History- ‘Civil Society’ of Suzhou in the Early 20th Century”. The Orient (4).

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system is implemented in villages. With this, the whole society is included in the dominant system of state power. “Social members have their affiliated ‘organizations’ and can work with pay. More importantly, the structural relationship between them and public system is established: individuals obtain the position in new public system and become its member. This means that individuals obtain corresponding public qualifications, so the connection of social members and national official system occurs”.4 For example, the state, through the people’s commune system focusing on “(production elements and products) owned by three levels (the commune, production group and production team) and based on the team”, has reconstructed modern Chinese villages. Therefore, the reason why villages in this period can exist as a community or unit is that what they depend on is not the “collective symptom” reflected in the meaning of community of villages in traditional society but a new type of power constructed by the state possessed by the village (the production team during that period). The new pattern of power is sustained and supported by production materials owned by the collective group and a number of systems comprising the system of work points, the system of controlled procurement and distribution and the system of household. This power based upon system reshapes the way in which villagers are connected and displays a strong dominant ability among them.5 By realizing the reconstruction of social integration through political integration, state power has carried out the full coverage of the whole society including urban and rural communities. That said, the result for social restructuring is that urban and rural communities become a basic unit ruled by state political power appended to the process of modern retransformation in national authoritative controlling system. Following the reform and opening up, the grassroots social order reentered a process centering on authoritative rebuilding order (of party politics). But compared with the previous organizational form of grassroots communities, it is of more structural significance. Firstly, the state has altered the controlling way of grassroots communities. From the integration of government administration and commune management to

4 Zhang Jing. 2015. “Transition of Passage: Connection of Individual and Public Organization”. Journal of Xuehai (1). 5 Shen Duanfeng. 2006. “Review of Studies on the Power of Villages in the 20th Century”. Academics in China (4).

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the separation of government administration from commune management, the systematic power is retracted from communes to townships and towns, and changes have taken place in the relationship between state and grassroots communities. Secondly, the organizational form of rural society has been changed—carrying out the organizational pattern of villagers’ self-rule. The self-rule of villagers is the membership community connected with collective land property right, but this self-rule is more shown in economic sense. Thirdly, it is the withdraw of state power and the weakening of systematic power in village and group. Although traditional forces in rural regions are rising,6 throughout the country, the situation is not enough to produce a substantial impact on the social order at the community level. In contrast with the traditional society, the current grassroots communities is a kind of official–civilian (cadres and masses) structural relationship in which the state directly faces the people as individuals. The order feature of organization form reconstruction of grassroots communities, on the one hand, introduces the rule and knowledge from the primary level in the operating process of national official power and embodies the practice pattern of relationship of state and farmers7 ; on the other hand, the state power takes self-ruled organization of villagers as the new organizational form of controlling and influencing the grassroots social order; the state power makes the grassroots communities more “administrative” (more official and bureaucratic) again while the latter becomes the organizational form of grassroots social control and mobilization ability of grassroots political power in villages and towns. In short, after the reform and opening up, the state power has changed the past controlling and mobilizing ways from the grassroots social structure constructed by national forces to the order and organization patterns focusing more upon the standard power of state and the nonstandard power of rural society (villagers’ self-rule) as well as focusing less on the standard of grassroots communities.

6 Wang Mingming. 1997. The Culture and Power Reflected in the Perspective of Villages. SDX Joint Publishing Company. 7 Sun Liping. 2000. A Carrot or Stick: Analysis of the Process of the Unofficial Operation of Official Power, printed in Tsinghua Sociological Review. Lujiang People’s Publishing House.

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6.2 Social Authority Order System at the Grassroots At present, the operation of social order at the community level is made up of party administration system, derivative system and government staff system. The first is the party administration system, which involves two power systems of the party’s organization system and the state’s administrative system. The former stands for political power, and the latter administrative power. The governance meaning for party administration integration system is embodied by the following: the ruling party carries its political purpose through all levels of administrative governance system through the organization system of political party and embeds the principle of party’s substantial leadership into the model of government governance. The core of party administration integration system is the basic characteristic of this system is that political control becomes a part of complete administrative machine. The social integration is made possible in the administrative system, and political game enters administrative system. In the above-mentioned rules about nature, grassroots governance reflects such traits as contradictions arising from the centralization of power and separation of power, pressure-based system, “operators of political power”,8 governance model of promotion in tournament and administrative outsourcing system9 and foreignization of government system.10 The second is the derivative system composed of state-run enterprises and institutions. These governance entities and primary governments are not affiliated in administration, but they are responsible for affairs in a certain area and constitute a complicated relationship with the government at the community level, which is both competitive and cooperative. These governance entities include “external organizations” of party administration system, such as workers, youth and women organizations and state-run enterprises and institutions (those beyond the jurisdiction also included). Societies attached to administrative departments are also involved, but these organizations are not basically social organizations that are independent, autonomous and promotional. They are similar to “close organizations”, also termed social autonomous 8 Zhang Jing. 2000. Political Power at the Community Level: Questions on Rural Systems. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House: p. 52. 9 Zhou Lian. 2014. Outsourcing System of Administration. The Society (6). 10 Zhao Shukai. 2012. Governance in Townships.

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organizations attached to authoritative authorization.11 The governance entities beyond the system of party administration have mainly played roles of government helpers in publicity policy and issues of welfare and sanitation. The third is the system of government staff system.12 The government staff system is an organizational form combing rule by officials and rule by people beyond the system, which comprises three parts of villagers’ self-rule organization, public security auxiliary force and recruitment group. First, villagers’ self-rule organization. Village cadres include three major cadres of village party secretary, director and accountant and other two committee members. Second, public security auxiliary force. It involves the group of auxiliary police force; due to the division of interests in the grassroots communities, the expansion of social flow and the diversification of employment group, primary-level police force finds it hard to handle such a situation. Thus, recruited staff—“auxiliary police”— becomes an important supplementary force. There is a very large recruited group for community management in both urban and rural areas; that is, the group of auxiliary police is formed through social recruitment. Third, recruited group, which is formed by totally relying on marketbased mechanism institutions. The group exists in a converging point of state and society and undertakes the tasks assigned by administrative organs.13 The staff in auxiliary system is not systematically staffed and its scale, personnel and expenses are roughly from the following. (1) The group of villages (committee) cadres. After the people’s communes system is absolved, cadres of village residents’ committee have always received

11 Richard C. Box. 2013. CITIZEN GOVERNANCE- Leading American Communities into the 21st Century (translated by Sun Boying et al.). Renmin University of China Press: p. 20. 12 It refers to one of service laws in the Song Dynasty. After the Yuan Dynasty, post

service is also called “errand service”. In accordance with national rule of household system, the service of requestioning villagers to act as some posts of public officials in prefectures and counties as well as rural grassroots organizations was called “post service”. These posts, if selected by the state with funding, are called “recruitment service”. Errandbased service, recruitment-based service, security-based service and subsidy-based service are all ways of post services. 13 Liu Jianping and Ma Yanyin. 2016. From “Different Way of Officials” to “Three Levels of Officials”: The shift of human resources structure of local governance in China and its governance effects—a supplement to the article from “Different Way of Officials” to “Separation of Levels”: Human Resources System of Chinese Bureaucracy under the Logic of Empire (1).

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“remuneration” from the government’s financial source, which is manifested in the system of “community expenses of cities and villages” of government spending.14 The group of “grassroots cadres” connects both government and grassroots people and performs the function and role of allocating rural public resources and maintaining social order, so they are an auxiliary governance force that the government values. (2) The group of auxiliary police. The spending necessary for salary, bonus, equipment, social insurance and daily management of police auxiliary staff is fully supported by financial departments of all levels in accordance with financial system; the scale can be twice as many as official police personnel. In a context where the ability of social mobilization of government is constantly declining, ensuring stability is a top priority of governance for grassroots government and the scale of auxiliary police group is increasingly enlarging. (3) The group of recruitment. They are underpinned by the government by way of purchase services. And these social organizations grow up by relying on the government; they are organized instead of being self-organized, run by the government instead of being half run by it. Besides, they are not oriented toward the public, nor as part of society but as the extended part of officials and government.

6.3 The Nature and the Changes of Public Social Relationships The stimulating mechanism of grassroots social order development is always from the following two aspects: first, regarding the order standard and principle of state power, it incorporates grassroots-level social force into the national controlling system through top-down political governance; second, the standard or rule of social spontaneous order still constitutes a basic condition for grassroots social life. In modern times, the former’s change comes from modernized driving force—the building of modern nation-state requires us to improve the capability of resource extraction and social mobilization and control. The latter has always served as an object being transformed, but despite this, its basic 14 In current financial budget of the government, “community expenses of cities and villages” is listed in the program of “general public service expenditure”. But the latter refers to administrative spending, and the latter actually means the maintenance expense of primary-level political power in township and town, most of which were spent in the work of ensuring stability at the community level.

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habits, customs and standards have never disappeared and become fundamental conditions for the development and growth of spontaneous order at the community level in present China. In the wake of the reform and opening up, the changes in social relation structure and systematic relation provide preconditions and essential conditions for the construction of grassroots social order system. Firstly, social organization structure has changed. The first fact is that the organized structure of interests for a single society transitions into an organized pattern of interests for a public society. The share of social organizations owned by state or all people has decreased sharply in the whole Chinese society; and in some economic fields and industries, economic organizations owned by the state or all people have been reduced to a smaller proportion, replaced by the manifestation of private, co-funded or shares-based economic organizations.15 The number of people entering the market organization is on the rise, and those who still stay in the unit interests structure keep decreasing. The second fact is that major changes are also seen in the structure of rural social organization. The old grassroots mass self-governance (old organized structure of interests abolished) gives way to the new organized structure of interests—villagers’ self-governance organization. However, the villagers’ self-governance organization is a social organization with less self-governing right and emerges as a functioning part of primary-level government power. Moreover, it is only a community of “membership self-governance” of villagers in administrative villages connected with collective land property right and it is impossible to incorporate the interests of all people at the community level including villagers into the power distribution system.16 Secondly, the way of social contact has changed. On one hand, the past bonds linked with the factors of people’s right, responsibility and obligation, such as unit, village, family and clan, are witnessing a change from “identity to contract”, namely from identity relation to contractual relation. In the field of social relation, what is different from the past is that the contract-based nature of interpersonal relationship represents the most fundamental form of all social relations in modern life. On the 15 Li Hanlin. 2014. The Unit Society in China: Discussion, Thinking and Research. China Social Sciences Press: p. 1. 16 Zhou Qingzhi. 2016. “The Modern Transition of Social Self-governance and Social Governance at the Community Level”. CASS Journal of Political Science (4).

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other, a community formed for the contractual relationship based on free will gradually develops, as shown, for example, by all kinds of societies and organizations, like mutual assistance group, chamber of commerce in market and industrial association and organization. It is the contractual relationship full of choices and transactions that constitutes the basic connection of society. In other words, the organized nature of socializing relationship has become an indispensable condition for modern economic life. Thirdly, the relationship between state and society has changed. Since the inception of reform and opening up, new organization forms in social fields have had their substantial independent space, and in turn societies or individual associations “partially linked to officials and people” for integrating or coordinating the relationship between individuals or individuals and state have come into being out of the system.17 For example, the state allows citizens to enjoy limited freedom of association building and allow some types of social organizations to exist. This said, the state also utilizes all sorts of social organizations to provide public goods and ability of public services in a conscious way, and for example, the market-based practices of supplying public products and services at the community level all reveal that these organizations play a role of supplementary governance. The changes of social relations above offer a favorable space for the growth and development of social organizations, creating a basic condition for structural arrangement and institutionalization of this arrangement betwixt state and society. The above-said changes in factors of system and structure have made it clear that private sphere independent of state (economic sector centering upon market) and public sphere (fields of social culture and life) begin to show that they advocate their existing right and organization form. This is to say, the basis of economic society has altered greatly, so the sector of social relations will inevitably go with the trend. Besides, the alteration of social structure and the variation of systematic relationship will eventually exercise an influence on the change of governance structure system in grassroots communities.

17 Wang Yin, Zhe Xiaoye and Sun Binyao. 1993. The Middle Level in Society—Reform and China’s Societies and Organizations. China Development Press; Shi Xianmin. 1993. The Breakthrough of System: Research on Self-employed Households in Western City District of Beijing. China Social Sciences Press.

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But the changes mentioned above do not necessarily mean that the system of whole grassroots communities will vary with them, since in the historical perspective, there is always a trend suggesting that the state system will integrate or cover the spontaneous order: since modern times, the state has been committed to making the community level a social basis and integral part of the modern nation-state. For the change in social order at the community level, there are two characteristics: one is the total infiltration of state power into the society and the other the reorganization of grassroots communities by state power. For instance, by dismantling social structure and meaning system originally for local society, a new and integrative system that can replace the original structure and meaning is established and helpful to allow society to reach the expected outcome of order and harmony. The state often finds itself confused about traditional symbol or meaning, that is, it also uses symbolic or ceremonial contents and forms to build its own power structure and meaning system.18 In fact, discussions on grassroots social order today are still carried out from two aspects: grassroots self-governance and social self-governance. The former can be traced back to the 1980s when the village was taken as a unit in the self-rule movement, but studies indicate that villager’s selfrule does not mean that state power recedes from rural society but prove that it is a kind of reflection of penetrating into rural society. It is actually a form of state political power reconstruction in rural society. Still, the goal is to improve the state’s authority among the majority of ordinary people and its ability of effective integration of rural society. The latter began in the self-rule movement in the middle and late periods of the 1980s, with a focus on the development of citizens’ society and the transition of modern social governance brought about by development. Its theoretical perspective is the relationship of society to state and the most important interactive relationship between society and state. Therefore, the modern construction of grassroots social governance or social self-governance system always traces back to the starting point of history.

18 Guo Yuhua. 1999. Civil Society and Ceremonial Country. Dushu Magazine (9).

PART II

The Contemporary Authority Structure and Governance System of Grassroots Social Order

Regarding the contemporary social order at the community level, there are some popular views. One tends to regard the authoritative structure pattern of grassroots social order as an integral part of legitimate basis and its social control. Therefore, how to rule and govern the grassroots communities becomes a starting point of research and explanative object. The precondition of research is that society is attached to the state, and the society at the community level is seen as part of the national concept or functional realization. The other tends to explain the modern grassroots social order as a simple extension of the traditional social order of imperial power autocracy. And it holds that the basic element of traditional grassroots social order exists in one way or another and becomes a component of the modern authoritative system. Additionally, people still argue that the development and change of economy and society in contemporary China contribute to the extension of a private activity space out of public authority (market and family, etc). The public sphere gradually generated from private activity marks the emergence of a “main society”. For example, during this period, it is not just old social organization and the behavioral way that emerge as the social space extends, and there are modern various forms of social organization: many intermediary social organizations, including a variety of societies, associations, research institutes, vocational groups and societies of all sizes more connected with

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daily life.1 These social organizations are neither similar to the traditional type of social organizations such as patriarchal clans nor similar to the socalled “people’s group” or “mass organization”. As a matter of fact, the latter is merely the extension of the official organization.2 Then, when it comes to the contention of China’s Civil Society (which originated from the category and concept of Western social experience), people are inclined to depict a descriptive and active pattern of the modern state and society relationship, which is of standard significance. Of the above-mentioned views, some come from the political perspective of totalism. In this explanative framework, civil, social, diverse and other complicated concepts don’t exist or turn out to be insignificant. Some conflate both modern authoritative system and traditional despotism, so they cannot correctly know about the changes in Chinese society since modern times. But totalism-based politics and country are a kind of modern phenomenon, and modern social order at the community level is not a simple extension of traditional grassroots social order but the result of social change over the past one hundred years. For the social organization grown from modern grassroots communities, the prediction of whether it means the growth of a kind of modern state and society relationship model or the extension of “civil society” space in the traditional sense is still in the process of uncertain structural changes. To know and explain the grassroots social order in modern China, we need to figure out two questions: First, how to know and explain its historical continuity, which includes the extension of traditional grassroots social order for today, the concept of autocratic power dominating over society and the relationship between society and state, and so on; second, how to know about the meaning of modern state construction since modern time, its inherent connection with imperial despotism and the connotation reflected by new system principle. The first question is to explain the matter of historical basis for grassroots social order today and which aspect is expressed in the essential difference between old and new national forms, such as what the difference between modern nationalism and new nationalism lies and what is today’s manifestation. The other question is to tell apart which matter needs to be mainly addressed for

1 Pei Mingxin. 1998. “Chinese Civic Association”. Modern China, Vol. 24 (3). 2 Liang Zhiping. 2003. “Minjian (Civil)”, “Minjian Shehui (Civil Society)” and Civil

Society”—Reexaminzation of These Concepts”. Yunnan University Journal (1).

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the construction of the modern state in China, what order and principle are based on the relationship between society and state, and what is the nature of standard principle and governance for modern grassroots social order. That is to say, the question that we need to understand is whether the traditional basis and power of social order at the community level always represent the form of extension and change. In other words, what society is appearing today and what so-called “modern transformation of social governance” exactly refers to: whether it is to strengthen the penetrating and mobilizing power of state power for the grassroots communities or it is to take the building of public social relations as the objective of grassroots political power, different objectives will lead to different results. Besides, in the present day, what we have seen for massive “return” of control of state power over grassroots communities is a kind of new phenomenon or traditional strategy demand for the control of the state over society. For this question, we need to know clearly about what principle and standard are exactly based for grassroots social order today.

CHAPTER 7

The Historical Basis of the Governance Order in Rural Society

The summary of traditional to modern governance order of rural society made by adopting the concept of “co-governance of officials and people” is based on the following cognitive aspects. The governance order in rural society during the popularity of imperial power is a kind of cogovernance order of officials and people based upon individual small peasant economy. Because of the pressure of modernization, the new order structure of co-governance of officials and people formed since modern times is designed to address the corruption of official governance at the traditional community level and reshape new agents of political power. What is manifested in the system is that on one hand, the governance order of rural society becomes the part of function realization of modern state governance; on the other, rural governance produces a new power structure system featuring the interlocking of officials and people. The state governance logic supporting the former is the principle and systematic condition of governance structure formation for the latter. From this point of view, the concept of “co-governance of officials and people is used to dissect the governance order of rural society in order to clarify the historical basis and condition of realistic development for the transition of today’s governance order in rural society.

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_7

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7.1

The Order of Governance in Rural Society

In recent years, some scholars who engage in rural governance have attempted to ignore the experience of regional rural governance and tried to use bigger explanative framework such as theory on political power of modern state and relationship between state and society to analyze the status quo or predicament of China’s rural governance1 and seek or construct the local category and idea system of China’s social governance in the description of political trait, system and culture of the state as well as experience in several cases of rural society. This clearly shows a cognitive difficulty, namely avoiding political feature of (traditional/modern) state governance logic to explain rural governance. In this way, we will find it difficult to achieve outcomes and are consciously divorced from structural reality of state governance and plunge ourselves into a small regional situation in a world of rural experience. By putting the focus of traditional to modern rural social governance on the logic of state governance, what is the schema of obtained order in rural society? Some dominant cognitive paradigms in past to modern period can be summed up with two aspects. One cognitive paradigm is the so-called “dual-track politics”. This cognitive paradigm started from Mr. Fei Xiaotong, popular in sociological, anthropological and political areas. It is held that traditional rural society is a pattern characterized by the top-down political integration and the bottom-up social integration connected by the gentlemen class. That is also to say, what connects “a situation from the county government office to the gate of every family” is the function and role performed by the gentry. Or we can say that there

1 The focus on rural governance can be dated back to the self-governing practice taking the village as the basic unit in the 1980s. Most of studies center on the micro-research of some experiences, and in particular, researchers have failed to differentiate villagers’ selfrule and grassroots social self-rule and even mixed all these concepts. But after decades of research (especially a series of studies based on Central China Normal University). Regardless of any so-called concepts or models like “rural administration” ruled by village, village school; and model of rural governance, we cannot evade such a basic fact: villagers’ self-rule is not a social autonomy in modern sense but a community of adherent identity linked with collective land property right. And in essence, the so-called villager’s self-rule only represents the realization of function of state power or state governance. It is still built on the dominance and attached relationship dominated by state power. As for various types of rural governance models since villagers’ self-rule system was carried out, we can see the Review of Studies on the Pattern of Rural Governance since the Beginning of Villagers’ self-rule in Contemporary China. Rural Observation in China: 2016 (1).

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is a “self-governance by the gentry in somewhere between imperial power and individual peasants. But during the modern times to the Republic of China, as a large number of gentlemen left rural areas and were headed to cities, some ruffians grabbed the political power of villages and served as national agents in the process of political power modernization, translating “dual-track politics” into “one-track politics”. They imposed a large amount of taxes and potions on farmers, which worsened the relationship between farmers and state.2 The other cognitive paradigm is what we call “broker model” and is proposed by Prasenjit Duara, who introduced a “broker model” when discussing the relations between state political power and tax of farmers in his book “Culture, Power and State—Rural North China 1900–1942”. It means that the government rule the rural society through “brokers” (or called “intermediaries”), but brokers are divided into “protective” and “profiting” types. In the late nineteenth century, the government of the Qing Dynasty just used double brokers to levy taxes and realize its major function of rule. In modern times, when the process of modernization of state power accelerated, portions of burden increased, breaking the original so-called “cultural network of power”.3 This situation made original protective brokers withdraw from their leading positions in villages and a crowd of ruffians took advantage of this opportunity. These people increased the way of blackmail, thus leading to the “involution” of political power. The reason why I mention the two cognitive paradigms is that the two paradigms have affected rural research in China until today. During the period, there have appeared different insights, such as “triangle structure”4 of state, gentry and village, so-called “double ruling”5 formed between upper political powers and entity organizations in grassroots

2 Fei Xiaotong. 1998. Native China and Family Planning System. Peking University Press: p. 63. 3 Prasenjit Duara. 1994. Culture, Power and the State—Rural North China 1900–1942 (translated by Wang Fuming). Jiangsu People’s Publishing House. Mr. Duara introduced the new concept of “cultural network of power” and cited detailed examples to prove how state power penetrates the grassroots level of rural society through business groups, temple fair organizations, religions, myths, symbolic resources, etc. 4 Huang Zongzhi. 2000. Small Peasant Economy and Social Change in Northeast China. Zhonghua Book Company. 5 Zhang Yan and Niu Guanjie. 2002. The Evolution of China’s Double Ruling Pattern in the Mid 19th Century. Renmin University of China Press.

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communities, “dual power system”,6 “village-level social structure”,7 “triple power in village governance”,8 “township administration and village governance”, “model of county administration-township-village governance”, to name a few. But such cognitive aspects almost represent the supplement or depth of the above-mentioned two paradigms. The above-said mainstream cognitive paradigms include later created or added studies—all hold or presuppose that traditional countries carry out indirect rule over rural society through a certain kind of middle class, forming a triple-level structure of “state-grassroots elites-ordinary people”. Meanwhile, its starting point is the separation or disconnection of state and society; state power and rural society are a very different and separated structure, each with their own supporting system. Between the two, there is a clear gentlemen class that plays the role of connection (current research mostly uses rural/village elites or local elites to explain or copy this middle class). As a result, this class is increasingly conceived and enlarged, and then a pattern of “self-governance by the gentry” is constructed. Therefore, the political integration and social integration of imperial power naturally obtain the same order. With this as reference, scholars argue that the pattern of governance in traditional rural society has shifted greatly, as marked by the penetration of modern state power into rural society and the worsening relationship between state and farmers brought about by the change in original order structure. That is to say, this change is structural, including the establishment of political power in villages and towns and the replacement of social integration by political integration. In this sense, the dual power structure of state and

6 Mr. Xu Yong believed that the dual power system of the top-down administrative power and self-rule power contained in rural society existed in rural areas of ancient China. Please see Analysis of the Dual Power System of Administration and Self-rule in Rural Areas of Ancient China (from the Collected Works of Xu Yong). Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press. 7 Cong Hanxiang: Rural Areas in Hebei, Shandong and Henan Provinces in Modern Time. China Social Sciences Press: 1995. The book firstly introduced the idea of “villagelevel social structure”, in which it made it clear that an organization that is partly official played an intermediary role in mediating between government office and rural society. Because of this intermediary agency, the control of government office over rural areas is indirect and rural areas are in an “autonomous” state. 8 Jin Taijun. 2002. “Analysis of Political Sociology of Triple Power Interaction in the Governance of Villages”. Strategy and Management (2).

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society thus vanishes, giving way to new political power and new rural social order. This is one aspect of the analysis. However, the above-mentioned mainstream cognitive paradigms would have lost convincing explanation when it comes to how traditional villages possess the form of grassroots control organization with multiple natures and functions. A good case in point is the neighborhood system, which is both a political organization and an economic organization. Given its nature, it is an organizational pattern combining politics, economy and society. As for its function, it has many functions of household management, tax collection, public security and education, and they are interconnected and confined to each other.9 On top of that, such works as population registration, compilation of land book, maintenance of local order, building of water project, mediation of civil conflicts should be done by relevant organizations. In fact, since the period of Qin and Han dynasties, governments of past dynasties have not set up grassroots organizations in rural areas. For example, township and pavilion system in the Qin and Han dynasties, three-level community level system during the periods of Wei and Jin dynasties as well as Southern and Northern Dynasties, five neighborhoods system in the Sui and Tang dynasties, household system and village agreement system in the Song Dynasty, community system in the Yuan Dynasty, one-hundred-and-ten-households system (Lijia system in Chinese) in the Ming Dynasty and neighborhood system and household system (Baojia system in Chinese) in the Qing Dynasty— in which ordinary people in the neighborhood (they receive no salary as officials) act as all kinds of roles, implementing the management policy of “people governing people”. This is quite different from the traditional autonomous schema of rural society described in mainstream cognitive paradigms and is hard to be classified into their explanative model. This is the second point that I want to mention. As for the above-said mainstream views, there is always a suspicious voice among the people. For example, generalizing the order of traditional rural society with self-governance by the gentry fails to take into full account the feature of regional difference (e.g. North China and South China). This mainly comes from field research based on anthropology, 9 Yang Guoan. 2006. The Power Structure of Rural Society in the Middle and Upper Reaches of Yangtze River and Its Change (1368–1911), included in the On the History of Social Development in the Reaches of Yangtze River since the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Wuhan University.

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especially regional (dominantly in southeastern regions) field investigations. But the self-contradictory point is that given the anthropological research of taking providing proven materials for self-governance by the gentry as the cognitive paradigm, its research outcomes seem not to support its preconditional hypothesis—self-governance by the gentry is the common norm of traditional social order; in addition to this, studies on social history from historiography, in particular new archeological findings in recent years, repeatedly prove that the community level in traditional rural society is filled with imperial power controlling organizations and sum up the order of traditional rural society as “officials-civilian society” or “society of people under household system”. Inter alia, studies from Chinese political history, particularly history of political thought, are also made not to support the view of self-governance by the gentry. For example, in his work “Textural Research on “Feudal”, Feng Tianyu maintains that in the past over two thousand years spanning from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties, we have seen more changes in the level of social system, but three major factors including clan system, landlord system and autocratic monarchy have all along coexisted and supplemented each other.10 Additionally, studies from the history of social life are also conducted to sort out and confirm the nature of all organizations, involving those organizations below the county level and above the family level. They have proposed the concept of “quasiadministrative organization at the community level”,11 but this idea is merely focused on defining the fact of these powers coming from the government’s grassroots organization. Seemingly, its argumentation is still confined to the major paradigms mentioned above without more regard for focusing upon the feature of official-ruled order. As of the foregoing, we cannot simply use popular “ideal type” (especially emphasizing some elements and combining them rather than reflecting the fact in full and loyal way) of schema to summarize the order attainment in rural society since the period from traditional times to modern times. There are two reasons accounting for this. First, using “self-governance by the gentry” to define the existence of dual system 10 Feng Tianyu. 2006. Textual Comment On “Feudal”. Wuhan University Press. 11 Yang Guoan. 2006. The Power Structure of Rural Society in the Middle and Upper

Reaches of Yangtze River and Its Change (1368–1911), included in the On the History of Social Development in the Reaches of Yangtze River since the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Wuhan University.

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of state power and rural society seems unjustifiable. This is to say, “selfgovernance by the gentry” has always been regarded as truly existing “social autonomous space”—this view is likely to be the misinterpretation of history and in nature, it is just a form of imperial power exercising indirect rule over the grassroots communities. Second, it is hard to make a clear demarcation of the line between rule by officials and rule by people in terms of function. In this regard, there are no laws to follow and we cannot see rule by officials end at county level. For instance, in view of legitimate resources and system form, the traditional grassroots communities are interspersed with intricate formal and informal structures as well systematic form and unsystematic form—class of local government clerks and runners, grassroots organization forms of village officials, neighborhood and household systems and gentlemen class and clan-based forces.12 Therefore, we find it necessary to shift the focus of discussion toward relational fields between state power (county government office) and other official grassroots controlling organizations (one-hundred-and-tenhouseholds, ten-households system, grain head system, etc.), grassroots organizations built jointly by officials and people (village agreement, social granary and local public welfare granary) and local authority (gentry), nongovernmental organizations (family organizations based on the bonds of consanguineous relationship). On the basis of system analysis, the book introduces the idea of “co-governance of officials and people”, arguing that the grassroots social order traditionally in China is the authoritative governance system shared by county government office dominated by imperial power and its derivative systems and affiliated grassroots organizations as well as local authoritative forces (gentry or clan), on which a pattern of power structure featuring the interlocking of official-people cogovernance, which is neither for rule by officials nor for rule by people, is thus generated. We try to fully outline the attained order in rural society through “co-governance of officials and people” because these official and people-based organizations of different natures and functions reflect the essence of governance of rural society during traditional period to modern

12 Liu Zhiwei. 1997. Between the State and the Society: Research on the Lijia System of Guangdong Province during the Periods of Ming and Qing Dynasties. Sun Yat-sen University Press; Qin Hui. 2004. Grassroots Control of Rural Areas in Traditional Chinese Empire: Rural Organization during the Han and Tang Dynasties. Included in Ten Discussions in Traditional China. Fudan University Press: pp. 1–44.

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times. Moreover, only through this analytic logic can the construction meaning of order in rural society in modern China be fully understood and adequately explained.

7.2

The Principle of Order and the Form of Authority in Rural Society

By using local category and concept to observe, we can find two characteristics regarding the order of traditional rural society: tax and corvee connect imperial power with rural society; the stability of official order of a dynasty is linked with all authoritative forms of rural society. Between the two there is a series of systematic arrangements of rule by officials and structural definitions—formal and informal systems, official and unofficial structures—connected with social organizations at the community level, but the latter is not the official part of bureaucratic system under imperial power because they receive no salary from the government and are not voluntary self-rule organizations. Their way of existence depends on seeking profits above and below all levels—what Mr. Prasenjit Duara calls political power brokerage system. But the opposite end of this order is the order principle and standard of individual peasants attached to clan system, fixating on land in the form of law and existing in the form of family or big family. In history, what traditional rural society presents is an order pattern based on co-governance of officials and people, which consists of four supporting systems that can be differentiated but inherently cohesive. The first is bureaucratic system, namely county-level political power organization directly linked with grassroots communities—county government office. Its function covers all aspects of rural society; either for jurisdiction sphere or duty of officials, we cannot simply define “imperial power not going to the county level”. A case in point is that in a new county of Jiangxi in the Ming Dynasty, there are three county officials: county head, assistant to county head and secretary; one chief official in charge of official documents; three Confucian officers (one teacher and one instructor included); two inspectors in the second inspection office affiliated to the county; four officers respectively responsible for departments of Yin and Yang, medicine, monk and Taoist associations; in six sections of official appointment, household system, rituals, military affairs, penalty and construction and engineering, every section has one official of general responsibility and another of dealing with documents; one

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military department officer (in charge of every registration of all documents for checking the flow of people); one shop inspector (in charge of investigating articles and products of shops and dealing with official documents) and one archive officer (in charge of registration of soldiers and military officers).13 The above-said power function and duty scope of officials are based on the category and reference of rural society. The second is the bureaucratic derivative system. In addition to “decision of prison litigation” and education and others, such works as registration of population, compilation of land book, maintenance of local order, building of water conservancy project, mediation of civil conflicts need to be done by corresponding personnel, who are the group of local government clerks and runners “recruited” by county government office and who actually control the administrative affairs. The third is the official enslavement system, including government-built (government-controlled) grassroots controlling organization, such as organizational forms of neighborhood system, guard system and grain system and all kinds of primary-level organizations jointly built by government and people, including village agreement, social granary and granary for public interests.14 The fourth is the social power system constituted by local authority (“gentry power”) and nongovernmental organization (“clan power”), such as gentlemen class and family organization bonded by consanguineous relationships relying on unofficial influence to play their role. In particular, the major work of gentlemen class includes upholding the order of imperial power. Its existence plays a declarative role in the concept of order of imperial power in itself—which can be proven by the origin of gentlemen class and its connection with the bureaucratic system. The reason why scholars have paid attention to the gentlemen class in modern times is that there is a big background: on the one hand, the decline of imperial power is the decline of gentlemen class, but the latter can mostly reflect the order concept of family in the world, so by observing the situation of gentlemen class, we can see through the trend of structural changes in China’s rural society; on the other hand, there is 13 Zheng De: Geography of Chronicle of Xincheng County, quoted from Yang Guoan. 2006. The Power Structure of Rural Society in the Middle and Upper Reaches of Yangtze River and Its Change (1368–1911), included in the On the History of Social Development in the Reaches of Yangtze River since the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Wuhan University. 14 Yan Changhong and Peng Nansheng. 2000. Review of International Academic Symposium on Economic Development and Social Change. The Historical Research: (1).

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no self-awareness of methodology if we use Western system and culture to analyze the Chinese rural society. In this perspective, anthropological research goes farther, such as using the category and method of native society or community reflected in Western anthropological research and being directly applied to the analysis of big society in China. In this “modern” trend, traditional gentlemen class precisely or seemingly finds an explanation in the Western theoretical framework and places it in a quite “ideal” rural governance pattern. For historical research, rural social order is examined based upon political concept and systematic change usually from the grand standpoint or perspective of imperial power. On one hand, as for traditional political ideology, “All lands in the world belong to the King and all people on the soil are the King’s subjects”—the idea is regarded as an order concept and fact. In this perspective, the representative view is embodied by the order system of “power dominating over society”.15 The cognitive paradigm is just contrary to field research or regional research of anthropology and sociology.16 On the other, as the research on traditional government power and organizational structure becomes more thorough and as the knowledge of folk vision for social life history becomes deeper,

15 Liu Zehua. 2000. Monarchism in China. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 16 From the period of the Republic of China to the present day, the research on

the grassroots social order traditionally in China from anthropological and sociological perspective was usually carried out by focusing on the demarcation and definition pf two systems (rule by officials and rule by people). At the same time, the extension and depth of subsequent studies were basically based on this cognitive paradigm. For example, with reference to the sociological and anthropological studies from the 1950s to recent 30 years, they basically presuppose “self-rule by gentry” or self-rule by patriarchal clans, and they also manifest selective regional studies, which, for example, are characterized by southeastern regions where patriarchal clans are well developed. However, these research results are mostly related to the supporting evidences and new discoveries of clan-based ethical society or the application and verification of modern analytic concepts. The results in this regard mainly come from studies of Chinese scholars since the periods of the late Ming to the Republic of China and ones conducted by foreign researchers over the past 30 years. The former covers a broad range of areas, such as history, society, culture and economic life, with representative scholars including Liang Qichao, Wu Wenzao, Fei Xiaotong, Lin Yaohua, Zhang Zhongli, etc., while the latter involves two major fields, one of which is the historical area, especially the field of living history since the late Qing dynasty, represented by Kong Lifei, and Prasenjit Duara; the second of which is the research on the change of China’s economy and society in recent 30 years, with representatives such as Jean Oi, Zhang Jing, Huang Zongzhi, Helen Soi, Zheng Zhenman and Wang Mingming.

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the imperial power is not extended to the county level, and its control in rural society is structural and functional. A case in point is that countless grassroots control organizations are sufficient to prove the fact that the so-called self-governance by the gentry is merely a ruling part linking both imperial power and ordinary people. At the same time, this is even an exception, historically. Therefore, whether for the order concept of imperial power or the power structure of rural society, we should not make a demarcation of “official–civilian co-governance” regarding the attainment of order of traditional rural society. It is built on the following cognitions. First, political thoughts for the homogeneity of state and family and priority of people can provide the legitimacy and order concept of ruler,17 which causes ambiguity of officials and civilians and uses a kind of interlocking and mixed structure to build the governance order of rural society. Second, the order and rule of officials and civilians support and supplement each other. Social ethics and public ethics related to the family-centered culture are consistent with the legitimacy of imperial power (rule based on family name). The former’s traditions, customs, habits, conventions, tattoos and other standards, as well as the latter’s power, hierarchy, order and standard, are integrated into standard source and authoritative form of rural social governance. Third, it is about order pattern dominated by imperial power. It is combined through various grassroots controlling organizations and nongovernmental spontaneous organizations and merged with system arrangement and cultural tradition. In this regard, it is the gentry class and local government clerks and runners that play a connecting and supporting role. The position of the two, neither official nor civilian, connects both imperial power and ordinary people. They can be seen as the reserved force of imperial power and the extended part of imperial power. While they tend to feather their nest and pursue profits from the top level to the lower level, they are essential to the two levels. In fact, they act as servants of imperial power and spokesmen of local interests. In general, when it comes to using the concept of “official–civilian cogovernance” to summarize traditional rural social governance order, in traditional grassroots communities, there is no so-called self-governance by the gentry in both state and society. But it is not an official–civilian 17 Liang Zhiping. 2014. The Origin of the People-Centered Thought. China Law Review (3).

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society controlled by the bureaucratic system of imperial power because from the local perspective and category, we cannot tell apart both traditional state and society in China from modern state and society in the West. Of course, categories such as official–civilian, public–private and family–state overlapped the relationship category of state and society originated from the West in modern times, but the meaning is different. Especially for the standard of concept and order, there is no obvious demarcation between officials and civilians. Therefore, “co-governance of officials and civilians” outlines a mutually embedded power structure system, which is based on the concept of imperial power and the pattern of a mutually embedded organization and structure of officials and civilians.

7.3 The Ruling Characteristics of Governance in Rural Society The essence of official–civilian co-governance lies in rule. In other words, traditional rural social governance is unrelated to self-governance, for this so-called self-governance is gentlemen autonomy, which is unconnected with that self-governance in modern sense. Figuratively speaking, the latter is reflected by an organized form of interests for social power or civilian right—people describe it as “wind and rain can enter, but the King cannot” (line of demarcation of public and private power); the former is nothing but an autonomous form—people depict it as “All land in the world belong to the King”. This is because despotism of imperial power is prevalent in all kinds of controlling organizations, which means that it can enter and depart from all fields (public and private) in rural society without any barrier and restriction. However, such situation where an autonomous form exists but autonomous right (individual and social right) fails has not been substantially improved in great social changes in modern times. The strong infiltration of Western system and culture once triggered off a widespread contemplation of people in and out of the court about “local selfgovernance” and national system modernization, but the final result is still focused on strengthening of upholding state authority (imperial power).18 18 Kong Lifei thought that the nation-state building and modernization starting from modern times was always characterized by the intensification of centralized power. In this process, the conception of local autonomy witnessed no fundamental change, let alone a

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In fact, with the reference of Western civilization and its system and culture, the so-called “contention of Chinese essence and Western utility” is actually a war of contention related to “implements”,19 which can be clearly observed in the change of political thought since modern times. By looking at the practices of recurrent political revolution and social transformation movement, the logic of state (imperial power) governance has not been altered in modern sense. Nor is the rural social order based upon the legal guarantee of individual right and social power. That is to say, given people’s contemplation of rural social order since modern times, there have been a lot of thoughts and explanations about so-called tremendous social change, which, for example, show that “dualtrack politics” has become “one-track politics” or “protective broker” has been changed into “profiting broker”, etc. But the conclusion is that after the gentry class disappears from historical arena, corrupt administration of officials becomes more serious, resulting in the deterioration of relationships between state and farmers. Yet these explanations seem not to concentrate on the continuity of history. It is true that from the late Qing dynasty to the Republic of China, as for rural social governance, a cliché problem that remains to be faced is the corruption of official management in rural society. Conversely, what we call the deterioration of governance in rural society is just the problem of official corruption or arrogated power that has sustained during the period of imperial power.20 This can exactly explain that there is no self-ruled form in traditional rural society. It only suggests that according to the pressing requirement of modernization, the power structure of co-governance by officials and civilians in rural society needs to be improved and strengthened. The duty of government in modern society is to build public social relationships at the primary level, which constitutes the core part of modern society building. revolution, and its goal targeted at “a more vibrant and stronger centralized country”, so what it aspired was the grassroots social order of a clean official system under centralized power system (Kong Lifei. 2013. The Origin of Modern Country in China. SDX Joint Publishing Company: p. 43). 19 The so-called “contention of Chinese essence and Western Utility”, an issue that was always disputable since modern times is still ongoing until today. Its essence means taking Chinese value-based culture and systematic culture as the essence and absorbing the skills of the West, finally growing up and conquering the West and achieving a leapfrog from backwardness to prosperity. 20 Zhou Qingzhi. 2017. “On the Autonomy of Grassroots Society”. Journal of Central China Normal University (1).

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But at the same time, this point is not included in the topic of traditional retransformation of local government. As mentioned above, the governance of corruption in rural society has become the starting point for the transformation of traditional rural society. In fact, this is an old issue that has been discussed throughout the ages. The idea of “included in the enfeoffment system and county system” proposed by Gu Yanwu attempts to solve this problem from the system, and others advocate the use of “seniors” to replace subordinate staff in managing grassroots administrative affairs. The Western system and culture advocates “local self-governance”, but no matter what proposition or practice, it has no intention of decentralization and governance. Instead, it is necessary to overcome the corruption of the grassroots officials and rely on the establishment of political institutions (such as the establishment of township government organizations) to support local authority and determine the position of local authority in the national management system, and finally bring rural society into the modern national control system. In other words, the themes of various grassroots political reforms discussed by the ruling and opposition parties since modern times. It is just a refurbishment of the traditional “people-oriented thought”. When applying the concept of “official–civilian co-governance” to make a generalization that is different from previous studies on the order of rural social governance, it is also necessary to explain some of the following issues. First, the so-called “dual-track politics”, “brokerage model”, the state—local elite—popular two-tier or three-tier structure system, “self-governance by the gentry”, and “political society” and other cognitive paradigms all have historical and cultural resources and reality. Supported by empirical research, but from the perspective of the nature of state (imperial power) power and the structure of social power, these explanations are all subject to the “order of rituals and law” formed by the different normative systems of the government and the people and the integrated order structure. A rural social order system is governed by the government and the people. Second, from the historical “long period”, that is, from the structural point of view, the evolution of the rural social power system has a long process, and only through a long period of investigation can we truly understand the truth of history.21 21 Fernand Braudel. 1992. Material Civilization, Economy and Capitalism (1st Volume) translated by Gu Liang and Shi Kangqiang. SDX Joint Publishing Company: p. 7.

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Among these, we find it essential to conduct an overall analysis of the nature, function, and role of the various organizational forms of traditional villages—formal, informal, structural and non-structural. It requires interdisciplinary research. Considering the overall situation, we feel it necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of local differences, and avoid using one discipline or one aspect to summarize or refer to the overall picture of the rural social order, especially regional research cannot be used to summarize the overall situation. Third, rural society is in transition, which refers to the transition from a pre-industrial society to a modern society. Therefore, we think it necessary to observe and analyze this transition from the perspective of historical continuity. In this respect, we need to have a complete picture of the changes in the rural social order. On the other hand, we should be able to understand the current rural social governance structure and changes in rural social order in a deeper and more essential sense, especially there being a reasonable explanation and analysis of the changes in the rural public social relations. Rural social governance involves multiple rules or norms with different sources and multiple political and social forces that influence and restrain each other. From a historical point of view, there seems to be no exception in reality. This is only one aspect of the rural social governance order. But the essence of the problem is what kind of rules or norms the rural social governance order should be based on. This is not only the key to distinguishing the traditional and modern rural social governance order, but also our analysis of the nature of the rural social governance order. Requirement, further speaking, whether rural social governance is based on the concept of power dominating the society or based on the legal confirmation and protection of individual rights and social rights. This is the fundamental difference between traditional and modern rural social governance. For example, the biggest difference between the contemporary rural social governance order and the imperial despotism period seems to be the lack of a structural intermediary organization, the gentry class, so in recent years, from academia to politics, they have been working together to create a so-called traditional “worthy village group”, but this is an imaginary group without history and reality foundation, which is a misunderstanding of history and reality. Because, first, it can copy the image of the squire but cannot give it substance. The former is internally linked to the imperial bureaucracy. It is a social group generated on the basis of a closed individual small-scale peasant economy, which plays the

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function and role of maintaining rural order and implementing civilization; now The so-called “worthy village seniors”—old party members, old cadres, old teachers, old models, demobilized soldiers, rich masters, cultural talents, etc., are just “volunteers” or “able people” dedicated for a public welfare nature inside and outside the system. Second, the political logic of modern state governance cannot allow a so-called “representative group” appearing in the countryside, and they are not allowed to become a competitive social and political force to share power with the system. The “worthy village seniors” shaped by the political governance logic of state governance are merely dependent groups that assist the grassroots government in managing the countryside. That’s it. Third, the “worthy village seniors” are different from the squire. For the rural social community, it is only a marginal group. Therefore, the governance significance of the traditional gentry is: govern the matter related to village with “village group” and achieve the purpose of village group helping each other through the systems of “household registration management under military governance” and “township or village agreement” system, today’s “worthy village seniors” is neither an agent of the government nor a spokesperson for the interests of the villagers. The building of rural social governance needs to be built on the basis of historical and cultural resources, because different social systems and cultures have different governance thinking and methods. The current problem is how to find those that conform to the national historical and cultural traditions, but must be based on individual rights and the rural social governance order form above social rights requires grassroots political reforms, such as changing the concept of power dominating society, rooting the publicity of grassroots government in the rural social foundation, and at the same time allowing social forces to be fully developed. The society manages itself and forms a modern public space and public lifestyle in rural society. Such “government by the government and the people” will become the main form of public life in rural society. Therefore, the transformation from a dominant and dependent relationship to a democratic and co-governance negotiation relationship is probably the modern meaning of the transformation of rural social governance.

CHAPTER 8

Finance and Governance (1): The Nature of Government Power and Its Boundaries

The public nature of government finances has the following meanings: First, public finance is a form of resource to which all citizens with equal rights jointly contribute in order to guarantee funding for public affairs jointly provided financial guarantee; second, regarded as finance to achieve public goals, it refers to the fact that as an agent of public affairs, the government is given the use of public resources for taxation to achieve citizens’ public goals1 ; third, fiscal democracy. For the above reasons, the governor of the state is only the agent of public affairs, not the owner of any special rights that transcend citizens. The establishment of this concept is based on citizenship with citizenship as the core. Therefore, democratic finance has the essential meaning of modern national finance. Publicness is the legal basis of taxation. First, public nature or publicness is based on individual citizens, rather than collective groups. For example, the so-called “national finance” is based on the collective means being built on the overall interests or national interests; the so-called “public finance” is based on the individual means being built on the rights of citizens. Depending on the principles of fiscal and taxation 1 In recent years, due to the knowledge of the shortcoming of government behavior

model, the government has been no longer regarded as the only agent of public affairs, increasingly moving toward the public governance model of joint governance model with multi-governors with citizens’ subjective and participatory democracy and civil organization. As a result, the pattern of taxation expenditure has changed, but the basic idea of taxation as the mere and only public resource.

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arrangements, the latter relies on equal and basic civil rights to determine the collection and use of public resources. Second, taxation for public purposes is levied on the legal premise and calculation basis of the use of public utilities. The only legal basis for taxation in modern countries is the purpose of public affairs, so the amount of tax collected can only be based on the goals of public utilities. For instance, the taxation system of a democratic country is based on “adjusting its expenditure to its revenue”—levying taxes based on public affairs. This involves the priority of individual rights at different levels. For example, raising national welfare means levying more taxes, and these are related to the balance of citizens’ rights and interests. Thirdly, the collection and use of public taxes should go through citizens’ democratic process choice, and the core is the democratization of tax collection decisions. For example, the formulation of the tax system and the collection of taxes are based on the results of careful calculation of public affairs that need to be completed. Therefore, incorporating taxation decision-making and public budget into the decision-making category of the people’s representative agency, through detailed and practical implementation, is an important procedure to ensure the “public nature” of public finances and establish their legitimacy. Fourth, public taxes should be the only source of funds for public governments. It has two meanings. On the one hand, taxation is the only legal source of funds for the government as a public affairs agent, and all public fiscal revenues should be included in the “tax” system; on the other hand, the government’s operating funds should all be obtained through taxation, to avoid the phenomenon that government departments need to “finance their own profits and losses” and shoulder their own economic goals in addition to public goals. Fifth, establishing the public nature of the taxation system is the basic task of taxation reform. Publicity is the only source of legitimacy for modern government. The tax system for public purposes, the corresponding public government, and citizens with the awareness of “equal rights and public responsibilities” are the main bodies that establish the publicity of fiscal and taxation, especially taxpayers, which ensure that “citizens pay the government funds for public purposes”. Finance or taxation reflects changes in the relationship between the state and its citizens. Finance or taxation arises based on the public function of the “state”, and is the product of the distinction between

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private space and public responsibility. In the past, finances and taxes were defined by the emperor, which is equivalent to saying that the legality of finances and taxes was defined by the emperor. The legitimacy of the modern state has a different foundation—the social contract. Its essential meaning is the reason why the state exists is that its legitimacy comes from the transfer of each citizen’s own rights; this transfer can only be done for the purpose of citizens themselves in group life. Its most important significance is that the country no longer has any talent or its own purpose that exists apart from its citizens, which endows fiscal and taxation with the democratic characteristics.

8.1 Changes of Power Boundaries Reflected in the Fiscal Account The boundaries of taxation and expenditure define the boundaries of the expansion of state power. This chapter observes its public nature from the fiscal revenue and expenditure trend of the county-level government, as well as its power nature and power coverage boundary. Therefore, analyzing the changes of government power by counting the two variables of government fiscal inflow and outflow is of substantial significance for analyzing the publicity of government finance. Finance is the tangible hand of the government to regulate, manage and serve market entities, social entities and individual citizens. The boundary and extent of power intervention in other entities are directly reflected in the scope of fiscal sources and fiscal expenditures. From these two dimensions, we can see the change in the total amount of power, which reflects the logic of power operation. Western democracies generally take power as a fixed amount, that is, the gain of power by one person or group must be accompanied by the loss of power by another person or group. Socialist countries emphasize the “collective” or “expandable” side of power.2 In other words, socialist countries generally believe that power is not an object, not a dead thing placed in a certain place, and needs to be created. Among them, fiscal revenue is the prerequisite for power creation, and fiscal expenditure is a means of power maintenance

2 S.P. Huntington. 1989. Political Order in Changing Societies. Shanghai Translation Publishing House: p. 120.

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and power expansion. Therefore, from the changes in fiscal revenue and expenditure in a certain period of time, we can see the trajectory of state power changes. Looking at Power Changes from Fiscal Revenue Here, we select Xiangcheng District of Suzhou City as the analysis object, based on two considerations: First, Xiangcheng District is located in Suzhou City, which is one of the representative regions of the Southern Jiangsu model. Here, the collective economy is developed, and industrialization and urbanization are relatively advanced. Compared with the backward areas, this region boasts a unique source and structure of fiscal revenue, and the impact on government behavior is also representative. Second, the construction period of Xiangcheng District is not long. In the past 15 years, the relationship between the government and the market, society and private individuals have been in the process of planned layout and adaptive adjustment, and the leverage effect of finance on the government’s adjustment of the relationship with other subjects is more obvious. The Mobilization Ability of Local Governments Xiangcheng District is situated in the hinterland of the Yangtze River Delta City Cluster, adjacent to Shanghai to the east, Wuxi to the west, the ancient city of Suzhou and industrial park to the south and Wuxi and Changshu to the north. The district governs four towns, four streets, one provincial-level economic development zone and one new city with highspeed railway. Industry and service industries occupy a dominant position in economic development. In 2015, the district achieved a regional GDP of 60.52 billion yuan, and the annual fiscal budget revenue was 7.1 billion yuan. Among them, tax revenue was 6.26 billion yuan, and tax revenue accounted for 89.4 percent of fiscal revenue. Based on differences in source channels, management systems and uses, fiscal revenue can be classified into four parts: tax revenue, non-budget revenue, fund revenue and earmarked revenue. It can be seen from Fig. 8.1: First, tax revenue is the main source of fiscal revenue, and local economic and social operations are vigorous and stable. The fiscal revenue contribution of Xiangcheng District from large to small is tax revenue, non-budget revenue, fund revenue and earmarked fund revenue. Among them, tax revenue makes up the vast majority of

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Fig. 8.1 The composition and trend of fiscal revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou

fiscal revenues in each year and has shown a steady upward trend, from 53.6 percent in 2010 to 66.80 percent in 2014, and as high as 89.4 percent in 2015. The continuous increase of tax revenue in the proportion reflects the obvious vitality of economic growth, but the clear land finance in the tax structure brings hidden concerns for fiscal sustainability; the proportion of non-budget revenue to fiscal revenue is about onefourth, but the proportion has slightly decreased from 35.4 percent in 2010 to 26.20 percent in 2014; the decrease in fund income is relatively large, except for 5.80 percent in 2014, and the proportion in the first four years has exceeded 10 percent. The second is that fiscal revenue accounted for about 30 percent of the region’s GDP that year, indicating that local governments have strong fiscal mobilization capabilities. The GDP of Xiangcheng District was 57.826 billion yuan in 2014, 54 billion yuan in 2013, 48 billion yuan in 2012, 42.163 billion yuan in 2011 and 36.06 billion yuan in 2010. The budget revenues were 16.708 billion yuan, 17.796 billion yuan, 13.199 billion yuan, 15.407 billion yuan and 12.023 billion yuan, respectively. The proportions of gross regional product were 28.90, 33, 27.5, 36.5 and 33.4 percent.

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Tax Revenue and Non-budget Revenue Tax revenue and non-budget revenue are the main part of local fiscal revenue. Among them, taxation is a kind of financial income obtained free of charge from units and individuals according to statutory standards, which is backed by the power of the state. All are passed by the government authorized by the National People’s Congress to pass legislation, and taxation more expresses the government’s will; non-budget revenue is backed by political power and is collected, withdrawn and arranged for use in accordance with government laws, regulations or rules. Various fiscal funds are not included in the national budget management. Generally, it is a typical government action without the legislation of the National People’s Congress and the authorization of the National People’s Congress. Because power has the instinct to expand, non-budget income also has the instinct to expand. Non-budgetary income mainly includes state-owned capital operating income, administrative fee income, urban additional income from public utilities, income from the transfer of state-owned land use rights and income from agricultural land development funds; special income and fund income are also non-budget income, but because the two types of income have special purposes or corresponding expenditure items, they have strong exclusivity. Usually, the special purpose is specified at the beginning of the levy decision. Therefore, the two types of income are classified separately here. Special fund income and fund income usually reflect the government’s guidance on the macro-control of key links, major areas and important groups in economic and social development, which is the conscious embodiment of government power. Compared with the past, special fund income and fund income have a tendency to expand. The current earmarked income includes additional income from education fees, income from pollution discharge fees and income from water resources fees; income from the past state-owned land transfer income and social security fund income is extended to the state-owned land income base. There are four categories: income from funds, income from cultural and educational sector funds, income from the disabled security funds and income from pension insurance funds. (1) The tax structure is more reasonable, the local economy is more dynamic, and redistribution is emphasized. From Fig. 8.2, it can be seen that: First, value-added tax is the main source of tax revenue in Xiangcheng District, accounting for 40 percent or so. Value-added tax is a tax levied on the added value or additional value of goods in

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Fig. 8.2 The composition and trend of tax of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou

various links in the production and circulation of goods, mainly involving industry, logistics, service, transportation and tourism. In 2014, the valueadded tax accounted for 47 percent of the tax revenue in Xiangcheng District, 36.20 percent in 2013, 41.90 percent in 2012, 41.8 percent in 2011 and 40.2 percent in 2010. All these proportions are far higher than backward areas. Let us take Zhijin County in Guizhou Province as an example; value-added tax only accounted for about 10 percent of tax revenue, 13.50 percent in 2013, 9.90 percent in 2012, 9.50 percent in 2011 and 13.40 percent in 2010. It can be seen that the government management and service areas of Xiangcheng District mainly involve the above-mentioned industries and fields to ensure the stability of fiscal revenue. Second, the industrial and commercial tax contribution of other places is relatively large, contributing to about one-fourth of tax revenue. It accounted for 26 percent in 2014, 28.10 percent in 2013, 27.30 percent in 2012, 27.40 percent in 2011 and 26 percent in 2010. Other local industrial and commercial taxes include turnover tax, individual income tax, resource tax, property tax, behavior tax, special purpose tax and other taxes, covering urban land use, adjustment of fixed

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asset investment direction, salary bonus adjustment, urban maintenance and construction, real estate, etc., which are also government priorities. Third, corporate income tax contributes a lot, with corporate income tax accounting for nearly 20 percent. It was 16.40 percent in 2014, 16.50 percent in 2013, 19 percent in 2012, 18 percent in 2011 and 17.80 percent in 2010. Corporate income tax is a tax levied on the production and operation income and other income of domestic enterprises and business units, including income from sales of goods, income from providing labor services, income from transfer of property, income from dividends, interest income, rental income, income from the use of concessions and income from accepting donations. The collective enterprises in Xiangcheng District are well developed, and their contribution to taxation is more obvious than that of backward areas. Taking Zhijin County in Guizhou Province as an example, the corporate income tax from 2010 to 2013 was 5.96 million yuan, 31.02 million yuan, 61.08 million yuan and 48.88 million yuan. In the same period, it was 114.3 billion yuan, 142.8 billion yuan and 142.8 billion yuan in Xiangcheng District. At 164.4 billion yuan and 165.3 billion yuan, the corporate income tax of Xiangcheng District is 20–40 times that of Zhijin County, and the fiscal revenue is only five to six times. Fourth, the contribution of personal income tax and deed tax to tax revenue is stable, with a contribution rate of about 5 percent; farmland occupation tax accounts for less than 1 percent, which is about 0.3 percent; consumption tax accounts for very little, but it is increasing year by year. (2) The structure of non-budget revenue is simple, and the proportion of land finance has increased. It can be seen from Fig. 8.3: First, China is a socialist country with ownership of public sectors, and land resources have laid the foundation for the accumulation of national finances. The income from the transfer of state-owned land use rights is the main source of nonbudget income, occupying about 90 percent, reaching nearly 60 percent of the annual public fiscal budget revenue and even accounting for nearly 30 percent of the annual full-caliber budget revenue. The transfer fee of state-owned land use rights is all the land price obtained by the government through the allocation of state-owned land use rights, including land acquisition and demolition compensations paid by the transferee, early-stage land development costs and land transfer proceeds. It is usually expressed as government approval land to meet financial needs. It can be

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Fig. 8.3 The composition and trend of non-budget revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou

seen that land finance is still an important pillar of Xiangcheng’s fiscal revenue. The problems that arise are the transfer income is generally “selfreceived” by the government at the same level, and the lack of revenue and expenditure norms and supervision mechanisms are the main incentives for “achievement projects” and “power rent-seeking”; land transfers bring abundant benefits and fiscal revenue induces short-term behaviors of local governments to a certain extent. “Eating the next year’s food” is not conducive to sustainable development; local governments rely too much on the real estate industry, which creates hidden dangers such as high housing prices and weak sustainable development. Second, the income from the transfer of state-owned land use rights has slowed down, indicating that the local government is trying to avoid falling into a land finance-related quagmire. In 2011, the income from the transfer of state-owned land use rights in Xiangcheng District accounted for 97.6 percent of the total income accounted for 34 percent of the full-caliber budget revenue. The proportion of the Party’s 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012 dropped to 81.5 and 15.2

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percent, respectively, indicating that local governments are on the sidelines. In 2015 and 2014, the proportion rose to 91.8, 27.7, 87.6 and 23 percent, respectively. However, the overall trend is declining. On the one hand, it shows that local governments are increasing fiscal revenue structure adjustments. The income structure is gradually becoming more reasonable. On the other hand, it also shows that with the continuous increase of the urbanization rate in developed areas, the land available for sale is becoming less and less. Third, in the past three years, the proportion of state-owned capital operating income in the full-caliber budgetary income has increased, from 4.3 percent in 2012 to 7.9 percent in 2014. Administrative fees have been collected. Income has slowed significantly, from 12.9 percent in 2012 to 3.6 percent in 2014. This increase and decrease indicate that the improvement of the quality and efficiency of state-owned capital and the streamlining of administration and delegating power have made progress. In particular, administrative fees are conscious of the power of the government. The field and amount of fees have always been relatively flexible. Some departments rely on unreasonable administrative fees, which breeds a lot of corruption. Therefore, clearing and standardizing administrative fees is not only necessary to promote selfconsciousness and administration according to law but also to effectively reduce the burden on enterprises and society and maintain stable and rapid economic development. (3) Earnings from earmarked funds have risen steadily, while fund income has fluctuated significantly. From Figs. 8.4 and 8.5, it can be seen: First, the source of government special funds mainly involves education development, environmental governance and resource protection. Earnings from earmarked funds are established according to specific purposes and stipulate the income corresponding to special purposes. These funds relate to the country’s sustainable development and reflect the government’s power consciousness. The supplementary income of education fees in Xiangcheng District accounts for over 80 percent of the earmarked income, and the income from pollution discharge fees and water resources fees contribute to nearly 10 percent, respectively, which reflects the government’s emphasis on education in the distribution of power. Second, the fund income mainly involves income from stateowned land income fund, income from cultural and educational sector funds, income from the disabled security fund, and income from pension

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Fig. 8.4 The composition and trend of earmarked revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou

insurance funds. Fund income is fiscal income with special purpose or corresponding expenditure items. It also manifests the government’s conscious power to predict and regulate major livelihood issues. It is a fiscal policy based on social equity, equal opportunities and differential compensation. In the past five years, Xiangcheng district pension insurance funds have accounted for 70–80 percent of fund income, and state-owned land income fund accounted for about 10 percent, and income was relatively stable. It is worth noting that the income of the cultural and educational sectors has increased significantly, up from 3.8 percent in 2010 to 13.4 percent in 2014 while the income from the disability security fund accounts for a relatively low rate, but the growth rate is the same. Soon, it went up from 0.4 percent in 2010 to 3 percent in 2014, which reflects the importance of finance on the redistribution of disadvantaged groups.

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Fig. 8.5 The composition and trend of fund revenue of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou

Looking at Power Changes from Fiscal Expenditures The Scope of Public Fiscal Expenditure Is Wide, and the Investment in Social Governance Has Increased As can be seen from Fig. 8.6: First, the proportion of urban and rural community affairs is stable, and fiscal expenditure is biased toward the field of social governance. In the past five years, Xiangcheng District’s financial expenditure on urban and rural community affairs has stabilized between 1 and 2 percent. In 2014, it accounted for more than 20 percent, reaching 23.3 percent, which is much higher than that in underdeveloped areas. Take Zhijin County in Guizhou Province as an example. During the four years from 2010 to 2013, urban and rural community affairs expenditures accounted for 2–3 percent of fiscal expenditures, which were 2.20 percent in 2010, 1.90 percent in 2011, 3.10 percent in 2012 and 3.30 percent in 2013. The expenditure on urban and rural community affairs in Xiangcheng District is about 10 times that of Zhijin County, while the registered population of Xiangcheng District is 340,000, which is only about 1 percent of the 1.13 million

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registered population in Zhijin County. This high and one low highlight the importance that developed regions attach to innovation in the field of social governance, and also reflects the dynamic complexity and superposition of contradictions faced by the field of social governance in the starting area. The “political and social interaction” that began in Taicang in 2008 has gradually become the main mode of social governance in Jiangsu. As a result, financial expenditures have increased due to the appraisal and incentives for staff, the cultivation and guidance of autonomous social organizations, and the upgrading of working methods; however, due to the interaction between the political and social organizations, they are still in a planned layout and reactive adjustment. Therefore, to form a benign interaction mechanism between the party committee, government, autonomous social organizations and residents, it is necessary for government power to intervene in the social self-governance and private spheres with the help of fiscal expenditures, thus forming a situation where the boundaries of power are relatively blurred. Second, regular fiscal expenditures have steadily increased, and expenditures on education and general public services have advanced. In the past five years, education expenditure has accounted for about 20 percent of Xiangcheng’s fiscal expenditure, and general public service expenditure has accounted for more than 10 percent. Education expenditure, as a strategic expenditure to maintain the country’s sustainable development, directly reflects the importance of education by the state and localities, and is also a conscious manifestation of fiscal expenditure in the field of power; general public service expenditure is mainly used to ensure the normal operation of institutions. The general term for various agencies to perform their functions, guarantee the project expenditure needs of various agencies and departments and support the local implementation of the retirement funds for autonomously selected military cadres. General public service expenditures involve administrative costs and administrative efficiency. From the actual situation in Xiangcheng District, the general public service expenditure has shown a downward trend year by year, from 18.2 percent of fiscal expenditure in 2010 to 15.8 percent in 2012, and then to 12.2 percent in 2014, which signals the government should cut official expenditures and practice diligence and frugality meets the requirements of controlling administrative costs and improving administrative efficiency, and has typical and representative significance.

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Fig. 8.6 The composition and trend of fiscal budget of Xiangcheng District in Suzhou

The Expenditure of Funds and Special Funds Is Concentrated, and the Risk of Land Fiscal Expenditure Increases It can be seen from Fig. 8.7 that state-owned land use rights transfer fees are the main part of funds and special funds. It accounts for about 70 percent of the total, reaching 80–90 percent in 2014. State-owned land transfer expenses include compensation expenses for land acquisition and demolition, land development expenses, agricultural support expenses and urban construction expenses, and involve demolition compensation, resettlement subsidies and infrastructure construction. The land transfer fee is allocated and established by the financial department from the transfer income paid into the local treasury and is accounted for separately. The potential problems of transfer payments are as follows: First, the imbalance of capital investment, resulting in a new urban–rural duality. The transfer funds are mainly invested in the areas of industrialization and urbanization. Industry is concentrated in parks, farmers in towns and new communities and land is concentrated in moderately large-scale operations. While increasing the scale effect, improving the living environment and improving governance efficiency, the intervention of power is torn apart. The logical structure of “agriculture, rural areas and farmers” has been weakened, and the spontaneous self-government consciousness of the masses has been weakened. The expansion of cities has been accompanied by the decline of rural society as a whole. The second is the weakening of the management system, and there are risks of loss of transfer funds and power rent-seeking. For a long time, the revenue

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Fig. 8.7 The structure and trend of fund and expenditure

and expenditure of the transfer of state-owned land use rights accounted for a large part of the fiscal revenue and expenditure, but the management system has problems of low rank and large discretion. The only management system currently is the Ministry of Land and Resources and the Ministry of Finance in 2006. The “Administrative Measures for the Revenue and Expenditure of the Transfer of State-owned Land Use Rights” jointly issued with the People’s Bank of China is a departmental regulation. In the process, it is in a dominant position, and there is greater “flexibility” in expenditure standards such as land acquisition and house demolition, leading to the emergence of power rent-seeking. The Non-public Nature of the Fiscal Structure and the Nature of Fiscal Growth Source of Taxation: Fiscal Expansion China is a socialist country with public ownership of the means of production, and land finance, royalty and state-owned enterprise income provide a stable source of taxation. At the same time, our country is still in the initial stage of socialism where taxes are paid in accordance with regulations rather than in accordance with the law. There are also fiscal power expansion and power expansion phenomena in fiscal behavior, which are manifested in the arbitrariness of taxation to a certain extent. “A kind of totalitarian power is bound to be related to heavy taxation and unchecked fiscal power. To limit the government’s power, the government’s fiscal power must first be restricted. This is a universal history of human society.

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Laws”. In other words, power needs finance as a backing. Public finance constitutes the prerequisite and foundation of national administration, but the borderless, unlimited and unconstrained power penetration implies many hidden worries. At present, my country’s taxation is still based on the regulations of the State Council, and few of them have been reviewed by the National People’s Congress. Among the existing eighteen tax categories (plus the environmental protection tax currently submitted to the National People’s Congress, the number of tax categories is expected to increase to nineteen), only three tax categories, namely corporate income tax, personal income tax and vehicle and vessel tax, are considered and legislated by the National People’s Congress. Other tax categories are based on Regulations formulated by the State Council. Since state administration is mainly carried out by the government, and administrative powers often have the impulse to expand, the lack of effective supervision and restriction by the National People’s Congress may lead to problems such as the expansion of the fiscal and taxation boundary. At present, the government’s delineation of fiscal revenue boundaries, degree of intervention and management methods mainly rely on power consciousness and internal supervision. From the perspective of the fiscal and tax revenue structure in Xiangcheng District, Suzhou City, the government’s power has consciously improved, which is reflected in the improvement of the tax source structure, the emphasis on sustainable development, and the attention to the redistribution of special groups. Tax Expenditure: Growth in the Non-public Sector The more things included in the power system, the higher the cost of supporting the operation of power. In other words, in the case of imperfect systems and imperfect procedures, power is an increase, and financial and other resources must be used as a guarantee to generate more power. Especially for the expansion of power from the inside out, its unidirectional, mandatory and exclusive nature requires stronger financial protection, and the method is to find new agents. At present, the expansion of financial support power is mainly reflected in the intrusion into the quasi-public service field, the club-style self-governance field and the private product field. The method is to build a borderless governance network and maintain the stability of power and search through the leadership of the party and government. The use of agents to acquire new powers confuses the boundaries of public and private powers to a certain

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extent, and is also the main cause of pan-government responsibility, devaluation of authority and failure of governance. From the perspective of the fiscal expenditure structure of Xiangcheng District, urban and rural community affairs expenditures account for more than 20 percent of fiscal expenditures, and are increasing year by year. Among them, the interaction between government and society and grid governance involve the supply of a large number of non-public products and services, and the expenditure is relatively high. The first is the power absorption of autonomous organizations, and fiscal investment is directed to the establishment of a borderless governance network. The government assumes the responsibility of maintaining social stability. In addition to the fact that autonomous organizations have weak self-governance and strong dependence under the official governance tradition, interaction between government and society and grid governance have become the main measures of government intervention, guidance and service to the grassroots in the new era. Since 2014, the public security, urban management, development and reform and transportation departments of Xiangcheng District have been sinking to the grid to ensure the effective implementation of the grid, and more funds have been invested in finance. In terms of hardware construction, new communities were built at 600,000 yuan, and operating expenses were 160,000 yuan per year. The annual funding for community construction and operation activities alone reached more than 25 million yuan; in terms of social organization cultivation and guidance, the fiscal subsidy fund was more than 2 million yuan in 2015 alone; The finance supplements the village committees, and the public funds are similar to those of the agencies. The administrative staff is included in the town-level guarantee. At the same time, the village committee members are provided with subsidies for year-end rewards during the interaction between politics and society. The second is to invest financially in temporary hires to help power extension. As long as there is a demand, the report can generally be approved, and the average salary is about 4000 yuan. Fiscal government expenditures should mainly be invested in the supply of pure public products and services, and part of the supply of quasi-public products and services should be supplemented. Generally, they should not be involved in the supply of autonomous club-style products and services and should not be invested in private products and services. In terms of supply, but at present, the situation of power-encumbering fiscal expenditures to intervene in autonomous social organizations and private spheres still exists. Just take the law enforcement

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agency as an example. With financial support, it recruited a large number of community police officers, traffic police assistants, fire control assistants, urban management assistants, police assistants, etc., to enrich the three-level grid at the grassroots level. There are as many as 5000 police assistants of various types, plus other agent executors for fiscal expenditures. These are one of the reasons why expenditures on urban and rural community affairs remain high. If the maintenance of power is only supported by finances, not on statutory obligations, but on temporary contracts, the consequences can only be to increase the financial burden while at the same time. Under the circumstances of obvious downward pressure on the economy and poor fiscal revenues, vertical and borderless power agencies are unsustainable, leaving governance gaps and even affecting the stability of the regime. Tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 show the public financial revenue and expenditure and balance of Zhijin County in Guizhou Province from 2009 to 2013. The trend of changes in financial revenue and expenditure presented by it is a testament to Xiangcheng. Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 show a balanced trend. The Nature of Resource Monopoly and Increase in Fiscal Revenue This section analyzes how the power of the county government expands and contracts by looking at changes in the proportion of fiscal revenue and expenditure into GDP and its determinants, and which factors determine the magnitude of the power expansion and contraction. The following is the change in the proportion of total government revenue and budgetary revenue in the GDP of Xinji City (county-level city) from 1987 to 2015. From the results of the analysis of financial data in Xinji City, we can observe the publicity of the government and the nature of its fiscal growth. First, we look at the three trend graphs in Figs. 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10. The trends in these graphs have the following points of observation: the growth rate of total government revenue is higher than that of GDP; total government revenue is basically the same as the GDP growth trend, showing a non-linear development trend; there are several important joint points; there was a tax-sharing system in both 1989 and 1994, and the growth rate dropped after 2008 and 2010. To explain the following roughly: Figs. 8.8, 8.9, and 8.10 show the proportion of Xinji City government’s total fiscal revenue and budgetary

42.34 50.77 42.98 67.18 82.06

Unit: Million yuan

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

144.78 186.26 113.12 135.26 87.96

4.50 5.96 31.02 60.18 48.88

25.60 48.46 65.05 93.07 59.64

Corporate Individual income tax income tax

2.63 10.43 7.37 14.07 19.93

Resource tax

Value-added tax

Year/item

Business tax

Tax revenue in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013

Table 8.1

24.96 24.14 23.90 34.42 35.73

Urban maintenance and construction tax 8.44 11.82 115.06 227.03 225.04

Land occupation tax

8.83 15.36 31.42 10.50 10.54

Contract tax

18.83 15.60 9.03 17.00 19.85

Tobacco tax

8.15 9.19 15.55 17.48 17.95

Revenues of other taxes

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Table 8.2 Non-tax revenue in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 Year/item

Special revenue

Administrative fees

Penalty and expropriation revenue

Paid use of state-owned resources (Assets)

Other revenues

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

198.52 266.55 291.22 379.57 268.99

13.20 9.30 101.66 26.57 38.60

17.73 24.87 32.68 42.21 33.95

1.98 2.15 8.73 11.16 77.18

1.41 1.21 82.13 147.96 384.25

Unit: Million yuan

revenue in GDP. According to the Hebei Financial Statistics Yearbook, the total fiscal revenue of Xinji City includes budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue; budgetary revenue mainly involves tax revenue and non-tax revenue, and non-tax revenue consists of special revenue, administrative fee revenue, fine and confiscated revenue and state-owned revenue. Capital operation income comes from the user fee on stateowned resources (assets); extra-budgetary income mainly includes subsidies from superior levels of government (including tax refund, general transfer payment income, earmarked transfer payment income) and onlending the Ministry of Finance’s agent issuance of local government bonds. First, from 1987 to 1997, the proportion of total government revenue in GDP and the proportion of budgeted revenue in GDP basically coincided with each other; especially during the nine years from 1988 to 1996, the value of total government revenue and budgeted revenue was completely identical; only in 1987 and 1997, the total government fiscal revenue was slightly higher than the budget revenue. This indicates that in the eleven years from 1987 to 1997, the budget income is more than just the main source of government finance revenue, but it is likely to be the only source. In other words, in this period in this city, budgetary income is rarely even. This indicates that Xinji City has not received attention from the superior unit in the past few years. There is almost no subsidy, support, policy funding subsidy. This is related to the Upgrade of Xinji City to Xinji City (county level). On March 5, 1986, he was approved by the State Council, withdrawing a bundle prefecture,

20.11 37.81 38.26 46.54 54.99

Affairs of agriculture, forest and water

Unit: Million yuan

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Year/item

13.30 23.96 64.93 63.46 64.40

Transport

70.29 10.42 94.88 12.95 16.68

18.82 26.66 25.98 61.77 76.90

Resource surveying, electric information, and others

42.51 43.64 56.78 70.46 81.49

– 21.08 14.20 15.06 26.75

Business service sectors and others

1.50 1.98 2.27 3.58 3.63

1.72 – 2.44 7.04 4.05

– 63.90 51.14 10.65 14.71

State land, resources and metrology

28.23 19.47 21.35 29.65 34.60

Social security and employment

Financial supervision and others

8.70 17.99 15.36 20.54 33.93

Culture, sports and media

26.55 26.09 36.88 38.32 49.12

Science and technology

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Education

General public services

Year/item

Public security

General fiscal expenditure in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013

Table 8.3

– 26.82 34.64 51.12 52.13

Housing security expenditure

14.38 24.38 31.20 38.21 48.62

Medical health

14.40 3.28 3.69 4.67 9.68

Food and oil management

33.38 96.09 78.52 67.25 81.32

Energy-saving and environmental protection

11.32 50.00 10.66 38.85 20.61

Other expenditures

27.56 50.11 50.23 11.46 13.80

Community affairs in towns and cities

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Table 8.4 Tax refund revenue in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 Year/item

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Refund of value-added tax and consumption tax

Refund of fundamentals of income tax

Refund of petroleum product price and tax revenue of tax and fees reform

16.49 17.60 17.60 20.51 21.36

9.62 9.62 9.62 9.62 9.62

– 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.45

Unit: Million yuan

set up a Xinji City (county level), with the administrative region of the original Kelong County as the administrative region of Xinji City. Second, from 1987 to 1993, the total revenue of government financial revenue accounted for a sharp drop in the proportion of GDP. This line was shown in 1993. The middle was slightly rising, but overall emerged. This change is likely to be related to the following three aspects. (1) The rapid growth of GDP and the low-speed growth of fiscal revenue. GDP growth rate, in addition to 11.11 percent in 1988, 10.00 percent in 1989, from 22.02 percent in 1990, the remaining 1987, 1991, 1992, 1993 GDP growth rate more than 40 percent, the year 1987 saw the highest growth rate, reaching 49.45 percent; the growth rate of government finance revenue in 1988 was 18.14 percent, and the lowest was 7.04 percent in 1989. (2) After the reform and opening up policy was introduced, after the socialist market economy policy was carried out in 1992, the Xinji Municipal Government responded to the policy call, and the capital and funds were reserved more for the people. Developing a socialist market economy means that the market plays a basic role in resource allocation, suggesting that the actions of government inventive interventions have been greatly reduced. Overall, this not only activates corporate vitality, which is conducive to the rapid growth of GDP, and at the same time it is beneficial to the company because the company has sufficient development funds and development vitality. (3) 1980 to 1993, the impact of the financial package system implemented, compared to the previous financial management system, the local annual budgetary payment indicators under the financial package system were completed by the local package, and the overload is not completed, the balance remains.

101.64 109.82 145.19 167.87 144.80

Unit: Million yuan

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

– – 130.26 166.47 169.46

Social security and employment transfer

– 2.70 106.42 137.87 174.52

Medical care transfer

38.21 38.21 38.20 38.20 38.20

– 16.60 19.54 41.27 34.20

Agriculture, forestry and water transfer

156.02 156.02 168.94 183.92 190.12

– – 5.96 12.20 10.97

Reward for major grain and oil producing counties

– 19.30 44.57 55.58 89.11

– – 1.96 1.20 53.27

Other general transfer payment

0.88 2.95 0.58 6.70 8.36

649.61 884.69 806.97 129.99 113.87

Special transfer payment

– – – – 24.89

Transfer of public security, procuratorate, court, judicial departments at the grassroots

Educational transfer payment

39.83 41.88 40.27 52.80 57.76

Balance subsidy

Year/item

150.63 178.27 238.44 155.48 288.76

Transfer Reward payment and of tax and subsidy fees reform of basic in rural financial areas security at the county level

4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 1556.26

Transfer subsidy of adjustment salary

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Transfer payment in ethnic minority concentrated regions

Systematic subsidy

Year/item

Balanced transfer payment

Revenue from general transfer payment in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013

Table 8.5

36.68 5.00 0 – 0

Reward and subsidy of debt transfer of ministry of finance

– – – – 14.88

Reward and subsidy of public undertakings at the village level

– 6.05 – – 30.88

Subsidy of relieving debts

16.26 23.03 24.43 26.89 –

Public security transfer payment

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Table 8.6 Expenditure under balanced budget in Zhijin County from 2009 to 2013 Item/year

2009

Submission of revenue on special items to higher – level Bond principal repayment expenditure –

2010

2011

2012

2013

10.98 18.30 16.05 23.00 –

–

36.88 56.57

Unit: Million yuan

Fig. 8.8 The structure and changes in tax revenue as a share of local GDP

It is a reason for the local government to reduce fiscal revenue with power to reduce fiscal revenue, which is also a reason why Xinji’s fiscal growth rate is much lower than the GDP growth rate. Third, from 1994 to 2015, the government’s total revenue in the budget has gradually separated, and the extra-budgetary revenue has increased significantly. Budgetary income mainly includes superior subsidies (including returning revenue, general transfer payment income, earmarked transfer payment income) and transmissions revenue issued local government bond revenue. Due to the complexity of personal capacity limited and extra-budgetary income, the exact value of extra-budgetary income is not found, but the proportion of extra-budgetary income accounts for the

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Fig. 8.9 Comparison of the structure and trend of local fiscal and tax absorption ability in different periods

Fig. 8.10 Comparison of year-on-year changes in annual growth rates of total government fiscal revenue and of GDP

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proportion of fiscal revenue by the budgetary income, accounting for the proportion of fiscal revenue. Fourth, since 1994, the total financial income of the Xinji Municipal Government has grown steadily. (1) From the domestic context, the tax reform has been implemented in 1994, and the tax revenue was dominated and managed, respectively, according to the management system; the central government shall return to the central government management and disparity, local tax return to local government management and disparity; The financial management system of the budget. The implementation of the tax reform has enabled local governments to profit by reducing fiscal revenue, and in fact, local governments have a desire to expand their financial scale. The steady growth of the financial revenue of the Xinji Municipal Government explained this problem. (2) By observing the development of Xinji City, we find that its wildlife resources are rich, especially rabbits and bunches have higher hunting value, which has promoted the development of these annual informations, so that China’s largest leather chain is one of the production and sales bases. With the development of market economy and the in-depth of opening-up, in 1993, Xinji City invested 1.7 billion yuan, and built high standards of Xinji Leather City and three tangent industrial areas, including leather coat, leather clothing, luggage leather, fur machining, leather chemical, leather machinery, etc. More complete leather industry chains. The development of the leather industry in Xinji City has driven the growth of tax revenue, making its financial revenue also show steady growth. Fifth, compared with 2008 and 2010, the total proportion of China’s financial revenue in 2009 accounted for a slightly reduced proportion of GDP. In 2008, the growth rate of GDP in 2008 was 7.76 percent, while the growth rate of finance revenue was 1.02 percent. This is related to the 2008 financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis has made Xinji City. The export of trade products is affected, which affects tax revenue to a certain extent, and China’s domestic economy still maintains steady and rapid growth, which has caused the 2008 Xinhua GDP to maintain faster growth, and its financial revenue has a lower speed growth. Sixth, from 2010 to 2014, the proportion of GDP in financial revenue and the share of total revenue within the budget in GDP suggested a

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smooth and rising trend. This shows that since 2010, the government’s financial scale has been expanding, and the corresponding government power has been gradually expanding. Seventh, comparing the rise of 2010 to 2014 and 2015, the total revenue of government fiscal revenue accounted for the proportion of GDP, which indicates that government power has shrunk. This contraction and reform are deepening, and the implementation of the power list system is related to a series of reforms such as simultaneous reform and non-tax reform. (1) From the national aspect, on March 24, 2001, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, the General Office of the State Council issued the “Guidance for the Listing System of the Government Working Department at all levels”, and issued a notice, requiring various regions and all sectors to implement it according to real conditions. In 2015, the State Council approved and issued the Notice of “Promoting the Plan of Streamlining Administration and Delegating More Power to Lower Levels and the Work of Transforming the Government’s Function by Combining Delegation and Regulation”. (2) Specifically for Xinji City, Firstly, on July 2, 2014, Xinji Municipal People’s Government Office forwarded the “Notice of the General Office of the People’s Government of Hebei Province on Resolutely Preventing the Violation of Fund-raising”. Secondly, on May 18, 2015, the Xinji Municipal People’s Government has released “Notice on Further Improving the Financial Management System in Townships”. The Notice pointed out that according to the requirements of the township and town financial system in Hebei Province and the actual situation of Xinji City, the townships and towns have implemented the two systems of separate tax and unified revenue and spending. The former’s scope of use of the financial management system is the level of economic development and the non-agricultural aggregation is high, the financial revenue is large, strong in financial resources, has a certain scale of funds that can be used for economic development, urban construction, strong Urbanization development potential, through independent development and self-accumulation, growing townships with strong adsorption and radiation driving around the surrounding area. In accordance with the guidance standards determined by Hebei Province, in 2014, in townships with annual revenue more than 24 million yuan, financial management systems unders taxation system are implemented. The reform of the “Tax” financial management system in Xinji City has given the right to townships

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to a certain extent, making the total revenue of Xinji City’s municipal fiscal revenue. Thirdly, on February 16, 2015, the Xinji Municipal People’s Government forwarded the notice of the State Council’s preferential policies for cleaning and regulation taxes, and the tax collection and norms have a certain impact on the reduction in financial revenue in Xinji City. Through the financial data analysis of Xinji City, an important trend can be seen: the tax reform in 1994, completely motivated the ability of local governments to reduce fiscal efforts. Under tax conditions, national tax revenue is divided into central fixed income, local fixed income and centrally shared income. Sharing income includes large-value-added taxes, income tax and other major taxes, and is levied by the national tax sector established during the tax reform, and then divided into the central and places in a certain scale. Under this rule, there is no movement of local governments to make profits by reducing fiscal revenue. On the contrary, there is a strong motivation to impose a fixed income of its own place, and “support” the local tax department to increase tax efforts. For more sharing revenue and return revenue. In fact, in the departmental budget revenue of the National Taxation Bureau, there is about 2 percent of the financial subsidies from local governments. In the national tax and local tax departments under the taxation system, the central government and local governments have formed a community of interests where the fiscal scale expands. Tables 8.7, 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10 show that fiscal data come from developed regions, and the features of above-mentioned regions are more apparent. The situation in the city indicates that the central government has greatly summarized the power under the tax system and increased local government density. As compensation, the central government gives the city and county local governments rely on the land to live money. The latter has used this power to the extreme and continuously pushed housing prices and land prices to a new high point. Since the reform of the same tax system, the revenue scale has been continuously rising in a straight line. There is a trend in the expansion of fiscal revenue in nonbudget; and the integration of non-budget income curves and financial revenue curves is remarkable. Budget income curve shows that the total size of local fiscal revenues since the tax reform, but more dependent on

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Table 8.7 The situation of tax revenue of Xiangcheng of Suzhou and its districts and towns from 2001 to 2006 Year

Tax revenue

Tax revenue at the district and town levels

Proportion of tax revenue at the district and town levels in tax revenue (percent)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

137.37 174.52 249.39 454.37 720.65 954.18 1294.23 1633.00 1851.87 3030.42 3638.09 3931.60 4498.86 4834.51 5162.22 5038.03

134.73 174.14 247.33 450.59 714.36 936.82 1259.33 1576.98 1788.55 2939.39 3505.24 3747.25 4300.56 4614.83 4944.78 4900.60

98.08 99.78 99.17 99.17 99.13 98.18 97.30 96.57 96.58 97.00 96.35 95.31 95.59 95.46 95.79 97.27

Unit: Million, percent

non-budgetary income, and the latter is mainly dependent on the change in land financial revenue. In this regard, the land and real estate market fluctuate, and became an important determinant of marginal changes in local fiscal scale after deciding on the reform of the tax system, because the main marketers in the real estate market are local governments, real estate developers and banks. For their own financial revenue, local governments have thousands of motivations, with real estate developers and banks, constantly pushing high real estate prices, or at least maintaining real estate prices in their fiscal revenue benefits will not be damaged.

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Table 8.8 The proportion of tax revenue, business tax, corporate income tax and individual income tax in Xiangcheng of Suzhou from 2001 to 2016 Year

Business tax

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

22.79 42.86 91.40 187.34 350.98 432.74 509.22 670.05 1845.09 987.44 1242.02 1244.55 1483.51 1478.81 1682.55 1394.97

Corporate Individual income tax income tax

57.21 63.15 62.14 102.47 119.05 172.47 208.19 215.15 194.81 239.81 318.42 365.93 458.72 560.26 584.48 649.88

26.09 32.78 49.29 79.29 106.85 122.15 207.35 229.49 249.87 379.13 463.17 412.81 530.55 605.83 656.20 820.22

Tax revenue

137.37 174.52 249.39 454.37 720.65 954.18 1294.23 1633.00 1851.87 3030.42 3638.09 3931.60 4498.86 4834.51 5162.22 5038.03

Percent of Percent of business corporate tax in tax income revenue tax in tax (percent) revenue (percent)

16.59 24.56 36.65 41.23 48.70 45.35 39.35 41.03 45.63 32.58 24.14 31.66 32.98 30.59 32.59 27.69

41.65 36.18 24.92 22.55 16.52 18.08 16.09 13.18 10.52 7.91 8.75 9.31 10.20 11.59 11.32 12.90

Percent of individual income tax in tax revenue (percent) 18.99 18.78 19.76 17.45 14.83 12.80 16.02 14.05 13.49 12.51 12.73 10.50 11.79 12.53 12.71 16.28

Unit: Million yuan, percent

8.2 Functions of Public Finance and Public Demands Directly related to the above analysis, this part of the country’s financial data analysis observes how to meet the public needs of grassroots society. On the one hand, the vast majority of rural areas are low in economic development. The lack of township financial resources, limited income— this is especially obvious after agricultural tax abolition; on the other hand, the township finance expenditure is huge when it comes to bearing the main part of rural compulsory education investment and to paying the huge number of staff workers who register out of government system and also share investment in rural social security inputs and infrastructure construction.

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Table 8.9 Tax revenue, business tax, corporate tax and individual income tax in Xiangcheng of Suzhou from 2001 to 2016 Year

Tax revenue

Tax revenue at the district and town levels

Business tax

Corporate income tax

Individual income tax

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

137.37 174.52 249.39 454.37 720.65 954.18 1294.23 1633.00 1851.87 3030.42 3638.09 3931.60 4498.86 4834.51 5162.22 5038.03

134.73 174.14 247.33 450.59 714.36 936.82 1259.33 1576.98 1788.55 2939.39 3505.24 3747.25 4300.56 4614.83 4944.78 4900.60

22.79 42.86 91.40 187.34 350.98 432.74 509.22 670.05 845.09 987.44 1242.02 1244.55 1483.51 1478.81 1682.55 1394.97

57.21 63.15 62.14 102.47 119.05 172.47 208.19 215.15 194.81 239.81 318.42 365.93 458.72 560.26 584.48 649.88

26.09 32.78 49.29 79.29 106.85 122.15 207.35 229.49 249.87 379.13 463.17 412.81 530.55 605.83 656.20 820.22

Unit: Million yuan

At present, China’s township finances face serious difficulties, the deficits are huge, and the debt is heavy, and the reason is the unreasonable financial management system (see Tables 8.11 and 8.12). Although China has begun to implement tax system since 1994, at the grassroots level, the tax system is still not perfect. The power of the township finance is inconsistent with the rights of the financial power controlled, and the power of implementation is too big, but the financial power is too small. The upper level of the government has excessively concentrated on fiscal revenue and expenditure, and the standards of various departments in the development of fiscal expenses are not unified. Therefore, township finances are not only rigid, but also meet the financial expenditures and requirements of the multi-level department. The fundamental way to solve the difficulties and problems faced by township finances is to continue to deepen the reform of the financial management system, improve and standardize the tax system, which makes the township government’s financial rights and matters; at the same time, we should also vigorously develop rural economies, increase the

137.37 174.52 249.39 454.37 720.65 954.18 1294.23 1633.00 1851.87 3030.42 3638.09 3931.60 4498.86 4834.51 5162.22 5038.03

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

– 27.04 42.90 82.19 58.60 32.41 35.64 26.18 13.40 63.64 20.05 8.07 14.43 7.46 6.78 −2.41

Year-on-year growth rate of tax revenue (percent)

Unit: Million yuan, percent

Tax revenue

Year

134.73 174.14 247.33 450.59 714.36 936.82 1259.33 1576.98 1788.55 2939.39 3505.24 3747.25 4300.56 4614.83 4944.78 4900.60

Tax revenue at the district and town levels

– 29.25 42.03 82.18 58.54 31.14 34.43 25.22 13.42 64.34 19.25 6.90 14.77 7.31 7.15 −0.89

Year-on-year growth rate of tax revenue at the district and town levels (percent) 22.97 42.86 91.40 187.34 350.98 432.74 509.22 670.05 845.09 987.44 1242.02 1244.55 1483.51 1478.81 1682.55 1394.97

Business tax

– 88.06 113.25 104.97 87.35 23.29 17.67 31.58 26.12 16.84 25.78 0.20 19.20 −0.32 13.78 −17.09

Year-on-year growth of business tax (percent)

57.21 63.15 62.14 102.47 119.05 172.47 208.19 215.15 194.81 239.81 318.42 365.93 458.72 560.26 584.48 649.88

Corporate income tax

– 10.38 −0.16 64.90 16.18 44.87 20.71 3.34 −9.45 23.10 32.78 14.92 25.36 22.14 4.32 11.19

Year-on-year growth of corporate income tax (percent)

26.09 37.28 49.29 79.29 106.85 122.15 207.35 229.49 249.87 379.13 463.17 412.81 530.55 605.83 656.20 820.22

Individual income tax

– 25.64 50.37 60.86 34.76 14.32 69.75 10.68 8.88 51.73 22.17 −10.87 28.52 14.19 8.31 25.00

Year-onyear growth of individual income tax (percent)

Table 8.10 A Year-on-year increase of tax revenue, business tax, corporate income tax and individual income tax in Xiangcheng of Suzhou from 2001 to 2006

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498.65 322.82 567.24 691.00 754.01 874.08 641.83 1090.15 1568.74 1548.88 1471.84 3437.86 1823.49 570.62 852.86 937.12 935.64 1660.39 987.99

Average 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Average 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Average 2003 2004 2005 2006

2007 Overall average

284.42 313.19

393.96 276.52 355.13 335.83 334.04

271.40 312.67 519.38 459.84 466.69 311.24

274.19 284.95 283.51 270.49 260.37 257.69

231.92 262.49 277.15 275.08 284.32

Total amount of creditor’s right

1375.97 674.81

1429.53 294.10 497.74 6011.29 601.69

370.43 777.48 1049.36 1089.04 1005.15 3126.62

224.46 37.87 283.72 420.51 493.64 616.39

66.97 160.12 294.32 305.98 384.91

Net debt balance

24.70 11.43

23.05 4.04 8.13 10.09 10.72

6.99 10.90 16.03 16.77 17.08 55.22

4.24 0.71 5.35 7.93 9.31 11.63

0.5 3.02 5.55 5.77 7.26

Average debt balance in towns

5.15 2.58

4.85 1.27 2.08 2.37 2.42

1.75 3.29 4.08 3.65 3.38 10.64

1.12 0.18 1.35 2.00 2.35 2.90

0.34 0.81 1.47 1.52 1.90

Per capital net debt balance

4.70 3.91

4.34 3.55 4.30 3.86 3.03

3.44 4.18 4.80 3.86 2.96 5.61

3.29 2.62 3.78 3.80 3.30 3.49

3.03 3.57 3.92 2.91 3.40

Debt ratio in townships and towns (percent)

10.11 7.95

10.45 6.62 8.61 7.99 6.97

6.48 9.97 12.17 9.08 7.52 15.22

6.04 4.15 6.62 7.29 6.82 6.90

4.62 5.91 7.23 6.32 6.29

Individual debt ratio (percent)

FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE (1): THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT …

Unit: Million yuan, percent Remarks: 1. Debt ratio in town and township equals total amount of debt in town and township dividing the GDP of the township multiplying 100 percent. 2. Individual debt ratio equals per capita total amount of debt dividing net income of farmers multiplying 100 percent.

The weighted average according to year

Developed regions

Medium-level regions

298.89 422.61 571.47 581.06 669.23

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Underdeveloped regions

Total amount of debt

Year

The scale of government debt and debt burden of sample townships

Type of region

Table 8.11

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498.65 322.82 567.24 691.00 754.01 874.08 641.83 1090.15 1568.74 1548.88 1471.84 3437.86 1823.49 570.62 852.86 937.12 935.64 1660.39 987.99

Average 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Average 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Average 2003 2004 2005 2006

2007 Overall average

Unit: Million yuan, percent

The weighted average according to year

Developed regions

Medium-level regions

298.89 422.61 571.47 581.06 669.23

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Underdeveloped regions

Total amount of debt

Year

284.42 313.19

393.96 276.52 355.13 335.83 334.04

271.40 312.67 519.38 459.84 466.69 311.24

274.19 284.95 283.51 270.49 260.37 257.69

231.92 262.49 277.15 275.08 284.32

Total amount of creditor’s right

1375.97 674.81

1429.53 294.10 497.74 6011.29 601.69

370.43 777.48 1049.36 1089.04 1005.15 3126.62

224.46 37.87 283.72 420.51 493.64 616.39

66.97 160.12 294.32 305.98 384.91

Net debt balance

The government debt purpose of sample townships

Type of region

Table 8.12

24.70 11.43

23.05 4.04 8.13 10.09 10.72

6.99 10.90 16.03 16.77 17.08 55.22

4.24 0.71 5.35 7.93 9.31 11.63

0.5 3.02 5.55 5.77 7.26

Average debt balance in towns

5.15 2.58

4.85 1.27 2.08 2.37 2.42

1.75 3.29 4.08 3.65 3.38 10.64

1.12 0.18 1.35 2.00 2.35 2.90

0.34 0.81 1.47 1.52 1.90

Per capital net debt balance

4.70 3.91

4.34 3.55 4.30 3.86 3.03

3.44 4.18 4.80 3.86 2.96 5.61

3.29 2.62 3.78 3.80 3.30 3.49

3.03 3.57 3.92 2.91 3.40

Debt ratio in townships and towns (percent)

10.11 7.95

10.45 6.62 8.61 7.99 6.97

6.48 9.97 12.17 9.08 7.52 15.22

6.04 4.15 6.62 7.29 6.82 6.90

4.62 5.91 7.23 6.32 6.29

Individual debt ratio (percent)

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source of wealth of township, reduce the number of personnel supported by finance, improve the utilization efficiency of fiscal funds and achieve the optimal configuration of financial funds. The Status Quo of Difficulty in Fiscal Operation in Township From the national perspective, the urban financial funds are insufficient, the guarantees are weak, causing not only the national nature of its “financial functions”, but also the operation is also a problem; on the other hand, the grassroots social public requires a secondary position and powerless supply. The township government is inadequate. First, the fund for government’s normal operation is not enough. Generally speaking, in this case, county finance usually increases the total amount of financial resources in townships by increasing taxes, adjusting systems, etc., while increasing the possibility of funding. But it will not consider township liabilities, so after townships return some new and old debts every year, the funds used for operation are not enough. Second, it is not enough funding for developing social undertakings. In civil affairs, the repair of the nursing homes, the basic life guarantee required for difficult people is not enough; on the safe side, the resolution of emergencies is not enough; the family planning service station staff cannot guarantee, the operating cost is not enough. To solve some specific problems, you have to “wait, rely on, ask for”; this means that you need either to reach out to the superior, or through various ways to “strive for funds”, or wait for the first-level policy (such as rural medical insurance, low insurance) because township finance has no ability to help social undertakings. The public services provided by the township government are very limited. In the twenty-first century, grassroots social contradictions and social conflicts have become more serious, forcing the township government to provide more public services from direct economic management, but the financial resources are limited, and the public services that can provide are significantly less. First, social public security, townships have certain administrative punishments in the safety supervision work, regarding a “rich” department, and daily work can be carried out. However, it is weak to improve township fire facilities, remove large hazardous buildings. Second, as for services related to “agriculture, rural area and famers”, industrialized agriculture, industrialization, rural urbanization are the goal and direction of the development of rural economy. If

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the township has no money, that is, it will have no ability to push forward the goal and move toward the direction. The lack of funds is an important reason. Insufficient supply of basic public goods and public services is one of the reasons for the decline in the credibility of township government. First, the government’s credibility is declining. Some work arrangements such as maintenance of schools, renovation of village roads, paying off a default or building the supporting facilities needed for agricultural industrialization are not achievable due to insufficient financial funds. As a consequence, ordinary people will judge us like this “our actions do not match our words” and “we pay less attention to promise”. Second, our cadres are inactive to do their work. When some employees cannot receive the bonus or just get some of the bonus, our cadres are never willing to use their money to pay for them, with expenses related to traveling or small-size office products and others. This shows that their work is not active. Regarding the communication among cadres, some cadres who work in county-level departments are generally unwilling to work in township. Internal Factors in the Difficulty of Fiscal Operation in Townships The township finance has played a huge role in the progress of rural economic development and social undertakings, but with the continuous development of economic and society, especially in the implementation of tax reforms in rural areas, various conditions have prompted the township fiscal revenue and expenditure. There is a big difficulty in operation. Economic growth is slow, and development is anemic. In the vast territories in the Midwest, most townships are agricultural towns, and the economic structure is relatively simple, industrial development has not started, and township enterprises and individual private economic development are relatively lag. Some townships have almost no domestic projects in the reform and opening up, and they are still in the state of agriculture, and the economic development is generally slow. In three aspects: First, the total economic volume is obviously low; second, the industrial structure is mainly based on traditional agriculture; third, secondary and tertiary industries are small, and there are no enterprises in most townships, or only one or two brickworks, small winery, etc., individual private economies are small and small. Reflected in fiscal revenue, agricultural tax, agricultural specialty tax in front of the tax reform,

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accounting for 50 percent of the financial revenue of this grade, 70–80 percent, and there is no big tax source after tax reform as the support of financial revenue in this level. Due to the small size of the township economy, coupled with the “tax content” based on traditional agriculture, the size of township fiscal revenue is significantly small, and the growth is relatively slow with a lack of development. Township debt is too heavy, financial operation is difficult, so this is a historical reason for the difficulties in township. According to the survey, the average liabilities of townships are more than 4 million yuan, up to more than 30 million yuan, and most township debts are attributable to the development of public welfare undertakings, the establishment of township enterprises, the improvement of office conditions, the construction of towns and agricultural development. In consequence, the debt has accumulated increasingly, and the township finance is overwhelmed with burden, thus causing a serious impact on all works of township. First, the money paid by cadres and workers for undertakings cannot be returned, which influences the enthusiasm of work; the second is that township leaders are often entangled in debt, so they cannot work properly; third, the funds have caused all kinds of social contradictions, and the investment of social public welfare is largely insufficient, which seriously influence economic and social development. From the perspective of township finances, due to the effective guarantee of the township finance, most of the fiscal is operational, the debt operation is operational, and due to the resolution and resolution in the long years, the more accumulated, the deeper the burden. For example, X township finance office is always operating under debt burden, reaching between ten thousand yuan and ten million yuan. According to preliminary statistics, the debt of the county township finance office amounted to 13.24 million yuan; such heavy debt burden has a serious impact on the normal working order and work quality of township finances. In addition, because of the management of township fiscal, township and township government management, township fiscal resolution debt risks are very weak, often due to government debt in the dilemma of litigation and disputes. The large influence of policy and the salient contradiction of revenue and spending are the policy reasons for the difficulties of township finance. First, the impact of rural taxation reform. The reform of the rural tax and fees implemented in the central government has greatly reduced the burden on farmers. The masses have been greatly affordable, but due

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to the lag behind the country, the income is mainly coming from the three tributes, education fees, agricultural specialty tax, slaughter tax, agricultural tax and other taxes. After the central government has implemented the reform of the rural tax and fee, the above tax payment is canceled, which has caused a large gap in township income. For example, before tax reform, X-town charges two taxes of farmity of more than 700,000 yuan per year, and the reform is more than 1.8 million yuan. After tax reform, this transfer payment subsidy is less than 1.1 million yuan, and the phase difference is 800,000 yuan, and finance is more difficult. The second is the impact of the reform of the taxation system. One of the guiding ideas of the financial institutional reform of the sub-tax system is to enhance the central macroeconomic capacity by concentrating on the financial resources. However, in order to ensure the financial revenue of this grade, the governments of all levels have made efforts to improve the proportion of financial revenue of this grade, and some of the taxes such as finance, telecommunications, personal income tax and financial business tax are collected, so they can go to the township level. It is conceivable to collect taxes. The third is that the expenditure of policy expenses is too high. In recent years, the state has successively introduced a lot of capital income policies, involving the broad, increasing amount; also established minimum living security and unemployment insurance, rural cooperative medical care, etc. The township government is responsible for the development and protection of stability, and the growth potential of fiscal revenue and financial tolerance is out of stamping, and the rights and property rights are increasingly incompatible. Ineffective budget management and ineffective financial monitoring are the reasons for the financial difficulties of townships. As far as township leaders are concerned, all capital expenditures are determined by “leadership research”, and financial fund management is completed. Regarding operating in accordance with the budget method, budgeting at the beginning of the year, adjustments in the middle of the year and final accounts at the end of the year are not paid much attention to let alone scheduling and using funds based on the budget. However, due to institutional and institutional reasons, the township and township financial departments are unable or unable to monitor the use of funds too much. Of course, it is impossible to talk about improving the efficiency of the use of funds. How to manage finances in accordance with the law (budget law, accounting law) and improve the management level is an important topic

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that urgently needs to be studied by township cadres, especially township leading cadres. In addition, in the reform of township institutions, the personnel has not been streamlined, and the financial funds are mainly used to “ensure food”, which is also one of the reasons for the financial difficulties of the township. In the face of the above-mentioned common problems in township finance, the grassroots government responds to the problems in accordance with the traditional old thinking and old methods of national finance, fulfills the functions of grassroots government construction and completes the basic tasks of national finance. For example, the common practice is to strengthen the economic strength of towns and villages. Firstly, we should pay attention to local characteristics and build well-known brands. We should use characteristic brands to promote income growth, increase agricultural efficiency, increase farmers’ income and improve industrial efficiency and fiscal taxation. Secondly, we should pay attention to investment promotion and develop the private economy. We should expand the opening up, depend on external forces, start internal forces, focus well on an open economy and follow the road of exchange of stock for increments and use assets to find capital, so as to realize the low-cost expansion of township industries. Thirdly, we should focus on long-term benefits and the development of tertiary industries. For example, we should seize the opportunity of the construction of rural roads and the “village-to-village” project to accelerate the transformation of rural power grids, accelerate the construction of small towns, create a distribution market for commodity circulation and develop the tertiary industry. The second is to increase the township’s ability to boost tax revenue. First, we should strengthen tax collection and management. We should also pay attention to the total amount and quality of fiscal and tax revenue, and extensively establish a tax control system. Intensify tax inspections, crackdown on stealing, leaking, fraud and anti-tax behaviors, and establish a tax protection system with tax administrators as the main body and ensure the steady growth of fiscal revenue. Second, we should cultivate follow-up financial resources. Guided by the idea of “relying on economic development to increase financial resources and promoting economic development through finances”, we should choose the right development direction and financial growth points, formulate realistic

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economic development ideas and focus on cultivating subsequent financial resources. Third, we should improve the capital efficiency of towns and villages while focusing on increasing revenue and reducing expenditure, and innovate management measures. We should promote the fiscal and tax revenue target assessment responsibility system, and break down fiscal and tax tasks at different levels: actively organize fiscal revenue, clear taxes and fees, catch old debts and promote collection. And we should also calculate and levy according to the rate, standardize tax reduction and exemption, establish the concept of reducing expenditures and increasing income, adhere to the financial guiding ideology of “working within your means, living within your means, increasing revenue and reducing expenditures, increasing income and reducing expenditures” and implement “separate revenue and expenditure” management for non-tax income to reduce general expenses such as conference expenses, entertainment expenses, vehicle expenses, travel expenses, water and electricity expenses. In accordance with “moderate, efficient, and unified”, we should remove and merge towns and towns, divert personnel, reduce financial burdens, adjust business layout and optimize educational resources. Meanwhile, we should rationally merge village organizations, streamline village cadres, implement cross-part-time jobs and reduce village-level expenditures. The third is to focus on financial management in accordance with the law and strengthen financial supervision. We should establish and improve township financial management methods and standardize financial revenue and expenditure. We will vigorously carry out inspections on the effectiveness of fiscal expenditures, establish a mechanism for tracking the effectiveness of fiscal funds, shore up the supervision and inspection of various special funds for poverty alleviation, relief, disaster relief, etc., to ensure that the funds are earmarked for use and improve the efficiency of the use of funds. We should introduce fiscal internal audit methods to prevent and resolve fiscal risks and ensure the safety of fiscal funds. The fourth is to focus on system improvement and increase transfer payments. First, standardize the new rural financial management system and straighten out the management relationship. The county and township finance should take into account the current development trends, upgrade and update some outdated rural financial management systems within the scope of fiscal policies, and establish, revise and improve the “Rural Financial Management Implementation Rules” and “Economic Responsibility Accountability System” and other systems. Second, establish a new county and township financial system. Since the “Eleventh

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Five-Year Plan”, township finance has entered a new period of development, but the economic development level, financial situation and geographical location of each township are very different. The previous fiscal system has not adapted to the development of the situation. Therefore, we must adhere to the “people-oriented” concept and formulate a new fiscal system. The important task is to ensure the normal operation of the grassroots government, lock the financial debts of towns and townships and establish a repayment fund system. Third, we should increase the transfer payment. After each year-end county finance deducts township and village cadre expenses, various insurance premiums, historical loans, water fees, etc., there is a large gap in public expenses such as unit public expenses, road transportation construction, preferential treatment expenses, subsidies for village-level office expenses, etc., that the township must insure, let alone repaying debts, reducing deficits and reducing debts, but when the new year is approaching, part of the arrears still needs to be repaid and part of employee allowances paid to ensure stability. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed from the reality of the township to ensure that the increase in tax revenue and the reduction in financial resources due to the abolition of the agricultural tax and agricultural special product tax due to the central policy are fully compensated, and the financial gap in the township should be reduced. Meanwhile, the higher-level financial departments should give them financial powers that are compatible with their powers, so that the township finance can coordinate expenditures according to its own financial resources, truly “send the government back to the township” and expand the regulation and control capabilities of the township finances. The fifth is to optimize the expenditure structure of townships. We should center on “public” finances and standardize the scope of supply. In accordance with the requirements of establishing public finances, the scope of supply of township finance mainly meets the government’s administrative expenditure and supports the needs of agriculture, science and education, culture, safety and stability and family planning. First, it is necessary to ensure the payment of cadres’ salaries, resolutely reduce business expenditures and strictly control transactional expenditures. At the same time, we should also pay attention to revenue and expenditure and harden budget constraints. We should strengthen the budget constraint mechanism, prepare annual budgets in strict accordance with the “Budget Law” and relevant policies and regulations, use revenue to determine expenditures, strictly control non-productive expenditures, avoid deficit

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budgets and arrange expenditures in strict accordance with the budget. It is important to strengthen supervision of budget preparation and implementation in accordance with the law, change the practice of disrespecting budget preparation and strictly control additional budget expenditures. We should pay attention to expenditure reform and strengthen financial management and optimize the expenditure structure to focus on key points, maintain and suppress. At the same time, we should also promote departmental budgets, comprehensive budgets and government procurement systems, implement “retailer management” for the finances of township agencies and public institutions and adopt a system of “examination and approval of expenditures” to ensure it is implemented in a good way in order to enhance the budget control ability and improve the use of fiscal funds.

CHAPTER 9

Finance and Governance (2): The Significance of Public Finance Restructuring at the Grassroots for Social Governance Transformation

Public finance is democratic finance that integrates individual needs, public needs and government fiscal functions. The transition from finance that realizes state functions to finance that meets the public needs of society not only has the substantive significance of the transformation of the fiscal functions of the grassroots government but also promotes the changing direction of democratic governance of the grassroots society. This is because government finances are responsible for the needs of society and the public, give finances a democratic nature and protect the people’s political, economic, social and cultural rights so that taxpayers’ public benefits from the government are greater than the value of resources transferred to the government through taxation. In order to make the government’s publicity and the construction of basic-level public social relations internally related, this is the essential meaning of modern social governance. Presently, discussions on the transformation of social governance have not paid enough attention to the relationship between the public nature of government finances and democratic governance and have no intention of explaining the close relationship between the two. As a result, the issue of government finance has become a matter that politicians, administrative functional departments and financial experts can arbitrarily decide. But in

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_9

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fact, the fiscal issue is, even more, a matter of the building of a democratic society. In this sense, without the establishment of public finances, or in other words, without focusing on the building of the public nature of finance, there would be no democracy in the so-called transformation of social governance. The significance of governance includes the practice of “participatory budgeting” in community governance that is jointly promoted by local governments and academia.1 Some confirmed facts are that without a democratic governance system structure, we will not see much substantial significance of innovation and institutional reform. The significance of the public nature of government finances or the transformation of social governance involves taxation democracy, resource distribution fairness, and distribution justice. This is also the essential meaning of promoting the current fiscal system from a planned economy’s “economic construction-based finance” to a market economy’s public finance transformation.2 Moreover, the publicity of finance is closely related to the legitimacy of the government. Citizens’ consent or refusal to pay taxes constitute the basis for the development of a country’s democratic system, and the rights of citizens, therefore, restrict state power.3 It embodies the modern essential meaning of social democratic governance. Therefore, the “production-construction-oriented finance” that serves the realization of state functions is essentially different from the public finance that serves the well-being of citizens, because this issue is closely related to the legitimacy of government power. In other words, the publicity embodied in public finance is the inherent requirement of the transformation of modern social governance. It can also be said that the public nature of government finance is a democratic social governance problem in the final analysis, which reveals the legitimacy of government power and the fairness and justice of the distribution system of social resources.

1 Meng Yuanxin. 2010. “Investigation and Research of Participatory Budget Practice in

China”. China Reform Forum Website, September, 20. 2 Xia Changjie. “The Policy Thinking of Providing the Level of Supply and Demand of Basic Public Services—Analysis Based on the Perspective of Public Finances”. Economy and Management (1). 3 Xiong Wei. 2004. “Constitutional Government and Transformation of Finance in China”. Faxuejia (5).

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9.1 Public Finance and Its Significance for Modern Governance The attention to the legitimacy of the modern tax system began with the claims of rights in the early capitalist development process. Theoretically, it is the classical liberalism represented by Adam Smith who fully explains this.4 Since then, the legality of the modern tax system has been linked with the public nature of the public sector (government). For example, taxation embodies two principles: the country’s financial needs and taxpayers’ interests. In other words, not all forms of fiscal revenue can be called “taxation”, because the primary feature of the modern tax system is the taxpayer’s consent. Taxation is a form of fiscal revenue that exists only in a modern country composed of free citizens. Its essence is that the members of the community voluntarily put out some resources so that the community has the strength to improve each member. In contrast, the finances of the imperial autocratic society rely on the state’s ownership of property (land) to obtain fiscal revenue. Its legitimacy is not established on personal rights and private property rights, but on the jurisprudence of taxation rights that are privately owned by the imperial power.5 In summary, taxes (taxes) in pre-modern countries (imperial power or royal power) are not based on the taxpayer’s consent. And it is also called “contribution”,6 reflected by the mandatory and looting nature of the tax. But the modern country’s tax system is based on the legitimacy of the public’s consent (the so-called “no taxation without representation”), including taxation and its use direction, which must be approved by representative agencies and established on the basis of public interest. It is one of the essential signs of the modern state. But the national finance with the modern tax system as the core is a historical category, not a logical category. It is based on a certain economic system and political system, or in other words, different economic and political systems have different fiscal models, and there are

4 Regarding the theory of taxation of classical liberalism, please see Adam Smith’s book

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth (translated by Tang Risong. Huaxia Publishing House, 2005). 5 Wang Yi. 2004. The Mandatory Nature of Tax System in the Society of Imperial Power and Its Fundamental Difference from the Tax System of Constitutional Government. Academia (5). 6 Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock. 2015.

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also different opinions on the public nature of finance. For example, the fiscal tax system of socialist countries. This tax system gains legitimacy through the representative body—the People’s Congress—and serves “production and construction type finance”, that is, the state is the main body of social resource allocation, and the fiscal system is based on the distribution function with the state as the main body plays a leading role in the allocation of social resources, and finance covers almost all aspects of production, investment and even consumption. Necessarily related to this fiscal system are the planned economy system and the “totalism”7 state governance model. This fiscal system incorporates all citizens into the national resource allocation system, such as the urban unit system and the rural people’s commune system, which is a typical form of interest organization in the distribution of wealth and resources under a fiscal system. The above-mentioned different types of fiscal and tax nature lead to the question of this chapter, that is, taxpayer’s consent is the essential connotation of fiscal publicity. Then, what is the relationship between the legitimacy of the grassroots government and fiscal publicity? What kind of public social relations do different types of fiscal and taxation systems and taxpayers have formed? In other words, what is the internal connection between the publicity of the grassroots government power and the social relations of grassroots publicity? These issues are closely related to the changes in the nature of public social relations due to the transformation of the fiscal system. The significance of the current transformation of China’s grassroots social governance involves two levels. The first is the transition from a planned system to a market system, which has led to changes in the distribution of social resources and changes in property rights. The proportion of state or all-people-owned social organizations in the entire Chinese society is rapidly declining. In some fields and industries, economic organizations owned by the state or the whole people have become a very small part, replaced by private, joint venture, or joint-stock economic organizations.8 The number of people entering the market organization is constantly increasing, and the number of people still in the unit’s interest structure is constantly decreasing. The 7 Tang Tsou. 2000. The Chinese Politics in the 21st Century—From the Perspective of Macro History and Micro Action. Oxford University Press (Hongkong): pp. 206–224. 8 Li Hanlin. 2014. The Chinese Unit Society: Discussions, Thoughts and Research. China Social Sciences Press: p. 1.

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significance of its social governance is what is the function and role of finance from the interest organization framework of unit society into the interest organization framework of public society. The second is what is the new form of organization of grassroots social interests. Changes in the economic structure have led to the diversification of the distribution of social wealth and resources, which is directly related to the diversification of interests, social conflicts and social competition. Its socio-political significance lies in the fact that the publicity of finance is directly related to the fairness and justice of social resource distribution. The past fiscal and taxation system served the purpose of strengthening the authority of the grassroots. Therefore, the transformation of this fiscal and taxation system is to establish the publicity of government finances on taxpayers’ consent and public interest. A complete explanation of the above issues first needs to return to the issue of the public construction of grassroots political organizations. In other words, only by returning to the historical development of the construction of grassroots political power, can we clarify what kind of internal logical and causal relationship the government’s legitimacy foundation has with the publicity of the fiscal and taxation system. Judging from the historical evolution of the functions and status of China’s grassroots regime, traditional imperial power to modern state form is a process of constructing the legitimacy of modern nationalism. In this process, the goal of grassroots regime construction is not to complete modern public social relations. It is only the functional realization part of state power construction (fiscal and tax extraction and social control and mobilization capabilities).9 In other words, it does not link the construction of modern power with the construction of modern grassroots public social relations. It only completes the modern reconstruction and strengthening of its own authority. This is concentrated in the fiscal and taxation system with nationalist characteristics that serves local authority. Furthermore, tax collection methods are inherently related to the nature of government power. The nature of the latter is reflected in the economic system. For example, “production and construction finance” is a product of a planned economy.10 The fiscal system may be different, such as unified revenue 9 Zhang Jing. 2001. “State Political Power Building and Village Self-Rule Unit— Problem and Review”. Kaifang shidai (Opening Era), (9). 10 Wang Guoqing and Shen Wei. 2005. “Analysis of Relations Between the Models of National Finance and Public Finance”. Financial Science (Caijing kexue) (1).

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and expenditure, fiscal contract system, tax-sharing system, etc., but the essential requirements of national finance (fiscal and taxation taken) have not changed, its basic principles or characteristics include: First, the state controls the allocation of social resources. Second, the distribution principle of state finance is based on the adjustment of the interests of the state, collectives, and individuals. Third, investment in people’s livelihood or social well-being has always been a secondary position in state finance.11 In conclusion, when paying attention to the changes in the fiscal system, the more crucial issue is that the fiscal system is closely related to the maintenance mechanism of fairness and justice in the distribution of social resources. By centering on the historical track of the fiscal system and the institutional procedures and public nature embodied in it, we find that it is possible to identify whether the building of grassroots political power takes the building of grassroots public social relations as the basic task, which can reveal the core meaning of the modern transformation of social governance. From another perspective, the development of finance and civil rights in modern countries are mutually supportive, and an essential sign is the continuous expansion of government publicity. This leads to the issue of public finances being discussed in this chapter. The so-called “public finance” is a kind of contractual arrangement in which the public based on the needs of common interests, through the transfer of part of their property ownership, in exchange for the public products and services they need. In essence, public finance embodies a social contractual relationship between taxpayers and the state.12 Therefore, public finance has three basic characteristics. First, meet the public needs of society. Social public needs determine the scope and effect of public finance activities. Second, it is about non-profit. The government department under the framework of public finance is a unit and entity motivated by the maximization of public interests. It must provide material guarantees, but cannot directly intervene in the market, so as to avoid corruption by government departments for personal gains. Third, standardize government revenue and 11 Xia Changjie. “The Policy Thinking of Providing the Level of Supply and Demand of Basic Public Services—Analysis Based on the Perspective of Public Finances”. Economy and Management (1). 12 Wei Jianguo. 2006. “The Formation of Constitutional Government Function of Representative System and Its Internal Mechanism of the West in Modern Period—An Explanation Based on the Perspective of Public Finance”. Zhejiang Social Sciences (1).

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expenditure behavior. One aspect is based on the legal system. The way and amount of fiscal revenue and the destination and scale of fiscal expenditure must be determined on the basis of the legal system. The second facet shows that all government revenues and expenditures are included in the budget. Through the preparation, review, execution and final accounts of the government budget, the government’s revenue and expenditure behavior can be under the supervision of the legislature and members of the society from beginning to end.13 The third is that the fiscal and taxation departments take charge of government revenues and expenditures. Therefore, the fiscal system is not only about economic growth. Its more essential meaning is reflected in the fairness and justice of the distribution of social resources. For example, why is the conflict of social interest also increasing as the economy grows? For another example, the government is getting richer and richer, but can the people not get richer? These problems are not “problems in development”, but directly point to the government’s fiscal publicity. Therefore, the essence of public finance is embodied in the connotation of the “political essence” revealed by the rule of law of the government budget and fiscal democracy. After the above analysis of the nature of national finances, the modern social governance implications of public finance can be summarized as follows. First, it involves the right of taxpayers. Different from premodern state power, modern state power comes from taxpayers, and it must provide taxpayers with the public goods and services they need. Therefore, taxpayers are the “ultimate constitutionalists”, which requires that finance must be democratic. The fiscal function is to realize the public interest, and the tax system is established on the basis of public consent. Under the socialist system, the realization of taxpayers’ rights is expressed in another legal system, that is, the state monopolizes almost all economic resources, and the main source of finance is the profits of state-owned enterprises. The state directly participates in economic life and participates in the initial distribution and redistribution of social wealth. The distribution principle of national fiscal and taxation system is collectivism, and it is the distribution principle and form of socialist distribution. That is to say, the distribution relationship of personal property ownership, state-owned property rights, and collective property rights is based on the collectivism 13 Wei Jianguo. 2005. “Representative System and Public Finance—The Formation of Representative System Model and Analysis of Its Role Mechanism”. Political Law Forum (6).

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principle of integrating the rights of taxpayers with the adjustment of the interests of the state, collectives, and individuals. Second, it is about the right of citizens to participate in fiscal decisionmaking. Government fiscal revenues and expenditures, budget and final accounts, etc., that is, fiscal control and decision-making power, must be made with the substantial participation of citizens. This power is not the government, but the people exercise the power of supervision and control over the fiscal budget through representative agencies. Moreover, it must be carried out under the substantive supervision of citizens, that is, the people have the right to supervise finances. It is the essential meaning of democratic finance or fiscal democracy, in other words, finance reflects a social contractual relationship between taxpayers and the state. That is to say, the taxation power of the state is symmetrical to its obligation to provide public services, and the tax obligation of the people is symmetrical to the right to enjoy public services provided by the state. This is a social contract based on reciprocity. Therefore, realizing citizen participation and its participation in the rule of law and institutionalization is the proper meaning of the construction of public finances. Third, public finance reflects the relationship of rights and obligations between citizens and the state. The tax system or finance of traditional or authoritarian countries only serves (or mainly serves) one person or a part of the privileged class. Unlike modern democracies, due to the strengthening of people’s awareness of rights, the publicity of the government is required (the most important of which is finance). The publicity must be based on the individual rights and social rights of all citizens. “The scope and nature of both rights and obligations determine the nature of the state’s regime”. In other words, people pay taxes to the state and transfer part of their property in order to better enjoy the state’s public services. In other words, if state finances are not public, the state will not have legitimacy, because without public finances, the publicity of state power cannot be guaranteed, and it cannot be ensured that state power is only used to provide public services. Such constitutional rights relationship requires fairness and justice in the distribution of social resources, that is, taxpayers are all citizens, not some (privileged) citizens, that is, the distribution of social resources must take the rights and interests of all citizens into consideration.

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Between Imperium and Dominium

However, it is not enough to make the difference between the abovementioned institutional characteristics of finance because a fundamental issue must be clarified or first clarified: the relationship between state government and property rights. From the perspective of country types, there are two fiscal models. First, the fiscal model that governs and property rights are unified, that is, the income derived from the state’s ownership of property, including various income generated by the state’s ownership, control, or transfer of property. All these can be called stateowned property income. In the era of imperial autocracy, it was a common form of income. The second is the fiscal model that separates governance and property rights. Only in modern countries can political power exist on the basis of organizations elected by the people, and power at this time has true publicity. In other words, the taxation power of modern countries relies on elected public organizations, adopting a universal, equal, direct, and standardized rationalization form, and is only allowed to be used for public purposes. Therefore, such taxation power Reflects true publicity. These two different fiscal models are determined by different political systems and legal systems or are based on different political systems and legal systems. In other words, from the perspective of the relationship between ruling power and property rights, it is possible to make a fundamental difference between the fiscal nature of pre-modern countries and modern countries in theory: the fiscal characteristics of the former depend on the ownership of property (land) held by the state. For fiscal revenue, the state system is constructed with property (land) and its ownership as the support. The resulting fiscal power has the characteristics of both ruling power and property right. Although it has a certain public nature, it is mixed with (royal power) and private. Real government power; the latter’s taxation is different from state-owned property income, it embodies publicity, which marks the real modern government power. Therefore, to understand the nature of a country’s taxation or finances, it is necessary to go back to its traditional state power form and the growth process of its modern state government power, and to explain the relationship between ruling power and ownership based on historical grounds, that is, from the entry of pre-modern countries The evolution of the nature of the relationship between ruling power and ownership in modern countries reveals the essential meaning of fiscal functions in ruling and governing society.

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The financial power of the imperial autocratic society firstly belongs to the royal family. This is a rather complicated set of discourses on the fiscal and taxation relationship between the king and private ownership, such as the essential characteristics of land ownership and private ownership, and the complex and complicated legal relationship between the two. From history from the above point of view, although the imperial fiscal power objectively also has the characteristics of “public nature”, it is only a derivative form of royal ownership. The private ownership of land under the state ownership of land has the political characteristics of the unity of ruling rights and property rights. Furthermore, land state ownership(kingdom) and private ownership coexist, that is, the status of land king and people’s ownership has always coexisted, but land king ownership is always the highest nominal system concept, the so-called “The land is owned by the king; farming crops is done by famers” refers to the private ownership of land under the land ownership (state-owned) system. The emperor plays the role of ruler and owner of his empire at the same time. Moreover, the fiscal model of the unity of ruling power and property rights has not changed after more than 2000 years of the monarchy era. The taxation system established on the unity of ruling power and property rights is the “combination of households and people”. “Household registration system under military management” are people who are listed in the national household registration and have equal status. “Household registration” has no personal rights and property rights. First, under the imperial power, the peasants do not break away from the system of “editing the people” to become free people, and the imperial power is established in the dependency relationship. That is to say, in the legal relationship of this system, farmers are not free people or self-employed farmers, but a member of “household registration system under military management” taken as the basis of imperial power. Second, when it comes to the consistency with the nature of the above-mentioned “personal rights”, farmers have no property rights. All wealth belongs to the emperor at the source. Therefore, “Although the small farmers occupy a small piece of land, they can even buy and sell, but conceptually the highest ownership of the land has always belonged to the emperor… When farmers of low status are personally occupied, the significance of their land ownership will not go beyond the meaning of their personal bodies”. In a nutshell, the peasants under the “household registration system under military management, as well as other households”, belong

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to the emperor. The emperor can decide for them to serve, to pay tax, to move and to be confined. Due to the personal bondage of the household registration system under military management, the householder, his taxation or labor servitude is inevitably authoritarian and predatory. The relationship between ruling power and property rights has changed since modern times, that is, shifting from traditional clan rule to a modern state pattern with the goal of overthrowing the old regime and replaced by modern party politics. But the political ruling logic that runs through it is still “the old logic of political rule featuring” whoever wins the whole country through military forces runs and rules it—the right to rule is gained only when the ownership of (land) is seized. The relationship between state power and ownership is based on this logic. Supported by this logic, the modern state is to extract as many resources as possible from rural society and strengthen social mobilization capabilities. The integration of ruling power and property rights began in New China. The state implements a planned economy system, and the fiscal system is based on the unity of ruling power and property rights. In such a fiscal system, the fiscal revenue derived from holding state-owned property may be monopoly rent (excess profits obtained by the government for its own privilege to create a monopoly position), or operating profit (the government does not rely on privileges). Relying on the normal profits obtained by state-owned enterprises), it may also be royalties or ordinary rents (the income obtained by the government from lending the right to use the property under its control). The sale or transfer of state-owned property may also generate income, that is, income from the transfer of ownership. Among the above income sources of state-owned property income, the most common income is actually monopoly rent, which is created by the state using coercive force. This form of fiscal revenue confuses the different nature of government power and private power, destroying the operation of the private economy and corrupting the publicity of power. The social management system adapted to this is the unit system and the street housing system implemented in the city and the people’s commune system implemented in the countryside. The entire society is included in the state power control system. “Members of society not only have an ‘organization’ to which they belong, are able to work and get paid, and more importantly, they and the public establish the structural relationship of the system: the individual gains a position in the new public system and becomes a member of it. This is equivalent to the individual obtaining the corresponding public qualifications, and the

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connection between the members of the society and the formal system of the state also occurs”. As far as the unit system is concerned, “The state combines compulsory administrative power and exchange property power. Through the allocation of resources and powers to the unit organization, it has the power to directly control the unit organization and make the unit organization attached to the country”. Moreover, the entire society members are immovably fixed in the right difference system formed by the household registration system, forming an identity society. The above-mentioned characteristics of the unity of ruling power and ownership are fully embodied in the ownership of the grassroots government: the integration of administrative power and resource ownership. The latter refers to the resources legally controlled and controlled by grassroots political organizations, including the stateauthorized economic resource control status (including taxation power, capital management power, and other various resources and resource disposal power provided by the state); legislation, law enforcement Jurisdiction status; mobilize society, form proposals, formulate procedures, collect and monopolize information and other organizations and decision-making authority, etc. These “public” conditions not only make the grassroots government the administrator of the administrative region, but also make it the operator of local public resources. It uses the abovementioned “public” conditions extensively for economic purposes and becomes an economic actor who engages in business without having to bear any risks. In other words, the economic actor status of the grassroots government has rapidly improved its financial autonomy, and it has continuously opened up self-financing channels by virtue of its “public identity” to support the increasing demand for administrative institutions and personnel expansion year by year. To a large extent, the existence of grassroots political organizations is based on extra-budgetary income on the basis of enterprises handed in and self-raised funds. In other words, the fiscal function of the grassroots government is the right to control and benefit from public resources. Under this system, the local territorial jurisdiction, judicial and law enforcement powers of the grassroots government, the right to control land, and the establishment of enterprises, the right to industry, the right to raise funds and the right to control state-owned or collective enterprises are inseparable. These authorities have caused the grassroots government to survive

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without relying on the state’s financial payments or the support of grassroots social forces. At the same time, the development of the role of public asset managers has made grassroots political organizations more deeply involved in capital monopolistic activities of property, financing, credit and market information. Moreover, with the symbolic capital of government power, capital-resource possession and dominance, the right to raise funds, the right to dispose of assets, credit and pricing status and so on, the basic-level political organizations engaged in business activities have greatly weakened the competitiveness of other social and economic actors, and at the same time put it in a position of interest competition and conflict with various economic organizations in the society. From the perspective of the relationship between state power and ownership, as well as the tax system borne by members of society and the identity characteristics and household registration system behind it, many aspects of the contemporary grassroots tax system can be traced from history. In other words, among these tax systems, the basic rationale and methods of collection have changed little over the centuries or even longer years. The difference in form from the “household registration system under military management” in the era of the imperial rule is that the former “serves one person in the world”, namely serving the emperor’s power; the latter serves the modern state power. The interesting relationship serves as a basic link of “wealth accumulation”. “In terms of substantive jurisdiction, the basic power structure is still the old, unified rules of action-the legal and tax system have not been established, and farmers are still under the rule of a divided political unit”. That is to say, in addition to the different legal narratives of the relationship between state power and ownership, the construction of grassroots power is not connected with the construction of modern public social relations. The meaning of the latter is that of the state. The legal fixation and constitutional structure of the relationship between family and civil rights. The traditional and contemporary forms of organization of social interests under the financial system, the household registration system, and the household registration system have the same national governance function and historical form. They have in common that they place the people in an immovable position.

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9.3 The Significance of Institutional Reform for Public Finance Construction As mentioned above, different types of countries have different fiscal systems and their fiscal functions. For example, the finances of the imperial autocratic society are autocratic, but the finances of modern countries are not necessarily public finances. The main reason is that the nature of the political system and the economic system are different. The distinguishing characteristics of the system are: “Public finance” and the finance to meet public needs are also called “public finance”. The former belongs to a planned economy system or an economic system in which state-owned property rights dominate, and the latter is a financial system compatible with modern democratic politics and market economy. Fiscal democracy not only combines constitutionalism and rule of law, but also unifies the requirements of political democracy and economic democracy. Its realization is of great significance to the rule of law of government behavior and the protection of civil rights. In other words, the market economy is one of the driving forces of public finance. For the socialist system, changes in the economic and social structure do not necessarily bring about changes in fiscal functions, but market-oriented reforms promote the growth of diversified economic communities other than the owner of the whole people, and the diversification of citizens’ economic and social life requires fiscal The function must be developed in the direction of democratic finance where citizens enjoy personal needs, public needs and government financial functions. In other words, the separation of ruling rights and property rights is the basic prerequisite for the rights and interests of all taxpayers and the realization of fair and just resource distribution. From the perspective of practical experience, after the marketization reform, the scope of private property rights has continued to expand, and its contribution to national finance has become greater and greater, and finance has become “paid finance”, that is, people obtain public products at the cost of part of their property rights. And public services, which requires the state to provide satisfactory public products and public services to the public and accept its supervision. At the same time, the issue of the public nature of taxation has also emerged. Therefore, to achieve a balance between the state’s fiscal rights and citizens’ property rights, and to guarantee the realization of taxpayers’ economic, social and cultural rights, this puts the government’s constitutional constraints on taxation rights on the agenda. The distribution

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relationship established on the principle of collectivism has been established. After losing the function and role of the organization of social multiple interests, on the one hand, citizens’ common needs continue to expand. On the other hand, modern social governance requires the protection of citizens’ individual rights and social rights. Among them, the rights of taxpayers have substantial significance in fair and just distribution of social resources. The protection of taxpayers’ rights includes the rights to life, freedom, property, and other rights, so that the concepts of social justice and basic human rights can be embodied in the actual institutional arrangements, to achieve the rule of law and finance, and to place government fiscal activities in the interests of citizens, that is, taxpayers under supervision. Under the above economic and social background, since the twentyfirst century, the establishment of “public finance” (budget rule of law and fiscal democracy) has been constantly raised. Synthesizing the expressions of the government and academia, its meaning can be summarized into three aspects: First, guaranteeing the state’s ability to absorb (that is, the state’s ability to obtain financial resources from society) promotes the establishment of the fiscal and taxation relationship between the state and local governments in a constitutional framework; the second is to curb the illegal tax collection behavior of grassroots government organizations, so that the grassroots government organizations can truly become the state The agent in the grassroots society; the third is to eliminate the contradictions and conflicts (between the officials and the people) that have accumulated in the grassroots society, so that the rights and interests of the people, the taxpayers, are protected, and the local order and stability are ensured. However, the construction of public finance to this day is only reflected in the increase in investment in the so-called “people’s livelihood”, that is to say, the “publicity” that public finance must have—the rule of budget and fiscal democracy—has not yet been integrated into the whole government. In the process of fiscal revenue and expenditure, it has not been integrated into the government’s process of formulating fiscal policies, and it has not been integrated into the government’s budget preparation and budget control. The grassroots government has always been focusing on operational and competitive fields, and almost all administrative power has been concentrated on the income of state-owned assets, that is, dividends, dividends, rents, capital possession fees, land lease income and state-owned assets obtained by virtue of its asset ownership. Transfer and

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disposal income, etc., as well as various fees and fund income collected by various government departments, including various fees and public property use fees collected in the process of administrative law enforcement. Moreover, the government has always played a fundamental or decisive role in the allocation of resources. It usually uses various law enforcement powers to exclude and eliminate various competitive factors for its own business activities, and relies on its monopoly on public resources to control the distribution of market opportunities. To make it develop toward the rules of the game that are conducive to one’s own interests and preferences in order to pursue the interests of others prior to others, resulting in individual economic actors in an unfair competitive position, thereby inhibiting the economic rights and individual property rights of the local society The growth of globalization and market rules. In other words, the reason why the construction of public finances has not been substantively promoted requires an institutional perspective. First, the current tax system and the resulting grassroots fiscal taxation activities are not established on the basis of social consent. Therefore, it cannot play a role in mediating income distribution objectively, and therefore it does not have to be responsible for rural public goods expenditures. Instead, it only concentrates the revenue to the greatest extent to the tax collectors, that is, grassroots political organizations. Second, the current tax system and its “tax reform” are not formed by the grassroots people participating in the decision-making and management of local public affairs, and through bilateral and multilateral equal dialogue with the state and grassroots governments. It has an indisputable characteristic of exclusive authority. Third, the fiscal centralization system has led to the preferred action strategy of grassroots government organizations to increase management costs and strengthen management capabilities, and enforce taxation tasks. However, measures such as “village finance and town management”, “township finance and county management” and other initiatives aim to mention the county government to the management authority of funds that originally belonged to the peasant collective. There is a consequence of institutional violations: counties and townships squeeze and misappropriate collective funds, while village collectives have “reasons” to charge farmers more. Fourth, when such a tax system design incurs positive or negative resistance from taxpayers, it is increasingly difficult to collect taxes and fees, and the grassroots government is more inclined to expand the ranks of cadres and strengthen tax management

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(charging) functions, thereby increasing management costs. It is bound to increase the burden of farmers’ assessments. For example, in formulating tax tasks, the grassroots government organizations only pay attention to how much they can collect, how to collect excessive amounts, and how to “dig out tax sources”. That is to say, it does not consider how to win the support of the people, the legality of its tax structure, that is, just taxation. It only considers its own interests and preferences, pursues tax maximization and portrays taxpayers as tax evaders who always deliberately conceal their economic conditions and provide false information, and regard them as opponents, not collaborators who do not follow the rules. This situation is reflected in its fiscal budget plan of “determining revenue by expenditure”. That is to say, this kind of budgetary institutional arrangement allows only a few people to participate in the budgeting process, thereby helping to minimize the conflicts that political participants may cause due to conflicts of interest. However, the opacity brought about by this process greatly reduces Budget decision-making and fund allocation have become the personal behavior of a few people. This kind of fiscal budget plan similar to “using other people’s money to discuss one’s own expenses” (Milton Friedman) usually can only rely on the administrative method of “strengthening collection measures” to implement. This will inevitably lead to non-cooperation and even opposition between the grassroots and the tax administration. There are a large number of tax evasion activities, such as non-fulfillment of tax obligations, under-reporting of taxable income, and failure to pay taxes in a timely manner. Grassroots taxation work is difficult, and the relationship between grassroots governments and grassroots people is always in tension and conflict. Generally speaking, the construction of public finance or the reform of the fiscal and taxation system should not be reduced to a country’s control capacity or fiscal issues. Instead, it should be carried out on the basis of the structure of the institutional development of power competition and the balanced allocation of power. In this sense, “the key to the choice of tax system is not what kind of tax structure is reasonable and desirable, but whether the decision-making process that determines the tax structure can fully reflect the preferences and values of individuals and organizations that are given the same rights”. Furthermore, the current political system and administrative system should be reformed to develop social forces that can check and balance the authority at the grassroots level. For example, perhaps the people can choose between candidates

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for deputies to the People’s Congress that best reflects their willingness to spend or the public or social organizations can directly participate in budgeting and introduce such social supervision forces to local political relations to determine the social basis of grassroots authority in an institutionalized way. At the same time, grassroots political organizations withdraw from the monopoly of public resources. We should eliminate all kinds of monopoly power, protect individual economic opportunities and transaction rights, promote the growth of individual economic actors and so on. Compared with the transition from a planned fiscal system to a fiscal autocratic system under the market-oriented reforms, state governance has changed the past political control and social mobilization methods, and transformed from a basic social order structure constructed by state forces to a normative power of the state. Mainly with the non-normative power of rural society (village self-government) and basic social norms as the supplementary form of order and organization. First, the state has changed the way it controls the grassroots society, from a system of unity of government and society to a system of separation of government and society, institutional power has shrunk from the village community to the township level, and the relationship between the state and grassroots society has changed. Second, the form of rural social organization has changed, that is, the form of villagers’ self-government organization has been implemented. Villager self-governance is a community of members linked to collective land property rights, and its self-governance is more embodied in an economic sense. Third, the withdrawal of state power and the weakening of the institutional power of village groups. Different from the past, the current grassroots society is a country’s official-civilian (cadre-group) structure that directly faces individual people. The order characteristics of the reconstruction of the basic social organization form, on the one hand, in the operation of the formal power of the state, the introduction of basic social rules or local knowledge, showing the practical form of the relationship between the state and peasants, on the other hand, the state power will take villagers’ autonomous organization as a new form of organization that controls and influences the social order at the grassroots level, and the latter has become the main organizational form of the township grassroots government’s ability to control and mobilize the grassroots society.

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9.4 Construction of Public Finance and Transformation of Social Governance The substantive step in the construction of public finance is to supervise the government’s fiscal power, which is also a key step to ensure the publicization of government finance. Financial supervision is mainly performed by the representative body, the National People’s Congress. In fact, the most fundamental reason for the emergence of the modern representative system is the supervision requirements for the publicization of government finances. Conversely speaking, if the representative agency is not an effective political institution and cannot play the political responsibility of financial supervision, it will not be possible to ensure the publicization of government finances. In the actual political operation, the grassroots people’s congress is essentially a component of the party’s power, and its supervisory role is restricted and restricted by many institutional mechanisms, which makes it difficult to avoid becoming “legitimacy” for the government’s fiscal policy and taxation behavior. The form of consultative organization. Because of this, in the twenty-first century, some local governments have tried so-called “participatory budgeting” in community practice, such as Wenling City in Zhejiang Province, Wuxi City in Jiangsu Province, Harbin City in Heilongjiang, Minhang District in Shanghai, Jiaozuo City in Henan Province, and Baimiao City in Bazhong City in Sichuan Province. For the implementation of government budgets in the township, Huainan City of Anhui, Shunde District of Foshan City of Guangdong, etc., the community governance practice form of “participatory budgeting” has been carried out outside of the people’s congress system. Through this form of “civilian” supervision and participation, it is hoped that government budget expenditures will take into account the “taxpayer’s preferences”, and they also involve attempting to find a connection between government power and civil rights, ensuring the publicization of grassroots government finances, and at the same time facing the continuous differentiation of social interest groups in order to enhance political cohesion, an effort to bring people from the edge of politics into the center of politics. The following is an analysis of a typical case—Wenling’s “participatory budgeting” community practice, because, in a sense, this case reveals certain aspects of China’s grassroots public finance construction approach, as well as several other aspects. We must face and resolve the institutional

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or structural issues that must be resolved, and finally, try to put forward some observational opinions based on the discussion of individual cases. The “Financial Budget Reform” in Wenling, Zhejiang, which began around 2005, is regarded as the “farthest” fiscal budget in the country because it provides a way to attract public representatives to conduct “democratic discussions” with government officials and allow the public to participate in the preparation of government budgets. Reform was once considered to represent the development direction of the construction of the grassroots public financial system. The following is a case of community practice called “participatory budgeting” in Wenling, Zhejiang, to analyze the relationship between government fiscal publicization and social governance, as well as in the construction of the government’s publicity and the construction of new grassroots public social relations. Participatory budgeting’s community practice has limited meaning, indicating that without the framework of a democratic fiscal structure, the meaning of such efforts is very limited. Almost it has nothing to do with the so-called construction of public finances, and it will not bring much improvement to the organization of social interests and social justice mechanisms. However, the case of the so-called “participatory budgeting” in Wenling, Zhejiang, can reveal to a large extent the nature of grassroots government finances and the structural characteristics of social governance and the form of interest organization. Based on discussions and presentations in the government, academic circles, and the media, Wenling, Zhejiang, including other places, is the direct motivation for the implementation of “participatory budgeting”. The efficiency of the use of funds promotes the maximization of public interests, and the practice of “participatory budgeting” objectively contributes to the optimization of grassroots social governance and democratic progress; on the other hand, the goal of implementing “participatory budgeting” is to solve the financial crisis, strengthen the constraints on fiscal revenues and expenditures, distribute scarce resources fairly, and promote transparent administration. For example, the direct cause of the implementation of “participatory budgeting” in Xinhe Town, Wenling is to resolve the fiscal deficit. The cumulative fiscal deficit of Xinhe Township in 2007 was close to 50 million yuan. The financial crisis prompted the town leaders to accept the proposal to implement a “participatory budget” through democratic discussions. In addition, the town leaders believe that the mass participation process can be enough to reduce excessive expenditure, stimulate administrative capacity,

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and promote the public interest. Moreover, through increased supervision, citizens can allocate resources and increase transparency can reduce corruption and increase the administrative efficiency of the bureaucracy. Although the practices of “participatory budgeting” vary from place to place, they can be divided into three types: Jiaozuo City is the representative of budget disclosure, Wuxi City is the representative of public project selection, and Wenling City’s “participatory budgeting” The “style budget” is a complex of this kind of experiment, which not only focuses on budget preparation, review, and supervision with public participation, but also includes budget disclosure and budget item selection. The “participatory budget” in Wenling City has the earliest start, the longest duration, the most comprehensive field of exploration, and the most typical and representative. Wenling’s “participatory budget” consists of two major sectors, namely the Zeguo model and the Xinhe model. “Participatory budgeting” has been promoted in Wenling towns, subdistricts and some municipal government departments, and is continuing to advance steadily. The implementation of the town-level budget is made public monthly, the performance is evaluated quarterly, the final account statement is prepared in detail at the end of the year and a third party is entrusted to evaluate the performance, and the submitter’s congress will review it early next year. The municipal government department prepares the budget, holds a democratic discussion meeting to publicly listen to the public opinions, and submits it to the municipal people’s congress for review and vote after revision. The original intention of academia and the field of public policy to promote “participatory budgeting” is to regard it as a part of the “consultative democracy” system—a form of deliberative democracy that uses fiscal budget as the content of negotiation. But in essence, “participatory budgeting” is a measure of the party’s power to “collect public opinion”. It is neither a form of governance in which citizens directly participate in decision-making, nor is it a form of participatory democracy. For example, the Wenling Municipal Party Committee summarized and promoted the democratic talks in Songmen Town as a “new way of ideological and political work”. The public cannot exert any substantial influence on the determination of the issue, and the result of democratic discussions is not the decision itself. The final decision makers of the communist policy are still the party committee, the government, and the people’s congress. Even if the organizers of democratic talks, they have not adopted the suggestions and opinions of the public, and have

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no obligation to give feedback and explanations to the public. On the other hand, the development of democratic talks is incorporated into the government performance evaluation index system. The performance evaluation standards directly involve the welfare, treatment and promotion of government employees, which have become an important factor in determining the direction of public servants’ behavior. The enthusiasm for democratic talks and the promotion of the deepening and development of democratic talks are of great significance. Therefore, the so-called “consultative democracy”, a concept derived from Western democratic societies, has little in common with the social and political context of China. The application of this concept to the analysis of Chinese social and political practice does not have much substantive significance. For example, the “democratic talks” of “participatory budgeting” in Wenling cannot be interpreted as “grassroot/grassroots democracy”. It is actually born out of the practice of ideological and political work in towns and villages. This is the same as “grassroots/grassroots”. And it is mainly to solve the government’s own financial problems and improve government performance or efficiency, that is, the government does not regard taxpayers’ budget participation as a way of realizing rights, but as a form of realizing the government’s “political performance”. In short, using the so-called “participatory budget” to attach the “consultative democracy” or the so-called “consultative democracy” to attach the “participatory budget” does not have much essential meaning of the rule of budget and fiscal democracy. The deeper reasons for the emergence of the budgetary rule of law and fiscal democracy are directly related to the continuous expansion of the development ratio of property rights (private and individual) and the diversification of social interests beyond the ownership of the whole people since the market reform. On the one hand, although the ownership system of the whole people mainly composed of stateowned enterprises dominates, there is also a market system composed of countless small businesses, farms, and self-employed individuals. The latter generates taxpayer awareness and requires corresponding rights; on the other hand, On the one hand, due to social division of labor and social differentiation, the entire society has various problems such as unequal income distribution, unbalanced economic development, imbalanced resource allocation, inflation and unemployment. To solve these problems, institutional reforms and social reforms are needed to equalize

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the power and income of the two systems through state power. In addition to the above two reasons, the decline of grassroots social and political identity and the continuous weakening of the party’s power mobilization system are one of the direct reasons for the requirements of budgetary rule of law and fiscal democracy. This is the economic and social reason for the emergence of the so-called “participatory budget”, and of course it may become one of the government’s efforts in the building of public finances. But the problem is that this first requires changing the legal status of the representative body, the People’s Congress, and to make it work substantively. At the same time, the government must use public resources. For public goals, it cannot only be used for “economic development” or “productive finance”. If the above aspects are difficult to change, community-wide practices such as so-called “participatory budgeting” cannot have any substantive significance. Furthermore, without considering the political logic of the state system and the logic of authoritarian governance, the so-called rule of budgetary law or fiscal democracy cannot be a real problem. In fact, “participatory budgeting” does not or cannot carry out its original meaning: this imported concept refers to an innovative policy-making process, in which citizens directly participate in a decision-making process that affects their own interests. Citizens can use various forums, conferences and other platforms to determine resource allocation, social policy priorities, and monitor government public expenditures. Such a “participatory budget” must achieve the following goals: first, promote public learning and stimulate citizens’ awareness of rights; second, achieve social justice by improving policies and resource allocation; third, reform administrative institutions. In this direct, voluntary and universally participatory democratic process, people can discuss and decide on public budgets, various policies and government management on an equal footing. As traditionally excluded social groups such as low-income, disadvantaged and marginalized groups gain the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, social and political exclusion will be gradually eliminated. Such a “participatory budget” is a form of participatory democracy, which effectively combines direct democracy with representative democracy. When looking at the local practice in China in this way (rather than applying it directly), we find that almost all “participatory budgets” are practice within the scope of the community under the control and guidance of the grassroots government, and can only be limited to the community rarely

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within the scope outside. Therefore, budget reform is essentially a political issue, that is, under the constraints of the current system, there is no open government budget, no community self-governance, and no legal support. Almost all the so-called budget reforms are only entangled at the level of budget transparency and openness. Therefore, it is impossible and unnecessary to give the so-called “participatory budgeting” practice too much budget reform or public finance construction significance. For instance, in contrast to the experience from outside the region (mainly Brazil), “Participatory budgeting” is a budget decision agency (mainly referring to public opinion representative agencies such as parliaments) transferring part of the budget decision power to ordinary people, that is, through the budget field direct democracy (using participatory budgeting methods) complements indirect parliamentary democracy. The current practice of “participatory budgeting” in China is manifested in the public budget reform of the grassroots government within the existing system, with the implementation of the power of the People’s Congress to review and approve the budget as the core. In other words, if even the statutory deputies’ budget review and decision rights cannot be fully guaranteed, the “participatory budget” without legal basis at all cannot have the significance of institutional reform, and at best can only rely on the promotion of individual reformers. To a certain extent, the rights of budget review and decision-making that deputies to the National People’s Congress enjoy constitute a symbiotic relationship with ordinary citizens’ “participatory budgeting”. In other words, the efforts to push for the reform of the public budget of grassroots government of deputies to the National People’s Congress for substantial review and deliberation just mean that we are creating conditions for “participatory budgeting” of ordinary citizens. For another example, the “participatory budget” outside the system cannot be ruled by law and institutionalized because it has significance for uncontrollable political competition, and then it advocates the sharing of political power. In addition to the legislature of the National People’s Congress, the government conducts “democratic talks” with the people and allows the public to participate in government budgeting. This is similar to the “mass line” (soliciting public opinion). In other words, this is not an organizational form involving independent and autonomous social forces regarded as the main body, power participation. In fact, the “participatory budgeting” practice that has emerged so far is mainly reflected in the participation of deputies to the National People’s

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Congress to a certain degree, because in reality the National People’s Congress cannot be the decision-making budget itself. The exploration of the path to the decision-making power of the National People’s Congress, that is, “activating the functions of the grassroots people’s congress”, is particularly evident in Wenling Xinhe’s practice. From the perspective of the characteristics of the political system, the authority of the party and government institutions surpasses that of the legislature, that is, the people’s congress. The position of authority, in other words, the authority of the people’s congress is subordinate to the authority of the party and government, and the authority of the grassroots people’s congress has always been in a state of formalization and marginalization. In addition, in the practice of “participatory budgeting” in communities, most village and community residents did not participate in discussions, dialogues and exchanges between the government and citizens. At present, the majority of citizen participation is mostly village cadres and business leaders. On the one hand, the practice of “participatory budgeting”, such as Wenling’s “Xinhe Experiment”, is reflected in the grassroots government’s public budget reform with the implementation of the power of the People’s Congress to review and approve the budget within the existing system, but the true meaning of “participatory budget” lies in the fact that ordinary citizens’ participation in the budget, or in essence, is manifested in the decision-making power of the participating budget; on the other hand, there is no social organization in the sense of real rights protection, or in other words, some nongovernmental organizations such as social intermediary organizations and industry associations. Government organizations and people from all walks of life who are really concerned about the government budget have not yet or are unlikely to participate in the government budget. Fundamentally speaking, there is no real social (community) self-governance, or in other words, there is no social self-government organization. There is no so-called “participatory budget” for substantial participation, and the current village committees are just the administrative branch of the grassroots government, and they are just the facilitators of the government-led “participatory budget”. Without a democratic political structure and an autonomous multisubject governance system, public finance would not be established, because the public finance system is based on the institutional structure of democratic politics and democratic governance. Conversely speaking, without public finances, the core meaning of democratic governance will

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be lost. But today, the diversification of the organization of social interests, the diversification of social contacts, the distinction between the public domain and the private domain, and the continuous confirmation of the scope of rights between the state and society, whether in theory or in practice, the construction of grassroots public finances has a political and social foundation. Therefore, the building of grassroots public finances should be promoted in the following aspects. First, distinguish the right of governance from property rights. The constitutional determination and demarcation of the relationship between state power and property rights is the fundamental prerequisite for the system and concept of the construction of grassroots public finances. There are two types of relations between state power and property rights: either political power depends on property, or political power exists on the basis of an organization elected by the people. The publicity of the former is only a derivative form of the ruling power and cannot develop into a pure government power; the power of the latter has true publicity and becomes a real government power. The core issue here is the separation of governance and ownership, that is, the state has no property, not a property state, and the state relies on taxation to become a taxation state. This is how the state and the people are not a dependency relationship but a social contract relationship. The reason why the relationship between state power and property rights is the core issue is that: first, relying on the property ownership held by the state to obtain fiscal revenue, including the various income generated by the state’s ownership, control, or transfer of property, can be called state-owned property income; second, confusion to understanding the different nature of government power and private power, participating in the process of generating income from state-owned property in the name of government power not only undermines the operation of the private economy but also corrupts the publicity of power, and will bring about the problem of power being abused by private individuals; third, financial decision-making Has an exclusive nature. On the one hand, the design of the tax system is not based on the taxpayer’s consent, representative agencies cannot be a gathering place for public opinion, and people’s taxation rights cannot be guaranteed; on the other hand, taxpayers have no right to know and do not know the tax payment beforehand (public interest). The direction of use, during the event (in the process of tax collection and use), cannot play a supervisory role. Afterward, I don’t know what role the audit and accountability

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mechanism can play. In short, the public cannot participate in the process of fiscal decision-making. Second, establish the legal power status of fiscal legislation and fiscal supervision of representative agencies. If the right to govern and property rights can be distinguished, then theoretically, the representative organization—the People’s Congress is first loyal to the country and loyal to citizens, it can and must stay outside of political and administrative power and become a true representative body of public opinion. As for the relationship between the National People’s Congress and the ruling party, that is another legal issue, and there is no need to discuss it here. Starting from the reality of the system, the authority and representativeness of the grassroots people’s congresses should be implemented in the following ways: first, according to the Constitution, grassroots (township) people’s congress deputies are directly elected by voters. This “voter” should be all citizens, not a part of them. “Special” citizens, or deputies to the National People’s Congress, cannot be designated by local party committees. Therefore, if the local people decide or elect deputies to the National People’s Congress, the deputies to the National People’s Congress can be accountable to voters and represent the people in exercising power, including financial supervision; second, the National People’s Congress Representatives’ powers and actions are subject to supervision and inquiries by voters. For example, reviewing and approving fiscal budgets and supervising the implementation of fiscal budgets is an important power granted to local people’s congresses and their standing committees by the Constitution and laws. The central task, if the National People’s Congress cannot perform its duties or is subject to the influence of power groups, such as the drafting of some local annual fiscal budgets and decision-making of the party committee and the government before submitting the plan to the People’s Congress for review and approval. In terms of procedures, it is impossible to supervise, inquire, or even dismiss. Third, people’s congress representatives cannot be the “sample representatives” selected by functional constituencies—the spokesperson of the system. In today’s diversified social interests, people’s congress representatives must be able to truly represent the rights and interests of different interest groups and stand in the position of taxpayers. Position, acting as an intermediary and spokesperson for the expression of social interests. In fact, the “participatory budgeting” community practice in various places is aimed at the virtual representation of the National People’s Congress and initiated the “democratic conference” outside the

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system, which shows that the National People’s Congress is playing the meaning of formal legislation. In summary, if the above aspects can have substantive significance, the National People’s Congress can play the function and role of the interactive negotiation mechanism between the state and the people, and truly become the promoter, supervisor and constitutional implementer of the rule of law and fiscal democracy in the budget. One of the most substantive functions and roles of the representative body of the National People’s Congress. Third, the public benefits that taxpayers can enjoy from the government are greater than the value of resources transferred to the government through taxation. Conversely, if taxpayers do not see what public services the taxes that they pay can bring them, they will not obey the taxation rules, and most of them regard taxation as a “burden” imposed upon them instead of becoming taxpayers who abide by the law. The main reason is that the government spends most of its tax expenses on productive investment rather than on the supply of public goods. In fact, if the people cannot become the beneficiaries of their contributions, and at the same time a large amount of tax is used by the government to pursue the profit production of “profit maximization” and the government’s own fiscal expenditure, it will only cause the people to feel what they feel. Or think of the political consequences of the government in a negative way. As a result, both tax collectors and taxpayers are unable or unwilling to assume their respective public responsibilities, and the concept of collecting and paying taxes in accordance with the law is difficult to grow. Fourth, promote fiscal democracy with social self-governance. The significance of social self-governance for fiscal democracy lies in the following: closely linking the publicity of finance with the mechanism of public demand expression and realization, and promoting the institutionalization of citizen participation. Conversely speaking, there is no interest expression mechanism, and the government “makes the decision on behalf of the people”. The so-called fiscal publicity cannot have substantive significance. Therefore, this involves two aspects. On the one hand, through the form of democracy, the public, social organizations and other stakeholders will complete the public selection process of “pursuing the maximization of their own interests” to ensure that the public needs of the society are met. On the other hand, in the design of the public financial system, through democratic mechanisms, the basic concepts of the rule of law and democracy are embodied, and it is up to the public to

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decide what is public interest and how public interest should be realized. The so-called “participatory budget” discussed above, the participants are government personnel and various government agencies, such as village neighborhood committees and market organizations that have an employment relationship with the government. These are neither autonomous organizations nor independent society groups but those social organizations with a rights-defending nature, such as nongovernmental organizations such as clothing associations, fisheries associations, and rural technology promotion associations, are not involved in “participatory budgeting” activities. Fifth, promote the development of grassroots democratic politics. One is the construction of a government under the rule of law. On the one hand, the government’s fiscal power is bound by law, that is, the government’s fiscal activities must be within the scope of the law; on the other hand, the government’s fiscal behavior must have a legal basis. The market economy is an economic form governed by law, and public finance is a fiscal model that is compatible with the market economy. Therefore, the rule of law is also one of the basic principles that public finance should follow. For example, in the “participatory budget” discussed above, the budget should be disclosed first, that is, the government should disclose its fiscal functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and fiscal budget information to the public before they can truly participate. The second is the construction of democratic politics. In theory, there is a democratic system first, and then public finances. The public finance system can only be established on the basis of a democratic system. The current urgent problem is to expand political participation. Because of the shortcomings of the current institutional mechanisms such as the National People’s Congress, ordinary people cannot express their own interests through institutionalized normal channels, and they are excluded from important political processes, including fiscal decision-making processes. In short, national finance is not something that “small circles” such as politicians, financial experts, or government functional departments can arbitrarily or arbitrarily do. After all, without the rule of budget and fiscal democracy, there can be no democratic governance or social governance transformation at all. The so-called “no taxation without representation” expresses this meaning: one is fiscal democracy, and the other is the protection of taxpayers’ rights. This is the internal driving force of democratic governance in modern society. Therefore, public finance is a democratic finance that unifies individual needs, public needs,

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and government fiscal functions. Therefore, for China in the transition of social governance, the transition from finance that realizes state functions to finance that meets the public needs of society is not only the essential significance of the construction of the public finances of the grassroots government and the transformation of its fiscal functions is also the direction of the reform of the democratic governance of the grassroots communities. The construction of grassroots public finances is a socio-political issue, which involves a series of conceptual, institutional, and institutional changes. Since the market-oriented reform, although the state-owned monopoly of fiscal revenue has taken advantage of the market by virtue of “public conditions”, market opportunities have also been fairly given to private enterprises and individuals, and state-owned enterprises have become market monopoly forces backed by the government. In view of the diversification of ownership and the claims of property rights, the traditional concept, system and system design of the unity of governance and ownership need to be changed. Moreover, the definition of rights between public and private rights, public domain and private domain distinguish from functional boundaries, and constantly expressing the interests of citizens’ individual rights claims and the requirements of the interest organization of community rights. All of these are not only the challenges and pressures facing the transformation of traditional fiscal models but also the economic and social development foundation and conditions of the building of public finance. In the above sense, the building of public finance is the form of modern democratic governance, because it is hard to imagine that without a democratic governance structure, public finance with the goal of budgetary rule of law and fiscal democracy can be established. For example, the above-mentioned “participatory budget”. The results of practice without a tail are just one example. In other words, there must be democratic rights or a democratic governance structure in order to achieve the goals of the rule of law in public finances and democratic finance. These goals include the protection of the rights of taxpayers, the ordering and institutionalization of citizen participation, the publicity of the government and the democratization and legislation of social governance, and so on. In other words, fiscal and taxation reform with the goal of constructing public finance is not just a change in the fiscal system and economic system, but also centered on the reform of the taxpayer system and the reform of the government budget system as the main

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line to strengthen fiscal democratization and rule of law, and ultimately establish a public financial system. Among them, there is an inherent connection between fiscal and taxation reforms and the transformation of social governance. Only citizens are largely involved in the government’s fiscal decision-making, and government finances are responsible for public needs, endow finances with a democratic nature, protect the people’s political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and allow taxpayers to enjoy the public benefits from the government. It is greater than the value of resources transferred to the government through taxation. Only in this way can the government’s publicity and the construction of basic-level public social relations be internally linked to form a mutually supportive and mutually beneficial relationship. This is the essential meaning of modern social governance. It must be recognized that the transition from the organizational structure of interest in the unit society to the organizational structure of the public society has not only changed the form of social organization and social contact, but also the fundamental change in the structure of social resources. Therefore, when the fiscal policy of the grassroots government is still focusing on “economic construction-oriented finance”, it will inevitably cause social inequities and conflicts of social interests, because such fiscal policies cannot necessarily create “public products” and may even harm public interests. This is directly related to the publicity of the government. Therefore, under the condition that the “economic construction-oriented finance” and the old public social relations remain unchanged, the efforts to promote the publicity of government finance will not have substantive content and significance of institutional reform. Therefore, the construction of government public finance involves the construction of “public nature” in government decision-making, government management, and government services. It includes three aspects. First, the institutionalization of citizen participation involves the openness and transparency of government fiscal decision-making and fiscal policy information. On the one hand, clarify and limit the functions of the state and government, that is, establish a limited government power structure, and continuously adjust the relationship between the state and nongovernmental organizations and groups based on this; on the other hand, the participation of social organizations is an irreplaceable public order. It is a form of interest organization that is restricted and constrained by laws, regulations, and social norms. It prevents public authority from directly and to the maximum extent imposed on each

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individual member of society. Second, the construction of a public serviceoriented government. Public finance is a mode of government revenue and expenditure activities or a mode of financial operation mechanism constructed to meet the public needs of society. The construction of a public financial system is the premise and content of the construction of a public service-oriented government, involving the task of using laws to protect economic freedom and incentives. Protect economic freedom through the distribution of rights and provide security for legal transactions. This “not only guarantees the financial source of public authority, but more importantly, it restricts that tax revenue must be treated as ‘public property’”. Third, we are committed to the construction of modern public social relations. This is the basic task of the construction of grassroots government power and its promotion of the rule of budget and fiscal democracy, and it is also the social foundation and institutional conditions for the construction of the public governance and public service system of the grassroots government. In other words, public finance is a form of finance based on the market economy, and its activities are mainly carried out in the so-called public domain that provides public goods and services to the public, and it is a supplement or replacement of market allocation of resources. Therefore, by linking the public nature of the government with its public service functions, the changes in the public nature of the grassroots government and the nature of grassroots public social relations can be placed on the basis of fiscal democracy and the fair and just rule of law in the distribution of social resources.

CHAPTER 10

Rules and Order: The Transformation of Grassroots Social Governance

The current grassroots social order is an order under government authority based on the dominant relationship of political power and government power and originated from the notion that state power dominates society. Its main characteristics are the ruling structure and the proxy governance model, which form a monocentric order under government authority. The challenge posed by order under government authority is the growth of social self-governance. From the order under government authority to the autonomous order, it’s the development direction of grassroots social governance transformation. Unlike an order under government authority, an autonomous order is based on the rights of individual self-governance and social self-governance, and it follows public and social rules. Its main characteristics are the democratic governance structure and the governance model of the social community that form a polycentric autonomous order. From an order under government authority to an autonomous order, the process is the direction of the transformation of grassroots social governance. The order under government authority is based on the relationship between authority and obedience, and it is political power and government power that play an integrated function. The way of governance is perhaps different, such as changing from the totalitarian governance model of the past to the authoritarian governance model of today, which is a change that adapts to changes in the economic and social structure and social development conditions at the grassroots level, like change © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_10

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in the structure of social organizations, change in social contact, change in the relationship between the state and society, but so far the order under government authority structure of the grassroots communities has not altered. To make possible the transformation of grassroots social governance and build an autonomous order through public and social rules, they involve two issues: the first is that the self-governance of the grassroots communities is a necessary condition for the organization of interests and the formation of social governance order; the second is that the establishment of a grassroots social autonomous order requires social system conditions. The goal of the transformation of grassroots social governance is to make the government and the society represented by “State Action and Autonomous Order” established in the structural relationship of rule of law, democracy, self-governance and co-governance. The basic conditions for constructing the order of grassroots social self-governance involve two aspects: one is the legal guarantee of selfgovernance, that is, making clear the social self-governance rights and the connotation and borders of rights between citizens and the state, and between different levels of self-rule bodies. The second is the structure of multi-center public governance entities in the fields of government, society and markets. The third is a reconstruction of the subject society. Only by removing the dependence of society on the state can the principle of self-governance be established.

10.1

Order of Governance and Authority

Whether a kind of social order is based on the relationship of authority and obedience between political power and government power or on the self-governance and cooperation between social self-organization and civic associations. This is a fundamental distinction between an authoritative society and a democratic society because the former is targeted at a monocentric order under government authority built on the concentration of authority and structure, while the latter points to a polycentric autonomous order, which is based on the rights of individual selfgovernance and social self-governance. Correspondingly, the former is dominated by state power or expressed in the form of a ruling society. In addition to a national public authority, other authorities are in a state of being dominated and obeyed. The latter is the democratic co-governance of various organizations (including public institutions and private institutions), despite the fact that their respective functions and rules followed

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are different. For example, the sources of democratic governance include various non-state mandatory contracts in addition to national laws. But the organizations are shown by a relationship of self-governance and cooperation, jointly maintaining a benign social autonomous order form. In terms of social theory, the order under government authority refers to the organizational order led or designed by the dominant authority with mandatory force (organization or arrangement based upon order) leading or designing. In other words, it is the political authority and the political power that maintain the order, and it is not from civil social authority and social rules. Hayek believes that all social orders are either generated or constructed. The former refers to “Spontaneous Order”, while the latter refers to “Organization” or “A Made Order”.1 The difference between these two social orders is mainly in three aspects. First, the primary difference between spontaneous order and organizational order is the orderly way of production that they show. The spontaneous order is spontaneously generated among individuals who pursue their own goals. That is to say, they are the unintended consequences of human actions rather than human designs; order in organizations (of which the government is the largest organization2 ) is the result of concerted action because cooperation in the organization is the result of centralized guidance. Second, these two social orders rely on different coordination intermediaries. Coordination and harmony that lead to spontaneous order certainly involve issues of general rules, because for self-coordination to work, participants in social order must share certain rules and strictly follow them; on the contrary, the social structure that coordinates the division of labor in an organization is a kind of hierarchical relationship, in which the order specifies the activities of each member in detail. Third, spontaneous order provides favorable conditions for different individuals to achieve their respective goals. Instead, an organization is a collective tool that helps to implement a specific purpose established in advance.3 Therefore, the “organized” order (or external order) is an order under

1 Deng Zhenglai. 1999. “The Duel Concept of Social Order Rule—Research on Hayek’s Law Theory”. Peking University Law Review, Vol. 2 (2): pp. 416–417. 2 Hayek pointed out, “Family, farm, factory, business number, company and all kinds of groups as well as all systems or institutions, are organizations”. Please see Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order (The University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 46. 3 Deng Zhenglai. 1998. Freedom and Order. Jiangxi Education Press: pp. 17–22.

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government authority, while a “spontaneous order” is (or internal order) is an autonomous order. Since modern times, the result of various political changes and social movements carried out in the name of social transformation has been usually the integration of an order under government authority (organizational order) and the coverage of an autonomous order (spontaneous order)—this is one of the historical trends of modern social practice. The changes in China’s grassroots communities are one part of statebuilding since modern times. As Fei Xiaotong pointed out in “Peasant Life in China”, the establishment of local administration system in the period of the Republic of China is a “planned social change”. That is, the state tries to transform local authority into the grassroots branch of political power set up by it through a series of institution establishment and appointments. The local authority has gradually turned into an organization that serves the national goals—conscription and taxation collection.4 As a result, the national authority controls all resources and plans the political, economic and social aspects of the entire social life. This is similar to what Hayek refers to as a process of integrating the “made” or “organized” order or covering the “spontaneous order” and its rationalism based on constructive theory—that constitutes one of the mainstream schemas in modern society.5 In other words, since modern times, especially since 1949, the establishment of the local administrative system has been closely related to the construction of the modern state. It is the extension of the state’s control over the grassroots communities, and the process of the integration and coverage of the authority order over the autonomous order. This means that the process of state authority replacing local authority or civil authority is one of the goals of the change of the entire grassroots communities. The order under government authority comes from the concept of government, namely the concept of state power dominating society. The social philosophical origin of an order under government authority or

4 Zhang Jing. 2015. “The Change of Way: The Connection Between Individual and Public Organization”. Xuehai Journal (1): pp. 17–21. 5 Deng Zhenglai. 1999. “The Duel Concept of Social Order Rule—Research on Hayek’s Law Theory”. Peking University Law Review, Vol. 2 (2): p. 400.

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organizational order is the monistic view of social order rules.6 This kind of social concept of order will inevitably lead to the emerging concept of substantive control over people, that is, the concept of rule. The main body of rule is the government, which places the entire society under a mandatory authority (government) governance. The other side of the concept of rule is to guard against society, that is, restricting social rights and expanding government power are the two sides of the concept of rule or the concept of state power dominating the society. The goal of rule is to allow society to be attached to the state and to the power of the state. From the 1950s to the present, under the above-mentioned concept of rule, as for the grassroots governance structure, the principle of a monistic view of social order and rules is implemented, and in the fields of politics, economy, society and culture, the state power system is the center of authoritative and allocated resources. But on the one hand, concentrated political power leads to the lack of social participation and constitutional constraints; on the other hand, in the areas of society and culture, the monopolistic business system does not really represent the interests of the members of the organization but the interests of the government and, it is an auxiliary and extended part of the government’s power. Therefore, the idea of rule enables the members of the entire society to live under the order under government authority supported by the regulatory system through the order under government authority.

10.2 Structure of Grassroots Governance by Authority After the middle of the twentieth century, China’s urban communities practiced the management style of “unit system supplemented by the street dwelling system”. In this way, the unit system management has thus become the organizational structure of the order under government authority at the community level. This management approach is a kind of community management system focusing mainly on the “unit system” organization and less on the “street dwelling system” management in the grassroots region. Through the organizational form of the unit for managing employees and through the “street dwelling system” 6 For relevant comments, please see Deng Zhenglai. 1999. “The Duel Concept of Social Order Rule—Research on Hayek’s Law Theory”. Peking University Law Review, Vol. 2 (2): pp. 395–445.

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for managing social idlers, civil affairs relief and social preferential treatment, etc., we can realize the control and integration of all members of the city’s society, thus achieving the purpose of social stability and consolidating political power. The unit system management is essentially a kind of totalitarian social governance model.7 Under the planning system, in order to make possible the authoritative integration of the grassroots social order, the unit system provides a very effective guarantee from the perspective of the organization, playing the functions of politics, economy and society and constituting an organization system covering the whole society. Here there are three aspects as shown in the following. First, it is about political mobilization. The units in the unit system have important political functions. Every unit has a certain administrative level, and each unit is composed of cadres and workers with two political identities. Each unit has established a sound party-mass organization as the leading force for political mobilization. Therefore, this kind of efficient political mobilization mechanism allows the party and the government to adopt top-down administrative approaches for organizing the masses to participate in various political movements on a large scale, thus ensuring the principles and policies of the party and the government can be realized. Second, it is about economic development. Under the planned economy system, the state controls almost all resources, and its, mobilization, control and allocation of resources are carried out through various units and organizations. The party and the government, through the affiliated relationship network of the unit, enable each grassroots unit to be affiliated to its own superior unit so that the superior unit can fully control the lower level units, and the higher level units are subordinate to the central and provincial and municipal administrative departments. Therefore, by assigning working tasks to lower level units through higher level units, the party and the government can allocate manpower, material resources, financial resources and other resources. Third, it is about social control. The unit system organizes people in political, military, economic, cultural, and various other organizations, and through systems such as full employment, labor insurance benefits, housing allocation, and children’s enrollment, a high degree of organization of the entire social life is made possible. “The state combines both compulsory administrative power and 7 Tang Tsou. 2000. The Chinese Politics in the 21st Century—From the Perspective of Macro History and Micro Action. Oxford University Press (Hongkong): pp. 206–224.

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exchange financial power of property, owing the power of controlling unit organization through the resource allocation and power endowment of the unit organization, and making the unit organization dependent on the state”.8 This is a kind of “unit-run society” system, in which members of society are included in the scope of administrative power control, and the entire society has achieved a high degree of integration and organization. After the reform and opening up, the economic and social foundation of the above-mentioned order under government authority has undergone structural changes. For example, as we have seen the transition from a planned economic system to a market economic system, the relationship between the state and society has also diverged, but the essential characteristics of the order under government authority have not changed, and the governance method has evolved from the past totalitarian model to the current authoritarian model. That is to say, compared with the period before the reform and opening up, the current goal of grassroots government governance is to pursue the maximization of its own political interests rather than the maximization of public interests.9 Its governance structure and governance approach are the way of single top-down resource absorption, social control and mobilization method of unified authority. In other words, the current urban community governance is still the historical extension of the past unit system governance concepts and management concepts. Next, I want to make the analysis by taking the urban community governance of Xiangcheng, Suzhou as an example10 because this case is a typical version of the current order under government authority or “organized order”, and it is still a constantly strengthening version. Therefore, this case can reveal the essential characteristics of grassroots governance by authority, and the organizational structure form of the order under government authority of the grassroots communities. Different from the unit system management under the planning system, today’s urban community governance structure has undergone 8 Li Lulu and Li Hanlin. 2000. The Chinese Unit Organization—Resources, Power and

Exchange. Zhenjiang People’s Publishing House: p. 1. 9 Zhao Shukai. 2010. Township Governance and Government Systematization. The Commercial Press: pp. 8–12. 10 Here these empirical materials come from the investigation of the project team of Politics Research Center of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, so they are not noted one by one.

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tremendous changes: The unit system continues to weaken, while unregistered personnel and migrants—“Unorganized street residents” (in the past they were referred to as “social idlers, civil relief and social preferential treatment objects”) continue to increase, entering the community and changing the governance structure of the community. Regarding the situation of Suzhou Xiangcheng, the weakening function of the unit mainly refers to the unit (administration, business, enterprise) gradually returning to its original functions and responsibilities, such as the establishment of a modern enterprise system, the implementation of a classified management system for public institutions, and the reform of the logistics system in public institutions, which finally make each unit break away from the political and administrative functions and social functions to the government and society. The weakening of this function makes the unit’s status and function in the community decrease and makes the size of the community group become smaller. However, due to social intermediary organizations (Intermediate Group) have not fully become mature; for the grassroots government, it is necessary to change the past top-down way to intervene in the community in order to respond to society and improve the management. For communities in developed areas, especially newly built communities such as Suzhou Xiangcheng, due to increased social mobility and a developed economic division of labor, “unorganized street residents continue to enter the community and become an important part of the community’s governance structure. Some already become the main force of district governance. However, even in the practice of community governance in Xiangcheng, Suzhou, we can’t see the transformation of thinking and methods of unit-based community management in the past, and the changes in community structure have not changed the usual practice of “the government organizes the society”. The socalled social organizations active in the community are not real social organizations; instead, they are quasi-government organizations or halfofficial and half-citizen social organizations. They cannot become the main body of community governance. In summary, although the organizational dependencies of today’s community governance structure have been witnessed, the old unit management organizational structure and management philosophy have not seen changes that adapt to them. In other words, the above-mentioned governance model is still a traditional governance model: the government controls ownership and adopts the way of restraining the society to maintain social stability and social order. The basic characteristics are shown as follows. The first is about

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social atomization. Preventing society is a functional manifestation of an authoritative system, that is, stopping independent social intermediary organizations from developing and growing. For the atomized individual citizens, the government organizes these scattered individuals by allocating resources and giving power, allowing public institutions to take the place of the individual’s social functions. This also means that the rights of individuals are directly put under the control of the state. Second, it is about authoritative mono-center. The so-called mono-center authority means to maintain the concentration of ownership of the state or government and to maintain the absolute leading and controlling power of the party’s power over the society. In other words, a monocenter authority (government) does not allow any political forces or social intermediary forces in the society share a power competition relationship with it, and social forces outside the system must be incorporated into the system through the principle of “political rightness”. Third, it is about bureaucratic governance. Bureaucratic governance is the basic operating model of unit-based management. In the sense of community governance, bureaucracy means “organizing citizens”; and the only subject of community governance under a bureaucratic system is the government, and all other social contacts are formed by taking the power relationship as the expansive form. From the perspective of the community power structure and operating mechanism, the maintenance of grassroots order under government authority is mainly composed of two systems: The first is the integration system of the party’s political power, and the second is the authoritative governance model. First, the integration system of party and government power, that is, a separated but interplaying and influencing integration system of the political party system and the administrative system within the administrative system. The former is political leadership, while the latter is administrative execution; and the administrative system plays the functions and roles of political functions and administrative functions. The basic governance form of Suzhou Xiangcheng is reflected through the structural system constructed by the integration of the party and government power, integrating all social forces into the administrative control system. For example, the establishment of a party branch among mobilizing workers (mainly migrant workers) plays the role of party organizations in serving, leading and gathering migrant workers. Let me take another example. The establishment of party organizations in non-public enterprises and

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the establishment of party organizations in social organizations are aimed at expanding the party’s influence and control of the economic and social spheres. This is to say, the ruling party uses the party organization system to implement its political intention in the administrative governance system at all levels and to embed the principle of the party’s substantive leadership in the government governance mode. The essence of the party power integration system lies in the fact: the basic feature of this system is that political control becomes a part of a complete administrative machine. For authoritative governance, social integration is achieved in the administrative system, and political games appear in the administrative system. Its essence, however, is that, first of all, the mix of politics and administration (no separation of party and government) has legitimacy; secondly, after interest-based politics enters the administrative system the “rationality” or “legitimacy” of the bureaucracy is destroyed, and the unified nature of the national administrative system is corroded and blurred; in the end, the atomized citizens become the object of governance, but they cannot become the subject of participation, and its involvement is in the unorganized level of individual “decentralized opinions”. Second, is the authoritative governance model, that is, the governance method in which the administrative power dominates the society. There are two layers of meaning contained: one is government-led governance, and the second is agent governance. The government monopolizes social resources and has an absolute power advantage. Therefore, social authority cannot and does not allow it to develop and grow, thus forming a unified government authority. The second is agent governance. It can be explained from the two role dimensions of governance, namely, One is the government, whose main function is policy decision and resource redistribution and specific work consists of formulating plans and issuing instructions (documents)as well as approving and allocating resources; the second is the unit, whose main function is to implement the government’s instructions and carry out social governance and provide public goods, such as education, medical treatment, housing, etc. In this sense, the unit becomes the extension of the government, and its uniqueness is performing a partial function on behalf of the government.11 Furthermore, government governance has a dual agency nature of politics and 11 Zhang Jing. 2016. “Why Does Grassroots Social Governance Become Ineffectual?” Wenhua Zongheng (5): pp. 32–36.

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administration. On the one hand, it governs on behalf of the country, and at the same time, meets the goals and needs of the state and society; on the other hand, it copies new agency relationships centering on the government, forming multi-center governance by authority structure. In other words, unlike the Weberian bureaucracy system, the grassroots political government system integrates political and administrative functions. On the one hand, it is determined by the “autonomous nature”, the grassroots government has its own political interest preferences; on the other hand, in the aspect of agency governance, it is subject to the interests of the department and produces organized structure form composed of the political control of multi-center interest. For example, in enterprises and institutions and organizations of “authorized governance”, “quasigovernment agency relationship is copied, and the agency unit for the realization of its public functions is copied. For example, in recent years, the government procurement service developed in Suzhou Xiangcheng has been a new (indirect) agency approach. In addition, similar to the “social organization incubator” in Xiangcheng, Suzhou organizations, in essence, do not have the key characteristics of nongovernmental organizations—organizational, nongovernmental, non-profit, autonomous, and voluntary.12 They play a limited role in social governance, and they are essentially the peripheral auxiliary form of the authoritative agency governance model.

10.3 From Order Under Rule by Government Authoritative to Order Under Self-Rule At present, the biggest problem facing the order under government authority is the matter of social justice, which is directly manifested by the problem of the organization of social interests because this is the direct cause of the contradictions and conflicts in the grassroots communities. But the core of the organization of social interests focuses on establishing a social justice maintenance mechanism. From order under government authority to autonomous order, the above-mentioned problem is exactly the one that needs to be resolved essentially because the autonomous order based on public rules (from the law) and social rules (from the

12 Lester M. Salamon. 2002. Global Civil Society—A Perspective of Non-Profit Sector. Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA).

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contract) is the basic condition for achieving interest organization and social fairness and justice. Social self-rule is the basic condition for the formation of an autonomous order. When building the social self-rule, the historical resource from tradition is probably the self-governance by the gentry, but in fact, self-governance by the gentry is not modern self-governance because it is the self-governance of imperial power agent (countryside gentlemen), which has nothing to do with individual self-rule and social autonomy, for it is the social governance model based on the small peasant economy. The so-called discussion of “local self-governance” based on the consideration of national modernization was not carried out in the subsequent practice of Chinese social and political development. After 1949, the traditional “autonomous order” (for example, the civil authority structure includes the form of self-governance by the gentry) was unified by order under government authority, with political integration replacing social integration, and order under government authority rules gradually dominating or replacing traditional “autonomous order” rules. In essence, the so-called “planned social change”, is just a process of social reconstruction and reorganization that imposes the authority order (organization order) on the autonomous order. The autonomous order and the order under government authority have different concepts of order. Autonomous order is based on the concept of democratic governance, namely, the concept of social order: the cooperation between the political state and the civil society, the cooperation between government and non-government, the cooperation between public institutions and mandatory and voluntary cooperation of private institutions. But the concept of order of authority based on rule (government), is the concept of social order which indicates the use of the political authority of the government, and by formulating and implementing policies, the government carries out single-dimensional management of social public affairs. Here, the sources of authority of the two orders are also different: the source of governance is the mandatory national law; the source of democratic governance includes a variety of non-state mandatory contracts such as self-government regulations, village regulations and agreements except for the law.13 Then, the modern transformation of grassroots social governance, it means transitioning 13 Yu Keping. 2014. On the Modernization of State Governance. Social Sciences Academic Press: p. 169.

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from an authoritative governance model in the past to a model of social self-governance, that is, for the operation and maintenance of the grassroots public governance order, the monocentric order under government authority indicates that the authority comes from national authorization has transitioned into a polycentric autonomous order showing that its authority stems from social authorization. First, establish the rights of individual self-rule and social self-rule. On the one hand, individuals have the right to decide their own matters, that is, the right of individual self-rule; on the other hand, social self-rule is a joint and extended form of individual self-rule. The current grassroots communities have not produced the right of self-rule in the sense of the rule of law, which has a direct impact on the development of social selfrule. On the one hand, the lack of self-rule blurs the scope and boundary of social self-rule; on the other, the existing self-rule cannot be the selfrule of the members of the autonomous body, but only the self-rule of self-ruled authority. In the practice of Suzhou Xiangcheng governance, village (residential) self-government has become a power structure of the grassroots government. At the same time, other social self-ruled subjects and areas cannot develop. Essentially, “the idea of people’s self-rule is the guiding principle of self-rule and the ideal of self-rule; the idea of group self-rule is for producing the form of the self-rule system”.14 In other words, without individual self-rule and social self-rule, social groups would be unable to exist independent of the state by law, and nor can they deal with their own public affairs, and in turn, grassroots social self-rule cannot develop. Additionally, from a legal point of view, in the relationship of individual right and state power”. Although individual right is the foundation and the origin, they are very fragile. It requires the protection of state power and is extremely easy to be violated by the latter. In this way, how to restrain the power of the state and make it not too expansive, or when it infringes on individual right, there is a force that can compete with. This is a very important matter”.15 But the force that can check and maintain a balance with the power of the state is an independent (in the form of social self-rule) self-ruled society, that is, “a pluralistic society composed of various independent and autonomous associations 14 Shen Qingquan. Local Autonomous Concept and System. (Shanghai) Local Autonomy Monthly Editing Committee (1st volume) (1), January of the thirtieth six year of the Republic of China. 15 Liang Zhiping. “Market, State, Public Areas”. Dushu (5): pp. 10–17.

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can become a kind of ‘social check and balance’ of power”.16 Therefore, the right of self-rule must be guaranteed by law: on the one hand, social self-rule follows the principle of rule of law, and respects and protects the basic rights of members of society. If there is no individual citizen’s right for the form of association, there is no self-governance for social organizations; on the other hand, the state provides institutional legal protection for social self-governance, that is, establishing universal laws applicable to everyone in social autonomous activities. Therefore, the rule of law is the guarantee for the institutionalization of social self-governance and the basic condition for the existence of a social community. Second, build a multi-center public governance system. The cogovernance of multi-players is the basic feature of autonomous order, and the key to the building of multi-players is the change in the role and nature of the government’s authority and its relationship with the governed. The most important thing for the government to provide public products is safety and justice, and to ensure the institutionalized relationship of affairs. Its authority stems from the protection of civil rights and the maintenance of the rule of law in public order. At the same time, for grassroots governance to achieve “good governance”, which requires support from other systems such as elements from social, economic, and cultural levels. Social self-rule and the building of civil society are the basic part of the grassroots public governance structure. The main body of this basic part is the society group, including the selfruled organizations of the market and society; its authority is established on the authorization and support of the members. Furthermore, the multi-subject construction of grassroots governance is firstly the change in the principles of authoritative governance. If the government wants to become a public management department of common affairs and public finance, this transformation is reflected in the change in the relationship between public authority and citizens. The core issue is the “public nature” building of the government, including three aspects. The first is the systematization of public participation, which involves the openness and transparency of government policy information, as well as the systematization of involvement channels among individual citizens and social organizations. The second is fiscal democracy. The government’s financial responsibilities include undertaking the task of using the law to uphold

16 Liang Zhiping. “Market, State, Public Areas”. Dushu (5): pp. 10–17.

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economic freedom and incentives, protecting economic freedom through the new distribution of rights, and providing security for effective and legitimate transactions. Therefore, the meaning of fiscal democracy lies in “not only ensuring the financial source of public authority”, and more importantly, it restricts the way of the tax revenue that must be treated as “public property”.17 The third is the legal relationship between the government and society. On the one hand, we clarify and restrict the limited functions of the state and government so as to adjust the relationship between the state and non-state organizations; on the other hand, the social organization is the irreplaceable form of interest organization in the common order, and it is restricted and limited by laws, regulations and social norms. It prevents the authority of the state from directly and maximumly imposing on each individual member of society. Then, it is “society ruling itself”. The grassroots social self-rule is: exercises the right of self-rule through the combination of community members—the form of social governance of “self ruling self”. Social self-rule reflects the essential meaning of civil society. On the one hand, civil society plays an important role in public life, forms the sharing and balanced situation of multiple social rights over the state power, and is able to curb government power. On the other hand, civil society consists of an intermediary organization between the state and the individual—society’s self-governance organizations and groups; civil society and social organization that is non-profit, nongovernmental, and voluntary play an active role in dealing with “market failure” and “government failure”. To achieve the above two goals, it is necessary to standardize the behavior of the state and the government, build a self-ruled civil society, handle the relationship between government management and social self-governance; in other words, individuals and public institutions establish systematic associations and effectively play the roles of connection, representation, coordination and accountability. The significance is that it extensively influences the survival interests of individuals, for example, the ability to rely on public systems to solve problems and avoid mutual harm, the ability to enhance one’s own power through representation, and the ability to seek public measuring standard and asking for help from authoritative institutions.18 17 Zhang Jing. 2001. “State Political Power Building and Village Self-Rule Unit— Problem and Review”. Kaifang shidai (Opening Era) (9): pp. 5–13. 18 Zhang Jing. 2015. “The Change of Passage: Correlation of Individuals and Public Organizations”. Xuehai (1): pp. 50–58.

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Undoubtedly, all of these must be implemented in the internal interaction between the state and the society. Finally, market players participate in governance. A market order is the source of autonomous order. Civil society is based on a market economy or even private property rights, which promotes the contractual relationship of equality and selfgovernance, the principle of rule of law, the principle of self-governance and the process of democratic development.19 Therefore, market selforganization is the basic factor of market order. On the one hand, market entities form a joint form, become an endogenous interest group organization, and constrain members and regulate market behavior, play a role in communication and coordination between the government and individuals, thus preventing improper intervention from the government power of the government; on the other hand, it also restrains members from harming market order and the act of social order. However, there are three development directions for the current market interest community. This is especially evident in grassroots social governance (such as the practice of Suzhou Xiangcheng). One is dependence. Party power integrates market economy organizations through political and administrative forces, such as in the “two new” organizations—in new economic organizations and new social organizations, social mobilization is carried out by mobilizing party and government resources. On the one hand, the “two new” organizations reflect and exert the influence of the party’s power; on the other hand, the intervention of the party and government organizations have two functions of regulation (control) and politics (interest expression and struggle), re-integrating the decentralized structure of rights, so that the distinct social interests can reach a political order. The second is corporatism, which refers to local governments, namely district (county) and township governments, directly intervening in the economy and managing the role of managing enterprises. as well as governments at all levels, political party organizations, and enterprises under their jurisdiction to form a common interest similar to that of a large enterprise.20 These interest communities become part of the state system (power

19 Deng Zhenglai. Research on Studies of Civil Society in China, published in Deng Zhenglai’s Deng Zhenglai and Alexander. 2006. State and Society—A Research Path of Social Theory. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 20 Jean Oi. 1999. Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform. University of California Press (Berkeley, CA): pp. 3–16.

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dominates society), that is, organization with a corporatist structuremarket organization has become a formal and organized interest alliance of government power. The third is self-governance. That is, the market interest community has become a coordinating economic organization connecting the country and society. With more autonomous status and power, it means that for both the state and society, the balance of power has changed. Although the extent of affecting decision-making is limited, their expanded influence is still “close” to the system, rather than pressure on it.21 But this kind of economic organization has obtained an important intermediary status and brought about new changes in the state and social relations (“quasi” civil society or “semi” civil society). In short, the above development tendencies all exist to varying degrees. In the final analysis, the development of social interests depends on the nature, function, limit and form of connecting way of social interest organization and systematization in the grassroots order under government authority. Third, establish social subjectivity. Subject society is the essential attribute of social subjectivity, which refers to a sphere between the state and the individual within the national or political community. It consists of relatively independent organizations and groups, including family organizations, religious groups, trade unions, chambers of commerce, societies, school groups, community and village organizations, as well as entertainment organizations and clubs, various federations and mutual aid associations. The subject society is an autonomous society formed spontaneously out of the state power system, characterized by its independence and institutionalization. And according to different organizational methods and code of conduct, it organizes single individuals in different “secondary social communities”. The subject society relates to two aspects: one is the “civil society”, which is based on individuals engaged in economic, cultural and social activities. Various nongovernmental organizations, voluntary associations, charitable organizations, community groups and interest groups constitute the basic elements of civil society. In this public sphere, society operates autonomously based upon the principles of self-organization and self-rule under the framework of the rule of law and democratic consultation and lead to a checked and balanced situation with the power of the state. The other is the “active society”, which shows that in the face of market erosion, the society itself mobilizes to 21 Gordon Wite. 1993. “Prospects Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City”. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs (29): p. 68.

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contribute to various social norms and institutional arrangements, such as trade unions, cooperatives, organizations striving to reduce working hours, and campaigns striving to expand political rights, etc., to regulate the market.22 Further speaking, the subject society is demonstrated by the existence of different levels and different types of organizations in the society entity. In other words, social subjectivity refers to the selfgovernance and self-discipline of the society, that is, as a self-organized, independent and autonomous subject. Social structure is the basis of social subjectivity, and social organization is the carrier of social subjectivity, while the social system is the guarantee of social subjectivity, and its ultimate goal is to form a pluralistic social governance model based on mutual checks and balance and benign interactions between limited governments, boundary market and self-organized society.23 In other words, such a society is no longer a field that can be dominated by state power, but a subject composed of social autonomous organizations, or we can say that, such a society is made up of a number of self-organizations of citizens, and joins the social governance in an organized and united manner—the interest cohesion mechanism and public opinion expression system.

10.4 Public Rules and Their Implications for Social Order The modern transformation of grassroots social governance is a transformation from an order under government authority to an autonomous order. The former is built on the relationship between authority and obedience, and it is political power and government power that play an integrated function; the latter is based on individual self-rule and social self-rule, and it is the public rule (from the law) and the social rule (from the contract) that play an integrated function. As for the construction of autonomous order, one is the reconstruction of the government’s public nature, which is built on the law-based relationship, the second is the construction of a basic social self-governance structure system aiming at 22 Lu Sipin. “Face Contradictions Heads-On and Strengthen Social Building—Exclusive Interview of Guo Yuhua, Professor of Sociological Department of Tsinghua University”. Theoretical Reference (3): pp. 34–35. 23 Guo Yuhua. 2011. “Overcoming Social Phobia: Sociologist Tea Talks”. Shehuijia chazuo (2): pp. 34–40.

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achieving social justice and the organization of social interests. The goal of the transformation of grassroots social governance is to make the government and society “national action and autonomous order” established on the structural relationship of rule of law, democracy, and co-governance. The grassroots governance under the current order under government authority exhibits such characteristics: On the one hand, it is a strong government under centralized authority, that is, the government has strong governance resources and governance capabilities, and controls and balances power decentralization and governance diversity centralized authority and centralized structure; on the other hand, decentralization under centralized power, that is, decentralization in the direction of democratization, adapts to social pluralism. But society has undergone structural and systematic changes, which leads to the diversification of value and social benefits, and then it is difficult to use a unified authority structure to integrate or cover diversified social forms. Therefore, there is such a paradox in the current grassroots social governance: not only strengthen the party’s power and improve the ability to control and govern the society, but also to adapt to the development trends of a diversified market economy, diversified society and culture and diversified ideology. The division of power caused by the decentralization of social resources leading to the expanding requirement for the participation of diverse social forces is a structural issue. In other words, replacing social pluralism with a single one is the challenge and inherent tension in face of the current modern transformation of grassroots governance. However, there is no social self-governance structural system in the current grassroots governance. Structural reasons include: First, the centralized system determines the nature of the authoritarian governance of the grassroots government. The authoritarian governance method is the party the political agency mechanism replacing the community people’s interest gathering mechanism is a system of integration of the party’s power; second, the grassroots government governance system has the power to intervene in all social fields. This is an authoritarian governance model, which is based on the structure of “total society”; third, the structural characteristics of strong countries and weak societies are the basic social conditions for the existence of a agency governance model, and the government is the controller and dominator of almost all resources. The above structural reasons are determined by the characteristics of the following political system: First, the state power dominates the

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concept of social governance, and the purpose of governance is to make society dependent on the state and state power; second, the organizational structure of the party-government integration, that is, the united governance system led by the party and government power to perform political and administrative functions; third, the agency governance model, that is, the ruling party implements its political intentions in the administrative governance system at all levels through political party organizations and embeds the principle of substantive leadership of the party in the government governance model. More than 30 years of market-oriented reforms have led to the diversification of the social structure and the diversification of social interests, changing the foundation and supporting conditions of the past omnipotent governance. As a consequence, this has resulted in the current authoritative governance facing the challenge of reality: how to ensure the unified power status of the party and government and maintain a relatively stable and authoritative social order in a society of interest polarization and social diversification. Here, the significance of the order building of grassroots self-governance lies in: grassroots social self-governance is the essential condition for the organization of interests and the order of social governance and the building of the grassroots social autonomous order has already been attributed to the condition for the economic and social system.

CHAPTER 11

Grassroots Public Political Culture

The most noticeable phenomenon in the public sphere today is heterogeneity and value confusion, which stem from the absence of public political culture. As for unit social governance, it cannot solve the problem of value sharing and benefit sharing in public social governance (so) it is not possible to establish new cultural and political connections between individuals and public organizations. In other words, for the public sphere, the function of public law is to adjust people’s basic relationships, but public political culture makes the public sphere valuable and meaningful. Therefore, the key to constructing public sphere value lies in reshaping public political culture, which requires that the basic task of public organizations is to build modern public social relations. And the political and cultural consortium formed by the latter is based on the intimate political connections of coordinating mechanism of organization of interest and maintenance mechanism of social justice.

11.1 The Significance of Public Political Culture for Governance The most attractive social phenomenon in the public sphere today is the lack of shared value, such as insufficient publicity of public organizations (governments), low social credit, and individual citizens’ atomized state, etc. that result in the loss of public morality, social contradictions and the politicization of conflicts, and so on. Equally, these social political © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_11

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phenomena have even been interpreted as a precursor to the orderly disintegration of society. The apparent reason is that the disintegration of traditional beliefs and the prevalence of egoism, materialism/consumerism lead to moral corruption and worsening social order. In response to the above-mentioned symptoms of social collapse, various value demands such as the reconstruction of traditional Confucian ethical values1 and the reconstruction of a revolutionary value system2 have been continuously proposed or strengthened in an attempt to ensure social development has a political culture that can unite people’s hearts in terms of public values and can bring a direction for the construction of the public sphere. But the problem is that how can the above-said advocacy or assertion of shared values (universalism such as national ideology, particularism such as Neo-Confucianism or traditional familyism) transform into the public in the public sphere? What are the basic principles of the public sphere? Are they specific relations, such as family, clan, village community, race, ethnic group, and other cultural and historical connections., or abstract relations, such as state, group/ society, and individuals (realistic rights and interests) and other political connections? If it is the former, it can be a private society, a group society, a local society or a clan society, but not a public society3 ; if it is the latter, then what kind of basic principle for the social system is the political connections established (it is the unit society under the planned distribution system) or the public society under the market distribution system)? But these views can be boiled down to a core issue: how to encourage heterogeneous and diverse individuals to establish public values and be attracted to the public sphere. Political sociology believes that it is the public political culture that connects individuals in the public sphere with the public organization (government). But the latter is the basic value condition for the maintenance of the public sphere. The concept of “political culture”4 (political

1 Sheng Hong. 2017. “On Familyism”. Beiing Tianze Economic Institute (internal document) (2): p. 13. 2 Wang Lisheng and Wang Qingtao. 2016. “The Emergence of Capital Logic and

Reconstruction of Value in Contemporary China”. Wenhua Zongheng (5). 3 Zhang Jing. 2012. Public Nature and Familyism-Analysis of Fundamental Principle of Social Order. The Origin of Social Conflicts. Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA). 4 This is the concept of Cabriel A. Almond, who believed that political culture refers to a set of political attitudes, political beliefs and feelings and it is caused by the history and contemporary China as well as economic and political activities. Based upon the definition

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culture) defined by the contemporary academic circle is usually read from the following two (different) meanings: to restrict political culture within the subjective orientation of the political system, or to regard public political behavior as part of political culture. In the above sense, public political culture is a component of political culture, but this chapter aims to limit it mainly to cultural and political connections between individuals and public organizations (government) in the public sphere. It (public political culture) is the price basis for a heterogeneous society to achieve social integration, and it shapes an impersonal public relationship, and is also the condition of social integration for the maintenance of the social membership system. Therefore, the main characteristics or constituent factors of public political culture involve three aspects: publicity, connecting forms of organization of public society, and the relationship between individuals and public organization (government). The first is the publicity. In the sense of this chapter, publicity can be perceived as Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of “the identity of the object” (that is, publicity is evidenced by the facts: Although the perspective is different, and views are diverse, everyone always pays attention to the same object),5 which stimulates people to share a kind of moral order. The second is the organizational connection form of public society. This mainly means that the carrier of action in the public sphere is a kind of social membership system composed of various consortia. The third is the relationship between individuals and public organizations (government). Public political culture is the result of mutual construction between individuals and public organizations (government). Therefore, regarding what kind of connection basis is the relationship of the two built upon, this is particularly critical because of Almond, Lucian Pye thought that political culture is the political subjective factor in the political system, including a political tradition, political awareness, national spirit and ethos, political psyche, individual values and public opinions of society. And the role of political culture lies in attributing political system with value orientation, standardizing individual behavior and ensuring it is consistent with political system. When analyzing the composition and role of political culture, the political culture of a society consists of a series of beliefs, symbols and values formed on the basis of experience. It decides the condition of people’s behavior, which provides people with the subjective intention of involving themselves in politics. Please see the The Civic Culture (1963) co-authored by Almond and S. Verba, Political Culture and Political Development co-authored by L.W. Pye and S. Verba (1965) and Comparative Politics: Path of Development and Research (1966). 5 Hannah Arendt. 1999. The Human Condition (translated by Lan Qianwei and others). Shanghai People’s Publishing House.

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the legitimacy of government power originates from the public sphere and it reveals the essential connecting significance of public political culture. Conversely, if a public political culture that can unite members of society is not formed, the rule/regulation of the public organization (government) and the organizational form certainly occupy or find themselves in a dominant position. As a result, government power always tries to turn public sphere relations into a kind of dominant and obedient relationship. In other words, the political and cultural links that focus on the public sphere have become a kind of power dominance relationship here. In fact, today’s public sphere is occupied by this kind of power dominance relationship and form of dominance. yet individuals who move into the sphere cannot form a membership system and become an atomized state. And of course, it is impossible to form publicity of value sharing and benefit sharing. Social relations, and most importantly, the relationship between individuals and public organizations (government) cannot be built on a political and cultural connection based on real rights and interests. Jürgen Habermas proposed an ideal public sphere concept. This public sphere is composed of discussions and joint actions. It has three components: the public, “public opinion”, public media and public place. It is a sphere found between the state and the society, and its scope depends on the “boundary” between the state and the society. Strictly speaking, it is different from the private sphere (civil society) or the family sphere (Sphere of the Oikos)6 because the latter is based on personal principles rather than public principles. And for the latter, the rules of closeness, distance and the meaning of internal and external boundaries prevent the transformation of rules toward nonpersonal publicity.7 The origin of Habermas’s public sphere theory is from Hannah Arendt. The latter’s “public sphere” concept refers to the place where the action is achieved, but “action” refers to an activity in which people communicate directly without resorting to intermediaries. Not only are personal identity and self-existence established in action through the presence of others, but it

6 Jürgen Habermas. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquire into a Category of Bourgeois Society. The MIT: p. 3. 7 Zhang Jing. 2012. Public Nature and Familyism-Analysis of Fundamental Principle of Social Order: The Origin of Social Conflicts. Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA).

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is also a reminder of the individual’s mere freedom.8 In other words, Arendt’s concept of the “public sphere” is derived from the concept of politics, and the meaning of politics lies in freedom; diversity and difference are the essence of politics and the heterogeneity of opinions and opinions. Habermas’ public sphere theory refers to the gathering of private individuals as the public to discuss public affairs. The will is finally formed while emphasizing that an agreement is reached. The “action” and “consensus” of the above-mentioned public sphere concept are applicable to the public political culture discussed in this chapter. Public opinions are formed in the public sphere, and individuals who act exist in a diverse and heterogeneous political and social space. But the nature of the issues that this chapter focuses on is obviously not in the action or process itself of the public sphere, and we need to further ask the following questions: what are the public rules linking individuals? Discussion or action requires a platform, which, correspondingly, can be called a public space or a political space; is it a cultural and historical connection that consolidates the public space, or a connection of political interests, or a combination of both? Then what are the functions and effects of cultural or political connections in the integration of the public sphere? In addition, when using the above categories and concepts, we need to be certain about two key differences in the “public sphere”. First, the social development and social structure of China and the West are very different. For example, the public sphere in the West began in ancient Greece, and later despite different social development stages, the general trend is the shrinking of the public sphere, a problem faced by Western society. As for Chinese society, the so-called public sphere is fundamentally different from the Western concept. The former cannot form a self-ruled social space between the state and the society, and what connects “a period of situation from the county office to the gate of each house” is filled by the “self-governance by the gentry”.9 The latter has always had a public space, and the difference is just the historical development stage and sometimes content. Second, it is especially important that 8 Hannah Arendt. 1958. The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man. The University of Chicago Press: pp. 27–28. 9 Jürgen Habermas. 1999. Strukturwandel der Offeentlichkeit - Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der Burgerlichen Gesellschft (translated by Cao Weidong and others). Xuelin Press.

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Chinese and Western tradition, history, system and culture are distinct. The former is a “feudal society” with decentralized power, while the latter is an “autocratic society”10 with centralized power. The power structure and the power form are different, and naturally so are the category and scope of the public sphere. The above difference does not mean that we cannot find commonalities between Chinese and Western experiences. Take one example. An important and basic concept that analyzes the nature of the public sphere, Western citizens/civil society has something in common with China’s “civil” or “civil society”. For the latter, it contains a number of elements similar to civil society: a market for commodity exchanges, the interior space of the family, intermediary social organization, a certain kind of public and publicly discussed notion, and a kind of social space and order not directly under the control of the government.11 In this sense, the aforementioned difference does not prevent us from observing the changes in the nature of public social relations in China from the perspective of the state and society (and further) making historical and sociological analyses of the evolution of the public sphere in China. While identifying the current public sphere in China, the basic problems and construction conditions facing the development of the public sphere, we can reveal what are the cultural and historical resources of the construction of public politics and culture and the development basis of real society.

11.2 The Public Sphere and Public Political Culture As mentioned above, the public sphere is a historical category, and every specific stage of human history has its own structural features. This is equally saying that it is different cultural, historical and realistic political characteristics that attribute the public sphere with significance. Furthermore, the characteristics of the public sphere are only (and can only be) built on different economic and social systems. For example, for a society with a small-scale peasant economy, the value and meaning of its 10 Feng Tianyu. 2006. Textual Comment On “Feudal”. Wuhan University Press. 11 Liang Zhiping. 2003. “‘Civil’ (Minjian), ‘Civill Society’ (Minjian) and CIVIL

SOCIETY-Reexamination on the Concept of CIVIL SOCIETY”. Yunnan University Journal (social science edition) (1).

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public sphere is filled by the gentry who grows on the land. Of course, it is essentially not a modern public space because it does not have the substantive significance of self-governance. Even the so-called “civil society” or “public sphere” that has developed in the West since modern times, is not the “civil society” in the modern sense. For instance, Mr. Habermas traces the source of the public sphere12 by turning to ancient Greek, but it is only to explain the origin of basic elements of the modern public sphere. From a historical point of view, from the perspective of the clan and the country, or from the angle of family–state–world, the content and form of public sphere may be different, but the public sphere exists at the boundary between individuals and public organizations (governments) and is the legitimacy basis of government power. Indeed, this is the basic meaning that it contributes to for social development and social political order. In other words, if there is no public sphere, a social community would not be formed, and even there is no need for the emergence of a country. At the same time, it is impossible to produce a public political culture rooted in the soil of culture and history. In the above-said sense, the shaping of the public sphere and the formation of its public political culture are interrelated to the type and formation of the country, especially closely related to the legitimacy of government power. During the period of the imperial system, the people’s identity and recognition of the country is mainly based on a sense of cultural community, which has a set of cultural symbolic meaning systems. “Cultural identity is broad and strong at the level of individual consciousness, just like worshiping family ancestors, and worshiping ancestors or deceased emperor in broad sense reflects the way to maintain the people’s identity and sense of belonging to the same clan and ancestor. The foundation of this identity is the sharing of homogeneous characteristics, especially the origin and historical relationship of blood and geography”.13 This cultural identity connects family–country–world, that is, what links individual people with imperial power is one kind of “cultural bond”, which is existential in the consortium consisting of specific relationships such as family, family clan, patriarchal clan and village. From 12 Jürgen Habermas. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquire into a Category of Bourgeois Society. The MIT: p. 3. 13 Zhang Jing. 2013. “Contrast of Bonds of Social Integration: Culture and Politics”. The 21st Century (140).

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the perspective of historical development, this is what plays the role of social integration. It can be known as cultural nationalism—this kind of cultural community consciousness is deeply hidden in the cultural and historical connections of the masses. “With thousands of years of civilization and education, there are countless elites and men of vision, who cultivate them. So heroic and admirable, this is the soul of China”.14 As an abstract relationship, it fails to integrate a realistic relationship of rights and interests with the public. Cultural identity is mainly inherited from the historical community consciousness passed on from generation to generation. For the state/imperial power, the people more often establish reciprocal and mutually dependent relationships with primary-level social organizations such as families, family clans, patriarchal clans and villages. Unlike cultural and historical ties, connections of political rights and interests developed with the nationalism of the modern nation-state born at the same time—Political Nationalism. The modern nation-state provides a complete, independent, and politically unified national identity. As a social movement, nationalism serves as the pattern of a social organization combining modern masses and the masses generated during the construction of the nation-state. This is the so-called “civilized process”.15 Unlike cultural nationalism, a real relationship of political rights and interests with the people of the country at the time takes shape.16 The biggest feature of China’s modern state construction since modern times is reflected by the strengthening of the country’s fiscal and tax absorption and social control and mobilization capabilities, and this

14 Kang Youwei. 1912. The First Preface of Confucian Associations. The Journal of Confucian Associations (1st volume No. 2): pp. 2–3. 15 Philip Kuhn. 2013. The Origin of Modern State in China. JXD Joint Book Company:

p. 109. Xu Xun. 1998. Nationalism. China Social Sciences Press: pp. 25–26. 16 In 1904, in an article called Talking about a State, Chen Duxiu wrote, the Opium War made him know that “state” and “himself” has a kind of relationship: “The people in the world are originally sorted out by different countries and borders without connections. Our country, China, is one of many countries and I am one of people of China. The rise, fall, glory and disgrace of a country will be felt by all people of the country, so how can I escape from it? Thinking of this, I feel it in cold sweat and overcome by embarrassment. After over twenty years, I have understood that we have a country, that this country is a big family of all people and that everyone should be responsible for this big family. I just knew before that individual happiness, a family’s glory and national affairs have nothing to do with me”.

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is the cohesion of building political nationalism or statism. The latter is a combined ideology of nationalism and political power. In other words, the state has not committed to the establishment of modern public social relations. Its goal is to incorporate members of society into the modern national control system and resource allocation system. After 1949, under the system of the integration of the state and society, the individual was connected with the ideology of the state. The latter incorporates members of society into a common culture and ideology with a systematic concept system. National ideology belongs to the superstructure, which is based on a specific society and economy. Therefore, the functional role of national ideology is to incorporate all into the national system—from the form of ownership of the means of production to the form of production organization, then to the content of people’s thoughts. Thus, the public ethics or public political culture for the basic unit of state governance—“administrative unit” (urban unit system and rural people’s commune system) is endowed with collectivism—national interests are supreme, and personal interests are subordinate to national interests in order to protect national interests that can sacrifice local interests and personal interests—value orientation. This is a society of public ownership where there is no distinction or boundary between the public and private spheres, and the individual’s identity, public consciousness or public spirit can only be placed in the national ideological beliefs—its value and meaning can only be obtained from the grand discourse system of communism. But fundamentally speaking, it is better to believe that it is the system of national resources allocation that unexceptionally incorporates individuals into the unit of national control and governance than to consider that national ideology connects individual and public systems. This is because two basic prerequisites are required to allow individuals to transform their awareness of identity with primary social organizations such as families, clans, and villages into national consciousness or public consciousness. First, the connection between the individual and the country is a kind of real rights and interest relationship. If the state had failed to establish real rights and interest relationship with individuals, the relationship between national consciousness and individual could not have been constructed. Second, the connection between individual and national consciousness is based on the modern public legal protection through which the country safeguards citizens and their rights. In other words, the abstract consciousness of state should be associated with

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specific individual rights, and this kind of association is established in the framework of the modern public legal order. Only in this way can the cultural and political connections between individuals and public organizations (government) be constructed. On the contrary, if the individual’s identity with the country only remains linked with the cultural and historical consciousness or national ideology, then the goal of the construction of national community consciousness cannot manifest the substantive political significance of real rights and interests. In other words, only when a close and intimate relationship of political rights and interests can be established between the individual and the public organization (government) construct can a modern public space and public lifestyle be formed, and a kind of rational citizen public spirit can be developed. Because the connection of political rights and interests is not only based on the connection of history and culture but more fundamentally, based on the connection of real rights and interests. “If the people’s livelihood is not closely related to the basic system of the country, they have no motivation to truly involve themselves in the country’s political and economic life, because its specific needs are not very closely associated with the country’s system, and the protection and definition of their rights and interests are not mainly from the country, but from the specific relations around them”.17 Under this organizational order, due to no public society there, the differentiation between public and private powers is not sufficient, and the nature and purpose of the two powers are often integrated. The definition of individual rights and realization of safety guarantees are from the family, clan, village community, fellow villagers, gentry groups, village community rather than the state public system. However, such a society cannot develop a public ethical consciousness and public spirit—public political culture. In other words, only when a political connection is established between individuals and public organizations (governments), the public political culture formed on the basis of value sharing and benefit sharing can be of substantial significance for construction. The connection of political rights and interests can bring about a new kind of public lifestyle and public ethical culture for the members of the social community and the public sphere because this connection of political rights stems from the following nature of the relationship: 17 Zhang Jing. 2013. “The Comparison of Social Integration Bond: Culture and Politics”. The 21th Century (140).

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“The sharing of mutual authorization and responsibilities takes place between citizens and between them and countries, and they rely on this cooperative relationship to coexist, thus forming a unitary connection of ‘us’”.18 In this way, the public political culture is based on the separation and mutual dependence of the rights and interests of individual and public organizations and the sharing of their goals and values, and at the same time, the connection between individual, group and public interests is constructed, and finally social integration is achieved in this political connection. Only in this way can the individuals transcend the specific relationship of the primary organizations and integrate into the relationship of rights and contract of the public society.

11.3 Transformation of the Public Sphere and Evolution of Public Political Culture After the market mechanism was introduced during the reform and opening up, the nature of public social relations in China has undergone tremendous changes. Structural changes have taken place in the nature and form of the connection between the individual and the public systems. The most prominent phenomenon of political culture is the gradual separation of the individual from the national ideology. Meanwhile, the collectivism value established in the unit society is fully deconstructed, and public political culture has entered a pluralistic and disordered state. As social divisions, social polarization, social conflicts and social disagreements have increased, Chinese society has entered a state of multiple parties indulged in their revelry. In particular, egoism and materialism/consumerism have become the mainstream pattern of social life. At the same time, in the public sphere, political and social corruption, value differences, low public awareness and other phenomena lead to the weakening of the ability of social integration and social mobilization. The secularization brought about by marketization has even deprived the original public social life of public reason and public value. The emergence of the above-mentioned problems is precisely attributable to the fact that market forces have allowed Chinese society to regain public space, and this public space is still expanding. In other

18 Zhang Jing. 2013. “The Comparison of Social Integration Bond: Culture and Politics”. The 21th Century (140).

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words, after entering the public society from the unit society, the original political and cultural connections of governance system no longer exist, and the public sphere structure and public political culture are in the midst of changes. So, this is the root cause of social disorder and public value anomie, and it is a kind of pluralistic, heterogeneous and chaotic social order schema. This is the first point. But this public space composed of multiple social subjects cannot become the social space of a public community. The life of an individual is not closely related to the basic system of the country, and the protection and definition of their rights and interests are not mainly from the country, but from the specific relations of primary social organization (blood relationship, kinship, geographic relationship, etc.). In other words, today’s public organization (government) has not adapted to the changed social relations and established new and close political ties and cultures with individuals. The individual is brought back to the small community of the family and lives by depending on the primary social group or local body and by relying on these organizations to protect themselves and handle most of their affairs. In addition to the sharing of cultural and historical identity, the people do not share the same legal status or the same legal rights.19 The public society requires a new public political culture, but the social reforms for this are lagging behind. In other words, the original public political culture has been deconstructed, but the new alternative public political culture has not been built. Therefore, this is the structural reason for the lack of public ethical culture and the lack of public political culture in the current public sphere. To be specific, first, the disorder of value is not due to the collapse of the unit society and the result of “capital logic” brought about by marketization crushing the communist belief.20 Instead it is because of the external separation of national ideology and individual, and the absence of the collectivist value of the unit system. Eventually individuals seem to be captured by materialism/consumerism brought about by the secularization of the market economy. Second, the old governance logics and governance methods are unable to adapt to the new social structural changes. The outstanding feature is manifested

19 Zhang Jing. 2013. “The Comparison of Social Integration Bond: Culture and Politics”. The 21th Century (140). 20 Wang Lisheng and Wang Qingtao. 2016. “The Rise of Capital Logic and Value Rebuilding in Contemporary China”. Wenhua Zongheng (5).

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by the fact that the relationship between the public organization (government) and the individual is not based on the association of social value sharing and benefit sharing, which makes it impossible to construct new public social relations. Public sphere relations are still dominated and bounded by government power. In turn, emerging social self-government organizations cannot fill this space, and more importantly, in addition to continuing the traditional way of governing society, the government has not taken significant and effective actions. Third, a series of institutional and systematic barriers to maintaining an identity society such as the household registration system cannot be removed totally. As a result, this structurally influential factor hinders the social progress seen from identity to contract, and the identity of the public society cannot be formed. In a system of unequal rights caused by the differential system of rights, the people entering the public society are still individuals with different identities and rights. In this sense, it is impossible to achieve the identity of social members in the public sphere, nor can civic rationality and public spirit be nurtured. Therefore, the above aspects can be attributed to one problem: new civil awareness and public spirit depend on the relationship between public organizations (government) and individuals based upon (cultural) historical connection and (political) real connection of rights and interests.

11.4 Building a Public Political Culture Based on Political and Cultural Ties The underlying reason why the issues discussed above are meaningful is that the current form of public life and public spirit are undergoing a profound transformation. Since the market reform, Chinese society has seen profound changes in public ethical culture, gradually moving from the collective public ethical culture of unit society to the political/social cultural transformation of the post-unit society. Individuals return to individual life from national life and social life, and the individual’s life goal is returned from the national ideology—the grand appeal of communism back to the real family and personal life. Market-based reform plays a role in fully deconstructing the value of collectivism or communism; individuals are found no longer necessary to be part of the social organism but incorporated into the logic of capital and are divorced from the original social whole, nor can Individuals establish their one’s own meaning in

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the social whole from the whole.21 Therefore, confirming the historical and cultural foundation of a community of social ethics and the construction of a new public political culture are two aspects of the same issue. This is because the construction of any kind of public political culture must be based on the historical culture and realistic value of the people’s community. So, how to upgrade from the traditional (consortium of specific relations) cultural cohesive bond to the political cohesive bond of the public society (a consortium of abstract relations) and reconstruct an orderly and pluralistic social public ethical value has a great significance for social integration and construction of public political order when it comes to the generation and confirmation of modern public lifestyle aimed at realizing a form of public life based on self-rule. Conversely, public life in the present society lacks public ethical significance. This change begins with market reform. In the past, the people were attached to the organizational form of the unit, in favor of the view that this kind of meaning system of public life is intimately connected with the external revolutionary collectivism value, the spiritual world of individual people and national ideology. Since the reform and opening up, great changes have taken place in economic and social life. For example, in rural society, after the household contract responsibility system replaced the attached commune system, on one hand, the state power was transferred to the township level and was brought out of the economic and social life of the peasants; and on the other hand, the peasants returned to the unit of family (family clan), and the meaning of personal life and the ethical meaning of public life fall back to the family-based cultural norms composed of traditions, customs, habits and conventions. The ethics of rural public life has undergone fission. The spiritual world of the people is separated from the national ideology. That is to say, the original public value and meaning are lost, but the meaning of new public values has not been formed, which has led to the decline of rural public life and the lack of public ethics. Finally, the meaning of rural public life is found in a disorderly pluralistic schema. To answer the above-mentioned questions, we need to discuss and analyze the role of politics and culture as two types of organizational relationships in social cohesion. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the two basic relationships that constitute public political culture—political 21 Wang Lisheng and Wang Qingtao. 2016. “The Rise of Capital Logic and Value Rebuilding in Contemporary China”. Wenhua Zongheng (5).

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connection and cultural connection—are the prerequisites for the establishment of a close and uninterrupted connection between individuals and public institutions and systems. From the perspective of social integration, the integration advantage of cultural connection is more obvious in a homogeneous society. The integration is based on the specific relations of family, family clan, patriarchal clan, village community, race, nationality, etc., and forms cohesion according to shared history, blood relationship, geography, language and other factors. But for a heterogeneous and diverse public society, the integration function of political connections can be achieved by designing selective competition procedures, by coordinating differences across social categories, by forming a consortium with abstract relationships based on the right allocation of countries, groups, and individuals and by generating a cohesive force based on the agreement and constraints of rights and interests allocation, so it has a more social integrative advantage.22 In other words, cultural connection exercises more impact on the community of traditional identity society and forms cohesive relations, while political connections exert more influence on the community of public society and form contractual relations. Hence, we can understand and explain the construction meaning of public political culture by seeing how the nature of public ethics and culture revealed by political and cultural connections permeates the social community. In the above-said sense, we can understand that the lack of public political culture in the current public sphere is not the weakening of the national ideology or the decline of inherent core values caused by “capital logic”, but the fact that the individual and the public system cannot build a kind of connection of real (political) interest and value/culture. Contrarily, if the individual and the public organization (government) cannot establish a connection between real (political) rights and interests and the two rely only on the value connection of national ideology beyond individuals, it will only cause the loss of individual’s political identity for the public organization (government) and the loss of recognition of the state system. In a situation where political ties are absent and cultural ties are weakened, there are only two things left in such a public sphere: one is arbitrary institutional power, and the other is atomized individual. Therefore, such public spheres will be flooded with ideologies 22 Zhang Jing. 2013. “The Comparison of Social Integration Bond: Culture and Politics”. The 21th Century (140).

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or thoughts such as statism, nationalism, anarchism, and populism. In a nutshell, because of the fact that public organizations (the government) cannot establish a political connection with individuals, and at the same time, the national ideology cannot provide a set of value support system for the public sphere because it has no political and cultural connections with real interests of individuals, this consequently, on one hand, caused individuals to weaken their national identity or cause their identity only to have the symbolic meaning of culture and history, and on the other, actions in the public sphere will not (and cannot) constitute a constraint on government power. Thus, it is impossible to form a unified public opinion. In other words, the current public society is heterogeneous and pluralistic, and what can combine the public society must be the political connection and the cultural connection. The former refers to the connection of people’s real rights and interests, while the latter means the connection between traditional and current culture and history. In this regard, we cannot expect to reshape revolutionary values or traditional values to construct a new public political culture. The former tries to reshape the ideology so that it can return to the public sphere, but ideology is a special value/belief system and is a set of systematic expressions regarding the legitimacy of the state system or political power. And it has little to do with the real rights and lifestyles of individuals. The latter goes back to the identity connection of traditional society, but its particularistic nature makes it impossible to expand into a value system of public society. Therefore, this type of value is either not related to the actual interest of the individual or cannot be transformed into impersonal public relations. This requires that shaping the public political culture is based on actual political connections and cultural and historical connections. Furthermore, a public political culture based on political and cultural ties needs to have the following structural and institutional conditions. First, is the construction of publicness. Throughout history, the publicness of Chinese society has always been different from Western society in one distinct way, that is, the officials and the public have always been interlocked with each other. In other words, the public sphere of Chinese society does not have a dual structure in which the state and society are opposite each other. Instead, the two are interlocked with each other. That is to say, namely, norms governing social order at the national level (in the form of national law) and those governing social order at the community (grassroots) level (in the form of customary law) have

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a complex relationship in which the two are fused together and intertwined, something that is uniquely Chinese.23 The modern form of this sort of relationship is the structural integration of state and society after 1949, and its characterized by the consolidation of the social governance system and the resource distribution system. The so-called publicness essentially captures the relationship among the state, the collective and the individual in terms of their interests. In summary, state building that has taken place since modern has not been committed to the building of public social relations, and the relationship between the rights of the state and citizens has not been confirmed in the legal relationship. Therefore, the public nature of the public sphere failed essentially to achieve the transition from tradition to modernity. Public sphere relations are not based on citizens’ individual rights and social rights but on the power dominance of public organizations (government).24 The so-called public political culture has rich characteristics of subjects or local people, modern public reason and public spirit cannot be built.25 Since the reform and opening up, the vast transformation in social structure has created space for autonomy/self-rule. However, the national governance logic still uses the traditional governance system and subjects the society to its control. Grassroots organization (government) does not take the construction of public social relationships as its basic task. This is one of the reasons for the absence of political culture. Second, is the cohesive form of public social organization. The carrier of action in the public sphere is the social membership system consisting of various combinations. Public society is a heterogeneous and pluralistic society, and the main organizational form of public society is the social membership system, which is brought together in an autonomous way. While promoting social cohesion, it also enhances the ability of the system equality to absorb external social forces and achieves the organization of social interests. But as for the traditional social governance structure, on the one hand, there is no independent, autonomous and promotional social organization, and a social membership system in the public 23 Zhou Qingzhi. 2018. The Change of Grassroots Social Order in China and Its Meaning of Building. Central China Normal University (1). 24 Wang Lisheng and Wang Qingtao. 2016. “The Rise of Capital Logic and Value Rebuilding in Contemporary China”. Wenhua Zongheng (5). 25 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 2008. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Dongfang Publishing House: pp. 10–15.

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sphere cannot be formed; on the one hand, the relationship between the dominant public organization (government) and individuals in the past has not changed. The infiltration of government power into social space has caused the public sphere to be still occupied by power-dominated relations. Cultural and political connections with public organizations (government) cannot be established. Therefore, to promote social selfgovernance includes: First, the legal protection of self-ruled right—to clarify social autonomous rights and the connotation and boundary of rights between different levels of autonomous bodies; second, the form construction of multi-center public governance subject of government, society and market and other fields; third, the reconstruction of the subject society; when removing the dependence of society on state, the principle of self-governance cannot be established.26 To summarize, social self-governance is the cohesive form of public social organization and is the basic organizational structure condition for the formation of the public sphere and the construction of public political culture. Third, the relationship between the individual and the public organization (government). The legitimacy of government power comes from the public sphere, and public political culture is the result of mutual construction between individuals and public organizations (government). The relationship between the individual and the public organization (government) should be based on close political and cultural ties. Furthermore, individual and public systems establish institutionalized connections and play the roles of connection, representation, coordination and accountability. Its significance is reflected in the following: the individual’s interests of survival can rely on the ability of the public system to solve problems and avoid harm to one another, the ability to augment one’s own strength through representation, the ability to seek public standards of evaluation and to ask for help from bodies of authority.27 This can mitigate the impact of the decline of the public sphere and growing atomization of society following the disintegration of the unit-based society. Undoubtedly, all of this must be implemented through the internal interaction between the state and society. In other words, we don’t expect that by reshaping the belief of statism or after experiencing the baptism 26 Zhou Qingzhi. 2017. “On Grassroots Social Autonomy”. Journal of Central China Normal University (1). 27 Zhang Jing. 2015. “The Change of Passage: The Correlation of Individuals and Public Organization”. Xuehai (1).

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of national ideology, individuals can overcome the “loss of personal beliefs”28 and build cultural and political cohesion in the public sphere, and especially, we cannot expect one that by relying on an authoritarian governance system (which is characterized by restricting social rights and expanding government power and aimed to allow society to depend on the state and state power), we can obtain legal resources from the public sphere. The point is particularly critical because the latter shapes the essential connection meaning of public political culture. In essence, the construction of public political culture is the reform and transformation of social governance. First, the governance system of the unit system is not suitable for the pluralistic structure and heterogeneous characteristics of public society. Through “the agency role of “organization”, the unit society realizes social integration, and unexceptionally individuals are included in the national control system and the resource allocation system. The public society forms the power of cohesion based upon the coordinating mechanism of shared benefits and shared values among members, and the dependent path of today’s social governance is manifested in a kind of dominant thinking and, by continuously copying or cultivating new agent roles, people try to incorporate diverse and differentiated individuals into the authoritarian governance pattern, but it faces such a problem: The real situation of disconnection between individual interests and public interests. In other words, how it solves the problem of benefit sharing and value sharing in the public society. It can be boiled down to one question: How to construct the social justice mechanism and interest coordination mechanism? The reason why individual and public society can be connected is that individuals can share benefits and values with others. Therefore, this coordination mechanism requires the involvement of diversified social mobilization forces, and forms a structured relationship of mutual assistance and reciprocity and promotes the growth of sharing of responsibilities and ability of organization among social members. In a nutshell, unit social governance cannot solve the problem of value sharing and benefit sharing of public social governance (so) it is not possible to establish new cultural and political connections between individuals and public organizations. Second, for the public sphere, the function of public law is to adjust people’s basic relationships, but it is the public political culture that makes the public 28 Wang Lisheng and Wang Qingtao 2016. “The Emergence of Capital Logic and Reconstruction of Value in Contemporary China”. Wenhua Zongheng (5).

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sphere valuable and meaningful. Therefore, the key to building value of lies in reshaping public political culture, which requires that the fundamental task of public organizations (government) is to construct modern public social relations, and the political and cultural combination of the latter is based on the close connections of interest organization coordination mechanism and social justice maintenance mechanism. Third, the formation of public political culture and public ethical culture depends on the rule of law, proceduralization and institutionalization of public participation, which is the basic institutional condition for the formation of modern political life and public ethical life. We need to ensure the power is fully developed and the society manages itself, thus forming a modern public space and public life. On the contrary, today’s public participation channels are nothing, and individuals have little ability of understanding and influence for public system. From the perspective of the reform practice of grassroots social governance, its goal is to strengthen the authoritative status of the public organization (government), which allows the public organization strong governance resources and governance capabilities. Especially since the twenty-first century, grassroots governance has used power concentration and structural concentration to control and balance the decentralization and diversified structure, trying to put the grassroots communities under the management and service of a strong government. There is a tendency for the recurrence of the traditional omnipotent governance system.29 In other words, the reform of grassroots social governance does not directly sees the changes in the nature of public social relations at the community level, and adapt to the development trend of a diversified market economy, social and cultural diversification and value diversification in order to adjust the economic and social function and governance role of the public system and achieve the goal of multi-center social governance modernization. On the contrary, the modern construction of China’s grassroots social governance or social governance system has returned back to the starting point of history. But the involvement of multiple social forces is the cornerstone of democratic and political stability and the main form of social public life, and its huge potential is cultivated in the extensive participation of social mobilization players.

29 Jing Yuejin. 2018. “The Change of Logic for the Grassroots Governance in China’s Rural Areas”. Governance Research (1).

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Today, the lack of public political culture comes from the inability to establish political and cultural connections between individuals and public organizations (governments). This is because the public organization (government) is still using the framework of interest group of the unit society to govern society, and its main characteristic is a kind of power dominance relationship, but it fails to resolve the problem of value sharing and benefit sharing in public society. Furthermore, the unit society and its value were disintegrated, and the public sphere that emerged afterward was filled with government power and primary social organizations. On the one hand, this shows the failure of social governance, and on the other hand, it indicates that when it comes to the reconstructing of the public sphere, we cannot put the topic back to the identity connection of traditional social governance because public society is a fluid, heterogeneous, differentiated, and diverse society; the individual actions in the public sphere transcend (familyism and specialism of a society of acquaintances) the specific relationship, and they must be based on the abstract relations of allocation of rights of the state, group, individual, etc. (contract society and universalism). Therefore, the connection between the individual and the public organization (government) is required to be built on the relevant basis of the rule of law (protection of rights) and political rights (realistic interests). The heterogeneous and pluralistic society needs a kind of political relationship or political connection to form a kind of public political Culture. In other words, the shaping of public political culture requires the following elements as basic conditions. One is the spirit of the rule of law. The rule of law is a sort of value and a lifestyle; or we can say that if there is no modern public law, individual and public organizations will lose their basic public rules and norms, and they cannot be established on interrelated and mutually restrictive relations. The other is the cultural and historical connection, which is the basic value of national identity and political identity, but for public social relations, this cultural and historical connection must be established on the basis of (political) real rights and interests. In other words, because of heterogeneity and pluralism, there is a necessity for political connections, but this kind of political connection cannot be based on a mandatory dominance relationship, but on the legal and systematic guarantee of individual rights and social rights. With the above-mentioned factors, the political culture in the public culture can be constructed, which contributes to the following benefits: first, the protection and realization of individual rights; second, the political culture of

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the public sphere consortium becomes the basis of the legitimacy of the regime. Both individuals and public organizations (governments) have both functional boundaries and interest relationships, and they support and restrain each other. Therefore, to shape the public political culture, we should do the following things. Firstly, it is necessary to change the dominant–obedient relationship in the public sphere and to establish and realize a kind of relationship between individual and public organization (government); secondly, it is necessary to allow the public sphere of “action” to become a space for free and equal debate, and constitute a basic guaranteed condition for public opinions. thirdly, the characteristics of identity society should be eliminated, which is the basic condition for modern contractual relationships and public society to build equal rights; finally, realizing social self-rule is the basic realization form of individual selfruled right and social self-ruled right and is the structural factor that makes possible the transformation from unit social governance to public social governance. Speaking of unit social governance, we cannot solve the problem of value sharing and benefit sharing in public social governance (so) it is also impossible to establish new cultural and political connections between individuals and public organizations. The former uses the form of agent organization—“unit organization”—to replace (essentially to abolish) social connections in the public sphere. The unit is a political unit, a production unit, and even a governance unit, with collective rights and value running through this unit. In other words, individuals do not demand (and will not generate) public needs because all this has been resolved in the “unit organization”, or to put it in a different way, such a social structure does not have a “public sphere”, and it is also called a “general society”. This is a governance system with the integration of state and society. The latter is a heterogeneous and pluralistic society, and the dispersion of interests results in decentralization, which makes public politics possible or even necessary. And as for individual actions and public opinions, we need to push for the emergence of the public sphere. On the one hand, this will protect the interests of members of society and on the one hand (even the more important aspect) claims constraints on government power. In this way, the public sphere can become the source and foundation of the legitimacy of government power. All of these have become the basic condition for sharing of benefits and values in the public sphere.

CHAPTER 12

Forms of Rights for Members of the Rural Society: From Primary Community to State-Based Community

The core issue of rural governance is the issue of building civil rights. No matter what level of governance it requires, the ultimate basis must be focused on the system protection of basic rights including civil rights— political rights, economic rights and social rights. It is hard to imagine that through governance ability, the relationship of control and asylum between state and citizens is under mandatory power. Explaining rural governance from the perspective of civil rights means that not only do we need to point out that the problem faced by rural governance is not only an issue of institutional arrangement but also, more importantly, the issue of institutionalized protection of civil rights. Rural governance is not merely a question of order, but also a normative question of civil rights. Only by promoting the building of rural governance based upon the institutionalization of civil rights can the democratization and legislation of rural governance. This chapter examines a case of rural governance—the practice in Hanzhong, in which we find that the governance authority structure and governance philosophy that has been developed since the founding of the People’s Republic of China has not seen any significant changes: unified administrative governance by authority and grassroots self-ruled organizations that have been implemented for many years fail to perform their due functions and roles, and instead, it is constantly shrinking. Neither can social forces be actually involved in rural governance, nor can farmers’ rights and interests be fully guaranteed by the system. Nowhere can © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_12

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we fail to see the decline of rural areas and the incompetence of grassroots government governance. All this leads people to think about what principles and social foundations rural governance is based upon and what changes economic and social development bring to the governance of rural society.

12.1

From Small Community to Large Community

The construction of civil rights in China has just spanned a hundred years, but the modern significance of farmers’ civil rights has not been developed. Modern civil rights include fundamental rights, political rights, economic rights, social rights and so on. The goal of modern state construction is to achieve the relationship between the state and society based on the standard and law of the above-mentioned various rights, and the new national governance principle is the constitutional principle, and the governance method is the constitutional principle. Government governance and social governance are based on the protection and realization of civil rights. Therefore, regardless of urban or rural areas, their community governance is completely built on the basis of rule of law and democratization. But from the perspective of the goal and result of state construction, the goal is reached only when state power dominates the world—the formation of nation-state—that is, the construction of a democratic country based on civil rights and law-based principles is far from being completed. In a nutshell, Chinese politics is peasant politics; no matter how the blueprint of modern state building is and no matter how unquestionable the sense of historical mission is, the logic and trend of rural governance turn out to be the traditional relationship between the regime and the peasants—continuously copying and transforming in the form of strength and obedience. Rural governance in the period of imperial rule was a so-called “selfgovernance by the gentry”, which was however built in the village’s “small community”—the attachment of small peasant family community. During the time of imperial power, the establishment of imperial power was found at the county level, and under the county; rural governance under gentry is based on a self-sufficient small peasant economy and society. In this historical period, the core of rural governance is to connect the upper and lower parts—the imperial power and the rural community—the gentry power. As the main body of gentry power, the gentry class is the intermediary between imperial power and rural society. At the top, they maintain

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the imperial power and ensure the social order in the countryside; at the bottom, they provide public service that cannot be offered by the imperial power and act as a spokesperson for the small peasant class. The basic function of rural governance based on gentry power is that the local gentry or big clan families maintain order, levy taxes, apportion corvee, collect taxes and soldiers, keep law and order and promote education. Through the agent directly responsible to the county magistrate—the gentry, the imperial power carries out the governance and control of rural society and connects state governance and rural society with the help of gentry power. Obviously, autonomy is established on the attachment of small peasants to the family community, not on the institutional protection of the rights of individuals. That is to say, self-rule by the gentry is not rural social self-governance, and the gentry only represents their own interests, not the interests of other groups in rural society. In short, rural governance based on gentry power is not local social selfrule in the modern sense: “First of all, participants are limited to the gentry as a minority group. Secondly, the gentry is neither the representative of the local people’s election nor the representative appointed by the government. They are only (usually) accepted as spokespersons of local communities by virtue of their privileged position”.1 In essence, the nature of the role of the gentry in participating in rural public affairs is not based on explicit provisions of the law or political obligations. In other words, the self-rule of the gentry does not have a role as a public organization. By nature, it only serves the imperial autocratic political governance structure—the level below the county. The process of modern state building since modern times is an integrated course of rural society constantly merging into state power when it comes to China’s rural governance. Modern state building—the direct epitome of modernity in the national system is expressed in China as the fact of state power largely penetrating into rural society, and it is dedicated to accomplish two goals: one is the absorption of national finances and taxes, and the other is social control and mobilization ability. However, with the gradual disintegration of the traditional rural social structure, the modern order has been unsuccessfully built. At the same time, what is more essential is that the state is difficult to accomplish much in terms

1 Qu Tongzu. 2003. Local Government in the Qing Dynasty. China: Law Press: p. 337.

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of regulations, civil rights, and legal fixation. In other words, the principles of modern governance—the rights-based relationship between the state and the society and the legal provisions of civil rights, etc.—neither have a historical basis nor realistic conditions. The so-called political modernization is a process of building of authoritarian order dominated by state supremacy. In other words, the building of China’s modern state has failed the connotation of modernity—the people in the sense of sovereignty—the expansion of political competition and political participation and the structural changes in relationship between the modern state and social rights. Specifically, in modern times, rural governance has turned out to be a reorganized process of power structure in grassroots communities centering on state power. The goal of this process is to expand the power of the state to the grassroots level and to drive the gentry class as “agent” out of the system or include them in the bureaucratic system. But historically, in this process, we have failed to carry out the state power thoroughly. That is to say, the new political reform introduced in the late Qing Dynasty and the efforts of the government of the Republic of China to achieve modernization—such as the reform of the tax system, the bureaucratization of the township government power, the performance of social and educational services, etc., which, due to what Prasenjit Duara call “regime involution”, caused the state’s ability to shrink continuously. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, through a series of changes—land institutional reform, the establishment of public ownership, collectivization of agriculture, and other socialist transformation movements, state power has made possible the significant situation where state power dominates all in the world in the sense of modern state building. The direct effect is that the new regime has greatly strengthened the social control, mobilization capacity and national ability for fiscal and tax absorption. However, this is just one part of the modern state building, and another aspect of modern state building is the little progress of modern relationship building between the state and citizens (based on various rights). Instead, the people’s commune system featuring “integration of government and society” puts farmers directly under the political and administrative control of the country. By dominating the daily life of each peasant, the state integrates farmers into the top-down system of the centralized power of the state as a big community from the previous attachment to the family community. In other words, after the founding of New China, the modern state building fails to set the goal focusing on

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the construction of the right relationship between the modern state and the citizens. That is, the building of the modern state that occurred in China has not fully moved towards the building of modern order. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, members of rural society were incorporated into the larger community of the country from a small family community, and rural governance was established on the dependence of rural community members on the national community. The dependency of this rural governance is constructed through a series of institutional arrangements, including the form of resource control of state ownership, the integration of politics and society, the dual division of urban and rural areas, and the household registration system. Specifically, first, through the public ownership system of resource distribution, the state power has achieved dominance of social and economic life and realized control of rural social politics and all other fields, thus bringing the members of rural society from the traditional small community into the large country. In the community, this has greatly strengthened the country’s social integration and social mobilization capabilities. Second, the integration of politics and society means that the state and society are highly integrated. This integration is through the “government to the countryside” and “party to the countryside”, and village organizations are built through various formal and informal relationships, such as the militia, party branch, brigade, squad, peasant association, women’s federation and Communist Youth League. These organizations are the exogenous order of the state embedded in the rural society. On the other hand, through such institutional embedding, the rural society loses its subjectivity and the members of the rural society are incorporated into the national community. Third, the dual urban–rural divide-and-conquer and household registration system. In line with the country’s industrialized capital accumulation, planned economic system, and hierarchical society, the dual urban–rural structure and household registration system are conducive to social stability and management. “Non-agricultural population” has not only become a manifestation of identity, but also a confirmation of the right to enjoy resources. Furthermore, the fundamental reason for the fact that the household registration system causes inequality among citizens is that the household registration system carries too many additional functions, and its function orientation tends to be management-oriented rather than socially autonomous development. At the national level, the dual urban–rural division and household registration system have caused extensive damage to farmers’ rights, including

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First, farmers’ political rights cannot be guaranteed equally, and political life is open to urban residents and closed to farmers. In other words, farmers have no rights such as the right to vote and be elected, and the right to hold public office; second, they violate the basic rights principles of a modern democratic society, such as the principle of “everyone is born equal”, the principle of freedom of movement, etc. The majority of farmers’ rights are subject to institutional deprivation and discrimination; the third is the deprivation of farmers’ economic rights, including private property rights, equal competition rights, employment rights, etc., and this inequality has resulted from the difference in citizenship status caused by the dual structure of urban and rural areas. In a nutshell, the construction and confirmation of democratic rights that political modernization must point to is inharmonious or even contradictory to the abovementioned series of institutional arrangements, such as demands for the expression of interests, demands for political rights, protection of economic rights, and the promotion of social rights. All these cannot be reconciled with the authoritarian goal of state power building. In short, after the founding of New China, rural governance was a model of patronage based on the dependence of rural social members on the national community. In other words, after the founding of New China, members of rural society moved from the traditional small community to the large national community, forming a so-called “Clientelist” political, economic and social development order. The essence of this patronage is that “the exercise of daily authority is manifested by the distribution of opportunities, products and resources monopolized by the elite and on which the masses rely for survival”.2 In other words, the traditionally relatively independent society with a certain degree of selfgovernance that was maintained in the family community disappeared, the boundary between the state and the society no longer exists, and the state and society are highly integrated. This model of patronage creates such a state-social governance situation: First, the government has become the only authoritative governing body, and the heavy governance responsibility it shoulders puts it under the burden of impossibility and the pressure of the people’s endless expectations; second, political power has become the one like “patriarchal power” and has cultivated and even encouraged the people to rely on the state. Under the large national 2 J.C. Oi. 1989. State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press.

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community, social subjectivity is lost, and social autonomous organizations and social autonomous capabilities cannot be developed and grown; third, politics is outside the control of the people, and it becomes a matter of a few people, and individuals continue to succumb to the political power dominating them.

12.2 Foundation of Rural Governance: Lack of Civil Rights Whether it is a small family community or a large national community, farmers have always been subject to the domination of the community that dominates them. “The process of man getting rid of his attachment to the community and becoming an independent individual is the essence of the democratic revolution. For the peasants, it means enabling peasants to obtain full and full civil rights, including the right to democratic participation in public affairs and freedom in the private sphere”.3 In other words, rural governance under the domination of state power has not been placed on the legal building and institutional protection of equal civil rights. Since the reform and opening up, the institutional and social foundations of rural governance have undergone tremendous changes—the people’s commune system that integrates politics and society has disintegrated, and the grassroots mass self-governance system has been realized. At the same time, the reform of the economic system has promoted the diversification of interests and the transformation of the social structure. Expanding the space for social independent development and promoting social diversification. However, first of all, whether it is the transformation of the economic system or the transformation of the social structure, this change is mainly a “primary-level government-led” change. In other words, the changes in grassroots society are mainly not spontaneous changes in society, but changes under the control of grassroots governments—“planned changes”. Such changes cannot and cannot be allowed to go far within the framework of the current political, economic and social system. In fact, the grassroots government power and social forces are not in proportion, and social organizations cannot develop. In other

3 Qin Hui. 2003. Peasants and China: Historical Reflection and Realistic Choice. Henan People’s Publishing House: p. 6.

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words, the former maintains a strong ability to intervene, while the latter is still in a weak and “rabble” state of growth. Secondly, this change driven by economic reforms has not changed the basic fact that farmers are attached to the national community—grassroots autonomous organizations have not obtained substantive autonomy, farmers’ right to vote and be elected has become formalized, and village neighborhood committees have become townships. The tool of the government’s unified governance, that is, the basic-level autonomous organization loses the meaning of autonomy due to the substantial intervention of grassroots party power. At the same time, the original unequal status of farmers’ rights has become more prominent due to economic and social changes and shows the characteristics of social movements of group resistance, and social integration is becoming more and more difficult. Finally, the grassroots governance system has not adapted to the general trend of economic and social changes at the grassroots level, and still dominates the authority structure and control concept of unified governance. This is particularly evident in underdeveloped areas in the central and western regions, such as Hanzhong. Field research found that there has not been any meaningful institutional change in rural governance in the central and western regions in the past 40 years. However, “no matter how complicated the situation of a society is, the balance of power between groups is always changing. But if society is to become a community, then the power of each group should be exerted through the political system, and the political system regulates this power, moderates and reinforces its guidance, so that the dominant position of one social power is coordinated with many other social powers”.4 Compared with traditional society, the new social power brings a growing deconstruction ability. For example, resistance to unequal status discrimination, claims of economic rights and requirements for freedom of movement—these are inevitably caused by “incomplete civil rights”. As a result, its extreme manifestations are protesting behaviors such as petitions and mass incidents. All this shows the awakening of the main consciousness of the grassroots people and the social forces organized, and the diversification of interests and the diversification of the society have gradually expanded, forcing the grassroots governance system to make adaptive adjustments, and take the construction of modern civil rights as the core. The functions, scope and boundaries of grassroots 4 S.P. Hungtington. 1989. Political Order in Changing Societies. Shanghai Translation Publishing House: p. 11.

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government power and grassroots public participation are confirmed and standardized. Since the twenty-first century, there has been a crisis in rural governance based on the dependence of the people on the national community. From the perspective of the grassroots government, its traditional methods of wealth accumulation and social control are no longer sustainable due to the diversification of grassroots social interests and the diversity of social groups. However, its coping methods—for example, the current so-called “government innovations” are still a kind of consolidation and reinforcement of traditional governance concepts and governance methods. Zhao Shukai believes that the stalemate in rural governance is manifested in the financial crisis of the township government, policy failure, decline in authority, and system alienation. Various systems that do not meet the needs of society are gradually becoming vacant and unable to function effectively. The reason is that in addition to the historical reason of the strong inertia of the traditional system, a new factor cannot be ignored. This is the expansion of the self-interested pursuit of the grassroots government. “The extreme state is manifested by the fact that some grassroots governments are neither the central government nor the grassroots government of the people, but the government of local officials”.5 The pursuit of self-interest continues to break through the constraints of rules and has a long-term negative impact on governance: Within the administrative system, self-interest at the grassroots level will undermine the coherence of the public service sector. After selfinterested filtering, the higher level policies are selectively passed down, and the lower level information is selectively reported. The trend of flexibility, concealment and evasion naturally forms administrative blockades, making the policy ineffective. Outside the political system, the self-interest of the grassroots will destroy the relationship between cadres and farmers, turning the service and commitment roles of public servants into profitseeking and commanding roles, creating estrangement, alienation and even complaints between the two sides, and it is naturally difficult to carry out cooperation between cadres and groups. However, the above view obviously enlarges the self-governance of the township government, and this enlargement may confuse the subjectivity of government governance and the free form relationship of the social field so that the 5 Zhao Shukai. 2010. Township Governance and Government Systematization. The Commercial Press: p. 291.

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self-governance tendency or “self-interestedness of the grassroots government pursuit”—the tendency that any regime possesses—is pushed to an improper position and distortion. The reason is simple: First, the township government cannot be regarded as a complete power, it plays the role of the executor of county politics to a large extent; Second, it does not fully consider the local differences in grassroots governance, which are different in developed areas. (Southeast Coast) and underdeveloped regions (Middle and West) are particularly obvious in governance thinking and governance structure, although this difference is mainly manifested in the strength of the dominant force of administrative power or the strength of the development of social forces. Moreover, this view mainly looks at the issue of rural governance from the standpoint of the grassroots government. However, as he observed, so far, the institutional environment of the grassroots government has not changed. The behavioral logic of the grassroots government has not changed, that is, the traditional governance concepts and governance operating mechanisms of the grassroots government have not undergone fundamental changes. Fundamentally speaking, the current problem of rural governance is a problem related to “modernity”—the incompleteness and lack of guarantees of civil rights. In other words, the foundation of today’s rural governance is still the incomplete citizenship established by the peasants. Above rights. Since the reform and opening up, great changes have taken place in rural society. However, due to the dual urban–rural structure, household registration system, social security system, land system and other reasons, farmers in the natural economic society of small farmers now have to face an industrial and commercial society. Therefore, their inherent difficulties and contradictions are expressed as how to fight for their own rights and adapt between the traditional agricultural society and the industrial and commercial society. It is true that changes in the system are not available overnight, and the social inequality and injustice covered by the old system are not just around the corner. The deeper conflicts are derived from the principles on which this series of unjust systems rely, that is, incomplete citizenship rights cause farmers to enter the industrial and commercial society from the agricultural society, inevitably in an extremely unfavorable state of survival and competition for survival. Villager self-governance has not brought much vitality to rural social governance. In fact, villager self-governance is still under the control of the power of the larger community. Although the opening of the market has given farmers a way out, they are burdened with innate

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deficiencies—incomplete civil rights to participate in the life of the market economy. This means that the resources and opportunities brought about by the development of the market economy are not and cannot be shared equally and fairly for farmers with incomplete civil rights. This is the source of the crisis in rural governance. The first step of change is also an essential step: transforming coercion into rights and turning obedience into obligations, constructing the modern meaning of the relationship between the state and society (based on the norms of citizens’ various rights). Thomas Janowski pointed out that in the development and gradual sequence of civil rights, the state is a process from the wasp to the locomotive. The so-called “wasp” means that the state collected tributes in the past and “stung people” like a wasp, but did not suck up human blood; over time, the country gradually became a locomotive, running on tracks supported by the people.6 For rural governance, it means to making the grassroots government a public organization, constructing complete civil rights, and letting the grassroots society release the power of self-governance and join the rural governance. However, this kind of historical progress is not easy to obtain. In fact, the various rights of citizens, including legal rights, political rights, economic rights, and social rights, are all embodied in the rights between the state and society through the continuous advancement of political modernization. Among the rules of the game and various rights relations. A basic fact is that after 40 years of economic and social development, farmers’ incomplete civil rights have not made much progress. Hundreds of millions of peasants are still walking between cities and villages, and this institutional discrimination puts peasants in an extremely unfavorable state of survival—the rights and interests of peasant workers are not guaranteed, and the elderly in the countryside maintain the old production methods and lifestyle. In other words, in today’s rural society, the authority supporting grassroots governance is top-down administrative authority; members of rural society still live within the unequal old institutional framework, and this old institutional framework consists of urban–rural dual structure, The household registration system, identity system, etc. constitute the institutional source of various incomplete rights

6 Thomas Janoski. 2000. Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes. Liaoning Education Press: p. 214.

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of farmers. One is that political rights based on elections have no substantive significance. For example, the right to vote is formalized by factors such as the power of the grassroots party power and interest politics. This is particularly prominent in underdeveloped regions. In other words, the innate shortcomings of grassroots self-government organizations—there is a form of self-governance but no real self-governance, which prevents farmers from becoming the main force in rural social and political life. Second, social rights are not guaranteed. Property rights are the core of social rights. The rights of life and freedom need to be based on property rights or manifestations of property rights. The nature, purpose and scope of the government are all for the realization of citizens’ property rights. For a long time, some grassroots governments have ignored and trampled on the individual property rights of farmers, especially the ownership, use and management rights of farmers to their houses, arable land and private enterprise property and imposed compulsory expropriation and coercion on the land and houses legally operated by farmers. Demolition. The third is the inequality of economic rights. Due to the existence of discrimination, farmers are marginalized and disadvantaged in the game of interests. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the state promoted the collectivization of agriculture and the construction of a dual urban– rural social structure, which caused farmers to lose their land and private property rights in their occupations and were demoted to the status of second-class citizens in terms of their status. Since the reform and opening up, for farmers and rural areas, land has been embodied in the form of property. However, the political and legal indistinguishability of the land system has made the protection of farmers’ land rights uncertain. In short, although since the reform and opening up, a series of policies such as exemption of agricultural tax, direct food subsidy, new rural construction, minimum living guarantee, new rural cooperative medical care, free compulsory education, improvement of people’s livelihood, equalization of basic public services, service-oriented government, etc. The reform measures provided by China have provided development conditions for the construction of complete civil rights. However, the incompleteness of farmers’ civil rights has become increasingly prominent in the process of economic growth and social transformation and is directly reflected in the crisis of rural governance.

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12.3 Full Civil Rights and Transformation of Rural Governance Granting full civil rights to members of rural society is the key to promoting the modernization of rural governance. In other words, incomplete civil rights cannot realize the modernization of rural governance with the participation of multiple subjects. The source of the incomplete citizenship rights of rural members of society is the inequality of citizenship, and the inequality of citizenship originates from the dual division of urban and rural areas and its household registration system. Marshall pointed out: “Citizenship is a status, a status enjoyed by all members of a community, and all people with this status are equal in the rights and obligations conferred by this status”.7 The essence of citizenship is that the state should ensure everyone can be treated as a complete and equal member of society and ensure the citizenship and national identity of social members. It is necessary to grant increasing citizenship to everyone, including farmers. In a nutshell, without civil rights, there can be no sense of citizenship, and there can be no national identity. In other words, the inequality of citizenship, and civil rights cannot be complete, and vice versa. The realization of various rights of farmers is the core of the construction of rural governance. Farmers’ rights mainly refer to the interests of farmers as the subject of rights, including material, spiritual and personal interests, as well as the legal reflection, embodiment and protection of these interests. The political rights of farmers are mainly the right to participate in the management of national social affairs, including the right to vote, the right to be elected, and the right to supervise. As a small producer, the most basic rights of farmers should be their own private property ownership and the right to contract management of land. Personal rights mainly refer to the basic personal rights enjoyed by farmers as social subjects according to the Constitution, such as personal rights, personal freedom rights, and the right to education. The acquisition of full civil rights by farmers is closely related to the structure and arrangement of the rural social governance system. In other words, to promote the modernization of rural governance, we must first 7 Thomas H. Marshall. 2006. Citizenship and Social Clas s (translated by Liu Xunlian, Li Lihong, and Ning Rui, published in the Collected Discussions of Chinese and Western Culture: The Fifth Edition of Will Kymlicka), Tianjin People’s Publishing House.

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institutionally protect the political, economic, and social rights of farmers. Only by establishing institutional guarantees for these rights and establishing the authority of rural governance on the basis of social sources can the subjectivity of farmers’ governance be constructed. Zhang Jing believes that the “contradictions in governance” existing in contemporary Chinese rural society are concentrated in the source of authorization and state building: On the one hand, in order to coordinate grassroots conflicts and political stability, the state has to adopt various methods to limit the arbitrary behavior of grassroots regimes. For example, limiting taxes—stipulating the bottom line of the proportion of taxes to income; on the other hand, the country has to rely on the grassroots government to issue loans, implement tax exemptions, donations, welfare and other governance, which in turn supports the legitimacy of grassroots authority and abets their power.8 Zhang Jing pointed out that the “contradictions in governance” mentioned above involve a core issue of contemporary Chinese rural politics, namely China’s grassroots politics has the attribute of dual structure. The traditional society is “government by the government and the people”, but now it has evolved into the “dualism of the party and government”. Rural society has increasingly become the intersection of state power and civil authority. The dual structure of rural social governance has its inherent logic: On the one hand, if modern state construction wants to draw a lot of economic and political resources from rural society, it will inevitably penetrate the tentacles of state power into the countryside; on the other hand, the governance of rural society must Rely on state power to maintain basic social order and provide basic public goods. In this way, the village governance organization actually has a dual function: not only to help the country but also to protect the common interests of the villagers. Therefore, the village politicians who perform this governance function naturally have a dual role: not only the agent of the state power in the countryside, but also the role of the spokesperson of the village community. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a common interest-related structure between the grassroots government and society through institutional innovation. Without completing the constitutional framework, villager self-governance cannot make the grassroots government truly a public service department, and civil rights cannot be finally established. Therefore, establishing the social source of authority in an 8 Zhang Jing. 2000. The Grassroots Political Power: Issues of Rural System. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House: p. 45.

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institutionalized way and strengthening the social foundation of authority are the foundation of long-term stability at the grassroots level.9 Fundamentally speaking, the core issue of rural governance is the issue of farmers’ rights. First, free grassroots autonomy gets rid of its dependence on the grassroots political power, and at the same time, establishes the subjectivity of farmers on the basis of the institutionalized construction and protection of civil rights. From the perspective of the grassroots government, it has to complete a transformation of the nature of public organizations, and such a role and its institutionalized relationship with citizens represents the principle of public (civic) rights, which is the modern meaning contained in the governance construction of the grassroots government. As far as the modernization of rural governance is concerned, it just adapts to the structural changes of the economy and society, to transform towards a pluralistic governance structure based on the principles of civil rights, and work toward democratic governance based on institutionalization and rule of law. To this end, it is necessary to promote the civil rights of farmers in terms of institutional arrangements and construct rural governance. First, build autonomy. Autonomy refers to the right of citizens to selfmanage the public affairs of the community, and the implementation of autonomy means that the state’s power withdraws from social spheres that it should not interfere with. In contemporary China, the autonomy of farmers is mainly reflected in the autonomy of villagers. However, in the grassroots practice of rural governance, the autonomy power possessed by the village committee is more administrative and instrumentalized, without the power to make independent decisions, and becomes a simple extension of the state’s administrative power represented by the township government. From the Hanzhong survey, the basic feature of rural governance is that rural community affairs and government administrative affairs are not separated but overlapped and mixed. In other words, from the perspective of townships, all affairs are administrative affairs; from the perspective of rural communities, in order to realize rural affairs, the premise is to complete the administrative affairs of the township government. Furthermore, the “township (town)-village” unified governance system at the rural grassroots level continues to a considerable extent 9 Zhang Jing. 2000. The Grassroots Political Power: Issues of Rural System. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House: p. 45.

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the consistent power operation logic of the people’s commune system, extends the power of the state to the grassroots, and implements oneway management and control of the grassroots society This top-down governance system formed a bureaucratic power structure, which not only compressed the space of the grassroots society but also stifled the vitality of the grassroots society. Therefore, under such a governance system, the so-called village (resident) autonomy does not have much real meaning. Second, guarantee economic rights. One is the confirmation of land rights. Since the 1990s, industrialization and urbanization have been advancing rapidly, and the current land system has played an important role. However, under the dual urban–rural structure, the right to contract management of agricultural land, homesteads, rural collective construction land, and land acquisition systems are politically compatible. Jurisprudence has not been differentiated, and the chaotic ownership relationship has become an obstacle to the further development of rural areas. Under this land system, it is difficult for land to form a large-scale operation, which also affects the free flow and optimal allocation of urban and rural production factors and various resources. The second is equal rights. The dual structure system of urban–rural division and division has prevented farmers from enjoying the benefits of industrialization. Due to the serious lack of public welfare, public services and social security, farmers cannot abandon scattered land. As a result, farmers can hardly enjoy the fruits of social and economic development, and cities can hardly get the development they deserve. In fact, “Villagers often refer specifically to those farmers who contract for the management of rural collective land. There are a series of differences in household registration, land property rights, and identity from urban community residents. In other words, the property boundary of rural collective land is not only the identity and rights boundary of villagers but also the management boundary of village-level organizations. Although farmers are allowed to work in cities after the reform and opening up, it is still difficult for farmers to work in cities to easily separate from their original villages and collectives, and migrant workers cannot enjoy the same benefits and civil rights as urban residents. It is impossible to truly integrate into the urban society, and the village-level public services and management objects are limited to the villagers. It is difficult to provide equal basic public services to outsiders, and effective management cannot be implemented, resulting in

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a huge management vacuum”.10 This long-standing separation of urban and rural areas and a closed-off grassroots governance system has caused Chinese farmers to survive only by working in cities and farming in the countryside in order to maintain a relatively normal standard of living. Third, guarantee social rights. Social rights include a series of rights ranging from enjoying a small amount of economic and security benefits to fully sharing social heritage and enjoying civilized life in accordance with social standards. The most closely related fields are the education system and the social service system. As a citizen’s social right, everyone has an equal right to receive an education or work. However, for “rural people” and “urban people”, there are differences in what kind of education they receive and what kind of occupation they are engaged in. There are huge institutional and institutional differences. Since the reform and opening up, my country has transformed from a planned economy to a market economy. Rural areas have implemented a household contract responsibility system. People’s communes quickly disintegrated. Farmers have obtained land management rights. The collective security function has gradually weakened. Rural social security has faced serious difficulties and challenges. For example, the current empty-nest elderly in rural areas are facing problems such as long distance from their children, high levels of poverty, low medical security, and few cultural activities. The farmer’s security system combines family security with land and non-agricultural occupational income as the content is far from visible. As an important part of basic public services, the new rural insurance is important for advancing the equalization of basic public services in urban and rural areas. The meaning is limited. Therefore, at the moment, in order to further play the role of the new agricultural insurance in promoting the equalization of basic public services in urban and rural areas, it is necessary to comprehensively improve the management level of the new agricultural insurance agency and establish a new agricultural insurance supervision and evaluation mechanism to ensure fairness and efficiency, etc.

10 Wu Licai and Yang Huan. 2012. “Reconstruction of Grassroots Governance between Cities and Villages in the Era of Urbanization—Wenzhou Model and Its Meaning”. Journal of Central China Norman University (Humanistic and Social Science Edition) (6).

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12.4 Democratization and Legislation for Rural Governance Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities, numerous articles have mentioned the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities. The governance methods are all talked about. In fact, first of all, locality is the essence of governance. Governance faces only local facts, while rural communities are the basic political unit of national governance. At the moment, it is important to understand the “what is” status quo of grassroots governance. From a historical perspective, what is the logic of grassroots governance in China, and what is the authority and responsibility mechanism for its operation? Furthermore, since the reform and opening up, what changes have taken place in the economic and social foundations of grassroots governance, what is the relationship between the state and society, what kind of functional impact has different levels of economic and social development have on rural governance, and whether there is a generalization? Appropriate governance model? And all of this cannot be planned and designed. It is the practice of life that gives the real meaning of governance. Fundamentally speaking, the construction of rural governance is based on the realization of civil rights. Judging from the practice in Hanzhong, the social foundation of its governance is still established on the incomplete civil rights of farmers. In fact, it is still using traditional experience (whether from the imperial era or the revolutionary era) to govern rural society. This traditional experience believes in power but does not believe that democratic governance can bring prosperity, stability and order. In fact, for the modernization of grassroots government governance, the most important and core aspects include expanding political participation, governing by law, and building a modern state–society relationship. First, is political participation. Political participation is one of the important agendas in the construction of rural governance. One is the consciousness of the political community. For the grassroots, the key is to promote the people’s awareness of the local political community. Once they have a sense of political community, they will actively care about local political life, strengthen the people’s rights, obligations, and responsibilities to the grassroots government, and the people will have the will to

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choose their own identity. Political candidates. The second is to participate in institutionalization. Improve the political participation system, and effectively absorb and channel the public’s ever-expanding demands for political participation. One of the most pressing issues is one of the largest potential participating groups—farmers are outside of politics, not “politicians”, but outsiders or natural persons. They have only an abstract national identity, but they don’t know how to treat them politically. What it means. Allowing this huge group to enter the grassroots political life is one of the basic issues in the construction of the modernization system of grassroots government governance. For example, first, through civic education cultivate the subjects of rights and obligations with independent rational judgment ability; second, enhance the people’s sense of trust and belonging to the local political community; third, promote the social and economic life, ideological and cultural fields, as well as family, school and work The democratization of society in all areas of public life, including units, production units, and consumption units, is a condition for the institutional change of political participation from unity to diversity, and so on. Second, the rule of law in governance. Including five meanings. The first is about institutionalization and standardization. The operation of government power must be institutionalized and standardized. It requires government governance, market governance and social governance to have complete institutional arrangements and standardized public order. The second is about democratization. All public governance and institutional arrangements must ultimately ensure that sovereignty rests with the people. All public policies must fundamentally reflect the will of the people and embody the people’s subjectivity. The third is about the rule of law. There are two meanings. One is that the Constitution and the law are the supreme power, and the other is to act in strict accordance with the law. The first meaning is more important, that is, the constitution and the law are the supreme power, and no organization or individual is allowed to override the constitution and the law. And in the modern state governance system, no political party or organization can override the law. The Constitution is the supreme power. The fourth is about efficiency. Now the modern national governance system should effectively maintain social stability and social order, with high administrative efficiency and economic efficiency. The fifth is about coordination. There are three particularly important subsystems in the modern state governance system. The first is political Government governance, the second is social governance, and

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the third is market governance. From the central to the local levels, from government governance. In terms of social governance, various institutional arrangements are a unified whole.11 For grassroots government governance, the core issue is to strengthen and strengthen the awareness of the grassroots political community, which is the building of a democratic and rule of law government. For government administrators, its power comes from the grassroots people, prompting them to interact with local people. The interests and will of the people are integrated, standardized and proceduralized. For the people at the community level, it can improve their political identity and truly participate in grassroots governance. In the political life ruled by law, the self-government ability and spirit of the people will be improved and cultivated, and government officials and the people will feel conscious to put one’s own ambitions and future into grassroots governance, try to manage the society and make themselves accustomed to the organizational form that democracy depends on. Third, is the modern construction of the relationship between the state and society. The structural condition for the modernization of rural governance is the construction of the right relationship between the modern state and society. Since the twenty-first century, the diversified interest structure, diversified social forms, and the growth of social organizations, all of which require that rules and norms that can be followed and confirmed between the state and society must be found. However, from the perspective of rural governance practices, there are two forces that work in opposite directions: one is that the grassroots government power cannot give up the dominant position of unified authority; the other is that social forces continue to raise their own interests and interests in the face of the grassroots government power. Power demands. So, what kind of modern state–society relationship should be established? From the perspective of system design, authoritarian claims, democratic demands, and civil society rights norms, etc., all of these have made rural governance so chaotic and so incomprehensible. The grassroots government wants to follow the traditional governance logic and governance methods, relying on coercive force and multi-resource monopoly, trying to maintain the grassroots society within a controllable order through some model designs and practical forms. However, today, the awareness 11 Jiang Baoxin and Yu Keping. 2014. “‘City Management Style Dilemma’ and Governance Modernization”. Journal of Tongzhou Gongjin (1).

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of civil rights is growing day by day. If any community construction or social management innovation is not based on the individual rights of citizens, then any harmonious community construction with modernity is a hypocritical authoritarian trick. From the perspective of system construction, the realization of the political participation rights of rural social members is the key to the democratization and rule of law in rural governance, and the key to the realization of the political participation rights is autonomous social selfgovernment organizations (trade unions, peasant associations, chambers of commerce and other nongovernmental interest groups). Institutionalization of development. With the unity of rural governance, social autonomous organizations express and maintain their rights and interests through their concerns and participation in public affairs, so that the realization of rural public interests is established on the basis of consultation and co-governance by multiple subjects. According to the survey in Hanzhong, although the development of rural social organizations has been slow, few social organizations have shown their power. For example, the operation methods of professional economic cooperation organizations that are not affiliated with or related to the township government and village committees have a strong subjectivity and gradually had the weight of reciprocity and negotiation with the township government or village committee. In fact, in today’s increasingly diversified interest groups, social self-government organizations play the function of communicating and expressing interests with the government, and those unions, peasant associations, chambers of commerce and others that were once directly affiliated to the state or under strict supervision and control by the grassroots government As the requirements for social self-organization increase, private interest groups will gradually transform from state-controlled social organizations to social self-government organizations, and will increasingly represent these interest groups in dialogue with grassroots governments. The level of government and the rural people play an active role in negotiation and dialogue. Moreover, the villagers get the substance autonomy will inevitably exert restraint and checks and balances on the power at the grassroots level. In other words, the villagers through independence the social intermediary organization platform supervise the grassroots government, which helps the grassroots society to have the power grassroots. Effective checks and balances. In a nutshell, if the above-mentioned institutional conditions are met, it is expected to form a government, a pattern of rural pluralistic democratic

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governance in which the government standardizes social organization and social organization standardizes social members. In addition to that, rural social governance can finally be established on various norms based on civil rights. In short, the key to the building of rural governance lies in the extent to which farmers enjoy the civil rights stipulated and guaranteed by the constitution, especially political rights at the core. This is particularly important not only for rural governance but also for China’s political development. Huntington said: “The source of political modernity is the city, and the source of political stability is the countryside”. “If the government wants to enjoy a little peace, it needs substantive support from the countryside. If a government does not get the support of the countryside, there is no possibility of stability”.12 The success or failure of rural governance is related to the construction of China’s democratic politics and whether the relationship between the state and farmers can be built on the norms and legal framework based on civil rights.

12 S.P. Hungtington. 1989. Political Order in Changing Societies. Shanghai Translation Publishing House: pp. 256–257.

CHAPTER 13

The Rights Distribution System for Urban Residents

In the current urbanized areas of China, the dual structure of rights because of residents’ household registration status has historical and realistic reasons, which is rooted in the power distribution system of authoritarian governance and the organization pattern of social interests. The social conflicts caused by the dual unequal structure of rights in urbanized areas are manifested in values, beliefs and competition of scarce positions, rights and resource allocation. Eventually, it has led to the change in the nature of social conflicts in urbanized areas from conflicts triggered by economic factors to conflicts caused by the distribution of rights, and economic inequality is directly demonstrated by the inequality of entitlements. Therefore, in urbanized areas, it is necessary to eliminate the right difference system in order to promote the household registration system. This aspect is related to the modern transition of urban authoritarian governance and is linked to the equality of rights and social fairness and justice in urbanized areas.

13.1 Urbanization and Grouping of Urban Population by Household Registration Status In recent years, as a result of what we call “urban diseases” triggered by urbanization, such as traffic congestion, housing shortage, employment difficulties, chaos of social public security, increasing pressure on social security and difficulty in filling the gap in social insurance, policy © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_13

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of “controlling the size of urban population”1 and trend of “floating population” (mainly targeted at the so-called “low-end population” or “low-end labor”—people engaged in manual labor) have been seen in some highly urbanized areas. For example, some so-called “megacities” (permanent resident population in urban areas outnumber 10 million) have set the upper limit of population size one after another. While introducing the indicator of urban population size, they make a comprehensive use of economic, legal, administrative and other means to control the disorderly and excessive growth of the population,2 and limit and resolve the problem of the inflow and residence of non-registered population. In particular, it is natural that these measures are linked with household registration and identity. For example, the non-registered population is not allowed to engage in certain service industries, and some sectors that non-registered population is involved in are relocated to other areas, and they contribute to the improvement of costs in the living and working areas of non-registered population in the name of management. At the same time, in some highly urbanized areas that have taken the lead in reforming the household registration system, they have slowed down the reform of the household system. In some areas, the reform policy of the household registration system has even come to a halt or has been in a retracting state.3

1 In January 2016, at the local “Two Sessions”, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou and other cities clearly put forward the policy of “strictly controlling total population”. On January 2, the Beijing Municipal Mayor Wang Anhun said the total population of Beijing will be limited to less than 23 million by 2020; on January 24, the Shanghai Municipal Mayor showed that during the 13th Five-Year Plan, Shanghai will adopt a comprehensive policy to control the size of population, making the total permanent population keep within 25 million. The proposal for the 13th Five-Year Plan of Guangzhou published before made clear that the city will implement the national policy of controlling the population of mega-cities and moderately controlling the size of population. Please see Xinwen Chenbao (News Morning), January 26, 2016. 2 The task was sent by the Haidian District of Beijing, planning to control the population within 4.71 million. This was published on January 13, 2015. 3 In highly urbanized areas, the selective nature of household registration system becomes increasingly strong, such as in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen and other areas where only “high-end talents”—professionals or business elites. In addition, the “point-based system” that has been implemented for many years—which is regarded as the innovation of household registration system, has failed to make substantial significance in some regions, such as Zhangjiagang, Kunshan, Taicang and other regions where migrants and locals are seriously incompatible, but the “point-based” system that has been

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The so-called “urban disease” and the retention and abolition of household registration system are two issues of different nature. The former is a common problem that is unavoidable in the process of urbanization in any country or region; the latter involves the equality of rights and social fairness and justice. Therefore, there is no inevitable connection between controlling the size of the population or to treat urban diseases and judging the extent of reforming the household registration system. So, by connecting two issues of different nature, we cannot help to control population size and cure urban diseases and will in turn aggravate the phenomenon of unequal rights and social injustice among urban residents (between non-registered population and registered population). From a nationwide perspective, the reform of household registration system has faced many systematic bottlenecks.4 But in regions with a high urbanization rate of 70–80 percent, or even 100 percent, such as Pearl River Delta regions, the institutional bottleneck for the reform of the household registration system no longer exists. In the above-mentioned urbanized areas, a “dual structure of rights” has emerged—the difference in rights between the registered population and the non-registered population. That is to say, the dual system of urban and rural society has evolved into a dual structure of rights for urban residents. In addition to this, the reform of household registration system has a clear orientation of protectionist policy of protecting the rights (privileges) of the residents of the city (the registered population). Besides, the focus of discussion on the reform of the household registration system in academia and public policy research fields is shown as follows. On the one hand, they recognize that the household registration system involves the issue of equality of rights and examine it in different

carried out for three to five years just resolves the household identity of a very minority, so this reform has no statistic significance. 4 As for the construction of urbanization, the logic of household registration system should be: to achieve urbanization, we should first break the dual structure of urban and rural areas, which however requires the reform of household registration system. In turn, the reform requires other supporting measures for relevant systematic reforms, and at the same time, these systematic reforms are related to the systematic advancement of systematic reforms of health, education, social insurance and land interests between urban and rural areas. Therefore, the reform of household registration system should be pushed forward with other related systematic reforms. Please see Zhou Qingzhi’s The Construction and the Transformation of Grassroots Governance System-Based on the Substantial Analysis of Urbanization Drive in Central and Western Regions. Research on Politics 2015 (5).

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fields, although this type of discussion is centered on the household registration system. On the other hand, such academic research or countermeasure research fails to pay attention to the fact that the household registration system in urbanized areas has evolved (or is in the process of) evolving into the dual structure of rights of urban residents, especially the fact that the dual structure of rights has caused the nature of social conflicts to change.5 In urbanized areas, the “dual structure of rights” formed by household registration status is attributed to the right distribution system and the organized pattern of social interests of authoritative governance. This means that the reform of household registration system is disturbed by essential requirements and policy wishes or intentions of urban authoritarian governance. Therefore, the household registration system has become an important factor of determining urban social stratification. That is to say, the dual unequal structure of rights in urbanized areas does not mean the decrease of the “available resources” of the household registration system, but the decrease of “deserved right” of social group with non-registered population, namely the decrease of the “right to enter the city”. In other words, the “dual structure” reflects an issue of inequality of rights on the non-registered population, which directly points to the maintenance mechanism of social fairness and justice. Thus, the reform of the household registration system involves more than just expanding the rights or improve the livelihood and living conditions of the non-registered population on the basis of the household registration status but is related to the social rights and the social contract itself and to what rules or principles new urban order is based upon. 5 As for the discussion of household registration institutional reform, it has been mentioned in the process of urbanization until today, but main discussion focuses on two aspects: the first concentrates on the issue of household registration system leading to the difference of rights between urban and rural residents; the second is that the household registration system helpful to the resources allocation is relevant to the construction urbanization, but such discussion fails to relate to the significance of household registration institutional reform in different urban and rural areas that has not existed any more. Regarding the research of this aspect, please see Mu Min’s Review of Several Issues of Household Registration Institutional Reform in China. Journal of Theory 2002 (4); Li Zhide’s The Path Choice of Change of Household Registration System in China: The Balance and Realization of Supply and Demand of Urban Household Registration System. Economic Institutional Reform 2010 (4); Wu Kaiya and Zhang Li’s Development Government and Threshold of Residence in Cities: Reflection on the Reform of Household Registration System. Research on Sociology 2010 (6).

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13.2 Rights Under a Dual Structure: Household Registration in Urbanized Areas The dual structure of urban rights refers to the phenomenon where, in urbanized areas where there is no dual urban–rural social system, household registration status results in structural disparity in people’s rights that seems resistant to change. Different from the system of rights disparity in the dual urban–rural society, the dual structure of urban rights refers to the rights disparity between two types of residents in an urban area who are registered as urban residents, those who are registered as residents in that city, and those who are registered as residents in a different city. It is a manifestation of the phenomenon of “rule based on differential rights for residents”. This is different from the rights disparity between farmers and urban residents, and between agrarian civilization and urban civilization.6 What is more, in urbanized areas, unregistered population covers a wide range, not only those from rural areas such as rural migrant workers, but also people living and working in the cities who are not registered as local residents. In other words, the so-called dual structure of urban rights is created by people’s pre-existing household registration status. These include not only urban and rural status, but also non-local household registration status. But the unregistered population that we are discussing here mainly refers to migrant workers, and in urbanized areas, they already constitute a significant sub-population. The rights disparity faced by this group is manifested in social stratification, social inequality and what must be addressed by mechanisms for maintaining social justice. In short, the dual rights structure of the city can be traced to the urban– rural household registration system. The disparity is present in areas such as education, medical care, employment, social security, pensions and others where the law calls for differential treatment. But in urbanized 6 The rights disparity in an rural–urban dual society refers to the fact that with urban and rural areas as the boundary and household registration system as the basis, the system divides types of household registration status into agricultural and non-agricultural; populations in urban and rural areas is divided into two social classes of unequal economic and social interests, thus forming the hierarchical system in real sense. In addition to this, the household registration system has the significance of social identity featuring factors deciding class and status and has the significance of social inequality between classes of social resources distribution based on status, wealth, power, knowledge and so on. Finally, a household registration system that determines people’s rights (what rights one has depends on their household registration status) has become the basic structural form of Chinese society.

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areas, the concept no longer refers to rights disparity based on people’s spatial distribution but primarily rights disparity based on whether one is registered in their city of residence. Furthermore, based on the institutional reform and practical experience of China’s urbanization regarding the transition from farmers to residents, from agriculture to industry and commerce, and from agricultural civilization to urban civilization, it is necessary to break the dual urban–rural structure that constitutes identity status society and is built on household system. Therefore, the reform of household registration system is a substantial and crucial step in the process of urbanization. This is especially true in the vast central and Western regions where there is a pattern of separation of governance and the rate of urbanization is not high. Conversely, if the dual urban–rural structure system of urbanized areas no longer exists, there will be no continuous systematic basis and social conditions for the rights disparity system based on the household registration system. But in fact, in urbanized regions, the household registration system remains stagnant—this can be further confirmed from another aspect in terms of why the urbanization growth rate of China’s registered population based on household system is far behind the growth of urbanization rate. According to the data of the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2012, China’s urbanization rate exceeded 50 percent, reaching 52.6 percent, but the urbanization rate of the registered population was only about 38 percent. By the end of 2016, China’s urbanization rate had accounted for 57.35 percent, and in this aspect, the urbanization rate of 10 provinces had outpaced 60 percent. Meanwhile, that rate of Beijing-Tianjin-Shanghai region had outstripped 80 percent. However, in these regions, the urbanization rate of the registered population is only 41.2 percent.7 An obvious system factor is that the household registration system has become a systematic obstacle standing in the way of population urbanization. The further question that we want to raise is why we find it difficult to see progress in the reform of household registration system and what the existence of household system does mean for urban governance. For example, the current urbanization rate of Shenzhen has reached 100 percent, and of total population of 14 million, population with local household registration is just 2 million or more, albeit. Among them, 7 The data comes from the materials published by the State Bureau of Statistics in 2013 and 2017.

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the ratio of “floating population” from outside (mainly referring to the non-registered population) is as high as 85 percent. This is evident from the proportion of the population structure in Bao’an District, Shenzhen. As of June 25, 2017, Bao’an District of Shenzhen had a registered population of 5,463,906 (permanent population of 532,615 and floating population of 4,931,291), seeing a daily increase of 480 compared with 532,578 as of December 26, 2016. At present, the size of the floating populations in the whole district is about more than 95.4 times of the permanent population.8 In other words, in a highly urbanized area like Shenzhen, the socalled “floating population” already surpasses the permanent population. In other words, the extension from a difference system of household registration system to the “new dual structure” in cities (the registered population and the non-registered population) has turned out to be disproportionate. Under such changes in the urban population structure, what is social and political significance reflected by the household registration system on political, economic and social fronts? The meaning of the identity group of the non-registered population is derived from the different possession of social resources (economic resources, political resources, cultural resources, etc.), and this difference is built on an institutionalized social difference system based on (household registration system) laws and regulations. In other words, the household registration system has caused today’s inequality of rights between urban residents (registered population and non-registered population), which is not only from the dual urban–rural division system based on household registration system, but also from the direct consequence of the inequality of social status caused by household system. And in turn, this results in the dual structure system of urban rights, which is directly reflected in the (registered population and non-registered population) the scarcity of urban residents’ status and the distribution difference of rights and resources. First, it restricts the equal sharing of resources between non-registered people and urban residents. The household registration system divides the registered population and the non-registered population into two social classes with unequal economic interests. Inequality of rights based on 8 The data comes from the following: Population Management Bureau of Police Office in Bao’an District of Shenzhen City about population calculation of all streets police office. The date of statistics is August 18, 2017.

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household system is focused on the following: In education, urban education facilities are favored and prioritized by non-registered population, but they cannot enjoy this superior education; in terms of welfare, the welfare of urban citizens is incurred by the local finance, so the non-registered population does not have such benefits; and as for medical and social security, urban governance authorities rely on household registration system to build a series of exclusive urban benefits such as housing, medical health, education and pension, etc. and urban employment systems of protecting full employment of the city’s labor force. In fact, household system has caused the inequality of rights of the registered population and the gap between the rich and the poor, a phenomenon showing that the gap is not narrowing but expanding in the current urbanized areas. Second, the formation of cultural mutual exclusion and opposition. The dual structure of rights leads to the mutual exclusion and opposition of lifestyle, social habits and even values among the non-registered population and the registered population. For non-registered groups, urbanization is not only a kind of social and economic relationship, but also a form of civilization, and it is also a modern lifestyle. Take migrant workers for example. Due to the social identity characteristics of the household registration system, farmers need employment, but farmers who come to the city do not have a sense of belonging to the city. They are migrant people, and their consumption behavior is not yet urbanized, so they cannot become immigrants. On the other hand, cities also require farmers to engage in the construction of building, catering services, security and cleaning, etc. However, in cities, residents are unwilling or even rejective to share benefits with farmers in fields like medical health, education, pension, social security, employment, etc. This is a reflection of “the city’s ‘economic acceptance and social exclusion’.9 ‘Economic acceptance’ represents the demand of the market and urban life, and it is especially necessary; ‘social exclusion’ is caused by the original system”. In addition, in the highly heterogeneous urban community, there is no place for local culture. The separation of urban and rural areas after more than half a century has caused migrant workers to be incompatible with the citizens in terms of lifestyle and cultural values, thus preventing them from truly integrating into the urban community.

9 Yang Jishen. 2013. Analysis of Contemporary Social Class in China. Jiangxi Higher Institutes Press: p. 168.

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Third, the stratification and hierarchy of urban residents. The dual structure of rights makes the registered population—urban residents— become a “privileged class”, and the selective characteristics of the so-called household registration institutional reform currently carried out have enabled hierarchical institutional arrangements for registered population and non-registered population to be further deepened and strengthened. In essence, the household registration system has the orientation of anti-urbanization, which prevents the non-registered people from becoming urban residents. “In addition to enjoying modern material civilization, people registered as urban household can also enjoy many benefits: employment benefit — people with urban household register can get employment indicators; economic benefit — people can get all kinds of subsidies when you buy things. People with urban household register can obtain the benefits brought about by ‘urban–rural differences’ and ‘differences between workers and peasants and this kind of benefit is hereditary.’”10 In urbanized areas, the dual structure of rights based on household registration status causes the social stratification between farmers and citizens, and creates social inequality between the two classes, which become the value basis for the building of the hierarchical structure, thereby making the identity system of the non-registered population and the registered population systematic and legalized. One of the essential characteristics of urbanization is the process in which the rural population gathers in cities and the cities continue to develop. In other words, the concentration of population and resources in cities is the natural trend of urbanization. However, the anti-urbanization orientation of household registration system is indicative of the fact that the household registration system makes the rights disparity of urban residents of non-registered population and registered urban residents in the same city have the significance for the difference in institutionalized rights, including the difference in social status, in social rights, in political rights, in economic rights and in cultural rights, which are manifested in the areas of education, medical care, employment, pension, social security, etc. The status of non-registered population and the status of registered population are attributed with substantial differences of distribution inequality and social inequality and systematic significance of social exclusion. At the same time, there is an aspect of essential significance: 10 Yang Jishen. 2013. Analysis of Contemporary Social Class in China. Jiangxi Higher Institutes Press: p. 20.

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From the separation of urban and rural systems to today’s “divided rights of residents governance”, the household registration system has become a very convenient and effective means of governance for city authorities. It serves the needs of authoritarianism for organization and order; the core characteristics are reflected in social management, social services and social control. Therefore, the fact that we usually see is that in urbanized areas, facing household registration with no foundation of existence, the reform of the household registration system, most of the discussions about the reform of the household registration system are still focusing upon the introduction of so-called “residence permits” and the “points-based system” unveiled in many places and focusing on the living conditions and rights of subsistence of the non-registered population. But in essence, such reforms of the household registration system and related discussions are still centered on the household registration system. That is to say, the basic rights attached to the household registration system have not been reduced or rarely reduced, and the so-called new reforms threshold set and mentioned by the reform measures shows that only a few so-called “high-end talents” can enter the city. The main population—the migrant worker group has almost nothing to do with it. In other words, the influence of old system is still there, the so-called new reform measures actually mean reemergence of new restrictive measures. However, in urbanized areas, the existence of household registration system has been unable to cope with continuously changing population structure and increasingly complex economic and social conditions of social division of labor in urbanization areas. Still worse, the nonregistered people don’t need more means of living any more, but more rights with less privilege—this is the essence of the problem because the status of citizenship cannot be compensated by anything. Then the nature of social conflict has changed. “Economic inequality is subject to the condition of market rather than more stress on social inequality, and social inequality requires political action.”11 In other words, social conflicts are caused by the distribution of rights, instead of economic factors; economic inequality is directly manifested by the inequality of rights. In other words, the social conflict has been expressed in values, beliefs and

11 Ralf Dahrendorf. 2000. The Modern Social Conflict (translated by Lin Rongyuan). China Social Sciences Press: p. 57.

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struggles over the allocation of scarce status, rights and resources, especially marked by conflicts of values or common beliefs, all of which will bring tremendous destruction to social order. In a sense, advancing the reform of household registration system in urbanized areas is related to the modern transformation of urban governance, and on the one hand, to social stability, social equality and rights fairness in urbanized areas.

13.3 Identity Groups and Authoritarian Governance Then, how did the dual structure of urban rights form today and what is its significance to urban governance? From a systematic point of view, the household registration system belongs to the system of national policy and legal rights disparity. The transition from the division of urban and rural dual society to the dual division of rights of residents in urbanized areas is the extended form of the identity-based and hierarchical system of urban and rural residents. However, the reason why the household registration system has evolved into a dual structure of urban rights is that it is inherently connected with population control, sharing of rights and market access of authoritarian governance. In fact, the household registration status constitutes a part of the institutionalized power of authoritarian governance. In other words, the household registration system has become an institutionalized component of social management and social control. But it has led to the following result associated with policy: On the one hand, the household registration system devoid of the systematic significance of “urban–rural dual structure” will inevitably exist; on the other hand, the household registration institutional reform policy as an institutionalized means of governance, the policy of household institutional reform is attributed with the nature of urban protectionist policy of safeguarding (registered population) urban residents’ (privilege) rights. For example, in order to balance the interests of local people, the limited public welfare will not be generously given to outsider because this will reduce the level of public welfare for the registered population. Take one more example. In light of the policy of the national college entrance exam, the employment rate of locals will be affected when children of non-locals are enrolled in school.

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In the past, the household registration system has performed the function of restricting population migration from rural to urban areas,12 which is essentially similar to the function of social and political control that today’s urban management authorities play to realize urban governance by making the best of household registration system. All these are designed to establish a dependent power dominance relationship of controlling and being controlled between government and society. In other words, the household registration system is an important part of order under government authority in city, reflecting the essence of authoritarian governance. It is connected with population control, housing, employment, education, health, pension, social security, etc. Here, in addition to the differential treatment of urban residents’ “deserved rights”, the household registration system performs another function of being used as an institutionalized power for social stratification and social control. This means that urban management authorities can use the systematic power in compliance with the legal norms to control the size and rights sharing and market access of the urban population at any time. In this sense, the formation of the dual structure of urban rights is only the result of institutionalization of authoritarian social and political control function. Therefore, why the reform of household registration system is difficult to implement or has a clear tendency of urban protectionism? At the root of it is the fact that authoritarian governance attempts to construct a “man-made order” between the state and society.13 This means establishing a kind of dependent dominant relationship of controlling and being controlled in a social group or social class, and the household registration system is just a component of the political logic of authoritarian governance. This leads to a kind of “spatial hierarchical structure”—the dual system of urban and rural areas, which is extended to the dual structure of rights in today’s urbanized areas. In this sense, the dual system of urban and rural areas and the dual structure of rights in urbanized areas. In essence, there is no difference. They are both the way of realization and extension of the power dominating the society. The difference is that from the dual system of urban and rural areas to the dual structure of 12 Lu Yilong. 2003. The Chinese Household Registration System After 1949: Structure and Change. Journal of Peking University (2). 13 James S. Coleman. 1990. The Foundations of Social Theory (First Part, translated by Deng Fang). Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA): p. 92.

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rights, the social stratified structure and the form of social conflicts have undergone completely different changes in nature, that is, from conflict caused by economic factors to conflict caused by the distribution of rights. Economic inequality is directly manifested by inequality of rights, so the latter has the following socio-political implications. First, the dual rights of the non-registered population are unequal. The household registration system makes the difference in rights between (registered population and non-registered population) urban residents have institutionalized meaning, including differences in social status, differences in social rights, differences in political rights, differences in economic rights and differences in cultural rights, which are manifested in education and medical care. In terms of social security, employment, pension, social security, etc., household registration status and nonhousehold registration status have substantial differences in distribution inequality and social inequality and institutionalized social exclusion. A large number of non-registered urban residents are identity groups such as migrant workers. Although they have become the main body of urban residents, they cannot become citizens or the masters of the city because they are still identity groups and their rights are subject to the household registration system. The rights disparity system stipulated by the above national laws. Therefore, to make the urban non-registered population become social members with equal rights in urbanized areas, two thresholds need to be crossed: one is the transformation from identity to contract, that is, from identity group to contract group. The key to this transformation is to cancel the right difference system of the household registration system; one is the acquisition of civil rights. The rights of identity groups are tied to the household registration system. These rights include basic rights, political rights, economic rights, social rights, etc., which are the basic content of civil rights. Therefore, removing the identity characteristics of the non-registered population is the first step for them to integrate into the city, and the acquisition of citizenship rights is of substantive significance. Second, the nature of urban social conflict has changed. The unequal rights of urban and rural residents caused by the household registration system include: First, the deprivation of economic rights of non-registered population such as migrant workers, which includes property rights, the right to equal competition, the right to employment and so on. In other words, unlike the social conflicts that are mostly caused by economic factors under the urban–rural dual social system, in urbanized areas,

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social conflicts are caused by the distribution of power, rather than (or have not been) caused by economic factors. In other words, it is not that the “available resources” of the household registration system have decreased, but the “deserved rights” of other social groups—the rights to enter the city, have decreased. This is reflected in the fact that, on the one hand, the household registration system has caused mutual exclusion and antagonism between urban and rural residents in terms of lifestyle, social habits and even value; the differences in identity characteristics and rights between the two countries have been further strengthened and consolidated, and the unfair distribution of economic benefits has been transformed into a fight for the due rights such as status, benefits and resources. Third, the organizational structure of social interests has been transformed. Urbanized society is no longer an ethical society, and of course it is not a small community society with strong homogeneity. The characteristics of urbanized society are mainly manifested in the differentiation of groups based on multiple interests based on social contract relationships. The household registration system is suitable for the former’s agricultural social form with low social differentiation, but it cannot adapt to the latter’s highly differentiated social structure and the contractual form of social relations caused by industrialization, marketization and urbanization. Therefore, in urbanized areas, public social relations and social contacts have undergone structural changes. In other words, the household registration system has no economic and social foundation and conditions. Therefore, a household registration system with all the characteristics of the unequal rights of the old system cannot meet the requirements of the new organization of social interests. The latter is a public social interest organization structure, which is fundamentally different from the authoritarian unit system interest organization structure. It means the transformation and change of the nature of public social relations from an organizational order dominated by a single authority to an autonomous order governed by multiple social subjects. In the past, urban society was a “unit system society”. The city government managed the society through units. The members of the society belonged to certain units. The unit organization was the basic unit of the social management structure. The ownership of resources was in the government, and the relationship between social members and the government It is a relationship of subordination and dependence. However, in today’s urban society, especially in urbanized areas,

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with diversified distribution mechanisms and alternative development of resources, the unit is no longer an irreplaceable place for survival and development for members of society. This requires social governance to transform from unit-based management to modern social governance. However, current urban social governance focuses on systems rather than people. The social governance of urban governments is still responding to changes in urban society with unit-based management thinking and methods. It is the root of the institutional problems faced by the transformation of urban social governance today. Furthermore, the way of organizing the interests of authoritarian governance is to institutionalize social management of different groups. However, in today’s urbanized areas, the social organization structure has changed, that is, the organizational structure of the interests of the unit society has been transformed. Enter the interest organization structure of the public society. The proportion of state or all-people-owned social organizations in the entire Chinese society is rapidly declining. In certain economic fields and industries, state-owned or all-people-owned economic organizations have become a very small part, replaced by private ones, joint venture or joint-stock economic organization form.14 The number of people entering the market organization is increasing, and the number of people still in the unit’s interest structure is constantly decreasing. In the face of an increasingly divided urban society, the goal of authoritarian governance is to use institutionalized power (such as the household registration system) to govern and try to incorporate all groups into the national control system. In other words, under the conditions of social structural differentiation and social pluralism caused by the market economy, the effectiveness of authoritarianism relies on government power to control huge resources and social control capabilities, and to control and balance the decentralization and structural pluralism by the concentration of power and structure. For example, market contract behaviors are restricted by administrative powers and there is no institutional space for development. Typical examples are the market operations of the taxi-hailing platform “Didi Chuxing” in large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in recent years. The behavior of many discriminatory restrictive measures against non-registered population operating permits, the shrinking and expulsion policies of low-end 14 Li Hanlin. 2014. The Chinese Unit Society: Discussion, Contemplation and Research. China Social Sciences Press: p. 1.

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industries or “disorderly gathering” of “low-end population”, etc. Essentially, the urban authoritarian governance style pursues a social order dominated by the centralization of power and the ability of social management, control and governance. Therefore, under such urban governance, the issue of rights has become a technical issue, causing the alienation of the social governance of people. In other words, in the face of the dramatic changes in the urban social structure, urban authoritarian governance ignores the basic fact: as long as a society moves toward an open and market economy, there will be population and resource flows, and diversified values and diversified social interests will be formed. Relying on the two governance tools of bureaucracy and coercive force, dividing social groups into two or more groups with different rights, adopting a centralized approach to copy or reconstruct a unit system society, this is the reverse of Be in force. Therefore, the solution to “population scale” or “disorderly gathering of low-end population” or “enhancement of urban functions” is just a unit-based governance method of urban government authoritarianism. At the same time, among urban social groups with divided interests, in recent years, urban governments have focused their governance on people’s livelihood care, mainly economic growth that is, increasing the quality and diversity of products and services, and providing products and services. Relying on economic development to evade the substantive problem of inequality of rights means that all problems of inequality of rights in urbanized areas are attributed to economic nature. However, the inequality of rights for non-hukou groups is political in nature, that is, the distribution of rights and wealth. Therefore, there is a paradox in urban authoritarian governance: it is necessary to maintain or construct a new dependency relationship among different social groups, and to improve the ability to control and govern society, but also to adapt to the development trend of the pluralistic market economy and pluralistic interest groups. Therefore, it uses authoritative governance to incorporate diverse and unequal rights of social interest groups into the control system and attempts to bring the non-registered population into urban. The problem of urban residents’ rights is transformed into an economic problem or a supply problem, which is the current urban social governance facing Challenges and inherent tensions.

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13.4 From Identity to Contract, and the Granting of Civil Rights In a sense, the so-called urbanization means that farmers become citizens. But China’s urbanization is, first of all, a transition from identity to contract. Not only that, but also the issue of the acquisition of civil rights. Therefore, in urbanized areas, for the non-registered population, there are two thresholds of rights that need to be crossed. First, the transition from identity to contract is the transition from an identity society to an open modern society. This is a historical issue as well as a practical issue. The “Regulations on Household Registration” promulgated in 1958 made the household registration system the institutional basis for the separation of urban and rural areas. China has formed a rights differential system with national legal significance.15 Under this urban–rural separation system, an identity society has been formed. The so-called identity society means that a person’s legal rights and obligations often depend on his innate or acquired identity, or in other words, the law determines people’s corresponding rights or obligations based on various identities, and this situation is extremely common. It constitutes the normal state of society, and this kind of society can be called an identity society.16 Conversely speaking, in a society where identity characteristics can also determine citizens’ rights in education, medical care, pensions, social security, etc. and constrain people’s thinking and behavior, to realize the transformation from identity to contract is to realize the transformation of the social contract relationship that is full of choices and variability produced by free agreement. Among them, realizing the equal rights of urban and rural residents is the essential meaning of this transformation process. Second, the acquisition of civil rights. In other words, becoming a citizen is only the first step in realizing equal rights, but the more essential thing is the acquisition of civil rights. These rights include the political, economic, social and cultural rights shared with urban residents. Marshall pointed 15 The “Regulations on Household Registration” made the household registration system the institutional basis. The Regulations standardized the system of household registration system across China, stipulating two basic systems of controlling the migration of population—review and approval system of household register transfer and household registration system based on certificate. The purpose of the Regulations is to control the surplus labor flowing in flocks into cities, thus relieving the contradiction of food supply and demand in cities and the pressure of housing, traffic and healthcare. 16 Qu Tongzu. 1981. Chinese Law and Chinese Society. The Commercial Press.

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out: “Citizenship is a status, a status enjoyed by all members of a community. The rights and obligations given are equal.”17 In essence, civil rights are the essential connotation of citizenship. The latter means that the state must ensure that everyone can be treated as a complete and equal member of society. To ensure the sense of citizenship of social members, it is necessary to grant the right of citizenship to everyone. From the above two thresholds of rights, the current problem is that the non-registered population in the city is still an identity group, an identity group in the sense of national law, and cannot enjoy equal rights with urban citizens, including education, medical care, employment, social security and pension rights, and so far the household registration institutional reform policies in urbanized areas have mainly targeted “high-end talents” and have little to do with “low-end labor” such as migrant workers. This is the case across the country. There are few exceptions in urbanized areas. For example, Guangdong’s household registration reform policy requires that “As for the mega cities Guangzhou and Shenzhen with a population of more than 10 million, it is necessary to strictly control the population size and focus on attracting various types of professionals urgently needed for local economic and social development to settle down.”18 From the results of the reform, Such reform measures have not removed the rights disparities between the urban and rural or non-registered population and the registered population, on the contrary, they have strengthened the various unequal social welfare systems attached to the household registration system and the rights of citizenship. In other words, the abolition of household registration status and efforts to fight for civil rights have no substantive and institutionalized significance. In addition, the structure of non-registered population in urbanized areas has become increasingly complex and the number has continued to increase, which has brought challenges and pressures to urban management and public security. This situation has prompted urban authoritarian governance to habitually use the institutionalized rigid constraint of user 17 Thomas H. Marshall. 2006. Citizenship and Social Class (translated by Liu Xunlian, Li Lihong, and Ning Rui), published in the Collected Discussions of Chinese and Western Culture: the Fifth Edition of Will Kymlicka, Tianjin People’s Publishing House. 18 A New Round of Household Registration institutional reform in Guangdong is advanced in an Orderly Way, Focus on Addressing the Issue of Surplus Floating Population. People’s Daily, July 14, 2015.

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registration identities to control and even drive away the non-registered population. This practice has strengthened each other’s social identities between the non-registered population and the registered population. Awareness and awareness of the difference between rights. Take Bao’an District of Shenzhen as an example. The government routinely implements “selective governance” and “movement governance” to deal with the challenges and pressures brought about by the huge quantification and complexity of the non-registered population. For example, its specific approach is as follows. One is the information management of the floating population. In 2017, the Baoan District Government launched the “Four Major Actions for Summer Offensives”, aiming to “siege, clear the source, and regulate residences” throughout the district, and implemented a half-year “double clearance and double inspection” of rental houses (cleaning up rental houses and clearing up illegal crimes). Security and fire hazards, investigation and punishment of illegal and criminal personnel). In response, the relevant government functional departments jointly issued a target for the active residence registration rate of 70 percent in March, 80 percent in April and 90 percent in May. The task of cleaning up 200,000 unemployed rental houses. The second is the normalization of “police-civilian joint defense”. The government has established 392 police posts based on 392 community police officers in 24 local police stations in the district. According to the “one police for many officers” model, they seamlessly connect with 4833 grid officers to implement responsibilities and realize the integration of police and network. Guide and organize the 45,192 building chiefs in the whole district to form a “1 + 392 + 4,833 + 45,192” work network, and then through strict law enforcement, the employers and “building administrators” and other reporting obligors are forced to fulfill their main responsibilities and achieve The point, line and surface are organically linked by a huge transformation of information from passive collection to active declaration. The above-mentioned task pressure has caused the human, material, and financial resources of the public security department to be overwhelming. The outstanding performance is to increase the police force. As a result, as an auxiliary force of the public security, the number of auxiliary police has expanded uncontrollably.19

19 The source of data: The Police Bureau of Bao’an District, Shenzhen. August 18, 2017.

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In fact, in highly developed urbanization areas, the so-called “nonregistered population” already has stable occupations and fixed residences in the local area, becoming veritable “urban residents”, in other words, they have little institutional connection with the “urban–rural dual structure”, but they still cannot enjoy citizenship in the law. Take Shenzhen with an urban rate of 100 percent as an example. The floating population has reached 89 percent. They are already the main body of the city. However, the registered population and the non-registered population are in areas such as education, medical care, employment, pension and social security. The difference has always existed. Although Shenzhen’s household registration reform has been implemented for many years, reform measures such as the “residence certificate points management system” and “population access conditions in cities in the province” are considered to weaken the traditional concept of household registration and blur the “local” and “foreign” concepts, and the legal status of the vast “floating population” including migrant workers has been improved. But today, the above-mentioned so-called reforms are still very limited in terms of changing the household registration system or even canceling it, because for a de facto “immigrant city”, it originally has the political, economic and social conditions to eliminate the difference in rights of the household registration system. The reform of the household registration system is still centered on the right difference system of the household registration system. In fact, today, the difference in rights embodied by the household registration status has become one of the sources of social opposition and conflict. The separation of the individual rights and social rights of the nonregistered population in urbanized areas is due to the territorial management of the household registration status. That is to say, the residents can only enjoy various legal rights when the individual and the household registration match, including Individual rights, political rights, economic rights, social rights, etc. For example, in urban political life, the nonregistered population has no institutional connection with politics, and hardly any political rights and political influence in urban public affairs.20 Therefore, in order to complete the transformation of non-registered population from status to contract in urbanized areas and realize the civil

20 Zhou Qingzhi. 2016. The Political Rights of Migrant Workers and Political Development in China. Journal of Central China Normal University (1).

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rights of urban non-registered population, the crossing of these two rights thresholds requires substantial reforms in the following aspects. First, the household registration system is attributed to the original function and role of population information collection and management. At the beginning of the founding of New China, the household registration system only had administrative functions such as population registration and demographic data statistics. The 1958 “Regulations on Household Registration” made the household registration system finally fixed the urban–rural dual interest structure system in an administrative and legal way, forming an urban–rural system. The hierarchical system of resident status and the design of the household registration system have become a kind of “artificially maintained order” constructed by the state in society, which has a specific political, economic, social and historical background. The question now is: The current reform of the household registration system aims to eliminate the various rights disparitys attached to the household registration status and return the household registration system to its original functions and functions, that is, the household registration system plays the role of population information collection and management. Only in this sense can the household registration system be able to strip the rights and discriminatory characteristics attached to it. In addition to that, it will also play a function and role in protecting the rights of all citizens. Second, eliminate the characteristics of household registration status in urbanized areas. Most of the high-speed urbanization areas are areas where the non-registered population accounts for a large proportion of the population, north to Guangzhou, Shenzhen, or the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. In other words, the legal and institutional significance of the household registration system in high-speed urbanization areas has completely lost its original institutional mechanism. Therefore, in terms of laws and systems, it is a matter, of course, to completely cancel the rights disparities between the registered population and the non-registered population in terms of education, medical care, employment, old-age care and social security. Rather than the opposite, maintain the household registration system that only protects the rights of minorities, and strengthen rather than weaken it through so-called reforms such as “residence permit” and “point system”. For example, since 2003, Shenzhen has initiated the reform of the household registration system, and it is expected that about 120,000 migrants will become

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permanent residents of Shenzhen. In the next 10 years, Shenzhen’s registered population increased from 1.32 million at that time to about 3.5 million. After more than ten years have passed, the problem of the inversion of the registered population and the non-registered population in Shenzhen becomes even more serious. The actual population is nearly 1.4 million. The registered population has reached more than 85 percent. Conversely speaking, how much substantial significance does this so-called “residence permit” and “point system” household registration institutional reform policy have? Therefore, in the current high-speed urbanization areas, the household registration reform policy must be adjusted, or the cancelation of the household registration system already has relatively mature political, economic and social conditions. Third, eliminate the difference in rights between the registered population and the non-registered population. Because household registration is linked to education, medical care, social security, etc., the rights and interests of migrants who have left the place of household registration cannot be guaranteed, such as the compulsory education of middleaged children of migrants. In the Baoan area of Shenzhen, the ratio of registered population to non-registered population in many communities has been seriously out of balance. It accounts for about 10 percent of the actual population, which means that the privileges of hukou status only exist among a very small number of people. Such a difference in rights will only gradually accumulate and politicize the social dissatisfaction of the non-hukou population. In fact, in high-speed urbanization areas, the social contradictions and conflicts caused by the differences in the rights of urban and rural groups have become increasingly sharp and explicit: on the one hand, for the registered population and nonregistered population, the household registration status is still enjoyed by one person. Including the basis of basic rights such as economic rights and political rights, this will inevitably increase the relative deprivation of the non-registered population; on the other hand, the market economy requires a unified labor market in order to achieve an optimal allocation of labor resources. The rigid constraints of the household registration system conflict with the requirements of economic and social development, resulting in the conflict of interests between the floating population and the registered population. The nature of social conflict has changed, and it has been transformed into a competition for scarce status, rights and resource allocation.

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Fourth, change the orientation of reform policies centered on the system of rights differentiation in the household registration system. There is no contradiction between strict control of population size and cancelation of household registration status. It is not possible to use “control population size” to keep the non-registered population out of the urban social system. There is no doubt that the abolition of the household registration system, how much load can local public services, finances and facilities bear? After the localization of a large number of non-registered population, what impact might it have on the local education, transportation and living environment? These are of course issues that must be considered in the reform of the household registration system, but the reform of the household registration system is first of all an issue of equality of rights and social justice. Some current household registration institutional reform policies treat the non-registered population as a group working for the registered population and try to make them a legally marginalized group of cities. For example, one of the key points in the reform of the household registration system in Guangdong Province is to “focus on the time to enter the city”. Long-term, strong employability, adaptable to industrial transformation and upgrading and market competition, as well as people who have long been engaged in special and difficult industries (such as environmental protection workers) settle down, etc. This has unmistakable meaning of rights discrimination and also reveals the real intention of the authorities in charge of city management to safeguard the household registration system. However, the reform centering on the right difference system of the household registration system cannot be called a reform, but only a consolidation of the old system. Fifth, urban community governance cannot be centered on the registered population. Currently, there are two main types of population structure in urban communities in China. One is that the registered population accounts for the majority, and the other is that the nonregistered population accounts for the majority or even the majority. But no matter which type, one thing in common is that there is a problem of inequality of rights for the non-registered population. At present, the ratio of registered population to non-registered population in Shenzhen’s communities is seriously inverted. For example, Baoan Yanluo Street has

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five communities with a population of 300,000 and a registered population of 6000.21 The reform of the household registration system cannot match the rights (privileges) of this small part of the household registration population. In other words, if we still look at the problems from the standpoint of the household registration system, that is, from the family planning policy, maternal and child health care standards, to education, medical care, employment, unemployment, social insurance, accidental injury compensation, etc., we should differentiate them based upon urban and rural household registration. Then the household registration status not only widens the income gap but also increases or strengthens the awareness of the difference between the rights of the registered population and the non-registered population, which may affect several generations. Therefore, it is necessary to look at and promote the reform of the household registration system from the perspective of urban governance institutional reform and social stability. Non-registered populations should not always regard cities as “other people’s cities”. It is necessary to cultivate a sense of community belonging and cohesion of the floating population, and let non-registered population actually become the main players and master of urban community governance. Regarding civil rights, there are two definite meanings that are suitable for the above discussion. First, civil rights do not simply refer to a legal status. Civil rights can also bring economic benefits. These benefits are related to public health, education and social security. They can be called “civil rights in society”.22 Marshall believes that judging whether a person has civil rights can be based on whether he has civil rights, political rights and social rights. These rights are complementary to each other. For example, the possession of political rights will enable economically disadvantaged groups to obtain the means to provide social security by the state, leading to the expansion of various social rights.23 Here, people with citizenship enjoy the above-mentioned entitlements, without exception. Second, the existence of the entitlements contained in the status 21 The data comes from the following: Population Management Bureau of Police Office

in Bao’an District of Shenzhen City about population calculation of all streets police office. The date of statistics is August 18, 2017. 22 Keith Faulks. 2008. Political Sociology (translated by Chen Qi, et al.). Huaxia Press: p. 102. 23 Keith Faulks. 2008. Political Sociology (translated by Chen Qi, et al.). Huaxia Press: p. 102.

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of citizenship is unconditional, that is, “they do not depend on birth and social status, nor on certain specific behaviors”, and “the status of a citizen is non-transferable. Its fundamental feature is: it cannot be compensated by anything.”24 In this sense, the city government is similar to increasing the supply or expanding some social welfare for the non-registered population. The practice of coverage does not belong to the proper meaning of citizen’s status or citizen rights, because the citizen’s status can only exist in its due rights. Undoubtedly, breaking the urban dual rights structure, from identity to contract and ultimately realizing civil rights, requires a process of institutional and social construction, which involves the transformation of urban authoritarian governance and the realization of social equality, fairness and justice. Currently, the reform of the household registration system in high-speed urbanization areas has to face the following three problems. One is that other policies and measures attached to the household registration system are further fragmented, creating a variety of different interest groups and affecting social and economic development. Second, the floating population is huge and unevenly distributed. The third is the lack of public services and infrastructure facilities, and the finances at all levels are responsible for large investments in implementing reforms. These problems actually exist, but they cannot be the reason why the household registration system is difficult to shake. In particular, the household registration status cannot be used as the institutional power of urban authoritarian governance. Judging from the nature of the social conflicts that have occurred in urbanized areas in recent years, a typical example is the Zengcheng incident,25 which is described as “war within the city”, which is mainly caused by the inequality of rights between the registered population and the non-registered population. As well as the competition for scarce status, rights and resource allocation, it is (or has) become the main form of social conflict in urbanized areas.

24 Ralf Dahrendorf. 2000. The Modern Social Conflict (translated by Lin Rongyuan). China Social Sciences Press: p. 46. 25 In summer of 2011, in Zengcheng, Guangzhou, a pregnant woman and her husband who put up stand conflicted with city security guards, thus triggering off severe group incident of smashing, gabbing and burning for three nights.

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13.5

Urbanization and the Entitlements

In urbanized areas, the reform of the household registration system is still centered on the right differentiation system of household registration status. The so-called household registration institutional reforms so far, for example, from “temporary residence permit” to “residence permit” to “point-based system”, etc., have no substantive significance for the realization of urbanization from farmers to citizens. On the one hand, such reform of the household registration system itself has a tendency to maintain the system of rights differentiation that the household registration system has; on the other hand, this type of reform is related to the largest non-registered population in the city—the “low-end population” such as migrant workers. There is hardly any substantive connection, but the selective acceptance of the so-called “high-end population” of nonregistered population. The household registration system has become an institutionalized power closely related to the control of population size, rights sharing and market entry, and has become a tool and means of authoritarian governance by urban management authorities. With such institutional means, it ignores market rules and continuously differentiated social interest organizations. The trend of globalization is still continuing the past unit-based governance thinking, trying to incorporate different social rights groups in the city into the authoritarian “man-made social order” or “organizational order”. Therefore, the so-called reform of the household registration system can only result in the further strengthening of the privileges and inequality of rights in the household registration system. As a result, a “dual structure of rights” has emerged in urbanized areas. The core meaning of this structure is the inconsistency of economic factors. Equality is no longer the main aspect of urban governance. The inequality of social rights has become a realistic form of social conflict, and the changes in the nature of social conflicts directly point to the authoritarian system that maintains the system of differences in rights. First, the politicization of social conflicts. Because this kind of social conflict is not or not only caused by economic factors but transformed into the opposite level of values and beliefs. Second, social conflict on the level of value or belief has the effect of destroying order. Conflicts that focus on competing for scarce resources generally occur within the rule of law of the system or system. Conversely, if they focus on conflicts in the rules or principles of the system, they will evolve into conflicts of value that cannot be

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reconciled. Third, taking collective action against the system that maintains the privileges of the minority (urban residents) is a potential trend of social conflicts in current urbanized areas. Because the urban system protects the minority (registered population), the social movement for the rights of the majority will be referred to as social action along with the differentiation and diversification of interests in the public society. The dual structure of urban rights is rooted in the rights distribution system of authoritarian governance and the organization of social interests. Authoritarian governance maintains a kind of “organizational order”. The connotation of this order is control, governance and service, and establishes a dependent power dominance relationship in all areas of social life. It faces interest differentiation and social differentiation. On the one hand, it increases supply—the economic distribution system distributes a certain amount of material and living resources to different groups; on the other hand, the power system distributes power to prevent any behavior that undermines the economic distribution system. The household registration system happens to be connected with population control, power sharing and market entry, and it can easily become a tool and means of authoritarian governance. After all, in urban social groups, maintaining a system of power differentiation is beneficial to maintaining the order of authority. Therefore, the dual structure of urban power or the unequal reality of social rights will not prompt any substantial changes in authoritarian governance. Because authoritarian governance is based on the system of social rights differentiation above. But the problem now is that the concentration of population and resources in cities is a natural trend of urbanization development, and urbanization brings not only the flow of resources, but also changes in population structure. In this case, for authoritarian governance, it is not so much that the household registration system protects the (privileged) rights of urban residents, but the household registration system is an indispensable institutional power for authoritarian governance. Undoubtedly, the dual structure of rights in the city will inevitably lead to a wider range of social conflicts. To resolve such conflicts, it is not only dependent on increasing supply—this is the usual practice of authoritarian governance, or in other words, the issue of urban governance is not a single issue. The question of how many resources is a question of the distribution of rights is a question of social justice maintenance mechanism, which directly involves basic values or common ideas. Maintaining the current

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unequal structure of dual rights will surely encourage quasi-group organizations such as migrant workers to develop into self-interested groups. Sooner or later, as a collective actor, they will be involved in open social group conflicts. Therefore, the elimination of conflict is to realize the transition from identity to contract and obtain civil rights, and establish a social justice maintenance mechanism based on equality of rights, which is especially important for urbanized areas, because the latter has already completed the change from the interest structure of unit society to the interest structure of public society, urban governance must be based on power on the basis of benefit sharing and rights protection. In other words, from the perspective of urbanization, it is impossible to achieve urbanization in the sense of modern rights by maintaining a system of rights differentiation for an identity group. The current urbanization rate of the registered population is only 41.2 percent, and its growth rate cannot keep up with the growth rate of the urbanization rate, which is clear evidence. However, from a socio-political perspective, if the difference between urban and rural areas is always a difference in status/rights, then a large number of non-registered people employed in cities and towns (migrant workers are the largest group) will not be able to settle in cities and towns, which will inevitably lead to many societies. Problems occur, such as the problem of left-behind women and children, the old and the weak and the problem of “migrant workers”. The migrant worker group still maintains the status of “agricultural hukou”, and various public service interests such as employment, resettlement (indemnified housing), medical care, education, etc. are in an unstable state, and household registration restrictions exclude migrant workers from the urban social security system outside. Because of household registration status, the inability to enjoy the same social welfare, social security and public services as urban residents will lead to changes in the nature of social conflicts, that is, conflicts caused by economic factors will turn into conflicts caused by the distribution of rights, and economic inequality. It is directly manifested in the inequality of entitlements, and social conflicts are manifested in values, beliefs and competition for scarce status, rights and resource allocation. The ideal governance scheme of urban authoritarianism is the “organizational order” based on dependent dominance. The latter uses the right distribution system and the organizational form of social control, and the organizational governance supported by institutionalized power, which combines different social groups are all incorporated into the

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system. Moreover, it usually turns the issue of human rights into a technical issue of governance, such as driving and evacuating the “low-end employed population” to improve the “function” of the city and the various methods of dealing with urban diseases. In other words, it tries to make the people very dependable on the sense of belonging for status society in an immobile way, ignoring people’s basic rights and social fairness and justice. This is the fundamental reason why the urban dual rights structure and the transformation of authoritarian governance are difficult to achieve.

CHAPTER 14

Social Organizations in Historical and Social Contexts

In China’s historical and social context, social organization is an existence outside the public system. The function and role are the self-organization form of society, and the auxiliary form of state rule. This contains two interrelated aspects: On the one hand, in the understanding and concepts of historical participants and social actors, it concerns whether Chinese social organizations should or can, under the framework of state power, realize the existential significance of self-coordination and self-building. On the other hand, it concerns whether Chinese social organizations can become an intermediary form connecting public institutions and individuals, and through the free association between individuals, discussion of public topics and attention to public affairs, it can influence or determine the formation of public system policies, and play the role of the main body of social governance.

14.1 Civil Social Organizations or Governmental NonGovernmental Organizations? At present, legal or “illegal” in China (most of them belong to the category of unregistered) existing social organizations can roughly be divided into the following types in nature: One category is governmentrun social organizations, such as the Red Cross Society of China and its various levels Branches, the All-China Women’s Federation and their © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_14

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organizations at all levels, etc.; there is another type of societies or individual associations that are semi-official and semi-civilian or governmentsupervised and privately-run, such as various social organizations affiliated to government functional agencies, etc.; the other category is privatelyrun. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as citizens’ voluntary associations, associations, community organizations, interest groups and citizens’ spontaneously organized movements.1 The first two types of social organizations have a common characteristic: distinct dependence and strong profit-making tendency. Although the latter type of social organization has autonomy and independence, they cannot yet become the main participants.2 The above-mentioned various social organizations are different from “civil society organizations”,3 because they are fundamentally different from the legal status and social governance functions and meanings of social organizations in modern society. The latter is the main social organization. An autonomous structural functional part. As far as the social governance function of modern social organizations is concerned, on the one hand, in the sociological sense, it is between the state and the society, has the characteristics of promotion and autonomy, and is an intermediary organization that connects the government and the individual; on the other hand, in the sense of politics, it plays the

1 Wang Ying, Zhe Xiaoye and Sun Bingyao. 1993. The Social Middle Level—Reform

and China’s Societies. China Development Press; Shi Xianmin. 1993. Institutional Breakthrough—Research on Self-employed Business in Xicheng District, Beijing Municipality. China Social Sciences Press. 2 Zhou Qingzhi. 2017. “On Grassroots Social Autonomy”. Journal of Central China Normal University (1). 3 Civil Society Organizations have four prominent features: first, it is unofficial. These organizations appear in a nongovernmental form and they do not represent the position of government or state; second, it is non-profitable. These organizations don’t regard obtaining profits as their main purpose of existence, and instead, they will usually take providing services for public good and public services as their major objective; third, it is relatively independent. These organizations have their own organizational mechanisms and management mechanisms, and they have independent economic sources; they are politically, managerially and financially independent of the government; fourth, it is voluntary. Members of civil society organizations are fully voluntary, so they are also called citizens’ voluntary organizations. Please see Yu Keping’s. 2002. The Emergence of Civil Society in China and Its Significance to Governance. Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA): p. 189.

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function and role of guaranteeing civil rights and citizens’ political participation.4 The above definition of the modern social organization concept has the following essential attributes or elements: A private person outside the public authority activity space (market, family, etc.); the public sphere gradually generated by private activities (from the early cafes to later political parties and mass media); an external and independent society, a highly autonomous society (Civil Society), etc.5 These attributes or elements essentially highlight the role played by citizens or social organizations in civil society: freely exchange views under the protection of the law to form “public opinions”, and relying on the independence and autonomy is the fundamental feature of modern social organizations, while this contains a notion of a society coexisting with the state and at least not under the direct control of the state. When putting the above-mentioned Chinese social organizations in the social spheres that have occurred with economic reforms in the past 40 years, especially the changes in the relationship between the state and society, its meaning is quite different, even from mainstream political and social life in China. Almost nothing. In the past 40 years, judging from the number and distribution of social organizations in China, their influence is not small,6 but their social governance functions and roles are extremely disproportionate to their scale and number, and they cannot become the mainstay or mainstream of political, economic and social life. In terms of form, it can only be regarded as a social marginal force in nature. From a national perspective, political requirements and policy promotion are trying to promote social organizations to become public 4 Yu Keping. 2002. The Emergence of Civil Society in China and Its Significance to Governance. Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA): p. 189. 5 Liang Zhiping. 2003. “Minjian (Civil), ‘Civil Society’ and CIVIL SOCIETY -CIVIL SOCIETY -Reexamination on the Concept of CIVIL SOCIETY”. Journal of Yunnan University (Social Science Edition) (1). 6 Here we only take “quasi-official” social organization as an example. On June 10, 2010, the Statistic Report of Civil Affairs Development in 2009 published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs shows that by the end of 2009, China had had 431 thousand social organizations, a year-on-year increase of 4.1 percent. According to the report, these social organizations covers all social fields of technology, education, culture, health, labor, civil affairs, sports, environmental protection, legal service, social agency services, working injury service and rural professional economy. At the same time, the report also indicates that in 2009, these social organizations absorbed 5.447 million employees of all kinds, up 14.5 percent over the previous year; they generated a fixed asset of 103 billion, representing a rise of 27.9 percent over the past year.

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organizations (government) as a kind of governance auxiliary force, and establish a cooperative relationship with public organizations (governments); from a social perspective, various (non-governmental) economic and social organizations hope to obtain more convenience and benefits from public organizations (government).7 This vague relationship distinguishes it from social organizations in the modern sense. It is very limited in understanding and explaining changes in contemporary Chinese political life, economic life and social life. The latter’s distinctive autonomy and Promotional features are based on the very clear and identifiable functional boundaries and rights boundaries between it and the public organization (government). A further question is, in the context of China’s history and society, the so-called “social organization” is a political concept, or a social concept; or, in other words, it is just a self-organized form of existence of “civil society”.8 The latter is an indigenous concept in the Chinese context. On the other hand, does the concept of “Civil Society” correspond to the definition of “civil society” more in line with the definition of Chinese history and social context. Therefore, an in-depth understanding of Chinese social organizations needs to be based on the discussion of their functions and roles in the national ruling (governance) structure, and it needs to be placed in China’s historical and social context. In other words, we must first identify the nature of the existence of the so-called “social organization” in China’s history and social context, and finally determine what function and the role it plays in China’s social governance structure. In other words, here is not to discuss how the socalled “social organization” can properly demonstrate its analytical and 7 Zhou Qingzhi. 2017. “On Grassroots Social Autonomy”. Journal of Central China Normal University (1). 8 Liang Zhiping thought that “civil” is a kind of specifically traditional social form; as a “social” concept, “civil” can and should be understood as something different from the state (officials, government office or government) and something opposite to the latter. But the state here obviously is not the modern nation-state rising in Europe in the seventeenth century. In the same way, the society called “civil” is not a combination of countless private people seeking the satisfaction of their own interests under the protection of law, less than the fact that it is a social network based on various social organizations, groups and mentioned above. Historically, the emergence and continuation of “civil” is not a modern phenomenon, which has nothing to do with the process of modernity. Please see Liang Zhiping’s. 2013. “‘Minjian’ (Civil) and ‘Minjian Shehui’ (Civil Society) and CIVIL SOCIETY -CIVIL SOCIETY-Reexamination on the Concept of CIVIL SOCIETY”. Journal of Yunnan University (1).

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normative significance in the Chinese context, but to place it in a realistic development under the control of modern social governance concepts. In the background structure, it is treated as a social reality rather than a concept or a series of concepts. In this interpretation process, it is also pointed out that it has been misunderstood and the historical and realistic development it faces. The limitations and limited significance of social governance.

14.2

Social Organizations in Historical Context

In China’s historical and social context, whether a social organization is a political organization, an economic organization or a social organization has always been an unclear question in the sense of political and academic research. Social organizations in the modern sense resemble “civil organizations” in the local sense of China, but they are different in quality, because the latter is not an existence independent of the state or public system, or in other words, it is only recognizable in the following two senses: the marginal power of society or the form of community connected by members of society. In other words, it does not have the basic characteristics of modern social organizations: unofficial, nongovernmental, independent and autonomous, and it does not pursue the rights and obligations of individuals and their associations as members of society in the constitutional sense with the state. What are the understandings and concepts about “social organization” and the relationship between the state and society in the Chinese context? This issue needs to be placed in a local context with a long tradition, and it needs to be clarified and analyzed from both historical inheritance and social changes. To this end, we will discuss the following two meanings: One is the indigenous concept of “Civil Society”, which is used to observe and analyze the nature of social organization in history and its modern extension; the other is “Civil Society”. The modern (Western) concept of “society” (Civil Society) is used to observe and analyze the nature of social organization and its political significance in reality. The former emphasizes the division and distinction between society and the state, highlighting the meaning of unofficial, nongovernmental and autonomous voluntary organizations in society. The latter can more clearly express the rights and obligations of individuals and their associations as members of society with

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the state in the constitutional sense.9 It should be pointed out that “Civil Society” is regarded as a “contrastive” concept, which is only limited to analytical work in a concrete sense, this is to observe and analyze the characteristics of contemporary China’s social organization and its governance significance from the comparison. Furthermore, the identification of the nature of contemporary Chinese social organizations in China’s historical and social contexts is to clarify whether there is a social organization in the meaning of Civil Society or an equivalent form of social development in Chinese history and whether we can use the concept of Civil Society to understand the changes of community organization in the field of contemporary Chinese society. If the answer is yes, what are the characteristics of Chinese social organization in the sense of Civil Society, how is it formed, what is its operating mechanism, and what is its development trend and prospects? If the answer is no, how does it differ from traditional Chinese or modern social organizations? The next question is, what kind of intermediary function and role does the so-called “social organization” play between the state (official or public) and society (private or private)? The essential order characteristics of traditional Chinese society: First, the society and the state are isomorphic. In other words, the state and society are mutually integrated and homogeneous in terms of order rules. Therefore, there is no society outside the state, vice versa. Second, the boundaries between public rules (derived from the law) and social rules (derived from contracts) are uncertain and non-normative, and can be interchanged. Therefore, this inevitably leads to the boundaries of the public sphere that can be subjectively determined by social actors definition. Third, the official-civilian corresponds to the relationship between the state and society, which reflects a dominant relationship characteristic. In this sense, the traditional grassroots social order is both “generated” and “constructed”, or in other words, the grassroots society order cannot be based on the “people” or the spontaneous order of the people. So, what is the meaning of acquiring social organization in historical context? To answer this question, we need to go deep into the discussion of the nature of traditional society. The traditional society is a patriarchal society, and scattered, poor and weak self-cultivating farmers with family (family) as the unit are the source of taxes, ruling foundation 9 Gao Bingzhong. 2012. “‘Civil Society’ Concept and Chinese Reality”. Sixiang Zhanxian (Ideological Front) (1).

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and object of imperial autocracy. The popular view (mainly referring to the cognitive paradigm of sociology and anthropology) believes that clan society is an autonomous society, and the form of “self-governance by the gentry” constitutes the traditional social order schema.10 However, from the tax system design that fixed self-cultivation farmers on the land to the growth of “local autonomy” (in the military sense) and the bankruptcy of self-cultivation farmers, which eventually led to the recurrence of the imperial power, local powers or landlord groups include various local organizations—The various intermediary forces between the state and the taxpaying peasants have always been the objects of imperial power to rely heavily on, control and even attack. This shows that imperial power and local forces have been fighting for the control of taxation and fiscal revenue in the history of China.11 In addition, history studies in the history of science and political thought have repeatedly proved that, in this kind of ruling structure, local organizations (gentry, clan organizations, etc.) are non-autonomous forms and dependent status with elements of “national concept”, and are a part of the functional realization of the imperial power structure.12 This view can confirm the judgment: The ruling system of traditional Chinese society is divided into

10 Regarding the concept of “dual-track” politics, in his works such as Reconstruction of Villages, Imperial Power and Gentry Power and From the Soil—the Foundations of Chinese Society, Fei Xiaotong believed that traditional Chinese society has two paths: one is the top-down path of centralized power; the other is the autonomous path of grassroots organization. The latter’s order pattern is described as a harmonious natural society. Please see Native China -Family Panning System. Peking University, 1998: p. 63. 11 Kong Lifei thought, “The financial policy of Qing-dynasty ruler is to keep a lower level of taxation of farmers, while trying every means to threaten local elites who owned land, not allowing them to interfere between the state and farmers. Once big landlords become the boss of tax collection, they will present the biggest potential threat for the imperial court. In addition to introducing a series of policies good for small landowners, the government will impose strict sanctions on people with frequent tax evasion. As “foreigners”, Manchus have never got the benefits from big landlords of China’s wealthiest provinces, especially in Yangtze River Delta regions, so they have also shown no mercy towards them. In 1661, thousands of squires and celebrities were penalized for tax evasion, and some even suffered spanks and imprisonment”. (Please see Kong Lifei’s. 2013. The Origin of Modern State in China. SDX Book Company: pp. 87–88). 12 Qu Tongzu thought, village gentlemen are neither representatives elected by local ordinary people nor representatives appointed by the government. Instead, they are just spokesmen of local communities (customarily) accepted by others through their privilege. Please see Qu Tongzu’s. 2003. Local Government of the Qing Dynasty. China Law Press: p. 337.

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two major systems, “public” and “private”, that is, the dual rule of the state and village forces.13 Ordinary people have almost no influence on national policies. In the face of official abuse of power, there is almost no protection. Moreover, clan society is an identity society, which means that a person’s legal rights and obligations often depend on his innate or acquired identity, or in other words, the law determines people’s corresponding rights or obligations based on various identities, and this kind of situation is extremely common and constitutes the normal state of society. This kind of society can be called an identity society.14 In other words, in such a society, the individual’s identity characteristics limit the development and growth of an autonomous and independent social organization membership system, because the legally fixed identity determines the individual’s political, economic and social status and constrain people’s way of thinking and behavior. This means that during the imperial period, there was no existence outside the state in an “autonomous society”, that is, there is no “public sphere” that can determine or influence the formation of national decision-making through “free association”—an organizational form that members of society join voluntarily and treat each other as equals. The social form of the task of social integration. The organizational form of society is “civil organizations” such as families, temple fairs and gangs. Such social organizations are not autonomous and independent. Their relationship with the state or state power is an embedded, dependent and cooperative relationship. The above-mentioned structural characteristics of political society determine that traditional Chinese social organizations can only be a marginal form of social existence.

14.3

The Changing Import of Traditional Forms of Social Organization in Modern China

The nature of the social organization of traditional China is positioned in the modern nation-states of the West in modern times. After the concept was imported into China, there have been changes that are not substantive but have injected new ideas into the tradition. Philip Kuhn believes that the “local autonomy” that has occurred since the

13 Fu Yiling. 1988. “China’s Traditional Society: Diverse Structure”. Research on Economic History of Chinese Society (3). 14 Qu Tongzu. 1981. Chinese Law and Chinese Society. The Commercial Press.

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mid-nineteenth century (mainly in the military sense). It means a major institutional change, that is, “China’s regime and society can no longer be rebuilt according to the old model”.15 This judgment may be based mainly on the Western social facts of (Western) social autonomy or “local autonomy”, which is one of the essential signs that distinguish modern countries from traditional countries. There have been ideas and practices of autonomy in modern China, especially under the structural situation of local separatism, “local autonomy” even became a topic of state system construction, but the result is that the concept of autonomy from the West is theoretically localized. Interpretation is connected with the public authority structure of the authoritarian centralized system, so that the discussion and practice of autonomy at that time did not leave any mark on the political, social and historical development of China since modern times.16 Historically, it was the authoritarian regime—bureaucratic. The political system has strengthened control and expanded its power through “political participation”. Because the characteristic of modern state construction in modern China is the expansion and downward extension of state power, its goals are focused on the state’s fiscal and taxation and social mobilization and control capabilities. Some commentators also believe that a so-called “new type of civil society” has emerged in China since the mid-nineteenth century, which has a different meaning from traditional society. Under the influence of the West, China’s so-called capitalist economy has developed, and the bourgeoisie and new intellectual stratum have initially formed and become the main force of modern civil society. Therefore, it is believed that it conforms to some basic characteristics of Western Civil Society: the formation of the public sphere, a community based on contractual relations instead of traditional mutual aid groups based on blood and geographic relations, gangs and charitable relief organizations, and so on. For example, the research findings on business associations that developed mainly in cities in modern times have the above characteristics, and they believe that they are generally in areas of social autonomy that are separated from the direct control and intervention of the state, and 15 Philip Kuhn. 1990. The Rebellion and Enemies of the Late Period of the Chinese Empire: Military and Social Structure from 1796 to 1864. China Social Sciences Press: pp. 3–8. 16 Zhou Qingzhi. 2016. “Grassroots Social Autonomy and Modern Transformation of Social Governance”. Research on Politics (4).

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have a considerable degree of independence and autonomy. “It mainly relies on contract rules, rather than traditional family relationships such as blood and rural ties”, and implements the “principles of voluntariness and democracy”. Based on this, it is believed that a “new type of civil society” different from traditional civil society has emerged.17 In other words, the nature of this new type of civil society not only shows the connection between modern Chinese civil society and traditional civil society, but also shows that the modern civil society that has begun to form has begun to break away from official control but has no completely independent and transitional characteristics.18 However, if the above statement is true, the following questions need to be answered: Can the so-called “new type of civil society” summarize the overall picture of the political and social development of China in modern times? In traditional autocratic society, the so-called “All the land and subjects belong to the King” is just an argument on the legitimacy of imperial power, that is to say, there are many “autonomous” spaces and orders besides the imperial power, such as the social space formed by clan power, gentry class, etc. And order, but they have no autonomy, just an “autonomous space” under the authoritarian system. The changes that have taken place in modern times, outside the direct management and control of official institutions, the part of social life that is dominated by nongovernmental people has indeed appeared. It is specifically manifested in the expression of opinions by nongovernmental people on national or public affairs and social issues, organizing or engaging in various activities. A variety of social activities, such as running schools, running newspapers, providing relief, improving customs, safeguarding one’s own rights, etc., as well as forming various social organizations for the conduct of these activities, these “active factors” that can indicate social autonomy are only limited to the structural part of “people” and the changes that have taken place, the modern citizen or citizen class in the complete sense has not really formed, and the above changes only have the meaning of “modern enlightenment”. There is no doubt that modern social organization originated from the development of the “public sphere” after the emergence of the “private sphere”, and the separation of the state and 17 Zhu Ying. 2005. “On the Development and Evolution of Society and State in the Late Qing Dynasty and Early Republic of China”. Theory Monthly (4). 18 Li Xuezhi. 2014. “Renewed Knowledge of the Issue of ‘Civil Society’ in Modern China”. Theory and Modernization (6).

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society is a prerequisite for this process. Furthermore, the separation of state and society not only produces impersonal public state authority,19 but also produces a “private sphere” society in which individuals pursue their own interests (first economic interests) in private status. This society that appears as a “private sphere”, through the free association between private individuals through the discussion of public topics and attention to and participation in public affairs, a “public sphere” that transcends the individual comes into being.20 In other words, the so-called “new type of civil society” and its changes in modern times cannot and cannot prove the emergence of a “public sphere” outside the authority of the state. Of course, it cannot and cannot confirm the modern significance of the above-mentioned social organizations. Because the most fundamental point of these changes in modern Chinese society is that they did not reveal a constitutional relationship of rights and obligations between individuals and individuals, and between the state and society. Judging from the existing research, we find that the changes in social structure that have occurred since the end of Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China have not deviated from the traditional official-civilian relationship and public–private division. For example, the new social organization developed from production and exchange is not established through the legal system to protect people and property and through the external order of safeguarding their special interests and public interests,21 so as to distinguish them from the state and political society. Those groups that resemble modern social organizations such as churches, schools and news institutions, cultural and academic groups,

19 Jurgen Habermas. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: p. 19. 20 Taylor Charles. 1995. “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere”, in Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: pp. 257–287. 21 Mr. Hegel defined civil society as the “social organization developed from production and exchange”, believing that this organization “is the combination of all members as independent single individuals, also the combination of universal forms; this kind of combination is built through the needs of members, by upholding the legal system of individuals and property and by upholding the external order of their special interests and public interests”. Please see Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 1982 (translated by Fan Yang and others). The Commercial Press: p. 174.

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trade unions and political parties are all under the control and intervention of state power.22 Even if the so-called “local autonomy” is endowed with political, military, and social significance, it is essentially just a state power game strategy. It is not intended to change the entire system structure, and it is still a prerequisite for strengthening the ruling order of a centralized system. In other words, the development of social organizations in modern times cannot reveal the establishment of the principle of citizenship and ensure the institutionalized relationship between the state and citizens in public affairs, and social autonomy cannot have the basic structural conditions for political and social development.23 However, after experiencing the state-making of nation-state in modern times and a series of political revolutions and social transformation movements that accompany it, traditional social organizations have been infused with new and “modern” elements. In other words, only when being placed in the legitimate narration can new social organizations acquire the meaning of “modernity”. First, the inclusion in the expression of nationalist concepts. Accompanying the nation-state is the concept of (political) nationalism—different from the traditional concept of a historical and cultural community. It is connected with the traditional idea of “loyalty to the king and helping the people”, and has a mutually external and internal relationship with modern nationalism and the concept of collective rights. Therefore, traditional social organizations have been engulfed in popular political movements and given new instrumental meanings, and they have been included in the establishment agenda of the modern state control system. Second, the structural function part of the centralized system. The centralized system or “bureaucratic state” is rooted in traditional Chinese politics—in the historical evolution of the social system24 ; the social control governance model of the centralized system is the agent governance model dominated by administrative power. Here, the new social organization is only the social control form of the centralized system, and this form of social

22 Song Meiyun. 2002. Modern Tianjian Chamber of Commerce. Tianjian Academy of Social Sciences Press: p. 71. 23 Kong Lifei. 2013. The Origin of Modern State in China. SDX Joint Publishing Company: p. 7. 24 Kong Lifei. 2013. The Origin of Modern State in China. SDX Joint Publishing Company: p. 7.

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control becomes the power organization pattern of grassroots communities. The so-called “civil organization” cannot influence the formation of public institutions and policies, and at most, it is the social marginal power of a self-organizing form. Third, undertaking the social integration task of the political community of the modern state. Regarding the transition from the traditional family-country-world to the modern omnipotent state–society integration, there are no legal obstacles to the legitimacy of governance and rule. For example, the tax system design is not based on consent, and the principle of order is still the old one. It only involves the adjustment of the state’s governance model. The old agent is replaced by the new agent. Legally, this only means completing the process from the divine right of kings to the theoretical argumentation of the authority construction of modern nationalism. In short, from the historical perspective of the above-mentioned systems and thoughts, the connotation of traditional social organization has not been changed but has been continued, strengthened and intensified under the framework of the modern nation-state: it can only be a supplementary form of modern state rule or just a form of existence in the instrumental sense. The reason why traditional social organizations can be perfused with the above-mentioned qualitative concepts is because of a fundamental cultural tradition or historical basis: Chinese society and the country have the characteristics of isomorphism and interlocking, that is, the norms of national order (in the form of national law). It has a complex relationship with the folk (basic level) and social order norms (in the form of customary law). Whether it is from the subjective cognition of the “officials” or the “people”, they all regard each other as their own support in one part, it reveals China’s unique state–society relationship. In this sense, it can be understood and explained why social organizations have injected new connotations in modern times and the culture of government and people (dominant relations) formed over thousands of years, family and country feelings (national honor and collectivism supremacy), and the division of public and private (collective interests and collective interests). The opposition of personal interests) and other traditional factors can be penetrated and cast into one. Conversely, this kind of cultural tradition or historical basis for the rule of man has little conscious connection with the “modernity factors” such as the protection of individual rights or social rights and preventing government power (government) from being abused. That is to say, no matter what is in the opposition, whether the officials or the people, there is nothing to break away from authoritarian

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power and dictatorship to promote the development and growth of the public sphere independent of national authority, great modern consciousness and civil rights claims. On this point, Philip Kuhn has a convincing conclusion: the local autonomy advocated by China’s political and intellectual elites in the past generations essentially pursued “a more dynamic and powerful centralized state”.25 For example, Liang Qichao tried his best to advocate local autonomy at the beginning and finally transformed the concept of political autonomy (self-governance, self-rule) into an ethical concept of personal autonomy (self-restriction, self-restraint),26 returned to strengthening national authority Traditional rules and traditional thinking. In addition, from the perspective of traditional political culture, small farmers who have infested traditional family ethics and culture are accustomed to family-oriented and country-oriented. This kind of political culture can hardly be transformed into impersonal public relations—individuals. The modern concepts of civil rights based on the position and society as the basis, etc.27 These historical and cultural factors partly determine the essential cognition and status design of modern social organizations by the elites and the masses as historical participants and social actors. Historical and cultural factors have considerable limitations and constraints on the development of modern social organizations and the choice and improvement of systems.

14.4 Mirroring of Social Organizations in Contemporary China There is no doubt that the connotations of traditional social organizations (clan, guild, village, religious, and secret society) have changed in modern times. There are political, economic and social reasons for this, but the more direct reasons are mainly the overall impact caused by internal rebellions (such as the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) and the entry of external (Western) forces has led to the overall changes in China’s social structure. However, from the perspective of the reconstruction and 25 Kong Lifei. 2013. The Origin of Modern State in China. SDX Joint Publishing Company: p. 43. 26 Yang Zhende. 2004. Freedom and Autonomy: “Individual” of Liang Qicao’s Thoughts. Published in the 21st Century (84). 27 Zhou Qingzhi. 2013. “Social Autonomy—One Discussion about Political Culture”. Research on Politics (4).

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acquisition of the connotation of traditional social organizations in this process, if local changes such as “active modern factors” are indeed a historical social fact in certain cities, it only shows that the form of local social organization has also changed accordingly, and this change of the latter does not have the meaning of integrity, so it is impossible to obtain the complete meaning of modern social organization, especially without the meaning of institutional change. And as mentioned above, even if this change can “generalize” certain “modern elements”, it only means it is under the modern disguise of nationalism, collective interests above anything, and political nationalism. In other words, this change does not produce a social space and order that is not under the direct control of public authority. Therefore, this change is not fundamental, and there is not much meaning of “modernity building”. The political and social changes that occurred after 1949 are in line with the basic narrative of Totalism. Social organizations in the traditional sense no longer exist, at least in the sense of “legitimacy”. In other words, almost all social organizations must be placed in and conform to the legal system of political states. However, this is not the focus of this chapter. What we are more concerned about is the historical continuity of the development of social organizations under the omnipotent politics, that is, this omnipotent social organization structure is by no means “coming out of thin air”. Its historical and cultural basis reveals the subjective cognitive significance of historical participants and social actors themselves, that is, after 1949, this form and orientation of social organization conforms to the traditional cognitive categories of family, state, public and private, and so on. It can never be a historical accident. The in-depth research on the above aspects has not produced much weighty results, but from the research results of anthropology including legal anthropology in the past 30 years, we can obtain an intriguing counterevidence to the above judgments, that is, what the omnipotent state is trying to eliminate. The concept and form of traditional social organization appeared “unexpectedly” decades later.28 This at least shows that the value foundation and historical continuity of traditional social organization have not been advertised as anti-traditional modern popular 28 Wang Mingming and Wang Sifu. 1997. “The Order of Local Society and Fairness and Authority”. Journal of China University of Political Science and Law; Wang Huning. 1991. The Family Clan Culture in Contemporary China. Shanghai People’s Publishing House.

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politics. The movement was rooted out, on the contrary, it survived tenaciously with the basic connotations rooted in traditional family ethics and culture (such as the state standard, the supremacy of collective values, the concept of the unity of the government and the people, etc.). This is especially the point where we examine and review the essential provisions and significance of current Chinese social organizations, and it requires that our further thinking on Chinese social organizations must be placed in China’s historical and cultural resources. For the next question, we must think about the limits and forms of the development of contemporary Chinese social organizations. In other words, in what sense and to what extent do we endow Chinese social organizations with modern meanings, and why this kind of modernity can be understood and given meaning in China’s historical and cultural resources. The discussion that follows is mainly limited to two aspects: one aspect is the impact or change brought about by changes in the social structure on social organizations; the other aspect is the structural or overall change from the state system, how to decide the basic regulations and cognitive categories of the connotation of social organizations. In other words, this discussion includes two (relationship) aspects that are interrelated: on the one hand, as historical participants and social actors, can Chinese social organizations gain the meaning of self-coordination and self-construction only under the framework of state power; on the other hand, whether Chinese social organizations can become an intermediary form connecting the public system and individuals, through free association between private individuals, discussion of public topics and attention to and participation in public affairs, and influence or determine the formation of public system policies, give full play to the functional role of the main body of social governance. From a historical point of view, the founding of New China to the reform and opening up period was an “Organization” or “A Made Order”.29 A period of historical development that fully covered society. State power has achieved an unprecedented reorganization of social structure in the whole society, which includes the reorganization of social relations, organizational relations and governance relations, in order to construct new public social relations. For example, the unit system and street residence system are implemented in cities, and the people’s 29 Deng Zhenglai. 1999. “The Dual Concept of Social Order and Rule—Research on Hayek’s Law Theory”. Peking University Law Review. Vol. 2 (2): pp. 416–417.

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communes system is implemented in the countryside. The entire society is included in the state’s power control system and resource distribution system. This new type of power is maintained by a series of systems such as the collective ownership of the means of production, the work point system, the unified purchase and marketing system and the household registration system. This institutional power has reshaped the way of connection between villagers, and has a strong effect of dominance on villager. The space of social autonomy no longer exists, including its traditional organizational forms such as clans, guilds, villages and religious associations and secret clubs, and the social organizations in New China have completely become agent organizations or auxiliary forms for the government to control the society. Traditional social organizations have either been eradicated or become hidden forms in the world of daily life. However, from the perspective of traditional historical foundations, the new forms of social organizations are still established on the rules governed by the government and the people—this has always been the historical foundation of the operation of traditional Chinese political society, so this period cannot be understood as a historical exception. The basic characteristics of public social relations after 1949 are that the degree of differentiation of the social structure is very low, the public system penetrates all areas of social life, and the operation of the entire social life presents a high degree of politicization and administrative. Individuals and their families/family communities are completely included in the larger community of the country. Such a society is defined as a “total society”30 that is, the political center, ideological center and economic center of the society are merged into one, the state and society are integrated, and the resources and the power are highly concentrated and the public system has strong social mobilization and organization capabilities. According to the general logic of the development of modern social organizations in the West, the emergence and development of modern social organizations that have freed themselves from the shackles of tradition generally meet the following conditions: A private activity space

30 The concept of “total society” was originally proposed by the American political

philosopher Tsou Tang. Please see Ho Ping-ti and Tsou Tang, eds. 1968. China in Crisis. Chicago: University of Chicago; Tsou Tang. 1989. “China’s 20th Century Politics and Western Politics”. Thinker (1); Sun Liping. 1993. “Resources of Free Flow and Space of Free Activities — On the Change of Social Structure in China in the Process of Reform”. Exploration and Contention (Tansuo and Zhengming) (1).

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(market, family, etc.) outside of public authority appears; the public sphere gradually produced in activities; a society that is external and independent of the state, and a society with a high degree of autonomy. Here, a structural premise is that the development of the social division of labor and the diversification of social differentiation, the shaping and growth of social strata and social interest groups, and the awareness of individual rights and claims have become the consensus of the whole society. Formed and prepared the basic conditions. The basic reasons for these changes are mainly derived from the development of the market economy (rather than the planned economy), from the identity relationship to the formation of contractual relationships, and a distinction (establishment spontaneous order based on free agreement, which provides structural conditions for the development of modern social organizations. However, changes in the economic and social structure have contributed to the substantial development of modern social organizations. The more fundamental reason is the development of civil society. Whether China currently exists or has entered civil society is a controversial issue. Those who believe that China has entered a civil society are based on the premise that the social sphere can be separated from the political sphere and the economic sphere, that is, to judge China’s “civil society” on the basis of the three-division theory of the political sphere, the economic sphere and the social sphere. With or without, it mainly focuses on the new personal freedom, individual associations and the mutual cooperation of social organizations, such as the social fact: “Individuals are no longer fully affiliated to the work unit and can easily interact with people who know or do not know. Form an equal membership in the association, willing to pay their own labor regardless of remuneration or willing to donate their own money to help people who have no direct relationship with them or who do not bear direct responsibilities”,31 this has become the basis for the existence of civil society Based on this, it is presumed that the Chinese civil society actually already exists. But we must say that these changes can only mean that the current Chinese society has some of the characteristics of a civil society, that is to say, it may be more appropriate to regard these characteristics or factors as the basic elements of a public society. In other words, although some characteristic factors of modern social organizations can be 31 Gao Bingzhong. 2012. “Concept of ‘Civil Society’ and Chinese Reality”. Sixiang zhanxian (1).

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summarized and extracted from the above changes, such as nongovernment, non-profit, autonomy and independence, it does not indicate that the individual as a member of society. The relationship between the rights and obligations of its associations and the state in the constitutional sense is a reality. Therefore, civil society, which is the basic condition for the development of modern social organizations, is not “China’s reality”, not only that. However, the limited or restricted public sphere is not formed spontaneously but is an unexpected gain from the transition from omnipotent governance and unit society to authoritarian governance and public society. This essentially points to a more core issue: some theoretical and legal issues at the core of civil society have not been clarified, such as the boundary between the public sphere and the private sphere, the protection of private rights, free association and public opinion. Issues such as openness are all basic issues that must be resolved in the political and economic fields. They are inseparable from the social field and are mutually conditional. Conversely speaking, new social organizations must take individual rights and social rights as the basic principles of the community of social members. This is the core issue that must be resolved in the political field and the essential requirement for the formation of a “spontaneous order” in the economic field. Furthermore, if individual freedom in the political sphere cannot be established, and private rights in the economic sphere cannot be confirmed, then the “social sphere” attached to the meaning of “civil society” cannot appear, and the so-called “public sphere” is just a contrived concept. The above judgment can be further confirmed from the focus of Chinese academic circles on social autonomy after the reform and opening up. This kind of research pays more attention to changes in the social field, rather than closely linking changes in the social field with changes in public authority. Therefore, the limitations of such research are very obvious. For example, the focus on villager autonomy began in the village-based autonomy movement in the 1980s. Most of them focused on the micro-study of individual experiences, and they did not distinguish between villager autonomy and grassroots social autonomy, or even confuse it; and then further the social autonomy. Although it focuses on the development of civil society and the transformation of modern social governance that it brings, its theoretical perspective is the relationship between society and the state and the most important interaction between

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society and the state.32 However, this kind of research still remains at the discussion on the theory of civil society or social autonomy, or that this kind of research intentionally or unintentionally ignores the following core issues: First, grassroots social autonomy is a necessary condition for the organization of interests and the formation of social governance order. The second is the political and social institutional conditions required for the construction of the basic-level social autonomy structural system. In addition, perhaps the more fundamental problem is that this type of research only uses the concept of Western civil society to impose on the reality of “heterogeneous” Chinese society, without considering the Chinese officials, scholars and people as historical participants and social actors. The mirror image and cognition of social organizations in Chinese society. Therefore, how to define the connotation of the current Chinese social organization needs to be discussed in a larger framework—the framework of the state system, that is, how the above-mentioned changes in social structure can be incorporated into the public system and kept within the scope of order, or in other words Only by clarifying the political logic and governance logic of the public system, can we better grasp the current Chinese social organization’s nature, regulations and development trends. From the perspective of 40 years of development, in the face of the diversity of public society and the differentiation of interests, the public system has entered an agenda for restructuring orders around authority. First, the adjustment of the concept of omnipotent social management and control methods has shrunk from the institutional power of the village community to the township level, and today’s state power is relowered to the grassroots village level. This shows that the public system controls the society and guards against it. The concept of society has not undergone any substantive changes. That is to say, after the reform and opening up, the state power has withdrawn, and the institutional power of villagers’ autonomy has not been strengthened but has weakened. This is mainly due to the fact that the power of the grassroots party’s political power is essential to rural society. Sexual intervention, in other words, the construction of rural social order after the reform and opening up has not been outside the coverage of the party’s power. Second, different from the past omnipotent governance structure, the current social governance 32 Deng Zhenglai and Alexander. 2006. State and Society—A Research Path of Social Theory. Shanghai People’s Publishing House: p. 481.

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structure is the official-civilian (“cadres”) governance structure relationship of a country (government) directly facing individual people. For example, in rural areas, the order characteristics of the reconstruction of the basic social organization form are mainly reflected in two aspects: On the one hand, in the operation of the formal power of the state, the introduction of basic social rules or local knowledge shows the practical form of the relationship between state and farmers.33 On the other hand, the state power regards villagers’ autonomous organizations as new organizational forms of controlling and influencing the order of the grassroots communities. “Administrative” means official governance, and the latter has become an organizational form for the control and mobilization of the grassroots society by the township and township government. Furthermore, after the reform and opening up, state power has changed the past control and mobilization methods of grassroots society. This is a change from omnipotent governance to authoritarian governance. For example, in terms of order norms, the grassroots social order constructed by state power has changed. The structure transforms into a form of order and organization that is dominated by the normative power of the country and supplemented by the non-normative power of rural society and basic social norms (such as customs and practices and other local knowledge). However, the political logic and governance logic behind the abovementioned institutional changes are to strengthen and strengthen the authoritative and dominant position of the public system (state), so that public organizations (governments) have stronger governance resources and social mobilization capabilities. As part of the “people” outside the state system, social organizations are the product of changes in social structure and changes in public social relations over the past 40 years of reform and opening up. It is the basic condition for the development and growth of social organizations to give new modern connotations to the part of “people” (such as village autonomy, economic organizations in the market, and various mutual aid organizations, etc.). However, observing the changes in social governance over the past 40 years, social organizations have not undergone such transformations. For example, the grassroots self-government organizations have finally become a new form of organization for state 33 Sun Liping. 2000. A Carrot or Stick: Analysis of the Process of the Unofficial Operation of Official Power, printed in Tsinghua Sociological Review. Lujiang People’s Publishing House.

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power to control and influence grassroots social order. In other words, the arrangement of village self-government institutions does not mean that the withdrawal of power from rural society, on the contrary, is a manifestation of the state’s true penetration into rural society. It is actually a form of state power rebuilding in rural society.34 The goal of public organizations (governments) is still to enhance the authority of state power among rural people and the ability of the state to effectively integrate rural society. Its usual practice is to continuously copy or cultivate new agency organizations to undertake a certain aspect of public affairs and public service tasks, for example, through (such as the linkage of the three agencies, venture philanthropy, etc.) through the market purchase of services. The employment group is committed to providing public products and public services to the grassroots society. This type of employment organization generally reproduces and grows around the government’s public resources. It is organized rather than self-organized. It is government-run or semi-official and semi-civilian, not private, and not a part of society, but the extension of the official, the extension of the government. Various agency organizations (peripheral organizations of the party and government system, such as industrial, youth and women, enterprises and institutions, village neighborhood committees, market employment organizations, etc.) due to their non-systematic characteristics and their functions of “ruling the people with officials” and “ruling the people with the people”. It has an inherent relevance and continuity with the traditional local concepts of “public–private” and “official-people”, because the relationship between the individual and the public system revealed by these conceptual categories in history is not an antagonistic relationship (Modern concepts such as the relationship between state and society) are intelocking and supportive relationships that can be converted to each other. That is to say, the current various agency organizations are compared with the historical “indirect agency organizations” such as the township official system or the rural servitude system (with subordinates, clans, squires, etc. as the main body). Compared with each other, they have isomorphism and continuity, and both are based on the relationship of power control the unique characteristics of Chinese social organizations reveal its significance as a traditional historical and cultural concept. 34 Rong Jingben and Cui Zhiyuan, et al. 1998. The Transformation from Pressure-based System to Democratic Cooperation System—Reform of Political System of Two Level of County and Township. Central Compilation and Translation Press.

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In short, from the characteristics of the above-mentioned system development, the development and growth of modern social organizations are subject to the following political logic and state governance logic: The concept of a society under the direct control of the state is committed to fostering a private activity space (market, family, etc.) outside of public authority, and the public sphere is gradually generated from private activities, an external and independent state with a high degree of an autonomous society, on the contrary, the goal of public authority reshaping is to integrate scattered individuals and divided social groups into the power control system of the public system. Here, the “civil society” discussed in Chinese academic circles is only a localized “civil society”, that is, “imposing” a concept with Western origins on a heterogeneous social reality, and making it in line with China. The understanding and interpretation of history and social situations, therefore, either (intentionally) separates the social sphere from the political sphere and the economic sphere, or tries to find a balanced relationship between the social sphere, the political sphere and the economic sphere.35 But these views intentionally or unintentionally ignore the fact that state power plays a leading role in all areas of politics, economy, society and culture. In other words, the definition of all areas must be included in the discussion of political correctness or the legitimacy of the regime. Therefore, in the current reality of Chinese society, social organizations as existence outside the public system, its function and role are nothing more than two forms of existence: one is the self-organization form of society, and the other is the auxiliary form of state domination. Then, how these two forms of existence can be integrated and recreated to jointly promote a harmonious and stable social order is a systemic and institutional choice currently facing the development of social organizations in China.

14.5 Definition of Social Organizations in Contemporary China The current Chinese social organization needs to be placed in a context of contrast between history and reality for the purpose of discussion because we can hardly use the (Western) modern concept of “civil society” to

35 Yu Keping. 2006. Civil Society in China: Concept, Classification and System Environment. China Social Sciences Press (1).

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grasp the connotation of Chinese social organization,36 but the current social organization in China is not a traditional social organization. The modern elements it exhibits distinguish it from traditional social organizations, so, the question now is how to find the modern connotation of current Chinese social organizations and confirm that it is a social concept and form belonging to Chinese social organizations in the “contrastive” review of tradition and modernity. This is may be where the value of questions to be discussed lies in this chapter. The next question is, what does the so-called “social organization”, “society group” or “civil organization” actually mean in the Chinese context? If it is the dependent existence form of the public system, it can only obtain self-construction and self-construction within the system. The meaning of coordination; if it is a form of existence outside the public system, it enters into the public sphere influences or determines public policies and exerts the governance function of social subjects. From the above discussion, we can see a clear and unmistakable phenomenon that the current social organizations in China have fully identifiable modernity factors: nongovernmental, non-profit, autonomy and autonomy, etc., so that some commentators believe that China has formed a social sphere independent of the state, and in the sense of structural changes in the social sphere, “Civil Society” has become “China’s reality”.37 But we have seen another unmistakable fact that China does not have a “autonomous”, “independent”, or “intermediary” social field, or that it constitutes a “civil society”. One is not under the direct or indirect control and prohibition of the government, and the space for autonomy that depends on its existence is constantly narrowing, or it has become a “civilian” part in the traditional sense, or it has become an auxiliary form of government social governance. This situation has completely become “China’s reality” in the power sinking of “party building leading social governance” in recent years. Obviously, not only can we not separate the social sphere or economic sphere from the political sphere for discussion, but we must also put the changes in the connotation of Chinese social organizations on the relevance of Chinese history and 36 Liang Zhiping. “‘Civil (Minjian)’, ‘Civil Society’ (Minjian Shehui) and CIVIL SOCIETY -Reexamination on the Concept of CIVIL SOCIETY”. Yunnan University Journal (Social Science Edition) (1). 37 Gao Bingzhong. 2012. “Concept of ‘Civil Society’ and Chinese Reality”. Sixiang zhanxian (1).

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reality. Because it is different from the modern social organization connotation derived from Western experience, China has never had a tradition of social organization outside of public authority, and the modernization movement in modern times has not developed a modern social organization form independent of the public system. Part of the reason is that Chinese social organizations can adapt to changes in the official-civilian structural relationship, and in different social scenes, different groups of people, and different historical periods, the concept of social organization is constantly changing. But one thing is certain, that is, from traditional to modern, a social space and social order that is not under the direct or indirect control of the government does not exist. So, what is the significance of the existence of social organizations in the traditional and practical sense of China? The explanations obtained from traditional historical and cultural resources can partially prove that Chinese social organizations (clan, guilds, squires, etc.) and the public system are an embedded cooperative relationship, which is cooperative, dependent and mutually dependent. The embedded relationship can be explained and understood in line with historical continuity even in the post-1949 totalitarian structure. The difference is nothing more than a complete integration into the national control system. After the reform and opening up, in general, although the social structure has undergone changes that are “in line with” and “civil society”, this does not mean that there will be a social field and its organization form outside of public authority. It does show that, such as individual freedom, voluntary associations and mutual cooperation of social organizations, these general characteristics of “Civil Society” cannot separate from the political realm and become independent social concepts and social forms, and social organizations that continue to appear. Nor did it break away from the traditional categories of government and people, public and private and family and country. In the historical and social context of China, social organization is an existence outside the system. It mainly performs two functions and functions: as a part of the “people”, it obtains a form of social self-organization; as a part of the “private”, it becomes a form of selforganization. An auxiliary form of state domination. These two forms do not necessarily bring about confrontation and conflict. They are a compatible and transformable relationship. Therefore, in observing and analyzing the characteristics of Chinese social organizations, one cannot ignore the subjective cognitive orientation of Chinese officials, scholars and the

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public as historical participants and social actors. Does this mean that Chinese social organizations face two problems? Development trend: On the one hand, Chinese social organizations can only obtain the meaning of self-coordination and self-construction under the framework of state power; on the other hand, Chinese social organizations have become an intermediary form connecting the public system and individuals. Through the free form of association among private individuals, they can play the role of the main player of social governance by discussing public topics, paying attention to and participating in public affairs and influencing or deciding the formation of public system policies. So, the question now is how to connect the above two aspects? The foreseeable development is how the development of public society (rather than “Civil Society”) can accommodate differentiated and atomized individuals and diverse interest groups, or in other words, if there is no public rule or maximum acceptable to the whole society Common divisors such as “citizens” or “civil society” will generate rising awareness and claims of rights, and the function of the public sphere will be to gather these diverse and divergent “public opinions” and propose rights to the public system demand and create pressure, the community of social members based on contractual relations will continue to develop and rise, and then require social governance to be established on the basis of the protection of individual rights and social rights, rather than on the basis of power domination. The intellectual concerns and issues that need to be further discussed in this chapter are: First, the development experience of the West since modern times has shown that civil society organizations with “modernity factors” are positive and indispensable for the realization of rights and order stability in a democratic society. The functional role of substitution, then, in China’s history and reality, how can social organizations in the modern sense develop and redefine their modern significance based on “own conditions”? Therefore, the cognition or definition of this aspect cannot ignore the world of the actors. Undoubtedly, it needs to base Chinese officials, scholars and people (as historical participants and social actors) on the understanding and concept of social organization and the relationship between state and society. But the core is that the relationship between the state and society must be established on the right relationship in the meaning of the constitution and will be organized to regain understanding and construct meaning. Second, to understand the realistic attributes of Chinese social organizations, we must consider that

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China’s social and state relations have the historical and cultural characteristics of isomorphism, mutual integration and interlocking. Therefore, the modern reconstruction of this characteristic requires both the integration of local historical and cultural conditions and the use of new theories and perspectives, such as whether it can be placed in the Mutual Empowerment and Mutual Transformation theory of state and social relations38 proposed by Joe Migdale to discuss the state and the society and observe their role in development in a balanced way.? It is necessary to see the influence of the state on the society, but also cannot ignore the influence of the society on the state. The state and society can also empower each other. The two constitute a kind of mutual transformation relationship; for another example, corporatism (Corporatism’s theoretical orientation pays special attention to the issue of stability and integration, that is, how to transform social conflict into order. In response to the conflict and coordination issues in the pluralist structure, corporatism hopes to free society from fierce group conflicts and organize social interests in an orderly manner by establishing a stable, well-controlled system with extensive joint capabilities, centralized and communicated to the national decision-making system, which can promote the institutionalized cooperation between the state and social groups.39 The question that needs to be further discussed in terms of realistic policy significance lists as follows. First, as China is a state-dominated society, either for people’s historical consciousness or social cognition, concepts such as centeredness of state and power and society embedded in state—these historical and cultural consciousness—is only continuously strengthened instead of being weakened, so changing the logic of totalitarian state governance is a modern issue of construction and that requires us to redefine civil society organization. Second, we must observe the social environment embedded by state, namely diverse and polarized social structure; therefore, public authority uses control and centralization to deal with the development and growth of decentralized and diverse social organizations; meanwhile, the form of order that can embrace all kinds of social forces is impossible to emerge, and from an integrated unit society to diverse public society, this is a direct challenge facing order 38 Joe Migdale. 2012. Strong Society and Weak State—The Relationship between State and Society in the Third World, State Ability (translated by Zhang Changdong et al.). Jiangsu People’s Publishing House: pp. 11–43. 39 Zhang Jing. 2005. Corporatism. China Social Sciences Press.

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under government authority of totalitarianism. In other words, the division and polarization brought about by public society present a threat to the ability of public system absorbing and embracing diversity and difference in modern society. The key issue revealed by this structural tension points to how to deal with the meaning of rebuilding and construction of Chinese social organization.

CHAPTER 15

Documentary Governance: How Authority Is Exercised and Its Significance for Order and Rules

Through legalized normative document forms, political and administrative constraints are formed, which is the general system logic of a centralized system.1 The documentary governance resulting from the former is also the formal norm source and authoritative form of the grassroots order. From the perspective of older building, documentary governance serves a kind of “organizational order”; different from the legal order and autonomous order based on public rules (derived from the law) and social rules (derived from the contract), the former is placed between the legal order and the autocratic order,2 playing the roles of bureaucratic administration of political control and administrative restraint, as well as the role of political and administrative integration in society. Centralized system is a mobilization system, that is, decision-making and execution are carried out based on political mobilization system and administrative level. The system is implemented, with normative documents (different from laws and regulations) running through them. While giving the symbolic meaning of state power, the document constitutes

1 Xie Yue. 2007. “Document System: The Process and Function of Political Communication”. Journal of Shanghai Jiaodong University (6). 2 Guoguang Wu. 1995. “Documentary Politics: Hypotheses, Process, and Case Studies”. Carol L. Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao, eds., Decision-Making in Deng’s China. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

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the source of norms and the form of authority of the grassroots order document. The function of documentary governance is the management, governance and service of social order by the party’s power and its agency organizations throughout the grassroots communities to cover the normative documents of the political system and the administrative system. By obtaining power through the society, it generates an order network and an authoritative form that penetrates into all areas of society. To take documentary governance as an analytical concept and explain it as a source of formal norms for grassroots and authoritative forms, there are two goals: one is to identify the formal normative meaning of documentary governance under a centralized system and the authoritative form of its operation; the second is that documentary governance as the official and standard source face multiple challenges of standard, that is, how to balance the organizational order constituted by documentary governance and the legal order and autonomous order and place them in the reconstruction of multiple order rules.

15.1 Documentary Governance: A Form of Governance Between Democracy and Autocracy “Document governance” is a product of “document politics”, and the meaning of the latter is mainly based on the centralized system. In other words, document politics has the general characteristics of the rule of man system, but it is also transitional. Qualitative distinction. Comparing with the “rule of law” in democratic politics and the “individual dictatorship” of authoritarian countries, document politics refers to the phenomenon of “government by document” under the collective leadership of the CCP. It reflects the important role of documents in Chinese politics.3 In other words, “the operation of the state machine and the social management of government are not carried out by the law, but to a large extent rely on the “red-head documents” of the party and the government to realize governance and management”.4 Documents can be divided into three types according to their different functions: political literature 3 Guoguang Wu. 1995. “Documentary Politics: Hypotheses, Process, and Case Studies”. Carol L. Hamrin, Suisheng Zhao, eds., Decision-making in Deng’s China. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 4 Xie Yue. 2007. Document System: The Process and Function of Political Communication. Journal of Shanghai Jiaodong University (6).

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documents, administrative documents and informative documents. The above-mentioned normative documents have become the source of rules and authority for government governance form, and with this (trying to) build an orderly latitude and longitude that covers the entire grassroots society. Document politics (different from law and politics) rooted in China’s political mobilization and administrative pressure system characteristics, and documentary governance is only a form of governance that implements document politics. Therefore, the nature of documentary governance is derived from document politics, and the latter’s political function involves control and deal with all political issues that occur inside and outside the system, and implement political issues through the government system. In the government’s administrative power activities, at the same time, document politics establishes the basic lines, guidelines, and policies for government administration. Policy, which forms political and administrative constraints on the government, has become the main functional aspect of documentary governance. Furthermore, the political function of documentary governance is achieved mainly through two systems of integrated governance system of party and government and it is reflected in procedure. The party committee system makes decisions on major issues of politics and economy as well as various social undertakings before forming proposals, legalizes the political authority and the administrative authority of decision-making through document, and then supervises the administration in the form of documents, thus generating political control and administrative tools of government administrative system. In the functional operation of the party-government system, the two basic political governance and administrative tools of document and meeting have become important means and methods of political mobilization and administrative mobilization. That is to say, meeting is the important approach of political mobilization, and through meeting, documents are communicated from top to bottom. As a result, meetings and documents are closely linked together. In other words, the constituent elements of documentary governance are documents and meetings, the latter become an authoritative form of grassroots politics and administration. In short, “document politics” is the essential attribute of documentary governance and is the realization form of the above two political functions of documentary governance.

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Document governance has an important feature: Normative documents play an important role in the agency organization of the bureaucracy. The role of guidance, supervision, and restraint is that documents become a form of party power/authority linking agency organizations. The political and administrative activities of the grassroots government begin with documents and meetings, and through documents will spread throughout the grassroots society. Various agency organization forms run through to play the role of political and administrative control, guidance and supervision use. Agency organization mainly refers to the derivative system or “peripheral organization” of the party power governance system—Enterprises and institutions, industrial, youth and women, and social organizations have formed a decentralized governance model of indirect control. This model is composed of multiple agency governance entities. These governance entities and the grassroots government do not constitute an affiliated relationship related to superior and inferior levels. They are responsible for the affairs of a certain social field, and they form a kind of relationship that is both competitive and cooperative with the grassroots government. Agency organizations mainly play a role in publicizing policies and deal with social issues such as welfare, health, etc., and the role of government assistants.5 In a nutshell, the reason why documentary governance can play the role of restraining the agency organization and integrating itself into the overall governance structure of the party and government system is that the structure of the latter’s power is also built on the top-down relationship of political and administrative authorization. In addition, the grassroots self-government organizations—village neighborhood committees—are also within the scope of documentary governance. This is because from the angle of change of the latter’s autonomous nature, it is essentially the form of government’s agency organization. For the self-governing organizations of the masses, in addition to the “administrative” role of documentary governance, there is another important point. Important order and normative meaning, that is, authoritative government documents give grassroots self-government organizations “Quasi-formal norms” (social norms formulated by state power organizations but promulgated or implemented in the name of agency organizations). In other words, quasi-formal norms are also an 5 Zhou Qingzhi. 2016. “Agency Governance Model: A Kind of Discussion about Ruling Category”. Beijing Administration Institute (4).

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expression of the will of the government. They play a role in regulating the order in certain areas of grassroots communities, such as those implemented by village committees. The “Rules of Procedure for Villagers” is a typical form of quasi-formal norms. In short, in the grassroots society, in addition to formal norms such as legal order or informal norms such as those derived from the spontaneous order formed by habits, customs, conventions, taboos, etc. constitute the basic pattern of social life order. The policies and guidelines implemented by documentary governance, as well as various norms and regulations that permeate the public sphere, constitute the “potential” or de facto basic rule system and authoritative form of the grassroots order. Furthermore, the characteristics of the party’s power system and mechanism have caused documents from various channels to be swept across the party’s government system and its agency groups in the organization.6 So, documentary governance spreads out the order under government authority network of grassroots government governance. Different from social life informal norms such as taboos, habits, customs and conventions that arise spontaneously are different, documents, serving as the carrier of authority and politics and relying on the mandatory force of the state, play a role in coordinating expectations and promoting order. Essentially, the core of documentary governance is the mixed administration of the party system and the administrative system, but the two aspects of accumulation of authority and order 6 Here it is from the description of fact-finding investigation: The source of document comes from two channels. The first is from the delivery of vertical relationship, including the relationships between central government and local government, between high and low local governments, between higher managerial organs and lower governments and between pairing departments of higher and lower governments. The second comes from the delivery of horizontal relationship, including relations between internal connections of local government at every level and different levels of local government. Besides, the factfinding investigation shows that a certain village will receive 200–300 documents from higher levels every year, most of which are connected with the plan of work. Meanwhile, in order to promote the work, towns and townships will also send 100–200 kinds of documents to villages and units under their jurisdiction. But during the period of national initiative of special governance, the document task becomes heavier. According to the introduction of an archive department manager surnamed Yi, when the initiative of the party’s mass line education was carried out, receiving and sending documents was an important task. A case in point is that only from February to October in 2014, there were 190 documents between cities and counties and other departments; there were about 200 documents made and sent by villages (Luo Dameng and Ren Zhongping, 2015). Document Politics in the Grassroots Political Power of Towns and Townships: Symbol, function and Root—Expression of G Village. Study Forum (9).

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construction perform the main functions of the organizational order. The order of documentary governance can be attributed to the structure forms of the party-government integration system and authoritative political governance, but latter implements governance and gives documents the meaning of standardization through document administration, namely the significance of order building.

15.2 Origin of Formalized Rules and Form of Authority There are multiple sources of norms in the grassroots order, including formal norms, informal norms, and quasi-formal norms. And so on, these normative sources constitute the normative system of grassroots order. These multiple norms have different properties and have different effects on the construction of grassroots order. National laws, policies, and the organization of state power (Including county and township government agencies) other norms promulgated are formal norms and are part of the basic-level normative system An important component, formal norms such as national laws adjust basic social relations, and informal norms (self-developed social norms) do not rely on the state’s mandatory force, but on the conscious and voluntary compliance of the society. Guard or rely on coercive force from the people. The reason why documentary governance is regarded as the source of formal norms for grassroots order is that it has the general characteristics of norms, namely showing the consistency, continuity and certainty of order in social life state.7 It is related to the formal norms of the 7 In terms of the concept of order, the definition of Edgar Bodenheimer is: “The concept of order refers to the fact that there are some degrees of consistency, continuity and certainty in the process of nature and society.” Edgar Bodenheimer. 1999. Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law (translated by Deng Zhenglai). China University of Political Science and Law: pp. 219–200. Hayek’s definition is: The order is a state of things; under such a state, a variety of factors connect with each other, which enables us to understand which order we should adopt from what we know about partial space or time. The characteristic of order is that people living under order can make an expectant judgement of their own behavior, so repeated same behavior will not suffer different consequences. The order is so important because it can stabilize people’s expectation. If people live in a disorderly state, this means that people have no expectancy of their behavior. Once there is no expectancy of behavior, the result is that all activities linked with interpersonal exchanges like market transaction, political campaigns, and marriage as well as even daily life have no correct expectation or at least this can allow us

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law and informal norms such as customs, conventions, taboos, customary laws, etc. There are similarities, that is, they are used to distribute the rights and obligations between people, adjust and resolve the differences between them. Conflicts of interest contribute to the formation of order. The difference is that the order formed by documentary governance is a (In the Hayek sense) “artificial” order or “organized” order. Their norms depend on the strength of the state and are the result of the idea that power dominates the society. Therefore, to some degrees, there is a phenomenon of rupture (or discontinuity) and irregularity, that is, the lack of patterns within the reach of intelligence or manifested as an unpredictable sudden change from one state of affairs to another”.8 In other words, it has the characteristics of discontinuity and uncertainty of the rule of man, which reflects the centralization of power. Political logic and administrative logic are the result of political integration replacing social integration. For a centralized system, documentary governance reflects the form of authoritative governance, and the latter refers to the form of coercive power. The dominant authority (an order-based organization or arrangement) that leads or designs the organizational order, or according to the author, it is political authority and government power that maintain organizational order. The power/authority relationship presented in the document has an indispensable sense of order and norms, and then becomes a carrier of power and makes power/authority Embedded in the symbol system. Moreover, the operation process of the document is expressed as an authoritative form. Therefore, the document “Regulatory documents” (not laws and regulations) for file governance have formal norms of order symbolic meaning. Hayek pointed out that all social orders are either generated or constructed. The former refers to “spontaneous order”, while the latter refers to “Organization” or “A Made Order”.9 Organization (of which the government is the largest organization10 ) Order in the organization to get correct expectation.” Andrew Gamble. 2002. The Iron Cage of Liberty (translated by Wang Xiaodong and Zhu Zhijiang). Jiangsu People’s Publishing House: p. 48. 8 Zhang Wenxian. 1999. Jurisprudence. Higher Education Press: p. 224. 9 Deng Zhenglai. 1999. “The Dual Concept of Social Order and Rule—Research on

Hayek’s Law Theory”. Peking University Law Review. Vol. 2 (2). 10 Hayek pointed out that “Family, Farm, Factory, Shop, Company and Other Kinds of Groups, and Including All System or Organization, Are Organizations”. Please see Hayek.

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is the result of concerted action, because cooperation in the organization is the result of centralized guidance. And moreover, the social structure that coordinates the division of labor in an organization is a hierarchical relationship, during which the command stipulates the activities of each member in detail. An organization is a kind of collective tools for specific purposes.11 Therefore, the order of the “organization” is an order under rule by government authority that is, maintaining the order is political authority and government power, and documentary governance becomes a practice and system, which constitutes authority, the source and necessary elements of the rules of order. In other words, from the source of legitimacy that constitutes the grassroots social order, in addition to national legislation or laws, there are more important formal regulations at the grassroots level. This is the “important document” issued by the regime organization. For example, the normative documents formulated by county, township, and town government agencies, in addition to national policies, mainly including: first, village (township) regulations and folk agreements formulated or drafted and approved by the government; second, local rules regarding the adjustment of marriage and family relations; third, administrative contracts related to the comprehensive management of public security signed by the government with all village committees in order to maintain the rural grassroots social order; fourth, various work systems and principles formulated by the local party committees and government, village committees and their affiliated organizations for the institutionalization and standardization of work; fifth, other normative documents.12 This kind of normative document has the function and significance of the rules that people generally follow in their actions but have not yet been clarified in the process of building the grassroots order. Therefore, documentary governance becomes a part of “organizational order” building. Its core is the mixed governance of the political party system and the administrative system. By implementing the political and policy intentions through moderate politics and administrative control, the document 1973. Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order (1) The University of Chicago: p. 46. 11 Deng Zhenglai. 1998. Freedom and Order. Jiangxi Education Press. 12 Wang Qiliang. 2006. “The Standard System and Realization of Standard System and

Social Order in Grassroots-Based on the Perspective of Legal Anthropology”. Journal of Guangxi Minzu College (1).

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system becomes the procedure and form of grassroots authoritative governance, running through the course of its political and administrative activities. The rules of the documentary governance structure are written and binding rules, which are between laws and regulations and social norms, it can neither be understood as “rule of law”, nor is it rational standard.13 Although it embodies the characteristics of the rule of man, it also has considerable stability, standardization, anticipation and is a repetitive and ritualized form of power/authority generated by the formal system. And due to the omnipotent nature of the party’s power, documentary governance supported by mandatory power has the meaning of order and standard of social and public life. Document management takes bureaucratic administration as the carrier. Historically, documentary governance has always been given specific political and administrative characteristics along with the organizational order. During the period of the imperial system, documentary governance was the main feature of the rule of man; the emperor and bureaucrats at all levels use documents to manage the country. There is a generalization of “using documents to rule the world”, as shown by an example in the Eastern Han Dynasty Wang Chong’s book Lunheng (On Balance), which said: “The reason why the Han Dynasty is able to control all regions is that the empire relies on the power of the document”. The documentary governance in the period of systemic management is similar to today’s documentary governance. The difference lies in the fact that the standard meaning of “documentary governance” today is not limited to the national institutional system, but also covers the social field. At the same time, it has the significance for norm-led order building and is the result of political constraints and administrative task subcontracting. There is no difference in the way of governance among the two, and they are all obvious signs of the “organizational order”, but the essence and content are a bit different. Document governance is determined by the characteristics of the political system. First, the documents are circulated and run through the party and government system, so it is necessary for the integrated operation of party affairs and government affairs, that is, political control and administrative constraints are the characteristics of the political system. 13 Max Weber. 1998. Economy and Society (Part I) (translated by Lin Rongyuan). The Commercial Press: pp. 55–56, 241.

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second, documentary governance plays a role in coordinating government relations, and these relations include vertical upper and lower borders relations, horizontal left–right relations, and relations with local governments in different regions that are not affiliated; third, documentary governance plays the function and role of strengthening the hierarchical and authoritative nature of the superiors and subordinates of the bureaucracy. It turns the government’s public functions into a variety of longitude and latitude power relations. In short, the grassroots government is not entirely a bureaucratic organization (in the Weber sense). More importantly, it is the product of a mixture of politics and administration. But documentary governance assumes both political and administrative functions, reflected in the authoritative form of normative documents widely connected with the party-government system. The organizational order formed by documentary governance stems from the concept of government, that is, state power support the concept of matching society. This political feature makes the bureaucracy take on more and more governance functions, and gives the basic-level order the following characteristics: First, the power’s leading, leading, and demonstrative role in the basic-level social order. Second, documentary governance penetrates almost all areas of the grassroots society and exerts the control of grassroots order role. Third, the will to power becomes an integral part of the grassroots order. The other side of the concept of domination is to defend the society and the goal is to make society dependent on the state and state power. Therefore, under the document management, the grassroots order is an order under rule by government authority, which is based on the power of the party’s political power. Normative documents have the formal normative meaning of grassroots order. In short, documentary governance exerts the country’s “Infrastractual Power”.14 On the one hand, documentary governance exerts the ability to effectively implement political decision-making within the jurisdiction, that is, through the power acquired by the society (Power Through Society); on the other hand, by penetrating into the political economy

14 This is Michael Mann’s concept. The state’s infrastructure power refers to the fact that the state actually infiltrates the civil society, implementing its ability of political decision-making within its territory effectively—power through society. Please see Michael Mann’s Origin of Social Power (2nd Vol.) Part 1 (translated by Chen Haihong and others). Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2007: p. 69.

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and the social field, compulsory normative documents are internalized as a source of formal norms for the grassroots social order and authoritative governance form.

15.3 Documentary Governance and Public Social Relationships The “formal norms” embodied in documentary governance have all the meanings of authoritative governance, and the latter controls and dominate the grassroots public sphere order and even lead the way of life. In other words, what documentary governance manifests is an omnipotent governance method in which political power and administrative power cover the grassroots communities, and its profound system foundation is established on the integration structure of the state and society and the homogeneity of the society. Furthermore, the political principle of documentary governance is omnipotence, that is, “the power of political institutions can penetrate and control the guiding ideology of every class and every field of society at any time and without restriction. Omnipotent politics refers to a political society based on this guiding ideology”.15 In other words, the omnipotent governance is built on the structure of controlling the economy and state–society integration. The complete form of this kind of governance is a social control system that combines a planned economy with the integration of government and society (unit system and people’s communes). In other words, only under the condition of the interest organization framework of the unit society, the identity of social contact, and political integration replacing social integration can documentary governance have the systematic power of forming the rules and authoritative pattern of the basic social order. Conversely, if the above conditions have undergone structural and heterogeneous changes, such as changes in the nature of public social relations leading to the continuous expansion of new political and social spaces, then the order maintenance function and role of document management will gradually weaken until it doesn’t work. Finally, the order and standard function of governance loses its meaning.

15 Tang Tsou. 2000. Chinese Politics in the 20th Century—Observing from the Perspective of Grand History and Macro Action. Oxford University Press (Hongkong): pp. 206–224.

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Since the market-oriented reforms, basic social relations have undergone structural changes. Based on the form of social organization structure, the rule system of the grassroots society has changed, namely from unit social framework of the past to the present public social framework. What follows is a change in the form of interest organization, that is, the proportion of “unit” in the unit system decreases sharply, giving way to new market organization forms such as private, joint venture or shareholding system.16 This shows that from the personal attachment relationship of the unit system society to the public, the contractual relationship in the communist society has undergone a structural change, which is reflected in the field of social relations, which is the interpersonal relationship. The contractualization of relationships, that is, the bonds that link people’s rights, responsibilities, and obligations from the past, such as units, villages, families and clan have undergone a change from identity relationship to contract relationship, and this change is forming the most basic form of all kinds of social relations, that is, the basic social connection. It is a contractual relationship full of choices and changes. The organization of the association relationship has become a must in modern economic life. In addition, the above-mentioned changes in the field of social relations have made the development of social organizations outside the system a space of growth. Mutual aid groups in society, chambers of commerce in the market, industry associations, and other new forms of social organization provides the basic conditions for structural arrangement between the state and society and the institutionalization of such arrangements. That is to say, the development of social freedom and autonomy allows the relationship of state and society to be continuously demarcated and confirmed by the law, and gradually forming a kind of relationship of social power checks and balances, namely, the development of social autonomy that restricts and restricts the expansion of documentary governance has a limited social foundation and institutional conditions. The above-mentioned changes in social relations at the grassroots level are compressing the institutional space and regulatory space for documentary governance. In other words, the political space and social space of grassroots social power are constantly expanding. Furthermore, marketoriented reforms have led to the disintegration of traditional order and 16 Li Hanlin. 2014. The Unit Society in China: Discussion, Thinking and Research. China Social Sciences Press: p. 1.

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the decentralization of social power, and the source of formal norms for grassroots governance and the form of authority become diversified and diversified, and the economic and social fields that documentary governance can lead and integrate are functionally weakening due to the shrinkage of the unit system. Therefore, how does documentary governance relate to the increasingly important formal norms, namely legal order, and informal norms, namely autonomous order, form a complement of rules or authoritative relationships rather than tensions, this involves the modern transformation of grassroots governance. In other words, the functions and roles of order rules and the form of authority provided by document management are declining, and its relationship with those based on public rules (derived from law) and social norms (derived from contracts), the rising social order norm system is interweaving, confrontational and even conflicting. For a long time, formal norms such as laws and regulations, as well as customs, habits, morals, religions and other informal norms, without exception, are stifled by the power of the state, and an organizational order with state power as the basic level appears, like the general structure and form of the unit system, and the dominant role is the rule of power and the privilege of acting in a standard way of state law. One of its forms is the significance of order standard given to documentary governance. Standard has different sources and exists in different fields. As Weber believes, groups establish the order based on their own rules, but there are various and different groups in society, so the order is pluralistic.17 When analyzing the source of legality of rule, Weber proposed the coexistence of rule of different sources of legality in social life.18 This means that orders established by different types of governance coexist in society. In turn, today’s grassroots communities in China is facing a problem of order reconstruction because a society with a high degree of freedom emerges, so there will be various social groups and organizations with their own habits, norms and even rules, which can effectively handle their internal affairs, and sometimes participate in or even dominate the local public affairs.

17 Max Weber. 1998. Economy and Society (Part I). Translated by Lin Rongyuan. The Commercial Press: pp. 76–80. 18 Max Weber. 1998. Economy and Society (Part I). Translated by Lin Rongyuan. The Commercial Press: p. 294.

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It is said that documentary governance is a form of governance between democracy and autocracy, that is to say documentary governance with a transitional nature, it is not and cannot become a governance norm. Therefore, to remove the rule of man characteristic of document management and its order and standard function, we need to start from the following aspects. First, we should incorporate document management into the legal order system, making it a part of legal governance. Document governance is the rule of man, and the source and form of authority. Therefore, we must first regulate the party-government relationship in accordance with the law. The party’s leadership is the political leadership, the leadership of the party committee is the leadership of major policies, and the administration is the implementation of national policies. Document governance confuses the functional boundaries between party and government. Second, we must strictly define the rights of party organizations and government organizations’ power and responsibility. In other words, administrative management should stay outside the unique scope of “politics.”19 Finally, we must build the public nature of the government, which includes: Provide basic rules and supervisory order for grassroots governance, continuously explore innovative mechanisms to improve government efficiency and offer high-quality public products and public services, serve as the main organizer and convener of the dialogue between policy communities, integrate the social system and social cohesion, and maintain the improvement of institutional environment and sustained economic growth. Second, we should give play to the governance role of a diversified social and eliminate the stressful relationship between documentary governance and informal norms. On the one hand, we should allow social organizations based on different norms to develop. History continuously proves that local knowledge will not disappear. If we try to influence, change and control the people through the formal system of the country until they are replaced by informal institutions in the inter, it is regarded as the usual practice to cover the grassroots communities through organization order in the name of social transformation, but such efforts are not successful.20 It is applicable unless the informal system becomes a 19 Gu Denuo. 1987. Politics and Administration. Huaxia Press: p. 65. 20 Liang Zhiping. 1997. Law and Order in Local Society, published in The Order, Fair-

ness and Authority in Local Society by Wang Mingming and Wang Sifu. China University of Political Science and Law.

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positive part of the style system. Because informal institutions or informal norms are tied to the habits and prices of people’s communities, value and meaning of beliefs, so relying on laws or policies to go to the countryside cannot change its spontaneous and local nature. On the other hand, social organizations and groups are of great significance to the generation and maintenance of social order. The existence and growth of an spontaneous and organized social self-government organization is indispensable for the healthy development of a society condition. In other words, the higher the degree of social autonomy, the stronger the self-organization ability of the society, and the less intervention of government power, the more mature and robust society will be. Too much government power intervenes, destroying the self-sufficiency of society long.21 In addition, the force that can check and balance the power of the state is the independent (in the form of a social autonomous organization) autonomous society, that is, the effective force for supervising government power depends on whether the social autonomous community is developed and powerful. Third, we should allow the document system to focus on the original function of bureaucracy, that is (in the Weber sense) in the rational sense of the bureaucratic “operation of written rules”. According to Weber’s definition, bureaucracy refers to an organizational system and management approach in which power is divided and stratified according to functions and positions, and rules are the main management body and management methods, that is, it is both an organizational structure and a management method.22 Different from WeiBo’s idea based on the ideal type of “rationality” or “legitimacy”, the administrative system of China’s grassroots government is endowed with political and administrative functions and plays a role within the system. In other words, these two functions are embedded in the administrative system, which makes it essentially a form of social rule. This has documentary governance under the operation of document politics; that is to say, although a document is not a law, it can play its role as a norm of order. Despite this, this should be one of the constituent elements of highly dependent regulations to govern the organization. Conversely speaking, party and government documents should not and cannot become a formal norm, it can only 21 Liang Zhiping. 1996. “Market, State and Public Areas”. Journal of Dushu (50: pp. 10–17). 22 David Beetham. 1989. Max Weber and Modern Political Theory. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House: p. 65.

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become a policy text and guidelines for coordinating administrative activities. And it must be consistent with the law and based on modern legal governance, embodying the original meaning of administration in accordance with law. In short, documentary governance is a product of document politics. On the one hand, documentary governance embodies the general characteristic of a centralized system. The documentary governance system not only controls the bureaucratic administrative system but also infiltrates the society, incorporating all informal norms into the order construction of the national control system with the political logic of omnipotence; on the other hand, documentary governance integrates political and administrative functions. For the government, the law cannot be done without authorization”, hence “the document cannot be done without authorization”, and the governance of documents is higher than the law and carries out its authority and rule under the guise of law. Therefore, documentary governance has the meaning of order construction of “formal norms”.

15.4 Documentary Governance and Law-Based Governance: Authority, Rules and Others As an analytical concept, documentary governance reveals its basic order and normative nature and the meaning of order building, but this does not deny that the legal order adjusts the most basic social relations at the grassroots and it is also an important part of the basic-level norm system. It does mean that the order norms of documentary governance are more important than the legal order norms. As for the relationship with the legal order, it can be connected with it and become a tool or overriding it or replacing it. This happens to reflect the rule of man characteristic of documentary governance, so it is a governance form between democracy and despotism. In this sense, documentary governance has both the general characteristics of legal governance and external norms of rule of human politics. Meanwhile, it has the value and significance of the specific and local characteristics. In other words, the reason why documentary governance has become an integral part of the formal specification is because it embodies what is now a political and administrative power governance model of totalism, but this does not mean that normative texts and documents can complete the entire building of the grassroots order because there are other sources

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of norms, such as legal order, informal norms such as legal order, spontaneous order, moral order, market order, etc. These norms are also the components of grassroots order. The difference from informal norms is that documentary governance has power or an authoritative mandatory force. The meaning of order is the product of the omnipotent political society, so it can become the norm source and authoritative form of the grassroots order, while the civilian order represented by informal norms only belongs to local knowledge and is placed on the opposite side of the construction of “modernization”. Document governance is not legal governance. The latter represents the rationalization process of modern society, that is, the modern country ruling by law must be built on a reasonable and legal basis. Official standards and norms provided by documentary governance deviate from laws and regulations, but laws and regulations as formal norms are often but under the political constraints of governance, because documentary governance obeys a national political will, and this political will does not have much democratic significance, nor is it always based on the majority of the people. And the irreplaceability of documentary governance is concerned with the fact that it gives the legal order “value and meaning” and can penetrate into the specific institutional arrangements and social situations in various fields of the society. In other words, document management has the practicability and value meaning of informal norms, so this is also where documentary governance contributes to organizational order: it can have the value and significance of becoming more inclusive, more specific, and more suitable for local knowledge. But nowadays, documentary governance is no longer suitable for the reality of the rapidly divided grassroots economic and social development. Regulatory authority or administrative authority top-down regulatory documents (rather than laws, regulations and other social norms) have been unable to play a role in the integration of social order. Because political space and social space are constantly expanding, habits, customs, conventions, taboos, religions, ethics, etc. and other multiple norms reflect the spontaneous and local nature, and become more and more important and irreplaceable in the building of the grassroots order. It constitutes the order of daily life at the grassroots level. In addition, the continuous improvement of the level of grassroots social autonomy requires the public nature of the government to be based on individual and social rights, instead of still being based on nationalism and collective rights embodied in documentary governance.

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In other words, there is an inherent flexible space between the formal norms and authoritative forms provided by documentary governance are different from those based on public rules (derived from the law) and social rules (derived from the contract) formed by the social norm system and the form of social power because the former is between the legal order and the authoritarian order, and is essentially a rule of man order; the main feature of the latter is the social community governance model, which is based on the principle of rule of law. It is a polycentric autonomous order. The institutional reason for documentary governance is that the grassroots government is a system that is accountable to power, which leads to “document politics” becoming the realizing method of grassroots government governance. Changing the system in which the grassroots government is accountable to power and eliminating the rule of man characteristic of documentary governance, we must focus on the implementation of democracy and the rule of law, that is, the establishment of the government’s public nature of the rule of law and the social authorization relationship, including the promotion of the transformation from the idea of governing the people contained in governance to the idea of governing by the people. The rule of law means that the government is in all actions bound by the rules stipulated and announced in advance,23 and only under the control and regulation of democracy and the rule of law, the disposal and treatment of documentary governance can play the role of addressing root causes.

23 Friedrich Hayek. 2012. The Road to Serfdom. China Social Sciences Press: p. 73.

CHAPTER 16

Co-governance by Officials and the People

With regard to the research on the grassroots social governance, people have always examined the pattern of social governance and controlling approach of primary-level organizations from the perspective of “strengthening the building of grassroots government power”. The orientation of their cognition is like this: “organizational involvement” is carried out through the existing control system of party and government for political space and social space shown out of the system. This has two meanings: the first is to prevent social force from generating rejective force out of the system; the second is to include new social force in the system. But the prerequisite for this type of research is that nationalism and collective rights are placed above anything. Conversely speaking, the legitimacy of individual and social rights must be compatible with and placed in the former’s verification of political logic. Considering the origin of rule of social order, the grassroots governance in China consists of interlocking power system of officials and people: the first is about the party and government system, which comprises the party’s organization system and the government’s administrative system—the power system dominating social governance at the community level; the second is about the derivative system, which involves governance players who are derivative from party and government power system, and which plays the function and role of auxiliary force of party and government power; the third is about the system of local government clerks and runners, which refers to a form of combining both rule © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_16

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by officials and rule by people and a way through which rule by people assists rule by officials—a kind of extension of the government toward the society. As for the structure of grassroots social governance formed by the interlocking power system of officials and people, the core is the relationship of political governance and power asylum. Proceeding from the position of grassroots communities and starting from system analysis, we need to expound the change in the nature of public social relations at the community level and discern legitimate resources and systematic forces that constitute the grassroots social governance before making a structural analysis of rule or standard system of grassroots communities. Finally, it is held that when changes occur in political and social space at the community level, it is requested to establish grassroots public social relations into the basis of social self-rule focusing on individual and social rights.

16.1 Official Governance or Self-Governance: Different Narratives Two totally different research positions are found always existing when it comes to our observation on the grassroots governance. First, we regard the form of grassroots organization as part of functional realization of state power. The so-called grassroots governance is how to incorporate grassroots communities into the state control system—this is a position held from the perspective of rule by officials (or government). Second, we pay attention to the realization form of individual and social rights on the basis of change in the nature of public social relation. With this, we can observe the public meaning of government power building at the community level—this is a potion from the perspective of rule by people (or people). Therefore, both the position of research and the perspective of analysis are different. According to the former’s perspective, it is generally held that the connotation of running through the building of government power of a modern state is manifested by the fact that state power infiltrates into all aspects of economy, society and life. For example, “community nationalization” caused by the state power can be interpreted as

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the fundamental difference between traditional state and modern nationstate,1 which is usually emblematic of state politics modernization. But in light of the latter’s perspective, it is generally said that the interactive relationship between social power and state power is examined based on the grassroot level, and the core issue focuses upon the realization of citizens’ rights. During the period of the imperial system, the government power was designed to serve the autocratic imperial power. It was the local government office and its derivative groups and local government clerks and runners that represent the grassroots government power. Included in this, for example, are the class of local government clerks and runners and all kinds of controlling organization forms interspersed in the community levels of the empire. The former is an important political force that constitutes the traditional order system in the grassroots communities in China and can be seen as a power form of authorized system in the rule by officials, a pattern of directly dealing with the ordinary people and a model of controlling substantial power at the community level. The latter is a grassroots organizational form with which rule by officials and rule by people are interlocking and the rule by people assists the rule by officials. Seeing the changes of grassroots communities, we find that the most fundamental points when we observe the building of state power since modern times are whether the nature of state power has changed and whether the nature of public social relation at the community level has changed. Looking back on the historical development of modern China, we know that as for the pressing issue for “building of grassroots political power”, it is not the case that we need to make clear the relation of right between people’s rights and state’s rights—building the social relationship that is modern and public at the community level.2 In other

1 In her book called Agents and Victims in South China, American Anthropologist Helen Siu found, after making a case study of town, townships and villages, that the community in traditional period has a greater degree of autonomy; the state relies on local elites to control civil society and community life. But since the twentieth century, the state administration power is constantly extending downward and make the community “like a cell”, leading to a tendency of community nationalization. 2 By analyzing the process of nation-state building in Western Europe, Zhang Jing thought “The building of state political power is not just related to the extension of power, but more substantially, it is certainly linked with the change of nature of power, the change of state-public (government) organization role, the change of various related systems—law, taxation, authorization and governance method and the change of public

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words, what we call “state power building” is a modernized process dominated by nationalism. Contrarily speaking, the public social relationship at the community level is not established on the basis of individual and social rights. On the part of state power building, it is not the fact that the logic verification for public issues of government fails in when it comes to the building of grassroots political power—the society has the fundamental significance for the state. Instead, the fact is that the so-called strengthened building of grassroots political power is nothing but a “historical normal” of traditional country transitioning into modern country—a development form of political logic of national interests and political logics. That is to say, the concept and practice of power dominating society rooted in the agricultural society are always the essential features of political development in China. The past authoritative expression centering on imperial power, like legitimate comments on the process from divine right of kings to clan rule,3 are now replaced by the new legitimate comments on nationalism and collective rights, such as the concept of class rule of national ideology and collective interests. In contrast with the imperial system, the political logic of power dominating society has not changed.4 As regards the continuity of history, the grassroots social order in today’s China is built on top-down relation of authority dominance of grassroots authority and citizenship. All these indicate that the building of state political power can replace other political units or communities. The key to becoming the center of what citizens belong to within the domain lies in governance principle, a series of classifications of social identity different from the past appearing in this process, the definition of rights of different members and mutual relationship as well as political entities of allowing public organizations themselves to safeguard and spread these basic principles, rights and relations” (Zhang Jing). State Political Power Building and Village Self-rule Unit—Problem and Review. Kaifang shidai (Opening Era), 2001 (9). In other words, for the building of state political power, we must complete a transformation of nature oriented toward public organizations, thus making it an organization providing public products, managing public finance and offering public services. Such a role and principle of public (citizen) rights of it represented by the systematic relationship of citizens, all of which are standard meanings contained in “the building of state political power”. 3 Zhou Qingzhi. 1994. “On the Cultural Connotation of ‘Zhengrunguan’ in the History of China”. Social Science Front (Shehui kexue zhanxian) (6). 4 Philip Kuhn thought that the nation-state building and modernization serve the final purpose of strengthening centralized power; the conception of local autonomy appearing in this process is not a change with fundamental nature, less than a revolution. Its goal points to “a more vibrant, strong centralized state”. SDX Joint Book Company, 2013: p. 43.

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power. In other words, as for the building of modern public order and rule, the grassroots social order in present China is not built upon the public social relationship of top-down nature based on habits, customs, practices and self-rule right. But modern governance and traditional governance are fundamentally different, which, for example, can be shown by the trait of modern political state, social structure of interest difference, market order based upon rule and contract, and the organized contact way of modern state, etc. In terms of state power building, the modernization of political power is a process of “grassroots political power building” and “removal of selfrule” from the grassroots communities (in counterpoint to traditional self-rule order, e.g. self-governance by the gentry). Distinct from the grassroots social order mixed with imperial power, gentry power and clan power during the period of imperial system, the biggest change for the modern grassroots social order is the fundamental feature of extension of state political mobilization and social control ability. The success of grassroots political power building is exactly reflected in the fact of top-down authoritative accumulation and social structure concentration. From what is said above, it is seemingly impossible for us to understand the grassroots social order and its changes from the angle or position of rule by officials or rule by people because rule by officials and rule by people have always not existed in the same rule space in terms of the shift of traditional and modern development but they are an integrated order form. For instance, in view of system building, the current construction of public social relations in the grassroots communities is first targeted at a public issue of grassroots political power and it concentrates on structural issues such as the contradiction of power centralization and power decentralization, pressure-based system, “operator of political power”,5 tournament governance model and administrative outsourcing system6 and the foreignization of government system. In reverse, from the perspective of people (society), the fundamental meaning targeted at the public nature of building grassroots political power should be the following: in addition to serving the public and emerging for the interests of people, grassroots political power has no other self-purpose; whether

5 Zhang Jing. 2000. The Grassroots Political Power: Several Issues of Rural System. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House: p. 52. 6 Zhou Lian. 2014. “Administrative Outsourcing System”. Journal of Society.

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this purpose is considered to serve national interests or collective interests or any other interests, we cannot place it above individual interests and public interests. This is because this is the legitimacy for the existence of grassroots political power and represents the full meaning for the completion of modern transition of building of political power at the community level.

16.2 Interlocking Power System: A Hybrid Governance System With the reference to the nature of questions discussed above, the manner of narration centering on the rule by officials or the rule by people restricts us from our understanding of the nature of traditional social order at the community level and our effort of deepening of research, which further influences us in terms of understanding and explaining the rule structure and system significance of grassroots social order in today’s China. This is because whether based on the position of rule by officials or the position of rule by people, the complex pattern of grassroots social governance cannot be completely presented,7 and in particular, the structural feature and social and political meaning of official-civilian co-governance of grassroots social system also cannot show themselves. Historically, the grassroots social traditionally in China is neither a society under or beyond imperial power nor an official-civilian society featuring power dominating relation of top-down “single-track politics”. As for the social nature of China, the state and the society are of interlocking nature; the standard of state order and the standard of grassroots social order share mixed and mutually infiltrated relationship. Accordingly, (nongovernmental) society is neither an independently existing society nor a self-improving order space formed out of the state. Instead, it is a continuum of linking with the national system through the concept of common space order, expressed by system, so it is an all-embracing order ruled by rituals that include rituals in law and integrates law into

7 Today’s social governance research shows a fragmental state, and mainstream research

is oriented toward the rule by officials. The precondition is how to incorporate separated grassroots communities into the state system. Additionally, the research done from the perspective of rule by people, ideal comments are the employment of modern analytical concept and are also concentrated in the development of social organization and the realization system of social fairness and justice.

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ordinary customs.8 Research shows that the so-called “self-rule of grassroots communities” prevailing in the period of imperial system is just an indirect form of rule emerging when the imperial power witnesses the decline of centralized power and the rise of rural clan forces. In other words, when the ability for the rule of imperial power is strong enough, its grassroots social governance is then restored to a direct form of rule.9 As for legitimate resource and systematic form, what is widely interspersed in the traditional grassroots communities is the complicated official structure or unofficial structure, systematic form or unsystematic form; and their functions given include administration, justice, tax and labor service and education. For example, the bureaucratic groups, agent groups and recruited groups of county government office—the class of local government clerks and runners, village officials or grassroots organization forms10 such as neighborhood system, gentlemen class and clan forces. Among them, the “self-governance by the gentry” to which people pay attention is always regarded as a genuine “social self-rule space”—the view likely to be a misunderstanding of the history, and by nature, it is merely a form indicating the rule of the imperial power over the grassroots communities. Generally speaking, the grassroots social order traditionally in China is an authoritative governance system jointly shared by a county government office and its derivative system dominated by imperial power as well as grassroots organizations based on the system of local government clerks and runners and local authoritative forces (gentry or clan). On the basis of this, a structural pattern of interlocking power characterized neither by rule by officials nor by rule by people takes shape. The building of state power since modern times has changed the original integrated rule of order in traditional grassroots communities and reorganized the order of grassroots communities. But this is the result of state power transforming society in a top-down manner, and this is

8 Liang Zhiping. 1997. Seeking the Harmony in the Natural Order. China University of Political Science and Law Press: p. 23. 9 Zheng Zhenman. 1992. Family Organization and Social Change of Fujian in the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Hunan Education Press: p. 242. 10 Liu Zhiwei. 1997. Between the State and the Society: Research on the Lijia System of Guangdong Province during the Periods of Ming and Qing Dynasties. Sun Yatsen University Press; Qin Hui. 2004. Grassroots Control of Rural Areas in Traditional Chinese Empire: Rural Organization during the Han and Tang Dynasties. Included in Ten Discussions in Traditional China. Fudan University Press: pp. 1–44.

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not a change for the nature of public social relations in the grassroots communities; the latter’s point is the key to the transition of traditional grassroots social governance into the modern for the reason that “establishing citizenship (identity), public relations (the connection between citizens and public organizations as well as public rule is the important task for the building public political power. It represents a form of modern social relationship and a basic structural condition for the formation of constitutional and political relations”.11 Observing the history development of modern China, the biggest characteristic of state power building is reflected by the fact that the extraction of fiscal revenue and tax and the ability of social control and mobilization are increasingly strengthening.12 And in this process, the foundation of traditional grassroots social order has altered, the new grassroots social order has not replaced the previous relation protected by traditional social power but given way to modern public relations. That is to say, the logic of traditional grassroots social governance has seen no change, and it is still built upon the dominant relationship of state political power and administrative power. The unit system and the people’s commune system appeared after 1949 are inherently a modern form of power dominating society. Based upon the logic of traditional state governance, the emergence of a socially organized movement is not an exception.13 The unit system and the street resident system, along with the people’s commune system carried out in rural regions, incorporate the whole society into the system of state power dominance. “Not only do social members have their own ‘organization’, they can also work with paid renumeration. More importantly, they, as

11 Zhang Jing. 2006. Modern Public Rules and Rural Society. Shanghai Book Store Press: p. 5. 12 “State Making or State Building” is an analytical framework refined by Charls Tilly from the evolutionary process of modern nation-states in Western countries. When studying the formation of European nation-state, Tilly believed that this process could be divided into two different processes. “State building” was demonstrated by the separation of political power, bureaucracy, infiltration as well as consolidation of control over the lower levels and expanding source of wealth. For details, please see Prasenjit Duara. 1994. Culture, Power and the State—Rural North China 1900–1942 (translated by Wang Fuming). Jiangsu People’s Publishing House. 13 Zhou Xueguang. “From “Huang Zongxi’s Law to the Logic of Empire: The Historical Clues of State Governance Logic of China”. Kaifang Shidai (Opening Era) (5).

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well as the structural relationship of public system, are established: individuals gain a position in new public system and become its members. This means that individuals obtain corresponding public qualification, and the connection between social member and state official system takes place”.14 In terms of unit system, “the state gathers mandatory administrative power and exchanged property power, and through resource allocation and power empowerment of unit organization, it has direct power of controlling unit organization and makes the unit organization attached to the state”.15 The social order is completely dependent on the intensity and power of the state’s control. The level of social structure division is not strong, and no external environment and internal condition of independent function are existed for all subsystems in society. As for the people’s commune system, it is linked by all official and unofficial connections of village and community organizations such as people’s militia, party branch, big team, small team, agriculture association, women’s union, communist youth league, etc. These organizations are not formed spontaneously inside villages but embedded by the state to ensure that it can control villages, but there is a lack of a clear boundary of organization between the state and the society.16 When compared with the old system, the new system focuses on more total dependence on rule by officials and more total removal of self-rule. In this sense, we can in turn explain the grassroots social order as a “official-civilian society” integrated by order under rule by government authority—its feature is embodied by the relationship between cadre (manager) and mass (subordinate). This means that the previous traditional society groups with self-ruled feature and other primary-level organizations based on consanguinity, relative relationship, village connection and geographic condition are unexceptionally stifled by the state force,17 and by governing the economy and life of the 14 Zhang Jing. 2015. “The Change of Passage: Correlation of Individuals and Public Organizations”. Xuehai: (1). 15 Li Lulu, Li Hanlin. 2000. The Chinese Unit Organization—Resources, Power and Exchange. Zhenjiang People’s Publishing House: p. 1. 16 Victor Nee, Davide Stark. 1989. Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe. Stanford University Press, published in Jing Yuejin’s “The Reshaping of Boundary between State and Society”. Jiangsu Social Science, 2000 (2). 17 As for the changing situation of primary-level social groups before and after 1949 and even before and after the reform and opening up, anthropological and sociological research provides us with ample empirical analysis. That is to say, a clear mark for social revolution and social transformation movement is to use external concept and system to

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whole society, the state has made it possible to control the politics of rural society and all other areas. As both officials and people are interlocking and form a whole, and social space is largely narrowed, the ability of the state for social mobilization is greatly strengthened. After the reform and opening up, the grassroots social order enters a process in which the authority rebuilds the order. First, the state has changed the way of management and control over the grassroots order; seeing the shift from the integrated system of government and society to the separated system of government and society, systematic power has retracted from village to township and town, so the relationship between the state and the grassroots communities has witnessed structural changes. Second, the pattern of social organization in villages has seen changes: the organizational form of people’s communes, a model with high integration of state and society, has turned into a pattern of villagers’ self-rule organization. The latter is a community of membership linked with the collective land property right, and its self-rule is more reflected in economic sense. Third, it is about the drawback of state power and the weakening of systematic power of village group. Although traditional forces in rural areas, such as family forces, are rising, this situation is still not yet to cause a substantial impact upon the social order at the community level. In contrast with the previous highly organized society, the present social governance at the community level is considered a kind of official-civilian (cadres and masses) structural relationship in which the state directly faces individuals. After the reform and opening up, the order feature of the organizational form of grassroots communities is mainly manifested as follows. On the one hand, in the process of operation of state official power, the rule of grassroots communities or local knowledge is introduced, and the

cover local system and culture, including reform and eradication of civil social organization but ending up with failure. Given this aspect of research, we can see the situation of social organization during the period of the Republic of China for details, and also see A Compilation of Social Investigation Materials (Thirteen Volumes); as well as historical, anthropological, sociological and folk studies over the past nearly 30 years. But the latter shifts people’s focus toward the micro society as the object of field investigation, such concepts like “smaller community”, “local knowledge”, “little tradition” and “local worship and sacrificial circle” become the center of discussion.

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practical pattern of relationship between state and farmer is expressed.18 But on the other, state power regards villagers’ self-rule organization as a new organizational form of controlling and influencing the order of grassroots communities, a way that state power makes grassroots communities “administrative” again (governance of officials). The latter has become an organized pattern in which grassroots government power in township and town controls and mobilizes grassroots communities. In a nutshell, the state power has changed the past way of controlling and mobilizing grassroots communities and shifted from the structure of order of grassroots communities constructed by state forces to the order pattern and organizational form characterized more by state standard power and less by nonstandard power of rural society (villagers’ self-rule) and standard of grassroots communities. The governance system of grassroots communities supported by the official-civilian interlocking structure has the following political and administrative characteristics. First, the governance logic of double authority system of government, along with the rule of governance of bureaucratic group and standard bureaucracy system, share the same form but different nature. The former has a systematic feature of politics embedding administration—bureaucratic group is a special group with “political mission”; the latter has the features of “rationality” or “legitimacy”. The characteristic of the former attributes the governance of grassroots communities with the trait of politics and the nature of political governance. Second, the organizations out of party and government system as well as enterprises and institutions are still seen as an extension of political governance; they possess the majority of monopolistic economic and social resources, which indicate a feature of power derivative. But in fact, they are the agent part of the party and government power, which is decided by the feature of state governance system. It is not only included in the object of governance system and represents the organization form with which effective governance is achieved. Furthermore, the system of local government clerks and runners plays a role of intermediary organization in linking government and society as well as government and market, including grassroots mass self-rule organization and social organization run by or half run by the government as 18 Sun Liping. 2000. A Carrot or Stick: Analysis of the Process of the Unofficial Operation of Official Power, printed in Tsinghua Sociological Review. Lujiang People’s Publishing House.

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well as force supplementation of government power department (auxiliary police force). Figuratively speaking, local government clerks and runners are what the government uses to manage and control grassroots communities—rule by people assist rule by rule by officials. Finally, the most fundamental difference is that the grassroots governance characterized by the interlocking structure of official-civilian power is a kind of political governance rather than a kind of government governance, social governance or market governance. Or we can say that the so-called social governance and market governance are nothing but supplementary forms of political (government) governance.

16.3 Construction of Social Power and the Changing Nature of Public Social Relationships From the above history and reality, the imperial rule vis-à-vis the grassroots social order today is neither an order of political centralization and bureaucrat group, nor is it an order formed by the involvement of multiple forces in governance. It is an order form supported by the interlocking power system of officials and civilians. It is essentially a political governance, which is designed to control the administrative system and implement the political will of administrative power, thus building the relationship of power dominance and alyssum with society. When making a comparison between modern governance and traditional governance, there is no essential difference in spite of a distinction of strong and weak political control and administrative power of implementation. Conversely speaking, today’s grassroots social order structure has the full characteristics of traditional Chinese grassroots governance structures: from the top-down hierarchical centralized management system, the mutual structural characteristics of the law and the people, and the non-organized form of grassroots society. In other words, modern public social relations based on rule by people or social autonomy is not completely established. Of course, grassroots governance has not fully established equal civil rights building based on individual rights and social rights, social justice mechanism is mainly built on the basis of national power logic.

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Traditionally, for the imperial power, the society is only part of the civil society.19 In other words, compared with the analytical concept of modern state and society, civil society and autocratic imperial power are neither marked by dual relationship nor by opposite relationship. Meanwhile, modern concepts correspondingly connected with the two are different from the social and national connotations. For example, the civil society organizations represent the interests of their members while playing a role of government agents and assisting the government to complete their duties. In response, the government usually relies deeply on local social organizations in terms of resolving disputes and other local affairs. Local elites, like gentlemen, can be said to be part of the “people”, but many of them, or those with the experience of becoming officials, or those who have the qualifications of becoming officials, are in the same social class with officials. In other words, only with this sense of such a state–society relationship concept can bureaucratic power deeply take root in civil society. This is, on the one hand, because of the homogeneity of society and its isostructuralism with the state, and on the other hand, because of the impossibility of being allowed to advocate different social interests as well as efforts of forming a party in an organized way. But the official is the official, and the people are people; they are restricted by more complex political and ethical standards and norms, such as family-country-world relationship, public–private demarcation line, official-civilian distinction.20 This is a complex value system that penetrates and transforms each other, which is formed and established on the order form of grassroots social order featuring the mixed and interlocking structure of officials and people. In modern times, the above-mentioned concept system has completed a change, which, in fact, means a new discussion on state rule. In the

19 In his work Liang Zhiping. 2003. “‘Civil (Minjian)’, ‘Civil Society’ (Minjian Shehui) and CIVIL SOCIETY—Reexamination on the concept of CIVIL SOCIETY”, Liang Zhiping believes that as a “social” concept, “civil” can and should be understood as a certain thing different from and opposite to state (official, government mainsion or government, but obviously the state here is not the modern nation-state rising in Europe in the seventeenth century. In the same way, the society named “civil” is not the combination of countless individuals who seek the satisfaction of respective interests under the protection of laws. Needless to say, it is a social network built on all kinds of social organizations, groups and unions. 20 Liang Zhiping. 1996. Customary Laws of the Qing Dynasty. China University of Political Science and Law Press: pp. 22–23.

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change of concept, as for corruption and social decline related to officials at the community level, social autonomy has been attributed with the significance of modern transformation of grassroots social governance. This driving force and imagination are mainly from the impact or referenced effect of the Western institutional culture and value system. For example, by quoting “Western approach” as the reference, Liang Qichao proposed the so-called idea of “restoring the ancient style, following the Western approach, and valuing the rights of village”. At the same time he introduced the concept of establishing a local parliament, ruling other things with local rules, and discussing the topic of implementing the local government reform of “local autonomous political system”. But he ultimately transformed the original meaning of autonomy—Self-rule and Self-government—into Self-mastery and Self-control. In other word, he interpreted “individual self-rule” in political sense as individual self-rule (self-control) in the ethical sense in a localized way.21 This autonomous meaning is essentially different from the foreign word “autonomous”, so that is not the meaning of modern state building. The concepts of such social transformation and the results of political practice finally focus on strengthening the central centralized system, thus creating this modern political value system that replaces the concept of the imperial power with the concept of statism. But the concept of modern social autonomy is not or impossible to exist in this value system. In other words, from the official-civilian interlocking power system of imperial power to the official-civilian interlocking power system of modern state, what requires us to complete (at least objective is not) is not the construction of modern public social relations, but to put the legitimacy of order rules of grassroots communities into the political logic expression of modern nationalism. Therefore, only when we move toward the direction of this thought can we understand and explain the historical continuity of China’s grassroots social order, and the changes in the nature of public social relationship and only when we proceed from this perspective can we understand and explain the historical characteristics and meaning of realistic governance of official-civilian interlocking power system of China’s grassroots communities. From the perspective of today’s official-civilian interlocking power structure, the grassroots social governance system is established on the 21 Yang Zhende. 2004. “Freedom and Self-Rule: ‘Individual’ Reflected in Liang Qichao’s Political Philosophy”, printed in the Journal of Century (84).

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relationship of domination and asylum of state power. It is dominated by the party and government system, supplemented by derivative system and staffing system, constituting an (attempted) order network of grassroots communities. What supports this system is the concept of nationalism and the logic of collective rights. However, this “organizational order” designed by state power is impossible to adapt to economic differentiation and social diversified reality; the development trend of the latter is a polycentric subject involved autonomous order, and it must be established on the basis of personal and social rights. Today, the differentiation and changes in the basic economic and social foundation have led to the decentralization of social power, which means requiring changes for the monocentric authoritative governance led by the concept of nationalism. In other words, the nationalist authoritative governance structure has not been able to adapt to current changes, and it has already achieved the meaning of political modernization. Therefore, the key to ensuring the decentralization of power but not harming the order is how to achieve adaptive transformation, building the social source of the grassroots order authority. This concerns the public nature and social restructuring of grassroots governance as well as the change of social interest organization and modern social contacts. In the final analysis, it is related to which kind of standard or rule local social community and grassroots social legitimate order are based on.

CHAPTER 17

Restructuring Order: Forty Years of Grassroots Governance Reform in China

Over the past 40 years, China has seen structural changes in grassroots governance, shifting from the organized structure of interests in unitbased society to the organized structure of interests in public society. The previous governance system-administrative unit system has been disintegrated, and individuals move toward a heterogeneous, contractual and diverse pattern of social order. When the relationship nature of public society experiences changes, the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China are linked with the main patterns of government governance, social governance and market governance and their functional separations. Thus, traditional governance structure and governance concept system become the focus of a series of reforms in Chinese grassroots governance and constitute a historical background for the realization of grassroots governance in China and a condition for real social development.

17.1 Structural Changes: Public Social Relationships How to sort out and analyze the reform and transition of grassroots governance over the past forty years with an observational and explanative perspective depends upon the researcher’s disciplinary background, analytical method and approach of narration. Through observation, mainstream observational and explanative viewpoints can be boiled down to © Social Sciences Academic Press 2022 Q. Zhou, Official Governance and Self-governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6601-9_17

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the following. One is the perspective of politics—the reform of party and government system, which bases observational perspective on the macro level of national governance. For example, the reform of major political fields like party building, primary-level democracy, consultative democracy, political supervision, responsible government, public service and public policy accounts for the change and progress of democratic governance over the past 40 years since reform and opening up. And based on the theory of governance of the Communist Party of China and the conditions of China, we analyze and explain the basic meaning of national governance, government governance and social governance.1 Another is a sociological perspective, which is designed to explain structural changes in the field of grassroots governance through the change in social member formation included in sociology. For example, we explain structural changes in governance system of grassroots communities in China by relying on three ways of social organization structure that impact people’s existence and interests: the first is membership, which suggests whether individuals are involved in a team as a member; the second is organization affiliation, which refers to whether individuals have a responsible organization; and the third is structural access, which means whether individuals can access public system and influence policy and rely on it to exist in order to expound the structural changes of governance system in the grassroots communities of China.2 Furthermore, from the viewpoint of relationship between state and society, we expound on innovative exploration and practical experience in social governance in China based upon the “model” of two-way movement of government and society.3 Besides, there is still another organizational (including organizational sociology) or administrative perspective. For example, we explain traditional features, organization logics and process of evolution of government governance in China by looking at two viewpoints of vertical central-local relationship to horizontal local competition in order to sort

1 Yu Keping. 2018. “China’s Governance Reform (1978–2018)”. Journal of Wuhan University (3). 2 Zhang Jing. 2015. “The Change of Passage: Correlation of Individuals and Public Organizations”. Xuehai (1). 3 Yan Jirong. 2017. “Chinese Experience of Social Governance”. Teaching and Research

(9).

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out the continuation and reform of traditional government governance experience since reform and opening up.4 But as for the outline and summarization of grassroots governance over the past 40 years, we need to proceed from the viewpoint of grassroots communities and start from the change of structural relationship in grassroots communities. If fail to do so, we are unable to make overall screening, explanation and analysis of grassroots governance in China. On the one hand, the questions raised for the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China center upon the change of nature of public social relationship; in fact, given the change of grassroots governance over the past 40 years, central topics are all found in the area of public social relation. On the other hand, governance research is an interdisciplinary field; especially in recent 20 years, grassroots governance has become an important topic of many disciplines and academic research scope. Despite the fact that the above-said observations and explanations are full of value and profundity, serve as the dimensions of reference for the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China and reflect a certain or some aspects of change in grassroots governance in China, they are just forms of different angles or dimensions for grassroots public social relation in China. Public social relation refers to the social relationship between individual and public system in public areas. In other words, the so-called public social relation means the way of organization and linking relationship of social member system. It is the basic form of relation produced between individual and public organization (government) and its essential feature is identified as the nature stipulation of public rule/standard and right relationship or contractual relationship between social members. Public social relation exists in traditional and modern periods, but the fundamental difference lies in the nature of relationship. For instance, traditional public social relation is based on the principle of power dominance, while modern public social relation is built upon the legal guarantee of 4 For relevant explanations, please see Zhou Lian’s “Reform of China’s Government Governance and Modernization”, Paper News on May 25, 2018; Liu Jianjun and Ma Yanyin’s “From the ‘Different Path of Officials’ to the ‘Difference of Groups’: Transformation of Human Resource Structure in Local Governance of China and Its Political Effect—A Supplement to Zhou Xueguang’s Article called ‘Different Paths of Officials’ to ‘Different Division of Levels: Chinese Bureaucratic Human Resources System Under the Logic of Empire’”, Society (1). Zhou Xueguang. 2017. The System Logic of State Governance of China—A Research on Organization. SDX Joint Book Company.

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individual right and social right. In terms of organizational characteristics, public social relation is the structural pattern of social organization—form of social organization and way of social contact. Before the reform and opening up, it was the structural form of social organization featuring unit system, in which the society was placed under the control of government; in this case, the form and maintenance of order was achieved by the government through “administrative unit” (cities follow the unit system but rural areas adopt the people’s commune system). This means that the major organization of bearing the responsibility for grassroots governance is not the government but those “organizations” widely found in society—enterprises and institutions. Thus, the role of the government’s “indirect governance” and the working way focusing on unit instead of individual appear.5 After the reform and opening up, the introduction of market mechanism makes social division of labor and interests’ group more diversified, and more and more people depart from the unit system and enter the organized structure of interests in public society. As the form of structure of social organization changes, new social organization and market organization become the basic organizational forms. The significance they have for traditional government governance or for the relationship between individual and public system is embodied by this: “Establishing citizenship (identity), public relationship (connection between citizens and connection between citizen and public organization) and public rule is the important task for the building of public government power”.6 On the basis of the significance mentioned above, the change in the nature of public social relation is related to aspects such as the existing foundation of governance, public relation, public rule and public authority and role in the grassroots communities. Because of this, this change constitutes the background and motivation of reform and transition of grassroots governance in China and the socially structural fundamental condition of grassroots governance in China.

5 Zhang Jing. 2016. “Why Does Social Governance Become Ineffectual?”. Review of Fudan Politics (16). 6 Zhang Jing. 2016. Modern Public Rules and Rural Society. Shanghai Book Store Press: p. 5.

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Changes in the Grassroots Governance System

After the reform and opening up, centering on the change of nature of public social relation, the grassroots social governance reenters a process focusing upon the order of authority reconstruction. First, the state has altered the way of management and control over the grassroots communities; from the integration of government and society and the separation of government from society, systematic power retracts from village to township and town; the relationship between state and grassroots communities has shifted. Second, the form of primary-level social organization has changed. In cities, social members out of system enter the field of market, and diverse and heterogenous social space is continuously expanding. In rural areas, the form of grassroots mass self-rule organization is carried out; this is a community of membership combing villagers themselves and collective land property, but this self-rule focuses more on the significance of economic life. Third, the state power withdraws, and the systematic power of the village group is not strengthened but declining. This is fundamentally because of the substantial involvement of grassroots party and government power in rural society; and we can say that the construction of order in rural society after the reform and opening up was not covered by the power of party and government. It is different from the traditional social governance structure. In the past, the state (government) establishes the connection with the public through “direct agency” (administrative unit). But today, such an “intermediary structure” is lacking in the structure of grassroots social governance because it is an official–civilian governance relationship in which the state (government) directly faces individual people. This is in a contrast with the traditional social governance structure. In rural areas, for example, the order feature of pattern reconstruction of grassroots social organization is mainly reflected in the following two aspects. On one hand, when the state’s official power operates, the introduction of grassroots social rule or local knowledge showcases the practical relationship between the state and the farmer.7 On the other, the state power takes villagers’ self-rule organization as the new organizational form of 7 Sun Liping. 2000. A Carrot or Stick: Analysis of the Process of the Unofficial Operation of Official Power, printed in Tsinghua Sociological Review. Lujiang People’s Publishing House.

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controlling and influencing the social order at the community level. This is a renewed “administrative” (bureaucratic) endeavor made by the state power for grassroots communities. In other words, after the reform and opening up, the state power has changed the organizational pattern of controlling and mobilizing grassroots communities and transformed from the structure of grassroots social order constructed by the state power to the order pattern and organizational form that focuses more on state standard power and less on nonstandard power of rural society (grassroots mass self-rule organization) and standard of grassroots communities (e.g. customs, practices and other local knowledge). In order to include the heterogeneous and diverse society (unorganized individuals) in the scope of system and order, the Chinese government at the community level has always tried to change its relationship of governance with other social elements through systematic reform to adapt itself to social structure and governance environment. First, the management-oriented reform of government, which includes the following. The first is structural reform. It means that we need to determine government’s administration in accordance with law and improve the efficiency of administrative organs. For example, we should strengthen grassroots management, set up special organization to resolve special issues, introduce the policy of transparent administration, establish transparent government and reduce the procedure of review and approval and improve efficiency. The second is functional reform. It means that we need to build service-oriented government and optimize public service system. For instance, we should intensify public service, improve services of education, medical care, social insurance and employment, expand the coverage of social security, promote social fairness and justice and advance the building of a harmonious society. By the same token, we should strengthen the government’s ability of emergency response. The third is procedural reform. It means that we need to standardize the act of law enforcement, implement the policy of streamlining administrative and delegating more power to local levels and make the information of government affairs more public, advance consultative democracy and improve consultative mechanism to dissolve social contradictions. For example, we should enlarge the channel of oversight over government power, increase effective oversight over government power, expand the channel of orderly participation of people and promote the development of people’s democracy. Second, the service-oriented reform of government. We need to work actively carry out effective services

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for the convenience of people in areas like civil administration, public security, household system, industry and commerce and tax. The government also pumps much money into the improvement of public facilities such as rural roads, health station, public television network and intensify efforts to advance the projects of village image improvement and renovation, spread of culture in rural areas and building of special towns. At the same time, we should implement the policy of poverty alleviation and build social relief system to uphold the rights and interests of the disadvantaged group. Third, the reform of improving the management system of nongovernmental organization. A case in point is that we need to ask the party of interests to join together, ensure the efficiency of public choice, enhance interactions between government and people and effectively government mechanism and social mechanism so as to make possible the joint governance of all sides of the society.8 But the above-mentioned institutional reform runs through the logic of governance, and it is designed to strengthen the authoritative dominance of public system (state). This means that public organization (government) has more powerful ruling resources and social mobilizing forces.

17.3

Reform and Transformation of Grassroots Governance

One prominent feature of governance system in the grassroots communities is that public system (party and government power system) occupies a dominant position in the grassroots governance structure, and it moves toward grassroots communities more systematically and administratively. The other opposite feature is that social space is constantly narrowing, and most of social organizations don’t have critical characteristics of nongovernment organizations: organized, public, non-profit, autonomous and voluntary.9 In addition to this, especially in recent years, many “systematic innovation” of grassroots governance has changed the

8 Yan Jirong. 2017. “Chinese Experience of Social Governance”. Teaching and Research (9); Yu Keping. Several Points of Focus of Government Innovation—An Analytical Report of 1500 Local Government Innovation Cases: http://www.aisixiang.com/data.35286. html. August 6, 2010. 9 Lester M. Salamon. 2002. Global Civil Society—A Perspective of Non-Profit Sector. Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA).

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stereotype of “separation of party and government” adopted by the grassroots government over the past 30 years; through renewed combination of power system of party and government, the political function and social governance function of party and government has been further strengthened, forming the governance structure system of party and mass at the community centering on the power of party organization at the community level and the institutionalization and structure of its peripheral social mass organization. Under the operating system and mechanism of high-level centralized power with the integration of government and party, the power centralization and integration of power and responsibility are realized in order to improve the efficiency of party and government power operation and avoid the problems of power decentralization and low efficiency of social governance caused by the separation of party and government.10 This is a way to retrace and strengthen the traditional governance logic, but we must face such a question: the present grassroots communities is a society of diversified governance structure with features of power decentralization and structural diversity represented by diverse division of social labor, diversification of interests group and plurality of value. In other words, it means how government power controls and balances power decentralization and structural diversity through power centralization and structural centralization, so replacing social diversity and interests diversity is a structural issue. In this sense, there is a paradox political logic for grassroots governance in China: while strengthening public system and enhancing its ability of controlling and governing the society, we need also to adopt ourselves to the development trend of diverse market economy, diverse social culture and diverse value. And the decentralization of power caused by the decentralization of social resources raises the requirement for the involvement of diverse social forces; this is a structural issue. Using one aspect of public system to replace diversity of society is a challenge and internal potential for the transition of Chinese grassroots governance. The dominant force for the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China comes from the government because of the grassroots political power organization in China is always the center of allocation of authoritative and allocative resources and the provider of system building and reform or system supply (rules establishment) and even the sole 10 Zhou Qingzhi. 2016. “Authoritative Grassroots Governance—Taking ‘Party Building Based on Quality’ of Shenzhen Luohu as an Example”. Qiushi (10).

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provider. That is to say, grassroots government power organization in China is always the dominant force in social and market fields and has a decisive influence. The traditional social management refers to the fact of the government controlling and managing social affairs, emphasizing that the government is the subject of public management and the society is the object of public management. Finally, the control of the government over the society is made possible. But “if social or economic change weakens or destroys traditional combined foundation, as higher political development is achieved, we will need to rely on the people to develop new form of combined ability”.11 This means that a transition from the past authoritative model to the consultative co-governance model is required for grassroots government governance. The operation and maintenance of public governance order at the community level requires a transition: its authority comes from the grassroots monocentric organization order authorized by the state and its authority originates from the polycentric self-rule order. In other words, for modern social governance, the government is not the only power center of the state.12 All agencies (including social and private) can become the center of social power as long as they win support from their members. Thus, the core topic for the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China is: the grassroots government power organization is required to take building modern public social relationship as the basic task, which is also the starting point and orientation of thought for the theoretic building and realistic design of grassroots governance in China. Furthermore, the building of social governance system in Chinese community level depends on the following traits of modern social relationship: self-rule structure in public area, the division of rights of diverse governance subjects and strong subject society. These structure conditions are consistent with the features of diversification, heterogeneity and power decentralization of public society and provide conditions of systematic structure and organized interests for social integration and cohesion. The governance order based on this concerns the maintenance mechanism of social fairness, the coordination mechanism of interests and the form of social organization. In other words, the government 11 S.P. Hungtington. 1989. Political Order in Changing Societies. Shanghai Translation Publishing House: p. 34. 12 Yu Keping. 2000. Governance and Good Governance. China Social Sciences Press:

p. 5.

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is no longer the sole subject of system origin; the rise of social power provides a new origin for system supply; social forces and organization forms like community, society group, social enterprise and social worker are appearing and rising, which offers an effective guarantee for social order; the involvement of social capital in the supply of public products spurs more economic vitality and social creativity for social development and political stability.13 That is to say, the traditional governance—the government is the subject of public management while the society is the object of public management—is now hard to adapt itself to the changing public social relationship. The problem facing the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China is more complicated; it requires more practices and innovations of many dimensions. These innovations include aspects of value, system, standard and structure; “the core topic of social reform and innovation as well as social governance system is: to deal well with the relationship between government and society as well as market and society. We need to figure out the fact that what social affairs require the respective responsibility of government, market and society and what requires their joint responsibility. While fully leveraging the role of government macro-regulation and the decisive role of market, we need to play a better role of social forces”.14 This means that all government governance practices or innovations are concentrated in the field of relations between the government and the society as well as the government and the market. Generally speaking, the current reform and transition of grassroots governance in China is a comprehensive system and we will realize such a pattern of governance: the government mechanism (the government is the subject), market mechanism (the market is the subject) and social mechanism (society group, community and social worker class, social enterprises are the subjects) form a diverse situation of co-governance, which reveals the structural features and nature changes of the grassroots public social relationship in China. The first is about the reshaping of subject of government governance. Regarding the construction of diverse subjects of grassroots governance mechanism, the key is the role and nature as well as the change of their relationship with other social elements. (1) The change of traditional 13 Yan Jirong. 2017. “Social Change and Social Governance—Theoretical Explanation of Social Governance”. Journal of Peking University (5). 14 Li Peilin. 2014. Social Reform and Social Governance. Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA): p. 3.

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governance thinking. When compared with the governance thought and governance mode controlled and managed by the government before, the current change in the nature of social relations requires the government to become the management department of public affairs and public finance, to provide public products and services and ensure the systematic relation of public affairs between the state and citizens. (2) Law-based government governance. It involves three levels: the first is to establish the legal principle; the second is the systematization of public engagement; and the third is the law-based budget and financial democracy. As for the first facet, it contains two levels of meaning: law-based government and democratic politics. In terms of the building of law-based government, on the one hand, government power is based upon the principle of popular sovereignty, but on the other, the government should uphold the right of all citizens. As regards democratic politics, the most pressing issue focuses on expanding political engagement; without political engagement, there would be no public opinion, and in turn, law-based governance becomes legal system as a tool and means of governing the society. As for the second facet, in light of the construction of public nature of government governance, we should start from the engagement of all ordinary people. “The social cooperation featuring the main form of broad social engagement offers an indispensable social mechanism for social governance. This cooperation mechanism gives prominence to the cooperation and engagement of social governance process rather than confrontation; equally it puts emphasis on the mobilization and integration of social resources instead of allowing them to offset each other in the process of confrontation”.15 Public engagement is related to the transparency of government policy information and the systematization of engagement channel of citizens and social organizations. As for the third facet, there are two aspects: for one thing, the government undertakes the task of using the law to safeguard economic freedom and incentive, protect economic freedom through new distribution of rights and provide safe and secure guarantee for high-efficient and legitimate transaction; and for another, fiscal and tax reform is inherently linked with the transition of social governance. We should allow the government to be responsible for public demand, attribute finance with democratic nature, uphold the political, economic, social and cultural rights of people and make 15 Li Peilin. 2014. Great Change of Chinese Society and Governance. China Social Sciences Press: p. 20.

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taxpayers enjoy more public benefits from the government than they give to the former through tax payment. Only by doing so can we make the public nature of the government internally connected with the construction of public social relationship at the community level and make them form a mutually supporting and beneficial relationship. (3) The establishment of law-based relationship between the government and the society. It also has two points: it makes clear and limits the limited function of the government, namely building a power structure of limited government, through which we constantly adjust the relationship between national and nonnational organizations and groups; social self-rule organization is the organized pattern of interests that public order cannot replace, and it is limited and restrained and prevents state authority from directly and maximumly imposing these limits on every social member. The second is about the pattern and structure of social governance subject. It mainly involves two dimensions: subject society construction and the legal guarantee of self-rule right of social governance. When it comes to the first dimension, as the unit society enters the public society, a structural problem facing social governance is that there is no subject society between individual and public systems. The public society refers to a sphere somewhere between the state and individuals. It consists of various independently existing organizations and groups which include family organizations, religious groups, labor unions, chambers of commerce, school groups, community and village units, as well as many entertainment organizations and clubs and unions and mutual assistance associations. The development and rise of social organizations can help to establish a public sphere for communication between the government and individual citizens. The function of individual citizens is to stand for individuals and public organizations to forge a kind of consultative and co-governing relationship. Furthermore, the subject society performs its functions from two perspectives. The subject society based on the fact of individuals engaged in economic, cultural and social activities is a public sphere in counterpoint to the state. A variety of nongovernmental organizations, voluntary social groups, community organizations and interests’ groups form the basic elements of public society. In this public sphere, in line with the principle of self-organization and self-rule, the society functions within the framework of rule of law and democratic consultation. But on the other, as the subject society faces market corrosion, the society will itself carry out mobilization work to produce a number of social standards and systematic systems, which can, for example, be

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shown by labor unions, cooperatives, organizations seeking to reduce working period and movements aimed at expanding political rights in order to standardize the market. In this sense, society subjectivity refers to the society’s self-rule and self-discipline. It also means that the society is taken as the self-organized, self-independent and self-ruled subject. Social organization is the carrier of social subjectivity while social system is the guarantee of social subjectivity. However, their ultimate goal is to create a diverse social governance model based upon the mutual restraint and benign interaction of limited government, boundary market and self-organized society.16 The second dimension is the legal guarantee of self-rule right of social governance. As mentioned above, the intermediary organizations existing between the state and individuals are composed of social self-rule organizations and groups. These self-rule groups deal with “government dysfunction” and “market dysfunction”. When individual and public systems establish systematic connection and play their roles of connection, representation, coordination and responsibility, the significance is reflected in the following: widely influence the existence interests of individuals, such as the ability of relying on public system to resolve problems and avoid mutual harm, ability of enhancing one’s forces through representatives and ability of looking for public measuring standard and requesting the assistance of authoritative agencies.17 In other words, social governance mainly means the management of society over social affairs, emphasizing that social organizations and citizens are the subjects of public management. And its major form of expression is not the control of government but the self-rule of society. It is true that current social self-rule is not yet to generate social self-rule rights in legal sense, which may be linked to the fact that people mix the concept of social self-rule subject and social self-rule right. For example, government power is actively affiliated into society and community; the social organization, in fact, is mostly the branch of government power institution.18 In this regard, it will have two direct impacts on the development of social self-rule: the lack of self-rule makes the demarcation and category 16 Kuo Yuhua. 2011. “Overcoming Social Phobia”. Social Scientist Tea Talk (Shehui kexue chahuahui) (2). 17 Zhang Jing. 2015. “The Change of Passage: Correlation of Individuals and Public Organizations”. Xuehai (1). 18 Cui Zhiyou. 2001. “Contemplation Based on Law Science of Villagers’ Self-rule in China”. Chinese Social Sciences (3).

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of social self-rule; self-rule fails to become the self-rule of members of selfrule system but turns into the self-rule of self-rule institution. That is to say, without personal self-rule right and social self-rule right, it would be impossible for social groups to be independent of public system in legal sense, nor can they handle their own public affairs independently. And in the same way, grassroots social self-rule can develop itself. Therefore, the legal guarantee of self-rule right involves two aspects: first, social selfrule follows the principle of rule of law and is premised on the respect and protection of basic rights of social members. Without the right of forming association for citizens, there would be no self-rule right of social organization. Second, government power provides system-based legal guarantee for social self-rule, which can also be explained as establishing universal legal rule of all people for social self-rule activities. Moreover, all public organizations enjoy a limited but independent self-rule status, and anyone or any group cannot place itself above the law as an ultimate or almighty authority.19 From this point of view, rule of law is the guarantee for the systematization of social self-rule and the essential condition for the existence of community. The third is about the pattern and structure of market governance subject. Market self-organization is the basic factor of market order, and market economy contributes to the contractual relationship, principle of rule of law, principle of self-rule and democratic development process of equal self-rule.20 This has two aspects of meaning: main market players constitute a combined form and become endogenous interest group organizations that play a communicative and coordinated role between the government and individuals. In this sense, they can prevent the government from interfering in matters improperly in terms of government power. In addition, these players can restrict members from acts of hurting market order and social order and standardize market behavior. Currently, market governance players have two striking features: first, there is a kind of alternating or attached relationship between market organization and public organization, which is based on a sort of political

19 Liu Jianjun. 2014. “Harmonious but Different: Triple Properties of Modern State Governance System”. Journal of Fudan (Social Science) (3). 20 Deng Zhenglai. “Research on Studies of Civil Society in China”, published in Deng Zhenglai’s Deng Zhenglai and Alexander. 2006. State and Society—A Research Path of Social Theory. Shanghai People’s Publishing House.

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and interest correlation; second, market organization has the characteristic of corporatism; this kind of market organization mainly refers to local government, namely governments of county, town and township, directly meddling in economy and undertaking the role of managing enterprises. And all levels of government and party organization as well as enterprises under their jurisdiction form an interest community similar to a magnate corporation.21 In truth, since market-based reform, the development of roles of public system and asset operators has made it possible for them to involve themselves in monopoly activities of asset, financing, credit and market information. Hence, this kind of market organization is full of a certain feature of corporatism structure, which is indicative of the fact that market organization becomes the system pattern of standard public system, organized interests and consortium. But the above-mentioned features of market organization are not all of market player structure, nor can they stand for the reform orientation of pattern and structure of current market governance players because the pattern and structure of market governance players requires us to promote the self-rule of market organization. That is to say, market interest community should become coordinated economic organization linking the state and the society, which has more independent status and social power. This means that the balance of power between the state and the society has changed. The above-said development trends exist to different degrees, but in the final analysis, they depend on the connecting way of social interest organization and system regarding the nature, role, limitation and form of the grassroots political order. By observing the reform practices of grassroots governance in China, we find that explorations and practices have been made in aspects such as building of law-based government, democratic engagement, development of social organization, social self-rule and power oversight, with the aim of strengthening the authoritative status of public system (state) and attributing public organization (government) with stronger resources of administration and capability of governance. Especially since the advent of the twenty-first century, the grassroots governance is reflected by the trend of using power centralization and structure centralization to control and balance power decentralization and structural diversity and tries to place the grassroots communities under the management and service of 21 Jean Oi. 1999. Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform. Berkeley and LA: University of California Press: pp. 3–16.

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the authoritative government. At the same time, it has also seen a trend returning back to the traditional omnipotent governance system.22 In other words, as for the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China, it is necessary to adapt to the development trends of market economy diversity, social culture diversity and value diversity in order to adjust economic and social function and governance role of public system and realize the modern goal of social governance. On the contrary, it is not the case: the building of authority for grassroots social governance returns back to the starting point of traditional social governance. Presently, problems facing the reform and transition of grassroots governance in China are shown as follows. On the one hand, the change in the nature of public social relationship requires us to base the grassroots social governance upon the structure of consultative co-governance of government mechanism, social mechanism and market mechanism. On the other, the grassroots government governance always reflects the tendency of covering government power in all social sectors. The reason why the two different orientations of governance reform appear is mainly from reliance on the traditional path of government governance, structure diversity and decentralization of social forces as well as non-organization of grassroots communities in real world. But we cannot evade such a realistic issue: different from the previous social governance structure, the current structure faces a kind of public social relationship focusing on structure diversity, interest diversity and value diversity. Therefore, the core question is how to make public interests organized and all social members are placed in an interconnecting and systematic network through social organizations of linking individual people and the state. The essence of this question is that whether reform and transition of grassroots governance in China is successful or not finally depends on the construction of coordination mechanism of social interests and maintenance mechanism of social fairness. The reform of grassroots governance in China serves the purpose of altering the relationship of power dominance in traditional social governance and basing the order of grassroots governance upon the goal realization of individual right and social right. This means that we need

22 Zhou Qingzhi. 2016. “Authoritative Grassroots Governance”. Qiushi (10); Jing Yuejin. 2018. The Logic Conversion of Grassroots Governance in China’s Rural Areas (1).

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to carry out a substantial change of traditional governance rule and grassroots system, such as changing the concept of power over society, allowing social force to achieve adequate development, enabling the society to manage itself and forming a modern public sphere and modern public lifestyle in the grassroots communities. Therefore, the fundamental conditions for the building of grassroots governance in China include the following: the first is the legal guarantee of social self-rule right, that is, clarifying the connotation and boundary of rights for social self-rule right and citizens and state and different levels of self-rule objects; the second is the reconstruction of main society; the main society is the basic part of transition of grassroots governance; and it is an essential public sphere and organization form between individual and public systems; and the third is the pattern and structure of public governance players of government, society and market. The transition of grassroots governance in China involves two aspects of system and mechanism reform. The first is about the public construction of government function and establishment of a law-based relationship with the society; the second is about the building of self-rule structure system for grassroots communities and realization of social fairness and organization of social interests. Additionally, the goal of transition of social governance in Chinese grassroots communities is to allow the government and the society to establish the fact of transitioning from traditional governance featuring dominant and adherent relationship to modern governance characterized by consultative relationship of democratic co-governance. This is the political meaning of real society manifested in the transition of grassroots governance in China.

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