Of Walls and Bridges: The United States & Eastern Europe 9780814763605

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Of Walls and Bridges

OF WALLS AND BRIDGES The United States and Eastern Europe Bennett Kovri g A Twentieth Centur y Fun d Boo k

n

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRES S New York and London

Copyright © 199 1 b y the Twentieth Centur y Fund , Inc . All rights reserve d Manufactured i n the United State s of Americ a

Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Kovrig, Bennett . Of wall s an d bridge s : the United State s an d Easter n Europ e / Bennett Kovrig . p. cm . "A Twentiet h Centur y Fun d book. " Includes bibliographica l reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-4612-8 (acid-fre e paper)—ISB N 0-8147-4613-6 (pbk . : acid-free paper ) 1. Europe , Eastern—Foreign relations—Unite d States . 2 . Unite d States—Foreign relations—Europe , Eastern . 3 . Unite d States — Foreign relations—1945 - . I . Title . DJK45.U5K69 199 1 327.73047—dc20 91-218 1 CIP

New Yor k Universit y Pres s books ar e printed o n acid-fre e pape r and thei r bindin g material s ar e chose n fo r strengt h an d durability .

Book design by Ken Venezio

For Michael, Ariana, and Alexander

T

J - h e Twentiet h Centur y Fun d i s a researc h foundatio n undertakin g timely analyse s o f economic , political , an d socia l issues . Not-for-profi t and nonpartisan , th e Fun d wa s founde d i n 191 9 an d endowe d b y Ed ward A . Filene . BOARD O F TRUSTEE S O F T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y F U N D Morris B . Abram, Emeritu s H. Brand t Ayer s Peter A . A . Berl e Jose A . Cabrane s Joseph A . Califano , Jr . Alexander Morga n Capro n Edward E . David , Jr . Brewster C . Denny , Chairman Charles V . Hamilto n August Heckscher , Emeritu s Matina S . Horne r James A . Leac h

Georges-Henri Martin , Emeritu s Lawrence K . Miller , Emeritu s P. Michae l Pitfiel d Don K . Price , Emeritu s Richard Ravitc h Arthur M . Schlesinger , Jr. , Emeritu s Harvey I . Sloane , M.D . Theodore C . Sorense n James Tobin , Emeritu s David B . Truman, Emeritu s Shirley William s

Richard C . Leone , Director

VI

Foreword

i n th e years since World Wa r II , America's policies toward th e nation s of Easter n Europ e wer e overwhelmingl y influence d b y globa l competi tion betwee n th e Unite d State s an d th e USSR . I t i s temptin g t o sa y tha t the apparen t endin g o f tha t struggl e ma y resul t i n a n eve n mor e limite d American rol e i n tha t par t o f th e world . Thi s work , b y Bennet t Kovri g of Trinit y Colleg e i n Toronto , significantl y enriche s ou r understandin g of th e complexit y an d nuanc e o f pas t U.S . policy an d o f th e stake s an d possibilities fo r futur e America n relation s wit h th e region . Hegel's assertio n tha t me n an d nation s lear n nothin g fro m histor y may b e right, althoug h no t fo r lac k o f edifyin g material . Surel y th e stor y of th e pas t forty-fiv e year s o f U.S . policy towar d Easter n Europ e offer s lessons t o curren t America n leaders . Ther e i s muc h t o b e said , fo r example, fo r patienc e an d consistency , undergroun d liberatio n opera tions notwithstanding . The objective s o f polic y shoul d b e realistic , avoidin g promise s tha t simply canno t b e kept. I n addition , w e must kee p i n min d tha t succes s is often terribl y expensive . The victory ove r communism i n Eastern Europ e required billion s o f Wester n dollar s an d a steadfast America n will . Real izing th e ful l fruit s o f tha t achievemen t an d settin g th e stag e fo r a lon g peace likewise ma y b e costly . vii

viii Foreword Kovrig's boo k coul d no t b e more timely. It may keep many o f u s fro m closing th e doo r o n ou r thinkin g abou t th e col d wa r i n Easter n Europ e before w e full y understan d wha t happene d durin g thos e decade s o f tension, hope , and , finally, triumph . Moreover , Kovrig' s study , whic h was complete d durin g a tim e o f rapi d change , continue s th e Twentiet h Century Fund' s traditio n o f supportin g researc h tha t influence s Ameri can foreig n policy . RICHARD C . LEONE , Directo r

The Twentieth Centur y Fun d

Contents

Foreword by Richard C. Leone vi i Acknowledgments xii i Introduction 1 1. Promise s to Keep 5 Misfortunes o f Wa r an d Diplomacy . Stalin' s Postwa r Plans . The Atlanti c Charter . The U.S.-Sovie t Alliance . Sphere s o f Influence . Th e Declaratio n o n Liberate d Europe. Truman' s Har d Line . Th e Failur e o f Economi c Leverage . Idealis m vs . Reality. Potsda m an d th e Col d War . Th e Divisio n o f Europe . Les s Patience , More Firmness . America n Polic y Alternatives . Th e Polic y o f Containment . Th e Sovietization o f Easter n Europe . Th e Militarizatio n o f Containment . Fosterin g Anti-Communism. Th e Specia l Cas e o f Yugoslavia . America' s Propagand a Offensive. Th e Promotio n o f Insurgency . Politic s an d Liberation .

2. Rebellio n Too Far 5 0 Rollback throug h Negotiation? . Eisenhowe r an d Dulle s vs . Churchill . Th e Issu e of Germa n Unification . Rollbac k b y Othe r Means . East Germa n Uprising . Wha t Happened t o Liberatio n Policy? . Th e Proble m o f Emigres . U.S . Propagand a Efforts. NS C 174 : U.S. Policy toward th e Satellites. The Kremlin' s "Ne w Course" . Trade Sanctions. Yugoslavia's Case . Continuing Ques t fo r Liberation . The Promis e IX

x Contents of De-Stalinization . Rumble s i n Poland . Eruptio n i n Hungary . Sovie t Deceptio n and Intervention . Washingto n Face s Tw o Crises . Polic y Option s an d Decisions . The United Nation s an d Hungary . Liberatio n Polic y i n Retrospect .

3. Wall s an d Bridge s 10 3 Peaceful Engagemen t an d Bridgebuilding . Th e Polic y o f Peacefu l Engagement . The Berli n Crisis . Th e Pragu e Sprin g an d th e Brezhne v Doctrine . Detent e an d Differentiation. Kissinger' s Differentiation . Germa n Compromise s an d th e CSCE . Carter an d Differentiation . Exploitin g Diversit y withi n th e Sovie t Bloc . Th e Polish Crisis . Soviet and Wester n Pressures . Preparing fo r Martia l Law . Solidarity' s Demands and th e Coup. Differentiation Polic y Continues. Gorbachev's Revolution . Reagan's Response s t o Perestroika . Bilatera l Relations . Bus h Move s beyon d Containment. Th e Temptation o f Disengagement .

4. Huma n Right s 15 7 Self-Determination an d Easter n Europe . Moralis m i n th e Col d War . Detent e Diplomacy an d Huma n Rights . The European Securit y Conference . Th e Helsink i Final Act. Domestic Battle over th e Radio Services. Congress an d Huma n Rights . Carter an d Huma n Rights . Human Right s Monitorin g an d th e Belgrade Review . Reagan's Crusad e fo r Democracy . Romani a an d Reagan . The Madrid Conference . Ottawa/Budapest/Bern. Th e Vienn a Meeting . Huma n Right s afte r Vienna . Fro m Leninism t o Liberalism . Hungaria n Reforms . Polis h Reforms . Eas t German y an d Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia' s "Velvet " Revolution . Cou p i n Romania . Yugoslavi a and Albania . Problem s an d Need s o f Democratization .

5. Economi c Lever s 22 8 Strategic Embargo . Controvers y ove r th e Embargo . Changin g Objective s an d Problems o f Enforcement . Th e Embarg o afte r th e Eas t Europea n Revolution . Economic Leverage : Yugoslavia , Poland , an d Hungary . East-Wes t Trad e unde r Johnson. Trad e an d Detent e fro m Nixo n t o Carter . Poland' s Financia l Crisis . The Recor d an d Legac y o f Socialis t Economics. The Hungaria n Lesson . The Eas t German Alternative . Poland' s "Bi g Bang. " Intra-CME A Trade . Th e CME A an d the Worl d Market . Th e Easter n Debt . GAT T Membership . Trad e wit h th e European Communit y an d th e Unite d States . Prospect s fo r Trad e an d Investment . Western Aid .

6. Securit y Structure s 30 3 Alliance Politics : Securit y an d Stability . Collectiv e Security . Th e Helsink i Fina l Act an d CBMs . Gorbache v Discard s th e Brezhne v Doctrine . Militar y Disen gagement. Th e MBF R Talks . Gorbachev' s Diplomati c Offensive . Th e Roa d t o CFE. Th e Warsa w Pac t Implodes . CF E an d th e "Peac e Dividend. " Germa n Centrality. Ostpolitik . Inter-Germa n Relations . German Nationalis m an d Nationa l

Contents x

i

Interest. Kohl' s Driv e fo r Unity . Tw o Plu s Fou r Mak e One . Europeanis m an d Regionalism. Finlandization an d Beyond . America an d th e Architecture o f Europe .

Notes 36 5 Bibliography 40 1 Index 41 1

Acknowledgments

Jjie le origina l impetu s fo r th e undertakin g cam e fro m th e Twentiet h Century Fund' s lat e director , Murra y Rossant , an d Scot t McConnell . The Fund' s curren t director , Richar d C . Leone , an d publication s direc tor, Beverl y Goldberg , an d thei r staff , especiall y Nin a Massen , Joh n Samples, Carol Kahn , Susa n K . Hess, and Steve n Greenfield , gav e gener ously o f thei r advic e an d support . Ever y autho r shoul d hav e suc h goo d shepherds. T o them , an d t o Nik o Pfun d o f Ne w Yor k Universit y Press , my heartfelt thanks . I' m als o indebted t o the staf f o f Radi o Fre e Europe , where I served a s Director o f Researc h an d Analysi s in 1987-88 , fo r th e unique expertis e an d documentatio n tha t the y hav e accumulate d an d continue t o offe r t o student s o f Easter n Europe .

xiii

Introduction

A f consistenc y o f purpos e an d flexibilit y i n tactic s ar e th e inseparabl e hallmarks o f a sound foreig n policy , America's engagemen t i n the affair s of Easter n Europ e ha s stoo d th e tes t o f history . Onl y a nation possesse d of ideologica l certaint y an d th e attendan t sens e o f missio n coul d perse vere s o doggedl y i n championin g th e caus e o f democrati c self-determi nation i n a distan t regio n vulnerabl e t o th e imperia l ambition s o f mor e proximate grea t powers . To b e sure , pursui t o f tha t goa l wa s fraugh t wit h frustratio n an d compromises dictate d b y othe r strategi c prioritie s an d th e limit s o f American power . Liberatio n rhetori c coul d no t sto p th e tank s i n Buda pest. Fo r al l th e gradualis m o f th e diplomac y o f peacefu l engagement , the Brezhne v doctrin e prevaile d ove r "socialis m wit h a huma n face " i n Prague. America' s differentiatio n polic y nurture d th e seed s o f Solidarit y but di d no t preven t it s temporar y demise . Th e Unite d State s dare d no t jeopardize th e West's immediat e securit y b y a more aggressiv e pursuit o f its objective s i n Easter n Europe , bu t thos e objective s wer e neve r sacri ficed to expedien t appeasemen t o f th e Sovie t Union . While thes e tactica l adjustment s al l faile d t o und o Sovie t hegemony , the broa d strateg y o f containmen t wa s exertin g a stead y erosiv e effec t on th e Easter n empire . A secur e an d prosperin g Wes t se t th e example . 1

2 Introduction Economic warfar e aggravate d th e imbalance s i n th e militarize d com mand economie s o f th e Sovie t bloc . The ideologica l war , culminatin g i n the human right s crusad e o f th e 1970s , stiffened interna l oppositio n an d drove Communis t regime s int o a hopeless ques t fo r domesti c legitimacy . In retrospect, th e struggle was a n uneven one , pitting historically irresist ible claims to individual freedom , nationa l dignity , and materia l progres s against th e self-servin g scheme s o f tyrannica l oligarchies . B y promisin g Utopia an d deliverin g misery , th e latte r fanne d expectation s tha t the y could no t fulfill , thu s sealin g their ow n fate . The architect s an d agent s of containment anticipate d thi s outcome an d strov e to spee d it s arrival . America's refusa l t o countenanc e th e legitimac y an d permanenc e o f Soviet domination an d Communis t dictatorshi p i n Eastern Europ e foun d vindication i n th e exhilaratin g win d o f freedo m tha t swep t th e col d wa r into histor y i n 1989 . Historian s wil l lon g debat e th e cause s o f th e erosion o f Sovie t power an d hegemoni c will. But who ca n doub t tha t th e sustained pressur e o f containmen t contribute d materiall y t o th e chroni c instability an d ultimat e collaps e o f tha t empire ? This boo k aim s t o trac e th e historica l element s o f continuit y an d flexibility i n th e pursui t o f America' s interest s i n Easter n Europe . Th e first three chapters giv e a chronological overvie w of relevant policies an d actions fro m th e Roosevel t t o th e Bus h administrations . Som e o f thi s ground wa s covere d i n a boo k I wrot e almos t twent y year s ago , The Myth of Liberation. Th e origin s o f th e col d wa r hav e bee n exhaustivel y analyzed b y a n arm y o f statesme n an d scholars , an d onl y th e essentia l aspects bearin g o n Easter n Europ e ar e relate d here . Th e accoun t o f America's response s t o Titois m an d th e succeedin g convulsion s tha t shook th e region benefit s fro m mor e recent revelations . The remainin g thre e chapter s focu s mor e narrowl y o n th e theme s o f human right s an d democratization , th e applicatio n o f economi c lever age, and Europea n security , looking back t o prior experience s with thes e issues an d forwar d t o th e ne w task s tha t fac e Washington' s policymak ers. Chapters fou r an d five assess the intent an d resul t o f ideologica l an d economic warfar e an d conside r th e ne w necessitie s o f economi c an d political rehabilitation . Reader s familia r wit h th e circumstance s o f th e 1989 revolution s an d th e shortcoming s o f socialis t economic s ca n ski p the relevan t section s i n chapter s fou r an d five, bu t other s migh t find th e brief account s helpful . Chapter si x investigates , fro m th e perspectiv e o f Eas t Europea n pol -

Introduction 3 icy, the salient issue s of Europea n security , from th e rigidities of the col d war t o the contemporary challeng e of devising a new and stabl e architec ture fo r Europe . A s th e Eas t European s reac h westward , a s German y i s unified, an d a s th e Sovie t Unio n retrenche s an d undergoe s it s ow n revo lution, th e balanc e o f powe r i n Europ e i s being inexorabl y transformed . The chapte r therefor e range s beyon d Easter n Europ e prope r t o addres s historical an d curren t issue s o f Germa n polic y an d America' s Europea n policy, an d t o broac h th e problems o f broade r Europea n integration . Eastern Europ e i s a ramshackl e an d wobbl y wing , greatl y i n nee d o f reinforcement b y th e architect s o f a ne w Europea n house . I t remain s vulnerable to the influence, benig n or otherwise, of more powerful neigh bors, an d t o it s ow n interna l division s a s well . The stimulu s o f th e col d war i s gone, but America's commitmen t t o a stable an d secur e Europea n order mus t endure . Creativ e engagemen t i n the affairs o f Easter n Europ e is an essentia l componen t o f tha t commitmen t an d responsibility . What bega n a s a n orderl y reassessmen t o f Washington' s approache s to Easter n Europ e becam e a chas e afte r a movin g target . Th e exercis e brought unexpecte d rewards , fo r i t cam e t o encompas s a histori c trans formation a s the outlines o f a new Europ e bega n t o tak e shape .

1 Promises to

Keep

-LjLfter fort y year s o f politica l an d economi c exile , the Eas t European s are beginnin g thei r journe y home . Notwithstandin g occasiona l miscal culations an d mishaps , the Unite d State s ha s bee n steadfas t i n pursuit o f this goal. I t would b e ironic i f America's principle d commitmen t flagge d just whe n a t lon g las t ther e loom s th e prospec t o f success . Indeed , th e promise o f self-determinatio n ha s kep t th e U.S.-Eas t Europea n relation ship alive . In World Wa r I , the United State s contribute d th e Wilsonian visio n of national self-determinatio n t o legitimat e it s participatio n an d forg e a more peacefu l an d democrati c orde r i n Europe . Bu t neithe r it s commer cial nor it s security interest s were great enough t o warrant activ e engage ment i n th e affair s o f tha t troublesom e region . America' s interes t i n Eastern Europ e remaine d minima l unti l it s global confrontatio n wit h th e Soviet Union . Some East Europea n nations , notably Polan d an d Hungary , glorie d i n memories o f pas t greatness , bu t al l ha d falle n pre y t o Austro-German , Russian, an d Ottoma n imperia l ambitions . Nationalis m go t it s rewar d at th e en d o f Worl d Wa r I , thoug h Wilson' s promis e wa s easie r t o proclaim tha n t o appl y evenhandedl y i n th e ethni c mosai c o f Easter n Europe. Th e compromise s reache d a t Versaille s lef t perhap s onl y th e 5

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Czechs full y satisfied . Th e redrawin g o f th e ma p a t Versaille s create d a n unstable collectio n o f wea k states , divide d b y histori c an d irredentis t animosities. Th e resultin g powe r vacuu m invite d foreig n manipulatio n and influence . Predominantl y conservativ e regime s dreade d th e ne w Bolshevik viru s an d succeede d i n repellin g it , bu t th e renascen t Germany' s economic an d militar y powe r prove d irresistible . Left defenseles s b y Wester n appeasemen t o f Hitler , th e Eas t Europe ans succumbe d piecemea l t o th e Naz i Gleicbschaltung. Democrati c Czechoslovakia wa s truncated , partitioned , an d subjugated , a s wa s Po land i n concer t wit h th e Sovie t Union . Hungar y wa s lure d int o th e Axi s by partia l satisfactio n o f it s territoria l revisionis m a t th e expens e o f Czechoslovakia an d Romania , an d th e latter was similarly recruited wit h the bai t o f regainin g Bessarabi a fro m th e Soviets . Militar y forc e tempo rarily secure d a mor e complian t regim e i n Yugoslavia , thoug h th e Ger mans neve r succeede d i n full y pacifyin g tha t country . B y 1941 , Germa n power wa s preponderan t i n th e region , an d Bulgaria , Hungary , Ro mania, a s wel l a s th e puppe t state s o f Slovaki a an d Croatia , wer e allie d to Hitler . Washington ha d exhorte d th e Eas t European s t o resis t Germa n pres sure, withou t offerin g concret e support . Yugoslavia' s Princ e Pau l pro tested t o th e U.S . ambassador, Arthu r Blis s Lane , "Yo u bi g nation s ar e hard. Yo u tal k o f ou r hono r bu t yo u ar e fa r away." * Th e Unite d State s did no t accep t th e subjugatio n o f Poland , Czechoslovakia , an d Yugo slavia, an d grante d recognitio n t o thei r exil e regime s i n London . Bu t American interes t i n th e fat e o f thes e countrie s wa s no t sufficien t t o overcome isolationism , an d ther e wer e n o commitment s suc h a s tha t t o Poland whic h finally impelle d Britai n an d Franc e t o challeng e Hitler . When Roosevel t i n Jun e 194 2 reciprocate d declaration s o f wa r b y th e three Axis satellites, he observed tha t they had take n tha t ste p "not upo n their ow n initiativ e o r i n response t o the wishes of thei r ow n people s bu t as instruments o f Hitler." 2 Regarde d b y the great powers with a mixtur e of sympath y an d condescensio n a s pawns an d victims , th e Eas t Europe ans coul d onl y hop e tha t th e wa r woul d produc e a more benig n constel lation o f force s o n th e continent . In historical perspective , the war i n Europe may b e seen a s the contin uation o f Germa n an d Russia n rivalry , a contes t tha t neithe r th e feebl e efforts o f th e Wes t European s no r th e hamstrun g Leagu e o f Nation s could attenuate . Althoug h th e contes t ha d acquire d a n ideologica l di -

Promises to Keep 7 mension, th e fundamenta l stake s remaine d nationa l powe r an d influ ence. Fo r mos t Americans , fascis m (wit h it s virulen t Naz i variant ) an d communism wer e equall y abhorrent , bu t th e struggl e fo r predominanc e in East-Centra l Europ e di d no t appea r t o involv e crucia l U.S . interests . To b e sure , Tocqueville' s prophec y o f America n an d Russia n greatnes s and competitio n bega n t o materializ e i n th e twentiet h century . Th e Bolshevik Revolutio n challenge d America n value s bu t di d no t palpabl y endanger America n securit y an d commerce . Only whe n Hitler' s wa r ha d brough t Russia n powe r an d Communis t ideology int o th e hear t o f Europ e di d th e Unite d State s confron t wha t i t perceived t o b e a direc t challeng e t o it s interests . Onl y the n di d Easter n Europe assum e crucia l importanc e fo r America n foreig n policy , a s a testimony t o Sovie t duplicit y an d aggressivenes s an d a stimulu s fo r rallying th e democracies . Th e Sovie t dominatio n o f Easter n Europ e no t only mad e a mocker y o f America' s professe d wa r aim s bu t als o ostensi bly threatene d th e remainin g bastion s o f libera l democrac y an d capital ism. Althoug h Washingto n soo n adjuste d it s challeng e t o Sovie t imperi alism t o coincid e wit h th e limit s o f it s power, it s refusa l t o condon e th e subjugation o f th e Eas t European s becam e a doctrin e tha t endure s t o this day . Misfortunes of War and Diplomacy. Th e Gran d Allianc e cam e int o being t o rol l bac k th e driv e b y German y an d Japa n fo r worl d power , and no t fo r th e sak e o f a fe w suppresse d nation s suc h a s th e Eas t Europeans. 3 Th e primar y objectiv e wa s militar y victory , bu t politica l advantage i n th e peacefu l worl d t o com e wa s clearl y a secondar y ai m from th e start . Separat e an d join t politica l calculation s informe d Allie d tactics an d strategy , encompassin g bot h realisti c expectation s an d ideal istic hopes regarding the future o f Easter n Europe . While there was som e realization tha t thes e interests migh t not b e fully reconcilable , until Yalt a such concern s wer e subordinate d t o th e requisite s o f Allie d unity . Th e acrimony tha t erupte d whe n th e tim e cam e fo r peacemakin g ha d it s roots i n th e compromise s an d misperception s tha t accompanie d th e conduct o f tota l war . Stalin's Postwar Plans. Ther e is no evidence that Stali n had a blueprin t for a postwar order , an d unti l Stalingrad hi s battle for surviva l overshad owed longer-ter m objectives . Initially , th e Sovie t Unio n disclaime d an y

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intention o f exporting its version of socialism to the prospective liberate d areas, bu t doubtles s Stali n alread y hel d th e vie w late r expresse d t o th e Yugoslav partisa n leade r Milova n Djila s tha t i n thi s wa r "whoeve r occupies a territor y als o impose s o n i t hi s ow n socia l system." 4 H e ha d already demonstrate d hi s readines s t o seiz e opportunitie s fo r extendin g Soviet power , t o realiz e ol d tsaris t ambition s fo r territoria l expansion . His pac t wit h Hitle r i n 193 9 wa s inspire d partl y b y disappointmen t a t British an d Frenc h reluctanc e t o challeng e Germany , bu t i t brough t th e USSR tangibl e gai n a t th e expens e o f th e Balti c states , Finland , Poland , and Romania . Although th e Comintern wa s nominally dissolved , Communis t partie s throughout Europ e wer e mobilize d b y Mosco w t o lea d th e resistance , and Stali n anticipate d tha t th e politica l credit s thu s earne d woul d serv e Communists wel l afte r th e defea t o f th e Axis . Th e partie s professe d a "national front " versio n o f th e Comintern' s earlie r popula r fron t tacti c in orde r t o rall y anti-Naz i resistanc e i n bot h Easter n Europ e (where , apart fro m Yugoslavia , the Communis t undergroun d wa s negligible) an d Western Europe , where onl y Charle s d e Gaulle's Fre e French emerge d a s a seriou s competitor . Al l of the m presente d a soothing democrati c imag e that belie d thei r unwaverin g dedicatio n t o eventua l Communis t revolu tion. Thus, i n Jul y 1943 , a n exil e "Nationa l Committe e fo r a Fre e Ger many" wa s se t u p unde r Sovie t auspices , wit h th e futur e leade r Walte r Ulbricht playing a prominent role. 5 As the fortunes o f war turned agains t Hitler, an d particularl y afte r th e openin g o f th e secon d front , a mor e confident Stali n proceede d t o develo p politica l strategies . A proto-gov ernment, th e Lubli n Committe e o f Polis h Communists , wa s establishe d in Jul y 1944 , an d whe n th e Warsa w uprisin g brok e ou t th e followin g month, th e Re d Arm y stoo d b y whil e th e German s convenientl y massa cred th e anti-Communis t Hom e Army . Als o i n August , Stali n launche d a majo r offensiv e o n th e Romania n fron t an d declare d wa r o n Bulgaria , where, within days , a Communis t cou p followed . Although Stali n wa s perfectl y awar e tha t th e majorit y o f Eas t Euro peans abhorre d communism , th e questio n wa s no t whethe r bu t ho w Communists an d fello w traveler s woul d secur e a predominan t politica l role i n th e liberate d area s an d ensur e government s "friendly " t o th e Soviet Unio n o n it s wester n approaches . T o al l appearances , unti l Yalt a Stalin genuinel y hope d tha t h e could bot h obtai n a sphere of influenc e i n

Promises to Keep 9 Eastern Europ e an d retai n th e cooperatio n an d suppor t o f th e Wester n Allies.6 This expectatio n wa s du e t o mutua l misperception s a s well a s t o expedient self-deception s tha t ca n b e trace d bac k t o th e beginning s o f the Gran d Alliance . The Atlantic Charter. I n August 1941 , four month s befor e Pear l Har bor an d America' s entr y int o war, Roosevel t an d Churchil l issue d a join t declaration o f commo n principle s tha t would guid e their foreig n policies . This "Atlanti c Charter " proclaime d tha t the y sough t n o territoria l o r other aggrandizemen t no r frontie r change s tha t di d no t accor d wit h th e freely expresse d wishe s o f th e people s concerned , thei r respec t fo r th e "right o f al l peoples t o choos e the for m o f governmen t unde r whic h the y will live, " an d thei r "wis h t o se e sovereig n right s an d sel f governmen t restored t o thos e wh o hav e bee n forcibl y deprive d o f them." 7 Thes e principles embodie d th e America n visio n fo r postwa r peace , i n Easter n Europe an d elsewhere , bu t the y wer e no t followe d u p wit h concret e planning base d o n feasibilit y an d th e interest s o f th e othe r Allies . Ho w the principles o f th e Atlantic Charte r coul d b e reconciled wit h th e Sovie t Union's "legitimat e securit y interests " wa s a proble m t o b e amicabl y resolved b y th e "Fou r Policemen " o r b y th e planne d Unite d Nations . Indeed, Washingto n remaine d wedde d t o th e principl e o f n o predeter mination o f specifi c detail s o f th e postwar politica l an d territoria l settle ment unti l victor y wa s i n hand . Stalin perceive d th e problem an d trie d t o secur e Allied legitimatio n o f the territoria l gain s he had wo n b y the Molotov-Ribbentro p Pact . Chur chill was dispose d t o compromise, but Washington demurred . I n arguin g against acceptance , th e State Department' s Europea n divisio n note d tha t "there i s n o doub t tha t th e Sovie t Governmen t ha s tremendou s ambi tions wit h regar d t o Europe " an d tha t "i t i s preferabl e t o tak e a firm attitude now " i n defenc e o f th e Atlanti c Charte r principles. 8 Occasion ally, Roosevelt himsel f privatel y anticipate d tha t th e Soviet Union woul d become predominan t i n East-Centra l Europe , bu t mor e typicall y h e would wa x optimisti c abou t hi s abilit y t o handl e Stali n s o that th e latte r "won't tr y t o anne x anythin g an d wil l wor k wit h m e fo r a worl d o f democracy an d peace." 9 The U.S.-Soviet Alliance. Th e axio m tha t my enemy' s enem y i s my friend ha s produce d fe w odde r couple s tha n Roosevel t an d Stalin , bu t

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the Unite d State s behave d a s th e mos t loya l o f allies . Washington' s domestic propagand a depicte d th e ma n wh o perfecte d totalitarianism , created th e Gulag , an d eliminate d million s o f hi s subject s a s the benevo lent Uncle Joe, agrarian reforme r an d soldie r o f freedom . Immens e quan tities of wa r materie l an d relie f supplie s were shippe d t o the USSR unde r the Lend-Leas e program . Comradel y loyalt y rule d i n militar y circle s a s well. Even afte r Stalin' s floutin g o f th e Yalt a agreement s becam e appar ent, Eisenhowe r stuc k t o earlie r understanding s i n holdin g bac k hi s advance t o allo w th e Soviet s t o captur e Berlin , Vienna , an d Pragu e an d withdrawing hi s force s t o prearrange d demarcatio n lines . Year s later , Churchill woul d lamen t privately tha t wit h Eisenhowe r electe d presiden t he coul d no t i n hi s chronicl e o f Worl d Wa r I I "tel l th e stor y o f ho w th e United State s gave away, to please Russia, vast tracts of Europe they ha d occupied." 10 The Offic e o f Strategi c Services , unde r it s colorfu l head , "Wil d Bill " Donovan, wa s no t abov e deceivin g allies. In August 1943 , Donovan ha d urged secre t talk s wit h Hitler' s Balka n satellite s t o induc e the m t o tur n against th e German s an d for m "relativel y stabl e non-Communis t bu t not anti-Russia n governments. " Althoug h ther e wer e doubt s abou t th e feasibility o f th e project , o n Septembe r 7 th e Join t Chief s o f Staf f in structed th e OS S t o procee d an d infor m th e Britis h an d th e Soviet s bu t "not consul t wit h th e Soviet s o n th e politica l phas e o f th e propose d operations." Preliminar y secre t talks were held wit h th e Hungarians an d the Bulgarian s i n neutra l capitals , an d specia l operation s mission s wer e dispatched t o those countries, but since the Americans coul d not promis e to sen d troop s t o th e Sovie t spher e o f operations , th e separat e peac e feelers prove d fruitless . Hungary , Bulgaria , an d Romani a woul d hav e n o choice bu t t o see k armistic e term s fro m Moscow . B y Septembe r 1944 , Donovan wa s reportin g t o th e presiden t tha t th e USS R clearl y intende d to dominat e th e Balkans . Ye t th e OS S als o cooperate d extensivel y wit h the NKVD , an d a s lat e a s Decembe r o f tha t year , whe n Mosco w ha d already impose d i n Buchares t th e first o f a serie s o f leftwar d reorganiza tions o f th e government , Donova n betraye d a n anti-Sovie t plo t b y Ro manian militar y officer s t o his Soviet counterparts. 11 To b e sure , no amoun t o f cooperatio n coul d full y alla y Stalin' s chroni c suspicions. Despit e th e Allie d agreemen t o n unconditiona l surrender , h e professed outrag e a t "Operatio n Sunrise, " th e secre t negotiatio n con ducted b y Alle n Dulles' s OS S team i n Ber n fo r th e surrende r o f Germa n

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forces i n Italy , althoug h th e Soviet s themselve s ha d engage d i n tentativ e contacts wit h th e German s i n th e sprin g an d summe r o f 1943. 12 Bu t Roosevelt's flattery, ingenuou s complaint s abou t th e nee d t o pacif y Polish-American voters , an d gentl e mocker y o f Churchil l fo r bein g a n imperialist hardl y prepare d Stali n fo r a rigi d applicatio n o f th e Atlanti c Charter principle s a t war' s end . H e ha d littl e reaso n t o anticipat e tha t serious objection s woul d b e raise d t o th e consolidatio n o f a spher e o f influence h e considere d t o b e th e rightfu l spoil s o f wa r an d essentia l fo r Soviet security . Churchill, lik e Stalin , wa s mor e concerne d tha n th e presiden t abou t the politica l implication s o f militar y strategy . In th e cours e o f 194 3 h e repeatedly advocate d a n Anglo-America n thrus t int o th e Balkans , wit h the obviou s ai m o f preemptin g th e Soviets . Bu t Stalin , wh o ha d th e psychological advantag e o f bearin g th e brun t o f th e Germa n onslaugh t and wa s alread y suspiciou s abou t Anglo-America n procrastinatio n i n relieving th e pressure , insiste d o n confirmatio n o f Operatio n Overlor d (the assaul t i n norther n France) , whic h wa s als o preferre d b y th e U.S . Joint Chief s o f Staff . A t th e Tehera n conferenc e i n Decembe r 1943 , Roosevelt concurre d wit h Stalin , remarkin g tha t h e sa w "n o reaso n fo r putting th e lives of American soldier s i n jeopardy i n order t o protect rea l or fancied Britis h interests on the continent." 13 Th e following June, afte r the Normand y landing , Churchil l revive d th e optio n o f a n Anglo-Amer ican offensiv e fro m norther n Ital y throug h th e Ljubljan a Ga p int o Cen tral Europe . Th e presiden t concede d tha t th e attendan t politica l consid erations wer e important bu t refuse d t o alte r existin g strategy. The Sovie t Union's responsibilit y fo r th e easter n fron t woul d no t b e dilute d i n th e interest o f Western politica l advantage , though i n retrospect suc h advan tage could hav e dramaticall y altere d th e postwar orde r i n Europe . The Eas t European s wh o observe d Allie d diplomac y sa w tha t Stali n would hol d th e trum p car d i n th e postwa r settlemen t o f thei r countries ' fate, bu t the y adopted divergen t tactics. The pro-Soviet exil e governmen t of Czechoslovakia' s Edvar d Bene s too k th e initiativ e o f negotiatin g a separate mutua l defens e treat y wit h th e Russian s i n Decembe r 194 3 involving th e restoratio n o f prewa r frontier s an d th e inclusio n o f Com munists i n postwa r government . Britai n an d th e Unite d State s deplore d the treat y a s premature , whil e th e Soviet s regarde d i t a s a politica l commitment givin g the m a droit de regard ove r Czechoslovakia' s futur e political life .

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Allied solidarit y wa s teste d mos t sorel y b y th e dilemm a o f Poland , whose peopl e an d leader s wer e generall y Russophobic . Th e Pole s ha d gallantly i f hopelessl y resiste d th e Soviet-Germa n onslaught , an d the y were makin g a soli d contributio n t o th e wa r effor t o n severa l fronts . General Wladysla w Sikorski' s Londo n governmen t ha d th e allegianc e o f most Poles , includin g a sizabl e undergroun d "Hom e Army. " Polish Americans wer e no t a negligibl e facto r i n U.S . electora l politics . Bu t history ha d taugh t the Poles that bot h German y an d Russi a wer e a threat to their nationa l survival , a lesson confirmed b y the Molotov-Ribbentro p Pact. Th e Soviet s nominall y concede d i n 194 1 tha t th e pac t ha d los t it s validity, bu t the y registere d thei r wis h t o retai n th e ne w frontier . Thi s corresponded roughl y t o th e Curzo n line , whic h ha d bee n propose d b y the World Wa r I allies a t Versailles; in the Treaty o f Rig a (1921 ) endin g the Polish-Russia n war , th e actua l frontie r wa s extende d eastwar d b y some 15 0 miles . The ethni c mi x o f Poles , Ukrainians, an d Byelorussian s in th e dispute d regio n offere d littl e guidance . Muc h t o Churchill' s an d Roosevelt's discomfort , th e Pole s adamantl y demande d restoratio n o f the Rig a frontier . Stalin perceive d tha t th e Centra l Europea n confederatio n promote d by th e Londo n Pole s wa s directe d a s muc h agains t th e Sovie t Unio n a s against Germany , an d whe n i n Apri l 194 3 Sikorsk i implie d (accurately ) that th e Soviet s an d no t th e German s wer e guilt y o f th e massacr e a t Katyn o f severa l thousand Polis h officers, Mosco w severe d relations wit h the government-in-exile . Irritate d b y th e Poles ' obduracy , an d reluctan t to jeopardiz e relation s wit h th e USSR , Churchil l an d Roosevel t a t Teh eran agree d i n principl e t o Stalin' s deman d fo r th e Curzo n lin e an d territorial compensatio n fo r Polan d a t the expense of Germany . The dea l not onl y floute d th e Atlanti c Charte r bu t als o mad e a futur e Polan d vulnerable t o Germa n irredentis m an d dependen t o n grea t powe r guar antees, i n practic e o n Sovie t protection . Th e furiou s Pole s urge d th e Americans t o reconsider , bu t th e opening o f th e secon d fron t dre w near , and Cordel l Hul l observe d tha t th e Unite d State s "coul d no t affor d t o become partisa n i n the Polis h questio n t o th e exten t o f alienatin g Russi a at tha t crucia l moment." 1 4 Having writte n of f th e exil e Poles , Stali n i n August-Septembe r 194 4 proceeded t o us e th e Warsa w uprisin g t o eliminat e muc h o f th e anti communist leadershi p i n Polan d an d discredi t th e Londo n exil e regime . Ambassador Averel l Harrima n wa s appalle d a t Stalin' s refusa l t o allo w

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American aircraf t carryin g supplies for th e insurgents to use Soviet bases, but Churchil l an d Roosevel t refraine d fro m pressin g th e issue . The Ger mans eventuall y crushe d th e uprisin g an d raze d Warsaw . Thi s wa s th e moment, reflecte d Georg e Kenna n later , "when , i f ever , ther e shoul d have bee n a full-fledged an d realisti c showdow n wit h th e Sovie t leaders : when the y shoul d hav e bee n confronte d wit h th e choic e betwee n chang ing thei r polic y completel y an d agreein g t o collaborat e i n th e establish ment o f trul y independen t countrie s i n Easter n Europ e o r forfeitin g Western-Allied suppor t an d sponsorshi p fo r th e remainin g phase s o f their wa r effort." 15 Bu t th e immediat e enem y wa s Hitler , an d loyalt y t o the Sovie t all y prevaile d ove r mor e sophisticate d an d long-ter m calcula tions. Spheres of Influence. Increasingl y anxiou s abou t th e sprea d o f Sovie t and Communis t influenc e int o area s o f traditiona l Britis h interes t i n th e Balkans, Churchil l sough t Roosevelt' s concurrenc e i n a sphere s o f influ ence agreement with Moscow . Predeterminatio n an d sphere s of influenc e were anathem a t o Secretar y o f Stat e Hull , leavin g th e presiden t t o pri vately giv e limite d assen t t o Churchill . Th e latte r proceede d i n Octobe r 1944 t o conclud e th e notoriou s percentag e agreemen t wit h Stalin . Th e division o f influenc e favore d th e Sovie t Unio n 90—1 0 i n Romani a an d 75—25 in Bulgaria ; Britai n secure d a 90—1 0 edge in Greece ; influenc e i n Yugoslavia an d Hungar y wa s divide d 50-50 . Th e deal , insiste d Chur chill, wa s purel y provisiona l an d di d no t commi t th e Unite d States , though Ambassado r Harrima n ha d participate d a s an observer . At th e Mosco w embassy , Georg e Kenna n wrot e t o th e like-minde d Harriman tha t "a s fa r a s th e borde r state s ar e concerne d th e Sovie t Government ha s neve r cease d t o thin k i n term s o f sphere s o f interest " and expecte d th e Unite d State s t o b e sympathetic. 16 Bu t i n Washingto n the propose d ne w internationa l organizatio n ha d plannin g precedence , and littl e progres s wa s mad e i n definin g politica l prioritie s i n Easter n Europe. Stali n probabl y dre w encouragemen t fro m America n passivit y and th e percentage deal , which, give n foreseeabl e militar y outcomes , lef t him wit h cart e blanch e i n al l bu t Greece . In th e event , h e (unlik e hi s Yugoslav, Bulgarian , an d Albania n associates ) refraine d fro m directl y assisting th e Communist s i n th e ensuin g Gree k civi l war , an d h e evi dently expecte d hi s allies to behav e wit h equa l restrain t i n respec t t o th e other countries .

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This assumptio n o f Sovie t primac y wa s reflecte d i n th e armistic e agreements wit h th e thre e mino r Axi s allies . The y wer e negotiate d i n Moscow an d signe d i n Septembe r 194 4 fo r Bulgari a an d Romani a an d in January 194 5 fo r Hungary . Despit e som e Wester n objections , Britis h and America n participatio n i n th e Allie d Contro l Commission s wa s clearly subordinate d t o th e Sovie t Union; th e Italia n model , in which th e Soviets were given only token representation, wa s for Stali n a convenien t precedent fo r linkin g political predominance t o military occupation . Th e Americans trie d t o mitigat e Moscow' s reparation s demand s an d it s dis position t o favor Romania' s clai m to Transylvania ove r that of Hungary , but i n th e en d coul d onl y reserv e their righ t t o reope n contentiou s issue s at th e eventua l peac e conference . By th e beginnin g o f 1945 , coalitio n government s ha d bee n forme d under Sovie t auspice s i n th e thre e satellites , an d th e Communist s wer e reaching fo r powe r fro m abov e an d belo w wit h th e materia l assistanc e of the occupying power. In Yugoslavia, Tito was consolidating his powe r as th e Londo n exil e governmen t fade d int o irrelevance . Th e Britis h ha d pragmatically shifte d thei r suppor t awa y fro m th e les s effective force s o f the royalis t Dragolju b Mihajlovic , whil e th e Americans remaine d hostil e to Tit o an d suspiciou s o f Russia n an d Britis h schemes . A Britis h agen t who wa s i n Albania a t th e critica l momen t i n the autum n o f 194 4 whe n the German s pulle d ou t believe d tha t wit h a "ver y smal l Britis h o r American interventio n w e coul d hav e save d Albani a fo r th e West, " bu t the tin y countr y fel l int o th e hands o f Enve r Hoxha' s Communists. 17 As for Poland , Stalin's intent t o designate the Lublin Committe e o f Nationa l Liberation a s th e provisiona l governmen t dre w th e objection s o f a "dis turbed an d deepl y disappointed " Roosevelt , bu t th e ac t was nevertheles s consummated o n Januar y 5. 1 8 Th e politica l consequence s o f militar y strategy an d Sovie t liberation wer e becomin g manifest . In Novembe r 1944 , Secretar y o f Stat e Edwar d R . Stettiniu s summe d up fo r th e presiden t America' s majo r interest s i n Easter n Europe : fre e choice o f political , social , an d economi c systems , non-restrictiv e trad e and communication s policies , freedo m o f acces s fo r America n philan thropic an d educationa l organizations , the protection o f American prop erty, an d settlemen t o f territoria l dispute s onl y afte r th e cessatio n o f hostilities. 19 Th e Stat e Departmen t briefin g book s Roosevel t too k wit h him t o th e Yalt a Conferenc e i n Februar y 194 5 accuratel y depicte d th e political moo d o f Eas t European s a s bein g "t o th e lef t an d strongl y i n

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favor o f far-reachin g economi c an d socia l reforms , bu t not , however , i n favor o f a left-wing totalitaria n regim e to achieve these reforms." 20 Since "it no w seem s clea r tha t th e Sovie t Union wil l exer t predominan t politi cal influenc e ove r th e area s i n question, " th e Unite d State s "probabl y would no t wan t t o oppos e itsel f t o suc h a politica l configuration, " bu t "neither woul d i t desir e t o se e America n influenc e i n thi s par t o f th e world completel y nullified." 21 Ther e wer e les s ambivalen t hypothetica l alternatives, suc h a s Kennan' s privat e advic e t o Charle s Bohle n tha t th e United State s bit e th e bulle t an d "divid e frankl y Europ e int o sphere s o f influence," writin g of f Easter n Europ e unles s it was willing to "g o whol e hog" i n opposin g th e Sovie t domination ; bu t this , i n Bohlen' s mor e representative view , "instea d o f relievin g u s o f responsibility , woul d compound th e felony." 22 The Declaration on Liberated Europe. Th e Stat e Departmen t ha d drafted fo r th e presiden t a four-powe r declaratio n o f polic y governin g provisional administrations , earl y free elections , and economi c aid, all to be supervise d b y a n "Emergenc y Hig h Commission. " A t th e final pre conference briefin g session , Roosevel t rejecte d th e las t componen t mainl y on th e ground s tha t th e Unite d State s "woul d b e loat h t o assum e th e responsibilities i n regar d t o th e interna l problem s o f th e liberate d coun tries that suc h a standing high commission woul d unavoidabl y entail." 23 Shorn o f it s enforcin g mechanism , th e proposa l issue d fro m th e confer ence as the Declaration o n Liberate d Europe , essentially a restatement o f Atlantic Charte r principles . A s Churchil l observed , th e Charte r wa s no t "a la w bu t a star." 2 4 Stali n wa s n o doub t undisturbe d b y suc h a purel y exhortative proclamatio n an d reassure d b y Roosevelt' s expresse d inten t to withdra w America n troop s fro m th e continen t withi n a maximu m o f two years . If th e Declaratio n o n Liberate d Europ e nominall y confirme d adher ence t o Atlanti c Charte r principles , th e sam e coul d no t b e sai d o f th e agreements o n Poland . Roosevel t an d Churchil l coul d secur e onl y mar ginal modificatio n o f th e Curzo n lin e i n favo r o f Polan d an d agree d t o "substantial" compensatio n i n th e for m o f Germa n territory . Length y debates produce d onl y a wea k agreemen t o n th e reorganizatio n o f th e Communist provisiona l governmen t "o n a mor e democrati c basis, " t o be followe d b y free elections. 25 America n publi c opinio n wa s littl e exer cised b y the Sovie t Union' s territoria l demand s bu t sensitiv e abou t dem -

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ocratic proprieties , an d Roosevel t pleade d wit h Stali n tha t th e election s be "beyond question , lik e Caesar's wife." 26 It di d no t augu r wel l fo r Polan d tha t thes e fatefu l decision s wer e taken wit h scan t regar d fo r th e view s o f th e Polis h government-in-exile , which promptly denounce d them . Harriman, amon g others, has reflecte d that Roosevel t shoul d hav e hel d ou t fo r bette r guarantee s o f democrac y in Poland. 27 Bu t th e Pole s ha d no t cooperate d wit h th e Sovie t Unio n against Naz i German y i n th e 1930s , an d Stali n wa s boun d t o b e reluc tant t o expos e his military line s of communicatio n t o German y t o a full y independent Polis h government . No r di d th e toke n inclusio n o f som e exile politician s i n a ne w Yugosla v assembl y offe r muc h prospec t o f democratic self-determinatio n fo r tha t country . In Roosevelt' s prioritie s at Yalta , Eas t Europea n issue s were overshadowe d b y hi s proposed ne w international organizatio n an d th e coordinatio n o f th e final battl e agains t Japan. Hi s subsequen t assuranc e t o Congress , tha t th e Allie s woul d jointly hel p th e Eas t European s t o "solv e thei r problem s throug h firmly established democrati c processes, " soo n ran g hollo w eve n t o th e Ameri can public. 28 Washington' s belate d plannin g fo r peacetim e reste d o n th e preservation o f a political consensu s tha t wa s rapidl y eroding . With victor y i n hand i n Europe, th e divergent politica l interest s o f th e Allies inexorabl y resurfaced . Li p servic e t o th e Atlanti c Charte r woul d n o longer suffice fo r th e concrete tasks of political an d economic reconstruc tion. Tha t Roosevelt' s generou s spiri t an d Churchill' s pragmati c conces sions in defense o f th e defensible produce d a n impression o f fatalis m an d weakness wit h regar d t o Easter n Europ e di d no t escap e suc h concerne d observers a s Harriman , wh o warne d fro m hi s Mosco w vantag e point : "It ma y b e difficul t fo r u s t o believe , bu t i t stil l ma y b e tru e tha t Stali n and Moloto v considere d a t Yalta t h a t . .. w e understood an d were read y to accep t Sovie t policies alread y know n t o us." 2 9 Truman's Hard Line. Polan d remaine d th e majo r sourc e o f discord , and Stalin' s inten t t o allo w onl y toke n participatio n b y Londo n politi cians i n th e ne w provisiona l governmen t drov e th e dyin g Roosevel t t o protest tha t thi s woul d lea d American s t o regar d th e Yalt a agreement s as havin g failed . A s th e Stat e Departmen t informe d th e incomin g Presi dent Truman , sinc e Yalt a th e Soviet s ha d "take n a firm an d uncompro mising positio n o n nearl y ever y majo r questio n tha t ha s arise n i n ou r relations," i n particula r o n Poland. 30 Harrima n tol d Truma n o n Apri l

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20 tha t "i n effec t wha t w e wer e face d wit h wa s a 'barbaria n invasio n o f Europe,' tha t Sovie t contro l ove r an y foreig n countr y di d no t mea n merely influenc e o n thei r foreig n relation s bu t the extension o f the Sovie t system wit h secre t police , extinctio n o f freedo m o f speech , etc . an d tha t we ha d t o decid e wha t shoul d b e ou r attitud e i n th e fac e o f thes e unpleasant facts." 31 Afte r meetin g i n th e Whit e Hous e wit h hi s to p advisers o n Apri l 23 , Truma n adopte d a har d lin e tha t h e immediatel y conveyed t o a stunned Molotov . Far fro m turnin g conciliatory , Stali n proceede d t o deriv e maximu m political benefit s fro m hi s military advantage, and Truman wa s not read y to accede to Churchill' s urging s that Anglo-American force s shoul d pres s forward an d hol d thei r positions regardless o f predetermined occupatio n lines t o gai n som e leverag e ove r Sovie t behavio r i n Easter n Europe ; i n July, they bega n t o withdraw fro m th e Soviet zone. 32 Truman sen t Harr y Hopkins t o Mosco w ("t o see, " recalls Kennan , "wha t coul d b e salvage d from th e wreckage o f FDR's policy with relatio n to Russia an d Poland") , but Stali n prove d imperviou s t o warning s abou t a n increasingl y hostil e American publi c opinio n an d wo n agreemen t t o a predominantl y Com munist provisiona l government. 33 O n th e understandin g tha t fre e elec tions woul d follow , thi s regim e wa s grudgingl y grante d recognitio n b y the United State s and Britai n o n July 5 . The Failure of Economic Leverage. Indeed , a s Washington's ange r a t Soviet action s i n Easter n Europ e mounted , th e pullback s followe d b y demobilization weakene d it s potentia l militar y leverage , an d economi c leverage was never seriousl y attempted . Th e abrup t terminatio n o f Lend Lease shipment s immediatel y afte r V- E day, though mor e a bureaucrati c fumble tha n a calculated sanction , onl y reinforce d Stalin' s belie f tha t th e contest wit h Wester n imperialis m wa s enterin g a new phase. The Soviet s had earlie r requeste d a $ 6 billio n loan , bu t afte r visitin g th e Sovie t Union, th e Hous e Selec t Committe e o n Postwa r Economi c Polic y an d Planning mad e it s consen t conditiona l o n sweepin g politica l refor m i n that countr y a s wel l a s o n stric t fulfillmen t o f th e Yalt a an d Potsda m undertakings wit h respec t t o Easter n Europe . Anticipatin g tha t Mosco w would no t accep t suc h conditions , th e Stat e Departmen t fatalisticall y gave up activ e consideratio n o f a loan. 34 The ravage s o f wa r ha d lef t mos t o f th e Eas t Europea n countrie s i n desperate need of aid for immediat e relief an d reconstruction . Th e Unite d

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States provide d credit s fo r th e purchas e o f America n wa r surplu s mate riel, bu t th e prospec t o f substantia l loan s soo n wane d a s th e Sovie t Union proceeded t o reorient the region's economies eastward. American Polish negotiation s o n a loa n wer e broke n of f i n Ma y 194 6 whe n th e Warsaw governmen t refuse d t o provide information o n its economic an d commercial policie s an d agreements . Tito was s o unpopular i n Washington tha t hi s request fo r a n Export-Impor t Ban k loa n wa s rejecte d an d h e did no t eve n ge t credit s fo r surplus . I n Marc h 1946 , Washingto n pro tested t o th e Sovie t Unio n tha t it s exclusiv e trad e agreemen t wit h Hun gary violate d th e spiri t o f Yalta , an d i t deplore d th e "over-burdenin g [of] th e countr y wit h reparations , requisitions , an d th e cos t o f maintain ing larg e occupatio n forces. " I t propose d a join t progra m o f economi c rehabilitation, whic h ha d i n fac t bee n invite d b y th e (non-Communist ) Hungarian finance minister , bu t Mosco w rebuffe d th e initiative. 35 Al l the United State s coul d d o was to retur n th e gold reserve removed b y th e retreating Nazis an d gran t a $1 5 millio n credi t fo r surplu s goods . Economic leverag e faile d eve n i n th e cas e o f relativel y autonomou s Czechoslovakia. Pragu e aske d fo r a $30 0 millio n loa n i n Septembe r 1945, the n droppe d th e request , presumabl y becaus e o f Sovie t pressure . Talks wer e resume d i n February , whe n Washingto n se t a $5 0 millio n limit, bu t the y wer e marke d b y disagreement s ove r th e settlemen t o f American claim s an d th e issu e o f disclosur e o f Czechoslova k economi c and trad e policy. When a t the Paris peace conference i n August 194 6 th e Czechoslovak delegatio n ostentatiousl y applaude d a Sovie t diatrib e abou t American economi c imperialism , James F . Byrnes promptl y ordere d th e suspension o f surplu s deliveries , an d th e loa n negotiation s wer e sus pended.36 Presiden t Bene s an d othe r non-Communist s privatel y approve d Washington's pressure , hopin g tha t thei r countr y coul d retai n economi c links wit h bot h Eas t an d West . Tha t hop e wa s definitivel y dashe d onl y when Mosco w prevente d Pragu e fro m enrollin g i n th e Europea n Recov ery Program . Bu t eve n i n lat e 194 5 th e Eas t Europea n regime s wer e no t free enoug h t o accep t th e reasonable condition s fo r America n aid. 37 Idealism vs. Reality. Truma n remaine d wedde d t o th e diplomati c pur suit o f Atlanti c Charte r principle s no t becaus e th e Unite d State s ha d discovered crucia l securit y o r economi c interest s i n Easter n Europ e bu t simply becaus e th e America n peopl e woul d no t readil y surrende r th e democratic ideal s fo r whic h th e wa r ha d bee n fought . Throug h 194 5

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congressional attitude s becam e increasingl y hostil e t o th e Sovie t Unio n and i n favo r o f a toughe r America n stance . Th e Unite d State s accepte d Soviet primac y o f influenc e i n Easter n Europ e a s lon g a s i t accommo dated freel y electe d governments , wherea s Stali n anticipate d tha t suc h governments woul d no t b e sufficientl y complian t t o Sovie t interests . That wa s th e unbridgeabl e gap , an d t o condon e a Sovie t orde r tha t manifestly di d no t enjo y popula r suppor t i n Easter n Europ e wa s no t a politically feasibl e optio n fo r th e Unite d States . O n th e othe r hand , a s the president records in his memoirs, "I did not want t o become involve d in the Balkans in a way that could lea d us into another worl d conflict." 38 Thus, fro m th e start , th e principled refusa l t o accep t th e Stalinist versio n of a sphere of influence wa s adjusted t o the higher priorities o f America n power. Th e illusion s inspire d b y th e Atlanti c Charte r amon g ordinar y Americans an d Eas t European s becam e th e casualt y o f thi s asymmetr y between idealis m an d hars h reality . Peacemaking afte r Yalt a consiste d o f piecemea l diplomati c effort s t o salvage som e minima l Wester n influenc e an d a semblanc e o f democrac y in Easter n Europe . A prudent Stali n instructe d Eas t Europea n Commu nists t o pursu e a coalitio n strateg y whil e securin g th e ke y lever s o f power, notabl y th e interior ministries . In 194 5 he even allowed relativel y free election s i n Austri a (whic h th e Allie s ha d agree d durin g th e wa r t o treat wit h undeserve d charit y a s Hitler' s firs t victim ) an d Hungary , bu t they resulte d i n humiliatin g defea t fo r th e Communists . In Poland , de spite Stalin' s promis e o f earl y an d unfettere d elections , a fraudulen t constitutional referendu m wa s followe d i n Januar y 194 7 b y a n eve n more fraudulen t electio n claime d b y th e Communist s t o giv e thei r blo c an overwhelmin g mandate . Onl y i n unoccupie d Czechoslovaki a di d th e Communists i n Ma y 194 6 wi n a substantia l plurality , som e 3 8 percen t of th e nationa l vote , althoug h thei r popula r suppor t subsequentl y waned . In Czechoslovaki a a s elsewher e th e Communists ' roa d t o powe r de pended mor e o n unconventiona l method s (wha t th e Hungaria n part y chief Matya s Rakos i calle d "salam i tactics" ) tha n o n parliamentarian ism. Whe n wartim e harmon y gav e wa y t o Wester n protests , th e Soviet s professed surprise . Th e vetera n diploma t Maxi m Litvino v complaine d off th e record t o a private visitor i n mid-1945: "Why di d you American s wait unti l no w t o begi n opposin g u s in the Balkans an d Easter n Europe ? . . . Yo u shoul d hav e don e thi s thre e year s ago . No w it' s to o lat e an d your complaint s onl y arous e suspicio n here." 3 9

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Potsdam and the Cold War. A t th e Potsda m Conferenc e i n July 1945 , the deadloc k ove r Easter n Europ e remaine d unresolved . Despit e Sovie t urgings, th e Unite d State s withhel d recognitio n o f th e Bulgarian , Hun garian, an d Romania n regime s an d requeste d internationall y supervise d elections; th e result , i n th e word s o f a participant , wa s " a complet e impasse an d migh t b e sai d t o hav e bee n th e beginnin g o f th e col d war." 4 0 No r coul d th e Wes t obtai n mor e tha n toke n influenc e i n th e Allied Contro l Commissions , the Soviets again pointing to Western prac tice in Ital y an d reluctanc e t o includ e them i n the postwar supervisio n o f Japan. Wit h regar d t o Poland , Stali n presente d th e conferenc e wit h th e fait accompl i o f Polis h administratio n i n Germa n territor y eas t o f th e Oder-Neisse lin e an d precipitou s expulsio n o f th e inhabitants . Afte r securing a compromis e o n Germa n reparations , Truma n gav e hi s assen t subject t o fina l determinatio n a t a peac e conferenc e (whic h neve r mate rialized). Nevertheless , tw o week s late r th e Sovie t Unio n conclude d a treaty wit h Polan d guaranteein g th e ne w frontier . The successfu l tes t o f a n atomi c devic e a t Alamogord o durin g th e Potsdam Conferenc e potentiall y shifte d th e globa l balanc e o f militar y power i n favo r o f th e Unite d States . Its immediate utility , whic h n o one , including Stalin , questione d a t th e time , was t o secur e earl y victor y ove r Japan. Truma n di d hop e tha t i t woul d b e a n asse t i n persuadin g th e USSR t o b e mor e conciliator y wit h regar d t o Easter n Europe , an d afte r the Japanese surrende r h e promoted th e ide a o f a n internationa l author ity fo r atomi c energy . T o th e exten t tha t thi s was intende d a s a bargain ing chip , th e effec t wa s imperceptible , fo r whil e th e Soviet s eventuall y accepted th e America n proposa l fo r a Unite d Nation s Atomi c Energ y Commission, the y mad e onl y toke n politica l concession s i n Easter n Eu rope in late 194 5 an d 1946 . Postdam wa s dominate d b y th e proble m o f Germany . Th e divisio n into occupatio n zone s ha d bee n determine d i n rathe r casua l fashio n i n early 194 4 b y th e Europea n Advisor y Commission . I t wa s no w decide d that th e countr y (reduce d b y Sovie t an d Polis h territoria l acquisitions ) would b e treate d a s a singl e economi c uni t fo r al l purposes , includin g reparations. Stali n wa s initiall y inten t o n extendin g hi s influenc e ove r a united Germany , instructin g th e Germa n Communist s i n hi s zon e t o work withi n a n embryoni c multipart y system . Th e reparation s compro mise, on th e other hand , enhance d th e role of the zonal authoritie s a t th e

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expense o f th e Allie d Contro l Council ; th e Soviet s woul d tak e thei r du e from thei r ow n zon e an d i n additio n receiv e 1 0 percen t o f industria l capital equipmen t deeme d unnecessar y fo r th e Germa n peac e econom y from th e other zone s as well as a further 1 5 percent i n exchange fo r foo d and othe r commoditie s fro m th e Sovie t zone. 41 The America n approac h wa s formall y define d i n JC S 1067 , itsel f inspired b y th e harshl y punitiv e Morgentha u Plan , an d involve d demili tarization, denazification , an d deindustrialization . I t soon becam e appar ent, however , tha t starvation , collapse , an d prolonge d dependenc e o n American relie f ai d coul d onl y b e averte d b y promotin g economi c re vival. Commo n Allie d polic y wa s necessar y t o achiev e thi s o n th e basi s of economi c unity , bu t agreemen t wa s hampere d bot h b y Sovie t unilat eralism an d b y d e Gaulle' s resistanc e t o unificatio n an d th e restoratio n of centra l Germa n administration . An d America n fear s wer e mounting , as recorded b y Kennan i n March 1946 , about th e prospect o f a German y "nominally unite d bu t extensivel y vulnerabl e t o Sovie t political penetra tion an d influence." 42 I n th e Sovie t zone , Moscow-impose d economi c reforms an d th e force d merge r o f th e Socia l Democrati c Part y wit h th e Communist Socialis t Unit y Part y (SED ) suggeste d tha t i f Stali n wa s keeping hi s option s ope n o n unification , h e woul d onl y condon e i t o n his terms. The Division of Europe. A s th e threa t o f a divide d Europ e loomed , Undersecretary o f Stat e Dea n Acheso n an d Assistan t Secretar y fo r Eco nomic Affair s Wil l Clayto n presente d Secretar y o f Stat e Byrne s wit h a draft proposa l (endorse d b y th e fathe r o f Wes t Europea n integration , Jean Monnet ) fo r a Europea n settlemen t o n a n all-Europea n basis . De signed t o forestal l th e consolidatio n o f a Sovie t spher e an d t o provid e a secure framewor k fo r a disarmed an d reunite d Germany , th e plan calle d for a regiona l U N securit y counci l t o overse e th e peac e settlement s an d an all-Europea n economi c organizatio n backe d b y America n aid . "W e believed," recall s Wal t Rostow , on e o f th e plan' s authors , "tha t accep tance o f th e spli t was a weak, no t a strong policy," an d tha t thi s schem e would b e a bette r tes t o f Sovie t intentions ; Byrne s dismisse d th e plan ; Truman neve r sa w it ; an d Rosto w himsel f concede s tha t th e probabilit y of Sovie t concurrence wa s low. 43 Byrnes i n Apri l 194 6 propose d a four-powe r treat y guaranteein g th e

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disarmament o f German y fo r twenty-fiv e years . However , mountin g disagreements wit h Mosco w ove r reparation s an d implementatio n o f a common export-impor t progra m drov e the American zona l commander , General Luciu s Clay , t o suspen d o n Ma y 3 furthe r deliverie s t o th e Soviet zone . Tw o month s later , Moloto v declare d tha t i n ligh t o f th e reparations proble m Byrnes' s demilitarizatio n guarantee s wer e meaning less. The fundamental reappraisa l i n early 194 6 of American policy towar d the Sovie t Union wa s reflecte d i n Byrnes' s Stuttgar t speec h o f Septembe r 6. Th e Unite d State s stil l favore d unificatio n an d guarantee d demilitari zation, bu t i t woul d no t le t German y becom e a Sovie t satellite , an d "i f complete unificatio n canno t b e secured , w e shal l d o everythin g i n ou r power t o secur e maximu m possibl e unification." 44 Thre e month s later , the Britis h an d America n zone s wer e fuse d int o th e economi c uni t o f Bizonia, t o b e joine d i n 194 8 b y th e Frenc h zone . Secretar y o f Stat e George C . Marshal l mad e anothe r futil e effort , a t Mosco w i n th e sprin g of 1947 , t o secur e a n all-Germa n peac e settlemen t acceptabl e t o th e West, bu t th e divisio n o f German y an d o f Europ e wa s onl y confirmed . The Wes t woul d hencefort h direc t it s effort s towar d reconstructin g it s share o f German y an d preservin g it s foothol d i n Berlin . T o th e exten t that Stalin' s quest fo r a sphere of dominanc e i n Eastern Europ e had bee n motivated b y the fear o f a resurgent Germany , the failure o f the erstwhil e allies t o com e t o term s o n tha t country' s futur e onl y reinforce d th e strategic necessit y o f suc h a sphere fo r th e Soviet Union . The deterioratio n i n Soviet-America n relation s ha d gathere d spee d i n early 1946 . In a speech o n Februar y 9 , Stalin reminde d Sovie t citizens of the ineluctabl e conflic t betwee n communis m an d capitalism . A wee k later cam e th e revelatio n i n Canad a o f a Sovie t espionag e operatio n t o obtain atomi c secrets . Sovie t policie s i n Iran , whic h Stali n appeare d unwilling to evacuate , the Far East, the Middle East, as well as in Europ e were appraise d a s inimica l t o America n interests . I n Congress , Republi can criticis m o f th e administration' s allege d dispositio n t o appeas e th e Soviets becam e strident , notabl y o n th e par t o f Senato r Vandenberg , who regarde d Byrne s a s a dangerou s compromiser ; an d i n Novembe r the Republican s fo r th e first tim e sinc e 193 0 gaine d contro l o f bot h houses. B y March , a n opinio n pol l suggeste d tha t 7 1 percen t o f th e American peopl e disapprove d o f Sovie t foreig n policy , an d 6 0 percen t felt th e United State s was too sof t i n its response. 45

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Less Patience, More Firmness, Thes e perception s o f bein g "sof t o n communism" wer e reinforce d b y th e famous "lon g cable " tha t th e charg e d'affaires i n Moscow , Georg e Kennan , sen t t o Byrne s o n Februar y 22 , 1946. In hi s analysis , Kenna n opine d tha t th e Sovie t dictatorshi p wa s wedded t o a rigid ideologica l doctrin e denyin g th e possibility o f coexist ing peacefull y wit h th e Wes t an d impellin g i t t o expan d powe r an d influence. Th e Unite d States , conclude d Kennan , ha d t o resis t Commu nist expansion whil e waiting fo r interna l change s to alte r Sovie t policy. 46 This intellectua l rationalizatio n o f a "ge t tough " polic y fitte d perfectl y the moo d i n Washington . Withi n tw o weeks , afte r consultin g wit h Tru man, Churchil l delivere d hi s histori c "iro n curtain " speec h i n Fulton , Missouri. Th e Soviets , h e warned , wante d "th e fruit s o f wa r an d th e indefinite expansio n o f thei r powe r an d doctrines " an d ha d contemp t for militar y weakness . Onl y Wester n resolve , manifeste d throug h th e United Nation s b y Anglo-America n collaboration , coul d preserv e peace. 47 In September , th e President' s specia l counsel , Clar k Clifford , presente d Truman wit h a repor t o n U.S.-Sovie t relation s tha t wen t beyon d th e Kennan thesi s i n arguin g tha t th e USS R wa s preparin g fo r a n inevitabl e war wit h capitalis t states . America n concession s woul d b e viewe d a s a sign o f weaknes s an d encourag e i t t o increas e it s demands . Onl y th e language o f militar y powe r coul d dissuad e th e Soviet leaders. 48 If th e necessit y o f a polic y o f "patienc e wit h firmness " wa s rapidl y becoming th e conventional wisdo m i n Washington, th e attainabl e objec tive accordin g t o Clifford' s repor t wa s "t o confin e Sovie t influenc e t o it s present area. " Th e implicatio n o f th e iro n curtai n metapho r wa s tha t Eastern Europ e ha d slippe d irretrievabl y int o th e Sovie t sphere . A s th e new American ambassador , Walter Bedel l Smith, reported fro m Mosco w at th e en d o f May , th e commo n Britis h an d America n vie w was tha t th e Soviet Unio n "i s determine d t o continu e dominatio n ove r thes e state s and i s prepare d t o g o t o almos t an y lengt h an d emplo y almos t an y measures t o achiev e thi s end. " Therefore , "th e facts o f th e situatio n compel u s to vie w Europ e no t a s a whole, bu t a s divide d essentiall y int o two zones." 49 I n th e sam e spirit , a Join t Chief s o f Staf f repor t i n Jul y concluded tha t th e "chie f Europea n proble m are a i n th e postwa r rela tions o f th e USS R an d th e Wester n power s wil l b e i n th e zon e lyin g between th e bel t o f smal l countrie s o n th e USSR' s wester n frontier s where Sovie t influence wil l b e predominant an d th e countries o f Wester n Europe." Tha t zon e comprise d German y an d Austria , fo r eve n Hungar y

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and Czechoslovaki a "appea r t o b e i n th e Sovie t sphere." 50 "Th e fac t o f the matter, " observe d Kenna n a t abou t th e sam e time , "i s tha t w e d o not hav e power i n Eastern Europ e reall y to d o anythin g bu t talk." 5 1 There wa s plent y o f talk , mos t o f i t acrimoniou s an d unproductive , for Washingto n persevere d i n it s diplomati c effort s t o secur e reasonabl y representative government s i n th e countrie s liberate d b y th e Sovie t Union . In Septembe r 1945 , at th e first meetin g o f th e Counci l o f Foreig n Minis ters (create d a t Potsda m t o wor k ou t th e detail s o f th e peac e treaties) , Byrnes agree d t o recogniz e th e provisional Hungaria n governmen t upo n receiving a pledg e o f fre e elections . Bu t th e Russian s woul d mak e n o similar concessio n regardin g Bulgari a an d Romania , wher e Soviet Communist contro l wa s mor e advanced . A fact-findin g missio n heade d by th e Louisvill e publishe r Mar k Ethridg e wa s dispatche d b y Byrne s t o Sofia an d Bucharest , an d reporte d o n Decembe r 3 o n th e authoritaria n and unrepresentativ e characte r o f thos e regimes . A t th e foreig n minis ters' meetin g i n Mosco w late r tha t month , Byrne s cave d i n an d agree d to recogniz e th e regimes , subjec t t o inclusio n o f a fe w oppositio n politi cians an d elections . Truma n wa s incense d a t th e compromise , assertin g that h e was "tire d o f babyin g th e Soviets, " bu t despit e ritualisti c Ameri can diplomati c protest s th e consolidatio n o f Communis t powe r pro ceeded complet e wit h pseudoelection s an d th e persecutio n o f politica l opponents. 52 As for Yugoslavia , when th e American ambassado r arrive d in Belgrade in December, h e conveyed Washington's vie w that th e recen t elections ther e ha d no t bee n fre e an d tha t diplomati c relation s wer e no t to b e construed a s approval o f th e Tito regime. 53 As negotiatio n ove r th e peac e treatie s dragge d o n throug h 1946 , i t was apparen t tha t i n th e cas e o f Hitler' s forme r allie s in Easter n Europ e the Sovie t Unio n woul d cal l the shots . The Western power s champione d Italy (securin g ove r Yugosla v oppositio n a n interi m "fre e territory " solution fo r Trieste ) an d unoccupie d Finlan d (which , bein g o f margina l strategic importance , occasione d littl e controversy ) bu t wer e fatalisti c about th e rest . In th e cas e o f Hungary , wher e despit e growin g Communis t pressur e pro-Western element s stil l hel d a majorit y i n th e coalitio n government , the politica l stake s include d th e statu s o f territories , inhabite d i n th e majority b y Hungarians , tha t ha d bee n reannexe d fro m Czechoslovaki a and Romani a earl y i n th e war . Czechoslovaki a wishe d t o expe l th e Hungarians, Romani a t o recove r al l o f Transylvania . Th e America n

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minister t o Budapest , H.F.A . Schoenfeld , ha d argue d i n Marc h tha t i t was "mor e importan t fo r u s t o conside r th e effec t o f a frontie r revisio n on Hungaria n interna l politic s tha n o n Rumania n interna l politic s in asmuch a s Hungar y i s stil l a twiligh t zon e i n respec t t o Sovie t expan sion wherea s th e shadow s fallin g o n Rumani a ar e alread y o f a deepe r hue." 5 4 Althoug h th e American s an d Britis h mad e a toke n effor t t o se cure a territoria l adjustmen t i n favo r o f Hungary , th e Sovie t prefer ence fo r rewardin g Romani a (which , however , ha d t o ced e Bessarabi a to th e Sovie t Union ) prevailed . No r coul d Hungar y b e effectivel y aide d by th e Wes t a t th e expens e o f Czechoslovakia , a n Allie d country , and th e minorit y questio n wa s lef t t o th e tw o partie s t o resolve. 55 Onl y in th e cas e o f Bulgaria n territoria l claim s agains t Greec e di d Wester n opposition succeed . The resultin g peac e treaties , signe d o n Februar y 10 , 1947 , i n Paris , bound th e variou s government s t o respec t huma n right s an d fundamen tal freedom s an d assigne d supervisio n o f thei r executio n t o th e thre e great power s actin g i n concert . Despit e a n America n attemp t t o reduc e Hungary's reparation s burden , th e Soviet s prevailed , a s the y di d i n trimming thei r Bulgaria n client' s reparation s t o Greec e an d Yugoslavia . The treaties limited th e size of arme d force s an d specifie d th e withdrawa l within ninet y day s fro m ratificatio n o f occupatio n troops—apar t fro m those require d t o guar d line s o f communication . Sinc e th e Sovie t Unio n was blockin g progres s o n Germa n an d Austria n peac e treaties , tha t qualification legitimate d it s continue d militar y presence . Truma n re ported lamel y t o Congres s tha t h e di d "no t regar d th e treatie s a s com pletely satisfactory . Whateve r thei r defects , however , I a m convince d that the y ar e a s good a s we ca n hop e t o obtai n b y agreemen t amon g th e principal wartim e Allies . Further disput e an d dela y woul d gravel y jeop ardize politica l stabilit y i n th e countrie s concerne d fo r man y years." 56 No on e doubte d tha t th e condition s o f tha t stabilit y woul d b e se t b y th e Soviet Union. The treaties, observed Kennan , "contai n numerou s clause s which w e kno w ful l wel l wil l neve r b e implemented." 57 The y woul d provide a legal basi s fo r America n protests , an d nothin g more . American Policy Alternatives. Coul d alternativ e America n approache s have secure d th e realizatio n o f th e Atlanti c Charter' s promis e i n Easter n Europe? Th e mos t plausibl e answe r wa s Litvinov's , who, when aske d i n November 194 5 b y Harriman wha t th e United State s coul d d o t o satisf y

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the Sovie t Union , replied : "Nothing." 5 8 A stronge r formul a migh t hav e been negotiate d a t Yalta , an d th e exten t o f Anglo-America n militar y occupation maximize d an d exploite d a s a bargainin g counter . Bu t onc e the Red Army was entrenched i n the region, only superior strengt h coul d have induce d it s withdrawal , an d i n 194 5 th e America n publi c yearne d for demobilizatio n an d ta x cuts . No r di d th e desirabilit y o f democrac y in farawa y countrie s warran t seriou s consideratio n o f atomi c blackmail . Washington coul d hav e reciprocate d Sovie t procrastinatio n o n th e Ger man an d Austria n treaties , bu t tha t woul d hav e totall y paralyze d th e process an d blocke d th e Finnis h an d Italia n settlement s withou t an y likelihood o f haltin g th e Communis t gra b fo r powe r i n Easter n Europe . As fo r a mor e comprehensiv e schem e o f th e Acheson-Clayto n variety , i t would hav e required a degree of mutual trus t an d compatibilit y o f value s that wa s absen t eve n a t the moment o f greates t wartime harmony . In th e final analysis , Easter n Europ e wa s los t t o democrac y no t i n peace bu t i n war. The criticis m tha t b y pursuin g democrac y i n Easter n Europ e Wash ington rod e roughsho d ove r legitimat e Sovie t securit y interest s an d onl y accelerated th e process o f Sovietizatio n i s as fanciful a s the notion tha t i t was drive n fundamentall y b y capitalis t ambition . In fact , America' s economic interes t i n th e regio n wa s marginal . Export s i n 193 7 range d from $147,00 0 fo r Albani a t o a stil l paltr y $2 6 millio n fo r Poland ; the y added u p t o barel y 2 percen t o f tota l U.S . exports . America n asset s amounted t o som e $56 0 million , 4 percent o f global foreign investments , and o f tha t onl y $278,600,00 0 wer e investment s i n American-controlle d enterprises.59 Protest s a t th e allege d conversio n o f Easter n Europ e int o a Soviet colon y an d advocac y o f nondiscriminator y commercia l an d eco nomic policie s wer e th e reflectio n o f a genera l America n approac h t o world trad e an d finance tha t onl y th e Communist s foun d objectionable . That U.S . economi c securit y need s informe d th e Marshal l Pla n an d containment polic y i s self-eviden t an d axiomatic , sinc e suc h need s ar e inseparable fro m nationa l security. 60 Nor doe s th e balanc e o f evidenc e indicat e tha t America n politica l advocacy wa s counterproductive . Th e popula r fron t tactic s i n th e var ious countrie s appeare d t o b e marginall y calibrate d t o Sovie t prioritie s and Wester n sensibilities . Polan d wa s crucia l t o Sovie t security , Bulgari a and Romani a concede d b y Churchill , Yugoslavi a secure d b y Tito . In these countrie s Stali n too k n o ris k o f holdin g bac k Communis t ascen -

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dancy. A greate r concessio n t o pluralisti c democrac y wa s afforde d i n Hungary, perhap s partl y t o compensat e i n Wester n eye s fo r th e subju gation o f Allie d Poland ; bu t there , too , th e Communist s wer e steadil y advancing t o a position o f politica l predominance . An d eve n i n Czecho slovakia th e Communist s wer e maneuverin g t o undermin e a n alread y pro-Soviet regime . To th e exten t tha t Wester n actio n influence d th e pac e of domesti c politica l change , i t serve d t o prolon g rathe r tha n eliminat e the token tribute s t o democrati c practice paid b y Stalin's servants . Stalin's intentio n t o secur e Communist-dominate d regime s wa s clea r from th e start , an d th e fac t tha t thi s proces s wa s accompanie d b y som e objectively beneficia l socia l an d economi c policies , suc h a s lan d reform , hardly mad e i t democratic . I t migh t a s wel l b e argue d tha t rura l electri fication justifie d th e eventua l impositio n o f integra l Stalinism . T o b e sure, a s Kenna n observe d i n Octobe r 1946 , n o Eas t Europea n regim e was a perfec t replic a o f th e Stalinis t mode l o r professe d t o ai m a t a classic "dictatorship o f th e proletariat," bu t th e superficial for m wa s les s significant tha n th e emergin g substance. 61 Th e earl y experiment s wit h free election s ha d taugh t th e Communist s tha t ther e wa s n o clea n roa d to power . Communis t rule , whateve r it s precis e form , coul d no t b e reconciled wit h th e requisite s o f democrati c self-determination , an d th e United State s jeopardize d n o highe r nationa l interes t b y it s ultimatel y fruitless defens e o f principle . The Policy of Containment. Maste r a t lon g las t o f it s wester n ap proaches, the USS R could hav e reste d content ; drive n b y the momentu m of powe r an d Marxis t determinism , Stali n di d not . Throug h 194 7 an d 1948 a fatefu l spira l o f actio n an d reactio n confirme d th e spli t betwee n the Sovie t Unio n an d th e West , an d America n polic y regardin g Easter n Europe becam e a functio n o f thi s hardenin g confrontation . Th e ter m containment, coine d b y Georg e Kenna n (wh o ha d bee n appointe d b y Secretary o f Stat e Marshal l t o hea d th e department' s ne w Polic y Plan ning Staff ) i n hi s famou s " X " articl e i n th e Jul y 194 7 issu e o f Foreign Affairs, cam e to denot e the comple x an d evolvin g response o f th e Unite d States t o th e perceive d Sovie t threat. 62 In Kennan' s view , th e Soviet directed Communis t movemen t was impelled by a structure an d ideolog y impervious t o th e influenc e o f traditiona l diplomacy . Sinc e thi s forc e threatened America n value s an d ultimatel y America n securit y interests , the Unite d State s ha d t o bolste r resistance , mor e b y economi c tha n b y

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military means , in key areas, first and foremos t i n Western Europe . Thu s contained, th e Sovie t threa t coul d eventuall y b e undermine d b y th e system's interna l stresse s an d contradictions , allowin g fo r th e resump tion o f mor e civilize d dialogu e an d negotiation . In thi s essentiall y evolu tionary approach , Easter n Europe' s subjugatio n woul d ad d t o th e bur dens o f empir e an d haste n tha t empire' s natura l dissolution . On Marc h 12 , 1947 , th e presiden t announce d tha t i n respons e t o a n urgent appea l fro m Londo n h e ha d committe d th e Unite d State s t o giv e military an d economi c assistanc e t o th e embattle d anti-Communis t re gimes i n Greec e an d Turkey . Avoidin g th e ter m communism , Truma n declared tha t "totalitaria n regime s impose d o n fre e peoples , b y direc t o r indirect aggression , undermin e th e foundation s o f internationa l peac e and hence the security of the United States, " and that Washington woul d therefore tak e preventiv e steps . Th e administratio n subsequentl y mad e clear tha t thi s di d no t ai m a t countrie s alread y unde r Sovie t control. 63 Convinced afte r hi s meetin g wit h Stali n tha t th e latte r woul d no t coop erate o n th e Germa n an d othe r Europea n problems , Marshal l turne d t o unilateral initiatives . Kennan's staf f develope d a proposal fo r stimulatin g European economi c recover y which , reveale d b y th e secretar y o f stat e on June 5 , cam e t o b e known a s th e Marshal l Plan . Ostensibl y th e offe r did no t exclud e th e Sovie t sphere . Th e Eas t Europeans , argue d Kennan , should "eithe r exclud e themselve s b y unwillingnes s t o accep t th e pro posed condition s o r agre e t o abando n th e exclusiv e orientatio n o f thei r economies," an d i n thi s wa y "w e woul d no t ourselve s dra w a lin e o f division throug h Europe." 6 4 But a n earlie r repor t b y th e Join t Strategi c Surve y Committe e t o th e Joint Chief s o f Staf f ha d alread y conclude d tha t "n o countr y unde r Soviet contro l shoul d receiv e assistanc e fro m th e Unite d State s unti l every vestig e o f Sovie t contro l ha d bee n remove d therefrom. " I t identi fied German y a s potentiall y th e stronges t militar y powe r i n Wester n Europe an d argue d tha t it s economi c reviva l wa s o f "primar y impor tance" t o America n security . Therefore , althoug h th e Stat e Departmen t had include d Hungary , Czechoslovakia , an d Polan d i n its list of eightee n countries urgentl y needin g America n assistance , th e JSSC repor t argue d that becaus e o f securit y priorities n o ai d b e given them. 65 To th e exten t tha t th e Marshal l Pla n wa s intende d t o tes t Eas t Euro pean autonomy , th e result s confirme d Washington' s expectations . Th e Soviets walke d ou t o f th e preparator y conference , rejectin g th e condi -

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tions a s interference i n thei r interna l affairs . Amon g th e East Europeans , only th e Czechoslovak s wer e bol d enoug h t o accep t th e invitation , an d they wer e promptl y ordere d b y Stali n t o withdraw , o n th e ground s tha t the pla n wa s anti-Soviet . Jan Masary k commente d bitterly : "I t i s a ne w Munich. I left fo r Mosco w a s Minister o f Foreig n Affair s o f a sovereig n state. I am returnin g a s Stalin's stooge." 66 American largess e wa s intende d t o expedit e th e economi c reviva l an d political consolidatio n o f Wester n Europe , a s wel l a s t o promot e it s integration, th e first ste p bein g th e creatio n o f th e Europea n Coa l an d Steel Community . Cover t fundin g wa s als o give n t o anti-Communis t parties an d trad e unions , notabl y i n Franc e an d Italy . (I n the cas e o f th e latter th e CI A too k som e credi t fo r th e victor y o f th e Christia n Demo crats i n th e 194 8 elections. ) I n Easter n Europe , b y th e en d o f th e 194 7 the U.S . administratio n ha d approve d expor t control s tha t increase d it s economic isolation ; withi n a year , America n export s wer e les s tha n a quarter o f th e postwa r hig h reache d i n 1946. 67 B y 195 2 America n exports t o th e regio n (excludin g Yugoslavia ) ha d dwindle d t o les s tha n $6 million . Althoug h thi s strategi c embarg o wa s no t expecte d t o alte r the satellites' status, it took it s place in the general strateg y o f weakenin g Soviet military migh t (se e chapter 5) . The Sovietization of Eastern Europe. Concurrently , th e Sovietizatio n of Easter n Europ e gathere d speed . Althoug h Washingto n ha d fe w illu sions abou t it s remaining influenc e i n the region, th e Centra l Intelligenc e Agency anticipate d tha t a t leas t i n Polan d socialis t an d othe r democrati c parties woul d retai n a measur e o f independenc e fo r a lon g time. 68 Bu t Stalin wa s impatient , an d a t a secre t conferenc e hastil y convene d b y th e Russians i n Septembe r 194 7 a t Szklarsk a Poreb a nea r th e Polis h cit y o f Wroclaw, Andre i Zhdano v confirme d th e division o f th e world int o tw o antagonistic camps . In a carefull y stage d crescendo , th e "democrati c road t o socialism " wa s roundl y denounced . Th e Americans , wit h thei r Marshall Plan , wer e th e immediat e peril , an d promp t adoptio n o f th e Soviet an d Yugosla v model s o f Communis t dictatorshi p (or , i n th e cas e of th e Frenc h an d Italia n parties , uncompromisin g opposition ) wa s th e only acceptabl e tactic . A new institution , th e Cominform , woul d hel p t o coordinate th e imposition o f Stalinis t uniformity. 69 Within a few months , th e more backwar d Eas t Europea n Communis t parties ha d forcibl y absorbe d th e socia l democrats , thei r mai n competi -

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tor fo r th e allegianc e o f th e workin g class . B y th e en d o f 194 8 th e elimination o r neutralizatio n o f al l institutionalize d opposition , includ ing the churches , was accomplished . Th e Americans , apar t fro m deliver ing diplomati c protests , wer e reduce d t o facilitatin g th e escap e o f a fe w politicians an d scientists . Czechoslovaki a ha d th e longes t roa d t o travel , but b y th e autum n o f 194 7 Kenna n foresa w th e imminenc e o f a Com munist coup. 70 Washington' s last-minut e offe r o f a $2 5 millio n credit , designed t o bolste r democrati c elements , arrive d onl y day s befor e Presi dent Bene s cave d i n t o Sovie t an d domesti c Communis t pressur e an d appointed, o n Februar y 25 , 1948 , a Communis t government . Th e las t domino ha d fallen . The Militarization of Containment. Th e Pragu e coup , combine d wit h Soviet pressures ove r Berlin and Communis t activis m in Western Europe , created a n atmospher e o f crisi s tha t hastene d th e militarizatio n o f con tainment. War , reporte d Genera l Cla y fro m Frankfur t i n Marc h (per haps les s out o f anxiet y tha n t o provide the administratio n wit h politica l ammunition), "ma y com e wit h dramati c suddenness." 71 Th e respons e to thes e alarum s too k th e for m o f th e Brussel s Treaty , a West Europea n collective defens e agreemen t signe d i n Marc h 1948 , followe d b y th e Senate's endorsemen t o f th e Vandenber g resolution , whic h calle d fo r a n expansion o f U.S . militar y strengt h an d militar y a s wel l a s economi c assistance programs . Stali n ordere d th e shif t t o a "wa r economy " throughout hi s domain, an d b y 194 9 the satellite armies were being buil t up beyon d treat y limits . There wa s n o clea r evidenc e t o sho w tha t Stali n intended t o us e militar y forc e beyon d hi s perimete r i n Europ e (wit h th e possible exceptio n o f Yugoslavia)—h e wa s cautiou s a s wel l a s oppor tunistic—but th e West girde d fo r war . The perceptio n o f Sovie t aggressiveness , no t t o sa y wa r hysteria , le d to a n emphasi s o n collectiv e security , whic h i n tur n require d quic k resolution o f th e Germa n impasse . Whe n th e Counci l o f Foreig n Minis ters faile d t o mak e progres s a t it s Decembe r 194 7 meeting , th e Wester n powers develope d th e "London Program " fo r th e creation o f an indepen dent Wes t Germany . Stali n responde d i n June 194 8 b y blockadin g Ber lin. Rejecting mor e forcefu l options , Truman resorte d t o a n air-bridg e t o sustain th e city . Whe n th e Russian s lifte d th e blockad e i n Ma y 1949 , Truman decide d tha t th e Wes t ha d t o kee p rearmin g t o preven t Stali n from exploitin g weakness. 72 Kennan' s Polic y Plannin g Staf f earlie r ha d

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developed a n alternativ e proposa l fo r all-Germa n election s an d a phase d withdrawal o f occupatio n force s leadin g t o a reunite d an d demilitarize d Germany, bu t Dea n Acheso n (wh o too k ove r a s secretar y o f stat e i n January 1949 ) recall s tha t "w e soo n cam e t o believ e tha t ou r chie f concern shoul d b e th e futur e o f Europe , an d tha t th e reunificatio n o f Germany shoul d no t b e regarded a s the chie f en d i n itself." 73 What followe d wa s th e proclamatio n o f th e Federa l Republi c o f Germany i n th e Wester n zon e an d th e Sovie t transfe r o f administratio n of its zone to a Communist-dominated provisiona l government . Mosco w persisted wit h proposal s t o reunif y Germany ; th e Wes t persistentl y re buffed them . It is conceivable tha t eve n if he could no t attai n hi s primar y objective o f a Communist-dominate d reunite d Germany , Stali n woul d have genuinel y preferre d a demilitarizatio n an d reunificatio n t o a mili tarized NAT O (hurriedl y founde d i n Apri l 1949 ) tha t incorporate d a majority o f th e Germans . Bu t he had los t al l credibilit y i n th e West, an d Washington woul d no t brea k th e momentum o f alliance-buildin g fo r th e sake of uncertai n negotiation . No r woul d compromis e o n German y hav e eliminated th e traditional Russia n desir e for influenc e i n Eastern Europe , but i t migh t hav e attenuate d Sovie t insecurit y an d th e impositio n o f Stalinism.74 In th e event , th e Marshal l Pla n an d NAT O dashe d Stalin' s hopes fo r a wea k an d vulnerabl e Wester n Europ e an d reinforce d hi s determination t o consolidat e hi s domain i n the East . FDR's universalis t visio n o f a peacefu l worl d patrolle d b y th e benev olent Fou r Policeme n gav e wa y t o th e realit y o f a toug h an d moralisti c sheriff leadin g tw o crank y invalid s an d a hastily parole d mas s murdere r in a global battl e fo r tur f agains t a paranoid re d bully . Just a s the Sovie t Union i n 194 1 wa s converte d b y America n propagand a fro m godles s pariah t o stalwar t ally , so West German y wa s no w haile d a s an essentia l partner i n th e leagu e fo r libert y an d decency . Th e America n publi c adjusted readil y t o thi s reversa l o f images ; nazis m ha d bee n a malignan t tumor, bu t communis m wa s a deadl y globa l virus . And i f fo r th e Sovie t Union Easter n Europ e becam e a n indispensabl e strategi c an d ideologica l asset, fo r Washingto n i t became a reason t o stiffe n th e West's resolve . Fostering Anti-Communism. Whil e a secur e Wester n Europ e wa s America's first priority , containmen t encompasse d mor e aggressiv e tac tics a s well . O n th e premis e tha t "th e defea t o f th e force s o f Soviet directed communis m i s vita l t o th e securit y o f th e Unite d States, " a

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National Securit y Counci l (NSC ) repor t i n Marc h 194 8 recommende d that th e U.S . "develop, an d a t th e appropriat e tim e carr y out , a coordi nated campaig n t o suppor t undergroun d resistanc e movement s i n coun tries behind th e iron curtain , including the Soviet Union." 75 The first ful l elaboration o f America n objective s cam e tha t Augus t i n NS C 20/1 , prepared b y the Policy Planning Staff o n the request of Defens e Secretar y James V . Forrestal . A peacetim e ai m o f th e Unite d State s wa s "t o en courage an d promot e b y mean s shor t o f wa r th e gradua l retractio n o f undue Russia n powe r an d influenc e fro m th e presen t satellit e area, " t o be accomplishe d "b y skillfu l us e o f ou r economi c power ; b y direc t o r indirect informationa l activity , b y placing th e greates t strai n possibl e o n the maintenanc e o f th e iron curtain, " an d b y the attractio n o f a prosper ous an d fre e Wester n Europe . However , ther e wa s nee d fo r flexibilit y and prudenc e i n orde r t o "mak e possibl e a liberatio n o f th e satellit e countries i n way s whic h d o no t creat e a n unanswerabl e challeng e t o Soviet prestige " an d rais e th e ris k o f war. 76 B y Novembe r 1948 , th e administration ha d convince d itsel f tha t "th e ultimat e objectiv e o f th e leaders o f th e USS R i s th e dominatio n o f th e world. " America n intelli gence estimate d tha t th e Soviet s coul d overru n continenta l Europ e an d the Nea r Eas t a s fa r a s Cair o i n si x months . Th e Stalin-Tit o schis m raised expectations , however , tha t "i f th e Unite d State s wer e t o exploi t the potentialities o f psychologica l warfar e an d subversiv e activit y withi n the Sovie t orbit , th e USS R woul d b e face d wit h increasin g disaffection , discontent, an d undergroun d opposition. " Th e Unite d State s therefor e had t o "plac e th e maximu m strai n o n th e Sovie t structur e o f powe r an d particularly o n th e relationships betwee n Mosco w an d th e satellite coun tries." 7 7 The fulles t expositio n o f America n polic y regardin g Easter n Europ e came i n NS C 58/2 , approve d b y Truma n o n Decembe r 13 , 1949 . Wit h Western Europ e politically stabilize d an d o n the road t o economic recov ery, "th e tim e i s no w rip e fo r u s t o plac e greate r emphasi s o n th e offensive t o conside r whethe r w e canno t d o mor e t o caus e th e elimina tion o r a t leas t a reductio n o f predominan t Sovie t influenc e . . . becaus e [the satellites ] ar e i n varyin g degree s politico-militar y adjunct s o f Sovie t power." A wa r initiate d b y th e Unite d State s wa s no t a practica l alter native. Les s forcefu l tactic s include d th e encouragemen t o f Communis t heretics an d nationalists , o f "non-Stalinis t regime s a s temporar y admin istration," al l withou t impairin g th e potentia l emergenc e o f full y non -

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Communist regimes ; diplomati c pressur e t o attac k Soviet-satellit e ties ; and measure s t o "jolt " th e economi c structur e o f th e Sovie t bloc , sinc e "it i s probably i n th e economi c real m tha t w e can mos t concretel y mak e our influenc e felt. " Stressing th e centralit y o f psychologica l warfare , NS C 58/ 2 recom mended tha t th e Unite d State s shoul d "d o wha t i t ca n . . . particularl y through cover t operation s an d propaganda , t o kee p aliv e th e anti-com munist sentimen t . . . i n th e satellit e countries . T o d o les s woul d b e t o sacrifice th e mora l basi s o f Unite d State s leadershi p o f fre e peoples. " That th e propose d measure s migh t no t b e u p t o th e tas k wa s concede d in th e final conclusion : "Th e Unite d State s should , i n developin g it s plans an d programs , bea r i n min d th e possibilit y tha t th e USS R migh t resort t o a wa r susceptibl e o f becomin g globa l rathe r tha n suffe r los s o f the Eastern Europea n satellit e states." 78 By th e tim e th e critica l redefinitio n o f America n securit y objectives , NSC 68/2 , wa s approve d i n Septembe r 1950 , Communist s ha d take n over China , th e Soviet s ha d teste d thei r atomi c bomb , an d th e Nort h Koreans ha d launche d thei r offensiv e agains t th e South . Accordin g t o intelligence estimates , th e West' s militar y buildu p mad e "an y majo r deferment o f th e Sovie t progra m t o attai n worl d domination " unlikely , implying a definit e dange r o f globa l war . Th e dange r peake d i n 1953. 79 On th e othe r hand , th e Stat e Departmen t considere d tha t althoug h th e Kremlin wa s behin d th e Korea n attac k an d woul d likel y "prob e th e firmness o f ou r purpos e an d ou r nerve s a t othe r sensitiv e points, " i t di d not inten d t o se t of f a genera l war. 80 Wha t Stalin' s rea l plan s were , an d what th e West kne w o f them , remain s unclear . B y one account , h e had a scheme t o mov e int o Wes t German y an d delive r a n ultimatu m t o th e United State s t o leav e Europ e withi n seve n days , an d h e se t of f th e Korean Wa r t o diver t America' s energies . Othe r source s hav e reporte d that a t a top-leve l blo c meetin g i n Januar y 195 1 Stali n unveile d a pla n to invad e Western Europe . Th e Sovie t blo c coul d onl y retai n it s militar y superiority fo r a fe w years , h e said . I t shoul d therefor e seiz e th e oppor tunity an d mobiliz e al l it s resource s t o exten d socialis m t o th e res t o f Europe. 81 Despite th e uncertaintie s regardin g Stalin' s intentions , th e ke y policy makers opte d fo r decisiv e action . A s th e distinguishe d historia n Joh n Lewis Gaddi s observed , a "cost-minimizing " strateg y wa s supersede d b y a "risk-minimizing " strategy. 82 Containmen t bega n a s a long-ter m pol -

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icy wit h limite d securit y objectives ; a s elaborate d b y Acheso n an d th e new Polic y Plannin g Staf f director , Pau l Nitze , in NSC 68/2 , it became a call to arm s t o resis t Communis t expansio n a t al l points o f th e compass : "The col d wa r i s i n fac t a rea l wa r i n whic h th e surviva l o f th e fre e world i s a t stake." 8 3 Sinc e th e optio n o f preventiv e wa r "woul d b e repugnant t o many Americans," and sinc e atomic threat would no t likel y obtain Sovie t capitulation , th e feasibl e alternativ e wa s " a rapi d buildu p of political, economi c an d militar y strength. " This virtua l stat e o f wa r demande d offensiv e a s wel l a s defensiv e measures. The United States , recommended NS C 68/2 , should tak e dynami c step s t o reduc e th e powe r an d influenc e o f th e Kremli n inside the Sovie t Union an d othe r area s unde r it s control. The objectiv e woul d be th e establishmen t o f friendl y regime s no t unde r Kremli n domination . Suc h action is essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union. Appropriate technique s would includ e "intensificatio n o f affirmativ e an d timely measure s an d operation s b y cover t mean s i n th e fields o f eco nomic warfar e an d politica l an d psychologica l warfar e wit h a vie w t o fomenting unres t an d revol t i n selecte d strategi c satellit e countries. " The prospec t o f chang e throug h negotiatio n ha d hardl y bee n enter tained i n NS C 58 , an d i n NS C 68/ 2 i t wa s considere d necessar y onl y a s a tacti c t o wi n suppor t fo r th e militar y buildu p an d th e recruitmen t o f Germans an d Austrian s t o th e cause . Anothe r Stat e Departmen t repor t observed tha t whil e i t wa s prematur e fo r th e Unite d State s t o publicl y press fo r Germa n rearmament , "ou r presen t Germa n an d Europea n policies ar e designe d t o creat e wit h th e maximu m spee d possibl e th e conditions unde r whic h German y ca n b e completel y aligne d wit h th e West." 8 4 Tha t thi s wa s n o tim e fo r rea l negotiatio n wa s confirme d b y NSC 68/2 : The present world situation [ . . .] is one which militates against successful nego tiations wit h th e Kremlin—fo r th e term s o f agreement s o n importan t pendin g issues would reflect present realities and would therefore b e unacceptable, if not disastrous, to th e United State s an d th e rest o f th e fre e world . After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then b e desirable fo r th e Unite d State s t o tak e a n initiativ e i n seekin g negotiations i n th e hop e tha t i t migh t facilitat e th e proces s o f accommodatio n b y the Kremlin to the new situation.

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Indeed, Washington' s prioritie s remaine d unaltere d whe n i n Marc h 1952 Stali n calle d fo r quadripartit e discussion s o n a peac e treat y creat ing a reunited, neutral , bu t no t necessaril y demilitarize d Germany . Stim ulated presumabl y b y NATO plan s t o boos t militar y capacit y wit h Wes t German help , h e appeare d prepare d t o sacrific e th e Eas t Germa n Com munists; Ulbrich t late r admitte d tha t a positive Wester n respons e woul d have "greatl y endangered " th e SED' s positio n i n th e GDR. 85 Bu t Ache son wa s no t abou t t o hav e thre e year s o f "colossa l effort " t o buil d a powerful allianc e spoiled. 86 Th e allie s proceede d t o conclud e i n Ma y "Contractual Agreements " wit h Bon n tha t allowe d fo r Wes t Germany' s rearmament an d eventua l participatio n i n th e alliance . The y agreed , a s did Wes t Germa n Chancello r Adenauer , tha t th e Sovie t initiativ e threat ened t o dela y ratificatio n o f th e Europea n Defens e Communit y agree ment (whic h wa s designe d t o integrat e Wes t Germa n militar y force s with NATO ) an d devise d a dilator y respons e i n whic h the y objecte d t o the neutralit y clause. 87 Subsequent polic y review s reaffirme d th e basi c thrus t o f NS C 58/ 2 and NS C 68/ 2 o n th e subject o f Easter n Europe , althoug h the y indicate d growing pessimis m regardin g th e abilit y o f th e Unite d State s t o achiev e its ultimat e objectiv e o f detachin g th e satellites . Th e Stat e Departmen t noted i n mid-195 1 tha t th e Communist s wer e i n tota l politica l control , and "popula r discontent , thoug h widespread , ha s no outlet s sufficien t t o threaten th e stabilit y o f th e regimes , owin g t o th e effectivenes s o f th e police syste m an d t o th e popula r convictio n tha t nothin g ca n shak e Soviet contro l shor t o f a U S victory ove r th e USS R i n war." 8 8 War , o n the othe r hand , ha d t o b e avoided , an d th e NS C warne d agains t overes timating America' s abilit y t o foste r peacefu l change. 89 The Special Case of Yugoslavia. I f th e architect s o f th e invigorate d version o f containmen t tempere d thei r dispositio n t o mak e troubl e i n Stalin's backyar d wit h prudence , thei r reactio n t o th e Stalin-Tit o spli t was enthusiasti c an d secretl y le d t o th e inclusio n o f Yugoslavi a i n th e perimeter t o b e defended b y the West. Unti l lat e 194 7 Tito was regarde d in th e Eas t a s a mode l Communist . Bu t b y pursuin g independen t plan s for a Balka n federation , rebuffin g Russia n advice , an d eventuall y purg ing hi s part y o f Stalin' s agents , h e brough t dow n o n hi s hea d th e ful l wrath o f th e Sovie t dictator . Stali n confidentl y expecte d tha t threat s an d subversion woul d soo n brin g a chastene d Yugoslavi a bac k t o th e fold ,

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and o n Jun e 28 , 1948 , th e Cominfor m formall y expelle d th e 'Tit o clique." Instead, Tito' s defianc e o f Stali n arouse d wid e popular support . Despite Washington' s dislik e o f Tito , th e spli t wa s immediatel y rec ognized b y the CIA as "the mos t significant developmen t i n internationa l communism i n twent y years." 90 Kennan' s initia l repor t t o th e Nationa l Security Counci l cautione d tha t i t would b e " a frivolou s an d undignifie d error o n ou r par t t o assum e tha t becaus e Tit o ha d falle n ou t wit h Stali n he coul d no w b e considere d ou r 'friend. ' " Still , realpolitik dictate d tha t a distinctio n b e mad e betwee n th e Sovie t threa t an d communism , an d although Tito' s regim e wa s "deepl y distasteful, " th e Unite d State s shoul d "recognize tha t i f Yugoslavi a i s no t t o b e subservien t t o a n outsid e power it s internal regim e i s basically it s ow n business. " The West there fore shoul d neithe r faw n o n Tit o no r repe l hi s advance s bu t sustai n th e demonstration effec t o f a successful defectio n fro m Moscow. 91 By Februar y 194 9 Tit o ha d com e t o b e regarde d a s "perhap s ou r most preciou s asse t i n th e struggl e t o contai n an d weake n Russia n expansion," an d a n activ e policy was formulated t o bolster his resistanc e to Stalin . Pressur e t o liberaliz e hi s regim e woul d b e suspended . Instead , the control s o n exports , includin g munitions , woul d b e lifte d an d eco nomic ai d coordinate d wit h th e allies . Th e onl y qui d pr o qu o woul d b e Tito's abandonmen t o f assistanc e t o th e Communis t guerrilla s i n Greece. 92 Over th e nex t fe w years , America n an d othe r Wester n economi c ai d flowed t o Yugoslavi a (se e chapte r 5) , bu t i t wa s recognize d tha t suc h limited assistanc e coul d no t b y itsel f sustai n Tit o i f Stali n wa s deter mined t o crus h th e heresy . A yea r afte r th e histori c schism , indication s wer e tha t direc t Sovie t attack o n Yugoslavi a wa s unlikely . Thi s wa s on e o f th e product s o f "Operation Silver, " a CI A eavesdroppin g facilit y i n Vienna. 93 B y No vember th e NS C calculate d that , althoug h Mosco w appeare d t o b e contemplating mor e drasti c action , thi s wa s probabl y a wa r o f nerves , for th e Sovie t Unio n wa s no t likel y t o ris k a direc t militar y attac k tha t could develo p int o a genera l conflict . However , th e satellit e armie s i n Bulgaria an d Hungar y bega n t o mak e ominou s preparation s aime d a t Yugoslavia.94 Th e NS C estimate d tha t th e Yugoslav s coul d cop e wit h Soviet-directed guerrill a operation s an d eve n wit h a satellit e attac k a s long a s i t di d no t hav e substantia l Sovie t support . I n an y event , th e United State s ha d t o giv e Tito assurance s tha t i t would provid e "limite d military supplies " in the event o f a n attack. 95

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The modalitie s o f logistica l assistanc e wer e worke d ou t wit h th e NATO allies , principall y wit h Britain , an d i n consultatio n wit h th e Yugoslavs. Thi s wa s don e ami d grea t secrec y becaus e o f th e "extrem e sensitivity" o f Belgrade to question s o f Western militar y aid . But matter s did no t sto p a t contingenc y planning . A s Fran k Lindsay , th e CIA' s Eas t European chief , recalls, "Tito tol d u s that h e wanted weapon s badly , bu t not overtly , becaus e thi s woul d giv e th e Sovie t Unio n a pretex t fo r attacking him . We sent him five shiploads o f weapons." 9 6 The links the n established b y America n militar y an d intelligenc e woul d b e exploite d long afte r th e crisi s had passed . Reviewing the Soviet threat afte r th e outbreak o f the Korean War, th e NSC doubte d tha t th e Sovie t blo c would ti e u p it s force s i n a periphera l area suc h a s Yugoslavi a an d regarde d th e continuin g militar y deploy ments a s designe d fo r "intimidation , deception , o r desir e t o b e abl e t o neutralize Tit o i n th e even t tha t a worl d wa r shoul d ensu e b y inadvert ence in the near future. " Th e reestablishmen t o f contro l ove r Yugoslavi a would brin g definit e militar y advantage s t o th e Sovie t Union , bu t i t could als o hav e a disruptiv e effec t o n othe r Communis t regime s an d parties. There remained , however , th e seriou s possibilit y o f a n attac k b y satellite forces , whic h th e Yugoslav s migh t b e abl e t o repe l i f substantia l military supplie s fro m th e Wes t reache d the m i n time . Wer e th e Sovie t Union nevertheles s t o attac k Tito , the plan wa s to keep the United State s out o f direc t involvemen t bu t t o "suppor t Tit o t o th e exten t possibl e b y supplying arm s an d othe r form s o f indirec t assistanc e a s well a s partici pating i n appropriat e U N action. " Th e NS C considere d i t "doubtfu l whether th e Kremli n conclude s tha t w e woul d g o t o wa r i f Yugoslavi a were to b e attacked eithe r b y its satellite neighbors alon e or b y the USSR and th e satellites." 97 In fact , th e administratio n ha d decide d t o g o to th e limit i n protectin g Tito. Yugoslavi a wa s perceive d i n Washingto n t o b e a significan t asset , the loss of which woul d represen t a serious strategic an d politica l revers e for th e West . A Soviet-dominate d Yugoslavi a woul d mak e NAT O vul nerable i n th e easter n Mediterranean . Arme d wit h th e Korea n experi ence, U.S. policy i n th e even t o f a militar y mov e agains t Yugoslavi a wa s to obtai n an d suppor t Unite d Nation s involvemen t i n defens e o f tha t country's independence . I t wa s anticipate d tha t afte r th e predictabl e Russian vet o o f Securit y Counci l action , th e Genera l Assembl y woul d b e called int o emergenc y sessio n unde r th e freshl y minte d "Unitin g fo r

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Peace" Resolutio n t o authoriz e th e appropriat e measures . Th e contin gency plans coordinated betwee n Washingto n an d Londo n envisage d th e provision o f strategi c an d tactica l ai r support , an d Acheso n an d Nitz e also evoke d th e possibilit y o f resortin g t o atomi c weapon s t o quickl y "localize an d abort " aggressio n agains t Yugoslavia. 98 It appears , then , tha t i n the tens e period o f lat e 1950-5 1 th e Truma n administration committe d itsel f t o ful l militar y containmen t o f Sovie t expansion i n th e Balkans . I t i s no t know n whethe r thi s polic y wa s full y conveyed t o Tito , no r whethe r Stali n go t win d o f i t throug h diplomati c or cover t channels . I n an y case , the West's decisiv e respons e ove r Kore a must hav e had a cautionar y effec t o n th e Sovie t dictator. Th e fact i s tha t the threa t t o Yugoslavi a graduall y receded , the n vanishe d a s Stalin' s heirs mad e thei r peac e wit h Tito . A n over t America n militar y ai d pro gram wa s inaugurate d i n 1951 , an d ther e wer e eve n som e tentativ e overtures mad e t o dra w Tit o int o th e Wester n alliance , but h e remaine d steadfast i n a nonalignmen t postur e tha t grante d fe w concession s t o Western sensibilities . That, i n th e end, was sufficien t i f not optima l fro m Washington's poin t o f view , fo r i t preserve d a mode l o f nationa l com munism tha t wit h th e ai d o f politica l warfar e othe r Eas t European s might b e impelle d t o emulate . Th e subversio n o f Sovie t powe r wa s a more immediat e priorit y tha n th e eradicatio n o f communis m an d ful l self-determination.

America's Propaganda Offensive. America' s relations with th e govern ments o f Easter n Europ e reache d thei r nadi r i n th e earl y 1950s . A grea t totalitarian experimen t i n socia l engineerin g wa s unde r wa y behin d th e impenetrable iro n curtain . Polic e terror , deportation s an d internment , and sho w trials , suc h a s tha t o f Hungary' s Cardina l Mindszenty , sup pressed al l over t opposition . Diplomati c protest s i n 194 9 a t th e "perse cution o f al l political leader s an d partie s no t amenabl e t o th e dictate s o f the minorit y rulin g group s an d denia l o f fre e expression " an d a t viola tions o f th e peac e treaties ' demilitarizatio n claus e wer e summaril y re jected b y Bulgaria , Hungary , an d Romani a a s intrusion s int o sphere s o f domestic jurisdiction. " No r di d American-sponsore d resolution s a t th e United Nation s an d a n advisor y opinio n b y th e Internationa l Cour t o f Justice deflec t th e regimes from thei r path. The United State s blocked th e admission o f thes e three countrie s t o th e United Nation s bu t clun g to it s

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diplomatic outpost s despit e recurrin g expulsion s an d charge s o f espio nage. "Nothing," declare d Acheso n a t Berkele y i n Marc h 1950 , "coul d s o alter th e internationa l climat e a s th e holdin g o f election s i n th e satellit e states in which the will of the people could be expressed." 10° Such publi c appeals an d diplomati c demarche s serve d psychologica l warfar e a s wel l as th e domesti c politica l nee d t o generat e acceptanc e o f th e burden s o f containment. Washingto n wa s a t war , agains t th e Communis t regime s and fo r th e hearts an d minds of the East European peoples . The principa l weapons i n thi s war , apar t fro m economi c sanctions , wer e propagand a and cover t operation s a s th e Unite d State s mounte d a sustaine d cam paign t o undermin e Sovie t power i n Eastern Europe . In June 1948 , followin g th e CIA' s success i n th e Italia n elections , th e National Securit y Counci l authorize d th e establishmen t o f a n Offic e o f Special Operations , linke d t o th e CI A an d charge d wit h th e conduc t o f covert operations . Base d o n a proposa l b y Kennan , th e projec t ha d th e strong suppor t o f th e Presiden t a s wel l a s Georg e Marshal l an d Dea n Acheson. Th e mandat e o f th e soon-rename d Offic e o f Polic y Coordina tion (OPC ) include d "propaganda , economi c warfare ; preventiv e direc t action, includin g sabotage , anti-sabotage , demolitio n an d evacuatio n measures; subversio n agains t hostil e states , includin g assistanc e t o un derground resistanc e movements , guerrillas an d refuge e liberatio n groups. " The onl y provis o wa s tha t suc h operation s ha d t o b e conducte d i n suc h a way tha t th e government coul d "plausibl y disclaim " responsibility. 101 The ma n chose n t o hea d th e OP C wa s Fran k Wisner , a Ne w Yor k lawyer an d forme r OS S operativ e i n Romani a an d Germany , an d h e remained i n charg e whe n th e OP C wa s converte d int o th e CIA' s Direc torate fo r Plan s i n Augus t 1952 . Liberall y funde d an d staffe d b y suc h OSS veterans a s Frank Lindsay , who ha d spen t nin e months wit h Tit o i n 1944, th e OP C becam e a majo r acto r i n th e Eas t Europea n theate r i n collaboration wit h th e British . On e notabl e asset , inherite d fro m th e Nazis, wa s th e Germa n intelligenc e operativ e Reinhar d Gehlen , whos e new sp y organizatio n successfull y penetrate d Eas t Germany . Th e OP C and th e CI A were galvanize d b y the mandate s i n NSC 58/ 2 an d 68/ 2 fo r a cover t offensiv e agains t Easter n Europe . Ther e wa s ne w sens e o f urgency, an d policy directive s called for intensifie d cover t operations an d the encouragemen t o f individua l defection s fro m th e Soviet bloc. 102 In the realm o f psychological warfare , th e peoples o f the Soviet Unio n

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and th e satellite s wer e soo n identifie d a s th e primar y target . Alread y i n early 194 6 Georg e Kenna n ha d aske d th e retire d diploma t Josep h C . Grew t o organiz e a privat e grou p fo r th e tas k o f aidin g an d employin g East Europea n refuge e politicians , an d soo n ther e aros e th e ide a o f helping the m t o communicat e wit h thei r homelands . Ther e wa s a suc cessful preceden t i n RIAS , th e Radi o i n th e America n Secto r o f Berlin , created i n Februar y 194 6 an d oriente d increasingl y t o a n Eas t Germa n audience. O n Jun e 1 , 1949 , th e Nationa l Committe e fo r a Fre e Europ e came int o being , includin g suc h notable s a s Allen Dulle s an d Dwigh t D . Eisenhower. On e of its tasks was to ride herd over East European emigr e organizations, bu t a broadcastin g facilit y becam e it s concret e objective . General Cla y wa s pu t i n charg e o f th e fund-raisin g campaig n Crusad e for Freedom ; a replic a o f th e origina l Libert y Bel l wa s cas t i n England , and thi s "Freedo m Bell " toure d th e Unite d State s t o hel p rais e mone y for Radi o Fre e Europe . Crusad e fo r Freedo m wa s designe d a s muc h t o raise publi c consciousnes s a s t o generat e donations , fo r mos t o f th e funding fo r Radi o Fre e Europe cam e from th e CIA . Radio Fre e Europe , base d i n Munic h an d staffe d largel y b y emigres , began transmittin g o n July 4, 1950 . Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia , Hungary , Poland, Romania , and , fo r a time , Albani a wer e it s targets . Radi o Lib eration (late r Radi o Liberty) , similarl y organize d an d funded , wen t o n the ai r i n 195 3 wit h broadcast s i n Russia n an d late r othe r language s o f the Sovie t Union . Th e purpos e o f RFE , i n Clay' s words , wa s t o "hel p those trappe d behin d th e curtai n t o prepar e fo r th e da y o f liberation. " The Fre e Europ e Committee' s president , C . D . Jackson , pu t i t i n th e language o f psychologica l warfare : t o "creat e condition s o f turmoil " i n the satellites. 103 At the CIA , first Thomas Braden , then Cor d Meyer , wa s put in charge of exercisin g policy contro l ove r RF E "on th e basis of Stat e Department guidance." 104 T o rais e th e moral e o f th e "captiv e peoples " and t o fomen t unres t wer e bot h consisten t wit h th e polic y o f aggressiv e containment, thoug h suc h crusadin g propagand a wa s boun d t o arous e unrealistic hop e o f Wester n aid . Fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e CI A an d the OPC , propaganda an d othe r subversiv e operation s wer e al l part o f a strategy t o weake n enem y regimes , bu t ther e wa s littl e expectatio n tha t unaided interna l oppositio n coul d brin g abou t a Titoist , le t alon e West ern-oriented, secession . Th e military , o n th e othe r hand , looke d upo n propaganda a s a usefu l weapo n i n cas e o f wa r wit h th e Sovie t Union . The Join t Intelligenc e Committe e advise d th e Join t Chief s o f Staf f i n

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September 195 1 tha t whil e th e Eas t Europea n people s an d armie s wer e vulnerable t o psychologica l warfare , "unti l assure d o f effectiv e Allie d support, the y woul d sho w littl e defianc e t o th e Soviet s beyon d slow downs an d mino r cover t assistance" : Among the present Satellites , the most effective result s from psychologica l war fare probably could be developed in Poland. Strong, popular underground movements coul d b e organize d whic h migh t b e abl e t o undertak e localize d arme d action against the Soviets. Effective resistanc e movements could also be expected with the Polish Armed Forces. The Hungarians , observe d th e JIC, wer e a "traditionall y passiv e peopl e [who] consider themselve s a s pawns in the East-West struggl e an d expec t the Wes t t o liberat e them." 1 0 5 A n earlie r Stat e Departmen t pla n fo r psychological warfar e i n th e even t o f wa r observe d similarl y tha t man y East European s "woul d welcom e wa r i n th e hop e o f eventua l libera tion." 1 0 6 Since th e doctrin e o f containmen t no t onl y rule d ou t th e initiatio n o f war b y the United State s bu t als o aime d t o forestal l a Soviet attack , suc h calculations amounte d t o contingenc y plan s an d di d no t addres s th e problem o f propagand a mean s an d objective s i n a tim e o f col d peace . Although th e nee d t o coordinat e polic y wo n som e recognitio n i n th e creation i n April 195 1 of a Psychological Strateg y Board, which include d the under secretar y o f state , the deputy secretar y o f defense , an d th e CI A director, i t too k a revolutio n i n Hungar y t o impos e a sobe r reappraisa l of th e political cost s an d benefit s o f psychologica l warfare . Beginning i n 1949 , th e CI A resorte d t o secre t flight s ove r Easter n Europe t o gathe r intelligenc e and , unti l th e inceptio n o f Radi o Fre e Europe, t o dro p propagand a t o incit e dissidence . In Augus t 1951 , th e first balloo n launc h wa s mad e i n Wes t German y i n a n operatio n tha t over th e years would delive r severa l hundre d millio n propagand a leaflet s to Easter n Europe . The CIA' s Vienna statio n place d o n train s goin g int o Hungary toile t pape r bearin g th e pictur e o f th e hate d dictato r Rakosi . Such tactic s wer e a measur e o f th e impermeabilit y o f th e iro n curtain , for th e OP C had onl y limited succes s in infiltrating agent s into the tightl y controlled polic e state s o f Easter n Europe . I t di d tak e ove r som e o f th e networks o f th e Britis h Secre t Intelligenc e Servic e (SIS) , an d on e o f th e assets acquire d wa s Lt . Col . Jozef Swiatlo , a disillusione d officia l o f th e Polish U B secre t police . H e becam e a ke y figure i n a n extraordinar y game of deception .

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The stor y o f "Operatio n Splinte r Factor " rest s o n bot h corroborate d evidence an d investigation s b y a n Englis h journalist , wh o describe s i t a s "probably th e foremos t intelligenc e battl e o f th e Col d War." 1 0 7 Th e facts ar e tha t th e Sovie t secre t service s bega n i n 194 9 t o orchestrat e a massive purg e o f allege d Titoist s an d Wester n agent s involvin g leadin g figures i n th e Eas t Europea n Communis t parties ; an d tha t i n th e sam e year th e America n Noe l Field , a Communis t fello w travele r wh o ha d worked i n refuge e relie f an d fo r th e OSS , defecte d t o Pragu e an d wa s soon arreste d an d use d t o implicate Communis t traitors . Allen Dulles, a t that tim e a senio r consultan t t o th e CIA , ha d bee n involve d i n Eas t European intelligenc e operations afte r th e war, mainl y to help the escap e of leadin g anti-Communists ; soo n h e was appointe d deput y directo r fo r plans and, in January 1951 , deputy directo r o f the agency. When Swiatl o proposed t o implicate th e Polish securit y chief , Jakub Berman , by brand ing Field a CIA agent, Dulles conceived o f a plan tha t reportedl y h e late r claimed becam e hi s "bigges t success ever" : t o persuad e Lavrent i Beria , the Sovie t secre t polic e boss , wit h contrive d evidenc e tha t th e CI A wa s orchestrating a regionwid e conspirac y o f Titoist s wit h a hug e arm y o f agents an d tha t Fiel d was th e linchpin o f thi s conspiracy. 108 Though alread y i n ful l swing , Stalin' s anti-Tit o campaig n acquire d a new ferocit y afte r th e arres t o f Fiel d an d hi s wife , Herta , an d brothe r Hermann, wh o ha d followe d hi m t o Prague . The Soviet MVD's chie f fo r southeastern Europe , Lt . Gen . Fedo r Bielkin , was give n cart e blanch e t o extirpate traitors , an d h e bega n i n Hungary , wher e th e leadin g hom e Communist, Laszl o Rajk , wa s pu t o n tria l wit h tw o associate s i n Sep tember 194 9 an d subsequentl y executed . Testimony extracte d fro m Fiel d implicated Raj k i n a n America n espionag e network , an d tortur e a s wel l as false promises drove him to confess to a litany of crimes and betrayals . The purges sprea d t o ever y othe r satellite , leading notabl y t o th e impris onment o f th e Romania n Lucreti u Patrascanu , th e executio n o f th e Bulgarian Traich o Rosto v an d th e Albania n Koci Xoxe , an d th e arres t (by Swiatlo! ) i n July 195 1 o f th e alread y disgrace d Stanisla w Gomulka . The purg e i n Czechoslovaki a bega n onl y i n lat e 1950 , an d i t ende d tw o years late r wit h th e tria l an d executio n o f Rudol f Slansk y an d othe r alleged conspirators ; they , too , wer e linke d t o Alle n Dulle s an d th e Fields. 109 Th e obsessiv e searc h fo r traitor s cam e t o a n en d onl y wit h Stalin's death . Most Eas t European partie s ultimately acknowledge d tha t these purge s ha d bee n base d o n fabrications , an d man y o f th e victims ,

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including Rajk , wer e posthumousl y rehabilitated . (Fiel d an d hi s wif e were als o eventuall y release d an d give n $40,00 0 i n compensation , an d they remained i n Budapest.) Fo r Stalin, this terrifying charad e had serve d to impos e iro n disciplin e a t a time when h e was contemplatin g offensiv e action agains t a stil l relativel y wea k Wester n Europe . If , a s th e Britis h source describes , Alle n Dulle s an d th e CI A mounte d a massiv e exercis e in disinformatio n t o fee d Stalin' s paranoia, th e immediate resul t was no t division an d disaffectio n bu t consolidation . Onl y afte r Stalin' s deat h di d the disintegrative aftereffect s o f th e purges begi n to b e felt, principall y i n Hungary, wher e th e party's demoralizatio n materiall y contribute d t o th e outbreak o f revolution . The Promotion of Insurgency. Polic y als o calle d fo r th e encourage ment o f insurgency , an d America' s campaig n t o destabiliz e Sovie t powe r in Easter n Europ e wen t beyon d deceptio n an d psychologica l warfare . The Lodg e bill , passe d b y Congres s i n Jun e 195 0 (Publi c La w 587) , provided fo r militar y recruitmen t o f Eas t Europea n emigres , bu t th e army's respons e wa s slo w an d token . O f th e handfu l actuall y enlisted , twenty-two wer e assigne d i n 195 2 t o th e newl y create d Specia l Forces ; in Septembe r 1953 , some o f th e Specia l Force s wer e redeploye d t o Wes t Germany t o trai n fo r partisa n actio n i n Easter n Europ e i n tim e o f war . Meanwhile, o n th e advic e o f th e join t chief s o f staff , th e OP C wa s give n responsibility fo r paramilitar y operations. 110 The OP C collaborate d wit h th e SI S in aidin g nationalis t partisan s i n the Balti c state s an d th e Ukraine , bu t b y th e earl y 1950 s th e resistanc e movements ha d bee n effectivel y quelled , an d th e progra m ende d i n failure. Th e prospect s wer e apparentl y bette r i n Poland , wher e scattere d partisan activit y b y remnant s o f th e Hom e Arm y persiste d fo r severa l years after th e war. The emigre "Freedo m an d Independence " movemen t (WIN b y it s Polis h initials ) claime d t o hav e extensiv e huma n resource s and organizatio n i n Poland , an d beginnin g i n 195 0 th e OP C responde d with airdrop s o f arms , radios , an d money . Verificatio n o f WIN' s claim s was hampere d b y th e promp t apprehensio n o f agent s dispatche d b y th e CIA. The operation continue d unti l Decembe r 195 2 when Warsaw radi o proudly announce d tha t fo r year s th e loca l en d o f WI N ha d bee n ru n b y the secre t polic e an d ha d bee n makin g fool s o f th e America n col d warriors an d o f unwittin g Polis h dissidents . Albania wa s th e targe t o f th e mos t darin g operation , th e onl y on e

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that aime d directl y t o overthro w a Communis t regime . Washington an d London ha d give n provisiona l recognitio n t o th e Hoxh a regim e i n No vember 1945 , but instea d o f th e promised fre e election s Hoxha impose d rule b y terror . H e als o aide d th e Communist s i n th e Gree k civi l war . A year later , afte r tw o Britis h destroyer s hit mines in the Corf u channel , al l Americans wer e evacuate d fro m Albania . Thoug h isolate d b y Tito' s defection, Albani a remaine d a Sovie t outpost , an d th e Soviet s wer e installing a t Valon a Ba y a submarin e bas e tha t coul d contro l acces s t o the Adriatic . I n London , a secre t "Russi a Committee " reache d th e sam e conclusions a s the American architect s o f containment—tha t promotio n of unres t an d th e liberation o f satellite s b y any means shor t o f war coul d mitigate th e Sovie t threat . In Februar y 1949 , Foreig n Secretar y Ernes t Bevin approve d a plan t o "detac h Albani a fro m th e Soviet orbit." 111 The operation ha d t o be coordinated wit h th e Americans, who, recall s the OPC' s Jame s McCargar , wer e equall y optimisti c tha t "w e ha d onl y to shak e th e tree s an d th e rip e plum s woul d fall." 112 Albania , antici pated Wisner , woul d b e " a clinica l experimen t t o se e whethe r large r rollback operation s woul d b e feasible elsewhere." 113 The Joint Chief s o f Staff concurred , a s di d th e Stat e Department , whic h i n NS C 7 4 judge d that Albania , "b y virtu e o f it s expose d geographica l positio n an d th e relative instabilit y o f th e presen t regime , i s th e mos t vulnerabl e o f th e Satellite State s t o Wester n effort s t o loose n th e Sovie t gri p i n Easter n Europe." 1 1 4 Th e operatio n wa s cloake d i n th e utmos t secrecy , an d Pres ident Truma n gav e only ora l approva l t o preserv e th e optio n o f "plausi ble denial. " The ide a wa s tha t infiltrate d agent s woul d lea d a revol t t o toppl e Hoxha. A CI A repor t i n Decembe r 194 9 foun d tha t whil e th e over whelming majorit y o f Albanian s wer e oppose d t o th e regime , th e secu rity force s wer e strong an d Stali n determine d t o keep his outpost. 115 No r was there hope o f help fro m Tito , who feare d provokin g th e Soviets. But the SI S an d th e OP C proceede d t o cobbl e togethe r a n "Albania n Na tional Committee " fro m variou s emigr e groups , mostl y follower s o f th e exiled Kin g Zog , an d th e paramilitar y trainin g o f recruit s bega n o n Malta. In Octobe r 1949 , th e Britis h lande d tw o partie s o f Albania n partisans o n th e Karaburu n peninsula . Inauspiciously , the y walke d int o an ambush ; fou r wer e killed an d th e rest had t o flee to Greece . The OPC , originall y th e junio r partne r i n th e exercise , intensifie d it s involvement i n 1950 , trainin g a "labo r battalion " o f Albanian s desig -

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nated "Compan y 4000 " i n Wes t German y an d beginnin g airdrop s o f combatants i n November. Th e Sovie t an d Albania n securit y force s showe d uncanny skil l i n capturin g on e missio n afte r another . In fact , wha t wa s apparently calle d "Operatio n Valuable " wa s foredoomed . Th e SIS' s liaison ma n i n Washington , H.A.R . "Kim " Philby , ha d com e unde r suspicion a s earl y a s Ma y 195 1 afte r th e defectio n o f tw o othe r Sovie t spies, Donal d Maclea n an d Gu y Burgess , bu t h e wa s simpl y retired . From him , fro m agent s amon g fre e Albanians , an d fro m th e interroga tion o f capture d partisans , Hoxh a an d Mosco w discovere d al l about th e operation b y th e en d o f 1951 . The Britis h terminate d thei r involvemen t in earl y 1952 , bu t th e OPC , drive n b y bureaucrati c momentu m a s wel l as th e publi c call s fo r liberatio n i n 1952 , persevered fo r tw o mor e year s before throwin g i n th e towe l an d disbandin g Compan y 4000 . Th e bal ance shee t wa s grim . Severa l hundre d Albanian s ha d los t thei r lives , an d the Communist s ha d score d a propaganda victory . In sum , thoug h cover t operation s t o destabiliz e Easter n Europ e an d roll bac k Sovie t power kep t th e Communist s o n thei r toes , they brough t few positiv e results . Suc h disappointment s di d no t alte r th e convictio n of American s an d emigre s engage d i n th e cover t wa r tha t the y wer e fighting fo r a jus t cause . Psychologica l warfare , meanwhile , exploite d the alienatio n o f Eas t Europeans fro m thei r master s an d assure d the m o f the continuin g sympath y o f th e West . T o th e people s seale d of f b y th e hermetic iron curtai n fro m norma l contac t with th e West, the broadcast s that coul d penetrat e jammin g brough t spiritua l comfor t an d som e hop e of liberation . Politics and Liberation. Th e requisite s o f domesti c politics ha d playe d a par t i n th e genesi s o f th e Atlanti c Charter , fo r th e America n peopl e needed a n ideologica l goa l beyon d th e immediat e necessitie s o f nationa l security t o shoulde r th e burde n o f tota l war . Containmen t a s wel l wa s wrapped i n th e ringin g rhetori c o f America n democrati c values . But thi s was a new typ e o f war , wit h shiftin g frontline s an d n o prospec t o f earl y victory. The temptation t o see k new formula s gre w strong . The bipartisa n consensu s exemplifie d b y th e Vandenber g resolutio n soon bega n t o fra y a s th e Communist s triumphe d i n Chin a an d taxe d America's enduranc e i n the bloody an d protracted Korea n War . Partisa n attacks multiplie d o n Roosevelt' s an d Truman' s allege d sellou t o f East ern Europ e a t th e wartime conference s an d o n th e policy o f containmen t

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for bein g too costly an d purel y defensive . Senato r McCarth y le d a witchhunt fo r Communis t fello w traveler s i n th e Stat e Departmen t an d else where wh o wer e responsibl e fo r th e los s o f Chin a an d othe r setbacks , and th e tria l o f Alge r His s persuade d man y tha t America' s interest s ha d been betraye d b y th e Democrati c administrations . Whil e Genera l MacArthur wa s lionize d fo r hi s willingnes s t o wag e atomi c wa r agains t China, Truma n an d Dea n Acheso n cam e t o b e depicte d absurdl y a s sof t on communism . Authentic frustratio n a s wel l a s politica l partisanshi p fuele d wha t became a grea t debat e ove r foreig n policy. 116 Th e Republica n party' s right win g le d th e attac k o n containment , whic h wa s describe d b y Sena tor Alexande r Wile y a s passive , "pantywaist " diplomacy. 117 Th e prof fered alternativ e wa s a t onc e aggressiv e an d isolationist , callin g fo r tougher action , includin g fomentin g revolution s behin d th e iro n curtain , which woul d lea d t o th e defea t o f communis m an d th e trimmin g o f America's militar y an d economi c sacrific e an d commitments . The belligeren t moo d i n Congres s wa s reflecte d b y th e passag e i n October 195 1 o f th e Kerste n amendmen t t o th e Mutua l Securit y Ac t (Public Law 164 , sec. 101 [a]). It allocated $10 0 millio n "fo r an y selecte d persons wh o ar e residin g i n o r escapee s fro m [th e Sovie t Unio n an d th e satellites] eithe r t o for m suc h persons into elements of th e military force s supporting th e Nort h Atlanti c Treat y Organizatio n o r fo r othe r pur poses." Th e Unite d States , sai d th e Republica n congressma n fro m Wis consin, shoul d assur e the East Europeans tha t "w e will do everything w e can t o wor k fo r thei r eventua l liberation " and , a t th e opportun e time , "actually assist " the m i n liberatin g themselves. 118 Mosco w reacte d an grily, i n diplomati c note s an d a t th e Unite d Nations , a t th e interferenc e in domesti c affair s suggeste d b y th e "residin g in " clause , bu t th e mor e lasting impac t o f th e Kerste n amendmen t la y i n th e real m o f psycho logical warfare , i n inducin g Eas t Europea n misapprehension s abou t America's intent . By early 1952 , th e notio n tha t ther e existe d a dynami c alternativ e t o the polic y o f containmen t ha d becom e widespread ; a s Pau l Nitz e pu t it , "the evolutio n o f ou r polic y ha d outru n publi c understandin g an d sup port." 1 1 9 Th e stalemat e i n Kore a wa s th e mos t immediat e issue , bu t much o f th e debat e focuse d o n Easter n Europe . Jame s Burnham , th e author o f a n influentia l boo k entitle d Containment or Liberation, de fined a polic y o f liberatio n a s "th e vie w tha t th e ke y t o th e situatio n i s

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what happen s an d wha t ca n b e mad e t o happe n i n Easter n Europe. " Commitment t o th e goa l o f liberation , i n hi s analysis , mean t "all-side d political warfare ; auxiliar y militar y an d para-militar y action s wher e called for ; adequat e preparatio n fo r whateve r militar y actio n ma y b e required i n th e future." 120 Th e critic s o f containmen t wer e presumabl y ignorant o f secre t commitment s an d cover t measures , fo r wha t the y denounced wa s a travesty o f th e operational policy . Dissatisfied wit h th e results, they blamed the policy for th e constraints o f the global alignmen t of forces . The mos t prominen t exponen t o f liberatio n wa s Joh n Foste r Dulles , whose lon g experienc e i n foreig n affair s (includin g servin g a s a n advise r to Truman ) mad e hi m a leadin g contende r fo r th e pos t o f secretar y o f state i n a Republica n administration . H e ha d bee n advocatin g a mor e offensive strateg y o f liberation eve r since 1949 . In its fullest formulation , published i n Ma y 1952 , Dulles' s alternativ e calle d fo r th e dynami c us e of idea s base d o n mora l principles . By making it "publicl y know n tha t i t wants an d expect s liberation t o occur," th e United State s could galvaniz e the captiv e people s an d "creat e ne w opportunitie s fo r liberation. " Th e concrete mean s t o tha t en d propose d b y Dulle s differe d littl e fro m existing tactic s o f psychologica l an d economi c warfare , an d h e dis claimed an y intentio n o f sparkin g of f "blood y uprising s an d reprisals. " But h e averred , citin g Tito' s defection , tha t "enslavemen t ca n b e mad e so unprofitable tha t th e maste r wil l le t go his grip." m121 In th e sprin g o f 1952 , Dulle s submitte d t o Genera l Eisenhower , th e putative leade r o f th e GOP' s internationalis t wing , a polic y proposa l that include d bot h liberatio n an d th e creatio n o f a militar y deterren t capable o f massiv e retaliation . Ik e foun d th e latte r mor e attractiv e tha n the former , an d indee d liberatio n wa s mor e i n tune with th e belligerenc e of Senato r Rober t Taft' s nationalist-isolationis t wing . Dulle s neverthe less threw his support t o the general an d proceeded t o draft a Republica n foreign polic y plan k tha t coul d reconcil e th e tw o wings . I t promise d t o "repudiate al l commitment s containe d i n secre t understanding s suc h a s those o f Yalt a whic h ai d Communis t enslavements " an d replac e th e "negative, futil e an d immoral " polic y o f containmen t wit h a messag e o f liberation tha t woul d "se t u p strain s an d stresse s withi n th e captiv e world whic h wil l mak e th e ruler s impoten t t o continu e i n thei r mon strous ways an d mar k th e beginnin g o f th e end." m122 In th e electio n campaign , notabl y i n hi s American Legio n conventio n

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address o n Augus t 25 , Eisenhowe r pai d lipservic e t o liberatio n wit h circumlocutions abou t peacefu l instrument s t o ai d thos e wh o year n fo r freedom. 123 Tw o day s later , a t th e America n Politica l Scienc e Associa tion conventio n i n Buffalo , Dulle s wa s mor e forthcomin g i n outlinin g a strategy fo r stirrin g u p an d aidin g resistanc e movements , bu t h e righ teously dismisse d Averel l Harriman' s warnin g abou t provokin g prema ture revolt s an d hi s evocatio n o f th e Warsa w massacre. 124 Reprove d b y Eisenhower, who cultivate d th e image of a peacemaker an d was sensitiv e to th e alar m liberatio n ha d cause d amon g th e Europea n allies , a chas tened Dulle s stresse d relianc e o n peacefu l mean s an d Titoism . Excessiv e rhetoric wa s curbed , an d Eisenhower' s promis e t o en d th e war i n Kore a overshadowed th e issu e of Easter n Europe , bu t a s late a s Octobe r Eisen hower reiterate d hi s commitmen t t o a "mor e dynami c foreig n polic y which, b y peaceful means , will endeavor t o brin g abou t th e liberatio n o f the enslave d peoples." 125 Sensitive to the popular appea l of liberation particularly amon g ethni c voters, th e Democrat s wer e reduce d t o arguin g tha t th e promis e o f liberation withou t externa l militar y suppor t wa s irresponsibl e an d tha t all peacefu l effort s wer e alread y bein g exerted , thoug h Adla i Stevenso n evoked th e additiona l optio n o f negotiation . Th e apparen t inconsistenc y between th e advocac y o f liberatio n an d o f budgetar y stringenc y als o drew unfavorabl e comment . Bu t eve n i f th e salienc e o f liberatio n a s a major campaig n issu e wa s reduce d b y Eisenhower' s ambivalence , th e GOP exploited i t and assigne d th e former ambassado r t o Poland, Arthu r Bliss Lane , t o th e tas k o f winnin g ove r ethni c voters . Polish-American s and othe r Eas t European "hyphenates " (wh o numbered som e 1 1 millio n in all , no t includin g Germans ) wer e no t unreceptiv e t o allegation s o f a Yalta sellou t (on e GOP pamphlet was entitled Betrayal! Over 100,000,000 East Europeans by the Democratic Administration) an d th e promis e o f rollback. In th e end , thes e tactic s di d stimulat e defection s fro m a tradi tionally Democrati c constituency , reducin g tha t party' s Polis h vot e fro m 70 t o aroun d 5 0 percent , bu t the y contribute d onl y marginall y t o Eisen hower's landslid e victory. 126 This wa s th e onl y America n electio n i n whic h polic y regardin g East ern Europ e occasione d significan t debate . Whil e i t woul d b e unfai r t o Dulles an d othe r moralisti c crusader s t o dismis s liberatio n a s merel y a cynical electora l tactic , the y canno t escap e responsibilit y fo r arousin g unrealistic expectation s a t hom e an d abroad . Liberatio n ha d a lastin g

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effect o n th e outsid e worl d an d i n Congress , wher e it s superficia l belli gerence overshadowe d it s lac k o f distinctiv e substance . Close r scrutin y revealed tha t i t offere d n o ne w America n commitmen t t o fre e th e satel lites. Bu t th e Europea n allies , bein g o n th e frontline , apprehende d th e threat o f violen t confrontation , whil e th e satellit e people s hear d th e promise o f a crusade fo r thei r release . In Congress , b y the en d o f January 195 3 five separate resolution s ha d been introduce d callin g fo r disavowa l o f th e siniste r deal s mad e a t wartime conference s a t th e expens e o f th e Eas t Europeans . Th e roa d from th e Atlanti c Charte r ha d bee n rough , an d no t al l th e pitfall s wer e avoided b y America' s leaders . Th e clamo r fo r repudiatio n o f Teheran , Yalta, an d Potsda m indicate d th e distanc e lef t t o trave l befor e purpos e and power wer e finally reconciled .

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JLhe ambiguitie s o f liberatio n di d no t disappea r wit h Eisenhower' s triumph. A successio n struggl e i n th e Kremli n presente d th e Wes t wit h new opportunitie s a s well a s uncertainties. Stalinism' s oppressiv e weigh t drove Eas t European s t o confron t thei r masters , first i n Czechoslovaki a and Eas t Germany , the n i n Polan d an d Hungary . Th e prospec t o f revis ing th e divisio n o f Europ e flickere d briefly , the n die d out . Th e securit y priorities o f Washingto n an d Mosco w remaine d unaltered , an d th e per manence o f Sovie t rul e ove r Easter n Europ e wa s reconfirmed . Thi s wa s a disma l outcom e fo r a n administratio n whos e electio n campaig n ha d been marke d b y sonorous promise s t o restor e freedo m t o th e oppressed . The impac t o f liberatio n o n America n politic s wane d rapidl y afte r Eisenhower's election , bu t a crusadin g spiri t continue d t o inspir e tru e believers i n th e CI A an d i n Congress . America' s messag e o f hop e t o th e East European s wa s ritualisticall y reiterate d b y th e presiden t an d hi s secretary o f stat e an d b y th e propagand a organs , wha t th e CIA' s Fran k Wisner calle d hi s "might y Wurlitzer. " "W e shal l neve r acquiesc e i n th e enslavement o f an y peopl e i n orde r t o purchas e fancie d gai n fo r our selves," said Eisenhowe r i n hi s first Stat e o f th e Unio n message. 1 Bu t h e also observe d privatel y tha t h e "alway s though t Foste r wa s a bi t to o optimistic" abou t change s or upheaval s i n the satellites. 2 50

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At th e Foreig n Relation s Committe e hearing s o n hi s nomination , Foster Dulle s use d hi s favorit e metapho r i n predictin g tha t i f th e Unite d States kep t aliv e th e Eas t Europeans ' hop e o f liberatio n th e Sovie t Union' s "indigestion wil l become s o acute that i t might b e fatal." 3 Dulle s insiste d that thos e wh o doubte d tha t thi s coul d b e accomplishe d b y mora l pres sure didn' t kno w wha t the y wer e talkin g about . Tito' s rule , howeve r reprehensible, was a n exampl e o f successfu l heresy . In Congress , th e backwas h o f liberatio n produce d a serie s o f Repub lican resolution s demandin g repudiatio n o f Yalta . Th e troubl e wa s tha t the State Department's file s produced n o evidence to suppor t th e popula r allegation tha t Roosevel t ha d secretl y sol d ou t th e Eas t Europeans . Seeking bipartisa n support , th e administratio n introduce d a moderat e "Captive People s Resolution " tha t calle d fo r self-determinatio n and , i n deference t o the sensibilities of Democrats , simply blamed th e Soviets fo r flouting th e term s o f Allie d agreement s suc h a s th e Declaratio n o n Liberated Europe . Speakin g i n it s defense , Dulle s insiste d tha t th e reso lution wa s "n o cal l t o blood y an d senseles s revolution " bu t wa s neces sary t o reassur e th e Eas t European s an d generat e a "spiritua l power " that woul d ultimatel y overcom e Sovie t dictatorship. 4 Neithe r conserva tive Republican s no r libera l Democrat s wer e satisfie d wit h th e resolu tion, an d th e resulting , bitte r politica l wranglin g wa s mercifull y brough t to a n end b y news of Stalin' s deat h o n March 5 , 1953 , much t o the relie f of Eisenhowe r an d Dulles . T o persis t wit h th e resolutio n "woul d b e difficult no w becaus e i t woul d loo k a s i f w e wer e rejectin g th e peac e bids," explained Dulles. 5 Rollback through Negotiation? Th e deat h o f th e grea t dictato r wa s unforeseen, an d th e presiden t complaine d a t a cabine t meetin g thre e days late r abou t th e Stat e Department' s unpreparedness : "W e hav e n o plan. W e ar e no t eve n sur e wha t differenc e hi s deat h makes." 6 Th e difference depended , o f course , a s muc h o n Washingto n a s on Moscow . Stalin's unexpecte d not e o f Marc h 10 , 1952 , invitin g talk s o n Germa n reunification an d hi s subsequent offe r t o meet with Eisenhowe r ha d bee n summarily rebuffed . Th e CIA' s estimat e regardin g th e consequence s o f his demis e forecas t continuit y i n Sovie t domesti c an d foreig n polic y while the successors avoided difficul t decision s and struggled fo r suprem acy.7 The ne w leade r appeare d t o b e Georg i Malenkov , wh o di d displa y a dispositio n t o tal k wit h th e West . I n a speec h a t Stalin' s funera l

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Malenkov calle d fo r peacefu l coexistence , an d late r h e told th e Suprem e Soviet tha t h e wa s read y t o negotiat e o n al l dispute d o r undecide d questions. These overtures , probabl y reinforce d b y confidentia l messages , ar rived a t a tim e whe n Wes t Germany' s integratio n int o th e Wester n military allianc e wa s reachin g it s fina l phase . Th e signin g i n Ma y 195 2 of th e Europea n Defens e Communit y Treat y appeare d t o settl e th e mat ter. However , whil e consensu s reigne d amon g th e allies ove r th e nee d t o consolidate th e securit y o f fre e Europe , no t al l o f the m sa w clearl y o r fully condone d th e fatefu l significanc e o f thi s step . I f Wes t German y became a full-fledge d membe r o f th e Wester n Alliance , it s statu s woul d no longe r b e ope n t o East-Wes t negotiation , an d th e divisio n o f Europ e could onl y b e undone b y unilateral concession s o n th e part o f th e Sovie t Union. Suc h a prospect di d no t distur b Adenaue r o r Dulles . For bot h o f them, th e stabilit y an d securit y promised b y the EDC fa r outweighe d th e loss o f negotiatin g flexibilit y o n th e questio n o f Germa n reunification . The French , thoug h secretl y fearfu l o f a reunifie d Germany , wer e to o insecure t o welcom e fundamenta l reconsideratio n o f th e principle s o f Western security . They were, therefore, mor e ambivalent about the EDC. Doctrinal adherenc e t o th e priorit y o f allianc e buildin g require d tha t Stalin's an d Malenkov' s overture s b e interprete d a s spoilin g tactic s de signed to delay the West's military integratio n an d a s offering n o genuin e opportunity fo r negotiation . Thi s pessimisti c estimat e o f Sovie t inten tions dre w strengt h fro m th e sorr y recor d o f postwa r diplomacy , bu t i t also reflecte d a n elemen t o f convenien t fatalis m tha t rule d ou t th e ver y possibility o f chang e an d compromis e i n th e Kremlin' s calculation s o f Soviet interests . Eisenhower and Dulles vs. Churchill. Whil e Dulles' s predispositio n was t o constru e th e Sovie t peac e bid s a s phon y an d a trap , Churchil l yearned fo r on e last attempt a t ending the cold war an d trie d t o persuad e Washington t o seiz e th e opportunity . I f Eisenhowe r wa s elected , h e observed i n June 1952 , he would "hav e anothe r sho t a t peac e b y mean s of a meetin g o f th e Bi g Three." 8 Th e secretar y o f state' s first reactio n was t o kee p u p th e pressur e o n Moscow , bu t Fran k Wisne r warne d against provocative statements . The satellites, he reported, were a tinderbox, an d th e CI A needed tim e to prepare fo r exploitatio n o f a revolt. 9 Eisenhower opte d fo r wha t h e regarde d a s a conciliator y gesture .

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"The slat e i s clean, " h e tol d hi s chie f speechwriter , Emme t Hughes ; "Now le t u s begi n talkin g t o eac h other." 10 In a speec h delivere d o n April 1 6 befor e th e America n Societ y o f Newspape r Editors , entitle d "The Chanc e fo r Peace, " th e presiden t invite d th e Soviet s t o negotiat e "universal disarmament. " Armistic e i n Korea , a n Austria n peac e treaty , the reunificatio n o f German y b y fre e elections , an d freedo m fo r othe r nations—"including thos e o f Easter n Europe"—t o choos e thei r for m of governmen t woul d b e appropriat e demonstration s o f Sovie t sincer ity.11 Thi s unexceptionabl e shoppin g lis t elicite d a n offende d respons e from Moscow , notabl y regardin g th e referenc e t o Easter n Europe . Dulles , meanwhile, felt compelle d t o reassert publicly the importance o f assurin g the East Europeans tha t "w e d o not accep t their captivity a s a permanen t fact o f history." 12 Churchill, wh o dislike d an d distruste d Dulles , ignore d th e advic e o f the Foreig n Offic e an d muc h o f hi s cabine t an d continue d t o advocat e negotiation. O n Ma y 11 , i n a foreig n polic y speec h i n th e Hous e o f Commons, he called fo r a n earl y summi t meetin g without preconditions . In th e event , th e mistrus t o f th e Russian s an d single-minde d pursui t o f the ED C exemplifie d b y Dulle s an d Adenaue r prevaile d ove r Churchill' s boldness an d Eisenhower' s mor e tentativ e dispositio n t o negotiate . O n Dulles's recommendatio n th e summi t proposa l wa s simpl y pu t o n th e agenda o f a n American-British-Frenc h conference , which—becaus e o f a stroke Churchil l suffere d i n June an d a Frenc h chang e o f government — was postpone d unti l December . Thu s Malenkov' s (and , apparently , Beria's) willingnes s t o negotiat e wa s no t tested , an d Churchil l privatel y expressed disappointmen t i n a "wea k an d stupid " Ike. 13 It i s difficul t t o avoi d th e conclusio n tha t th e Wes t misse d a rar e opportunity i n th e sprin g an d summe r o f 195 3 t o renegotiat e th e divi sion o f Europe . Th e stake s wer e immense ; th e risk s appeare d manage able. Stalin's uncertai n successor s coul d no t hav e bee n expecte d t o com promise Sovie t security , bu t wit h Wester n incentive s the y migh t hav e been induce d t o redefin e th e condition s o f tha t security . Thei r fea r o f Germany wa s historically well-founded , an d the specter o f West Germa n rearmament haunte d them . Th e threa t o f suc h rearmamen t wa s a bar gaining chi p o f tremendou s valu e i n th e West' s diplomati c arsenal . Th e EDC proposal mad e the threat tangible and apparently immediate . Western security woul d hardl y hav e bee n damage d b y simpl y puttin g Germa n rearmament o n th e agend a o f a summi t conference . America' s strategi c

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military supremac y remaine d a n adequat e guarante e o f Wester n Eu rope's security , althoug h th e Sovie t Union' s successfu l tes t o f a thermo nuclear devic e i n Augus t 195 3 serve d a s a warnin g tha t th e advantag e would no t las t long . As fo r th e ris k t o Wester n unity , Churchill' s advocac y o f a summi t without precondition s wa s itsel f a departur e fro m allianc e orthodoxy , while th e Frenc h wer e divide d o n th e desirabilit y o f th e ED C an d woul d eventually scuttl e th e scheme . The military integratio n o f West German y into th e allianc e cam e tw o year s late r b y includin g th e German s i n th e Western Europea n Union , an d subsequen t summitr y n o longe r ha d a realistic chanc e o f forgin g a n East-Wes t compromis e attenuatin g Eu rope's divisio n int o blocs . The Issue of German Unification. Eve n this tangible ris k was arguabl y outweighed b y th e potential benefit s o f negotiation . Unificatio n stil l ha d vast suppor t amon g Eas t an d Wes t Germans , an d whil e Adenaue r an d his part y place d Wester n integratio n ahea d o f unification , th e prospec t of a reunite d an d neutralize d German y woul d i n al l likelihoo d hav e proven politicall y irresistible . A Stat e Departmen t repor t i n Jul y foun d "mounting convictio n tha t th e stati c foreig n polic y o f th e presen t gov ernment ha s becom e obsolescen t an d tha t eventua l reunificatio n migh t be brough t abou t b y mean s shor t o f complet e integratio n wit h th e West." 14 A s lat e a s 1955 , a confidentia l Stat e Departmen t estimat e concluded tha t a neutralized German y woul d inclin e as far a s possible t o the Wes t an d "woul d see k t o equi p an d deplo y it s force s s o tha t the y might bes t complemen t NAT O strengt h i n Europ e an d improv e th e West's strategi c position . The y migh t eve n attemp t limite d cover t con tacts wit h th e NATO power s i n orde r t o work ou t informa l understand ings concernin g Wester n strategi c planning." 15 Still , fro m a Wester n perspective, relinquishin g Wes t German y a s a militar y bas e an d all y would hav e bee n a majo r concession , necessitatin g fundamenta l recon sideration o f securit y condition s fo r th e rest o f Western Europe . For a t leas t som e o f th e Sovie t leaders , th e prospec t o f a neutralized , largely disarmed , unite d German y migh t plausibl y hav e appeare d t o represent th e lesse r threat . T o b e sure , th e plan s t o exten d Sovie t influ ence b y th e Re d Arm y an d th e intermediar y o f Communis t partie s ha d been hatche d befor e war' s en d an d implemente d systematicall y through out Eastern Europe . But these plans were driven more by security consid -

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5

erations tha n b y purely ideologica l imperatives . The former alway s over rode th e latte r i n Sovie t foreig n policy . Stali n an d hi s successor s re mained uncertai n abou t th e viabilit y o f Eas t Germany . Strippe d o f it s industrial plan t an d hemorrhagin g throug h th e ope n sor e o f Berlin , i t was a t leas t i n th e shor t ru n a questionabl e economi c asset . Sovie t control wa s tota l (an d was brutall y asserte d a t th e time of th e June 195 3 riots), ye t th e zon e wa s no t full y integrate d int o th e bloc . In sum , i t appears tha t Mosco w wa s keepin g it s Germa n option s ope n an d migh t have bargaine d a t a tim e whe n i t wa s stil l weake r strategicall y tha n th e United States . Negotiation o n th e futur e o f German y woul d hav e necessaril y ad dressed a relate d Sovie t idea , tha t o f a ne w Europea n securit y regim e guaranteeing postwa r borders . Thi s scheme , whic h i n th e even t reache d fruition onl y i n th e 1970 s wit h th e Helsink i conference , sough t Wester n (and therefor e German ) acquiescenc e i n th e Oder-Neiss e boundar y be tween German y an d Poland , enhancemen t o f th e Sovie t Union' s statu s as a majo r Europea n power , an d attenuatio n o f th e Wes t Europeans ' perceived nee d fo r a n American-le d militar y alliance . Th e Wes t woul d have ha d t o weig h carefull y th e for m an d implication s o f suc h a securit y regime, whic h i t ha d previousl y dismisse d a s a propaganda ploy . Ye t i n September 1953 , Dulle s himsel f raise d wit h Eisenhowe r th e possibilit y of a "spectacula r effort " t o negotiat e a mutual withdrawa l o f Sovie t an d American force s fro m Europ e a s wel l a s a n arm s contro l agreement : "The presen t i s a propitiou s tim e fo r suc h a move , i f i t i s eve r t o b e made, because we will be speaking fro m strengt h rathe r tha n weakness. " The presiden t expresse d "emphati c agreement " wit h th e nee d fo r a n initiative t o reduc e tensions , bu t ther e i s n o evidenc e tha t th e secretar y of state' s uncharacteristi c fligh t o f fanc y wen t further. 16 Negotiated resolutio n o f th e Germa n questio n woul d inevitabl y hav e had a profoun d impac t o n th e res t o f Easter n Europe . Th e variou s Stalinist regime s justifie d thei r hars h rul e a t leas t i n par t wit h constan t reminders o f th e threa t o f Germa n revanchis m an d th e unremittin g hostility o f th e West . Malenkov' s readines s t o tal k di d no t guarante e that th e politica l statu s o f th e satellite s wa s ope n t o negotiation , bu t th e creation o f a unifie d an d neutralize d German y an d a ne w Europea n security regim e woul d hav e radicall y altere d th e perception s o f Eas t Europeans. Th e ne w leader s i n th e Kremli n wer e alread y inten t o n alleviating Stalinis m i n thei r satellit e domain , an d a mor e settle d inter -

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national environmen t woul d hav e reinforce d th e pressure s fo r domesti c liberalization. Whethe r thi s proces s o f decompressio n coul d hav e pro ceeded smoothl y enoug h t o forestal l eruption s suc h a s tha t whic h oc curred i n Hungar y i n 195 6 i s a questio n tha t lie s a t th e limit s o f specu lation. The ailin g Churchil l persevere d i n hi s ques t fo r a meetin g wit h th e Soviets, muc h t o th e irritatio n o f hi s foreig n secretary , Anthon y Eden , who lik e Dulles regarded th e strengthening o f NATO a s the priority tha t overrode al l othe r considerations . Whe n hi s proposa l t o mee t Eisen hower i n Octobe r i n th e Azore s wa s rejected , h e conclude d (accordin g to hi s secretary ) tha t th e presiden t di d no t wan t t o b e confronte d wit h a demand fo r a conferenc e wit h th e Soviet s tha t h e wa s unwillin g t o accept. Ye t Churchil l stil l thought tha t a n explorator y visi t to Malenko v "might d o goo d an d coul d d o n o harm. " A t th e Bermud a conferenc e i n December, th e presiden t dismisse d Churchill' s "double-dealing " ap proach o f strengt h an d conciliatio n wit h th e remark tha t Russi a wa s jus t the sam e whore i n a new dress. 17 In Februar y 1954 , a t th e Berli n conferenc e o f foreig n ministers , Vy acheslav Moloto v advance d a "Draf t Genera l Europea n Treat y o f Col lective Securit y i n Europe, " whic h aime d t o unit e al l Europea n state s (including th e tw o Germanys ) i n commo n defense , relegatin g th e Unite d States an d Canad a t o th e rol e o f observer s i n th e process . O n th e question o f a Germa n peac e treaty , th e Sovie t proposa l fo r Germa n representation a t a peace conferenc e b y a coalition governmen t i n whic h West an d Eas t German s woul d hav e equa l statu s wa s countere d b y Western insistenc e o n a freel y elected , all-Germa n government . I n March , the Sovie t Unio n agree d t o America n participatio n i n th e treat y an d made th e nove l suggestio n tha t NAT O coul d b e preserve d i f i t wa s expanded t o includ e th e USS R an d th e Eas t Europeans . Th e Wester n powers, embroile d i n dispute s ove r ratificatio n o f th e ill-fate d EDC , dismissed thes e overture s a s unrealistic , particularl y i n ligh t o f Sovie t objections t o fre e election s a s a prelude t o Germa n unification . The followin g June , durin g a visi t t o Washington , Churchil l foun d Eisenhower mor e favorabl y dispose d t o th e ide a o f a summit . Afte r Dulles coole d th e president's ardor , Churchil l decide d t o g o to th e USSR without th e American s an d "as k fo r freedo m fo r Austri a a s a n earnes t of bette r relations. " Ede n an d th e cabine t wer e appalle d a t th e prim e minister's initiative , an d i n th e even t th e telegra m t o Moloto v evince d a

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cool reply. 18 I t i s temptin g bu t wron g t o dismis s Churchill' s single minded pursui t o f negotiation s a s the mania o f a n old an d vain ma n pas t his peak. H e wa s al l that, bu t h e als o perceived th e necessit y o f attempt ing to brea k a deadlock no t of his creation much a s he had fel t compelle d in 194 4 t o reac h a separat e agreemen t wit h Stali n o n influenc e i n th e Balkans. Wit h hi s departur e fro m offic e i n Apri l 195 5 th e Wes t los t it s wisest leader . Hi s ha d bee n a lon e voic e i n allie d council s durin g th e brief momen t whe n summitr y migh t hav e produce d mor e tha n empt y phrases. Later, other s regrette d th e misse d opportunity . " I thin k I mad e a mistake i n no t takin g th e initiativ e an d recommendin g suc h a meeting, " records Charle s Bohlen , the n U.S . ambassado r t o Moscow. 19 Prudenc e and conservatis m prevailed ; consolidatio n o f th e West' s securit y appa ratus proceeded ; an d th e divisio n o f Europ e remaine d th e subjec t o f pious an d ineffectua l condemnation . The prospect s fo r successfu l negotiatio n o n th e Germa n questio n ha d altered dramaticall y b y th e tim e a summi t conferenc e wa s finally con vened i n Genev a i n Jul y 1955 . Th e leadershi p struggl e i n th e Kremli n had bee n resolved i n favor o f Nikit a Khrushchev , wh o too k initiative s t o stabilize hi s empire , pacif y Tito , an d explor e opportunitie s i n th e thir d world. When , i n Octobe r 195 4 i n Paris , th e Wester n power s overcam e the ED C fiasco an d devise d a ne w formul a t o brin g Wes t German y int o NATO, th e Russian s resorte d t o last-ditc h attempt s t o forestal l Germa n rearmament. The y convene d i n lat e Novembe r a n Easter n blo c "Euro pean Securit y Conference " tha t warne d tha t a countervailin g allianc e would b e forme d i f th e Pari s agreement s wer e confirmed . The y als o professed a ne w willingnes s t o conside r free , all-Germa n elections . Th e West, a s before, sa w only destructiv e motive s behin d thes e maneuvers . In a spectacula r volte-face , Moloto v i n Marc h 195 5 unilaterall y of fered th e Austrian s a peace treat y wit h neutralization . Consummate d b y the fou r occupyin g power s o n Ma y 1 5 i n Vienn a amids t grea t rejoicing , the dea l wa s presumabl y intende d b y th e Russian s a s a n incentiv e t o those German s tempte d b y neutrality . Th e previou s day , however , th e Soviet Unio n ha d stage d th e signin g o f th e Warsa w Treaty , bindin g th e satellites eve r close r t o thei r mentor . Dulle s chos e t o constru e th e Aus trian treat y a s a Sovie t retrea t an d opine d o n televisio n tha t Austria' s neighbors, Czechoslovaki a an d Hungary , "ma y find freedo m conta gious." 20 H e als o considere d tha t Mosco w ha d pai d th e pric e fo r a

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summit meetin g an d relaxe d hi s previou s oppositio n t o suc h a confer ence. At th e summit , th e Sovie t leader s demande d th e disbandmen t o f th e two alliance s an d th e withdrawa l o f foreig n troop s fro m Europ e a s th e precondition t o an y discussio n o f Germa n reunification . A t th e subse quent meetin g o f foreig n ministers , th e Wes t countere d wit h Eden' s proposal fo r all-Germa n fre e elections , reunification , mutua l securit y guarantees, an d a demilitarize d stri p alon g Germany' s easter n frontier . Neither sid e wa s dispose d t o compromise , an d Dulle s reporte d t o th e Senate Foreig n Relation s Committe e tha t th e Genev a meeting s a t leas t had th e salutar y effec t o f reconcilin g th e Wes t German s t o th e practica l impossibility o f reunification. 21 Peacefu l coexistence , haile d i n th e pres s as th e "spiri t o f Geneva, " reste d o n mutua l an d taci t acceptanc e o f tw o exclusive sphere s o f influenc e i n Europe . Rollback by Other Means. I f the mos t propitiou s momen t fo r negotia tion was not seized by the United States , what remained o f the revisionis t impulse behin d th e slogan s o f liberatio n an d rollback ? Durin g th e sum mer o f 195 3 th e administratio n conducte d a planning exercise , "Opera tion Solarium, " t o conside r broa d foreig n polic y options . Separat e stud y groups a t th e National Wa r Colleg e reviewed th e merits o f containment , deterrence, an d liberation , a s wel l a s o f negotiatio n wit h th e Soviet s within a two-yea r tim e limit . Georg e Kennan , thoug h ou t o f favo r wit h the ne w secretar y o f state , participate d i n th e exercis e an d ha d th e satisfaction o f winnin g th e president' s approva l fo r a modifie d versio n of th e containmen t strategy. 22 I n fact , th e "Ne w Look " strategi c con cept, adopte d i n Octobe r 195 3 a s NS C 162/2 , evoke d NS C 6 8 an d encompassed element s o f al l the options . Greater relianc e on th e nuclea r deterrent an d o n alliance s would , i t wa s argued , hel p th e Unite d State s regain th e initiativ e i n meetin g Sovie t challenge s selectively , wit h supe rior force , an d a t lowe r cos t ("mor e ban g fo r th e buck, " a s Secretar y o f Defense Wilso n pu t it) . Cover t actio n an d psychologica l warfar e woul d be economical instrument s o f liberation, althoug h NS C 162/ 2 conclude d that "th e detachmen t o f an y majo r Europea n satellit e fro m th e Sovie t bloc does not now appea r feasible excep t by Soviet acquiescence or war. " The sam e strategi c directiv e allowe d fo r th e possibilit y o f negotiatio n a s long a s thi s di d no t "dela y o r reduc e effort s t o develo p an d maintai n adequate fre e worl d strength." 23

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The Ne w Loo k wa s ye t t o b e formulate d whe n event s i n Easter n Europe too k a violent turn . O n June 1 , 1953 , a day afte r th e Czechoslo vak regim e announce d ne w economi c austerit y measures , workers a t th e Skoda factor y i n Pilsen rioted an d storme d part y an d governmen t offices . The riot s wer e quickl y quelle d an d thousand s place d unde r arrest , bu t the messag e t o bot h Eas t an d Wes t wa s clear . Stalinis t economic s wa s not working , an d totalitaria n control s coul d no t preven t spontaneou s outbursts agains t Communis t rule . East German Uprising. Simila r economi c grievance s sparke d of f a n even mor e dramati c confrontatio n i n Eas t Germany . Part y bos s Walte r Ulbricht's desperat e attemp t i n May to raise industrial outpu t b y increasing productio n norm s ha d alread y cause d labo r unres t an d wor k stop pages. Th e ne w leadershi p i n th e Kremli n wa s read y t o admi t pas t economic mistakes an d advise d th e East German s t o give greater empha sis t o th e productio n o f consume r good s an d t o rela x othe r unpopula r strictures. Unfortunately , th e reform s announce d o n Jun e 1 1 di d no t prevent th e elit e brigad e workin g o n th e Stalinalle e constructio n projec t in Eas t Berli n fro m takin g it s grievance s t o th e sea t o f governmen t o n June 16 . The demonstration calle d fo r a general strik e an d fre e elections . "This i s a people' s rising, " declare d on e o f th e workers. 24 B y th e tim e even large r masse s o f demonstrator s gathere d th e nex t morning , Sovie t armored troop s an d specia l Volkspolize i unit s wer e read y fo r action . The spar k sprea d rapidl y throug h th e zone , bu t th e Sovie t Hig h Com mand promptl y impose d martia l la w i n Eas t Berli n an d othe r cities . Within a day som e twenty-tw o demonstrator s wer e killed an d th e upris ing was effectivel y quelled . The CI A statio n chie f i n Wes t Berli n cable d headquarter s fo r permis sion t o distribut e arm s t o th e demonstrators . Th e hea d o f th e CIA' s Eastern Europea n Division , John A . Bross, consulted Fran k Wisner , an d in th e absenc e o f th e ne w CI A directo r Alle n Dulles , the y decide d t o offer th e rebel s sympath y an d asylu m bu t n o arms . Whe n informed , Allen Dulle s wa s reportedl y unhapp y wit h thi s pruden t response . Eisen hower's recentl y appointe d psychologica l warfar e advisor , forme r Fre e Europe Committe e presiden t C . D . Jackson, wa s furious . Th e "bloo d o f martyrs," he told Bross , would hav e helped t o discredi t th e Soviet Union. 25 Jackson argue d fo r a mor e forcefu l respons e i n th e spiri t o f liberation , evoking th e possibilit y o f simila r uprising s i n Czechoslovaki a an d else -

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where. T o forc e th e Re d Arm y t o tak e repressiv e measure s i n hi s vie w would giv e the West a n importan t propagand a victory . In a telephon e conversatio n wit h Jackso n o n th e afternoo n o f Jun e 17, Foste r Dulle s averre d tha t "thes e breaking-ou t incident s wer e symp tomatic an d w e shoul d d o somethin g abou t it. " Jackso n agreed. 26 Th e Psychological Strateg y Boar d me t t o discus s th e issu e late r tha t day , an d it was pu t o n th e agend a o f th e followin g day' s Nationa l Securit y Coun cil meeting as an emergency item. Meanwhile, the White House refraine d from publi c commen t o n th e situation . On th e whole , officia l Wes t Germa n reactio n wa s low-keyed , al though Erns t Reuter , Wes t Berlin' s mayor , broadcas t o n Jun e 1 8 a n anguished ple a t o th e world t o heed th e cal l of the East Germa n worker s for a differen t politica l system . Tha t sam e da y th e allie d commander s i n West Berli n an d th e mayo r sen t a join t not e t o th e Sovie t militar y command deplorin g th e us e o f force . Whe n th e U.S . high commissione r to Bonn , James B . Conant, visite d Berli n three day s after th e uprising, he issued a protest a t th e Sovie t closin g o f al l crossin g points . Washington , he recalls , "woul d hav e vetoe d anythin g mor e drastic . A three-powe r statement wa s out o f th e question. Londo n an d Pari s had littl e sympath y with th e uprising." 27 Th e American s distribute d foo d t o Eas t Berliner s and, a few weeks later, made the offer (i n Moscow) o f $1 5 million wort h of foodstuff s t o alleviat e th e eviden t shortage s i n Eas t Germany . Th e offer wa s contemptuousl y dismissed . Ulbricht an d th e Kremli n soo n indulge d i n accusation s tha t Wester n agents ha d fomente d th e uprising . Berli n wa s indee d th e cockpi t o f th e cold war , swarmin g wit h spie s an d agents ; th e Gehle n sp y organizatio n was wel l represente d i n th e Easter n zone , an d accordin g t o on e Wester n account som e arreste d rioter s wer e Wester n agent s carryin g sabotag e instructions. 28 "Th e les s w e pu t ou r labe l o n this , th e better, " reflecte d the secretar y o f stat e privatel y o n th e first anniversar y o f th e uprising ; such outbreak s ar e "wonderfu l i f the y appea r t o b e wholl y sponta neous." 2 9 Still , n o conclusiv e evidenc e ha s surface d t o indicat e tha t Western cover t actio n helpe d se t off th e uprising . It nonetheles s remain s tru e tha t th e languag e o f liberatio n wa s inher ently inflammatory , an d Wester n propagand a wa s instrumenta l i n turn ing th e rio t int o a nationwid e uprising . On e o f th e "nationa l tasks " o f psychological strateg y was :

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1

to reduc e th e effectivenes s o f th e Sovie t an d communis t administrativ e an d control apparatu s b y conductin g i n a non-attributabl e manne r psychological , political, and economic harassment activities in the Soviet Zone, and to prepare, under controlle d conditions , fo r suc h mor e activ e form s o f resistanc e a s ma y later be authorized. Propaganda wa s t o includ e "informatio n calculate d t o hel p creat e a climate conduciv e t o disaffectio n i n th e Sovie t Zon e an d Eas t Berlin. " The militar y wa s instructe d t o giv e suppor t t o CI A cover t operation s i n pursuit o f these objectives. 30 America's inten t wa s clearl y t o destabiliz e Eas t Germany , an d fo r years th e U.S.-sponsore d "Radi o i n th e America n Sector " (RIAS ) ha d been broadcastin g t o a broa d an d receptiv e audience . A delegatio n o f East Berlin workers presente d itsel f a t the RIA S on th e afternoo n o f Jun e 16 wit h th e reques t tha t the y b e allowe d t o broadcas t thei r demands . The station' s politica l director , Gordo n Ewing , claim s tha t h e ha d n o instructions fro m Washingto n whe n h e decide d t o ai r th e demand s a s well a s th e messag e o f a Wes t Berli n unio n leade r callin g fo r a genera l strike i n th e Easter n zone . H e wa s awar e tha t RIA S woul d thereb y b e "pouring gasolin e o n th e flames," an d th e radio' s commentator s di d warn thei r listener s tha t the y wer e a t th e merc y o f th e "Russia n occu piers." 3 1 B y June 1 7 ne w directive s ha d gon e ou t fro m th e CI A t o th e propaganda radi o i n Europe . This wa s t o b e a recurrin g dilemm a fo r th e agent s o f psychologica l warfare. Reinforcemen t o f th e Eas t Europeans ' abhorrenc e o f thei r re gimes an d desir e fo r freedo m wa s a n eas y tas k an d on e tha t presumabl y enhanced th e securit y o f th e Wes t b y sustainin g politica l instabilit y i n the East . Bu t wha t wa s th e prope r rol e o f th e propagand a organ s i n th e event o f rebellion ? T o cold-bloodedl y continu e wit h incitement ? T o belatedly war n thei r listener s tha t the y face d hopeles s odds ? I n resortin g to bot h encouragemen t an d caution , RIA S responde d a s bes t i t coul d given th e apparen t lac k o f contingenc y planning . Fo r Eas t Germans , th e very existenc e o f RIA S wa s a symbo l o f Wester n concer n fo r thei r fate , and it s active role in spreading news of th e uprising undoubtedly encour aged speculatio n i n th e Eas t tha t America n hel p wa s o n th e way . Suc h help was, of course , out o f th e question , no t onl y becaus e o f th e absenc e of politica l wil l bu t als o becaus e o f th e overwhelmin g superiorit y o f Soviet force s i n Centra l Europe .

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The uprisin g playe d a par t i n th e concurren t powe r struggl e i n th e Kremlin. Stalin' s siniste r secre t polic e chief , Lavrent i Beria , apparentl y chose to dabbl e in gran d strateg y afte r hi s mentor's death . Both Ulbrich t and Khrushche v subsequentl y allege d tha t h e had bee n plottin g t o mak e a dea l wit h th e West allowin g fo r Germa n reunification . Beria' s gra b fo r power me t with th e combined oppositio n o f the party an d militar y elites , which i n Jul y engineere d hi s arrest . Ulbrich t thereupo n purge d tw o alleged coconspirators , Wilhel m Zaisse r (ministe r o f stat e security ) an d Rudolf Herrnstad t (edito r o f th e part y paper) . The y wer e accuse d o f having plotte d a cou p wit h Beri a aimin g a t reversin g th e proces s o f socialization i n Eas t German y i n orde r t o facilitat e reunification. 32 I f Beria wa s i n fac t schemin g t o secur e a compromis e settlemen t o f th e German question , hi s eliminatio n probabl y signifie d th e ascendanc y o f a more cautiou s tendenc y i n th e Kremlin . Tha t thi s wa s th e conclusio n reached i n th e West's chancellerie s i s suggested b y Eden' s reflectio n tha t Beria's fal l wa s a defeat fo r moderatio n i n Moscow. 33 Mor e characteris tic o f th e psychologica l warfar e mentalit y wa s C . D . Jackson's repor t t o the Eisenhower cabine t on July 1 0 to the effect tha t Beria's ouster offere d a grea t opportunit y fo r developin g passive resistance i n the satellites. 34

What Happened to Liberation Policy? Onc e orde r wa s restore d i n East Germany , Washingto n an d it s allies coul d safel y indulg e i n confi dent postmortems . Dulle s tol d hi s Britis h an d Frenc h counterpart s i n Washington o n July 1 0 tha t th e uprisin g ha d demonstrate d th e inheren t weakness o f th e Sovie t empire , an d h e extracte d fro m the m a publi c wish t o se e "tru e libert y restored " i n Easter n Europe—th e first time , h e observed privately , tha t Londo n an d Pari s had bee n willin g to "embrac e this principle. " Eisenhower , fo r hi s part , sen t a reassurin g messag e t o Chancellor Adenaue r predictin g tha t th e contras t betwee n democrati c and prosperou s Wes t German y an d Eas t German y woul d "i n th e lon g run produc e condition s whic h shoul d mak e possibl e th e liquidatio n o f the presen t Communis t dictatorshi p an d o f th e Sovie t occupation, " an d pledging America' s political, diplomatic , an d mora l support. 35 A concurren t resolutio n adopte d b y Congres s i n Augus t laude d th e heroic resistanc e o f th e Eas t European s an d expresse d confidenc e tha t their sacrifice s woul d advanc e th e cause of freedom . Thi s confidenc e wa s not share d b y thos e who , lik e Bohlen , sa w th e opportunit y fo r negoti -

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ated detent e rapidly slippin g away a s the East Germa n experienc e tough ened th e Kremlin' s manner. 36 Neither th e rejectio n o f Sovie t peac e feeler s no r th e passiv e respons e to th e Eas t Germa n uprisin g offere d muc h guidanc e t o th e positiv e substance o f th e polic y o f liberation . O n th e diplomati c front , Washing ton continue d t o reiterat e th e objectiv e o f liberatio n whil e stressin g tha t only peacefu l mean s were contemplated , a qualification tha t allowe d th e timorous allie s t o joi n i n th e chorus . Hi s hope s fo r a n independen t Eastern Europe , said Dulle s befor e th e UN Genera l Assembl y i n Septem ber 1953 , lay i n "th e vas t possibilitie s o f peacefu l change." 37 Th e Wes t Europeans wer e clearl y no t i n a crusadin g mood , an d aggressiv e formu lations o f liberatio n coul d no t b e comfortabl y accommodate d eithe r b y allied priorities o r b y the conventions o f diplomacy . Public opinio n i n th e Unite d State s displaye d rathe r mor e activ e sym pathy fo r th e Eas t Europeans . A n elit e opinio n surve y conducte d i n lat e 1953 found fervi d rejectio n o f an y acquiescenc e in Soviet hegemony ove r the area. 38 Politician s suc h a s Senato r Alexande r Wiley , th e powerfu l chairman o f th e Foreig n Relation s Committee , Senato r Willia m Know land, an d Congressma n Charle s Kersten , chairma n o f th e Committe e o n Communist Aggression , continue d t o agitat e fo r activ e measure s t o im plement liberation . Thei r motivatio n stemme d mor e fro m doctrina l con viction than fro m electora l considerations , for liberatio n was of margina l utility i n winnin g votes . On e disenchante d believe r wa s Arthu r Blis s Lane, who resigne d fro m th e Republica n Nationa l Committe e befor e th e end o f 1953 , chargin g tha t th e administratio n showe d n o intentio n o f making goo d th e campaign pledg e o f liberation. 39 In th e political arena , th e Kerste n Committe e remaine d a thorn i n th e side of th e administration , callin g repeatedl y fo r stronge r sanction s agains t the Russians . I t complaine d i n Augus t 195 4 tha t th e provisio n o f th e Kersten amendmen t (whic h wa s retaine d i n th e Mutua l Securit y Ac t o f 1954) fo r creatin g militar y unit s o f Eas t European refugee s ha d no t bee n acted upon . Indeed , th e Pentago n wa s mos t reluctan t t o compl y an d suggested tha t "mor e goo d wil l b e accomplishe d . . . b y allowin g th e Kersten Amendmen t t o laps e o r a t th e mos t leavin g i t on th e book s wit h no actua l implementation." 40 I n fact , ther e alread y existe d i n th e U.S . zone in Germany a so-called Labor Service Organization. Finance d throug h the arm y civilia n personne l budget , i t consiste d som e 8,00 0 Eas t Euro pean refugee s forme d i n lightl y armed , paramilitar y units . Anticipatin g

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budget cuts , though , th e arm y wa s plannin g t o reduc e i f no t eliminat e these units . In February 1953 , Eisenhower instructe d th e National Securit y Coun cil t o investigat e th e feasibilit y o f a "Voluntee r Freedo m Corps " com posed o f infantr y battalion s recruite d b y th e U.S . Army "fro m stateless , single, anti-Communis t youn g men , comin g fro m th e countrie s behin d the Iro n Curtain. " Qualifie d recruits , suggeste d th e president , shoul d b e "developed int o specialist s in anti-Communist undergroun d an d i n political offensive wor k i n their respectiv e countries. " He complaine d tha t h e was "disappointe d i n th e progres s mad e b y th e Unite d State s Arm y i n carrying into effec t th e Lodge Act, the objective o f which wa s to produc e from stateless , anti-Communis t youn g me n a n elit e o f office r material, " observing tha t ou t o f mor e tha n 6,00 0 applicant s onl y 39 5 ha d bee n accepted. "I t woul d see m possible," wrote Eisenhower, "i n thes e day s of tension, wit h a zea l equa l t o need , t o recrui t u p t o 250,00 0 me n fo r th e Volunteer Freedo m Corps." 4 1 Three months later , a n a d hoc committee compose d o f representative s from State , Defense, th e CIA , an d th e Psychologica l Strateg y Boar d dul y delivered NSC 143/2 , an elaboratio n o f th e president's proposal tha t ha d the endorsemen t o f th e arm y chie f o f staff . Questionin g th e President' s optimistic projection , i t estimate d tha t u p t o 33,00 0 escapee s woul d b e available fo r recruitment . Althoug h i t acknowledged th e goal o f securin g additional comba t manpower , th e committe e stresse d th e psychologica l value o f th e project . I t woul d boos t th e moral e o f Eas t Europea n anti Communists, "elicitin g mor e escapees , an d compoundin g th e problem s of th e authoritie s i n the Soviet-dominate d areas, " and "possibl y provok ing th e Sovie t ruler s int o self-defeatin g counter-policie s whic h w e ca n exploit." Recruit s t o th e Voluntee r Freedo m Corp s woul d b e prepare d for "fightin g t o liberat e thei r people s i n cas e o f war. " Th e U.S . ambas sador t o th e United Nation s endorse d th e notion tha t "escapee s ca n giv e the U.S . th e initiativ e i n psychologica l warfare , an d ca n b e th e biggest , single, constructive, creativ e element i n our foreig n policy." 42 For reason s tha t ar e unclea r bu t probabl y includ e th e lingerin g reser vations o f th e Pentagon , allie d objections , an d th e change d circum stances o f th e post-Stali n thaw , th e proposa l neve r reache d th e stag e o f enabling legislation . Althoug h th e a d ho c committe e considere d tha t th e Kersten amendmen t wa s no t wholl y suitabl e fo r th e purpos e o f settin g up th e VFC , i t ha d prudentl y appende d a n interi m proposa l t o expan d

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the Labo r Servic e Organizatio n wit h Kerste n amendmen t funds . Th e military raise d variou s legalisti c an d practica l problems , whil e th e Frenc h objected t o the notion o f basin g a 5,000-man LS O unit in their country . Eventually, a derivativ e schem e code-name d "Re d Sox/Re d Cap " wa s devised, the n aborte d afte r th e Hungaria n debacl e o f 1956 . NS C 143/ 2 was quietl y rescinde d i n I960. 4 3 The Problem of Emigres. Psychologica l objective s a s wel l a s humani tarian concern s informe d th e America n approac h t o th e proble m o f th e several hundre d thousan d refugee s fro m Easter n Europe , man y o f the m lingering i n camp s i n Wester n Europe . Inadequat e assistanc e wa s con sidered responsibl e fo r deterioratin g moral e amon g th e emigre s an d a n asset for Communis t counterpropaganda . Various program s therefor e wer e devise d t o supplemen t th e wor k o f the International Refuge e Organization , th e Intergovernmental Commit tee fo r Europea n Migration , an d Unite d Nation s a s wel l a s voluntar y agencies. Th e U.S . Escape e Program , establishe d i n 1952 , withi n thre e years resettle d som e 25,00 0 escapee s overseas . Under th e Refuge e Relie f Act enacte d i n 1953 , nearl y 100,00 0 nonquot a immigratio n visa s ha d been issue d b y April 1956 . The Defens e Departmen t wa s responsibl e fo r the Labo r Servic e Unit s an d th e Alie n Enlistmen t Program , whic h b y 1956 accounte d respectivel y fo r 10,00 0 an d 97 6 escapees. 44 Finally , i t was officiall y claime d tha t som e $4,300,00 0 ou t o f th e Mutua l Securit y appropriations ha d bee n spen t o n providin g transi t facilitie s fo r refugees.45 Such program s helpe d t o placat e th e emigre s an d othe r American s o f East Europea n extraction , bu t man y o f the m expecte d more . The rheto ric o f liberatio n galvanize d refuge e politicians , an d th e Fre e Europ e Committee continue d t o serv e a s thei r mento r an d channe l fo r cover t CIA funding , preservin g th e semblanc e o f a n arm' s lengt h relationshi p between th e governmen t an d emigr e group s tha t (apar t fro m th e Estoni ans, Latvians , an d Lithuanians ) di d no t enjo y diplomati c status . I n Sep tember 195 4 th e FE C organize d a conferenc e o f representativ e Eas t European notable s i n Ne w Yor k tha t ceremoniall y founde d th e Assem bly of Captiv e European Nation s (ACEN) . The ostensible purpose o f th e new bod y wa s t o coordinat e activit y i n servic e o f th e goa l o f liberation . ACEN woul d periodicall y issu e appeal s fo r a consisten t an d nonviolen t pursuit o f liberatio n an d too k a hard lin e on East-West trade , diplomati c

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recognition an d U N membership , an d peacefu l coexistence . Fo r th e purposes o f domesti c politics , ACE N wa s a usefu l safet y valv e an d display o f public concern fo r th e satellites. It helped t o keep the fractiou s emigre politicians i n line and pacif y congressiona l crusaders . The demonstratio n effec t o f ACE N i n th e satellit e targe t area s wa s fraught wit h greate r risk . It s message s o f encouragemen t an d th e incli nation o f it s membe r group s t o regar d themselve s a s virtua l govern ments-in-exile gav e th e Eas t European s a fals e impressio n o f America n activism i n pursui t o f thei r liberation . Sovie t an d Wester n propagand a both reinforce d th e impressio n tha t Eas t an d Wes t wer e locke d i n a n inexorable an d uncompromisin g struggl e fo r supremacy . Fo r mos t Eas t Europeans, wa r seeme d th e onl y realisti c wa y t o escap e Moscow' s em brace, an d the y sough t assurance s t o thi s en d fro m Wester n propa ganda. 46 Th e scop e fo r unwittin g deceptio n an d self-deceptio n wa s dan gerously great .

U.S. Propaganda Efforts. Th e principa l Wester n propagand a organs , Radio Fre e Europ e an d Radi o Liberatio n (afte r 1956 , Radi o Liberty) , remained unde r th e contro l o f th e Centra l Intelligenc e Agency . Th e responsible official , Cor d Meyer , recall s tha t h e wa s relieve d t o fin d broad agreemen t amon g th e CIA , th e Stat e Department , an d th e tw o watchdog congressiona l committee s tha t th e electora l rhetori c o f roll back "di d no t affec t th e standin g injunctio n tha t th e radio s wer e no t t o provoke prematur e an d suicida l interna l revol t b y an y implie d promis e of externa l assistance. " Meye r reporte d directl y t o Alle n Dulles , wh o took a n activ e interes t i n Eas t Europea n development s an d emigr e poli tics. H e collaborate d wit h th e Stat e Departmen t i n draftin g a n annua l guidance directiv e fo r eac h targe t countr y an d the n "hammere d ou t a n agreement with th e radios o n its provisions." The directives were supple mented b y dail y advic e i n time s o f crisis . Meyer' s staf f conducte d ran dom sampl e check s o f broadcast s t o ensur e compliance , an d h e main tains that "ou r contro l function , althoug h publicl y no t evident , served t o keep th e broadcast s responsiv e t o officia l policy " an d tha t h e resiste d agency pressure s fo r disinformatio n campaign s agains t particula r Eas t European leaders. 47 Th e administratio n an d Congres s frequentl y pai d tribute t o th e importanc e o f th e radi o operations . The y kep t aliv e th e hope o f eventua l self-liberation , argue d Dulles , an d h e pointe d t o th e

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satellite regimes ' jammin g effort s a s confirmatio n o f th e effectivenes s o f psychological warfare. 48 Paradoxically, th e officia l myt h o f self-liberatio n wa s onl y reinforce d by th e disturbance s i n 195 3 i n Czechoslovaki a an d Eas t Germany . Th e Psychological Strateg y Boar d wa s requeste d t o prepar e "recommenda tions a s t o policie s an d action s t o b e taken durin g th e nex t sixt y day s t o exploit the unrest in the satellite states." A week later, the NSC approve d with amendment s th e repor t o f th e board. 49 Th e recommende d policy , contained i n th e stil l onl y partiall y declassifie d NS C 158 , set the follow ing psychological objectives : a. T o nourish resistanc e to communist oppressio n throughou t satellit e Europe, short o f mas s rebellio n i n area s unde r Sovie t militar y control , an d withou t compromising its spontaneous nature. b. T o undermine satellite puppet authority. c. T o exploi t satellit e unres t a s demonstrabl e proo f tha t th e Sovie t empir e i s beginning to crumble. d. T o convince the free world, particularly Western Europe, that love of liberty and hatre d o f alie n oppressio n ar e stronge r behin d th e Iron Curtai n tha n i t has been dared to believe and that resistance to totalitarianism is less hopeless than has been imagined. Other recommendation s included : encouragemen t o f passiv e resistance ; support fo r Germa n unit y base d o n fre e election s followe d b y a peac e treaty; discussion s wit h allie d government s t o implemen t th e Voluntee r Freedom Corps ; an d consideratio n o f bringin g Sovie t repressio n o f th e East Germa n revol t befor e th e United Nations. 50 NSC 174: U.S. Policy toward the Satellites. I n Decembe r 1953 , th e policy revie w culminate d i n th e adoptio n o f NS C 174 , "Unite d State s Policy towar d th e Sovie t Satellite s i n Easter n Europe, " designe d t o supersede NS C 58/ 2 an d NS C 158 . It s ultimat e genera l conclusio n wa s that th e "detachmen t o f an y majo r Europea n satellit e fro m th e Sovie t bloc doe s no t no w appea r feasibl e excep t b y Sovie t acquiescenc e o r b y war." Whil e suc h a detachmen t woul d no t decisivel y impai r Sovie t strategic militar y capability , i t woul d b e a "considerabl e blo w t o Sovie t prestige" an d impai r Sovie t conventiona l militar y capabilitie s i n Europe . The mai n polic y conclusio n wa s tha t i t i s nevertheles s "i n th e nationa l security interest s o f th e Unite d State s t o pursu e a polic y o f determine d resistance t o dominan t Sovie t influenc e ove r th e satellite s i n Easter n

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Europe an d t o see k th e eventua l eliminatio n o f tha t influence . Accord ingly, feasibl e political , economic , propagand a an d cover t measure s ar e required t o creat e an d exploi t troublesom e problem s fo r th e USSR , complicate contro l i n the satellites , and retar d th e growth o f th e militar y and economi c potential o f the Soviet bloc." NSC 17 4 urged preparation s to "exploi t an y futur e disturbance s simila r t o th e Eas t Germa n riots, " but i t als o stresse d th e importance o f avoidin g "incitemen t t o prematur e revolt" an d "commitment s o n th e natur e an d timin g o f an y U.S . actio n to brin g about liberation " o r th e creation o f fals e hope s of U.S. intervention. This policy , a s th e staf f stud y argued , represente d th e feasibl e middl e course betwee n liberatio n b y militar y forc e (whic h woul d "probabl y mean wa r wit h th e Sovie t Union an d mos t probabl y woul d b e unaccept able t o th e America n peopl e an d condemne d b y worl d opinion" ) an d acceptance o f th e fac t o f Sovie t contro l ("inconsisten t wit h th e funda mental principl e o f th e righ t o f th e satellit e people s t o freedom " an d contrary t o th e Wester n nee d t o reduc e Sovie t power) . A further , an d somewhat tortured , rational e fo r th e middl e cours e wa s tha t "thoug h i t may preclud e reachin g an y genera l accommodatio n wit h th e Sovie t Unio n in th e foreseeabl e future , [it ] migh t contribut e t o th e creatio n o f condi tions whic h wil l induc e th e Sovie t leadershi p t o b e mor e receptiv e t o negotiated settlement s in line with U.S. objectives toward s the satellites. " Soviet dominatio n ove r Easter n Europ e ha d "create d a fundamenta l disequilibrium o n th e continen t an d a continuin g pressur e o n Wester n Europe" tha t wa s unacceptabl e t o the United States. 51 On Decembe r 23, 1953, th e presiden t approve d NS C 17 4 an d designate d th e Operation s Coordinating Boar d a s the responsible implementin g agency . The OCB' s firs t progres s report , delivere d th e followin g July , note d soberly tha t implementatio n o f NS C 17 4 amounte d t o n o mor e tha n "holding actions " an d tha t "th e har d fact s o f th e situatio n mak e i t unrealistic t o expec t tha t conspicuou s progres s toward s achievin g th e long-range polic y objective s o f NS C 17 4 wil l b e mad e unde r presen t circumstances." 52 Plannin g fo r futur e disturbance s simila r t o th e Eas t German riot s wa s confine d t o "fixin g responsibilit y o n th e puppe t re gimes and/o r th e Kremlin , propagand a exploitatio n an d possibl e us e o f the forum s o f th e Unite d Nations. " Th e repor t reiterate d th e basi c dilemma:

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The desire fo r liberatio n fro m Sovie t domination i s undoubtedly stron g amon g the captive peoples, many o f whom woul d welcom e militant Western actio n t o liberate them , eve n t o th e exten t o f resor t t o a war o f liberatio n b y th e West . Neither the U.S. nor other free world countries are willing to take such extreme steps, nor i s the U.S. prepared t o undertak e o r foste r activitie s whic h i t woul d not back up with military support in the event of ruthless Soviet suppression and reprisals. Furthermore, our European allies are strongly against taking what they estimate to be provocative action. Consequently, the U.S. must limit its activities to a scop e whic h i s considere d inadequat e b y a t leas t th e activist s amon g th e captive peoples and some of the emigres. More concretely , improve d service s fo r refuge e resettlemen t ha d bee n developed, a one-megawat t transmitte r wa s establishe d i n Wes t Ger many, an d NAT O member s ha d conferre d i n Januar y 195 4 o n th e coordination o f propaganda . Ne w operationa l plans , anticipate d th e OCB, woul d "primaril y involv e action s whic h wil l permi t propagand a exploitation t o th e people s o f th e satellite s state s an d severa l diplomati c moves." A polic y designe d principall y t o maximiz e Sovie t difficultie s amon g people perceive d t o b e friendl y t o th e Wes t place d impossibl e demand s on th e manager s o f psychologica l warfare . A s th e staf f stud y leadin g t o NSC 17 4 recognized , "continuin g an d carefu l attentio n mus t b e given t o the fin e line , whic h i s no t stationary , betwee n exhortatio n t o kee p u p morale an d t o maintai n passiv e resistance , an d invitation s t o suicide. " Radio Fre e Europe' s policymaker s ha d n o choic e bu t t o ac t o n th e assumption tha t th e division s i n th e Kremli n an d th e uncertaint y thes e induced i n th e satellit e regime s coul d b e exploite d i f th e laten t popula r opposition wa s properl y guided . Th e polic y directiv e issue d fo r Czecho slovakia o n Jun e 30 , 1953 , stresse d th e nee d t o rais e th e workers ' consciousness o f thei r powe r t o extrac t concession s an d t o undermin e the loyalt y an d self-confidenc e o f th e regime' s servants . Implementatio n took th e for m o f "Operatio n Prospero, " a n intensiv e propagand a bar rage through th e airwaves an d million s o f leaflets droppe d fro m balloon s over Czec h cities . The Kremlin's "New Course." Whe n late r i n 195 3 th e Pragu e regim e began o n Moscow' s instruction s t o adop t certai n reform s i n th e contex t of th e Ne w Course , RF E strategist s conclude d tha t thei r effort s coul d bear frui t an d a fe w month s late r launche d a secon d broadcas t an d

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leaflet campaign , "Operatio n VETO. " The campaign attempte d t o prop agate te n demand s fo r incrementa l chang e an d t o demoraliz e leadin g Communists b y publicizing thei r misdeed s an d corruption . Th e underly ing strateg y envisage d th e growt h o f a n organize d opposition , whic h with prope r externa l guidanc e coul d exploi t a "favorable confluence " o f internal an d externa l event s t o wi n majo r concession s an d perhap s na tional autonomy. 53 At leas t i n retrospect , th e notio n tha t wit h a littl e Wester n guidanc e the satellit e nation s coul d seiz e the hypothetica l opportun e momen t an d by thei r ow n effor t liberat e themselve s fro m totalitaria n rul e seem s improbably optimistic . Ye t such optimis m wa s liberall y professe d b y th e managers o f psychologica l warfar e an d thei r emigr e employee s a s wel l as b y th e presiden t an d th e secretar y o f state . Disclaimer s o f an y inten t to driv e th e Eas t European s t o suicida l rebellio n di d no t eliminat e th e ambiguities o f th e strategy , i f onl y becaus e th e targe t audience s enter tained fe w doubt s regarding the will an d capabilit y o f their domesti c an d Soviet masters t o preserve orde r an d assume d tha t America n encourage ment implie d a commitmen t t o provid e materia l assistance . Wherea s many propagandist s foun d i n th e Eas t Germa n uprisin g encouragin g evidence o f popula r oppositio n t o communism , Eas t European s an d th e more sobe r Wester n observer s sa w tha t th e self-appointe d leader s o f th e working clas s ha d n o compunctio n abou t shootin g worker s t o retai n power. Th e ideologica l qualit y o f th e liberatio n strateg y advocate d b y the mor e enthusiasti c col d warrior s overrod e th e prudentia l axio m tha t he who will s the en d wills the means . Of course , psychological warfar e ha d a short-rang e objectiv e a s well: to destabilize , howeve r marginally , th e Sovie t blo c an d thereb y reduc e its offensive potential . The operational polic y of liberation therefor e als o involved exploitatio n o f th e Eas t Europeans ' legitimat e grievance s an d aspirations fo r th e purpos e o f enhancin g Wester n security . N o doub t most proponent s an d agent s o f psychologica l warfar e manage d t o rec oncile th e idealisti c an d pragmati c aspect s o f thei r crusad e a t a smal l cost i n self-deception . The y dre w confidenc e fro m th e short-ter m results , for propagand a obviousl y irritate d th e targe t regimes . Jozef Swiatlo , th e CIA's asse t i n th e Polis h secre t police , finally move d wes t i n Decembe r 1953, bringin g wit h hi m vas t evidenc e o f corruptio n i n leadin g circles . Drawing o n thes e revelations , RF E mounte d a radi o an d leafle t opera tion i n th e fal l o f 195 4 tha t impelle d th e Polis h authoritie s t o sav e fac e

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by purgin g som e expose d officials , notabl y th e ministe r o f security , General Stanisla w Radkiewicz . The Kremlin' s Ne w Cours e ha d it s mos t dramati c impac t o n Hun gary, wher e th e ultra-Stalinis t method s o f Matya s Rakos i wer e no w perceived b y Sovie t leader s t o b e dangerousl y counterproductive . Th e fall i n th e standar d o f livin g an d rul e b y terro r ha d alienate d eve n th e working class , th e peasantr y seethe d wit h resentmen t a t forcibl e collec tivization, muc h o f th e forme r middl e clas s ha d bee n reduce d t o penur y and interna l exil e o r imprisonment , thousand s o f arbitraril y purge d Communists languishe d i n jail , an d a growin g numbe r o f th e party' s intellectual servant s an d sycophant s wer e becomin g disenchante d an d restive. In Jun e 1953 , Rakos i wa s summone d t o Mosco w an d ordere d t o relinquish th e prim e ministershi p (whic h h e hel d alon g wit h th e part y leadership) t o a Malenkov protege , Imre Nagy . The latter , als o a Soviet trained vetera n Communist , ha d bee n i n disgrac e fo r darin g t o oppos e the precipitous collectivizatio n o f agriculture . Nagy understoo d hi s man date t o b e a more consumer-oriente d economi c policy an d i n genera l th e creation o f a les s oppressiv e politica l mechanism . Hi s patentl y popula r reforms wer e oppose d b y Rakosi , wh o feare d abov e al l a public investi gation o f th e part y purges . Whe n Malenko v fel l fro m grac e i n earl y 1955, Rakosi' s intrigue s bor e fruit , an d h e persuade d th e Kremli n t o dismiss th e increasingl y libera l Nagy . Th e politica l impac t o f th e Ne w Course i n Hungar y coul d not , however , b e s o readil y undone . Th e party's unit y an d self-confidenc e ha d bee n shattered , dissiden t intellec tuals and rehabilitate d victim s of the purges were no longer held in chec k by th e cul t o f th e infallibl e leader , an d th e populatio n a t larg e bega n t o emerge fro m it s repressed an d submissiv e condition . Having assesse d th e promis e o f Nagy' s Ne w Course , Radi o Fre e Europe i n Octobe r 195 4 launche d "Operatio n FOCUS " t o incit e Hun garians t o ste p u p th e pressur e fo r reforms . Th e operatio n resorte d t o the teste d tool s o f radi o an d balloon-carrie d leaflet s an d dre w o n th e talents o f emigr e academic s an d politicians , notabl y th e forme r Peasan t party leade r Imr e Kovacs , to tailo r th e message s t o loca l susceptibilities . Leaflets carryin g th e letter s NE M (fo r th e Hungaria n equivalen t o f Na tional Oppositio n Movement ) o r th e numera l 1 2 (standin g fo r th e de mands o f a fictional oppositio n movement ) inaugurate d th e campaign . Also droppe d fro m Hungaria n skie s wer e light-meta l medal s depictin g

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the Freedo m Bel l an d carryin g th e comfortin g messag e "Hungarian s fo r Freedom—All th e Fre e Worl d fo r th e Hungarians. " Th e radi o broad casts elaborate d o n thes e theme s an d urge d Hungarian s t o deman d economic reform s an d politica l right s fro m th e regime. 54 The operatio n ended followin g Nagy' s demise , an d whil e i t probably contribute d littl e to th e ris e an d suspensio n o f th e New Course , it left a stron g impressio n of Western sympath y fo r th e aspirations o f anti-Communist Hungarians . The RF E an d Voic e o f Americ a broadcaster s i n th e Eas t Europea n languages wer e emigres whose understandabl e feeling s o f solidarit y wit h their oppresse d countryme n dispose d the m t o reinforc e hope s o f libera tion. Polic y directive s an d periodi c monitorin g coul d no t preven t th e nuances an d ambiguitie s o f liberatio n fro m receivin g differen t interpre tation i n Washington , Munich , an d Easter n Europe . Meanwhile , whe n Budapest o r Pragu e proteste d a t th e propagand a campaigns , th e Stat e Department simpl y professe d th e fictio n tha t RF E wa s a privat e organi zation drawin g attentio n t o obviou s popular grievances . While psychologica l warfar e continue d t o rage , the othe r unmention able too l o f foreig n policy , cover t action , suffere d fro m earlie r setbacks , notably th e Albania n fiasco. In th e fal l o f 1953 , a meetin g wa s hel d i n the Whit e Hous e t o conside r wha t counte r measure s migh t b e take n b y the United State s in the event of anothe r eruptio n suc h a s the East Berlin rising. O n th e reques t o f Alle n Dulles , no w directo r o f centra l intelli gence, Richar d Bissel l assemble d a smal l staf f t o stud y th e questio n an d reached th e now-familia r conclusio n tha t clandestin e operation s ha d little chance o f succes s against th e Sovie t bloc. 55 The discouragin g prospect s di d no t preven t th e CIA' s rol e i n th e col d war fro m expandin g steadily . B y 1952 , Fran k Wisner' s Offic e o f Polic y Coordination ha d acquire d clos e t o 300 0 employees , forty-seve n over seas field stations , an d a n annua l operatin g budge t o f $8 2 million . Wisner continue d t o hol d th e titl e o f deput y directo r o f plan s an d enjoyed th e enthusiasti c suppor t o f Alle n Dulles , wh o wa s mor e inter ested i n cover t operation s tha n i n researc h an d analysis . National Secu rity Counci l directiv e 541 2 o f Marc h 15 , 195 4 restate d th e scop e o f th e secret war , whic h include d al l th e standar d propaganda , subversion , resistance, an d economi c tactic s "an d al l activitie s compatibl e wit h thi s directive necessar y t o accomplis h th e foregoing. " NS C 5412/ 1 (Marc h 1955) an d NS C 5412/ 2 (Novembe r 1955 ) provide d fo r th e revie w an d

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oversight o f clandestin e actio n b y a grou p compose d o f presidential , State, and Defens e nominee s know n a s the "541 2 Committee." 56 CIA activitie s i n Eastern Europe , however, wer e largel y limite d t o th e infiltration o f agent s fo r intelligenc e gathering and , of course , psycholog ical warfare . Th e satellit e regime s periodicall y proteste d U.S . cover t activities, whic h th e Unite d State s officiall y denied . Alle n Dulle s did , however, allo w i n a n intervie w i n Marc h 195 4 tha t i n th e fac e o f Communist subversion , th e American s woul d b e stupi d no t t o respon d in kind. 57 Militar y Specia l Force s unit s receive d som e instructio n i n Eas t European language s an d wer e deploye d i n Wes t Germany , bu t th e ide a of creatin g paramilitar y refuge e unit s acquire d immediac y onl y i n th e wake o f Khrushchev' s secre t speec h i n 1956 . Trade Sanctions. Officia l America n polic y towar d th e satellite s pur sued thei r diplomati c an d economi c isolation . Onl y i n Decembe r 195 5 did th e administratio n decid e tha t th e deadloc k ove r Unite d Nation s membership wa s becomin g counterproductiv e an d agre e t o a packag e deal whereb y Albania , Bulgaria , Hungary , an d Romani a wer e admitte d to th e world body . Harol d Stassen , the ne w directo r fo r mutua l security , appointed Genera l Willia m J . Donova n a s specia l consultan t o n East West trad e contro l an d develope d a program fo r eve n tighter restriction s on export s t o th e Sovie t bloc. 58 The volum e o f America' s trad e wit h th e East continue d t o decline , bu t tha t o f Wester n Europ e wit h th e Eas t surged afte r 1953 . In particular , Wes t German y bega n t o reasser t it s historic economi c influence . It s trade wit h th e Eas t gre w b y 17 5 percen t between 195 2 an d 1954 , although eve n then i t scarcely reache d one-fift h of th e prewar volume . Ove r hal f o f thi s trade was with Eas t Germany . Western control s ove r th e expor t o f capita l good s o f strategi c valu e were effectiv e an d undoubtedl y impede d th e modernizatio n o f Eas t Eu ropean industry . Washington too k a dim view o f it s allies ' greate r readi ness to trad e wit h th e enemy , an d fre e trad e an d economi c warfare wer e uncomfortable bedfellows . In Septembe r 195 5 a recommendatio n wa s submitted t o th e Counci l o f Europ e fo r th e establishmen t o f a centra l organization t o overse e al l East-Wes t trade . This , i t wa s argued , woul d overcome the East's advantag e of having a trading monopoly tha t force d Western price s dow n whil e maintainin g hig h Easter n prices . Commo n action coul d rais e th e volum e o f trad e a s wel l a s giv e th e allie s greate r

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flexibility i n usin g trad e a s a bargainin g too l an d fo r sanctions . Ap proved b y th e Council' s Assembly , th e proposa l wa s rejecte d b y th e Committee o f Minister s ostensibl y o n th e ground tha t i t was contrar y t o Western fre e trad e principles. 59 A n endurin g patter n emerge d i n th e 1950s wherein th e West European s graduall y revive d thei r histori c com mercial link s wit h th e Eas t whil e th e Unite d States , puttin g principl e before profit , stoo d aloo f an d disapproving , an d i n tim e becomin g en vious (se e chapter 5) . Economic sanctions di d not palpably undermin e th e stability o f Sovie t rule i n Easter n Europe , althoug h the y helpe d t o preserv e th e West' s technological superiorit y an d therefor e militar y security . O n th e othe r hand, Washingto n an d it s allies showe d littl e readines s t o us e trade a s a positive reinforcemen t o f desirabl e politica l trends . Ther e wa s som e disposition o n the part o f the administration t o detect and ac t on positiv e developments i n the satellites suc h a s Imre Nagy's Ne w Course . An NS C policy directiv e i n earl y 195 5 recommende d tha t th e Unite d State s en courage "greate r emphasi s o n interna l problems " an d "exploi t differ ences" withi n th e bloc. 60 Th e scop e fo r constructiv e externa l influenc e was judge d t o b e negligible , however , an d differentiatio n amon g th e satellite regime s wa s recognize d mor e i n term s o f th e immediat e advan tage t o Wester n securit y tha n i n th e contex t o f rollback . Th e relevan t guidelines fo r cover t operation s disclose d tha t Marc h enjoine d th e CI A to "creat e an d exploi t troublesom e problem s fo r Internationa l Commu nism, impai r relation s betwee n th e USS R an d Communis t Chin a an d between the m an d thei r satellites , complicat e contro l withi n th e USSR , Communist Chin a an d thei r satellites , an d retar d th e growt h o f th e military an d economi c potential o f th e Soviet bloc." 6 1 Yugoslavia's Case. Th e on e exceptio n t o th e tactic s o f isolatio n an d subversion remaine d Yugoslavia , which continue d t o benefit fro m Amer ican economi c an d militar y aid . In th e seve n year s followin g Tito' s expulsion fro m th e Sovie t bloc , th e Unite d State s spen t clos e t o $1. 5 billion, mos t o f i t i n th e for m o f outrigh t grants , t o assis t hi m i n main taining hi s secessionis t regime . Th e investmen t pai d som e dividends . In October 195 4 Tit o settle d hi s long-standin g disput e wit h Ital y ove r Trieste b y retainin g th e hinterlan d bu t abandonin g clai m t o th e city . H e had earlie r signe d a treat y o f friendshi p an d cooperatio n wit h Greec e and Turke y tha t i n August 195 4 becam e a mutual defens e pact . Wester n

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security i n th e eastern Mediterranea n wa s enhanced , an d th e exampl e o f "national" communis m provide d b y Yugoslavi a ha d a n unquestionabl y unsettling effec t o n th e othe r regime s o f Easter n Europe . A n additiona l benefit fo r Washingto n wa s th e workin g relationshi p establishe d be tween th e CI A and th e Yugosla v intelligenc e service . Tito's successfu l consolidatio n an d expandin g link s with th e develop ing worl d tempte d th e ne w leadershi p i n th e Kremli n t o wo o hi m a s well. Stalin' s unrelentin g hostilit y towar d Tit o wa s judge d t o hav e bee n counterproductive, an d i n Ma y 195 5 Khrushche v an d Bulgani n jour neyed t o Belgrad e to mak e amends . Blame for th e estrangement wa s lai d on Beri a (an d soo n o n Stali n himself) . Th e Soviet s agree d t o coexis t peacefully, thu s establishin g th e revolutionary notio n tha t ther e could b e several road s t o socialism . Th e concep t wa s enshrine d i n th e Belgrad e Declaration, whic h formall y ende d th e feu d an d normalize d Soviet Yugoslav relations . A s a result , whil e Dulle s an d hi s adviser s wer e no t sanguine abou t makin g headwa y o n th e statu s o f th e satellite s a t th e forthcoming Genev a summit , i t wa s note d tha t Wester n pressur e migh t nonetheless hav e som e effec t sinc e "wha t w e as k fo r i s les s tha n wha t the Soviets gave Tito." 6 2 The Soviets , o f course , ha d give n Tit o nothin g bu t grudgin g recogni tion tha t h e wa s beyon d thei r reach . Still , Dulle s trie d t o exploi t th e Moscow-Belgrade tha w an d pai d a quic k visi t t o Tit o a t hi s Brion i retreat durin g a lul l i n th e foreig n ministers ' conferenc e a t Genev a tha t autumn. Th e resultin g communiqu e asserte d th e right o f Eas t European s to determine their future s fre e o f externa l interference , an d Dulles waxe d optimistic abou t th e coming disintegratio n o f th e Sovie t empire. " I don' t mean t o sugges t tha t ther e wil l b e a n earl y breakawa y o f th e satellite s from Moscow, " h e observed. "Bu t I think there will soon b e visible sign s of evolutio n towar d government s whic h comman d mor e popula r sup port tha n thos e whic h no w exist , an d whic h ar e markedl y les s th e pai d hirelings o f Moscow. " H e reporte d t o th e Senat e Foreig n Relation s Committee i n Januar y 195 6 tha t Tit o "undoubtedl y i s eage r t o ge t th e best h e ca n ou t o f bot h sides , an d tha t i s somethin g whic h I di d no t think w e necessaril y wan t t o den y hi m if , i n the process o f doin g tha t h e creates, a s h e i s doing , a ver y larg e measur e o f unsettlemen t i n th e satellite countries." 63 Th e possibilit y tha t th e Eas t European s migh t no t prudently settl e for a version o f Titois m wa s scarcel y entertained .

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Continuing Quest for Liberation. O n th e diplomati c front , Washing ton's insistenc e tha t th e statu s o f th e satellite s wa s a n internationa l issu e was rejecte d b y Moscow . Mosco w refuse d t o b e part y t o a summi t i f Eastern Europ e wer e o n th e agend a o f th e Genev a meetings , an d Wash ington regretfull y conceded . Dulle s suggeste d t o th e presiden t tha t h e pursue th e questio n i n private , bu t Eisenhowe r sa w littl e purpos e i n futile debate . Aske d abou t liberatio n a t a pres s conferenc e befor e th e summit, h e retorted , "Yo u ar e certainl y no t goin g t o declar e war , ar e you? S o there, instantly, yo u fix yourself limitation s o n ho w fa r we , as a people, will go in accomplishing thi s thing." 6 4 The allies were even mor e reluctant t o spoi l th e emergin g detent e wit h tal k o f liberation , an d the y persuaded Eisenhowe r a t th e las t minut e t o ton e dow n hi s propose d references t o Sovie t tyranny. 65 A s noted, th e summi t produce d n o prog ress o n German y o r Europea n securit y an d disengagement , le t alon e o n the satellit e question . It s rea l significanc e la y i n th e taci t acknowledg ment b y bot h side s that th e divisio n o f Europ e coul d no t an d woul d no t be altered . The troubl e wa s tha t i f peaceful coexistenc e mean t th e transfe r o f th e East-West contes t t o area s less explosive than Europe , it undermined th e fundamental revisionis m o f th e polic y o f liberation . Sinc e thi s wa s a central elemen t i n America n foreig n polic y doctrine , i t ha d t o b e pro fessed eve n if shorn o f operationa l significance . In it s secon d progres s repor t o n NS C 174 , th e OC B acknowledge d that keepin g aliv e th e hop e o f liberatio n wa s becomin g mor e an d mor e difficult, sinc e "an y movemen t towar d a relaxatio n o f tension s betwee n East an d Wes t i s boun d t o b e widel y interprete d i n th e satellite s a s a weakening o f Wester n determinatio n t o achiev e thei r liberatio n fro m Soviet contro l an d a dispositio n t o accep t thei r statu s a s permanent. " Encouragement o f passiv e resistanc e wa s "somewha t incompatible " wit h detente an d effort s t o negotiat e an d t o foste r evolutionar y change : "I t may b e tha t th e U.S . wil l hav e t o undertak e t o follo w simultaneousl y two policie s wit h inconsisten t course s o f action , representin g divergen t approaches t o th e on e objective. " Th e repor t sa w n o likelihoo d o f Titoism emergin g elsewher e bu t recommende d tha t "attentio n shoul d b e given t o determinin g wha t furthe r course s o f actio n migh t b e take n t o induce th e Sovie t an d satellit e leadershi p t o b e more receptiv e t o negoti ated settlement s an d wha t degre e o f stres s shoul d b e place d o n encour -

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agement o f Titois t tendencie s o r 'nationa l Communis t movements ' " a s well as to a more differentiate d approac h t o th e satellites. 66 Secretary o f Stat e Dulle s trie d t o squar e th e circl e b y arguin g tha t insofar a s th e summi t ha d attenuate d th e dange r o f war , th e Soviet s could n o longer clai m the y needed t o dominat e thei r western approache s for reason s o f security. 67 Th e Kremli n sa w differen t implication s i n peaceful coexistence . In Septembe r 195 5 Adenaue r visite d Mosco w t o negotiate th e releas e o f te n thousan d Germa n prisoner s o f wa r an d th e reopening o f diplomati c relations . Th e Sovie t Unio n thereupo n con cluded a treat y wit h Eas t German y t o reinforc e th e latter' s clai m t o sovereign an d equa l status . Th e Unite d State s remaine d adamantl y op posed t o recognitio n o f th e GD R an d wedde d t o th e objectiv e o f reunifi cation (i f only because that hope was considered t o be the "mai n psycho logical barrie r t o ful l acceptanc e o f th e GD R regim e b y a majorit y o f East Germans") , bu t th e OC B warne d tha t "w e mus t b e prepare d t o fight a n alread y discernibl e tendenc y o n th e par t o f som e element s i n West Europea n countrie s t o favo r concludin g securit y agreement s wit h the USS R base d o n a divide d rathe r tha n a unifie d Germany." 68 T o th e extent tha t th e integrit y an d permanenc e o f th e Sovie t blo c appeare d t o be th e essentia l componen t o f peacefu l coexistence , Washington' s revi sionism was bound t o suffer .

The Promise ofDe-Stalinization. Th e spirit of Genev a was short-lived , for 195 6 turne d ou t t o b e a calamitou s yea r fo r Mosco w an d Washing ton wit h regar d t o thei r respectiv e alliances . In th e Kremlin , collectiv e leadership proved t o b e a transitional phas e a s Khrushchev consolidate d his persona l powe r an d proceede d t o proclai m th e en d o f Stalinism . H e stunned th e delegate s a t a close d sessio n o f th e Communis t Part y o f th e Soviet Union' s twentiet h congres s i n Februar y wit h a seven-hou r speec h criticizing Stalin' s despoti c rule , economi c mismanagement , an d intoler ance o f differen t route s t o socialism . Rumor s regardin g th e thrus t o f th e secret speec h soo n reache d th e West , an d b y Apri l Secretar y o f Stat e Dulles wa s commentin g liberall y o n it s implication s fo r th e sprea d o f Titoism t o othe r Eas t European s "wh o woul d muc h rathe r hav e thei r own nationa l bran d o f communis m tha n b e run fro m Moscow." 6 9 Khru shchev disbande d th e Cominform , renewe d hi s peac e offensiv e b y an -

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nouncing troo p reductions , an d seale d th e reconciliatio n wit h Tit o b y welcoming hi m t o Mosco w i n June. What di d Khrushchev's forma l rejectio n o f Stalinism mean ? And wha t opportunities di d i t presen t t o th e West ? Alle n Dulle s ordere d tha t th e secret speec h b e obtaine d a t an y cost . Th e deput y directo r fo r intelli gence, Rober t Amory , Fran k Wisner , an d th e chie f o f counterintelli gence, James J. Angleton, Jr., al l set about th e task. Amory mad e a direct though necessaril y secre t an d ultimatel y unsuccessfu l approac h t o th e Yugoslav foreig n ministry . Wisne r wa s somewha t mor e successfu l an d secured, probabl y fro m Polis h sources , a n abridge d version . Th e rea l coup wa s pulle d of f b y Angleton, wh o go t th e ful l tex t b y way o f Israel i intelligence.70 The questio n o f ho w t o handl e th e covete d priz e generate d heate d debate withi n th e CIA . Angleto n an d Wisne r urge d tha t i t b e exploite d to so w confusio n an d unres t i n th e Sovie t sphere , tha t excerpt s an d doctored version s b e leaked selectivel y an d wit h carefu l timin g while th e CIA marshale d it s psychologica l warfar e an d cover t actio n force s t o extract th e maximu m advantage . Others , notabl y Ra y Cline , argue d fo r the immediat e releas e o f th e ful l an d authenti c tex t o n th e ground s tha t publication o f thi s unprecedente d self-indictmen t b y a totalitaria n re gime would i n itsel f b e a tremendous propagand a victor y fo r th e Unite d States. Allen Dulle s agreed , an d wit h th e concurrenc e o f hi s brothe r an d the president , th e Stat e Departmen t forwarde d th e speec h t o th e New York Times, whic h publishe d i t on June 4. 7 1 Outside th e Sovie t blo c the revelation s serve d t o dispe l an y remainin g doubts abou t th e horror s o f Stalin' s tyrann y an d cas t Khrushche v i n a favorable ligh t a s a courageou s reformer . I n America n politica l circles , reaction wa s mixed , particularl y i n vie w o f Tito' s recen t visi t t o Mos cow. In June , Senato r McCarth y introduce d a bil l t o terminat e ai d t o Yugoslavia, an d durin g hearings on the Mutual Securit y bill the secretar y of stat e had t o argu e strenuously tha t Tit o was not th e Kremlin' s puppe t and tha t America n ai d reinforce d th e attractiveness o f his national Com munist mode l i n th e satellites . Suppor t fo r Tito , Dulle s insisted , wa s a n essential par t o f th e America n strateg y o f liberation. 72 Nevertheless , t o forestall congressiona l actio n an d wit h a n ey e t o th e ongoin g electio n campaign, Dulle s temporaril y suspende d th e militar y an d economi c ai d program fo r Yugoslavia , onl y to reinstat e i t in October . The potential effec t o f de-Stalinization o n the satellites was the subjec t

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of muc h speculatio n i n Washington , bu t n o consensu s emerged . Th e National Intelligenc e Estimat e o f Ma y 1955 , drafte d wel l befor e Khru shchev's bombshell , ha d predicte d tha t "popula r resistanc e o f a n orga nized an d activ e kin d i s unlikel y t o appea r i n th e Satellites " ove r th e following five years. 73 Th e frequentl y revise d "Basi c Nationa l Securit y Policy" summar y o f th e NS C recommende d i n it s Marc h 15 , 1956 , version (NS C 5602/1 ) tha t th e United State s continu e t o promot e evolu tionary changes , an d t o "assur e th e satellit e people s o f th e continuin g interest o f th e U.S . in th e peaceful restoratio n o f thei r independenc e an d political freedom. " A week later , afte r hearin g a report b y Allen Dulles on the significanc e of Sovie t effort s t o discredi t Stalin , th e Nationa l Securit y Counci l di rected it s Plannin g Boar d t o prepar e revision s o f NS C 174 , NSC 5505/ 1 ("Exploitation o f Sovie t an d Europea n Satellit e Vulnerabilities") , an d NSC 5602/1. 7 4 Someon e i n th e CI A eve n suggeste d tha t th e tim e wa s ripe fo r a visi t b y Vice-Presiden t Nixo n t o th e satellit e countries , bu t Allen Dulle s dismisse d th e ide a a s crazy. 75 Report s fro m Mosco w indi cated tha t th e Sovie t leader s wer e divide d o n th e merit s o f de-Staliniza tion, an d Dulle s tol d th e Foreig n Relation s Committe e i n Jun e tha t "Khrushchev i s o n th e rope s and , i f w e ca n kee p th e pressur e up , [ . . .] there i s goin g t o occu r a ver y grea t disintegratio n withi n th e apparatu s of th e internationa l Communis t organization." 76 By th e earl y summe r o f 195 6 Cor d Meye r wa s receivin g warning s from th e satellit e watcher s a t Radi o Fre e Europ e tha t "event s wer e moving towar d a confrontatio n wit h th e Soviet s i n Polan d an d Hun gary." Th e expert s a t th e Stat e Departmen t wer e skeptical , an d Meye r records tha t Alle n Dulle s late r chide d hi m fo r no t bringin g thes e warn ings mor e forcefull y t o hi s attention. 77 Othe r branche s o f th e CI A ea gerly seize d upo n th e chanc e fo r a majo r upheava l i n Easter n Europe , and Alle n Dulle s mus t hav e approve d preparation s t o exploi t thes e tendencies. Behin d Wisner' s an d Angleton' s urging s t o hol d bac k th e secret speec h fro m immediat e publicatio n la y Operatio n Re d Sox/Re d Cap. Conceive d b y Wisner' s directorate , th e operatio n involve d th e training of hundreds of refugee s fro m Czechoslovakia , Hungary , Poland , and Romani a a t a bas e nea r Munich . Th e pla n wa s t o prepar e thes e paramilitary force s fo r infiltratio n int o th e satellite s a t th e opportun e moment t o fomen t o r ai d nationa l uprising s agains t Sovie t rule . Th e forces, recall s Angleton , wer e no t u p t o snuf f i n th e sprin g o f 1956 , an d

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he an d Wisne r wante d tim e t o read y the m befor e usin g element s o f th e Khrushchev speec h t o destabiliz e th e satellit e regimes. 78 The schem e wa s bold , fraugh t wit h risk , an d carrie d th e America n policy o f liberatio n t o it s logica l conclusio n b y proposin g t o pursu e th e covert wa r beyon d th e iro n curtai n vi a indigenou s rebels . It s author s possessed a passionat e belie f i n th e justic e o f America' s caus e i n th e battle agains t communism . Bu t thes e self-style d Knight s Templa r wer e dangerously isolate d fro m th e worl d o f hig h politics , elections , an d diplomacy. Th e distanc e betwee n th e Whit e Hous e an d th e CI A ha s seldom bee n greate r tha n i n the case of liberation . De-Stalinization presente d ne w opportunities an d problems fo r Amer ica's propagand a agencies . In Ma y th e USI A launche d a country by-country revie w t o bette r attun e Voic e o f Americ a programmin g t o the diversit y amon g th e satellites . Radi o Fre e Europ e hammere d hom e the messag e tha t th e politica l syste m ha d t o b e change d t o preven t th e recurrence o f tyranny , bu t i t als o warne d agains t overestimatin g th e Kremlin's tolerance. 79 GI A balloon s wer e droppin g Khrushchev' s trans lated speec h al l ove r Easter n Europe . America' s messag e t o th e Eas t Europeans wa s riddle d wit h ambiguity : You r regime s ar e ou r commo n enemy; the y mus t b e overthrown ; pres s fo r reform ; avoi d ras h action ; you hav e ou r mora l support ; w e ar e seekin g to reduc e tension s wit h th e Soviet Union . Th e Kremlin , fo r it s part , acknowledge d th e existenc e o f internal oppositio n i n th e satellite s an d convenientl y blame d America' s "lying propaganda." 8 0 Although Secretar y o f Stat e Dulle s an d th e psychologica l warfar e agencies persiste d wit h thei r exhortativ e rhetoric , th e Europea n allie s and man y American s soo n cam e t o th e conclusio n tha t liberatio n wa s a dead letter , a t bes t a peculiarl y America n professio n o f fait h i n th e ineluctable force s o f histor y advancin g th e caus e o f freedom . Th e 195 6 election campaig n confirme d thi s impression. Eisenhower presente d him self a s th e agen t o f peace , i n Kore a an d i n negotiation s wit h th e USSR . The Republica n platfor m mad e passin g referenc e t o liberatio n o f th e satellites b y peaceful methods , a s di d Vic e Presiden t Nixo n i n campaig n speeches. Eisenhower i n his acceptance speech a t San Francisco promise d to en d th e col d wa r b y bridgin g "th e grea t chas m tha t separate s u s fro m the people s unde r communis t rule. " Thes e dutifu l reference s differe d little fro m thos e issuin g fro m th e Democrati c camp . Th e latte r wen t s o far a s t o denounc e th e Republica n administratio n fo r it s "heartles s

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record o f broke n promise s t o th e unfortunat e victim s o f Communism " and fo r "standin g silen t whe n th e people s ris e i n Eas t German y an d Poland." 81 Indeed , development s i n Polan d an d Hungar y soo n thrus t the issue of liberatio n bac k int o th e limelight . Rumbles in Poland. Emboldene d b y the hints o f greater permissivenes s emanating fro m Moscow , Polis h dissident s steppe d u p thei r pressure . On June 28, workers i n the industrial cit y of Poznan too k their economi c grievances t o th e street s an d attacke d part y an d securit y polic e offices . Americans a t th e trad e fai r bein g hel d i n th e cit y wer e begge d fo r Western aid . Armore d troop s too k thre e day s t o quel l th e revolt . Scores wer e kille d o r wounded , hundred s imprisoned . A semblanc e o f order wa s restored , bu t th e scen t o f revolutio n wa s unmistakabl e an d the party' s leader s bega n t o tak e step s t o wi n bac k som e publi c sup port. When i n th e earl y evenin g o f Jun e 2 8 Alle n Dulle s telephone d hi s brother wit h new s o f th e riots , Foste r exulted , "Whe n the y begi n t o crack, the y ca n crac k fast . W e hav e t o kee p th e pressur e on." 8 2 How ever, Radio Free Europe responded wit h grea t caution, warning the Poles against suicida l insurrection . Th e State Department commente d tha t "al l free people s wil l b e watching th e situatio n closel y t o se e whether o r no t the Polis h peopl e wil l b e allowe d a governmen t whic h wil l remed y th e grievances whic h hav e brough t the m t o a breakin g point." 8 3 A s i n th e earlier cas e o f Eas t Germany , America n surplu s foo d wa s offere d an d rejected. An embarrasse d Kremli n lashe d ou t a t th e Americans , accusin g the m of havin g financed th e Pozna n rebels . Fortuitousl y fo r th e Soviets , tw o amendments t o th e Mutua l Securit y Ac t ha d jus t bee n introduce d i n th e Senate offerin g a $2 5 millio n subsid y t o privat e organization s dedicate d to Easter n Europe' s liberation. 84 Th e sponsors , Senator s Pau l Dougla s and Everet t Dirksen , ha d evoke d th e liberatio n promise s a s wel l a s th e recent Polis h event s in support o f th e amendments. Foster Dulle s told hi s brother Alle n that he found nothin g objectionabl e i n the Dirksen amend ment, bu t neithe r measur e wa s passed. 85 Th e Soviet s nevertheles s seize d the occasio n t o war n th e Wes t agains t attempt s t o subver t th e satellit e regimes an d war n th e Eas t European s agains t nationalisti c an d oppor tunistic tendencies . Meanwhile , i n Polan d an d Hungar y th e momentu m of refor m accelerated .

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The leadin g figure i n th e quie t Polis h revolutio n wa s Wladysla w Gomulka. In th e earl y postwa r year s h e deplore d Sovie t remova l o f German propert y fro m th e annexed lands , resisted th e collectivizatio n o f agriculture, an d oppose d th e anti-Tito campaign . A t Soviet insistence, he was remove d i n 194 9 fro m th e Polis h Worker s part y leadership . Unde r the Stalinis t Bolesla w Bierut , th e Warsaw regim e struggle d lik e its neigh bors t o collectiviz e an d industrialize , t o isolat e th e Catholi c churc h an d Russify Polis h culture . Th e expansio n o f industr y proceede d apace , bu t most Pole s resente d th e party' s oppressiv e rul e an d especiall y Sovie t domination. I n Augus t 1956 , Gomulk a wa s readmitte d t o ful l part y membership an d becam e a symbo l an d rallyin g poin t fo r nationalist s within an d outsid e th e party . The trial s o f th e Pozna n rioter s wer e conducte d wit h a degre e o f openness tha t onl y encourage d dissidents , an d b y early Octobe r popula r unrest an d sporadi c demonstration s b y workers an d student s amounte d to a n incipien t revolution . Moscow' s displeasur e wa s represente d mos t forcefully b y General Konstanti n Rokossovsky , a defense minister , mem ber o f th e Polish Politburo , an d Sovie t citizen. Apart fro m Rokossovsky , the Polis h part y leader s showe d stead y nerve , independen t spirit , an d unity o f purpos e i n th e fac e o f Sovie t pressure , goin g s o fa r a s t o reorganize th e workers ' militi a int o a forc e fre e o f Sovie t influence . O n October 1 5 the Politbur o agree d t o nominat e Gomulk a a s first secretar y at the forthcoming meetin g of th e Centra l Committee . On th e mornin g o f Octobe r 19 , a few hour s afte r th e confirmatio n o f Gomulka's appointment , Khrushche v arrive d i n Warsa w accompanie d by muc h o f th e Sovie t Politburo . A t th e sam e tim e som e o f th e seve n Soviet division s statione d i n Polan d bega n t o mov e upo n th e capital . Barred fro m joinin g th e meetin g o f th e Centra l Committee , a furiou s Khrushchev demande d th e appointmen t o f a more complian t part y lead ership. In th e extraordinar y tes t o f will s tha t followed , h e accuse d th e Poles o f sellin g ou t t o th e Americans , whil e Gomulk a threatene d t o broadcast t o al l Polan d th e natur e o f th e Sovie t blackmai l unles s th e ominous troo p movement s wer e halted. "W e will not tal k while cannon s are pointin g a t Warsaw, " sai d Gomulka. 86 Workers , students , an d th e militia wer e alerte d t o th e possibilit y o f violen t confrontation . Khru shchev blinke d first; th e Sovie t force s halte d thei r advance , an d a blood bath wa s narrowl y avoided . Rokossovsk y wa s force d t o revea l t o th e Central Committe e th e nex t da y tha t th e part y leadershi p ha d aske d th e

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Soviets t o sto p thei r sabe r rattling . H e wa s the n strippe d o f hi s office s and repatriate d t o th e Sovie t Unio n alon g wit h mos t othe r militar y advisers. Gomulka's victor y owe d a s much t o th e Sovie t leaders ' sober reconsi deration o f hi s merit s a s t o thei r reluctanc e t o wag e war . Hi s renuncia tion o f Stalinis m an d assertio n o f th e righ t t o pursu e th e Polis h rout e t o socialism wa s doctrinall y compatibl e wit h th e ne w Khrushchevia n line , and th e unite d fron t presente d b y the Polis h part y di d afte r al l guarante e the preservation o f Communis t rule . O n Novembe r 18 , with th e lesson s of the Hungarian revolutio n alread y recorded , Gomulk a secure d i n Moscow tangibl e assurance s o f support—cancellatio n o f Poland' s debt , ne w Soviet credits , recognitio n o f Poland' s righ t t o consultatio n i n th e de ployment o f Sovie t forces, an d a pledge to le t Poles still held i n the Sovie t Union retur n t o thei r homeland . H e undertoo k i n tur n t o safeguar d Communist supremac y an d endors e Sovie t foreig n policy , notabl y wit h regard t o the forcibl e reintegratio n o f Hungar y int o the Sovie t bloc. This was a smal l pric e t o pa y fo r th e fre e pursui t o f domesti c reform , whic h included th e decollectivizatio n o f muc h o f agriculture , a reviva l o f mar ginal privat e enterprise , th e establishmen t o f workers ' council s i n facto ries, th e rehabilitatio n o f victim s o f Stalinism , an d th e releas e o f Stefa n Cardinal Wyszynsk i fro m hous e arrest . Gomulk a appeare d t o b e th e agent o f nationa l reconciliation , an d hi s regim e eve n expresse d a desir e for close r relation s wit h th e West. 87 The Polis h quie t revolutio n seemingl y vindicate d Wester n policymak ers, includin g Secretar y o f Stat e Dulles , wh o ha d anticipate d a peacefu l evolution towar d Titoism . Bac k i n Jul y 1956 , Henr y Cabo t Lodge , th e U.S. ambassado r t o th e Unite d Nations , ha d suggeste d t o Dulle s th e introduction i n th e Securit y Counci l o f a resolutio n t o se t u p a Peac e Observation Commissio n fo r Poland . Th e Soviet s woul d exercis e thei r veto, o f course , bu t th e initiativ e woul d hav e a positiv e politica l effec t on Polish-Americans . Alternatively , th e Unite d State s coul d propos e a UN investigatio n o f th e Kremli n charge s tha t th e American s ha d insti gated th e riots. Observed Dulles , "From a political poin t o f view it is not too ba d t o le t som e thin k w e did. " Th e tw o me n agree d tha t th e matte r was "no t simpl e an d ther e coul d b e a lo t o f dividend s i f i t i s playe d right," bu t Dulle s though t tha t th e Britis h an d th e Frenc h woul d no t endorse ope n allegation s o f Sovie t interference , commentin g tha t "the y are wea k whe n thing s ar e breakin g ou r way." 8 8 O n Octobe r 22 , Lodg e

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again propose d actio n a t th e Unite d Nations , an d Dulle s agree d al l th e more readil y sinc e h e ha d hear d th e representation s o f leadin g Polish Americans. Events i n Hungar y wer e abou t t o dra w attentio n awa y fro m Poland, bu t fo r th e momen t Dulle s coul d confidentl y tel l a calle r tha t "the continuou s sequenc e o f concession s demonstrate s th e weaknes s o f the Communis t regim e an d wil l ultimately lea d to fre e elections." 89 Radio Fre e Europ e playe d it s par t admirably , warnin g th e Pole s no t to deman d immediat e Sovie t militar y withdrawa l o r fre e election s an d urging the m t o suppor t Gomulka' s compromise . S o calmin g wa s thi s message tha t Warsa w suspende d th e jammin g o f RF E durin g th e crisis . The CI A had , accordin g t o Rober t Amory , "virtuall y real-tim e soli d information leake d t o th e Polis h editor s b y thei r friend s o n th e Warsa w Politburo an d gladl y passe d o n t o encourag e U S assistanc e i n cas e th e Soviets cracke d down. " H e urge d th e Pentagon' s operation s chief , Gen eral Wheeler , t o prepar e fo r Worl d Wa r III , arguin g tha t i f th e Polis h army turne d o n th e Russian s "th e lan d wa r balanc e i n Easter n Europ e will b e decisivel y tippe d i n ou r favo r i f materia l suppor t ca n onl y b e given them." 9 0 Although Wheele r an d hi s staf f promptl y se t t o wor k o n a "cras h analysis an d plannin g program, " th e White Hous e displaye d onl y seren e confidence. O n Octobe r 2 0 th e presiden t sen t a n anodyn e messag e o f sympathy t o th e Poles . Th e nex t day , o n th e CB S progra m "Fac e th e Nation," Dulle s expresse d doub t tha t th e Soviet s woul d resor t t o mili tary measure s bu t stresse d tha t i n suc h a n eventualit y th e Unite d State s would definitel y no t intervene . B y the n th e mos t critica l momen t ha d passed i n Warsaw , an d th e secretary' s reassuranc e t o th e Soviet s wa s superfluous, althoug h the y n o doub t dre w comfor t fro m i t a fe w day s later i n th e mids t o f th e Hungaria n conflagration . Th e cours e o f actio n recommended b y th e NSC' s Plannin g Boar d include d bilatera l talks , inducements t o reorien t Polis h trad e towar d th e West , an d "economi c and technica l assistanc e i n moderat e amount s sufficien t t o giv e the Pole s an alternativ e t o complet e dependenc e o n Moscow." 9 1 I n th e event , Eisenhower decide d t o quietl y exten d economi c ai d t o th e Poles , thoug h this too k a tangibl e for m onl y i n mid-195 7 an d Gomulka' s reformis m proved t o b e short-lived . The wind s o f chang e wer e blowin g throug h Easter n Europe . Favor able an d irreversibl e force s appeare d t o b e a t work , an d i f al l thi s owe d little t o Washington' s efforts , America' s strategi c interest s wer e never -

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theless wel l served . A mor e immediat e threa t t o thes e interest s wa s emerging i n th e Middl e East , fo r o n Octobe r 1 9 Dulle s learne d tha t despite hi s effort s a t conciliatio n thre e o f America' s closes t friend s wer e preparing a concerte d attac k o n Egypt . Withi n a week , th e Hungaria n and Sue z crise s woul d shak e bot h th e Easter n an d Wester n alliance s t o their foundation s an d dispe l th e comfortin g illusion s o f peacefu l coexis tence. Another fata l casualt y woul d b e the myt h o f liberation . Eruption in Hungary. In Hungary , th e Party' s crisi s o f confidence , se t in motio n b y th e Ne w Course , deepene d despit e th e retur n t o undivide d power o f th e hated dictato r Matya s Rakosi . The libera l tendenc y associ ated wit h th e dismisse d Imr e Nag y an d officiall y brande d "revisionist " was gainin g groun d amon g Communis t intellectuals . Th e part y pres s displayed unprecedente d independenc e i n criticizin g "dogmatic " leader ship. In fact , b y th e sprin g o f 195 6 a discussio n foru m officiall y sanc tioned a s a safety valv e an d know n a s the Petof i Circl e becam e th e scen e of devastatin g denunciation s o f economi c mismanagemen t an d politica l oppression. Th e unrepentan t Rakos i plotte d t o purg e hi s tormentors , but th e Kremli n intervene d an d i n Jul y ha d hi m replace d b y anothe r Comintern veteran , Ern o Gero . Rakosi ha d becom e expendabl e no t onl y because o f hi s unpopularity bu t als o because he was a bete noire of Tito , who despise d hi m fo r hi s savage attacks o f earlie r years and charge d tha t his hands wer e soake d i n blood . Under Ger o th e Hungaria n part y trie d t o recove r it s balance . Nag y was grudgingly readmitte d t o party membership , the purged Laszl o Raj k was posthumousl y rehabilitated , an d promise s o f economi c refor m an d socialist legalit y wer e made . I n mid-October , a t Sovie t insistence , Ger o traveled t o Belgrad e to be g Tito's forgivenes s fo r calumnie s convenientl y attributed t o Rakos i (wh o ha d retire d t o th e Sovie t Union ) an d t o th e former secre t police chief. Back i n Budapest, th e classi c prerevolutionar y situation wa s i n evidence : a divide d an d demoralize d rulin g elite , a restive an d outspoke n intelligentsia , an d a n alienate d populatio n yearn ing fo r change . Encourage d b y th e new s fro m Poland , th e Writers ' Union, th e Trad e Unio n Council , th e Petof i Circle , an d studen t group s outbid eac h othe r wit h ever-bolde r manifestos . B y the mornin g o f Octo ber 23 , th e demand s include d fre e multipart y election s an d th e with drawal o f Sovie t troops . Late r tha t da y a studen t demonstratio n o f solidarity wit h th e Pole s wa s first prohibited , the n sanctione d b y Gero .

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The street s of Budapest filled with marchin g protesters, an d tha t evenin g the first shot s o f th e revolutio n wer e fired int o a crow d b y secre t polic e guarding the broadcasting center . In thirteen day s the revolution wen t through stage s of arme d confron tation, democrati c consolidation , an d final repression . Ger o trie d t o bu y time b y appointin g Imr e Nag y prim e ministe r whil e callin g fo r Sovie t military help . Th e Warsa w Treaty , evoke d i n officia l justificatio n o f th e appeal, provide d fo r assistanc e onl y i n th e cas e o f externa l threa t an d guaranteed noninterferenc e i n th e members ' interna l affairs , bu t neithe r in 195 6 no r i n 196 8 di d th e pac t inhibi t intervention . In fact , Sovie t troops ha d bee n conductin g maneuver s fo r thre e day s an d reache d Bu dapest befor e daw n o n Octobe r 2 4 t o crus h wha t Ger o calle d "counter revolutionary gangs. " Mos t Hungaria n soldier s remaine d inactiv e o r defected t o th e revolution , an d afte r a fe w blood y bu t inconclusiv e skirmishes i t becam e eviden t tha t th e regim e coul d coun t onl y o n th e secret police an d th e Soviet s to prop u p party rule . Two Sovie t Politbur o members, Anastas Mikoya n an d Mikhai l Suslov , hurried t o Budapes t i n order t o hav e Ger o replace d a s first secretar y b y th e mor e moderat e Janos Kada r an d stabiliz e th e situation . Kada r professe d hi s suppor t fo r Prime Minister Nagy , an d th e latter appeale d t o the rapidly proliferatin g revolutionary group s t o la y dow n thei r arms , promisin g sweepin g re forms an d th e withdrawal o f Sovie t troops . Responding t o popula r pressures , Nag y graduall y expande d hi s gov ernment t o includ e representative s o f th e postwa r non-Communis t par ties an d promise d th e formatio n o f a ne w nationa l army . Deserte d b y most o f it s members , th e Communis t part y (rename d th e Hungaria n Socialist Worker s party ) wa s reduce d t o a har d cor e o f beleaguere d veterans hole d u p i n th e Centra l Committe e buildin g an d distric t offices . Freedom fighters lai d sieg e to th e Budapes t part y committee' s headquar ters, an d som e summar y execution s ensued . A s revolutions go , the Hun garian uprisin g wa s a n uncommonl y civilize d affair , an d th e people' s wrath claime d relativel y fe w victims , mostly secre t policemen . Bu t eigh t years o f Stalinis m dissipate d whateve r genuin e suppor t th e Communist s once enjoyed , an d Kada r anticipate d tha t hi s party woul d hav e t o func tion a s a minorit y opposition . Th e famou s Marxis t philosophe r Gyorg y Lukacs wa s mor e blunt : communis m ha d bee n "totall y disgraced " i n Hungary, an d i n fre e election s th e part y coul d coun t o n n o mor e tha n 5 to 1 0 percen t o f th e popula r vote. 92 Th e revolutionar y spiri t swep t th e

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country, politica l partie s ol d an d ne w emerged , an d th e liberate d Cardi nal Mindszent y mad e a triumphal retur n t o Budapest . Th e ne w politica l consensus favore d a pluralisti c democracy , som e for m o f mixe d econ omy, and , abov e all , national autonomy . The new s tha t Mikoya n an d Suslo v carrie d bac k t o th e Kremli n afte r their secon d visi t t o Budapest , o n Octobe r 27 , coul d no t hav e bee n encouraging. Th e Sovie t leadershi p wa s divide d o n th e appropriat e re sponse, a s wer e it s allies . Th e Chines e initiall y recommende d agains t intervention, bu t th e mor e vulnerabl e satellites , notabl y Czechoslovaki a and Romania , whic h ha d larg e an d no w restiv e Hungaria n minorities , were clamorin g fo r swif t action. 93 Th e first militar y interventio n i n Budapest ha d bee n a t bes t a standoff . I t faile d t o eliminat e politica l challenges to party rule . The bloodshed i t caused was denounce d aroun d the worl d a s a demonstratio n o f Sovie t brutality , an d th e subsequen t tactical withdrawa l fro m th e capita l implie d acquiescenc e i n th e demo cratic revolutio n engulfin g Hungary . N o doub t Khrushche v woul d hav e preferred a political solution , a s he confided t o the Yugoslav ambassado r on Octobe r 24. 94 Betwee n Octobe r 2 9 an d 31 , th e Sovie t Politbur o decided o n th e tactic s t o follow . Hungar y wa s abandonin g communism ; the American s ha d mad e clea r the y woul d no t intervene ; an d th e West ern allie s were divided ove r the impending militar y actio n agains t Egypt . The imperative s o f confirmin g th e integrity o f th e Soviet bloc were clear , the risks—apart fro m inevitabl e propaganda damage—minimal . Soviet Deception and Intervention. Preparation s fo r a decisiv e mili tary strik e wer e se t i n motion . In th e meantime , o n Octobe r 3 0 th e Kremlin issued a remarkably conciliator y declaratio n affirmin g it s acceptance o f differen t road s t o socialis m an d respec t fo r th e complet e equal ity, territoria l integrity , an d sovereignt y o f othe r socialis t states . Th e declaration wa s presumabl y designe d t o dampe n unres t i n th e othe r satellites, reassur e Tito , an d deceiv e th e Hungarians . Mikoya n an d Sus lov were dispatche d onc e agai n t o Budapes t o n Octobe r 3 1 t o tr y t o stil l Nagy's apprehensions . Alon g wit h Moscow' s ambassador , Yur i Andro pov, the y repeatedl y assure d th e Hungaria n leade r tha t Russia n troo p movements wer e merel y preparation s fo r withdrawa l an d tha t negotia tions fo r a full evacuatio n coul d commence . Reports o f a massiv e influ x o f Sovie t reinforcement s convince d Nag y that h e ha d bee n deceived , an d o n Novembe r 1 he secure d hi s cabinet' s

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support (includin g tha t o f Kadar ) fo r th e fatefu l ste p o f appealin g t o th e United Nations. He proclaimed Hungary' s withdrawa l fro m th e Warsa w Pact an d requeste d th e "fou r grea t powers " t o recogniz e an d guarante e Hungary's neutrality . Speaking to his countrymen, he observed tha t "ou r people ar e a s unite d i n thi s decisio n a s perhap s neve r befor e i n thei r history." 95 Andropo v promptl y demande d tha t Nag y retrac t thi s mea sure, then invite d th e Hungarian s th e next da y t o join i n negotiations o n a Sovie t withdrawal . I t i s wort h reiteratin g tha t Nag y resorte d t o th e provocative proclamatio n o f neutralit y onl y after receivin g evidenc e o f the Sovie t intent t o overthro w hi s government b y force . Khrushchev an d Malenko v pai d lightning , secre t visit s o n Novembe r 1 t o Brest , the n t o Bucharest , t o brie f th e Polis h an d othe r satellit e leaders o n th e impendin g suppressio n o f th e Hungaria n revolt . A mor e difficult jo b o f persuasio n awaite d the m th e nex t day , whe n the y ap peared a t Tito' s Brion i retreat . Th e othe r Communis t leaders , Khru shchev assure d Tito , al l agree d o n th e necessit y o f militar y intervention . The Wester n power s wer e "mire d dee p i n th e mu d o f Egypt. " Th e counterrevolutionaries i n Hungar y wer e killin g communist s an d bring ing back capitalis m t o th e very frontiers o f th e Soviet Union. The Soviet s could no t affor d t o le t thing s tak e thei r cours e an d appea r stupi d o r weak. Tit o argue d agains t resor t t o forc e bu t finall y contente d himsel f with urgin g th e appointmen t o f Kada r a s Moscow' s ne w lieutenant. 96 Kadar b y thi s tim e ha d bee n persuade d t o serv e th e inevitable . Spirite d out o f Budapest b y the Soviets, he was held i n readiness i n the Carpatho Ukrainian cit y o f Uzhgoro d fo r th e impendin g formatio n o f a ne w "Hungarian Revolutionar y Worker-Peasan t Government. " In the late hours o f November 3 , a Hungarian militar y delegatio n me t with it s Sovie t counterpar t a t th e Sovie t militar y headquarter s outsid e Budapest t o continu e discussion s o n withdrawal. Th e meetin g was inter rupted b y th e appearanc e o f th e hea d o f th e KGB , Genera l Iva n Serov , who summaril y arreste d th e Hungarians . A t daw n th e nex t day , th e Soviets launche d a massiv e assaul t o n Budapest . A shattered Imr e Nag y broadcast t o hi s people tha t "Sovie t troop s attacke d ou r capita l wit h th e obvious intentio n o f overthrowin g th e lega l Hungaria n democrati c gov ernment" an d claime d tha t "ou r troop s ar e i n combat. " In fact , h e di d not giv e th e orde r t o fight , fo r th e formatio n o f a ne w Hungaria n national arm y ha d hardl y begun . Fighting continue d sporadicall y fo r a fe w days , an d severa l week s

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passed befor e th e resistanc e o f workers ' council s i n th e factorie s wa s crushed. Kada r wa s brough t bac k t o Budapes t i n a Sovie t armore d ca r and se t abou t th e thankles s tas k o f restorin g Communis t rule . Cardina l Mindszenty sough t sanctuar y i n th e U.S . legation; Nag y an d hi s retinu e in th e Yugosla v embassy . Som e tw o hundre d thousan d Hungarian s fle d abroad. Th e dead , an d burned-ou t Sovie t tanks , littere d th e street s o f a devastated city . Execution, imprisonment , o r deportatio n wa s th e fate o f thousands o f patriots. Nagy wa s enticed fro m hi s refuge an d execute d i n June 195 8 afte r refusin g t o recan t a t a travest y o f a secre t trial . A spontaneous an d movingl y courageou s attemp t b y a smal l natio n t o discard communis m an d foreig n dominatio n ha d com e to a tragic end . Washington Faces Two Crises. Th e outbrea k withi n a fe w day s o f both th e Hungaria n an d Sue z crise s sorel y trie d th e fortitud e an d nerv e of Washington' s policymakers . Sue z wa s no t a s muc h o f a surpris e a s Hungary. Deput y Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e Rober t Murph y claime d subsequently tha t Washingto n ha d neithe r advanc e warnin g no r a con tingency pla n fo r th e Hungaria n uprising. 97 Th e Stat e Departmen t an d the CI A ha d undoubtedl y observe d th e mountin g tensio n i n Budapest , but th e eruptio n o f a full-scal e revol t o n Octobe r 2 3 wa s spontaneou s and coul d hardl y hav e bee n accuratel y predicted . A s Alle n Dulle s late r observed, "W e wer e no t caugh t b y surpris e a s t o th e genera l condition s or th e genera l reactions , excep t i n Hungar y i t wen t beyon d wha t w e expected." H e awakene d Cor d Meye r wit h th e new s tha t "al l hel l ha s broken loos e i n Budapest. " Th e commo n belie f tha t Communis t rul e was immovable , recall s Meyer , impede d th e formulatio n o f realisti c contingency plan s fo r suc h a revolt . Momentaril y th e secretar y o f stat e was elated : "W e kep t aliv e th e yearnin g fo r freedom . I t worke d i n Yugoslavia; i t will wor k i n Polan d an d Hungary . Th e grea t monolit h o f Communism i s crumbling!" 98 Eisenhower record s tha t th e developin g crisi s i n Hungar y wa s o n th e agenda o f numerou s Whit e Hous e meetings , bu t th e dispositio n o f poli cymakers wa s t o wait an d see. 99 The ne w Hungaria n prim e ministe r wa s a Communis t an d ha d apparentl y sanctione d th e cal l fo r Sovie t assis tance. Fro m hi s vantage poin t i n Moscow, Ambassado r Bohle n reporte d that ther e di d no t appea r t o b e an y ope n divergenc e betwee n th e Sovie t and Hungaria n governments. 100 Perhaps , a s Dulle s claimed , th e ai d t o Tito wa s payin g dividend s i n Hungar y a s wel l a s Poland , an d evolutio n

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toward nationa l communis m woul d b e condone d b y Khrushchev . Th e latter wa s regarde d a s a bol d reforme r wh o wa s stil l consolidatin g hi s position, an d provocativ e America n actio n migh t weake n hi s gri p an d even rais e th e ris k o f globa l conflict . Th e hop e i n officia l Washingto n was tha t th e Polis h an d Hungaria n situation s woul d evolv e a t a pac e tolerable t o Mosco w an d i n a direction favorabl e t o th e West . After new s of th e bloody clashe s with Sovie t troops reache d Washing ton, o n Octobe r 2 5 th e presiden t issue d hi s first publi c comment . Th e United States , h e said , note d th e "renewe d expressio n o f th e intens e desire fo r freedo m lon g hel d b y th e peopl e o f Hungary " an d deplore d the interventio n o f Sovie t forces . H e tol d a Republica n rall y i n Madiso n Square Garde n tha t evenin g tha t th e Unite d State s woul d d o al l i n it s power peacefull y t o hel p th e Hungarians , ari d confide d t o a journalist : "Poor fellows , poor fellows , I think abou t the m al l the time. I wish ther e were some way o f helpin g them." 1 0 1 The option s fo r a n America n respons e wer e th e subjec t o f intensiv e debate withi n th e administratio n an d i n th e press . Actio n a t th e Unite d Nations wa s on e commo n ide a urge d b y Hungarian-America n leader s and recommende d b y th e New York Times. Dulle s discusse d thi s wit h Lodge, worryin g "fro m a politica l standpoint " tha t "i t wil l b e sai d tha t here ar e th e grea t moment s an d whe n the y cam e an d thes e fellow s wer e ready t o stan d u p an d die , we were caugh t nappin g an d doin g nothing. " He though t tha t ther e wa s mor e o f a n excus e t o tak e Hungar y t o th e Security Counci l tha n ther e ha d bee n wit h Polan d an d tha t th e Britis h and Frenc h woul d reluctantl y g o along. 102 Th e nex t day , Lodg e sug gested a n observatio n commission , whil e Dulle s toye d wit h th e possibil ity o f a circula r lette r t o U N member s o r a resolutio n initiate d b y othe r states o n th e Securit y Counci l suc h a s Cub a o r Peru . Dulle s an d th e president agree d actio n shoul d b e concerte d wit h th e allies , wh o migh t otherwise suspec t a n electio n gambit. 103 The Nationa l Securit y Counci l convene d o n th e mornin g o f Octobe r 26 t o tak e stoc k o f th e situation . Alle n Dulle s reporte d tha t Khrushche v appeared t o b e i n trouble , an d th e presiden t voice d grea t concer n tha t the Kremli n migh t b e "tempte d t o resor t t o extrem e measures , eve n t o start a worl d war. " Th e tentativ e consensu s wa s tha t th e Unite d State s should exten d a guarante e o f noninterferenc e t o alleviat e Sovie t appre hensions an d induc e a mor e permissiv e attitud e towar d Hungar y an d Poland. 104 Th e NSC instructed it s Planning Board t o prepare " a compre -

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hensive analysi s o f th e development s i n Hungar y an d Poland , an d pos sible courses o f actio n i n the light thereof whic h th e United State s shoul d consider," deferrin g actio n o n th e latest policy guidance , NSC 5616. 1 0 5 Secretary o f Stat e Dulle s wa s schedule d t o mak e a majo r foreig n policy addres s i n Dalla s o n Octobe r 27 . Thi s opportunit y wa s use d t o deliver th e authoritativ e America n respons e t o th e Hungaria n revolu tion. H e twic e consulte d th e presiden t th e nigh t before , an d the y agree d the world shoul d b e assure d tha t Americ a wante d genuin e independenc e for th e Eas t Europeans ; i f thi s wa s granted , th e proble m o f Europea n security woul d b e altered . Th e presiden t an d Dulle s als o agree d tha t th e issue shoul d b e broache d wit h th e Soviet s onl y i n private , backstag e discussions a t th e Unite d Nations. 106 In hi s Dalla s speec h Dulle s offere d America's economi c ai d withou t an y conditio n a s t o "an y particula r form o f society " tha t migh t emerge . In othe r words , Titois m wa s a n acceptable, indeed desirable , outcome. 107 The prospect s fo r peacefu l evolutio n dimme d th e nex t da y whe n th e State Departmen t learne d tha t fres h Sovie t troop s wer e floodin g int o Hungary. 108 Ominou s new s als o arrive d fro m th e American ambassado r to Te l Aviv : full-scal e mobilizatio n b y th e Israel i forces. 109 Th e final plans fo r th e Anglo-French-Israel i operatio n t o toppl e Nasse r ha d bee n developed jus t a s the Hungarian revolutio n brok e out , an d th e conspira tors evidentl y sa w n o reaso n t o postpon e action . Moscow' s preoccupa tion wit h Hungar y migh t wel l have been regarde d b y them a s fortuitous , although Dulle s promptl y warne d Frenc h an d Britis h diplomat s tha t th e operation woul d undermin e Wester n attempt s t o forestal l repressio n o f the Hungarians. 110 Dulles's reassuranc e t o th e Soviet s wa s meanwhil e reiterate d a t th e United Nation s o n Octobe r 2 8 b y Lodg e an d i n Mosco w th e followin g day b y Bohlen, wh o o n Dulles' s instruction s als o reminde d Khrushchev , Bulganin, an d Zhuko v tha t th e Unite d State s continue d t o favo r a n earlier Wester n proposa l linkin g a "treat y o f assurance " t o Germa n unification.111 Dulle s ha d cleare d thes e instruction s wit h th e president , who suggeste d tha t "thi s woul d b e a goo d tim e reall y t o tal k wit h th e Russians." Th e secretar y warne d tha t the y ha d t o b e "extremel y carefu l not t o d o anythin g whic h coul d b e misinterprete d i n th e satellit e coun tries t o indicat e tha t w e wer e sellin g the m ou t an d dealin g wit h thei r hated master s behin d thei r backs, " an d Eisenhowe r agreed. 112 This , o n available evidence , was th e onl y America n attemp t t o plac e th e Hungar -

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ian events in the context of East-West negotiations o n European security . There was apparentl y n o response , nor an y follow-up . The Stat e Departmen t wa s equall y cautiou s i n it s appraisa l o f th e political orientatio n o f th e Nag y government , whic h b y thi s tim e ha d made clea r it s radica l departur e fro m Communis t orthodoxy . Th e ne w American ministe r t o Hungary , Edwar d T . Wailes , wa s schedule d t o leave fo r Budapes t o n th e afternoo n o f Octobe r 30 . Whe n th e questio n of havin g Waile s mee t wit h th e presiden t aros e i n a discussio n betwee n Dulles an d a Whit e Hous e aide , th e secretar y observe d tha t "i t i s no t important. . . because th e presen t governmen t i s not on e we want t o d o much with. " Th e diploma t complaine d tha t h e ha d no t bee n briefe d o n his assignment. 113 Nor , apparently , ha d ther e bee n contac t betwee n Nagy an d th e remainin g America n diplomat s i n Budapest , an d Hunga ry's permanen t representativ e a t th e Unite d Nation s wa s a Stalinis t wh o enjoyed th e confidenc e o f neithe r th e ne w regim e no r th e West . Th e momentary laps e i n communicatio n an d inadequat e intelligenc e ma y therefore serv e t o explai n Dulles' s coo l respons e t o th e emergenc e o f a n ultra-Titoist regime—th e ver y developmen t h e had s o confidentl y antic ipated. Soviet charge s tha t America n agent s an d mone y ha d fomente d th e uprising wer e publicly dismisse d b y the secretar y o f state. 114 CI A opera tives in Western Europ e wer e rushe d t o th e borde r t o mak e contac t wit h their agent s i n Hungary , an d som e arm s wer e supplie d t o th e rebels , bu t there i s n o corroborate d evidenc e o f calculate d an d cover t collusio n t o precipitate a n uprising . T o b e sure , th e CIA' s operationa l department s reacted wit h enthusiasm . For Frank Wisner an d his aides in the Director ate o f Plans , the long-awaite d opportunit y ha d come . Air resuppl y facil ities, stock s o f arms , an d communication s equipmen t wer e ready . Th e Hungarian uprising , recall s a onetim e directo r o f centra l intelligence , was "exactl y th e en d fo r whic h th e Agency's paramilitary capabilit y wa s designed." 115 Wisner , o n a Europea n inspectio n tour , presse d th e cas e for activ e rollback, fo r unleashin g th e Red Sox/Re d Ca p force s t o ai d th e Hungarians an d sprea d th e spar k o f revol t i n the satellites . If Alle n Dulle s favore d paramilitar y intervention , h e wa s soo n over ruled b y th e president . Thi s wa s th e momen t o f trut h fo r th e CIA . I n William Colby' s words , "Whateve r doubt s ma y hav e existe d i n th e Agency abou t Washington' s polic y i n matter s lik e thi s vanished." 116 Hungarian specialist s lik e James McCarga r wer e reduce d t o speculatin g

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about th e desirabl e politica l compositio n o f a ne w Hungaria n govern ment. Th e agent s a t th e Hungaria n borde r coul d offe r littl e mor e tha n cautious encouragemen t t o contact s wh o wer e becomin g increasingl y anxious abou t Sovie t an d America n intentions . Frustrated b y th e collaps e o f al l hi s plan s an d preparations , Fran k Wisner wa s als o furiou s a t th e coincidenta l Sue z operatio n an d a t no t having receive d an y warnin g fro m hi s Britis h counterparts . Di d Britai n not understan d wha t it s action would d o to Hungary, where Khrushche v was abou t t o mak e concessions ? Th e revolutio n turne d int o a persona l tragedy fo r thi s col d warrior . Whe n th e fina l Sovie t assaul t go t unde r way, h e fle w t o Vienn a t o observ e th e disma l sigh t o f freedo m fighters and refugee s floodin g acros s the border. A t his next stop, the CIA statio n in Rome , h e wa s visibl y o n th e brin k o f a nervou s breakdown , an d h e never full y recovered . Recurrin g fits o f depressio n an d othe r illnes s eventually drov e hi m t o suicide , " a casualt y o f th e realitie s o f th e Col d War." 1 1 7 One o f th e realitie s o f th e col d wa r wa s propaganda , an d Radi o Fre e Europe serve d a s a convenient scapegoa t fo r bot h Eas t an d West. Admit tedly, it s performanc e durin g th e revolutio n wa s a controversia l mi x o f encouragement an d excessiv e suspicion . Unti l Novembe r 1 , RFE' s com mentators treate d th e Nagy regim e a s a Communist Troja n horse , blam ing i t fo r th e initia l cal l fo r Sovie t help , althoug h som e polic y adviser s would hav e preferre d t o withhol d judgment . O n th e othe r hand , RF E offered som e tactica l advic e t o th e rebels , serve d a s a transmissio n bel t for thei r demands , an d wa s generall y identifie d wit h th e goal s o f th e revolution. In retrospect, Cor d Meye r agree d tha t th e tone o f th e broad casts was "mor e exuberan t an d optimisti c than the situation warranted. " Reports o n U N debate s an d Wester n expression s o f sympath y implie d the promise o f tangibl e assistance . On th e mornin g o f Novembe r 4 , a s fighting rage d i n th e street s o f Budapest, th e statio n broadcas t a revie w o f a newspaper repor t suggest ing tha t i f th e Hungarian s hel d ou t unti l afte r th e America n election , Congress migh t approv e arme d intervention . Th e commentato r adde d that " a practica l manifestatio n o f Wester n sympath y i s expecte d a t an y hour." 1 1 8 Th e nex t day' s polic y guidelin e wa s somberl y realisti c i n observing tha t "non e o f ou r audience s will b e to o receptiv e t o stron g propaganda word s an d striden t voice s whil e th e victim s o f Sovie t impe rialism li e unburied." 119

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Investigations b y th e CI A an d th e Wes t Germa n governmen t largel y exonerated RF E o f an y wrongdoing , althoug h a fe w broadcast s wer e found t o b e i n violatio n o f standin g policie s an d dail y guidances . Th e real issue , o f course , wa s no t s o muc h th e occasiona l transgressio n b y overzealous emigr e broadcaster s bu t rathe r th e perception s induce d b y American psychologica l warfare . Survey s amon g refugee s indicate d tha t while fe w blame d RF E for incitement , a great man y construe d Washing ton's liberatio n rhetori c an d th e ver y existenc e o f RF E a s a n America n commitment t o com e t o thei r assistanc e a t th e appropriat e momen t against th e Sovie t Union . No t surprisingly , the y fel t tha t th e Hungaria n revolution, b y creatin g a constitutiona l regim e tha t requeste d recogni tion an d protectio n o f Hungary' s sovereignt y an d neutrality , ha d pre sented th e Wes t wit h th e idea l opportunit y fo r constructiv e action. 120 That thes e illusion s persisted despit e Washington's pruden t emphasi s o n peaceful evolutio n an d Titois m owe d mor e t o fundamenta l mispercep tion o n bot h side s than t o willful deceptio n o r self-deception . The mos t damagin g misperception , displaye d notabl y b y Dulles , in volved th e transferability o f Titoism. Tito, initially the most orthodo x o f Communist leaders , had secure d Yugoslavia' s autonom y wit h onl y mod est assistanc e fro m th e allie s an d enjoye d a domesti c followin g tha t onl y grew afte r hi s refusa l t o d o Stalin' s bidding . N o othe r Eas t Europea n Communist leade r commande d suc h popula r suppor t an d suc h stron g and reliabl e defens e forces . Dulles's hope that the virus of Titoism woul d spread wa s understandabl e an d consonan t wit h America n interests , an d Gomulka's succes s momentaril y len t i t som e strength . Titois m hel d ou t the promis e o f liberatio n withou t additiona l o r mor e tangibl e America n commitments. Israel's lightnin g advanc e o n Octobe r 29 , followe d th e nex t da y b y the prearrange d Anglo-Frenc h ultimatu m t o Nasser , compelle d Wash ington t o concentrat e it s attentio n o n th e Middl e East . Th e implication s for th e outcom e o f th e Hungaria n crisi s wer e evident . Alle n Dulle s shared hi s brother' s concer n tha t " a spar k i n the Middle Eas t coul d giv e the Soviet s a shiel d t o d o thing s the y can' t d o now " an d tha t "th e cloc k might b e turne d bac k i n Centra l Europe. " In a telephon e conversatio n with Eisenhowe r o n th e afternoo n o f Octobe r 30 , th e secretar y o f stat e observed "wha t a great traged y i t is just when th e whole Sovie t policy i s collapsing th e Britis h an d Frenc h ar e doin g th e sam e thin g i n th e Ara b world." 1 2 1

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The CIA' s directo r haile d Moscow' s Octobe r 3 0 declaratio n a s "on e of th e mos t significan t t o com e ou t o f th e Sovie t Unio n sinc e th e en d o f World Wa r II, " althoug h b y the n U.S . an d Britis h militar y intelligenc e had learne d tha t som e Re d Arm y unit s ha d bee n place d o n ful l battl e alert. Th e presiden t doubte d Moscow' s sincerity , an d i n a majo r publi c address o n th e tw o crises , delivere d i n th e evenin g o f Octobe r 3 1 , h e toned dow n Foste r Dulles' s propose d reference s t o irresistibl e force s o f liberation i n Easter n Europe. 122 Instead , Eisenhowe r note d tha t th e us e of forc e t o fulfil l th e wartim e pledge s regardin g Eastern-Centra l Europ e would no t hav e been in anyone' s interest , bu t that th e United State s "di d help t o kee p aliv e the hope o f thes e peoples fo r freedom. " H e reaffirme d Dulles's statemen t tha t th e Unite d State s di d no t loo k upo n ne w Eas t European government s a s potentia l allie s bu t wa s read y t o offe r the m economic aid. 123 Washington's dilemm a wa s aggravate d b y Nagy's declaratio n o f neu trality an d appea l fo r recognition . Th e America n legatio n i n Budapes t reported tha t th e revolutio n wa s clearl y leadin g t o a democrati c for m o f government an d tha t "th e potentialit y o f U.S . influence i n thi s perio d i s tremendous"; i t recommende d urgen t consideratio n o f "furthe r U.S . statements." 124 Th e directo r o f centra l intelligence , fo r hi s part , con strued th e occurrence s i n Hungar y a s a "miracle." 125 The les s favorabl e developments wer e the Sue z crisis and th e movement o f Sovie t reinforce ments int o Hungary . Th e critica l momen t ha d arrive d fo r reassessin g Washington's response . Ther e wa s n o shortag e o f advice : congressmen , emigres, diplomat s wer e al l lobbyin g th e Stat e Departmen t fo r som e form o f suppor t fo r th e Hungarian s i n their hou r o f need . Policy Options and Decisions. Sinc e Octobe r 26 , th e member s o f th e National Securit y Counci l Plannin g Boar d ha d bee n strugglin g wit h th e development o f polic y recommendation s i n a fluid an d comple x situa tion. A revisio n o f NS C 561 6 wa s i n preparation , an d accordin g t o Robert Amory , h e an d som e othe r member s o f th e Plannin g Boar d wer e urging forceful action . He recalls that intelligenc e reports o f Sovie t troo p movements le d the m t o conclud e tha t th e Sue z crisi s ha d helpe d th e Kremlin t o decid e o n swif t repression : "Appalle d b y th e combinatio n o f a God-give n chanc e t o witnes s a significant roll-bac k o f thi s iro n curtai n by th e unaide d gut s an d verv e o f th e Magya r peopl e an d a sens e o f helpless forebodin g a t wha t woul d happe n t o the m i f th e Russian s fel t

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certain tha t th e West woul d no t lif t a finger," Amor y desperately searche d for a workabl e strategy . Th e optio n o f conventiona l militar y interven tion woul d hav e require d th e acquiescenc e o f th e Europea n allie s an d direct access . The ke y allies , Britain an d France , were otherwis e engage d and i n an y even t woul d no t hav e agree d t o NAT O takin g a n aggressiv e stance. Austria wa s certainly not ready to compromise her neutrality an d would no t eve n condon e th e us e o f he r airspac e fo r a n airlift . Claimin g that hi s countr y wa s "tremblin g o n th e thi n edg e o f war, " th e Yugosla v ambassador urge d Rober t Murph y tha t everythin g b e don e t o confin e the conflict t o Hungary. 126 Even i f conventiona l militar y interventio n wa s unfeasible , ther e re mained, a t leas t i n Amory' s view , th e optio n o f a surgica l nuclea r strike . The Unite d State s possesse d a substantia l stockpil e o f thermonuclea r weapons, an d th e strategi c balanc e wa s stil l clearl y i n America' s favor . He therefor e advance d th e ide a o f a preemptiv e attac k directe d a t Lvo v and mountai n passe s i n th e Carpatho-Ukrain e an d wester n Romania , designed t o obstruc t rai l an d roa d acces s t o Hungary : "S o I drafte d a one-page ultimatu m fo r th e Presiden t an d th e Secretar y o f Stat e t o consider, callin g for a halt to al l further Sovie t reinforcement o f its force s in Hungar y o n pai n o f ou r takin g militar y measure s a t ou r disposa l [...]. I sai d tha t i f Khrushche v wer e t o as k Marsha l Zhuko v i f h e wa s ready fo r nuclea r wa r wit h th e Unite d States , th e latte r woul d hav e t o answer no ; hence, the ultimatu m b y itself migh t well work." 1 2 7 It i s highl y unlikel y tha t an y America n presiden t woul d eve r hav e seriously considere d takin g suc h ris k fo r th e sak e o f freein g a small , faraway country , o r fo r th e margina l strategi c benefit s tha t migh t hav e accrued fro m a successfu l ultimatum . Eisenhowe r wa s certainl y no t a n impetuous man , an d i f Amory' s proposa l wa s eve r conveye d t o him , h e must hav e dismisse d i t ou t o f hand . I n hi s memoir s th e presiden t in dulged i n som e saf e speculation : " I stil l wonde r wha t woul d hav e bee n my recommendation t o Congres s an d th e American peopl e had Hungar y been accessibl e b y se a o r throug h th e territor y o f allie s wh o migh t hav e agreed t o reac t positivel y t o th e tragic fate o f th e Hungaria n people." 128 In fact , neithe r th e America n peopl e no r th e West European s wer e read y to ris k wa r ove r Hungary , wher e n o vita l nationa l interest s wer e a t stake. Fro m thi s perspective , th e Sue z crisi s coul d b e see n a s mor e hel p than hindrance , fo r i t allowe d th e Unite d State s t o displa y mora l consis tency i n deplorin g al l foreig n intervention . Dulle s late r explaine d t o th e

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French foreig n ministe r tha t America n acquiescenc e i n th e Sue z opera tion woul d hav e onl y encourage d th e intereste d America n ethni c group s to press for militar y actio n t o liberate th e satellites. 129 The Nationa l Securit y Counci l receive d it s Plannin g Board' s assess ment o f th e Polis h an d Hungaria n situation s o n Novembe r l. 1 3 0 Th e report viewe d th e event s a s " a seriou s defea t fo r Sovie t polic y [which ] may caus e th e Sovie t Unio n t o reapprais e th e valu e o f continuin g it s control throug h th e presenc e o f it s force s i n th e ligh t o f th e increasin g costs o f suc h a policy. " Th e Wes t shoul d therefor e "striv e t o ai d an d encourage force s i n th e satellite s movin g towar d U.S . objectives withou t provoking counter-actio n whic h woul d resul t i n th e suppressio n o f 'lib eralizing' influences. " The repor t reflecte d th e heate d debate s ove r possibl e course s o f ac tion, whic h include d publi c pressur e throug h th e Unite d Nation s t o inhibit furthe r Sovie t intervention ; immediat e cover t suppor t o f th e reb els; ope n recognitio n o f thei r belligeren t status , an d over t militar y sup port an d recognitio n o f thei r government ; a disarmamen t proposa l in volving Hungaria n neutralit y o n th e Austria n mode l an d a n indicatio n of America n willingnes s t o "consul t wit h NAT O o n th e probabl e with drawal o f som e U.S . force s fro m Wester n Europ e i f th e Sovie t doe s withdraw al l it s force s fro m Hungary " (eve n a t thi s stage , Defens e an d the Join t Chief s o f Staf f objecte d t o assurance s tha t th e Unite d State s would no t loo k upo n Hungar y o r othe r satellite s a s potentia l militar y allies); disaste r relie f an d economi c measure s simila r t o thos e propose d for Poland ; and , mos t pessimistically , assistanc e t o Austri a i n dealin g with refugees . Th e Plannin g Boar d urge d th e administratio n a s a matte r of hig h priorit y t o "exploi t full y throughou t th e worl d propagand a opportunities afforde d b y the recent event s in Poland an d Hungary " an d (in evocatio n o f NS C 174 ) "t o determin e U.S . course s o f actio n i n th e event of futur e revolutionar y action s o r uprisings " in other satellites . The NS C evidentl y dismisse d no t onl y th e mor e warlik e option s bu t also thos e involvin g recognitio n an d militar y disengagement . Th e Stat e Department's dispositio n wa s t o avoi d an y officia l endorsemen t o f th e Nagy regim e an d it s claim t o neutrality . Onl y som e moderat e versio n o f Titoism wa s considere d t o hav e an y chanc e o f surviva l i n Hungary , an d if Nagy overextende d himself , the n th e Unite d State s shoul d no t encour age him . Th e department' s circula r t o majo r embassie s o n Novembe r 2 still gav e credenc e t o th e Kremlin' s earlie r professio n o f readines s t o

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significantly loose n it s contro l ove r th e satellite s an d claime d tha t i t wa s not clea r whethe r th e Sovie t Unio n ha d decide d tha t development s i n Hungary necessitate d arme d repression. 131 Comin g afte r Nagy' s renun ciation o f th e Warsa w Pac t an d report s o f massiv e reinforcements , suc h an estimat e wa s misinforme d or , mor e likely , disingenuous . Tha t sam e day, a n incomin g cabl e fro m Ambassado r Bohle n i n Mosco w warne d that th e Sovie t promis e o f negotiatio n wit h th e Nag y governmen t wa s probably a device to gai n tim e for militar y preparations. 132 More consisten t with Washington's rea l appraisal o f the situation wa s the advic e relaye d t o Nag y t o avoi d to o grea t a sho w o f friendshi p fo r the Wes t an d th e reassurin g messag e sen t t o Moscow—apparentl y vi a Tito o n th e occasio n o f hi s secre t meetin g wit h Khrushche v o n Novem ber 2—tha t th e Unite d State s di d no t favo r government s unfriendl y t o the Sovie t Unio n o n th e latter' s borders. 133 Bu t confirmatio n o f th e Kremlin's decisio n t o interven e soo n reache d Washington . In th e lat e afternoon o f Novembe r 2 , Alle n Dulle s twic e calle d hi s brothe r wit h news o f th e Sovie t militar y buildup . Tha t sam e day , a convo y o f U.S . diplomatic personne l an d dependent s tryin g t o leav e Hungar y wa s turne d back b y Sovie t troop s nea r th e Austria n border . Waile s cable d a t 140 0 hours GM T o n Novembe r 3 tha t Sovie t force s ha d encircle d Budapes t and othe r Hungaria n citie s an d tha t i n the "veile d for m o f negotiations " the Soviets would probably issu e an unacceptable ultimatu m t o the Nag y government: "Thi s coul d lea d t o slaughter. " Tw o hour s later , Bohle n reported tha t afte r "considerabl e discussion " th e Sovie t leadershi p ha d decided o n militar y intervention. 134 Only afte r th e Sovie t assaul t wa s unde r way , i n th e earl y hour s o f November 4 , di d th e Hungaria n governmen t dispatc h a direc t ple a fo r help t o th e Unite d States . Addressed t o Presiden t Eisenhower , i t claime d that althoug h th e Hungarian s wer e "determine d t o resis t wit h despera tion th e attack upo n them , there is no doub t tha t i n this unequal struggl e [Hungary] wil l b e defeated i f it does not receiv e help. In this moment th e most necessar y kin d o f hel p i s political, no t military. " Hungaria n Min ister o f Stat e Istva n Bib o urge d Eisenhowe r t o negotiat e a simultaneou s withdrawal o f foreig n force s fro m Hungar y an d Egypt. 135 The presiden t issue d a statemen t o n Novembe r 4 reportin g tha t h e had conferre d wit h Foste r Dulle s (wh o ha d bee n take n t o Walte r Ree d Army Hospita l th e previou s day) , Actin g Secretar y o f Stat e Herber t Hoover, Jr. , Alle n Dulles , an d othe r adviser s t o "discus s th e way s an d

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means availabl e t o th e Unite d State s whic h woul d resul t i n . . . [the ] withdrawal o f Sovie t troop s fro m Hungary " an d ha d sen t a messag e t o Premier Bulganin askin g that th e Soviets desist "in th e name of humanit y and i n th e caus e o f peace. " But a more provocative messag e was alread y on it s wa y fro m Bulgani n threatenin g a nuclea r attac k i f th e Britis h an d French di d no t withdra w fro m Egypt . Washingto n officiall y dismisse d the Sovie t threa t a s a diversionar y tactic , bu t Eisenhowe r privatel y wor ried tha t th e Soviet s wer e "furiou s an d scared, " i n a "mos t dangerou s state o f mind, " an d h e apprehende d th e ris k o f war . Bulganin' s repl y o n Hungary wa s dismissive , "almos t th e las t provocatio n tha t m y tempe r could stand," recalls Eisenhower. Despite the reported "emotiona l urges " of som e cabinet members, the prevailing view was that militar y interven tion woul d incu r th e ris k o f worl d wa r an d tha t nuclea r stalemat e ha d created tw o impregnabl e sphere s o f influenc e i n Europe. 136 Having rule d ou t interventio n an d eve n over t diplomati c suppor t fo r the Nagy government , Washington wa s reduced t o showing its sympath y for th e revolutio n wit h humanitaria n gesture s an d a belated propagand a offensive a t the United Nations . O n Novembe r 1 , the president allocate d $20 millio n fro m hi s emergenc y fun d fo r Hungaria n relief , an d th e International Re d Cros s wa s mobilized , bu t onl y som e medica l supplie s reached th e Hungarians . Later , o f course , th e Unite d State s an d othe r Western countrie s mad e generou s provisio n fo r th e resettlement o f Hun garian refugees . Actio n a t th e United Nation s materialize d onl y afte r th e signs of impendin g Sovie t intervention wer e unmistakable, when i t coul d serve to condem n bu t hardl y t o prevent th e crushing o f th e revolution . The United Nations and Hungary. A t th e Octobe r 2 8 sessio n o f th e UN Securit y Counci l th e situatio n i n Hungar y di d receiv e som e atten tion. Statement s o f concer n b y Wester n delegate s wer e me t b y Sovie t charges o f foreig n provocation , an d furthe r debat e wa s postpone d sin e die o n th e ground s tha t th e Hungaria n governmen t ha d mad e n o ap proach t o th e United Nation s an d tha t th e situatio n i n Hungar y wa s to o confused t o warran t internationa l action . Th e Britis h delegate , Si r Pier son Dixon , waxe d eloquen t o n th e urgenc y o f a UN response , bu t whe n Foster Dulle s querie d Lodg e th e nex t da y regardin g th e feasibilit y o f sending a n internationa l observatio n commissio n t o Hungary , th e am bassador reporte d tha t th e British di d no t lik e the idea. 137 The Sue z invasio n soo n overshadowe d Hungar y a t th e Unite d Na -

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tions, an d Secretar y Genera l Da g Hammarskjol d pragmaticall y chos e t o concentrate hi s efforts o n the more manageabl e o f the two crises . Nagy's request o f Novembe r 1 fo r recognitio n an d protectio n o f Hungary' s neutrality wa s handle d i n a n extraordinaril y dilator y manne r b y th e Secretariat, an d a t th e firs t meetin g o f th e Genera l Assembly' s specia l emergency session , convened t o addres s the Suez issue, Hungary receive d only passin g mention . Hammarskjol d late r reflecte d tha t Sue z "ha d a time priority o n th e thinkin g an d policy-makin g o f th e mai n bod y i n th e UN. Tha t wa s no t thei r choice . I t wa s histor y itself , s o t o say , whic h arranged i t that way." 1 3 8 Indeed, an y U N respons e t o th e Hungaria n crisi s wa s dependen t o n the politica l wil l o f th e Wester n allies , an d thei r divisio n ove r Sue z undoubtedly weakene d thi s will . When o n Novembe r 2 Lodg e reporte d that th e Britis h an d Frenc h wer e pressin g fo r a condemnatio n o f th e Soviet Union , Dulle s retorte d tha t "i t i s a mocker y fo r the m t o com e i n with bomb s fallin g ove r Egyp t an d denounc e th e Sovie t Unio n fo r per haps doin g somethin g tha t i s not quit e a s bad." 1 3 9 Th e fea r o f wa r wa s an eve n mor e compellin g deterren t t o earl y America n initiative s a t th e United Nations . Th e president's vie w a t th e tim e was tha t "i f th e Unite d Nations, overridin g a certai n Sovie t veto , decide d tha t al l th e militar y and othe r resource s o f membe r nation s shoul d b e use d t o driv e th e Soviets fro m Hungary , w e would hav e a major conflict." 140 The Securit y Counci l indulge d i n inconclusiv e debate s o n Hungar y (revolving mostly aroun d th e credentials o f Nagy's envoy ) o n Novembe r 2 an d 3 , but i n th e en d Lodg e merel y observe d tha t "adjournmen t fo r a day o r tw o woul d giv e a real opportunit y t o th e Hungarian Governmen t to carr y ou t it s announce d desir e t o arrang e fo r a n orderl y an d immedi ate evacuatio n o f Sovie t troops." 1 4 1 Hi s publi c optimis m stoo d i n shar p contrast t o th e growin g evidenc e o f Sovie t preparations fo r intervention . Only afte r tha t interventio n wa s a fai t accompl i di d th e Unite d State s and it s friend s mobiliz e th e Unite d Nation s fo r a serie s o f impassione d debates an d resoundin g resolution s condemnin g th e Soviet s an d askin g a helples s Hammarskjol d t o investigat e th e situation . Endorse d b y th e majority o f U N members , thi s exercis e i n propagand a reflecte d an d reinforced th e virtually universa l abhorrenc e o f Moscow' s bruta l action . No on e expecte d tha t resolution s coul d alte r th e reimpositio n o f Sovie t rule. The Unite d Nation s remaine d a saf e foru m fo r th e verba l ritual s o f East-West discord . Th e eventua l repor t o f th e U N "Specia l Committe e

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on th e Proble m o f Hungary " foun d an d deplore d tha t th e constitution ally forme d governmen t o f a membe r stat e ha d bee n overthrow n b y th e armed actio n o f another . I t recorded tha t mos t Hungarian s ha d expecte d more tha n sympath y fro m thei r Western friends. 142 Liberation Policy in Retrospect. Followin g the Hungarian debacle , the administration wa s subjecte d t o a barrag e o f criticis m fo r it s sin s o f omission an d commission . A specia l repor t o f th e Hous e Committe e o n Foreign Affair s conclude d tha t th e "failur e o f th e Unite d State s t o hav e a pla n o r plan s o f actio n concernin g th e Hungaria n event s indicate s either a seriou s weaknes s i n ou r intelligenc e service s o r a seriou s misap plication b y th e administrator s o f ou r foreig n polic y o f th e fact s re ported." Fo r fou r fata l days , sai d th e report , th e Unite d State s wa s "paralyzed b y inaction . Thi s inactio n i n effec t weakene d th e moral e o f the freedo m fighter s an d emboldene d th e Soviet s t o tak e thei r ruthles s action withou t fea r o f countermeasure s fro m th e fre e world." 1 4 3 Man y would charg e tha t Washingto n ha d misrepresente d it s commitmen t t o rollback. The inadverten t an d calculate d ambiguitie s o f th e policy o f liberatio n were throw n int o shar p focu s b y th e Hungaria n revolution . Th e officia l formulation o f tha t polic y ha d alway s stresse d peaceful means , althoug h there wa s consisten t discrepanc y betwee n th e president' s vagu e affirma tions o f America n interes t i n th e welfar e o f Eas t European s an d hi s secretary o f state' s profession s o f activ e suppor t fo r th e sprea d o f Tito ism. Dulles' s confidenc e i n th e inexorabl e an d controlle d evolutio n o f national communis m wa s share d t o som e exten t b y th e intelligenc e community bu t reflecte d a n idiosyncrati c self-deceptio n wit h regar d t o both Sovie t toleranc e an d th e dispositio n o f th e satellit e people s t o limi t their expectations . Th e tactic s o f psychologica l warfar e ha d le d man y Americans an d Eas t European s t o believ e tha t th e U.S . commitmen t t o liberation represente d mor e tha n principle d exhortation . Granting that th e Hungarian revolutio n wen t beyond th e expectation s and hope s o f th e Eisenhower administration , th e question remain s whethe r its respons e t o th e crisi s serve d th e bes t interest s o f th e Unite d States . Those interest s woul d hav e bee n advance d b y th e emergenc e o f a na tional Communis t regim e an d eve n mor e b y a democrati c an d neutra l Hungary. Washington' s calculatio n tha t a n essentiall y passiv e attitud e would alleviat e th e Kremlin' s fear s an d forestal l Sovie t interventio n

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might well have been mistaken. It is more likely that America's assuranc e of noninterventio n strengthene d th e han d o f thos e advocatin g a quic k reimposition o f Sovie t control . Similarly, th e promp t recognitio n an d symboli c guarante e o f Hunga ry's independenc e an d neutralit y b y th e Unite d State s actin g alon e o r through th e Unite d Nation s an d th e dispatc h o f a n internationa l obser vation commissio n coul d hav e a t leas t delaye d th e Sovie t decisio n t o intervene, and an y delay would hav e increased th e chances of consolidat ing th e gain s o f th e revolution . Th e combinatio n o f suc h diplomati c steps an d a less halfhearted attemp t t o seiz e the occasio n fo r renegotiat ing European securit y would hav e carrie d n o seriou s risks . More aggres sive measure s suc h a s cover t operation s t o provok e unres t i n th e othe r satellites an d the flexing o f America's nuclea r muscl e in the form o f som e ultimatum t o th e Kremli n t o desis t wer e technicall y feasibl e bu t politi cally inconceivable . The administration' s failur e t o full y explor e th e opportunitie s pre sented b y th e Hungaria n revolutio n ca n b e explaine d b y certai n precon ceptions regardin g th e domesti c dynamic s o f chang e i n th e satellite s a s well a s b y a n exces s o f prudence , manifeste d firs t an d foremos t b y Eisenhower bu t reinforce d notabl y b y th e Pentagon' s oppositio n t o an y serious reconsideratio n o f th e militar y statu s qu o i n Europe . These inhi bitions an d constraint s migh t stil l have allowe d fo r bolde r initiative s ha d the Sue z crisi s no t intervened . Tha t ill-conceive d an d cynicall y time d adventure effectivel y incapacitate d th e Wester n allianc e an d comforte d the Kremli n a t th e momen t o f greates t challeng e t o bot h Eas t an d Wes t in Europ e i n postwa r history . Th e Hungarian s wer e punishe d fo r tryin g to und o th e politica l legac y o f Worl d Wa r I I in Easter n Europe . Fo r th e United State s a s well, the revolution serve d a s an unwelcome momen t o f truth. I t finally lai d t o res t the rhetoric of liberation , bu t th e dilemmas of policy remained .

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th e mirag e o f earl y liberatio n dissipated , bot h th e Unite d State s and th e peoples of Eastern Europe settle d in for th e long haul anticipate d in th e origina l concep t o f containment . Ther e woul d b e n o mor e at tempts a t destabilization , n o mor e invitation s t o th e Eas t European s t o seize the Titoist option . Th e Soviet Union's forcefu l reminde r tha t i t wa s the sole arbiter ove r it s sphere of dominanc e compelle d th e United State s to adjus t polic y t o the possibilities o f evolutionar y change . The lesson s o f Hungar y als o informe d Khrushchev' s pursui t o f de Stalinization. Polan d wa s allowe d t o mak e concession s t o th e Roma n Catholic churc h an d t o privat e farming . Polic e terro r an d cultura l Rus sification wer e graduall y relaxe d throughou t th e region , bu t orthodox y was reimpose d i n agricultur e whe n i n 1959—6 0 a ne w collectivizatio n campaign (sparin g onl y Poland ) turne d peasant s int o worker s an d com pleted th e creatio n o f a classles s "socialis t society. " B y the earl y 1960s , when th e extensiv e approac h t o industrializatio n (promotin g growt h b y imputs o f capita l an d labo r rathe r tha n b y technologica l improvement s in productivity) ha d exhauste d th e region' s resource s withou t generatin g adequate productivit y an d competitiveness , economi c refor m cam e o n the agend a i n Czechoslovaki a an d Hungary . I t wa s arreste d i n th e cas e of th e forme r b y th e 196 8 invasion , bu t tha t sam e yea r Hungar y inau -

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gurated a "ne w economi c mechanism " tha t aime d t o reconcil e centra l planning wit h th e force s o f th e market . Khrushchev ha d attempte d t o invigorat e th e Counci l fo r Mutua l Eco nomic Assistanc e (CMEA ) b y promoting mor e efficien t regiona l integra tion. Romani a balke d a t adjustin g it s industrializatio n progra m (t o fit the CMEA' s visio n o f Romani a a s a breadbasket) an d adopte d a nation building strateg y tha t encompasse d a mor e autonomou s foreig n policy . Tito's nonalignment , Romania n voluntarism , an d th e concurren t Sino Soviet rif t al l seeme d t o indicat e tha t withou t Stalin' s firm han d th e Communist worl d wa s driftin g towar d "polycentrism. " Thoug h th e staunchly Stalinis t Albania n regim e brok e wit h Mosco w i n 1961 , seven years late r th e Brezhne v Doctrin e se t th e limit s t o polycentris m i n th e rest o f Easter n Europe . In th e Brezhne v er a th e Kremli n continue d t o tolerat e Romania' s independent posturin g a s well a s a degre e o f economi c experimentatio n and recours e t o Western trad e an d credits , but it s abhorrence o f politica l liberalization wa s onc e agai n displaye d i n th e suppressio n o f Poland' s Solidarity. Onl y wit h th e adven t o f Mikhai l S . Gorbache v di d th e pro found economi c and political malais e of Eastern Europe win recognition . The lifting o f th e Brezhnev Doctrine' s procrustean disciplin e unleashe d a whirlwind o f change , first in Hungary an d Poland , the n i n the rest of th e region. B y earl y 1990 , th e questio n wa s no t whethe r th e Kremli n ha d really relinquishe d it s grip o n Easter n Europe , but whethe r i t coul d hol d the Sovie t Union together . Washington's policies , variousl y designate d a s peacefu l engagement , bridgebuilding, an d differentiation , ha d aime d to promote liberalization . Their effec t o n th e natur e an d rat e o f chang e was tangibl e bu t marginal . Reform i n Easter n Europ e remaine d governe d b y domesti c factor s and , most critically , b y th e Kremlin . Doctrinall y unwillin g t o accep t th e per manence o f Sovie t rul e ove r Easter n Europe , th e Unite d State s wa s compelled t o exercis e it s limite d leverag e i n ai d o f th e disintegrativ e an d ultimately liberatin g force s tha t Georg e Kenna n ha d predicte d i n 194 7 would dissolv e th e Sovie t empire . A gradualis t strateg y wa s pursue d with onl y mino r modification s b y president s Eisenhowe r throug h Bush , with greate r o r lesse r emphasi s o n th e foreig n polic y dimension s o f human rights , economi c interaction , an d militar y securit y an d geopoli tics in America's ques t fo r chang e i n Eastern Europe .

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Peaceful Engagement and Bridgebuilding. Th e Eisenhowe r adminis tration ha d t o suffe r som e hars h criticis m i n th e wak e o f Hungary' s failed revolution . A congressional stud y characterize d tha t even t a s "th e lost opportunit y o f ou r generation, " deplorin g America' s apparen t un preparedness whil e recognizin g tha t militar y interventio n woul d hav e been inappropriate. 1 Th e Nationa l Securit y Counci l conclude d tha t th e United State s ha d n o alternativ e cours e o f actio n bu t recommende d policies t o prevent it s recurrence. 2 First, th e concep t o f rollbac k ha d t o b e buried. Psychologica l warfar e to destabiliz e th e Sovie t domai n ha d backfired , an d th e propagand a organs, especiall y Radi o Fre e Europe , wer e no w attune d t o a mor e modest evolutionar y approach . Operatio n Re d Sox/Re d Ca p wa s deeme d to b e inconsisten t wit h America n aim s an d capabilitie s an d raise d th e risk o f provokin g a Europea n war . Th e CIA , whic h apparentl y contem plated renewin g the offensive an d inciting an uprising in Czechoslovakia , was ordere d t o wind dow n th e operation. 3 The basi c U.S . polic y continued—t o "assur e th e satellit e people s o f the continuin g interes t o f th e United State s i n th e peaceful restoratio n o f their independenc e an d politica l freedom." 4 Th e secretar y o f stat e too k pains t o indicat e th e continuit y i n hi s approach , tellin g congressiona l leaders that he still favored nationa l communis m "a s means to [an ] end, " economic ai d fo r "semi-independent " Poland , an d diplomati c condem nation o f th e Sovie t Unio n a t th e Unite d Nations . Bu t h e stresse d tha t "we d o no t ourselve s incit e violen t revolt . Rathe r w e encourag e a n evolution t o freedom." 5 I t ha d al l bee n sai d before , bu t th e disclaimer s had acquire d ne w force , an d ther e woul d b e n o mor e cover t wa r t o obtain liberation . Khrushche v warne d tha t "i f w e ar e confronte d wit h conditions suc h a s Dulle s like s t o pu t forwar d suc h a s th e liberatio n o f East Europea n countrie s fro m 'slavery, ' i t migh t tak e 20 0 year s befor e we ever come together. Fo r o n thes e matter s w e are inflexible." 6 The intractabilit y o f th e proble m reduce d th e frequenc y o f officia l policy statement s i n Washington . Whe n th e Kremli n i n earl y 195 8 pro posed a summi t meeting , Eisenhower , sensitiv e t o domesti c opinion , requested tha t th e Eas t Europea n questio n figure o n th e agenda . A s expected, Khrushche v retorte d tha t ther e coul d b e n o dialogu e i f th e United State s di d no t accep t th e statu s quo. 7 He was eve n mor e incense d when, i n July 1959 , the president complie d wit h a unanimous resolutio n

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of Congres s t o proclai m Captiv e Nation s Wee k i n hono r o f th e "en slaved peoples " o f Easter n Europe. . Vice Presiden t Nixo n trie d t o ap pease th e Soviet s b y stressin g th e peacefu l an d mora l natur e o f th e resolution, bu t eve n a t th e heigh t o f detent e i n th e 1970 s America n administrations coul d no t overcom e Congress' s attachmen t t o thi s an nual ritual . Easter n Europ e thu s remaine d a chroni c irritan t i n U.S. Soviet relations eve n afte r th e rhetoric o f liberatio n wa s abandoned . Nevertheless, a selectiv e approac h t o th e regio n wa s pursue d lon g before th e ter m "differentiation " entere d th e officia l vocabulary . Polan d was th e first satellit e t o benefi t fro m positiv e action . Ai d fo r Communis t countries wa s controversia l i n Congress , bu t a U.S . organizatio n calle d the Polish-America n Congres s becam e a n advocat e o f economi c assis tance an d individua l contacts. 8 In 1957 , th e administratio n move d cau tiously t o exten d Export-Impor t Ban k credits , sel l agricultura l commod ities fo r Polis h currency , an d conclud e a cultura l agreement . Poland' s most-favored-nation tarif f status , revoked i n 1951 , was restored i n 196 0 after settlemen t o f America n claims . Vic e Presiden t Nixo n wa s greete d by enthusiasti c crowd s i n Warsa w o n hi s wa y bac k fro m Mosco w i n July 1959 . Bu t alread y i n 1958 , Eisenhowe r ha d observe d regretfull y that suc h concession s seeme d t o hav e littl e effec t o n Polis h (an d Yugos lav) policies , an d indee d Gomulk a soo n turne d mor e intransigen t do mestically an d mor e subservien t t o his Soviet mentors. 9 If Polan d momentaril y raise d hope s fo r evolutionar y change , the ne w Kadar regim e i n Hungar y incurre d onl y ostracis m and , a t th e Unite d Nations, annua l resolution s demandin g th e withdrawa l o f Sovie t troop s and respec t fo r huma n rights . Finally , i n 1963 , th e Unite d State s mad e its peace wit h Kadar , allowin g th e Unite d Nation s t o restor e Hungary' s full membershi p an d sellin g Hungary som e surplus wheat. B y then, mos t political prisoner s ha d bee n amnestied , an d th e Stat e Departmen t re ported t o Congres s tha t "w e hop e tha t th e action s of th e United Nation s have ha d a helpfu l influenc e i n thi s regard." 10 Eve n so , the Assembl y o f Captive Europea n Nation s proteste d vehementl y a t th e implicatio n tha t the Wes t ha d accepte d th e finality o f th e Eas t Europea n statu s quo. 11 Three mor e year s passe d befor e Washingto n an d Budapes t agree d t o raise thei r diplomati c representatio n t o th e ambassadoria l level . Else where, i n 1960 , th e settlemen t o f America n claim s i n Romani a wa s followed b y a cultural an d scientifi c exchang e agreement , an d i n 1963 , a

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similar dea l wa s mad e wit h Bulgari a (ful l diplomati c relation s havin g been restore d i n 1959) . The Policy of Peaceful Engagement. Normalizatio n o f relation s a s a goal wa s inheren t i n a gradualis t strateg y tha t calle d fo r th e calibrate d application o f economi c an d othe r benefits . Although , a s Alle n Dulle s reported t o Congres s i n Januar y 1959 , th e satellite s "woul d revol t to morrow i f the y ha d an y chanc e o f gettin g free, " ther e wa s n o practica l alternative t o wha t becam e know n a s peacefu l engagement. 12 Th e ter m was coine d b y tw o academics , Willia m E . Griffit h ( a forme r polic y adviser a t Radi o Fre e Europe ) an d Zbignie w Brzezinsk i (eventuall y th e most influentia l voic e in America n polic y towar d Easter n Europe) , i n a n article publishe d i n Foreign Affairs i n 1961. 1 3 The y recommende d tha t the Unite d State s addres s bot h th e regime s an d th e people i n stimulatin g diversity an d evolutionar y chang e leadin g t o a neutra l bel t o f state s enjoying "genuin e popula r freedo m o f popula r choic e i n interna l polic y while no t bein g hostil e t o th e Sovie t Union. " Th e Unite d State s shoul d not compromis e i n its advocacy o f ful l self-determination , bu t " a genera l attitude o f disapprova l doe s not preclud e ou r attemptin g t o improv e ou r political, economi c an d cultura l relation s wit h th e Eas t Europea n states , providing these regimes refrain fro m hostil e act s toward us. " Though thi s incremental approac h hardl y represented a radical depar ture fro m establishe d practice , it s formulatio n coincide d wit h evidenc e of poly centric tendencies in the Communist worl d an d with the accessio n of John F . Kennedy t o the presidency. On e of hi s most influential foreig n policy advisers , Walt Rostow , reporte d tha t th e Sino-Sovie t spli t "coul d give ris e t o increase d factionalis m i n nationa l Communis t parties , weake n the overal l thrus t o f worl d Communism , an d facilitat e th e emergenc e o f more independent an d nationalisti c Communis t states , especially in East ern Europe." 1 4 Easter n Europ e di d no t figure prominentl y i n Kennedy' s "Grand Design, " bu t h e indicate d i n hi s first Stat e of th e Union messag e that h e woul d see k congressiona l authorit y t o selectivel y expan d eco nomic relations with th e satellites. 15 In Octobe r 1962 , a t a Pulask i Da y meetin g i n Buffalo , Kenned y reiterated th e principle d an d pragmati c dimension s o f peacefu l engage ment: "Ther e ar e varying shades, even within th e Communis t world . W e must be able to seize the initiative when th e opportunity arises , in Polan d

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in particula r an d i n othe r countrie s a s tim e goe s on, " bu t "w e mus t never—in an y statement , declaration , treaty , o r othe r manner—recog nize Soviet domination o f Eastern Europ e a s permanent." u16 A year later , Secretary o f Stat e Dea n Rus k professe d confidenc e i n th e prospec t o f peaceful change : The darkes t nigh t o f Stalinis t terro r an d oppressio n i s past. Histori c force s o f nationalism ar e visibl y a t work . Graduall y th e smalle r Communis t nation s of Eastern Europ e see m t o b e finding for themselve s a littl e mor e autonomy . . . . We would like to do what we can to encourage these trends within the Communist world . . . [an d thin k they ] ar e more likely t o b e furthered b y a somewha t relaxed atmosphere than by an atmosphere of crisis or severe cold war. 17 Kennedy's dispositio n t o liberaliz e trad e wit h th e Eas t wa s reinforce d by a report fro m th e Stat e Department' s Polic y Plannin g Counci l i n July 1963, whic h argue d tha t th e "abilit y t o us e trad e flexibilit y i n Easter n Europe woul d ad d greatl y t o th e presen t limite d capacit y o f th e Unite d States t o shap e th e course " o f event s i n tha t region. 18 Bu t th e moo d o f Congress, affected b y successive Berlin crises, the Cuban missil e confron tation, an d th e deepenin g conflic t i n Vietnam , wa s anythin g bu t accom modating, an d neithe r Kenned y no r hi s successor , Lyndo n B . Johnson , could obtai n significan t discretionar y power s t o offe r economi c incen tives to communis t regime s (se e chapter 5) . Apart fro m Poland , whic h remaine d a t th e to p i n th e ran k orde r o f East Europea n countrie s a s muc h fo r reason s o f domesti c politic s a s fo r the performanc e o f th e Gomulk a regime , Romani a wa s single d ou t a s a promising testin g groun d fo r economi c leverage . The America n ministe r in Bucharest , Willia m Crawford , ha d bee n lobbyin g fo r measure s t o exploit th e emergin g Soviet-Romania n economi c discord , an d th e Ro manians wer e eage r t o obtai n America n help . Negotiation s resulte d i n June 196 4 i n a trad e agreemen t tha t extende d Eximban k credi t guaran tees, bu t legislativ e constraint s prevente d th e administratio n fro m offer ing long-ter m credit s o r MF N tarif f status . Th e upgradin g i n Decembe r of th e Buchares t legatio n t o a n embass y brough t smal l comfor t t o th e disappointed Romanians. 19 The Johnso n administratio n persevere d i n tryin g t o persuad e Con gress an d domesti c opinio n tha t peacefu l engagemen t coul d serv e Amer ican interests in Eastern Europe . The prospects, argued Secretar y of Stat e Dean Rus k i n Februar y 1964 , were favorabl e i n Poland , wher e " a goo d deal o f th e nationa l autonom y an d domesti c liberalizatio n whic h th e

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Poles wo n i n 195 6 persists, " i n Romania , whic h ha d "asserte d a mor e independent attitud e an d ha s expande d it s trade an d othe r contact s wit h the West, " an d eve n i n Hungary , whic h ha d "turne d t o a mor e permis sive policy o f nationa l conciliation. " Yugoslavia' s "succes s i n defendin g its independenc e mad e othe r people s i n Easter n Europ e wonde r wh y they coul d no t d o likewise." 20 Th e bridge-buildin g metapho r wa s em ployed b y Johnson i n hi s Virginia Militar y Institut e addres s o n Ma y 23 : "We wil l continu e t o buil d bridge s acros s th e gul f whic h ha s divide d u s from Easter n Europe . The y wil l b e bridge s o f increase d trade , o f ideas , of visitors , and o f humanitaria n aid." 2 1 When Brzezinsk i joine d th e Stat e Department' s Polic y Plannin g Staf f in 1967 , he was intent (a s related i n his memoirs) o n developin g " a mor e forward-looking approac h towar d Easter n Europe." 2 2 Hi s objective s remained modest : evolutio n int o mor e socialis t an d les s Communis t "semidictatorships" o n th e Yugosla v model. 23 Upo n leavin g th e depart ment a t th e en d o f th e year , Brzezinsk i delivere d himsel f o f a mor e visionary progra m callin g fo r a n "institutionalize d multilatera l frame work" includin g East-Wes t economi c an d politica l "assemblies " an d a European Securit y Commissio n base d o n th e tw o alliances , al l i n th e interest of attenuatin g the division of Europe. 24 The political climat e wa s hostile eve n t o hi s les s radica l urgings . Althoug h th e presiden t invoke d the bridge-building them e agai n i n a speech i n Octobe r 1966 , his ambas sador t o Poland , Joh n A . Gronouski , observe d regretfull y tha t th e pro gram "ra n int o dee p troubl e unde r th e sustaine d attac k o f thos e t o whom peacefu l engagemen t i s being 'sof t o n communism. ' " 2 5 Congres s was no t dispose d t o discriminat e amon g Communist s a t a tim e whe n Americans wer e righting them i n Vietnam . The Berlin Crisis. Indeed , despit e autonomou s stirring s i n part s o f Eastern Europe , th e Sovie t Unio n wa s no t abou t t o le t evolutionar y tendencies weake n it s western bulwark . Mosco w ha d becom e committe d to th e consolidatio n o f th e GDR , whic h Wes t Germa n Chancello r Ad enauer, an d therefor e hi s allies , refuse d t o recogniz e a s a sovereig n entity. Khrushche v trie d t o us e Berli n fo r leverage , threatenin g i n No vember 195 8 t o han d ove r hi s zon e t o Eas t Germa n administratio n unless the West agree d withi n si x months t o tur n Berli n int o a n indepen dent an d demilitarize d district ; a simila r threa t wa s issue d i n 1961 . O n both occasion s th e Wes t calle d Khrushchev' s bluf f an d stoo d firm , an d

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the polic y develope d b y th e Kenned y administratio n i n mid-Jul y 196 1 differentiated betwee n th e tw o halve s o f th e city . Th e presiden t wa s prepared t o ris k wa r t o defen d th e statu s o f Wes t Berli n bu t no t fo r Western right s in East Berlin and unimpede d acces s between the Western and Sovie t zones. 26 The crise s onl y swelle d th e flood o f Eas t German s fleeing int o Wes t Berlin. Th e Wes t German s welcome d thi s mas s migration , offerin g th e defectors citizenshi p an d ai d i n resettling . Th e CIA' s psychologica l war fare operation s ha d include d activ e inducemen t o f Eas t Germans , espe cially professionals , t o mov e West . B y th e summe r o f 1961 , whe n th e monthly rat e ros e t o 10,000 , ove r thre e millio n German s ha d take n th e route. O n Augus t 6 alone , ther e wer e tw o thousan d defectors . A wee k later th e Eas t Germa n regim e bega n t o sea l of f it s zon e wit h wha t became th e infamou s Wall , a hundred-mile-lon g barrie r equippe d wit h minefields an d 28 5 watchtowers tha t confirme d th e division o f German y and Europe . The measur e wa s no t wholl y unexpected . Ther e ha d bee n numerou s intimations sinc e earl y sprin g tha t th e refuge e proble m woul d driv e th e GDR an d th e Sovie t Unio n t o tak e som e preventiv e step . Fearin g tha t tighter borde r control s migh t precipitat e popula r unres t i n th e East , Kennedy an d th e allie s wante d t o avoi d an y provocativ e gesture , an d especially an y hin t tha t th e Wes t migh t interven e militarily . Althoug h Washington fel t tha t th e GDR shoul d b e punished fo r th e border closur e with economi c sanctions , neithe r Bon n no r Londo n favore d suc h a ste p unless th e West' s presenc e i n Berli n wa s threatened. 27 A t a press confer ence i n Eas t Berli n o n June 15 , Ulbricht ha d declare d tha t "nobod y ha s the intentio n o f buildin g a wall, " an d i n th e circumstance s th e denia l should hav e arouse d suspicion. 28 Thi s an d othe r signal s an d rumor s caused littl e alar m i n NAT O capitals , fo r th e natur e o f th e threa t re mained uncertain , an d wha t wa s threatene d wa s no t o f vita l interest . The actua l preparation s wer e detected , notabl y b y West Germa n intelli gence, but Kenned y ha d alread y considere d th e contingenc y an d decide d not t o challeng e it. 29 Fearing anothe r Eas t Germa n uprising , th e Kenned y administratio n limited it s respons e t o diplomati c protest s an d demonstrativ e militar y movements o n th e acces s route s t o Wes t Berlin . Genera l Clay , th e leg endary her o o f th e airlift , wa s dispatche d t o reassur e th e West Berliners , but h e had n o mandat e t o challeng e th e borde r closure . When tw o year s

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later th e presiden t proclaimed , "Ic h bi n ei n Berliner, " h e was emphasiz ing th e West' s determinatio n t o preserv e Wes t Berlin . A s fo r th e Wall , his administratio n wa s secretl y relieve d tha t i t alleviate d a n unstabl e situation whil e presenting th e West with a lasting symbo l o f Communis t brutality. Th e hemorrhag e debilitatin g th e GD R wa s stemme d i f no t entirely stopped . Ove r th e nex t twenty-fiv e year s th e Wal l woul d clai m the live s o f seventy-fou r Eas t Germans . Bu t th e Wal l facilitate d th e consolidation o f the GDR, the agreements tha t normalized intra-Germa n relations, an d th e statu s o f Berlin , an d thus , paradoxically , th e pursui t of peacefu l engagement . In th e er a o f detente , suc h achievement s out weighed th e human cost s of a n iro n curtain . A nuclea r tes t ba n treat y ha d bee n conclude d wit h th e Soviet s i n 1963, an d five year s late r th e Johnso n administratio n wa s anticipatin g agreement o n nonproliferatio n an d th e beginnin g o f negotiation s o n th e limitation o f strategi c weapons . I t als o prepare d t o reintroduc e it s polit ically controversia l East-Wes t Trad e Relation s bill . Bonn' s emergin g Ostpolitik supersede d th e long-standin g Hallstei n Doctrine , whic h ha d precluded diplomati c relation s wit h an y stat e (othe r tha n th e Sovie t Union) tha t recognize d th e GDR , an d i t registere d it s first succes s i n breaching th e Warsa w Pact' s reciproca l ba n wit h th e establishmen t o f diplomatic relation s wit h maveric k Romani a i n Januar y 1967 . Wes t Germany's ne w foun d flexibility facilitate d a NAT O agreemen t i n De cember o f tha t yea r t o pursu e negotiatio n wit h th e Sovie t blo c o n issue s of Europea n security . I t seeme d that , despit e th e bitte r wa r i n Vietnam , progress coul d b e mad e o n East-Wes t detent e an d reconciliatio n i n Europe. The Prague Spring and the Brezhnev Doctrine. Thes e hope s wer e momentarily reinforce d b y th e wav e o f liberalizatio n tha t swep t Czech oslovakia i n th e earl y month s o f 1968 . Mountin g oppositio n t o th e Stalinist rul e o f Antoni n Novotn y culminate d i n January i n hi s replace ment b y Alexande r Dubcek . Th e Kremli n ha d sanctione d thi s ste p bu t not wha t followed , fo r i n Apri l th e new , reformis t part y leadershi p adopted a n "actio n program " tha t calle d fo r sweepin g economi c an d political reforms . Dubce k sa w n o contradictio n betwee n thi s "socialis m with a huma n face " an d loyalt y t o th e Sovie t Unio n an d th e Warsa w Pact, bu t th e liftin g o f censorshi p an d othe r totalitaria n control s un leashed popula r pressure s fo r quic k an d radica l change .

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The exhilaratin g freedo m o f speec h i n thi s Pragu e sprin g thoroughl y alarmed th e Kremlin , whic h convene d a meetin g o f th e allianc e i n War saw o n July 14 . Ulbricht an d Gomulk a wer e a s belligerent a s the Soviets. The Czechoslovak s ha d decline d th e invitatio n an d receive d a ster n warning tha t "thi s i s n o longe r you r affai r alone . . . . Neve r wil l w e consent t o allo w imperialism , b y peacefu l o r non-peacefu l means , fro m within o r without , t o mak e a breac h i n th e socialis t syste m an d chang e the balance o f power i n Europe in its favor." In its reply, Prague invoke d the declaratio n o n noninterferenc e tha t th e Sovie t Unio n ha d issue d o n October 30 , 1956 , a dubious referenc e poin t i n light of what followe d i n Hungary. 30 A confrontation betwee n th e Sovie t an d Czechoslova k lead ers a t Ciern a o n Jul y 2 9 faile d t o budg e th e latter . Th e Bratislav a communique five day s late r adopte d a mor e conciliator y tone , bu t thi s was merel y a smoke scree n t o cove r u p preparations fo r invasion . The Pragu e leader s delude d themselve s tha t thei r versio n o f socialis m could surviv e a war o f words. Three days before th e invasion, Hungary' s Kadar trie d t o cautio n Dubce k agains t ignorin g th e Russia n warnings , observing in parting: "D o yo u really no t kno w th e kind o f people you'r e dealing with?" 3 1 Th e answe r cam e o n th e nigh t o f Augus t 20 , whe n Soviet an d Warsa w Pac t force s invade d Czechoslovaki a withou t eve n the pretens e o f a n invitatio n suc h a s tha t provide d b y Kada r i n 1956 . The Pole s an d Eas t German s participate d mor e willingl y tha n th e Hun garians, who ha d hope d tha t Prague' s economi c reforms woul d reinforc e their ow n striving s an d ha d t o b e persuade d wit h th e threa t o f Sovie t economic sanctions ; an d th e appearanc e o f blo c unit y wa s marre d b y Romania's absence . Soo n ther e descende d th e long , dar k nigh t o f "nor malization," o f purges an d proscriptio n o f an y tal k o f reform . The Kremli n afte r th e even t trie d t o evok e i n mitigatio n "perfidiou s plans of NAT O warmongerin g circles " and th e aggressiv e intent of Wes t Germany, an d indee d th e troop s participatin g i n "Operatio n Danube " had bee n fe d tale s o f bourgeoi s anarch y an d impendin g NATO interven tion. 32 In fact , Washington' s respons e t o th e Pragu e sprin g bordere d o n paralysis. Ther e develope d wha t on e analys t ha s characterize d a s a process o f taci t bargaining , initiate d b y th e Sovie t Union , t o lin k th e extension o f detent e t o America n noninterferenc e i n Czechoslovakia. 33 Although ther e i s n o concret e evidenc e tha t Washingto n wa s a willin g party t o suc h a bargain , it s signals t o th e Kremli n wer e conciliator y t o a fault.

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The Stat e Departmen t o n Ma y 1 issue d a n expressio n o f benevolen t interest i n th e Czechoslova k developments , an d som e tentativ e step s were take n t o improv e economi c relations , bu t th e administratio n evi dently calculate d tha t i n th e shor t ru n anythin g mor e tha n passiv e sym pathy coul d b e o f disservic e t o th e Czechoslova k reformers. 34 Th e Sovi ets attempted t o reinforc e th e spiri t o f detente , belatedl y implementin g a commercial ai r agreemen t an d ratifyin g a consula r conventio n wit h th e United States , whil e sendin g signal s tha t include d denunciation s o f bridgebuilding an d Wester n interferenc e a s wel l a s militar y exercise s i n June i n Czechoslovakia . Presiden t Johnso n hope d t o regai n som e popu larity b y advancin g detente , an d afte r th e nonproliferatio n treat y wa s signed i n July , h e se t hi s sight s o n Strategi c Arm s Limitatio n Talk s (SALT) an d a summit . Washington too k pain s t o assur e th e Soviet s o f it s limite d interes t i n the mountin g confrontatio n betwee n the m an d th e Czechoslovaks . O n May 2 1 , Under Secretar y o f Stat e Eugen e Rosto w volunteere d th e gra tuitous reminde r tha t th e Unite d State s ha d no t intervene d i n th e Eas t German an d Hungaria n revolts. 35 On July 14 , the United State s signed a new cultura l agreemen t i n Moscow . Fiv e day s later , th e Stat e Depart ment declare d tha t "w e hav e no t involve d ourselve s i n an y way " i n th e Prague crisis , an d o n Jul y 2 2 Rus k me t Ambassado r Anatol y Dobryni n to refut e Sovie t charge s o f America n interference. 36 O n th e followin g day th e Sovie t Unio n announce d massiv e groun d an d ai r maneuver s o n its wester n reache s (designed , i n fact , t o cove r u p preparation s fo r th e invasion), whereupo n a previousl y schedule d NAT O exercis e wa s relo cated awa y fro m th e Czechoslova k borde r area. 37 The Johnso n administratio n hope d tha t th e Sovie t Unio n woul d no t intervene forcefull y a s lon g a s Dubce k professe d adherenc e t o th e War saw Pact. 38 T o b e sure, twelve years earlier th e decisio n t o interven e ha d been take n eve n befor e Imr e Nagy proclaime d Hungary' s neutrality , bu t surely Brezhne v would no t ac t rashly t o disrup t detente . This comfortin g assumption wa s reinforced b y the invitation t o a summit conferenc e tha t Dobrynin hande d t o Johnso n o n Augus t 19 . Althoug h th e overtur e might hav e bee n purel y diversionary , i t arguabl y reflecte d th e Kremlin' s impression tha t th e Unite d State s would no t allo w a police actio n b y th e Soviet Union i n it s ow n backyar d t o derai l detente . Ambassador Llewel lyn Thompso n ha d reporte d earlie r fro m Mosco w tha t Sovie t militar y preparations pointe d t o a high probabilit y o f invasion , bu t th e presiden t

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records i n hi s memoir s tha t "w e coul d onl y tr y t o avoi d an y actio n tha t would furthe r inflam e th e situation." 39 Th e Czechoslovaks , h e notes , had indicate d the y would offe r n o resistance nor welcome Western offer s of assistance . Neither policymaker s no r th e intelligence service s distinguished them selves i n th e Czechoslova k crisis . A n earl y warnin g fro m Wes t Germa n intelligence o f th e Sovie t decisio n t o interven e ha d me t with conditione d skepticism i n Bon n an d a t NAT O headquarters . America n intelligenc e even manage d t o los e trac k o f a Sovie t comba t grou p i n Poland , onl y t o rediscover i t tw o week s late r i n th e invasio n force . An d whe n CI A Director Richar d Helm s belatedl y trie d t o rais e th e alar m a t a Whit e House meetin g shortl y befor e th e invasion , hi s attempt s a t persuasio n were a s futile a s (i n his words) "peein g u p a rope." 4 0 President Johnso n learne d o f th e invasio n fro m Dobrynin , wh o in sisted tha t thi s "renderin g o f direc t assistance " shoul d no t har m Soviet American relations. 41 Th e CI A reporte d t o th e presiden t tha t th e Sovie t Politburo ha d bee n divide d u p t o som e thre e week s earlie r an d tha t "the decisio n t o execut e th e pla n o f interventio n cam e a t a fairl y lat e stage." 42 Give n thi s ambivalenc e i n Moscow , th e Unite d State s prob ably mad e a mistak e (a s Brzezinsk i late r argued ) i n no t takin g seriousl y the possibility o f invasio n an d warnin g th e Soviets o f th e potential dam age t o detente. 43 Ther e ca n b e n o certaint y a s t o th e deterren t effec t of suc h a warning , thoug h i t apparentl y worke d year s late r i n th e 198 0 Polish crisis . In th e event , Washingto n wa s reduce d t o protestin g a fai t accompli. After a n emergenc y sessio n o f th e Nationa l Securit y Council , Rus k told Dobryni n tha t th e summi t meetin g wa s off , an d th e presiden t wen t on th e ai r t o denounc e th e invasio n an d urg e th e invader s t o withdraw . When a few day s later th e CI A reported tha t Sovie t troops wer e massin g on Romania' s borders , wit h th e possibilit y tha t th e Kremli n wa s inten t on eliminatin g dictato r Nicola e Ceausesc u a s well , Johnso n issue d a public warnin g agains t "unleashin g th e dog s o f war. " Bu t th e Romani ans wer e mor e likel y t o offe r arme d resistanc e tha n th e Czechoslovaks , and th e threa t dissipated. 44 Th e Kremli n als o mad e threatenin g noise s about it s right to intervene against West German aggressiveness , promptin g the United State s to declar e tha t suc h actio n woul d mee t with immediat e allied response. 45 Thes e wer e probabl y diversionar y tactic s t o safeguar d tangible gains : nippin g dangerou s refor m i n th e bu d an d strengthenin g

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the Warsa w Pact' s norther n tie r b y extractin g fro m Czechoslovakia' s cowed leader s agreemen t o n th e stationin g o f Sovie t troop s i n thei r country fo r th e first tim e since the en d o f World Wa r II . The Wes t registere d it s displeasur e wit h th e Sovie t invasio n a t th e United Nations , bu t condemnatio n wa s short-live d an d perfunctory . I t was als o marre d b y mutua l recrimination . Washington' s passivit y wa s attributed b y some , notabl y Presiden t d e Gaulle , t o a n unhol y pac t t o preserve th e divisio n o f Europe , impellin g Secretar y o f Stat e Rus k t o publicly den y tha t "ther e mus t hav e bee n som e 'sphere s o f influence ' agreement betwee n us , that perhap s ther e was 'a n arrangement ' mad e a t the Yalt a Conference , tha t perhap s th e Soviet s acte d i n Czechoslovaki a with som e 'cart e blanche ' fro m th e Unite d States , tha t w e concurre d o r connived i n tha t aggression. " Bu t th e Unite d States , h e said , acknowl edged "th e realit y o f th e Soviet military positio n an d th e existence o f th e Warsaw Pact, " an d Johnson , lik e Eisenhower , "recognize d tha t ther e was littl e we coul d do , through th e us e o f militar y force , t o assis t an y o f those countrie s withou t automaticall y engagin g i n genera l wa r wit h th e Soviet Union." 46 I t wa s al l sadl y reminiscen t o f th e Hungaria n fiasco, leaving th e sam e suspicio n tha t Washingto n ha d bee n ill-prepare d an d derelict i n failin g t o explor e al l preventive options . The administratio n soo n returne d t o it s pursui t o f detent e an d a summit meeting , an d eve n Brzezinsk i argue d tha t th e invasio n di d no t invalidate th e bridge-buildin g strategy , claimin g rashl y tha t "i t wa s th e success o f thi s polic y tha t force d th e Sovie t Unio n int o thi s crimina l act." 4 7 I t was more a case of illusion s share d b y Czechoslovak reformer s and America n policymaker s regardin g th e Brezhne v regime' s readines s to accommodat e significan t liberalization . Tha t th e individua l Eas t Eu ropean countries ' scop e fo r refor m wa s limite d b y th e socialis t commu nity's collectiv e interest a s defined i n Moscow receive d redundan t confir mation i n the so-called Brezhne v Doctrine . That rational e fo r qualifie d sovereignt y wa s first expresse d i n a Sovie t note t o Bon n o n Septembe r 2 , which state d tha t "th e entr y int o Czecho slovakia wa s founde d o n th e obligatio n whic h th e countrie s o f th e socialist cam p ha d mutuall y undertake n fo r th e protectio n o f thei r unity. " A fe w week s later , Pravda explaine d tha t "antisocialis t degeneration " could no t b e sheltere d b y "abstrac t sovereignty. " An d a t th e Polis h party's congres s i n November , Brezhne v himsel f elaborate d tha t "whe n external an d interna l force s t o socialis m tr y t o tur n th e developmen t o f

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a give n socialis t countr y i n th e directio n o f restoratio n o f th e capitalis t system, whe n a threa t arise s t o th e caus e o f socialis m i n tha t country , this i s n o longe r merel y a proble m fo r tha t country' s people , bu t a common problem , th e concer n o f al l socialist countries." 48 Th e Warsa w Treaty's prohibitio n o f interferenc e i n interna l affairs , flouted i n 1956 , was no w explicitl y subordinate d t o a commitmen t t o preserv e Soviet style socialism . Ther e wa s stil l n o alternativ e t o th e gradualis t rational e of peacefu l engagemen t an d bridgebuilding , bu t i t was cleare r tha n eve r that America n policie s an d action s coul d scarcel y influence , le t alon e expedite, the rate o f evolutionar y change . Detente and Differentiation. Althoug h activis m an d bol d initiative s marked th e Nixon-Kissinge r approac h t o foreig n policy , Easter n Europ e was onl y a residua l beneficiary . Washington' s prioritie s wer e disengage ment fro m Vietnam , detent e wit h th e Sovie t Union , an d rapprochemen t with China , no t t o spea k o f crisi s managemen t i n th e Middl e Eas t an d elsewhere. Henr y Kissinger , first a s national securit y advise r an d the n a s secretary o f state , pursue d a globa l balanc e o f powe r strateg y tha t con centrated o n America' s majo r interlocutor s an d o n a traditiona l diplo macy tha t depreciate d th e people-to-peopl e approac h an d meddlin g i n domestic affairs . Eastern Europea n polic y wa s subordinate d t o th e highe r politic s o f detente o n th e assumptio n tha t peacefu l coexistenc e ( a Sovie t ter m tha t now entere d th e America n diplomati c vocabulary ) woul d b e beneficia l to evolutionar y chang e i n th e region . A s Kissinge r observe d befor e h e joined th e Whit e Hous e staff , th e invasio n o f Czechoslovaki a ha d onl y confirmed tha t "n o Wester n polic y ca n guarante e a mor e favorabl e evolution i n Centra l Europe ; al l i t ca n d o i s t o tak e advantag e o f a n opportunity i f it arises." Greater Wester n Europea n unit y an d autonom y would exer t a growing attractio n o n th e East , an d "th e majo r initiative s to improv e relation s betwee n Wester n an d Easter n Europ e shoul d origi nate i n Europ e wit h th e Unite d State s i n a reserv e position." 49 Dispar aged b y Brzezinsk i a s "benig n neglect " an d "mora l indifference, " thi s approach nevertheles s earne d som e tangible benefit s i n bilateral relation s and, somewha t inadvertently , i n th e eventua l Conferenc e o n Securit y and Cooperatio n i n Europe. 50 Policy statement s focusin g o n Easter n Europ e becam e les s frequen t and essentiall y reflecte d continuity . I n hi s first repor t t o Congres s i n

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February 1970 , Presiden t Richar d Nixo n note d tha t "reunio n o f Europ e will com e abou t no t fro m on e spectacula r negotiation , bu t fro m a n extended historica l process " in which th e Sovie t Union woul d overcom e its fea r o f German y an d discove r tha t reconciliatio n wa s th e bes t guar antee o f it s security : It is not th e intention o f th e Unite d State s to undermin e th e legitimate securit y interests of the Soviet Union. The time is certainly past, with the development of modern technology , whe n an y powe r woul d see k t o exploi t Easter n Europ e t o obtain strategi c advantage agains t the Soviet Union. . .. B y the same token, the United State s view s th e countrie s o f Easter n Europ e a s sovereig n . . . We ar e prepared t o enter into negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe , looking to a gradual normalization of relations. . . . Progress in this direction has already been achieved in our relations with Romania . . . . A similar relationship i s open to any Communist country that wishes to enter it. 51 Two year s later , th e presiden t assure d Eas t Europea n nation s o f "ampl e opportunities fo r economic , technical , an d cultura l cooperatio n o n th e basis o f reciprocity . Th e Eas t Europea n countrie s themselve s ca n deter mine th e pac e an d scop e o f thei r developin g relation s wit h th e Unite d States." 52 Leaving the initiative to the West Europeans an d t o the East Europea n regimes wa s a fa r cr y fro m th e spiri t o f th e Captiv e Nation s Resolution , which th e administratio n woul d hav e preferre d Congres s t o repeal . B y the fal l o f 1974 , with Nixo n ou t an d domesti c qualm s abou t detent e o n the rise , Kissinger ha d t o argu e strenuousl y i n defense o f th e "imperativ e of coexistence" : We must know what can and cannot be achieved in changing human condition s in the East. . . . There has always been a fear that by working with a government whose internal policies differ s o sharply wit h ou r own , we are in some manner condoning thes e policie s o r encouragin g thei r continuation . . .. I n tha t view , demands fo r interna l change s mus t b e the precondition fo r pursui t o f a relaxation of tension s with th e Soviet Union. Our view is different. W e shall insist on responsible behavior b y the Soviet Union and use it as the primary index of our relationship.53 Although th e immediat e targe t o f Kissinger' s ple a wa s th e mov e i n Congress t o lin k trad e concession s t o Jewish emigratio n fro m th e Sovie t Union, it reflected hi s general view that the primary concer n o f America n diplomacy wa s th e foreig n polic y an d action s o f othe r states , no t thei r domestic affair s an d huma n right s practices . A s h e observe d t o th e columnist James Resto n a fe w week s later , th e growin g interdependenc e

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of th e globa l econom y an d th e inabilit y o f socialis t dictatorship s t o adequately foste r economi c modernization woul d induc e favorabl e change : "The pressure of this realization o n Communis t system s is going to brin g about a transformatio n apar t fro m an y consciou s polic y th e Unite d States pursues, s o long a s there i s not a constant foreig n dange r tha t ca n be invoked t o impos e regimentation." 54 Fait h i n the inexorable force s o f history informe d Kissinger' s vie w o f detent e a s it had Kennan' s logi c fo r containment. Kissinger's Differentiation. Kissinge r mad e externa l behavio r th e prin cipal criterio n fo r improvin g relation s with Easter n Europe . The purpos e of wha t becam e know n a s "differentiation " was , a s Kissinge r recall s i n his memoirs , t o "encourag e sentiment s o f nationa l independence." 55 The guidelines set down i n the National Securit y Decision Memorandu m (NSDM 212 ) o f Ma y 2 , 1973 , reportedl y specifie d th e conditio n o f "satisfactory" foreig n polic y conduc t b y Eas t Europea n regime s a s wel l as the settlemen t o f private American claims . Economic favors , commer cial, cultural, an d scientifi c agreement s woul d b e calibrated t o th e merit s of eac h state , th e descendin g ran k orde r bein g Polan d an d Romania , Hungary, Czechoslovakia , an d Bulgaria. 56 Eas t German y wa s no t ye t recognized b y the United States ; Albania remaine d i n self-impose d isola tion (benefiting , unti l 1978 , fro m Chines e aid) , an d Yugoslavi a (whic h Nixon visite d i n 1970 ) wa s alread y a model o f cooperativ e relations . This mode l o f differentiatio n wa s distille d i n th e administration' s extensive statemen t o n Eas t Europea n policy , delivere d b y Deput y Sec retary o f Stat e Kennet h Rus h i n Apri l 1973 . H e outline d thre e basi c principles: First , to dea l with eac h countr y "a s a n independen t sovereig n state entitled t o b e free o f al l outside interference, " withou t an y desir e t o intervene i n it s domesti c affairs ; second , t o expan d trad e an d encourag e receptivity t o foreig n investmen t (Rus h indicate d tha t th e previou s fal l American ambassador s ha d bee n directe d t o "plac e trad e promotio n a t the ver y to p o f th e lis t of ou r polic y priorities") ; an d third , t o "promot e a deepenin g o f politica l an d economi c relation s betwee n th e countrie s o f eastern an d wester n Europe." 5 7 U.S.-Romanian relation s benefite d mos t fro m th e priority assigne d t o external conduct . Romania' s refusa l t o cooperat e i n CME A integration , to seve r relation s wit h Israe l a s th e othe r Warsa w Pac t member s (apar t from th e GDR , whic h ha d n o suc h relations ) di d i n 1967 , an d t o

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participate i n the invasion o f Czechoslovaki a wa s favorabl y appraise d i n Washington. Th e Romania n prim e ministe r ha d secretl y visited Chin a i n 1967, an d th e Brezhne v Doctrin e onl y intensifie d Bucharest' s ques t fo r new linkage s t o counte r Sovie t pressure. Hardl y ha d Nixo n take n offic e when a n invitatio n arrive d fro m Presiden t Ceausescu . Despit e th e mis givings o f th e Stat e Departmen t an d o f Ambassado r Thompson , th e White Hous e seize d th e opportunit y t o signa l it s activis t approach , particularly t o China , an d t o impres s o n th e Sovie t Unio n tha t peacefu l coexistence di d not preclude American diplomati c forays int o its wester n approaches. I n Bucharest , durin g th e firs t presidentia l visi t t o a n Eas t European capital , Nixo n declare d tha t "w e stan d read y t o reciprocat e the effort s o f an y countr y tha t seek s norma l relation s wit h us." 5 8 Th e visit infuriate d th e Russians , wh o retaliate d wit h a toke n dela y i n th e start o f th e SAL T talks , bu t i t inaugurate d a phas e o f activ e diplomati c collaboration betwee n Washingto n an d Bucharest . Nixon ha d aske d Ceausesc u fo r hel p i n approachin g th e Chinese , an d in Decembe r 1969 , Romania n Deput y Foreig n Ministe r Gheorgh e Ma covescu brough t hi m a messag e fro m Beijing . Th e followin g October , when Ceausesc u returne d Nixon' s visi t an d receive d th e ful l re d carpe t treatment a t th e Whit e House , h e wa s give n anothe r messag e fo r th e Chinese, to the effect tha t the United State s was eager for rapprochemen t and eve n willin g t o compromis e o n Taiwan ; thre e month s late r th e Romanians relaye d Zho u Enlai' s invitatio n t o th e president. 59 Romani a was no t th e onl y channe l o f communication , bu t it s eagernes s t o coop erate earne d Ceausesc u anothe r visi t t o Washingto n i n Decembe r 1973 . In July 1972 , Secretar y o f Stat e Roger s signe d a consula r conventio n i n Bucharest. A n agreemen t o n th e exchang e o f scientifi c an d technica l information wa s conclude d i n Septembe r 1973 , an d U.S.-Romania n trad e was growin g rapidly . Whil e Ceausescu' s domesti c rul e remaine d thor oughly repressive , h e ha d performe d usefu l service s an d ostentatiousl y breached Warsa w Pac t solidarity . In Poland , th e deterioratin g domesti c situatio n wa s marke d b y th e harsh repressio n o f studen t dissidenc e an d a n anti-Semiti c campaig n i n 1968, an d i t culminate d tw o year s late r i n strike s agains t foo d pric e hikes an d Gomulka' s replacemen t b y Edvar d Gierek . Giere k promptl y launched a n ambitiou s progra m t o revitaliz e Poland' s econom y wit h th e help o f Wester n credit s an d technology . Whe n Nixo n visite d Warsa w i n April 1972 , o n hi s wa y bac k fro m th e Mosco w summit , th e tw o coun -

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tries signe d a consula r conventio n an d agree d o n reschedulin g th e deb t Poland ha d incurre d i n it s earlie r grai n purchases . Gierek' s visi t t o Washington i n Octobe r 197 4 le d to th e expansion o f economi c relation s and a package o f agreement s o n th e creatio n o f a joint economi c counci l by th e tw o chamber ^ o f commerce , a ta x convention , an d cooperativ e research. Relations wit h Hungar y improve d a s well , reflectin g th e remarkabl e transformation o f th e Kada r regim e fro m agen t o f Sovie t repressio n t o promoter o f economi c an d politica l liberalization . Cardina l Mindszenty , who ha d take n refug e i n the American legatio n whe n th e revolutio n wa s crushed, wa s finall y persuade d b y Nixon an d th e pop e t o accep t exil e i n September 1971 . With thi s diplomaticall y awkwar d legac y o f th e revo lution eliminated , Secretar y of State Rogers visited Budapest in July 197 2 and signe d agreement s o n consula r facilitie s an d scientifi c cooperation . The followin g March , Hungaria n Deput y Premie r Pete r Valy i cam e t o Washington t o sea l th e settlemen t o f America n claim s an d receiv e th e administration's promis e t o submi t t o Congres s a recommendatio n fo r most-favored-nation (MFN ) tarif f status . Some modes t progres s wa s mad e wit h respec t t o Czechoslovaki a an d Bulgaria a s well . A consula r agreemen t wa s signe d wit h th e forme r i n July 197 3 an d th e latter i n April 1974 . Negotiations resume d i n Septem ber 197 3 o n America n claim s i n Czechoslovaki a value d a t $7 2 million . Congress, however , balke d a t th e propose d settlemen t ($29. 5 millio n and th e retur n o f 18,40 0 kilogram s o f Czechoslova k gol d hel d b y th e United States) , adding to the Trade Act of 197 4 a n amendment requirin g the Stat e Departmen t t o see k mor e favorabl e terms ; final settlemen t came i n 1982 . I n th e Jackson-Vanik amendmen t t o th e 197 4 Trad e Ac t Congress impose d sever e constraint s o n th e administration' s freedo m t o dispense economi c favors . Romani a wa s grante d MF N i n 1975 , bu t Hungary ha d t o wait thre e mor e years for th e sam e benefit . German Compromises and the CSCE. Washington' s recognitio n i n September 197 4 o f th e Germa n Democrati c Republi c wa s th e culmina tion o f a serie s o f histori c diplomati c compromises , originatin g fo r th e most par t i n Europe . I n th e lat e 1960s , wit h Americ a absorbe d i n Vietnam, Franc e an d Wes t German y too k th e lea d i n seekin g detent e with th e East . D e Gaull e pursue d hi s visio n o f a reconcile d Europ e fre e from superpowe r dominatio n wit h a n activ e Easter n policy , visitin g

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Poland an d Romani a i n 196 7 an d 1968 , but th e invasio n o f Czechoslo vakia serve d t o remin d hi m o f th e limit s o f Eas t Europea n autonomy , and Franc e subsequentl y concentrate d o n detent e wit h th e Sovie t Union . Germany an d Berli n ha d lon g bee n th e ke y stumblin g block s t o Euro pean detente , wit h th e Wester n allie s hostag e t o Adenauer' s adaman t refusal t o formall y acknowledg e division . Will y Brandt' s coalitio n gov ernment, forme d i n Octobe r 1969 , adopte d a n invigorate d Ostpolitik that accommodate d itsel f t o realitie s an d th e decisiv e rol e o f th e Sovie t Union. Although th e previou s tw o administration s ha d encourage d Bon n t o be mor e flexible , Kissinge r an d Nixo n wer e apprehensiv e tha t Brandt' s unilateral openin g t o th e Eas t migh t preemp t America n initiative s towar d detente an d divid e th e alliance. 60 Nevertheless , i n Augus t 1970 , Bon n and Mosco w conclude d a nonaggressio n pac t tha t entaile d recognitio n of curren t frontiers , an d i n December th e West German s confirme d thei r acceptance o f th e Oder-Neiss e frontie r i n a treat y wit h Poland . A treat y with Czechoslovaki a tw o year s late r affirme d th e inviolabilit y o f tha t common frontier . Th e Warsa w Pact' s long-professe d fear s o f Germa n revanchism an d territoria l revisionis m wer e presumabl y lai d t o res t b y these treaties , bu t ther e remaine d th e deadloc k ove r recognitio n o f th e GDR. Surrender o f th e goa l o f unificatio n wa s politically eve n mor e conten tious i n Wes t German y tha n forma l acceptanc e o f th e territoria l losses . The Federal Republi c regarded itsel f a s the legal continuation o f a unite d German state , an d i n it s Basi c La w th e "entir e Germa n peopl e i s calle d on t o achiev e i n fre e self-determinatio n th e unit y an d freedo m o f Ger many." O n th e othe r hand , afte r 195 5 th e Eas t German s adopte d wit h Soviet approva l th e doctrin e o f tw o separat e state s an d pursue d a polic y of Abgrenzung (demarcation) . Th e Warsa w Pac t (apar t fro m Romania ) demanded ful l recognitio n o f th e GD R a s th e preconditio n fo r normal izing relations. With hi s "tw o state s withi n on e Germa n nation " formula , Brand t tried t o reconcil e th e irreconcilable . In Eas t Germany , th e replacemen t of th e intransigen t Ulbrich t b y Eric h Honecke r heralde d greate r flexibil ity. Toug h negotiatio n produce d i n Decembe r 197 2 a Germa n treat y that fudge d th e issu e o f sovereignty . Th e tw o countrie s declare d tha t their relation s wer e o f a n "interstate " natur e an d agree d t o exchang e not embassie s bu t "permanen t missions. " Th e treat y als o enshrine d

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respect fo r eac h other' s territoria l integrity , althoug h articl e 9 , whic h registered tha t th e agreemen t di d no t supersed e othe r existin g treat y commitments, allowe d Wes t German s t o argu e that residua l allie d right s left ope n th e frontie r questio n pendin g a peace treaty. Thus, the normal ization o f state-to-stat e relation s di d not , a t leas t i n th e Wes t Germa n view, represen t a conclusiv e resolutio n o f th e nationa l question. 61 Th e Christian Democrat s nevertheles s preferre d t o withhol d publi c assent , leaving the Bundestag t o ratif y th e treaty b y the narrowest o f margins . In th e meantime , th e fou r forme r allie d power s ha d com e t o grip s once agai n wit h th e Berli n conundrum , an d a Quadripartit e Agreemen t was signe d i n Septembe r 1971 . It was, inevitably, a n imperfec t compro mise. Th e Sovie t Unio n tacitl y gav e u p it s effort s t o forc e th e Wes t ou t of Berli n an d agree d t o continue d allie d presenc e an d acces s an d t o political self-rul e fo r th e Wes t Berliners . Th e Wes t accepte d tha t Wes t Berlin woul d remai n a distinc t politica l entity , wit h specia l institutiona l links t o th e Federa l Republic ; Bon n woul d als o loo k afte r Wes t Berlin' s international representation , althoug h th e Sovie t Union di d not formall y recognize it s right t o d o so . A more tangibl e concessio n b y the West wa s the d e fact o recognitio n o f Eas t Berli n a s th e capita l o f th e GDR . Th e Quadripartite Agreemen t confirme d th e continuin g four-powe r respon sibility fo r th e entir e city , bu t i n practice th e Soviet s tended t o trea t Eas t Berlin a s a n integra l par t o f th e GD R an d t o depic t Wes t Berli n a s th e only occupie d area . For th e Sovie t Union , th e Germa n an d Berli n agreement s wer e step s toward a comprehensive East-Wes t agreemen t o n European securit y tha t would legitimat e its sphere of influence i n Eastern Europe. Having achieve d military parit y a t grea t cos t t o othe r economi c sectors , th e Brezhne v regime sough t symboli c recognitio n o f it s equa l superpowe r statu s an d the acces s t o Wester n trad e an d technolog y tha t detent e coul d bring . It s quest fo r a Europea n securit y conferenc e date d bac k t o th e mid-1950s , and whe n th e Warsaw Pac t concede d tha t th e United State s an d Canad a were vali d partner s i n suc h a n exercise , th e pressur e withi n NAT O t o respond becam e irresistible. 62 A negotiate d disengagemen t fro m Vietna m wa s Nixon' s to p priority , and th e nee d t o secur e Sovie t suppor t wa s a key elemen t i n th e comple x linkage diplomac y pursue d b y Henr y Kissinger . Th e summi t meetin g i n Moscow i n Ma y 197 2 marke d a hig h poin t o f detente . Th e SAL T I agreement wa s signed , a s wa s a statemen t o f "basi c principles " govern -

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ing U.S.-Sovie t relations . Th e principle s affirme d peacefu l coexistenc e and noninterference , mutua l recognitio n o f securit y interest s "base d o n the principl e o f equalit y an d th e renunciatio n o f th e us e o f force, " an d the nee d t o "promot e condition s i n whic h al l countrie s wil l liv e in peac e and securit y an d wil l no t b e subjec t t o outsid e interferenc e i n thei r internal affairs. " Les t tha t injunctio n b e rea d a s invalidatin g th e Brezh nev Doctrine , th e final principl e registere d tha t th e agreemen t di d no t affect "an y obligation s wit h respec t t o othe r countrie s earlie r assumed " by th e tw o signatories. 63 Nixo n als o agree d "i n principle " t o procee d with th e securit y conferenc e (th e eventua l Conferenc e o n Securit y an d Cooperation i n Europe , o r CSCE ) s o avidl y sough t b y th e Soviets , an d they reciprocate d b y agreein g t o th e mutua l an d balance d forc e reduc tion talk s (MBFR ) advocate d b y the United State s and NATO . The CSCE , i n fact , ha d mor e suppor t i n Wester n Europ e tha n i n Washington, wher e prevailing political opinio n feare d tha t i t would onl y produce a gratuitou s an d undesirabl e legitimatio n o f Sovie t dominanc e in Eastern Europe . The administration treate d i t as a bargaining counter , and a s on e o f Kissinger' s aide s pu t i t later , "w e sol d i t fo r th e German Soviet treaty , w e sol d i t fo r th e Berli n agreement , an d w e sol d i t agai n for th e opening o f th e MBFR." 64 The exploratory talk s o n MBF R bega n in Vienn a o n Januar y 3 1 an d th e forma l negotiation s o n Octobe r 30 , 1973; sixtee n year s later, wit h littl e achieved , the y wer e supersede d b y a new offsprin g o f th e Helsink i process , th e Conventiona l Force s i n Eu rope (CFE ) talks . Th e CSC E opene d wit h preliminar y consultation s i n Helsinki i n Jul y 197 3 an d produced , i n Jul y 1975 , a Fina l Ac t tha t launched a continuing serie s of revie w conferences . That th e Helsink i proces s serve d admirabl y t o focu s worl d attentio n on huma n right s violation s i n th e Sovie t spher e owe d littl e t o Kissinger . His focu s wa s a n artfu l balanc e o f power diplomacy , no t vulga r psycho logical warfare . Detent e require d tha t Communis t regime s no t b e of fended wit h reminder s o f thei r shortcomings . Respondin g t o domesti c criticism, James Keogh , who in 197 3 replaced col d warrior Fran k Shake speare a s directo r o f th e U.S . Informatio n Agency , argue d tha t detent e meant "w e d o no t interfer e i n th e interna l affair s o f othe r countries . We're no t i n th e busines s o f tryin g t o provok e revolution s an d upris ings." 65 Th e sam e restrain t ha d t o b e exercise d b y Radi o Fre e Europ e and Radi o Liberty , whose presenc e wa s beginnin g t o embarras s Bon n i n this heyday o f detent e an d Ostpolitik.

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For al l it s tangibl e achievements , th e Nixon-Kissinge r strateg y o f detente graduall y los t domesti c political support , muc h lik e containmen t had i n th e earl y 1950s . I t was , charge d it s detractor s i n th e medi a an d Congress, sof t o n communism . Presiden t Geral d R . For d wa s subjecte d to violent attack s whe n h e traveled t o Helsink i t o sea l the Fina l Act, an d he include d Warsa w an d Buchares t i n hi s tou r t o displa y America n support fo r Eas t Europea n autonomou s tendencies . In Decembe r 1975 , at a supposedl y confidentia l briefin g o f America n ambassadors , Stat e Department counselo r Helmu t Sonnenfeld t declare d tha t "i t mus t b e ou r policy t o striv e fo r a n evolutio n tha t make s th e relationship betwee n th e Eastern European s an d th e Sovie t Unio n a n organi c one . An y exces s o f zeal o n ou r par t i s boun d t o produc e result s tha t coul d revers e th e desired proces s fo r a perio d o f time . . .. S o ou r polic y mus t b e a polic y of respondin g t o th e clearl y visibl e aspiration s i n Easter n Europ e fo r a more autonomou s existenc e withi n th e contex t o f a stron g Sovie t geo political influence. " Seizin g on the ambiguou s ter m "organic, " two jour nalists construe d hi s unexceptionabl e remark s a s a ne w "doctrine " con doning Sovie t domination . In th e ensuin g politica l furor , Sonnenfeld t was compelle d t o reassur e Congres s tha t th e For d administratio n re mained devote d t o th e goa l o f self-determinatio n fo r th e Eas t Euro peans. 66 Carter and Differentiation. Th e "Sonnenfeld t Doctrine " canar d wa s not alon e i n bringin g Easter n Europ e t o th e for e i n th e 197 6 electio n campaign. In June, Kissinge r trie d t o und o th e damag e b y declarin g tha t the United State s recognized "n o sphere s o f influenc e an d n o pretension s to hegemony . W e ar e determine d t o dea l wit h Easter n Europ e o n th e basis of th e sovereignty an d independenc e o f eac h o f it s countries." 67 T o presume sovereignt y i n orde r t o reinforc e i t wa s a cardina l rul e o f Kissinger's differentiation . Geral d Ford' s renderin g o f th e sam e notio n in Octobe r i n hi s secon d televise d debat e wit h Jimm y Carte r wa s politi cally disastrous : "Ther e i s no Sovie t dominatio n o f Easter n Europe , an d there neve r wil l b e under a Ford administration. " I n answe r t o a follow up question , For d insiste d tha t Romani a an d Polan d (a s wel l a s Yugo slavia) wer e independen t an d autonomous. 68 Hi s formulatio n dismaye d many, particularl y voter s o f Eas t Europea n origin , wh o wer e alread y susceptible t o th e vie w tha t th e Helsink i Fina l Ac t wa s a sellou t o n th e order o f Yalta .

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Ford subsequentl y tol d a delegatio n o f ethni c leader s tha t h e ha d made a mistak e i n no t expressin g himsel f clearly , bu t th e origina l bloope r probably contribute d t o his defeat. 69 Jimmy Carte r mad e his own contri bution t o controvers y i n th e final debat e b y declarin g h e didn' t believ e that "ou r securit y woul d b e threatene d i f th e Sovie t Unio n wen t int o Yugoslavia." No w i t was Kissinger' s tur n t o remin d voter s o f America' s long-standing interes t i n preserving Yugosla v independence. 70 Early i n tha t electio n year , Brzezinsk i ha d sen t a foreig n polic y brie f to Jimm y Carte r arguin g tha t "onl y a mor e comprehensiv e an d a mor e reciprocal detent e ca n enhanc e peac e an d promot e chang e withi n th e Communist system " an d tha t "th e abandonmen t o f th e polic y o f benig n neglect towar d Easter n Europ e i s desirable , fo r th e Unite d State s ough t to b e a t leas t a s intereste d i n Easter n Europ e a s th e Sovie t Unio n i s i n Latin America." 71 In hi s rol e a s nationa l securit y adviser , h e steere d th e Carter administratio n towar d a mor e activis t approac h t o th e regio n that culminate d i n attempt s t o manag e th e Solidarit y crisi s in Poland . The interagency debat e o n Eastern Europ e revolved aroun d th e merit s of differentiatin g accordin g t o foreig n polic y independence , o r domesti c liberalization, o r both , an d o f expandin g relation s withou t an y differen tiation. N o Eas t Europea n countr y coul d satisf y bot h differentiatin g criteria, whil e th e las t optio n preclude d discriminatin g leverage . Th e outcome wa s a polic y tha t reflecte d Brzezinski' s preferenc e fo r a mor e balanced versio n o f differentiation . Th e guideline s calle d fo r developin g closer relationships wit h Easter n Europ e fo r it s own sak e an d no t merel y as a by-product o f detent e wit h th e Sovie t Union; fo r rewardin g interna l reform a s well a s foreig n polic y independence ; an d fo r developin g regu lar contact s wit h "representative s o f th e loya l oppositio n i n Easter n Europe—liberal intellectuals , artists , and churc h leaders " as well as with the regimes. 72 This ne w versio n o f differentiatio n departe d fro m it s predecesso r i n the greate r weigh t assigne d t o interna l reform . Brzezinsk i als o presse d for a more assertiv e U.S. posture i n the CSCE on human right s an d mor e funding an d scop e fo r Radi o Fre e Europ e a s "a n instrumen t fo r th e deliberate encouragemen t o f politica l change. " Th e initia l NS C polic y review ha d advocate d bette r coordinatio n o f Wester n economi c policie s toward th e Sovie t bloc , an d th e president , sensitiv e t o Wes t Europea n concern abou t hi s huma n right s crusade , assure d a NAT O summi t i n May 197 7 tha t "ou r ai m i s no t t o tur n [Easter n Europe ] agains t th e

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Soviet Unio n bu t t o enlarg e th e opportunitie s fo r al l Europeans t o wor k together i n meeting the challenges o f moder n society." 73 Indeed, despit e it s additio n o f huma n right s t o th e foreig n polic y agenda, th e Carte r administratio n wa s inten t o n pressin g forwar d wit h detente, SAL T II , an d rapprochemen t wit h China . Th e specia l effor t t o improve relation s wit h Easter n Europ e would not , i t was hoped, imped e detente wit h th e Russians . Deput y Assistan t Secretar y o f Stat e Willia m H. Luer s observe d a t a congressiona l hearin g tha t th e Soviet s "ar e reluctant t o use military power , an d the y ar e prepared t o tolerate a goo d deal mor e diversit y tha n the y were 1 0 or 1 5 years ago." American polic y "is t o b e cooperative wit h th e individua l countrie s o f Easter n Europe , t o move a t a pac e whic h i s comfortabl e t o the m i n thei r relation s wit h u s and th e Wester n world , t o provid e the m th e opportunit y t o promot e their ow n diversit y an d thei r ow n pluralism. " Th e Eas t European s n o longer expecte d tha t a n uprisin g woul d wi n significan t Wester n help ; rather, oppositio n element s ha d adopte d mor e subtl e way s o f pressin g for change , notabl y b y invokin g th e Helsink i Fina l Act . Luers' s succes sor, Georg e S . Vest , reaffirme d tha t "w e inten d neithe r t o leav e ou r relations with Easter n Europe hostage to relations with th e Soviet Union , nor t o conduc t a policy that i s reckless an d destabilizing. " 74 Exploiting Diversity within the Soviet Bloc. Th e unanswerabl e ques tion wa s wha t degre e o f diversit y th e Kremli n woul d tolerate . Th e satisfaction o f materia l need s could dampe n yearning s fo r democracy ; i n the 1970s , therefore , th e Sovie t Unio n encourage d it s clien t state s t o invigorate thei r economies , i f necessar y b y drawin g o n Wester n credit s and technology . Th e mov e woul d als o reduc e th e burde n o n th e Soviets . Western bank s wer e mor e tha n read y t o recycl e petrodollar s t o th e region. Th e expectatio n wa s tha t structura l reform s t o mak e th e Eas t European economie s mor e marke t an d consume r oriente d woul d expos e Communist regime s t o th e necessit y o f politica l liberalizatio n a s well . What woul d happe n i f popula r demand s wen t beyon d Sovie t tolerance , or i f th e economi c reform s failed , wer e question s tha t government s Eas t and West preferred no t t o entertain . "We wante d t o sho w tha t th e roa d t o Easter n Europ e di d no t neces sarily lea d throug h Moscow, " observe d Brzezinsk i i n 1978. 75 The impli cation tha t previou s administration s ha d believe d an d acte d otherwis e was n o easie r t o demonstrat e tha n t o no w completel y decoupl e Eas t

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European an d Sovie t policy . Althoug h th e Carte r administratio n di d abandon Kissinger' s restrain t i n th e pursui t o f huma n right s i n th e Helsinki proces s an d refin e th e strateg y o f differentiation , continuit y rather tha n radica l chang e marke d it s approac h t o th e region . I n th e event, trade expanded , bilatera l contact s an d agreement s multiplied , an d at th e margi n Polan d an d Hungar y benefite d fro m th e enhance d empha sis on domesti c liberalism i n the policy o f differentiation . Romania's Ceausesc u remaine d a prize d asse t fo r Washington . H e was instrumenta l i n facilitatin g th e histori c Jerusale m meetin g betwee n Egypt's Anwa r Sada t an d Israel' s Menache m Begi n i n Novembe r 197 7 that le d t o th e Cam p Davi d accord s o n a peac e treaty . Ceausesc u wa s rewarded wit h anothe r gal a receptio n i n Washingto n th e followin g April , when Presiden t Carte r declare d tha t the y share d a commitmen t t o per sonal freedom , lavis h prais e indee d fo r th e dictato r o f a polic e state . According t o Ceausescu' s senio r intelligenc e adviser , wh o subsequentl y defected, h e ha d devise d a strategi c deceptio n operatio n codename d "Horizon" t o creat e a n impressio n o f independenc e an d gai n acces s t o Western credit s an d technology . H e apparentl y als o nurture d cordia l relations wit h th e PLO' s Yasse r Arafa t an d Muamma r Qaddafi , an d hi s intelligence service s collaborated wit h th e PL O in a plot agains t Jordan' s King Hussein i n 1975. 76 If al l this was know n i n Washington, i t evidently di d not detrac t fro m Ceausescu's utility . H e continue d t o spur n th e Soviet s ove r China , host ing th e ne w part y leader , Hu a Guofeng , i n 197 8 (whe n th e Chines e leader als o visite d Yugoslavia) . Romania' s deviatio n fro m Warsa w Pac t orthodoxy i n th e Helsink i proces s an d o n arm s contro l issue s please d Washington, an d whe n i n late 197 8 Ceausesc u rebuffe d Sovie t pressure s for greate r militar y integratio n an d expenditures , th e administratio n hurriedly dispatche d Treasur y Secretar y Michae l Blumentha l t o Bucha rest t o sho w approval . Fo r th e tim e being , Romania' s complianc e wit h Jackson-Vanik i n respec t t o Jewis h emigratio n allowe d th e administra tion t o overloo k it s other shortcoming s i n the sphere o f huma n rights . Kadar's "goulas h communism " an d hi s comparative toleranc e o f cul tural freedo m als o qualifie d Hungar y fo r specia l treatment , an d i n 1977 , the Stat e Departmen t propose d tha t th e Crow n o f St . Stephen an d othe r national treasures , i n America n safekeepin g sinc e the en d o f th e war , b e returned. Despit e public protests b y Hungarian-American organizations , Carter wa s satisfie d b y th e regime' s promis e t o pu t th e relic s o n perma -

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nent publi c display. 77 In January 1978 , a delegatio n le d b y Secretar y o f State Cyru s Vanc e mad e th e ceremonia l transfe r i n Budapest . A mor e tangible accolad e cam e tw o month s late r wit h a bilatera l trad e agree ment tha t extende d MF N t o Hungary . I n ostensibl y acceptin g th e term s set by Jackson-Vanik, Hungary , lik e Romania, ha d chose n no t t o follo w the lead o f th e Soviet Union . The origina l Communis t heretic , Yugoslavia , continue d t o benefi t from America n patronage , althoug h occasiona l cloud s passe d ove r th e cordiality. Outspoke n criticis m b y th e U.S . ambassado r i n 1975-7 6 o f Tito's huma n right s abuse s embarrasse d bot h government s an d le d t o the envoy' s resignation. 78 I n Ma y 1977 , Yugoslavi a faile d t o notif y Washington tha t i t transferre d t o Ethiopi a a numbe r o f obsolescen t M 47 tanks tha t ha d bee n provided i n the 1950 s a s part o f the U.S. military assistance program , thereb y violatin g th e Arm s Expor t Contro l Act . When th e Yugoslav s professe d ignoranc e o f th e provision , n o penaltie s were imposed . Tito' s nonalignmen t wa s no t t o b e endangered. 79 After the 197 9 Sovie t invasio n o f Afghanista n ha d soure d detent e an d raise d fears o f renewe d Sovie t aggressiveness , Deput y Assistan t Secretar y o f State Rober t L . Barr y delivere d a n uncommonl y forcefu l warnin g tha t "attempts t o undermin e Yugoslavia' s unity , territoria l integrity , an d independence woul d b e a matte r o f grav e concer n t o th e United States." 80 Fresh assurance s o f suppor t wer e conveye d b y Carte r whe n h e visite d Belgrade in June 1980 , a month afte r Tito' s death . The presiden t an d hi s nationa l securit y advise r bot h considere d Po land t o b e th e mos t importan t Eas t Europea n country . Giere k seeme d intent o n economi c reform . Pole s wer e fre e t o trave l an d practic e thei r faith, an d a n oppositiona l countercultur e flourished wit h onl y sporadi c official interference . Riot s i n 197 6 ove r a propose d hik e i n mea t price s signaled tha t th e Pole s wer e no t satisfie d b y th e improvement s i n con sumption. Th e regim e prudentl y rescinde d th e pric e increases , bu t onl y after jailin g numerous citizen s who wer e involved i n the rioting. Intellectuals forme d a Committe e t o Defen d th e Worker s (know n b y it s Polis h initials a s KOR ) t o see k th e releas e o f imprisone d protesters . Othe r opposition group s emerged , som e openl y anti-Communis t an d anti-So viet, an d economi c grievance s combine d wit h nationalis m t o deepe n th e cleavage betwee n ruler s an d ruled . The election o f a Polish pope, and hi s triumphal visi t i n 1979 , brough t furthe r inspiratio n t o thi s profoundl y Catholic nation .

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Communist rul e an d th e machiner y o f a polic e stat e remaine d i n place, bu t i n July 1977 , face d wit h growin g unres t ove r foo d an d othe r consumer-goods shortages , Giere k mad e a conciliator y gestur e towar d both hi s domesti c an d America n critic s b y includin g te n politica l dissi dents i n a genera l amnesty . Despit e som e apprehension s i n th e Stat e Department abou t th e Kremlin' s reaction , Carte r an d Brzezinsk i decide d to mak e Polan d th e sit e o f thei r first presidentia l stat e visit , an d the y arrived i n Warsa w o n Decembe r 29 , 1977 . Th e officia l meeting s wer e marked b y grea t cordiality , wit h Carte r evokin g Polis h independenc e and invitin g close r relations. 81 Gierek's effort s t o revitaliz e Poland' s econom y wer e runnin g int o trouble, fo r th e substantia l Wester n loan s an d technolog y transfe r ha d not produce d satisfactor y result s i n term s o f productivity , exports , an d domestic supply . America n commodit y assistanc e throug h direc t credit s and guarantee s ros e steadil y t o $67 0 millio n i n 1980 . Economi c assis tance intensifie d whe n i n mid-197 9 Brzezinsk i receive d "quit e explici t signals fro m som e Polis h leader s tha t th e situatio n wa s deterioratin g rapidly an d tha t th e pro-Sovie t element s i n Polan d wer e deliberatel y interfering wit h Polis h economi c program s s o a s t o kee p Polan d depen dent o n th e Sovie t Union. " Poland' s economi c trouble s coul d hardl y b e attributed t o siniste r sabotag e alone , bu t b y lat e 197 9 Brzezinsk i wa s advising th e presiden t tha t th e situatio n wa s movin g towar d a critica l stage representing " a significan t chang e i n the Soviet world an d a sign of decreasing Sovie t control." 82 Whethe r America n economi c assistanc e had contribute d materiall y t o thi s chang e an d coul d sustai n peacefu l evolution wa s a cause-effect conundru m tha t defie d resolution . The detent e o f th e 1970 s ha d undoubtedl y facilitate d close r Wester n relations wit h Easter n Europe , an d Carter' s campaig n fo r huma n right s was logicall y linke d b y Brzezinsk i t o a differentiate d approach . Differ entiation reinforce d positiv e tendencie s i n Hungary , Poland , an d Ro mania, bu t suffere d fro m inheren t dilemma s an d contradictions . Fo r example, symboli c an d materia l reward s fo r foreig n polic y devianc e could indirectl y hel p th e preservatio n o f repressiv e domesti c rule . More over, differentiatio n reste d o n th e expectatio n o f incrementa l change , and no t o f radica l challeng e t o th e politica l order . I t wa s understood , given th e asymmetr y betwee n Sovie t an d America n interest s i n Easter n Europe, tha t Wester n leverag e coul d no t b e a decisiv e factor . Althoug h the possibilit y o f anothe r Eas t Europea n crisi s remained , gradualis t as -

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sumptions di d no t conditio n America n policymaker s t o anticipat e an d plan fo r an y suc h crises . Detente, alread y straine d b y th e Sovie t deploymen t o f SS-2 0 missile s in Easter n Europ e an d NATO' s reluctan t dispositio n t o reciprocate , a s well a s b y America' s assiduou s courtin g o f Mao' s successors , di d no t survive th e invasio n o f Afghanista n i n Decembe r 1979 . That crisi s dashe d President Carter' s hope s o f winnin g Senat e approva l fo r th e SAL T I I agreement a s he entered a n election year during which his administratio n also ha d t o grappl e wit h th e Irania n hostag e crisi s an d a revolutio n i n Nicaragua. Yugoslavi a condemne d th e Afghanista n invasion , an d som e East Europea n regime s privatel y expresse d reservations , bu t onl y Ro mania brok e Warsa w Pac t rank s b y absentin g itsel f fro m th e U N vot e on th e issue . Th e subsequen t Polis h dram a onl y reinforce d growin g American skepticis m abou t th e prospect s fo r detent e an d evolutionar y change i n Eastern Europe . The Polish Crisis. O n Jul y 1 , 1980 , th e Polis h governmen t onc e agai n took th e economicall y rationa l bu t politicall y perilou s ste p o f raisin g meat prices. Protest strikes spread fro m Warsa w t o the Baltic, and Radi o Free Europe was instrumenta l i n fanning th e flames o f discontent . By the middle o f August , th e strik e leaders , advise d b y KOR , wer e demandin g free trad e unions . Washington' s immediat e reactio n wa s t o maintai n a low profile, thoug h Carte r declare d a s early a s August 22 that "w e hope , and I might sa y w e expect , tha t ther e wil l b e n o furthe r Sovie t involve ment i n Polis h affairs." 83 Learnin g fro m th e lesso n o f 1976 , th e Giere k regime too k th e path o f appeasement . O n Augus t 30 , after thre e day s of negotiations, i t conclude d a n agreemen t wit h th e Interfactor y Strik e Committee i n Gdans k t o permi t th e formatio n o f independen t trad e unions, o n conditio n tha t th e latte r recogniz e th e leadin g rol e o f th e party an d no t challeng e Poland' s allianc e commitments . Thu s Solidarit y was born , an d i t eventuall y becam e a mas s movemen t wit h te n millio n members. A wee k later , Stanisla w Kani a replace d Giere k a s firs t secre tary o f th e beleaguered Polis h United Workers' part y (PUWP) . Even befor e th e Gdans k accord , a n interagenc y tas k forc e ha d bee n considering Washington's options , an d o n Augus t 29 , Carter sen t letter s to Prim e Ministe r Margare t Thatche r o f Britain , Presiden t Valer y Gis card d'Estain g o f France , and Wes t Germa n Chancello r Helmu t Schmid t inviting coordinatio n o f Wester n responses . A t th e sam e time , however ,

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the Unite d State s was havin g difficult y i n coordinating it s own response . The AFL-CI O responde d enthusiasticall y t o th e formatio n o f th e first democratic trad e unio n i n Easter n Europ e an d immediatel y planne d t o send som e $25,00 0 i n financial aid . Brzezinsk i was "distressed " t o lear n that Secretar y o f Stat e Edmund Muski e (wit h Carter' s approval ) warne d Lane Kirklan d (th e AFL-CIO president ) tha t th e actio n coul d b e "delib erately misinterpreted " b y th e Russian s an d assure d th e Sovie t embass y that th e administratio n ha d n o par t i n th e scheme. 84 Indeed , th e Sovie t media wa s alread y deplorin g th e ris e o f "anti-socialis t elements " i n Poland an d allegin g Wester n interference ; o n Septembe r 23 , Pravda accused Brzezinsk i o f conductin g psychologica l warfar e throug h RF E and th e VOA . Washington ha d bette r intelligenc e source s i n Polan d tha n i t had ha d twelve year s earlie r i n Czechoslovakia , notabl y i n th e person o f a senio r staff officer , Col . Ryszard Kuklinski . He had bee n a reluctant participan t in th e Warsa w Pac t invasio n and , i n disillusionment , becam e a CI A source. Th e ide a o f resortin g t o martia l law , h e reports , wa s conceive d as earl y a s Augus t 1980 , an d b y Novembe r preliminar y plan s ha d bee n drafted, the n shelved. 85 Concurren t Sovie t militar y activit y o n Poland' s borders impelle d Carte r o n Septembe r 2 0 t o publicl y pledg e U.S . nonin terference an d invit e th e Russian s t o d o likewise ; fou r day s earlier , h e had announce d tha t th e Commodit y Credi t Corporatio n woul d mak e another $67 0 millio n availabl e fo r grain . The America n strategy , inspire d b y Brzezinsk i an d develope d b y th e NSC's Specia l Coordinatio n Committee , wa s twofold : first, t o avoi d th e apparent mistak e o f 196 8 b y publicizin g Sovie t militar y move s an d th e Western sanction s tha t a n intervention woul d precipitate , and second , t o induce moderatio n o n th e par t o f th e Warsa w regim e wit h economi c incentives. Meanwhile , Brzezinsk i urge d officia l an d unofficia l Polis h visitors t o striv e fo r compromis e bu t t o presen t a unite d fron t i f th e Soviets trie d t o intervene . Pravda promptl y construe d thi s advic e a s a n invitation t o arme d resistance , leadin g Brzezinsk i t o issu e a n elliptica l denial, acknowledgin g th e nee d t o resolv e th e crisi s i n th e contex t o f "certain historica l an d geographi c realities." 86 Soviet and Western Pressures. Afte r th e Polis h Suprem e Cour t con firmed Solidarity' s lega l statu s o n Novembe r 10 , signs o f Sovie t militar y preparations multiplie d a s the East German s seale d of f thei r borde r wit h

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Poland. A t Brzezinski' s urging , Senato r Charle s Perc y tol d Foreig n Min ister Gromyk o i n Mosco w tha t th e "us e o f troop s i n Polan d woul d change th e fac e o f th e globe " an d lea d t o a hug e arm s buildup . O n December 3 , the president sen t a message to Brezhnev expressin g "grow ing concern " an d warnin g tha t U.S . polic y towar d th e Sovie t Unio n would b e "directl y an d ver y adversel y affected " b y militar y interven tion. 87 Tw o day s later , Sovie t blo c leader s meetin g i n Mosco w issue d a communique expressin g confidenc e i n th e abilit y o f th e PUW P to "over come th e curren t difficulties " an d assurin g Polan d o f th e fraterna l sup port o f thei r Warsa w Pac t allies. 88 Thi s thinl y veile d evocatio n o f th e Brezhnev Doctrin e wa s reinforce d th e sam e da y b y a CIA report tha t th e Soviets wer e plannin g t o mov e int o Polan d (ostensibl y a s par t o f th e "Soyuz 8 1 " exercises) o n Decembe r 8 with fifteen division s (alon g wit h one Eas t Germa n an d tw o Czechoslova k divisions ) an d tha t th e Polis h General Staf f wa s debatin g whethe r t o put u p resistance. 89 The Kremli n suspecte d tha t i n delayin g martia l la w th e Kani a leader ship wa s playin g a doubl e gam e an d plannin g t o mak e radica l conces sions t o Solidarity . Militar y interventio n woul d b e followe d b y th e in stallation o f a hard-line regime and mass arrests. Moscow secretl y discussed operational coordinatio n wit h th e Polis h military , includin g Defens e Minister Genera l Wojciec h Jaruzelski , wh o wa s reduce d t o bargainin g for th e participatio n o f a fe w Polis h units . Amids t th e risin g tension , discussions i n Washingto n range d ove r th e option s o f forewarnin g th e Polish opposition , seekin g U N action , an d eve n blockadin g Cub a i n retaliation. O n Decembe r 7 , th e CI A confirme d th e imminenc e o f inva sion, an d a n enlarge d Specia l Coordinatio n Committe e meetin g agree d on presidentia l message s t o Brezhne v an d othe r leaders . Th e first mes sage, t o whic h Brezhne v neve r replied , wa s a ters e restatemen t o f th e previous warning . Th e other s (addresse d t o Schmidt , Giscard , Thatcher , Canada's Pierr e Trudeau , Italy' s Arnald o Forlani , Australia' s Malcol m Fraser, Japan' s Zenk o Suzuki , NAT O Secretar y Genera l Josep h Luns , UN Secretar y Genera l Kur t Waldheim , an d India' s Indir a Gandhi , wh o was abou t t o host Brezhnev) indicate d th e probability o f Sovie t interven tion an d invite d diplomati c support . Brzezinsk i use d Lan e Kirklan d an d other channel s t o war n Solidarity ; h e personall y telephone d th e pope , and instructe d RF E an d th e VO A t o broadcas t th e Whit e Hous e state ment withou t delay. 90 This feveris h activit y wa s aime d a t deprivin g th e Soviet s o f th e ele -

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ment o f surprise . The y might , Brzezinsk i hoped , b e deterre d b y interna tional diplomati c pressur e an d th e possibilit y o f resistanc e b y th e fore warned Poles , who, in turn , migh t b e sobered b y news o f th e threat . Bu t by Decembe r 10 , th e CI A reporte d tha t som e twenty-seve n division s were read y an d likel y t o mov e withi n th e nex t si x days. 91 Czechoslova kian an d Eas t German troop s were prepared t o participate i n the assault . Though Giscar d sen t a stron g not e t o Moscow , othe r allie d suppor t was not a s forthright. Bon n was particularly reluctan t t o stake its detent e with th e Sovie t Union o n th e latter' s noninterventio n ("bes t proo f ye t of the increasing finlandization o f th e Germans, " recorded Brzezinsk i i n hi s diary). 92 But a European Communit y summi t i n Luxembourg o n Decem ber 1 promise d foo d ai d fo r Polan d an d indicate d tha t flouting o f th e UN Charte r an d th e Helsink i Fina l Ac t principle s woul d hav e "ver y severe consequences." 93 Th e followin g week , NAT O foreig n minister s met t o conside r join t step s i n cas e o f invasion , includin g increasin g defense expenditures , cuttin g of f credit s t o Polan d an d th e Sovie t Union , canceling technolog y transfer s (notabl y thos e involve d i n th e Soviet West Europea n ga s pipelin e project) , closin g Wester n port s t o Sovie t ships, an d terminatin g MBF R an d CSC E talks . In th e event , th e allies — including Wes t Germany—agree d o n economi c sanction s an d a mino r military buildup , an d th e communiqu e issuin g fro m th e meetin g o n December 1 2 warned tha t detent e would b e imperiled b y intervention. 94 The U.S . Senate , meanwhile , passe d a unanimou s resolutio n t o th e same effect. Th e AFL-CIO worked o n plans for a comprehensive boycot t of Sovie t good s b y internationa l transpor t workers . An d Brzezinsk i in structed th e Pentago n t o prepar e a lis t of weapon s tha t migh t b e offere d to th e Chinese , anticipatin g tha t th e initiativ e woul d lea k an d becom e known t o th e Soviets . In th e mids t o f thes e alarums , whil e Pravda mocked Brzezinsk i fo r thinkin g tha t "h e ca n ac t toug h withou t gettin g into an y fights," farmer s a t a meetin g i n Warsa w founde d Rura l Soli darity. 95 By th e en d o f December , th e Soviet s ha d suspende d thei r invasio n plan. America n an d allie d pressure , doubt s abou t th e Polis h army' s loyalty, preparation s fo r popula r resistance , an d Jaruzelski' s renewe d offer t o eventuall y resolv e th e crisi s b y interna l mean s ha d evidentl y acted a s a deterrent . Brzezinsk i regarde d th e outcom e a s on e o f th e Carter administration' s signa l successes. 96 Bu t a s th e presiden t note d i n his las t Stat e o f th e Unio n message , "althoug h th e situatio n ha s show n

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signs o f stabilizin g recently , Sovie t force s remai n i n a hig h stat e o f readiness, an d the y coul d mov e into Polan d o n shor t notice." 97 Invasion ha d bee n deterred , bu t it s threa t overwhelme d th e secon d part o f th e administration' s strategy , th e consolidatio n o f reforms . In November th e Polis h governmen t ha d approache d Washingto n wit h a request fo r a $3 billion financia l ai d package (an d other Western govern ments fo r a n additiona l $ 5 billion) . Tentativ e allie d consultation s fol lowed, bu t suc h a n immens e subsid y t o a mismanage d an d technicall y bankrupt socialis t econom y coul d no t b e lightl y entertained , leas t o f al l by a defeate d president . No r i s i t to o likel y tha t a quic k an d positiv e response in principle from th e West could have strengthened th e positio n of th e mor e reform-minde d Communist s suc h a s Kania , draw n the m together wit h Solidarit y int o a commo n front , an d generate d th e neces sary structura l reforms , al l without provokin g Sovie t intervention. 98 Th e request wa s therefor e pu t off . When , a year later , ne w CC C credit s an d a partia l reschedulin g o f deb t wer e offered , Kani a wa s gon e an d th e countdown t o martial la w reachin g it s end . The incomin g Reaga n administratio n carrie d o n wit h establishe d strategy bu t remaine d divide d o n th e optio n o f significan t economi c leverage. Althoug h Secretar y o f Stat e Alexande r Hai g woul d publicl y dangle th e lur e o f aid , linkin g i t t o interna l reform , Presiden t Ronal d Reagan's tax-cuttin g priorities an d th e preference o f som e of his adviser s for a mor e "red-blooded " polic y t o declar e Polan d i n defaul t an d brin g the Soviet Union "t o he r knees " militated agains t prompt action . Recall s Haig, "Som e of m y colleagues i n the NSC were prepared t o look beyon d Poland, a s if it were no t i n itself a n issue of war an d peace , and regar d i t as a n opportunit y t o inflic t morta l political , economic , an d propagand a damage o n th e USSR." 99 Thu s Washingto n concentrate d it s effort s o n keeping the Soviets out . Preparing for Martial Law. Caugh t between the millstones of the Kremlin and Solidarity , th e Polis h regim e struggle d t o maintai n som e orde r an d stave off disaster . Whe n Solidarit y leade r Lec h Walesa threatene d a oneday strik e i n suppor t o f fre e Saturday s an d th e legalizatio n o f Rura l Solidarity, suspensio n o f censorship , th e releas e o f politica l prisoners , and a ne w unio n law , th e leadershi p mad e a concessio n o n th e first demand; bu t te n day s later , o n Februar y 9 , 1981 , it responded t o Sovie t pressure by appointing Genera l Jaruzelski prime minister. On the follow -

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ing day , th e Suprem e Cour t rule d tha t Rura l Solidarit y coul d registe r only a s a n "association, " no t a s a trade union . In a toug h speec h t o th e Sejm (th e Polis h parliament ) o n Februar y 12 , Jaruzelski warne d agains t the creepin g process o f destabilizatio n an d calle d fo r a ninety-day mora torium o n strikes . Soviet-Polish consultation s i n Mosco w produce d a communique , is sued o n Marc h 4 , tha t professe d fait h i n th e abilit y o f th e PUW P t o "reverse th e cours e o f event s an d . . . liquidate th e danger s tha t threate n the socialis t gains " an d evoke d agai n th e commo n responsibilit y t o defend a n "indissoluble " socialis t commonwealth. 100 Tw o week s later , when th e polic e brutall y disperse d a sit-i n protes t b y Rura l Solidarit y members i n Bydgoszcz , Wales a declare d tha t unles s a ful l investigatio n of th e inciden t wa s conducte d h e woul d cal l a genera l strik e fo r Marc h 31. A n eleventh-hou r compromis e offere d littl e t o Solidarity , bu t th e strike was calle d of f a s the threat o f Sovie t intervention waxe d again . Hopes fo r a politica l accommodatio n wer e raise d b y th e schedulin g of a n extraordinar y congres s o f th e PUW P fo r Jul y 2 0 unde r rule s tha t strengthened th e voic e o f part y reformers . Th e latter , meetin g i n Toru n on Apri l 15 , called fo r a mor e democrati c part y tha t permitte d factions . The Czechoslova k part y ha d bee n moving in the same heretical directio n in 1968 ; the Russians now responded b y denouncing revisionist element s in th e PUW P an d dispatchin g o n Apri l 2 3 a delegatio n le d b y Politbur o member Mikhai l Suslo v to impres s o n th e Poles the imperativ e o f ortho doxy. 101 Jaruzelski ha d submitte d a detaile d report , "O n th e Statu s o f th e State's Preparation s fo r Imposin g Martia l Law, " a t th e Marc h Kremli n meeting bu t pleaded , the n an d i n countles s othe r discussions , for tim e t o prepare th e party , army , an d securit y forces . A powerfu l militar y an d KGB delegation le d b y Marshal Vikto r G . Kuliko v arrive d i n Warsaw i n late March t o stud y th e situation , an d a week late r Kani a an d Jaruzelsk i were take n t o se e Brezhnev , wh o pu t pressur e o n the m t o spee d thing s up. Neithe r woul d agre e t o se t a fir m timetabl e fo r martia l law . Mean while, th e prospec t o f mas s resistance , includin g part s o f th e Polis h army, an d renewe d Wester n warning s onc e agai n deterre d th e Russian s from actin g on thei r own. 102 Washington wa s awar e o f th e martia l la w preparation s bu t faile d t o devise a n adequat e contingenc y pla n becaus e (accordin g t o Haig ) th e allies coul d no t reac h a consensus. 103 Wors e still , a Stat e Departmen t

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spokesman declare d o n Februar y 1 0 tha t Polis h actio n t o restor e orde r would b e regarded b y th e Unite d State s a s a n interna l matter ; hi s subse quent clarification , tha t suc h actio n would stil l be "a matte r o f very grea t concern t o us, " did no t dispe l th e impressio n tha t Washington' s priorit y was t o dete r Moscow . Whe n Hai g invoke d th e principle s o f detent e proclaimed a t th e 197 2 summit , Sovie t Foreig n Ministe r Andre i Gro myko refuse d t o discus s Poland' s interna l affair s an d charge d Wester n interference.104 Th e administratio n hinte d tha t militar y sale s t o Chin a were stil l unde r consideration , an d o n Apri l 3 , Reaga n tol d Brezhne v that arm s contro l talks were contingent o n nonintervention i n Poland. 105 NATO defens e minister s issue d a simila r warning , bu t a North Atlanti c Council statemen t o n Polan d a month late r refraine d fro m assertin g tha t linkage, reportedl y a t Bonn' s insistence. 106 Th e Reaga n administratio n was i n an y cas e coo l t o th e resumptio n o f arm s contro l talks , an d i t ha d refused t o pres s fo r Senat e ratificatio n o f th e SAL T I I treat y signe d b y Carter i n Jun e 1979 . Nevertheless , mainl y t o pacif y Wes t Europea n public opinion , i t agree d i n Jun e t o ne w negotiation s o n intermediate range nuclea r force s (INF ) an d strategi c arm s reductions (START) , thereby effectively decouplin g arm s contro l fro m th e Polish crisis . Apart fro m thes e verba l signal s an d th e publicit y give n t o Sovie t military moves , some modest step s were taken t o "bridge " Poland's deb t crisis. O n Februar y 27 , th e Unite d State s deferre d fo r fou r month s th e repayment o f $8 8 millio n i n CC C credits ; o n Marc h 18 , Bonn guaran teed a n additiona l $71. 4 millio n i n private credit s fo r Poland ; o n Marc h 24, anothe r E C summi t raise d th e prospec t o f economi c aid ; an d tw o days later th e White Hous e issue d a warning agains t externa l o r interna l repression, addin g tha t peacefu l resolutio n woul d brin g economi c bene fits.107 Whe n tension s momentaril y seeme d t o eas e i n April , th e Unite d States agree d t o provid e $7 0 millio n wort h o f surplu s foo d (payabl e i n zlotys, thus more a gift tha n a sale) and, together with the other member s of th e "Pari s Club, " th e grou p o f Wester n Government s tha t ha d ad vanced credit s to Poland, develope d th e outlines of a partial reschedulin g arrangement. A t th e sam e time , however , Reaga n sen t a contradictor y signal t o th e Sovie t Unio n b y liftin g th e Carte r grai n embarg o impose d in respons e t o th e Afghanista n invasion . In August , th e Pole s expresse d interest i n rejoinin g th e IM F an d signe d th e reschedulin g agreement , though neithe r initiativ e survive d martia l law . Moscow's impatienc e with th e Poles was full y displaye d i n the forma l

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complaint addresse d o n June 5 t o th e Centra l Committe e o f th e PUWP . It charge d tha t th e Polis h part y ha d "retreate d ste p b y ste p unde r th e onslaught o f interna l counter-revolution , whic h relie s o n th e suppor t o f imperialist subversio n centre s abroad " an d promise d (quotin g Brezhnev ) that th e Sovie t Unio n "wil l no t abando n socialis t Poland , fraterna l Po land i n it s tim e o f need—w e wil l stan d b y it!" 1 0 8 Haig , o n hi s wa y t o Beijing, calle d a specia l pres s conferenc e i n Hon g Kon g t o decr y thi s interference i n Polis h affairs , an d a fe w day s late r th e Unite d State s announced tha t i t ha d decide d i n principl e t o sel l letha l weapon s t o China. 109 Solidarity's Demands and the Coup. Th e Polis h part y congres s wa s anticlimactic, fo r Sovie t pressure s successfull y prevente d th e reformer s from gainin g ground . Frustrated , Solidarit y turne d increasingl y towar d total politica l confrontation . Undeterre d b y anothe r roun d o f Warsa w Pact maneuvers , it proceeded a t its September nationa l congres s i n Gdans k to cal l fo r a national referendu m o n self-management , an d invite d work ers i n othe r socialis t state s t o follo w it s lead . Mosco w demande d tha t the PUW P an d th e governmen t "immediatel y tak e determine d an d radi cal step s i n orde r t o cu t shor t th e maliciou s anti-Sovie t propagand a an d actions hostil e t o th e Sovie t Union." 110 Th e deman d wa s reinforce d b y the threa t o f economi c sanction s (o f som e consequenc e give n Poland' s dependence o n an d trad e defici t wit h th e Sovie t Union) . Th e Polis h cabinet me t i n emergenc y sessio n an d declare d tha t sinc e th e obviou s goal o f Solidarit y wa s t o tak e power , i t woul d broo k n o compromis e and us e all means a t its disposal. 111 Washington responde d wit h deliberat e caution . "Ther e ar e interven tionist implication s i n th e Sovie t note, " sai d Haig , "an d w e don' t wel come that . O n th e othe r hand , i t i s als o no t a blatan t threa t o f th e kin d some migh t b e eve n mor e fearfu l of. " Th e presiden t o n Septembe r 2 2 sent a not e t o Brezhne v urgin g tha t th e Polis h peopl e b e lef t alon e t o deal wit h thei r problems. 112 Tha t martia l la w wa s becomin g th e mor e likely for m o f suppressio n wa s scarcel y reflecte d i n th e administration' s public stance . Moscow's propagand a barrag e onl y intensifie d a s Solidar ity reconvened it s congress fro m Septembe r 2 6 to Octobe r 7 . Its progra m demanded dismantlemen t o f th e party-state's economi c dominance , cut s in defense spending , an d mor e pluralistic elections . On Octobe r 18 , Jaruzelski adde d th e leadershi p o f th e PUW P t o hi s

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other function s a s prime minister , defens e minister , an d commander-in chief. Harassmen t an d arrest s o f Solidarit y activist s le d t o wildca t strikes , which i n tur n gav e th e governmen t th e excus e t o deplo y militar y team s —ostensibly t o supervis e supplie s an d hel p maintai n la w an d order , i n fact t o conditio n th e populatio n t o martia l law . Hai g professe d t o tak e comfort fro m th e fac t tha t "thi s wa s les s tha n martia l law, " an d o n October 27 , Washingto n cam e forwar d wit h a n additiona l $2 7 millio n in foo d aid. 113 B y then, th e deadlin e an d mechanis m fo r imposin g mar tial la w ha d bee n worke d ou t i n consultatio n wit h th e Soviets. 114 Soli darity organize d a nationwide , one-hou r wor k stoppag e o n Octobe r 28 , and ove r th e nex t fe w week s Jaruzelsk i wen t throug h th e motion s o f negotiating with th e union th e creation o f a "Front o f National Accord, " but thes e move s wer e evidentl y designe d t o deceiv e th e opposition . Warsaw Pac t coordinatio n proceede d a t meetings o f foreig n minister s i n Bucharest, defens e minister s i n Moscow , an d new s agenc y head s i n Prague, al l o n Decembe r 1 , whil e Jaruzelsk i presente d th e Sej m wit h a request fo r emergenc y powers , includin g a strik e ban . Whe n Wales a threatened a general strike, the regime charged that Solidarit y was takin g "the positio n o f a politica l oppositio n embarkin g o n a n ope n struggl e against th e socialis t authorit y an d a struggle fo r power." 1 1 5 The optio n o f a majo r economi c ai d progra m ha d meanwhil e com e under discussio n agai n i n Washington , an d a n offe r o f $10 0 millio n i n CCC credit s reache d Warsa w o n Decembe r l l . 1 1 6 Bu t th e opportunity , if it ever existed, to reinforce peacefu l compromis e wa s long past, fo r th e offer coincide d wit h anothe r directiv e from th e Soviet party t o the Polis h leadership an d th e secre t retur n o f Marsha l Kuliko v t o supervis e th e impending coup . Th e followin g evening , securit y force s surrounde d th e Solidarity headquarter s i n Gdansk , an d a t 6 a.m . o n th e Decembe r 13 , 1981, Genera l Jaruzelski wen t o n th e ai r to declar e a "stat e o f war" a s a patriotic necessit y t o dea l wit h th e pervasiv e "chao s an d demoraliza tion." 1 1 7 Th e operatio n wa s meticulousl y planne d an d executed . Th e Solidarity leader s were caught unprepared , an d the cutting of al l interna l telephone communication s effectivel y impede d th e organize d mas s resistance anticipate d b y the CIA. 118 "I woul d say , i n general , tha t al l th e Washingto n partie s wer e sur prised," recall s Secretar y o f Stat e Haig. 119 Indeed , th e America n polic y of publicizin g preparation s fo r militar y interventio n an d fo r martia l la w had draw n th e ne t o f suspicio n aroun d th e CIA' s prim e source , Col .

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Kuklinski, an d h e prudentl y defecte d i n earl y November . Thus , Wash ington apparentl y ha d n o advanc e knowledg e o f th e precis e tim e o f th e coup an d coul d no t war n Solidarity. 120 Ignorance , i n thi s case , probabl y prevented unnecessar y bloodshed . From th e start , Brezhnev' s Kremli n ha d regarde d Solidarit y a s anath ema, an d i f i t wavere d betwee n invasio n an d th e martia l la w option , i t was i n al l likelihoo d neve r prepare d t o condon e th e emergenc e o f a fre e trade union movemen t tha t would inevitabl y weaken th e party's monop oly rul e an d inspir e politica l heres y i n othe r part s o f Easter n Europe . A hypothetical unite d fron t o f part y reformer s an d opposition , supporte d by th e army , obviousl y woul d hav e raise d th e cos t o f intervention . Whether th e prospec t o f a blood y wa r ove r Polan d migh t hav e steere d the Soviet s t o attemp t les s forcefu l mean s o f suasio n lie s a t th e limit s o f fruitful speculation. 121 For Washington , th e Polis h crisi s wa s ye t anothe r Eas t Europea n lesson i n frustration . Th e basi c approach , i n Haig' s rendition , ha d bee n to war n of f th e Soviet s withou t "excessiv e provocation " an d t o "offe r humanitarian ai d t o th e Polis h people , bu t no t eve n hin t tha t th e Unite d States woul d unde r an y circumstance s g o beyon d that." 1 2 2 Th e strateg y probably helpe d t o forestal l invasion , bu t neithe r th e Soviet s no r th e Poles expecte d mor e forcefu l America n action . Th e Wes t conceivabl y could hav e com e forwar d wit h massiv e economi c ai d or , alternatively , threatened th e Pole s wit h default , bu t suc h radica l departure s wer e beyond th e capacit y o f th e lame-duc k Carte r administratio n o r hi s suc cessor i n th e mids t o f a divisiv e polic y review . In al l likelihood , neithe r the carro t no r th e stic k woul d hav e altere d th e Kremlin' s perceptio n o f deadly threa t t o it s spher e o f dominance . In term s o f militar y security , Poland wa s a ke y constituen t o f th e Warsa w Pact' s norther n tier , th e gateway t o Germany . T o b e sure , a differen t Sovie t regim e migh t hav e taken a mor e sanguin e vie w o f th e domesti c reform s advocate d b y Solidarity, bu t i n 198 1 Sovie t interest s wer e define d b y th e agin g Brezh nev. Martial law , coming on to p o f the invasion o f Afghanistan, reinforce d the administration' s belligeren t stanc e vi s a vi s th e Sovie t Union. 123 Reagan put Vice President Georg e Bush in charge of a task forc e t o stud y American responses , an d te n day s afte r martia l la w a serie s o f sanction s were imposed o n Poland . A bitter disput e erupte d betwee n Department s of Stat e an d Defens e ove r appropriat e sanctions , wit h th e Pentago n

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favoring a ba n o n th e sal e o f equipmen t fo r th e $1 0 billio n Soviet-Wes t European ga s pipelin e projec t b y Europea n subsidiarie s o f America n corporations. Reaga n side d wit h th e Pentagon , an d th e Stat e Depart ment's representative explaine d to Congres s that "w e hope by this actio n to pu t furthe r pressur e o n th e Soviet s t o restor e th e refor m an d renewa l process in Poland." 124 The administratio n wa s alread y aggrieve d a t th e allies ' comparativel y complacent reactio n t o martia l law . Bonn' s dogge d attachmen t t o de tente an d stabilit y wa s reflecte d i n Chancello r Schmidt' s concurren t visi t to Honecke r an d hi s insensitiv e remar k tha t th e tw o Germa n leader s regretted th e necessit y o f martia l law . I t matche d th e initia l reactio n o f French Foreig n Ministe r Claud e Cheysso n tha t "o f cours e [France ] wa s not goin g t o react " t o a n interna l Polis h affair. 125 Th e pipelin e measur e provoked mor e acrimon y amon g th e allies , compellin g th e presiden t t o suspend th e licensing ban i n November 1982 . The earl y sanction s agains t Polan d wer e economicall y damagin g bu t politically fruitless , an d whe n i n Octobe r th e militar y regim e formall y banned Solidarity , Reaga n turne d th e scre w b y suspending th e country' s MFN status . The optio n o f forcin g Polan d int o defaul t ha d it s advocate s in Congres s an d amon g Reagan' s advisers , bu t prudenc e prevailed . In stead, th e administratio n sough t t o extrac t th e maximu m propagand a advantage fro m th e Polis h disaster . I n earl y 1982 , th e USI A beame d a television spectacular , "Le t Polan d B e Poland!" t o Wester n an d Easter n Europe. Th e AFL-CI O an d th e CI A provide d cover t assistanc e t o th e remnants o f Solidarity , an d afte r 198 3 the new National Endowmen t fo r Democracy becam e th e over t sourc e o f suc h sustenance. 126 Poland' s ambassador t o Washingto n ha d defecte d afte r martia l law , an d whe n i n early 198 3 th e tim e cam e t o rotat e America n ambassador s i n Warsaw , Jaruzelski impose d unacceptabl e condition s an d th e post was left vacant . U.S.-Polish relation s ha d sun k t o a postwa r nadir . Fo r th e moment , Solidarity endorse d th e America n sanction s i n th e hop e tha t the y woul d impel Jaruzelski t o compromise . Differentiation Policy Continues. Th e decad e tha t bega n inauspi ciously wit h th e consolidatio n o f Sovie t rul e an d orthodox y i n Polan d ended wit h th e Sovie t empir e i n incipien t disintegratio n an d optimisti c plans fo r reintegratin g th e Eas t European s int o th e democrati c world . The impetus fo r thi s dramatic transformation cam e from Moscow , invit -

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ing Washingto n t o reconside r th e tactic s i f no t th e long-ter m objective s of differentiation . Cold wa r wit h Polan d suite d administratio n officials , notabl y i n th e Pentagon, wh o wer e pressin g fo r a tougher polic y o f economi c isolatio n and destabilizatio n o f th e Sovie t bloc. 127 In the absenc e o f allie d consen sus, wha t emerge d wa s th e ol d polic y o f differentiatio n enhance d b y more aggressiv e rhetori c o n Communis t huma n right s violation s (alon g with a mor e lenien t attitud e towar d th e practice s o f friendl y regimes) . The administration' s polic y revie w onc e agai n addresse d th e optio n o f making America n favor s conditiona l o n interna l liberalizatio n a s well a s foreign polic y independence , bu t onc e agai n th e existin g strateg y o f rewarding on e o r th e othe r wa s reaffirme d i n a Nationa l Securit y Deci sion Directiv e (NSDD-54 ) o f Augus t 1982. 128 A s before , stackin g th e criteria o f foreig n an d domesti c devianc e woul d hav e lef t th e Unite d States wit h n o opportunitie s fo r leverag e i n Easter n Europe , wher e de spite th e Polis h setbac k domesti c pressure s fo r economi c refor m an d human right s were accumulating . Differentiation i n the conduc t o f bilatera l relation s remaine d th e min imal realisti c respons e t o thes e stirrings . With Poland' s demotion , Rom ania becam e th e mos t promisin g targe t fo r rewardin g liberalization . Secretary o f Stat e Hai g visite d Buchares t i n Februar y 198 2 t o prais e Romanian independence , a s di d Vic e Presiden t Bus h th e followin g Sep tember. Romani a earne d muc h credi t i n Washingto n fo r attendin g th e 1984 summe r Olympic s i n Los Angeles, which was boycotte d b y the res t of th e Warsa w Pac t i n retaliatio n fo r th e America n boycot t o f th e 198 0 Moscow event , bu t cloud s wer e gatherin g ove r th e specia l relationship . The American ambassador , Davi d Funderbur k ( a political appointe e an d Romanian expert) , recommende d agains t suc h visit s "becaus e o f th e wrong signal s [they ] woul d sen d regardin g wha t Ceausesc u represents, " and trie d t o convinc e th e Stat e Departmen t tha t Ceausescu' s ostensibl y independent foreig n polic y covere d extensiv e collaboratio n wit h th e So viet Union , whil e hi s domesti c rul e wa s th e mos t repressiv e i n th e bloc . The Stat e Department , charge d Funderburk , downplaye d an d dismisse d his protest s becaus e it s "overridin g concern " wa s t o protec t th e MF N relationship fro m congressiona l challenge. 129 The criticism s tha t h e vente d publicly whe n h e resigne d i n 198 5 became , thre e year s later , conven tional wisdom . This continuit y i n differentiatio n polic y wa s occasionall y overshad -

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owed durin g th e first Reaga n administratio n b y denunciatio n o f Sovie t rule i n languag e tha t evoke d th e darkes t day s o f th e col d war . "Sta r Wars" an d "evi l empire" supplante d th e soothing vocabulary o f detente . In a n addres s t o th e Britis h parliamen t o n Jun e 8 , 1982 , th e presiden t called fo r a "crusad e fo r freedom " t o relegat e Marxism-Leninis m t o th e "ash hea p o f history." 130 Thre e year s later , o n th e fortiet h anniversar y of Yalta , h e reiterate d th e America n commitmen t t o "und o thi s bound ary" betwee n repressio n an d freedom : "W e d o no t den y an y nation' s legitimate interes t i n security . Bu t protectin g th e securit y o f on e natio n by robbin g anothe r o f it s nationa l independenc e an d nationa l tradition s is no t legitimate." 131 I t wa s no t al l idl e rhetoric , fo r th e administratio n pursued huma n right s wit h unprecedente d vigo r i n th e Helsink i revie w process an d move d t o establis h a Nationa l Foundatio n fo r Democrac y to nurtur e th e seedling s o f pluralis m i n Eastern Europ e an d elsewhere . Moscow reacte d predictabl y t o thes e challenge s t o th e legitimac y o f the Eas t Europea n statu s qu o an d t o Vic e Presiden t Bush' s reminde r o n September 21 , 1983 tha t "th e Sovie t violation o f th e [Yalta ] obligation s is the primary roo t o f East-Wes t tension s today. " Speakin g i n Vienna o n his wa y bac k fro m a visi t t o Yugoslavia , Romania , an d Hungary , Bus h delivered a blun t expositio n o f America n polic y t o suppor t an d encour age "al l movemen t towar d th e social , humanitaria n an d democrati c ideals" withou t seekin g t o "destabiliz e o r undermin e an y government. " Differentiation mean t tha t th e Unite d State s woul d "engag e i n close r political, economi c an d cultura l relation s wit h thos e countrie s suc h a s Hungary an d Romani a whic h asser t greate r opennes s o r independence " but no t rewar d "close d societie s an d belligeren t foreig n policies " (e.g . Czechoslovakia an d Bulgaria ) o r those , specificall y Eas t German y an d Bulgaria, that served as Soviet proxies in aiding terrorists and revolution aries. 132 Dissident s i n Easter n Europ e wer e comforte d b y suc h state ments, though to o muc h prais e made th e comparatively libera l Budapes t regime nervous abou t Sovie t reaction . Gorbachev's Revolution. I t befel l Mikhai l Gorbachev , wh o i n Marc h 1985 too k ove r th e Kremli n afte r th e brie f tenure s o f Yur i Andropo v and Konstanti n Chernenko , t o tak e stoc k o f th e gri m legac y lef t b y hi s predecessors. Th e statu s o f militar y superpowe r ha d bee n achieve d a t ruinous cos t t o th e civi l economy , an d Reagan' s defens e modernizatio n

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program promise d onl y mor e costl y competition . Th e Sovie t Unio n re mained technologicall y backwar d i n most spheres; consumer good s wer e in chronicall y shor t supply , an d a n inefficien t agricultur e require d con tinuing relianc e o n grai n imports . O n to p o f this , Brezhne v ha d be queathed rampan t corruptio n an d a militar y commitmen t tha t threat ened t o tur n Afghanista n int o a Sovie t versio n o f Vietnam . Th e people s of th e Sovie t Unio n wer e no t i n a revolutionar y mood , bu t neithe r the y nor th e syste m displaye d th e productivit y neede d t o catc h u p t o th e West. The Eas t Europea n empir e wa s dubiou s asset . I t ha d turne d int o a n economic burde n an d a political embarrassment . Th e activit y o f isolate d dissidents coul d b e overlooked , bu t th e Solidarit y experienc e lef t n o ambiguity a s t o th e predominan t popula r moo d i n th e region . Th e majority o f Eas t European s seethe d wit h nationalisti c resentmen t a t Soviet suzeraint y and , fa r fro m regardin g th e Sovie t Unio n a s thei r model, looke d westwar d fo r economi c an d politica l formula s fo r salva tion. Impelled b y this soberin g reality , Gorbache v launche d a revolution t o revitalize th e Sovie t economy . Th e restructuring , o r perestroika, aime d at political an d administrativ e institution s a s well a s the economic mech anism. Th e stagnatio n an d conservatis m o f th e Brezhne v apparatu s wa s to b e challenge d wit h glasnost (literally , "openness") , th e unleashin g o f the intelligentsia' s critica l an d creativ e forces , an d wit h a degre e o f democratization tha t woul d invigorat e popula r participatio n i n th e pro cess of government . In th e West, th e initia l skepticis m soo n gav e way t o ebullient optimis m tha t Marxism-Leninis m wa s o n it s las t legs , thoug h Gorbachev's revolutio n generate d mor e problems—i n th e econom y an d with th e national minorities—tha n solutions . Gorbachev's "ne w politica l thinking " i n foreig n polic y reflecte d th e urgency o f concentratin g o n thes e domesti c problems . Th e ideologica l rationale fo r securin g a respit e i n th e East-Wes t militar y competitio n was that , afte r all , capitalism an d imperialis m di d no t necessaril y spaw n a threatenin g militarism . I n th e ne w detente , armament s coul d b e re duced t o a leve l o f "reasonabl e sufficiency " (allowin g fo r a transfe r o f Soviet resource s fro m th e militar y t o th e civi l economy ) whil e coopera tive relations coul d eas e access to Western technology , trade , an d invest ment. Al l this inspired Gorbachev' s soothin g evocatio n o f "ou r commo n

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European home " t o wo o th e Germans , i n particular , bu t other s a s wel l (witness hi s seductio n o f Reaga n a t th e summits) , an d justifie d hi s with drawal fro m Afghanistan . Gorbachev infuse d Sovie t Eas t Europea n polic y wit h unprecedente d permissiveness. Th e "entir e framewor k o f politica l relation s betwee n th e socialist countrie s mus t b e strictl y base d o n absolut e independence . . . . The independenc e o f eac h Party , it s sovereig n righ t t o decid e th e issue s facing it s countr y an d it s responsibilit y t o it s natio n ar e th e unquestion able principles, " wrot e th e ne w leade r i n hi s handboo k fo r perestroika.133 Althoug h h e also stressed collaboratio n an d commo n interests , his spokesme n an d adviser s insiste d tha t th e tim e wa s pas t whe n th e Soviet Unio n woul d interven e militaril y i n Easter n Europ e i n th e nam e of th e socialist commonwealth. 134 The sign s o f a new Sovie t approac h t o Easter n Europ e multiplied . O n his visi t t o Yugoslavi a i n Marc h 1988 , Gorbache v formall y reaffirme d the principl e o f noninterference . A t a n extraordinar y Soviet-America n symposium o n East-Wes t relation s an d Easter n Europe , hel d i n Jul y 1988 i n Alexandria , Virginia , Sovie t spokesme n acknowledge d Stalin' s role i n th e "revolutionar y transformations " afte r th e war . The y note d that hi s successors ' "hegemoni c aspirations " a s wel l a s majo r mistake s by th e satellit e partie s ha d bee n responsibl e fo r th e subsequen t crises . A return t o th e Brezhnev Doctrine , sai d the delegation' s head , academicia n Oleg T . Bogomolov , wa s "completel y unacceptabl e an d unthinkable. " To b e sure , Gorbache v i n hi s boo k ha d blame d no t "socialism " bu t th e local partie s an d Wester n subversio n fo r th e crises , ye t hi s permissive ness graduall y extende d t o th e abandonmen t o f Leninis m i n Easter n Europe. 135 Were th e Eas t Europeans , a s th e perceptiv e schola r Charle s Gat i speculated i n a n articl e in Foreign Affairs, o n thei r own ? An d what wer e the limit s o f th e Kremlin' s newfoun d tolerance ? Poland' s Mieczysla w Rakowski, late r premie r an d the n part y leader , secretl y warne d hi s colleagues in late 198 7 not to expec t Sovie t help if they lost control. An d in 1988 , whe n th e ne w Hungaria n part y leade r Karol y Gros z followe d established practic e i n seekin g th e Kremlin' s rulin g o n a polic y matter , he wa s tol d b y Gorbache v t o b e "guide d b y hi s conscience." 136 In hi s travels i n Eastern Europ e Gorbache v prove d a most diplomati c advocat e of perestroika, stressin g th e nee d fo r economi c revitalizatio n withou t urging (publicly , tha t is ) th e adoptio n o f a particula r model . Bu t hi s

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cautious criticis m o f Ceausesc u an d th e Russia n reformers ' acknowledg ment o f th e similarit y betwee n Dubcek' s "socialis m wit h a human face " and perestroika bod e il l for th e region' s mor e conservativ e regimes . The Hungarian s an d th e Pole s wer e th e first t o tak e Gorbachev' s cu e by treading gingerly on th e slippery slop e of political concession s i n mid 1988. Wit h Sovie t permissivenes s confirmed , th e liquidatio n o f th e Len inist party-stat e cam e wit h dramati c suddenness . A t th e beginnin g o f 1989, al l o f th e Eas t Europea n partie s stil l clun g t o thei r doctrina l leading role. A year later, al l except the Albanians had effectivel y surren dered i t i n respons e t o popula r pressure . Th e transitio n wa s relativel y peaceful excep t i n Romania . In Jul y 1989 , th e Hungarian s presente d President Bush with a piece of the barbed wir e from th e dismantled fenc e on thei r Austrian border . B y December, th e Berlin Wall had bee n breache d and the East Germans were busily sellin g pieces of it to Western souveni r hunters. Reagan's Responses to Perestroika. A s th e Gorbache v revolutio n be gan t o unfold , th e possibilit y o f hastenin g th e peacefu l emancipatio n o f Eastern Europ e acquire d ne w salience . "Th e Wes t typicall y heed s East ern Europ e onl y i n crisis, " editorialized th e New York Times i n Novem ber 1987 . "Thi s i s a goo d tim e t o brea k tha t patter n wit h a thoughtfu l and unifie d approac h t o nudg e inevitabl e change s i n desirabl e direc tions." 137 Brzezinski observe d tha t Easter n Europ e wa s enterin g a phas e of systemi c crisis , the "organi c rejectio n b y th e socia l syste m o f a n alie n transplant." Thoug h thes e countrie s wer e i n hi s vie w "potentiall y rip e for revolutionar y explosion, " gradua l chang e wa s preferabl e an d ha d t o be deliberatel y promoted , amon g othe r things , "b y th e developmen t o f more expansiv e East-Wes t economi c contacts." 138 The Reagan administratio n overcam e it s initial mistrust o f Gorbache v to move ahea d o n arm s control bu t kept up its pressure on human rights . Visiting Wes t Berli n i n Jun e 1987 , th e Presiden t issue d a rhetorica l challenge: "Genera l Secretar y Gorbachev , i f you see k peace—if yo u see k prosperity fo r th e Sovie t Unio n an d Easter n Europe—i f yo u see k liber alization: Tea r dow n thi s wall." In his proclamations o f Captiv e Nation s Week an d Helsink i Huma n Right s Da y an d othe r statements , Reaga n repeatedly calle d on the Soviet Union t o fulfill th e Yalta pledges, to allo w free elections , an d t o repudiat e forc e a s a mean s o f preventin g liberali zation i n Easter n Europe. 139 The linkag e o f huma n right s concession s t o

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new conventiona l forc e reductio n talk s wa s sustaine d a t th e CSC E re view conferenc e i n Vienna , whic h ha d bee n underwa y sinc e Novembe r 1986 (se e chapte r 4) . A s th e president' s Nationa l Securit y Strateg y Re port affirme d i n January 1988 , "W e hav e neve r recognize d Sovie t hege mony i n th e regio n a s legitimat e o r health y becaus e i t i s base d o n military powe r an d dictatorship , no t democrati c consent . W e wis h t o develop ou r relation s wit h eac h countr y o f th e regio n o n a n individua l basis." 140 In the summer of 1987 , Secretary of State George Shultz gave a special mandate t o hi s deputy , Joh n C . Whitehead , t o invigorat e America n engagement i n Easter n Europe . Tha t region , sai d Whitehea d i n a n ad dress t o th e Washington Institut e o f Foreig n Affair s th e followin g Janu ary, was rip e for change : [The] lon g ru n Sovie t interes t i n maintainin g a hegemoni c relationshi p wit h Eastern Europ e ha s no t changed , althoug h th e Sovie t definitio n o f wha t thi s means in practice ma y have evolved. . . . there i s no question tha t a confluenc e of easing East-West tensions, the reform process in the U.S.S.R. and enlightened self-interest presen t th e United State s and th e West our mos t important oppor tunity in Eastern Europ e in the four decade s since Winston Churchill' s [Fulton ] speech. We in the U.S. now have a unique and perhaps short-lived chance to influence change i n Easter n Europ e i n th e directio n o f politica l an d economi c liberaliza tion. These countries ar e looking for ne w solutions to their stubbornl y familia r problems. Our challenge is to make sure they look to the West for some of these solutions, and tha t meaningfu l politica l a s well as economic change occurs in a peaceful an d permanent manner. 141 At th e time , th e permissivenes s o f perestroika wa s inducin g mor e diversity tha n eve r i n Easter n Europe . Hungar y an d Polan d wer e caugh t up wit h reform , an d Bulgari a wa s tentativel y toyin g wit h it , bu t th e Romanian, Czechoslovak , an d Eas t Germa n leadership s wer e obviousl y discomfited b y th e ne w wind s fro m Moscow . Washington' s activ e en gagement therefor e ha d t o b e calibrate d t o th e circumstance s o f eac h country a s th e pac e o f diplomati c contact s increased . Withi n les s tha n two years , Whitehead visite d eac h Eas t Europea n countr y a t leas t twice . After a tri p i n Januar y an d Februar y 198 8 t o Czechoslovakia , Poland , Romania, an d Bulgaria , h e reporte d tha t " I hav e th e feelin g the y hav e a lot o f latitude . . . . I se e practicall y n o chance , n o evidenc e o f th e Rus sians intervening i n an y way." 1 4 2 Whitehead briefe d th e Eas t Europea n regime s o n America n ap -

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proaches t o arm s contro l and , i n th e spiri t o f differentiation , reminde d them tha t America n trad e an d othe r economi c benefit s wer e contingen t on liberalization. 143 H e mad e a n effor t t o mee t wit h religiou s leader s and oppositio n figures, suc h a s Charte r 77 activist s i n Czechoslovakia . This kin d o f symboli c legitimatio n o f politica l oppositio n i n Easter n Europe soo n becam e commo n practic e fo r visitin g Wester n statesme n and diplomats . Perestroika reduce d th e relevance of foreign polic y devia tion a s a criterion fo r differentiation , an d th e main thrust o f U.S. strateg y became encouragemen t o f domesti c reform . Th e sol e casualt y o f thi s shift wa s Romania , no w ou t o f favo r i n bot h Mosco w an d Washington ; by 198 8 Whitehea d wa s reflectin g tha t "i t wa s illogica l tha t Romani a should hav e had MF N status , given their human right s performance." 144 Washington wa s unde r n o illusion s tha t America n leverag e alon e could hav e a decisiv e influenc e o n chang e i n Easter n Europe , an d i t sought t o coordinat e polic y wit h it s allies . Whil e Franc e an d Britai n tempered thei r enthusias m fo r Gorbache v wit h sustaine d pressur e o n human rights , th e "Gorbymania " sweepin g Wes t German y di d no t dis pose Bon n t o adop t a politicall y mor e differentiate d Ostpolitik. More over, th e German s ha d th e bigges t potentia l economi c leverag e i n th e region. O n th e ev e o f a NAT O ministeria l meetin g i n Madri d i n Jun e 1988, a n America n officia l indicate d tha t ther e wer e difference s amon g the allie s o n th e linkag e o f ai d fo r economi c refor m t o politica l liberali zation an d tha t Secretar y o f Stat e Shult z woul d "insis t o n politica l reform u p front." 145 In th e event , n o forma l decisio n wa s taken , bu t th e foreign minister s agree d t o trea t Eas t Europea n countrie s individuall y and no t a s a bloc , an d th e allies ' response s t o development s i n Hungar y and Polan d followe d roughl y paralle l paths . Bilateral Relations. Th e patter n o f th e Reaga n administration' s bilat eral relation s altere d mor e wit h respec t t o Polan d an d Romani a tha n with th e others . Th e conservativ e regime s o f Gusta v Husa k an d hi s successor Milo s Jake s i n Pragu e remaine d largel y imperviou s t o perestroika an d Wester n lure s an d continue d t o repres s th e burgeonin g oppo sition group s an d religiou s protesters . Th e consula r conventio n ratifie d in 197 3 remained a dead letter for fourtee n year s as human right s abuse s put U.S.-Czechoslova k relation s int o a dee p freeze . I t wa s finally imple mented i n 1987 , when o n hi s visit to Prague Whitehead professe d t o find signs o f improvement ; a civi l aviatio n pac t a s wel l a s a cultura l an d

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scientific exchang e agreemen t wer e als o signe d tha t year . A measur e o f "improvement" wa s permission fo r tw o America n physician s t o conduc t a postmorte m o n th e activis t Pave l Wonka , wh o ha d die d i n prison . They foun d n o evidence of torture, but the State Department calle d upo n the governmen t t o releas e al l political prisoner s an d abid e b y it s huma n rights obligation s unde r th e Helsinki Fina l Act . Relations wit h Bulgari a improve d marginall y whe n th e Zhivko v re gime appeare d t o jum p o n th e perestroika bandwagon . Th e Bulgarian s had acquire d a bad reputatio n fo r harborin g internationa l dru g traffick ers an d terrorists , bu t i n 198 8 the y agree d i n bilatera l talk s t o b e mor e vigilant. Thei r interes t i n improvin g economi c relation s wa s signale d b y the visi t t o Washingto n i n Apri l tha t yea r o f trad e ministe r Andre i Lukanov, th e highest-rankin g Bulgaria n visito r sinc e th e war . Bu t th e concurrent campaig n t o assimilat e ethni c Turk s worsene d an d led , a year later , t o massiv e emigration , promptin g Washingto n t o recal l Am bassador So l Polansky i n August 1989 . East German y remaine d a t th e botto m o f Washington' s lis t fo r prior ities and favors , partly becaus e it was regarded a s Bonn's special preserv e and partl y becaus e i t continue d t o symboliz e Stalinis t orthodoxy . Th e regime ha d suspende d it s "shoo t t o kill " polic y a t th e Wal l prio r t o Honecker's visi t t o Wes t German y i n Septembe r 1987 , an d Washingto n took som e comfor t fro m thi s an d fro m trave l concession s fo r Eas t Ger mans. Talk s o n trad e expansio n bega n i n Apri l 1988 , bu t th e regime' s resistance t o reform , th e Jackson-Vani k requirement , an d outstandin g U.S. claim s (includin g thos e o f Jewis h victim s o f th e Naz i er a an d thei r survivors) i n th e amoun t o f som e $7 0 millio n mad e th e prospec t o f American concession s remote . In contrast, U.S . relations wit h Hungar y flourished. Th e dynamic ne w ambassador, Mar k Palmer , worke d tirelessl y t o foste r cordia l relation s with bot h officia l an d oppositio n reformers , encourag e commercia l con tacts, an d facilitat e privat e fundin g an d initiative s (notabl y b y the Amer ican-Hungarian financier Georg e Soros ) involvin g cultura l exchange s and th e creatio n o f th e first Western-styl e busines s schoo l i n Easter n Europe, th e Internationa l Managemen t Cente r i n Budapest . Impelle d b y mounting foreig n deb t an d th e failur e o f partia l economi c reforms , th e Hungarians assiduousl y nurture d thei r relation s wit h Wester n countrie s and wer e th e first Warsa w Pac t countr y t o establis h relation s wit h th e European Community .

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Whitehead's successfu l visit s t o Budapes t pave d th e wa y fo r a tri p t o Washington i n Jul y 198 8 b y th e ne w part y leader , Karol y Grosz . Th e United States , Reaga n tol d him , wa s "encourage d b y you r recognitio n that economi c reform s canno t succee d unles s the y ar e accompanie d b y political reform s a s well." 146 Withi n a year, Gros z ha d bee n eclipse d b y more radica l reformer s an d a ne w America n presiden t ha d com e t o Budapest bringin g fulsom e prais e an d modes t materia l rewards . While th e erstwhil e favorit e o f differentiation , Ceausescu' s Romania , withdrew int o isolation i n reaction t o international criticism , Jaruzelski' s Poland slowl y emerge d fro m th e isolatio n i t incurre d wit h martia l law . Poland wa s uniqu e amon g Eas t Europea n countrie s i n havin g a signifi cant constituenc y i n th e Unite d States , includin g influentia l politician s on Capito l Hill . Th e Polish-America n Congres s supporte d th e condi tional normalizatio n o f relations , an d America n economi c sanction s were progressivel y suspended , culminatin g i n th e restoratio n o f MF N i n 1987 (se e chapter 5). 147 Jaruzelski's self-confidenc e wa s displaye d i n th e releas e o f al l remain ing political prisoner s i n Septembe r 1986 , an d althoug h th e bul k o f th e population remaine d profoundl y alienate d fro m hi s regime , Solidarit y appeared t o b e a wanin g force . Th e followin g August , afte r tw o fact finding mission s t o Polan d b y Congressma n Stephe n Solar z (D.-N.Y.) , a senior membe r o f th e Hous e Foreig n Affair s Committee , Congres s gav e final approva l t o a $ 1 millio n gran t t o Solidarit y throug h it s Brussel s office. Solidarit y intende d t o appl y th e fund s t o healt h care , principall y diagnostic clinics , bu t a yea r late r th e governmen t refuse d t o authoriz e the autonomou s foundatio n forme d t o administe r th e project . Th e ide a of a church-sponsore d fun d t o channe l Wester n ai d t o privat e farmer s had bee n abandone d earlie r fo r th e sam e reason . Secretary o f Stat e Shult z an d PUW P Secretar y Jose f Czyre k ha d agree d in Marc h 198 7 t o upgrad e diplomati c relations , leading i n Septembe r t o the nominatio n o f Joh n Davis , a vetera n diploma t wh o wa s servin g i n Warsaw a s charg e d'affaires . Th e administratio n considere d mor e sub stantial America n ai d t o eas e Poland' s economi c crisis , a n optio n tha t had som e backin g amon g Stat e Departmen t specialist s bu t littl e suppor t at Defense an d th e Treasury. 148 Th e conditional offe r tha t Vice Presiden t Bush too k t o Warsaw i n Septembe r linke d ai d t o fundamenta l economi c reforms an d politica l liberalization . "Th e mor e yo u procee d towar d greater freedo m an d pluralis m th e mor e w e wil l endeavo r t o find ne w

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ways t o hel p you, " h e declare d o n Polis h television. 149 Bus h foun d Jaruzelski willin g t o rela x th e rule s o n fre e association s an d t o allo w fo r a semblanc e o f electora l competitio n bu t adamantl y oppose d t o accom modating Solidarity , a prospec t h e describe d a s "suicidal." 150 Th e vic e president coul d consequentl y promis e suppor t fo r consolidatio n an d rescheduling o f Poland' s deb t b y th e Pari s Clu b bu t n o additiona l financial assistance . The tha w i n officia l relation s wa s thu s superficial , an d Bus h under scored America' s distast e fo r th e regim e b y laying a wreath o n th e grav e of Fathe r Jerzy Popieluszko , a pro-Solidarity pries t murdere d b y securit y police i n 1984 , an d b y meetin g wit h Lec h Walesa . H e urge d Wales a t o press fo r politica l pluralism , an d indee d tha t genera l deman d cam e t o overshadow th e opposition' s cal l fo r reinstatemen t o f Solidarity' s lega l status. O n hi s return , Bus h reporte d t o th e Polish-America n Congres s that "Jaruzelsk i resist s an y linkag e wit h economi c ai d tha t migh t mak e it appea r a s i f th e Unite d State s i s dictatin g th e interna l policie s o f Poland. I told hi m tha t genuin e economi c progres s woul d b e impossibl e without meaningfu l movemen t towar d pluralis m an d nationa l reconcili ation." 151 Jaruzelski di d submi t a n ambitiou s economi c refor m pla n a s well a s a proposa l fo r limite d electora l pluralis m t o a nationa l referen dum i n lat e 1987 , onl y t o receiv e wha t h e construe d a s a rebuff . H e could onl y offe r economi c austerity , an d mos t Pole s ha d n o confidenc e in his regime. The Polis h domesti c politica l deadloc k allowe d fo r onl y margina l progress i n what th e Stat e Department calle d the "proces s o f U.S.-Polis h re-engagement" durin g last year of the Reagan administration . Th e Pole s stopped jammin g Radi o Fre e Europ e an d complie d wit h America n re quests t o shu t dow n th e Warsa w offic e o f th e terroris t Ab u Nida l orga nization. In Februar y 1988 , th e Polish-U.S . join t trad e committe e me t for th e first tim e sinc e martia l la w began . Th e Warsa w regim e finally agreed t o registe r a church-linke d far m foundation , an d Whitehea d in dicated tha t u p t o $1 0 millio n i n America n fund s migh t b e provided fo r this purpose . Concurrently , th e Rockefelle r Brother s Fun d develope d another progra m t o ai d Polis h privat e agriculture . Bu t whe n i n Ma y a new wav e o f strike s le d t o th e forcefu l interventio n o f th e militi a a t th e Nowa Hut a stee l works , Washingto n pu t furthe r consideratio n o f eco nomic aid "o n hold. " The United States , said a White House spokesman , strongly urge d th e governmen t t o "begi n a productive dialogu e wit h al l

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segments o f Polis h society , includin g Solidarity, " an d th e Senat e pro ceeded t o pas s a resolutio n condemnin g th e Jaruzelski regime. 152 West ern insistenc e o n th e nee d fo r nationa l reconciliatio n a s a preconditio n to economi c ai d remained firm . That messag e wa s impresse d o n Polis h Foreig n Ministe r Tadeus z Olechowski o n th e occasio n o f hi s visi t t o Washingto n i n Jul y 1988 . Secretary o f Stat e Shult z tol d hi m tha t "th e potentia l exist s i n you r country fo r bol d steps , mayb e grea t an d histori c steps , tha t woul d cap ture th e imaginatio n o f Europ e an d th e world . Th e peopl e an d govern ment o f th e Unite d State s ar e read y t o respond." 153 Anothe r wav e o f strikes i n Augus t finally persuade d Jaruzelsk i tha t vita l domesti c an d foreign suppor t require d suc h bol d steps . I t fel l t o th e Bus h administra tion t o respon d t o th e resultin g radica l transformatio n o f th e Polis h political climate . Bush Moves beyond Containment. Th e foreig n polic y revie w o f th e new administratio n showe d unprecedente d challenge s an d opportunitie s in East-Wes t relations . Refor m i n Easter n Europ e an d th e Sovie t Unio n and Gorbachev' s diplomati c offensiv e i n Wester n Europe , includin g arm s control proposal s tha t threatene d t o divid e NATO, demande d America n leadership an d initiative . I n his first majo r addres s o n thes e issues , deliv ered a t Texa s A & M Universit y o n Ma y 12 , 1989 , Presiden t Bus h declared tha t containmen t ha d worke d bu t th e tim e ha d com e t o mov e beyond it . Th e Unite d States , h e said , "no w ha s a s it s goa l muc h mor e than simpl y containin g Sovie t expansionism—we see k the integration o f the Sovie t Unio n int o th e communit y o f nations. " H e calle d upo n th e Soviets t o reduc e thei r militar y forces , cooperat e i n solvin g regiona l disputes and othe r globa l problems, "achieve a lasting political pluralis m and respec t fo r huma n rights " a t home , an d adher e t o th e obligatio n incurred a t Yalt a b y abandoning th e Brezhnev Doctrine. 154 Two week s later , speakin g i n Mainz , Wes t Germany , th e presiden t elaborated fou r proposal s t o "hea l Europe' s tragi c division. " Th e first was t o strengthen an d broade n th e Helsink i proces s t o promot e fre e election s an d political pluralis m i n Easter n Europe . As the force s o f freedo m an d democrac y rise in th e East , s o should ou r expectations . An d weaving togethe r th e slende r threads of freedom wil l require much from th e Western democracies. In particular, the great political parties of the West must assume an historic responsibility

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—to lend counsel and support to those brave men and women who are trying to form the first truly representative political parties in the East, to advance freedom and democracy, to part the Iron Curtain. His secon d proposa l wa s t o "brin g glasnost t o Berlin, " t o tur n th e cit y into a cente r o f East-Wes t commerce . Th e third , t o wor k togethe r o n environmental problems . An d th e fourth , t o brin g abou t a les s militar ized Europ e throug h "solid , verifiabl e agreements " betwee n th e tw o alliances (se e chapter 6). 155 In th e meantime , roundtabl e talk s betwee n th e Warsa w regim e an d Solidarity ha d produce d a n accor d o n mor e democrati c elections . Thi s development accelerate d th e administration' s polic y revie w concernin g Eastern Europe . Hailin g th e accord s a s " a watershe d i n th e postwa r history o f Easter n Europe, " Bus h outline d a modes t an d conditiona l economic ai d package : If Poland's experiment succeeds, other countries may follow. And while we must still differentiate amon g the nations of astern Europe, Poland offers tw o lessons for all. First, there can be no progress without significant politica l and economic liberalization. An d second , help from th e West will come in concert with liber alization. Our friend s an d European allie s share this philosophy. . . . The Soviet Union shoul d understan d . . . tha t a fre e democrati c Easter n Europ e a s w e envision it would threaten no one and no country. 156 In its reformulation o f th e policy o f differentiation , th e Bush administra tion displaye d a judicious blen d o f optimis m an d prudence . With regar d to aid , i t stresse d conditionalit y an d collectiv e Wester n responsibility . And i t continue d t o insis t tha t overcomin g th e divisio n o f Europ e di d not entai l a threat t o Sovie t security . Al l this had bee n sai d before ; wha t had change d wa s th e politica l climat e i n th e Sovie t Unio n an d som e o f its dependencies an d i n Western Europe . The Wes t European s ros e t o th e challeng e b y adoptin g a "global , consistent an d dynami c approach " towar d Easter n Europe . Th e E C Commission's president , Jacque s Delors , an d th e Belgia n foreig n minis ter, Le o Tindemans, had argue d th e cas e for a coordinated polic y withi n the Europea n Community , an d o n Apri l 24 , th e E C foreig n minister s agreed t o thi s experimen t i n politica l cooperation. 157 Emulatin g th e American strateg y o f differentiation , the y decide d t o pu t a trad e accor d with Polan d o n th e fas t trac k an d t o formall y suspen d th e alread y

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faltering trad e negotiation s wit h Romani a becaus e o f th e latter' s huma n rights violations . Gorbachev offere d increasingl y explici t reassurance s abou t th e scop e for autonomou s chang e i n Easter n Europe . "Ho w th e Polis h peopl e an d the Hungaria n peopl e wil l decid e t o structur e thei r societie s an d live s will b e thei r affair, " h e sai d a t a news conferenc e wit h Presiden t Mitter rand o n Jul y 5 , a s th e triumphan t Solidarit y wa s abou t t o tak e it s plac e in th e Polis h parliament ; th e "righ t t o fre e electio n i s . . . o f vita l impor tance." T o b e sure , h e anticipate d tha t refor m woul d giv e socialis m a second win d and , speakin g earlie r a t th e Sorbonne , cautione d th e Wes t against expectin g Easter n Europ e t o "retur n t o th e capitalis t fold " an d "cultivating th e illusio n tha t onl y bourgeoi s societ y represent s eterna l values." Bu t ther e wa s n o hin t o f th e Brezhne v Doctrin e i n hi s addres s to the Counci l o f Europ e i n Strasbourg th e next day : Social an d politica l order s i n on e countr y o r anothe r change d i n th e pas t an d may change in the future. Bu t this change is the exclusive affair o f the people of that countr y an d i s thei r choice . An y interferenc e i n domesti c affair s an d an y attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states—friends, allie s or any others—ar e inadmissible.158 Indeed, a remarkabl e harmon y seeme d t o prevai l betwee n Washingto n and Mosco w ove r th e development s i n Easter n Europe . Afte r hi s visit s to Polan d an d Hungary , Presiden t Bus h too k pain s t o giv e Gorbache v credit, indicatin g tha t h e ha d tol d hi s interlocutors, "W e ar e no t her e t o poke a stic k i n th e ey e of Mr . Gorbachev—jus t th e opposite , t o encour age the very kind o f reform s tha t he is championing, an d mor e reforms. " And Gorbachev , fo r hi s part, reportedl y conveye d t o th e administratio n his appreciatio n fo r it s relativ e restrain t i n respondin g t o th e change s and clamo r fo r ai d i n the East. 159 Washington's messag e t o th e Eas t European s ha d t o b e finely tune d to reinforc e th e reform proces s without offendin g Mosco w an d arousin g unrealistic expectation s o f Wester n assistance . " I don' t wan t t o over promise, d o to o littl e o r to o much, " sai d th e presiden t o n hi s wa y t o Warsaw o n Jul y 9. 160 Accordingly , th e presiden t foun d a friendl y bu t sober welcom e i n Warsaw an d Budapes t i n July. H e evenhandedl y praise d Jaruzelski an d Wales a an d stresse d tha t ther e coul d b e n o substitut e fo r Poland's ow n effort s a t recovery, though th e United State s "stand s read y

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to help , a s yo u hel p yourselves." 161 Th e proffere d ai d wa s modes t indeed, althoug h Congres s woul d eventuall y increas e it (se e chapter 5) . The Temptation of Disengagement. I t becam e eviden t tha t Washing ton wa s passin g th e torc h t o th e Wes t European s a t th e economi c summit i n Pari s immediatel y followin g th e President' s Eas t Europea n tour. Polan d an d Hungar y dominate d th e Grou p o f Seven' s agenda , an d it wa s decide d t o charg e th e Europea n Commissio n wit h coordinatin g aid. Fo r lon g th e American s ha d bee n th e stronges t politica l advocate s of Easter n Europe' s emancipation , an d th e Wes t German s economicall y the mos t engage d i n th e region . Sinc e the West European s wer e destine d to bea r mos t o f th e burde n o f direc t ai d an d deb t rescheduling , an d i n order t o spar e th e Kremlin' s sensibilities , i t mad e diplomati c sens e t o superficially depoliticiz e the West's respons e b y enhancing the role of th e European Community . In fact , Georg e Kennan , th e fathe r o f containmen t an d th e Marshal l Plan, responde d t o th e Eas t Europea n revolutio n b y counselin g U.S . disengagement. H e tol d th e Senat e Foreig n Relation s Committe e o n January 19 , 1990 : The problems o f th e designin g o f a new political an d economi c relationshi p of the Eastern Europea n countrie s to the remainder o f Europe is primarily one fo r the Europeans themselve s to confront, an d I see no reason why we should tak e any prominent part i n it. Let the other Europeans dra w up their ow n plan, and implement it with such of their own resources as they can spare for it. If we can help in minor subsidiary ways, so much the better; but the initiative, the responsibility, and the main burden of implementation must be theirs.162 To b e sure , Kenna n advocate s continuin g America n involvemen t i n th e creation o f a ne w securit y structur e fo r Europe , bu t h e generall y sup ports a much les s active concern fo r thi s troublesome region . America's interes t i n Easter n Europ e appear s o n th e declin e a t th e same tim e a s tha t o f th e Sovie t Union , a coincidenc e tha t confirm s transcendence o f th e policy an d realit y o f containmen t b y a new proces s of regiona l reintegration . I f in the short run differentiatio n brough t som e disappointments, notably i n Poland an d Romania , i t was because distan t America's leverag e wa s bu t a mino r facto r i n th e calculation s o f deter mined Sovie t an d othe r dictators . Th e bridge s tha t ha d bee n buil t reache d nations mor e tha n the y reache d individua l governments . Unti l Sovie t

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power turne d mor e benign , Washington' s peacefu l engagemen t serve d mainly t o sustai n th e promise o f eventua l reintegration . How fa r America n policy had move d beyon d containmen t was vividl y revealed i n th e mids t o f th e Romania n revolution , whe n o n Christma s Eve, 1989 , Secretar y o f Stat e Jame s A . Bake r declare d tha t th e Unite d States woul d welcom e a Warsaw Pac t militar y interventio n i n ai d o f th e reformist forces. 163 (Frenc h Foreig n Ministe r Rolan d Duma s ha d simi larly urge d Sovie t o r Wester n intervention. ) In th e event , th e Sovie t Union remaine d aloof , and th e Ceausescu dictatorshi p fel l without exter nal aid . Baker' s invitatio n migh t hav e seeme d disingenuou s i n ligh t o f the concurren t U.S . "polic e action " t o seiz e Panama' s Genera l Manue l Noriega, bu t i t reflected th e administration' s judgmen t tha t Gorbachev' s Soviet Unio n ha d becom e a forc e fo r democratizatio n an d self-determi nation i n Eastern Europe . American officia l an d popula r interes t i n Easter n Europ e ha s tende d to wa x a t moment s o f crisi s an d wan e i n time s o f detente . Ye t th e potential an d nee d fo r engagemen t a s wel l a s th e leverag e i s fa r greate r in th e latte r tha n i n th e forme r circumstance . A s th e Sovie t empir e disintegrates, th e Eas t Europeans ' nee d grow s fo r hel p i n developin g stable democracy , productive economies , and close r associatio n wit h th e West. Thei r succes s wil l depen d i n par t o n th e wil l an d abilit y o f th e Bush administratio n a s th e stimulu s o f th e Sovie t threa t disappears . Conditionality wil l becom e mor e difficul t t o calibrate , an d th e resurgen t nationalisms wil l test diplomati c impartiality . The spee d o f democratizatio n i n Easter n Europ e outpace d Wester n expectations, an d th e Bus h administratio n suffere d som e criticis m fo r the alleged timidit y of it s response. "We don' t nee d to be out there tryin g to micromanag e th e desir e fo r chang e i n thes e countries, " retorte d th e president; "w e wan t t o b e read y an d availabl e . . . t o hel p financially, i f we don' t g o brok e i n th e process." 164 Th e consolidatio n o f chang e would requir e mor e tha n money , for , a s Ronald Reaga n observe d o n th e fortieth anniversar y o f Yalta , th e freedo m o f Europ e wa s unfinishe d business. A s Americ a an d it s allie s bega n t o devis e th e architectur e o f post-cold-war Europe , th e East' s initia l euphori a ove r it s escap e fro m socialist authoritarianis m wa s rapidl y dissipatin g i n th e fac e o f gri m economic realities . Afte r th e sacrific e o f generation s o n th e alta r o f Communist Utopia , th e ne w democracie s face d th e prospec t o f demand ing more sacrific e fo r th e distant reward s o f th e fre e market .

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The Eas t Europeans ' recognitio n tha t thei r newfoun d freedo m owe d much t o America' s unflaggin g crusad e wa s vividl y displaye d i n th e offi cial expressions o f gratitud e tha t greete d forme r Presiden t Reaga n o n hi s visits t o Eas t Berli n an d Warsa w i n Septembe r 1990 . Bu t freedo m of fered n o guarante e agains t politica l turbulenc e a s conflictin g economi c demands an d interethni c rivalrie s bega n t o reappear . In th e sphere s o f human rights , economic rehabilitation , an d regiona l a s well a s continen tal security , explore d i n th e remainin g chapters , man y task s awaite d America an d it s allies. Recognition o f thes e necessities an d opportunitie s prompted i n mid-199 0 th e namin g o f Deput y Secretar y o f Stat e Law rence S . Eagleburger a s coordinator o f U.S . assistance t o Easter n Europ e and plan s to shift nearl y eight y State Department position s t o the region . Containment ha d pai d off ; th e potentiall y mos t constructiv e phas e o f peaceful engagemen t wa s onl y beginning .

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A h e principl e o f inalienabl e individua l freedom s i s deepl y roote d i n the America n politica l culture , a s i s th e belie f tha t thes e freedom s hav e universal validity . Ideologica l universalis m ha s bee n a constan t facto r i n the U.S . worl d outlook , confirme d b y forc e o f exampl e a s wel l a s b y active engagemen t o f th e Wilsonia n variety . I n moder n times , th e pow erful popula r appea l o f huma n right s ha s induce d regime s o f al l color s to see k legitimac y b y professing t o respec t the m o r t o see k thei r realiza tion. Bu t muc h a s th e notio n o f democracy , o r rul e b y th e wil l an d consent o f th e majority , ha s bee n debase d i n it s appropriation b y count less authoritarian regimes , s o have huma n right s bee n use d an d misuse d to fit other ideologica l preconception s an d formula s fo r politica l power . Contending philosophica l approache s an d tactica l accommodation s continue t o confus e an d devalu e huma n rights , yet neve r befor e ha s th e concept enjoye d suc h prominenc e an d powe r i n internationa l an d na tional politica l life . Fo r this , th e Unite d State s deserve s a larg e shar e o f the credit . T o b e sure , man y compromise s hav e bee n mad e an d man y abuses condone d o r ignored ; a s th e Unite d State s acquire d increasingl y global interests , human right s consideration s wer e ofte n subordinate d t o calculations o f securit y an d politica l advantage . Bu t i n th e ideologica l contest o f th e col d war , th e clea r an d consisten t advocac y o f huma n 157

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rights wa s targete d o n th e Communis t world , an d fo r Washington , Eastern Europ e becam e th e prime battleground . That huma n being s posses s natura l right s no t bestowe d b y tempora l authority o r dependen t o n tim e an d circumstanc e wa s a belie f affirme d and elaborate d b y politica l philosopher s o f th e Enlightenment , notabl y Locke, Montesquieu , an d Rousseau. 1 Th e right s t o life , liberty , an d property requir e recognitio n o f certai n civi l an d politica l rights . N o regime ca n clai m t o rul e b y consen t i f i t fail s t o guarante e th e righ t o f emigration. No right s ar e secure without th e rule of law , which demand s an independent an d neutra l judiciary . The right to the rule of law implie s a constitutiona l orde r i n whic h th e citize n i s fre e t o expres s an d propa gate his views, to choos e an d recal l hi s legislative representatives, an d t o have recourse t o safeguard s agains t th e abus e o f political power . The mora l universalis m o f thi s libera l doctrin e cam e unde r challeng e from bot h Marxis m an d a relativis t tendenc y t o trea t th e hierarch y o f rights a s contingen t o n materia l an d cultura l circumstance . I n keepin g with thei r economi c determinis m an d clas s dogma , Marxist s hav e dis missed th e right s o f ma n a s a self-servin g inventio n o f th e bourgeoisi e designed to protect its privileged status , property, an d freedo m t o exploi t the majority . Huma n rights , i n th e Marxia n view , ar e inseparabl e fro m class, an d th e onl y legitimat e right s ar e thos e o f th e proletaria t a s i t realizes it s historicall y preordaine d mission . Individua l right s deriv e from , and ar e subordinate d to , th e collectiv e right s an d obligation s veste d i n class membership an d articulate d b y the political vanguar d o f tha t class , the Communis t party . The Marxia n an d relativis t approache s t o th e problem o f right s com e together i n thei r dogmati c o r expedien t focu s o n th e satisfactio n o f material desires . To b e sure , man ha s certai n irreducibl e need s fo r phys ical survival , fo r security , health , an d subsistence , an d i t woul d b e ab surd t o insis t tha t politica l an d civi l right s tak e precedenc e ove r thes e essential claims . Bu t th e elevatio n o f open-ende d economic , social , an d cultural desire s to the status of entitlements o r "rights " makes a mocker y of th e principl e tha t universa l right s ar e natural , inalienable , concrete , and enforceable . Tha t principl e can , however, b e sustained i n the case of political an d civi l rights . Freedom o f speech , fo r example , ca n b e unam biguously codifie d an d enforce d i n al l societie s regardles s o f thei r mate rial circumstances . Th e "right " t o sanitation , o n th e othe r hand , i s

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simply on e o f a multiplicit y o f socia l need s amon g which , give n th e scarcity o f resources , hard choice s have t o b e made. The so-calle d social , economic , an d cultura l right s ar e therefor e no t analogous t o fundamenta l freedoms . B y invokin g economi c an d socia l rights, however , th e stat e legitimize s a theoreticall y unlimite d degre e o f intervention i n th e privat e spher e t o marsha l huma n resource s fo r th e benefit o f others . The individual's righ t t o libert y thus become s a contin gent rathe r tha n a primar y claim . Th e primac y o f politica l an d civi l rights, on th e other hand , allow s fo r a participatory proces s i n which th e individual ca n articulat e hi s persona l desire s an d socia l values , thereb y influencing th e choic e o f prioritie s i n th e allocatio n o f communa l re sources. A direc t threa t t o nationa l securit y o r som e othe r crisi s ma y require th e temporar y suspensio n o f politica l an d civi l right s withou t denial o f thei r immanen t validit y an d supremacy . Thei r permanent , doctrinal subordination , however , demean s th e dignit y o f th e individua l by turning hi m int o a politically impoten t subject . By vesting freedoms i n the individual rathe r than i n society, the libera l doctrine o f natura l right s affirm s th e essentiall y pluralisti c natur e o f human communities . I t follow s tha t th e politica l organizatio n o f thes e communities mus t aggregat e an d serv e multipl e interest s withou t violat ing individua l basi c rights . Fro m thi s perspective , democrati c proces s i s less a righ t tha n a n instrumen t fo r th e preservatio n o f th e right s t o life , liberty, an d property , an d fo r thi s purpos e th e optima l politica l syste m is base d o n pluralisti c representatio n an d governmen t limite d b y la w a s well a s by institutional check s an d balances. 2 The diffusion o f human right s by force o f moral exampl e an d throug h international institution s wa s advocate d b y Kant an d man y other s a s th e road t o "perpetua l peace. " A s lon g a s th e right s o f ma n wer e no t universally recognize d an d respected , th e anarchi c natur e o f interna tional relation s threatene d th e libertie s an d securit y o f thos e wh o ha d secured the m withi n thei r ow n society . Mora l convictio n aside , there fore, enlightene d self-interes t militate s i n favo r o f activ e diffusio n o f human right s an d thei r instrumenta l corollaries . Ironically , th e first at tempt t o realiz e th e Kantia n vision , th e Leagu e o f Nations , coincide d with th e greates t historica l challeng e t o th e libera l doctrin e o f huma n rights, that o f th e institutionalization o f Marxism , transforme d b y Leni n into a doctrine o f stat e power an d worl d revolution . America' s timorou s

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abandonment o f Wilsonia n internationalis m furthe r weakene d th e im pact o f th e fragil e an d partia l mora l consensu s tha t ha d emerged . Th e global confrontatio n inaugurate d b y Lenin' s triump h pitte d a distorte d Marxian versio n o f huma n right s agains t th e liberal belief , and totalitar ian governmen t agains t limite d government . Other totalitaria n an d authoritaria n regime s have come and gone , bu t only i n th e lat e 1980 s di d th e Marxist-Leninis t construc t begi n t o crum ble. The philosophica l distinction s betwee n th e Marxis t an d libera l doc trines wer e accommodate d withou t bein g directly addresse d i n th e 194 8 Universal Declaratio n o f Huma n Rights , a nonbindin g enshrinemen t o f political an d civi l rights tha t als o mad e referenc e t o economi c an d socia l rights. Disagreement ove r the primacy o f rights between th e West on on e side an d Marxis t a s wel l a s th e growin g numbe r o f thir d worl d regime s on the other persisted, an d th e outcome i n 196 6 was two United Nation s International Covenants , on e on civi l and politica l right s an d anothe r o n economic, social , an d cultura l rights . B y mixin g rights , needs , an d wel fare-state objectives , th e declaratio n an d th e covenant s len d themselve s to selective application an d dilut e the principle of fundamenta l liberties. 3 This dilutio n impelle d Congres s t o tak e a positio n tha t som e con strued a s inconsisten t wit h America' s huma n right s advocacy . Th e U.S . Constitution include s treatie s amon g th e suprem e law s o f th e land , an d the Senate therefore refuse d t o ratify th e covenants (an d the enforcemen t provisions i n th e Optiona l Protoco l an d Optiona l Article ) o n th e ground s that the y intrud e int o th e spher e o f domesti c legislation . Th e Carte r administration, sensitiv e t o th e apparen t contradictio n betwee n thes e reservations an d it s huma n right s campaign , trie d withou t succes s t o accommodate th e legalistic objections t o ratification. Sinc e the covenant s were not backe d b y an authentic international mora l consensu s an d wer e practically unenforceable , th e Senate' s refusa l t o ratif y the m wa s under standable if also embarrassing to the administration. I n the final analysis, as Assistant Secretar y o f Stat e Richard Schifte r observe d i n March 1988 , "our tota l effor t i n the human right s field is not seriousl y impede d a t th e present tim e b y ou r failur e t o hav e ratifie d th e huma n right s cove nants." 4 Self-Determination and Eastern Europe. Althoug h a democracy's for eign polic y shoul d aspir e t o a t leas t a degre e o f idealism , traditiona l diplomacy shie d awa y fro m addressin g huma n right s i n othe r sovereig n

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states. Th e Unite d State s and , mor e briefly , revolutionar y France , brok e with thi s tradition . America' s anti-imperia l etho s prevaile d i n polic y toward Europe' s oversea s dependencie s an d produce d spontaneou s sym pathy fo r th e republica n an d nationalis t revolution s tha t shoo k th e imperial orde r o f Centra l Europ e i n th e mid-nineteent h century . Hunga ry's Lajos Kossuth , leader o f the failed revolutio n agains t Habsbur g rule , received a n enthusiasti c welcom e i n th e Unite d States . Th e Democrats ' Young Americ a movemen t o f tha t tim e calle d fo r th e abandonmen t o f neutralism an d th e activ e propagatio n o f republicanis m throughou t th e world. America's ow n imperia l driv e i n th e lat e nineteent h centur y wa s rationalized i n term s o f ideologica l universalism , a belie f th e res t o f th e world woul d benefi t fro m th e adoptio n o f America n values . A t th e en d of World Wa r I , Woodrow Wilson' s Fourtee n Point s invoked th e univer sality o f "th e principl e o f justic e t o al l people s an d nationalities , an d their righ t t o liv e o n equa l term s o f libert y an d safet y wit h on e another , whether the y b e stron g o r weak. " Th e applicatio n o f Wilson' s prescrip tion o f nationa l self-determinatio n fo r th e Pole s an d othe r Eas t Europe ans wa s flawed b y man y a politica l compromise , an d America' s hast y return t o isolatio n undermine d th e capabilit y o f th e Leagu e o f Nation s to preserve th e new, imperfect order . Advocacy o f th e righ t t o nationa l self-determinatio n remaine d th e principal manifestatio n o f th e huma n right s elemen t i n U.S . foreig n policy, notabl y i n th e Atlanti c Charte r an d th e Yalt a Declaratio n o n Liberated Europe . In hi s Fou r Freedom s appeal , Presiden t Roosevel t evoked th e classica l libera l principle s o f huma n right s b y specifyin g freedom o f speec h an d expression , an d freedo m o f worship , an d ap pended th e mor e problematica l freedom s fro m wan t an d fro m fear . H e later adde d tha t neithe r i n Americ a no r i n th e res t o f th e worl d coul d true individua l freedo m exis t withou t economi c securit y an d indepen dence. Thi s stretchin g o f th e libera l right s doctrin e reflecte d Roosevelt' s ideological preference s a s wel l a s th e moo d o f th e times , bu t i t di d no t alter th e precedenc e o f politica l an d civi l rights , whic h Washingto n affirmed implicitl y a s well a s explicitly i n it s advocac y o f self-determina tion fo r th e East European nations . The politica l clause s o f th e peac e treatie s wit h Hitler' s forme r allie s enjoined the m t o guarante e huma n right s an d fundamenta l freedoms , "including freedo m o f expression , o f pres s an d publication , o f religiou s

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worship, o f politica l opinio n an d o f publi c meeting. " Thes e clauses , observed Georg e Kennan , a fo e o f idealis m i n foreig n policy , "w e kno w full wel l wil l neve r b e implemented " i n th e countrie s occupie d b y th e Soviet Union. 5 The y nevertheles s reflecte d America' s dispositio n t o legit imate foreig n intrusio n int o th e domesti c spher e o f huma n rights . To b e sure, th e Unite d State s als o activel y pursue d economi c objective s tha t were i n it s immediat e commercia l interest—fre e trade , multilateralism , security o f foreig n investment , an d freedo m o f navigatio n o n th e Dan ube. Still , America' s tangibl e economi c stak e i n Easter n Europ e wa s minimal an d coul d hardl y b e regarde d a s a hidde n materialisti c motiv e for advocac y o f political an d civi l rights. Moralism in the Cold War. Th e ne w "people' s democracies ^ copie d the Sovie t approac h b y enumeratin g i n thei r ow n constitution s a com mendably comprehensiv e lis t o f rights , subordinate d t o th e pursui t o f social revolution . Th e judiciary wa s enjoine d t o appl y law s i n defens e o f socialism. Genera l politica l right s wer e qualifie d b y th e leadin g rol e o f the Communis t party . Whil e th e clas s struggl e officiall y ha d bee n brough t to a successfu l conclusio n i n th e Sovie t Union , Eas t European s wer e stil l in the mids t o f it , an d therefor e "clas s enemies " were legall y deprive d o f political an d civi l rights . Right s wer e contingen t o n correspondin g obli gations; citizens had th e duty a s well as the right to work, an d to espous e socialism i n retur n fo r it s benefits . Sinc e la w wa s regarde d a s a n instru ment o f revolution , socialis t legalit y i n th e Stalinis t perio d wa s th e wil l of th e party, i n practice o f th e ruling oligarchy. Arbitrary arrests , tortur e and imprisonment , massiv e deportation s an d compulsor y resettlement , the seizur e of private property, prohibition o f emigration , discriminatio n in employment, education , an d housin g o n ground s o f clas s and politica l or religiou s belief , th e practica l eliminatio n o f freedo m o f speec h an d association al l flouted elementa l notion s o f huma n rights . In theory , th e party wa s th e servan t o f th e workin g masse s an d "substituted " fo r th e latter i n managin g revolutionar y change . In reality, the Stalinis t politica l system totall y subordinate d th e individua l t o th e capriciou s wil l o f th e "workers' vanguard. " As th e Soviet-impose d experimen t i n totalitaria n socia l engineerin g began t o unfol d behin d th e iro n curtain , th e Unite d State s foun d itsel f reduced t o ineffectiv e profession s o f mora l outrage . America n an d U N

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protests a t violations o f th e human right s an d demilitarizatio n clause s of the Bulgarian , Hungarian , an d Romania n peac e treatie s wer e countere d by satellite rulin g party claim s (endorse d b y the Sovie t Union) o f domes tic jurisdiction; th e Stat e Departmen t observe d fruitlessl y tha t "persecu tion o f al l politica l leader s an d partie s no t amenabl e t o th e dictate s o f the minorit y rulin g grou p an d denia l o f freedo m o f expressio n canno t properly b e justifie d unde r an y Articl e o f th e Treaty." 6 Finally , th e United State s an d it s allies a t th e Unite d Nation s resorte d t o blockin g the admission o f these three countries (a s well as Albania), and the Soviet Union reciprocate d b y blocking Western applicants . The logja m o f twenty one state s awaitin g admissio n wa s finally broke n i n a packag e dea l a t the en d o f 1955 , America n acquiescenc e i n th e cas e o f th e satellite s taking th e for m o f abstention . Violations o f huma n right s i n Easter n Europ e wer e gris t t o th e mill s of th e Voice of Americ a an d Radi o Fre e Europe. The Truman Doctrine' s offer t o "assis t free people s to work ou t their destinie s in their ow n way " did no t directl y appl y t o th e already-captiv e Eas t Europeans , bu t Dea n Acheson observe d i n 195 0 tha t th e Unite d State s would "maintai n undi minished it s concer n fo r thei r right s an d thei r welfare, " an d th e affirma tion o f huma n right s wa s a centra l tas k o f psychologica l warfare. 7 Behind th e iro n curtain , recalle d Truma n i n hi s 195 2 Stat e o f th e Unio n address, "minoritie s ar e bein g oppressed , huma n right s violated , reli gions persecuted . W e shoul d continu e an d expan d th e activitie s o f th e Voice o f America , whic h bring s ou r messag e o f hop e an d trut h t o thos e peoples." 8 Late r i n tha t presidentia l electio n year , Joh n Foste r Dulle s developed th e GOP' s liberatio n polic y plank , callin g fo r a "grea t ne w Declaration o f Independence " o n behal f o f th e Eas t European s an d invoking natura l law : "W e shoul d b e dynamic , w e shoul d us e idea s a s weapons; an d thes e ideas should confor m t o mora l principles." 9 America's mora l hig h groun d wit h respec t t o Easter n Europ e wa s shored u p b y legalisti c reminder s o f th e allies ' wartim e pledg e o f self determination. Th e Sovie t Unio n an d it s allie s routinel y proteste d a t such verba l interferenc e i n thei r interna l affairs . Washingto n maintaine d diplomatic relation s wit h th e satellit e regime s bu t a t th e sam e tim e denied thei r clai m t o autonom y an d popula r legitimacy , thereb y reserv ing th e righ t t o champio n th e politica l an d civi l right s o f thei r subjects . From th e foundin g o f th e Cominter n forward , th e Sovie t Unio n ha d

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scarcely respecte d th e convention s o f sovereignt y an d politica l imperme ability, an d th e Unite d States , havin g assume d ideologica l leadershi p o f the "fre e world, " fel t fre e t o reciprocate . To champio n th e entitlemen t o f Eas t European s t o self-determinatio n and othe r libertie s wa s goo d politics , particularly i n th e domesti c arena , but i t wa s n o substitut e fo r a n operationa l policy . A s Vic e Presiden t Nixon explaine d lamely after th e Hungarian revolution , "Ou r onl y weapo n here wa s mora l condemnation , sinc e th e alternativ e wa s actio n o n ou r part which migh t initiate the third an d ultimate world war." 1 0 America' s advocacy o f huma n right s i n Easter n Europ e wa s fundamentall y soun d and hones t bu t constraine d b y consideration s o f nationa l security . T o reconcile idealis m an d realis m i s th e unhapp y bu t necessar y tas k o f democratic statesmen , an d th e inevitabl e compromise s tha t ar e mad e almost invariabl y incu r th e wrath o f idealists , or realists , or both . A chastene d Eisenhowe r administratio n rod e ou t th e stor m o f criti cism b y concentratin g it s fir e a t th e Unite d Nation s o n th e Sovie t Unio n and it s ne w clien t regim e i n Hungary . Th e latte r wa s deprive d o f ful l membership right s a t th e Unite d Nations , an d fo r year s the "questio n o f Hungary" regularl y reappeare d o n th e Genera l Assembly' s agenda . Fi nally, i n 1963 , afte r th e Kada r regim e ha d begu n t o sho w mor e libera l tendencies an d ha d amnestie d mos t politica l prisoners , th e Genera l As sembly approve d on e last time an American-sponsored resolutio n callin g for th e withdrawa l o f Sovie t troop s an d th e restoratio n o f basi c huma n rights, an d th e matter wa s lai d to rest . Succeeding administration s ha d littl e choic e bu t t o profes s fait h i n evolutionary chang e i n Easter n Europ e an d t o selectivel y offe r induce ments an d rewards . Th e Hungaria n traged y confirme d th e divisio n o f Europe, bu t de-Stalinizatio n promise d t o allo w th e Eas t Europea n re gimes greate r latitud e i n courtin g domesti c popularity . Fo r Washington , there remaine d th e chroni c proble m o f ho w t o normaliz e relation s an d gain leverag e ove r regime s tha t wer e regarde d a s fundamentall y illegiti mate an d les s tha n autonomous . Mora l absolutis m di d no t facilitat e diplomatic flexibility . In July 1959 , Congress unanimousl y approve d th e Captive Nation s Resolution , whic h denounce d th e "enslavement " o f millions b y Communis t imperialis m an d requeste d tha t th e presiden t designate a "Captive Nations Week" o f prayers fo r th e enslaved peoples , to b e repeate d annuall y "unti l suc h tim e a s freedo m an d independenc e shall hav e bee n achieve d fo r al l th e captiv e nation s o f th e world. "

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Khrushchev commented : "Thi s resolutio n stinks. " n Nevertheless , Cap tive Nations Week (th e third wee k i n July) becam e a perennial fixture o n the American politica l calendar .

Detente Diplomacy and Human Rights. Th e logi c o f th e strateg y o f peaceful engagemen t wa s compelling , an d it s intellectual guardian s trie d to reconcil e idealis m an d realis m b y arguin g tha t disapprova l o f th e status qu o di d no t preclud e pragmati c effort s t o improv e bilatera l rela tions. 12 T o b e sure , th e languag e o f congressiona l politic s wa s blunte r than th e languag e o f diplomacy , an d th e satellit e regime s bridle d a t reminders tha t the y enslave d thei r subjects . Face d wit h th e Proxmire Lausche initiative in June 196 2 aimin g to restrict United State s economi c aid t o Yugoslavi a an d Poland , Secretar y o f Stat e Dea n Rus k fel t com pelled t o reaffir m tha t th e Unite d State s wa s no t "permanentl y writin g off t o Sovie t domination " th e Eas t Europeans. 13 An d whe n th e Polis h ambassador complaine d abou t a speec h b y Arthu r Goldber g criticizin g his government' s repressio n o f religiou s freedom , Rusk' s soothin g re sponse was , "Mr . Ambassador , coul d yo u perhap s allo w u s some fifteen percent o f ou r speech-makin g fo r domesti c purposes ? W e allo w a muc h larger percentag e fo r yours." 1 4 Although th e principl e o f self-determinatio n remaine d commo n coi n in America n domesti c politica l discourse , th e gradualis t approac h re quired tha t i t b e tone d dow n i n th e conduc t o f foreig n relations . In th e era o f detent e an d arm s contro l negotiation , i t becam e counterproduc tive t o belabo r th e obvious . Fo r th e West , detent e diplomac y subsume d the expectation , o r rathe r th e hope, that liberalizatio n i n Eastern Europ e would progress peacefully. Th e Warsaw Pac t invasion o f Czechoslovaki a momentarily dispelle d thes e illusions . "Socialis m wit h a huma n face " unleashed nationalisti c an d libertaria n impulse s tha t th e Kremli n woul d not condone . Th e Brezhne v Doctrin e affirme d tha t th e interest s o f th e socialist cam p an d o f th e worl d revolutionar y movemen t too k prece dence ove r th e sovereignt y o f individua l socialis t states . Dea n Rus k protested tha t "wha t the y ar e askin g us to accep t i s that i n thi s 'Socialis t commonwealth' th e Sovie t Union ha s th e righ t to us e its armed force s t o determine wha t happen s insid e independen t countries , an d tha t i s ver y difficult fo r th e res t o f u s t o accept." 15 Bu t the bruta l suppressio n o f th e Czechoslovaks' righ t t o self-determinatio n an d th e reimpositio n o f a

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despotic regim e prove d t o b e a passing disturbanc e a s fa r a s th e flo w o f detente diplomac y wa s concerned . Human right s advocac y wa s ou t o f tun e wit h th e realpoliti k styl e o f the Nixo n administration . A t hi s confirmatio n hearin g i n 1973 , Henr y Kissinger warne d tha t "i t i s dangerou s fo r u s t o mak e th e domesti c policy o f countrie s aroun d th e worl d a direc t objectiv e o f America n foreign policy." 16 I t i s al l th e mor e ironic , then , tha t th e entrenchmen t of huma n right s o n th e worl d agend a woul d becom e th e shinin g legac y of a conferenc e tha t th e administratio n joine d wit h grea t diffidence . I n Kissinger's linkag e approac h t o East-Wes t relations , th e Europea n secu rity conferenc e persistentl y advocate d b y th e Soviet s sinc e 195 3 wa s a price t o pay fo r progres s o n higher Unite d State s priorities, notably talk s on mutua l an d balance d forc e reductions. 17 Th e Kremlin' s campaig n reinforced suspicio n tha t suc h a conferenc e coul d onl y serv e it s interes t in legitimating its political predominance i n Eastern Europe and in weak ening the cohesion o f the Western alliance . On th e other hand , Washing ton's relativ e neglec t o f Europ e i n th e Vietna m year s an d it s preferenc e for bilatera l negotiatio n wit h th e Soviet s ha d create d (i n Kissinger' s words) "enormou s eagerness " o n th e par t o f th e Wes t Europea n allies for suc h a conference . The "Declaratio n o n Basi c Principle s o f Unite d States-Sovie t Rela tions," signe d b y Nixo n an d Brezhne v a t th e Mosco w summi t i n Ma y 1972, mad e repeate d referenc e t o non-interferenc e i n internal affair s bu t did no t mentio n huma n rights . Kissinge r considere d publi c confronta tion wit h th e Soviet s ove r huma n right s t o b e counterproductive , an d indeed Jewis h emigratio n ros e i n thi s perio d o f traditiona l diplomacy . Paradoxically, i t wa s America' s NAT O allie s wh o no w champione d human right s an d humanitaria n diplomac y an d deplore d Washington' s low-profile approac h t o thes e issues. The European Security Conference. Notwithstandin g Washington' s reservations, th e European allies an d nonaligne d participant s wer e eage r to engag e i n thi s unprecedente d diplomati c revie w o f th e politica l stat e of the continent. The Conference o n Securit y and Cooperatio n i n Europ e (CSCE) ha s bee n describe d a s a "minima l Concer t o f Europ e an d Nort h America," a "surrogate World War I I peace treaty," and th e "high wate r mark o f th e detent e era." 1 8 I t was , i n fact , a n extraordinaril y laboriou s

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exercise i n th e superficia l accommodatio n o f conflictin g interests . It s novelty la y i n it s inclusivenes s wit h regar d t o bot h participatio n an d terms o f reference . Th e thirty-fiv e participant s include d al l th e state s o f Europe excep t Albani a a s wel l a s th e Unite d State s an d Canada ; th e agenda range d fro m securit y t o economi c relations an d huma n contacts . The Sovie t Union wante d a symbolic, multilateral confirmatio n o f th e political an d territoria l statu s qu o a s wel l a s easie r acces s t o Wester n markets an d technology . Th e Kremli n hope d fo r a quic k conferenc e leading t o a concis e endorsemen t o f th e inviolabilit y o f frontier s (mean ing the permanent divisio n o f Germany ) an d th e political impermeabilit y of Easter n Europe . The West , o n th e othe r hand , wante d t o preserve th e possibility o f peacefu l chang e an d politica l evolutio n i n th e Sovie t sphere , the Wes t European s bein g particularl y kee n t o consolidat e detent e b y the normalizatio n o f relation s i n al l spheres . Arguably, th e fundamenta l conflict wa s ove r th e legitimac y an d immutabilit y o f th e Brezhne v Doc trine. The grea t achievemen t o f th e CSC E wa s t o firmly entrenc h huma n rights o n th e internationa l diplomati c agenda , thereb y subvertin g tradi tional notion s o f sovereignty . Thi s achievemen t di d no t com e easily. Th e Soviet Union , thoug h read y t o rais e huma n right s issue s whe n i t suite d its interests , notabl y i n Sout h Africa , fough t vigorousl y agains t thi s tendency, extendin g th e principl e o f noninterventio n (whic h denote s aggression) t o noninterferenc e i n the domestic affair s o f sovereig n states . In th e initia l debate s o n principles , th e Sovie t delegat e argue d tha t hu man right s wer e no t relevan t t o interstat e relation s an d tha t self-deter mination wa s no t a n issu e i n Europe. 19 Th e Warsa w Pac t positio n wa s that socia l justic e forme d th e basi s o f individua l freedom , tha t thes e matters wer e wholl y withi n domesti c jurisdiction , an d tha t communica tion an d contac t acros s border s wer e dependen t o n th e foreig n polic y interests o f states . It wa s no t th e Unite d States , wit h th e oldes t traditio n o f idealis m i n foreign policy , tha t introduce d th e cas e fo r linkin g individua l right s an d the free r movemen t o f peopl e an d idea s t o internationa l securit y i n th e CSCE, bu t Franc e an d Italy . I n Washington , a damage-limitin g strateg y overshadowed th e potentialit y o f huma n right s advocacy . Kissinge r questioned th e utilit y o f makin g progres s i n detent e contingen t o n do mestic refor m i n th e Sovie t sphere. 20 B y default, then , i t wa s mainl y th e

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European Communit y member s wh o develope d an d promote d th e pro posals o n easie r huma n contact s an d free r flow o f informatio n (know n in CSCE lingo a s "Basket Three" proposals; the issues under negotiatio n at th e CSC E wer e groupe d int o thre e "baskets, " wit h th e first tw o encompassing securit y an d economi c matter s respectively) , whil e th e Americans urge d cautio n an d "greate r realism." 21 Apart fro m th e questio n o f inviolabilit y o f frontiers , wit h it s implica tions fo r th e Germa n problem , huma n right s prove d th e mos t trouble some. 22 Th e requiremen t o f unanimit y mad e fo r protracte d semanti c debate; i t too k a subcommitte e fifty-six sitting s ove r thre e month s t o reach a lowes t commo n denominato r formulatio n o f huma n rights . Th e Soviets countere d Wester n pressur e o n huma n right s b y stressin g th e principle o f noninterventio n i n interna l affairs . The y als o tried , unsuc cessfully, t o rende r Baske t Thre e commitment s virtuall y meaningles s b y subordinating them to the "laws and custom s of the participating states." 23 The Warsa w Pac t strateg y wa s t o g o fo r broa d rathe r tha n detaile d directives, fo r institutiona l cooperatio n rathe r tha n individua l contacts , and fo r facilitatin g onl y communicatio n tha t "strengthen s peac e an d security." 24 Bu t externa l development s reinforce d th e ne w salienc e o f human rights . O n Septembe r 17 , 197 3 th e Unite d State s Senat e unani mously passe d a resolutio n invokin g th e Universa l Declaratio n o f Hu man Right s an d callin g on Moscow t o allow fre e circulatio n o f ideas an d emigration. In th e Sovie t Union , leadin g dissident s Alexande r Solzheni tsyn an d Andre i Sakharo v issue d publi c plea s fo r intellectua l freedom . The relativ e mildnes s o f th e sanctio n (arres t an d expulsion ) agains t Solzhenitsyn i n February 197 4 was perhaps attributabl e t o the CSCE . Initially, Kissinge r remaine d aloo f fro m th e CSCE , and th e America n delegation trie d t o avoi d a confrontatio n wit h th e Soviet s tha t migh t draw th e secretar y o f stat e int o tha t diplomati c arena . Bu t a s Unite d States-Soviet relation s too k a tur n fo r th e wors e an d domesti c hostilit y to th e CSC E grew , Kissinge r too k th e lea d i n pressin g th e West' s case . His intervention s wit h Sovie t foreig n ministe r Andre i Gromyk o i n Feb ruary 197 5 i n Genev a an d i n Ma y i n Vienn a helpe d t o brea k impasse s over th e inviolabilit y o f frontier s an d provisio n fo r peacefu l change , a s well a s th e huma n contact s an d informatio n section s o f Baske t Three . The Soviet s wer e i n a hurr y t o en d th e conference , an d a trade-of f i n compromises ove r Baskets One and Three allowe d the CSCE to conclud e with th e ceremonia l signin g of th e Final Act on Augus t 1 , 1975 .

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The Helsinki Final Act. Th e Fina l Act , characterize d b y Poland' s Ed ward Giere k a s the "Magn a Cart a o f inter-Europea n relations, " di d no t have th e bindin g forc e o f a treaty. 25 I t represented , rather , a minima l diplomatic compromis e o n th e desirabl e parameter s o f relation s amon g the participants . Th e nee d fo r consensu s ha d produce d artfull y vagu e and ofte n ambiguou s formulation s tha t invite d selectiv e emphasi s an d interpretation. Th e Declaratio n o n Principle s enjoine d th e signatorie s t o "respect eac h other' s righ t freel y t o choos e an d develo p it s political , social, economi c an d cultura l systems. " Principl e VI I invite d respec t fo r "human right s an d fundamenta l freedoms , includin g th e freedo m o f thought, conscience , religion o r belief"; th e signatories, it went on , "wil l promote an d encourag e th e effectiv e exercis e o f civil , political , eco nomic, social , cultural an d othe r right s an d freedom s al l of whic h deriv e from th e inheren t dignit y o f th e huma n perso n an d ar e essentia l fo r hi s free an d ful l development, " an d "confir m th e righ t o f th e individua l t o know an d ac t upon hi s rights an d dutie s in this field." The issue of minority right s had divide d bot h Eas t and West , resultin g in anodyn e statement s o f th e righ t o f nationa l minoritie s t o equalit y before th e la w an d th e recommendatio n (i n Baske t Three ) tha t thei r cultural contributio n t o internationa l cooperatio n b e facilitated . Baske t Three als o provided fo r "cooperatio n i n humanitarian an d othe r fields." The recommende d practices—facilitatio n o f travel , famil y reunification , freedom o f information , bette r workin g condition s fo r journalists , dis semination o f foreig n cultura l products—lai d th e greates t burde n o f adaptation o n th e socialis t states . The reiteratio n o f conventiona l huma n right s principle s wa s les s sig nificant tha n th e provisio n tha t th e signatorie s "endeavo r jointl y an d separately . . . t o promote universa l an d effectiv e respec t fo r them. " Th e message wa s clear : th e right s o f individua l citizen s wer e n o longe r a purely domesti c politica l matte r bu t als o a vali d issu e o f internationa l relations linke d t o security . Thus , th e Fina l Ac t wen t wel l beyon d th e exhortation o f th e U N Declaratio n i n legitimatin g externa l scrutin y o f national huma n right s practices . The conversio n o f th e CSC E int o a n ongoin g "process " offere d a framework fo r suc h scrutiny . Originall y th e Warsaw Pac t ha d envisage d the creatio n o f a permanen t advisor y bod y t o institutionaliz e pan-Euro pean consultatio n o n securit y matters , a n ide a tha t arouse d n o enthusi asm i n th e West . Bu t a s huma n right s an d fre e movemen t o f peopl e

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became issue s centra l t o th e CSCE , the positions wer e reversed, wit h th e Soviet Unio n hostil e t o an d th e Wes t mor e supportiv e o f a permanen t forum t o follo w u p o n implementatio n o f th e Fina l Act . Significantly , some of th e smalle r Warsa w Pac t countries—especiall y Romania—wel comed th e presumption o f autonom y bestowe d upo n the m b y the CSC E and wer e les s hostil e tha n th e Sovie t Unio n t o a follow-u p proces s tha t would enhanc e thei r imag e a s independen t states . The y woul d no t hav e welcomed th e prospect o f international scrutin y o f their domesti c huma n rights conduct . Ye t th e continuin g multilatera l revie w finally agree d t o was destined t o greatly enhanc e th e prominence o f human right s in East West relations . President For d observe d a t th e signin g o f th e Fina l Ac t tha t histor y would judg e th e CSC E no t b y th e promise s mad e bu t b y th e promise s kept. Fe w anticipate d th e enormou s impac t tha t i t woul d hav e o n th e process an d substanc e o f East-Wes t relations . Th e low-leve l styl e o f negotiation tha t characterize d mos t o f th e CSC E had perhap s facilitate d Soviet verbal concession s o n huma n rights , bu t i t als o faile d t o dra w th e attention o f th e mas s medi a an d th e public . Muc h t o Moscow' s delight , the prevalen t judgmen t i n th e West , reminiscen t o f th e Yalt a myth , wa s that th e Sovie t Unio n ha d wo n o n point s b y securin g solem n confirma tion o f th e politica l statu s qu o i n Europe . "N o journe y I mad e dur ing m y Presidenc y wa s s o widel y misunderstood, " recall s For d i n hi s memoirs. 26 In fact , th e Wes t ha d concede d nothin g i n th e affirmatio n o f th e inviolability o f frontiers , regardles s o f th e cosmeti c claus e o n peacefu l change. The fe w wh o too k th e trouble t o rea d th e Final Act realized tha t the diplomati c wal l behin d whic h socialis t regime s freel y violate d politi cal an d civi l right s ha d bee n breached , an d tha t th e libera l principl e o f individual libertie s ha d gaine d a t th e expens e o f th e socialis t premis e o f collective rights . The perceptio n tha t th e CSC E reflecte d taci t America n acquiescenc e in Sovie t hegemon y ove r Easter n Europ e an d a passiv e approac h t o human right s i n th e regio n wa s unwittingl y reinforce d i n the las t year o f the For d administration , notabl y i n th e fla p ove r th e mythica l "Sonnen feldt Doctrine " (se e chapte r 3) . T o b e sure , th e Kissinge r versio n o f differentiation stresse d foreig n polic y deviatio n an d no t huma n rights . This perceptio n wa s inadvertentl y reinforce d b y For d i n hi s electio n debate i n Octobe r 1976 , whe n h e affirme d tha t ther e wa s n o Sovie t

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domination o f Easter n Europe . Retorte d Jimm y Carter : " I woul d lik e t o see Mr . For d convinc e th e Polish-American s an d th e Czech-American s and th e Hungarian-American s i n thi s countr y tha t thos e countrie s don' t live unde r th e dominatio n an d th e supervisio n o f th e Sovie t Unio n behind the Iron Curtain. " 27 What For d mean t was that the United State s treated th e Eas t Europea n regime s a s sovereig n i n orde r t o encourag e them t o becom e mor e independent , bu t h e manage d t o soun d legalisti c and politicall y naive . I n th e event , th e geni e o f huma n right s ha d bee n let ou t o f it s diplomati c bottle , an d a s detent e wane d th e Unite d State s was draw n int o a moral crusad e whose tim e had come . Domestic Battle over the Radio Services. Ironically , th e most tangibl e and sustaine d manifestatio n o f America' s commitmen t t o huma n right s in Easter n Europ e almos t faile d t o surviv e int o th e Helsink i era . Afte r the traum a o f 1956 , Radi o Fre e Europe wa s recas t int o a less propagan distic medium , wit h emphasi s o n professionalis m i n new s an d research . What a forme r directo r calle d th e "romantic-heroi c period " wa s over , but RFE , stylin g itsel f a surrogat e hom e servic e fo r th e Eas t Europeans , continued t o serv e a s a condui t fo r accurat e informatio n an d varie d opinion tha t wer e lacking in the official an d exclusiv e media. 28 Althoug h article 1 9 o f th e U N Declaratio n o f Huma n Right s enshrine d th e righ t "to receiv e an d impar t informatio n an d idea s through an y media regard less o f frontier, " th e Sovie t an d Eas t Europea n government s ceaselessl y denounced Radi o Libert y an d Radi o Fre e Europ e a s threat s t o peace . They brok e internationa l convention s b y systemati c (thoug h no t offi cially acknowledged ) jamming , bot h groun d wav e an d sk y wave , a t a cost tha t surpasse d tha t o f th e radios . Jamming o f othe r Wester n radio s such a s th e VO A an d th e BB C wa s relaxed , the n reimpose d afte r th e invasion o f Czechoslovakia . Hungar y an d Romani a suspende d jammin g in the 1960s , although a t least in the case of the latter listening to foreig n broadcasts remaine d a punishabl e offense . Th e electroni c curtai n wa s less effectiv e i n rura l area s an d i n th e perio d o f atmospheri c "twiligh t immunity," an d Radi o Fre e Europ e continue d t o reac h a n audienc e o f some thirty million . In Februar y 1967 , Ramparts magazin e disclose d tha t fro m it s incep tion, RF E ha d bee n financed b y th e CIA , th e mone y bein g channele d through dumm y an d legitimat e foundation s t o th e Nationa l Securit y Agency. Althoug h Presiden t Johnson ha d som e doubt s abou t th e radios '

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effectiveness, th e administratio n wa s no t prepare d t o liquidat e them . A special committe e chaire d b y Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e Nichola s Katzen bach conclude d tha t th e radio s continue d t o serv e Unite d State s foreig n policy interests . Genera l Luciu s Cla y wa s brough t bac k t o hea d th e Fre e Europe Committe e whil e CI A Directo r Richar d Helm s struggle d t o con vince the responsibl e congressiona l committee s tha t i f the radios ' privat e status wa s a deception , the y wer e nevertheles s "governmen t proprietar ies" eligible fo r cover t CI A funding. 29 The cover-u p wa s initiall y successful , bu t i n Januar y 1971 , Senato r Clifford Cas e mad e th e revelatio n officia l an d denounce d th e deceptio n of Congress , o f America n taxpayers , an d o f th e donor s t o th e erstwhil e Crusade fo r Freedom . Th e rea l leade r o f th e attac k wa s Senato r Willia m J. Fulbright , wh o characterize d th e radio s a s "outwor n relic s of th e col d war" an d seeme d obsessivel y inten t o n shuttin g the m down . A pro tracted battl e ensue d involvin g supporter s an d detractor s i n Congres s a s well a s th e administration . A reluctan t Stat e Departmen t assume d tem porary guardianship , an d emergenc y fundin g kep t th e radio s aliv e whil e alternative administrativ e an d financing scenario s wer e debate d an d President Nixo n appointe d a stud y commission , chaire d b y Milto n S . Eisenhower, t o repor t b y Februar y 28 , 1973 . Fulbright' s nex t spoilin g tactic wa s t o deman d Wes t Europea n contributions . Whil e th e radio s had som e taci t suppor t amon g th e allies , the y wer e no t abou t t o hel p finance them . The Eisenhowe r Commissio n conclude d tha t "th e broadcast s o f Ra dio Fre e Europ e an d Radi o Libert y ha d no t deterre d bu t rathe r con tributed t o th e searc h fo r long-ter m detente. " Nonetheless , ther e re mained th e questio n o f ensurin g tha t th e radio s woul d operat e "i n a manner no t inconsisten t wit h broa d Unite d State s foreig n policy." 30 The hypothetica l optio n o f allie d cosponsorship , wit h th e consequen t multiple accountability , entaile d risk s fo r th e radios ' professiona l inde pendence an d wa s rejected . Th e commissio n recommende d federa l financing b y annua l congressiona l appropriation s channelle d throug h a new, quasi-governmenta l agency—th e Boar d fo r Internationa l Broad casting, appointe d b y th e president—tha t woul d exercis e oversigh t bu t free th e radio s fro m direc t government control . This was dul y enacted i n Public La w 93-12 9 o n Octobe r 19 , 1973 . Presiden t Carter' s huma n rights crusad e encompasse d fre e flo w o f information , an d hi s repor t o n international broadcasting , submitte d t o Congres s March 22 , 1977 , con-

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firmed th e value o f RF E and R L (a s well a s the VOA) an d recommende d new transmitters. 31 Th e radio s wer e compelle d t o tri m budget s an d consolidate thei r Munic h operations , bu t thei r broadcastin g an d re search remaine d invaluabl e an d fa r ou t o f proportio n t o thei r modes t cost. Radio Fre e Europ e an d Radi o Libert y remaine d a prim e targe t o f Warsaw Pac t invective , an d th e bes t tha t th e Wes t coul d secur e a t th e CSCE was a n ambiguou s provisio n i n Baske t II I that ha d th e signatorie s "note th e expansio n i n th e disseminatio n o f informatio n broadcas t b y radio, an d expres s th e hop e fo r th e continuatio n o f thi s process, so a s t o meet th e interes t o f mutua l understandin g amon g people s an d th e aim s set fort h b y thi s Conference. " A t th e Madri d follow-u p meeting , th e Warsaw Pac t interprete d th e "s o a s t o meet " claus e t o allo w jamming , while the West argued tha t i t expressed th e purpose o f expandin g broad casts. 32 Congress and Human Rights. Th e RF E financing crisi s had mor e t o d o with politica l vendetta s an d congressiona l prerogative s tha n wit h East ern Europe . Congres s ha d maintaine d a watchin g brie f ove r th e satellit e countries reachin g bac k t o th e Kerste n amendmen t o f th e earl y 1950 s and th e obstructio n o f trad e liberalizatio n i n th e followin g decade . Congressional initiative s an d th e Carte r administration' s effort s i n th e mid-1970s gav e huma n right s unprecedente d prominenc e i n Unite d State s foreign polic y an d provoke d domesti c an d diplomati c controvers y re garding philosoph y a s wel l a s practice . Th e principa l motiv e forc e o f American involvemen t i n Europ e fo r ove r a centur y wa s give n a ne w lease o n life . Th e mas s media , publi c opinion , an d nongovernmenta l organizations cam e to b e possessed b y a moral fervo r rar e in peacetime . Thanks t o the activism o f conservativ e Republican s an d Democrat s o f the conservative, Henry M. "Scoop " Jackson wing , human right s consid erations wer e repeatedl y impose d o n foreig n polic y i n th e Helsink i era . Congressional amendment s prohibite d securit y an d economi c assistanc e to huma n right s violators . Th e essentia l huma n righ t o f emigratio n wa s the inspiration , an d th e Sovie t blo c th e target , fo r th e Jackson-Vani k amendment (sectio n 402 of the 197 4 Trade Act), which prohibited most favored-nation tarif f statu s an d credit s fo r "nonmarke t economy " coun tries tha t unreasonabl y restricte d thi s right. 33 (Th e implementatio n an d impact o f thes e restrictiv e measure s wil l b e considere d belo w an d i n

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chapter 5) . Administrations generall y regarde d congressiona l huma n right s initiatives a s a n unwelcom e intrusio n int o area s o f executiv e responsi bility. Of mor e profoun d an d endurin g consequenc e fo r th e substanc e an d conduct o f policy towar d Easter n Europ e was the innocuous initiativ e of a Republica n congresswoma n fro m Ne w Jersey , Millicen t Fenwick . Sh e had toure d th e Sovie t Unio n wit h a congressiona l delegatio n shortl y after th e Helsink i accor d an d ha d bee n move d b y th e plea s o f dissident s for sustaine d Wester n pressur e o n huma n rights . I n Ma y 1976 , sh e introduced a bill for th e creation o f a commission t o monitor complianc e with th e Fina l Ac t tha t woul d "embod y thos e principle s whic h hav e distinguished thi s Natio n abov e al l others : ou r respec t fo r huma n dig nity, th e importanc e o f th e individua l an d th e freedo m t o pursu e one' s own thought s an d belief s an d religion." 34 Th e commissio n wa s t o b e a n independent advisor y agenc y consistin g o f a n equa l numbe r o f member s from eac h legislative chamber a s well a s executive nominees representin g the Department s o f State , Defense, an d Commerce . With th e suppor t o f Senators Claiborn e Pel l an d Cliffor d P . Case , th e bil l passe d an d wa s signed int o la w (Publi c La w 94-304 ) withou t publicit y b y Presiden t Ford o n June 3 , 1976 . There wa s stron g resistanc e i n th e For d administratio n t o thi s exten sion o f Congress' s constitutiona l righ t o f oversigh t int o wha t promise d to b e ongoin g involvemen t i n th e conduc t o f foreig n policy . Th e Stat e Department reporte d tha t it s procedure s fo r report s o n implementatio n and complianc e with the Final Act were sufficient, a s was the monitorin g provided b y existin g congressiona l committee s an d subcommittees . Th e Commission's first chairman , Congressma n Dant e Fascel l (D-Fla. ) wa s soon complainin g abou t th e secretar y o f state' s uncooperativ e attitude . He charge d i n Novembe r 197 6 tha t Kissinge r an d th e Soviet s wer e colluding t o tr y t o preven t a visi t b y commissio n member s t o th e Sovie t bloc. 35 Despite thes e unpropitiou s beginnings , th e Commissio n o n Securit y and Cooperatio n i n Europe , commonly know n a s the Helsink i Commis sion, soon becam e a leading forc e i n the institutionalization o f th e CSC E process an d th e public diplomac y o f huma n rights . The popularit y o f it s mandate attracte d energeti c politician s a s well a s a n exper t staff . Throug h its frequen t hearing s wit h officials , scholars , interes t groups , an d Eas t European dissidents , an d throug h it s direc t participatio n i n th e CSC E

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review conferences , th e Helsink i Commissio n acquire d a credibilit y an d authority tha t perhap s justifie d th e fear s o f traditiona l diplomatist s bu t at th e sam e tim e represente d a quintessentiall y America n manifestatio n of idealis m i n foreign policy . Carter and Human Rights. Th e Helsink i Commissio n di d benefi t indi rectly fro m th e Carte r administration' s storm y romanc e wit h huma n rights. This was a cause that appeale d t o the conservativ e Scoo p Jackso n wing a s wel l a s th e libera l Georg e McGover n win g o f th e Democrati c party, an d tha t suite d Jimm y Carter' s mora l impulse . I n th e campaign , human right s serve d a s th e centra l them e o f a foreig n polic y approac h distinct fro m tha t o f Nixo n an d Kissinger . Unlike Ford , declare d Carter , he would invit e Alexander Solzhenitsy n t o the White House. Encourage d by the American public' s positive response , Carte r stresse d huma n right s in hi s inaugura l address . Th e mor e pragmati c expectation , recall s hi s national securit y adviser , Zbignie w Brzezinski , wa s tha t huma n right s policy would "sustai n domesti c suppor t fo r ou r policie s b y rooting the m clearly i n ou r mora l values." 36 But , a s had bee n th e cas e with liberatio n twenty-four year s earlier , i t wa s easie r t o proclai m a principl e tha t t o turn i t into a n operationa l policy . It soo n becam e apparen t tha t Communis t regime s woul d no t b e th e primary target . Joshu a Muravchik , a Scoo p Jackso n Democra t an d au thor o f th e mos t thoroug h analysi s o f th e issue, records that "th e foreig n policy tea m o f th e Carte r administratio n include d a networ k o f individ uals i n ke y position s affectin g huma n right s polic y wh o share d a 'Mc Governite' o r 'left-liberal ' worldvie w an d whos e huma n right s passion s were focuse d o n th e depredation s o f rightis t regimes . It included n o one , at leas t amon g it s politica l appointees , wh o share d th e 'Jacksonite ' worldview an d whos e huma n right s passion s wer e directed t o the act s of Communist governments." 37 T o b e sure , Brzezinsk i himsel f sa w i n hu man right s "a n opportunit y t o pu t th e Sovie t Unio n ideologicall y o n th e defensive," bu t t o hi s disappointmen t thi s priorit y wa s no t share d b y either the administration's huma n right s activist s o r b y Secretary o f Stat e Cyrus Vance. 38 There wa s n o deart h o f criticis m o f Communis t huma n right s prac tices i n th e earl y day s o f th e Carte r administration . Th e Stat e Depart ment denounce d th e reprisal s agains t Czec h dissident s wh o i n Januar y 1977 ha d issue d th e "Charte r 77 " appea l fo r implementatio n o f th e

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Helsinki huma n right s provisions . Simila r reprisal s i n th e Sovie t Unio n drove Andre i Sakharo v t o invit e Carter' s support . Th e president' s mea sured response , drafte d b y Vanc e an d Brzezinski , ma y hav e brough t spiritual comfor t t o Sovie t dissidents , bu t thei r harassmen t continued. 39 After muc h hesitation , Carte r o n Februar y 2 9 receive d th e exile d Sovie t dissident Vladimir Bukovsk y bu t kep t photographers a t bay. The ambiv alence had t o d o wit h domesti c a s well a s international politics . In orde r to mak e progres s o n SAL T II , th e administratio n ha d t o satisf y bot h Brezhnev, wh o wa s furiou s a t th e huma n right s campaign , an d th e Senate, wher e huma n right s concern s an d hostilit y t o arm s deal s wit h the Soviet s ran strong . By mid-1977 , afte r a n acrimoniou s meetin g betwee n Vanc e an d Brezhnev, th e Carte r administratio n ha d tone d dow n it s pursui t o f hu man right s i n th e East : agreemen t o n SAL T wa s no t t o b e jeopardized . Criticism o f violation s continued , bu t th e administratio n preferre d t o avoid direc t attributio n o f th e abuse s t o totalitaria n ideology . "Ol d ideological label s hav e los t thei r meaning, " declare d Carte r expansivel y when h e me t Giere k i n Warsa w i n Decembe r 1977. 40 Though eage r fo r more America n aid , his hosts disabuse d hi m o f thi s hopeful assumption . The Carte r administration' s prioritie s i n huma n right s wer e soo n adapted t o a calculatio n o f interes t an d leverag e tha t focuse d o n th e non-communist world . I n a n addres s a t th e Universit y o f Georgi a o n April 30 , 1977 , Secretar y Vanc e offere d th e ne w an d authoritativ e defi nition o f huma n rights . First came the right to b e "free fro m governmen tal violatio n o f th e integrit y o f th e person, " fro m arbitrar y arres t an d torture; second , th e satisfactio n o f economi c an d socia l needs ; an d last , the right to enjoy civi l and politica l liberties. The ordering was deliberat e and consistentl y reiterated. 41 It was designed to appeal to the third worl d and t o addres s principall y th e bruta l practice s o f right-win g dictator ships. A s Muravchi k observes , "integrit y o f th e person " i s mor e a cate gory o f violation s tha n o f rights ; implicitl y thi s priorit y pai d tribut e t o the capacit y o f establishe d totalitaria n regime s t o den y fundamenta l rights with onl y a modicum o f over t violence agains t th e individual. 42 In an Easter n Europ e cowe d b y th e experienc e o f Stalinis t terror , onl y a few wer e willin g t o ris k arbitrar y arres t an d imprisonmen t i n pursui t o f political an d civi l rights . Th e administration' s bia s wa s deplore d b y Brzezinski, who blame d th e Stat e Department . H e complaine d t o Carte r that "ou r human-right s polic y wa s i n dange r o f becomin g one-sidedl y

Human Rights 111 anti-rightist," bu t i n pursuin g SAL T an d courtin g th e Chines e an d th e Romanian regimes , he followed a realpolitik worth y o f Kissinger. 43 There was , therefore , som e forc e i n Jean e Kirkpatrick' s charg e tha t the effec t o f Carter' s prioritie s wa s t o favo r th e Communis t enem y ove r the authoritaria n friend. 44 Th e fac t tha t th e denia l o f civi l an d politica l rights wa s inheren t i n Leninis m wa s glosse d ove r i n th e Carte r crusade . This ideologica l relativis m an d th e gradua l mutin g o f criticis m o f Sovie t and Eas t Europea n violation s di d no t fai l t o disappoin t Eas t European s who ha d expecte d muc h fro m th e coincidenc e o f Carte r an d Helsinki . To b e sure , America's leverag e upo n huma n right s i n Easter n Europ e remained minimal , and advocate s o f quie t diplomacy coul d alway s poin t to Kissinger' s succes s i n inducin g Mosco w t o facilitat e Jewis h emigra tion. Th e Jackson-Vani k amendmen t arguabl y ha d bee n temporaril y counterproductive i n thi s respect , althoug h i t di d induc e som e improve ment i n Romania n emigratio n practices . Moreover, othe r consideration s tended t o overrid e huma n right s wher e potentia l leverag e existed . Th e United State s invariabl y supporte d multilatera l ai d fo r Romani a an d Yugoslavia. Neithe r ha d a shining human right s record o r mor e pressin g "basic huma n needs " (th e escap e claus e i n sectio n 70 1 o f th e Interna tional Financia l Assistanc e Act ) tha n non-Communis t countrie s tha t earned a negativ e vote , bu t bot h ha d contribute d t o a mor e o r les s tangible fragmentatio n o f th e Sovie t empire . Politica l pragmatis m of fered les s justificatio n fo r th e fulsom e prais e heape d upo n Tit o an d Ceausescu o n th e occasio n o f thei r visit s t o th e Unite d State s i n th e spring o f 1978 , whe n Presiden t Carte r laude d bot h leader s fo r thei r dedication t o human rights. 45 Human Rights Monitoring and the Belgrade Review. B y the middl e o f the 1970 s a n extensiv e networ k fo r th e scrutin y o f huma n right s ha d emerged. Th e Harki n amendmen t t o th e Foreig n Assistanc e Ac t ha d mandated th e Stat e Departmen t t o produc e annua l report s o n huma n rights practices . In 1976 , Congres s extende d thi s requiremen t t o cove r all U N members , no t jus t Unite d State s ai d recipients , an d legislate d th e establishment o f a coordinato r fo r huma n right s an d humanitaria n af fairs a t th e Stat e Department . Th e followin g year , a t th e urgin g o f th e Helsinki Commission' s chairman , th e office wa s expande d int o a burea u headed b y an assistan t secretary . The la w establishin g the commissio n require d th e president t o submi t

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semiannual report s (Implementatio n o f Helsink i Fina l Act ) o n CSC E compliance b y th e Warsa w Pac t signatories . Th e Stat e Department , no t without complainin g abou t th e burden , assigne d a n office r i n eac h em bassy t o repor t o n huma n rights . On e result , observe d th e assistan t secretary fo r huma n right s an d humanitaria n affairs , Richar d Schifter , was th e sensitizatio n o f th e entir e bureaucrac y t o huma n right s issues. 46 The situatio n i n Easter n Europ e wa s als o addresse d i n th e Helsink i Commission's publishe d hearing s an d it s CSCE Digest, i n th e Nort h Atlantic Assembly's quarterl y Bulletin , a s well a s in the publications an d lobbying o f numerou s nongovernmenta l organization s suc h a s th e Ne w York-based Helsink i Watc h an d th e London-base d Amnest y Interna tional. 47 This proliferatin g monitorin g industr y constitute d a internationa l lobb y that undoubtedl y promote d publi c awareness o f huma n right s violation s and exerte d som e salutar y pressur e o n th e violator s a s wel l a s Wester n policymakers. Eas t Europea n dissident s value d th e mora l support , an d in som e case s th e publicit y reinforce d quie t diplomac y t o dete r o r alle viate reprisal s agains t them . Admittedly , positiv e result s wer e mostl y achieved i n countrie s wit h relativel y toleran t regime s o r wher e th e Unite d States ha d som e economi c leverage , notabl y Poland , Hungary , an d Ro mania. Bu t eve n i f th e immediat e an d tangibl e benefit s wer e few , th e advocacy effort s pu t Communis t regime s o n th e defensiv e an d raise d both th e domesti c an d internationa l cos t of violation an d denial . After a preparatory meetin g fro m Jun e 1 5 to Augus t 5 , 1977 , the first CSCE revie w conferenc e wa s convene d a t Belgrad e o n Octobe r 4 , onl y to disban d five month s late r wit h littl e accomplishe d bu t th e airin g o f acrimony an d agreemen t o n furthe r meetings . Brzezinski record s tha t h e "pushed har d an d I believe effectivel y fo r a more assertiv e Unite d State s posture i n CSCE " an d "horrified " th e Stat e Departmen t b y considerin g a "confrontationis t approach." 48 Th e Stat e Department' s preferenc e fo r low-keyed an d balance d negotiatio n wa s als o oppose d b y th e Helsink i Commission, whic h demande d th e additio n t o th e Unite d State s delega tion o f commissio n member s an d othe r publi c figures. The Wes t Europeans , alread y skeptica l abou t th e thrus t an d conduc t of Carter' s huma n right s crusade , di d no t welcom e th e prospec t o f a confrontational approach . Th e Wes t German s wer e particularl y appre hensive that thei r improve d relation s with th e East might be jeopardized . The Eas t German s warne d tha t Baske t Thre e wa s no t " a licens e t o

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undermine th e socialis t countrie s ideologically " whil e insistin g tha t th e objective ideologica l clas s struggl e wa s inevitable . The y stresse d th e primary rol e o f th e stat e i n implementin g th e objective s o f Baske t Thre e and asserte d tha t "th e disseminatio n o f idea s endangerin g peac e a s par t of th e exchang e o f cultura l an d spiritua l value s an d informatio n wa s expressly prohibited, " a referenc e t o wha t wer e identifie d furthe r o n a s "subversive radi o stations. " Th e genera l Warsa w Pac t positio n wa s reflected i n th e claim s tha t th e Eas t ha d th e superio r recor d i n imple menting economi c an d socia l right s an d tha t "citizen s o f th e socialis t countries ar e muc h bette r informe d o n politica l an d cultura l lif e i n th e West than vic e versa." 49 At th e preparator y talks , th e Unite d State s delegatio n maintaine d a low profile whil e th e West European s presse d fo r procedure s tha t woul d allow mor e publi c session s an d a ful l revie w o f implementation . Bu t a more aggressiv e American stanc e was foreshadowe d b y the appointmen t of a forme r Suprem e Cour t justic e an d U N ambassador , Arthu r Gold berg, t o lea d t o th e revie w conferenc e a delegatio n tha t include d publi c members a s wel l a s professiona l diplomats . No r wa s ther e an y sig n o f mellowing i n th e East . Undeterre d b y th e impendin g review , th e Sovie t authorities arreste d eleve n member s o f th e Mosco w Helsink i Watc h Group; i n Czechoslovakia , severa l Charte r 7 7 founder s wer e arreste d and pu t o n trial . After heate d debat e in the NATO caucus , the Europea n and America n position s wer e reconciled , an d i n a serie s o f speeche s Goldberg castigate d th e Communist s fo r thei r huma n right s record . Th e Soviet Unio n trie d t o argu e tha t eac h countr y wa s responsibl e fo r moni toring it s ow n compliance , an d t o invok e th e principl e o f noninterfer ence, which Goldber g argued referre d t o compulsion an d no t persuasion . By retaliating i n criticis m o f Wester n huma n right s practices , th e Sovie t Union i n effect concede d th e legitimac y o f th e exercise . The verba l violenc e o f th e Soviet-America n confrontatio n mad e th e front page s an d cause d som e uneas e i n Wester n Europe . I t als o straine d the solidarit y o f th e Warsa w Pact , fo r Hungar y an d Polan d reportedl y argued fo r moderatio n whil e Romani a simpl y skippe d man y blo c cau cuses. 50 The Belgrad e conferenc e rewarde d huma n right s advocate s wit h a publi c condemnatio n o f th e Sovie t bloc , bu t i t faile d t o advanc e th e CSCE process. The brie f final communiqu e mad e n o referenc e t o huma n rights bu t simpl y calle d fo r thre e experts ' meeting s followe d b y anothe r review a t Madrid . Alber t W . Sherer , Jr., a caree r diploma t wh o ha d le d

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the Unite d State s delegatio n t o th e preparator y talk s onl y t o b e eclipse d at th e forma l meetin g b y Goldberg, reflected wit h som e bitterness o n th e latter's outspoke n self-righteousness , whic h h e construe d a s bein g de signed t o "protec t Carter' s credibilit y o n huma n rights." 51 The choic e o f confrontatio n ove r low-profil e diplomac y owe d muc h to th e president' s sensitivit y t o domesti c politica l concerns , champione d most forcefull y b y the Helsinki Commission . Bu t the American har d lin e at Belgrad e ha d n o direc t negativ e or , fo r tha t matter , positiv e conse quences. Detent e wa s fas t dissipating , an d th e cou p d e grac e wa s soo n to b e administere d b y th e Sovie t invasio n o f Afghanistan . B y th e tim e the nex t revie w meetin g convene d i n Madrid , anothe r administratio n was preparing t o tak e office . Reagan's Crusade for Democracy. Th e Carte r record , an d huma n rights, wer e gris t fo r th e 198 0 presidentia l campaign . Adoptin g Jean e Kirkpatrick's critiqu e o f a moralis m tha t damage d America' s friend s more tha n he r enemie s an d downgrade d th e centralit y o f th e East-Wes t conflict, Ronal d Reaga n initiall y seeme d inten t o n attenuatin g an d re casting officia l huma n right s advocacy . Th e objectiv e wa s no t t o con done violations i n what Reaga n brande d th e "evi l empire," but rathe r t o spare friendl y regimes , howeve r authoritaria n an d repressive . Carter' s apparent doubl e standar d ha d bee n rationalize d a t leas t partly o n ground s of availabl e leverage . Highe r nationa l securit y consideration s wer e in voked i n justificatio n o f th e ne w doubl e standard . In th e event , th e shif t in emphasi s scarcel y altere d America' s approac h t o huma n right s i n Eastern Europe . That huma n right s ha d wo n a soli d politica l constituenc y wa s mad e clear t o Reaga n whe n th e Senat e Foreig n Relation s Committe e refuse d to confir m Ernes t Lefeve r fo r th e pos t o f assistan t secretar y o f stat e fo r human right s an d humanitaria n affairs . Th e reason fo r th e rejection wa s that h e had expresse d reservation s abou t makin g humanitarian concern s the focu s o f foreig n policy . While many—in th e Congres s an d elsewher e —believed tha t Carter' s practic e ha d bee n flawed, fe w wer e prepared t o surrender th e principle. By the end o f 198 1 the principle was reaffirmed , notably i n a n interna l Stat e Department memorandu m tha t stated , "Hu man right s i s a t th e cor e o f ou r foreig n policy. " Echoin g Brzezinski , th e memo observe d tha t "w e wil l neve r maintai n wid e publi c suppor t fo r our foreig n polic y unles s w e ca n relat e i t t o America n ideal s an d t o th e

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defense o f freedom. " Huma n right s would "giv e u s the bes t opportunit y to convey what i s ultimately a t issue in our contes t with th e Soviet bloc. " A positiv e effor t t o promot e democrati c value s woul d b e accompanie d by a negativ e polic y towar d violators , differentiate d i n favo r o f Ameri ca's friends. 52 Elliot t Abrams , wh o reportedl y drafte d th e memo , wa s duly appointe d t o th e post lef t vacan t b y Lefever's rejection . The genera l principl e wa s preserved , bu t th e operationa l definitio n o f human right s underwen t significan t alteration . Wherea s th e Carte r ad ministration ha d emphasize d th e ideologicall y neutra l notio n o f th e "integrity o f th e person, " Reaga n reverte d t o th e philosophicall y firmer ground o f politica l an d civi l right s (whos e observanc e woul d safeguar d the integrit y o f th e person) an d linke d the m t o the American traditio n o f democracy throug h limite d government . Th e Reaga n administration' s intent, state d Abrams , wa s t o "trea t no t onl y th e symptom s bu t th e disease." The president, i n his addres s t o the British Hous e o f Common s in June 1982 , denounced Sovie t human right s practices an d promise d t o actively foste r th e "infrastructur e o f democracy." 53 The mos t tangibl e manifestatio n o f Reagan' s ideologica l crusad e wa s the National Endowmen t fo r Democracy , establishe d i n December 1983 . The bipartisa n boar d o f thi s federall y funde d privat e corporatio n in cluded Kissinger , forme r Vic e Presiden t Mondale , AFL-CI O Presiden t Lane Kirkland , an d Helsink i Commissio n chairma n Dant e Fascell ; it s first chairma n wa s a onetim e RF E president , Joh n Richardson , an d it s president a forme r Kirkpatric k aide , Car l Gershman . Th e NE D receive s its federa l fundin g fro m th e Unite d State s Informatio n Agenc y an d dis burses i t mainl y throug h fou r "cor e grantees" : th e AFL-CIO' s Fre e Trade Unio n Institute , the Cente r fo r Privat e Enterpris e o f th e Chambe r of Commerce , an d th e Nationa l Republica n an d Nationa l Democrati c Institutes fo r Internationa l Affairs . The NE D ha s implemente d it s mandat e t o foste r democrac y an d political pluralis m b y subsidizin g independen t labor , business , an d civi c groups, educatio n an d trainin g i n th e practica l organizatio n o f demo cratic politics , an d publishin g b y politica l exile s an d dissidents . Clearly , in many respect s the NED attempte d t o pursue openl y what th e CI A ha d done secretl y fo r man y year s wit h mixe d success . Observe d Gershman , "We shoul d no t hav e t o d o thi s kin d o f wor k covertly . I t woul d b e terrible fo r democrati c group s aroun d th e world t o b e seen a s subsidize d by th e CIA . We sa w tha t i n th e 60's , an d that' s wh y i t ha s bee n discon -

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tinued. W e hav e no t ha d th e capabilit y o f doin g this , an d that' s wh y th e endowment wa s created." 54 The Endowmen t check s wit h th e CI A vi a th e Stat e Departmen t t o ensure tha t potentia l recipient s ar e no t alread y benefitin g fro m othe r United State s aid , an d recipient s kno w th e sourc e o f th e largesse . Still , given th e condition s o f semilegalit y o r eve n illegalit y i n whic h som e NED beneficiaries , suc h a s Solidarity , operate d unti l 1989 , the principl e of ful l opennes s ha d t o b e qualifie d t o protec t the m fro m reprisals . Th e difficulty o f identifyin g viabl e project s lef t Easter n Europ e wit h onl y a modest shar e o f NE D funding . Solidarity' s undergroun d publishin g net work wa s on e majo r recipient ; exil e publication s wer e als o subsidized , and independen t group s i n Hungar y receive d copyin g an d printin g equipment. Romania and Reagan. N o suc h opportunitie s aros e i n retrograd e Ro mania, rule d wit h a n iro n han d b y th e neo-Stalinis t Ceausesc u regime . That regime' s diplomati c departure s fro m Warsa w Pac t orthodoxy , however, ha d earne d i t MF N tarif f statu s a s wel l a s th e endurin g favo r of th e Stat e Department . Unite d States-Romania n trad e surged , thoug h with a n imbalanc e heavil y i n favo r o f th e latter ; i n 1983 , the Commerc e Department estimate d tha t loss of MFN woul d cos t the Romanians $20 0 million i n export s (ou t o f a total o f $34 0 million ) an d America n export ers a similar amount . Fo r th e first six years o f Jackson-Vanik, th e Carte r and Reaga n administration s manage d t o convinc e Congres s tha t th e leverage o f MF N ha d produce d improvemen t a t leas t i n on e are a o f human rights , tha t o f emigration—specificall y th e emigratio n o f Jewis h Romanians. America n Jewis h organization s exerte d sustaine d politica l pressure t o extrac t thi s concession , an d a s lon g a s th e flow o f emigrant s did no t ebb , the y lobbie d i n effec t fo r th e extensio n o f MFN . Fearin g that onc e suspended, MF N woul d neve r b e granted agai n t o Ceausescu' s Romania, th e State Department wa s als o a staunch advocat e o f renewal . By 1982 , economi c a s wel l a s huma n right s problem s threatene d t o upset thi s ostensibl y cordia l relationship . Earl y i n th e year , agains t th e background o f Poland' s deb t disaster, Romania reache d it s own liquidit y crisis an d technicall y defaulte d o n loan s b y United State s financial insti tutions, forcin g th e Export-Impor t Ban k t o mak e goo d o n $ 8 millio n o f unpaid loans . Th e administratio n als o accuse d Romani a o f dumpin g steel o n th e United State s market . Th e persecution o f Christia n activists ,

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a declin e i n Jewis h emigratio n levels , an d continuin g cultura l discrimi nation agains t the two-million-strong Hungaria n minorit y dre w growin g attention fro m th e huma n right s constituenc y i n Washington ; i n Apri l and May , severa l member s o f Congres s jointl y sen t message s o f concer n to Reaga n an d Ceausescu . Th e Romanian s hastil y responde d b y sendin g Foreign Ministe r Stefa n Andre i a s well a s Chie f Rabb i Mose s Rose n an d a parliamentary delegatio n t o lobby o n Capito l Hill . President Reaga n o n Jun e 2 formall y recommende d renewa l o f th e waiver, acknowledgin g tha t th e maximu m numbe r o f emigrant s admis sible t o th e Unite d State s ha d bee n permitte d t o leav e ove r th e previou s twelve month s (overall , Romania n emigratio n ha d grow n fourfol d sinc e 1973), bu t indicate d tha t unles s Romania n emigratio n procedure s im proved h e migh t recommen d otherwis e i n 1983 . Concurrently, th e Stat e Department attempte d t o counte r criticis m b y revealing tha t i t had bee n communicating t o Bucharest American concer n ove r religiou s an d ethni c persecution. 55 Th e Romanians , i n response , quickl y grante d mor e emi gration permits , resolved som e individual humanitaria n cases , amnestie d twenty-seven prisoner s (includin g som e whose crim e had bee n to distrib ute Bibles) , an d promise d t o discus s emigratio n procedure s wit h Ameri can Jewish organizations . A partially mollifie d Congres s voted dow n th e resolutions o f disapproval , bu t a "Sens e of the Senate" resolution passe d on Septembe r 2 4 instructe d th e administratio n t o pursu e th e issu e o f human rights . Six week s later , th e Romania n governmen t decree d tha t would-b e emigrants ha d t o reimburs e th e stat e i n har d currenc y (whic h citizen s were forbidde n t o hold ) fo r th e cos t o f mos t o f thei r education , a prohibitive ta x tha t wa s explicitl y rule d ou t b y Sectio n 40 2 o f th e 197 4 Trade Act. The main recipient s of Romania n immigrants , West German y and Israel , lodge d diplomati c protests , an d th e measur e wa s roundl y condemned a t th e Madri d CSC E follow-u p meeting , bu t Washingto n played fo r time . I n January 1983 , the presiden t dispatche d Unde r Secre tary o f Stat e Lawrence Eagleburge r t o Buchares t t o warn tha t implemen tation o f th e decree , schedule d fo r th e followin g month , woul d mea n suspension o f MFN , an d t o tr y t o wor k ou t a face-savin g compromise . Two month s later , th e presiden t mad e th e threa t public , an d congres sional official s visitin g Romani a confirme d tha t Congres s woul d sustai n a negativ e recommendation. 56 A t the en d o f May , West Germa n Foreig n Minister Hans-Dietric h Gensche r struc k a n apparen t dea l wit h Ceau -

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sescu, securing withdrawal o f the offensive decre e an d promising to hav e Romania's bilatera l deb t rescheduled . Emigratio n level s rose , an d Rea gan recommende d anothe r extensio n o f MFN . Despite Jackson-Vanik' s narro w focu s o n emigration , th e annua l hearings conducte d b y th e Subcommitte e o n Trad e o f th e Hous e Way s and Mean s Committe e an d th e Subcommitte e o n Internationa l Trad e o f the Senat e Financ e Committe e graduall y becam e occasion s fo r genera l human right s reviews . Th e Helsink i Commissio n concerne d itsel f wit h the emigratio n issu e in th e broa d contex t o f huma n rights . Its reports o n CSCE implementation painte d a n increasingly blea k picture of violation s in Romania , a s di d th e president' s semiannua l repor t fo r th e perio d ending Ma y 31 , 1983 , which note d th e "extensiv e harassment " o f reli gious, political , an d cultura l dissidents . Th e regime' s totalitaria n reac h was displaye d i n a decre e requirin g th e licensin g o f al l typewriter s an d registration o f th e typeface . Th e promis e o f suspensio n o f th e emigran t education ta x wa s overshadowe d b y growin g awarenes s o n Capito l Hil l of Romania' s disma l right s record , generatin g suppor t fo r th e ne w dis approval motions . Bu t a coincidenta l Suprem e Cour t rulin g i n th e Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha cas e rendered unconsti tutional a one-house vet o o f executiv e action , th e procedure allowe d fo r in Jackson-Vanik. Now , onl y b y a bill or joint resolution coul d Congres s reject a presidential reques t fo r waiver . Th e rulin g too k th e win d ou t o f the sails of the disapproval motions , and MFN wa s extended fo r anothe r year. 57 For fou r year s more , th e administratio n clun g t o th e belie f that , o n balance, extensio n o f MF N t o Romani a serve d America n interests , al though eac h yea r i t cam e close r t o losin g th e cas e i n Congress . Th e Ceausescu regime' s huma n right s abuse s receive d increasin g interna tional exposure . In particular , th e issu e o f minorit y rights , whic h ha d been studiousl y downplaye d b y th e Stat e Department , ros e i n promi nence, thanks i n part t o th e Hungaria n government' s no w ope n concer n and t o th e lobbyin g activit y o f Hungarian-Americans . Ceausescu' s pri mary tacti c fo r winnin g popula r legitimac y ha d bee n t o wav e th e stan dard o f Romania n nationalism . A s a consequence , th e larg e Hungaria n minority suffered fro m over t an d cover t measure s o f dispersal , discrimi nation, an d cultura l assimilation . Transylvani a historicall y ha d bee n linked t o Hungar y unti l i t wa s awarde d t o Romani a a t th e Versaille s Peace Conference ; Hungaria n irredentis m wa s partiall y satisfie d b y th e

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Vienna Award o f 1940 , but in the postwar settlemen t al l of Transylvani a once agai n reverte d t o Romania . Buchares t wa s therefor e eve r read y t o allege tha t foreig n interes t i n th e minorit y threatene d Romania' s territo rial integrity . The Stat e Department' s vie w remaine d tha t th e ver y limite d influenc e afforded b y MF N ough t no t t o b e jeopardize d b y unrealisti c demands , and i t oppose d a congressiona l initiativ e t o recogniz e th e Transylvania n Hungarians' righ t t o self-determination. 58 Deput y Assistan t Secretar y o f State Thoma s W . Simons , Jr. , tol d th e Helsink i Commissio n o n th e occasion o f it s hearin g o n Eas t Europea n minoritie s i n Ma y 198 7 tha t "we d o no t inten d t o b e draw n int o debate s abou t deepl y roote d histor ical question s whic h stil l provok e dee p emotion s o n al l sides . . . ." H e conceded tha t eve n i f "assimilatio n int o th e majorit y cultur e i s a natura l byproduct o f development , a s i t i s i n th e Unite d State s a s well , ther e i s nevertheless seriou s evidenc e tha t Romania n Governmen t authoritie s today see k activel y t o pus h th e natura l proces s o f assimilatio n forward , in practice , i f no t a s a matte r o f policy." 59 Othe r witnesse s wer e no t s o diplomatically disingenuou s i n comparin g America n an d Romania n practices. The Stat e Departmen t use d huma n right s leverag e a s th e mai n ratio nale fo r extendin g MFN , bu t i t becam e increasingl y difficul t t o sustain . There wa s muc h embarrassmen t a t Stat e i n 198 5 ove r th e scathin g public denunciatio n b y th e retirin g ambassador , Davi d Funderburk , o f Ceausescu's despotis m an d th e administration' s relativ e complacency . He had fough t a running battle with his superiors over what he perceived to b e an unhealth y "convergenc e o f interests " between th e Stat e Depart ment an d th e Romania n regime . A regim e tha t turn s bible s int o toile t paper, observe d Funderbur k i n referenc e t o th e reporte d fat e o f thou sands o f book s donate d fro m th e Wes t t o th e Transylvania n Reforme d Church, doe s no t deserv e MF N status . The leadin g Romania n dissident , Mihai Botez , als o criticize d America' s extraordinar y forbearance. 60 An d even on e o f Funderburk' s targets , Deput y Assistan t Secretar y Mar k Palmer, testifie d befor e th e Helsink i Commissio n i n Jun e 198 5 tha t "Romania is , i n huma n right s terms , certainl y on e o f th e bigges t chal lenges and on e of th e biggest offender s i n Eastern Europe. " 61 Indeed, fa r fro m amelioratin g hi s domestic policies, Ceausescu turne d more repressiv e an d becam e a paria h t o bot h Eas t an d West . B y 1986 , the margi n o f approva l i n th e Hous e o n th e president' s waive r recom -

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mendation ha d narrowe d t o 216-190 . Th e followin g summer , bot h chambers passe d resolution s condemnin g Romani a an d vote d fo r a six month suspensio n o f MF N pendin g presidentia l certificatio n o f progres s on human rights . The Helsinki Commission' s Sten y Hoyer reporte d afte r a visit to Buchares t a t the end o f August tha t "w e receive d n o assurance s from Ceausesc u tha t th e huma n right s situatio n woul d improve." 62 Th e administration wa s read y t o thro w i n th e towel . Seein g th e writin g o n the wall , i n Februar y 198 8 th e Romania n governmen t announce d tha t rather tha n submi t t o furthe r calumn y i t woul d voluntaril y surrende r MFN. The Romania n experienc e offere d littl e satisfactio n t o advocate s o f human rights . Highe r emigratio n ha d bee n induce d b y Jackson-Vanik , though th e bargai n o f emigrant s fo r commercia l favor s and , i n th e cas e of Wes t German y an d Israel , fo r outrigh t ransom , wa s hardl y i n th e spirit o f th e Fina l Act. 63 O n rar e occasions , publicit y an d diplomati c pressure ha d som e effect , suc h a s th e releas e o f th e long-imprisone d priest Gheorgh e Calciu , bu t o n th e whol e th e regim e remaine d imper vious t o America n an d Wester n blandishments . Th e Stat e Departmen t displayed remarkabl e bureaucrati c rigidit y i n clingin g agains t al l evi dence t o a positiv e imag e o f Ceausesc u a s a Warsaw Pac t maverick . T o be sure , h e ha d performe d som e usefu l diplomati c service s i n th e past . There was , perhaps , anothe r reaso n fo r Washington' s lenien t attitude . The Washington Post reporte d i n Ma y 199 0 tha t ove r th e te n year s preceding Ceausescu' s downfall , th e CI A ha d pai d ove r $4 0 millio n t o obtain advance d Sovie t militar y technology , includin g ai r defens e sys tems, fro m Romania . Tw o o f Ceausescu' s brother s wer e involve d i n th e transactions, presumably wit h th e dictator's taci t approval. 64

The Madrid Conference. Despit e it s initia l reservations , th e Reaga n administration too k ful l advantag e o f th e opportunitie s presente d b y th e CSCE process t o prob e th e huma n right s recor d o f Communis t regimes . During hi s electio n campaig n Reaga n ha d questione d it s value , bu t o n the tent h anniversar y o f th e Fina l Ac t h e ignore d th e advic e o f som e hard-line conservative s tha t i n ligh t o f continuin g Sovie t violation s h e should simpl y repudiat e it . As his relationship wit h Gorbache v warmed , he tacticall y an d temporaril y relaxe d th e pressur e fo r Sovie t compli ance. 65 Nevertheless, the linkage of human right s to progress on security -

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related issue s wa s sustaine d t o th e en d o f th e Vienn a follow-u p confer ence. The Belgrad e experienc e ha d mad e th e Sovie t Unio n an d it s allie s wary o f th e Helsink i process , an d durin g th e preparator y phas e o f th e Madrid follow-u p conference , i n the autumn o f 1980 , they tried to bloc k procedural provisio n fo r a thoroug h revie w o f implementation . Thes e tactics, added t o the invasion o f Afghanistan an d recurrin g human right s violations, reinforce d th e resolv e o f th e Wester n participants . A wind o f liberty a s a universa l righ t ha d finally swep t awa y th e West' s Sovie t apologists, an d Thatcher' s Britai n a s well a s Mitterrand's Franc e share d the human right s perceptions o f Reagan' s America . At Madrid, NATO' s united fron t an d it s practice o f regula r consultatio n wit h th e neutra l an d nonaligned participant s (NNa ) resulte d i n procedure s tha t allowe d fo r not onl y a n initia l length y revie w o f complianc e bu t als o subsequen t exposure o f ne w violations . The Carte r Whit e Hous e ha d appointe d a s chairma n o f th e Madri d delegation forme r Attorne y Genera l Griffi n Bell , and as cochairman Ma x M. Kampelman , a Scoop Jackson Democrat ; th e latter becam e chairma n when th e Reaga n administratio n too k office . Th e delegatio n no w in cluded some thirty public members. Congressional hearing s an d Helsink i Commission staf f report s ha d generate d voluminou s informatio n an d advice tha t emphasize d huma n right s an d informe d th e America n ap proach a t Madrid. 66 Mor e tha n on e hundre d pressur e group s conveye d their view s t o th e conference , includin g thirty-seve n association s o f Eas t European emigre s and fourtee n Helsink i Watch committees . In the open ing day s o f th e meeting , emigr e dissident s an d representative s o f huma n rights organization s conducte d i n Madri d a veritabl e "counterconfer ence" t o lobb y fo r thei r cause. 67 This publi c involvemen t an d th e West ern practice s o f namin g dozen s o f victim s o f repression , holdin g pres s conferences, an d releasin g speeches delivered i n closed sessio n turned th e Madrid meetin g into a media even t that focuse d o n huma n rights . That focu s wa s foreshadowe d i n th e openin g addres s o f Griffi n Bell , who warne d delegate s the y woul d "hea r ofte n ove r th e nex t severa l weeks tha t th e word s o f th e Fina l Ac t o n huma n right s an d huma n contacts mus t b e interprete d i n differen t way s whe n applie d i n differen t social systems . This argumen t i s untrue—and profoundl y harmfu l t o th e spirit o f ou r enterprise." 68 Th e Unite d State s concentrate d o n reviewin g fulfillment an d submitte d onl y a fe w ne w proposals , fo r meeting s o f

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experts o n huma n right s an d famil y reunification . France , wit h NAT O support, propose d a conferenc e o n confidence-buildin g measure s an d a cultural forum . Th e Easter n priority , announce d a t th e Warsa w Pac t meeting i n Warsa w o n Ma y 15 , 1980 , wa s a conferenc e o n militar y detente an d disarmamen t i n Europe , par t o f Brezhnev' s "peac e pro gram." Som e initiatives cancele d eac h othe r out : a n Easter n proposa l o n the right t o work wa s countere d b y a Western on e o n th e righ t t o strike . A Europea n Communit y proposa l t o ba n jammin g wa s me t b y Soviet Czechoslovak proposa l t o terminat e RF E an d Radi o Liberty . Th e bar gaining, mediate d b y th e NNa , woul d b e ove r a mutuall y acceptabl e se t of securit y an d huma n right s recommendations . The NNa' s draf t o f a concludin g documen t wa s almos t complete d when martia l la w wa s impose d i n Polan d o n Decembe r 13 , 1981 . Th e CSCE process ha d offere d som e encouragement t o Polis h dissidents , an d as Solidarit y ros e man y hope d tha t th e Madri d meetin g migh t serv e as a deterrent t o repression . Bu t fo r Brezhne v an d Jaruzelski , blatan t viola tion o f severa l Helsink i principles wa s a price worth payin g fo r reaffirm ing undivide d Communis t rule . Th e Madri d revie w phas e cam e t o a n end a fe w day s late r ami d discord . Difference s aros e betwee n Washing ton an d Bonn : th e forme r wa s dispose d t o hav e th e meetin g adjour n a s long as repression continue d i n Poland, while the latter preferred t o kee p the dialogu e goin g a t al l costs . When th e meetin g reconvene d o n Febru ary 9 , 1982 , th e chairman , b y alphabetica l rotation , wa s th e Polis h delegate, an d h e resorte d t o procedura l chicaner y i n a n attemp t t o prevent severa l foreig n ministers , includin g France' s Claud e Cheysson , from deliverin g thei r speeches . Despite lon g procedura l wrangles , th e huma n right s violation s o f martial la w wer e full y expose d an d denounced , wit h Kampelma n aptl y quoting fro m Bertol t Brech t tha t "th e peopl e hav e los t confidenc e i n their government . Th e government has , therefore, decide d t o elec t a ne w people." 69 Determine d t o preven t "busines s a s usual " an d t o secur e a long recess , the Wes t resorte d t o procedura l delayin g tactics . O n Marc h 5,1982, i n the drafting committe e charged with finalizing th e concludin g document, Wester n delegation s remaine d silen t i n wha t on e historia n called a triump h o f allie d solidarity. 70 Whe n afte r eigh t month s th e meeting reconvene d o n Novembe r 9 , th e focu s shifte d fro m implemen tation (thoug h Romania' s ne w educatio n ta x o n emigrant s wa s de plored) t o recommendations ; th e Wes t introduce d a flurr y o f ne w

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amendments o n suc h issue s a s securit y o f individua l Helsink i monitors , free trad e unions , an d jamming . After muc h difficul t negotiatio n an d mediation , consensu s wa s finally reached i n July 198 3 o n a concludin g document , an d th e Madri d meet ing cam e t o a n en d o n Septembe r 9 , 1983. 71 Th e Sovie t downin g o f a South Korea n airline r figured prominentl y i n th e closin g speeche s o f Secretary o f Stat e Georg e Shult z an d othe r Wester n foreig n ministers . The Madri d results , thoug h modest , represente d a n improvemen t ove r Belgrade. Th e Sovie t desir e fo r a militar y securit y conferenc e wa s satis fied, and th e West's persistence paid of f wit h som e minor embellishment s of th e Fina l Act' s huma n right s provisions . Th e participant s formall y agreed t o "tak e th e necessar y actio n i n thei r respectiv e countrie s t o effectively ensure " th e right s enumerate d i n Principl e VII . O n trad e unions, i t wa s agree d tha t th e "participatin g state s wil l ensur e th e righ t of worker s freel y t o establis h an d joi n trad e unions , th e righ t o f trad e unions freel y t o exercis e thei r activities, " bu t thes e right s ha d t o b e exercised "i n complianc e wit h th e law o f th e state. " This wa s th e escap e clause for th e East, which ha d n o intentio n o f allowin g fre e trad e union s in th e wak e o f Solidarity , bu t eve n so , the compromis e wa s a victory fo r the West . O n thi s a s o n othe r issue s wher e agreemen t wa s reached , th e CSCE proces s wa s a battl e ove r for m a s muc h a s substance , bu t th e results were more tha n symbolic . The Helsink i Commission' s stocktakin g o f th e first te n year s o f th e CSCE revie w proces s recorde d som e progress. 72 Th e Fina l Ac t ha d lib erated Wester n government s fro m th e inhibition s o f traditiona l diplo macy b y providin g a referenc e poin t an d continuin g framewor k fo r addressing th e huma n right s deficiencie s o f stat e socialism . Althoug h tangible improvement s wer e slo w i n coming , an d owe d muc h t o th e reformist tendencie s o f a few East European regime s in quest of domesti c legitimacy, internationa l standard s an d Wester n pressur e wer e instru mental i n raisin g th e awarenes s o f huma n right s amon g bot h ruler s an d subjects. Observe d th e Polish Helsinki Committee , "Abov e all , the CSC E process strengthen s resistanc e t o anti-Wester n propagand a o r a t leas t weakens it s effectiveness . . . . The societies ' awarenes s tha t on e norma tive standar d exist s help s giv e socia l demand s a rationa l for m an d in creases th e chance s o f a peacefu l resolutio n o f th e conflict." 73 Thes e pressures helpe d t o induc e a progressiv e reinterpretatio n o f "socialis t legality" b y th e mor e libera l regime s i n favo r o f th e lega l right s o f th e

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individual an d o f impartia l justice . Th e slo w erosio n o f th e rulin g par ties' arbitrar y authorit y ove r political an d civi l liberties had begun . From 197 5 onwards , Wester n government s an d Easter n dissident s invoked th e Fina l Ac t i n seekin g implementatio n o f th e huma n contact s provisions o f Baske t III. The State Department regularl y submitte d "rep resentation lists " o f pendin g famil y reunificatio n cases , an d th e compli ance an d genera l emigratio n recor d o f th e Eas t Europea n countrie s (notably Hungary ) improved. 74 Thoug h thei r motive s wer e no t humani tarian, Czechoslovaki a an d som e other s bega n t o allow , an d indee d t o urge, political dissident s t o emigrate . Contacts amon g Eastern an d West ern religiou s organization s multiplied . Bill y Graha m pai d pastora l visit s to Hungar y i n 197 7 an d Polan d i n 1981 . Rigi d stat e contro l ove r th e dissemination o f informatio n allowe d littl e improvemen t i n th e Easter n public's acces s t o Wester n media , bu t domesti c censorshi p wa s ease d i n Poland an d Hungary , an d Hungaria n televisio n bega n t o broadcas t un precedentedly ope n discussion s betwee n Easter n an d Wester n expert s o n aspects o f detente . Th e ora l exchang e o f informatio n wa s fostere d b y easier trave l a s wel l a s b y suc h establishe d Unite d State s governmen t facilities a s th e USIA' s America n Participan t Program , whic h sponsore d lecture tour s b y American experts ; th e USIA' s Internationa l Visito r Pro gram, whic h brough t Eas t European s t o th e Unite d States ; an d th e Fulbright an d Internationa l Researc h an d Exchange s Boar d (IREX ) pro grams fo r academi c exchanges . Cultura l exchange s als o benefitte d fro m the spiri t o f Helsinki . In sum , th e pressure legitimize d b y th e CSC E process wa s no t wholl y without effect . "An d yet, " sai d Secretar y Shult z a t th e commemorativ e meeting i n Helsinki , "1 0 year s afte r th e signin g o f th e Fina l Act , n o on e can den y th e ga p betwee n hop e an d performance . Despit e th e rea l valu e of th e Fina l Ac t a s a standar d o f conduct , th e mos t importan t promise s of a decade ago have not bee n kept." 75 The Helsinki agend a nevertheles s had usefull y serve d t o marsha l th e West' s diplomati c resource s an d public attentio n agains t reprehensibl e practice s i n th e East , an d t o nur ture a powerfu l constituenc y fo r huma n rights . Nowhere wa s thi s mor e evident tha n o n Capito l Hill , wher e (i n wha t ha d becom e a n annua l ritual) a join t resolutio n wa s passe d o n Augus t 2 , 198 5 callin g o n th e president t o "us e ever y opportunit y t o stres s th e inheren t link—explic itly state d i n th e Helsink i Fina l Ac t an d th e Madri d Concludin g Docu ment—between respec t fo r huma n right s an d th e achievemen t o f lastin g

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peace." 76 In 1988 , Reagan responde d b y proclaiming a Helsinki Huma n Rights Day . Ottawa/Budapest/Bern. Th e measur e o f th e distanc e t o b e travele d was vividl y reveale d i n th e Ottaw a meetin g o f expert s o n huma n right s in May-Jun e 1985 . At th e outset , th e Sovie t delegat e deliberatel y misin terpreted th e Madri d mandat e fo r th e meetin g (t o addres s "question s concerning respect , i n thei r States , fo r huma n right s an d fundamenta l freedoms, i n al l thei r aspects" ) b y arguin g tha t eac h countr y wa s simpl y required t o repor t o n it s domestic huma n right s situation ; unfortunatel y for him , th e officia l Russia n tex t di d no t suppor t hi s contention. Despit e the Warsaw Pact' s initial refusa l t o discus s specifi c violations, the Unite d States launche d a length y debat e wit h detail s o f numerou s individua l cases, an d th e Eas t retaliate d b y condemnin g socia l abuse s suc h a s unemployment i n the West . The hea d o f th e Unite d State s delegation , Richar d Schifter , pointe d out th e illogi c i n th e Sovie t contentio n tha t huma n right s wer e contin gent o n detente : "Doe s i t stan d t o reaso n tha t i f foreig n countrie s establish friendl y relation s wit h a particula r governmen t tha t govern ment, i n turn , will—s o t o speak—rewar d th e foreig n countrie s b y deal ing kindly wit h it s own citizens? " The Western participant s an d mos t o f the NNa' s stoo d b y Principl e VH' s linkage , whic h mad e respec t fo r human right s a conditio n o f friendl y relations . Schifte r als o reiterate d the Wester n distinctio n betwee n individua l right s an d socia l objectives : "The right s guarantee d i n th e Unite d State s Constitutio n . . . ar e right s which ever y citize n ca n cal l upo n th e court s t o protect . W e vie w wha t are her e referre d t o a s economi c an d socia l right s a s . . . th e goal s o f government polic y i n domesti c affairs. " Afte r expoundin g o n th e short comings o f th e Sovie t socia l an d economi c system , Schifte r ende d b y citing th e conclusio n o f forme r Communis t intellectual s suc h a s Arthu r Koestler t o th e effec t tha t "th e pric e i n term s o f persona l freedo m wa s not wort h payin g to attai n th e promised goa l o f a future paradise." 7 7 Another Sovie t diversionar y tacti c wa s t o introduc e a "huma n righ t of th e thir d generation, " th e "righ t t o liv e in peace." The Soviet s argue d that i n th e nuclea r ag e this "right " wa s th e fundamenta l prerequisit e fo r the fulfillmen t o f othe r right s an d demande d tha t i t b e include d i n th e meeting's recommendations . Th e Wes t woul d no t condon e th e implici t downgrading o f politica l an d civi l liberties , while th e Eas t rejecte d eve n

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an NN a compromis e repor t tha t calle d fo r a furthe r meetin g o f huma n rights experts . The Ottaw a meetin g disbanded withou t tangibl e results . Some of th e smalle r Warsa w Pac t member s ha d show n onl y grudgin g solidarity wit h Sovie t initiative s a t Ottawa . Anothe r notabl e develop ment wa s th e beginnin g o f a debat e o n minorit y rights . Turkey' s com plaint regardin g ne w Bulgaria n measure s t o assimilat e Musli m ethni c Turks le d t o a n examinatio n o f minorit y issue s tha t expose d Warsa w Pact differences . Th e Bulgaria n representative , observe d Richar d Schif ter, claime d tha t "thes e ethni c Turk s o f Bulgari a neve r existed , tha t i f they di d exist , the y ar e givin g u p thei r Turkis h ethni c identit y voluntar ily, an d that , a t an y rate , thei r ancestor s wer e ethni c Bulgarian s wh o hundreds o f year s ag o wer e forcibl y Islamicized. " Th e facts wer e tha t the clos e t o one-million-stron g minorit y ha d bee n "subjecte d t o hars h oppression, force d t o chang e thei r name s an d t o en d thei r cultura l an d ethnic ties. " Schifte r praise d th e Hungaria n representative' s "thoughtfu l and informativ e presentation " o n minorit y rights , criticized th e persecu tion o f Hungaria n minorit y spokesme n i n Czechoslovakia , an d manage d to avoi d namin g Romani a i n relatin g tha t "governmenta l restriction s o n the fre e flow o f informatio n abou t th e pas t an d presen t o f minoritie s have intensified ; churches , cultura l monuments , an d othe r artifact s o f minority culture s hav e bee n destroyed ; limitation s o n th e us e o f nativ e languages an d cultura l facilitie s hav e increased ; historie s hav e bee n re written, persons wh o decr y thes e development s hav e bee n harshl y perse cuted." 78 Th e multilatera l Helsink i proces s thu s allowe d th e Unite d States t o overcom e it s diplomati c reluctanc e t o addres s th e thorn y issu e of Eas t European minorities . The airin g o f tha t issu e a t th e Budapes t Cultura l Foru m i n Octobe r 1985 annoye d th e Romanians s o much tha t they blocked an y concludin g statement. A t Wester n insistence , th e delegation s include d prominen t artists an d writer s a s well a s governmen t officials , an d Solidarity , Char ter 77 , an d Hungaria n dissident s addresse d brief s t o th e forum , bu t th e meeting only confirme d th e conflictin g view s of th e West an d th e officia l East regardin g intellectua l freedom . "Nothin g els e i s wort h writin g abou t except peace, " declare d a Sovie t delegate . In th e event , th e foru m wa s overshadowed b y a concurren t independen t cultura l symposiu m orga nized b y th e Internationa l Helsink i Federatio n fo r Huma n Rights . Thi s counterconference, hel d i n privat e apartment s afte r th e Hungaria n gov ernment denie d i t the use of public facilities, allowe d fo r ope n discussio n

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of suc h problem s a s censorshi p an d th e cultura l privation s o f th e Hun garian minorit y i n Romania . Fo r dissiden t intellectual s i n th e East , th e Helsinki process was indeed a "framework fo r hope." 7 9 Human contact s wer e th e focu s o f th e Ber n meetin g i n April-Ma y 1986, which als o ended without consensus . The issues were of particula r concern t o th e Unite d States , fo r a s th e delegation' s head , Michae l Novak, observe d a t th e outset , a tent h o f America' s populatio n wa s o f East Europea n origin . Th e Sovie t positio n wa s tha t sinc e employment , housing, medica l care , an d socia l securit y wer e guaranteed , n o on e ha d any reaso n t o leave , an d tha t huma n contact s suc h a s famil y reunifica tion depende d o n progres s i n detente . Again , th e Unite d State s rejecte d this linkage . Nova k argue d tha t "th e right s t o famil y reunificatio n ar e prior t o question s o f foreig n policy " an d tha t "ther e i s a crucia l differ ence betwee n fundamenta l huma n rights , suc h a s th e righ t t o emigrate , and th e norma l commercia l o r cultura l activitie s o f norma l times . Th e first ma y neve r b e abridged . Th e secon d d o follo w th e rhythm s o f international life." 80 After sufferin g throug h a painstakin g revie w o f violation s tha t lef t only Hungar y unscathed , th e Sovie t blo c wa s read y t o accep t a Swis s formula tha t include d som e ne w provisions , suc h a s prohibition o f stat e interference wit h internationa l telephon e an d postal communication . Bu t Washington foun d th e documen t "to o thin , containin g loophole s dam aging t o compliance, " exemplifie d b y th e qualificatio n "whe n persona l and professiona l circumstance s permit " appende d t o th e righ t t o travel. 81 Despite a last-ditc h appea l fro m Wes t Germa n Foreig n Ministe r Gensche r to Secretary Shultz, the United State s refused t o endorse the compromise . The Vienna Meeting. B y th e tim e th e thir d CSC E revie w conferenc e convened i n Vienn a i n Novembe r 1986 , Sovie t orthodox y wa s bein g shaken t o it s root s b y a new leader , Mikhai l Gorbachev . A meeting tha t began wit h length y criticis m o f Sovie t an d Eas t Europea n huma n right s violations ende d twenty-si x month s late r with agreemen t t o hold th e las t of a series o f conference s o n th e "huma n dimension " o f th e CSC E in , of all places , Moscow . In th e interval , Gorbachev' s notion s o f restructur ing, openness , an d democratizatio n ha d materialize d i n a proces s o f change tha t affecte d bot h th e domesti c an d foreig n policie s o f th e Sovie t Union an d th e climat e fo r refor m i n Easter n Europe . Politica l an d civi l liberties in particular acquire d ne w meaning, and i n May 198 8 th e CPS U

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Central Committe e woul d pas s a resolutio n invitin g "th e exercis e o f constitutional freedom s (freedo m o f speech , th e press , conscience , as sembly, meetings, street processions an d demonstrations, etc.) and firme r guarantees o f persona l rights , such a s the inviolabilit y o f th e perso n an d the home , an d privac y o f correspondenc e an d telephon e conversa tions." 8 2 Thoug h th e Gorbachevia n squarin g o f th e Leninis t circl e fel l short o f Western libera l democracy , i t alleviated domesti c repression an d narrowed th e ga p betwee n Eas t an d Wes t o n man y issue s o f huma n rights. Gorbachev's reformis t zea l initiall y me t wit h widesprea d skepticis m in th e West , an d particularl y i n th e Unite d States , bu t ther e wer e als o glimmerings o f hop e fo r rapprochement . Th e cordialit y o f th e Reykjavi k summit contraste d wit h th e continuin g bruta l interventio n i n Afghani stan. A few prominent prisoner s o f conscienc e were released, notably th e Moscow Helsink i Grou p leade r Yur i Orlov , and , i n Decembe r 1986 , Andrei Sakharo v an d hi s wife wer e allowe d t o retur n fro m interna l exil e to Moscow . Bu t th e deat h i n priso n o f th e dissiden t write r Anatol y Marchenko cas t a pall o n thes e auspiciou s changes . Still , the ne w Sovie t regime displaye d unprecedente d opennes s i n a public relations campaig n designed t o ear n i t some credibilit y o n huma n rights . The American approac h t o Vienna was, as usual, to emphasize huma n rights. Th e delegation , heade d b y Ambassado r Warre n Zimmerman , included a s vice-chairme n Helsink i Commissio n chairma n Alfons e D'Amato an d cochairma n Sten y Hoye r a s well a s fifteen publi c member s representing a variet y o f civic , huma n rights , an d ethni c organizations . Groups fro m Nort h Americ a an d Europ e mounted demonstrations , sym posia, an d exhibit s i n Vienn a t o tak e advantag e o f th e momentar y attention o f worl d media . Th e Unite d State s an d it s allie s focuse d o n violations o f huma n right s principles i n the Soviet Union an d Czechoslo vakia. Recognizin g tha t thei r earlie r retrenchmen t behin d th e principl e of noninterferenc e ha d bee n ineffective , th e Sovie t Unio n an d it s mos t like-minded allies , Bulgaria, th e GDR , an d Czechoslovakia , complaine d that suc h criticis m wa s unproductiv e an d responde d bot h b y claimin g positive achievement s an d b y accusin g th e Unite d States , Britain , an d Canada o f racis m an d neglectin g th e poor . Reviewing Baske t II I compliance , th e Unite d State s addresse d a ple thora o f specifi c concern s tha t include d mistreatmen t o f minorities ; pen alties for unauthorize d contac t wit h foreigners ; restriction s o n travel an d

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emigration; censorship ; an d more. 83 Ther e wa s a certai n divisio n o f labor amon g th e allies ; Canad a too k th e lea d i n promotin g minorit y rights an d Britai n i n callin g fo r th e en d o f broadcas t jamming . Th e ke y Western proposa l a t Vienn a wa s fo r mor e systemati c monitorin g an d discussion o f problem s i n th e spher e o f huma n right s an d humanitaria n contacts. Fo r th e first tim e i n th e Helsink i process , a Warsa w Pac t member cosponsore d a Wester n proposa l whe n Hungar y endorse d a Canadian initiativ e o n behal f o f th e fundamenta l huma n right s an d cultural identitie s o f nationa l minorities . Bu t th e mos t surprisin g pro posal cam e from th e Soviet Union, which invite d a follow-up meetin g o n humanitarian cooperatio n t o b e hel d i n Moscow . Take n aback , th e NATO allies initiall y dismisse d th e ide a o n th e ground s tha t th e USS R could no t guarante e unrestricte d acces s t o suc h a meeting . Th e Soviet s showed thei r ambivalenc e o n huma n right s durin g th e fifth sessio n (Jan uary-March 1988 ) b y attackin g Wester n proposal s fo r follow-u p an d tabling amendment s t o th e Concludin g Document . The y insiste d tha t domestic law , rathe r tha n internationa l norms , governe d th e freedo m o f individuals t o promote huma n rights . In th e final phase , th e majo r issue s wer e th e forma t an d mandat e o f new securit y meetings , o n whic h th e Wes t wa s divide d (se e chapte r 6) , and th e Mosco w venu e fo r a revie w o f th e "huma n dimension. " A s happened a t Madrid , i t fel l t o th e NN a grou p t o mediat e betwee n Eas t and Wes t i n draftin g a concludin g document . Th e bigges t potentia l spoiler turne d ou t t o b e Romania , whic h i n Jun e 198 8 declare d tha t i t would accep t n o additiona l commitment s o n huma n rights , while a t th e same tim e introducin g ne w amendment s o n economi c an d socia l rights . But Warsa w Pac t solidarit y wa s fraying , an d i n Novembe r an d Decem ber 1988 , th e Unite d State s an d Britai n conducte d bilatera l discussion s with th e Sovie t Unio n o n condition s fo r th e Mosco w meeting . B y thi s time, Gorbache v ha d earne d som e credit s i n huma n rights . The numbe r of emigrant s ha d rise n t o 80,00 0 i n 1988 ; som e 60 0 politica l prisoner s had bee n release d ove r th e precedin g tw o years ; an d glasnost ha d un leashed a n extraordinaril y ope n politica l debat e i n th e Sovie t Union , including a ne w assertivenes s amon g th e non-Russia n nationalities . Th e jamming o f Wester n broadcast s wa s als o graduall y suspended , s o tha t by th e en d o f 198 8 eve n Radi o Libert y an d Radi o Fre e Europ e enjoye d unhindered acces s to thei r vast audiences . These auspiciou s development s an d concession s le d th e Unite d State s

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and Britai n t o announc e o n Januar y 4 , 1989 , thei r consen t (conditiona l on sustaine d improvement s i n huma n rights ) t o a n eventua l sessio n i n Moscow. President Reagan , said his spokesman, had agree d to the schedule of follow-u p meeting s "a s a mean s o f encouragin g continuatio n o f th e significant progres s tha t ha s take n plac e i n th e Sovie t Unio n ove r th e past thre e years." 84 Bu t th e Vienn a meetin g di d no t en d i n perfec t harmony. Evidentl y irke d b y th e spreadin g criticis m o f hi s repressiv e practices, particularly i n regard t o minorities, Ceausescu ha d ordere d th e Romanian delegatio n t o secur e last-minut e revisio n o f seventee n huma n rights provisions . This gambi t faile d t o wi n th e suppor t o f eve n Roman ia's allies , and Ceausescu' s envoy , fearin g hi s master' s wrath , reportedl y broke dow n i n tear s a t a Warsa w Pac t caucus. 85 A s th e conferenc e wa s drawing t o a clos e tw o week s later , th e Romania n delegat e declare d i n the close d plenar y tha t whil e h e joine d th e consensu s "w e fee l n o com mitment t o implemen t thos e provision s t o whic h Romani a doe s no t agree o r consider s inadequate. " Canad a (speakin g fo r NATO ) an d Aus tria (o n behal f o f th e NNa ) rejecte d thi s qualificatio n a s contrar y t o th e CSCE rule s o f procedure , an d U.S . Ambassado r Warre n Zimmerma n categorized i t a s "absur d an d illegal." 86 Romania n Foreig n Ministe r Io n Totu nevertheles s reiterate d th e reservatio n durin g th e concludin g cere monies. Such ope n rejectio n o f accountabilit y an d th e bindin g qualit y o f consensus wa s unprecedente d i n th e history o f th e CSC E and threatene d to subver t th e entire process. Secretary Shult z wa s guardedl y optimisti c i n hi s address , praisin g Gorbachev whil e criticizin g som e of his allies. Crackdowns o n dissident s in Eas t German y an d i n Prague , wher e polic e ha d brutall y disperse d a peaceful demonstratio n th e previou s day , were , h e said , "i n glarin g contradiction t o th e solem n internationa l commitments " tha t ha d jus t been made . "I n Romania , th e economic an d socia l conditions , a s well a s the political an d civi l rights o f al l citizens, are being eroded a t a discour aging rate , an d i n bot h Romani a an d Bulgaria , minoritie s hav e bee n particularly har d hi t b y governmen t policie s o f recen t years." 8 7 Still , a s Richard Schifte r observed , th e Vienn a agreemen t provide d th e mos t significant ne w guarantee s o f huma n right s sinc e th e Fina l Ac t o f 197 5 and, more importantly, reflecte d a t least on the part o f som e Communis t signatories a more seriou s intentio n o f livin g up t o their commitments. 88 Much o f th e progres s embodie d i n th e Vienn a agreemen t la y i n ter minological nuanc e an d emphasis . Th e signatorie s undertoo k t o brin g

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their law s an d regulation s int o conformit y wit h thei r CSC E commit ments an d t o respec t th e righ t o f individua l citizen s t o exercis e thei r freedoms, includin g tha t o f emigration . Ne w commitment s t o respec t freedom o f religiou s practic e an d educatio n wer e denounce d b y Ceau sescu a s takin g "mankin d bac k b y 50 0 year s t o th e ag e o f th e Inquisi tion." 8 9 Severa l provisions addresse d th e cultura l right s of ethni c minor ities; Bulgari a an d Romani a attempted , unsuccessfully , t o appen d t o each mentio n o f minoritie s th e ominou s phras e "wher e the y exist. " A s before, th e reiterations an d elaboration s o n human right s lay the greates t burden o f adaptatio n o n th e socialis t states . Human Rights after Vienna. Th e West' s desir e t o furthe r institution alize the monitorin g o f huma n right s complianc e wa s me t b y new provi sions fo r th e exchang e o f relevan t informatio n an d bilatera l meetings . The Vienn a agreemen t als o se t th e schedul e fo r a n Informatio n Foru m (London, April-Ma y 1989 ) an d fo r thre e meeting s (i n Paris , June 1989 ; Copenhagen, Jun e 1990 ; an d Moscow , Septembe r 1991 ) o f a Confer ence o n th e Huma n Dimensio n t o "achiev e furthe r progres s concernin g respect fo r al l human right s an d fundamenta l freedoms , huma n contact s and othe r issue s o f a related humanitaria n character. " Th e fourt h majo r follow-up meetin g o f th e CSC E was schedule d t o conven e i n Helsink i i n March 1992 . The Londo n Informatio n Foru m marke d th e furthe r erosio n o f War saw Pac t solidarity . Th e Sovie t Unio n trumpete d th e achievement s o f glasnost an d criticize d Western vis a practices while distancing itself fro m its mor e conservativ e allies . Th e Wes t concentrate d it s attack s o n Ro mania an d Czechoslovakia ; i n Prague , polic e ha d jus t beate n u p a BB C correspondent wh o wa s coverin g a n unofficia l demonstration . Th e Eas t Europeans, particularl y Bulgari a an d Czechoslovakia , continue d t o de nounce Radi o Fre e Europe , an d Wester n request s tha t al l jammin g b e deemed illega l went unheeded. 90 At the Pari s meeting of th e Conferenc e o n th e Huma n Dimension , th e split i n Communis t rank s wa s confirmed . Romani a stoo d alon e i n it s insistence tha t th e entir e mechanis m fo r reviewin g huma n right s compli ance constitute d interferenc e i n interna l affairs . Hungary , meanwhile , denounced Romania' s treatmen t o f ethni c minorities , announce d th e opening o f it s borders , an d cosponsore d wit h th e Unite d State s an d Austria a proposal t o abolis h exi t visas a s well a s offerin g othe r propos -

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als o n freedo m o f associatio n an d minorities . Eve n th e Sovie t Unio n joined i n the criticis m o f Romania' s erectio n o f a barbed-wire barrie r o n its border wit h Hungary . Bulgaria bor e th e brun t o f criticis m i n th e late r stage s o f th e Pari s meeting when it s discriminatory policie s too k th e for m o f encouragin g a massive exodu s o f ethni c Turk s t o Turkey . Th e America n delegation , which include d severa l Helsink i Commissio n staf f members , too k th e lead i n denouncin g th e retrograd e Eas t Europea n regimes ; o n Jun e 15 , 1989, concurren t resolution s wer e submitte d i n th e Senat e an d th e Hous e condemning Bulgaria' s treatmen t o f it s Turkis h minority . A t Paris , th e United State s table d a proposa l callin g fo r fre e election s an d th e estab lishment o f multipl e politica l parties . Bu t Romania' s obdurac y ensure d that n o communiqu e woul d b e issued b y the conference . When th e CSC E signatorie s me t i n Sofi a fro m Octobe r 1 6 to Novem ber 3 , 1989 , fo r a conferenc e o n environmenta l protection , thei r pres ence emboldene d loca l ecologica l an d huma n right s group s t o moun t public demonstrations . Thi s conference , too , ende d withou t issuin g a concluding document , fo r Romani a refuse d t o accep t th e draft' s ap proval o f independen t environmenta l activism . O n th e las t day , i n a remarkable sho w o f solidarity , al l th e othe r delegation s adde d thei r names a s cosponsor s t o th e document . A wee k later , th e Bulgaria n dictator Todo r Zhivko v wa s ousted . When th e las t remainin g Eas t Europea n dictator , Romania' s Ceau sescu, perpetrate d a massacr e o f demonstrator s a t Timisoar a i n Decem ber 1989 , th e CSC E provide d th e venu e fo r on e mor e condemnatio n o f tyranny. A t th e plenar y sessio n o f th e Confidenc e an d Security-Buildin g Measures negotiation s i n Vienna o n Decembe r 20 , United State s Ambas sador Joh n Maresc a delivere d a n impassione d statemen t o f th e West' s outrage. 91 And the n Ceausescu , too , was gone . By th e tim e th e secon d Conferenc e o n th e Huma n Dimensio n ende d in Copenhage n o n Jun e 29 , 1990 , fre e election s ha d bee n hel d i n al l o f the forme r Sovie t satellite s excep t Poland , which wa s stil l saddled wit h a legislature chose n o n th e basis of a restrictive formula . Th e Warsaw Pac t members n o longe r me t a s a group , an d eve n Albani a ha d joine d th e CSCE process , a s a n observer . Th e qualit y o f democrac y i n Easter n Europe remaine d uneven , bu t th e ne w regime s al l professe d respec t fo r political an d civi l rights , an d i n contras t t o earlie r meeting s th e confer ence devoted littl e time to review of implementation. Th e main exceptio n

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was th e concer n expresse d b y th e America n delegatio n an d twenty-on e others o n June 14-1 5 a t th e violen t repressio n o f anti-Communis t dem onstrations i n Bucharest . The U.S. delegation, heade d onc e agai n b y Max Kampelman , concen trated o n securin g entrenchment o f fre e election s an d political pluralism . The wor k o f th e conferenc e wa s divide d amon g fou r draftin g group s focusing o n th e rul e o f la w an d democracy ; minoritie s an d tolerance ; improvements t o th e Conferenc e o n th e Huma n Dimensio n mechanis m (coordinated b y Hungary) ; an d huma n rights , huma n contacts , an d related issue s o f a humanitaria n character . Th e resultin g concludin g document reflecte d remarkabl e consensu s o n al l issues except minorities . It listed a s essential element s o f democrati c societie s representative , con stitutional government , separatio n o f stat e an d politica l parties , subor dination o f th e militar y t o civi l authority , an d a n independen t an d impartial judiciary . I t declare d tha t politica l legitimac y i s base d o n th e will of th e people expresse d throug h periodi c an d genuin e elections, tha t individuals an d group s ha d th e righ t t o establis h politica l parties , an d that foreig n an d domesti c observers coul d enhanc e electora l propriety . The concurrent ethni c tensions in Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, an d the Sovie t Unio n an d th e recurrin g incidenc e o f anti-Semitis m enhance d the urgenc y o f addressin g minorit y right s an d racism . Thes e controver sial issues cu t acros s countr y groupings , dividin g West an d Eas t alike , as debate rage d ove r th e definitio n o f individua l vs . grou p right s an d ad ministrative autonomy . Austria , Czechoslovakia , Hungary , Italy , an d Yugoslavia jointl y propose d tha t th e CSC E guarante e th e protectio n o f minority rights . The outcome was a compromise affirmin g tha t the right s of nationa l minoritie s wer e essentia l t o peace , justice , stability , an d democracy. Th e right s enumerate d include d preservatio n o f ethni c cul ture an d fre e association , contact s acros s frontiers , an d participatio n i n public affair s t o promot e minorit y interests ; racia l an d nationa l intoler ance wer e roundl y condemned . Th e conferenc e invite d furthe r consid eration o f th e thorn y issue , a t a n experts ' meetin g an d a t othe r venue s such a s the Counci l o f Europe . At Copenhage n th e CSC E reache d a hig h poin t o f consensu s o n th e principles o f huma n rights . Th e Helsink i proces s ha d serve d th e caus e well fro m th e phase o f bitte r confrontatio n t o th e comparative cordialit y that cam e t o prevai l a t th e en d o f th e decade . Wit h th e furthe r institu tionalization o f th e CSC E promise d a t th e Novembe r 199 0 summit ,

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there wer e ground s fo r optimis m tha t internationa l scrutin y an d media tion coul d promot e applicatio n o f th e principles professed . From Leninism to Liberalism. America' s pursui t o f huma n right s i n Eastern Europ e ha s consume d immens e tim e an d energy , i n th e CSC E process a s wel l a s i n th e routin e diplomati c an d publi c spheres . Ye t i t i s scarcely possibl e t o dra w u p a precis e balanc e sheet , i f onl y becaus e o f the complexit y o f caus e an d effec t i n the political evolutio n o f th e Sovie t sphere. T o b e sure , publicit y an d quie t diplomac y ha d wo n Easter n concessions o n numerou s individua l case s o f emigration , famil y reunifi cation, an d harassmen t o f dissidents . Afte r Vienna , eve n th e repressiv e regimes i n Pragu e an d Sofi a ha d se t t o th e tas k o f adjustin g thei r prac tices to th e ne w criteri a regarding , fo r instance , the issuing of passports . The laboriou s CSC E proces s ha d a salutar y impac t o n specifi c issue s of individua l rights , an d i t continue d t o serv e a s a usefu l foru m fo r denouncing th e mos t egregiou s violators . Th e rea l tes t o f th e West' s human right s crusad e nevertheles s la y les s i n th e resul t o f suc h humani tarian pressur e tha n i n th e comprehensiv e restoratio n o f politica l an d civil liberties i n Eastern Europe . The Western libera l example , America' s psychological warfar e an d huma n right s crusade , an d th e CSC E proces s all serve d t o undermin e th e popula r legitimac y o f Leninism . Thes e pres sures contributed materiall y to the wave of liberalism tha t swep t throug h Eastern Europ e i n 198 9 a s Gorbache v relaxe d th e Sovie t Union' s impe rial gri p an d se t the ruling parties adrift . The classica l concep t o f right s inheren t i n th e individual , advocate d by th e West , clashe d wit h officia l Eas t Europea n politica l culture s i n which right s ar e grante d b y society , tha t i s by its self-appointe d leaders . The illegitimac y o f tha t notio n ma y no t hav e bee n alway s self-eviden t t o all Eas t Europeans . Historically , th e authoritaria n an d paternalisti c as pects o f thei r politica l inheritanc e conditione d the m t o a certai n exten t for Communis t bureaucrati c rule , thoug h fo r al l it s pretens e a t egalitar ian socia l justic e an d scientifi c management , communis m soo n prove d more oppressiv e tha n earlie r form s o f socia l control . Nevertheless , b y the en d o f th e Secon d Worl d War , mos t Eas t European s leane d mor e toward th e libera l versio n o f right s an d limite d governmen t tha n t o th e collectivism an d dubious , "socialist " legalit y o f th e Soviet-sponsore d alternative. Eve n th e uncertai n appea l o f Communis t Utopi a wa s dis pelled b y th e bitte r experienc e tha t followed . Thus , th e West' s contem -

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porary crusad e fo r politica l an d civi l libertie s an d fo r unqualifie d self determination foun d a receptive audienc e i n Eastern Europe . At th e beginning , i n thei r revolutionary-Stalinis t phase , th e Commu nist partie s relie d o n agitpro p tactic s o f mas s mobilizatio n t o generat e ritualistic display s o f popula r support . B y th e lat e 1950s , a s th e partie s settled int o a mor e bureaucratic-manageria l styl e o f rule , som e o f the m allowed an d indee d encourage d a certai n depoliticizatio n o f socia l life . The implici t bargai n wa s tha t th e partie s woul d rul e an d provid e mate rial welfar e fo r a politicall y passiv e society . Thi s strateg y di d induc e widespread politica l apath y a s wel l a s th e "interna l emigration " o f frustrated intellectuals . Dissen t di d no t di e out , bu t i t too k economi c failure an d growin g evidenc e o f th e rulers ' incompetenc e an d mora l weakness t o stimulat e mor e activ e challenges t o Communis t authority . By th e mid-1980s , th e popula r an d intellectua l appea l o f Marxis m had dissipate d no t only in the West but als o in the East, where previousl y much dissen t (fro m ideologica l convictio n o r fo r tactica l reasons ) too k the for m o f Marxis t revisionism . Onl y a fe w Communist s continue d t o profess fait h i n th e reformabilit y o f socialism . Th e Polis h dissiden t (an d onetime Marxist ) Ada m Michni k observed , "Th e debat e abou t ho w t o improve socialis m ha s becom e irrelevan t becaus e nobod y i n Polan d knows an y longe r wha t socialis m means . Ou r discussion s concentrat e instead upo n ho w t o achiev e freedom." 92 The mos t stingin g rebuk e t o th e Communist s cam e fro m th e younge r generation, fro m thos e nurture d b y th e stat e t o becom e th e model s o f socialist man . A 198 7 surve y o f architectur e student s i n Budapes t re vealed tha t th e majorit y di d no t regar d Hungar y a s a democrati c coun try, denied tha t mos t Hungarian s supporte d th e party's policies , felt tha t Hungary woul d hav e bee n bette r of f withou t socialism , di d no t believ e that socialis m coul d onl y b e buil t i n a one-party system , an d considere d the "bourgeoi s democrati c system " appropriat e fo r Hungary. 93 A na tional debat e organize d b y th e Hungaria n Communis t Yout h Leagu e o n the them e "Wha t Kin d o f Socialis m Shoul d W e Build? " generated man y impatient demand s fo r pluralis m an d democrac y bu t n o interes t i n Marxism-Leninism. 94 Barel y 4 percen t o f youn g Poles , accordin g t o a 1986 survey , desire d progres s towar d "som e for m o f socialism." 95 A s Mieczyslaw Wilcek , th e Polis h industr y minister , note d afte r hi s defea t in th e June 198 9 elections , "Nobod y want s t o hea r abou t Marxis m an d Leninism an y more , eve n i n th e party." 9 6 Bot h Marx' s law s o f histor y

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and Lenin' s politica l syste m seeme d hopelessl y discredite d i n Easter n Europe. It wa s o f cours e no t th e lur e o f politica l liberalis m bu t rathe r eco nomic crisi s that drov e th e Communis t elite s in the 1980 s t o desperatel y seek viabl e alternative s tha t coul d expan d th e bas e o f politica l consen t while preservin g th e party' s supremacy . Th e mor e perceptiv e reformer s recognized tha t th e rationa l remed y o f decentralized , marke t economic s is inherentl y pluralisti c an d canno t succee d withou t institutiona l an d behavioral chang e i n th e politica l realm . Havin g littl e choic e bu t t o accept blam e fo r th e mismanagemen t tha t contribute d t o thi s crisis , th e Communists wer e eager to share the onus for painfu l economi c austerity , to diffus e an d deflec t popula r resentmen t b y distancin g th e part y fro m the dail y tas k o f governmen t an d b y sanctionin g mor e participator y processes. The optio n o f retainin g undivide d ultimat e powe r whil e surrenderin g responsibility fo r th e routine management o f economic affairs wa s tempting but politically unworkable , fo r th e regulation o f eve n a market econom y is intimatel y linke d t o socia l an d trad e policy , t o fiscal an d monetar y variables, al l o f whic h deman d choice s tha t ar e th e brea d an d butte r o f politics. The nee d fo r choic e is driven b y the plurality o f interests , whic h even Communist s concede d t o b e inheren t i n moder n society . Th e exe crable recor d o f Leninis t rul e robbe d o f al l popular legitimac y th e Com munists' origina l clai m t o possessin g th e sol e scientifi c formul a fo r hu man progress . But retreat fro m utopianis m t o the more pragmatic outlook , which characterize s Wester n liberalism , tha t th e functio n o f governmen t is t o represen t an d serv e th e ever-changin g patter n o f competin g socia l interests threatene d th e foundations o f Leninism . The ruling parties' claim to aggregate all valid interests was in practic e as untenabl e a s thei r earlie r pretens e a t representin g th e consensu s o f a seamless, proletarianize d society . Withou t th e Marxis t dogm a o f scien tific socialism , th e partie s coul d no t justif y monopolisti c rule , an d with out th e disciplin e o f Leninis t democrati c centralism , the y coul d no t effectively impos e suc h rule . Th e realit y o f divers e socia l interest s lead s logically t o institutionalize d pluralisti c politic s an d t o codifie d libertie s that nurtur e an d protec t a civi l societ y o f autonomou s an d fre e individ uals. Ho w a Communis t part y worth y o f it s ideolog y coul d accommo date suc h a fundamentall y libera l outloo k withou t surrenderin g it s doc trinal leadin g role is a question tha t invite s squarin g th e circle .

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The Gorbachevia n answe r o f "pluralis m i n one party" prove d t o b e a short-lived palliative . Th e superficia l democratizatio n o f one-part y rul e initially envisage d i n Hungar y an d Polan d (an d i n th e Sovie t Unio n a s well) onl y intensifie d th e multipl e politica l demand s o f a n emergin g civi l society. The minuscule non-Communist partie s preserved i n a permanen t state o f subordinatio n i n al l Eas t Europea n state s excep t Hungar y ha d been a politicall y meaningles s remnan t o f th e Communists ' postwa r "popular front " strategy . Cautiou s reformer s toye d wit h variation s o n the them e o f qualifie d pluralis m tha t woul d entrenc h a Communis t majority o r a Communist-dominated coalition , or reserv e certain power s to th e party i n evocation o f constitutiona l monarchy . The commo n denominato r o f al l thes e alternative s wa s denia l o f th e individual's ful l politica l liberty . Th e mos t self-servin g rational e ad vanced b y Communist s fo r limitin g democrac y wa s tha t th e peopl e o f Eastern Europ e (afte r forty-od d year s o f socialis t enlightenment ) lacke d the experienc e an d politica l wisdo m t o freel y choos e thei r governors . In the cas e o f othe r reformers , includin g non-Communists , suc h approxi mative approache s wer e inspire d no t b y attachmen t t o socialis m bu t b y estimates o f irreducibl e Sovie t imperia l interests . Whe n b y 198 9 Gor bachev ha d confirme d tha t thes e interests n o longe r require d loca l Com munist supremacy , th e tentativ e step s awa y fro m Leninis m i n Easter n Europe turne d int o a rout . Hungarian Reforms. Th e first countr y t o benefi t fro m thi s retrea t wa s Hungary, wher e Jano s Kadar' s comparativ e liberalis m faile d t o arres t economic declin e an d undermine d th e party' s self-confidenc e an d credi bility. Communis t reformer s an d frustrate d middl e cadre s dumpe d Ka dar an d mos t o f the old guar d a t the May 198 8 nationa l conference , an d the floodgate s o f pluralis m wer e opene d wide . Alread y a t th e beginnin g of tha t yea r a new press law had com e into forc e liftin g virtuall y al l stat e controls o n publishin g an d th e media . A strea m o f ne w newspapers , opposition periodicals , an d book s o n hithert o tabo o topic s appeared ; i n a fe w day s tw o hundre d thousan d copie s o f Arthu r Koestler' s Darkness at Noon wer e sold . Hungary's ne w genera l secretary , Karol y Grosz , faile d t o delive r a concrete program an d unit e the party behin d him, and unde r th e impetu s of reformer s i n party an d governmen t an d oppositio n forces , th e proces s of political decompressio n gathere d speed . A multiplicity o f new politica l

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parties, unions, an d othe r association s surge d int o th e breach . The Hun garian Democrati c Foru m emerge d a s a nationwid e movemen t fo r re form. B y th e sprin g o f 198 9 Hungar y wa s i n th e mids t o f uncontrolle d pluralistic ferment . Nationalisti c sentiment s wer e openl y displaye d a t mass demonstration s i n 198 8 ove r th e Transylvania n minorit y issu e an d in 198 9 o n th e reinstate d nationa l holida y (Marc h 15 ) commemoratin g the 184 8 revolution . The governmen t als o responde d t o popula r concern s b y activ e diplo macy o n behal f o f minorit y right s i n Romania . I n a n editoria l o n Marc h 15, 1989 , the party dail y Nepszabadsag accuse d Ceausesc u o f operatin g a dictatorshi p tha t ha d "practicall y abolishe d th e constitution " an d called th e si x Communis t veteran s wh o ha d addresse d a letter o f protes t to Ceausesc u th e real representatives o f the Romanian people . In anothe r concession, th e governmen t suspende d wor k o n th e ecologicall y contro versial joint Czechoslovak-Hungaria n da m projec t o n th e Danube . The Communis t reformers ' wis h t o divorc e th e part y fro m it s pas t culminated i n th e reevaluatio n o f 1956 . Originall y define d a s a counter revolution, i t ha d bee n subsequentl y describe d b y Kada r a s a nationa l tragedy. B y Ma y 198 9 th e even t wa s openl y referre d t o a s a popula r uprising an d revolutio n an d it s leadin g figure, Imr e Nagy , a s a goo d Communist an d martyr ; th e followin g month , Nag y an d hi s associates , who ha d bee n execute d i n 195 8 an d place d i n unmarke d graves , wer e ceremoniously reburie d amids t a mas s demonstration . Freedo m o f speec h and associatio n pu t i n questio n no t onl y th e party' s exclusiv e leadin g role bu t it s internal , Leninis t discipline . A t a meetin g i n mid-Ma y o f th e party's proliferatin g "refor m circles, " th e Stalinist , "Asiatic " mode l o f despotism wa s denounce d alon g wit h Kadar' s neo-Stalinism , an d civi l rights, politica l pluralism , an d marketizatio n o f th e econom y wer e en dorsed. The party's leadin g reformer, Imr e Pozsgay, asserte d (ironically , i n a n interview wit h Radi o Fre e Europe ) tha t "i t i s impossibl e t o refor m th e communist syste m now existing in the Soviet Union an d Eastern Europe " and tha t a ne w part y woul d aris e base d o n th e Europea n socialis t an d social democrati c pattern ; h e openl y accepte d th e possibilit y tha t th e party migh t on e da y find itsel f i n opposition. 97 Th e "bureaucratic , over centralized mode l o f socialis m an d th e buildin g o f stat e socialis m an d a party-state" ha d ru n thei r course , declare d Prim e Ministe r Miklo s Ne meth; a multiparty syste m was the best guarantee o f democracy , an d th e

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Western experienc e wa s a "treasur e house " fo r thos e wh o wishe d t o avoid mistake s an d wron g paths. 98 At a congress i n October , th e officia l Hungarian Socialis t Workers ' part y reconstitute d itsel f a s th e "Hungar ian Socialis t party, " formall y surrenderin g th e Leninis t leadin g rol e an d identifying itsel f wit h th e Western socia l democrati c mainstream . Onl y a small fractio n o f th e HSW P membershi p too k th e troubl e t o joi n th e new party , whil e a fe w tru e believer s denie d th e legalit y o f th e transfor mation an d trie d t o kee p th e ol d part y alive . Bu t t o al l appearances , Marxism-Leninism i n Hungary ha d peacefull y passe d away . Meanwhile, a n invigorate d parliamen t enacte d a constitutiona l amendment declarin g Hungar y a republi c pur e an d simpl e instea d o f a "people's republic " dedicate d t o socialism . Ne w law s provide d fo r free , multiparty election s an d guarantee d civi l rights , affirmin g tha t freedo m of conscienc e an d religio n wa s a fundamenta l libert y no t grante d b y th e state o r an y othe r authority . Pluralis m returne d wit h numerou s ne w political parties , an d i n th e two-roun d electio n i n March/Apri l 199 0 Hungarians delivere d thei r verdic t o n socialism . Th e ol d Communis t party wa s exclude d fro m parliament , an d th e ne w socialis t versio n wo n less tha n 9 percen t o f th e vote . Democrati c Forum , th e conservative nationalist part y le d b y Jozse f Antall , secure d a comfortabl e pluralit y with ove r 4 0 percent , followe d b y th e urban-libera l Fre e Democrats an d the reconstitute d Independen t Smallholders . Th e first ac t o f th e ne w parliament wa s to declare Octobe r 2 3 a national holida y i n commemora tion o f th e "gloriou s freedo m struggle " of 1956 . Polish Reforms. Hungary' s gradua l an d peaceful abandonmen t o f Len inism coincide d wit h a more dramati c shif t t o semidemocrac y i n Poland . Solidarity's challeng e ha d bee n repulse d b y th e Brezhne v Doctrine , bu t the Polis h part y foun d itsel f wholl y discredite d i n th e aftermat h o f martial law , leavin g th e tas k o f governmen t t o Genera l Jaruzelsk i an d his smal l ban d o f Communis t an d nonpart y collaborators . Hi s attempt s at economi c refor m me t wit h recurren t labo r unres t a s wel l a s a pro found skepticis m tha t manifeste d itsel f i n th e disappointin g resul t o f th e 1987 referendum o n reform measures . The regime's attempt s t o simulat e democracy wit h a n advisor y counci l o f selecte d non-Communist s an d t o win worke r suppor t wit h mor e responsiv e officia l trad e union s faile d t o generate eve n th e minima l politica l consensu s necessar y t o extrac t Po land fro m it s economic quagmire .

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The churc h remaine d th e onl y institutio n enjoyin g popula r legitimac y while th e rum p o f th e proscribe d Solidarit y soldiere d o n wit h call s fo r pluralism. Meanwhile , i n th e burgeonin g alternativ e civi l society , inde pendent association s proliferated , some , lik e Fightin g Solidarit y an d th e Confederation fo r a n Independen t Polan d (KPN) , openl y callin g fo r national sovereignt y an d a n en d t o communis t rule . The regim e applie d relatively fe w restriction s o n religiou s an d intellectua l freedom , allowin g a fe w o f th e mor e innocuou s independen t club s t o b e legall y registered , tolerating a vas t countercultur e o f undergroun d publications , an d sanc tioning th e reestablishmen t o f th e moderat e independen t journa l Res Publica. Suc h concession s di d no t exten d t o outrigh t politica l opposi tion. Th e polic e continue d t o haras s radica l dissidents , an d a n ope n attempt t o reviv e th e ol d Polis h Socialis t part y i n Novembe r 198 7 wa s quickly suppressed . Jaruzelski' s appeal s fo r nationa l reconciliatio n wer e belied b y his adamant refusa l t o ope n a dialogue with Solidarity . Two wave s o f strikes , i n Apri l an d Augus t 1988 , impelled th e regim e to relent . Afte r th e first, censorshi p wa s relaxe d t o allo w wide r discus sion o f issue s an d a n "anticrisi s pact. " I n August , afte r th e strikin g workers i n Silesi a an d o n th e Balti c coas t ha d reiterate d th e deman d fo r relegalization o f Solidarity , the regime for th e first time since martial la w opened talk s wit h Lec h Walesa . Thi s histori c surrender , presumabl y sanctioned b y Gorbachev , reflecte d no t onl y economi c urgenc y bu t als o a hope that compromis e wit h th e politically seasone d Wales a migh t ste m the rampant radicalis m o f a younger generatio n o f Polish workers. Face d with empt y coffer s an d th e threat o f anarchy , Jaruzelski opene d th e doo r to meaningfu l politica l reform . The subsequen t roundtabl e talk s betwee n th e regime , Solidarity , an d the officia l trad e unio n progresse d throug h month s o f toug h bargainin g to reac h a historic agreemen t i n April 1989 . The accord s anticipate d th e relegalization o f Solidarity , th e farmers ' Rura l Solidarity , th e Indepen dent Students ' Association , an d othe r pro-Solidarit y associations . Th e institutional structur e o f governmen t wa s reformed , wit h a ne w stat e presidency enjoyin g limite d powers ; a new , freel y electe d Senate ; an d a lower house , th e Sejm , tha t woul d nee d a two-third s majorit y vot e t o override Senate veto of it s bills, and i n which, at least in the first election, the Communist coalitio n (th e Polish Unite d Workers' party an d it s allie d parties) woul d b e guarantee d 6 5 percen t o f th e seats . Th e oppositio n was allowe d t o publis h it s ow n newspaper s an d give n limite d acces s t o

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state radi o an d television . Th e accord s als o sanctione d reform s aimin g at a marke t econom y a s wel l a s wag e indexatio n t o a maximu m o f 8 0 percent (ironically , a limitation rejecte d b y the official trad e union). Soon after thi s compromise , th e regim e move d t o legislat e normalize d rela tions betwee n stat e an d church , restorin g th e latter' s independenc e an d property an d openin g th e wa y fo r ful l diplomati c relation s wit h th e Vatican. Walesa haile d th e accord s a s th e beginnin g o f th e roa d t o a demo cratic an d fre e Poland , an d too k pain s durin g th e campaig n t o convinc e skeptical Pole s tha t partia l democrac y wa s bu t a prelud e t o ful l self determination: "Ou r representative s i n th e Sej m an d Senat e ca n creat e a platform fro m whic h w e will jum p int o freedo m an d independence. " " The June 198 9 election s confirme d th e wors t fear s o f Poland' s Commu nists. Radi o Fre e Europ e broadcast s an d financial donation s fro m th e West aide d Solidarity' s vigorou s campaign , an d on e Solidarit y electio n program o n televisio n feature d Zbignie w Brzezinski , Yves Montand, an d Stevie Wonder . Th e regim e proteste d suc h "intervention, " bu t th e out come o f th e electio n coul d hardl y b e attribute d t o foreig n assistance . Poland's voter s overwhelmingl y endorse d Solidarity' s candidate s i n th e open contest s an d denie d eve n unoppose d Communis t candidate s vic tory i n th e first round . Jaruzelsk i commente d stoically , "I t wa s th e first time tha t voter s coul d choos e freely . Tha t freedo m wa s use d fo r th e crossing-off o f thos e wh o wer e i n powe r till now." 1 0 0 Hi s ow n electio n to th e presidency onl y cam e abou t b y grace of Solidarity' s support . Hungary wa s alon e amon g Poland' s Warsa w Pac t associate s t o pub licly expres s th e obvious : "Whateve r ma y happe n i n th e future , afte r four decade s th e peopl e o f a n Eas t Europea n countr y hav e fo r th e first time expresse d thei r rea l opinio n o n a syste m tha t wa s impose d o n them." 1 0 1 Whe n politica l deadloc k finally gav e wa y t o th e appointmen t of a Solidarity-le d government , Romania' s Ceausesc u issue d a futil e cal l for Warsa w Pac t interventio n t o salvag e socialism . "Everythin g i s fine and there' s nothin g t o worr y about, " sai d KG B chairma n Vladimi r Kryuchkov afte r meetin g wit h th e ne w prim e minister , th e once-impris oned Catholi c intellectual Tadeus z Mazowiecki. 102 The Kremlin' s professe d equanimit y wa s a n ominou s signa l fo r th e other rulin g parties, for i t confirmed th e death o f th e Brezhnev Doctrine . Earlier i n th e year , Hungary' s part y leade r ha d reporte d afte r meetin g his counterpar t i n Moscow : "Analyzin g th e historica l lesson s o f 195 6

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and 1968 , Mikhai l Gorbache v sai d tha t ther e mus t b e maximu m guar antees today tha t outsid e forc e shoul d no t b e used t o resolv e the interna l affairs o f socialist countries." Gorbachev als o opined that the Hungaria n reforms wer e "historicall y ripe." 1 0 3 And Poland' s Mieczysla w Rakowsk i warned hi s fello w Communist s no t t o expec t hel p fro m th e Sovie t Union ; admitting tha t i n the past th e Sovie t Union ha d "t o som e exten t violate d [Poland's] sovereignty, " h e declare d tha t Polan d i s "no w absolutel y independent i n shaping it s policies." 104 Poland's ne w governmen t include d som e Communists , amon g the m the interio r minister , bu t it s politica l orientatio n reflecte d th e massiv e popular rejectio n o f Marxism-Leninism . Mazowieck i invoke d th e sup port o f al l "patrioti c sociopolitica l forces " whil e anticipatin g tha t th e application o f necessaril y painfu l economi c remedie s woul d mak e th e honeymoon a shor t one . Rakowski , fo r hi s part , calle d upo n forme r communists t o buil d a "might y part y o f th e Polis h left, " evidentl y hop ing tha t Solidarit y woul d exhaus t it s popularit y i n th e thankles s tas k o f economic reform. 105 At it s Januar y 199 0 congress , th e Polis h Communis t part y followe d the Hungaria n Party' s lea d i n renamin g itsel f "Socia l Democrac y o f th e Republic o f Poland, " whil e a mor e reformis t factio n spli t of f t o for m a "Union o f Socia l Democracy." Th e forme r passe d a resolution acknowl edging th e crime s committe d b y th e part y i n Stalinis t time s a s wel l as its responsibility fo r th e economic crisis ; it als o apologize d fo r havin g punished Pole s fo r thei r politica l view s bu t rejecte d an y notio n o f tangible redres s fo r thes e wrongs . A concurren t publi c opinio n surve y revealed tha t scarcel y 1 percen t o f Pole s stil l supporte d th e Commun ists. 106 The radical economi c reforms an d austerit y measure s promulgated b y the new coalitio n i n December 198 9 were no prescription fo r popularity , and th e Polis h politica l compromis e soo n bega n t o fra y a s the other Eas t Europeans move d t o unqualifie d democracy . Popula r impatienc e wit h growing materia l hardshi p an d th e continuin g predominanc e o f forme r Communists i n stat e administratio n le d t o a spli t i n Solidarit y rank s between supporter s o f Prim e Ministe r Tadeus z Mazowieck i an d Lec h Walesa, th e latte r advocatin g mor e rapi d chang e an d promotin g hi s candidacy fo r president . B y lat e 199 0 Polan d wa s catchin g u p t o it s neighbors wit h th e transformatio n o f Solidarit y int o competin g politica l parties, and Lec h Walesa wa s electe d president .

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East Germany and Bulgaria. "W e inten d t o continu e i n th e previou s proven way, " declare d th e Eas t Germa n part y leade r Eric h Honecke r i n June 1988 , dismissin g perestroika a s a Sovie t remed y fo r Sovie t prob lems. 107 A s th e Politburo' s chie f ideologist , Rober t Hager , pu t it , ther e was n o nee d t o repape r one' s wall s jus t becaus e a neighbo r wa s doin g so. 108 On e sourc e o f thi s arroganc e wa s th e Eas t Germa n economy' s comparatively hig h productivity , bu t th e officia l coolnes s towar d glasnost an d politica l refor m derive d mainl y fro m th e proximit y o f anothe r Germany, stronger , democratic , an d economicall y prosperous . Despit e the efforts o f the regime to promote a distinct, East German nationalism , the constan t exposur e o f it s subject s (throug h Wes t Germa n television ) to image s o f freedo m an d plent y continue d t o undermin e it s clai m t o success an d legitimacy . Th e Socialis t Unit y Party , SE D b y it s Germa n initials, base d tha t legitimac y o n a spuriou s identificatio n o f th e GD R with Germa n antifascism . I n Decembe r 1988 , th e authoritie s banne d circulation o f a n issu e of th e Sovie t diges t Sputnik tha t carrie d a n articl e arguing tha t Stali n an d th e ol d Germa n Communis t part y ha d con tributed t o Hitler' s rise . Soviet Foreig n Ministe r Eduar d Shevardnadz e affirme d lamel y a t a press conferenc e i n Vienn a tha t "eac h stat e ha s th e righ t t o buil d it s frontiers a s i t wishes, " bu t wha t hi s Britis h counterpar t describe d a s a "monstrosity," th e Berli n Wall , remaine d a vivi d symbo l o f th e GDR' s political insecurity. 109 Wes t Germa n leverag e secure d periodi c conces sions to eas e cross-border traffi c an d famil y reunification , ye t the major ity o f case s recorde d b y th e Wes t Germa n huma n right s Centra l Docu mentation Burea u a t Salzgitte r involve d priso n sentence s fo r th e offens e of "preparin g t o escap e fro m th e republic." 110 Numerous group s o f dissenter s forme d i n th e mid-1980s , mos t o f them shelterin g unde r th e protectiv e umbrell a o f th e Evangelica l church , which becam e a n activ e proponen t o f socia l an d politica l renewal . In 1988, som e churc h leader s issue d a cal l fo r democratization , declarin g that th e part y "mus t renounc e it s monopol y o n trut h an d it s fundamen tal clai m t o superiority " ove r al l othe r institutions. 111 Th e regime' s response wa s t o crac k dow n o n dissident s an d impos e tigh t censorshi p on churc h publications . Loca l election s i n Ma y 198 9 wer e manipulate d to produc e th e requisit e sweepin g Communis t victory , a frau d tha t spurred dissident s t o ne w activism . Th e rigidit y o f th e Honecke r regim e was motivate d i n larg e measur e b y th e logica l outcom e o f respec t fo r

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political an d civi l rights : democrati c self-determination , whic h i n tur n could reviv e the prospect o f Germa n unification . Hungary's decision s i n earl y 198 9 t o dismantl e th e iro n curtai n an d adhere t o th e international conventio n o n refugee s (th e latter i n orde r t o obtain financial ai d fo r refugee s fro m Romania ) ha d a n unexpecte d effect o n Eas t Germany . Beginnin g i n August , thousand s o f Eas t Ger mans too k th e Hungaria n rout e t o escap e t o Wes t Germany , an d whe n East Berli n proteste d tha t thi s violate d a bilatera l accor d datin g bac k t o 1969, Hungar y unilaterall y suspende d tha t agreemen t o n th e ground s that th e CSC E Vienn a norm s o n freedo m o f trave l too k precedence . By November, som e 120,00 0 Eas t German s ha d fle d throug h Hungary , Czechoslovakia, an d Poland . This ne w exodu s presented th e Honecke r regim e with a n economi c a s well a s politica l dilemma , fo r th e GD R coul d hardl y affor d th e los s o f masses o f young , skille d worker s an d professionals . I t als o emboldene d domestic dissident s alread y inspire d b y th e wav e o f refor m i n Poland , Hungary, an d th e Sovie t Unio n t o for m pressur e groups , notabl y th e New Forum , an d moun t publi c protests . Honecke r gav e order s fo r th e police t o us e al l mean s t o dispers e a demonstratio n i n Leipzi g o n Octo ber 9 , whic h dre w 70,00 0 people , bu t thes e wer e countermande d b y some o f hi s Politbur o colleagues , avertin g wha t migh t hav e becom e a replay o f th e Tiananme n massacr e i n Chin a a fe w month s earlier . Gor bachev, i n Eas t Berli n fo r th e GDR' s 40t h anniversar y celebrations , ha d also counsele d compromise , reportedl y tellin g Honecke r tha t "thos e who resis t history wil l be punished b y life." m112 Within a week , Honecke r wa s deposed , an d th e ne w part y leader , Egon Krenz , move d t o ope n th e Wall , initiat e talk s wit h oppositio n groups, an d promis e politica l reform . A t a specia l part y congres s o n December 8—9 , Krenz was replaced b y the reformist lawye r Grego r Gys i amid condemnatio n o f th e Honecke r regime' s mismanagemen t an d cor ruption. Honecke r an d the n Kren z wer e expelle d fro m th e redesigne d "Party o f Democrati c Socialism, " an d i n January , Honecke r an d thre e other forme r Politbur o member s wer e charge d wit h treason ; accordin g to th e indictment , the y ha d systematicall y trample d fundamenta l huma n rights, warpe d th e medi a wit h censorship , squandere d an d embezzle d public funds , an d sanctione d electora l fraud. 113 The East Berlin parliament meanwhil e unanimousl y repeale d th e con stitutional entrenchmen t o f th e party' s leadin g role , then legislate d free -

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dom o f th e pres s fro m governmen t control . Th e collaps e o f Leninis m i n the GD R ha d com e wit h astonishin g rapidity , bringin g no t onl y th e turmoil o f unfettere d pluralis m bu t als o a n issu e o f self-determinatio n unique t o Eas t Germany : whethe r it s people wer e disposed , an d free , t o seek unification wit h thei r Western conationals . The opening of th e Wal l unleashed a flood o f economi c refugee s tha t force d bot h Germany s t o seek a quic k an d stabl e politica l solution . Bonn' s promis e o f economi c largess seale d th e fat e o f a n independen t Eas t Germany . Th e leadin g West Germa n partie s poure d thei r resource s int o a n electio n campaig n that le d i n Marc h t o th e triump h o f th e Easter n Christia n Democrats ; they an d th e Socia l Democrat s swampe d th e allianc e o f grass-root s opposition groups , includin g Ne w Forum , tha t ha d momentaril y pre vailed i n th e revolution . Th e reforme d Communist s manage d t o wi n 1 6 percent o f th e vote . Th e resultin g coalitio n governmen t o f Christia n Democrats, Fre e Democrats , an d Socia l Democrat s committe d itsel f t o seek speed y unification . Th e restoratio n o f huma n right s i n Eas t Ger many reopene d a "Germa n Question " tha t wa s troublesom e fo r bot h East an d Wes t (se e chapter 6) . By 1988 , a fe w huma n right s an d environmentalis t group s had emerge d in Bulgaria , includin g th e Clu b fo r th e Suppor t o f Perestroik a an d Glas nost, th e Independent Associatio n fo r th e Defense o f Human Rights , an d Eco-Glasnost, bu t the y mad e littl e headwa y agains t th e regime' s deter mination t o suppres s dissent . Th e fal l o f Todo r Zhivkov , wh o ha d rule d with a n iro n han d fo r thirty-fiv e years , came abruptl y o n Novembe r 10 , 1989. The palac e cou p wa s engineere d b y hi s successor , forme r Foreig n Minister Peta r Mladenov , an d evidentl y ha d Gorbachev' s approval . Th e new leadershi p subsequentl y charge d Zhivko v wit h corruptio n an d con demned hi m fo r hi s policies of discriminatio n agains t the Turkish minor ity ( a measur e tha t provoke d nationalis t counterdemonstrations) . Lega l proscription o f independen t politica l activit y wa s abolished , a s wa s th e party's constitutiona l leadin g role . Althoug h Mladeno v insiste d tha t reform woul d tak e plac e withi n th e contex t o f socialism , h e promise d early multipart y elections , th e separatio n o f part y an d state , an d a shif t to a more market-oriented economy . The "allied " Agrarian part y promptl y reasserted it s independence , an d a n oppositio n alliance , th e Unio n o f Democratic Forces , emerged t o tes t the promise o f democratization . The June 199 0 elections , essentiall y fre e accordin g t o foreig n observ ers, brough t a resul t a t varianc e wit h th e othe r Eas t Europeans ' first

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response t o pluralisti c democracy : th e renamed , ex-Communis t Bulgar ian Socialis t part y secure d a parliamentar y majority . Th e viscera l rejec tion o f al l remnant s o f Sovie t influenc e tha t distinguishe d th e res t o f th e region wa s absen t fro m th e historicall y Russophili c Bulgaria n politica l culture. Socialism , i f no t it s authoritaria n variant , ha d struc k deepe r roots, an d th e ne w governin g part y promise d economi c reform . Th e Muslim "Movemen t fo r Right s an d Freedoms " als o secure d representa tion i n parliament , an d th e ne w governmen t undertoo k t o suspen d offi cial discriminatio n agains t ethni c Turks . Bu t thi s apparen t continuit y and gradualis m di d no t res t o n widesprea d consensus ; th e firs t month s of Bulgaria n democrac y wer e marke d b y anti-Communis t demonstra tions, administrativ e paralysis , an d attempt s a t creatin g a mor e broadl y representative coalitio n government . Czechoslovakia's "Velvet" Revolution. A few day s afte r th e Bulgaria n coup, a n equall y abrup t bu t mor e fundamenta l revolutio n engulfe d Czechoslovakia. Afte r th e suppressio n o f th e drea m o f "socialis m wit h a human face, " Czechoslovaki a unde r Gusta v Husa k an d hi s successo r Milos Jake s ha d suffere d th e protracte d nightmar e o f "normalization. " Abjuring politica l liberalization , th e regim e concentrate d o n satisfyin g the basi c material need s o f a n apatheti c populace. The party wa s purge d of al l reformis t elements , an d forma l endorsemen t o f th e Sovie t invasio n and normalizatio n becam e a prerequisit e fo r meaningfu l employment . Those dissenter s wh o di d no t choos e exil e bu t adhere d t o th e loos e Charter 7 7 organization , th e Committe e fo r th e Defense o f th e Unjustl y Persecuted (VONS) , an d Polish-Czechoslova k Solidarit y (whic h link s Charter 7 7 an d KOR ) wer e subjecte d t o constan t harassment . Eve r vigilant fo r sign s o f politica l deviation , th e regim e readil y resorte d t o repressive measure s agains t th e ostensibl y innocuou s Jaz z Sectio n o f th e Czechoslovak Unio n o f Musician s (fo r it s "counterrevolutionar y activ ity"), roc k groups , religiou s activists , an d spokesme n fo r th e cultura l rights o f th e Hungaria n minority . The obviou s similarit y betwee n Sovie t perestroika an d Dubcek' s 196 8 Action Progra m cause d acut e discomfor t t o th e regime , al l th e mor e s o since th e Gorbachevit e critiqu e o f th e Brezhne v er a threatene d t o nega tively reevaluat e th e Sovie t intervention . Dubcek' s congratulator y mes sage t o Gorbache v an d th e airin g o f hi s view s a t a n Italia n Communis t

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conference an d o n Hungaria n televisio n i n Apri l 198 9 adde d t o th e embarrassment. Gorbachev' s encouragemen t produce d tentativ e step s toward economi c restructuring , bu t glasnost an d politica l refor m re mained anathem a t o th e conservativ e leadership . Th e ne w sloga n o f so cialist pluralis m hel d n o appea l fo r Genera l Secretar y Jakes , wh o de clared in 198 8 that "th e broadenin g o f democratization i n no case means the creatio n o f spac e fo r th e legalizatio n o f politica l oppositio n which , as al l experience s t o dat e show , canno t b e othe r tha n antisocialist." 114 Despite th e regime' s effort s a t suppression , a groun d swel l o f protes t arose i n Czechoslovaki a a s th e revolutionar y wav e swep t throug h it s neighbors. The issue s had becom e mor e divers e sinc e Charte r 77' s origi nal concer n wit h violation s o f huma n rights , an d encompasse d environ mental decay , cultura l freedom , militar y service , an d fundamenta l chang e in th e politica l system . I n earl y 1988 , som e 600,00 0 signature s wer e collected o n a petitio n callin g fo r religiou s freedom , an d a relate d dem onstration i n Bratislav a i n Marc h wa s quelle d b y force . Undergroun d publications proliferated , an d numerou s ne w independen t group s emerged . In earl y 1989 , on th e ev e of th e anniversar y o f Jan Palach' s self-immola tion i n protest agains t th e Sovie t crushin g o f th e "Pragu e spring, " Radi o Free Europe broadcas t a cautionary messag e from th e playwright Vacla v Havel. The regime imprisoned hi m o n ground s o f incitement , promptin g protests fro m hundred s o f prominen t intellectual s a s well fro m Wester n governments an d huma n right s advocates . When a student demonstratio n i n Pragu e o n Novembe r 17 , 198 9 wa s brutally disperse d b y th e police , Czechoslovak s responde d wit h a wav e of mas s protest s an d strikes . Face d wit h a wholl y alienate d populatio n and lackin g Moscow' s support , th e part y leadershi p resigne d a wee k later. A genera l strik e o n Novembe r 2 7 impelle d th e governmen t t o accept th e demand s o f th e ne w oppositio n group , Civi c Forum , an d i n the ne w coalitio n governmen t name d o n Decembe r 3 , Communists wer e reduced t o a minority . B y th e en d o f Decembe r Vacla v Have l ha d replaced Husa k a s president, whil e Dubce k wa s electe d chairma n o f th e federal assembly . I n th e meantime , censorshi p wa s lifted , politica l pris oners wer e amnestied , an d ne w law s wer e drafte d guaranteein g civi l rights. Th e beleaguere d party , unde r it s ne w leader , Ladisla v Adamec , announced th e rehabilitation o f thos e purged afte r 196 8 an d it s espousa l of pluralisti c democracy , bu t it s membershi p an d influenc e wer e rapidl y

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eroding. Althoug h fre e election s wer e schedule d fo r th e spring , i n Janu ary 199 0 th e Communist s agree d t o surrende r thei r majorit y i n parlia ment. In his eloquent Ne w Year' s address , the new Presiden t Have l dre w u p a disma l balanc e shee t o f th e socialis t record . Afte r reflectin g o n eco nomic decline , pollution, exploitatio n o f workers , an d fallin g lif e expec tancy, he stated : The worst thin g i s that w e live in a contaminate d mora l environment . W e fel l morally ill because we became used to saying something different fro m wha t we think. . . . The previous regime, armed with its arrogant and intolerant ideology, degraded peopl e int o a productiv e forc e an d natur e int o a too l o f produc tion. . .. I t reduce d gifte d an d autonomou s people , skillfull y workin g i n thei r own country , t o nut s an d bolt s o f som e monstrousl y huge , noisy an d stinkin g machine, whose real meaning is not clear to anyone. . . . We had all become used to th e totalitaria n syste m an d accepte d i t a s a n unchangeabl e fac t an d thu s helped t o perpetuat e it . . .. I dream o f a republic independent, fre e an d democratic, o f a republi c economicall y prosperou s an d ye t sociall y just _ short , o f a humane republic that serves the individual and therefore hold s the hope that the individual will serve it in turn. 115 The rapidit y an d peacefu l characte r o f th e revolutio n testifie d t o th e popularity o f thes e sentiment s i n Czechoslovakia , whos e earlie r demo cratic experienc e prepare d i t bette r tha n som e o f it s neighbor s fo r th e tasks ahead . In the election s o f June 8-9 , Civi c Forum an d it s Slovakia n branch, Publi c Agains t Violence , wo n 16 8 ou t o f th e 30 0 seat s i n th e Federal Assembly , agains t 47 fo r th e Communis t party . A former libera l Communist, Maria n Calfa , wa s name d prim e minister , an d Dubce k wa s confirmed a s chairma n o f th e Federa l Assembly . A democrati c futur e seemed assured , althoug h th e ope n assertio n o f th e severa l nationa l interests soo n pu t i n questio n th e viabilit y o f th e federa l union . Slovak ian nationalis m an d separatis m wa s o n th e rise , provoking lon g debat e over th e namin g o f th e state , endin g wit h th e compromis e formul a "Czech an d Slova k Federa l Republic. " Th e Hungaria n minorit y als o secured parliamentar y representatio n bu t foun d littl e sympath y i n th e increasingly nationalisti c Slovakia n republica n government . Coup in Romania. Th e fal l o f Romania' s Ceausesc u wa s no t fre e o f violence. Tha t tyrannica l dictator , rulin g ove r th e poores t country' s i n the Soviet sphere, remained fanaticall y oppose d t o liberalization, arguin g

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(plausibly) tha t th e party "canno t share , and eve n less relinquish it s role, without disappearin g soone r o r later." 116 Th e party, i n fact , wa s merel y the servan t o f hi s corrup t an d nepotisti c rule . Ceausescu' s neo-Stalinis t convictions wer e displaye d i n th e ruthles s suppressio n o f dissen t b y th e dreaded Securitate ; i n monumenta l constructio n projects , notabl y a ne w palace, larger than Versailles, for whic h a good part of historic Buchares t had t o b e razed ; an d i n a massiv e experimen t i n socia l engineerin g aiming to eliminat e ove r hal f o f th e countr y village s (an d what remaine d of privat e farming ) an d th e resettlemen t o f farmer s i n "agroindustria l centers." Designed ostensibl y t o increas e th e stoc k o f arabl e lan d an d industri alize foo d production , tha t "systematization " progra m als o threatene d to destro y th e historica l an d cultura l inheritanc e o f th e Hungaria n an d German minorities . I t exacerbate d th e alread y straine d officia l relation s between Budapes t an d Buchares t an d dre w worldwid e protest . Begin ning i n 1987 , thousands o f Romanians , mostl y ethni c Hungarians , sough t refuge i n Hungary , wher e th e part y newspape r accuse d Ceausesc u o f operating a dictatorshi p tha t "practicall y abolished " th e constitutio n and disregarde d huma n rights. 117 In early 1989 , Hungary joine d Swede n in havin g th e U N Huma n Right s Commissio n launc h a n internationa l investigation o f th e situatio n i n Romania , whil e th e Europea n Commu nity, France , an d othe r Wester n countrie s suspende d trad e negotiation s or resorte d t o diplomati c sanctions . Within Romania , th e Securitat e operate d wit h a vas t networ k o f informers t o ni p protest i n the bud . A workers' demonstratio n i n Braso v in Novembe r 198 7 wa s swiftl y crushed . Ethni c Hungaria n dissenters , including th e forme r part y officia l Karol y Kiraly , an d other s wh o i n th e early 1980 s manage d t o disseminat e som e samizda t material , wer e si lenced. Th e fe w Romanian s wh o dare d t o criticiz e th e regim e openly , such a s Doin a Corne a i n Cluj , suffere d sever e reprisals . A n anonymou s group stylin g itself "Romania n Democrati c Action " issue d a program i n 1987 callin g for a return t o parliamentary democracy , a s did th e organi zation "Fre e Romania " founde d b y ethni c Romania n refugee s i n Hun gary. In Marc h 1989 , si x part y veterans , includin g forme r foreig n min ister Corneli u Manescu , addresse d a n ope n lette r to Ceausesc u denouncin g the village systematizatio n an d constructio n programs , the force d assim ilation o f minorities , an d a n economi c polic y tha t produce d penury . They calle d o n Ceausesc u t o "restor e th e constitutiona l guarantee s re -

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garding th e right s o f citizens . Thi s wil l enabl e yo u t o observ e th e deci sions o f th e Vienn a Conferenc e o n Huma n Right s [sic]." 118 Polic e ha rassment wa s their reward . With th e oppositio n tin y an d fragmented , an d wit h Ceausesc u imper vious t o externa l pressure , ther e seeme d t o b e n o promis e o f a n en d t o Romania's agony . Th e unexpecte d revolutio n bega n i n th e cit y o f Timi soara o n Decembe r 16,1989 . Ethnic Hungarians were joined b y Roman ians i n defens e o f th e Protestan t pasto r Laszl o Tokes , who wa s abou t t o be deporte d fo r hi s criticis m o f th e regime . O n Ceausescu' s orders , th e Securitate turne d th e ensuin g demonstratio n int o a bloodbath , prompt ing simila r demonstration s elsewhere . Upo n hi s retur n fro m a visi t t o Iran, th e dictato r calle d fo r a publi c rall y o f suppor t i n Buchares t o n December 2 1 , but th e stratage m backfired . Th e Timisoara massacr e ha d finally galvanize d th e opposition . Ordere d t o marsha l troop s agains t the demonstrators , th e ministe r o f defense , Vasil e Milea, committe d sui cide, and th e army joined th e revolution. Fo r a few days , battle raged be tween rebel s an d th e loya l securit y force s a s a National Salvatio n Fron t emerged to fill the vacuum o f power. The execution o f Ceausesc u an d hi s wife o n Christma s Da y marke d th e en d o f a tragi c er a i n Romania n history. The National Salvatio n Fron t wa s dominate d b y dissident an d oppor tunistic Communists , includin g th e interi m president , th e party' s forme r chief ideologist , Io n Iliescu . (Som e o f the m eventuall y claime d tha t the y had bee n lon g plottin g t o overthro w Ceausescu. ) It s earl y rul e wa s chaotic. Th e Fron t first declare d th e Communis t part y outlawe d ("con sidering tha t i t i s agains t th e nationa l spiri t an d ou r ancestors ' law") , then opte d t o put th e questio n t o a national referendum , the n postpone d the referendum. 119 I t promise d fre e elections , the n decide d t o contes t them a s a ne w party . Prewa r parties , notabl y th e Liberal s an d Nationa l Peasants wer e revived , an d i n Februar y 1990 , th e Fron t agree d t o shar e power wit h a provisional, multipart y Counci l o f Nationa l Unity . The revolutio n wa s applaude d b y Gorbache v an d th e West , an d th e first foreign ministe r t o visit Bucharest afte r th e dictator's fall , Hungary' s Gyula Horn , voice d som e confidenc e tha t ethni c discriminatio n woul d be suspended . Ye t nationalisti c intoleranc e soo n resurfaced , i n intereth nic clashe s an d i n th e pronouncement s o f th e Nationa l Peasan t party . The clos e identificatio n o f communis m wit h Ceausescu' s despotis m ha d left th e ideolog y beref t o f popula r legitimacy , bu t th e ol d nomenklatura

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expediently professe d democrati c principle s unde r th e guis e o f th e Na tional Salvatio n Front . I t improve d th e foo d supply , suspende d Ceau sescu's oppressiv e practices , an d thereb y manage d t o wi n th e suppor t o f a majorit y accustome d t o paternalistic government . The electio n campaig n wa s marke d b y intimidatio n an d violenc e against othe r parties , promptin g th e Stat e Departmen t t o temporaril y recall it s ambassador , an d b y a protracte d demonstratio n o f student s and intellectual s i n Buchares t agains t th e rul e o f forme r Communists . Iliescu an d th e Fron t nevertheles s triumphe d i n th e Ma y 2 0 election , obtaining 26 3 ou t o f 39 6 seat s i n th e Deputies ' Assembl y an d 9 2 ou t o f 119 i n th e Senate . Th e reconstitute d Libera l an d Peasan t parties , le d b y returning emigres , wer e fa r behind . Intimidatio n an d eve n frau d playe d a part , thoug h no t decisive , i n th e lopside d victor y o f th e Front . An d i t bode il l fo r nationa l reconciliatio n tha t th e electorall y stronges t part y possessed o f a credibl e democrati c platfor m wa s th e Hungaria n Demo cratic Union, which earne d th e votes of mos t ethni c Hungarians . The earl y recor d o f th e Iliesc u governmen t indicate d tha t th e transi tion t o a full y democrati c orde r i n Romani a woul d no t com e easily . Although th e Communis t part y ha d cease d t o exist , it s personne l an d appointees (apar t fro m Ceausescu' s relative s an d mos t expose d acolytes ) remained i n place. The Securitat e was renamed , bu t th e fear i t generate d did no t dissipate . Antigovernmen t protest s flare d up , an d i n Jun e th e government calle d i n miner s t o brutall y dispers e a prolonged , student led demonstratio n i n Bucharest . Freedo m o f th e pres s an d associatio n unleashed no t onl y libera l bu t als o chauvinisti c opinion . Th e initia l promises o f cultura l an d educationa l facilitie s fo r th e ethni c minoritie s were soo n qualifie d i f no t renege d on . Fo r al l th e officia l profession s o f reformist intention s an d respec t fo r huma n rights , i t appeare d tha t a cabal o f forme r Communist s ha d hijacke d Romania' s democrati c revo lution an d wa s expedientl y fannin g nationalis m t o bolste r it s popula r legitimacy, muc h a s Ceausesc u ha d don e earlier . Yugoslavia and Albania. A s th e las t Warsa w Pac t domin o fell , th e winds o f chang e reache d beyon d th e Sovie t sphere . Th e politica l affair s of Yugoslavi a ha d draw n littl e attentio n fro m th e Unite d State s an d it s allies after Tito' s declaratio n o f independence . The party's rul e remaine d unchallenged, an d huma n right s were circumscribed, bu t Yugoslavs wer e free t o trave l an d see k work abroa d an d th e country' s relation s wit h th e

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West becam e comparativel y cordial . Th e Titois t experimen t wit h work ers' self-managemen t provide d a semblanc e o f decentralizatio n withou t generating rea l economi c efficiency . After Tito' s death , centra l part y an d stat e authorit y wa s progressivel y undermined b y ethni c tensions an d economi c decline . In the mor e devel oped republic s o f Sloveni a an d Croatia , nationalisti c tendencie s resur faced an d combine d wit h pressure s fo r politica l democratizatio n an d even ful l autonomy . In th e backwar d Kosov o provinc e o f th e Serbia n republic, ethni c Albanian nationalis m provoke d a Serbian backlas h and , by earl y 1990 , a stat e o f nea r civi l war . Th e economi c disparitie s be tween region s exacerbate d ethni c rivalries , an d whil e th e Belgrad e gov ernment toye d wit h plan s fo r market-oriente d reforms , inflatio n reache d a rat e o f 2,00 0 percent . Bot h th e federa l part y an d th e governmen t seemed powerles s t o cop e o f thes e disintegrative forces , an d th e Serbian dominated militar y talke d darkl y o f th e need t o restore orde r an d unity . At it s Januar y 199 0 congress , th e Leagu e o f Yugosla v Communist s decided t o giv e u p it s politica l monopol y an d recommen d legislatio n instituting a multiparty system . Reformist delegate s failed t o win suppor t for a socia l democrati c redefinitio n o f th e League , mor e libera l huma n rights, an d greate r independenc e fo r republica n parties , s o a fe w day s later th e radica l Slovenia n part y secede d fro m th e League . Within a fe w months, a s the republica n partie s concentrate d o n thei r loca l constituen cies, the Leagu e effectivel y cease d t o exist . Non-Communis t nationalist s triumphed i n multipart y election s i n Sloveni a an d Croatia , an d th e tw o republics declare d thei r "sovereignty " withi n a yet-to-be-negotiated Yu goslav confederation . Serbi a trie d t o secur e a t leas t it s ow n republica n rule b y curtailin g the constitutiona l autonom y o f it s provinces o f Vojvo dina an d Kosovo . An d whe n Kosovo' s ethnic-Albanian-dominate d par liament challenge d centra l authority , Belgrad e dissolve d i t an d sen t i n the troops . Tension s ros e i n Bosnia-Herzegovin a a s well , betwee n th e Muslim majorit y an d th e Serbs . Thus, democrati c pluralis m ha d a peculiarl y disintegrativ e effec t o n multinational Yugoslavia . There , a s i n man y othe r part s o f th e region , the delegitimation o f stat e socialism unleashe d historical forces tha t wer e not necessaril y conduciv e t o unit y an d politica l stability . Simila r force s had le d i n th e interwa r perio d t o th e impositio n o f centralize d Serbia n rule. Ther e wa s n o guarante e tha t th e federatio n woul d withstan d th e

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wave o f nationa l self-determinatio n a s th e countr y drifte d towar d civi l war. There remaine d Albania , onc e a targe t o f cover t Anglo-America n efforts a t rollback , the n largel y ignore d b y th e Wes t a s i t withdre w i n the earl y 1960 s int o Stalinis t isolation . I t i s th e onl y Europea n countr y not part y t o th e Helsink i Fina l Act , an d th e onl y countr y wher e i t i s against th e law to speak t o a foreigner withou t officia l permission . Enve r Hoxha's successor , Rami z Alia , thundere d tha t "i n th e countrie s o f th e East, th e bourgeoi s an d opportunist s ar e workin g wit h unite d forces , with unifie d tactic s an d strategie s t o liquidat e socialism." 120 Bu t eve n this las t tru e believe r mad e a toke n concessio n t o politica l pluralis m when i n Januar y 199 0 h e announce d tha t hencefort h Albanian s coul d choose betwee n tw o Communis t candidate s i n elections . A fe w month s later, th e governmen t suspende d it s proscriptio n o f "religiou s propa ganda" an d declare d tha t i t wa s read y t o joi n th e CSCE . It s concurren t promise t o facilitat e foreig n trave l di d no t sto p th e stormin g o f Wester n embassies i n Jul y b y thousand s o f Albanian s impatien t t o escap e fro m the las t bastio n o f stat e socialis m i n Europe . I n earl y 1991 , face d wit h mounting protests , Ali a finally too k th e histori c ste p o f sanctionin g a more pluralistic democracy . Problems and Needs of Democratization. Th e yea r o f unexpecte d revolutions wa s followe d b y the year of fre e elections , and a new Easter n Europe bega n t o tak e shape . Th e legacie s o f nationa l history , bot h pre Communist an d Communist , marke d th e variegate d patter n o f transfor mation. Fro m Hungar y northward , a comparativel y stabl e democrati c order was emerging; political turbulenc e an d ethni c cleavages onc e agai n turned th e Balkans int o a n unstabl e region . For all , there remained man y obstacles an d pitfalls o n th e path o f convertin g Leninis t dictatorshi p int o pluralistic democracy . Th e pressin g an d universall y popula r deman d fo r the dismantlin g o f th e totalitaria n state' s mos t fearsom e agenc y o f en forcement, th e secre t police , coul d b e satisfie d wit h relativ e ease . Free dom o f th e press an d othe r politica l an d civi l rights coul d als o b e readil y reinstated, althoug h a s Have l observed , th e behaviora l transformatio n into a democratic civi l society will hav e to overcome decade s o f negativ e conditioning. An d th e veste d interest s o f th e ol d "ne w class " o f office holders an d managers , th e jo b securit y o f workers , th e universalit y an d

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adequacy o f socia l benefit s ar e al l threatene d b y th e linke d proces s o f democratization an d marketization . N o governmen t o r politica l part y could offe r a credible, painless panace a t o these concerns . East Europea n reformer s resor t readil y t o the Thatcherite "ther e i s no alternative" rationale , bu t th e emergin g democrati c orde r bear s th e heav y burdens o f penur y an d scarcity , o f dee p mistrust , grudges , an d corrup tion bequeathe d b y fort y year s o f socialism . Betraye d b y th e illusio n o f Communist Utopia , th e haples s Eas t European s ar e now pre y t o th e ne w illusion tha t democrac y an d th e marke t ca n wor k a magi c cure . Th e restoration o f politica l an d civi l right s allow s fo r governmen t b y renew able consent , an d th e marke t an d privat e propert y foste r productiv e competition, bu t th e satisfactio n o f al l need s an d desire s remain s a dangerous hop e read y t o b e exploite d b y demagogue s an d ideologues . The onl y certaintie s ar e tha t th e Marxist-Leninis t formul a ha s faile d the tes t o f histor y an d tha t th e Eas t Europeans ' fait h i n democrac y wil l be sorel y teste d b y th e economi c an d socia l transformatio n tha t lie s ahead. As th e Eas t European s begi n t o exploi t th e intoxicatin g opportunit y for self-determinatio n offere d b y Gorbachev , th e nee d fo r th e Wes t t o watch ove r huma n right s alter s bu t doe s no t disappear . Self-determina tion bring s wit h i t domesti c politica l turbulenc e an d th e reassertio n o f national interest s tha t ar e no t necessaril y conduciv e t o regiona l stabilit y and orderl y relation s i n th e regio n an d betwee n th e tw o alliances . A military an d ideologica l monolit h wa s fa r simple r t o dea l wit h tha n th e increasingly divers e an d unstabl e Easter n Europ e o f th e 1980 s an d 1990s . The West' s interes t i n reinforcin g refor m i n th e Sovie t Unio n an d rene gotiating th e condition s o f Europea n securit y ma y strai n it s principle d advocacy o f ful l self-determinatio n fo r th e Eas t Europeans , particularl y in the case of the several multinationa l states , including the Soviet Union . The notio n tha t th e Eas t European s nee d instructio n i n democrac y may appea r patronizin g an d evok e th e hoar y Communis t rational e tha t the masse s ar e no t politicall y matur e enoug h fo r mor e democrac y (an updating o f th e eve n hoarie r assertio n tha t th e part y mus t rul e i n th e name o f a proletaria t tha t ha s no t reache d a sufficien t leve l o f clas s consciousness). T o b e sure , neithe r th e pre-Communis t traditio n o f pa ternalistic statis m no r th e subsequen t socialis t authoritarianis m nurture d the toleranc e fo r opposit e view s an d willingnes s t o compromis e tha t ar e essential t o th e successfu l practic e o f pluralisti c politics . Th e creativ e

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intellectuals wh o playe d a prominen t rol e i n th e dissiden t movement s are sincere champions o f huma n rights , but the y ar e traditionally ambiv alent abou t th e merit s o f marke t democracy . An d ne w regime s intent o n marketization lac k th e stabl e constituenc y o f a larg e propertie d an d entrepreneurial class . Histor y ha s bequeathe d t o thes e societie s shar p class an d ethni c antagonisms , an d economi c reconstructio n wil l creat e new socia l cleavage s a s compromise s ar e mad e amon g th e competin g claims o f market-drive n growt h an d redistributiv e justic e an d wit h re spect t o foreig n ownershi p o f industrie s an d th e media . A s the euphori a over regaine d nationa l autonom y dissipates , th e har d choice s demande d by reconstructio n ma y imperi l th e fragil e consensu s fo r marke t democ racy. Effectiv e politica l pluralis m depend s o n agreemen t o n th e rule s o f the game. It is a game in which th e East Europeans hav e little experienc e and which i n the short run promises psychological relie f bu t few materia l rewards. Political an d civi l right s ca n b e constitutionall y guaranteed , an d th e principles o f democrac y ca n b e taught i n schools , bu t democrati c politi cal behavio r i s develope d mainl y throug h practic e an d experience . Nevertheless, th e Wes t ca n offe r invaluabl e hel p t o th e Eas t European s in thei r retur n t o democracy . Th e variou s constitutions , form s o f check s and balances , an d presidentia l an d parliamentar y system s ar e indee d a treasure hous e o f democrati c practice . Western government s an d partie s should activel y suppor t th e effort s o f Eas t European s t o devis e demo cratic institution s optima l fo r thei r circumstance s an d shoul d dra w thei r counterparts int o cooperativ e relationships . At th e momen t o f structura l transformation , th e emerging , indepen dent politica l associations , trade unions , an d publication s labore d unde r severe handicaps . In a n environmen t wher e th e stat e lon g controlle d most resource s an d wher e privat e asset s ar e minimal , th e simples t mate rial need s o f organization , no t t o spea k o f organizationa l experience , were i n shor t supply . Ther e ar e precedent s fo r privat e a s wel l a s publi c assistance. A foundatio n establishe d b y th e Hungarian-bor n America n financier Georg e Soro s ha s expende d million s o f dollar s aidin g demo cratic groups an d exchange s i n Hungary. Solidarity' s rol e as the predom inant an d encompassin g Polis h oppositio n forc e an d it s ostensibl e trad e union statu s facilitate d materia l suppor t fro m Wester n unions , includin g NED fund s throug h th e Fre e Trade Unio n Institut e o f th e AFL-CIO . Indeed, th e Unite d State s ha s mad e a tangibl e i f modes t contributio n

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to th e proces s o f democratization . Withi n th e globa l mandat e o f th e National Endowmen t fo r Democracy , Eastern Europ e figured a s a mino r target, accountin g i n 1987-8 8 fo r n o mor e tha n $2,325,000 , o r 1 6 percent o f tota l expenditur e o n projects . Polis h project s too k th e lion' s share, $1,707,500 , o f whic h $ 1 millio n cam e a s a specia l congressiona l appropriation fo r Solidarity . Project s fo r Czechoslovaki a receive d $194,000, fo r Hungar y $71,500 , an d fo r Romani a $50,000 , wit h re gional project s absorbin g a n additiona l $302,500. 121 A s th e pluraliza tion o f th e Hungaria n politica l syste m gathere d spee d i n 1989 , th e Democratic, Republican , an d AFL-CI O institute s jointl y develope d a substantial fundin g progra m t o assis t fre e trad e union s an d partie s t o become established, includin g support fo r publication s an d training sem inars. In thi s fashion , th e NE D ha s usefull y fe d th e "flam e o f freedom " and complemente d diplomati c advocac y o f human rights . As th e opportunitie s an d need s grow , i n Poland , Hungary , an d else where, additiona l congressiona l fundin g fo r th e NE D an d mor e activ e development o f Eas t Europea n project s b y it s "retailers " ca n rea p ric h rewards fo r democracy . Congres s i n Novembe r 198 9 allocate d $1 2 million t o suppor t democrati c institution s i n Poland . In th e first Peac e Corps projec t i n a Europea n country , volunteer s wer e dispatche d t o teach Englis h i n Hungary ; th e nex t recipien t wa s Czechoslovakia . Hun garian lega l expert s workin g o n a ne w constitutio n wer e invite d t o th e United State s t o stud y th e America n politica l system , an d th e USI A ha s sponsored th e visi t o f buddin g Hungaria n politician s t o stud y America n electoral practice . Countrie s wit h mor e tenuou s democrati c traditions , such a s Romani a an d Bulgaria , ar e prim e candidate s fo r simila r pro grams. Presiden t Bush' s dispositio n t o encourag e voluntar y action—hi s "thousand point s o f light"—wa s reflecte d i n hi s announcemen t i n Ma y 1990 o f a "Citizen s Democrac y Corps " t o serv e a s a n informatio n clearinghouse fo r America n voluntee r program s i n ai d of marke t democ racy. In th e battl e fo r huma n right s an d self-determinatio n i n Easter n Eu rope an d th e Sovie t Union , Radi o Fre e Europ e an d Radi o Libert y hav e played a unparalleled an d critica l role. RFE took advantag e of the sprea d of liberalizatio n t o broadcas t interview s wit h reformer s an d dissidents , and it s reportin g o f politica l fermen t helpe d t o undermin e th e mor e retrograde regimes . Eve n i n Hungary , wher e b y 198 8 th e medi a ha d become extraordinaril y fre e an d diverse , RF E retaine d it s audienc e wit h

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superior programmin g i n new s an d commentary . Acknowledgin g th e legitimacy o f fre e communication , th e Hungaria n governmen t i n 198 9 permitted th e postin g o f a permanen t corresponden t i n Budapes t wit h full pres s accreditation . B y the followin g yea r RF E correspondent s wer e roaming freel y i n Easter n Europe , an d Czechoslovaki a ha d eve n pro vided fo r medium-wav e broadcastin g o f it s programs . The region' s ne w democrati c regime s no t onl y lavished prais e on RF E for it s pas t servic e i n th e caus e o f freedo m bu t asserte d tha t i t ha d no t outlived it s usefulness . Indeed , i n it s cross-reporting , whic h draw s o n a unique researc h capability , i t fills a n importan t ga p i n th e politica l consciousness o f Eas t Europeans . The regio n i s a hotbed o f nationalisti c passions, grievances , an d prejudices . Ther e i s a shortag e o f mutua l sym pathy and , indeed , o f mutua l interes t betwee n th e severa l nations , an d RFE remain s th e mos t impartia l an d best-informe d agen t fo r nurturin g familiarity, concern , an d solidarity , eve n i f a t time s (notabl y i n it s treat ment o f ethni c minority issues ) i t reflects Washington' s diplomati c reluc tance to addres s divisiv e conflicts . The rapid sprea d o f democratizatio n an d glasnost inevitabl y put s int o question th e futur e o f th e tw o Munich-base d radi o services . Their origi nal mandat e ha d a n implici t sunse t clause : operation s woul d terminat e with th e restoratio n o f freedom . A t a conferenc e sponsore d b y RFE/R L in Novembe r 1989 , Deput y Secretar y o f Stat e Eagleburge r argue d tha t "the ne w opennes s currentl y prevailin g i n the regio n doe s no t mea n tha t the radio s hav e worke d themselve s ou t o f a job. " The y serv e a s a n "insurance polic y agains t th e effort s o f thos e who remai n th e enemie s of glasnost" an d ca n "contribut e t o th e succes s o f perestroik a a s wel l b y creative programmin g whic h introduce s th e listener s t o th e technique s and buildin g block s o f th e fre e enterpris e syste m an d o f democrati c institutions." 122 The constructio n o f stabl e democrac y i n Easter n Europ e wil l no t occur overnight , an d fo r a fe w year s ye t Radi o Fre e Europ e an d Radi o Liberty ca n serv e th e region , no t leas t a s a benchmar k fo r th e emergin g pluralistic domesti c media . Bu t temptatio n wil l soo n moun t i n a n econ omy-minded Congres s t o writ e thei r epitaph . Whe n th e origina l polic y rationale fo r thes e U.S.-sponsore d voice s disappears , the y ca n silence d or, i f audience s an d economic s warrant , privatized . Th e European Com munity, o r th e Counci l o f Europe , i n it s effort s towar d integratin g th e East int o a united an d democrati c Europe , might wel l consider adoptio n

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of suc h a unique asset . And th e Voice o f Americ a wil l continu e t o d o it s part. Unti l then , the $20 0 millio n annua l operatin g cos t of the two radi o services wil l remai n a modest bu t invaluabl e contributio n b y th e Ameri can taxpaye r t o th e peaceful pursui t o f huma n rights . The Counci l o f Europe , base d i n Strasbourg , i s als o wel l suite d t o assist th e democratizatio n o f Easter n Europe . Founde d i n 194 9 a s a n association o f countrie s possesse d o f pluralisti c institution s an d a com mitment t o libera l huma n rights , it serves an essentiall y consultativ e an d advisory function . In 199 0 i t ha d twenty-thre e members . Withi n th e context o f democracy , i t i s explicitly nonpartisan : th e members ' delega tions mus t includ e representative s o f al l majo r politica l parties . Th e Council drafte d th e 195 0 Europea n Conventio n o n Huma n Right s an d has als o promote d th e socioeconomi c right s (notabl y th e righ t t o strike ) enumerated i n th e Europea n Socia l Charte r a s wel l a s variou s form s o f cultural cooperatio n addresse d i n th e 195 4 Europea n Cultura l Conven tion. The Counci l wa s activ e i n denouncin g huma n right s violation s i n th e East, an d a s earl y a s Jun e 198 9 i t responde d t o improvement s i n thi s sphere b y admittin g Hungary , Poland , Yugoslavia , an d th e Sovie t Unio n to specia l "gues t status " tha t allowe d nonvotin g participatio n i n th e parliamentary assembly . Simila r statu s wa s grante d t o Czechoslovaki a in March , t o Eas t German y i n May , an d t o Bulgari a i n Jul y 1990 . Hungary ha d th e longes t recor d o f contact s wit h th e Counci l and , afte r joining th e Europea n Cultura l Convention , i t was th e first Warsa w Pac t state to formally appl y for membership , in November 1989 . His country , said Foreig n Ministe r Gyul a Horn , "canno t manag e t o catc h u p wit h European civilizatio n i f i t is not integrate d int o Wester n Europea n orga nizations." Poland , Yugoslavia , an d Czechoslovaki a soo n followe d suit . Council representative s observe d th e election s i n severa l Eas t Europea n countries, and , a s pluralistic democrac y i s consolidated, ful l membershi p is boun d t o follow . In Octobe r th e Council' s Assembl y unanimousl y approved Hungary' s admission , t o tak e effec t o n Novembe r 6 , whil e denying even gues t status t o retrograde Romania . East European s ten d t o regar d membershi p i n th e Counci l a s a badg e of eligibilit y fo r admissio n t o th e Europea n Community . T o se e th e Council a s th e institutiona l embry o o f a Europea n confederatio n i s premature. I t i s well suited , however , t o pla y a n increasingl y activ e rol e in inducin g an d verifyin g implementatio n o f th e CSCE' s huma n right s

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provisions an d i n promotin g th e parliamentar y an d othe r contact s tha t are needed t o deepe n democrati c practice i n Eastern Europe . The inclusion o f Eas t European countrie s i n a continental communit y is an appealin g prospect fo r bot h Eas t an d West , on e that shoul d lea d t o a share d interes t i n th e developmen t o f compatibl e democrati c institu tions. Th e Europea n Parliament , whic h ove r th e year s repeatedl y passe d resolutions condemnin g huma n right s violation s i n th e East , a s earl y a s 1987 addresse d th e possibilit y o f parliamentar y contact s an d i n 198 8 received visit s fro m group s o f Polish , Czechoslovakian , an d Hungaria n deputies. The Parliamen t als o sponsore d th e establishmen t o f a Founda tion fo r Eas t Europea n Studies . I t was , i n earl y 1990 , th e scen e o f a lively debat e ove r th e merit s o f direc t ai d t o Eas t Europea n democrati c parties (advocate d b y center-righ t groups ) versu s party-to-part y assis tance, the optio n supporte d b y the social democrati c group . Material suppor t fro m th e Wes t fo r democrati c politica l partie s i s more problematical. Apar t fro m lega l obstacles, there are obvious dilem mas an d uncertaintie s i n the choice of recipients ; pluralism an d partisan ship g o han d i n hand , bu t th e West' s responsibilit y i s mor e t o nurtur e the necessar y institution s tha n selectivel y t o reinforc e parties . Th e Eas t German cas e of massiv e political penetratio n wa s a n exceptio n owin g t o unique circumstances . Th e Federa l Republic' s partie s promptl y move d in t o hel p thei r siste r partie s i n th e electio n campaign , a n involvemen t subsequently legitimate d b y a new East Germa n part y law . They swampe d the coalitio n o f Ne w Foru m an d othe r indigenou s oppositio n group s a s well a s th e revampe d Communis t party , pavin g th e wa y fo r th e absorp tion o f Eas t German y int o a common politica l structure . Elsewhere, the West's ai d to parties was prompted b y fear tha t th e exCommunists woul d deriv e unfai r advantag e fro m thei r financia l an d organizational asset s i n th e initia l democrati c contest . Th e fea r wa s perhaps warrante d i n th e cas e o f Romani a an d Bulgaria , bu t i n th e countries tha t receive d th e mos t foreig n assistance , th e Communists ' unpopularity wa s sufficien t t o sea l thei r fate . Eve n th e region' s mos t resolutely reformis t party , the Hungarian Socialis t party, performed mis erably a t th e polls , thoug h i t ha d spare d n o expens e i n buyin g th e services of a British advertisin g agenc y fo r it s campaign . In the case of Hungary , th e bulk o f American ai d had gon e to the Fre e Democrats. Tha t opposition-group-turned-part y seeme d t o b e th e mos t uncompromisingly Western-oriented ; som e o f it s leadin g figures spok e

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English an d ha d well-establishe d contact s in the United States . The othe r major oppositio n group , th e Hungaria n Democrati c Forum , wa s mor e nationalist an d populis t i n character , an d ha d bee n mor e dispose d t o seek compromis e wit h th e refor m Communist s i n th e earl y stage s o f th e transformation. Th e NED' s retailer s gav e modes t suppor t t o bot h par ties; the Democrati c Foru m receive d mor e substantia l ai d fro m Bavaria' s CSU party. The revived Socia l Democrats go t some help fro m th e Socialist International , bu t the y expende d thei r energie s i n interna l quarrel s and faile d t o win representatio n i n parliament, allowin g the ex-Commu nists t o prevai l a s th e part y o f socia l democracy . In th e event , th e Democratic Foru m prove d t o b e fa r bette r attune d t o th e moo d o f th e electorate. Th e part y leade r an d ne w prim e minister , Jozsef Antall , sub sequently hoste d a congress of th e Christia n Democrati c Internationa l i n Budapest. In Czechoslovakia , th e Civi c Foru m an d Publi c Against Violenc e ha d led th e revolutio n an d wer e identifie d a s th e principa l democrati c forc e by th e NED , whic h grante d the m $400,00 0 fo r technica l equipment . The Christia n Democrat s receive d som e supplie s an d advic e fro m thei r British, Wes t German , an d Belgia n counterparts . The y wo n onl y fort y seats i n the federa l assembly , fewe r eve n tha n th e second-plac e Commu nists, an d proteste d a t the selectivenes s o f America n aid . In thes e cases , and i n the cas e of Poland' s Solidarity , Wester n ai d an d advice wer e helpful , bu t probabl y no t crucia l t o th e succes s o n th e non Communists. Th e reinforcemen t o f democrati c politica l group s a t th e moment o f pluralism' s rebirt h wa s a logica l extensio n o f th e West' s human right s campaign . Wit h democraticall y electe d government s i n place, partisan ai d from officia l source s suc h as the NED become s poten tially counterproductive . In an y case , a s th e newl y victoriou s non-Com munist government s begi n th e comple x proces s o f divestin g th e ol d ruling partie s o f thei r vas t assets , th e nee d fo r externa l ai d vanishes . Individual partie s ma y forg e link s with thei r Western (an d Eastern coun terparts), bu t i t woul d b e unhealth y fo r Eas t Europea n democrac y an d national autonom y i f thei r partie s becam e identifie d a s client s o f on e o r another foreig n government . These experience s revea l th e pitfall s bu t offe r littl e concret e guidanc e on dealin g with unstabl e situatio n i n the Balkans . O n balance , prudenc e would dictat e NE D assistanc e o n a nonpartisa n basi s t o al l significan t groups tha t credibl y profes s adherenc e t o th e Helsink i principles . Th e

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deepening o f democrac y throughou t th e regio n wil l b e aide d b y educa tion, familiarizatio n wit h successfu l politica l models , an d intensiv e com munication. Th e NE D an d othe r Wester n institution s ca n facilitat e thi s process wit h mone y an d programs . S o can privat e initiative s suc h a s th e Prague Branc h o f th e Ne w York-base d Institut e fo r East-Wes t Securit y Studies. As the initial impetu s o f a consensual rejectio n o f stat e socialis m loses strength , th e fragile fabri c o f th e ne w democrac y wil l b e teste d b y old, undemocrati c reflexe s an d ne w socia l conflicts . Th e Unite d State s and other Wester n countrie s mus t help strengthe n tha t fabri c b y bilatera l as well a s multilateral initiatives . The CSC E put huma n right s on th e international agenda . In establish ing th e legitimac y o f collectiv e scrutin y an d a commo n standar d o f fundamental freedoms , i t breache d th e wal l o f sovereignt y tha t hithert o afforded lega l i f no t mora l immunit y t o devian t regimes . I f thi s radica l departure fro m traditiona l diplomati c practic e occasionall y cause s dis comfort eve n t o democrati c government s caugh t i n th e ac t o f compro mising o n civi l liberties , al l th e mor e reaso n fo r th e CSC E proces s t o b e further institutionalized . Th e forma l self-determinatio n o f Easter n Euro pean countrie s i s no caus e t o abando n a worthy collectiv e enterprise . I n fact, th e ongoin g CSC E coul d hel p t o restrai n nationalisti c excesse s tha t have s o ofte n i n th e pas t embittere d regiona l relations , an d t o forge , i n the word s o f Presiden t Bush , " a ne w consensu s o n th e cornerstone s o f freedom, rights , and democracy." 123 The fledglin g democracie s nee d mora l an d materia l encouragemen t t o avoid th e pitfall s o f demagoguery , o f expedien t compromise s a t th e cos t of individua l liberties , an d o f chauvinisti c neglec t o f minorit y rights . "I f 1989 was the year of sweeping away," said Secretary Baker in an addres s at Prague' s Charle s Universit y o n Februar y 7 , "199 0 mus t becom e th e year of buildin g anew. " Voicing concern particularly abou t Romania , h e warned tha t "an y backslidin g i n th e movemen t t o creat e legitimat e governments wil l isolate a nation fro m th e suppor t w e can provide." 124 To deplor e th e denia l b y totalitaria n regime s o f huma n right s ma y have bee n simple r an d easie r tha n t o nurture th e seedlings o f democracy , but i n willin g th e en d th e Unite d State s an d it s allies als o accepte d som e responsibility fo r providin g ai d an d counse l t o East Europeans onc e the y began t o emerg e fro m th e long night o f oppression .

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-M-he Wester n alliance , observe d a prominen t expert , ha s a capacit y for chaoti c mismanagemen t o f East-Wes t trad e polic y tha t i s har d t o underestimate. 1 Indeed , th e nee d t o reconcil e America' s security , politi cal, an d commercia l interest s i n Eastern Europ e has sorel y teste d th e wi t and wil l o f successiv e administrations . Recalcitran t allies , conflictin g domestic pressures , an d margina l economi c leverag e hav e hampere d th e development o f a consistent strateg y tha t coul d effectivel y advanc e al l of those interests . Th e relativ e declin e i n America' s economi c predomi nance furthe r weakene d tha t leverag e eve n a s detent e i n th e earl y 1970 s and i n th e Gorbache v er a invite d a redefinitio n o f th e cost s an d benefit s of tradin g wit h th e East . Ye t history' s devastatin g verdic t o n Marxis t economics i s openin g u p ne w opportunitie s fo r politica l advantag e an d economic profit . Lenin's revolutio n presage d a globa l competitio n betwee n socialis m and capitalism , betwee n planne d an d marke t economies . Th e Unite d States, rapidl y emergin g a s th e foremos t capitalis t power , reacte d wit h abhorrence. Th e negligibl e commercia l contact s wit h th e Sovie t Unio n were easil y sacrifice d i n orde r t o isolat e th e Bolshevi k virus . Th e Euro peans prove d readie r t o sel l th e rop e tha t coul d han g them , an d durin g the Secon d Worl d Wa r Washingto n to o overcam e it s ideologica l inhibi 228

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tions t o suppl y massiv e ai d t o Stalin' s USSR . That conflic t als o impelle d the United State s to develo p the tools of economi c warfare, the n directe d against th e Axis . They woul d late r b e used i n th e quit e differen t circum stances o f th e col d war . At war' s end , th e creatio n o f a ne w globa l economi c orde r ranke d high amon g Washington' s priorities . Followin g it s libera l economi c pre cepts an d applyin g the lessons of th e Grea t Depression , th e United State s pressed fo r unrestricte d exchange s o f good s an d capita l (throug h th e General Agreemen t o n Trad e an d Tariffs , o r GATT ) a s wel l a s fo r international institution s designe d t o stabiliz e an d promot e th e proces s of economi c developmen t (specifically , th e Internationa l Monetar y Fun d and th e Internationa l Ban k fo r Reconstructio n an d Development , o r World Bank) . Fro m th e Kremlin' s perspective , thes e measure s an d th e abrupt terminatio n o f Lend-Leas e signifie d America n resolv e t o impos e capitalism's dominion . For Easter n Europe , postwa r liberatio n mean t th e replacemen t o f German b y Sovie t domination , an d th e economi c implication s wer e no t long i n manifestin g themselves . No t satisfie d wit h th e expropriatio n o f German assets , th e Soviet s exacte d cripplin g reparation s fro m forme r Axis camp followers , suc h a s Hungary. Bilatera l commercia l agreement s with Mosco w bega n th e eastwar d reorientatio n o f th e region' s trade . The Unite d State s offere d som e militar y surplu s i n emergenc y relief , pressed fo r nondiscriminator y trade , an d sough t t o protec t privat e American assets . Although thei r nee d fo r reconstructio n ai d wa s desperate , b y the tim e of th e Marshall Plan , the East Europeans wer e no longer master s in thei r own house . Th e pla n ostensibl y di d no t discriminat e betwee n Wester n and Easter n Europe , bu t it s preconditions , notabl y th e requiremen t fo r full disclosur e o f economi c data , predictabl y prove d unacceptabl e t o th e Soviet Unio n an d it s ne w clien t states . Czechoslovakia' s rejectio n o f th e offer, afte r initia l enthusiasm , marke d th e exten t o f Sovie t rule . Ha d such temptin g bai t bee n dangle d a t war' s end , som e o f th e earl y Eas t European regimes , suc h a s Czechoslovaki a an d Hungary , migh t hav e been freer t o accep t it and th e attendant link s to the West. But Moscow' s political influenc e soo n encompasse d irresistibl e economi c demands, an d by 194 7 the Marshall Pla n coul d onl y confir m th e realit y o f a n exclusiv e Soviet sphere . Stalin's perception o f capitalist hostility became a self-fulfilling proph -

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ecy, for a s the iro n curtai n descended , Washington duste d of f it s arsena l of economi c warfare measures , this time against the Soviet Union an d it s unwilling satellites . I n th e East , th e nationalizatio n o f America n an d other foreig n assets , th e impositio n o f th e Stalinis t comman d model , complete wit h irrational , autarki c tendencies , an d th e shif t t o a wa r economy wit h th e onse t o f th e Korea n conflic t reflecte d th e subordina tion o f th e region' s people s t o Sovie t interests . Fo r Washington , Easter n Europe ha d becom e par t o f a n ideologicall y hostile , militarily aggressiv e empire a t wa r wit h th e Unite d State s an d th e fre e world . In th e contex t of th e polic y o f containment , economi c statecraf t woul d b e applie d t o the pursui t o f a foreseeabl y protracte d conflict . Th e threa t t o Wester n security woul d b e countere d b y positive step s t o consolidat e a militaril y and economicall y stron g allianc e an d negativ e measure s t o weake n th e enemy's capability . Th e Sovie t blo c coul d hardl y b e regarde d a s a n economic threa t t o th e West , bu t th e moder n notio n o f tota l war , justified b y ideology , dictate d th e pursui t o f ful l economi c an d psycho logical warfare agains t th e East . Strategic Embargo. Plannin g i n Washingto n fo r a n embarg o agains t the Sovie t blo c wa s unde r wa y b y lat e 1947 , an d o n Marc h 1 , 1948 , i n the wak e o f th e Pragu e coup , license s wer e mad e mandator y fo r al l exports t o Europe . Th e rea l targe t wa s th e East . Th e postwa r embarg o strategy wa s firs t codifie d i n th e Expor t Contro l Ac t o f Februar y 1949 , which provide d authorit y fo r th e denia l o f militaril y relevan t export s without specifi c referenc e t o th e Sovie t bloc . Consultatio n wit h NAT O allies led in late 194 9 to the creation o f a secret agency, the Coordinatin g Committee fo r Multilatera l Expor t Control s (Cocom) . Th e foundin g members wer e th e Unite d States , Britain, France , Italy , an d th e Benelu x countries, soo n joine d b y Canada , Denmark , th e Federa l Republi c o f Germany, an d Norway , the n i n 195 3 b y Greece, Japan, an d Turkey . For th e sak e o f politica l expediency , an d t o avoi d awkwar d debate s in Wes t Europea n legislatures , Coco m wa s establishe d withou t an y treat y or othe r lega l statu s an d therefor e withou t forma l enforcemen t author ity. Th e Wes t European s wer e ambivalen t abou t losin g wha t the y per ceived t o b e th e mutua l benefit s o f East-Wes t trade , notabl y acces s t o Soviet ra w materials . Bu t a t a tim e whe n Marshal l Pla n ai d exceede d their entir e turnover i n East-West trade, their self-interest dictate d acqui escence t o th e America n insistenc e o n a comprehensiv e embargo . B y

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1951, trad e betwee n Wester n Europ e an d th e Sovie t blo c ha d sun k below prewa r levels . On e measur e o f th e impac t o f autarki c Easter n economic policie s an d Wester n control s wa s that , overall , th e blo c im ported onl y 3 7 percent a s much a s it had i n 1938. 2 The embarg o list s quickl y ros e t o nearl y thre e hundre d item s i n th e early 1950s , effectivel y reducin g East-Wes t trad e t o a trickle . Th e ne t impact o n Wes t German y an d Ital y wa s greate r tha n o n th e othe r Europeans, whose trade with th e East had barel y starte d t o recove r fro m the disruptio n cause d b y war. Th e embargo' s impac t o n Easter n Europ e cannot b e calculate d precisel y bu t wa s undoubtedl y fa r greater . Th e reconstruction an d expansio n o f th e region' s industrie s an d infrastruc ture no w ha d t o b e pursued withou t acces s t o th e mos t logical , Wester n suppliers. Bu t eve n withou t a n embargo , Stalinis t notion s o f economi c self-sufficiency mean t bindin g the East European economie s to the Sovie t Union. Th e force d industrializatio n program s o f th e Eas t Europea n countries becam e a n exercis e i n technologica l obsolescenc e an d ineffi ciency, shapin g a legacy fro m whic h the y suffe r t o thi s day . Meanwhile , Soviet effort s t o obtai n controlle d item s me t wit h som e succes s thank s to th e readines s o f a fe w Wester n businessme n t o mak e a quic k profi t and th e occasionally lenien t attitud e o f thei r governments . The expectatio n o f som e col d wa r strategist s tha t economi c strain s induced b y th e embarg o migh t impe l th e Eas t European s t o brea k awa y proved politicall y unrealistic . The U.S. Minister i n Bulgaria, for instance , opined i n lat e 194 9 tha t Wester n sanction s coul d provid e a "fertil e field for th e developmen t o f malcontent s who , i t ma y b e hoped, will , i n thei r disillusionment ove r th e glories o f communism , tur n t o th e West i n thei r search fo r a wa y out." 3 Suc h hope s wer e dashe d b y regime s wholl y beholden t o Mosco w an d dedicate d t o th e sam e revolutionar y exercis e in socia l engineering . Th e embarg o simpl y reinforce d Communis t pro paganda regardin g th e irreconcilabilit y o f th e tw o systems . B y itself , i t neither cause d no r significantl y accentuate d th e force d integratio n o f Eastern Europ e int o a Sovie t empire , bu t tha t empir e justifie d Washing ton's decisio n no t t o differentiat e betwee n th e satellite s an d thei r maste r in its conduct o f economi c warfare . The Stat e Departmen t conclude d i n 195 0 tha t "neithe r restrictiv e measures no r th e offe r o f Wester n economi c assistanc e woul d i n them selves caus e th e satellit e countrie s t o brea k awa y fro m th e Sovie t Union . The economi c weapon s availabl e t o th e Wes t ar e chiefl y importan t a s

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auxiliaries i n a coordinate d progra m designe d t o caus e defectio n b y other means." 4 Western trad e was no t crucia l t o th e satellit e economies , and the y wer e no t fre e t o accep t loan s o r credit s o n term s tha t woul d have entaile d a reductio n i n Sovie t influence . Washingto n regretfull y acknowledged tha t th e embarg o coul d no t seriousl y jeopardiz e politica l stability bu t calculate d tha t i t woul d considerabl y impai r th e Sovie t bloc's capacit y fo r prolonge d war. 5 A t most , i t ma y hav e marginall y contributed t o th e declin e i n th e standar d o f livin g i n th e satellites , an d therefore th e unres t tha t le d t o eruption s i n 195 3 i n Eas t German y an d Czechoslovakia an d i n 195 6 i n Hungar y an d Poland . T o thi s uncertai n extent i t succeede d i n weakenin g an d destabilizin g th e enem y a t a tim e when th e conventiona l militar y balanc e i n Europ e favore d th e Sovie t Union. The Korea n Wa r onl y hardene d America n attitude s t o tradin g wit h the enemy . Foreig n complianc e wit h th e embarg o ha d t o b e secured . A n NSC repor t i n Novembe r 195 0 specifie d tha t "shipment s o f strategi c commodities t o an y Wester n Europea n countr y shoul d b e denie d wher e there i s evidenc e tha t suc h shipment s ma y b e transshipped , directl y o r indirectly, t o th e Sovie t Bloc." 6 Th e Battl e Ac t o f 195 1 prohibite d U.S . aid t o countrie s tha t shippe d item s o n th e America n embarg o lis t t o controlled areas , althoug h t o pacif y th e Wes t European s i t als o allowe d the presiden t discretionar y powe r t o gran t exemptions . Th e Battl e Act' s goal was of course to safeguard th e West's military an d economi c advan tages, an d th e notio n tha t th e measure s woul d ultimatel y "assis t th e people o f th e nations unde r dominatio n o f foreig n aggressor s t o reestab lish their freedom " wa s mor e a gratuitous expressio n o f America n hope s than a calculated linkag e o f embarg o an d rollback . The administration' s seriousnes s o f purpos e wa s signale d b y th e ap pointment o f Averel l Harrima n a s the Battl e Act's first administrator , t o be succeede d b y Harol d Stassen . Sinc e i n th e earl y 1950 s mos t non Communist countrie s receive d America n aid , th e Battl e Ac t prove d a potent lever , an d som e fifty-five ou t o f sixty-si x countrie s agree d t o cooperate. 7 American export s t o Easter n Europe , whic h ha d reache d a postwa r high o f nearl y $12 0 millio n i n th e secon d quarte r o f 1947 , ha d bee n virtually eliminate d b y mid-1951 . Th e on e exceptio n wa s Yugoslavia , which benefite d fro m a relaxatio n o f th e strategi c embarg o a s earl y a s 1949 an d becam e a recipien t o f America n aid . Amon g America' s Euro -

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pean allies , o n th e othe r hand , pressur e fo r revivin g trad e wit h th e Eas t mounted a s th e perceptio n o f Sovie t threa t recede d followin g Stalin' s death an d th e armistic e i n Korea . Rapi d economi c recovery , th e en d o f Marshall Pla n aid , an d skepticis m regardin g th e strategi c necessit y o f a comprehensive embarg o expose d th e divergence in the commercial inter ests of th e United State s an d Wester n Europe . Our allie s argue d tha t th e USSR's progress i n militar y technolog y ha d not bee n significantl y impede d b y th e embargo , notabl y i n th e nuclea r field, and th e Eas t Europea n economie s wer e growing, albei t a t th e pric e of lo w persona l consumption . America n busines s wa s enjoyin g globa l predominance an d ha d littl e incentiv e t o questio n th e merit s o f th e embargo, bu t Wes t Europea n industria l concern s wer e eage r t o regai n their histori c Easter n markets . Th e Federa l Republi c o f German y ha d a particular interes t i n developin g it s specia l ope n exchang e relationshi p with Eas t Germany . Th e restles s Wes t European s wer e accommodate d by waiver s o f Battl e Ac t sanctions , the n i n 195 4 b y a trimmin g o f th e Cocom lists . Four years later the lists were reduced further , t o 11 8 items . At the sam e time the United State s made it s second tactica l breac h i n th e embargo b y grantin g Polan d a $5 5 millio n credi t fo r America n exports , in a n attemp t t o reinforc e th e apparentl y reformis t regim e of Gomulka . Controversy over the Embargo. B y th e earl y 1960 s th e domesti c con sensus o n th e merit s o f th e strategi c embarg o wa s beginnin g t o fra y a s private businesse s i n th e Unite d State s bega n t o cas t covetou s glance s a t Eastern market s wher e th e Wes t European s wer e busil y establishin g beachheads. Th e functionalis t hypothesis , tha t free r trad e woul d buil d mutual confidenc e an d securit y an d induc e desirabl e reforms , struc k some political observer s a s the nex t logica l phas e i n East-West relations . For th e Americans , a t least , free r trad e ha d t o b e justifie d i n term s o f political benefits . Whil e th e growin g eagernes s o f America n busines s t o compete in East European market s coul d b e accommodated b y this mor e pragmatic approach , th e requisites o f military securit y ensured tha t som e form o f strategi c embargo woul d remai n i n place. Debates ove r th e appropriat e dimension s o f th e embarg o continue d within th e administratio n an d Congres s an d i n Coco m an d othe r allie d councils. Beginning with th e Kenned y administration , U.S . policy move d along tw o tracks : adaptatio n o f th e embarg o t o changin g military , tech nological, an d politica l perception s an d expansio n o f credit s an d non -

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strategic trade . Th e functionalis t notio n o f bridg e buildin g le d Presiden t Kennedy t o establis h a n Expor t Contro l Revie w Boar d i n 196 1 t o facili tate consideratio n o f waivers . Presiden t Johnso n responde d t o busines s pressures b y appointin g a Committe e o n U.S . Trade Relation s wit h Eas t European Countries . I n 1964 , th e Export-Impor t Ban k wa s directe d t o advance credit s t o Hungar y an d Romania , an d America n export s t o th e East momentaril y surged , t o nearl y $16 0 million . Bu t th e politica l cli mate was no t propitiou s t o trade expansion . The Berli n an d Cuba n missil e crise s an d th e Vietna m Wa r revive d domestic political oppositio n t o trad e with th e enemy. Congres s i n 196 2 passed a n amendmen t t o the Export Contro l Ac t specifying tha t no t onl y militarily relevan t export s bu t als o good s tha t coul d mak e a "significan t contribution" t o th e target countries ' militar y o r economi c potential ha d to b e controlled . I n 1965 , th e Coco m list s wer e expande d t o cove r 1 0 percent o f generall y trade d items. 8 America n unilatera l control s wer e even mor e restrictive , an d th e ga p betwee n th e tw o lists , th e so-calle d "embargo differential, " cause d bitte r dispute s amon g th e allies . Whe n the foreig n subsidiarie s o f America n corporation s wer e required t o abid e by th e longer , unilatera l list , th e European s proteste d a t thi s extraterri torial extensio n o f U.S . jurisdiction . D e Gaulle' s France , havin g with drawn fro m th e NATO militar y structure , was momentaril y dispose d t o ignore Cocom , makin g th e othe r Europea n participant s eve n mor e res tive. Towar d th e en d o f th e 1960 s Bon n launche d it s ne w Ostpolitik i n pursuit o f normalize d politica l an d economi c relations . Traumatize d b y Vietnam, Washingto n too k a di m vie w o f it s allies ' grudgin g participa tion i n th e strategi c embarg o bu t proceede d t o adap t t o th e changin g economic an d politica l realities . The risin g trad e defici t an d busines s pressure s ha d thei r impac t o n Congress whe n i n 196 9 i t debate d extensio n o f th e Expor t Contro l Act . The ne w Expor t Administratio n Ac t acknowledge d tha t th e controls , and i n particula r th e embarg o differential , ha d a deleteriou s impac t o n American's balanc e o f trad e an d payment s an d lai d stres s o n th e nee d for expor t promotion . Th e ac t reaffirme d th e strategi c embargo , bu t i n more limite d form , fo r good s o f militar y (an d no t merel y economic ) significance th e expor t o f whic h woul d prov e "detrimenta l t o th e na tional securit y o f th e Unite d States." 9 I n th e Equa l Expor t Opportunit y Act o f 1972 , Congres s calle d fo r liftin g unilatera l control s wher e com parable item s wer e availabl e fro m foreig n producers , promptin g th e

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Commerce Departmen t t o appoin t si x Technica l Advisor y Committee s to overse e expor t licensin g i n area s suc h a s computin g an d telecommu nications. As a result, man y good s were decontrolled, export s t o Easter n Europe double d betwee n 197 2 an d 1973 , an d i n Coco m th e Unite d States came to accoun t fo r ove r half o f th e requests fo r waivers . The basi c approac h i n th e detent e perio d o f th e 1970 s wa s t o expan d general trad e whil e refinin g th e control s o n strategi c trade . Th e Buc y report, commissione d b y the Pentagon an d issue d i n 1976 , laid emphasi s on th e preservation o f America' s lea d i n "critica l technologies " o f actua l or potentia l militar y applicatio n an d recommende d tha t control s b e concentrated o n desig n and manufacturin g knowho w rathe r tha n o n en d products. 10 Thi s vie w informe d th e Expor t Administratio n Ac t o f 1979 , which supersede d bot h th e EAA of 196 9 an d th e Battle Act. The new ac t reiterated th e desirabilit y o f trad e expansion , rationalize d licensin g pro cedures, instructe d th e presiden t t o revie w wit h th e allie s th e Coco m lists, an d stresse d th e importanc e o f controllin g th e expor t o f critica l technologies. 11 The Sovie t invasio n o f Afghanista n i n 197 9 an d th e Solidarit y crisi s in Polan d shifte d th e balanc e onc e agai n towar d economi c warfare . Th e modernization o f th e Sovie t bloc' s militar y machine , critic s charged , owed muc h t o th e transfe r (over t a s wel l a s covert ) o f Wester n technol ogy. Th e evidenc e wa s necessaril y incomplete . Accordin g t o intelligenc e estimates, som e $15 0 millio n wort h o f embargoe d good s foun d thei r way to the Soviet bloc between 197 3 and 1977 ; an East German defecto r claimed i n 198 0 tha t industria l espionag e save d hi s countr y a n annua l $70 millio n i n research an d developmen t costs. 12 The Carte r administra tion responde d b y expandin g unilatera l technologica l control s an d or dering the U.S. Customs Servic e to crac k dow n o n illega l shipments . The Reaga n administration' s initia l revie w o f East-Wes t trad e polic y reflected a hard-line approac h tha t issue d principall y fro m th e Pentagon . As Assistant Secretar y o f Defens e Richar d Perl e said o f th e Soviet Union , "at n o previou s tim e i n histor y ha s on e natio n bee n abl e t o pre y s o deeply an d systematicall y o n th e fruit s o f it s adversary' s geniu s an d labor." 1 3 Th e Custom s Service' s Operatio n Exodus , launche d i n lat e 1981, involve d cooperatio n wit h allie d custom s agencie s t o ste m th e flow, an d within tw o years some 140 0 illega l shipments valued a t almos t $200 millio n ha d bee n seized. 14 The administration' s inten t t o invigorat e economi c warfar e wa s man -

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ifest i n the bil l introduced i n April 198 3 t o supplan t th e EAA of 1979 . It aimed t o expan d bot h th e national an d Coco m list s of "militaril y critica l technology an d keyston e equipment, " t o strengthe n enforcemen t mech anisms, includin g th e Coco m secretariat , an d t o secur e foreig n compli ance b y threa t o f retaliator y penalties . Th e bil l wen t beyon d th e estab lished rational e fo r th e strategi c embargo , tha t is , th e preservatio n o f national security , i n seekin g discretionar y powe r fo r th e presiden t t o impose economi c sanction s i n pursui t o f foreig n polic y objectives . Th e objectives, explaine d th e Commerc e Department' s spokesman , include d deterrence an d punishmen t a s wel l a s th e simpl e expressio n o f politica l disapproval. 15 Th e bil l provoked muc h debat e i n Congress , notably ove r the merit s o f "foreig n polic y controls " o f symboli c purpose . Th e allies , having alread y accede d t o numerou s America n request s fo r stiffe r con trol procedures , wer e resistan t t o furthe r expansio n o f th e multilatera l control list s an d a congressiona l proposa l fo r convertin g th e informa l Cocom arrangemen t int o a full-fledge d internationa l organization . Onl y in Jun e 198 5 wa s a ne w EA A enacte d b y Congress , t o remai n i n forc e until Septembe r 30 , 1989 . Th e compromis e bil l provided fo r bot h trad e expansion, b y eliminating th e need for license s to expor t low-technolog y goods t o th e allie s an d generall y easin g licensin g procedures, an d tighte r controls o n militaril y sensitiv e technology . The Pentago n ha d le d th e driv e fo r stricte r controls , bu t America n industry an d researc h institution s voice d growin g alar m a t th e harmfu l effect o n th e internationa l competitiv e positio n o f th e Unite d States . In 1982, a pane l o f th e Nationa l Academ y comple x persuade d th e admin istration t o rela x restriction s o n th e communicatio n o f basi c researc h findings. In 1984 , anothe r Nationa l Academ y panel , chaire d b y Le w Allen, Jr., was charged with studying the complex problem o f controllin g dual-use technology . Th e titl e o f it s report , issue d thre e year s later , reflected th e basi c dilemma : "Balancin g th e Nationa l Interest : U.S . Na tional Securit y Control s an d Globa l Economi c Competition. " I t foun d that th e executiv e branc h ha d mismanage d th e embargo , whic h cos t th e American econom y a n estimate d $9. 3 billio n i n 1985. 16 The Alle n panel' s mos t origina l recommendation , tha t th e Unite d States contro l onl y Cocom-proscribe d items , wa s inspire d bot h b y th e prospect o f mor e opportunitie s fo r America n busines s an d th e difficult y of enforcin g unilatera l controls . The panel urged tha t th e coverage o f th e U.S. and internationa l list s be limited t o "item s whose acquisitio n woul d

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significantly enhanc e Sovie t blo c militar y capabilitie s an d tha t ar e feasi ble t o control. " Sinc e th e allies disagre e wit h som e America n foreign policy-driven expor t controls , the United State s ought t o clearl y separat e these fro m control s require d b y national security. 17 Changing Objectives and Problems of Enforcement. Initiall y th e mai n purpose o f th e strategic embargo ha d bee n what migh t b e termed "struc tural," t o retar d th e Sovie t bloc' s economi c an d militar y development , and fo r a time the United State s managed t o maintain broad , multilatera l controls. Th e erosio n o f thi s capabilit y an d th e limite d impac t o f th e embargo le d t o th e reconsideration s tha t culminate d i n th e Alle n report . The remainin g rational e fo r th e embarg o wa s preservatio n o f th e West' s technological lea d i n th e militar y sphere , a fundamenta l securit y consid eration i n vie w o f th e imbalanc e i n conventiona l forces . A s detente , an d then th e growin g trad e deficit , pu t a premiu m o n trad e expansion , th e Department o f Defens e becam e a n increasingl y influentia l advocat e o f effective controls , wit h authorit y t o revie w al l export s t o controlle d countries a s wel l a s som e export s t o fifteen othe r countries . Militar y exports, fo r whic h primar y responsibilit y rest s wit h th e Stat e Depart ment, ar e totall y exclude d fro m East-Wes t trad e an d therefor e caus e n o problems, bu t th e licensin g o f commercia l export s remain s fraugh t wit h controversy. Th e coverag e o f th e Pentagon' s 800-page-lon g "Militaril y Critical Technologies List " far exceed s the Control Lis t of the Commerc e Department, whic h ha s th e forma l licensin g authorit y fo r commercia l exports. Th e 198 5 EA A calle d fo r integratio n o f th e tw o lists , bu t th e divergent prioritie s o f Commerc e an d Defens e continu e t o bedevi l th e process. Ther e i s scarcely a technologica l innovatio n tha t doe s no t hav e potential militar y applicatio n an d therefor e coul d no t b e classifie d a s "dual-use." What i s militaril y "critical " an d susceptibl e t o effectiv e control s i s a question ove r whic h conflic t frequentl y arise s betwee n th e Pentagon — intent o n delayin g diffusion—an d th e Commerc e Departmen t (an d pri vate business) eage r to promote profitabl e trade . The chairman o f Unite d Technologies, Harr y J . Gray , observe d i n 1985 : "Clearly , ou r nationa l interests mus t com e first a t al l times . W e mus t b e aler t t o governmen t policies, however , tha t plac e unnecessar y an d excessiv e restriction s o n technology. Unrealisti c barrier s t o technolog y export s handcuf f Americ a economically an d degrad e u s i n th e eye s o f ou r friend s an d allies." 18

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Two year s later , a n associatio n o f leadin g U.S. computer an d electronic s trade groups , th e Industr y Coalitio n o n Technolog y Transfer , calle d fo r a liberalizatio n o f expor t control s tha t wen t wel l beyon d th e Coco m revisions. A t th e sam e time , th e Pentago n accuse d th e Commerc e De partment o f a n "egregiou s laps e o f responsibility " i n allowin g powerfu l computers t o b e sol d t o a Soviet-controlle d compan y i n Hambur g an d reasserted it s authorit y (pursuan t t o a n earlie r presidentia l directive ) t o review al l expor t licens e applications. 19 I n 198 8 th e administratio n ear marked $3 9 millio n fo r operatin g th e contro l syste m (compare d t o $7. 3 million i n 1980 ) an d se t u p a separat e agenc y a t th e Departmen t o f Commerce heade d b y Pau l Freedenberg , unde r secretar y fo r expor t ad ministration, wit h a staff o f 51 0 (versu s 207 in 1980 ) t o licens e exports . The problem s o f reconcilin g thes e interest s ar e multiplie d a t th e leve l of multilatera l controls . Th e allie d nations ' militar y establishment s gen erally shar e th e Pentagon' s restrictiv e disposition , wherea s trad e minis tries an d manufacturer s ten d t o regar d control s a s a n impediment . Th e latter suspec t th e American s o f occasionall y exploitin g th e control s fo r economic advantag e an d resen t th e extraterritoria l applicatio n o f Amer ican law s wher e U.S . component s o r subsidiarie s ar e involved . Cocom , which ha s a smal l secretaria t locate d i n a n anne x o f th e U.S . embassy i n Paris an d a n annua l budge t o f som e $ 1 million, has th e dauntin g tas k o f updating list s covering thousands o f items , monitoring enforcement , an d adjudicating request s fo r waivers . Cocom i s involved i n the actua l grant ing of expor t license s onl y fo r th e mos t sensitiv e products. The delibera tions o f Coco m ar e secret , an d unanimit y i s require d fo r it s decisions . The munition s an d nuclea r energ y equipment list s present fe w problems , for almos t al l o f th e item s ar e totall y embargoed . Mos t headache s ar e caused b y th e industria l list , whic h cover s dual-us e technologie s tha t might enhanc e th e militar y capabilit y o f th e targe t countries . Th e secre tariat spend s much o f its time controlling the shipments o f these technol ogies betwee n th e membe r countrie s t o guar d agains t illega l diversion s to th e Sovie t bloc . Enforceability i s th e ke y t o a meaningfu l embargo . A t a Coco m meeting i n January 1982 , th e allies agree d t o stiffe n thei r contro l mech anisms, bu t th e emergin g consensu s suffere d a sever e setbac k fro m th e subsequent Urengo i pipelin e dispute , a cas e o f tactica l "foreig n policy " controls. To punis h th e Soviet Union fo r it s misdeeds in Afghanistan an d Poland, Washingto n banne d th e sal e b y America n multinational s o f

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machinery essentia l fo r buildin g a ga s pipelin e fro m Siberi a t o Wester n Europe, bu t i t soo n ha d t o bac k dow n i n th e fac e o f allie d protests . Th e allies painstakingl y forge d ne w agreement s i n NAT O o n East-Wes t trade , in th e OEC D o n subsidize d credits , i n th e Internationa l Energ y Agenc y on energ y security , an d i n Coco m o n strategi c technology . Bu t particu larly i n high-tech trade , the weighing o f economi c gain s agains t strategi c losses remain s a n immensel y comple x an d politicall y contentiou s calcu lation, on e i n whic h governmen t agencies , privat e interests , an d allie d countries ofte n find themselve s a t loggerheads . A politica l stor m wa s unleashe d i n 198 7 b y th e Toshiba-Kongsber g case, i n whic h a Japanese an d a Norwegia n compan y ha d shippe d con trolled machiner y fo r makin g ultraquie t submarin e propeller s t o th e Soviet Union . Congres s issue d threat s o f economi c reprisals , an d th e administration bega n a ne w campaig n t o secur e complianc e i n th e mul tilateral contro l system . Th e Pentago n calle d fo r a n internationa l black list whereb y businessme n indicte d fo r expor t offense s i n on e Coco m country woul d b e automaticall y denie d expor t license s b y th e others . Deputy Secretar y o f Stat e John Whitehea d le d th e delegatio n t o a show down meetin g o f Coco m i n Januar y 1988 . Th e bargai n h e offere d wa s to lowe r U.S . licensin g requirement s fo r countrie s tha t tightene d thei r own enforcemen t system . Europea n pressur e fo r a shorte r an d mor e enforceable lis t wa s spearheade d b y Wes t Germa n Foreig n Ministe r Hans-Dietrich Genscher , wh o tol d th e Europea n Pariliamen t i n Stras bourg tha t "n o responsibl e Wester n politicia n want s t o endange r West ern securit y interests , bu t presen t trad e limitation s withi n Coco m g o beyond wha t i s necessary." 20 Coco m agreed , logicall y enough , t o (i n th e words of a European diplomat ) "erec t higher fences aroun d fewe r items." 21 Evidence o f toughe r sanction s agains t embarg o breakers , notably o n th e part o f France , wa s accompanie d late r tha t yea r b y Coco m permissio n to Boein g an d Airbu s t o marke t thei r aircraf t i n th e East , wit h th e proviso tha t th e engine s an d som e o f th e avionic s ha d t o b e service d i n the West . In Augus t 1988 , th e U.S . relaxe d th e curb s o n th e sal e o f lower-level compute r equipmen t t o Communis t countries . The rapi d globa l diffusio n o f technolog y an d th e emergenc e o f ne w economic powerhouses i n the Far Eas t has turned th e American-inspire d multilateral contro l syste m int o a leak y ship . Wester n participant s a t a computer trad e fai r i n Warsa w i n Februar y 198 8 wer e surprise d t o find Polish firms displayin g mor e powerfu l computer s tha n th e Westerner s

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were allowe d t o export , obtaine d largel y i n Taiwa n an d othe r Fa r East ern markets. The problem o f diversio n o f controlle d good s through thir d countries suc h a s Austri a an d Switzerlan d i s a s ol d a s th e embargo . "End-use" clauses in contracts offe r littl e real protection a s long as ther e are unscrupulou s middleme n willin g t o disregar d th e controls . A n Aus trian firm, Datapoin t International , wa s fined $275,00 0 i n 198 7 fo r shipping controlle d U.S . equipmen t t o Bulgaria , Czechoslovakia , Hun gary, an d Poland . I n anothe r instance , th e Commerc e Departmen t li censed th e sal e o f a n America n compute r capabl e o f simulatin g nuclea r explosions t o a n engineerin g colleg e i n Zagreb , Yugoslavia , onl y t o discover late r tha t i t ha d reache d Mosco w vi a Belgrad e an d Eas t Ber lin. 22 T o bloc k a s man y gateway s fo r diversio n a s possible , th e Com merce Departmen t offere d t o eas e licensin g control s fo r non-Coco m countries tha t tightene d u p thei r ow n expor t licensin g an d custom s inspection procedures . A growin g numbe r o f countries , includin g Aus tria, Finland , Singapore , Sweden , an d Switzerland , hav e complied . That th e Soviet bloc became a willing and eage r consume r o f Wester n technology i s bot h eviden t an d natural . Th e Sovie t foreig n minister , Eduard Shevardnadze , ha s referre d t o th e embarg o a s "thi s curse d list " and complaine d tha t i t ha d hel d u p twent y larg e industria l project s i n recent years. 23 Although Sovie t leaders, including Gorbachev, have warne d against excessiv e dependenc e o n th e West , ther e i s plent y o f evidenc e that th e systemati c acquisitio n o f Wester n technolog y i s an integra l par t of Sovie t weapon s development . Th e Sovie t government' s Militar y In dustrial Commissio n (VPK ) coordinates th e collection o f "spetsinformat siya," o r specia l information , b y th e KGB' s " T Directorate, " th e GR U military intelligenc e agency , th e Stat e Committe e fo r Scienc e an d Tech nology, th e Academ y o f Sciences , an d th e Stat e Committe e fo r Foreig n Economic Relations. An improved win g design fo r th e Sukhoi-25 fighter, a cruis e missil e guidanc e system , an d armour-piercin g shel l technolog y were amon g the allege d payoffs o f specia l information. 24 The intelligenc e resource s o f th e Eas t Europea n countrie s hav e serve d the sam e ends . Accordin g t o th e Romania n defecto r Io n Pacepa , i n th e 1960s, hi s agent s stol e th e secret s fo r makin g a n allo y use d i n spac e vehicles, and i n 1978 , Brezhnev an d Andropo v aske d Ceausesc u fo r hel p in obtainin g th e desig n o f Texa s Instrument s microchips . (The n again , as note d i n chapte r 4 , Ceausesc u apparentl y wa s als o sellin g Sovie t military secrets to the CIA in the 1980s. ) Polis h agent s were instrumenta l

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in the covert acquisitio n o f American missil e and rada r technolog y i n th e late 1970s . In 1982-83 , Hungaria n diplomat s conspire d wit h Japanes e businessmen t o smuggl e high-tec h lase r equipmen t fro m th e Unite d State s to Hungary vi a Japan. Hungarian s wer e also involved i n a foiled attemp t in 198 7 to smuggl e compute r an d microelectroni c equipmen t o f "incred ible militar y applications, " accordin g t o a Pentago n source . Th e equip ment wa s Japanese-made , wit h som e America n components , an d ha d been ordere d i n Australi a b y a dumm y corporatio n se t u p b y th e Hun garians i n Singapore. 25 An d when , afte r unification , th e Bon n govern ment bega n t o roun d u p forme r Eas t Germa n spies , i t discovere d tha t numerous miltar y secrets , includin g th e Tornad o fighter project , ha d been compromised . Such instance s o f high-tec h skuldugger y wer e gris t t o th e mil l o f th e Pentagon i n it s effor t t o stiffe n controls , bu t opinion s wer e divide d o n the ne t benefit s accruin g t o th e Eas t fro m over t an d cover t technolog y transfer. Accordin g t o secre t Sovie t document s smuggle d t o th e West , the budge t i n 197 9 fo r acquirin g specia l informatio n wa s roughl y equiv alent t o th e resultin g economie s i n research . Th e sam e sourc e reveal s that onl y hal f o f th e hardwar e an d one-fift h o f th e documentatio n wa s put t o practica l use , an d tha t mor e tha n 8 0 percen t o f th e materia l obtained b y th e KG B wa s unclassified. 26 Still , som e Wester n expert s have estimated that , thank s t o illegal purchases an d industria l espionage , the Eas t ha d manage d t o reduc e th e technolog y ga p i n computer s an d microelectronic system s fro m betwee n te n an d twelv e years i n th e 1960 s to betwee n thre e an d five years i n 1988. 27 From Easter n Europe' s perspective , th e situatio n looke d muc h bleaker . Erno Kemenes , deput y directo r o f Hungary' s Nationa l Plannin g Office , observed, "Th e technolog y ga p betwee n th e tw o part s o f Europ e i s getting wider . Thi s i s a proble m becaus e technolog y i s playin g a large r and large r rol e i n th e economy." 28 A s th e Eas t European s trie d t o modernize th e equipment an d infrastructur e o f their falterin g economies , they foun d tha t th e producer s i n th e CME A (Counci l fo r Mutua l Eco nomic Assistance , als o know n a s Comecon ) wer e unabl e t o provid e th e necessary good s i n adequat e quantit y o r quality . Th e CMEA' s progra m for scientifi c an d technologica l development , launche d b y Gorbache v i n 1985, faile d miserably . Th e Eas t European s ar e therefor e increasingl y compelled t o loo k westwar d fo r high-tec h good s rangin g fro m telecom munications equipmen t t o airliner s an d suffe r fro m th e constraint s o f

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the strategi c embargo . Needin g a powerfu l compute r t o manag e thei r new incom e ta x system , th e Hungarian s rejecte d th e availabl e Sovie t mainframe a s unreliable an d settle d fo r a West German Siemen s machin e that, becaus e o f controls , had onl y half th e desire d memory . The Embargo after the East European Revolution. Consensu s o n th e need fo r a strategi c embarg o an d it s scop e becam e eve n mor e elusiv e a s the win d o f revolutionar y chang e swep t throug h Easter n Europ e i n 1989. Negotiatio n o n arm s reductions , plannin g fo r Wester n aid , an d the lur e o f ne w market s overshadowe d th e perception o f threa t tha t ha d inspired th e embargo . Pressur e mounted , fro m th e Coco m partner s an d from America n industry , fo r fewe r controls . Th e restriction s (includin g the deterren t effec t o n trad e o f reexpor t controls ) continue d t o cos t th e United State s a n annua l $ 9 billio n i n los t exports . Facin g a trad e defici t of ove r $10 0 billion , the administration sa w the wisdom o f compromise . In May 1989 , the administratio n agree d t o rela x Cocom' s "n o excep tions" rul e affectin g high-tec h export s t o th e Sovie t bloc . A bitte r inter departmental disput e erupte d i n Jul y whe n th e Commerc e Departmen t sanctioned expor t o f mor e sophisticate d deskto p an d lapto p persona l computers. Th e ban , i t wa s argued , unnecessaril y penalize d America n companies sinc e comparabl e equipmen t wa s readil y availabl e fro m Asia n suppliers suc h a s Taiwan an d Singapore . President Bush supported Com merce Secretar y Rober t Mosbacher' s decision , bu t Defens e Secretar y Dick Chene y publicl y dissented , claimin g tha t th e som e o f th e decon trolled technolog y wa s no t freel y availabl e o n th e worl d marke t an d would giv e the Sovie t blo c "significan t capabilitie s tha t the y d o no t no w possess" (including , intimate d th e Pentagon , detectio n o f th e Stealt h bomber). 29 Anothe r Coco m controvers y aros e i n Octobe r ove r th e Ital ian Olivett i company' s sal e o f machin e tool s an d compute r softwar e fo r the ne w Sovie t YAK-41 jet fighter. Relaxation o f Coco m restriction s wa s hig h o n th e agend a o f th e Eas t European regime s a s the y move d towar d marke t economic s i n 1990 . Czechoslovakia, Hungary , an d Polan d mad e overture s t o Coco m prom ising no t t o diver t sensitiv e Wester n technolog y t o th e Sovie t Union . Whether i n a more pluralisti c Warsa w Pac t suc h self-disciplin e become s feasible an d verifiabl e remain s a n ope n question , bu t th e Wes t acknowl edged tha t th e Eas t European s n o longe r represente d a seriou s strategi c threat an d deserve d preferentia l treatment . A t it s Jun e 199 0 meeting ,

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Cocom define d th e criteri a fo r removin g al l restriction s o n export s t o these thre e countries , slashe d th e lis t o f controlle d item s b y a third , an d loosened th e control s i n th e computer , telecommunications , an d ma chine too l sectors . I t was estimate d tha t thes e measure s woul d eliminat e licensing requirements fo r $4 5 billio n wort h o f U.S . exports. A new cor e list, t o b e develope d b y th e en d o f th e year , wa s expecte d t o reduc e th e number o f annua l application s fo r expor t license s submitte d t o Coco m from 1,50 0 t o betwee n 15 0 an d 200. 30 Risk-benefit calculation s i n a strategi c embarg o ar e onl y broadl y indicative, bu t som e basi c conclusion s ca n b e drawn . First , socialist , centrally planne d economie s ar e singularl y inefficien t i n th e applicatio n of importe d technologies . Technolog y transfe r generate s deman d fo r more intermediat e good s bu t doe s no t greatl y enhanc e th e capacit y o f the socialis t countrie s t o innovat e an d t o compet e o n worl d markets . A s an America n schola r noted , "Th e mos t effectiv e barrier s t o technolog y transfer ar e thos e erecte d b y th e Soviet s themselves." 31 Second , th e Soviet military-industria l secto r doe s hav e a capability , exceptiona l b y Eastern standards , t o absor b an d appl y Wester n technology , an d i t wil l resort t o al l mean s t o acquir e it . Third , th e West' s ke y comparativ e advantage i n th e globa l econom y lie s i n th e spher e o f researc h an d development, o f hig h tec h knowho w an d products , bu t thi s spher e i s marked b y rapid diffusio n an d obsolescence . The implication s o f thes e proposition s fo r th e strategi c embarg o ar e obvious. Eve n i n a perio d o f detente , th e imperativ e o f militar y securit y justifies Wester n effort s t o dela y th e acquisitio n b y th e Sovie t Unio n o f the lates t scientific-technologica l innovation s o f direc t militar y applica bility. Th e Pentagon' s 198 8 repor t o n Sovie t militar y powe r foun d tha t the Unite d State s wa s superio r t o th e Sovie t Unio n i n th e technolog y level o f fifteen ou t o f thirty-on e deploye d militar y systems , an d equa l i n ten. 32 No natio n o r allianc e ca n affor d t o surrender suc h a security asset . The denia l o f technolog y tha t woul d b e of immediate militar y advantag e to th e enem y i s eminently pruden t an d rational , bu t th e sam e canno t b e said with an y assurance abou t knowho w an d technologies o f only poten tial, indirect, an d long-ter m militar y applicability . In th e final analysis , a s a n Englis h economis t ha s noted , "al l good s are strategic , sinc e in th e long ru n al l ar e substitutes." 33 Tota l economi c warfare woul d hav e justifie d th e denia l o f virtuall y al l trad e wit h th e East. Th e experienc e o f th e 1950 s indicate s tha t suc h warfar e i s politi -

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cally unproductiv e an d impossibl e t o sustai n effectivel y i n peacetime . Moreover, an y notio n tha t th e socialis t economie s represente d a threa t to th e Wes t wa s dispelle d b y thei r disma l performanc e an d prospects . The strategic embargo, despite flaws and transgressions, has served Western security. It s continue d utilit y an d viabilit y depen d o n a realisti c an d dynamic reassessmen t o f th e irreducibl e cor e o f military-technologica l secrets, a calculatio n tha t shoul d b e informe d b y political an d economi c considerations a s well a s by military expertise . Restricte d t o thes e essen tials, unilatera l an d multilatera l control s ca n serv e th e immediat e secu rity interest s o f th e democracie s withou t hamperin g harmon y amon g th e allies. Economi c competitio n an d free r trad e wil l serv e th e long-ter m interests o f nation s o n bot h side s o f th e grea t divide . An d a s th e Eas t Europeans joi n th e democrati c communit y an d seve r thei r militar y link s with th e Sovie t Union , thei r nee d fo r Wester n technolog y shoul d b e satisfied wit h onl y a minimal applicatio n o f strategi c controls . Economic Leverage: Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, Economi c re lations betwee n nation s ar e seldo m lef t untouche d b y politics , an d th e East-West nexu s ha s bee n th e mos t politicize d o f al l eve r sinc e th e Bolshevik revolution . Th e challenge , i t mus t b e remembered , wa s deliv ered unequivocall y b y th e practitioner s o f Marxism-Leninism , wh o preached a n unrelentin g struggl e t o achiev e th e historicall y preordaine d triumph o f thei r socioeconomi c system . The respons e o f th e libera l democracie s t o thi s challeng e wa s fraugh t with controversy . Consensu s wa s rule d ou t i n Wes t Europea n countrie s where Communis t partie s flourishe d o n memorie s o f anti-Naz i comrade ship an d th e economi c distres s o f th e earl y postwa r years . The appea l o f communism wa s graduall y diminishe d b y America n leadershi p a s wel l as covert an d over t aid , which playe d n o smal l part i n restoring Wester n Europe's economi c an d politica l self-confidence . Bu t beyon d a certai n elite consensus o n th e necessit y fo r a strategic embargo , the allies ' osten sibly pragmati c attitud e towar d economi c relation s wit h th e Eas t stoo d in shar p contras t t o th e fundamentall y politica l strateg y adopte d b y Washington. The Truman an d Eisenhowe r administration s argue d tha t "trad e wit h the enemy " woul d a t bes t foste r th e entrenchmen t o f Communis t re gimes an d a t wors t enhance , directl y o r b y substitution , thei r capabilit y for militar y aggression . Denia l o f trad e an d credits , o n th e othe r hand ,

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would aggravat e th e structura l an d productiv e deficiencie s o f th e Stalin ist comman d economie s and , i n th e logi c o f containment , haste n th e internal disintegratio n o f th e Sovie t empire . America n economi c state craft i n th e earl y year s showe d littl e fait h i n th e functionalis t strateg y o f commercial engagemen t an d resorte d t o th e tool s o f denial , sanctions , and rewards . Thes e symbolize d wha t som e Wes t European s deprecate d as naiv e mora l disapproval , a s wel l a s th e mor e concret e goa l o f weak ening and dividin g the enem y camp . An earl y an d indirec t exceptio n t o th e polic y o f economi c contain ment wa s acquiescenc e i n th e maintenanc e o f commercia l contac t be tween Wes t an d Eas t Germany . Determine d t o integrat e th e Federa l Republic int o Western militar y defense , Washingto n endorse d t o Bonn' s attachment t o th e principl e o f on e Germa n nation . Eas t Germany' s favored economi c statu s survive d th e failur e o f half-hearte d attempt s i n the mid-1950 s t o negotiat e reunificatio n an d becam e a permanent , i f anomalous, featur e o f East-Wes t commercia l relations . A mor e logica l applicatio n o f containmen t wa s th e favorabl e treat ment extende d t o Yugoslavi a fro m 194 9 onwards . I n breakin g awa y from Stalin' s embrace , Tit o ha d take n securit y an d economi c risks . Alarmed tha t hi s model o f nationa l communis m migh t find appea l i n th e rest o f Easter n Europe , th e Kremli n launche d a vicious , regionwid e campaign agains t al l real and imagine d evidenc e of Titoism. From Wash ington's perspective , Titois m an d it s disintegrativ e potentia l deserve d encouragement.Accordingly, followin g adoptio n o f th e basi c polic y re garding economi c relation s wit h Yugoslavi a (NS C 18/2) , a specia l a d hoc committee was established o n February 21 , 1949, to examine expor t license applications. Within five months it had approve d export s o f mor e than doubl e th e valu e o f al l license s i n 1948 . I n September , th e Export Import Ban k approve d a $2 0 millio n loa n an d th e Internationa l Mone tary Fun d a $ 3 millio n drawing . Th e NS C als o exempte d Yugoslavi a from th e ba n o n export s o f aviatio n fue l an d equipment . In Apri l 1950 , the Eximban k grante d a furthe r $2 0 millio n credi t t o alleviat e Yugosla via's critica l balanc e o f payment s problem . Late r tha t year , Washingto n responded t o a reques t fo r emergenc y assistanc e t o alleviat e th e critica l food shortag e cause d b y drought. 34 A militar y assistanc e progra m wa s launched i n 1951 . B y 195 5 th e Unite d State s ha d spen t clos e t o $1. 5 billion t o "kee p Tit o afloat. " American militar y ai d helpe d war d of f th e Sovie t threa t t o Yugosla -

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via, an d credit s assiste d th e country' s industria l development , bu t thi s provided littl e politica l leverage . Washingto n ha d undertake n no t t o ti e the ai d t o politica l demands , an d whe n i t nevertheles s aske d Tit o no t t o recognize th e rebe l regim e o f H o Ch i Minh , i t was sternl y rebuffed . Th e military agreemen t o f Novembe r 195 1 culminate d te n month s o f toug h negotiation; th e Yugoslav s agree d t o th e presenc e o f a U.S . militar y mission, bu t the y refuse d t o conside r an y linkag e wit h NATO . On e exception wa s mad e i n 1954 , whe n Yugoslavi a entere d int o a mutua l aid agreement , th e Balka n Pact , wit h NAT O member s Greec e an d Tur key; shortl y thereafte r i t settle d th e Triest e disput e wit h Italy . America n wheat an d credit s probabl y helpe d secur e Tito' s cooperatio n eve n thoug h the Yugoslav s strenuousl y denie d tha t the y coul d b e bought wit h aid. 35 When th e Kremli n i n 1955-5 6 engineere d a n apparen t reconciliatio n with Tito , many i n Congres s misinterprete d th e significanc e o f th e even t and calle d fo r a n en d t o al l aid . Th e flo w o f ai d waxe d an d wane d wit h the progressio n o f Soviet-Yugosla v rapprochemen t an d Tito' s reassur ances tha t h e wa s no t abou t t o surrende r hi s independenc e an d rejoi n the Sovie t bloc . In Jul y 1956 , Congres s amende d th e Mutua l Securit y Act t o requir e th e presiden t t o hal t ai d t o Yugoslavi a unles s h e coul d provide assuranc e tha t Tit o wa s "no t participatin g i n an y polic y o r program fo r th e communis t conques t o f th e world" an d tha t th e ai d wa s in the interes t o f America' s nationa l security . In the mids t o f th e electio n campaign th e Eisenhowe r administratio n prudentl y suspende d ai d unti l October, whe n i t provide d th e necessar y assurance s an d reinstate d th e economic program. 36 A n offende d Tit o rejecte d th e militar y assistanc e program, an d outrigh t ai d stoppe d afte r 1957 . Despite Washington' s sensitivit y t o Tito' s nonaligne d posturing , th e logic o f sustainin g Yugoslavia' s independenc e survive d th e forcefu l So viet reminder i n 195 6 tha t Titois m wa s no t a n acceptabl e alternativ e fo r the res t o f Easter n Europe . Th e Unite d State s an d it s allie s continue d t o treat Yugoslavi a a s a favore d economi c partner . Th e Kenned y adminis tration provide d a technica l assistanc e progra m o f som e $500,000 750,000, developmen t loa n assistanc e tha t amounte d t o abou t $1 0 mil lion i n fiscal 1962 , agricultura l surplu s an d militar y sales , th e sam e export licensin g statu s enjoye d b y othe r non-Soviet-blo c countries , an d the earl y restoratio n o f most-favored-natio n tarif f status. 37 Th e Yugos lav mode l o f nationa l communis m lef t muc h t o b e desired , notabl y i n economic performance , bu t th e exampl e o f independenc e fro m Mosco w

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it se t remaine d a n asse t fo r th e West . America n economi c leverag e ha d played n o par t i n th e Stalin-Tit o split , bu t i t helpe d t o safeguar d th e consequences. Economic leverag e wa s muc h les s successfu l i n it s applicatio n t o Gomulka's Poland . I n Februar y 1957 , th e Pole s cam e t o Washingto n with a reques t fo r credit s o f $30 0 million . The y wo n a $3 0 millio n Eximbank loa n an d agreemen t (unde r th e Agricultura l Trad e Develop ment an d Assistanc e Act ) fo r th e sale , payabl e i n Polis h currency , o f some $6 5 millio n wort h o f agricultura l commodities . A n additiona l $9 8 million i n America n ai d wa s promise d th e followin g February . Bu t th e Gomulka regim e soo n showe d tha t i t ha d littl e stomac h fo r politica l o r economic reform a t home, or fo r distancin g itsel f fro m Moscow . Smalle r credits an d sale s o f agricultura l surplu s wer e sanctione d b y Washingto n for a fe w mor e years , an d Poland' s most-favored-natio n tarif f status , revoked i n 1951 , was reinstate d i n 1960 , bu t th e Unite d State s receive d no politica l rewar d fo r it s modes t economi c favors . Th e lesso n seeme d to b e tha t wher e rulin g partie s wer e beholde n t o Moscow , ther e wa s little i f an y scop e fo r promotin g tangibl e evolutionar y chang e throug h economic leverage . Hungary i n 195 6 presented th e challeng e o f revolutionary , no t evolu tionary, change . Fou r day s afte r th e revolution' s outbreak , Secretar y o f State Dulle s declare d optimisticall y tha t th e Eas t Europea n regime s "mus t know tha t the y ca n dra w upo n ou r abundanc e t o tid e themselve s ove r the period o f economi c adjustmen t whic h i s inevitable a s they rededicat e their productiv e effort s t o th e servic e o f thei r ow n people , rather tha n o f exploiting masters. " "No r d o w e conditio n economi c tie s betwee n u s upon th e adoptio n b y these countrie s o f an y particular for m o f society, " he added , presumabl y stil l anticipatin g th e sprea d o f Titoism. 38 Th e promise o f America n larges s went unrealize d a s the Hungarian s reache d for democrac y an d sovereignt y an d wer e crushed . Th e Kada r regime , imposed b y Soviet arms, contemptuously rejecte d Presiden t Eisenhower' s offer o f $2 0 millio n fo r emergenc y relief . East-West Trade under Johnson. Succeedin g administration s re mained wedde d t o the strategy o f promoting evolutionar y change , couche d in terms o f peaceful engagement , bridg e building , an d differentiation . A t a tim e when th e Sovie t Union wa s attemptin g t o reinvigorat e th e CME A with a dos e o f supranationa l plannin g an d integration , i t wa s though t

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that America n economi c carrot s an d stick s migh t serv e t o encourag e a loosening o f ties between th e satellites an d Mosco w an d induc e domesti c reform. A less restrictive an d mor e differentiate d trad e policy, conclude d the Stat e Department' s Polic y Plannin g Counci l i n Jul y 1963 , coul d secure political advantages. 39 But if in the 1960 s West European govern ments an d firm s graduall y adopte d a "busines s a s usual " approac h t o East-West trad e (subject , o f course , to th e strategi c embargo) , Washing ton's mor e tentativ e an d politicall y calculate d move s i n th e sam e direc tion wer e repeatedl y frustrate d b y th e vagarie s o f domesti c politics . Th e predominant moo d i n Congres s wa s on e o f bipartisa n hostilit y t o trad e and ai d fo r Communists , an d thi s moo d wa s onl y reinforce d b y th e Berlin an d Cuba n crise s and, abov e all , the Vietnam War . Even nonalignmen t o f th e Titois t variet y wa s perceive d b y man y legislators a s perniciou s an d and-American . I n 1962 , th e Senat e passe d the Proxmire-Lausche amendmen t t o th e Foreign Assistanc e Act denyin g the presiden t discretionar y powe r t o allocat e far m surpluse s fo r aid ; th e administration manage d t o secur e a compromis e amendmen t tha t stil l required th e presiden t t o giv e assurance s tha t th e recipien t wa s no t controlled b y the international Communis t conspiracy . Another congres sional initiativ e qualifie d th e ne w Trad e Expansio n Ac t t o den y th e president powe r t o gran t most-favored-natio n tarif f statu s t o Commu nist countries . Agai n Kenned y ha d t o fight har d t o wi n bac k MF N fo r Poland an d Yugoslavia. 40 Th e far m lobb y helpe d hi m t o prevai l i n October 196 3 in sanctioning wheat sales to the Soviet Union an d Easter n Europe, an d America n export s t o the region momentaril y surged . Western Europe' s commercia l offensiv e i n th e Eas t an d a perceptio n of polycentri c tendencie s i n worl d communis m encourage d th e Johnso n administration t o cal l for buildin g economic bridges. In his 196 5 stat e of the unio n message , th e presiden t indicate d tha t th e government , "as sisted by leaders in labor an d business , is now exploring ways to increas e peaceful trade " wit h th e East. 41 T o loose n th e multitud e o f legislate d constraints, Johnso n proceede d prudentl y b y first settin g u p a specia l presidential committe e o n East-Wes t trad e heade d b y th e chairma n o f the Cummin s Engin e Company , J. Irwi n Miller . The committe e reporte d at th e en d o f Apri l 196 5 that , althoug h th e commercia l prospect s wer e limited, th e Unite d State s di d hav e potentia l export s tha t coul d giv e i t bargaining leverage . I t stresse d th e primac y o f politica l considerations , concluding tha t th e "cas e fo r expandin g peacefu l trad e come s dow n t o

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the propositio n tha t w e ca n us e trade t o influenc e th e interna l evolutio n and externa l behavio r o f Communis t countries. " Th e repor t recom mended tha t th e presiden t b e give n greate r latitud e i n grantin g an d withdrawing MF N an d tha t expor t licensin g b e mad e mor e flexible; i t warned, however , agains t long-ter m credit s tha t coul d amoun t t o a subsidy o f th e socialist economies. 42 Only i n Ma y 196 6 di d Congres s finally receiv e th e draf t East-Wes t Trade Relation s bill , proposing t o giv e the president powe r t o ente r int o three-year, renewabl e commercia l agreement s an d t o gran t MFN . In hi s letter o f transmittal , Secretar y o f Stat e Dea n Rus k warne d tha t withou t such authorit y th e Unite d State s woul d mis s "significan t opportunities " to affec t chang e i n Easter n Europe. 43 Nonetheless , th e bil l was kille d b y the chairma n o f th e House Ways an d Mean s Committee , Wilbur Mills . The Chamber o f Commerce , the National Associatio n o f Manufactur ers, an d banker s wer e al l kee n o n boostin g export s t o th e East , bu t i n congress, in the AFL-CIO, and a t the grass roots the notion tha t Americ a ought no t t o fee d an d fight communis m a t the same time outweighed th e hypothetical benefit s o f economi c leverage . Imprompt u "committee s t o warn o f th e arriva l o f communis t merchandis e o n th e loca l scene " organized boycott s o f Polis h ham s an d Czec h crystal . Administratio n officials sharpl y criticize d suc h initiatives , an d th e Stat e Departmen t i n 1966 issue d a pamphle t entitle d "Privat e Boycott s versu s th e Nationa l Interest," bu t a pervasiv e anticommunis m accentuate d b y th e Vietna m War poisone d th e climat e fo r liberalizatio n o f trade . Eas t Europea n ai d to Nort h Vietna m wa s gris t t o th e mil l o f right-win g group s suc h a s th e John Birc h Society , whic h collecte d mor e tha n on e an d a hal f millio n signatures t o a petition opposin g ai d an d trad e with th e Communists . Romania i n th e earl y 1960 s showe d a dispositio n t o distanc e itsel f from th e CME A an d th e Warsaw Pac t an d t o improv e relation s wit h th e United State s an d it s allies . Th e administratio n responde d i n 196 4 b y easing licensin g procedure s an d furnishin g Eximban k guarantee s fo r credits t o fun d majo r industria l projects . Encourage d b y th e Stat e De partment, th e Fireston e Rubbe r Compan y entere d int o a $5 0 millio n contract t o buil d a syntheti c rubbe r plan t i n Romania . Bu t whe n th e conservative Youn g American s fo r Freedo m pickete d th e company' s Akron headquarter s an d pu t pressur e o n it s dealers , Fireston e bea t a hasty retrea t an d abandone d th e project . A compan y les s expose d t o consumer pressure , Universa l Oi l Product s o f De s Plaines , Illinois , di d

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complete a contrac t t o buil d a petroleum crackin g plant nea r th e Ploest i oil fields. Bu t th e tota l turnove r i n U.S.-Romania n trad e amounte d t o under $2 3 millio n i n 1967 , th e balanc e bein g heavil y i n favo r o f th e United States . Th e Ceausesc u regim e resiste d Moscow' s pressure s fo r a division o f labo r i n the CME A that Romani a regarde d a s unfavorable t o its development , brok e rank s wit h th e Warsa w Pac t ove r relation s wit h West German y an d Israe l an d th e invasio n o f Czechoslovakia , an d per formed som e diplomati c service s fo r Washington , al l o f whic h earne d i t the reward o f MFN i n 1975 . The Romanians repai d th e tangible benefit s of MF N b y allowin g mor e emigration , bu t violation s o f basi c freedom s attracted eve r mor e attentio n i n th e West. Bucharest' s ultimat e respons e to America n pressur e o n huma n right s was to giv e up MF N i n 198 8 (se e below an d chapte r 4) . O n balance , th e Romania n experience , lik e th e Polish on e earlier, disappointe d th e advocates o f economi c leverage . Nor coul d th e economi c tool s o f foreig n polic y b e applie d effectivel y in the shor t spa n o f th e Pragu e spring . The prospects fo r bridg e buildin g did appea r mor e promisin g i n earl y 1968 , an d Presiden t Johnso n onc e again aske d Congres s fo r authorit y t o expan d trade . Trad e i n peacefu l goods, testifie d Deput y Unde r Secretar y o f Stat e Charle s Bohle n befor e the Hous e Subcommitte e o n Europe , coul d hel p t o brin g diversit y t o Eastern Europe. 44 There was a n attemp t mad e to resolve the contentiou s issue o f $2 0 millio n wort h o f Czec h gold , hel d b y th e Unite d State s pending agreemen t o n compensatio n fo r nationalize d America n prop erty, bu t Congres s wa s no t abou t t o approv e a generou s settlement . Mindful o f congressional resistance , the administratio n politel y rebuffe d the Czechs ' reques t fo r a $50 0 millio n loa n whil e instructin g th e Com merce Departmen t t o eas e licensin g procedures . Ye t ther e wer e som e positive initiative s i n Congress . Democrati c Senato r Walte r Mondal e o f Minnesota introduce d a Czechoslova k trad e bill , and Congressma n Pau l Findley, (a n Illinoi s Republican ) propose d a n amendmen t t o th e Foreig n Assistance Ac t makin g Czechoslovaki a eligibl e fo r MFN , bu t th e War saw Pac t interventio n pu t a n en d t o thes e probabl y foredoome d mea sures. Dean Rus k commente d th e day afte r th e invasion, "W e would no t expect that th e East-West trad e suggestion s put forwar d b y the Presiden t would b e acted upo n promptl y b y this Congress." 45 Venturing int o th e uncharted water s o f Easter n trad e was risk y enough , and fo r firms sensitiv e abou t thei r domesti c publi c imag e th e threa t o f consumer displeasur e serve d a s a poten t deterrent . Othe r companie s

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developed thei r Easter n contact s throug h foreig n subsidiarie s an d middlemen, bu t i n th e absenc e o f long-ter m credit s an d governmen t investment insurance , no t t o mentio n marketabl e Eas t Europea n ex ports, ther e wa s n o prospec t o f rapi d expansio n o f trade . America n exports t o Easter n Europ e (excludin g th e Sovie t Unio n an d Yugoslavia ) grew fro m $87,751,00 0 i n 196 1 t o $134,953,00 0 i n 1967 . Thi s repre sented 0. 3 percen t o f globa l export s t o Easter n Europ e a t a tim e whe n the America n shar e o f worl d export s stoo d a t 1 6 percent . Th e presenc e of America n industr y wa s particularl y weak : sinc e th e 1960s , Easter n Europe ha s accounte d fo r scarcel y 3 percen t o f America n export s o f finished products . Th e obstacles , apar t fro m restrictiv e legislation , in cluded distanc e fro m th e marke t an d lac k o f experienc e i n dealin g wit h centralized trad e organizations . Th e Unite d State s had , o f course , th e capacity t o b e a major supplie r o f Eastern Europe' s industria l needs , but , as a leadin g privat e exponen t o f East-Wes t trad e note d a t th e time , i t had largel y "cease d t o coun t a s a sourc e o f uniqu e an d irreplaceabl e supplies." 46 Nor wa s th e United State s a n essentia l sourc e o f credit s an d investment capita l fo r th e Eas t Europeans . In thes e circumstances , th e scope for influenc e throug h economi c leverage remained minimal . Trade and Detente from Nixon to Carter. Th e Nixo n administratio n made onl y modes t progres s i n liberalizin g trade . In Henr y Kissinger' s linkage approac h t o th e managemen t o f detente , commercia l relation s were mad e contingen t o n Sovie t cooperatio n i n othe r spheres . I f th e Soviets wante d a Europea n securit y conferenc e t o legitimiz e thei r zon e of influenc e an d gai n easie r acces s t o Wester n technology , the n the y would hav e t o cooperat e ove r Vietna m an d Wes t Berlin . Argue d th e president a t a Nationa l Securit y Counci l meeting , "Bette r politica l rela tions lea d t o improve d trade, " an d no t th e reverse. 47 Kissinge r believe d that technologica l an d economi c imperative s woul d inexorabl y driv e th e Communists t o detent e an d acknowledgmen t o f a n interdependen t worl d economy. 48 Th e broa d U.S . approach t o th e Eas t Europeans , (a s formu lated by Deputy Secretary o f State Kenneth Rus h i n 1973 ) wa s to "creat e a continuin g economi c relationshi p . . . b y expandin g ou r trad e an d b y encouraging thei r growin g receptivit y t o foreig n investment. " H e adde d that i t wa s equall y importan t fo r th e Unite d State s t o promot e close r economic relation s betwee n th e two halve s o f Europe. 49 The administra tion's guarde d dispositio n t o expan d trad e coincide d wit h a growin g

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perception i n Easter n Europ e tha t economi c growt h neede d th e boos t o f Western technolog y an d credit s an d wit h greate r permissivenes s o n th e part o f th e Sovie t mentor . America's ambivalenc e regardin g East-Wes t trad e wa s full y displaye d in th e Trad e Refor m Ac t finall y passe d b y Congres s a t th e en d o f 1974 . In additio n t o th e agricultur e lobby , a growin g numbe r o f America n multinational corporation s an d bank s wer e pressing—notabl y throug h the East-Wes t Trad e Council , establishe d i n 1972—fo r mor e libera l legislation. Th e AFL-CI O remaine d opposed , inspire d b y a mixtur e o f bedrock anticommunis m an d suspicio n tha t th e multinationals ' trad e with low-wag e countrie s woul d cos t American jobs . Conservative oppo sition ha d bot h purel y ideologica l an d security-relate d sources : wh y should Americ a trad e wit h a n enem y tha t wa s exploitin g Wester n tech nology t o enhanc e it s militar y capability ? America' s Eas t Europea n eth nic group s wer e divide d o n th e merit s o f trad e an d tende d t o favo r economic leverag e fo r politica l reform . I t wa s th e Jewis h lobb y tha t ultimately ha d th e greates t impac t o n America n trad e polic y becaus e o f growing publi c concer n ove r huma n right s i n th e Sovie t Union , an d particularly ove r th e issue of Jewish emigration . The hig h poin t o f detent e wit h th e Sovie t Unio n ha d bee n reache d a t Nixon's meetin g with Brezhne v i n Moscow i n May 1972 , and on e resul t was a trade agreemen t tha t include d th e promise o f MFN. Th e propose d Trade Refor m Ac t o f 197 3 wa s t o delive r o n thi s promise . Instead , th e Jackson-Vanik amendmen t linke d al l trad e an d financial concession s t o the emigratio n policie s o f Communis t countries ; the president's request s for waiver s woul d hav e t o b e scrutinize d b y Congres s an d coul d b e turned dow n b y a simple majority. (Concurrently , th e Stevenson amend ment t o th e 197 4 Export-Impor t Ban k Ac t limite d th e grantin g o f U.S . credits to th e Sovie t Union, specificall y i n energy-secto r goods. ) Henry Kissinge r warned tha t th e amendment coul d jeopardize detent e and negotiate d wit h Congres s th e term s o f a n initial , eighteen-mont h waiver, bu t i n Januar y 1975 , th e Soviet s flatly rejecte d th e condition s and abrogate d th e trad e agreement . Thre e month s later , Presiden t For d chided Congres s tha t trad e an d economi c sanctions , however wel l inten tioned, coul d b e self-defeating , an d observe d tha t Wester n Europ e an d Japan ha d alread y steppe d int o th e breach . Th e majorit y o f hi s audienc e remained wedde d t o a mor e ideologica l definitio n o f th e nationa l interest.50

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The coo l realis m o f th e Nixon-Kissinge r strateg y i n East-Wes t rela tions di d no t easil y accommodat e thi s moralisti c linkag e o f trad e t o Communist domesti c polic y an d huma n rights . Th e Carte r administra tion wo n mor e sympath y i n Congres s b y espousin g th e caus e o f huma n rights, bu t a t th e sam e tim e i t trie d unsuccessfull y t o decoupl e thi s issu e from trade . Th e amende d versio n o f th e EA A i n 197 7 no t onl y ease d licensing procedures bu t als o made the strategy o f differentiatio n explici t in requirin g tha t U.S . trad e polic y b e base d no t simpl y o n a country' s Communist statu s bu t "tak e int o accoun t suc h factor s a s th e country' s present an d potentia l relationshi p t o th e Unite d States , it s presen t an d potential relationshi p t o countries friendl y o r hostile to the United States , its abilit y an d willingnes s t o contro l retransfer s o f Unite d State s export s in accordanc e wit h Unite d State s policy , an d suc h othe r factor s a s th e President ma y dee m appropriate." 51 Bu t eve n befor e Afghanista n an d Poland, Congres s wa s no t prepare d t o surrende r th e restrictiv e powe r o f Jackson-Vanik, an d th e administratio n vacillate d i n it s attitud e o n eco nomic diplomac y vis-a-vi s the primary target , th e Soviet Union. 52 Recent administration s hav e use d MF N a s a rewar d that , despit e Jackson-Vanik, wa s onl y nominall y linke d t o huma n rights . A s earl y a s 1975, Presiden t For d persuade d Congres s tha t Romania' s diplomati c performance o n th e worl d stag e deserve d recognitio n an d tha t it s emi gration polic y wa s sufficientl y permissiv e t o warran t MFN . Th e domes tic neo-Stalinis m o f th e Ceausesc u regim e wa s convenientl y overlooked . (Realpolitik als o prevaile d ove r moralis m i n th e cas e o f th e Carter Brzezinski decisio n t o gran t th e People' s Republi c o f Chin a MF N i n 1979.) Fo r year s thereafter , th e Romanian s woul d gran t a batc h o f exi t permits jus t befor e th e annua l congressiona l revie w t o hel p th e adminis tration recommen d renewa l o f MF N (se e chapter 4) . Ceausescu cleverl y exploite d nationalis m t o wi n bot h domesti c popu larity an d Wester n favor s an d technology . A t the sam e time, pursuant t o a Warsa w Pac t agreemen t coverin g an y newl y acquire d technolog y re quested b y th e Sovie t Union , h e serve d a s a n agen t o f cover t technolog y transfer. Whe n Deput y Defens e Secretar y Fran k Carlucc i visite d Bucha rest i n Octobe r 198 2 t o protes t thi s practice , Ceausesc u refuse d t o mee t with him. 53 Th e Stat e Department' s effort s t o protec t th e specia l rela tionship wit h Romani a starte d t o wea r thi n i n th e earl y 1980s . Th e world's pres s increasingl y depicte d Ceausesc u a s th e tyrannica l maste r of a tightl y ru n polic e stat e an d focuse d o n hi s systemati c polic y o f

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discrimination an d force d assimilatio n o f ethni c minorities , notabl y th e Hungarians. Civil right s i n Romani a becam e gris t fo r th e annua l congressiona l hearings o n MFN , an d b y 198 5 th e Ceausesc u regim e was warnin g tha t the benefit s o f MF N di d no t warran t al l thi s criticism . Anticipatin g th e inevitable, th e Romania n governmen t i n Februar y 198 8 chos e t o volun tarily surrende r MFN , thereb y demonstratin g th e limitation s o f U.S . economic leverage . Th e cos t t o th e Romanian s wa s substantial : thei r exports t o th e Unite d State s fel l fro m $68 0 millio n i n 198 8 t o $35 4 million th e followin g year . Hungary wa s equall y kee n t o expan d economi c relation s wit h th e United States , an d th e Kada r regim e wa s fa r mor e toleran t an d reform minded tha n th e Romanian . I t wo n th e accolad e o f MF N i n 197 8 an d had n o difficult y i n retainin g i t throug h successiv e reviews . Hungary' s and Romania' s acquisitio n o f MF N brough t a modes t surg e i n thei r trade with th e United States . Overall, the turnover i n U.S.-East Europea n trade ros e in the 1970 s fro m $40 0 millio n to $ 3 billion, with th e balanc e at the end o f th e decad e heavily in America's favor . Poland's Financial Crisis. Th e 1970 s wer e a decad e o f relativ e opti mism i n bot h Eas t an d Wes t towar d bot h detent e an d th e benefit s o f increased trade . Polan d remaine d a prim e targe t fo r differentiation , fo r the positiv e applicatio n o f economi c leverage . Th e economi c growt h produced b y the strateg y o f extensiv e developmen t bega n t o falte r i n th e 1960s. The Polis h economy , lik e its counterparts i n Eastern Europe , wa s in a stat e o f structura l disequilibrium , characterize d b y productio n pro cesses wastefu l i n input s an d replet e wit h output s tha t di d no t mee t th e standards o f th e worl d market . Neithe r th e arbitrar y pricin g syste m no r the subsidie s fo r producer s an d fo r consume r good s coul d lon g concea l the fundamenta l imbalanc e an d inefficienc y o f th e economy . Th e out come wa s wha t ha s bee n calle d "th e deepes t economi c crisi s i n postwa r Europe." 5 4 Personal rea l income s ha d alread y bee n stagnatin g fo r som e tim e when i n Decembe r 197 0 th e governmen t announce d substantia l pric e increases. Face d wit h a n eruptio n o f labo r unrest , th e ne w part y leader , Edvard Gierek , opte d fo r a n economi c strateg y tha t aime d t o improv e the standar d o f livin g by increasing th e rate o f growth . Th e West wa s t o be the principal sourc e fo r thi s revitalizatio n o f th e Polish economy . Th e

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formula wa s deceptivel y simple : Wester n credit s woul d finance import s of Wester n technology , an d th e credit s woul d b e repai d wit h th e ex ported product s o f th e modernize d Polis h industry . In it s implementation , Gierek' s strateg y reveale d a plethora o f politi cal an d economi c weaknesse s characteristi c o f centrall y planne d econo mies. Th e massiv e ne w investment s i n plan t an d technolog y fa r out stripped th e abilitie s o f inefficien t centra l an d enterpris e bureaucracie s and th e capacities o f the construction industr y an d th e creaky infrastruc ture. Polan d becam e on e o f th e world' s to p te n owner s o f industria l robots. Ye t hope s o f repayin g foreig n deb t wit h export s fade d a s th e volume of unfinished investmen t projects mounted . Gierek' s half-hearte d attempt i n 197 3 t o decentraliz e economi c managemen t wa s doome d no t only b y unfavorabl e externa l circumstance s bu t also , i n th e word s o f a Polish economist , b y th e "lac k o f politica l wil l an d th e resistanc e o f th e party bureaucracy." 55 Without th e disciplin e o f th e market , an d wit h a centra l plannin g mechanism tha t graduall y los t effectiv e control , Poland' s econom y heade d for disaster . Th e rapi d growt h i n nomina l persona l income s an d domes tic consumptio n create d pressur e fo r fewe r export s an d mor e imports . Agriculture, formerl y a sourc e o f har d currency , becam e a drai n o n th e trade balance . I n 1975 , Poland' s ne t trad e defici t wit h th e industria l West hi t a pea k o f ove r $2. 6 billion . A basi c premis e o f th e origina l development strategy , th e boostin g o f exports , wa s supersede d i n prac tice b y a concentratio n o n investment s i n import-substitutio n projects . Some 2 0 percen t o f th e expensiv e foreig n license s wer e neve r used , an d another 1 0 percen t duplicate d domesti c alternatives. 56 Enterprise s ha d little experienc e o r interes t i n promotin g exports . Recessio n i n th e mar ket economie s i n the lat e 1970 s aggravate d Poland' s trad e imbalance . I n 1976, Gierek , lik e Gomulk a befor e him , retreate d befor e th e threa t o f social unres t an d rescinde d increase s i n th e pric e o f essentia l consume r goods. Th e patter n o f import-le d growt h an d unrestraine d domesti c consumption financed b y foreig n loan s wa s a prescriptio n fo r bank ruptcy. Clearly, th e Wes t wa s a partne r i n Poland' s financial crisis . Th e atmosphere o f detent e predispose d Wester n government s an d privat e institutions t o respond favorabl y t o the economic development strategie s of suc h Eas t Europea n countrie s a s Polan d an d Hungary . Politica l a s well a s economi c profi t coul d b e draw n fro m credit s an d trad e tha t

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reinforced move s awa y fro m th e embrac e o f th e Sovie t Union . Wester n producers eage r t o suppl y th e East' s need s an d commercia l financial institutions awas h wit h petrodollar s ha d a commo n interes t i n loan s t o Eastern Europe . A Bank o f Americ a specialis t i n Easter n lendin g recall s that i n th e earl y 1970 s thes e countrie s appeare d t o b e excellen t risks : they ha d a goo d repaymen t record , thei r deb t leve l wa s low , an d thei r conservative centra l authoritie s apparentl y kep t tight rei n ove r trade an d finance. Th e banker s als o dre w comfor t fro m th e "umbrell a theory, " which hel d tha t th e Sovie t Union wa s th e ultimat e guaranto r o f th e Eas t Europeans' creditworthiness. 57 B y th e en d o f th e decade , th e tota l deb t of th e Sovie t Unio n an d Easter n Europ e t o th e nonsocialis t worl d ap proached $7 0 billion. 58 Western governments , includin g th e Unite d States , looke d favorabl y on private lending to Poland, an d until 197 7 the banks liberally provide d loans wit h n o string s attached . Th e ne t trad e defici t wit h th e industria l West ha d bee n reduce d t o $1. 5 billion , bu t th e aggregat e deb t reache d $15 billion, yielding a debt-service ratio of fifty-nine. (Debt-servic e ratio s express interes t an d principa l repaymen t o n foreig n deb t a s a rati o o f exports, an d internationa l banker s ten d t o regar d a rati o o f twenty-fiv e as th e uppe r limi t o f safety. ) Alarme d a t th e chroni c mismanagemen t o f the economy , th e bank s bega n t o insis t o n ful l disclosur e o f balanc e o f payments an d deb t informatio n an d concret e plan s fo r improvin g th e current accoun t an d th e balance o f trade . The performance o f othe r Eas t European borrower s offere d som e reassurance . Th e Hungarian s wer e managing thei r deb t well , an d th e Bulgarian s responde d t o Wester n concerns b y quickl y halvin g thei r debt . Som e American bank s prudentl y reduced thei r Polis h exposure , whil e others , fearin g tha t a sudde n with drawal o f credi t migh t caus e economi c collapse , continue d t o mee t par t of Poland' s credi t needs with shorter-ter m loans . When Presiden t Carte r visite d Warsa w a t th e en d o f 1977 , he prom ised to provid e credit s t o compensat e fo r a growing shortfal l i n Poland' s grain production . Socia l Unres t provoke d b y foo d shortage s threatene d to destabiliz e Gierek , an d th e White Hous e wanted t o prop u p what stil l appeared t o b e a reformis t regime . Th e followin g year , Polan d receive d $400 millio n i n Commodit y Credi t Corporatio n credits . In 1979 , CC C aid ros e t o $20 0 millio n i n direc t credit s an d $30 0 millio n i n credi t guarantees, an d i n 198 0 t o $67 0 millio n i n credi t guarantees . B y then ,

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Poland accounte d fo r 3 7 percen t o f th e CCC' s outstandin g credit s (an d Hungary an d Romani a fo r anothe r 7 percent). 59 Brzezinski observe s tha t "i n retrospect , i t is clear that th e sum tota l o f private an d governmen t credit s extende d t o Polan d wa s excessive." 60 But th e alar m bell s ha d bee n run g a s earl y a s 1977 , when a contributo r to Foreign Affairs forecas t prescientl y tha t Polan d woul d probabl y b e forced t o reschedul e it s deb t i n 1980. 61 A stud y issue d b y th e CI A i n 1978 conclude d tha t Polan d wa s a poor credi t risk. The report coincide d with th e president' s decisio n t o exten d commodit y credit s an d wit h the administration' s advic e t o U.S . banks t o kee p o n lendin g t o Poland . CIA Directo r Stansfiel d Turne r record s tha t Brzezinsk i wa s "livid " at th e publicatio n o f a n unclassifie d repor t tha t threatene d t o under mine th e president' s policy. 62 Th e administratio n ha d humanitaria n a s well a s politica l motive s i n alleviatin g Poland' s grai n shortage , an d i t feared addin g t o Poland' s financia l trouble s b y signalin g restrain t t o th e bankers. By th e en d o f 1979 , Polan d wa s runnin g a $2. 8 billio n defici t i n it s current accoun t balance , an d i t wa s face d th e followin g yea r wit h th e need t o repa y $5. 2 billio n i n deb t principa l an d $1. 9 billio n i n interest , amounting t o som e 6 8 percen t o f it s anticipate d har d currenc y earn ings. 63 Th e crunc h cam e i n 1981 , whe n Poland' s deb t reache d $2 5 billion (wit h a debt-servic e rati o o f 175 ) an d th e onl y alternativ e t o rescheduling wa s default . Th e majo r proportio n o f th e ne w credit s sinc e 1977 ha d com e fro m governments . I n th e Unite d States , Poland' s fa vored statu s include d MF N (restore d i n 1960 ) a s wel l a s eligibilit y (granted i n 1972 ) fo r Commodit y Credi t Corporatio n credit s fo r grai n and Eximban k credit s fo r import s o f U.S . machinery . Th e latte r facili tated severa l industria l cooperatio n agreements , notabl y a join t ventur e with Internationa l Harveste r t o manufactur e crawle r tractors . Th e turn over i n bilatera l trad e ros e fro m $25 0 millio n i n 197 2 t o $1. 3 billio n i n 1980, when th e United State s accounte d fo r 1 0 percent o f Poland' s trad e with th e market economies . As the Solidarity crisi s unfolded, th e NATO allies devised contingenc y plans tha t include d economi c sanction s i n the even t o f a Soviet interven tion. Ye t in April 1981 , Reagan mad e good hi s campaign promis e t o th e farm lobb y an d decide d t o lif t th e grai n embarg o o n th e Sovie t Unio n over th e oppositio n o f Secretar y o f Stat e Alexande r Haig , Defens e Sec -

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retary Caspa r Weinberger , an d othe r advisers , giving , recall s Haig , a "sign o f weakness " o n a "significant bargainin g chip." 6 4 Both th e Carte r an d Reaga n administration s trie d t o exer t positiv e leverage o n th e Polis h regim e b y grantin g ne w CC C credit s an d "Foo d for Peace " aid , an d b y a multilatera l agreemen t fo r partia l reschedulin g of Poland' s deb t (se e chapter 3) . The grant s obviousl y di d no t suffic e t o dissuade Genera l Wojciec h Jaruzelsk i fro m doin g the Kremlin' s bidding , and the rescheduling agreemen t was aborted b y martial law. Washingto n did no t resor t t o th e ultimat e economi c lever , th e threa t o f forcin g Poland int o default . Tha t prospec t migh t hav e deterre d Jaruzelsk i fro m cracking down , bu t onl y if the Soviet Union itsel f wer e unwilling t o bea r the burde n o f a bankrupt Poland. 65 When th e Polis h crisi s materialized, Washingto n wa s alread y engage d in economic warfare wit h the Soviet Union. Responding to the Decembe r 1979 invasio n o f Afghanistan , Presiden t Carte r ha d impose d a packag e of sanction s tha t include d a partia l grai n embargo . Afte r Reaga n lifte d the embargo , Hai g trie d t o salvag e som e leverag e b y declarin g tha t a Soviet interventio n woul d incu r a tota l trad e embargo . Th e administra tion too k step s t o punis h th e Soviet s afte r th e Polis h coup. 66 It extende d national sanction s t o bloc k th e sal e b y U.S . subsidiarie s o f compresso r equipment fo r th e Urengoi-Wester n Europ e ga s pipelin e project , whic h it claimed would mak e the allies dangerously dependen t o n Soviet energ y supplies. 67 Th e Europea n allies wer e furiou s a t thi s America n initiativ e in punitiv e economi c policy . The y neede d th e gas , contract s ha d bee n signed, an d ther e wa s n o reason , the y argued , t o g o beyon d Coco m i n defense o f Wester n security . Th e earl y resumptio n o f grai n sale s t o th e Soviet Unio n displaye d America' s ow n inconsistency , an d Washingto n did no t eve n wai t fo r th e suspensio n o f martia l la w t o conclud e a ne w five-year agreemen t wit h th e Soviets for agricultura l sales . In the end, th e United State s gav e up it s attempt t o sto p th e ga s pipeline project, an d it s other post-Afghanista n sanction s agains t th e Sovie t Unio n ha d littl e effect othe r tha n th e demonstratio n o f displeasure . Sanctions agains t martia l la w i n Polan d wer e scarcel y mor e effective , reflecting onl y th e outrag e o f th e America n public . Incense d a t th e suppression o f Solidarity , AFL-CI O presiden t Lan e Kirklan d urge d Rea gan t o impos e radica l sanctions. 68 Withi n a wee k o f th e declaratio n o f martial law , Washingto n banne d grai n shipments , Eximban k an d othe r credits, preferentia l licensin g o f high-tec h exports , an d Polis h fishin g i n

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U.S. waters; i t als o suspende d th e Polis h airline' s landin g privilege s an d made it known tha t the United State s would no t suppor t Poland' s admis sion t o th e IMF . I n May , th e Unite d State s suspende d a scientifi c ex change program . When th e Polis h parliamen t formall y outlawe d Solidarity , th e Unite d States o n Octobe r 9 cancelle d Poland' s MF N status . Washingto n mad e it clea r tha t th e sanction s wer e mean t t o elici t complianc e wit h thre e conditions: th e liftin g o f martia l law , releas e o f al l politica l prisoners , and meaningfu l negotiatio n betwee n th e regim e o n th e on e han d an d Solidarity an d th e Roma n Catholi c churc h o n th e other . Afte r America n pressure an d prolonged debate , the NATO allies joined th e United State s in banning ne w commercia l credits . Economic sanction s offere d a quic k an d expedien t wa y fo r th e Wes t to retaliate , an d the y wer e initiall y supporte d b y th e oppositio n i n Po land. Th e proble m o f Poland' s deb t demande d greate r circumspection . The Warsa w governmen t ha d announce d i n Marc h 198 1 tha t i t wa s unable t o mee t it s repayment obligations , leavin g it up to it s creditors t o reschedule o r declare Poland i n default. America n an d Europea n banker s dreaded th e losse s an d internationa l repercussion s o f default. 69 Fo r Po land, forma l defaul t woul d hav e mean t th e potentia l los s o f foreig n assets a s wel l a s th e accelerate d maturit y o f it s long-ter m debt . I n th e end, the Reaga n administratio n too k th e prudent cours e of simpl y delay ing discussio n o f reschedulin g unti l Jaruzelsk i mad e som e politica l concessions. Th e Commodit y Credi t Corporatio n ha d guarantee d $7 1 million wort h o f loan s b y America n banks , an d it s rule s require d a formal declaratio n o f defaul t befor e th e guarante e wa s activated . Th e administration resorte d t o an emergency devic e waiving the requirement , prompting Senato r Danie l Patric k Moyniha n an d othe r irat e legislator s to pas s a measur e requirin g th e presiden t t o periodicall y justif y th e waiver o n ground s o f nationa l security . Concessions b y th e Polis h an d America n government s wer e slo w i n coming. Th e liftin g o f martia l la w an d a partia l amnest y fo r politica l prisoners i n July 198 3 le d th e "Pari s Club " o f Wester n credito r govern ments to begin discussion s o n rescheduling; commercial bank s had take n this ste p a yea r earlie r an d ha d resume d providin g short-ter m credits . Since projection s showe d tha t ful l deb t servic e woul d excee d b y a hug e and growin g margi n al l o f Poland' s har d currenc y expor t earnings , rescheduling wa s boun d t o b e a protracted an d painfu l proces s fo r bot h

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borrower an d lenders , an d indee d b y 198 9 th e outstandin g gros s deb t was nearin g $4 0 billion . After Solidarit y leade r Lec h Walesa calle d fo r a removal o f sanction s o n trade , Washingto n i n Januar y 198 4 restore d fishing right s and , a few month s later , lifte d th e ba n o n th e Polis h airlin e and o n scientifi c an d cultura l exchanges . Following a second amnest y i n 1984, th e administratio n indicate d tha t i t woul d n o longe r activel y oppose Poland' s readmissio n t o the International Monetar y Fund , whic h was dul y confirme d i n Jun e 1986 . Th e Warsa w regim e ha d previousl y taken a few austerit y measures , but i t was clear to al l concerned tha t an y IMF rescu e progra m woul d requir e comprehensiv e an d unpopula r re forms. By 1985 , Western ostracis m o f th e Jaruzelski regim e wa s eroding . H e had consolidate d hi s gri p o n th e country , marginalize d Solidarity , an d drafted plan s fo r economi c reform . Ye t th e condition s fo r th e liftin g o f U.S. sanction s ha d bee n onl y partiall y satisfie d i n th e suspensio n o f martial la w an d th e releas e o f mos t politica l prisoners ; ther e remaine d the conditio n o f som e positiv e step s towar d pluralis m an d nationa l reconciliation. I n Decembe r 1986 , Jaruzelski di d appoin t a Socia l Con sultative Counci l tha t include d som e nonpart y notables , bu t h e stead fastly refuse d t o ope n a dialogu e wit h th e illega l Solidarit y movement . The Reaga n administratio n foun d escap e fro m it s dilemma i n the chang ing attitud e o f th e Pole s themselves , fo r Wales a an d othe r oppositio n figures a s wel l a s th e church , includin g Pop e John Pau l II , had com e t o the conclusio n tha t th e remainin g sanction s merel y cause d economi c hardship withou t budgin g th e regime . Afte r consultin g wit h oppositio n spokesmen i n Polan d an d Polis h diplomat s a t th e Vienn a CSC E revie w conference, th e administratio n thre w i n th e towe l an d announce d o n February 19 , 1987 , the lifting o f al l sanctions. The balanc e shee t o f economi c sanction s agains t Polan d i s a mixe d one. I n Octobe r 1986 , th e New York Times editorialize d tha t th e Rea gan administratio n ha d "deftl y show n ho w t o express American abhorr ence for repressio n an d how to use economic power a s a lever for modes t change." 70 T o b e sure , th e measure s reflecte d America' s outrag e a t th e Soviet-inspired suppressio n o f democrati c renewa l a s well a s disappoint ment wit h th e result s o f it s earlie r preferentia l policies . T o pursu e busi ness as usual with Polan d unde r martia l la w would hav e undermined th e credibility o f diplomati c protest s an d mad e a mocker y o f th e polic y o f differentiation. Beyon d thes e symboli c benefits , th e sanction s probabl y

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served a s a n adde d inducemen t t o th e Jaruzelsk i regim e t o lif t martia l law an d releas e politica l detainees . I t wa s boun d t o tak e thes e step s sooner o r later ; Wester n pressur e an d ostracis m mad e i t sooner . How ever, Jaruzelsk i woul d no t expos e hi s monopol y o f powe r t o pluralis m even in the restricted spher e o f trad e unions . Sanctions certainl y aggravate d Poland' s economi c troubles . Trad e with th e West slumpe d sharpl y (U.S.-Polis h turnove r fel l t o $41 2 millio n in 1986) , addin g t o th e difficult y o f reschedulin g debt . Bu t thei r liftin g scarcely altere d th e patter n o f risin g debt , inflation , an d stagnation . Neither th e Wester n carrot s o f th e 1970 s no r th e stick s o f th e 1980 s could induc e a fundamenta l an d necessar y economi c refor m tha t re quired bot h steadfas t politica l wil l an d a capacity fo r prolonge d sacrific e on th e par t o f th e Polis h people . Unabl e t o secur e eve n a modicu m o f popular suppor t fo r th e reform s recommende d b y th e IMF , an d face d with a ne w wav e o f strikes , Jaruzelski i n lat e 198 8 swallowe d hi s prid e and se t t o negotiatin g a political pac t wit h Solidarity . Th e outcom e wa s a semidemocrati c electio n tha t allowe d Pole s t o displa y thei r animosit y toward th e rulin g party . Th e triumphan t Wales a pleade d fo r economi c aid, an d th e Wes t responde d wit h positiv e measure s tha t wil l b e exam ined below . Wester n sanction s contribute d marginall y t o th e collaps e o f communism i n Poland , bu t th e country' s continuin g economi c crisi s demands a costly commitmen t t o it s rehabilitation .

The Record and Legacy of Socialist Economics. I s Easter n Europ e becoming th e ne w thir d world ? Ther e i s ampl e evidenc e tha t socialis t economics ha s been a n immeasurabl y costl y experimen t fo r al l the coun tries o f th e region . Th e force d industrializatio n o f th e 1950 s create d th e appearance o f rapi d economi c growth. The annua l rat e of increas e i n th e net materia l produc t i n th e first hal f o f tha t decad e range d fro m 13. 9 percent fo r Romani a t o 5. 7 percen t fo r Hungary . Ye t th e immensel y wasteful investmen t o f huma n an d capita l resources , manage d b y bloate d and inefficien t bureaucracies , faile d t o generat e th e productivit y an d innovation tha t migh t hav e narrowe d o r eve n maintaine d th e ga p be tween the socialist and the market economies . Instead, in the observatio n of th e Hungarian economis t Janos Kornai , the centrall y planne d system s only achieve d th e "constan t recreatio n o f scarcity." 71 Economi c re forms, wher e introduced , replace d direc t bureaucrati c control s b y indi -

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rect ones, without alleviatin g significantly th e burdens of inefficiency an d corruption. The resul t wa s a stead y declin e i n th e socialis t economies ' competi tiveness i n worl d trad e an d i n thei r abilit y t o satisf y domesti c demand . As a youn g Polis h worke r i n Gdans k reflecte d bitterly , "Fort y year s o f socialism an d stil l no toile t paper." Eas t European consumer s ar e accus tomed t o comparin g thei r standar d o f livin g to tha t o f th e industrialize d West an d no t t o th e thir d world . Tha t standar d varie s greatly , fro m th e relative affluenc e o f Eas t Germany , Czechoslovakia , an d Hungar y t o th e dismal condition s i n Romani a an d Albania . Mos t o f th e regime s wer e eventually drive n t o acknowledg e th e existenc e o f inflatio n an d th e fal l in rea l income s i n th e 1980s . Queues , shortages , an d shodd y good s fe d the despai r o f frustrate d expectations . Eve n lif e expectanc y bega n t o fal l in th e Sovie t sphere . Both government s an d consumer s enjoye d a brief surg e of hop e i n th e 1970s, whe n th e vogu e wa s t o tinke r wit h th e plannin g syste m an d t o draw o n foreig n loan s an d technology . Th e averag e annua l growt h rat e (net material product) i n 1971—7 5 was a probably fictitious 11. 2 percen t in Romania , 9. 8 percen t i n Poland , 7. 8 percen t i n Bulgaria , 6. 3 percen t in Hungary, 5. 7 percen t i n Czechoslovakia , an d 5. 4 percen t i n the GDR . By th e en d o f th e 1980s , th e aggregat e Eas t Europea n growt h rat e ha d fallen belo w 3 percent , turnin g thes e hope s int o a profoun d pessimis m scarcely relieve d b y Gorbachev' s reformism . A prominent Sovie t propo nent o f perestroika, Abe l Aganbegyan , reflecte d soberl y o n th e unex pected obstacle s t o refor m b y notin g tha t "t o estimat e th e dept h o f th e hole you'r e i n i s onl y possibl e whe n yo u star t climbin g ou t o f it." 7 2 Some of th e East Europeans ha d starte d t o clim b ou t o f thei r hol e earlie r and wer e now slippin g back . After th e failur e o f th e strateg y o f technologica l import-le d growt h i n the 1970s , mos t Eas t Europea n regime s turne d t o expor t drive s an d austerity measure s t o restor e economi c stability . Unfavorabl e term s o f trade, trad e deficits , debt , an d domesti c inflatio n characterize d th e ne w economic reality . Th e region' s industrie s remaine d comparativel y ineffi cient i n thei r us e of labor , energy , an d ra w material s an d i n th e applica tion o f technologica l innovation . The y wer e als o dreadfu l polluter s o f the environment ; som e 7 5 percent o f Eas t Germa n industr y ma y hav e t o be shut dow n whe n Wes t Germa n pollutio n standard s ar e applied. Thei r hopes o f becomin g supplier s o f secondar y manufacture d product s t o

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Western market s hav e bee n dimme d b y th e rapi d ris e o f Asia' s newl y industrializing countries . Th e prospect s ar e n o bette r i n th e agricultura l sector, whic h lack s th e productivit y eve n t o satisf y domesti c demand . Hungary i s a n exception , havin g successfull y modernize d an d i n effec t privatized muc h o f it s agriculture , bu t Wester n overproductio n an d protectionism limi t the scope of foo d exports . As The Economist gloom ily observed , th e Eas t European s ar e i n dange r o f becomin g "newl y underdeveloped countries. " 73 To b e sure, the Eas t European economie s suffe r fro m historica l hand icaps. Wit h th e exceptio n o f Bohemia , the y serve d a s breadbasket s o f empire an d lagge d fa r behin d Wester n Europe' s industria l revolution . Dependence o n foreig n investmen t an d manufacture s retarde d th e mod ernization o f thes e backwar d economies. 74 Afte r 1945 , wa r damage , reparations, an d Sovie t exploitatio n se t bac k development . Ye t when al l is sai d an d done , thei r greates t handica p i n overcomin g scarcit y an d producing wealt h ha s bee n th e Soviet-typ e centrall y planne d system , which continue d throug h th e 1980 s t o inhibi t thei r economi c potential . This syste m i s succinctl y characterize d b y th e Polis h economis t Ja n Winiecki a s "illogical". 75 B y it s fundamenta l rejectio n o f market-base d rationality, i t ha s perversel y generate d inefficiency , waste , an d scarcity . By its egalitarianism an d distorte d incentive s i t has nurture d mediocrity , irresponsibility, fea r o f innovation , an d cheating . Worse still , the hybri d form s o f marke t socialism , attempte d i n Hun gary an d currentl y envisage d i n th e Sovie t Union , suffe r fro m suc h stresses an d ne w disharmonie s tha t th e economy' s overal l performanc e may b e n o bette r tha n i n th e undiluted , centrall y planne d model . Th e growth rat e o f Hungary' s GN P sinc e th e introductio n o f it s "ne w eco nomic mechanism " i n 196 8 ha s not exceede d th e averag e growth rat e of the CME A six . Th e recor d o f semimarke t socialis m i n nonaligne d Yu goslavia present s a n eve n grimme r picture ; th e standar d o f livin g fel l b y over one-thir d i n the 1980s , and b y the en d o f th e decad e hyperinflatio n had se t in . Th e bitte r lesso n o f thes e partia l reform s wa s tha t balance d and sustaine d growt h ca n onl y b e assure d b y fundamental , an d no t merely cosmetic , alteratio n o f th e economi c structure . That , a t leas t i n the shor t term , i s boun d t o creat e dislocatio n an d hardshi p a s th e secu rity foun d i n a n equalit y o f povert y i s erode d b y wide r incom e dispari ties, unemployment, an d unsubsidize d staples .

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The Hungarian Lesson. Th e problem s o f socialis t economic s an d par tial reform s ar e wel l illustrate d b y Hungary . Th e ne w economi c mecha nism (NEM ) launche d i n 196 8 promise d t o lighte n th e heav y han d o f state contro l ove r price s an d productio n plans . Hope s tha t th e NE M would b e reinforce d b y a simila r refor m i n Czechoslovaki a wer e dashe d by th e Sovie t invasion . I n th e earl y 1970s , conservativ e domesti c oppo sition, encourage d b y a n apprehensiv e Kremlin , succeede d i n halting th e reform, mainl y o n th e ground s tha t i t wa s neglectin g th e immediat e economic interest s o f industria l labor . It s chief success lay in the agricul tural sector , wher e heav y investment , pric e reform , an d privatizatio n (primarily i n the for m o f autonomou s cooperatives , which wer e allowe d to engag e i n ancillar y industria l activity ) booste d productivit y t o th e point tha t th e countr y manage d no t onl y to fee d itsel f bu t als o produce d a surplu s fo r export . Even afte r th e refor m wa s relaunche d i n th e lat e 1970s , an d despit e heavy us e o f foreig n credits , th e productivit y an d competitivenes s o n international market s o f th e stat e industria l secto r showe d onl y modes t improvement. Th e NE M ha d ostensibl y increase d th e autonom y o f en terprises, bu t i t lef t the m wholl y dependen t o n th e stat e fo r credit s a s well a s subsidie s an d subjec t t o centrall y determine d investmen t priori ties. Th e socialize d secto r accounte d fo r som e 9 0 percen t o f al l invest ment, and the record show s that muc h of this was not planned o r applie d efficiently. Centrall y planne d investmen t gre w rapidl y unti l 1979 , the n was cu t bac k a s the debt-servic e burde n mounted . A flurr y o f uncoordinate d measure s allowe d fo r expansio n o f th e second, privat e econom y (distinguishe d fro m th e third , undergroun d economy). The privat e sector' s contributio n t o th e nationa l incom e (ne t material product ) gre w fro m 2. 6 percen t t o 7 percent betwee n 197 0 an d 1986. Worker s wer e permitte d t o for m "workin g collectives " an d us e their plant' s machiner y t o produc e good s o n contract . Smal l privat e enterprises wer e sanctioned . Som e o f th e retai l an d servic e secto r wa s privatized. Sinc e basi c wage s di d no t kee p u p wit h inflation , th e regim e was expedientl y encouragin g Hungarian s t o moonligh t i n order t o main tain thei r standar d o f living , i n effect , t o exploi t themselves . The young , the pensioners, an d other s unabl e to d o so were left behind . These partia l remedie s manage d t o creat e a semblanc e o f consumer ism an d affluenc e (earnin g Wester n prais e fo r "goulas h communism" ) but coul d no t sufficientl y invigorat e th e industria l sector . Restructurin g

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and technologica l innovatio n wer e als o impede d b y long-ter m trad e commitments t o Hungary' s CME A partners . When a n enterpris e i s geare d to expor t a certai n obsolescen t produc t t o on e o f thes e partner s a t notional prices , i t ha s littl e scop e o r incentiv e t o restructure , innovate , compete fo r ne w customers , o r eve n t o declar e bankruptcy . A standar d complaint o f Hungaria n economist s i s tha t i n th e socialis t syste m i t i s impossible t o determin e th e rea l pric e o f anything , includin g labor ; ye t without rea l prices , n o manage r ca n rationall y pla n productio n an d investment. Faced wit h a debt-servic e rati o tha t i s projecte d t o ris e t o eight y b y 1990, th e Hungaria n regim e bravel y opte d fo r mor e liberalizatio n com bined wit h austerity . Th e decisio n wa s impelle d b y th e rapi d politica l democratization o f th e country , whic h generate d a broa d consensu s (encompassing forme r Communis t reformer s i n th e reorganized , socia l democratic Hungaria n Socialis t party ) o n th e failur e o f th e socialis t model an d th e nee d fo r restorin g a marke t economy . I t wa s officiall y conceded tha t social , that is , state property wa s no t th e mos t productiv e form o f ownership , an d tha t ful l employmen t coul d no t b e guarantee d by the state . Preliminary reform s include d lowe r stat e subsidie s an d ne w incom e and value-adde d taxe s t o reduc e th e budge t defici t an d th e institutio n o f a competitiv e bankin g syste m an d embryoni c bond an d stoc k market s t o generate domesti c capital . "I t ha s becom e quit e obvious, " sai d Justic e Minister Kalma n Kulcsa r when a new reform la w was passed i n Octobe r 1988, "tha t withou t a capital market , th e commodity an d labo r market s cannot functio n adequatel y either." 76 Th e measur e allowe d fo r ful l for eign ownershi p o f Hungaria n companie s an d fo r large r privat e firms. A "conversion law " provide d fo r th e privatizatio n o f stat e firms. Sinc e enterprises presentl y transfe r mos t o f thei r gros s profit s t o th e stat e i n the for m o f taxe s an d othe r mandator y contributions , profitabl e capital ism ma y b e a distan t prospect , althoug h th e governmen t anticipate s th e lowering o f bot h producers ' subsidie s an d ta x o n profit . Finally, i n Decembe r 1989 , the lame-duc k governmen t o f Prim e Min ister Miklo s Nemet h adopte d th e bitte r remed y recommende d b y th e IMF wit h a budget-balancin g progra m t o slas h subsidie s b y 2 0 percen t and shu t dow n fifty unprofitabl e enterprises , foreshadowin g massiv e consumer pric e increase s an d unemployment . I n th e real m o f trade , Hungary planne d t o cu t it s export s t o th e CME A b y 2 0 percent , re -

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ducing it s unspendabl e rubl e surplus , an d t o pu t it s exchange s wit h the Sovie t Unio n o n a har d currenc y basi s b y 1991 . Suc h market driven shoc k therap y would , i t wa s hoped , spu r productivit y an d gen erate th e export s an d har d currenc y neede d t o obtai n Wester n tech nology. Foreign trad e contribute s som e 4 0 percen t o f Hungary' s nationa l income. Jus t ove r hal f o f thi s trad e i s conducte d wit h th e socialis t countries, som e o f i t settle d i n convertibl e currency . Th e Sovie t Unio n accounts fo r 28. 5 percen t o f th e country' s import s an d 32. 7 percen t o f its export s (1987) . Th e bigges t Wester n partne r i s th e Federa l Republi c of Germany , wit h 13. 9 percen t o f import s an d 9. 8 percen t o f exports ; the correspondin g figures fo r th e Unite d State s ar e 2. 5 an d 3 percent . Whether th e patter n o f Hungary' s trad e i s bes t designe d t o exploi t th e country's comparativ e advantag e i s questionable, but it reflects th e coun try's earlie r politica l alignment . I t ha s als o offere d assure d source s o f energy an d ra w material s a s wel l a s market s fo r agricultura l an d indus trial exports , thoug h th e Sovie t Unio n ha s o f lat e becom e disenchante d with tradin g raw material s fo r low-qualit y industria l products. The Hun garians ar e thu s lef t t o choos e betwee n a roc k an d a hard place , fo r th e limited competitivenes s o f thei r export s an d othe r impediments , notabl y West Europea n protectionism , inhibi t a majo r reorientatio n o f expor t trade, whil e alternativ e source s o f energ y an d ra w material s woul d require payment i n scarc e convertible currency . "Secure dependence " o n th e CME A ha s no t equippe d Hungar y t o compete i n othe r markets . Plant s usin g obsolet e Eas t Europea n machin ery and Sovie t raw material s were designed mainl y to serve Soviet impor t needs. Meanwhile , import s fro m th e Wes t wer e largel y restricte d t o goods tha t d o no t compet e wit h domesti c an d CME A product s an d remain severel y limite d b y the shortag e o f har d currency . Unti l recently , joint venture s wit h Wester n firms wer e small-scal e an d generate d littl e profit fo r eithe r party . Th e CME A patter n o f bilateral , long-ter m trad e deals, cleare d a t notiona l prices , an d th e absenc e o f a convertibl e cur rency hav e impede d th e adaptatio n o f Hungary' s productio n t o worl d market condition s an d discourage d Wester n firms fro m usin g Hungar y (or any other Eas t European country ) a s a base for penetratin g th e entir e regional market . Hungary's economi c performanc e i s a tes t no t onl y o f th e ongoin g experiment wit h marketizatio n bu t als o o f Wester n confidenc e i n th e

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viability o f Eas t Europea n reform . Th e lates t austerit y progra m wa s expected t o wi n IM F approva l an d brin g substantia l Wester n economi c favors a s wel l a s ne w foreig n investmen t (se e below) . Th e immediat e consequence wa s th e first dro p i n persona l consumptio n i n ove r thirt y years, an d a governmen t commissio n calculate d tha t Hungar y woul d need a n additiona l $1. 5 billio n jus t t o kee p th e standar d o f livin g fro m falling further . Th e burde n o f escapin g fro m th e accumulate d failure s o f socialist economic s wil l b e born e b y th e haples s consumer s o f Easter n Europe. In th e shor t term , Wester n countrie s an d internationa l financial institutions wil l shar e responsibilit y fo r th e impositio n o f painfu l austerity. The East German Alternative. Whil e Hungar y opte d initiall y fo r a hybrid marke t socialism , th e Germa n Democrati c Republi c concentrate d on refinin g th e centrall y planne d mode l t o achiev e economie s o f scal e and mor e efficien t management . Th e industrial secto r wa s dominate d b y huge conglomerates , bu t i n retai l trad e an d foo d service s th e regim e tolerated wha t wa s proportionately th e largest private secto r i n the East ; private farm s als o contributed a greater shar e of agricultura l outpu t tha n elsewhere, excep t fo r Poland . A per capit a GN P 4 0 percen t highe r tha n that o f th e Sovie t Unio n mad e th e GD R Easter n Europe' s economi c powerhouse. I t wa s th e Sovie t Union' s larges t tradin g partne r an d sup plier o f manufacture d goods , bu t it s superiorit y i n th e productio n o f machine tool s an d opticals , fo r example , wa s mor e a reflectio n o f th e backwardness o f th e res t o f th e CME A tha n o f competitivenes s o n th e world market . Althoug h th e GD R ha d mor e internationall y competitiv e enterprises tha n an y o f it s socialis t neighbors , i n technologica l innova tion it s industry remaine d year s behin d th e develope d West , an d onl y 1 5 percent o f it s export s t o it s chie f Wester n market , th e Federa l Republi c of Germany , consiste d o f capita l goods . The relativ e succes s o f th e Eas t Germa n econom y wa s commonl y attributed t o th e abilit y o f diligent , well-trained , an d discipline d Ger mans t o mak e an y syste m work . Th e GD R possesse d anothe r uniqu e advantage: fre e acces s t o th e market s o f Wes t German y (an d therefor e indirectly t o th e Europea n Community ) a s wel l a s t o specia l Wes t Ger man credit s an d sundr y payments , al l o f whic h contribute d a n extr a 3 4 percen t t o it s GNP . This significan t subsid y wa s a long-standing para dox o f East-Wes t relations , fo r i n term s o f positiv e leverag e i t secure d

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only mino r concession s (o n trave l an d emigration , fo r instance ) bu t n o political o r economi c liberalization (se e chapter 6) . The major Eas t German reform , devise d b y Gunter Mitta g an d imple mented i n 1978-81 , wa s th e reorganization o f industr y int o large , vertically integrate d Kombinate linkin g firms i n relate d produc t fields. Thes e combines share d researc h an d developmen t an d enjoye d som e margina l autonomy i n th e reinvestmen t o f profits . A respectable growt h rat e wa s maintained throug h th e 1970 s an d earl y 1980s , but structura l an d othe r weaknesses increasingl y cas t a pal l ove r thi s easter n versio n o f th e Ger man economi c miracle : a lac k o f domesti c an d regiona l competition , administrative pric e setting , hug e stat e subsidies , stagnatio n i n th e pro duction o f sof t coa l (th e principa l domesti c sourc e o f energy) , fallin g prices fo r ke y export s suc h a s bul k chemical s an d refine d oi l products , and a shrinkin g labo r force . Consumers , meanwhile , ha d t o wai t ove r ten years fo r deliver y o f a new car . The revolutio n i n Novembe r 198 9 brough t th e promis e o f pluralis m and virtuall y unrestricte d travel , bu t i t als o precipitate d a politica l an d economic crisi s i n th e Eas t Germa n state . The floo d o f emigrant s aggra vated a n alread y acut e labor shortag e in the GDR, while countless other s seized th e opportunit y t o observ e a t first han d Wes t Germa n affluenc e and tak e stoc k o f th e fac t tha t a t th e realisti c rat e o f exchang e a Wes t German skille d worke r earne d severa l time s a s muc h a s hi s Easter n counterpart. Th e beleaguered Eas t German leader s promised t o liberaliz e trade an d privat e enterprise , t o allo w join t ventures , t o tri m taxe s an d the bureaucracy , and , ou t o f dir e necessity , t o devalu e th e Ostmark , conceding tha t i n th e pas t officia l statistic s o n th e GDR' s economi c prowess ha d bee n "beautifie d an d falsified." 77 Eve n th e Eas t Germa n economic powerhouse, then , had bee n somethin g o f a Potemkin village . The prospec t o f self-determinatio n unleashe d tal k o f unificatio n wit h the Federa l Republi c o n bot h side s o f th e crumblin g Wall , whil e neigh bors Eas t an d Wes t pondere d apprehensivel y th e potentia l economi c preponderance o f a combined populatio n o f 77. 8 millio n wit h a GN P of $1.1 trillion. Bonn linke d it s prompt offe r o f massiv e ai d an d investmen t to democratizatio n an d marketization . T o salvag e a rational e fo r th e retention o f a separat e GDR , th e ne w prim e minister , Han s Modrow , initially insiste d tha t "lif e point s u s towar d a socialis t syste m i n whic h planning an d th e marke t ar e closel y linked." 78 Bu t i t soo n becam e clea r that eve n hybri d socialis m coul d no t surviv e ope n borders . Lure d b y

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West Germa n Chancello r Helmu t Kohl' s ambiguou s promis e o f a one to-one exchang e rate , East Germa n voter s chos e ful l integratio n int o th e West Germa n economy . Th e term s wer e speedil y worke d ou t fo r th e economic union t o take place on July 2, 1990 . Thus, the East's economi c powerhouse wa s summaril y absorbe d b y that o f Western Europe . Poland's "BigBang." Eve r sinc e 1957 , Poland ha s flirted periodicall y with innovativ e economi c measures , bu t eac h tim e th e attemp t wa s aborted b y politica l consideration s o r undermine d b y socia l an d struc tural factors . In th e post-martial-la w period , overdu e pric e hike s wer e effectively nullifie d b y wag e inflation , an d th e creatio n i n 198 6 o f con glomerates simila r t o th e Eas t Germa n combine s scarcel y improve d pro ductivity. Th e predominanc e o f smal l privat e farm s (accountin g fo r nearly 8 0 percent o f gros s agricultura l output ) remaine d th e main distin guishing featur e o f th e Polis h socialis t econom y an d wa s grante d recog nition i n th e 198 3 constitution . Bu t agricultura l productivit y remaine d low, hampere d b y shortage s o f chemical s an d machinery , th e disincen tive of lo w prices, and diseconomie s o f scale . In 1986 , th e Jaruzelsk i regim e launche d th e "secon d stage " o f eco nomic reform , designe d t o encourag e small-scal e loca l enterprise , creat e a capital market , increas e labor mobility , an d decontro l mos t prices. The public's respons e i n a 198 7 referendu m reflecte d bot h a mistrus t o f th e government an d a n understandabl e distast e fo r th e inevitabl e belt-tight ening that accompanie s an y stabilizatio n program . Meanwhile , adminis trative control s ove r hal f o f consume r price s an d one-thir d o f produce r prices continue d t o distor t suppl y an d demand , inducin g shortage s an d a thrivin g "gra y market" ; interes t rate s fa r belo w th e leve l o f inflatio n discouraged savin g an d th e efficien t us e o f enterpris e assets ; stat e subsi dies i n 198 9 stil l amounte d t o one-sixt h o f Poland' s gros s domesti c product an d one-thir d o f governmen t spending ; an d th e closin g dow n o f unprofitable enterprises , sanctione d b y th e 198 3 bankruptc y law , ha d hardly begun . A foreig n deb t nearin g $4 0 billio n wa s o f cours e a formidabl e obsta cle t o economi c recovery . Thoug h expor t earning s ros e steadily , the y hardly suffice d t o servic e th e reschedule d deb t an d pa y fo r essentia l imports. Lac k o f confidenc e b y Wester n tradin g partner s mean t tha t i n 1988 Polan d stil l ha d t o pa y cas h fo r 9 0 percen t o f it s imports . Unde r the circumstances , ther e wa s littl e prospec t o f substantia l ne w foreig n

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investment. (Ther e were in Poland som e seven hundred companie s base d on foreig n capital , mostl y smal l businesse s establishe d sinc e 197 7 b y foreigners o f Polis h descent. ) Wit h th e econom y bankrup t an d refor m stalled b y socia l unrest , Jaruzelsk i ha d littl e choic e bu t t o see k a n alter native political formul a mor e palatable t o Pole s and th e West . That th e ne w Polis h governmen t woul d fin d littl e inspiratio n i n th e cautious incrementalis m o f perestroika wa s foreshadowe d b y Lec h Wal esa's observatio n i n April 1989 : I wis h Gorbache v an d hi s reform s al l th e best . Bu t w e stil l don' t kno w wha t communism in its final form will look like. In contrast, we know very well which political an d economi c models in Europe an d in the world hav e passed the test of time, and it is to these models that we must turn as opposed to attempting to "reform" faile d ideologies and concepts.79 A fe w month s late r Wales a tol d ABC' s Barbar a Walter s tha t "w e wil l build a system base d o n democrac y an d freedom . I t won't b e capitalism . It wil l b e a syste m tha t wil l b e bette r tha n capitalism." 80 Bu t the Mazo wiecki governmen t soo n cam e t o th e conclusio n tha t a "bi g bang " conversion t o capitalis m (recommende d notabl y b y th e Harvar d econo mist Jeffrey Sachs , whose simila r advic e to Bolivia was cited a s a positive precedent) wa s the only realistic remedy an d the only one likely to satisf y the IMF and Western creditors . The economi c progra m unveile d i n Warsaw i n Octobe r calle d fo r th e creation "i n th e swiftes t possibl e way " o f a marke t econom y base d o n private propert y an d enterprise . Stat e monopolie s woul d b e dismantled ; a competitiv e bankin g syste m an d othe r institution s woul d b e estab lished t o serv e a capita l market ; price s woul d b e free d an d subsidie s gradually eliminated ; wage s woul d b e temporaril y froze n an d th e cur rency mad e full y convertible . Unemploymen t woul d b e alleviate d b y retraining an d socia l insurance . I t wa s anticipate d tha t th e immediat e consequences o f thi s shoc k therapy—industria l recessio n an d a shar p drop i n th e standar d o f living—woul d sorel y tes t th e moral e o f th e population; i n fact , tw o month s afte r th e deregulatio n o f foo d prices , inflation reache d a n annua l rat e o f 45 0 percent . In th e firs t quarte r o f 1990, rea l income s an d outpu t fel l b y a third, bu t th e inflationar y spira l was reverse d an d the number o f private businesse s showe d a net increas e of clos e t o 100,000 . Th e first majo r protes t strike , b y rai l workers , erupted i n May . Unemploymen t ros e rapidly , reachin g nearl y on e mil lion b y th e en d o f September . Ther e wa s littl e doub t tha t prolonge d

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recession woul d soo n erod e th e permissiv e consensu s an d tha t onl y Western ai d coul d stav e off a new political crisis . By th e en d o f 1989 , th e remainin g Eas t Europea n dominoe s ha d fallen, an d th e interi m regime s i n Prague , Sofia , an d Buchares t al l pro fessed commitmen t t o som e degree of marketization . Pursui t o f that goa l will be no eas y task i n impoverished societie s shorn fo r fort y year s of th e institutions, managerial class , and wor k habit s tha t giv e life t o a market . Legislative sanctio n fo r a privat e secto r an d competitiv e financial insti tutions wil l no t generat e entrepreneurship , domesti c privat e investment , and a motivate d labo r forc e overnight . Pric e refor m i s n o panace a i n economies dominate d b y monopolistic producers; de-monopolizatio n b y the breakin g u p o f state-ru n conglomerate s i s no solutio n unles s produc ers' subsidie s ar e als o eliminated ; an d withou t subsidies , countles s inef ficient Eas t Europea n enterprise s wil l go bankrupt, precipitatin g massiv e unemployment. The effectivenes s o f economi c structura l refor m depend s o n th e avail ability o f skill s fundamentall y differen t fro m thos e nurture d b y th e bureaucratic leviatha n o f stat e socialism . Easter n Europ e ma y no t b e short o f cleve r economists , no t t o spea k o f bureaucrats , bu t i t lack s a market-oriented manageria l class . In th e lon g run , o f course , profes sional educatio n an d th e marke t itsel f wil l alleviat e this weakness. In th e short run , th e existin g manageria l nomenklatur a an d black-marketeer s are in a good position t o exploi t th e new opportunities . The nomenklatur a syste m o f politica l patronag e (i n Poland , fo r ex ample, some 900,00 0 appointment s wer e subject t o direc t party control ) encompassed a diversit y o f talent s an d motivations . Contrar y t o th e suspicion, i n th e word s o f a Polis h journalist , tha t "al l nomenklatur a people stea l nationa l property, " man y ar e not incompeten t o r corrupt. 81 Others fea r th e disruptiv e consequence s o f a replay o f th e housecleanin g conducted b y the Communist s i n the postwar perio d an d anticipat e tha t self-interest an d th e profi t motiv e wil l conver t bureaucrat s int o efficien t managers. Som e o f th e Eas t Europea n countries—Czechoslovakia , Eas t Germany, Hungary—hav e bette r entrepreneuria l tradition s tha n others , but economi c transformatio n wil l creat e socia l tension s i n al l o f them , affecting worker s a s well a s managers . Moreover, th e socia l turmoi l an d short-ter m cost s o f marketizatio n will onl y fee d th e fire o f ideologue s an d opportunisti c politician s read y to suppres s "capitalis t chaos " wit h th e trie d an d tru e remedie s o f com -

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mand socialis m o r som e othe r populis t chimera . A greate r degre e o f institutionalized politica l pluralis m migh t absor b som e o f th e socia l stresses o f th e escap e fro m socialis t economi c stagnation , bu t th e eco nomic crisi s o f Easter n Europ e wil l no t b e resolve d withou t mutua l adaptation i n its economic relations with th e rest of the world . Intra-CMEA Trade. A s i f foreig n debt , fallin g growt h rates , a chroni c inability t o upgrad e th e qualit y o f good s produced , an d a widenin g technology ga p wer e no t enough , th e Eas t Europeans ' economi c woe s are compounde d b y th e structura l weaknesse s o f th e CME A an d b y a more demandin g Sovie t Union. Th e CME A largel y faile d t o generat e th e cooperation an d divisio n o f labo r tha t coul d facilitat e economie s o f scale, an d i t offer s littl e i n th e wa y o f multilatera l clearin g an d fre e movement o f labo r an d capital . I t ha s provide d th e securit y o f a pro tected marke t fo r th e bilatera l exchang e o f substandar d goods , an d i t has assured supplie s of energy and raw materials. This security, however , is now threatene d b y the Soviet Union's reconsideration s o f it s economi c interests an d b y th e absorptio n o f th e GD R int o a unifie d Germa n economy. The traditiona l patter n o f intra-CME A trad e wa s th e exchang e o f low-cost Sovie t energ y an d ra w material s fo r Eas t Europea n manufac tures an d foo d products , typicall y o f lo w qualit y an d variet y an d hig h production cos t (bette r good s wer e reserve d fo r har d currenc y markets) . After th e earl y postwa r phas e o f Sovie t exploitation , th e term s o f trad e arguably favore d th e Eas t European s unti l Sovie t price s cam e t o reflec t the 1970 s energ y crisi s an d th e highe r cos t o f oi l extractio n i n th e mor e remote part s o f th e Sovie t Union . Mosco w bega n t o deman d Eas t Euro pean investmen t i n it s energy developmen t projects , whic h th e countrie s were no t eage r t o do , an d paymen t i n har d currenc y fo r increase d supplies. Mos t recently , th e dislocation s induce d b y perestroika hav e impaired th e Sovie t Union' s reliabilit y a s a supplie r o f energy ; bot h Hungary an d Czechoslovaki a experience d seriou s shortfall s i n deliverie s of Soviet oil to Eastern Europe were cut by some 30 percent in the cours e of 1990 . Mikhail Gorbache v i s taking a cold , har d loo k a t th e cost s o f empire . While th e Sovie t Unio n will remai n a prime marke t an d supplie r fo r th e East Europeans , th e implici t subsidie s ar e boun d t o b e cu t i n th e ag e o f perestroika.82 Th e Eas t European s ar e als o reassessin g th e hidde n cost s

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of th e CMEA . Intra-CME A trad e i s stagnatin g (i t ros e b y onl y 1. 5 percent i n 1987) , yet in the late 1980 s i t represented a growing shar e (t o some 6 0 percent ) o f Eas t European trad e a s the region' s competitivenes s in th e worl d marke t declined . Th e CME A economies ' inabilit y t o adjus t to consume r deman d create d unpredictabl e scarcities , an d th e fixed cur rency exchang e rate s produce d disparitie s i n purchasin g powe r tha t drove consumer s acros s border s i n searc h o f product s unavailabl e a t home. This , i n turn , cause d ne w suppl y problems , an d mos t Eas t Euro pean government s hav e i n recen t year s resorte d t o bannin g th e persona l import o f certai n consume r good s b y visitor s fro m othe r CME A coun tries. The Hungarian s accumulate d a n 80 0 million-rubl e surplu s i n thei r trade wit h th e Sovie t Unio n i n 1989 , an d afte r month s o f har d bargain ing th e tw o side s agree d o n a har d currenc y settlement . Meanwhile , i n January 1990 , Budapes t impose d a temporar y an d partia l moratoriu m on rubl e export s t o tr y t o stee r it s trad e westward ; "Th e IM F sai d the y don't wan t t o giv e loans t o Hungar y t o giv e loans t o th e Sovie t Union, " explained Deput y Trad e Ministe r Pirosk a Apro. 83 The CME A obviousl y can la y n o clai m t o bein g a dynami c economi c communit y unti l al l it s constituent economie s ar e reforme d t o a commo n denominato r o f mar ket responsivenes s an d allo w th e fre e movemen t o f good s i n a realisti c exchange rat e regime . Symptomatic o f th e fundamenta l weaknes s o f centra l plannin g i s th e CMEA's failur e t o overcom e technologica l stagnation . Th e much heralded shif t t o a new , "intensive " phas e o f developmen t lai d stres s on th e modernizatio n o f industria l processe s an d products . On e o f Gor bachev's earlies t initiative s wa s th e adoptio n i n Decembe r 198 5 o f a regional "Progra m o f Scientifi c Cooperatio n unti l th e Yea r 2000 " tha t called fo r majo r advance s i n suc h fields a s computers , biotechnology , and nuclea r power . Bu t afte r tw o years , onl y 2 0 percen t o f th e planne d contracts betwee n researc h institute s an d enterprise s ha d eve n bee n draw n up, let alone produced anything . Part o f th e problem, i n the view o f a Hungarian expert , wa s tha t "th e Soviets wante d t o pla y th e dominatin g rol e i n eac h an d ever y on e o f th e projects, bu t the y di d no t hav e an y experienc e a t al l i n ho w t o manag e such a venture." 84 Th e progra m wa s revise d i n 198 7 an d 198 8 t o mak e research organization s mor e accountabl e fo r th e generation an d produc tive application o f scientific-technologica l innovatio n an d t o ope n u p th e

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possibility o f East-Wes t cooperation. 85 Fo r now , th e East Europeans ar e left t o choos e betwee n Sovie t computer s an d commercia l aircraft , fo r example, whic h ar e obsolescen t an d ofte n i n shor t supply , o r Wester n alternatives, whic h ar e contingen t o n th e availabilit y o f har d currenc y and th e liberalizatio n o f Coco m rules . As presently structured , th e CME A offer s neithe r th e advantage s o f a regional fre e marke t no r th e largel y hypothetica l benefit s o f rationa l planning b y a stron g supranationa l organization . Hungaria n foreig n minister Gyul a Hor n complaine d tha t i t i s "no t onl y unsuitabl e t o mee t its tasks, but als o cost s to o muc h i n it s present form." 86 B y the tim e th e CMEA counci l me t i n Sofi a i n Januar y 1990 , ever y Eas t Europea n member wa s i n th e mids t o f revolutionar y transformation , an d Sovie t prime ministe r Nikola i Ryzhko v ha d declare d tha t withi n a yea r trad e should b e conducte d i n har d currenc y o n th e basi s o f worl d marke t prices. Consensus on a new CME A will be elusive until the economic system s of it s members obtai n a modicum o f symmetry . Th e conversion o f intra regional trad e t o worl d marke t price s wil l hav e a sever e impac t o n th e terms o f trad e o f mos t Eas t Europea n countries , whos e manufacture d exports t o th e Sovie t Unio n hav e bee n tacitl y overvalued . In th e cas e o f East German y alone , the term s o f trad e betwee n 197 0 an d 198 4 implie d a subsid y t o th e GDR' s industr y amountin g t o $4,00 0 fo r eac h Sovie t citizen; accordin g t o Sovie t estimate s tha t stil l include d th e GDR , th e USSR woul d gai n $1 0 billio n fro m th e conversio n o f CME A trad e t o hard currency. 87 An d a muc h highe r proportio n o f th e Sovie t export s could b e redirecte d t o othe r market s tha n Eas t Europea n export s t o th e Soviet Union . Bu t th e Hungarians , Poles , an d Czech s appea r willin g t o pay th e price o f short-ter m pai n fo r th e stimulu s t o energ y conservation , innovation, an d productivit y tha t suc h a reform woul d bring . In th e final analysis , th e interdependenc e o f th e CMEA' s Europea n members derive s no t fro m th e institutio n itsel f bu t fro m thei r share d economic backwardness . Thei r obsolescen t technolog y wil l no t b e soo n replaced b y expensiv e Wester n alternatives , an d convertibilit y o f thei r currencies wil l requir e a devaluatio n tha t i n th e shor t ru n a t leas t wil l favor intraregiona l trad e a t th e expens e o f import s fro m th e res t o f th e world. 88 I f th e temptatio n t o begga r th y neighbo r i s resisted , a mar ketized CME A coul d serv e a s a free-trad e holdin g patter n fo r th e Eas t Europeans eve n a s the y see k associatio n wit h th e mor e advance d eco -

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nomic grouping s o f Wester n Europe , EFT A an d th e Europea n Commu nity. The CMEA and the World Market. "W e wan t t o retur n t o th e interna tional market, " declare d Czechoslovakia' s ne w finance minister , Vacla v Klaus, a t th e Sofi a meeting ; "Wha t w e wan t t o d o i s business , no t cooperation." 89 Tha t will no t b e easily achieved , fo r hal f o f th e region' s export product s tha t wer e competitiv e a t th e beginnin g o f th e 1980 s ar e no longe r attractive . Singapor e alon e export s 2 0 percen t mor e manufac tured product s t o th e OEC D countrie s tha n al l o f Easter n Europe , including th e Sovie t Union. 90 B y 198 7 th e shar e o f East-Wes t trad e i n world trad e ha d slippe d t o 3. 6 percent , dow n fro m a high o f 5.5 percen t in 1975. 91 Th e growt h rat e i n Eas t blo c export s t o th e Wes t fel l t o 3 percent i n 1987 . Smalle r tha n expecte d gain s i n efficiency , wea k expor t demand, an d deterioratin g term s o f trad e wer e blame d i n th e annua l report o f th e U N Economi c Commissio n fo r Europ e fo r a n outloo k tha t was "no t favorable." 92 To counterac t thes e negativ e tendencies , th e Eas t European s cu t thei r imports fro m OEC D countrie s b y 11. 5 percen t i n 198 6 an d b y anothe r 5.5 percen t th e followin g year. 93 Sale s t o th e Wes t picke d u p somewha t in 1988 , ye t thei r balanc e o f trad e wit h th e OEC D countrie s continue d to deteriorate . The combine d trad e surplu s o f th e East European si x wa s halved betwee n 198 6 an d 1987 , while thei r curren t accoun t surplu s fel l from ove r $1. 7 billio n i n 198 5 t o a n estimate d $13 5 millio n i n 198 8 (when i n fac t onl y th e GD R an d Romani a registere d a surplus). 94 An d the current accoun t may be in worse shape than i t appears, for i t include s trade wit h developin g countrie s financed b y risk y long-ter m credits . Meanwhile, deb t burde n continue s t o inhibi t imports , leaving little prospect o f significan t expansio n i n East-West trade . The commodit y profil e o f East-Wes t trad e offer s ye t anothe r indica tion o f poo r performanc e an d prospects. 95 Th e Eas t Europeans ' chie f imports ar e grain , agricultura l nonfoo d item s suc h a s woo l an d hides , steel pipe , an d chemicals ; thei r lo w har d currenc y expor t earning s com pel the m t o concentrat e o n suc h essential s a t th e expens e o f machiner y and manufacture d consume r goods . Thei r larges t expor t item s includ e refined oi l product s (Romania) , har d coa l (Poland) , an d agricultura l products (Hungary) . Ther e are , t o b e sure , som e traditiona l a s wel l a s novel product s o f attractiv e cos t an d qualit y tha t d o find Wester n buy -

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ers. Hungary , wher e Rubik' s Cub e wa s invented , ha s o f lat e exporte d computer softwar e t o OEC D markets . Bu t eve n relativel y underdevel oped Yugoslavi a ha s a mor e balance d mi x o f export s t o th e Wes t tha n the member s o f th e CMEA . The stagnatio n i n East-Wes t economi c relation s wa s visibl e eve n i n the mos t activ e o f thes e tradin g partnerships , wit h Wes t Germany . Th e Federal Republi c lead s othe r OEC D countrie s i n East-West trad e mainl y because i t i s a big consume r o f th e East' s low-value-adde d exports , suc h as oil , chemicals , woo d products , foods , an d semimanufactures . Thes e have accounte d fo r ove r a thir d o f Eas t Germa n an d nearl y hal f o f Czechoslovak export s t o Wes t Germany. 96 Wes t Germa n firms ar e als o involved i n subcontractin g work , notabl y fo r clothing , to Eas t Europea n producers. Bu t to put th e Federal Republic' s predominanc e i n East-Wes t trade i n perspective , th e tota l turnove r i s n o greate r tha n it s trad e wit h Switzerland. Since the adven t o f Will y Brandt' s Ostpolitik a t th e en d o f th e 1960s , West German y ha s activel y sough t t o recapture it s traditional market s i n the East . Apar t fro m th e profi t motive , th e mai n incentiv e wa s th e entrenchment o f detente . Thi s positiv e linkag e betwee n politic s an d economics wa s inspire d b y Bonn' s specia l interes t i n securit y an d stabil ity, mor e particularl y i n normalizin g intra-Germa n relation s an d facili tating th e emigratio n o f Germa n minoritie s i n the Sovie t sphere . Havin g adopted a long-term , functionalis t strateg y o f economi c engagement , Bonn resiste d th e mainl y America n initiative s t o appl y negativ e linkage , such a s th e ga s pipelin e sanctions . Thi s polic y wa s buttresse d b y a soli d domestic consensu s i n favo r o f trad e wit h th e East . Unlik e it s majo r European Communit y partners , Bon n di d no t directl y subsidiz e credit s to facilitat e thi s trade, althoug h th e guarantee s t o exporter s provide d b y the Hermes insuranc e agenc y earned Washington' s mute d criticism . Bonn di d no t classif y it s economi c relation s wit h Eas t German y a s foreign trade . Instead , thes e relation s wer e monitore d b y the Economic s Ministry's "Trus t Offic e fo r Industr y an d Trade, " whic h a s a matte r o f political strateg y trie d t o ensur e tha t th e leve l o f intra-Germa n trad e stayed abov e 1 0 percen t o f th e GDR' s foreig n trade . (Trad e wit h Eas t Germany accounte d fo r les s tha n tw o percen t o f tota l Wes t Germa n trade.) Th e governmen t institute d a generou s clearin g arrangemen t (th e so-called "swing" ) an d guarantee d substantia l credit s ove r th e year s t o facilitate intra-Germa n trade . On e exampl e o f th e predominanc e o f

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politics ove r economic s wa s a dea l whereb y Wes t German y sol d crud e oil t o th e Eas t an d bough t bac k refine d oi l products , mostl y fo r Wes t Berlin consumption , a t mor e tha n thre e time s th e pric e o f th e crude . Since ther e wa s plent y o f exces s refinin g capacit y i n West Germany , th e transaction wa s clearl y designe d t o artificiall y boos t trad e a s muc h a s t o serve West Berlin's needs. 97 But even intra-German trad e faltered, declin ing by 9 percent i n 198 6 an d 5 percent i n 1987 . The Eastern Debt. Th e Eas t Europeans' ' burde n o f deb t add s t o th e urgency o f overcomin g economi c stagnatio n bu t a t th e sam e tim e limit s their options . They nee d import s t o moderniz e an d spu r economi c growt h and exports , bu t boostin g import s wil l a t leas t i n th e shor t ru n onl y increase thei r indebtedness . Accordin g t o OEC D estimates , th e region' s gross har d currenc y deb t ha d rise n t o ove r $10 0 billio n b y th e en d o f 1989: $4 1 billio n fo r Poland , $2 1 billio n fo r Eas t Germany , $2 1 billio n for Hungar y (th e highes t deb t pe r capita) , $1 0 billio n fo r Bulgaria , $ 7 billion fo r Czechoslovakia , an d $ 1 billion fo r Romania. 98 Onl y Romani a managed, b y draconia n measure s tha t slashe d domesti c consumptio n and debilitate d it s productiv e capacity , t o virtuall y eliminat e it s debt ; i t passed a la w prohibitin g ne w foreig n loans , whic h th e post-Ceausesc u regime promptly rescinded . The scal e of the deb t appear s les s formidable whe n compare d t o wha t is owe d b y Argentina , Brazil , an d Mexico , bu t tha t i s smal l comfor t t o countries lik e Hungary o r Bulgaria, which ar e caught i n the vise of risin g debt-service payment s an d curren t accoun t deficits . On e caus e o f thi s problem i s th e fallin g dollar , fo r man y Eas t Europea n countrie s (lik e Hungary, an d wit h th e notabl e exceptio n o f Eas t Germany ) mad e th e mistake o f keepin g thei r reserve s i n dollar s whil e incurrin g deb t i n Wes t German mark s an d Japanese yen . The deb t burde n increase d Easter n Europe' s vulnerabilit y t o a crisi s of foreig n confidenc e an d financial liquidity . In 1989 , Polan d ha d th e region's highes t debt-servic e rati o a t eighty-eight (dow n fro m nearl y tw o hundred i n 1981) ; th e debt-servic e ratio s o f th e GDR , Hungary , an d Bulgaria wer e als o in th e perilous rang e o f fort y an d above . Unable eve n to maintai n ful l interes t payments , le t alon e amortiz e it s debt , Polan d was reduce d t o seekin g reschedulin g agreement s wit h bot h th e Pari s Club an d commercia l lenders . I t wa s th e first Eas t Europea n countr y t o explore th e possibilit y o f reducin g it s deb t b y mean s o f debt-equit y

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swaps ( a devic e tha t ha s bee n use d i n Lati n America) , bu t th e virtua l absence o f capita l market s i n th e Eas t limit s th e scop e o f suc h nove l palliatives. Government credit s t o Easter n Europ e virtuall y cease d afte r 1981 , and (largel y becaus e o f America n pressure ) th e OEC D countrie s agree d to forg o competitio n an d se t standardized , "consensual " lendin g rate s for commercia l credit s tha t the y ar e willin g t o guarantee . However , commercial bank s soo n resume d fixed-rat e lendin g (a t level s belo w th e consensual rate ) t o som e o f th e CME A countries , notabl y creditworth y Czechoslovakia, an d a s a resul t Wester n nonguarantee d ban k deb t t o Eastern Europ e has risen faste r tha n it s total debt. " West Germa n bank s hold th e larges t shar e o f Eas t Europea n debt ; America n banks , on e o f the smalles t a t som e $ 3 billion . Th e German s remai n th e bigges t lende r to th e East . I n earl y 1988 , the y grante d a D M 1 billio n credi t t o Hun gary, a gestur e tha t i n ligh t o f tha t country' s perilou s debt-servic e rati o could onl y b e construe d a s a politicall y calculate d sho w o f suppor t fo r the refor m program . In recen t year s Japanes e bank s hav e als o becom e major lender s t o Easter n Europe , specificall y t o Hungar y (a s wel l a s t o the Sovie t Union) , i n th e contex t o f a long-ter m expor t strateg y t o develop thi s marke t fo r Japan's capita l goods . Reformers i n th e Eas t ar e naturall y eage r t o secur e har d currenc y credits a s they struggl e t o revitaliz e thei r economies , bu t fro m th e West ern perspectiv e a positiv e assessmen t o f th e commercia l an d politica l risks require s a leap o f faith . Non e o f th e past, partial economi c reform s produced th e expected results , and Western loan s have not generate d th e innovation an d productivit y necessar y t o repa y them . Commentin g o n an IM F standb y loa n t o Hungar y i n earl y 1988 , the Wall Street journal noted tha t "defender s o f th e IM F woul d argu e tha t a ke y tene t o f it s programs i s conditionality . Bu t we'v e bee n watchin g thi s stor y unfol d for year s now , an d we'v e ye t t o se e th e mos t importan t conditio n pu t forward—namely, en d Communist rul e or you don't get your money." 10° The record o f the IMF's East European member s (Yugoslavia , Poland , Romania, an d Hungary ) suggest s tha t the y hav e don e comparativel y well i n obtainin g IM F an d IBR D (Worl d Bank ) facilities . (Czechoslova kia wa s admitte d i n Septembe r 1990 , an d Bulgaria' s applicatio n wa s pending.) Fa r fro m bein g handicappe d b y thei r socialis t character , the y seem t o hav e benefite d fro m th e applicatio n o f positiv e politica l crite ria. 101 Hungary dre w on Western approva l o f its economic reforms whe n

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in th e mids t o f a liquidity crisi s i t applie d fo r IM F membershi p an d wa s admitted i n 1982 . Its subsequen t admissio n t o th e Worl d Ban k reflecte d further favoritism , fo r som e stretchin g o f th e Bank' s threshol d wa s required t o classif y Hungar y a s a developin g countr y eligibl e fo r loans . Since then , Hungar y ha s take n advantag e o f ove r $ 1 billio n wort h o f World Ban k credit s (a s wel l a s $1. 2 billio n i n Worl d Bank-organize d cofinancing loans) , includin g a $50 0 million , five-year progra m fo r in dustrial restructuring . I n the cas e of Yugoslavi a an d Romania , i t is plain that th e Fun d an d th e World Ban k wer e a t leas t partl y motivate d b y th e wish o f th e Unite d State s an d it s allies t o reinforc e thes e countries ' independent foreig n policies. 102 The charter s o f th e IM F an d th e IBR D specif y technica l an d eco nomic, no t political , criteria , bu t the y embod y a free-market philosoph y that i s clearl y antithetica l t o th e dogm a o f a Soviet-typ e centrall y planne d economy. Yugoslavia' s an d Hungary' s experimentatio n wit h marke t so cialism arguabl y fitted thi s free-marke t bia s an d deserve d reinforcement . The sam e coul d no t b e sai d o f Romania , wher e li p servic e t o refor m di d not alte r th e rigidl y centralize d system , an d dealin g wit h thi s countr y proved t o b e a "learnin g experience " fo r th e Fund . Betwee n 198 0 an d 1984, Romani a benefite d fro m $1. 2 billio n i n IM F facilitie s an d $ 1 billion i n developmen t loan s fro m th e Worl d Bank . Nevertheless , i n 1983, th e Ceausesc u regim e rejecte d th e Fund' s recommendatio n (in duced i n par t b y Western reconsideration s o f Romania' s politica l value ) that i t introduc e market-oriente d reforms , promptin g th e suspensio n o f IMF credits . Afte r th e facilit y wa s renegotiated , Romani a chos e no t t o draw fro m th e ne w standb y credi t a s i t pursue d it s hars h austerit y measures t o reduc e debt. 103 The intentio n a t th e Bretto n Wood s conferenc e tha t se t u p th e inter national leadin g agencie s wa s t o hav e voluntar y an d universa l member ship i n th e Worl d Ban k an d th e IMF , bu t bot h wer e designe d t o foste r open economie s receptiv e t o foreig n investment . Romania' s admissio n despite it s resistanc e t o economi c refor m se t a ba d precedent . Althoug h there i s littl e har d evidenc e o f direc t linkag e betwee n "conditionality " and structura l refor m o f th e economi c system s o f th e othe r thre e Eas t European members , th e Fund' s influenc e probabl y playe d a part i n thei r attempts t o liberaliz e investment , tri m unprofitabl e sectors , establis h a realistic price system an d exchang e rates , and balanc e budget s b y cuttin g subsidies an d othe r expenditure s an d raisin g taxes .

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It is plausible t o argu e tha t th e "emergenc e o f a group o f governmen t officials committe d t o an d dependen t upo n th e maintenanc e o f cordia l relations wit h th e lendin g agenc y . . . enhance s th e politica l a s wel l a s economic influenc e o f tha t agenc y o n th e polic y proces s o f th e bor rower." 1 0 4 Activ e membershi p compel s th e Eas t European s t o assum e the norma l obligation s o f borrowers , suc h a s providin g reliabl e eco nomic information , whil e easin g thei r acces s t o har d currenc y credit s and markets . IM F approva l o f a standby facilit y i s generally regarde d b y commercial lender s a s signifyin g a certai n confidenc e i n th e economi c management o f th e recipient. Th e Fund's leverag e over economi c refor m is limited, bu t i t remains i n th e interes t o f th e Unite d State s an d it s allie s to appl y an d reinforc e th e principle o f market-oriente d conditionalit y i n vetting ne w candidate s an d i n decidin g whethe r t o hel p alleviat e th e balance o f payment s problem s o f th e Eas t Europea n members . Th e World Bank , fo r it s part, ha s indicate d readines s t o loa n ove r $ 5 billio n to Easter n Europ e ove r th e nex t thre e years . I n Augus t 1990 , i t grante d a $30 0 millio n loa n t o Polan d i n suppor t o f privatization , ban k reform , and socia l welfare programs . GATTMembership. Eas t Europea n participatio n i n th e Genera l Agree ment o n Tariff s an d Trad e (GATT ) ha s offere d littl e specifi c leverag e t o the West . Establishe d i n 194 7 a s a devic e fo r expandin g fre e trad e b y reciprocal tarif f reductions , GAT T coul d no t easil y accommodat e cen trally planne d economie s tha t defie d standar d method s o f calculatin g prices, tariffs , subsidies , an d evidenc e o f dumping . Membershi p nor mally include d th e mutua l grantin g o f MFN , an d th e Eas t Europea n economic system s lacke d th e tarif f mechanis m necessar y fo r nondiscri minatory trade . Czechoslovakia wa s a foundin g membe r o f GAT T an d retaine d it s membership, althoug h i n practic e th e mutua l nondiscriminatio n claus e could no t b e enforced . Fo r politica l reasons , Yugoslavi a wa s grante d observer statu s a s early a s 1950 , and a s it moved towar d a hybrid mode l of marke t socialis m i t becam e a full membe r i n 1964 . When Polan d wa s admitted t o ful l membershi p i n 1967 , structura l incompatibilit y wa s papered ove r wit h a quantitativ e formul a requirin g i t t o increas e it s aggregate import s fro m GAT T member s a t a n annua l rat e o f n o les s than 7 percent . Poland' s failur e t o mee t thi s commitmen t i n th e earl y 1980s allowe d th e Unite d State s t o suspen d MFN . Politica l considera -

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tions als o predominated i n Romania' s admissio n i n 1971 , on term s eve n less enforceable tha t thos e granted t o Poland. When Hungar y wa s finally admitted t o full membershi p i n 1973 , the more conventiona l term s agai n reflected th e West' s politica l desir e t o encourag e it s progressio n t o a market economy. 105 GATT membership , therefore , wa s use d b y th e Wes t les s a s a rewar d than a s an inducement t o structura l reform , an d th e results were meager . Since th e Eas t Europea n member s accounte d fo r onl y a tin y shar e o f world trade , th e integrit y o f GAT T wa s no t seriousl y subverte d b y accommodation o f thei r centrall y planne d economies . Th e Sovie t Union' s application i n 198 7 (partiall y satisfie d i n 199 0 wit h observe r status ) an d China's interes t i n reactivatin g it s membershi p raise d mor e thorn y ques tions abou t th e compatibilit y o f eve n partially marketize d socialis t econ omies wit h a n institutio n dedicate d t o fre e an d fai r trade . A s th e Eas t Europeans bega n t o implemen t mor e radica l structura l reform s i n 1990 , they naturall y anticipate d unqualifie d acces s t o th e benefit s an d atten dant responsibilitie s o f GAT T membership , an d Polan d wa s th e first t o renegotiate th e terms o f it s membership . Trade with the European Community and the United States. Wester n Europe i s the mos t natura l an d proximat e tradin g partne r o f th e CME A countries, which observe d th e region' s economi c integratio n wit h a mix ture o f ideologica l hostility , envy , an d fear . Regardin g th e Europea n Community a s simpl y th e economi c dimensio n o f a n American-domi nated militar y alliance , th e Sovie t Unio n sough t t o promot e th e self sufficiency o f th e socialis t blo c an d discourage d CME A member s fro m seeking bilatera l trad e agreement s wit h th e EC . In th e earl y 1970s , against th e backdro p o f Ostpolitik, detente , an d th e Helsink i Fina l Act , the Eas t European s nevertheles s bega n t o cour t th e Community , an d i n an essentiall y defensiv e reactio n Mosco w initiate d talk s t o establis h a framework agreemen t betwee n th e two tradin g blocs . There wer e numerou s obstacle s t o suc h a n accord . Th e West Europe ans observe d tha t th e CME A lacke d th e internationa l lega l statu s an d supranational authorit y o f th e E C an d wa s therefor e juridicall y no t competent t o negotiat e a trade agreemen t o n behal f o f it s members. Th e Community's genera l polic y wa s t o expan d trad e (subjec t t o Coco m restrictions) wit h th e CME A member s b y selectiv e bilatera l agreements . The E C di d no t wis h t o jeopardiz e thi s expandin g networ k o f bilatera l

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economic cooperatio n no r t o encourag e eve n indirectl y th e integrate d regulation o f th e trad e o f th e smalle r CME A countries. 106 A forma l accord betwee n th e tw o bloc s promised littl e commercia l gai n an d som e political cost s for th e West . Aborted b y th e invasio n o f Afghanistan , talk s betwee n th e E C an d the CME A wer e resume d i n 1985 . Gorbachev' s "ne w thinking " an d disposition t o normaliz e relation s i n "ou r commo n Europea n home " produced a Sovie t compromis e proposa l fo r mutua l recognitio n i n a n agreement tha t woul d facilitat e bilatera l relation s betwee n Brussel s an d the Eas t Europeans . Bon n wa s particularl y kee n t o respon d positively , but i t too k thre e year s fo r th e Sovie t Unio n t o accep t th e Community' s standard requiremen t tha t it s treatie s b e applicabl e t o th e entir e E C territory, includin g Wes t Berlin . Th e declaratio n signe d i n Jun e 198 8 provided fo r officia l EC-CME A relation s an d th e expansion o f economi c cooperation withou t compromisin g the Community's preference fo r con ducting trad e negotiation s wit h th e individua l Eas t Europea n countries . "We didn' t wan t an y agreemen t tha t woul d strengthe n Moscow' s hol d over it s allies, " observe d a n Communit y official , an d th e declaratio n ostensibly satisfie d thi s condition. 107 The signin g o f th e join t declaratio n wa s followe d i n shor t orde r b y the conclusio n o f th e first comprehensiv e bilatera l trad e pact , betwee n the Communit y an d Hungary . Th e agreemen t reflecte d th e EC' s ap proval o f Hungary' s economi c reform s an d provide d fo r most-favored nation statu s a s wel l a s th e remova l o f al l quota s o n manufacture d imports (bu t no t agricultura l products ) fro m Hungar y b y 1995 . A les s generous accor d wa s reache d wit h Czechoslovaki a i n October . A partia l trade agreemen t ha d bee n signe d b y th e E C an d Romani a i n 1980 , bu t Bucharest's commercia l policie s an d execrabl e huma n right s recor d le d Brussels to brea k of f negotiation s i n 1989 . Such differentiatio n reflecte d politica l consideration s tha t wer e sel dom entirel y absen t fro m th e Community' s dealing s wit h th e East . Th e EC-CMEA accor d wa s haile d i n th e Wes t mor e a s a symbo l o f intra European rapprochemen t tha t migh t hav e a beneficia l effec t o n huma n rights i n Easter n Europ e tha n a s a commercial breakthrough . Th e East' s recognition o f Wes t Berli n a s a n integra l par t o f th e Europea n Commu nity wa s perhap s a mor e tangibl e achievement , althoug h thi s wa s soo n overshadowed b y th e rapi d movemen t towar d Germa n unification . O n the economi c side , th e Eas t European s redouble d thei r effort s t o secur e

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bilateral concessions , fearin g fo r thei r acces s t o th e singl e marke t tha t the Communit y aim s t o forge b y 1992 . Thei r succes s wil l ultimatel y depend o n thei r abilit y t o produc e competitiv e goods , an d tha t i n tur n will requir e fundamental , structura l reform s o f thei r economies . Th e relationship i s asymmetrical : th e CME A conduct s mor e tha n one-thir d of its external trad e with th e Communit y bu t account s fo r onl y 7 percent of th e latter' s trade . Indeed , th e Community' s trad e wit h th e CMEA , amounting annuall y t o som e $5 0 billio n (excludin g intra-German trade) , half o f whic h i s with th e Sovie t Union , i s no greate r tha n it s trad e wit h Sweden. As fo r th e Unite d States , les s tha n one-hal f o f 1 percent o f it s globa l trade i s accounte d fo r b y th e Eas t Europea n six . Assistan t Secretar y o f State Rozann e L . Ridgwa y commente d a t a congressiona l hearin g i n October 198 7 tha t "w e don' t d o muc h busines s wit h Easter n Europe . [. . .] Ou r nationa l polic y . . . requires u s t o impos e limit s o n tha t trade , at th e sam e tim e a s busines s an d trad e practice s impos e limit s o n th e enthusiasm o f man y o f ou r businessmen . S o prospect s fo r expandin g trade ar e mixed, an d likel y to remain so." 1 0 8 Tota l turnove r ha s hovere d around $2. 4 billio n fo r severa l years . I n 1989 , America n export s stoo d at $1.0 2 billio n an d import s a t $1.3 5 billion . (Th e correspondin g value s for Yugoslavi a wer e $50 1 millio n an d $80 2 million , an d fo r th e Sovie t Union, $4. 2 billio n an d $70 2 million. ) Th e trad e balanc e wa s favorabl e only wit h respec t t o Bulgari a (thank s largel y t o cor n sales ) an d Poland . Poland, Hungary , an d Romani a accounte d fo r clos e t o 8 0 percen t o f U.S. import s fro m th e six , althoug h Romania' s export s wer e halve d b y the surrende r o f MFN . The Reaga n administratio n ha d pursue d a selectiv e polic y o f encour aging America n exporter s an d investors . On e optio n wa s wide r Eas t European participatio n i n th e program s o f OPI C (Oversea s Privat e In vestment Corporation) , a federa l agenc y tha t insure s U.S . investors agains t political risk s suc h a s expropriation . Th e extensio n o f OPI C program s to Communis t countrie s require d approva l b y Congress , wher e huma n rights consideration s an d th e reservation s o f organize d labo r inspire d much diffidence . In 1989 , Yugoslavi a an d Chin a wer e eligibl e fo r thes e programs; th e onl y othe r Eas t Europea n participant , Romania , ha d los t its eligibilit y i n 198 7 becaus e o f it s oppressiv e labo r policies . A Stat e Department initiativ e t o offe r OPI C program s i n Hungar y wa s aborte d in Ma y 198 8 whe n th e Hous e defeate d th e relevan t amendmen t t o

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OPIC's reauthorization ; th e AFL-CI O ha d criticize d Hungaria n labo r practices an d objecte d t o th e expor t o f U.S . jobs. OPI C presiden t Crai g Nalen expresse d th e mor e positiv e viewpoint , tha t "thes e seed s o f capi talism [are ] bein g planted t o ou r advantage, " an d observe d tha t th e ke y question wa s whethe r America n initiative s helpe d t o "weake n th e lin k between mothe r Russi a an d th e satellites." 109 Forty years of export controls , ideological animosity , socialis t bureau cratic hindrances , an d receptiv e alternat e market s hav e il l prepare d American businessme n fo r th e emergin g opportunitie s i n Easter n Eu rope. No t a singl e U.S.-base d compan y tendere d fo r a shar e i n th e multimillion-dollar restructurin g projec t financed b y th e Worl d Ban k i n Hungary a fe w year s ago . Ye t th e U.S . econom y produce s man y o f th e goods neede d b y th e Eas t Europeans , notabl y i n th e agribusines s an d energy sectors , i n environmenta l technology , an d i n othe r high-tec h spheres. Th e prospect s fo r expor t growt h depen d therefor e mostl y o n the East Europeans' abilit y to obtain har d currency , b y trade an d credits , and o n th e marketin g skill s o f America n business . I n 1990 , th e Com merce Departmen t an d Coco m too k majo r step s t o decontro l al l but th e latest an d mos t sensitiv e technologies , an d th e impac t o f Jackson-Vani k waned a s democratizin g regime s eliminate d restriction s o n trave l an d other huma n rights . In th e sprin g o f 1990 , Washingto n extende d per manent MF N statu s t o Poland , Hungary , an d Czechoslovakia . An d a s some of th e East Europeans opene d u p their economie s t o foreig n invest ment, America n companie s bega n t o mov e in . Prospects for Trade and Investment. Recognizin g tha t thei r impor t needs fa r excee d thei r expor t possibilities , mos t o f th e Eas t Europea n countries hav e sough t join t venture s an d industria l cooperatio n wit h Western firms. The y hope d tha t th e infusio n o f foreig n capital , technol ogy, an d manageria l know-ho w woul d b e a low-cos t wa y o f improvin g their competitivenes s an d acces s t o worl d markets . In th e 1970s , Wes t Germany alon e almos t doubled , t o ove r five hundred , it s cooperatio n agreements wit h th e East , mainl y wit h Poland , Hungary , an d Romania . Various model s emerged , rangin g fro m th e Romania n "enclav e system, " in which al l accounting , settlement , an d valuatio n o f input s wa s don e i n foreign currency , t o th e Hungaria n variant , i n whic h accountin g wa s done i n both foreig n an d loca l currency. 110 On th e whole , th e experienc e disappointe d th e expectation s o f al l

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parties concerned . Th e laboriou s proces s o f dealin g wit h th e East' s byzantine bureaucracie s frustrate d Wester n partners , a s di d th e prob lems o f assurin g a marketabl e qualit y o f output . Wester n businessme n often encountere d difficult y i n securin g basi c economi c an d commercia l statistics (o r a local telephone directory) an d were compelled t o negotiat e with governmen t agencie s rathe r tha n wit h en d user s o f thei r product . They wer e als o discourage d b y th e insistenc e o f som e o f th e hard currency-strapped regime s o n countertrade , whereb y paymen t fo r West ern import s wa s mad e with Easter n products ; b y the late 1980 s som e 4 0 percent o f Wester n import s int o Easter n Europ e wer e covere d b y suc h "compensation trade. " Creaky transportatio n an d telecommunication s infrastructure s wer e another deterrent ; a n attemp t t o mak e a telephon e cal l i n Warsa w o r Budapest ha s sorel y teste d th e enduranc e o f man y a visitor . Bu t th e single greates t hindranc e t o th e establishmen t an d succes s o f join t ven tures remaine d th e lac k o f convertibl e currenc y i n th e CMEA , whic h prevents Western partner s fro m reachin g a regionwide market . The Eas t Europeans , i n turn , foun d tha t thei r expectation s o f techno logical benefit s an d substantia l revenue s fro m har d currenc y expor t failed t o materialize , partl y becaus e Wester n firms wer e prepare d t o transfer proces s technolog y (tha t is , how t o produc e an d marke t goods ) more readily than advance d product technology . Hungary's deput y trad e minister Imr e Duna i observe d ruefull y i n Apri l 198 8 tha t th e 13 5 join t ventures i n operatio n ha d brough t i n les s tha n $10 0 millio n an d serve d mainly to replac e imports; in 1987 , the exports o f thes e joint ventures t o hard currenc y market s wer e $3 5 millio n les s than thei r imports. 111 Such deterrents t o joint ventures ar e even more critica l a t a time whe n most Wester n economie s themselve s hav e unuse d productio n capacit y and unemploymen t an d whe n ther e ar e attractiv e opportunitie s fo r in vestment i n newl y industrializin g countries. 112 Ye t th e Eas t Europea n hunger fo r foreig n investmen t grows . Industria l restructurin g need s cap ital an d moder n equipment , an d eve n second-clas s importe d technolog y can b e put t o profitabl e use , i f onl y withi n th e CME A market . Hungar y and Polan d wer e th e first t o liberaliz e thei r regulations , allowin g ful l foreign ownershi p an d tryin g t o reduc e structura l disincentives , an d b y early 199 0 th e others wer e beginnin g to follo w suit . The Eas t Europea n market' s siz e an d potentia l fo r developmen t cer tainly offe r scop e fo r profitabl e trad e an d investment . I t has a combine d

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population o f 14 0 million : 38. 2 millio n i n Poland , 23. 3 millio n i n Yu goslavia, 23. 2 millio n i n Romania , 16. 6 millio n i n Eas t Germany , 15. 6 million i n Czechoslovakia , 10. 6 millio n i n Hungary , 9 millio n i n Bul garia, an d 3 millio n i n Albania . Accordin g t o CI A estimates, the richest , East Germany , ha d i n 198 9 a pe r capit a gros s nationa l produc t o f $9,679, roughl y hal f th e Wes t Germa n level ; th e comparabl e figure fo r Czechoslovakia wa s $7,878 ; for Hungary , $6,108 ; for Bulgaria , $5,710 ; for Yugoslavia , $5,464 ; fo r Polan d $4,565 ; an d fo r Romania , $3,445 . Such calculations , give n th e problem s o f definin g domesti c produc t an d currency conversion , ar e a t bes t approximative , an d som e estimate s ar e even lower. 113 For al l their economi c vicissitudes, the countries o f Easter n Europ e d o enjoy som e comparativ e advantage s tha t shoul d encourag e foreig n in vestment. Thei r labo r cost s ar e lowe r tha n Spain' s an d Portugal's , an d the labo r forc e (especiall y i n Eas t Germany , Czechoslovakia , an d Hun gary) possesse s skill s that coul d b e easily upgraded. Th e levels of literac y and educatio n ar e high . Proximit y t o th e hug e Wes t Europea n marke t minimizes transportatio n costs . The infrastructures , thoug h obsolescent , are close r t o Wester n tha n t o thir d worl d standards . An d th e long dormant seed s o f loca l entrepreneurshi p ar e beginnin g t o germinate . These advantage s an d th e pent-u p deman d fo r infrastructur e equipmen t and produce r an d consume r good s ar e beginnin g t o lur e Western inves tors a s th e reformis t regime s legislat e privatizatio n an d offe r enterprise s at bargain-basemen t price s an d a s th e OEC D government s gran t ne w credits, investment guarantees , an d trad e benefits . The prospect s ar e bes t i n Hungary , whic h wa s th e first t o sanctio n full foreig n ownership ; i n Eas t Germany , whic h i s bein g take n ove r b y West Germa n finance an d industry ; an d i n Czechoslovakia . In Poland , despite th e financial stabilizatio n program , th e chaoti c stat e o f th e econ omy an d politica l controvers y ove r privatizatio n (th e relevan t la w wa s passed onl y in July 1990 ) remaine d a deterrent to substantial investment . The valuation o f state-owne d asset s was a serious obstacle . Lech Wales a was delighte d whe n th e Polish-America n heires s Barbar a Piasecka-John son propose d t o inves t $10 0 millio n i n th e histori c Leni n (rename d Gdansk) Shipyard , bu t th e dea l fel l throug h whe n a Western accountin g firm estimate d tha t th e shipyar d wa s wort h les s tha n $1 0 million . Still , by th e beginnin g o f 199 0 Wes t German y alon e ha d 23 0 join t venture s operating i n Poland .

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Hungary, then , becam e th e preferre d targe t o f foreig n investors . In July 1988 , th e Michiga n firm Guardia n Industrie s entere d int o a $11 5 million join t ventur e t o manufactur e floa t glass . Th e followin g year , General Electri c pai d $15 0 millio n t o bu y a controllin g interes t i n th e Hungarian ligh t bul b manufacture r Tungsram , whic h ha s annua l sale s of $30 0 millio n an d export s 8 5 percen t o f it s output . "We'r e tryin g t o position ourselve s fo r th e decad e ahead, " commente d Genera l Electric' s CEO, John F . Welch, Jr.; "It' s a prudent ris k a t this point i n history." 114 In 1990 , Genera l Motor s committe d ove r $10 0 millio n fo r a 6 7 percen t interest i n a n automotiv e plan t i n wester n Hungary , an d For d als o announced plan s fo r a n automotiv e part s plant . Citiban k an d Mc Donald's ar e alread y installe d i n Budapest , an d Playbo y enterprise s ha s launched a Hungarian versio n o f it s magazine . Other foreig n investmen t include d th e Wes t Germa n Tengelman n group's shar e i n th e Skal a retai l chain , th e Hungarian-Japanes e chemi cals firm Polifoam , Suzuk i Motor' s pla n t o buil d a ca r plant , an d th e French compute r grou p Bul l International' s associatio n wit h th e Hun garian electronic s firm Videoton . Th e Wester n pres s baron s Rober t Maxwell an d Ruper t Murdoc h an d Germa n publisher s purchase d majo r shareholdings i n Hungaria n newspapers . Eve n Washington' s ambassa dor t o Budapest , Mar k Palmer , joine d wha t h e calle d a gol d rus h b y abandoning diplomac y fo r th e presidenc y o f th e Centra l Europea n De velopment Corporation , a n American-Canadia n investmen t consortium . Whether o r no t join t venture s prov e mutuall y profitable , the y shoul d contribute technolog y a s well as production an d marketin g expertise an d generate employmen t i n the critica l phase o f economi c restructuring . The Hungarian experienc e foreshadow s som e of the pitfalls o f foreig n investment i n Easter n Europe . Unti l th e questio n o f ownershi p i s clari fied, manager s o f stat e enterprise s hav e les s incentiv e t o secur e th e bes t price fro m foreig n bidder s tha n t o negotiat e sweethear t deal s fo r per sonal advantage ; a t leas t on e dubiou s transaction , th e purchas e b y a Western investmen t grou p o f HungarHotels , ha d t o b e subsequentl y nullified i n th e courts . Th e Wes t Germa n Springe r Group' s acquisitio n of provincia l newspaper s nominall y owne d b y th e forme r rulin g part y also cause d a furo r an d wa s rescinded . Inten t o n puttin g mor e tha n fou r hundred enterprise s (wort h a n estimate d $ 8 billion ) o n th e auctio n block, th e government belatedl y establishe d a n agenc y i n March 199 0 t o supervise foreig n purchase s an d ensur e arm' s lengt h transaction s base d

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on competitiv e bidding . Anticipat e popula r resentmen t a t th e sellou t o f the nationa l patrimon y t o foreigners , particularl y i f Wester n standard s of productivit y impos e massiv e layoffs . An d th e futur e rol e o f th e stat e in economi c life , includin g ownershi p o f resource s an d industries , wil l not b e easil y resolve d i n countrie s wit h a lon g histor y o f paternalisti c government, bu t a fascination wit h Wester n free-marke t theories . Western Aid. B y the en d o f th e 1980s , a s political an d economi c liber alism wa s makin g a dramati c comebac k throughou t th e region , th e ol d cold wa r stricture s agains t tradin g wit h th e enem y gav e way t o ne w an d urgent questions : Wha t shoul d b e th e respons e o f th e Unite d State s an d its OEC D partner s t o th e desperat e nee d o f thes e victim s o f socialism ? Could the y affor d t o le t th e reform s fail ? Th e Wes t wa s face d wit h th e historic challeng e o f rehabilitatin g th e economie s o f a fre e Easter n Eu rope. Afte r fort y year s o f modes t results , economi c leverag e loome d a s the optimal instrumen t o f political interest . Marx an d Lenin , an d mor e recentl y Khrushchev , confidentl y forecas t the triumph o f socialis m ove r capitalism . Their heir s are finally acknowl edging tha t th e experimen t ha s faile d dismally . Th e resultin g economi c and socia l damag e include s lo w productivit y an d technologica l back wardness, joine d mor e recentl y b y inflation , fallin g rea l incomes , an d even a declin e i n lif e expectancy . B y mismanagin g an d wastin g huma n capital an d othe r resources , socialis m ha s indee d create d a ne w thir d world i n th e hear t o f Europe . Th e verdic t o n socialis t economic s wa s implicit i n th e concludin g documen t o f th e CSC E economi c conferenc e held i n Bon n i n Apri l 1990 : al l participating state s endorse d th e princi ples o f marke t economic s an d th e nee d t o enhanc e economi c freedo m and cooperation . Th e marke t ha d supplante d Mar x a s the ne w lodestar . The cos t o f undoin g thi s damag e i s high . Th e attempt s t o "restruc ture" th e socialis t economies , which ai m essentiall y a t reintroducin g th e laws o f th e marke t i n th e allocatio n o f capita l an d labor , ca n brin g n o quick an d painles s relief . Fe w Eas t Europea n industria l o r agricultura l producers coul d a t presen t surviv e ope n competitio n o n th e worl d mar ket. An d economi c reform , i f i t i s to hav e an y chanc e o f lastin g success , will in the short ter m impos e sociall y painful an d divisiv e sacrifices . An earlie r generatio n o f Eas t European s wa s force d t o accep t pro longed sacrific e fo r th e sak e o f eventua l socialis t plenty . Th e presen t generation face s th e prospec t o f austerit y fo r th e distant , i f mor e plausi -

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ble, promise o f market-generate d abundance . Th e paternalis m an d egal itarianism o f th e socialis t welfar e stat e wer e no t onl y economicall y ruinous bu t psychologicall y damaging . A n opinio n pol l i n Yugoslavi a showed tha t 9 0 percen t o f respondent s wer e no t prepare d t o wor k a s hard a s th e on e millio n Yugoslav s employe d i n Wester n Europ e fo r th e sake o f highe r wages . The federa l prim e minister , Brank o Mikulic , gav e his interpretation o f th e results : "Th e conclusio n o f th e pol l i s that two thirds o f th e Yugosla v societ y i s not read y t o accep t th e marke t require ments o f work , an d therefor e i s no t read y fo r reform." 115 (H e wa s forced t o resig n si x month s late r whe n parliamen t rejecte d a n austerit y program endorse d b y the IMF. ) I t is scarcely surprisin g i f the insecuritie s of the market hav e little appeal fo r th e many who eve n by East Europea n standards ar e a t o r belo w th e poverty line . The Swedis h mode l o f productiv e capitalism , comprehensiv e socia l benefits, an d minima l unemploymen t i s a popula r alternative , bu t i t i s the produc t o f uniqu e circumstance s an d i s i n an y cas e runnin g ou t o f steam. Th e Wes t Germa n notio n o f a "socia l marke t economy " i s liber ally evoke d b y th e ne w Eas t Europea n governments , bu t th e domesti c and externa l factor s tha t generate d Germany' s postwa r "economi c mir acle" ar e als o largel y absen t i n th e forme r Sovie t sphere . Th e bes t o f both world s wil l remai n a chimera , fo r ther e ar e n o shor t cut s t o th e ideal stat e o f socia l justic e amids t materia l plenty . Althoug h th e disap pointing performanc e o f stat e socialis m ha s momentaril y galvanize d support fo r libera l economics , prolonge d hardshi p coul d easil y induc e demoralization an d disillusionment . For th e West , on e natura l respons e i s t o gloa t ove r th e implosio n o f socialism an d welcom e th e ne w opportunitie s fo r profitabl e business . But norma l investmen t an d commerc e ar e a n insufficien t remed y fo r Eastern Europe' s curren t crisis . Capita l generall y flow s t o area s o f hig h return an d lo w risk , an d a t presen t Easter n Europ e hardl y offer s th e most rewardin g investmen t opportunities . Lo w labo r cost s hav e lure d some Wester n companie s t o subcontrac t productio n i n th e East , bu t foreign investor s hav e bee n mor e intereste d i n sellin g t o th e Eas t an d earning har d currenc y profit s tha n i n developin g Easter n expor t indus tries. Commercia l lenders , burne d b y thei r earlie r experience , ar e reluc tant t o reente r th e Eas t Europea n marke t withou t IM F leadershi p an d government guarantees . An d commercia l credits , eve n i f efficientl y allo cated b y th e recipients , pale i n compariso n t o thei r accumulate d foreig n

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debt an d t o th e $50 0 billio n o f annua l domesti c investment i n the Sovie t bloc. Dependen t o n th e Sovie t Unio n fo r energ y an d ra w material s an d on th e Wes t fo r technology , an d suffering unfavorabl e term s o f trad e i n both sphere's , Eastern Europ e would i n this scenario remain a periphera l and backwar d regio n i n the world economy . There remai n alternative , mor e politicall y charged , approache s t o th e conduct o f economi c relations with the East, inspired a s much b y consid erations o f ideologica l purpos e a s b y securit y o r economi c interest . Th e most radicall y negativ e tendency , onc e foun d mainl y i n conservativ e American circles , was t o have no truc k o r trad e with Communist s bu t t o let the m b e hois t o n thei r ow n petard . Th e vie w tha t thei r economi c failure represente d a ne t advantag e fo r th e fre e worl d wa s aire d i n th e debates ove r Polan d withi n th e Carte r an d Reaga n administrations . Nothing, therefore , ough t t o b e done b y the West to eas e their economi c misery. Th e greate r tha t misery , th e soone r the y woul d b e drive n t o abandon socialism . Th e securit y versio n o f thi s poin t o f vie w wa s tha t all trade , an d particularl y technolog y transfer , enhance s th e militar y potential o f th e Sovie t blo c and therefor e increase s the threat t o Wester n security. After th e Eas t Europea n revolution s o f 1989 , politica l instabilit y arising fro m economi c distres s ca n n o longe r b e regarded a s a precurso r of desirabl e refor m bu t rathe r a s a threat t o th e consolidatio n o f reform . And indifferenc e t o th e materia l hardship s suffere d b y Eas t Europeans , most o f who m ar e ardentl y pro-Western , i s more tha n eve r morall y an d politically unjustifiable . The mos t radica l positiv e approac h i s t o addres s th e economi c need s of th e Eas t European s wit h a massiv e progra m o f economi c assistanc e modeled o n th e Marshal l Plan . Th e Italia n industrialis t Carl o D e Bene detti's proposa l t o thi s effec t i n Marc h 198 8 wa s endorse d b y forme r French presiden t Valer y Giscar d d'Estain g an d b y Le Monde. A fe w other politician s an d specialists , includin g th e America n Michae l Man delbaum, advance d variation s o n th e theme , som e with specia l referenc e to Poland . Secretar y o f Stat e Georg e Shultz' s respons e a t th e tim e wa s categorical: a Marshal l Pla n fo r Easter n Europ e shoul d neve r b e con sidered. 116 Indeed, whil e evocatio n o f th e Marshal l Plan' s spiri t ma y hav e bee n felicitous, circumstance s qualifie d th e analogy. That essentially America n amalgam o f generosit y an d enlightene d self-interes t wa s inspire d b y th e

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perception o f acut e threa t t o the security o f the United State s an d of the need t o buil d a soli d bulwar k i n Wester n Europe . Th e Europeans wer e to develo p th e modalities o f the program, an d they possesse d th e democratic institution s an d marke t economie s necessar y t o it s success . Per suaded o f th e rea l an d presen t menac e pose d b y th e Sovie t Unio n an d Communist ideology , Congres s an d th e America n peopl e assume d th e burden o f massiv e outrigh t aid . Today , eve n i f assistanc e t o th e Eas t were founde d o n soun d economi c an d politica l calculations , th e vas t sums neede d coul d no t b e appropriated . T o b e sure , th e burde n o f ai d can no w b e share d wit h America' s affluen t allies , bu t i t i s not likel y t o be comparable t o the largess of the Marshall Plan . Between th e options o f laissez-fair e neglec t an d unrealisticall y gener ous ai d ther e lie s a mor e realistic , differentiate d economi c strateg y fo r responding t o the opportunities o f the Gorbachev era . Specifically : 1. Onl y a fundamenta l refor m o f economi c an d political structure s ca n bring the benefits o f competition-driven growt h an d democratic legitimacy. Partial measures tend to create as many problems as they resolve and do not deserve Western subsidies. 2. Th e uncoordinated an d competitive allocatio n o f Western economi c favor s invites Easter n manipulation , damage s allie d relations , an d undermines the political purpose of a differentiated strategy . 3. Wher e the necessary political and economic structural reform s ar e instituted, a concerted program of credits, trade preferences, deb t relief, technical assistance, and training is eminently in the West's interest and within its means. 4. Th e rhetoric of reform mus t not cloud the West's judgment on the likelihood of succes s an d o n th e balanc e o f power . Th e scal e o f th e Sovie t Union' s economic problem s render s an y conceivable Wester n ai d wasteful an d ineffectual; an d the military powe r o f even a reformed Sovie t Unio n remain s a threat to the rest of Europe. Aid can, on the other hand , invigorate the East European countries and draw them into a secure relationship with the West. By the end of the 1980s , the United State s an d its allies were developin g a strateg y alon g thes e lines . The change i n official attitudes , particularl y in Washington, cam e slowl y an d grudgingly . The East European countries , warned U.S . Deputy Assistan t Secretar y for Commerc e Frankli n J . Varg o i n 1987 , "wil l hav e t o rel y upo n themselves t o generat e th e productivity, technolog y an d growth t o sup port th e economic need s o f thei r peoples . Eve n wit h th e best wil l i n the world, th e West canno t hel p but at the margin. Growt h i n exports to the West wil l b e difficult t o achieve . The West Europea n markets , t o whic h

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Eastern Europ e sell s 9 0 percen t o f it s har d currenc y exports , ar e no t growing fas t enoug h t o provid e th e Eas t European s wit h substantia l export gain s unles s the y ca n increas e thei r marke t share." 1 1 7 Commerc e Secretary Willia m Verit y reminde d a n East-Wes t conferenc e i n Potsda m in June 198 8 tha t "ther e i s no short-cu t t o refor m tha t ca n b e bought b y turning t o th e Wes t fo r assistance . Fundamenta l t o th e poo r economi c performance o f th e Warsa w Pac t nation s i s thei r inabilit y t o utiliz e technology, t o innovat e an d chang e an d t o allocat e capita l t o efficien t uses. . . . These ar e massiv e systemi c failing s tha t ca n onl y b e solve d b y changing th e syste m itself. " Th e East , therefore , "canno t loo k t o th e West fo r a bailou t fro m it s economi c problems, " an d increase d trad e and investmen t "ca n an d shoul d accompan y economi c restructuring, bu t this commerc e wil l follo w changes—no t lea d them." 1 1 8 Arme d wit h th e sobering experienc e o f th e Polis h economi c crisis , Zbignie w Brzezinsk i recommended tha t assistanc e "shoul d b e base d o n clea r indication s tha t these countries ar e pursuing seriou s institutionalized economi c and polit ical reforms." 119 Upon hi s retur n fro m a n Eas t Europea n tou r i n earl y 1988 , Deput y Secretary o f State John Whitehea d observe d tha t "the y ar e eager to mov e away fro m dependenc y o n th e Sovie t Union—economically , politicall y and socially . To th e exten t tha t the y want t o mov e awa y fro m th e Sovie t Union, i t i s U.S . polic y t o welcom e it." 1 2 0 Hungary , despit e it s heav y indebtedness, earne d Washington' s favo r wit h it s growin g liberalism . High-level contact s multiplied , includin g a visi t t o th e Unite d State s i n July 198 8 b y Genera l Secretar y Karol y Grosz . Althoug h U.S . exports t o Hungary stagnate d a t a leve l unde r $10 0 million , import s ros e fro m $172 millio n i n 198 5 to $30 5 millio n in 1987 . The United State s lobbie d intensely t o overcom e th e European Community' s hostilit y t o the admis sion o f Hungar y t o GATT . Th e U.S . ambassador , Mar k Palmer , an d American expert s an d donor s wer e instrumenta l i n a join t ventur e t o establish i n Budapest the Soviet bloc's first school of business administra tion. Bu t onl y i n mid-1989 , a s Hungar y joine d Polan d i n firmly settin g course towar d democrac y an d economi c liberalism , di d a substantia l American ai d program materialize . With respec t t o Poland , Washingto n remaine d steadfas t i n denyin g economic concession s t o th e Jaruzelski regime . The West' s bia s i n favo r of th e private secto r wa s evident in the first instances o f economi c aid . A private, nonprofi t "Foundatio n fo r th e Developmen t o f Polis h Agricul -

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ture," backe d b y the For d an d Rockefelle r Foundations , wa s establishe d with Polis h governmen t approva l i n Februar y 1988 . Dedicate d t o help ing Polish agricultur e hel p itself, the Foundation arrange d a $2. 4 millio n loan fro m a n Austrian ban k t o enable pig farmers t o import high-qualit y pig feed ; profit s fro m th e expor t o f ham s t o th e Unite d State s wer e expected t o mak e th e projec t self-sustainin g an d t o fun d agricultura l research an d development . Th e firs t internationa l loa n t o Polan d wa s granted i n November 198 8 b y the World Bank : a $17.9 millio n credi t t o facilitate th e expor t o f froze n frui t an d vegetable s t o Western Europe . Initially, ther e wa s littl e Wester n consensu s beyon d agreemen t tha t Eastern Europ e shoul d no t b e treate d a s a n undifferentiate d blo c an d that economi c reform s i n th e regio n coul d no t succee d withou t politica l change. Washington, an d particularl y Congress , was wary o f th e rus h t o finance perestroika. In June 1988 , o n th e ev e o f th e Toront o economi c summit, th e Senat e unanimousl y passe d a nonbindin g resolutio n askin g the presiden t t o "consul t wit h allie d leader s o n th e impac t o n Wester n security o f tie d an d untie d loans , trade credits , direct investment , line s of credit, joint ventures, government guarantee s an d othe r subsidies " to th e Soviet bloc. Senator Bil l Bradley repeate d hi s earlier suggestio n tha t "th e flow o f capita l shoul d b e limite d an d proportionat e t o th e degre e o f systemic reform." m121 The Bus h administratio n ha d hardl y complete d it s initial foreig n pol icy revie w whe n th e roundtabl e accord s i n Warsa w impelle d i t to devis e hurriedly a packag e o f economi c favors . Th e presiden t recalle d tha t when h e visite d Polan d i n Septembe r 1987 , h e ha d "tol d Chairma n Jaruzelski an d Lec h Wales a tha t th e America n peopl e an d Governmen t would respon d quickl y an d imaginativel y t o significan t interna l refor m m of th e kin d tha t w e no w see. "122 Th e resul t wa s a n eight-poin t package , disclosed i n hi s Hamtramc k speec h o n Apri l 17 , 1989 , whic h include d elimination o f tariff s o n selecte d Polis h export s unde r th e Genera l Sys tem o f Preferences (GSP) , a concession normall y extende d onl y to under developed countries. 123 Since the president's offer s wer e subjec t t o congressiona l approval , h e took pain s to ward of f potentia l criticism : "W e will not ac t uncondition ally. W e wil l no t offe r unsoun d credits . W e wil l no t offe r ai d withou t requiring soun d economi c practice s i n return. " On e conditio n fo r th e package, sai d hi s nationa l securit y adviser , Bren t Scowcroft , wa s IM F approval o f Polis h economi c reform s aimin g t o expan d th e privat e sec -

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tor. Th e Europea n allies , stressed Bush , share d th e vie w tha t "hel p fro m the West will com e in concert with liberalization. " Indeed, the West promised littl e and demande d much . The declaratio n issuing fro m th e NAT O summi t a t th e en d o f Ma y warne d tha t "i t i s essentially incumben t o n the countries of the East to solve their problem s by reforms fro m within" : We will seek expanded economi c and trade relations with the Eastern countrie s on the basis of commercially soun d terms, mutual interest and reciprocity. Such relations should als o serve as incentives for rea l economic reform an d thus ease the wa y fo r increase d integratio n o f Easter n countrie s int o th e internationa l trading system. 124 The Europea n Community' s foreig n minister s dre w u p a polic y towar d Eastern Europ e tha t followe d th e America n strateg y o f differentiation . The Communit y formall y suspende d contact s wit h Romani a bu t negoti ated a favorabl e trad e agreemen t wit h Poland . In earl y June , Prim e Minister Thatche r offere d Britain' s suppor t fo r a n IMF economic revital ization program , fo r deb t rescheduling , an d fo r liberalizatio n o f the EC' s trade quotas , a s wel l a s a five-year, $4 0 millio n (late r increase d t o $8 0 million) "know-ho w fund " t o provid e Polan d wit h advic e an d trainin g in th e mysterie s o f politica l pluralis m an d th e marke t economy . A fe w weeks later , Presiden t Mitterran d visite d Warsa w an d declare d tha t "clear-thinking an d responsibl e me n hav e show n the y kno w ho w t o organize fre e debate , fre e elections , an d a profoun d transformatio n o f public lif e i n Poland." 125 H e offere d Polan d th e first Wester n credit s since martia l la w ($2 5 millio n i n short-ter m credits , an d a furthe r $8 0 million i n credi t guarantee s whe n Polan d an d th e IM F settle d o n a n economic recovery program) an d th e rescheduling o f $1.1 5 billion , mor e than one-thir d o f Poland' s deb t t o France . After thes e cautiou s beginnings , th e Wester n power s wer e drive n b y the dramati c acceleratio n o f chang e i n th e secon d hal f o f 198 9 t o devis e a remarkabl y comprehensiv e economi c strategy . Conversely , th e grow ing radicalis m o f Eas t Europea n reformer s wa s reinforce d b y th e firm conditionality o f th e West's response. In preparation fo r th e forthcomin g economic summit, President Bush had written to the other leader s outlin ing Washington' s progra m fo r Polis h relie f an d invitin g the m t o mak e a concerted commitment . Th e modes t scal e o f th e administration' s pro posed contributio n owe d t o budgetar y stringency , skepticis m abou t th e Poles' abilit y t o administe r it , an d fea r o f arousin g unrealisti c expecta -

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tions o f America n bounty . Thi s prudenc e wa s no t unwarranted , fo r when Bus h arrive d i n Warsa w o n Jul y 9 th e outloo k wa s stil l fo r a Communist-dominated governmen t despit e th e humiliatio n suffere d b y the part y a t th e recen t elections , an d th e Pole s ha d ye t t o develo p a credible economi c reform program . Warsaw wa s disappointe d b y th e president' s gifts—th e Hamtramc k package, specifyin g a $10 0 millio n gran t fo r privat e enterprise , $1 5 million fo r pollutio n control , an d $ 4 millio n fo r technica l assistanc e an d labor training . I n recommending multilatera l aid , rescheduling, an d IM F and Worl d Ban k facilities , Bus h wa s proposin g t o spen d othe r people' s money. Eve n Bren t Scowcrof t concede d tha t th e America n contributio n was largel y symbolic , "a s muc h politica l an d psychologica l a s i t i s sub stantive." 126 A t hi s nex t stop , i n Budapest , th e presiden t delivere d a scaled-down versio n o f th e Polis h package : $2 5 millio n fo r a "Hungar ian-American Enterpris e Fund " an d $ 5 millio n fo r th e environment , along with th e prospect o f permanen t MF N statu s an d GS P preferences . That th e White Hous e was content t o let the West Europeans tak e th e lead an d assum e th e majo r par t o f th e burde n o f a recovery progra m fo r the Eas t wa s confirme d a t th e Pari s economi c summi t o f th e G- 7 grou p in mid-July . Sovie t sensibilities , i t wa s felt , migh t b e ruffled b y a n osten sibly American-managed initiative . The solution, proposed b y West Ger many's Kohl , wa s t o charg e th e E C Commissio n wit h th e tas k o f coor dinating th e respons e o f OEC D countrie s t o th e refor m proces s i n Polan d and Hungary . Th e presiden t o f th e Commission , Jacque s Delors , wa s delighted a t th e implie d extensio n o f hi s mandat e int o th e real m o f foreign polic y an d promptl y evoke d "th e spiri t o f a Marshal l Pla n fo r Eastern Europe." 1 2 7 While i n Warsaw a Solidarit y governmen t too k office , i n Washingto n the debat e ove r th e adequac y o f th e Bus h initiativ e intensified . Com plained a frustrate d Stat e Departmen t expert , "Becaus e w e basicall y have n o money , w e ar e goin g t o b e prevente d fro m respondin g effec tively t o th e greates t opportunit y t o alte r th e ma p o f Europ e sinc e 1945." 1 2 8 Th e administratio n di d exten d $10 8 millio n i n emergenc y food ai d t o Poland , an d i t include d i n it s reques t t o Congres s $20 0 million fo r a fun d t o stabiliz e Polis h currency , contingen t o n Warsa w reaching a n agreemen t wit h th e IMF . Bus h als o announce d th e forma tion o f a top-leve l presidentia l missio n t o examin e Poland' s economi c plans an d needs .

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But Congress, which i n the past had acte d mainly to constrain positiv e economic leverag e i n Easter n Europe , was no w galvanize d b y the demo cratic revolutio n rapidl y engulfin g th e region . Ai d fo r Easter n refor m became a popular caus e i n bot h partie s an d o n Novembe r 18 , two day s after hearin g a n impassione d appea l fro m Lec h Walesa, Congres s passe d legislation providin g $85 2 millio n fo r Polan d an d $8 6 millio n fo r Hun gary, doubl e th e fundin g requeste d b y th e administration . Th e state d purpose o f th e "Eas t Europea n Democrac y Ac t o f 1989 " was t o "facili tate th e transitio n fro m state-directe d control s t o a fre e marke t econ omy." Th e Illinoi s Democra t wh o steere d th e bil l throug h th e Senate , Paul Simon , terme d i t " a wage r o n Poland' s experimen t wit h democrac y and a n investmen t i n our security." 129 I t earmarked $24 0 millio n fo r th e Polish enterpris e fun d an d $6 0 millio n fo r th e Hungarian , $12 5 millio n in foo d aid , federa l guarantee s fo r u p t o $20 0 millio n i n loan s t o Polis h importers o f America n products , an d $1 0 millio n fo r Polis h trainin g programs, i n additio n t o th e $20 0 millio n stabilizatio n fund . I t als o directed th e administratio n t o see k " a generou s an d earl y reschedulin g program" fo r Poland' s debt . The bil l was n o Marshal l Plan , bu t i t represented a substantial contri bution t o th e emergin g multilatera l rescu e operation . A contempora neous opinio n pol l suggeste d tha t th e averag e America n wa s no t i n a generous mood . Seventy-fou r percen t o f the respondents oppose d spend ing the savings generated b y troop withdrawal s fro m Europ e o n aid , an d 80 percen t fel t tha t th e Unite d State s shoul d no t launc h a secon d Mar shall Pla n fo r Easter n Europe. 130 Fortuitously , th e beneficiarie s o f th e original Marshal l Pla n were now risin g to the challenge . "We canno t allo w Polan d t o fail, " conclude d a spokesma n o f th e European Commissio n afte r rhetoricall y recountin g the risks of pumpin g aid int o tha t leak y ship. 131 Th e first meetin g o f OEC D countries , con vened b y Delor s i n August , ha d addresse d th e questio n o f emergenc y food ai d fo r Poland . Th e secon d meeting , in lat e September, debate d th e Commission's "actio n plan " fo r reinforcemen t o f Polis h an d Hungaria n economic reform , focusin g o n agriculture , acces s t o Wester n markets , foreign investment , professiona l training , an d environmenta l protection . In late October , Franc e announce d a three-year, $70 0 millio n emergenc y assistance progra m fo r Poland , an d a fe w week s late r Chancello r Koh l visited Warsa w t o unvei l a $2. 2 billio n package , mostl y i n th e for m o f loan guarantee s an d insuranc e bu t includin g th e write-of f o f $40 0 mil -

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lion i n commercia l loan s an d th e conversio n o f anothe r $25 4 millio n into zloty s fo r reinvestmen t i n Poland . The collapse of the Honecker regim e prompted Bon n to dangl e poten tially eve n vaste r assistance . A s th e countr y becam e unified—economi cally i n July, politically i n Octobe r 1990—th e immens e cost s o f conver sion t o marke t economic s an d Wester n standard s wer e vividl y revealed . Unifying th e currencie s involve d th e injectio n o f $3 1 billio n int o th e economy. A n additiona l $2 9 billio n wa s allocate d t o subsidiz e th e East' s pensions, housing , unemploymen t insurance , highways , an d railways . To mak e th e East' s industrie s competitiv e woul d requir e ove r $50 0 billion i n investment . Withi n a yea r o f th e revolution , th e East' s indus trial outpu t ha d falle n b y 4 2 percent , an d almos t 2 millio n o f th e 8. 8 million wor k forc e becam e unemployed . Anothe r 500,00 0 civi l servant s were expecte d t o los e thei r job s a s a consequenc e o f unification , an d unemployment wa s projecte d t o reac h 3 0 percen t i n 1991 . These cost s and estimate s reflecte d som e unique feature s o f unification , bu t they als o indicated th e distanc e t o b e travelle d befor e th e res t o f th e regio n coul d come clos e to th e economic levels of th e industrialized West . Though th e Federa l Republi c wa s destine d t o b e th e bigges t singl e source o f aid , th e event s i n Eas t German y an d th e consequen t specula tion abou t Germa n unificatio n arouse d Frenc h apprehension s tha t Bonn' s priorities migh t shif t awa y fro m th e ne w plan s fo r Communit y integra tion. To reinforce th e principle of concerte d action , President Mitterran d (who wa s als o servin g a s president o f th e Communit y i n th e secon d hal f of 1989 ) convene d a n imprompt u E C summi t o n Novembe r 18 ; th e agenda include d emergenc y ai d fo r th e Eas t Europea n countries , thei r future relationshi p wit h th e Community , an d Mitterrand' s proposa l fo r a ne w developmen t bank . "Al l participant s share d on e sentiment, " re ported Mitterran d a t a midnight pres s conference , "an d tha t wa s jo y . . . because o f th e ne w marc h o f Easter n Europ e toward s freedom. " Chan cellor Kohl , fo r hi s part , averre d tha t "h e wh o think s tha t w e shoul d now withdra w fro m Europ e an d tak e car e o f Germa n thing s betray s th e reform movemen t i n Eas t Germany , Poland , Hungary , an d mayb e to morrow i n Czechoslovakia , a s well a s betraying perestroika i n the Sovie t Union." 132 In earl y December , th e regula r E C summi t endorse d a $ 1 billio n ai d package fo r Polan d an d Hungar y a s wel l a s th e creatio n o f a Europea n Bank fo r Reconstructio n an d Development an d a foundation fo r trainin g

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East Europea n managers . A fe w day s later , th e twenty-fou r OEC D foreign ministers , meeting in Brussels, agreed o n a $1 billion stabilizatio n fund fo r Polan d an d extende d th e promis e o f assistanc e i n th e so-calle d Phare progra m t o Eas t Germany , Czechoslovakia , Bulgaria , an d Yugo slavia "a t th e time they put i n place the necessary politica l an d economi c reforms"; b y the followin g February , al l these an d Romani a a s well ha d submitted forma l request s fo r aid. 133 Th e Pole s concurrentl y reache d agreement wit h th e IM F o n a toug h economi c refor m program , a ste p that cleare d th e way fo r a $72 3 millio n IM F credit a s well a s new Worl d Bank projects an d OEC D bridgin g loans. In January 1990 , Japan's Prim e Minister Toshik i Kaif u announce d i n Wes t Berli n a billion-dolla r ai d program fo r Polan d an d Hungary , includin g a contributio n t o th e mul tilateral stabilizatio n fun d an d expor t an d investmen t guarantees . Whil e the term s fo r th e ne w developmen t ban k wer e bein g worke d out , th e European Investmen t Ban k approve d a loa n o f 1 billio n ($1. 2 billion ) ecus loa n fo r thos e tw o countries . I n February , th e Pari s Clu b agree d t o reschedule nearl y one-quarte r o f th e Polis h deb t an d t o exten d a mora torium o n repayment s unti l Marc h 1991 , although n o on e wa s optimis tic abou t Poland' s abilit y t o eve r pa y i t off . An d i n July , th e Phar e program wa s extende d t o th e othe r Eas t Europea n supplicant s wit h th e exception o f Romania , whos e democrati c recor d wa s no t judge d satis factory. The OEC D countrie s thu s responde d wit h uncommo n spee d an d ingenuity t o th e pressing need s o f th e tw o leadin g reformer s i n th e East , establishing mechanism s an d precedent s fo r eventua l ai d t o thei r neigh bors a s well . Th e measure s promise d t o aver t immediat e financia l col lapse an d eas e th e stresse s o f conversio n t o marke t economics , bu t the y could no t guarante e th e sustaine d modernizatio n o f Easter n Europe' s industry an d agriculture . Tha t tas k wil l require , i n additio n t o multifa ceted domesti c adaptation , greate r foreig n investmen t an d increase d access to world markets . The Europea n Ban k fo r Reconstructio n an d Developmen t (know n a s BERD b y it s Frenc h acronym ) brok e ne w groun d i n bein g th e first financial institutio n create d jointl y b y East an d Wes t (it s founding mem bers compris e th e OEC D states , th e si x Eas t Europea n countries , Yugo slavia, an d th e Sovie t Union) , an d i t promise s t o becom e a powerfu l agent o f modernization . Mitterran d mad e n o bone s abou t th e politica l purpose o f th e initiative—"t o giv e th e peopl e o f thes e countrie s th e

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means the y requir e t o mak e liberty , democrac y an d pluralis m a real ity." 134 Washington's reservation s wer e met b y a Soviet undertaking no t to borro w mor e tha n it s capital contributio n fo r a period o f thre e years , and b y th e provisio n reservin g 6 0 percen t o f th e bank' s loan s fo r th e private an d cooperativ e sectors . The United State s subscribe d 1 0 percen t of th e bank' s $1 2 billio n capita l base , th e Europea n Communit y 5 1 percent, an d th e Sovie t Union 6 percent. Th e res t was contribute d b y th e other OEC D an d Easter n countries . The East' s economi c rehabilitatio n wil l als o b e contingen t o n it s access t o th e global , an d primaril y t o th e Wes t European , market . B y May 1990 , the Communit y ha d conclude d trad e an d cooperatio n agree ments wit h Czechoslovakia , Eas t Germany , an d Bulgari a offerin g concessions simila r t o thos e extende d earlie r t o Polan d an d Hungary , and i t wa s preparin g t o ope n office s i n Warsa w an d Budapest . Delors' s Commission, meanwhile , se t to th e tas k o f developin g term s fo r associa tion agreement s tha t woul d provid e the m wit h eve n greate r economi c concessions. The economi c integratio n o f th e tw o Europe s wil l no t b e easy . Rec ognition o f th e East' s immens e need s induce d th e Counci l o f Europ e i n May 199 0 t o cal l fo r a $40 0 billio n "Marshal l Plan, " bu t eve n mor e modest concession s ca n rais e problems . Wester n Europ e i s no t eage r t o absorb cheape r foo d o r manufacture s o r surplu s labor , no r t o furthe r extend it s regiona l an d socia l fun d benefits . Whe n i n earl y 199 0 th e Commission unveile d a pla n t o rais e b y 1 8 percen t th e quot a fo r stee l imports fro m Easter n Europe , th e Community' s stee l producer s pro tested vigorously . Ye t th e Eas t European s wil l nee d market s a s wel l a s loans, technica l aid , an d trainin g program s i f the y ar e t o overcom e th e legacy o f fort y year s o f stat e socialism . I t coul d tak e a decad e fo r mos t to becom e economicall y acceptabl e candidate s fo r ful l membershi p i n a n expanded Community . Tha t continenta l extensio n o f Jea n Monnet' s vision deserve s bot h persistenc e an d sacrific e o n th e par t o f Wes t Euro peans an d Americans . Counsel i s the cheapes t for m o f aid , an d ther e i s grea t deman d fo r i t as th e Eas t European s se t abou t t o reconstructin g a marke t econom y from scratch . Thi s i s the onl y deman d tha t th e Wes t ca n readil y satisfy . The IM F ha s alread y delivere d exper t advic e o n macroeconomi c policy , and th e Eas t European s ar e als o seekin g advic e from , an d membershi p in, th e OECD , wher e onl y Yugoslavi a currentl y enjoy s associat e status .

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Secretary-General Jean-Claud e Pav e indicate d tha t th e condition s fo r membership i n thi s clu b o f industrialize d countrie s ar e a marke t econ omy an d pluralisti c democrac y (criteri a tha t wer e no t alway s applie d i n the past) , bu t th e Eas t European s ca n ta p th e OECD' s broa d expertis e even befor e forma l adhesion . Th e Unite d State s offere d a n extr a $ 1 million t o th e secretaria t t o develo p a specialize d Eas t Europea n unit. 135 And bilatera l consultations , suc h a s meeting s betwee n Hungaria n an d Polish delegation s an d th e U.S . Securitie s an d Exchang e Commission , are multiplying . As economi c barrier s fall , th e politicall y sensitiv e issu e o f th e rol e o f Germany emerges . The German s enjo y natura l advantage s i n commerc e with th e East—proximit y an d familiarit y a s wel l a s a powerfu l an d export-oriented economy . Memorie s o f th e Thir d Reic h leav e a residu e of animosity , particularl y i n Polan d an d Czechoslovakia , wher e pas t regimes mad e a consciou s effor t t o diversif y thei r commercia l link s wit h the West . Polis h suspicion s ar e fuele d b y a n allege d Wes t Germa n pref erence fo r investin g i n th e forme r Germa n territories . Paradoxically , th e non-German Eas t Europeans als o fear tha t th e costs of unificatio n migh t reduce thei r shar e o f Wes t Germa n economi c favor s an d investment . Indeed, a s Eas t Germany' s prim e minister , Lotha r d e Maiziere , querie d when th e dea l o n economi c unio n wa s conclude d i n May 1990 , "Whic h other country gets such a good starting position a s we with this treaty?" 136 "Eastern Europ e wil l b e primaril y a Germa n market " a Bon n exper t confidently predicted. 137 There is, however, som e legitimate ambivalenc e about th e prospec t tha t th e Eas t European s wil l simpl y trad e Sovie t fo r German economi c domination . Wha t i s i n questio n i s no t th e merit s o f West Germany' s democrac y an d econom y bu t th e political influenc e tha t would inevitabl y accompan y th e consolidatio n o f a Germa n economi c sphere i n Easter n Europe , wher e th e mar k i s likel y t o becom e th e ke y currency. Suc h influence , howeve r benign , ca n unsettl e smal l an d vulner able nation s i n th e mids t o f reassertin g thei r autonomy . An d Germany' s Western neighbor s worr y abou t th e furthe r strengthenin g o f th e conti nent's economi c superpower . The reviva l o f a historica l patter n o f Germa n preponderanc e i n East Central Europ e ma y b e mitigate d b y secula r trend s an d compensa tory policies . Th e dependenc e o f th e Eas t European s o n on e proximat e economic superpowe r ma y b e dilute d a s the y joi n a globa l econom y characterized b y internationa l competition , a proliferatio n o f multina -

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tional companies , an d far-flun g investment . Moreover , a s th e Europea n Community advance s towar d a singl e marke t an d a commo n foreig n policy, it s commercia l an d politica l relation s wit h th e severa l Eas t Euro pean countrie s shoul d com e t o reflec t Europea n rathe r tha n specificall y German interests . Bu t fo r thi s t o occur , th e othe r majo r Wes t Europea n powers, particularl y France , wil l hav e t o assum e a mor e activ e rol e i n defining foreig n an d commercia l approache s towar d Easter n Europe , and i n promotin g economi c relation s i n th e contex t o f suc h policy . An d the Unite d State s ca n exer t simila r compensator y leverag e i n it s eco nomic policies an d encouragemen t o f Europea n unification . The West' s coordinate d economi c progra m t o reinforc e refor m ma y be insufficient , an d i t migh t eve n b e considere d niggardl y i n compariso n to th e $1 4 billio n "Marshal l Plan " bein g develope d b y the Unite d State s and Japa n fo r th e Philippines , o r indee d t o America n ai d fo r Panam a and Nicaragua . I n th e cas e o f th e mos t heavil y indebte d Eas t Europea n countries, Polan d an d Hungary , Wester n creditor s wil l probably hav e t o consider writin g of f muc h o f th e deb t t o sav e the m fro m prolonge d an d politically destabilizin g penury . Conditionalit y wil l no t b e eas y t o appl y and calibrat e vis-a-vi s regime s tha t enthusiasticall y profes s Wester n val ues. No r wil l generosit y b e eas y t o sel l t o taxpayer s a s th e novelt y o f a democratized Easter n Europ e wears off . The crisi s tha t erupte d i n th e Persia n Gul f i n Augus t 199 0 onl y aggravated th e economi c miser y o f th e Easter n Europea n countries . Al l of the m readil y enrolle d i n th e U N embarg o agains t Ira q an d occupie d Kuwait, thereb y suspendin g lucrativ e contract s an d th e repaymen t o f Iraqi debts . Th e precipitou s ris e i n th e pric e o f oi l promise d t o b e eve n more damaging . Wit h th e cut s i n Sovie t oi l deliverie s an d th e necessit y of paying fo r futur e Sovie t supplies i n hard currency , th e East European s were facin g a critica l energ y shortag e an d mor e unfavorabl e term s of trade . In th e cas e o f Czechoslovakia , oi l import s woul d consum e al l of th e country' s har d currenc y earnings . Th e IM F estimate d tha t th e region's rea l GD P woul d fal l b y a n averag e o f 5. 3 percen t i n 199 0 an d stagnate, a t best , i n 1991. 1 3 8 Eve n Czechoslovakia , whic h earlie r ha d denied an y nee d fo r substantia l foreig n aid , now clamore d fo r relief . At th e sam e time , th e Eas t Europeans ' clai m o n Wester n resource s was dilute d b y th e frayin g o f th e consensu s o n economi c polic y towar d the Sovie t Union. I n the summe r o f 1990 , the European Community , le d by Wes t German y an d France , parte d way s wit h th e Unite d State s i n

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urging coordinate d ai d t o tha t countr y despit e th e chaoti c stat e o f it s economy an d economi c reforms . Bon n wen t s o fa r a s t o guarante e $ 3 billion i n ban k credit s t o th e Sovie t Unio n a s par t o f th e unificatio n bargain. Despit e thi s diversion , an d th e potential fo r squanderin g scarc e resources, the Wes t maintaine d it s unit y o f purpos e i n regar d t o Easter n Europe: t o encourag e self-determination , democratization , an d reinte gration int o a communit y o f fre e nations . Fort y year s afte r Yalta , th e West ha s no t full y exorcise d it s partial responsibilit y fo r th e disma l fat e of th e Eas t Europeans . Consequently , ther e linger s a sens e o f mora l obligation t o hel p the m recover , without , o f course , jeopardizin g West ern security . Tha t securit y i s not enhance d b y chronic economic crisis . A new Easter n Europ e possesse d o f mor e pluralisti c institution s an d ra tional economi c structure s ca n b e a n asse t t o Wester n securit y an d a profitable tradin g partner . America's postwa r experienc e wit h economi c leverag e i n Europ e of fers mixe d lessons . Th e securit y rational e fo r embargoe s an d sanction s notwithstanding, punitive measures had littl e positive impact on the pace of refor m i n th e East . Unilatera l sanctions , exemplifie d b y Jackson Vanik, ha d onl y a margina l effec t o n th e policie s o f regime s tha t coul d afford t o forg o America n favors . The y occasionall y serve d a vali d sym bolic purpos e bu t undermine d allie d solidarit y i n th e process . Positiv e economic leverag e wa s no t muc h mor e successful , a s demonstrate d b y the Polis h experienc e o f th e 1970s . The Marshal l Plan , then , remain s th e shinin g exampl e o f economi c leverage tha t worked . I t reste d o n a commo n appraisa l o f proble m an d remedy. T o b e sure , th e stimulu s o f a n acut e perceptio n o f threa t i s absent now , bu t nonetheles s th e Unite d State s ca n agai n pla y a critica l part i n th e collectiv e respons e t o th e challeng e o f liberalis m tha t i s sweeping Eastern Europe .

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J - h e contes t fo r Europ e ha s stoo d a t th e hear t o f th e confrontatio n between Eas t an d Wes t sinc e Worl d Wa r II . Extensio n o f Sovie t hege mony ove r Polan d an d th e res t o f Easter n Europ e accentuate d th e threa t to th e res t o f th e continent , an d b y 194 7 Wester n strategist s becam e preoccupied wit h th e politica l an d militar y securit y o f fre e Europe . Al l other consideration s wer e subordinate d t o bolsterin g Wester n Europe' s military defense s an d integrativ e institutions . Whil e th e peopl e o f East ern Europe were nominally considere d t o be friendly captive s of a hostil e power, thei r countrie s wer e i n th e enem y camp . Fo r al l th e rhetori c o f liberation an d cover t attempt s a t destabilization, containmen t wa s there fore fundamentall y a defensiv e strateg y t o safeguar d an d strengthe n th e West, t o consolidat e rathe r tha n challeng e th e divisio n o f Europe . Forty years later, with th e Soviet empire gripped b y reformist ferment , and wit h a n economicall y an d politicall y confiden t Wester n Europ e moving eve r close r t o unity , th e stabilit y o f thi s standof f i s bein g chal lenged b y ne w geopolitica l uncertainties . In th e lat e 1940s , Stalin' s inse curities an d ambition s an d th e West's sens e of vulnerability conspire d t o divide th e continent . No w tha t divisio n i s eroding , i n th e Kremlin' s domain an d withi n th e Soviet Union itself . The success o f containmen t impose s a reappraisa l o f th e compara 303

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tively comfortabl e calculu s o f defens e o f th e statu s quo . Thi s involve s military disengagemen t an d politica l realignmen t o n term s tha t safe guard th e securit y an d accommodat e th e aspiration s o f all . Havin g served abl y a s guarantor o f Wester n Europe' s security , th e Unite d State s now face s th e challeng e o f guidin g an d facilitatin g th e proces s o f Eas t European reintegration , an d o f elaboratin g securit y policie s fo r a ne w European era . A complex geopolitica l transformatio n i s under way . Alliance Politics: Security and Stability. Sovie t hegemon y impose d military a s well a s ideological an d economi c subordinatio n o n th e coun tries o f Easter n Europe . Th e Wes t ha d n o choic e bu t t o regar d th e Eas t Europeans a s extension s o f Sovie t power, th e forwar d base s o f a n over whelmingly powerfu l militar y machin e tha t ostensibl y threatene d th e security o f Western Europe . The "captiv e peoples" may have been reluc tant partners , bu t thei r totalitaria n regime s possesse d th e capabilit y t o marshal huma n an d materia l resource s i n th e servic e o f Sovie t securit y needs. B y 1950 , th e proportio n o f thei r resource s allocate d t o militar y purposes fa r outstrippe d tha t i n th e West , an d fiv e year s late r th e War saw Treat y formall y converte d th e existin g networ k o f bilatera l mutua l security linkage s int o a multilateral politica l an d militar y alliance . Like a mirro r imag e o f NATO , th e Warsaw Pac t presente d itsel f a s a purely defensiv e alliance , establishe d t o protec t socialis t state s agains t the threa t o f Germa n militaris m an d revanchis m an d th e hostil e force s of imperialis m le d by the United States . There were, in fact, fundamenta l asymmetries betwee n th e two alliances . Membership i n the Warsaw Pac t was les s tha n voluntary , althoug h th e Eas t Europea n regime s share d Moscow's ideologica l outloo k an d owe d thei r surviva l t o Sovie t patron age. Moreover , th e Pole s an d Czech s i n particula r fel t vulnerabl e t o German irredentis m an d share d Russia' s historica l mistrus t o f Germany . The mos t obviou s asymmetr y la y i n th e militar y realm , wher e th e mas sive numerica l superiorit y o f th e Warsa w Pac t force s an d th e offensiv e doctrine impute d b y NAT O analyst s t o th e Sovie t militar y comman d made th e Communis t clai m o f defensiv e necessit y questionable . The othe r asymmetr y involve d intra-allianc e relations . Th e Warsa w Pact's smalle r member s wer e initiall y wholl y subordinate d t o thei r pa tron. Th e Warsa w Treaty , lik e th e Nort h Atlanti c Treaty , mad e n o provision fo r unilatera l abrogatio n excep t upo n notic e on e yea r befor e the en d o f it s twenty-yea r term . In th e cas e o f NAT O ther e wa s n o

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challenge t o France' s sovereig n righ t t o withdraw fro m th e joint militar y command. I n contrast , th e legall y constitute d Hungaria n government' s renunciation o f th e treat y durin g th e 195 6 revolutio n wa s ignore d an d superseded b y th e forcefu l reimpositio n o f a mor e complian t regime . Albania, beyon d Moscow' s reach , effectivel y suspende d it s membershi p in 1961 . When a fe w year s late r th e Romanian s secure d th e withdrawa l of allie d Sovie t forces , th e Kremli n tacitl y accepte d thei r apostasy , fo r there were propaganda advantage s i n this display of limited voluntarism . But i n Hungar y i n 1956 , i n Czechoslovaki a i n 1968 , an d i n Polan d i n 1980-81, th e Warsa w Pact' s mos t critica l functio n cam e int o play : t o preserve th e unit y o f th e "socialis t commonwealth " a t it s strategi c fron t line. Soviet and party contro l was imposed ove r the East European militar y establishments i n the early postwar years , and the Warsaw Pac t provide d for a join t militar y command . A full y integrate d militar y allianc e mate rialized onl y in the 1970s , with th e adven t o f new comman d an d contro l mechanisms, join t trainin g exercises , an d modernizatio n o f equipment . The prevailin g Sovie t doctrine , a s displaye d i n th e Pact' s exercises , wa s essentially offensiv e an d initiall y nonnuclear . Th e objectiv e wa s t o en gage the enem y o n it s own territory. 1 At th e en d o f th e 1970s , th e dominan t rol e o f th e Sovie t Unio n wa s affirmed i n a secre t Warsa w Pac t agreemen t (th e "Statut e o f th e Join t Armed Force s an d Organ s o f Thei r Comman d i n Wartime") , whic h provided tha t i n tim e o f wa r o r anticipate d war , contro l o f th e Eas t European arme d force s woul d b e exercise d exclusivel y b y th e Suprem e High Command , i n operationa l term s b y the Sovie t Genera l Staff . Thes e troops coul d b e deployed withou t prio r consultatio n o f th e government s concerned. 2 Thus , fo r al l practical purposes , th e Eas t European s surren dered thei r sovereignt y i n tim e o f crisis , bu t eve n a t othe r time s th e siz e and equipmen t o f thei r arme d force s wer e determine d i n Moscow . Th e imposition o f Sovie t comman d an d militar y doctrin e wen t han d i n han d with substantia l burde n sharin g i n th e for m o f manpowe r an d domesti c defense expenditur e (whic h remaine d proportionatel y highe r tha n fo r NATO members ) a s wel l a s contributio n t o th e maintenanc e o f Sovie t forces statione d i n Eastern Europe . From th e Wester n perspective , then , th e Warsa w Pac t presente d a formidable threa t t o security . I t enjoye d th e geographica l advantag e o f strategic depth , a concentration o f elit e Sovie t force s backe d b y nationa l

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armies i n th e GDR , Poland , an d Czechoslovakia , a vas t numerica l ad vantage i n tanks , artillery , an d othe r armore d vehicles , an d a standard ization o f equipmen t beyon d th e capabilit y o f th e mor e pluralisti c NATO . Outmanned an d outgunned , NAT O adopte d a forwar d defens e strateg y to contai n th e aggresso r a t Germa n borde r and , i n th e "Follow-o n Forces Attack " (FOFA ) pla n devise d i n th e earl y 1980s , t o hi t rea r echelons o f th e Warsaw Pac t force s b y tactical nuclea r strikes . The reliabilit y o f th e Warsa w Pact' s Eas t Europea n componen t wa s difficult t o assess . Th e domesti c politica l an d socioeconomi c circum stances o f the Soviet Union's allies and thei r lo w level of militar y prepar edness (excep t fo r th e GDR ) raise d doubt s a s t o thei r potentia l perfor mance i n war . Wester n analyst s tende d t o regar d th e GD R an d Bulgari a as th e USSR' s mos t reliabl e allies , an d assume d tha t i n centra l fron t operations, Eas t Germa n unit s woul d b e integrate d int o th e Sovie t first echelon, whil e th e Pole s (apar t fro m possibl e frontlin e actio n aime d a t northern German y o r Denmark ) an d th e Czech s woul d b e relegate d t o the secon d echelon . Th e standar d expectatio n wa s tha t Eas t Europea n military disciplin e would hol d durin g a n initial Warsaw Pac t assault, bu t that i f NAT O succeede d i n preventin g a quic k an d decisiv e Sovie t vic tory, the reliabilit y o f th e minor allies would rapidl y dissipate . While th e loyalty o f th e Eas t Europea n office r corp s was no t t o b e underestimated , the bond s wer e mor e professional tha n political , an d the y lacked domes tic root s an d reinforcement . Thus , eve n befor e th e revolution s o f 1989 , East Europea n militar y reliabilit y wa s no t considere d likel y t o withstan d the stres s of comba t an d th e pull o f nationalisti c sentiments. 3 Deputy Assistant Secretar y o f Stat e William Luer s reminded Congres s in 197 8 tha t "i t would b e folly fo r NAT O t o devis e a strategy o r a tacti c in Europ e tha t wa s base d o n th e assumptio n tha t Easter n Europea n forces woul d no t b e full y effectiv e i n thei r fighting capacit y agains t NATO forces." 4 Consequently , "worst-case " calculation s o f manpowe r and materie l overestimate d th e Pact' s militar y capability . Th e Eas t Eu ropeans' moral e an d politica l commitmen t wer e n o doub t weakene d b y the prospec t o f devastatio n tha t FOF A brough t t o thei r territory . Lik e West Germany , th e countrie s o f th e norther n tie r an d Hungar y realisti cally anticipate d tha t the y woul d b e the battlegroun d i n an y foreseeabl e military engagemen t an d therefor e ha d a highe r stak e i n detent e tha n their les s expose d allies . Detente , b y th e sam e token , weakene d th e cohesion o f th e Warsaw Pac t an d th e Sovie t Union's leverage .

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Collective Security. In th e earl y year s o f th e col d war , th e West' s concentration o n allianc e buildin g an d militar y deterrenc e preclude d serious consideratio n o f alternativ e approache s t o Europea n security . The Sovie t Unio n an d it s allie s represented a unified militar y threat , an d the erectio n o f th e Atlanti c allianc e preclude d tamperin g wit h th e statu s quo o f a divide d Europe . Th e nee d t o nurtur e stabilit y withi n th e tw o camps reinforce d th e stabilit y o f thei r separation . Article 1 1 o f th e Warsa w Treat y specifie s tha t "shoul d a syste m o f collective securit y b e establishe d i n Europe , an d a Genera l Europea n Treaty o f Collectiv e Securit y conclude d fo r thi s purpose , fo r whic h th e Contracting Partie s wil l unswervingl y strive , th e presen t Treat y shal l cease t o b e operativ e fro m th e da y th e Genera l Europea n Treat y enter s into force." 5 Thi s provisio n reflecte d a concurren t Sovie t diplomati c initiative t o alte r th e political an d militar y balance . On Februar y 10 , 1954 , a t th e Berli n conferenc e o f th e fou r powers , Soviet Foreig n Ministe r Moloto v advance d a "Draf t Genera l Europea n Treaty" fo r collectiv e securit y tha t wa s linke d t o a proposa l regardin g Germany. Tha t proposa l anticipate d neutralizatio n an d confedera l ar rangements leadin g eventuall y t o "democratic " unification . In th e in terim, mos t occupatio n force s woul d b e withdrawn , thoug h the y coul d be reintroduced i f security wa s threatened. Th e collective security regim e originally adumbrate d b y Moloto v assigne d onl y observe r statu s t o th e United States , whic h wa s patentl y unacceptabl e t o th e Wester n powers , and th e latte r als o rejecte d a n amende d proposa l tha t allowe d fo r Amer ican participation i n a European securit y system . The West apprehende d that Molotov' s scheme s wer e designe d solel y t o imped e Wes t Germa n participation i n NAT O an d reduc e th e America n commitmen t t o West ern Europe' s defense . Wester n securit y wa s equate d wit h a n expande d NATO, an d mistrus t o f Sovie t political promises had sinc e Yalta becom e an axio m i n U.S. foreign policy . Even afte r Wes t Germany' s accessio n t o NAT O ha d becom e a fai t accompli, th e Russian s revive d thei r ide a o f a European securit y confer ence at the 195 5 Genev a summi t an d propose d a zone fo r limitatio n an d inspection o f armament s encompassin g th e two Germany s an d neighbor ing states . Thi s prompte d th e Wes t t o advanc e th e so-calle d Ede n pla n for Europea n security , whic h envisione d a unifie d German y a s wel l a s a limited arm s zon e wit h a militar y balanc e an d verificatio n measures . Although th e tw o proposal s ha d point s i n common , th e West' s commit -

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ment t o NAT O an d it s terms fo r Germa n unificatio n preclude d compro mise. A s th e integratio n o f Wes t German y int o th e NAT O militar y structure proceeded , Khrushche v abandone d hi s Europea n securit y ini tiatives an d instea d precipitate d crise s over Berlin . The Helsinki Final Act and CBMs. Th e confidence-buildin g measure s proposed b y th e Unite d State s a s th e Eightee n Natio n Disarmamen t Conference i n Decembe r 196 2 foreshadowe d th e term s o f th e Helsink i Final Act , bu t i n th e 1960s , th e tw o alliance s wer e preoccupie d wit h their ow n problems—contro l ove r nuclea r weapon s an d th e balanc e o f European an d America n contribution s i n NATO , polycentris m an d th e Prague Sprin g in the Warsaw Pact . In the United States , the lone voice of Zbigniew Brzezinsk i persiste d i n advocatin g ne w multilatera l frame works fo r addressin g Europea n securit y an d attenuatin g th e divisio n o f the continent . Tw o year s afte r th e enunciation o f th e Brezhnev Doctrine , he agai n urge d th e creatio n o f som e permanent consultativ e mechanism , "a join t NATO-Warsa w Pac t commissio n o r a Europea n securit y com mission, t o monito r eventua l securit y arrangement s an d perhap s eve n t o initiate others." 6 A s noted earlie r (chapte r 3) , the Nixon administratio n saw littl e meri t i n reopenin g th e questio n o f Europea n securit y whil e i t pursued a multipola r balanc e o f powe r an d detent e wit h th e Sovie t Union, an d th e Unite d State s approache d th e CSC E wit h greate r skepti cism than th e othe r participants . The Helsink i Fina l Act's contributio n t o security , to reducin g tension s and enhancin g th e autonom y o f th e Eas t European countries , was nomi nal a t best . Reiteratio n o f th e principles o f sovereig n equalit y an d inviol ability o f frontier s offere d n o greate r guarante e o f securit y tha n th e U N Charter, althoug h i t wa s noteworth y tha t a Warsa w Pac t member , Ro mania, argue d successfull y fo r inclusio n o f th e righ t t o neutralit y an d o f the prohibitio n o f interventio n i n states ' interna l affair s "regardles s o f their mutua l relations. " Bu t th e firs t tentativ e ste p wa s take n t o reduc e the feasibilit y o f surpris e attac k i n th e "confidence-buildin g measures " (CBMs) enumerate d i n Basket I . The mos t importan t CB M wa s th e obligator y notification , a t leas t twenty-one day s i n advance , o f majo r militar y maneuver s exceedin g a total o f 25,00 0 troops . In th e cas e o f th e Sovie t Union, thi s requiremen t was limite d t o a depth o f 250 kilometer s fro m it s European borders . Th e invitation o f observer s an d othe r CBM s addressin g smaller-scal e maneu -

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vers an d othe r militar y movement s wer e discretionary . B y th e en d o f 1983, NAT O ha d give n du e notificatio n o f twenty-seve n majo r maneu vers, an d th e Warsa w Pac t o f eighteen . Agains t th e backgroun d o f th e Solidarity crisis , notificatio n wa s give n o f tw o larg e Warsa w Pac t exer cises i n th e regio n i n Jul y an d Septembe r 1980 , thoug h observer s wer e not invited . Ther e wa s n o adequat e notificatio n o f th e Zapa d 8 1 exer cise, sponsore d b y th e Sovie t Unio n an d hel d i n th e Byelorussia n an d Baltic areas in September 1981. 7 Thus, the Helsinki CBM s were not full y respected an d di d no t materiall y imped e th e Warsa w Pac t fro m puttin g military pressur e o n Poland . The voluntary CB M of encouraging contac t between militar y personne l le d t o visit s b y a delegatio n fro m th e U.S . National Defens e Universit y t o Hungar y an d Romani a i n Marc h 198 1 and b y two U.S . naval vessels to Romani a i n June 1982 . In sum , thi s first attemp t a t confidenc e buildin g marginall y increase d the predictabilit y o f majo r militar y activitie s b y th e tw o alliance s bu t offered scan t protectio n t o Eas t European s agains t th e stricture s o f th e Brezhnev Doctrine . Proposals cam e fro m Franc e i n 197 8 an d fro m th e Warsa w Pac t i n March 197 9 fo r th e expansio n o f CBM s i n th e contex t o f a conferenc e on disarmamen t i n Europ e (CDE) . Afte r it s initia l experienc e wit h th e geographically limite d MBF R (mutua l an d balance d forc e reduction ) talks (se e below) , th e Unite d State s questione d th e utilit y o f a CDE , bu t the Carte r administratio n helpe d develo p a NAT O proposa l an d Presi dent Reaga n assente d i n principle t o a CDE as part o f the CSC E process. The grandl y name d Conferenc e o n Confidenc e an d Security-Buildin g Measures an d Disarmamen t i n Europ e wa s convene d i n Stockhol m i n January 1984 . Circumstance s wer e no t propitious : Soviet-America n arm s negotiations i n Genev a ha d broke n down , an d NATO , afte r muc h offi cial an d publi c debate , wa s deployin g Cruis e an d Pershin g missile s t o counter th e threat o f th e Sovie t SS-2 0 devices. Nonetheless, th e agreemen t reache d i n Stockhol m i n Septembe r 198 6 achieved som e tangibl e results , probabl y th e mos t importan t o f whic h was th e commitmen t b y th e participant s t o "refrai n fro m th e threa t o r use o f forc e i n thei r relation s wit h an y state , regardles s o f tha t state' s political, social , economic o r cultura l syste m an d irrespectiv e o f whethe r or no t the y maintai n wit h tha t Stat e relation s o f alliance. " Thi s articl e 14 o f th e agreemen t wa s pointedl y highlighte d b y th e Romanians , an d indeed it s formulatio n challenge d th e legitimac y o f th e Brezhne v Doc -

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trine o f limite d sovereignt y mor e explicitl y tha n ha d th e Fina l Act . Moreover, articl e 1 6 stresse d tha t noncomplianc e "constitute s a viola tion o f internationa l law. " Th e agreement' s othe r provisions , fo r obser vation an d challeng e inspections , enhanced th e stabilit y o f mutua l deter rence bu t offere d scan t protectio n agains t Warsa w Pac t polic e actions . At best , commente d th e U.S . delegate t o th e CDE , th e agreemen t raise d the political cos t of foreig n intervention. 8 In an y case , suc h internationa l commitment s di d no t necessaril y supersede dogma , fo r a s a n authoritativ e Sovie t theoris t ha d writte n i n 1968, "in the Marxist conception , the norms of law, including the norm s governing relation s amon g socialis t countries , cannot b e interpreted i n a narrowly forma l way , outsid e th e general contex t o f th e clas s struggle i n the present-day world." 9 "Fo r us, " observed Brezhne v t o th e Czechoslo vak Politbur o afte r th e 196 8 invasion , "th e result s o f Worl d Wa r I I ar e inviolable, an d w e wil l defen d the m eve n a t th e cos t o f riskin g a ne w war." 1 0 No r di d th e Helsink i Fina l Ac t dete r th e Warsaw Pact' s chie f o f staff, Genera l Serge i Shtemenko , fro m reiteratin g tha t a principa l func tion o f th e allianc e wa s t o offe r "fraterna l assistance " i n defens e o f socialism.11 CBM s an d affirmation s o f inviolabl e sovereignty , therefore , would no t constitut e a n effectiv e deterren t unti l the y too k precedenc e over the ideological rationale s asserte d b y the Kremlin . Gorbachev Discards the Brezhnev Doctrine. Thes e rationale s bega n to weake n unde r Gorbachev' s "ne w thinking " i n foreig n policy . O n th e occasion o f th e Bolshevik Revolution' s 70t h anniversary , h e declared : The tim e o f th e Cominter n an d th e Cominform , an d eve n th e tim e o f bindin g international conferences , i s past. Bu t th e internationa l Communis t movemen t continues t o exist . Al l th e partie s ar e completel y an d irreversibl y independent . We talked abou t thi s a s fa r bac k a s th e 20t h Congress . True, w e did no t fre e ourselves o f ol d habit s a t once . However, no w thi s i s an immutabl e reality . In this sense, the 27th CPSU Congress was also a final and irrevocable landmark. 12 Although Gorbache v neve r referre d explicitl y t o th e Brezhne v Doctrine , his repeate d assurance s clearl y addresse d th e substanc e i f no t th e West ern labe l o f tha t policy . The Soviet-Yugosla v declaratio n o f Marc h 198 9 invoked th e sam e principle, an d a t th e Buchares t summi t o f th e Warsa w Pact i n July , Gorbache v affirme d tha t socialis t pluralis m ha d interna tional a s wel l a s domesti c validity : th e severa l Communis t partie s wer e

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totally independen t an d fre e t o accommodat e nationa l circumstance s ("without outsid e interference, " sai d th e communique ) an d t o lear n from eac h othe r t o produc e "unit y i n diversity." 13 An d in his speech t o the Counci l o f Europ e h e had stresse d tha t th e concep t o f a "commo n European home " rule d ou t th e threa t o r us e of forc e withi n a s wel l a s between alliances . It i s doubtful tha t Gorbache v full y anticipate d th e consequences o f a more permissiv e polic y towar d Easter n Europe . H e blame d th e crisi s in the syste m no t on socialism bu t on mistakes b y previous Sovie t and Eas t European part y leaderships . Th e possibilit y tha t som e rulin g partie s might voluntaril y surrende r th e leadin g rol e prescribe d b y Leni n struc k at a fundamenta l principl e o f Sovie t socialism . Ye t Moscow sanctione d that surrende r b y the Polish part y i n the summer o f 1989 , when on e of Gorbachev's associates , Yevgeny Primakov , state d tha t "thi s i s entirely a matter t o be decided b y Poland." 14 Gorbachev's ne w loo k wa s fraugh t wit h uncertaint y abou t th e com patibility o f th e divers e objective s o f Sovie t security , regiona l economi c revival, and a socialist pluralism tha t rapidl y transgresse d th e ideological boundaries o f Marxism-Leninism. I t remained, moreover , a t least partl y contingent o n Gorbachev' s succes s i n th e domesti c sphere . Bu t afte r a few year s o f his reign, America' s Kremlinologist s wer e comin g to believ e that perestroika was , i n Brzezinski' s words , a "massive , monumenta l transformation." 15 B y the autumn o f 198 9 the administration ha d over come it s skepticism , a s Secretar y o f Stat e Bake r allowe d tha t "i t woul d be foll y indee d t o mis s thi s opportunity " t o respon d t o th e dramati c changes in Soviet policy. 16 A yea r earlier , Kissinge r ha d advance d th e suggestio n tha t th e Wes t offer Mosco w a pledg e o f noninterventio n i n Easter n Europ e i n ex change fo r a Sovie t promis e t o allo w liberalizatio n t o occu r a t it s own pace. 17 But such a scheme smacked o f a superpower spheres-of-influenc e approach, a t odds wit h th e pluralistic spiri t o f the Helsinki process . The United State s coul d hardl y affor d t o reneg e o n it s interes t i n Easter n Europe's emancipatio n a t th e ver y momen t whe n th e prospec t o f self determination presente d itself . In the event, the administration's cautiou s and deliberatel y low-keye d reactio n t o th e Eas t Europea n revolution s served th e sam e end , to reassur e th e Soviet s tha t th e Unite d State s wa s not inten t o n fomentin g turbulenc e i n thei r sphere . Gorbachev' s mos t radical departur e fro m establishe d polic y wa s th e implici t vie w tha t

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Soviet securit y wa s bette r serve d b y a les s hegemoni c relationshi p wit h the Eas t Europea n buffe r zone . Objectively , thos e countrie s ha d becom e unproductive assets—indebte d t o th e West , heav y consumer s o f Sovie t energy repai d wit h low-qualit y products , politically restive , and o f ques tionable militar y value . Hi s initia l conceptio n wa s no t divestmen t bu t rather th e creation o f an economically mor e productive, more pluralistic , but stil l socialis t community . The rapi d eclips e o f Communis t powe r i n Easter n Europ e cam e a s a surprise tha t th e Gorbache v regim e accommodate d b y turnin g necessit y into a virtue . Addressin g th e Sovie t legislatur e o n Octobe r 23 , 1989 , Foreign Ministe r Shevardnadz e reflecte d o n th e "historic , qualitativ e changes" i n Easter n Europe : "New , alternativ e force s ar e enterin g th e political aren a i n som e o f thes e countries . N o on e i s bringin g the m in . They aris e becaus e th e peopl e wan t them. " Th e Kremlin , h e asserted , was undisturbed , indee d sympathetic . Fo r goo d measure , Shevardnadz e conceded tha t th e Sovie t interventio n i n Afghanista n ha d "violate d th e norms of proper behavior " an d Sovie t law. 18 Respectin g Eastern Europe , said hi s spokesma n Gennad i Gerasimov , "w e no w hav e th e Fran k Sina tra doctrine . H e ha s a song , ' I ha d [sic ] i t m y way. ' S o ever y countr y decides o n it s own whic h roa d t o take." 1 9 The communiqu e issuin g fro m th e Warsa w Pac t foreig n ministers ' meeting i n th e Polis h capita l o n Octobe r 2 7 (th e firs t suc h meetin g chaired b y a non-Communist ) terme d a s essentia l th e "righ t o f ever y nation t o independen t decision-makin g abou t it s . . . roa d t o social , political an d economi c development , withou t outsid e interference." 20 A fe w week s later , Gerasimo v spelle d i t out : "Th e Brezhne v Doctrin e is dead." 2 1 An d i n December , wit h th e irreconcilabl e Czechoslova k re gime finall y ou t o f th e way , th e origina l Warsa w Pac t invader s officiall y made amend s fo r th e 196 8 intervention . Tha t invasion , sai d th e de claration introduce d b y Gorbachev , ha d "interrupte d th e proces s o f democratic renewal" ; i t constitute d "interferenc e i n th e interna l affair s of Czechoslovaki a an d mus t b e condemned." 22 Th e popula r moo d i n Moscow favore d th e surrende r o f empire , fo r a surve y reveale d tha t large majoritie s di d no t wan t th e Sovie t Unio n t o imped e a n Eas t Euro pean country' s decisio n t o leav e th e Warsa w Pac t o r th e CMEA , o r t o adopt a marke t economy. 23 "I t i s clear, " sai d U.S . Defens e Secretar y Dick Cheney , tha t th e likelihoo d o f all-ou t conflic t betwee n th e Unite d States an d th e Sovie t Union , betwee n NAT O an d th e Warsa w Pact , i s

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3

probably lowe r no w tha n i t has bee n a t an y tim e sinc e the en d o f Worl d War II." 2 4 There wer e som e dissentin g voices . The conservativ e Yego r Ligache v questioned Gorbachev' s notio n tha t peacefu l coexistenc e take s prece dence over th e international clas s struggle, an d h e as well a s some Sovie t generals grumble d ominousl y abou t th e "collaps e o f th e Socialis t camp " in Easter n Europe . Characterizin g pas t Sovie t behavio r towar d th e re gion a s "violenc e t o history , democracy , tradition s . . . an d commo n sense," Foreign Ministe r Shevardnadz e retorte d tha t Sovie t securit y wa s better serve d b y a n Easter n Europ e fre e o f communis m tha n on e wher e the USSR maintained unpopula r regime s b y force. 25 Th e tendenc y t o de ideologize relation s with Easter n Europ e was apparentl y becomin g dom inant i n Soviet policy . Gorbachev's renunciatio n o f th e Brezhne v Doctrin e an d hi s evocatio n of a "commo n Europea n home " invite d Wester n diplomati c initiative s to enhanc e th e Eas t Europeans ' autonom y an d attenuat e th e divisio n o f the continen t withou t destabilizin g th e existin g framewor k o f Europea n security. Muc h o f th e requisit e polic y adjustmen t ha d t o com e fro m th e Soviet Union, which , i n Walt Rostow' s words , "woul d hav e to decid e t o accept a balanc e o f powe r rathe r tha n a n hegemoni c solutio n t o it s legitimate securit y interes t i n Easter n Europe ; tha t is , a solution guaran teeing that n o othe r majo r powe r dominate s Eastern Europe , rather tha n Soviet dominatio n o f th e region." 26 Bu t th e Unite d State s an d it s allie s also face d th e challenge s o f geopolitica l transformation—o f redefinin g the conditions o f their military security , addressing the complex proble m of Germany , an d nurturin g th e reintegratio n o f th e Easter n countrie s into a democratic community . Military Disengagement. Th e earl y militarizatio n o f containmen t pro vided a bulwar k behin d whic h Wester n Europ e coul d rebuil d it s eco nomic an d politica l self-confidence . Th e Wester n alliance' s strategie s were drive n principall y b y a chroni c sens e o f militar y vulnerability , an d only secondaril y b y political fear s o f Soviet-induce d procommunis m an d neutralism. Eas t o f th e iro n curtain , th e Warsaw Pac t assure d th e Sovie t Union's militar y a s wel l a s ideologica l security . Crise s suc h a s th e Hun garian revolutio n demonstrate d th e tenuou s popula r legitimac y o f Mos cow's client regimes, and eve n as a degree of military stabilit y was forge d by th e tw o alliances , ther e remaine d a glarin g asymmetr y i n thei r mem -

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bers' fundamenta l politica l stability . Sovie t militar y forc e wa s th e essen tial guarante e o f Communis t rul e i n Easter n Europe , an d th e Wes t ha d little expectatio n tha t thi s forc e coul d b e dislodge d withou t ris k t o it s own safety , le t alone to Sovie t influence i n the region . The optio n o f militar y disengagemen t i n Europ e enjoye d littl e cur rency i n col d wa r Washington , thoug h Eisenhowe r an d Dulle s toye d with i t i n Septembe r 195 3 (se e chapter 2) . Four year s later , Khrushche v evoked th e possibilit y o f a phased , mutua l withdrawal , an d Polis h For eign Ministe r Ada m Rapack i propose d a nuclear-fre e zon e i n Centra l Europe. Georg e Kennan , Walter Lippmann , an d th e British Labou r lead ers Hug h Gaitskel l an d Deni s Heale y amon g other s urge d th e Wes t t o explore th e optio n o f negotiatin g th e withdrawa l o f foreig n force s fro m Germany an d Easter n Europ e a s a conditio n o f Germa n unificatio n an d satellite self-determination . Bu t i n Washingto n th e vie w prevaile d tha t the Soviet s woul d no t willingl y ris k th e politica l statu s qu o i n thei r sphere b y removin g th e militar y cemen t o f empire , an d tha t withou t a favorable change , partial militar y disengagemen t woul d onl y weaken th e American componen t o f th e West' s defenses . Th e conventiona l wisdo m was reflecte d i n Dea n Acheson' s observatio n tha t " I canno t fo r th e lif e of me see how th e movement towar d a greater degre e of national identit y in Easter n Europ e i s furthere d b y removin g fro m th e continen t th e onl y power capabl e o f opposin g th e Soviet Union." 27 In Jul y 1957 , th e Unite d States , Britain , France , an d Wes t German y issued th e "Berli n Declaration, " proposin g fre e unificatio n o f th e tw o Germanys an d securit y guarantee s fo r th e Sovie t Unio n an d it s allie s i f the reunite d German y chos e t o joi n NATO . Thi s purel y toke n gestur e was mor e noteworth y fo r th e implici t relegatio n o f Easter n Europ e t o a Soviet spher e tha n fo r it s positive terms , which wer e no t expecte d t o b e acceptable t o th e Sovie t Union. The neutralize d German y an d weakene d NATO sough t b y th e Russian s wer e equall y unacceptabl e t o th e West . Khrushchev intensifie d hi s driv e t o consolidat e th e statu s quo , callin g i n 1958 fo r a general Germa n peac e treaty guaranteein g th e separate statu s of th e Federa l Republic , th e GDR , an d Wes t Berlin , an d whe n th e Wes t rejected this , h e provoke d a protracte d crisi s ove r Berlin . Amids t suc h tensions, the questio n o f militar y disengagemen t los t al l immediacy . Although arm s contro l figured o n th e agend a o f detent e diplomac y i n the lat e 1960s , militar y disengagemen t wa s n o longe r a Sovie t priority . Brezhnev's objectiv e fo r detent e i n Europ e wa s primaril y political : t o

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legitimate th e Eas t Europea n statu s quo , abov e al l b y securin g recogni tion o f th e GDR , an d the n t o normaliz e relation s wit h th e West Europe ans, abov e al l wit h th e Federa l Republic , i n orde r t o obtai n economi c benefits an d loose n the ties between th e two pillars of NATO. Reciproca l military disengagemen t hel d les s attraction fo r th e Kremlin, which some what paradoxically feare d tha t significan t America n retrenchmen t woul d stimulate expansio n o f Wes t European , an d especiall y Bundeswehr , re sources; moreover , th e Pragu e Sprin g ha d confirme d tha t a Sovie t mili tary presenc e wa s neede d t o maintai n politica l orde r i n Easter n Europe . Brezhnev's politica l desig n wa s serve d b y th e reversa l o f a twenty-year old Wes t Germa n polic y when , i n 1969 , Will y Brand t discarde d th e Hallstein Doctrin e an d move d t o acknowledg e th e divisio n o f Germany . The long-sough t Europea n securit y conference , i n th e Kremlin' s scheme , would symbolicall y sea l the political statu s quo . Instead, th e impetu s fo r conventiona l arm s reductio n talk s no w cam e from th e West , an d fo r reason s tha t ha d nothin g t o d o wit h Easter n Europe. Th e Atlanti c allianc e wa s sufferin g fro m discor d betwee n th e Americans an d th e other s ove r th e desirabl e pac e o f detent e an d ove r burden sharing . Senato r Mik e Mansfiel d ha d bee n introducin g resolu tions sinc e 196 6 callin g fo r a substantia l reductio n i n th e U.S . militar y presence i n Europe , an d publi c a s well a s congressional suppor t fo r suc h a unilatera l initiativ e wa s growing . Th e Harme l report , approve d b y NATO i n Decembe r 1967 , adde d th e tas k o f furtherin g detent e t o th e alliance's basi c functio n o f assurin g deterrence . NAT O bega n t o stud y the optio n o f mutua l forc e reduction s an d conveye d a specifi c proposa l to th e Warsa w Pac t i n 1970 . Th e Pact , meanwhile , steppe d u p it s cam paign fo r a European securit y conference , beginnin g with a "Declaratio n on Strengthenin g Peac e an d Securit y i n Europe " issue d i n Buchares t i n July 1966 . The MBFR Talks. Fo r Kissinger , th e mai n purpos e o f talk s o n MBF R was t o undercu t th e politica l appea l o f Senato r Mansfield' s proposa l t o halve th e America n militar y contingen t i n Europe . Fortuitously , a t th e 24th CPS U Congres s i n Marc h 1971 , Brezhne v cam e ou t i n favo r o f such talk s and , i n Kissinger' s rendition , "save d ou r whol e Europea n defense structur e fro m Congressiona l savaging." 28 Th e comple x linkag e between Sovie t ai d fo r peac e i n Vietnam , th e Germa n treatie s an d th e Berlin agreement , th e CSCE , an d MBF R bor e fruit , an d a t thei r 197 2

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summit, Nixo n an d Brezhne v agree d o n launchin g th e tw o multilatera l conferences. The preparatory meeting s fo r MBF R bega n a t Vienna o n January 31 , 1973. Th e are a covere d b y th e talk s wa s t o b e Centra l Europe , define d as th e tw o Germanys , Czechoslovakia , an d Poland . Th e Pentago n an d other allie s ha d wante d t o includ e Hungar y (whic h wa s kee n t o partici pate), bu t Kissinge r apparentl y ha d alread y concede d it s exclusion , an d in an y cas e NAT O woul d no t agre e t o th e qui d pr o qu o o f includin g Italy. 29 Othe r issue s tha t coul d no t b e resolve d a t th e preparator y talk s included th e conflic t ove r balanced , meanin g asymmetrical , reduction s that woul d tak e int o accoun t th e superio r numerica l strengt h o f th e Warsaw Pac t versus proportional, o r equal , decreases . The forma l MBF R conferenc e opene d i n October , an d althoug h a succession o f proposal s an d counterproposal s narrowe d som e o f th e gaps, i t becam e mire d i n technicalities . Whe n th e Warsa w Pac t i n Jun e 1976 finally presented th e essential basi c figures on troop numbers , thes e fell shor t b y som e 157,00 0 o f th e NAT O estimate s fo r groun d forces . The Soviet s explanatio n tha t th e NAT O estimate s include d serviceme n whose tasks i n the West were performed b y nonuniformed personne l di d not en d th e controversy , an d difference s persiste d ove r nationa l ceiling s and inspectio n an d verificatio n measures . When i n Octobe r 197 9 Brezh nev announce d th e unilatera l withdrawa l o f 20,00 0 Sovie t troop s an d 1,000 tank s fro m th e GDR , NAT O wa s unabl e t o verify th e claim. 30 The MBF R circu s survive d th e shoc k o f Afghanistan , an d th e Sovie t Union di d no t wal k ou t a s it later would fro m th e STAR T an d IN F talk s in 1983 , bu t persisten t disagreemen t ove r th e dat a bas e turne d i t int o a sterile diplomati c exercise . The Warsaw Pac t was modernizing it s forces , and NAT O cam e t o fea r tha t "stabilization " coul d diminis h it s ow n defensive capabilities. 31 Franc e ha d argue d fro m th e outse t tha t mean ingful disarmamen t negotiation s ha d t o encompas s th e continent , fro m the Atlantic to the Urals . Nor wa s MBF R linke d i n Wester n strateg y t o politica l chang e i n Eastern Europe , althoug h th e Stat e Department' s repor t t o Congres s o n policy toward tha t regio n mad e passing reference t o "seriou s pursuit " o f the Vienna talks. 32 In th e end , th e Solidarit y challeng e ha d bee n crushe d without Sovie t arme d intervention , bu t th e threa t o f invasio n remaine d the ultimat e guarante e o f th e socialis t commonwealth' s integrity . Th e

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modest objective s o f MBF R di d no t promis e t o materiall y weake n tha t threat. Most o f th e Eas t Europea n regimes , no t t o spea k o f thei r subjects , were mor e eage r tha n Brezhnev' s Kremli n fo r detent e an d arm s control . Honecker an d Czec h leade r Gusta v Husa k perhap s derive d som e sens e of securit y fro m th e Sovie t militar y presence , bu t th e other s preferre d t o follow a pat h t o legitimac y an d modernizatio n les s constraine d b y th e military burde n an d othe r stricture s impose d b y th e Sovie t Unio n i n th e name o f security . In Western ranks , too, impatience sprea d a t th e glacia l progress o f militar y detente . I n 1982 , a n internationa l commissio n chaire d by Olo f Palm e issue d a "Blueprin t fo r Survival " callin g fo r sweeping , all-European disarmamen t talks . A ke y advise r t o Wes t Germa n Socia l Democratic chancellors , Ego n Bahr , appende d a proposa l fo r th e with drawal o f al l foreig n nuclea r weapons , th e securin g o f a n approximat e balance o f NAT O an d Warsa w Pac t conventiona l forces , and , i n th e interest o f stability , fo r leavin g th e tw o allianc e system s "wit h thei r obligations an d guarantees " unaltered. 33 An d NATO' s maverick , France , continued t o agitat e fo r pan-Europea n arm s contro l talks . Th e restless ness an d voluntaris m o f th e allies cause d politica l a s wel l a s diplomati c headaches in Washington, an d when i n July 198 6 they reacted negativel y to th e punitiv e U.S . bombin g rai d o n Libya , th e Senat e onc e agai n threatened t o withdraw America n force s fro m Europe . Dissension withi n th e alliance s bor e littl e promis e o f overcomin g th e political divisio n o f Europe . Th e Eas t Europea n regime s sough t normal ization o f commercia l an d othe r links , no t th e surrende r o f socialism . Western government s wer e als o leer y o f tamperin g wit h th e politica l status quo . Thei r securit y depende d o n th e substantia l weigh t o f th e Bundeswehr (al l th e mor e i f th e Unite d State s reduce d it s commitment) , and th e recurrin g spectr e o f a unifie d an d perhap s neutra l German y consternated th e Europea n allies . Th e defens e an d arm s establishment s also ha d a n interes t i n th e preservatio n o f th e statu s quo . Unles s funda mental chang e cam e abou t i n th e Sovie t system , whic h n o one , Eas t o r West, expected , th e continue d divisio n o f Europ e seeme d t o serv e th e dominant interests . Gorbachev's Diplomatic Offensive. Gorbachev' s adven t upset the fun damental immobilit y o f thi s calculus o f stabilit y an d security . The Atlan -

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tic alliance's complacenc y wa s shaken b y the Reagan-Gorbachev summi t in Reykjavi k i n Octobe r 1986 , which pave d th e wa y fo r th e eliminatio n of IN F (land-based , intermediate-range ) missile s an d wa s followe d b y the Sovie t leader' s "double-zero " proposa l t o eliminat e shorter-rang e nuclear missile s a s well . In NATO' s deterrenc e strategy , thes e weapon s served t o offse t th e Warsa w Pact' s conventiona l superiority . Withou t them, th e conventiona l imbalanc e demande d remed y throug h eithe r Western conventiona l rearmamen t o r negotiated , asymmetrica l reduc tions. Most Wester n analyst s focuse d o n th e risk s o f a denuclearize d con frontation, an d on e Wes t Germa n conclude d i n 198 7 tha t "i t currentl y seems unrealisti c t o desig n arm s contro l scheme s tha t woul d chang e fundamentally th e existin g internationa l political-militar y orde r i n Eu rope." 34 Others , includin g th e forme r America n diploma t Willia m Luers , evoked th e potential benefit s fo r Easter n Europe' s politica l autonom y o f substantial reduction s i n regiona l nuclea r an d conventiona l forces , par ticularly thos e o f th e superpowers. 35 Brzezinsk i steppe d u p hi s advocac y of suc h reduction s couple d wit h a Europeanizatio n o f th e West' s defen ses, an d h e suggeste d a Centra l Europea n tank-fre e zon e tha t coul d lessen th e militar y threa t t o peacefu l politica l chang e i n Easter n Eu rope. 36 Th e mor e orthodo x strategist s i n Washingto n continue d t o dis parage scheme s tha t migh t sen d th e wron g messag e t o th e Europea n allies regarding th e American perceptio n o f threat . Gorbachev underscore d th e growin g irrelevanc e o f th e stalle d MBF R talks whe n o n Apri l 18 , 198 6 i n Eas t Berli n h e invite d negotiatio n o n the reductio n o f tactica l nuclea r a s well a s conventiona l force s fro m th e Atlantic t o th e Urals . Th e Warsa w Pact' s Budapes t appea l o n Jun e 1 1 elaborated o n th e offer , an d i n Septembe r a t th e U N Foreig n Ministe r Shevardnadze asserte d tha t "w e woul d generall y no t wan t ou r troop s t o be presen t anywher e beyon d ou r nationa l borders." 3 7 The developmen t of a Wester n respons e wa s hampere d b y divergen t perspective s o n th e appropriate foru m fo r suc h talks . France , a s before , preferre d th e pan European CD E forma t t o a n alliance-to-allianc e conference , partl y o n the calculatio n tha t suc h a settin g migh t allo w th e Eas t European s t o play a mor e independen t role , althoug h th e Stockhol m experienc e al lowed littl e optimis m i n this respect . The U.S . preference fo r a restricte d forum independen t o f th e CSC E proces s wa s mor e representativ e o f

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NATO views , an d th e alliance' s Brussel s declaratio n o f Decembe r 1 1 called fo r NATO-Warsa w Pac t talk s o n "conventiona l stability " a s well as the extension o f CD E talks o n confidence-buildin g measures . Nevertheless, th e potentia l leverag e i n linkin g securit y t o huma n right s militated i n favo r o f th e CSC E framework , an d b y Jun e 198 7 NAT O had devise d a compromis e puttin g bot h set s o f talk s (wha t wa s the n labeled th e Conventiona l Stabilit y Talks , o r CST , involvin g NAT O an d the Warsa w Pact , an d th e broade r CDE ) i n tha t context . Gorbachev' s diplomatic offensiv e wa s winnin g convert s no t onl y i n Europ e bu t als o in th e Unite d States , wher e Senato r Sa m Nun n propose d a 5 0 percen t cut i n U.S . and Sovie t force s i n Centra l Europ e t o reduc e th e chance s o f a "short-warnin g attack, " an d Senato r Bil l Bradle y declare d tha t "i f reform continue s i n the Soviet Union I believe we can cut U.S. and Sovie t conventional force s i n Centra l Europ e an d indee d nuclea r weapons , b y more tha n anyon e ha s bee n prepared t o tal k abou t unti l now. " 38 The issu e of Western securit y necessaril y overshadowe d th e uncertai n calculations o f politica l benefit s i n Easter n Europe , bu t a s th e mos t enthusiastic advocat e o f detente , Wes t Germa n Foreig n Ministe r Hans Dietrich Genscher , observe d i n February 1987 , "If ther e is a chance that , after 4 0 year s o f confrontation , ther e woul d b e a turnin g poin t i n East West relations , it would b e a mistake o f histori c proportions t o let it sli p away becaus e o f habit s o f though t whic h expec t onl y th e wors t fo r th e Soviet Union." 39 Indeed, NAT O approache d th e ne w Atlantic-to-Ural s talk s wit h con ditioned skepticism , aimin g a t stabilizatio n (tha t is , th e reductio n o f asymmetries, particularl y i n armore d forces ) rathe r tha n majo r cut backs. 40 A Pentagon repor t o n long-term strategy , entitled "Discriminat e Deterrence" an d presente d t o Presiden t Reaga n i n January 1988 , antici pated tha t th e Sovie t Unio n woul d develo p smalle r bu t mor e effectiv e military force s an d advocate d preparatio n fo r "discriminatin g nuclea r responses" (notabl y b y Franc e an d Britain ) a s wel l a s a retaliator y an d offensive conventiona l capabilit y b y NAT O i n keepin g wit h th e FOF A plan. Thi s ne w versio n o f flexibl e respons e di d no t alleviat e th e malais e within th e alliance , whic h wa s alread y ren t b y a n American-Wes t Ger man disput e ove r modernizatio n o f NATO' s tactica l nuclea r arsenal ; President Mitterran d remarke d tha t i f Sovie t troop s reache d Bonn , i t would b e too lat e to use France's nuclea r weapons. 41

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The Road to CFE. A t it s Marc h 198 8 meeting , th e Nort h Atlanti c Council declare d tha t sinc e the Sovie t Union ha d no t relaxe d it s militar y effort an d ha d deploye d fa r greate r militar y force s tha n wer e require d for it s defense , credibl e deterrenc e require d a n "appropriat e mi x o f adequate an d effectiv e nuclea r an d conventiona l forces " an d th e contin ued presenc e o f suc h America n force s i n Europe. The declaratio n sough t "security an d stabilit y a t lowe r level s o f armaments " an d "graduall y t o overcome th e unnatura l divisio n o f th e Europea n continent , whic h af fects mos t directl y th e Germa n people " an d explicitl y linke d arm s con trol t o huma n rights. 42 I n November , NAT O release d a repor t o n th e Warsaw Pact' s conventiona l militar y advantage , whic h i t appraise d a t 51,500 mai n battl e tank s compare d t o NATO' s 16,400 , 8,25 0 comba t aircraft vs . 4,000 , an d mor e tha n 3 millio n troop s vs . NATO' s 2. 2 million. 43 In th e event , NATO' s pruden t an d grudgin g respons e allowe d it s adversaries t o monopoliz e th e diplomatic limelight b y escalating propos als and unilatera l concessions . In May 1987 , Poland's Genera l Jaruzelsk i advanced a pla n fo r gradua l withdrawa l o f nuclea r an d conventiona l weapons fro m Denmar k an d Hungar y a s wel l a s th e MBF R zone . Th e following February , Czechoslovakia' s Milo s Jake s propose d a "zon e o f confidence" betwee n th e two alliances ; in June 1988 , the Poles reiterate d the Jaruzelsk i Plan ; an d i n July , a join t workin g grou p o f th e Wes t German SP D an d th e Eas t Germa n SE D advance d a simila r proposal . Meanwhile, Sovie t an d America n inspector s wer e busil y supervisin g th e removal an d destructio n o f missile s (86 7 America n an d 1,83 6 Sovie t devices, includin g thos e i n Eas t German y an d Czechoslovakia ) an d launchers covere d b y the IN F agreement . At th e Unite d Nations , o n Decembe r 7 , 1988 , Gorbache v onc e agai n stole a marc h o n NAT O b y announcin g tha t th e Sovie t Unio n woul d over tw o year s reduc e it s arme d force s b y 500,00 0 soldiers . Nearl y hal f of thi s cu t a s wel l a s eliminatio n o f 10,00 0 tanks , 8,50 0 guns , an d 80 0 combat aircraf t wa s t o com e i n th e are a wes t o f th e Urals , involvin g specifically si x armore d division s (50,00 0 soldier s an d 5,00 0 tanks ) i n Czechoslovakia, Eas t Germany , an d Hungary . Althoug h th e propose d measures mad e onl y a smal l den t i n Sovie t militar y capability , the y caused th e resignatio n o f th e Sovie t chie f o f staff , Marsha l Serge i Akh romeyev, wh o ha d oppose d unilatera l cuts . I t al l adde d u p t o les s tha n 10 percent o f th e formidabl e Sovie t presence i n the area. 44

Security Structures 3 2

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All o f th e lesse r Warsa w Pac t member s excep t Romani a promptl y followed suit , eac h announcin g cut s o f aroun d te n thousan d i n troo p strength an d i n defens e budget s rangin g fro m 4 percen t i n Polan d t o 1 7 percent i n Hungary . Fro m NATO' s defensiv e perspective , th e roughl y 6 percent reductio n o f th e Warsa w Pact' s combine d strengt h i n Easter n Europe (1,677,10 0 Sovie t an d indigenou s troops ) di d no t g o fa r towar d eliminating th e imbalance , particularl y regardin g armor . Th e Interna tional Institut e fo r Strategi c Studie s nevertheles s conclude d tha t th e So viet unilatera l withdrawals , whe n completed , woul d rul e ou t th e possi bility o f a surprise attack. 45 Trimming defens e budget s mad e sens e fo r th e falterin g Sovie t an d East European economies , as did the recasting o f their militar y establish ments i n a leaner an d modernize d mold . Bu t even the modes t beginning s of Sovie t withdrawal wer e welcome d b y the mor e reformis t regime s an d by population s tha t realisticall y regarde d th e Soviet s a s occupier s an d regional policeme n rathe r tha n a s defenders . A t leas t i n Hungary , th e leadership openl y anticipate d th e eventua l complet e withdrawa l o f So viet troops . "Th e presenc e o f Sovie t troops, " sai d a part y officia l i n September 1988 , "i s no t a fundamenta l conditio n o f ou r externa l an d internal security. " An d part y chairma n Resz o Nyer s reporte d afte r a visit wit h Gorbache v tha t "w e cam e t o a n agreemen t i n principl e tha t the troop s reduction s mus t b e continued , an d that , dependin g o n th e international situation , thi s proces s migh t b e carrie d ou t t o th e ver y end." 4 6 The CSC E revie w conferenc e i n Vienn a cam e t o a n en d o n Januar y 19, 1989 . Foreig n Ministe r Shevardnadze , belaborin g th e metaphor , commented tha t i t ha d "shake n u p th e Iro n Curtain , weakene d it s rust y supports, mad e ne w breache s i n i t an d hastene d it s corrosion." 47 A fe w days late r th e MBF R talk s receive d thei r epitaph , makin g wa y fo r th e opening o n Marc h 9 o f th e new , twenty-three-natio n "negotiation s o n conventional arme d force s i n Europe, " o r CFE , NAT O havin g surren dered it s "stability " leitmotif . NATO' s openin g positio n focuse d o n main battl e tanks , armore d personne l carriers , an d artillery , callin g fo r equal ceiling s tha t woul d requir e cut s o f ove r 5 0 percent b y the Warsa w Pact an d 1 0 percen t b y th e Wes t a s wel l a s nationa l an d geographica l sublimits. The Soviet counterproposal envisage d large r cut s and include d missiles, comba t aircraft , an d personnel . A t Strasbour g i n July , Gor bachev wa s a t hi s cajolin g bes t i n callin g fo r reduction s i n al l categorie s

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of weapon s withou t damag e t o th e West' s principl e o f minimu m deter rence. 48 These preliminar y skirmishe s exacerbate d a spli t withi n NAT O ove r the scop e o f CFE , fo r Bon n openl y favore d th e inclusio n o f tactica l nuclear weapons t o forestall th e politically unpopula r replacemen t o f th e obsolescent Lanc e missile . Th e Unite d State s a s wel l a s Franc e an d Britain feare d tha t a mutua l ba n o n short-range , land-base d missile s (o f which th e Sovie t Unio n possesse d fa r mor e tha n NATO ) woul d mak e the defens e o f Europ e largel y dependen t o n th e credibilit y o f th e Ameri can strategi c nuclea r deterren t a s lon g a s ther e remaine d a conventiona l imbalance. Defens e Secretar y Chene y denounce d th e optio n a s a "dan gerous trap, " an d anothe r U.S . officia l disparage d Bonn' s eagernes s a s "grandstanding b y a panic-stricken government." 49 Th e chairman o f th e House Arme d Service s Committee , Le s Aspin , warne d tha t Washingto n might withdra w it s troop s i f Bon n refuse d t o allo w suc h weapon s t o b e based i n West Germany , bu t h e als o urge d NAT O t o b e more flexible i n its option s o n conventiona l forc e cuts. 50 Th e pressur e wa s o n th e Bus h administration t o resolv e th e NAT O disput e an d regai n th e initiativ e i n the realm o f militar y detente . On Ma y 29 , 1989 , a t th e NAT O summi t i n Brussels , Presiden t Bus h expanded th e alliance' s negotiatin g positio n t o includ e land-base d com bat aircraf t an d helicopter s ( a Warsa w Pac t demand ) an d a 2 0 percen t reduction i n U.S . manpowe r i n Europ e (b y 30,000 ) t o 275,000 , a leve l to be matched b y a Soviet cut of som e 325,000 troop s in Eastern Europe , with th e provis o tha t th e withdraw n force s wer e t o b e demobilized . H e added a n "ope n skies " proposa l (recallin g Presiden t Eisenhower' s 195 5 initiative) fo r unrestricte d surveillanc e an d verificatio n o f agree d arm s control measures , a s wel l a s a n accelerate d schedul e fo r th e CF E talk s allowing th e reduction s t o b e implemente d b y 199 2 o r 1993 . Bonn' s concerns wer e appease d b y a n agreemen t t o initiat e talk s o n partia l reduction o f short-rang e missile s (bu t not anothe r zero , stressed Bush) a s soon a s th e CF E talk s ha d produce d agreemen t o n conventiona l forces . The questio n o f a successo r t o th e 8 8 agin g Lanc e launcher s i n Wes t Germany wa s sidestepped , an d ther e wa s n o questio n o f totall y denu clearizing NATO. O n balance , the Bush administratio n chos e wisely an d prudently i n givin g priority t o conventiona l reduction s a t th e expens e o f START and othe r nuclea r negotiations . There remaine d numerou s technica l hurdle s i n th e pat h o f CFE , in -

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volving precis e definition s o f th e affecte d arm s an d aircraft , regiona l ceilings, an d th e "prepositioning " o f arm s fo r reinforcement . Bu t bot h the Unite d State s an d th e Sovie t Unio n wer e displayin g unprecedente d negotiating flexibilit y an d optimis m tha t th e balanc e o f terro r i n Europ e could b e dramaticall y reduce d withou t endangerin g thei r securit y inter ests. The Warsaw Pact Implodes. A s the Soviet-cultivated imag e of a threat ening NAT O faded , s o di d th e cohesio n o f th e Warsa w Pact . I t wa s further undermine d b y th e divergenc e i n attitude s towar d politica l an d economic reform , whic h onl y widene d wit h th e adven t o f perestroika. At th e Jul y 198 9 summi t o f th e Warsa w Pac t i n Bucharest , Gorbache v declared tha t "ther e i s a ne w spiri t withi n th e Warsa w Treaty , wit h moves toward independen t solution s o f nationa l problems, " an d bac k i n Moscow h e tol d a televisio n audienc e tha t "th e Pac t probabl y wil l transform itsel f fro m a military-politica l [alliance ] t o a political-militar y one." Th e Pact' s appea l fo r th e simultaneou s disbandmen t o f th e tw o alliances, beginnin g wit h thei r militar y organizations , ha d bee n fre quently iterate d i n th e past , bu t no w th e manifestation s o f "socialis t pluralism" enhance d it s credibility. 51 Momentarily, a faultline la y between th e rapid move s toward politica l reform o f Polan d an d Hungar y an d th e immobilis m o f th e othe r Eas t European regimes . Whe n a Solidarity-le d coalitio n governmen t wa s i n the makin g i n Poland , fo r example , Ceausesc u reportedl y propose d tha t the Warsa w Pac t interven e t o defen d socialis m i n Poland. 52 In contrast , the Budapest parliamen t i n Septembe r condemne d Hungary' s par t i n th e 1968 invasion o f Czechoslovakia . Allianc e solidarit y wa s furthe r straine d by Hungarian allegation s tha t Romani a pose d a military threa t (becaus e of th e disput e ove r th e mistreatmen t o f th e Hungaria n minority ) an d b y the crisi s involvin g Eas t Germa n refugee s i n Hungary . Ye t b y the en d o f 1989, al l o f th e participant s i n th e suppressio n o f th e Pragu e Spring , including th e Sovie t Union , ha d expresse d thei r regrets , an d al l th e interim government s o f Easter n Europ e professe d a commonalit y o f purpose tha t ha d littl e t o d o wit h th e origina l function s o f th e Warsa w Pact. As far bac k a s the 1960 s Romani a ha d develope d a more autonomou s defense polic y tha n othe r Pac t members , an d som e twent y year s late r national militar y doctrine s bega n t o reemerge in the other Eas t Europea n

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countries a s the y sough t t o recove r thei r freedo m o f action . Reformer s continued t o pa y li p servic e t o th e sanctit y o f th e Warsa w Treat y whil e displaying clearl y independen t tendencies . Th e ne w Polis h foreig n min ister, Krzyszto f Skubiszewski , declare d tha t whil e abidin g b y existin g "international obligations " h e woul d pursu e a "practical " foreig n pol icy, an d a governmen t spokesma n opine d tha t "w e wan t a Europ e o f states tha t ar e sovereig n i n internationa l politic s an d independen t i n internal policy." 53 Driven b y economi c necessit y an d encourage d b y Moscow' s permis siveness, Hungary' s caretake r governmen t announce d a serie s o f unilat eral militar y cutbacks , th e establishmen t o f a demilitarize d "zon e o f security, confidence-buildin g an d cooperation " alon g it s border s wit h Austria an d Yugoslavia , an d th e suspensio n o f part y contro l ove r th e armed forces . Hungary , sai d Genera l Laszl o Borsit s a t th e CF E talks , "no longe r give s priority t o militar y power." 5 4 There wer e othe r sign s o f progres s i n militar y detente . I n Novembe r 1989, Hungar y an d Belgiu m agree d o n a progra m o f close r contact s between thei r militar y establishments . A proposa l fo r suc h bilateral , confidence-building militar y relation s wa s advance d a t th e CF E talks b y France an d Hungar y i n December , th e first join t initiativ e b y member s of th e two alliances . In January 1990 , NATO an d Warsaw Pac t chiefs of staff me t i n Vienn a fo r a three-wee k "militar y doctrin e seminar, " whil e Canada an d Hungar y conducte d a tria l exercis e i n aeria l inspectio n i n anticipation o f th e conferenc e i n Ottaw a o n Presiden t Bush' s ope n skie s initiative to supplemen t CF E verification measures . At th e en d o f 198 9 Budapes t too k th e eve n bolde r ste p o f requestin g withdrawal o f th e remainin g 50,00 0 Sovie t troop s i n Hungary . Report ing o n th e initia l talk s wit h hi s Sovie t counterpart , Prim e Ministe r Mik los Nemet h said , "W e agree d tha t th e stationin g o f Sovie t troop s i s th e result o f full y outdate d politica l an d militar y concept s an d ther e i s n o political o r militar y reaso n t o hav e the m here." 5 5 Simila r negotiation s were initiate d b y th e ne w Czechoslovakia n governmen t fo r th e with drawal o f th e 75,000-stron g Sovie t contingent . Poland' s Wales a ha d also calle d fo r th e remova l o f th e mor e tha n 50,00 0 Sovie t troop s i n hi s country. In earl y 1990 , Mosco w reache d forma l agreemen t wit h Pragu e an d Budapest t o remov e it s troops b y June 1991 , and th e evacuatio n promptl y began. Th e Sovie t Unio n als o starte d unilaterall y t o pul l som e unit s ou t

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of Poland , an d i t close d dow n th e Pact' s operationa l headquarter s a t Legnica. Ou t o f concer n wit h th e Germa n problem , th e Mazowieck i government initiall y resisted domesti c pressures t o follo w Czechoslovak ia's an d Hungary' s lead . I n September , afte r th e agreement s o n Germa n unification an d arm s control , i t was th e Polis h Senate' s tur n t o urg e ful l Soviet evacuatio n an d Poland' s withdrawa l fro m th e militar y structur e of th e Warsaw Pact . The emergenc e o f non-Communis t government s i n Easter n Europ e also affecte d th e institutiona l structur e an d politica l cohesio n o f th e Warsaw Pact . Th e Pact' s nonmilitar y controllin g body , th e Politica l Consultative Committee , ha d bee n compose d o f th e Communis t partie s general secretaries . Wit h thos e parties ' monopol y powe r eliminated , i t would b e compose d o f head s o f stat e o r head s o f government. 56 I n addition, Moscow' s militar y control , enshrine d i n th e 198 0 secre t "stat ute," wa s circumscribe d b y Polish , Hungarian , an d Czechoslovakia n initiatives t o mak e th e operationa l us e of nationa l militar y force s subjec t to parliamentary approval . The democratizatio n o f th e Warsa w Pac t impose d a fundamenta l review o f th e tw o alliances ' militar y doctrines . In th e forecas t o f a n American analyst , "Sovie t military planners will write their Eastern allie s out o f thei r operationa l plans , whil e Wester n planner s wil l n o longe r automatically coun t the m o n th e opposit e sid e o f th e strategi c bal ance." 5 7 Defense Secretar y Chene y note d tha t "yo u ma y b e able to mak e different assumption s abou t th e exten t t o whic h thos e government s might joi n with th e Soviet Government " i n a hypothetical conflict. 58 For Easter n Europe , escap e fro m Marxism-Leninis m bor e a n addi tional an d crucia l dimension : th e recover y o f nationa l sovereignty . In legal theor y sovereignt y i s absolute; i n internationa l politics , it is subjec t to a multitude o f constraints . But democrati c self-determinatio n le d Eas t Europeans int o a real m o f speculatio n tha t onl y a fe w year s ag o woul d have been dismisse d a s dangerous fantasy . A long-term scenari o outline d by th e Hungaria n socialis t reforme r an d academi c Attil a Ag h reflecte d the aspiration s o f many , perhap s most , Eas t Europeans. The first, "Dan ish" ste p envisage d b y Agh woul d b e a qualificatio n t o Hungary' s War saw Pac t membershi p permanentl y excludin g th e stationin g o f nuclea r weapons o n nationa l territory . I n th e second , "Greek " o r "Romanian " stage, Hungar y woul d reduc e it s participation i n Warsa w Pac t exercise s while th e Sovie t Unio n repatriate d it s militar y contingent . Th e third ,

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"French" stag e woul d involv e th e remova l o f remainin g Sovie t troop s and Hungary' s withdrawa l fro m a t leas t th e militar y dimensio n o f th e Warsaw Pact . In th e fourth , "Finnish " step , Hungary woul d conclud e a mutual securit y agreement with the Soviet Union that allowed the forme r to pursu e a foreig n polic y o f "dynami c stability. " Th e fifth, "Austrian " step woul d b e th e proclamatio n an d internationa l recognitio n o f Hun gary's neutrality . Hungar y coul d the n explor e th e feasibilit y o f adherin g to th e Europea n Community. 59 In fact , th e Democrati c Forum-le d coalitio n governmen t forme d i n Budapest afte r th e March/Apri l 199 0 election s adopte d thes e ojective s and shortene d th e timetable. The ne w foreig n minister , Gez a Jeszenszky , had earlie r proclaime d tha t Hungar y woul d remai n a membe r o f th e Warsaw Pac t "a s lon g a s necessary , bu t no t on e da y longer." 60 A t th e Warsaw Pac t summi t hel d i n Moscow i n June, the Hungarian s indicate d they woul d n o longe r participat e i n join t maneuver s an d gav e notic e o f their intentio n t o withdraw b y 1991. That summi t reflecte d th e sweepin g chang e i n Easter n Europe ; o f th e leaders wh o ha d attende d th e previou s meetin g eleve n month s earlier , only Gorbache v remained . Th e final communiqu e declare d tha t th e con cept o f "th e enemy, " an d therefor e th e militar y allianc e itself , ha d be come obsolete . Th e Pac t woul d dismantl e it s join t comman d an d othe r military structure s an d see k a ne w missio n a s a politica l organizatio n dedicated t o cooperatio n wit h th e res t o f Europe. 61 Respondin g t o a Soviet suggestio n fo r a nonagressio n treat y betwee n th e tw o alliances , a concurrent NAT O meetin g welcome d th e possibilit y o f cooperatio n i n the redefinition o f Europea n security . CFE and the "Peace Dividend." Th e East European revolutio n raise d the pressure , i n Congres s an d i n suc h allie d capital s a s Bonn , fo r mor e radical troo p reduction s an d cut s i n defens e spending . Europ e absorbe d around hal f o f th e U.S . $30 0 billio n defens e budget , an d th e lur e o f a "peace dividend " wa s provin g irresistible . Lowe r troop-leve l target s coul d also facilitat e Sovie t accessio n t o Eas t Europea n request s fo r evacuatio n and indirectl y strengthe n Gorbachev' s han d a t a tim e whe n perestroika was bese t with economi c troubles an d ethni c strife . By early 1990 , National Securit y Adviser Brent Scowcroft wa s hintin g that "lowe r number s i n consultatio n wit h th e allies coul d certainl y b e contemplated." 62 Th e Sovie t Unio n wa s beginnin g t o withdra w it s troop s

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from Czechoslovakia , Hungary , an d eve n Poland , th e Eas t European s were trimmin g defens e budgets , an d a s th e momentu m o f Germa n unifi cation accelerated , defection s shrun k th e GD R People' s Arm y t o hal f o f its forme r strength . Th e Warsa w Pact' s militar y capabilit y wa s erodin g rapidly. A s a senio r administratio n officia l observe d befor e Presiden t Bush's Stat e o f th e Union address , "I t appeare d that , i n th e are a o f arm s control, specificall y conventiona l arm s contro l i n Europe , event s wer e running ahea d o f th e [CFE ] negotiations." 63 I n tha t address , th e presi dent proposed tha t th e CF E talks no w ai m a t a ceiling of 195,00 0 Sovie t and America n troop s i n Centra l Europ e (instea d o f 275,00 0 i n non Soviet Europe) . The administratio n wa s adaman t tha t th e resultin g leve l of 225,00 0 U.S . force s i n Europ e (includin g 30,00 0 America n troop s outside th e centra l zone ) woul d remai n a nonnegotiable minimum . After securing Washington' s pledg e tha t th e contingen t outsid e Centra l Eu rope woul d no t b e increased , Mosco w endorse d th e Bus h proposal . Throughout th e sprin g o f 199 0 th e CF E talk s remaine d bogge d dow n over th e definitio n o f tank s an d armore d vehicle s an d cut s i n comba t aircraft. Withi n th e Warsaw Pact , the Soviet Union an d it s now indepen dent-minded allie s haggle d ove r thei r respectiv e share s o f th e armo r allowed b y a n eventua l CF E agreement . Hungar y threatene d t o bloc k any CF E agreemen t tha t faile d t o provid e inspectio n right s betwee n members o f th e sam e group . Meanwhile , th e exampl e se t b y th e Sovie t Union's unilatera l withdrawal s encourage d NATO' s member s t o rea p the popula r peac e dividen d b y plannin g cut s i n militar y budget s an d i n their militar y commitmen t t o NATO . Safeguarding th e allianc e whil e reassurin g Mosco w an d satisfyin g domestic budget cutter s was no easy task. The NATO summi t a t Londo n in July declare d tha t th e allianc e "mus t reac h ou t t o th e countrie s o f th e East whic h wer e ou r adversarie s i n th e Col d Wa r an d exten d t o the m the han d o f friendship." 64 I t offere d t o sig n a join t declaratio n o f non aggression an d invite d the Warsaw Pac t members t o establish diplomati c liaison wit h NAT O headquarter s i n Brussels . A t th e sam e time , th e summit recas t NATO' s conventiona l an d nuclea r strategy . Abandonin g "forward defense, " i t envisaged a smaller NAT O forc e deploye d i n ligh t screening unit s alon g th e borde r betwee n th e about-to-be-reunite d Ger manys an d heavier , multinationa l group s i n th e rear . Th e discor d ove r nuclear arm s wa s onc e agai n papere d ove r wit h a "las t resort " formul a that preserve d th e principl e o f flexibl e response , an d wit h th e offe r t o

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negotiate th e mutua l remova l o f short-rang e nuclea r weapon s wit h th e Soviet Unio n onc e CF E talk s ha d ru n thei r course . A t tha t time , sai d NATO, manpowe r ceiling s fo r th e nonsuperpowe r member s o f th e CF E could als o be negotiated . After th e Gorbachev-Koh l dea l o n unification , whic h wa s probabl y facilitated b y NATO' s conciliator y tack , th e peac e dividen d momentu m gathered speed . Britai n an d Franc e declare d tha t the y woul d halv e thei r forces i n Germany . I n September , th e Pentago n announce d plan s fo r major cut s i n th e numbe r o f U.S . base s i n German y an d elsewher e an d the withdrawa l o f 40,00 0 troop s fro m Wester n Europ e ove r th e nex t twelve months . Th e earlie r CF E target s o n conventiona l troo p level s were fadin g i n significanc e a s th e separat e agreement s o n Germa n unifi cation an d betwee n Mosco w an d it s allie s raise d th e prospec t o f a tota l evacuation o f Sovie t force s b y 1994 . A CF E accor d too k shap e i n earl y Octobe r wit h th e agreemen t t o limit eac h alliance' s aircraft , tank s (20,000) , armore d personne l carrier s (30,000), an d artiller y (20,000) , an d t o institut e a comprehensiv e verifi cation system . The Sovie t Union ha d t o bear the lion's shar e of removin g or scrappin g suc h weaponry . Thi s accord , signe d b y the tw o alliance s i n Paris o n th e occasio n o f th e CSC E summit , represente d a gian t ste p toward a Europe fre e fro m th e threat o f majo r war . For th e West , th e fea r o f a Sovie t surpris e attac k wa s effectivel y dispelled, makin g th e peac e dividen d safel y attainable . Fo r th e Eas t Europeans, th e militar y disengagemen t mandate d b y th e CF E promise d greater diplomati c elbowroo m i n thei r ques t fo r a secur e nich e i n th e common Europea n house . Stalin' s axio m tha t th e victor s woul d impos e their socia l system s a s fa r a s thei r armie s reache d wa s onc e agai n con firmed, i n reverse , a s Sovie t forc e an d ideolog y recede d fro m th e region . But Eastern Europ e i s bound t o remai n a key to calculation s o f Soviet — or Russian—security . Therefore , paradoxically , consolidatio n o f politi cal autonom y i n individua l Eas t Europea n countrie s ma y b e contingen t on voluntar y constraint s o n tha t autonomy . I t ma y b e i n th e West' s interest t o dissuad e democrati c force s fro m exploitin g thei r freedo m t o sever al l securit y link s with th e Sovie t Union. Th e nationalisti c euphori a of th e moment wil l not easil y heed suc h prudential advice . Both th e Sovie t Unio n an d th e Wes t evidentl y hop e tha t th e disinte gration o f alliance s wil l wor k t o thei r favor . Gorbachev' s professe d Europeanism an d hi s radica l disarmamen t proposal s ar e a t leas t partl y

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calculated t o loose n th e bond s o f th e Atlanti c allianc e an d induc e neu tralism, particularl y amon g Germans . Thes e goal s ca n serv e no t onl y Soviet securit y bu t als o renewe d Russia n ambition s towar d predomi nance in Europe. NATO, for it s part, anticipates that the powerful force s of nationalis m an d liberalis m i n Eastern Europe , an d th e immens e prob lems of perestroika a t home, will undermine th e Sovie t Union's offensiv e capability. Meanwhile, th e outlin e o f a stabl e structur e fo r Europea n securit y grew mor e elusiv e a s th e prospec t o f Germa n unificatio n bega n t o ac quire substance i n early 1990 . Gorbachev condone d th e rapid movemen t toward economi c an d socia l unio n bu t remaine d adaman t tha t th e ne w Germany coul d no t b e a membe r o f NATO . German y becam e th e ke y problem fo r bot h alliance s i n th e erectio n o f a ne w "architecture " fo r Europe. German Centrality. Th e West' s preoccupatio n wit h th e Soviet Communist menac e afte r Worl d Wa r I I overshadowe d th e fac t tha t Europe's declin e an d divisio n resulte d t o a grea t exten t fro m th e historica l ambitions o f th e Germans. For centuries th e latter exerted a modernizin g influence i n Eastern Europe . Diligent Germa n farmer s settle d throughou t the region . Germa n an d Austria n busines s an d financ e spearheade d eco nomic development. Th e urban cultur e o f suc h grea t citie s as Prague an d Budapest acquire d a pronounced Germani c flavor. Bu t as the Habsburgs ' grip weakened , th e Bismarckia n impuls e o f Drang nacb Osten ("driv e toward th e East" ) turne d a comparativel y benig n influenc e int o a ques t for domination . Th e firs t Russo-Germa n wa r bega t no t onl y th e apoth eosis of nationa l self-determinatio n i n Easter n Europ e bu t als o the triump h of Lenin' s Bolsheviks. Thus, German imperialis m serve d inadvertentl y a s the midwif e fo r a n eve n greate r threa t t o libera l democracy , an d th e lands betwee n remaine d th e mos t vulnerable t o bot h threats . The Naz i poiso n seepe d int o a regio n tha t Hitle r wa s determine d t o dominate, an d th e secon d Russo-Germa n wa r brough t devastatio n an d the expansio n o f Sovie t powe r an d ideolog y int o th e hear t o f Europe . The Eas t European s los t mor e tha n thei r autonom y an d materia l assets . Among th e huma n cost s were the exterminatio n o f muc h o f thei r Jewis h population an d th e expulsio n o f million s o f ethni c Germans , mos t o f whom ha d fatefull y transferre d thei r fealt y t o th e thousand-yea r Reich . Defeated German y los t no t onl y Hitler' s territoria l acquisition s bu t als o

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vast tract s o f lan d tha t wer e assigne d t o Polan d an d th e Sovie t Union. In seeking t o eras e al l vestige s o f nazis m an d t o crippl e Germany' s eco nomic an d militar y potential , th e victor s seeme d inten t o n a peac e eve n more punitive tha n tha t impose d a t Versailles. Germany wa s th e countr y i n th e middl e o f th e emergin g East-Wes t confrontation, an d b y late 194 6 Washington's concer n a t Soviet hostilit y and obdurac y wa s turnin g th e Western occupie d zone s int o th e frontlin e of defens e agains t communism . Stali n wante d t o dominat e al l o f Ger many, an d b y controllin g th e heartlan d t o exten d unchallengeabl e influ ence ove r th e entir e continent . An y punitiv e inten t o n th e par t o f th e Western Allie s wa s soo n overshadowe d b y ne w priorities—economi c reconstruction o f a Wester n Europ e tha t include d th e Federa l Republi c and th e latter' s militar y integratio n int o a defensiv e perimeter . A s a n American historia n speculate d a t th e time , "Th e ghos t o f Hitle r mus t have laughe d ghoulishl y t o se e th e Wes t buildin g u p German y agains t Communist Russia." 65 Wes t German y la y a t th e vita l cente r o f th e policy o f containment . It s consolidatio n coul d no t b e jeopardize d b y serious consideratio n o f Sovie t scheme s fo r neutralization , demilitariza tion, an d unificatio n eve n i f suc h a formul a appeale d t o a t leas t a minority o f Germans . The Unite d State s foun d a staunc h all y i n Konra d Adenauer , wh o came t o symboliz e hi s country' s conversio n t o democrac y an d firmly anchored German y i n th e West . Franco-Germa n reconciliation , Euro pean integration , an d th e America n guarante e o f Wes t Germany' s secu rity becam e th e vita l component s o f hi s foreign policy . Adenaue r simpl y refused t o conced e an y legitimac y t o divisio n an d th e Sovie t occupatio n zone. Th e Federa l Republic , a s it s Basi c La w stated , wa s th e lawfu l representative o f th e entir e Germa n nation , an d th e sol e acceptabl e alternative t o th e statu s qu o wa s absorptio n o f th e easter n zon e throug h self-determination int o a libera l democrati c Germany . Unti l then , th e Hallstein Doctrin e woul d preclud e diplomati c relation s wit h thir d par ties who chos e to recogniz e th e Germa n Democrati c Republic . The Western allie s became committe d t o this precondition fo r a peace treaty, ostensibl y o n th e ground s tha t onl y firm advocac y o f maximalis t goals coul d eventuall y brin g th e Sovie t Unio n t o compromise . Realisti cally, neither Adenaue r no r hi s allie s anticipate d suc h a chang e o f heart . But inflexibilit y o n th e principl e o f unificatio n wa s Bonn' s pric e fo r enlisting in the defens e o f the West. In Octobe r 1954 , the lasting bargai n

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was struck . Th e occupatio n regim e was supersede d b y a quasi-sovereig n Federal Republi c that would mak e a substantial contributio n t o NATO' s military strength . Th e thre e Wester n powers , i n turn , committe d them selves t o peacefu l unificatio n throug h democrati c self-determination , ac knowledged tha t Bon n wa s th e sol e internationa l representativ e o f th e whole Germa n natio n (agreein g thereb y no t t o recogniz e th e GDR) , an d affirmed tha t Germany' s inne r an d oute r boundarie s wer e provisiona l until a final peace settlement. 66 This pact suite d the immediate security interests of al l parties. NATO , in Lor d Ismay' s witticism , serve d t o kee p th e Russian s out , th e Ameri cans in , an d th e German s down . Washingto n ha d n o qualm s abou t applying the principle o f national self-determinatio n t o al l Germans, an d if th e prospec t o f a unite d German y arouse d littl e enthusias m i n Pari s and London , i t wa s mercifull y remot e an d hypothetical . B y makin g detente hostag e t o Germa n interest s an d improbabl e Sovie t accommo dation o f thos e interests , the agreemen t i n effec t allowe d Bon n t o se t th e limits t o Wester n approache s towar d no t onl y th e GD R bu t th e res t o f Eastern Europ e a s well. Bonn's rigi d posture onl y deepene d th e col d wa r as Khrushche v sough t t o legitimat e th e GD R wit h ultimatum s ove r Berlin. Bu t a s lon g a s i t regarde d th e Sovie t blo c a s a monolithi c threat , the Wes t coul d affor d thi s self-impose d constrain t o n it s freedo m o f action. Ostpolitik. Th e divergenc e betwee n Bonn' s nationa l outloo k an d th e other allies ' broade r perspectiv e o n policie s towar d th e Eas t becam e more apparen t i n th e 1960s . Th e "polic y o f movement " adopte d b y West German y i n th e earl y year s o f th e decad e aime d t o expan d com mercial contact s wit h th e Eas t withou t surrende r o f th e Hallstei n Doc trine. I t brough t modes t economi c result s bu t n o politica l gains , an d both th e America n an d th e Gaullis t approache s t o detent e wer e ham pered b y Bonn' s politica l inflexibility . Th e ne w Ostpolitik adumbrate d by th e Brandt-Kiesinge r gran d coalitio n an d pursue d wit h vigo r b y Chancellor Brand t afte r 196 9 overturne d existin g doctrine . Bon n i n a spate o f treatie s normalize d relation s wit h th e East , acceptin g th e terri torial statu s quo and the existence of two German state s "in on e nation. " Unification wa s n o longe r th e preconditio n bu t th e ultimat e goa l o f detente, t o b e patientl y pursue d b y a strateg y o f Wandel durch Annaherung, chang e throug h rapprochement . Th e Wes t Germa n foo t thu s

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shifted fro m th e brak e t o th e accelerato r o f detente , creatin g a ne w se t of problems fo r th e Atlantic alliance. 67 For th e Unite d States , West Germany' s strengt h an d locatio n a t NA TO's fron t lin e mad e i t th e ke y Europea n ally , notwithstandin g th e sentimental specia l relationshi p wit h Britain . Th e centralit y o f th e Fed eral Republi c i n Washington' s Europea n policie s wa s succinctl y formu lated b y Dea n Acheson : " A major—ofte n th e major—consideratio n should b e thei r effec t o n th e Germa n peopl e an d th e Germa n govern ment." 6 8 In th e zero-su m gam e o f th e col d war , Bonn' s Hallstei n Doc trine an d it s quie t nurturin g o f economi c relation s wit h th e GD R coul d be condone d a s harmles s manifestation s o f nationa l sentiment . In th e more comple x circumstance s o f detente , the divergence in Western inter ests and tactic s becam e harder t o ignore . That divergenc e manifeste d itsel f bot h i n th e broa d contex t o f East West relation s an d i n th e specifi c spher e o f polic y towar d Easter n Eu rope. B y the lat e 1970 s Bon n ha d becom e th e mos t persisten t promote r of politica l an d militar y detente . A t th e sam e time , bot h Ostpolitik an d Deutscblandpolitik (polic y towar d th e GDR ) departe d fro m th e logi c and practice of the policy of differentiation pursue d b y the United States . The functionalis t premis e o f Ostpolitik wa s tha t th e expansio n o f com mercial relation s woul d brin g immediat e an d mutua l economi c benefit s and ove r tim e induce politica l liberalizatio n i n the East . It would rebuil d Germany's market s i n th e region , appeas e historica l animosities , loose n the Eas t Europeans ' dependenc e o n th e Sovie t Union , an d weav e a we b of interdependenc e tha t serve d Wes t Germany' s economi c a s wel l a s security interests . Since the Soviet Union an d th e GDR i n particular wer e suspicious o f Wester n tactic s t o divid e th e Warsa w Pact , attempt s a t differentiation wer e considere d b y Bon n t o b e counterproductive , an d Ostpolitik therefor e stoo d fo r a strateg y o f "synchronization"—th e pursuit o f norma l relation s unencumbere d b y politica l condition s an d implicitly attune d t o Sovie t sensibilities. 69 The comparativ e politica l neutralit y o f Ostpolitik coul d b e regarde d as an expedient rationalization fo r th e unrestricted economi c penetratio n of Easter n Europe . I t als o ma y hav e reflecte d a n understandabl e inhibi tion o n th e par t o f Bon n t o assum e th e rol e o f huma n right s crusader . To thei r credit , th e Wes t German s gav e humanitaria n ai d generously , and thei r religiou s organization s activel y supporte d th e impoverishe d churches i n th e East . Bu t Bon n scrupulousl y avoide d linkin g economi c

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favors t o broade r huma n right s consideration s an d politica l reform . I n the first hal f o f th e 1980s , fo r instance , it s turnove r wit h neo-Stalinis t Czechoslovakia, reformis t Hungary , an d martial-la w Polan d al l hovere d in th e narro w ban d o f $1.6- 2 billion . Onl y whe n perestroika seeme d t o sanction refor m an d pluralis m di d Bon n ventur e t o appl y som e differen tiation, notabl y wit h som e major credit s fo r Hungar y i n 1988—89 . To b e sure , America's othe r Europea n allies were equall y reluctan t t o adopt a policy o f economi c differentiatio n eve n if some of them , notabl y France, gav e mor e publi c attentio n t o huma n right s issue s tha n di d th e Germans. But West German y ha d b y far th e greates t potentia l economi c leverage, accountin g fo r clos e to 4 0 percen t o f th e industrialized world' s trade wit h Easter n Europ e (th e American shar e being 4 percent, Italy' s 9 percent, an d France' s 7 percent). 70 Effective leverag e depends o n willing ness t o den y a s wel l a s exten d economi c favors , an d a s Wes t German y increased it s stak e i n East-Wes t trade , i t coul d argu e tha t i t woul d bea r the brun t o f th e cos t o f an y Wester n sanctions . Moreover , tariff s an d barriers to agricultura l import s ar e set collectively in the European Com munity, limitin g th e scop e o f individua l countrie s fo r politica l manipu lation o f thei r externa l commerce . Nevertheles s Wes t Germany , lik e th e others, retaine d numerou s facilitie s fo r differentiation , includin g loans , credit insurance , regulatio n o f join t venture s an d barte r deals , and othe r nontariff barriers . America's pursui t o f economi c differentiatio n wa s thu s undermine d principally b y the West Germans ' alternativ e approac h t o the East. The y (along with th e other Europeans ) participate d onl y grudgingl y i n Coco m and resiste d America n attempt s t o impos e economi c sanctions , notabl y in the Afghanistani an d Polis h crises . The political effectivenes s o f differ entiation an d sanction s wa s ope n t o question , bu t i n an y even t Bonn' s cooperation wa s essentia l t o a meaningful Wester n strategy , an d Ostpolitik dilute d suc h a strategy . Th e architect s o f Ostpolitik wer e no t com fortable wit h eithe r th e huma n right s crusad e launche d b y Jimmy Carte r or Ronal d Reagan' s obsessio n wit h th e "evi l empire. " Sensitive to Sovie t displeasure, Chancellor s Brand t an d Schmid t bot h urge d Washingto n t o wind dow n th e Radi o Fre e Europe/Radi o Libert y operatio n i n Munich . The West, warned Foreig n Minister Gensche r a t a conference a t Potsda m in Jun e 1988 , "shoul d no t entertai n an y thought s o f employin g it s undoubted economi c an d technologica l strengt h a s a leve r vis-a-vi s ou r eastern neighbors." 71 I f thes e polic y divergence s cause d som e irritatio n

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in Washington , the y wer e accommodate d wit h a remarkabl e absenc e o f public discord . Washingto n wa s no t abou t t o jeopardiz e NAT O solidar ity o n basi c securit y issue s an d fue l neutralis t sentiment s i n Wes t Ger many b y openly criticizin g Bonn's Ostpolitik.

Inter-German Relations. Th e Federa l Republic' s Deutschlandpolitik was a n equall y anomalou s elemen t i n th e Wester n approac h t o Easter n Europe. From the beginning, the allies treated Eas t Germany (apar t fro m Berlin) a s Bonn' s exclusiv e preserve . The y followe d Wes t Germany' s lead i n diplomati c ostracis m o f th e GDR , the n i n it s recognition . Th e United States , eve n afte r i t establishe d relation s wit h th e GD R i n 1974 , maintained a lo w profil e an d subordinate d it s policies t o Bonn' s wishes . This taci t acceptanc e o f Bonn' s primacy reste d o n th e Federal Republic' s claim t o represent al l Germans an d dedicatio n t o eventua l unification . In th e col d war , th e stricture s o f th e Hallstei n Doctrin e onl y rein forced a consensua l Wester n polic y t o isolat e th e Sovie t bloc . Bu t fro m its inception th e Federa l Republi c strov e to preserve economi c links wit h the easter n zone , ostensibl y fo r humanitaria n reason s a s wel l a s t o underscore th e principl e o f nationa l unit y an d t o giv e the Eas t German s a margina l alternativ e t o tota l economi c dependenc e o n th e Sovie t bloc . As earl y a s Octobe r 194 9 th e tw o Germany s agree d t o specia l commer cial relations , whic h i n th e Federa l Republi c wer e administere d b y a n "Inter-Zonal Trad e Trustee, " officiall y a n orga n o f West Germa n indus trial an d tradin g organizations . No dutie s were levie d i n the exchange o f goods, an d Eas t Germa n purchase s wer e fre e o f value-adde d tax . Th e GDR's specia l statu s wa s accommodate d i n a protoco l t o th e Rom e Treaty establishin g th e Europea n Economi c Community , givin g i t indi rect acces s t o tha t market . No r di d th e normalizatio n o f stat e relation s between th e Federa l Republi c an d th e GD R i n 197 2 alte r th e privilege d nature o f thei r mutua l trade . By the mid-1950 s inter-Germa n turnove r accounte d fo r 1 1 percent o f the GDR' s foreig n trade . It grew b y 75 percen t betwee n 195 5 an d 1960 , and quadruple d i n th e 1970s , befor e fallin g t o aroun d 6 percen t o f th e GDR's tota l foreig n trad e (an d t o onl y 1. 5 percen t o f Wes t Germany's ) in the 1980s . But th e Federa l Republi c remaine d it s third-largest tradin g partner (afte r th e Sovie t Unio n an d Czechoslovakia ) an d it s principa l source o f Wester n technology . Tha t technology , i n turn , strengthene d

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the GDR' s expor t capability , no t leas t i n th e directio n o f th e Sovie t Union. The Rome protocol di d not gran t th e GDR duty-fre e acces s to the res t of th e Community , bu t i n practic e som e Eas t Germa n good s di d filte r into othe r E C countries . Inter-Germa n trad e wa s cleare d i n specia l unit s of accoun t tha t inflate d th e valu e o f th e Eas t Germa n mark . Th e credit s that financed th e GDR' s bilatera l defici t i n goods an d services , known a s the "swing, " originall y cam e fro m privat e Wes t Germa n institutions . In 1967, five-year federa l expor t credit s wer e extended , an d b y th e lat e 1980s th e annua l (interest-free ) swin g credi t stoo d a t D M 85 0 million . When i n th e earl y 1980 s th e Eas t Europea n deb t crisis scare d of f West ern lenders , West Germa n bank s provide d som e D M 2 billio n t o bolste r the GDR's creditworthiness . In additio n t o thes e trad e an d credi t facilities , th e GD R receive d fro m West German y a plethor a o f othe r financial contribution s estimate d t o amount t o mor e tha n D M 2. 5 billio n a year. 72 In th e aggregate * these benefits an d transfer s adde d roughl y 4 percen t t o th e nationa l produc t of th e Germa n Democrati c Republic . Bonn's disarmin g rational e fo r thi s economic bount y wa s tha t i t helpe d t o stabiliz e inter-Germa n relations , ease the lo t o f Eas t Germans , an d secur e humanitarian concession s fro m the GDR . Th e latte r consistentl y rejecte d an y notio n o f linkag e betwee n politics an d economics , an d indee d th e patter n o f developmen t i n inter German trad e showe d littl e correlatio n wit h change s i n politica l rela tions. In th e earl y 1980s , Wes t Germa n loan s apparentl y induce d th e GDR t o ease some emigration an d trave l restrictions , although th e Kremli n set a limit to inter-Germa n detent e b y vetoing Honecker's propose d visi t to Chancello r Koh l i n Septembe r 1984 . But afte r takin g th e histori c ste p of recognizin g th e GDR , Bon n di d no t adop t Washington' s criteri a fo r differentiation an d neve r mad e it s massive economi c subsid y conditiona l on political o r economi c liberalization . Deutschlandpolitik thu s represented a perverse form o f differentiatio n favoring on e o f th e mos t orthodo x an d repressiv e regime s i n Easter n Europe. T o th e exten t tha t i t sough t stability , i t stabilize d authoritaria n rule an d socialis t economics . T o th e exten t tha t i t facilitate d huma n contacts, famil y reunification , an d emigration , th e polic y responde d t o nationalistic sentiment s an d serve d unexceptionabl e humanitaria n ends , but i t als o relieve d domesti c pressur e o n th e Honecke r regime . Th e special inner-Germa n relationshi p wa s cultivate d i n officia l visit s t o th e

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GDR b y Brand t i n 197 0 an d Schmid t i n 1981 , i n Honecker' s delaye d return visi t i n Septembe r 1987 , an d i n Kohl' s casua l privat e visi t t o Dresden i n Ma y 1988 . Th e histori c Honecke r tri p t o Bon n le d Jean e Kirkpatrick t o observ e (rathe r prematurely ) tha t "th e spectr e o f a re united German y i s agai n hauntin g Europe." 73 Wha t i t di d reflec t wa s the somewha t fancifu l Wes t Germa n notio n tha t a separat e an d deepe r detente coul d b e nurtured wit h th e Honecker regime . Yet tha t regim e remaine d steadfas t i n it s polic y o f Abgrenzung, o r political demarcation , a s resistan t a s th e Czec h an d th e Romania n re gimes t o th e sprea d o f perestroika. Befor e th e Gorbache v er a opened , i t had als o serve d a s Moscow' s principa l Eas t Europea n surrogat e i n th e third world , providin g militar y assistanc e an d secre t polic e trainin g i n places suc h a s Angol a an d Ethiopia . It s intelligenc e service s wer e th e KGB's most assiduou s collaborators . Clearly , no rational Western polic y would hav e identified th e GD R a s a candidate fo r preferentia l treatment . Indeed, i n th e month s befor e th e unexpecte d revolutio n i n Eas t Berlin , even Bon n wa s becomin g disenchante d wit h th e result s o f th e twenty year-old polic y o f "smal l steps " o f Wandel dutch Annaherung, whic h had intensifie d economi c relation s withou t inducin g th e Honecke r re gime to reform . Having accepted th e principle o f primary Wes t Germa n responsibilit y for relation s with th e GDR , Washington ha d littl e choice but to condon e the anomalou s outcome . Whe n i n lat e 198 6 Richar d Perle , the n a n assistant secretar y o f defense , venture d th e opinio n tha t Bon n shoul d spend les s on subsidizin g th e GD R an d mor e o n NATO , h e was roundl y condemned b y al l shade s o f th e Wes t Germa n politica l spectrum. 74 Th e notion tha t West Germany possesse d distinctiv e national interest s gaine d popularity a s an Americ a personifie d b y Ronald Reaga n an d a Europea n unification tha t seeme d t o stagnat e i n th e earl y 1980 s los t som e o f thei r appeal t o Germans . I f Ostpolitik an d Deutschlandpolitik di d no t visibl y promote politica l chang e i n th e East , the y a t leas t serve d mutua l eco nomic interest s an d pu t relation s o n a businesslik e basis . This unprovo cative an d pragmati c approach , i n Bonn' s belief , woul d induc e a stabl e environment i n whic h politica l liberalizatio n coul d materializ e a t th e pace chose n b y the Sovie t Union an d it s client regimes . German Nationalism and National Interest, I n Wester n perceptions , the Federa l Republic' s imag e a s dutifu l all y lon g overshadowe d it s mos t

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basic an d endurin g interest , th e caus e o f th e Germa n natio n an d o f German minoritie s maroone d i n th e socialis t world . Bon n concentrate d its activ e concer n abou t huma n right s o n thos e German s sprea d acros s the East. By paying a substantial pe r capit a ransom , i t bought th e releas e of no t onl y Eas t Germa n dissident s bu t ten s o f thousand s o f ethni c Germans fro m Ceausescu' s Romania , earnin g that impoverishe d countr y over D M 1 billio n i n th e 1980s . I n it s economi c diplomac y wit h th e Soviet Unio n i t bargaine d fo r th e emigratio n right s o f ethni c Germans . And Eas t Germa n visitor s t o th e Federa l Republi c wer e offere d "wel come money " an d trave l concessions . Al l ethni c Germa n emigrant s au tomatically receive d citizenshi p an d materia l assistance , includin g pen sions, i n th e Federa l Republi c a t a tim e whe n mos t othe r refugee s fro m socialism encountere d a close d doo r i n Wester n countrie s (includin g West Germany ) unles s the y coul d prov e t o hav e bee n victim s o f activ e political persecution . I n 198 9 alone , a record 720,90 9 German s fro m al l over Easter n Europ e an d th e Sovie t Unio n foun d have n i n th e Federa l Republic, 343,85 4 o f the m fro m th e GDR. 75 When i n 198 9 concerte d Wester n ai d fo r reformis t Polan d cam e o n the agenda , th e mai n stumblin g bloc k i n Polish-Wes t Germa n negotia tions wa s th e statu s o f tha t country' s Germa n minority , whic h th e Warsaw governmen t chos e no t t o recognize . Th e Wes t Germans ' hu manitarian interes t i n th e fat e o f thei r conational s wa s understandable , but th e practica l effec t wa s ye t anothe r invidiou s divergenc e i n Wester n policy toward s Easter n Europe , wit h Wes t Germa n notion s o f differen tiation workin g agains t thos e o f it s allies . If Bonn wa s tacitl y allowe d b y its allie s t o adop t a comparativel y voluntaristi c polic y towar d Easter n Europe, i n pursuin g th e goa l o f Germa n unificatio n i t coul d no t avoi d contending wit h th e vita l interest s o f othe r larg e an d smal l Europea n powers an d th e Unite d States . As long as the political divisio n o f Europ e seemed immovable , th e Wester n allies coul d affor d t o pa y li p servic e t o the principl e o f democrati c unificatio n withou t worryin g abou t it s stra tegic implications . The "Germa n question " remaine d dormant , apar t fro m th e occa sional alaru m whe n a Sovie t prob e me t wit h undercurrent s o f Germa n nationalism an d neutralism . Bu t Wes t Germa n democrac y wa s firmly anchored i n th e West , an d th e Kremlin' s periodi c ploy s stiffene d NAT O solidarity instea d o f seducin g th e German s int o anothe r Rapallo . Pan German sentiment s di d no t disappear , bu t th e prevailin g view , notabl y

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among th e political elite , was that unificatio n woul d onl y com e abou t i n the distan t futur e throug h Europea n reconciliatio n an d integratio n an d not b y som e bilatera l inter-Germa n negotiation . I t seeme d inconceivabl e that th e Sovie t Unio n woul d giv e u p it s Germa n garrison-state . An d while th e Germa n treatie s o f th e earl y 1970 s an d internationa l recogni tion o f th e GD R mad e th e absenc e o f a forma l peac e treat y a s wel l a s the residua l right s o f th e forme r occupyin g power s somewha t irrelevan t (except wit h respec t t o Berlin) , al l partie s assume d tha t unificatio n de pended o n th e consent o f a t leas t those powers . Before th e Eas t Europea n revolution s o f 198 9 precipitate d a funda mental reevaluatio n o f th e politica l an d strategi c balanc e i n Europe , then, Wes t Germany' s approache s t o th e Eas t wer e alread y distinctive . Bonn nurture d suc h paradoxe s a s a constitutiona l commitmen t t o unifi cation wit h a formall y recognize d separat e sovereig n state , an d prefer ential treatmen t o f a neo-Stalinist regime . Yet another parado x la y in th e success of th e West German s i n exploiting their subordinat e an d divide d postwar statu s t o secur e a privileged relationshi p wit h th e GD R an d th e rest of th e Eastern bloc . Professions o f "ne w thinking " i n Soviet foreign polic y coincide d with , and reinforced , a modes t renascenc e i n nationalis t feeling s amon g Wes t Germans, an d b y th e en d o f th e 1980 s th e Germa n questio n ha d com e to lif e again . Reflectin g o n th e divisio n o f Germany , Valenti n Falin , a key Gorbache v adviser , allowe d tha t i f th e tw o Germany s "on e da y decide t o becom e militaril y neutral , tha t wil l creat e a ne w situatio n i n Europe, an d the n we'l l tal k abou t it." 7 6 Refor m an d th e relaxatio n o f Soviet hegemony were , according t o Deput y Secretar y o f Stat e Lawrenc e Eagleburger, puttin g tha t questio n "bac k o n th e internationa l agenda." 77 Those processe s promise d t o weake n th e Warsa w Pact' s militar y capa bility, an d i t wa s clearl y i n th e Sovie t Union' s interes t t o pla y o n Wes t German fear s o f becomin g a nuclear battlefiel d an d hope s fo r unificatio n in orde r t o divid e NATO . Ther e wa s ampl e opportunit y a s th e disput e over Cruis e an d Pershin g missile s produce d massiv e peac e demonstra tions; th e SP D displaye d remarkabl e ideologica l relativis m i n it s accor d with th e Eas t Germa n SE D part y o n a nuclear-fre e zone ; an d Foreig n Minister Gensche r stoo d consistentl y a t th e forefron t o f detent e advo cacy. Th e ne w short-rang e missile s propose d b y th e Americans , Gensche r reminded th e Bundesta g i n Apri l 1989 , woul d b e abl e t o hi t "th e othe r part o f ou r fatherland." 78 Th e Gorbymani a sweepin g Wes t German y

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was reflecte d i n a 198 8 poll , whic h foun d tha t onl y 2 4 percen t o f Wes t Germans regarde d th e Sovie t Union a s a military threat. 79 Perception s o f national interes t wer e leadin g Wes t German y towar d a n eve r mor e distinctive foreig n policy . West Germany' s leader s neve r suspende d thei r publi c advocac y o f eventual unification . "Th e Germa n question, " declare d Chancello r Koh l at a part y conferenc e i n Jun e 1988 , "i s ope n an d remain s open . Th e CDU wil l neve r accep t thi s injustice." 80 Koh l registere d thi s desir e o n his visits to Mosco w i n July 198 3 an d Octobe r 198 8 an d i n his meeting s with Gorbache v i n Bon n i n June 1989 . "Thi s divisio n i s unnatural," h e told Gorbache v i n 1988 ; "Th e cohesio n o f th e German s i s a historica l and huma n realit y whic h politic s canno t ignore. " Th e Sovie t leade r retorted tha t alterin g th e statu s qu o woul d b e "a n unpredictabl e an d even dangerou s business." 81 A s a leadin g analys t o f Germa n affair s noted, "Mosco w want s t o leav e th e Germa n questio n ope n i n suc h a manner s o a s t o maximiz e Sovie t influenc e i n bot h Eas t an d Wes t Ger many." 82 German y wa s divide d becaus e Europ e wa s divided , an d a s th e military an d ideologica l confrontatio n receded , the debate ove r th e prospects of unit y inevitabl y intensified. 83 Bonn's dilemma s i n attemptin g t o reconcil e it s evolvin g Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik pale d i n compariso n wit h th e problem s o f th e East Berli n regime . Th e GD R bega n i n th e mid-1970 s t o styl e itsel f th e "socialist Germa n nation-state " an d t o conjur e u p th e existenc e o f a separate nationa l identit y wit h evocation s o f Bismarc k an d Frederic k th e Great. Th e futilit y o f suc h mythmakin g wa s tacitl y concede d whe n i n 1989 th e SED' s to p ideologist , Ott o Reinhold , explaine d wh y Eas t Ger many coul d no t affor d t o follo w th e lea d o f th e Sovie t Union , Poland , and Hungar y i n reform : th e onl y justificatio n fo r a separat e stat e wa s ideological, an d th e GD R "i s conceivabl e onl y a s a n anti-fascis t an d socialist alternativ e t o th e Federa l Republic. " H e aske d rhetorically , "What kin d o f righ t t o exis t woul d a capitalis t GD R hav e alongsid e a capitalist Federa l Republic?" 84 Thi s was , indeed , a compellin g rational e for Abgrenzung an d th e uncompromisin g stanc e o f th e Eas t Berli n re gime. Yet fort y year s o f socialis m di d no t persuad e Eas t German s o f it s superiority. Th e GDR' s econom y wa s th e mos t efficien t i n th e Sovie t sphere, bu t productivit y an d rea l incom e remaine d fa r belo w th e level s in th e Federa l Republic , an d Wes t Germa n televisio n brough t dail y

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reminders o f thi s chroni c disparity . Th e flood o f refugee s fro m th e GD R in th e fal l o f 1989 , through Hungar y an d th e Federa l Republic' s embas sies i n Pragu e an d Warsaw , onl y confirme d th e tenuou s natur e o f it s legitimacy, compellin g Honecke r t o restric t trave l t o thos e countrie s a s well. H e wa s adaman t tha t "normal , goo d neighborl y relation s betwee n the GD R an d th e FR G ca n b e forme d onl y whe n th e euphori a abou t a 'united Germany ' i s put aside, " an d hi s successor , Ego n Krenz , di d no t tarry i n denouncin g Bonn' s refusa l t o recogniz e Eas t Germa n citizen ship. 85 Bu t th e peacefu l demonstration s i n Leipzig , Eas t Berlin , an d Dresden followin g Gorbachev' s Octobe r visi t indicate d tha t th e viru s o f perestroika an d liberalis m wa s spreadin g eve n i n th e tightl y controlle d GDR. Kohl's Drive for Unity. Bon n waste d n o tim e i n exploitin g th e fissures in th e Warsa w Pac t t o destabiliz e th e Honecke r regime . O n Augus t 25 , as thousand s o f Eas t German s streame d int o Hungar y hopin g t o find a door t o th e West , Chancello r Koh l me t Hungaria n Premie r Miklo s Nemeth, wh o tol d hi m tha t i n th e absenc e o f Sovie t objection s an d despite Honecker' s protest s Hungar y woul d ope n it s frontier. Ther e wa s at leas t a n implici t linkag e betwee n thi s gestur e an d th e grantin g o f a $279 millio n Wes t Germa n loa n t o Hungary ; o n a visi t t o Budapes t i n November, Gensche r expresse d Bonn' s gratitud e an d suppor t fo r Hun gary's ques t fo r associatio n wit h th e European Community. 86 When i n November th e Berlin Wall was first opened^Kohl interrupte d his Warsaw visi t t o retur n t o Bonn , wher e th e Bundesta g deputie s greete d the new s wit h a n emotiona l choru s o f "Deutschlan d ube r Alles. " "W e are prepared, " h e declared , "t o offe r far-reachin g hel p i f genuin e an d thorough-going politica l an d economi c reform s tak e root." 8 7 Krenz , th e interim Eas t Germa n part y leader , continue d t o insis t tha t unificatio n was no t o n th e agenda , whil e th e reformis t prim e minister , Han s Mod row, raise d th e prospect o f close r relations base d o n bilatera l treaties . As East Germa n demonstrator s bega n t o openl y cal l fo r unification , Koh l on Novembe r 2 8 unveile d a pla n fo r "confedera l structures, " includin g joint committee s tha t afte r fre e election s i n th e Eas t woul d develo p common economic , environmental , an d othe r policies , an d fo r associat e membership fo r Eas t German y i n the European Community . The Wes t Germa n Socia l Democrat s endorse d th e Koh l plan , al though the y laid stress on linking the processes of German an d Europea n

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unification an d o n explici t guarantees o f the Polish border . In an addres s to thei r congress , th e write r Gunte r Gras s voice d som e reservation s about th e pursuit o f pan-German unity : Despite al l ou r protestations , eve n well-intentione d ones , we German s woul d once again be feared. For our neighbors would gaze at us with justifiable mistrus t and fro m ever-increasin g distance , whic h woul d ver y quickl y giv e ris e t o a renewed sens e of isolation an d with i t the dangerous self-pitying mentalit y tha t sees itself as "surrounded by enemies." A reunited Germany would be a colossus, bedeviled b y complexe s an d blockin g it s ow n path an d th e pat h t o Europea n unity. O n th e other hand , a confederation o f th e two Germa n states , and thei r declared renunciatio n o f a unifie d state , woul d benefi t Europea n union , espe cially because, like the new German self-conception , i t too will he a confedera tion.88 Such prudentia l advic e wa s scarcel y hear d amids t th e nationalisti c euphoria ove r th e crumblin g Wall . Opinio n poll s showe d tha t larg e majorities o f German s Eas t an d Wes t yearned fo r unification . The principl e tha t German s shoul d b e i n charg e o f resolvin g th e problem o f unificatio n la y behin d Kohl' s failur e t o discus s th e confeder ation program wit h his allies or with th e East, where Bonn's independen t spirit cause d muc h uneasiness . While allowin g fo r th e peacefu l develop ment o f intra-Germa n relations , Gorbache v wa s stil l insisten t tha t "n o harm com e t o th e GDR . I t i s ou r strategi c all y an d a membe r o f th e Warsaw Treaty . I t i s necessar y t o procee d fro m th e postwa r realities — the existence o f the two sovereig n Germa n states , members o f the Unite d Nations. Departure fro m thi s threatens . . . destabilization i n Europe." 8 9 He pleaded fo r Mitterrand' s support , reportedl y warnin g that "th e sam e day th e reunificatio n o f German y i s announced , a genera l wil l b e sittin g in my armchair." 90 The communique issuin g from th e European summi t i n Strasbourg o n December 9 , 198 9 incorporate d Kohl' s cal l fo r "unit y throug h fre e self determination" wit h th e provis o tha t thi s shoul d occu r "i n ful l respec t of th e relevan t agreement s an d treatie s an d o f al l th e principle s define d by th e Helsink i Fina l Act. " Easter n Europe' s borders , declare d Mitter rand, ar e unchangeable; alterin g one would b e "contagious," and he ha d "never aske d my partners t o restor e th e Frenc h empir e o f 1805." 9 1 An d the four powers ' ambassador s hel d a rare meeting in Berlin—"to remin d the Germans who' s i n charge," as a French officia l pu t it. 92 German unificatio n continue d t o enjo y soli d officia l an d publi c sup -

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port i n th e Unite d States . Tha t goa l foun d clea r favo r wit h proportion ately mor e American s tha n Europeans , an d comparativel y fe w Ameri cans wer e worrie d b y th e prospec t o f a unifie d German y becomin g th e dominant powe r i n Europe . On e pol l indicate d tha t 4 6 percen t believe d unification woul d benefi t th e Unite d States , an d 2 5 percen t th e Sovie t Union. 93 Th e rapi d pac e o f revolutio n i n th e Eas t force d th e Bus h administration t o reac t deftly . In earl y November , whe n Gorbache v wrote t o Bus h endorsin g th e change s i n Eas t German y an d urgin g pru dence, Secretar y o f Stat e Bake r stil l opine d tha t i t wa s "prematur e t o jump, t o mak e th e grea t leap , an d i t i s a bi g leap, fro m th e righ t t o fre e travel o n par t o f Eas t Germans , t o th e questio n o f reunification." 94 Bu t the administratio n soo n confirme d tha t th e Federa l Republi c wa s it s favored all y and jumped o n the bandwagon o f unification. Th e followin g month, Presiden t Bus h outline d i n Brussel s hi s preferred conditions : fre e elections i n bot h Eas t an d Wes t Germany , respec t fo r th e Helsink i Fina l Act's stipulatio n tha t Europe' s postwa r boundarie s ca n b e change d onl y by peacefu l negotiation , an d Germany' s continuin g adhesio n t o NAT O and th e Europea n Community . Consultatio n wit h Bonn' s allie s an d Eastern neighbors , declare d Secretar y o f Stat e Bake r i n Wes t Berli n a week later , was essentia l t o this peaceful an d gradua l process. 95 Amidst thes e qualifyin g declarations , th e viabilit y o f Eas t German y was rapidl y ebbing . I n th e ne w year , emigrant s continue d t o flood int o the Federal Republi c at a rate of over two thousand a day. Social turmoi l and a growin g labo r shortag e wer e underminin g th e economy , prompt ing Koh l t o plea d wit h th e Eas t German s t o sta y an d wor k a t hom e fo r a bette r future . Meanwhile , tangibl e sign s o f d e fact o intra-Germa n integration multiplied , includin g a majo r gran t fro m Bon n fo r environ mental cleanu p projects , an d Wes t Germa n companie s wer e champin g at th e bi t t o mov e int o th e ne w marke t wit h investment s an d join t ventures. An d unificatio n becam e a prominen t sloga n o f Eas t Germa n demonstrators. By th e en d o f Januar y Eas t Germa n part y leade r Grego r Gys i wa s conceding tha t "thi s proces s ca n n o longe r b e stopped, " an d Gorbache v himself accommodate d th e inevitabl e whe n afte r conferrin g wit h th e harassed Prim e Minister Modro w h e insisted that al l the Helsinki partic ipants ha d t o b e include d i n th e discussio n o f Germa n unification . Th e SPD's Ego n Bah r exulted : "Ther e ar e n o longe r an y difference s betwee n our an d th e Sovie t Genera l Secretary' s views . I t i s n o longe r a questio n

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of if , bu t whe n ho w an d wha t for m a unifie d Germa n stat e migh t take." 9 6 Bac k i n Eas t Berlin , Modro w unveile d a pla n fo r a "unite d fatherland": Th e tw o Germany s woul d first develo p mechanism s fo r economic integration , the n join t institution s i n a militaril y neutra l con federation. Th e final stag e woul d b e th e creatio n o f a "unifie d Germa n state i n th e for m o f a Germa n federatio n throug h election s i n both part s of th e confederation , th e convenin g o f a singl e parliamen t whic h woul d decide o n a singl e constitutio n an d a singl e government , wit h it s sea t i n Berlin." Al l thi s woul d b e seale d b y a peac e treat y wit h th e wartim e allies.97 Modrow's pla n evoke d Stalin' s proposal s o f th e earl y 1950s , an d Chancellor Koh l promptly rejecte d th e provision fo r neutralit y a s well a s Foreign Ministe r Shevardnadze' s concurren t proposa l tha t Europeans , Americans, an d Canadian s al l vot e o r conduc t "wid e parliamentar y discussions" on the issue of unification . Bu t the domestic political appea l of unificatio n soo n le d Koh l t o forc e th e pace, pointing to the impendin g economic collaps e o f Eas t German y an d callin g fo r talk s o n a currenc y union. Soo n afte r th e Marc h elections , i n whic h th e triump h o f th e Christian Democrat s owe d muc h t o Kohl' s brib e o f a n equa l exchang e rate, th e term s wer e settle d fo r economi c an d monetar y unio n effectiv e July 2 , 1990 . Th e tw o Germa n government s agree d o n th e quic k rout e to unit y vi a Articl e 2 3 o f th e Federa l Republic' s constitutio n (whic h allowed th e individua l Eas t Germa n state s t o acced e t o th e Federa l Republic) an d o n th e desirabilit y o f earl y pan-Germa n elections , reflect ing Kohl' s hop e tha t hi s part y woul d benefi t fro m havin g bee n th e architect o f unification . Two Plus Four Make One. Th e Wester n allie s ha d tacitl y give n th e Germans fre e rei n t o prepar e fo r unity , th e onl y provis o bein g tha t th e new stat e shoul d remai n i n NATO . Neithe r Washingto n no r Bon n wishe d to hav e unificatio n negotiate d i n th e CSC E an d mad e hostag e t o th e consensus o f tha t comprehensiv e bu t unwield y forum . Yet , a s a senio r administration officia l affirmed , "ther e wa s th e realizatio n tha t th e pac e of event s wa s creatin g th e realit y tha t Germa n unificatio n wa s no t jus t an ide a whos e tim e ha d come , bu t a realit y tha t wa s upo n us." 9 8 Bon n and th e State Department therefor e devise d the "two-plus-four" formul a for negotiatin g th e term s o f a unificatio n tha t al l regarde d a s inevitable . The tw o Germany s woul d develo p th e domesti c term s o f unification ,

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leaving th e fou r principa l wartim e allie s t o exercis e thei r lega l right s b y addressing th e broade r securit y aspects . Th e othe r allie s an d CSC E participants, accordin g t o thi s scenario , woul d ratif y th e result s a t th e Helsinki summi t tentativel y schedule d fo r lat e 1990 . At the ope n skie s conference i n Ottaw a i n February , Foreig n Ministe r Shevardnadze gav e th e Sovie t Union' s assen t t o th e propose d frame work. Bu t i f unificatio n wa s inevitable , s o wa s th e reviva l o f apprehen sions amon g Germany' s neighbors . Whil e th e two-plus-fou r formul a served Bonn' s sens e o f urgency , i t offende d th e exclude d NAT O allies , particularly Ital y an d Belgium . Th e fou r power s responde d wit h th e promise o f forma l consultations , an d eventuall y o f a specia l NAT O meeting o n th e question . Th e Pole s wer e furious ; Prim e Ministe r Mazo wiecki proteste d tha t "ou r securit y matter s canno t b e settle d b y prox y for us. " Th e Stat e Departmen t contente d itsel f wit h observin g tha t Po land di d not hav e the same legal standin g a s the four powers , but thank s largely t o Frenc h pressur e o n Bonn , Polis h sensibilitie s wer e soothe d b y an invitatio n t o Warsa w t o participat e i n th e discussion s o n Germany' s eastern borders. " At thei r Cam p Davi d meetin g a fe w day s later , Bus h an d Koh l dis missed th e options o f neutralis m an d o f the French mode l an d confirme d the necessit y o f continuin g ful l Germa n membershi p i n NATO . Th e United States , declare d th e president , welcome d th e movemen t towar d unification an d regarde d Europe' s borders , includin g th e German-Polis h frontier, a s inviolable. Koh l stuc k t o hi s position tha t th e latte r principl e would hav e t o b e ratifie d b y a freel y elected , all-Germa n government . "U.S. militar y force s shoul d remai n statione d i n a unite d German y an d elsewhere i n Europe , a s a continuin g guaranto r o f stability, " sai d Bush ; "The enem y i s unpredictability." 100 It wa s sig n o f th e time s tha t th e emphasi s o n America' s militar y contribution t o stabilit y wa s widel y interprete d a s a reassuranc e t o Germany's neighbors . Germa n reunification , reflecte d forme r CI A director Richar d Helm s i n a n articl e i n th e Washington Post, "ha s becom e a kind o f runawa y freigh t trai n tha t nobody—Eas t o r West—seem s abl e to contain . And tha t doesn' t bod e well for th e future." 101 The onl y apprehensio n tha t reall y counte d wa s tha t o f th e Sovie t Union, an d Gorbache v remaine d adaman t throug h hi s summi t meetin g with Bus h i n Jun e tha t German y coul d no t remai n a ful l membe r o f NATO. Whil e th e Sovie t peopl e an d mos t o f thei r leader s ha d accepte d

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with goo d grac e the los s of th e res t o f Easter n Europe , the Germa n issu e struck a ra w nerve , revivin g histori c anxietie s a s wel l a s concer n a t th e potential los s o f influenc e i n Centra l Europe . On e opinio n pol l indicate d that the majority o f Soviet s approved o f unification bu t opposed Germa n membership i n NATO. 1 0 2 Th e Kremli n insiste d tha t a CF E treat y limi t Germany's arme d force s an d propose d variousl y tha t th e countr y b e nonaligned, neutralized, a member o f both alliances , or, at the very least , suspend (a s Franc e ha d done ) it s militar y participatio n i n th e alliance ; European security , argue d th e Soviets , shoul d b e guarantee d b y a ne w regime buil t o n th e CSC E tha t woul d supersed e bot h NAT O an d th e Warsaw Pact . The ga p betwee n Eas t an d Wes t ove r Germany' s statu s coul d no t b e easily bridged . Secretar y o f Stat e Bake r ha d endorse d Genscher' s Febru ary suggestio n tha t th e easter n par t o f a unite d German y b e demilitar ized, a s wel l a s a late r compromis e formul a allowin g Sovie t force s t o remain ther e temporarily . Bon n expresse d readines s t o pa y th e cos t o f Soviet force s i n th e forme r GD R an d t o fulfil l Eas t Germany' s commer cial contract s wit h th e Sovie t Union , an d i t dangle d befor e Mosco w th e lure o f substantia l economi c benefits . Bu t th e Wester n allies , includin g Kohl, wer e a s adaman t a s Gorbache v o n th e issu e o f allianc e member ship. The impass e nevertheles s reveale d a malais e withi n bot h alliances . In th e Warsa w Pact , Czechoslovakia , Hungary , an d Polan d brok e rank s in openly endorsing German membershi p i n NATO a s the best guarante e of stability . An d i n th e West , ambivalenc e abou t th e emergenc e o f a dominant German y wa s mixe d wit h uncertaint y abou t th e futur e rol e of NATO an d th e United States . Although Mosco w seeme d prepare d t o le t social an d economi c unio n procee d whil e th e militar y statu s remaine d unresolved, th e German s wer e impatient t o secur e full sovereignty . The Germa n questio n thu s reimpose d itsel f wit h dramati c suddennes s on th e internationa l agenda . Fo r muc h o f thei r histor y th e Germani c people ha d live d i n severa l separat e states , bu t a hal f centur y afte r th e end o f th e Secon d Worl d Wa r n o on e openl y dispute d thei r righ t t o self determination an d unification . Warne d a senio r officia l i n Bon n si x months befor e th e fal l o f th e Wall , "I f anyone , afte r th e en d o f th e division o f Europe , shoul d insis t tha t German y mus t no t b e unifie d an d that Germans , uniquely, should b e denied the right to self-determination , then the y woul d b e threatenin g seriousl y Germany' s anchorag e i n th e West." 103 Sensitiv e t o foreig n criticis m o f Bonn' s hast e i n seekin g na -

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tional unit y an d o f th e restrictiv e two-plus-fou r formula , Gensche r as sured a meeting o f Europea n Communit y foreig n minister s i n Dublin o n February 20 , 1990 , tha t "nothin g wil l happe n behin d th e back s o f th e four power s an d nothin g wil l happe n behin d th e back s o f ou r Europea n partners." 1 0 4 The New York Times editorialize d o n Novembe r 19 , 1989 , tha t "neither Europeans , Russians , Americans , no r indee d Germa n leader s themselves ar e ready or eager to se e a Fourth Reich, " and i t subsequentl y adopted a n apprehensiv e ton e abou t th e pac e o f unification , bu t mos t Americans remaine d sanguin e abou t th e prospect . Th e sam e coul d no t be sai d fo r al l o f Germany' s neighbors . Th e lat e Frenc h autho r Francoi s Mauriac's aphorism , "J'aime tellement VAllemagne que je prefere quil y en ait deux" ( I lov e German y s o muc h tha t I prefer tw o o f them) , wa s quoted frequentl y afte r th e openin g o f th e Berli n Wall . Th e Wes t Ger man embass y i n Paris reported o n th e skepticism o f the French "politica l class" a s forme r foreig n ministe r Jea n Francois-Ponce t publicl y frette d about th e "economi c an d politica l hegemon y o f a natio n o f 8 0 millio n inhabitants becomin g th e industria l colossu s o f Europe." 105 Earl y sur veys indicate d tha t th e majorit y o f Frenchme n favore d unificatio n whil e remaining worrie d abou t th e economi c weigh t o f a n enlarge d Ger many. 106 B y autumn, wit h unificatio n a reality , a pol l showe d tha t onl y 37 percent o f th e French wer e pleased . The predominan t concer n i n governin g circle s wa s tha t Wes t Ger many, i n Jacques Delors' s words , "woul d b e tempted b y a destin y othe r than th e constructio n o f Europe." 1 0 7 An d on e bi g Germany , frette d th e Economist, "coul d out-argu e an d out-manoeuvr e th e mer e Britain s an d Frances an d Italy s o n an y issu e where it s interests differe d fro m theirs." 108 Willy Brand t use d t o observ e disparagingl y tha t "th e Germa n questio n is a Frenc h question. " Mitterran d insiste d tha t h e wa s no t afrai d o f reunification, bu t th e strategi c balanc e an d politica l stabilit y o f th e emerging Europ e i s boun d t o b e teste d b y th e reaffirmatio n o f pan German interest s an d th e weight o f a self-confident Germany. 109 In part s o f Easter n Europe , th e prospec t o f unificatio n revive d ol d fears. Pole s ar e th e mos t sensitive ; a pluralit y o f thos e surveye d i n January 199 0 oppose d unification , an d a majorit y expresse d fea r abou t Germany seekin g territoria l expansion. 110 Arguin g i n favo r o f Germa n membership i n NATO, Foreig n Ministe r Krzysto f Kubiszewsk i observe d at a Warsa w Pac t meetin g tha t neutralit y coul d "foste r tendencie s tha t

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might lea d German y t o b e a grea t power o n it s own." 1 1 1 Bonn' s prevar ication regardin g th e Oder-Neiss e frontie r onl y fuele d thes e apprehen sions. Polish treatie s wit h th e GD R i n 195 0 an d th e Federa l Republi c i n 1970 confirme d tha t boundary , bu t Wes t Germa n leaders , seekin g t o appease right-win g irredentist s an d th e domesti c lobb y o f postwa r refugees (som e 1 3 million German s wer e expelle d fro m th e Sudetenlan d an d the territorie s transferre d t o Poland) , occasionall y invoke d th e lac k o f a peace treat y t o qualif y thes e commitments . Koh l o n hi s visit t o Warsa w and i n his November 198 9 program fo r unificatio n skirte d th e issue, an d he commente d rathe r disingenuousl y (considerin g th e sweepin g claim s of th e Basi c Law) that , whil e th e 197 0 treat y boun d Wes t German y an d Poland, a s Wes t Germa n chancello r h e wa s "no t authorize d t o mak e declarations o n behal f o f [all ] Germany." 112 H e subsequentl y mad e border guarantee s conditiona l o n agreemen t b y Warsa w t o renounc e war reparation s claim s and t o grant recognition an d right s to its Germa n minority. Th e Polis h governmen t thereupo n threatene d t o delive r a bil l for th e labo r o f th e millio n Pole s force d t o wor k i n Naz i Germany . Th e discord prompte d th e Kremli n a s wel l a s Bonn' s allies , includin g Presi dent Bush, to affir m th e permanence o f the Oder-Neiss e frontier . Fearin g for th e progres s o f unification , th e tw o Germa n parliament s i n Jun e formally recognize d th e frontier . Concern i n Germany' s othe r vulnerabl e neighbor , Czechoslovakia , has bee n mor e muted . Presiden t Have l pai d hi s firs t foreig n visit s t o th e two Germanys , declarin g diplomaticall y tha t "a s lon g a s i t remain s peaceful an d democratic , i t ca n b e a s larg e a s i t wants. " Bu t hi s earlie r suggestion tha t Czechoslovak s apologiz e fo r th e postwa r expulsio n o f the German s dre w th e ir e o f man y o f hi s compatriots , an d Prague' s historic fears inspire d it s insistence that a united German y remain subjec t to th e constraint s o f NAT O membership. 113 Th e Hungarians , fo r thei r part, baske d i n th e goodwil l generate d i n Bonn b y their earlie r actio n o n refugees an d enthusiasticall y endorse d unification . Some Eas t European s fea r Germa n irredentism , other s Germany' s growing economi c an d politica l influence , bu t thei r mor e immediat e an d pragmatic concer n i s that Bon n will concentrat e it s economic aid on Eas t Germany a t thei r expense . Th e fea r o f irredentis m ma y b e appease d b y appropriate internationa l guarantee s an d th e progressive unificatio n o f a liberal democratic Europe; the sense of vulnerability t o ostensibly benig n

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forms o f influenc e i s likel y t o endure . Althoug h th e diminuatio n o f Franco-German enmit y set s a promisin g precedent , tha t reconciliatio n came abou t onl y whe n th e Frenc h recovere d thei r economi c self-confi dence an d acquired , thank s t o d e Gaulle , th e visio n o f a Europea n mission. Germany' s Eas t Europea n neighbor s ar e too smal l an d wea k t o shed thei r ambivalenc e abou t a futur e i n th e shado w o f tha t powerfu l country. In th e fac e o f suc h Easter n an d Wester n apprehensions , Bon n too k some pains to assur e its neighbors an d allie s that i t remained steadfas t i n its commitmen t t o NAT O an d Europea n unit y an d consciou s o f th e interests o f other s i n it s pursuit o f unification . "I t woul d b e anti-histori cal an d implausibl e t o asser t tha t i t i s a matte r fo r th e German s alon e whether an d ho w the y freel y determin e thei r fat e an d whethe r the y follow thei r pat h wit h o r agains t thei r neighbors, " sai d Koh l soothingl y in acceptin g a n honorar y doctorat e fro m th e Catholi c Universit y o f Lublin. 114 Bu t th e architect s o f a ne w Europ e wil l hav e n o eas y tim e drawing u p a blueprin t tha t accommodate s th e reemergin g nationa l interests an d historica l animosities . The stabilit y o f th e proces s o f reconstructio n migh t hav e bee n aided , and th e apprehension s o f Germany' s neighbor s forestalled , ha d Bon n responded t o th e Eas t Germa n revolutio n b y abrogatin g it s constitu tional commitmen t t o unification , recognizin g th e sovereignt y o f th e emerging democrati c Eas t Germa n stat e an d treatin g it s citizen s lik e al l others t o sto p th e hemorrhag e o f it s population . Th e Unite d State s a s well as the other allie s could, in turn, hav e indicated tha t unificatio n wa s not a primar y objectiv e bu t a residua l optio n o n th e roa d t o a united , secure, an d democrati c Europe . Bu t th e powerfu l nationalisti c passion s inspired b y th e fal l o f th e Wal l an d th e realizatio n o n bot h side s tha t without tha t shelte r th e Eas t Germa n econom y migh t collaps e drov e th e leaders o f th e tw o Germany s t o presen t th e worl d wit h a fai t accompli . Fears abou t Gorbachev' s futur e als o impelle d Koh l t o "brin g th e ha y into the bar n befor e th e storm. " Backed b y Wes t Germany' s politica l an d economi c power , d e fact o unification lef t eve n Gorbache v wit h littl e optio n bu t t o endors e th e principle whil e fighting a rearguard actio n o n th e issu e of alliances . An d no on e i n th e Wes t wa s prepare d t o compromis e eve n temporaril y o n the principl e o f self-determination . Th e nee d t o accommodat e th e Ger mans cause d Delor s t o advis e th e Europea n Parliamen t tha t Eas t Ger -

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many wa s a specia l cas e an d coul d joi n th e Europea n Communit y b y virtue o f th e Community' s commitmen t t o Germa n unification . Amon g Western leaders , onl y Prim e Ministe r Thatche r openl y expresse d reser vations abou t automaticall y takin g i n " a stat e tha t ha d bee n eithe r Communist o r Naz i sinc e th e 1930s." 1 1 5 Thus , paradoxically , th e Ger mans, wh o bea r heav y responsibilit y fo r th e East Europeans ' absorptio n into a Sovie t empir e i n th e aftermat h o f Hitler' s war , successfull y im posed th e primac y o f thei r nationa l interest s i n th e reconstructio n o f Europe. The histori c dea l tha t effectivel y ende d th e Secon d Worl d Wa r wa s forged b y Kohl an d Gorbache v a t the latter's holiday retrea t in Stavropo l on Jul y 16 . Unite d German y coul d remai n i n NATO . It s arme d forces woul d b e reduce d t o 370,00 0 (th e Wes t Germa n Bundesweh r alone ha d som e 480,000 ) an d coul d b e deploye d i n th e Easter n regio n (made ou t o f bound s t o othe r NAT O forces ) afte r th e las t Sovie t troop s had lef t i n 1994 . Until then, German y woul d pa y fo r maintenanc e o f th e Soviet garrison an d contribut e (i n a n amoun t late r se t a t $8. 8 billion ) t o the cos t o f resettlin g th e troop s i n th e Sovie t Union . An d a s a furthe r bribe, Koh l offere d $ 3 billio n i n government-guarantee d credit s t o hel p Moscow repa y it s deb t t o Germany . German y renounce d atomic , chem ical, an d biologica l weapons , an d a nonaggressio n pledg e an d bilatera l treaty o n economi c cooperatio n wer e als o part o f what Foreig n Ministe r Genscher terme d th e Final Settlement. The day after th e Stavropol break through (christene d Stavrapall o b y historicall y minde d skeptics) , a two plus-four meetin g i n Pari s satisfie d Polan d wit h Germany' s promis e t o make al l the necessary lega l provisions fo r unqualifie d recognitio n o f th e Oder-Neisse frontier . On Septembe r 12 , th e si x foreig n minister s ceremoniall y signe d th e two-plus-four treat y i n Moscow , an d o n Octobe r 3 , Germany' s unifica tion wa s consummated . I n Berlin , whic h a t Eas t Germa n insistenc e wa s to becom e th e ne w capital , th e origina l allie d power s gav e u p thei r occupation rights ; American , British , an d Frenc h troop s woul d remai n as guest s unti l th e Soviet s departed . "I n th e future , onl y peac e wil l emanate fro m Germa n soil, " declare d Kohl . "W e wil l resolutel y con tinue t o striv e fo r Europea n unificatio n wit h th e sam e determinatio n with whic h w e worked towar d Germa n unity." 116 If ther e wa s genera l satisfactio n wit h th e term s o f thi s settlement , th e same coul d no t b e sai d fo r th e proces s tha t le d t o it . Presiden t Bush' s

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notion tha t th e United State s and German y were destined t o be "partner s in leadership " wa s belie d b y Kohl' s voluntaristi c diplomacy . I n hi s sin gle-minded pursui t o f a compromis e wit h Gorbachev , th e Wes t Germa n chancellor ha d faile d t o consul t hi s allies , an d Secretar y o f Stat e Baker, fo r one , was less than pleased . To b e sure, the terms were broadl y consistent wit h Washington' s prescriptions , bu t bilatera l agreemen t o n troop level s an d denuclearizatio n an d th e implici t economi c brib e wen t beyond th e West' s coordinate d strategy . Bonn' s unilateralis m arouse d apprehensions i n othe r allie d capital s a s well . Britis h distast e fo r a German-dominated Europ e wa s expose d i n th e impoliti c remark s o f Nicholas Ridley , on e o f Mrs . Thatcher' s ministers. 117 An d whe n Presi dent Mitterran d me t Koh l a t Munic h i n September , hi s causti c referenc e to rivalrie s an d misunderstanding s i n th e ne w Europ e implie d a coolin g in Franco-Germa n relations . The centralit y o f German y i n th e continen tal balanc e o f powe r ha d bee n reaffirmed , bu t historica l memorie s a s well a s ne w economi c realitie s mad e fo r uneasines s a s European s an d North American s se t t o th e tas k o f devisin g a ne w architectur e fo r th e post-cold-war era . Europeanism and Regionalism. A s Gorbachev relaxe d th e strictures of Pax Sovietica in Eastern Europe , the possibilities of geopolitica l transfor mation an d realignmen t bega n t o excit e th e imagination . Afte r concen trating fo r decade s o n th e possibilities o f nurturin g evolutionar y change , the Wes t wa s drive n t o devis e a n effectiv e strateg y fo r consolidatin g politically an d economicall y th e Eas t Europea n revolution s an d rework ing European securit y arrangements . The maintenanc e o f Europe' s stabilit y an d securit y a s th e Sovie t empire recede s wil l b e n o eas y task , fo r onc e again , a s i n th e aftermat h of th e Firs t Worl d War , ther e wil l reemerg e a collectio n o f wea k state s diverse i n thei r politica l an d economi c development , divide d b y ethni c feuds, an d jealou s o f thei r ne w autonomy . Whil e seekin g close r associa tion wit h th e West , the y wil l hav e t o accommodat e Russia' s endurin g influence an d securit y interests . I n thi s diversifie d an d pluralisti c setting , there will be a greater nee d than eve r for a steady an d concerte d Wester n approach. When i n September 198 9 Deputy Secretar y o f State Eagleburger warne d of a "tendenc y fo r th e membe r state s o f th e NAT O Allianc e t o compet e in expanding thei r relations with the East," the East European revolutio n

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was incomplet e an d th e Wester n response s wer e ye t t o b e full y formu lated. Bu t hi s observatio n tha t th e Wes t European s ha d "th e principa l political stak e in making th e transition t o a new an d undivide d Europ e a peaceful an d orderl y one " reflecte d th e Bus h administration' s pragmati c disposition t o pas s th e torc h t o th e allies. 118 In th e 1960s , Kissinge r ha d similarly voice d a preference fo r leavin g th e frustratin g proble m o f East ern Europ e t o th e Wes t Europeans , an d i n th e mid-1980s , Brzezinsk i argued fo r th e latter to assum e a greater shar e of the burden wit h respec t to militar y securit y a s well. As America n polic y move d beyon d containment , Wester n Europe' s considerable asset s an d it s proximit y t o Eas t Europ e seeme d t o justif y such a transfer o f responsibilit y awa y fro m th e United States . And a s th e salience of Easter n Europ e i n American polic y waned, th e necessity gre w for reformulatin g Europea n polic y t o encompas s th e East . Bu t th e Wes t Europeans di d no t shar e commo n interest s o r a uniform strateg y towar d the East . Th e German s wer e th e mos t deepl y involve d commerciall y an d disposed t o asser t specia l interest s an d competence , an d indee d th e notion o f a German-le d Mitteleuropa resurface d i n debate s amon g Wes t German intellectual s an d politicians . Chancello r Koh l tried to embed th e concept i n the spiri t o f Europeanness : Because of our geographic situation and because of our history, we Germans are obligated t o maintain goo d relations with West and East. For us Germans there are man y historica l tie s t o th e East . W e shar e a dee p understandin g o f th e cultural unity of Europe, in all its variety and with all its differences. We consider our neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe—not onl y in this cultural sense— as parts of Europe. 119 As the y tur n westward , Eas t European s pragmaticall y welcom e th e ma terial benefit s o f Germa n economi c influence , bu t Germany' s closes t neighbors, Polan d an d Czechoslovakia , i f no t others , fea r excessiv e de pendence. German y a s th e predominan t regiona l powe r hold s littl e ap peal fo r them . Mos t Eas t European s identif y neithe r wit h a Germa n Mitteleuropa no r wit h a Russian-oriente d Easter n Europ e bu t simpl y with Europe. 120 Attempts t o conjur e u p a distinctiv e Centra l Europ e excludin g th e Germans appea r eve n mor e unrealisti c an d anachronisti c i n th e ag e o f European integratio n an d a globa l economy , an d a t a tim e whe n com munications technolog y i s inducin g a homogenizatio n o f cultura l an d political values . Nostalgi a fo r a n embellishe d Habsbur g er a an d a sens e

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of vulnerability i n the new pluralistic, market environmen t ma y howeve r momentarily len d forc e t o a quest fo r ne w regiona l linkages . The "Eas t Europe " stretchin g fro m th e Balti c t o th e Blac k Se a wa s a geopolitical fabrication , no t a natura l agglomeratio n o f strategi c an d economic interests . Th e integratio n impose d throug h th e Warsa w Pac t and CME A scarcel y reduce d th e cultura l diversit y an d th e economi c disparities withi n th e region . Historica l interest s an d cleavage s resur faced i n th e wak e o f th e 198 9 revolutions . Poland , Czechoslovakia , Hungary, Slovenia , an d Croati a wer e bus y reorientin g themselve s west ward, an d democratizatio n wa s proceedin g mor e smoothl y ther e tha n i n the Balkans . Th e proble m o f ethni c minoritie s soo n reemerge d i n Hun gary's relation s wit h it s neighbors , an d i n Polish-Germa n relation s a s well. Divisiv e ethni c nationalis m straine d federa l Czechoslovaki a an d Yugoslavia a s well a s unitary Romania . Ideas fo r multilatera l cooperatio n hav e proliferated . In earl y Januar y 1990, Brzezinsk i suggeste d tha t Polan d an d Czechoslovaki a joi n force s in a confederatio n t o fill th e vacuu m o f powe r betwee n German y an d the Soviet Union, recyclin g the simila r schem e of th e Polish government in-exile during the war. Neither Pragu e nor Warsaw warme d t o the idea . The Pole s di d loo k worthwar d t o Balti c cooperation , especiall y wit h secessionist Lithuania . Czechoslovakia' s Have l convene d a summit meet ing wit h Polan d an d Hungar y a t Bratislav a i n Apri l t o coordinat e th e three countries ' retur n t o Europe , bu t th e initiativ e le d nowhere . Ital y was instrumenta l i n convertin g th e earlie r Alpine-Adri a Workin g Grou p into a "Pentagonal " associatio n includin g Austria , Czechoslovakia , Hungary, an d Yugoslavia . A t it s meeting i n August a t Venice, the grou p developed ambitiou s plan s fo r cooperatio n i n suc h functiona l sphere s a s transport an d th e environment , bu t th e Eas t Europea n member s mad e clear tha t thei r overridin g interes t la y i n joinin g th e Europea n Commu nity. Budapes t als o raise d th e possibilit y o f "Tisza-Carpathian " cooper ation linkin g easter n Hungar y wit h easter n Slovakia , sub-Carpathia n Ukraine, an d Serbia' s Vojvodin a province , region s tha t no t coinciden tally all have Hungarian minorities . And Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia , and Turke y hav e als o talked o f close r cooperation . Some o f thes e regiona l linkage s ma y deepe n an d serv e usefu l ends , but the y wil l neithe r assum e th e function s o f th e Warsa w Pac t an d CMEA no r serv e a s a n alternativ e t o associatio n wit h th e Europea n Community. Give n th e region' s diversity , th e goa l o f Communit y mem -

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bership wil l no t b e reache d b y collectiv e effort , an d th e Eas t European s are realisticall y concentratin g o n bilatera l diplomac y t o approac h it . Inevitably, th e solidarit y bor n ou t o f rejectio n o f Sovie t hegemon y i s rapidly givin g way t o discret e definition s o f nationa l interest . If Eas t European s hav e mixe d feeling s abou t th e prospec t o f a Ger man-led Mitteleuropa, th e othe r Wes t European s ar e equall y coo l t o th e idea. Only France has persisted i n pursuing continental interests , a prominent on e bein g t o bin d German y economicall y an d militaril y int o a European community . Thi s interes t als o inspire d th e agreemen t i n earl y 1988 o n close r Franco-Germa n militar y cooperation , includin g th e for mation o f a mixe d Franco-Germa n brigad e statione d i n th e Federa l Republic. Th e Gaullis t campaig n t o reinforc e autonom y i n Easter n Eu rope trie d t o bypas s Mosco w bu t faile d t o pa y dividends , an d France' s subsequent championin g o f huma n right s i n th e Eas t wa s marre d b y it s premature hostin g o f Jaruzelski an d Honecker . No r wa s th e activ e pur suit o f huma n right s an d cultura l relation s matche d i n th e economi c sphere, for, d e Gaulle's legac y o f industrial modernizatio n notwithstand ing, France remaine d a minor playe r i n East-West trade . And yet , despit e it s modes t an d inconsistentl y applie d policie s i n th e past, France remained th e most promising generato r o f a concerted Wes t European polic y toward s Easter n Europe . Bon n wa s hampere d b y it s special interest s an d imag e problems . Prim e Ministe r Thatche r wa s a n eloquent advocat e o f liberalizatio n i n th e East , bu t Britain' s grudgin g approach t o a deepenin g o f th e Community' s politica l an d economi c integration undermine d it s credibilit y a s a n agen t o f deepe r a s wel l a s broader Europea n unification . Th e notio n tha t Franc e coul d European ize Ostpolitik b y infusin g i t wit h a ne w politica l driv e an d visio n ha d some advocate s a t th e Qua i d'Orsay . Dominiqu e Moisi , associat e direc tor o f th e Frenc h Institut e o f Internationa l Relations , commente d tha t France i s "the onl y trul y politica l entit y tha t coul d pla y a decisive role i n the constructio n o f a politically unifie d Europe , provided [it ] surmount s its economi c weakness" ; ideally , h e added , a Europea n Ostpolitik shoul d "combine Germany' s pragmatis m wit h France' s antitotalitaria n criti cism," meaning , presumably , Germa n mone y an d Frenc h politica l pur 121

pose. The revolution s i n th e Eas t onl y accentuate d th e nee d fo r a pan European strategy . Gorbachev' s notio n o f a "commo n Europea n home " with roo m fo r th e Soviet Union evoke d d e Gaulle's vision of a revitalize d

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Europe fro m th e Atlanti c t o th e Urals ; i t als o invite d leadershi p tha t transcends frontier s an d historica l animositie s an d i s respectful o f dem ocratic value s an d th e requisite s o f th e balanc e o f power . Europ e i s nervous abou t th e prospect o f Germa n leadership , even though German s are hardl y beref t o f politica l wisdom . Franc e i s a mino r nuclea r powe r and ha s recovered it s economic self-confidence. A certain complementar ity o f interest s an d asset s mak e th e tw o nation s idea l partner s i n th e enterprise o f reunitin g Europe . Franco-Germa n collaboratio n i n th e de velopment o f a Communit y polic y toward s th e Eas t ca n bot h serv e French securit y interest s an d mitigat e th e apprehension s tha t Germa n unilateralism ca n arous e i n both Eas t an d West . "The rapprochemen t o f th e tw o Europe s constitute s fo r us , Europe ans, th e grea t tas k o f thi s en d o f th e centur y (la grande affaire de cette fin de siecle)" announce d Presiden t Mitterran d i n 1 9 8 8 . m Th e postwa r reconciliation o f Frenc h an d Germans , facilitate d b y ne w supranationa l institutions, wa s alread y a signa l accomplishment . Th e mos t obviou s framework fo r promotin g a continenta l visio n remain s th e Europea n Community, an d Easter n Europ e could provide the stimulus fo r realizin g the long-cherished visio n o f a common Communit y foreig n policy . A salutar y preceden t wa s se t whe n th e Organizatio n fo r Economi c Cooperation an d Developmen t assigne d th e tas k o f coordinatin g ai d fo r Poland an d Hungar y t o th e Commission . Jacque s Delors , th e Commis sion president, approache d th e task with a keen sense of historic mission . President Mitterran d ros e t o th e challeng e wit h eloquen t speeche s link ing Europea n unit y an d th e reintegratio n o f th e Eas t Europeans . Hi s efforts t o harmoniz e Wes t Europea n responses , especiall y th e Europea n development ban k initiative , wer e partl y calculate d t o constrai n an d Europeanize Bonn' s economi c penetratio n o f th e East . Mitterrand' s ur gency als o cam e fro m concer n tha t Bon n woul d los e it s ardo r fo r Euro pean unit y a s i t concentrate d o n th e rehabilitatio n o f th e forme r Eas t Germany an d pursue d othe r ne w opportunitie s i n the East . Indeed, ther e soo n appeare d i n th e Europea n Communit y a diver gence between "deepeners " and "wideners, " between thos e (mainl y France, Italy, an d th e Commission ) wh o wante d rapi d progres s toward s eco nomic an d monetar y union , an d commo n securit y an d foreig n policies , and other s mor e willin g t o rela x th e pac e o f integratio n i n orde r t o facilitate expansion . Th e latte r tendenc y wa s displaye d b y Wes t Ger many's Gensche r i n Octobe r 1989 , an d althoug h Bon n subsequentl y

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reaffirmed it s Communit y loyaltie s i t becam e understandabl y preoccu pied wit h Eas t Germany . Th e Community , argue d Delors , "mus t no t only strengthe n itsel f bu t als o maintai n th e hope s o f others. " Hi s strat egy wa s t o maintai n th e momentu m o f federalization , t o buil d a stron g and unite d Communit y tha t coul d forg e a mutuall y beneficia l relation ship wit h neutra l neighbors . H e hope d tha t th e creatio n o f a "Europea n Economic Space, " a ne w structure d relationshi p unde r discussio n wit h the Europea n Fre e Trad e Association , coul d b e extende d t o includ e th e East Europeans. 123 Mitterrand , fo r hi s part , trie d t o rid e bot h horses , unveiling i n Marc h 199 0 a visionar y bu t elusiv e schem e fo r pan-Euro pean "confederation " an d th e nex t mont h joinin g Koh l i n proposin g a political unio n o f th e Twelv e b y 1993 , with commo n foreig n an d secu rity policies. Finlandization and Beyond. Th e Unite d State s an d Wester n Europ e must gir d an d coordinat e thei r policie s a t a time when th e temptatio n i s great t o passivel y relis h thei r ideologica l victor y ove r Marxism-Lenin ism. Th e Sovie t socialis t paradig m ha s registere d wha t Brzezinsk i calle d the "gran d failure " o f th e century. 124 Th e ne w paradig m i s liberalism . The necessar y radica l change s i n Eas t Europea n structure s an d attitude s are boun d t o creat e socia l stres s an d ma y ye t b e displace d b y regressio n to authoritarianism , especiall y i n th e Sovie t Union . Bu t th e wav e o f reform ha s lef t it s mark, jus t a s fifty years o f socialis m hav e lef t th e Eas t Europeans impoverished , insecure , an d unprepare d fo r th e har d roa d back withou t Wester n help . Eastern Europe' s futur e depend s no t onl y o n it s ow n resourcefulnes s but als o o n th e evolutio n o f Sovie t polic y an d th e readines s o f a unite d West t o offe r th e appropriat e inducement s an d reassurances . Th e hoar y concept o f Finlandizatio n ha s bee n evoke d mor e ofte n a s a threa t t o Western solidarit y tha n a s a n escap e fo r th e Eas t European s fro m th e Soviet embrace . It s applicabilit y t o muc h o f Easter n Europ e wa s ques tionable, sinc e in terms o f Sovie t security Finland' s periphera l locatio n i s hardly comparabl e t o th e strategi c importanc e o f Poland , Czechoslova kia, o r Eas t Germany . An d whil e Finlan d prospered , i t ha d t o pa y political tribut e t o th e Sovie t Unio n i n refusin g t o accep t Marshal l Pla n aid, exercisin g considerabl e self-censorshi p (notabl y o n th e subjec t o f Soviet-Communist attempt s a t subversion an d blackmail) , and refrainin g from officia l condemnatio n o f th e Sovie t invasion s o f Hungary , Czecho -

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Slovakia, an d Afghanistan . Still , i f Gorbachev' s versio n o f detent e i s allowed t o mature , th e Eas t European s wil l inevitabl y clai m th e Yalt a promise o f which , s o far , Finlan d ha s bee n th e sol e beneficiary. Finland , in turn , ma y find it s sovereignt y les s qualifie d an d ma y serv e agai n a s a test cas e o f Sovie t permissiveness . Significantly , o n a visi t t o Helsink i i n October 1989 , Gorbache v depicte d Finland' s neutralit y a s a positiv e feature rathe r tha n a s a concession b y the Soviet Union . The suitabilit y o f th e Austria n mode l o f self-impose d neutralit y a s a road t o th e Europea n Communit y i s abou t t o b e tested . Th e Vienn a State Treat y o f 195 5 prohibit s economi c an d politica l unio n wit h Ger many, bu t th e concurrentl y adopte d neutralit y la w doe s no t explicitl y preclude broade r international , nonmilitar y commitments . A s Austri a prepared t o submi t it s applicatio n fo r membership , th e Sovie t attitud e was tha t suc h a ste p wa s inconsisten t wit h permanen t neutrality . Mem bership woul d bin d Austri a t o follo w "al l decision s take n i n th e frame work o f th e Community, " observe d th e Sovie t spokesman Gennad i Ger asimov, an d "th e majorit y o f th e member s o f th e Communit y ar e als o members o f NATO o r o f th e Western Europea n Union." 125 Neutrality present s problem s fo r th e Communit y a s wel l a t a tim e when th e coordinatio n o f foreig n an d securit y policie s mandate d b y th e Single European Ac t get s unde r way . I f neutralit y prevent s Austri a fro m accepting securit y obligation s an d joinin g th e Community , ther e remai n other mechanism s fo r close r association , bu t fo r it s Easter n neighbor s the roa d t o Europea n integratio n i s boun d t o b e eve n longe r an d mor e difficult. Thei r greates t fear , tha t th e singl e marke t schedule d fo r 199 2 will onl y accentuat e th e isolatio n o f thei r falterin g economies , ca n b e assuaged b y bilatera l trad e concession s an d ai d programs. Th e Commu nity ha s alread y sen t th e appropriat e differentiatin g signal s i n it s trad e negotiations, favorin g th e mor e democrati c Eas t Europea n countries . But a n emergin g parado x o f Europea n reunificatio n i s tha t th e mor e rapid th e progress towar d politica l integratio n o f th e Twelve, the greate r the hurdle s fo r Eas t European s t o Communit y membership . Conversely , attempts t o accommodat e th e specia l geopolitica l circumstance s o f th e East ma y imped e suc h progress . On e happ y circumstanc e i s strong pop ular suppor t i n th e Wes t fo r eventua l adherenc e o f th e Eas t European s to th e Community ; a surve y i n January 199 0 showe d larg e majoritie s i n France an d Britai n (a s wel l a s i n th e Unite d State s an d Poland ) i n favo r of tha t prospect. 126

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Further integratio n o f th e existin g Communit y shoul d no t b e mad e hostage t o th e uncertaintie s o f chang e i n th e East . Th e Warsa w Pac t i s becoming a looser an d les s militarized association , bu t i t is premature t o bank o n it s earl y dissolutio n an d th e codifie d neutralit y o f an y o f it s members. Th e Community , fo r it s part, ca n accommodat e a nonaligne d Ireland bu t presumabl y no t member s wh o als o belon g t o th e Warsa w Pact or who ar e formally neutra l i n a politically sensitiv e zone. The mor e realistic scenari o i s fo r som e Eas t Europea n countrie s t o wi n sufficien t latitude i n thei r foreig n relation s t o obtai n a for m o f associatio n wit h EFTA an d th e Communit y tha t i s not incompatibl e wit h Sovie t securit y interests. Indeed, afte r Mosco w accepte d membershi p o f a unite d German y i n NATO, th e optio n o f neutralit y los t muc h o f it s appeal , an d attentio n focused o n complementary , pan-Europea n securit y regimes . Whe n Henr y Kissinger proposed, i n a lecture a t Prague on June 20, 1990 , the creatio n of a neutral bel t consistin g o f Poland , Czechoslovakia , an d Hungar y (i n addition t o Austria) , th e immediat e reactio n wa s tha t Czechoslovaki a had n o interest in serving as a new buffe r zone . The emerging attitud e o f the countrie s concerne d wa s represente d i n Hungaria n Foreig n Ministe r Geza Jeszenszky's reflectio n th e followin g mont h tha t "i f th e Col d Wa r is hopefully an d happil y reall y ove r an d th e Sovie t Unio n an d th e Wes t no longe r regar d eac h othe r a s enemies, then i t no longe r make s sens e t o declare onesel f neutral." 1 2 7 Whatever ne w structur e o f securit y ma y emerge , i t i s imperativ e fo r the Communit y t o forge a consensus, to signa l to the East Europeans th e terms o f associatio n the y wil l hav e t o satisf y an d assur e the m tha t the y will receiv e equa l an d unifor m consideration . Suc h a blueprin t wil l hel p focus th e policie s o f reformis t regimes . Th e Unite d State s ca n hel p for mulate th e criteri a fo r a concerte d Wester n approach , no t leas t i n th e sphere o f militar y security . Th e Bus h administratio n recognize s tha t th e revolutions i n th e Eas t an d militar y disengagemen t magnif y th e impor tance o f constructin g a politicall y cohesiv e Europ e possesse d o f militar y as wel l a s economi c self-confidence . Th e presiden t note d tha t a unifie d European communit y o f nation s coul d b e " a magne t tha t draw s th e forces o f refor m forwar d i n Eastern Europe." 128 America and the Architecture of Europe, America' s Eas t Europea n dilemmas ar e rapidl y mergin g int o th e genera l proble m o f th e futur e o f

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Europe. As Washington weave s togethe r th e variou s strand s o f it s Euro pean policies , it s interest s dictat e a secur e an d unifie d Europe . Tha t means no t onl y expansio n an d intensificatio n o f institutiona l relation s with th e Communit y bu t als o a reassessment o f th e actua l an d desirabl e balance o f power an d interest s amon g it s members . The progres s o f militar y disengagemen t i n Centra l Europ e an d Ger man unificatio n raise s ne w securit y problems . In the era o f containment , West German y occupie d a central rol e i n Washington's Europea n polic y by virtu e o f it s economi c an d militar y asset s an d strategi c importance , and th e Bus h administratio n ha s onl y reconfirme d thi s priority . "Th e United State s an d th e Federa l Republi c hav e alway s bee n firm friend s and allies, " declare d Presiden t Bus h a t Main z i n Ma y 1989 ; "Bu t toda y we shar e a n adde d role—partner s i n leadership." 129 Ye t a s the Warsa w Pact disintegrate s an d th e Sovie t threa t recedes , stabilit y become s les s dependent o n Germa n militar y ballast . Sinc e leadershi p i s to b e shared , the Unite d State s woul d b e well advise d t o broade n it s focu s fro m Bon n (and London ) t o includ e Paris , Brussels , an d Rome , i n th e interes t o f European unit y an d security . The uncertai n futur e o f th e USS R complicate s th e tas k o f th e archi tects o f a ne w Europe . Th e USS R i s i n th e earl y stage s o f structura l disintegration, an d a t leas t i n th e shor t ter m i t i s likel y t o experienc e more turbulenc e tha n stability . A s the Eas t European s bega n t o consoli date democracy , th e world' s attentio n turne d t o th e secessionis t tenden cies a t wor k i n th e Balti c regio n an d severa l othe r republic s an d th e revival o f Russia n nationalism . Thes e forces , alon g wit h deepenin g eco nomic crisis , pu t i n questio n no t onl y th e prospect s o f democratizatio n and marketizatio n bu t th e ver y surviva l o f th e Sovie t state . Th e West' s cautious reactio n t o Lithuania' s declaratio n o f independenc e reflecte d the dilemma s o f policy towar d a superpower i n agony . The deepenin g crisi s o f perestroika migh t precipitat e unfavorabl e changes i n Sovie t leadership an d policy , bu t b y no w mos t Soviet s regar d Eastern Europ e a s irretrievably lost . To b e sure, the Sovie t chie f o f staff , General Mikhai l Moiseyev , openl y criticize d Gorbachev' s propose d part y platform i n Februar y 199 0 fo r failin g t o addres s th e seriou s politica l situation i n th e region. 130 Ligache v late r lamente d tha t "th e position s o f imperialism hav e strengthene d incredibly. " A conservative counterrevo lution i n th e Sovie t Unio n woul d probabl y no t hav e th e capacit y t o restore the status qu o ant e simultaneousl y i n that countr y an d i n Easter n

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Europe. Yet even if a momentarily self-absorbe d Sovie t Union allow s th e rest o f Europ e t o peacefull y com e together , Russia n nationalis m an d th e military arsena l o f a superpowe r canno t b e factore d ou t o f th e ne w architecture o f Europe . For th e present , a s Charle s Gat i observe d i n hi s splendi d analysi s o f The Bloc that Failed, th e Sovie t Unio n ha s "nothin g o f significanc e t o contribute t o th e region' s emergin g order." 131 It s wil l t o appl y militar y or commercia l leverag e i s sappe d b y ideologica l an d economi c disarray . But Gorbache v canno t eras e Russia' s histori c interes t i n a spher e o f influence i n Easter n Europe , an d Sovie t militar y powe r a s wel l a s th e region's dependenc e o n Sovie t natura l resource s remai n poten t source s of influence . No r i s h e likel y t o condon e unilatera l liquidatio n o f th e Warsaw Pac t o r th e networ k o f bilatera l securit y treatie s wit h hi s neigh bors. The alternativ e o f a n "East-Centra l Europea n Union " (modele d o n the Wester n Europea n Union) , a tria l balloo n floate d b y Hungary' s Prime Ministe r Jozse f Antal l i n Augus t 1990 , wil l hardl y appea l t o Moscow i f i t exclude s th e Sovie t Union . Onl y i f th e Sovie t Unio n im ploded woul d suc h regiona l alternative s b e feasible, an d i n that even t th e extension o f a Western-base d securit y syste m t o Easter n Europ e woul d become preferable . Therefore, a s th e Wes t look s beyon d th e CF E roun d o f militar y disengagement, i t wil l hav e t o conside r th e cost s an d benefit s o f redefin ing Europea n security , includin g NATO , th e roc k o n whic h i t ha s buil t its entir e postwa r securit y strategy . A radical rethinkin g o f tha t strateg y will depend primaril y o n th e consolidation o f liberal reform i n the Sovie t Union. I f on e accept s th e conventiona l wisdo m tha t th e ideologica l an d economic contes t ha s bee n won , th e remainin g dange r t o th e Wes t i s purely military . If , i n turn , th e Sovie t Union' s assertion s o f "defensiv e sufficiency" ar e translated int o significan t demilitarizatio n o f th e Centra l European theater , the n th e reintegratio n o f th e Eas t Europea n countrie s into a fre e communit y i s wort h th e pric e o f symmetrica l reductio n i n NATO's militar y dimensio n an d o f a furthe r institutionalizatio n o f th e CSCE as a mechanism fo r mediatin g disputes . Whether o r no t ther e eve r was a danger o f Wester n Europe' s Finlandization , o r o f it s subjectio n t o nefarious Sovie t influence , th e succes s o f containmen t ha s deprive d i t of any credibility . If th e Germa n proble m i s addresse d wit h du e sensitivit y t o th e inter ests o f othe r Europeans , the n th e well-founde d a s wel l a s anachronisti c

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apprehensions i n bot h camp s coul d b e lai d t o rest . Th e rea l prospec t now i s fo r th e Finlandizatio n o f Easter n Europe , wher e i t wil l signif y transitional accommodatio n o f th e Sovie t Union' s lingerin g sens e o f insecurity. Henr y Kissinge r asked , In th e lon g run , aren' t arrangement s i n Finlan d mor e usefu l t o Sovie t securit y than thos e in Eastern Europe ? I s it possible t o devis e arrangements tha t woul d give the Soviets security guarantees (widely defined) while permitting the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose their own political future ? Unde r such a system, it would be possible to conceive a drastic reduction of all outside forces in Europe —including thos e o f th e U.S.—tha t migh t revolutioniz e presen t concept s o f security.132 As Kissinge r th e historia n know s ful l well , securit y guarantee s depen d on th e wil l an d mean s t o bac k the m up , an d suc h precedent s a s th e prewar Locarn o agreement s offe r littl e groun d fo r optimism . Wha t th e West ca n promis e i s no t t o exploi t Easter n Europe' s emancipatio n fo r military advantage , an d t o d o its share in devisin g a new securit y regim e for Europ e tha t woul d respec t th e spiri t o f th e Fina l Ac t an d th e right t o independence an d voluntar y associatio n o f al l European countries . The outline s o f thi s ne w regim e emerge d a t th e Pari s summi t o f th e CSCE i n Novembe r 1990 . Th e replacemen t o f th e tw o alliance s b y a n invigorated CSC E wa s Gorbachev' s preferre d scenario , on e tha t dre w some suppor t fro m th e German s a s wel l a s th e ne w Czechoslova k gov ernment, whic h propose d th e creation o f a "European Securit y Commis sion." Washington wa s loath t o conside r an y scheme that threatene d th e integrity o f NATO , an d wit h goo d reason , fo r th e CSC E ha s n o mor e military division s than th e Pope and operates on the principle of unanim ity, hardly the basis for effectiv e collectiv e security. The Bush administra tion nevertheles s wen t alon g wit h th e concep t o f institutionalizin g th e CSCE, partl y t o giv e th e ne w Eas t Europea n democracie s a sa y i n security matters an d to avoid isolation o f the Soviet Union. The "Charte r of Pari s fo r a ne w Europe, " signe d a t th e CSC E summit , provide d fo r a small secretaria t t o b e located i n Prague , a Conflict Preventio n Cente r i n Vienna, a Warsa w offic e t o collec t dat a o n (an d eventuall y monitor ) elections, an d a parliamentary Assembl y o f Europ e t o b e attached t o th e Council o f Europe . Th e secretaria t wil l hel p prepar e annua l ministeria l meetings. Th e Conflic t Preventio n Cente r wa s charge d wit h supervisin g a confidence-buildin g exchang e o f militar y information , an d some , no -

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tably th e Germans , anticipate d tha t i t might eventuall y pla y a mediatin g role in disputes betwee n CSC E participants . The CSC E ha s serve d th e caus e o f huma n right s an d militar y disen gagement well , an d i t can pla y a n expande d rol e in th e ne w architectur e of security . Bu t a soli d architectur e need s well-lai d foundations , an d i n the foreseeabl e futur e n o singl e securit y regim e ca n addres s al l th e con ceivable threat s t o peace an d stabilit y i n Europe. The Sovie t Union, eve n as i t trie s t o reinven t itsel f ami d mountin g disintegrativ e pressure s an d economic travails , remain s a militar y superpower . A n expande d an d powerful German y ma y becom e mor e assertiv e i n pursuit o f it s nationa l interests, includin g economi c penetratio n o f th e East . Democrac y an d autonomy offe r n o guarantee o f neighborly consensu s in Eastern Europe , where nationalis m an d prolonge d economi c distres s coul d spar k of f violent confrontations ; no r i s regiona l peac e likel y t o b e assure d b y a moribund Warsa w Pact . A t best , Eas t Europea n tension s migh t b e hel d in check b y the mediating function s o f a revamped CSC E and Counci l o f Europe. A t worst , th e fractiou s Eas t European s wil l becom e pawn s i n a new German-Sovie t contes t fo r influence . A sobe r assessmen t o f risk s inspire d Georg e Kennan' s prudentia l recommendation i n earl y 199 0 fo r a three-yea r moratoriu m o n basi c changes i n th e tw o allianc e structures. 133 Th e Warsa w Pac t i s th e mor e imperiled o f th e two , bu t i t ma y linge r o n a s a consultativ e body . Ther e is littl e doub t eithe r i n th e Wes t o r i n Easter n Europ e (apar t fro m th e Soviet Union ) tha t NATO , wit h a soli d America n presence , remain s th e essential componen t o f a stabl e balanc e o f powe r o n th e continent . Th e task therefor e i s t o adap t tha t allianc e t o th e ongoin g processe s o f military disengagement , Wes t Europea n unification , an d Eas t Europea n realignment. A s Soviet force s withdra w an d th e Eas t European s becom e friends instea d o f th e enemy' s outposts , NATO' s forwar d defens e strat egy become s politicall y untenable . Shevardnadze' s surpris e announce ment a t th e CSC E Copenhage n meetin g i n Jun e tha t th e Sovie t Unio n would mak e additiona l cut s i n it s tactica l nuclea r arsena l i n Centra l Europe onl y reinforce d th e dispositio n o f Washingto n an d it s allie s t o negotiate th e remova l o f land-base d nuclea r weapons , i n effec t t o de nuclearize Germany . Tha t woul d leav e NAT O wit h th e optio n o f de ploying extended-range , tactica l air-to-surfac e missiles , and th e proble m of where t o bas e them i f German y i s de-nuclearized .

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Another NAT O dilemm a lie s i n th e real m o f conventiona l forces . Europeans an d American s ar e kee n t o rea p th e peac e dividen d a s th e Soviet threa t recedes , bu t wha t i s th e configuratio n an d siz e o f conven tional force s adequat e t o mee t th e remainin g threat ? In hi s commence ment addres s a t Oklahom a Stat e Universit y i n May , Presiden t Bus h declared tha t th e Unite d State s wa s "no t goin g t o allo w Europ e t o become saf e fo r conventiona l war " an d tha t "militaril y significan t U.S . forces mus t remai n o n th e othe r sid e o f th e Atlanti c fo r a s lon g a s ou r allies wan t an d nee d them." 1 3 4 Bu t mos t o f thos e troop s ar e i n th e Federal Republic , wher e popula r suppor t fo r thei r maintenanc e waxe s and wane s unpredictably. 135 On e propose d palliative , originatin g i n Bonn , is t o restructur e NAT O int o multinationa l arm y corp s tha t woul d re quire fewe r America n troop s an d b e mor e palatabl e t o Wes t Germans . NATO's conventiona l troo p strengt h coul d probabl y b e reduce d sub stantially i n th e for m o f professiona l armie s a s a n alternativ e t o larg e conscript armies . While suc h calculation s ma y appea r alarmis t a t a tim e of Sovie t "ne w thinking " an d domesti c turmoil , the y tak e int o accoun t the unaltere d realit y o f Sovie t militar y preponderanc e o n th e continen t and th e unpredictabilit y o f a superpowe r wrestlin g wit h it s histori c purpose an d identity . While Wester n Europ e ha s th e potentia l t o develo p a n adequat e conventional deterren t forc e i f th e American s leave , their departur e woul d undermine th e credibilit y o f th e protectio n offere d b y th e U.$,-base d strategic nuclea r force . A credibl e Wes t Europea n nuclea r deterrent * i n turn, would requir e a problematic expansion an d coordination o f Frenc h and Britis h capability . I n th e long run, th e European Communit y shoul d assume primar y responsibilit y fo r defens e an d regiona l securit y eve n a s it draw s th e Eas t European s int o th e fold . In th e interim , mutua l forc e reductions an d treat y guarantee s d o not obviat e the necessity o f preserv ing th e onl y democrati c guardia n o f Europea n security , NATO , an d th e tangible assuranc e o f America' s strategi c umbrella . Having wo n Gorbachev' s verba l concessio n tha t i t (alon g wit h Can ada) ha s a plac e i n th e "commo n Europea n home, " th e Unite d State s must remai n engage d i n th e tas k o f reformin g th e politica l structur e o f Europe. Fo r fifty years , America' s strateg y an d approache s share d th e premise tha t Sovie t socialis m an d hegemon y i n Easter n Europ e sup pressed nationa l desire s fo r self-determination . Th e Unite d State s coul d not guarante e earl y realizatio n o f tha t goa l bu t remaine d committe d t o

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undoing th e politica l divisio n o f Europe . A s containmen t reap s it s re ward, ne w challenge s fac e Washingto n i n th e complexit y o f Europe' s politics. A multidimensiona l strateg y t o advanc e America' s interest s i s gradually emerging . A polic y revie w i n th e summe r o f 198 9 conclude d that progres s towar d deepe r Europea n Communit y integratio n shoul d be encouraged, couple d wit h a battle agains t EC protectionism i n GAT T and othe r forums . Washingto n ha s trie d t o forg e ne w link s wit h th e Brussels Commissio n an d t o reinforc e th e latter' s Atlanticism , notabl y by havin g i t coordinat e th e OECD' s ai d t o Easter n Europe . Whil e th e United State s i s destine d t o b e a n onlooke r i n th e proces s o f broade r European integration , it s interest s als o dictat e tha t i t promot e bot h orderly expansio n o f th e Communit y t o includ e th e Eas t European s an d pan-European, confedera l aspiration s tha t ma y bes t b e advance d throug h the Counci l o f Europe . Thoug h eage r t o rea p it s peace dividend , Wash ington remain s committe d t o th e preservatio n o f NAT O an d a militar y presence o n th e continent . I t has a t th e sam e tim e accepte d th e CSC E a s an embryoni c securit y regim e fo r Europe . A s activ e participan t o f en gaged advocate , Americ a retain s a veste d interes t i n th e draftin g o f th e new architectur e necessitate d b y containment's success . Washington's globa l interest s ar e many , onl y on e o f whic h i s Easter n Europe. Ye t arguabl y Europ e remain s a t th e cor e o f America' s strategi c and politica l interests , an d th e democratizatio n an d reintegratio n o f Eastern Europ e woul d represen t th e crucia l victor y i n a wa r tha t ha s been wage d fo r hal f a century . Enlightene d self-interes t a s wel l a s th e sense o f mora l missio n tha t ha s distinguishe d America' s internationa l outlook deman d tha t th e effor t b e sustaine d especiall y now , whe n th e dominant tendencie s i n Eastern Europ e appea r s o favorable . In short , thi s i s n o tim e fo r precipitou s militar y withdrawa l an d political disengagemen t fro m th e affair s o f Europe . Th e temptation s t o pass th e buc k t o th e West Europeans , to b e niggardly i n material ai d fo r the Eas t Europeans , an d t o en d America' s militar y presenc e o n th e continent mus t al l b e resisted . Th e Unite d State s ca n exer t it s consider able influenc e t o se e t o i t tha t Atlanticis m an d Europeanizatio n ar e complementary an d mutuall y reinforcin g tendencie s i n stabilizin g th e process o f transformation . America' s uniqu e consistenc y o f purpose , it s material wealth , an d it s militar y powe r hav e bee n essentia l asset s i n th e protracted struggl e fo r Europe . Th e Unite d State s mus t remai n activel y engaged a s stabilizer an d guaranto r fo r th e foreseeabl e future .

Notes

Chapter 1 1. Quote d i n Ala n Palmer , The Lands Between (London : Weidenfel d an d Nicolson, 1970) , p. 251. 2. U.S . Congress, Senate , Committe e o n Foreig n Relations , and Departmen t o f State, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 (Washington, D.C. , 1950) , p. 481. 3. Mor e extensiv e treatment s o f America' s wartim e policie s regardin g Easter n Europe ca n be found i n Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: SovietAmerican Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton , N.J. : Princeto n Univer sity Press , 1974) ; Gei r Lundestad , The American Non-policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947 (Ne w York : Humanitie s Press , 1975) ; Bennet t Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation: East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics sinc e 194 1 (Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press , 1973) ; Richard C . Lukas, The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland, 19411945 (Knoxville : Universit y o f Tennesse e Press , 1978) ; Michae l M . Boll , Cold War in Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943—1947 (Lexington : Universit y Pres s of Kentucky , 1984). 4. Milova n Djilas , Conversations with Stalin (Ne w York : Harcourt , Brac e S t World, 1962) , p. 114 . 5. Se e Vojtech Mastny , Russia's Road to the Cold War (Ne w York : Columbi a University Press , 1979) , pp. 60-80 . 6. Mastny , Russia's Road, p . 224. 365

366 Notes 7. U.S . Departmen t o f State , Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (hereafte r cite d a s FRUS) , 1941 , vol . 1 (Washington , D.C. , 1958), pp. 368-69 . 8. Memorandu m fro m Secretar y o f Stat e Hull to President Roosevelt , Februar y 4, 1942 , FRUS 1942 , Vol. 3, p. 510. 9. Willia m C . Bullitt , "Ho w W e Wo n th e Wa r an d Los t th e Peace, " Life, August 30 , 1948 , p. 94; and se e Kovrig, Myth of Liberation, pp . 7 - 8 . 10. Joh n Colville , The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955 (London: Hodde r an d Stoughton , 1985) , p. 658; see also p. 674 . 11. Bradle y F . Smith , The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (Ne w York : Basi c Books, 1983) , pp. 237, 243, 351-52; se e also Lev Bezymensky, "Genera l Donovan' s Balka n Plan, " International Affairs (Moscow), no. 8 (Augus t 1987) : 116-26 . 12. U.S.S.R. , Ministr y o f Foreig n Affairs , Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (Moscow , 1957) , vol . 2 , pp . 2 0 6 - 7 ; se e als o Mastny , Russia's Road, pp . 7 7 - 7 8 , 83-84 . 13. Ellio t Roosevelt , As He Saw It (Ne w York : Duell , Sloa n & Pearce , 1946) , p. 184 . 14. Cordel l Hull , The Memoirs of Cor dellHull (Ne w York : Hodde r & Stough ton, 1948) , p. 1442 . 15. Georg e F . Kennan , Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston : Little , Brown, 1967) , p. 211. 16. Kennan , Memoirs, pp . 2 2 2 - 2 3. 17. Julia n Amer y quote d i n Nichola s Bethell , The Great Betrayal (London : Hodder & Stoughton , 1984) , p. 22. 18. Se e FRUS 1945 , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 195 5 pp. 2 1 7 - 2 5 . 19. FRU S 1944 , vol. 4, pp. 1025-26 . 20. FRUS , Malta and Yalta, p . 103 . 21. FRUS , Malta and Yalta, p . 235. 22. Charle s E . Bohlen , Witness to History, 1929-1969 (Ne w York : Norton , 1973), pp. 175-77 . 23. U.S . Department o f State , Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington, D.C. , 1949) , pp. 3 7 2 - 7 3 , 655-57; Edwar d R . Stettinius , Jr. , Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (Garde n City , N.Y. : Doubleday, 1950) , pp. 68, 87. 24. Winsto n S . Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Bos ton: Houghto n Mifflin , 1953) , p. 393. 25. FRUS , Malta and Yalta, pp . 973-74 . 26. Jame s F . Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (Ne w York : Harper , 1947) , p. 32. 27. W . Averel l Harrima n an d Eli e Abel , Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1975) , pp. 4 1 2 - 1 3. 28. Worl d Peac e Foundation , Documents on American Foreign Relations, 19441945 (Princeton , N.J.: Princeto n Universit y Press , 1947) , pp. 2 4 - 2 5 .

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29. Walte r Millis , ed., The Forrestal Diaries (Ne w York : Viking , 1951) , p. 40. 30. Harr y S . Truman , Memoirs: Years of Decisions (Garde n City , N.Y. : Dou bleday, 1955) , p. 15 . 31. Memorandu m o f conversatio n b y Charle s Bohlen , Apri l 20 , 1945 , FRU S 1945, vol. 5, p. 232. 32. Se e Kovrig, Myth of Liberation, pp . 4 1 - 4 3 . 33. Kennan , Memoirs, p . 212. 34. Joh n Lewi s Gaddis , The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1972) , pp. 2 5 9 61. 35. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Augus t 4 , 1946 , pp. 229-32 . 36. FRU S 1946 , vol. 6, p. 216; see also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp . 143-44 . 37. Se e Thoma s G . Paterson , Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore : John s Hopkin s University Press , 1973) , pp. 101-2 , an d Walte r Ullmann , The United States in Prague, 1945-1948 (Boulder , Colo. : Eas t Europea n Quarterly , 1978) , pp. 3 9 - 4 7 . 38. Truman , Years of Decisions, p . 245. 39. Edga r Snow , quote d i n Mastny, Russia's Road, p . 357. 40. Wilia m D . Leahy, I Was There (Ne w York : McGraw-Hill , 1950) , p. 485. 41. Gaddis , United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p . 241. 42. Se e Kennan t o Byrnes, March 6 , 1946 , FRUS 1946 , vol. 5, pp. 516-20 . 43. W . W . Rostow , The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946 (Austin : University o f Texa s Press , 1982) , pp. 60, 87 , and passim . 44. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Septembe r 15 , 1946, pp. 4 9 6 - 5 0 1 . 45. Gaddis , United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p . 315. 46. Kenna n t o Byrnes, February 22 , 1946 , FRUS 1946 , vol. 6, pp. 696-709 . 47. Vital Speeches of the Day, vol . 12 , March 15 , 1946, pp. 329-32 . 48. Gaddis , United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp . 321-22 . 49. Smit h t o secretar y o f state , May 3 1 , 1946, FRUS 1946 , vol. 6, p. 758. 50. Join t Chief s o f Staff , JIS, "Capabilities an d Intention s o f th e U.S.S.R . i n tji e Post-War Period, " July 9 , 1946 , p. 167 . 51. Danie l Yergin , Shattered Peace (Boston : Houghto n Mifflin , 1977) , p. 255. 52. Truman , Years of Decisions, p . 552. 53. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Decembe r 23 , 1945 , p. 1020 . 54. FRU S 1946 , vol. 6, pp. 2 7 2 - 7 3 . 55. Se e Stephe n D . Kertesz , Between Russia and the West: Hungary and the Illusions of Peacemaking, 1945-1947 (Notr e Dame , Ind. : Universit y o f Notre Dam e Press , 1984) , an d Bennet t Kovrig , "Peacemakin g afte r Worl d War II : Th e En d o f th e Myt h o f Nationa l Self-Determination, " i n Stephe n Borsody, ed., The Hungarians: A Divided Nation (Ne w Haven: Yal e C.I.A.S. , 1988), pp. 6 9 - 8 8 . 56. Worl d Peac e Foundation, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeto n Universit y Press , 1949) , p. 2. 57. Lundestad , American Non-policy, p . 342.

3 6 8 Notes 58. Harrima n t o secretar y o f state , Novembe r 22 , 1945 , FRU S 1945 , vol. 5, p . 191. 59. Paterson , Soviet-American Confrontation, pp . 101-2 . 60. Fo r th e contendin g view s o n thi s question , se e Robert A . Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (Ne w York : Colum bia Universit y Press , 1985) , an d Joyc e an d Gabrie l Kolko , The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (Ne w York: Harpe r an d Row , 1972) . 61. Gaddis , United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp . 3 2 2 - 2 3 . O n the stages of Communis t takeover , se e Charles Gati , Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham , N.C. : Duke University Press , 1986) , Part 1 . 62. Georg e F . Kennan , "Th e Source s o f Sovie t Conduct, " Foreign Affairs, vol . 25, no . 4 (Jul y 1947) : 566-82 . 63. Dea n Acheson , Present at the Creation (Ne w York : Norton , 1969) , p. 225. 64. Se e Kennan, Memoirs, pp . 333-42 . 65. JC S 1769/1 , Joint Strategi c Survey Committee , "Unite d State s Assistanc e t o Other Countrie s fro m th e Standpoint o f Nationa l Security, " April 29, 1947 , FRUS 1947 , vol. 1 , pp. 738-50 . 66. Jose f Korbel , The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938—1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeto n Universit y Press , 1959) , p. 182 . 67. NS C Actio n 17 , Decembe r 17 , 1947 ; Paterson , Soviet-American Confrontation, p . 102 . 68. Walte r Laqueur , A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York : Basi c Books, 1985) , p. 113. 69. Se e Eugenio Reale , Avec Jacques Duclos: Au banc des accuses a la reunion constitutive du Kominform a Szklarska Poreba (22-27 septembre 1947) (Paris: Plon, 1958) . 70. Kennan , Memoirs, p . 403. 71. Jea n Edwar d Smith , "Th e Vie w fro m USFET : Genera l Clay' s an d Washing ton's Interpretation s o f Sovie t Intentions in Germany, 1945-1948, " in Han s A. Schmidt , ed. , US Occupation in Europe after World War II (Lawrence : Regents Press of Kansas , 1978) , p. 75. 72. Harr y S . Truman , Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (Garde n City , N.Y. : Doubleday, 1956) , p. 174 . 73. Kennan , Memoirs, pp . 421-24 , 443-44 ; Acheson , Present at the Creation, p. 291. 74. Se e Kovrig, Myth of Liberation, pp . 83-86 . 75. NS C 7 , "Th e Positio n o f th e Unite d State s wit h Respec t t o Soviet-Directe d World Communism, " Marc h 30 , 1948 . 76. NS C 20/1 , "U.S. Objectives wit h Respec t t o Russia, " Augus t 18 , 1948. 77. NS C 20/4 , "U.S . Objective s wit h Respec t t o th e USS R t o Counte r Sovie t Threats t o U.S . Security," November 23 , 1948. 78. NS C 58/2 , "Unite d State s Polic y Towar d th e Sovie t Satellit e State s i n East ern Europe, " December 8 , 1949 . 79. Join t Chief s o f Staff , Join t Intelligenc e Committee , "Mos t Likel y Perio d fo r

Notes 36

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Initiation o f Hostilitie s betwee n th e U.S.S.R . an d th e Wester n Powers, " August 22 , 1950 . 80. NS C 73 , "Th e Positio n an d Action s o f th e Unite d State s wit h Respec t t o Possible Furthe r Sovie t Move s i n th e Ligh t o f th e Korea n Situation/ ' July 1 , 1950. 81. Stewar t Stephen , Operation Splinter Factor (Philadelphia : Lippincott , 1974) , pp. 162-64 ; Kare l Kaplan , Dans les archives du comite central: Trente ans de secrets du bloc sovietique (Paris : Albin Michel , 1978) , pp. 167—68 . 82. Joh n Lewi s Gaddis, "Containment an d th e Logic of Strategy, " The National Interest, no . 1 0 (Winte r 1987/8) : 32 . 83. NS C 68/2 , "Unite d State s Objective s an d Program s fo r Nationa l Security, " September 30 , 195 0 (thes e ar e th e conclusion s o f NS C 68 , April 14 , 1950 , as approved i n NSC Action 30 , September 29 , 1950) . 84. NS C 71/1 , "State Departmen t Repor t o n th e Rearmamen t o f Wester n Ger many," July 3 , 1950 . 85. Fo r Stalin' s note , se e Department o f Stat e Bulletin, Apri l 7 , 1952 , pp. 5 5 152. O n th e Soviet-Eas t Germa n aspects , se e Jean Edwar d Smith , Germany beyond the Wall (Boston : Little , Brown , 1969) , p . 218 ; Ada m B . Ulam , Expansion & Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (New York : Praeger , 1968) , pp. 5 0 6 - 3 8; an d An n L . Phillips, Soviet Policy toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade (Westport , Conn. : Greenwood Press , 1986) . The West German historia n Werne r Mase r report s that a t th e tim e o f Stalin' s initiative , th e Russian s mad e a n extraordinar y overture t o Rudol f Hess , wh o wa s hel d i n Berlin' s Spanda u prison : h e wa s invited t o endors e th e Eas t Germa n versio n o f socialis m an d resum e hi s political caree r i n orde r t o rall y th e suppor t o f forme r Nazi s throughou t Germany (Reuter's , Septembe r 4 , 1987 ; Associate d Press , Septembe r 5 , 1987). 86. Acheson , Present at the Creation, p . 630 . 87. Memorandu m o f conversatio n wit h Frenc h Ambassado r Bonne t e t al. , June 12, 1952 , Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson (1949 1953), University Publication s o f America , 198 0 (microfilm) . 88. U.S . Departmen t o f State , Offic e o f Intelligenc e Research , "Exten t an d Stability o f Sovie t Contro l ove r Europea n Satellites, " August 3 , 1951. 89. Th e NSC' s "Reappraisa l o f Unite d State s Objective s an d Strateg y fo r Na tional Security " (NS C 135/3 , Septembe r 25 , 1952 ) argue d tha t "wher e operations ca n b e conducte d o n term s whic h ma y resul t i n a relativ e de crease i n Sovie t powe r withou t involvin g unacceptabl e risks , th e Unite d States shoul d pursu e an d a s practicabl e intensif y positiv e political , eco nomic, propaganda , an d para-militar y operation s agains t th e Sovie t bloc , particularly thos e operation s designe d t o weake n Kremli n contro l ove r th e satellites an d th e militar y potentia l o f th e Sovie t system . However , w e should no t overestimat e th e effectivenes s o f th e activitie s w e ca n pursu e within th e Sovie t orbit , an d shoul d procee d wit h a carefu l weighin g o f th e risks agains t th e possible gain s i n pressing upo n wha t th e Kremli n probabl y

3 7 0 Notes regards a s it s vita l interests. " A t best , th e Wes t migh t b e abl e t o "sa p th e morale o f th e satellit e leader s an d encourag e rifts, " thereb y increasin g th e Kremlin's preoccupatio n wit h interna l security . Meanwhile , Wester n eco nomic warfar e coul d "hel p t o depriv e th e Sovie t orbi t o f neede d resource s and retar d th e developmen t o f [its ] military potential. " 90. Laqueur , World of Secrets, p . 358 not e 10 . 91. NS C 18 , "Stat e Departmen t Repor t o n th e Attitud e o f thi s Governmen t toward Event s in Yugoslavia, " July 6 , 1948 . 92. NS C 18/2 , "Economi c Relation s betwee n th e Unite d State s an d Yugosla via," February 17,1949 . See also Beatrice Heuser, Western "Containment 33 Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53 (London : Rou tledge, 1989) , pp. 8 8 - 9 1 . 93. Joh n Ranelagh , The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Ne w York : Simon an d Schuster , 1986) , p. 140 . 94. Se e Bel a K . Kiraly , "Th e Aborte d Sovie t Militar y Plan s agains t Tito' s Yugoslavia," i n Wayn e S . Vucinich , ed. , At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective (Ne w York : Columbi a Uni versity Press , 1982) , pp. 2 3 7 - 8 8 . 95. NS C 18/3 , "Unite d State s Polic y towar d th e Conflic t betwee n th e USS R and Yugoslavia, " Novembe r 10 , 1949 . 96. Bethell , Great Betrayal, p . 119 . 97. NS C 73/1 , "The Positio n an d Action s o f th e United State s with Respec t t o Possible Furthe r Sovie t Move s i n th e Ligh t o f th e Korea n Situation, " Jul y 29, 1950 . See also Heuser, Western "Containment 33"Policies, pp . 149-54 . 98. NS C 18/6 , "The Position o f the United States with Respec t to Yugoslavia, " March 7 , 1951 ; Heuser, Western "Containment 33"Policies, pp . 168-70 . 99. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Jun e 12 , 1949 , pp. 756-5S. 100. New York Times, Marc h 17 , 1950 . 101. NS C 10/2 , "Office o f Specia l Operations, " June 18 , 1948. 102. Se e NSC 68/3 , "United State s Objective s an d Program s fo r Nationa l Secu rity," Decembe r 8 , 1950 ; Ranelagh , The Agency, pp . 219-20 ; an d NS C 86/1 (recommendation s stil l classified) . 103. New York Times, Ma y 3 and Novembe r 25 , 1951. 104. Cor d Meyer , Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (Ne w York: Harpe r & Row , 1980) , p. 111. 105. JC S 1735/84 , Joint Intelligenc e Committee , "Psychologica l Warfar e Plan ning i n Suppor t o f Join t Outlin e Emergenc y Wa r Plan, " Septembe r 11 , 1951. 106. NS C 74 , "A Pla n fo r Nationa l Psychologica l Warfare, " July 10 , 1950 . 107. Stephen , Operation Splinter Factor, p . 9. 108. Ibid., pp . 9 7 - 1 0 1 . 109. Se e Kaplan, Archives, pp . 140-58 . 110. Joh n Prados , Presidents 3 Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through to Iranscam (Ne w York : Quill/Morrow , 1986), pp. 89 , 2 2 2 - 2 3, 235.

Notes 3 7

1

111. Bethell , Great Betrayal, pp . 3 5 - 3 9 . 112. Ibid., p. 118 . 113. Prados , Presidents' Secret Wars, p . 46. 114. JC S 1654/ 4 cite d i n Bethell, Great Betrayal, p . 113. 115. Bethell , Great Betrayal, pp . 116-18 . 116. Fo r mor e detai l se e Kovrig, Myth of Liberation, chapte r 3 . 117. U.S . Congress , Congressiona l Record , 82n d Cong. , 1s t sess. , 1951 , pp . A7975-7, "Penetratio n Progra m agains t Communism, " extensio n o f re marks mad e b y th e Hon . Alexande r Wile y i n th e Senat e o n Januar y 2 , 1951. 118. U.S . Congress, House, Committe e o n Foreig n Affairs , The Mutual Security Program: Hearings, 82n d Cong. , 1s t sess., 1951 , pp. 1106-9 . 119. Pau l H . Nitze , U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington , D.C. : For eign Policy Association, 1956) , p. 48. 120. Jame s Burnham, Containment or Liberation (Ne w York: John Day , 1953) , pp. 138 , 223 . Se e als o Willia m Henr y Chamberlin , Beyond Containment (Chicago: Regnery , 1953) . 121. Joh n Foste r Dulles , " A Polic y o f Boldness, " Life, Ma y 19 , 1952 , pp. 1 4 6 60. 122. Counci l o n Foreig n Relations , Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952 (Ne w York : Harper , 1953) , pp. 8 0 - 8 3 . 123. New York Times, Augus t 26, 1952 . 124. New York Times, Augus t 28 , 1952 . 125. New York Times, Octobe r 5 , 1952 . 126. Loui s L . Gerson , The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence : Unviersit y Pres s o f Kansas , 1964) , pp . 198-99 ; Atha n G. Theoharis , The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945- 1955 (Columbia: Universit y o f Missour i Press , 1970) , pp . 149 , 2 3 8 - 4 3 ; an d Robert A . Divine , Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 19521960 (Ne w York : Ne w Viewpoints , 1974) , pp. 5 4 - 5 5, 84 . Chapter 2 1. Counci l o n Foreig n Relations , Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953 (Ne w York : Harper , 1954) , p. 20. 2. Emme t John Hughes , The Ordeal of Power (Ne w York : Atheneum , 1963) , p. 207 . 3. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Februar y 9 , 1953 , pp. 212-16 . 4. U.S . Congress, House , Committe e o n Foreig n Affairs , Hearings on House Joint Resolution 200: Joining with the President of the United States in a Declaration regarding the Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet Union, 83rd Cong. , 1s t sess., 1953 , pp. 3 - 2 2 . 5. Accoun t o f telephone conversatio n wit h Congressma n Walte r Judd, Marc h 28, 1953 , Dulles Papers, Princeton University .

372 Notes 6. Hughes , Ordeal of Power, p . 101. 7. Walte r Laqueur , A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York : Basi c Books, 1985) , p. 117 . 8. Joh n Colville , The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955 (London: Hodde r an d Stoughton , 1985) , p. 650. 9. Leonar d Mosky , Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network (Ne w York : Dia l Press/Jame s Wade , 1978), p. 331. 10. Hughes , Ordeal of Power, pp . 103-4 . 11. Rober t A . Divine , Eisenhower and the Cold War (Ne w York : Oxfor d University Press , 1981) , p. 108 . 12. New York Times, Apri l 19 , 1953. 13. Colville , Fringes of Power, p . 672 . 14. Departmen t o f State , Offic e o f Intelligenc e Research , "Ne w Element s i n West Germa n Foreig n Policy, " July 3 , 1953. 15. Departmen t o f State , Office o f Intelligenc e Research , "Problem s an d Policie s of a Reunited Germany, " July 12 , 1955 . 16. Joh n Lewi s Gaddis , Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1982) , p. 190 . 17. Colville , Fringes of Power, pp . 679-80, 683 . 18. Colville , Fringes of Power, pp . 692—702. 19. Charle s E . Bohlen , Witness to History, 1929-1969 (Ne w York : Norton , 1973), p. 371. 20. New York Times, Ma y 19 , 1955 . 21. U.S . Congress , Senate , Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (historica l series) , Vol. 8 , 84t h Cong. , 2d sess. , 1956 , p. 23. 22. Gaddis , Strategies of Containment, pp . 145-46 . 23. Gaddis , Strategies of Containment, pp . 155 , 160-61 . 24. Quote d i n Eugen e Davidson , The Death and Life of Germany (Ne w York : Knopf, 1959) , p. 3 3 2 - 3 3 . 25. Thoma s Powers , The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA (New York : Knopf , 1979) , p. 46. 26. Recor d o f Dulle s telephon e conversation , Jun e 17 , 1953 , Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter, Univer sity Publications o f Americ a (microfilm) . 27. Jame s B . Conant, My Several Lives (Ne w York : Harpe r & ; Row, 1970) , p . 601. 28. Pierr e Nor d an d Jacque s Bergier , L'actuelle guerre secrete (Paris : Encyclo pedic Planete, 1967) , p. 161. 29. O n th e mornin g o f Jun e 17 , Dulle s ha d advise d Eisenhowe r t o avoi d an swering question s abou t "ou r stimulatin g this. " Record o f Dulle s telephon e conversations wit h Eisenhower , Jun e 17 , 1953 , an d wit h Fran k Wisner , June 12 , 1954 . 30. Join t Chief s o f Staff , JC S 1735/200 , "Nationa l Psychologica l Progra m wit h

Notes 37

3

Respect t o Germany, " Augus t 31 , 195 3 (origina l draf t date d Februar y 20 , 1953). 31. Edmon d Taylor , "RIAS : Th e Stor y o f a n America n Psywa r Outpost, " i n William E . Daugherty , ed. , A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press , 1958) , pp . 145-50 ; Davidson , Death and Life of Germany, p . 334. 32. Se e Melvin Croan , "Eas t Germany : Lesso n i n Survival, " Problems of Communism, no . 11 , 1962 , p . 8 ; Stefa n Brant , The East German Rising (Lon don: Thame s Sc Hudson, 1955) , pp . 168-74 ; Arnul f Baring , Der 17. Juni 1953 (Bonn : Deutsch e Bundesverlag , 1958) , p . 68 ; an d New York Times, March 16 , 1963. 33. Colville , Fringes of Power, p . 672 . 34. Minute s o f cabine t meeting , Jul y 10 , 1953 , Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet Meetings of President Eisenhower (1953-1961), Universit y Publi cations o f Americ a (microfilm) . 35. Hughes , Ordeal of Power, p . 147 ; U.S . Congress , Senate , Committe e o n Foreign Relations , Documents on Germany, 1944—1959, 86t h Cong. , 1s t sess., 1959 , pp. 110-12 . 36. C . L . Sulzberger , A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs & Diaries (19341954) (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1969) , pp. 914-15 . 37. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953, p . 40. 38. Josep h Barber , ed. , Diplomacy and the Communist Challenge: A Report on the Views of Leading Citizens in Twenty-five Cities, (Ne w York : Counci l on Foreig n Relations , 1954) , pp. 8 , 37. 39. Loui s L . Gerson , The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence : Universit y Pres s of Kansas , 1964) , p. 213. 40. JC S 1735/170 , "Repor t b y th e Joint Strategi c Plan s Committe e t o th e Join t Chiefs o f Staf f o n Implementatio n o f Sectio n 101(a)(1 ) o f th e Mutua l Secu rity Ac t of 195 1 (Kerste n Amendment), " Februar y 24 , 1953 . 41. NSC/143 , "Proposal fo r a Volunteer Freedo m Corps, " February 14 , 1953. 42. NSC/143/2 , " A Voluntee r Freedo m Corps, " May 20 , 1953 . 43. NS C Action 2348 , December 28 , 1960 . 44. NSC , Operation s Coordinatin g Board , "Progres s Repor t o n Unite d State s Policy o n Sovie t and Satellit e Defector s (NSC/86/1), " April 18 , 1956 . 45. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Apri l 13 , 1953, pp. 5 3 9 - 4 1 . 46. S . Kracaue r an d P . L . Berkman , Satellite Mentality (Ne w York : Praeger , 1956), p . 153 ; U.S. Department o f State , Program Test of Voice of America's New York and Munich Output in Hungarian, prepare d b y the Institut e of Communication s Research , Inc. , Washington, D.C. , 1953 . 47. Cor d Meyer , Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (Ne w York: Harpe r & Row , 1980) , pp. 114 , 117-18 . 48. See , fo r instance , Dulles' s lette r t o Henr y For d II , Marc h 25 , 1954 , Dulle s Papers. 49. NS C Action s 817 , 826 . 50. NS C 158 , "Unite d State s Objective s an d Action s t o Exploi t th e Unres t i n

374 Notes the Satellit e States, " Jul y 29 , 1953 . Th e "Nationa l Psychologica l Progra m with Respec t t o Germany " (JC S 1735/200 , Augus t 31 , 1953 ) se t ou t th e following tasks : (a ) To stimulat e popular suspicio n o f Sovie t intentions wit h respect t o Germany ; (b ) T o persuad e Soviet-orbi t people s tha t a unifie d Germany integrate d int o a European Communit y i s a guarantee agains t th e revived Germa n driv e t o th e East ; (c ) To convinc e Soviet-orbi t people s tha t the weakenin g o f Sovie t powe r i n Eas t German y i s a necessar y prerequisit e to thei r ow n liberation ; (d ) To sustai n th e resistanc e o f Soviet-orbi t people s toward th e da y whe n thei r activ e participatio n i n thei r ow n liberatio n wil l be required . 51. NS C 174 , "Unite d State s Polic y towar d th e Sovie t Satellite s i n Easter n Europe," Decembe r 11 , 1953. In assessin g th e Eas t Europea n situation , th e NSC foun d tha t "know n undergroun d group s capabl e o f arme d resistanc e . . . ar e no w generall y inactive" ; tha t "th e abilit y o f th e USS R t o exercis e effective contro l over , an d exploi t th e resource s of , th e Europea n satellite s has no t bee n appreciabl y reduced , an d i s no t likel y t o be , a s lon g a s th e USSR maintain s adequat e militar y force s i n th e area" ; tha t th e deat h o f Stalin ha d create d "ne w problem s whic h ma y len d themselve s t o exploita tion"; an d tha t "i t doe s no t appea r likel y tha t a non-Sovie t regim e o n th e Tito model will emerge in any of the satellites under existing circumstances. " The propose d course s o f actio n include d encouragemen t o f passiv e resis tance an d continuin g revie w o f th e possibility o f detachin g Albania fro m th e Soviet bloc . 52. NSC , Operation s Coordinatin g Board , "Progres s Repor t o n Unite d State s Policy towar d th e Sovie t Satellite s i n Easter n Europ e (NS C 174), " July 16 , 1954. 53. Rober t T . Hol t an d Rober t W . Va n D e Welde , Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press, 1960) , pp. 2 0 8 - 2 3 . 54. Rober t T . Holt , Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis : Universit y o f Minnesot a Press, 1958) , p. 162 . 55. Powers , Man Who Kept the Secrets, pp . 4 5 - 4 7 . 56. Gaddis , Strategies of Containment, p . 158 ; Joh n Ranelagh , The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Ne w York : Simo n & Schuster , 1986) , p . 279. 57. Der Tagesspiegel (Wes t Berlin), March 26 , 1954 . 58. Minute s o f cabine t meeting , March 27 , 1953. 59. Departmen t o f State , Offic e o f Intelligenc e Research , "East-Wes t Trad e Activities o f th e Counci l o f Europe, " September 12 , 1955. 60. NS C 5501 , "Basic National Securit y Policy, " January 6 , 1955 . 61. NS C 5412/1 , "Cover t Operations, " Marc h 12 , 1955 . 62. Paper s o n Genev a Conferenc e goals , July 7 , 1955 , Dulles Papers . 63. Richar d Goold-Adams , A Time of Power (London : Weidenfeld S t Nicolson , 1962), p . 206 ; Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1956) , p. 17 .

Notes 3 7

5

64. Memorandu m o f June 18 , 1955 , Dulles Papers ; New York Times, Jun e 30 , 1955. 65. Harol d Macmillan , Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955 (London : Macmillan , 1969), p. 615. 66. NSC , Operation s Coordinatin g Board , "Progres s Repor t o n Unite d State s Policy towar d th e Sovie t Satellite s i n Easter n Europ e (NS C 174), " Februar y 29, 1956 . 67. New York Times, Augus t 25 , 1955 . 68. NSC , Operation s Coordinatin g Board , "Progres s Repor t o n Unite d State s Policy Relatin g t o Eas t Germany (NS C 174), " May 17,1956 . 69. New York Times, Apri l 25 , 1956 . 70. Ranelagh , The Agency, p . 286. 71. Ra y Cline , Secrets, Spies, and Scholars (Ne w York : Acropolis , 1976) , p . 164; Willia m Colby , Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (Ne w York : Simon an d Schuster , 1978) , p . 133 ; Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, p . 80. 72. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1956) , pp . 375-77,510. 73. Laqueur , World of Secrets, p . 359. 74. NS C Action 1530 , March 22 , 1956 . 75. Dulle s telephone coversation , Apri l 30 , 1956 . 76. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1956) , p . 503. 77. Meyer , Facing Reality, p . 119 . 78. Willia m R . Corson , The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (Ne w York : Dia l Press/Jame s Wade , 1977) , p . 367 ; Ranelagh, The Agency, p . 287; New York Times, Novembe r 30 , 1976 . 79. Hol t an d Va n D e Welde , Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy, pp . 230-32 . 80. New York Herald Tribune, Februar y 18 , 1956 . 81. Rober t A . Divine , Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952— 1960 (Ne w York : Ne w Viewpoints , 1974) , pp. 94ff, 128 ; Gerson, Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy, pp . 217—9 ; Ne w Yor k Times, August 16 , 1956 . 82. Dulle s telephone conversation , June 28 , 1956 . 83. New York Times, Jun e 29 , 1956 . 84. Counci l o n Foreig n Relations , Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956 (Ne w York : Harper , 1957) , p . 212 ; U.S . Congress , Congressional Record, 84t h Cong. , 2d sess. , 1956 , 102 : pp. 11339 , 11355-67 . 85. Dulle s telephone conversation , June 28 , 1956 . 86. Stewar t Stephen , Operation Splinter Factor (Philadelphia : Lippincott , 1974) , p. 213. 87. Departmen t o f State , Offic e o f Intelligenc e Research , "Independen t Course s of Actio n o f th e Polis h Regim e sinc e Gomulka' s Retur n t o Power, " Apri l 11, 1957 .

3 7 6 Notes 88. Dulle s telephone conversation , July 10 , 1956 . 89. Dulle s telephone conversations with Lodg e and Yarrow , Octobe r 22 , 1956 . 90. Ranelagh , The Agency, p . 304. 91. NS C 5616 , "U.S . Polic y towar d Development s i n Polan d an d Hungary, " October 31 , 1956. 92. Nowa Kultura, Decembe r 2 , 1956 , quote d i n Melvi n J . Lasky , ed. , The Hungarian Revolution: A White Book (Ne w York : Praeger , 1957) , p. 159 . 93. Se e Nikita Khrushchev , K[h]rushchev Remembers (Boston : Little , Brown , 1970), pp. 416—29, and Ole g Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (Garde n City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965) , p. 212. 94. Veljk o Micunovic , Moscow Diary (Garde n City , N.Y . Doubleday , 1980) , p. 127 . 95. Pau l E . Zinner , ed. , National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1956) , pp. 462-64 . 96. Micunovic , Moscow Diary, p . 140 . 97. Rober t D . Murphy , Diplomat among Warriors (Garde n City , N.Y. : Dou bleday, 1964) , p. 428. The America n ministe r t o Hungary , Christia n Rav ndal, who ha d returne d hom e shortl y befor e th e outbreak, allowe d tha t h e had "expecte d somethin g o f thi s sor t aroun d th e en d o f th e year " [New York Herald Tribune, Octobe r 25 , 1956) . 98. Laqueur , World of Secrets, p . 123 ; Meyer, Facing Reality, p . 127 ; Herma n Finer, Dulles over Suez (Chicago : Quadrangle , 1964) , p. 343. 99. Dwigh t D . Eisenhower , Waging Peace (Garde n City , N.Y. : Doubleday , 1964), p. 63. 100. Bria n McCauley , "Hungar y an d Suez , 1956 : Th e Limit s o f Sovie t an d American Power, " i n Bel a K . Kiral y e t al. , eds. , The First War between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Its Impact (Ne w York: Brookly n Colleg e Press, 1984) , p. 297. 101. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956, pp . 255-56; Murphy , Diplomat among Warriors, p . 429 ; C . L . Sulzberger , The Last of the Giants (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1970) , p. 336. 102. Dulle s telephone conversation , Octobe r 24 , 1956 . 103. Dulle s telephon e conversation s wit h Lodg e an d Eisenhower , 2 5 Octobe r 1956. 104. Eisenhower , Waging Peace, pp. 6 7 - 8 . 105. NS C Actions 1623 , 1628 , 26 Octobe r 1956 . 106. Dulle s telephone conversation , 2 6 Octobe r 1956 . 107. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956, pp . 45—6. 108. Murphy , Diplomat among Warriors, p . 428. 109. Finer , Dulles over Suez, p . 349. 110. Finer , Dulles over Suez, p . 353. 111. Dulle s telephon e conversation , 2 9 Octobe r 1956 ; Bohlen , Witness to History, p . 413. 112. Dulle s telephon e conversation , 2 9 Octobe r 1956 .

Notes 3 7

7

113. Dulle s telephon e conversatio n wit h Shanley , 2 9 Octobe r 1956 ; Ne w Yor k Times, 1 November 1956 . 114. Corso n als o allege s tha t th e CI A ha d infiltrate d Re d Sox/Re d Ca p group s into Hungary , Czechoslovakia , an d Romani a t o fomen t revol t (Rise of the American Intelligence Empire, p . 369). 115. Colby , Honorable Men, pp . 134-5 ; cf . E.H . Cookridge , Geblen: Spy of the Century (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1972) , pp. 3 0 4 - 5 . 116. Colby , Honorable Men, p . 135 . 117. Colby , Honorable Men, p . 135 ; Powers , Man Who Kept the Secrets, pp . 7 4 - 5 ; Ranelagh , The Agency, p . 307. 118. Meyer , Facing Reality, pp . 128-30 . 119. Holt , Radio Free Europe, p.194 . 120. Alla n A . Michie, Voices through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free Europe Story (Ne w York : Dodd , Mead , 1963) , pp . 2 6 5 - 6 ; Unite d Nations , Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (Ne w York , 1957), p. 18 . 121. Dulle s telephon e conversation s wit h Alle n Dulles , 2 9 Octobe r 1956 , an d with Eisenhower , 3 0 Octobe r 1956 . 122. Eisenhower , Waging Peace, p. 59; Hughes, Ordeal of Power, p . 220. 123. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956, p . 50. 124. McCaule y i n Kiraly , First War, p . 304 . 125. Eisenhower , Waging Peace, p. 82 . 126. Ranelagh , The Agency, pp . 3 0 5 - 6 ; Murphy , Diplomat among Warriors, p. 430 . 127. Ranelagh , The Agency, p . 306. 128. Eisenhower , Waging Peace, p. 88. 129. Rosco e Drummon d an d Gasto n Coblentz , Duel at the Brink (London : Doubleday, 1961) , pp. 176-7 . 130. NS C 5616 , U.S . Policy towar d Development s i n Polan d an d Hungary , 3 1 October 1956 . 131. McCaule y i n Kiraly , First War, pp . 3 0 4 - 5 . 132. Bohlen , Witness to History, p . 417. 133. McCaule y i n Kiraly , First War, p . 306 ; Edmon d Taylor , "Th e Lesson s o f Hungary," The Reporter, 2 7 Decembe r 1956 , pp. 18 , 21. 134. Dulle s telephon e conversation , 2 Novembe r 1956 ; McCaule y i n Kiraly , First War, pp . 3 0 7 - 8 . 135. Messag e fro m Budapest , 4 November 1956 , White Hous e Office , Offic e o f the Staf f Secretary : Records , 1953—61 , Dwigh t D . Eisenhowe r Library , Abilene, Kansas . 136. Unite d State s Informatio n Agency , Hungary: American Statements and Actions (London , n.d.) , pp . 32 , 34 ; Hughes , Ordeal of Power, p . 223 ; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p . 95 ; Phili p Dean e i n The Scotsman, 7 No vember 1956 . 137. Dulle s telephon e conversation , Octobe r 29 , 1956 .

3 7 8 Notes 138. Josep h P . Lash , Dag Hammarskjold (London : Cassell , 1962) , p. 93 . For a detailed analysi s o f actio n an d inactio n a t th e UN , se e Gordo n Gaskill , "Timetable o f a Failure, " The Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol . 34 , No . 2 (Spring 1958) , pp. 162-90 . 139. Dulle s telephone conversation , 2 November 1956 . 140. Eisenhower , Waging Peace, p. 89 . 141. Unite d Nations , Securit y Council , Official Records, 753r d meetin g (No vember 3 , 1956) , p. 17 . 142. Se e note 122 . 143. U.S . Congress, House, Committee o n Foreig n Affairs, Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe on Policy toward the Satellite Nations, 85t h Cong., lsst . sess. , 4 June 1957 , pp. 4, 7 . Chapter 3 1. U.S . Congress, House , Report of the Special Study Mission, pp . 6-7^ 1 4 16. 2. Edwar d Weinta l an d Charle s Bartlett , Facing the Brink (Ne w York : Scrib ner's, 1967) , pp. 2 1 0 - 1 1 . 3. Willia m R . Corson , The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (Ne w York : Dia l Press/Jame s Wade , 1977) , pp. 3 7 0 72. 4. NS C 5707/8 , "Basic National Securit y Policy, " June 3 , 1957 . 5. Whit e Hous e Leadershi p Meeting , January 1 , 1957 , "General Presentatio n to Congressiona l Leaders, " Dulle s Papers , Princeto n University ; Counci l on Foreig n Relations , Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1957 (New York : Harper , 1958) , p. 4 1. 6. New York Times, Ma y 11 , 1957. 7. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Januar y 27 , 1958 , pp . 122-27 ; Arnol d Wolfers, ed. , Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore : Th e John s Hopkins University , Press , 1959) , pp. 156—57. 8. Z . A . Kruszewski , "Th e Polish-America n Congress , East-Wes t Issues , an d the Formulatio n o f America n Foreig n Policy, " i n Mohamma d E . Ahrari , ed., Ethnic Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport , Conn. : Greenwoo d Press, 1987) , pp. 9 1 - 9 2 . 9. New York Times, Jun e 18 , 1958. 10. "Repor t o n th e Changin g Situatio n i n Hungary, " Congressional Record, 88th Congress , 1s t sess., May 15 , 1963, p. 8646 . 11. Assembl y o f Captiv e Europea n Nations , Resolutions,Reports, Organization, 9t h sess. , New York , 1962-63 , p. 116 . 12. Walte r A . Laqueur , World of Secrets: The Other Uses and Limits of Intelligence (Ne w York : Basi c Books, 1985) , p. 130 . 13. Zbignie w Brzezinsk i an d Willia m E . Griffith , "Peacefu l Engagemen t i n Eastern Europe, "Foreign Affairs, 39 , no. 4 (Sprin g 1961) : 642-54 .

Notes 3 7

9

14. Joh n Lewi s Gaddis , Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Ne w Yor k Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1982) , p. 209. 15. New York Times, Januar y 31 , 1961. 16. New York Times, Octobe r 15 , 1962 . 17. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Octobe r 28 , 1963 , pp. 656-57. 18. Josep h F . Harrington , "Romanian-America n Relation s durin g th e Kenned y Administration," East European Quarterly, 18 , no. 2 (Jun e 1984) : 2 2 4 - 2 5 . 19. Se e Harrington , "Romanian-America n Relation s durin g th e Kenned y Ad ministration," an d Josep h F . Harringto n an d Bruc e Courtney , "Romanian American Relation s durin g th e Johnso n Administration, " East European Quarterly, 22 , no. 2 (Jun e 1988) : 213-29 . 20. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Marc h 16 , 1964 , pp. 3 9 0 - 6 . 21. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Jun e 15 , 1964, p. 923. 22. Zbignie w Brzezinski , Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (Ne w York : Farrar , Strau s & Giroux , 1983) , p . 76. 23. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Marc h 13 , 1967, pp. 418-19 . 24. Zbignie w Brzezinski , "Th e Framewor k o f East-Wes t Reconciliation, " Foreign Affairs, 46 , no. 2 (Januar y 1968): , 256-75. 25. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Octobe r 2 , 1967 , p. 434. 26. Honor e M . Catudal , Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making (Berlin : Berlin Verlag, 1980) , p. 175 . 27. Catudal , Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 217-18 . 28. Neues Deutschland (Eas t Berlin), June 16, ' 1961. 29. Catudal , Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 242, 249-50 . 30. Robi n A . Remington , Winter in Prague (Cambridge , Mass. : MI T Press , 1969), p. 225. 31. Zdene k Mlynar , Night Frost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism (London: Hurst , 1980) , p. 157 . 32. New York Times, Septembe r 2 1 , 1968; see Viktor Suvorov , The Liberators (London: Hamis h Hamilton , 1981) , pp. 153-57 . 33. Thoma s M . Cynkin , Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (London: Macmillan , 1988) , pp. 17ff . 34. New York Times, Ma y 2 , 1968 . 35. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Jun e 10 , 1968 , p. 741. 36. New York Times, July , 20, 23 1968 . 37. Cynkin , Soviet and American Signalling, p . 32. 38. Joh n C . Campbell , "Czechoslovakia : America n Choices , Pas t an d Future, " Canadian Slavonic Papers, 11 , no. 1 (1969): pp. 13-14 . 39. Lyndo n Baine s Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (Ne w York : Holt , Rinehar t & Winston , 1971) , p. 486. 40. E . H . Cookridge , Gehlen: Spy of the Century (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1972), p. 361; Laqueur, World of Secrets, pp . 134 , 357 note 61. 41. Johnson , Vantage Point, 4 8 7 - 8 8 .

380 Notes 42. Laqueur , World of Secrets, p . 134 . Se e als o Kare n Dawisha , The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Berkeley : Universit y o f Californi a Press , 1984) , an d Jiri Valenta , Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press , 1979) . 43. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 465 . Se e als o th e view s o f th e Polis h Colonel Ryszar d J. Kuklinsk i i n Orbis, Winte r 1988 , pp. 6, 8 . 44. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, 2 3 Septembe r 1968 ; "Th e Imperia l Relation ship: A Conversatio n wit h Zbignie w Brzezinski, " Freedom at Issue, no . 9 8 (September-October 1987) : 21. 45. New York Times, Septembe r 18 , 1968. 46. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Octobe r 7 , 1968 , pp. 3 5 0 - 5 1 . 47. New York Times, Augus t 22 , 1968 . 48. Jose f Korbel , Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? (Princeton , N . J. : Princeton Universit y Press , 1972) , p . 9 1 ; Pravda, Septembe r 26 , Novembe r 13, 1968 . 49. Henr y A . Kissinger , American Foreign Policy, 3d . ed. , (Ne w York : Norton , 1977), pp. 76-77. 50. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 150 . 51. "U.S . Foreign Polic y fo r th e 1970s : A New Strateg y fo r Peace, " a repor t t o the Congress b y Richard Nixon , president o f th e United States, Washington , D.C., February 18 , 1970 , pp. 138-39 . 52. "U.S . Foreig n Polic y fo r th e 1970s : Th e Emergin g Structur e o f Peace, " a report t o th e Congres s b y Richar d Nixon , presiden t o f th e Unite d States , Washington, D.C. , February 9 , 1972 , pp. 4 9 - 5 1 . 53. Statemen t delivere d t o th e Senat e Foreig n Relation s Committee , Septembe r 19, 1974 ; see Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, pp . 171-72 . 54. New York Times, Octobe r 13 , 1974 . 55. Henr y Kissinger , White House Years (Boston : Little, Brown, 1979) , p. 1265. 56. Raymon d L . Garthoff, "Easter n Europ e i n th e Contex t o f U.S.-Sovie t Rela tions," i n Sara h Meiklejoh n Terry , ed. , Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven : Yal e University Press , 1984) , p. 322. 57. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Apri l 30 , 1973 , pp. 533-38 . 58. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Augus t 25 , 1969 , p . 169 . Se e als o Rowlan d Evans, Jr., an d Rober t D . Novak, Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1971) , pp . 98-100 , an d Ray mond L . Garthoff , Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington , D.C. : Brooking s Institution , 1985) , p. 73. 59. Garthoff , Detente and Confrontation, pp . 218-19, 221 , 227-28. 60. Se e Kissinger, White House Years, pp . 408—12, 529—34, and Henr y Kissin ger, Years of Upheaval (Boston : Little , Brown , 1982) , pp . 143-48 , 1 5 4 59. 61. Se e Ernes t D . Plock , The Basic Treaty and the Evolution of East-West German Relations (Boulder , Colo. : Westview Press , 1986) , pp. 6 8 - 7 9 . 62. O n th e background o f th e European securit y conference, se e Bennett Kovrig ,

Notes 3 8

1

"European Securit y i n East-Wes t Relations : Histor y o f a Diplomati c En counter," i n Rober t Spencer , ed. , Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Toronto : Cente r fo r Internationa l Studies , 1984), pp. 3 - 1 9 . 63. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, 2 6 June 1972 , pp. 898-99 . 64. Helmu t Sonnenfeldt , quote d i n Time, Augus t 4 , 1975 , p. 22. 65. Time, Decembe r 16 , 1974 , p. 58. 66. New York Times, Apri l 6, 1976 ; Rowland Evan s and Rober t Novak colum n in Washington Post, Marc h 22 , 1976 ; U.S. Congress, House , Subcommitte e on Internationa l Securit y an d Scientifi c Affair s o f th e Hous e Committe e o n International Relations , United States National Security Policy Vis-a-Vis Eastern Europe (The "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine"), 94t h Cong. , 2 d sess. , 1976 , p. 2 . 67. New York Times, Jun e 26 , 1976 . 68. New York Times, Octobe r 7 , 1976 ; an d se e Willia m G . Hyland , Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Ne w York : Rando m House, 1987) , pp. 177-79 . 69. Time, Octobe r 25 , 1976 , pp. 1 0 - 1 1 . 70. New York Times, Octobe r 17 , 1976 . 71. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, pp . 149—50 . 72. Presidentia l Directiv e 2 1 wa s signe d b y Carte r o n Septembe r 13 , 1977 . Se e Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp . 53, 296-97, an d Time, Jun e 12 , 1978 , p. 19 . 73. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, pp . 297 , 300 , 53 ; New York Times, Ma y 11,1977. 74. U.S . Congress, House, Committe e o n Internationa l Relations , Subcommitte e on Europ e an d th e Middl e East , Hearings on U.S. Policy toward Eastern Europe, 95t h Cong. , 2 d sess. , Septembe r 7 an d 12 , 1978 , pp . 4 1 - 4 6 ; U.S . Congress, House , Committe e o n Internationa l Relations , Subcommitte e o n Europe an d th e Middle East , Hearings, 96t h Cong. , 1s t sess., July 12 , 1979 , p. 12 . 75. Time, Jun e 12 , 1978 , p. 19 . 76. Los Angeles Times, Octobe r 14 , 1987 . See also Vladimir Socor , "Th e Limit s of Nationa l Independenc e i n th e Sovie t Bloc : Rumania' s Foreig n Polic y Reconsidered," Orbis, Fal l 1976 , pp . 707—32 ; an d Io n Miha i Pacepa , Red Horizons (Washington , D.C. : Regner y Gateway , 1987) . 77. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 299 . Se e als o U.S . Congress , Hous e o f Representatives, Committe e o n Internationa l Relations , Subcommitte e o n Europe an d th e Middl e East , The Holy Crown of St Stephen and United States-Hungarian Relations, hearings , 95t h Cong. , 1s t sess. , Novembe r 9 , 1977. 78. Se e Laurence Silberman , "Yugoslavia' s 'Old ' Communism, " Foreign Policy, (Spring 1977) : 3 - 2 7 . 79. Se e U.S. Congress, Hearings on U.S. Policy toward Eastern Europe, pp . 4 7 49, 55.

382 Notes 80. Departmen t o f State , "U.S . Polic y an d Easter n Europe, " Current Policy 139, Washington, D.C. , 1980 , p. 4. 81. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, pp . 297-99 . Th e Stat e Departmen t ha d counseled agains t a meetin g wit h Cardina l Wyszynsk i fo r fea r o f provok ing th e government , bu t Brzezinsk i an d Rosalyn n Carte r nevertheles s pai d him a n unannounce d visi t carryin g a messag e o f goo d wishe s fro m th e president. 82. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 464. 83. New York Times, Augus t 23 , 1980 . 84. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 464. 85. Kuklinsk i i n Orbis, Winte r 1988 , pp. 14-15 . 86. Zbignie w Brzezinski , "Whit e Hous e Diary , 1980, " Orbis, Winte r 1988 , pp. 3 5 - 3 7 ; Pravda, Decembe r 4 , 1980 ; New York Times, Decembe r 5 , 1980. 87. New York Times, Novembe r 29 , December 4 , 1980 . 88. Pravda, Decembe r 6 , 1980 . 89. Brzezinski , "Whit e Hous e Diary, " pp . 38 , 4 1; Kuklinski i n Orbis, Winte r 1988, p. 16 . 90. Kuklinsk i i n Orbis, Winte r 1988 , pp . 16-17 ; Brzezinski , "Whit e Hous e Diary," pp. 4 1 - 4 4 . 91. Brzezinski , "White Hous e Diary, " pp. 4 4 - 4 5 . 92. Ibid. 93. New York Times, Decembe r 3 , 1980 . 94. Cynkin , Soviet and American Signalling, pp . 74—75 ; New York Times, December 13 , 1980 . 95. Brzezinski , "White House Diary," pp. 47-48; Pravda, December 14 , 1980. 96. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 528 ; se e als o Kuklinsk i i n Orbis, Winter 1988 , p. 18 . 97. New York Times, Januar y 17 , 1981. 98. Se e Lincol n Gordon , "Interest s an d Policie s i n Easter n Europe : Th e Vie w from Washington, " i n Gordo n e t al. , Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe (Washington , D.C. : Brookings Institution , 1987) , pp. 121-22. 99. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Februar y 1981 , p . " H " ; Alexande r Haig , Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (Ne w York : Macmillan , 1984), p. 239. 100. Pravda, Marc h 5 , 1981. 101. Pravda, Apri l 26 , 1981. 102. Kuklinsk i i n Orbis, Winte r 1988 , pp. 2 0 - 2 4 . 103. Haig , Caveat, pp . 241, 247. 104. New York Times, February , 2 , 11 , 12, 1981. 105. New York Times, Apri l 5 , 6, 1981. 106. New York Times, Apri l 9 , May, 6 , 1981. 107. New York Times, Marc h 27 , 1981. 108. Pravda, Jun e 12 , 1981.

Notes 3 8

3

109. New York Times, Jun e 13 , 17 1981. 110. New York Times, Septembe r 19 , 1981. 111. Pravda, Septembe r 20 , 1981. 112. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Novembe r 1981 , pp. 19 , 52. 113. New York Times, Octobe r 25 , 1981. 114. Kuklinsk i i n Orbis, Winte r 1988 , p. 25. 115. New York Times, Decembe r 7 , 1981. 116. Gordo n e t al., Eroding Empire, pp . 124-25 ; Cynkin , Soviet and American Signalling, pp . 201, 250 not e 8 . 117. New York Times, Decembe r 14 , 1981. 118. Se e Gordo n e t al. , Eroding Empire, p . 12 5 not e 72 , an d Newsweek, October 10 , 1983 , p. 43. 119. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Januar y 1982 , p. 42. 120. Bo b Woodward , Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (Ne w York: Simo n an d Schuster , 1987) , pp. 177-78 . 121. Se e "Th e Imperia l Relationship : A Conversatio n wit h Zbignie w Brzezin ski," pp. 2 1 - 2 2 . 122. Haig , Caveat, p . 250. 123. Departmen t o f State , "American Foreig n Policy : Curren t Documents , 1981, " Washington, D.C. , pp. 623-24 . 124. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Septembe r 1982 , p. 31. 125. Michae l Mandelbaum , "Th e Unite d State s and Eastern Europe : A Window of Opportunity, " p . 384 , an d Dominiqu e Moisi , "Frenc h Polic y towar d Central an d Easter n Europe, " p . 361 , in Willia m F . Griffith , ed. , Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain? (Boulder , Colo. : Westvie w Press, 1989) . 126. Woodward , Veil, p. 375. 127. Se e Charle s Gati , "Polis h Futures , Wester n Options, " Foreign Affairs, 61 , no. 2 (Winte r 1982-83) : 305 . 128. Garthoff , "Easter n Europ e in the Context of U.S. Soviet Relations," p. 338. 129. Davi d B . Funderburk , Pinstripes and Reds (Washington , D.C. : Selou s Foundation Press , 1987) , pp. 3 3 - 3 4, 5 2 - 5 4 . 130. New York Times, Jun e 9 , 1982 . 131. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Apri l 1985 , p. 46. 132. Ibid., Novembe r 1983 , pp. 19-22 . 133. Mikhai l Gorbachev , Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (Ne w York : Perennia l Library/Harpe r & Row , 1987) , p. 151. 134. Fo r instance , Gennad y Gerasimov , quote d b y Reuter , Septembe r 4 , 1987 . See als o Kare n Dawisha , Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988), chapter 7. 135. "East-Wes t Relation s and Eastern Europe (An American-Soviet Dialogue), " Problems of Communism, 37 , no . 3 - 4 (May-Augus t 1988) : 5 5 - 7 0 ; Los Angeles Times, Jul y 10 , 1988 ; Gorbachev, Perestroika, p . 149 . 136. Der Spiegel, 1988 , pp . 119-20 ; Charle s Gati , "Easter n Europ e o n It s Own," Foreign Affairs, 68 , no. 1 (Fall 1989) : 106 .

3 8 4 Notes 137. New York Times, Novembe r 23 , 1987 . 138. The Independent (London) , February 4 , 1988 . 139. New York Times, Jun e 13 , 1987 ; Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Octobe r 1987, pp. 3 6 - 3 7; New York Times, Augus t 27 , 29, 1987 . 140. Whit e House , "Nationa l Securit y Strateg y o f th e Unite d States, " Washing ton, D.C. , January 1988) , p. 27. 141. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Apri l 1988 , pp. 6 6 - 6 8 . 142. New York Times, Februar y 28 , 1988 . 143. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Ma y 1988 , p. 54. 144. Washington Post, Ma y 11 , 1988. 145. New York Times, Jun e 9 , 1988 . 146. Unite d State s Information Service , July 28, 1988 . 147. Kruszewski , "Polish-America n Congress, " pp. 93-94 . 148. Washington Post, Octobe r 7 , 1987 . 149. Warsa w television , Septembe r 28 , 1987 . 150. New York Times an d Washington Post, Septembe r 28 , 1987 . 151. RFE/R L Central News , October 8 , 1987 . 152. Reuter , Ma y 5 , 1988 ; New York Times, Ma y 8 , 1988 . 153. Reuter , July 28 , 1988 . 154. USI S (Ottawa), "U.S.-Sovie t Relations : A New Polic y fo r th e 1990s, " Ma y 12, 1989 . 155. USIS , May 3 1 , 1989. 156. New York Times, Apri l 18 , 1989 . 157. Financial Times (London) , April 25 , 1989 . 158. New York Times, Jul y 6 , 7, 1989 . 159. New York Times, Jul y 14 , August 26, 1989 . 160. New York Times, Jul y 10 , 1989 . 161. New York Times, Jul y 11 , 1989. 162. USIS , January 18 , 1990 . 163. Reuter , Decembe r 26 , 1989 . 164. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , November 23 , 1989. Chapter 4 1. Se e Clifford Orwi n an d Thoma s Pangle , "The Philosophica l Foundatio n o f Human Rights, " i n Mar c F . Plattner , ed. , Human Rights in Our Time (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press , 1984) , pp. 1-22 . 2. Se e Roger Pilon , "Th e Ide a o f Huma n Rights, " The National Interest, no . 5 (Fal l 1986) : 9 9 - 1 0 1 . 3. Se e Mauric e Cranston , What Are Human Rightsf (Ne w York : Taplinger , 1973). 4. U.S . Congress, Commissio n o n Securit y an d Cooperatio n i n Europ e (here after cite d a s Helsink i Commission) , Hearings on Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, The International Covenants on Human Rights: Pros-

Notes 38

5

pects o n U.S . Ratification , 100t h Cong. , 2 d sess. , Marc h 29 , 1988 , p . 12 ; see als o Schifter' s statemen t a t th e Ottaw a CSC E meeting , June 4 , 1985 , in Vojtech Mastny , Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: Analysis and Documentation (Durham , N.C. : Duk e Universit y Press , 1986) , pp . 287-89. 5. Gei r Lundestad , The American Non-policy towards Eastern Europe, 19431947 (Ne w York : Humanitie s Press , 1975) , p. 342. 6. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Jun e 12 , 1949 , pp. 756-58 . 7. New York Times, Februar y 25 , 1950 . 8. New York Times, Januar y 10 , 1952 . 9. Joh n Foste r Dulles , " A Polic y o f Boldness, " Life, Ma y 19 , 1952 , pp . 154 , 157. 10. Counci l o n Foreig n Relations , Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956 (Ne w York : Harper , 1957) , pp. 5 7 - 5 8 . 11. U.S . Congress, Senate , Joint Resolutio n 111 , 86th Cong. , 1st . sess.; Richar d M. Nixon , Six Crises (Garde n City , N.Y. : Doubleday , 1962) , pp . 2 5 1 52. 12. Se e Zbignie w Brzezinsk i an d Willia m E . Griffith , "Peacefu l Engagemen t i n Eastern Europe, " Foreign Affairs 39 , no.4 (Sprin g 1961) . 13. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Jul y 2 , 1962 , p. 25. 14. Edwar d Weinta l an d Charle s Bartlett , Facing the Brink (Ne w York : Scrib ner's, 1967 ) p . 164 . 15. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Decembe r 23 , 1968, pp. 647—48. 16. Quote d i n Joshu a Muravchik , The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy (Lanham , Md. : Hamilto n Press , 1986), p. xviii. 17. Se e Henry Kissinger , White House Years (Boston : Little , Brown , 1979 , pp . 412-16. 18. Joh n J. Maresca , To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975 (Durham , N.C. : Duk e Universit y Press , 1985) , pp . ix, xi, xii. 19. Luig i Vittori o Ferraris , ed. , Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-GenevaHelsinki, 1972-1975 (Alphen : Sijthof f & Noordhoff , 1979) , p. 16 . 20. Maresca , To Helsinki, p . 36. 21. Jame s Rin g Adams, "Fro m Helsink i t o Madrid, " i n Plattner, Human Rights in Our Time, p . 107 . 22. Ferraris , Report on a Negotiation, p . 135 . 23. Maresca , To Helsinki, p . 52. 24. Ferraris , Report on a Negotiation, p . 300 . 25. Ibid. , p. 436. 26. Geral d R . Ford, A Time to Heal (Ne w York : Berkele y Books, 1980) , p. 287. 27. New York Times, Octobe r 7 , 1976 . 28. Jame s F . Brown , quote d i n Si g Mickelson , America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Ne w York : Praeger , 1983) , p. 120 .

386 Notes 29. Cor d Meyer , Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (Ne w York: Harpe r & Row , 1980) , p. 133. 30. Mickelson , America 3s Other Voice, p . 156nl , 2 . 31. Meyer , Facing Reality, p . 136 . 32. Ja n Sizo o an d Rudol f Th . Jurrjens , CSCE Decision-making: The Madrid Experience (Th e Hague: Nijhoff, 1984) , pp. 180-81 . 33. A n amendmen t t o th e Foreig n Assistanc e Ac t o f 1961 , introduced i n 197 4 as a sense of Congres s resolutio n an d mad e bindin g i n 197 8 a s Section 502 , prohibited securit y assistanc e t o government s tha t engag e i n a "consisten t pattern o f gros s violation s o f internationall y recognize d huma n rights " unless th e presiden t certifie d extraordinar y circumstances . Th e Harki n amendment (sectio n 11 6 of th e same act ) prohibited economi c assistanc e o n the same grounds "unles s suc h assistanc e will directly benefit need y people. " Section 70 1 o f th e Internationa l Financia l Assistanc e Ac t o f 197 7 advise d the executiv e t o stee r multilatera l bank s awa y fro m grantin g assistanc e t o human right s violators . Se e Davi d P . Forsythe , "Congres s an d Huma n Rights i n U.S . Foreig n Policy : Th e Fat e o f Genera l Legislation, " Human Rights Quarterly 9 , no . 3 (1987) : 382-404 ; an d fo r a listin g o f pertinen t U.S. legislation , appendi x D i n Davi d D . Newsom , ed. , The Diplomacy of Human Rights (Lanham , Md.: Universit y Pres s of America, 1986) , pp. 2 2 335. 34. Mastny , Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, p . 115 . 35. Ibid. , pp. 11 6 36. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Jun e 1978 , p. 1 . 37. Muravchik , Uncertain Crusade, p . 14 . 38. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, pp . 128 , 149 . 39. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 156 . 40. Muravchik , Uncertain Crusade, p . 57. 41. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , Apri l 30 , 1977 ; Muravchik , Uncertain Crusade, p . 89 . 42. Muravchik , Uncertain Crusade, p . 105 . 43. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 128 . 44. Jean e Kirkpatrick , "Dictatorship s an d Doubl e Standards, " Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (Novembe r 1979) : 3 4 - 4 5 . 45. Muravchik , Uncertain Crusade, p . 145 . 46. Richar d Schifter , "Huma n Right s an d U.S . Foreign Policy, " Departmen t o f State Bulletin, Augus t 1987 , p. 76. 47. Fo r a lis t o f huma n right s nongovernmenta l organizations , se e appendi x E in Newsom, Diplomacy of Human Rights, pp . 237-39 . 48. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, p . 297. 49. Helsinki, What Next? (Berlin : Panorama DDR , 1977) , pp. 2 1 - 2 4, 5 6 - 6 0 . 50. New York Times, Marc h 20 , 1978 . 51. Mastny , Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, pp . 18 5 52. New York Times, Novembe r 5 , 1981.

Notes 38

7

53. Tama r Jacoby , "Th e Reaga n Turnaroun d o n Huma n Rights, " Foreign Affairs 64 , no. 5 (Summe r 1986) : 1075 . 54* New York Times, Jun e 1 , 1986 . 55. Lynn e A . Davidson , "Romania , CSC E an d th e Most-Favored-Natio n Pro cess, 1982-84, " i n Newsom, Diplomacy of Human Rights, p . 190 . 56. Forsythe , "Congres s an d Huma n Right s i n U.S . Foreig n Policy, " pp. 4 0 1 - 2 . 57. Se e Davidson , "Romania , CSC E an d th e Most-Favored-Natio n Process, " pp. 194-96 . 58. Assistan t Secretar y J . Edwar d Fo x proteste d i n a lette r t o Congressma n Dante Fascell , chairma n o f th e Committe e o n Foreig n Affairs , o n Apri l 8 , 1987 tha t th e Dorna n resolutio n (H . Res . 56) conveye d th e impressio n tha t "a seriou s huma n right s issu e i s being use d b y th e Unite d State s t o promot e nationalistic an d territoria l concern s an d tha t th e Unite d State s wishe s t o redraw th e borders o f Easter n Europe. " 59. Helsink i Commission , Hearings, Ma y 5 , 1987 , pp. 5, 7 . 60. Davi d B . Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds (Washinton , D.C. : Selou s Foun dation Press , 1987) , pp. 79, 103 , 34, 85-86 , 189 , 196 . 61. Helsink i Commission , Hearings, Jun e 25 , 1985 , p. 49. 62. RFE/R L Centra l News , September 9 , 1987 . 63. Io n Pacep a claim s tha t Israe l als o pai d ransom , bu t covertl y (New York Times, Octobe r 14 , 1987) . 64. Washington Post, Ma y 6 , 1990 . 65. Jacoby , "Th e Reaga n Turnaroun d o n Huma n Rights, " p. 1083 . 66. See , for instance , Helsinki Commission , Fulfilling Our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act, Novembe r 1979 . 67. Se e H. Gordo n Skilling , "CSC E i n Madrid, " Problems of Communism, 30 , (July-August 1981 ) 6 - 7 . 68. Ma x M . Kampelman , Three Years at the East-West Divide (Ne w York : Freedom House , 1983) , p. 8 . 69. Ibid . p. 77. 70. Mastny , Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, p . 27. 71. Ibid . pp . 352-69 . Fo r th e U.S . ambassador' s assessment , se e Kampelman , Three Years at the East-West Divide, pp . 113-21 . 72. Helsink i Commission , The Helsinki Process and East West Relations: Progress in Perspective, Marc h 1985 . 73. Helsink i Commission , Hearings, Octobe r 3 , 1985 , p. 30. 74. Helsink i Commission , The Helsinki Process, pp . 113-20 . 75. Helsink i Commission , Hearings, Octobe r 3 , 1985 , p. 76. 76. Publi c Law 9 9 - 7 9 . 77. Mastny , Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, pp . 285 , 290 , 303. 78. Helsink i Commission , Hearings, Jun e 25 , 1985, pp. 179 , 182 . 79. Mastny , Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, p . 317.

3 8 8 Notes 80. Michae l Novak , "Ordinar y People, " The National Interest, no . 5 (Fal l 1986): p. 77. 81. Helsink i Commission , Hearings, Marc h 18-Jun e 18 , 1986, p. 246. 82. Moscow News, Jun e 5 , 1988 . 83. Helsink i Commission , Hearings, Novembe r 4 , 1986 , p. 19 . 84. New York Times, Januar y 5 , 1989 . 85. Financial Times, Januar y 18 , 1989 . 86. Reuters , January 16 , 1989 . 87. New York Times, Januar y 18 , 1989 . 88. New York Times, Januar y 17 , 1989 . 89. Agerpre s (Romania) , December 31 , 1988. 90. Se e Jonathan Eyal , "Th e Londo n Informatio n Foru m an d Futur e Trends i n East Europea n Attitude s towar d Internationa l Radi o Broadcasts, " Radio Free Europe Research, Munich , June 27 , 1989 . 91. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , December 21 , 1989. 92. Times Literary Supplement (London) , February 19-25 , 1988 , p. 199 . 93. Karima (Budapest) , November 26 , 1987 . 94. Magyar Hirlap, Apri l 18 , 1988 . 95. The Economist, Augus t 30 , 1986 . 96. Wall Street Journal, Jun e 8 , 1989 . 97. RFE/RL Daily Report, Ma y 6 , 1989 . 98. Nepszabadsag, Marc h 10 , 1989 . 99. RFE/RL Daily Report, Ma y 8 , 1989 . 100. Timoth y Garto n Ash , "Refolutio n [sic ] in Hungary an d Poland, " The New York Review, Augus t 17 , 1989 , p. 10 . 101. Magyar Nemzet, Jun e 7 , 1989 . 102. Washington Post, Augus t 17 , 1989 . 103. Financial Times, Marc h 30 , 1989 ; Nepszabadsag, Marc h 10 , 1989 . 104. GazetaWyborcza, Jun e 1 , 1989 . 105. RFE/RL Daily Report, Septembe r 14 , 1989 . 106. The Economist, Januar y 27 , 1990 , p. 48. 107. Neues Deutschland, Jun e 15 , 1988. 108. New York Times, Februar y 18 , 1989 . 109. Financial Times, Januar y 19 , 1989 . 110. Reuter , Septembe r 7 , 1987 . 111. Reuter , June 26 , 1988 . 112. Toronto Star, Decembe r 10 , 1989 . 113. Reuter , January 30 , 1990 . 114. Associate d Press , February 24 , 1988 . 115. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , January 24 , 1990 . 116. Radi o Bucharest , Novembe r 28 , 1988 . 117. Nepszabadsag, Marc h 15 , 1989. 118. The New York Review, Apri l 27 , 1989 , p. 9. 119. Associate d Press , January 19 , 1990 . 120. Reuter , Novembe r 24 , 1989 .

Notes 3 8

9

121. Nationa l Endowmen t fo r Democracy , Annua l Report , 1988 . 122. USIS , November 16 , 1989 . 123. New York Times, Ma y 13 , 1990 . 124. RFE/RL Daily Report, Februar y 7 , 1990 .

Chapter 5 1. Phili p Hanson , Western Economic Statecraft in East-West Relations (Lon don: Roya l Institut e o f Internationa l Affairs/Routledg e 8 c Kega n Paul , 1988), p. 3. 2. Departmen t o f State , Offic e o f Intelligenc e Research , "East-Wes t Trad e Continues t o Decline, " Octobe r 21 , 1952. 3. U.S . Departmen t o f State , Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1949 , Vol. 5 (Washington , D.C. ) p . 363. 4. Departmen t o f State , Offic e o f Intelligenc e Research , "Prospect s fo r En couraging Defectio n o f Easter n Europea n Orbi t Countrie s b y Economi c Means," July 28 , 1950 . 5. Departmen t o f State , Offic e o f Intelligenc e Research , "Vulnerabilit y o f th e Soviet Blo c to Existin g an d Tightene d Wester n Economi c Controls, " Janu ary 26, 1951. 6. NS C 91/1 , "East-West Trade, " November 17 , 1950 . 7. Richar d J . Ellings , Embargoes and World Power: Lessons for American Foreign Policy (Boulder , Colo. : Westview Press , 1985) , p. 81. 8. Ibid. , pp. 87-89 . 9. Publi c Law 91-184 , sectio n 23 . 10. Departmen t o f Defense , Offic e o f th e Directo r o f Defens e Researc h an d Engineering, "A n Analysi s o f Expor t Contro l o f U.S . Technology— A DOD Perspective, " Februar y 2 , 1976 ; se e als o J.F . Bucy , "Technolog y Transfer an d East-Wes t Trade, " International Security 5 , no . 3 (Winte r 1980/81): 132ff . 11. Publi c Law 9 6 - 7 2 . 12. Gordo n B . Smith , ed. , The Politics of East-West Trade (Boulder , Colo. : Westview Press , 1984) , p. 10 . 13. Fortune, Ma y 30 , 1983 , p. 112 . 14. Han s Jacobsen , "U.S . Export Contro l an d Expor t Administratio n Legisla tion," i n Reinhar d Rod e an d Han s Jacobsen , eds. , Economic Warfare or Detente: An Assessment of East-West Relations in the 1980s (Boulder , Colo.: Westview Press , 1985) , p. 223nl7 . 15. Ibid. , pp. 217-18 . 16. Nationa l Academ y o f Sciences/Nationa l Academ y o f Engineering/Institut e of Medicine , Committe e o n Science , Engineering , an d Publi c Policy , Pane l on th e Impac t o f Nationa l Securit y Control s o n Internationa l Technology , Balancing the National Interest: U.S. National Security Controls and Global

390 Notes Economic Competition (Washington , D.C.iNationa l Academ y Press , 1987) , pp. 177 , 264-75 (hereafte r cite d a s the Allen Report) . 17. Alle n Report , pp. 168-73 . 18. Nort h Atlanti c Assembly , Sub-Committe e o n Advance d Technolog y an d Technology Transfer , Draf t interi m report , Septembe r 1987 , p. 15 . 19. Financial Times, Augus t 17 , 1987; Wall Street Journal, Septembe r 28,1987 . 20. Wall Street Journal, Januar y 22 , 1988 . 21. Reuter , January 29 , 1988 . 22. Wall Street Journal, Februar y 23 , 1988 . Se e als o Lind a Melvern , Nic k Anning, an d Davi d Hebditch, Techno-Bandits: How the Soviets Are Stealing America's High-Tech Future (Boston : Houghto n Mifflin , 1984) . 23. The Sunday Times (London) , January 24 , 1988 . 24. Reuter , Septembe r 22, 1987 ; North Atlanti c Assembly, Draft interi m report , pp. 6 - 9 . 25. Associate d Press , October 20 , 1987 ; North Atlanti c Assembly, Draft interi m report, p . 5 ; Associate d Press , Novembe r 4 , 1987 ; Washington Times, October 2 1 , 1987. 26. Reuter , Septembe r 22 , 1987 . 27. Nort h Atlanti c Assembly, Draf t interi m report , p . 9 . 28. Washington Post, Februar y 28 , 1988 . 29. New York Times, Jul y 20 , 1989 . 30. Reuter , June 8 , 1990 . 31. Than e Gustafson , quote d i n Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft, p . 30. 32. Departmen t o f Defense , Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat, 1988 (Washington , D.C. , GPO, 1988) , p. 149 . 33. Pete r Wiles, quoted i n Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft, p . 9. 34. NS C progres s report s o n th e implementatio n o f NS C 18/ 2 (Economi c Relations betwee n th e Unite d State s an d Yugoslavia ) an d NS C 18/ 4 (United State s Polic y towar d th e Conflic t betwee n th e USS R an d Yugo slavia), Apri l 11 , 1949 , Augus t 19 , 1949 , Februar y 1 , 1950 , Octobe r 16 , 1950. 35. Stephe n C . Markovich , "America n Foreig n Ai d an d Yugosla v Foreig n Pol icy," i n Pete r J . Potichny j an d Jan e P . Shapiro , eds. , From Cold War to Detente (Ne w York : Praeger , 1976) , pp. 7 9 - 8 0, 8 2 - 8 5 . 36. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Octobe r 29 , 1956 , pp. 664-65. 37. NS C Actio n Memorandum s 13 2 an d 212 , Januar y 15 , an d Decembe r 14 , 1962. 38. Counci l o n Foreig n Relations , Documents on American Foreign Relations 1956 (Ne w York : Harper , 1957) , pp. 4 5 - 4 6 . 39. Josep h F . Harrington , "Romanian-America n Relation s durin g th e Kenned y Administration," East European Quarterly 18 , no. 2, June 1984 : pp . 2 2 4 25. 40. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Februar y 23 , 1963, pp. 3 0 3 - 5 . 41. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Jun e 15 , 1964 , p . 923 ; New York Times, January 5 , 1965 .

Notes 3 9

1

42. Departmen t o f State , Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union, presented a t th e Whit e Hous e o n Apri l 29 , 196 5 (Washington , D.C. , 1966). 43. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Ma y 30 , 1966 , pp. 839-40 , 843-44 . 44. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Marc h 25 , 1968 , p. 422. 45. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Septembe r 9 , 1968 , p. 262. 46. Samue l Pisar , Coexistence and Commerce: Guidelines for Transactions between East and West (Ne w York : McGraw-Hill , 1970) , p. 70. 47. Henr y Kissinger , White House Years (Boston : Little , Brown, 1979) , p. 154 . 48. New York Times, Octobe r 13 , 1974 . 49. Departmen t o f Stat e Bulletin, Apri l 30 , 1973 , pp. 5 3 3 - 8 . 50. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , April 10 , 1975 . 51. Ellings , Embargoes and World Bower, p . 93. 52. Se e Reinhard Rode , "Th e Unite d States, " i n Rod e an d Jacobsen, Economic Warfare or Detente, pp . 189-90 . 53. Se e Ion Miha i Pacepa , "Th e Defector' s Story, " The Washingtonian, Decem ber 1985 , pp . 171-82 , an d Davi d B . Funderburk , Pinstripes and Reds (Washington, D.C. : Selou s Foundation Press , 1987) , pp. 34, 161-62 . 54. Wlodzimier z Siwinski , "Wh y Polan d Los t it s Creditworthiness, " i n Pau l Marer an d Wlodzimier z Siwinski , eds. , Creditworthiness and Reform in Poland: Western and Polish Perspectives (Bloomington : Indian a Universit y Press, 1988) , p. 25. 55. Siwinski , "Wh y Polan d Los t it s Creditworthiness," p . 26. 56. Ibid. , pp. 2 7 - 2 8 . 57. Gabrie l Eichler , " A Banker' s Perspectiv e o n Poland' s Deb t Problem, " i n Marer an d Siwinski , Creditworthiness and Reform in Poland, p . 202. 58. Jerr y F . Hough , The Polish Crisis: American Policy Options (Washington , D.C.: Brooking s Institution , 1982) , p. 11. 59. Hough , The Polish Crisis, p. 16. 60. Zbignie w Brzezinski , "U.S . Policy towar d Polan d i n a Globa l Perspective, " in Marer an d Siwinski , Creditworthiness and Reform in Poland, p . 321. 61. Richar d Portes , "East Europe' s Deb t to the West: Interdependence i s a TwoWay Street, " Foreign Affairs 55 , no. 4 (Jul y 1977) : 768 . 62. Stansfiel d Turner , Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1985) , p. 119 . 63. Financial Times, Augus t 13 , 1980 . 64. Alexande r Haig , Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1984) , pp. 81 , 111. 65. Se e Thomas M . Cynkin , Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (London: Macmillan , 1988) , pp. 2 1 8 - 2 3. 66. New York Times, Apri l 26 , 1981. 67. Se e Gar y C . Hufbaue r an d Jeffre y J . Schott , Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington , D.C. : Institut e fo r Interna tional Economics , 1985) , pp. 655-66, 683-712 .

392 Notes 68. Lincol n Gordon , Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C. : Brooking s Institution , 1987) , pp. 9 7 - 9 8 . 69. Se e Wall Street Journal, Februar y 26 , 1982 . 70. New York Times, Octobe r 10 , 1986 . 71. Jano s Kornai , A hiany (Budapest : Kozgazdasag i e s jogi, 1982) . 72. Associate d Press , November 4 , 1988 . 73. The Economist, Apri l 23 , 1988 , p. 79. 74. Fo r a super b analysi s o f th e economi c an d othe r aspect s o f Hungary' s peripheral status , se e Andre w C . Janos , The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945 (Princeto n N.J. : Princeton Universit y Press , 1982) . 75. Ja n Winiecki , The Distorted World of Soviet-Type Economies (Pittsburgh : University o f Pittsburg h Press , 1988) , p . 205 ; se e als o Neve n Sesardi c an d Domenico Settembrini , Marxian Utopia? (London : Centr e fo r Researc h int o Communist Economies , 1985) . 76. Reuter , Octobe r 6 , 1988 . 77. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , November 18 , 1989 . 78. New York Times, Novembe r 19 , 1989 . 79. Die Welt, Apri l 24 , 1989 . 80. Reuter , Augus t 26 , 1989 . 81. New York Times, Decembe r 12 , 1989 . A Polish economis t argue d tha t th e only solutio n wa s t o bu y ou t th e to p laye r o f th e Communist-appointe d bureaucracy (Ja n Winiecki , Gorbachev's Way Out? [London : Centr e fo r Research int o Communis t Economies , 1988]) . 82. Se e The Costs and Benefits of the Soviet Empire, 1981-83 (Sant a Monica , Calif.: Ran d Corporation , Augus t 1986) . 83. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , February 19 , 1990 . 84. Washington Post, Februar y 28 , 1988 . 85. Vla d Sobell , "Th e Reshapin g o f th e CMEA' s Scientifi c Program, " RFE Research, (Munich ) Augus t 23 , 1988 . 86. Associate d Press , January 6 , 1990 . 87. Financial Times, Marc h 12 , 1990 . 88. Se e The Economist, Decembe r 16 , 1989 , pp. 68—69. 89. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , January 10 , 1990 . 90. New York Times, Decembe r 20 , 1987 . 91. Financial Times, Novembe r 11 , 1987. 92. Associate d Press , March 23 , 1988. 93. Austria n Institut e fo r Economi c Researc h report , cite d b y Reuter , Marc h 16, 1988 . 94. Organizatio n fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Development , Financial Market Trends, Paris , February 1989 . 95. Se e PlanEcon Report, 4 , nos. 12-1 3 (Marc h 30 , 1988) . 96. Financial Times, Augus t 6 , 1988 . 97. Financial Times, Augus t 3 , 1988 . 98. The Economist, Marc h 10 , 1990 , p. 116 . 99. International Herald Tribune, Marc h 4 , 1988 .

Notes 3 9

3

100. Wall Street Journal, Februar y 17 , 1988 . 101. Valeri e J . Assetto , The Soviet Bloc in the IMF and the IBRD (Boulder , Colo.: Westview Press , 1988) , pp. 4 3 - 4 5, 50 . 102. Ibid. , p. 191. 103. Ibid. , pp. 139-59 . 104. Ibid. , p. 32. 105. Se e Pau l Marer , "Centrall y Planne d Economie s i n th e IMF , th e Worl d Bank, an d th e GATT, " i n Joseph C . Brada , E d A . Hewitt , an d Thoma s A . Wolf, eds. , Economic Adjustment and Reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Durha m N.C. : Duke Universit y Press , 1988) , pp, 2 4 2 - 4 5 . 106. Se e Rober t M . Cutler , "Harmonizin g EEC-CME A Relations : Neve r th e Twain Shal l Meet? " International Affairs 63 , no . 2 (Sprin g 1987) : 2 5 9 70. 107. Reuter , June 24, 1988 . 108. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , October 29 , 1987 . 109. Washington Times, Jul y 2 1 , 1988. 110. Pau l Mare r an d Eugenius z Tabaczynski , Polish-U.S. Industrial Cooperation in the 1980s (Bloomington : Indian a Universit y Press , 1981) , pp . 2 1 22. 111. Radi o Budapest , Apri l 9 , 1988 . 112. Se e Klau s Bolz , "Industria l Cooperation, " i n Rod e an d Jacobsen , Economic Warfare of Detente, pp . 63—71 . 113. Se e The Economist, Marc h 10 , 1990 , p. 71. 114. Business Week, Novembe r 17 , 1989 , p. 61. 115. Associate d Press , July 2 1 , 1988. 116. Associate d Press , May 22 , 1988 ; RFE/RL Centra l News , June 16 , 1988 . 117. Financial Times "Eas t Europea n Markets " (specia l section) , Octobe r 2 , 1987. 118. RFE/R L Centra l News , June 11 , 1988. 119. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , June 16 , 1988 . 120. Unite d Pres s International, Februar y 13 , 1988. 121. Financial Times, Jun e 20 , 1988 ; New York Times, Octobe r 15 , 1987. 122. New York Times, Apri l 18 , 1989 . 123. Othe r proposal s wer e OPI C guarantee s t o stimulat e America n investmen t in Poland ; a progra m associatin g th e Commerc e Department , th e Smal l Business Administration , an d busines s organization s i n th e promotio n o f contacts wit h Poland' s privat e sector ; a n administratio n initiativ e t o ex plore ne w exchanges , training, an d educationa l program s i n support o f th e private sector ; encouragemen t o f debt-for-equit y trade s t o alleviat e Po land's commercia l deb t burden ; favorabl e reschedulin g arrangement s o f Poland's governmen t deb t throug h th e Pari s Club ; suppor t fo r ne w IM F and Worl d Ban k loans ; an d consideratio n o f loan s t o th e Polis h privat e sector b y th e Internationa l Financ e Corporation , a World Ban k subsidiar y that aid s private enterpris e i n developin g countries . 124. The Independent (London) , May 31 , 1989.

3 9 4 Notes 125. RFE/RL Daily Report, Jun e 16 , 1989 . 126. New York Times, Jul y 11 , 1989. 127. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , July 18 , 1989 . 128. New York Times, Augus t 26 , 1989 . 129. New York Times, Novembe r 19 , 1989 . 130. Busines s Week/Harri s pol l conducte d Novembe r 13-14 , 1989 , Business Week, Novembe r 27 , 1989 , p. 70 . 131. Toronto Star, Octobe r 15 , 1989 . 132. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , November 20 , 1989 . 133. Reuter , Decembe r 14 , 1989 . 134. Reuter , January 16 , 1990 . 135. The Economist, Marc h 3 , 1990 , p. 66. 136. Associate d Press , May 19 , 1990 . 137. Meinhar d Miegel , director o f the Institute fo r Economic s an d Social Policy , quoted i n the New York Times, Jul y 2 , 1990 . 138. The Economist, Septembe r 22 , 1990 , p.73. Chapter 6 1. Se e Josep h C . Douglass , Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (Ne w York : Pergamon, 1980) . 2. Zbignie w Brzezinski , "Peacefu l Chang e i n a Divide d Europe, " i n Uw e Nerlich an d James A . Thomson, eds. , Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe (Boulder , Colo. : Westview Press , 1988) , pp. 19-20 . 3. Se e Daniel Nelson , Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Fact (Boulder , Colo. : Westview Press , 1986) , pp . 62 , 6 6 - 6 8 ; Danie l Nelson , ed. , Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Fact and the Issue of Reliability (Boulder , Colo. : Westvie w Press, 1984) , p . 26 6 an d chapter s o n individua l countries ; an d Jeffre y Simon an d Tron d Gilberg , eds. , Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Boulder , Colo. : Westview Press , 1986) , pp. 202-12 . 4. U.S . Congress, House , Committe e o n Internationa l Relations , Subcomitte e on Europ e an d th e Middl e East , Hearings on U.S. Policy toward Eastern Europe, 95t h Cong. , 2d sess. , September 7 and 12 , 1978 , p. 46. 5. Rober t H . McNeal , ed. , International Relations among Communists (En glewood Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice-Hall , 1967) , p. 83. 6. Zbignie w Brzezinski , "Americ a an d Europe, " Foreign Affairs, 49 , no . 1 (October 1970) : pp. 11-30 . Se e also Brzezinski, "Th e Framewor k o f East West Reconciliation, " Foreign Affairs 46 , no . 2 (Januar y 1968) : 256-75 , and Brzezinski , Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe (Ne w York : McGraw-Hill , 1965) . 7. Helsink i Commission , The Helsinki Process, 1985 , pp. 19 , 29. 8. Rober t Barry , quote d i n Vladimi r Kusin , "Brezhne v Doctrin e Rejecte d i n the Stockholm Agreement? " RFE Research, Septembe r 29 , 1986 , p. 3. The Stockholm Agreemen t extende d th e coverag e o f majo r CBM s o n Sovie t

Notes 3 9

5

territory t o th e Urals ; require d earlie r notificatio n (4 2 days ) o f "militar y activities," lowering the threshold t o 13,00 0 troops , 300 tanks,20 0 mission s by aircraf t o r helicopters , o r 3,00 0 troop s i n a n amphibiou s landin g o r parachute drop ; specifie d notificatio n b y annua l calenda r o f exercise s b y more tha n 40,00 0 troops ; an d mad e mandator y th e invitatio n o f tw o ob servers from eac h signatory t o military activitie s involving more than 17,00 0 troops o r 5,000 in an amphibiou s landin g or parachute drop . States suspect ing no n complianc e coul d als o reques t mandator y inspection s o n shor t notice. Inspection s wer e limite d b y quota , member s o f a n allianc e coul d resort t o "challeng e inspections " agains t eac h other , an d militar y "alerts " were exempted fro m th e notificatio n requirement . Se e John Borawski , From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference (Ne w York : Pergamon , 1988) , p. I l l an d passim . 9. S . Kovalev, Pravda, Septembe r 26 , 1968 . 10. Zdene k Mlynar , Night Frost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism (London: Hurst , 1980) , p. 241. 11. New York Times, Ma y 8 , 1976 . 12. Pravda, Novembe r 3 , 1987 . The reappraisa l o f allianc e relation s ha d begu n the previous year , when th e Soviet Politburo issue d a relevant memorandu m and a CME A summi t wa s convene d i n Moscow . Se e Ronald Asmus , "Evo lution o f Soviet-Eas t Europea n Relation s unde r Mikhai l Gorbachev, " RFE Research, Septembe r 29 , 1989 , p. 2. 13. Tass,July7 , 8 , 1989 . 14. New York Times, Augus t 16 , 1989 . 15. Washington Post, Ma y 8 , 1989 . Se e als o Sewery n Bialer , "'Ne w Thinking ' and Sovie t Foreig n Policy, " Survival 30 , no . 4 (July/Augus t 1988) : 2 9 1 309; Rober t Legvold , "Th e Revolutio n i n Sovie t Foreig n Policy, " Foreign Affairs, Vol . 68 , No. 1 (Fal l 1989) : 8 2 - 9 8 ; Charle s Gati , "Gorbache v an d Eastern Europe, " Foreign Affairs 65, no . 5 (Summe r 1987) : 9 5 8 - 7 5 ; Ste phen M . Meyer , "Th e Source s an d Prospect s o f Gorbachev' s Ne w Politica l Thinking o n Security, " International Security, 13 , no. 2 (Fal l 1988) , 1 2 4 63; an d Thoma s M . Cynkin , "Glasnost, perestroika, an d Easter n Europe, " Survival 30 , no. 4 (July/Augus t 1988) : pp. 3 1 0 - 3 1 . 16. New York Times, Octobe r 24 , 1989 . 17. Sunday Star (Toronto) , April 2 , 1989 . 18. New York Times, Octobe r 24 , 1989 . 19. Reuter , Octobe r 16 , 1989 . 20. Associate d Press , October 28 , 1989 . 21. New York Times, Novembe r 12 , 1989 . 22. New York Times, Decembe r 5 , 1989 . 23. Moscow News, Januar y 1990 , no. 2. 24. Reuter , Novembe r 20 , 1989 . 25. Ogonek, no . 11 , 1990, quoted i n RFE/RL Daily Report, Marc h 22 , 1990 . 26. W . W . Rostow , "O n Endin g th e Col d War, " Foreign Affairs, 65, no . 4 (Spring 1987) : 848 .

396 Notes 27. Dea n Acheson , "Th e Illusio n o f Disengagement, " Foreign Affairs 36 , no . 3 (1958): p . 378 . Se e als o Bennet t Kovrig , The Myth of Liberation: EastCentral Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 1941 (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Universit y Press , 1973 ) pp . 227-28 . 28. Henr y Kissinger , White House Years (Boston : Little , Brown, 1979) , p. 949 , and se e also pp. 399-402, 947-48 . 29. Raymon d L . Garthoff , Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington , D.C. : Brooking s Institution , 1985), p. 481nl9 . 30. O n th e earl y phas e o f MBFR , se e Joh n G . Keliher , The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe (Ne w York : Pergamon , 1980) . 31. A Germa n analys t reflecte d tha t "th e entir e Wester n effor t a t Vienn a sinc e 1973 coul d b e viewed a s a protracted disengagemen t fro m tha t tra p inc h b y inch" (Lotha r Ruehl , MBFR: Lessons and Problems [London : Internationa l Institute o f Strategi c Studies , 1982] , pp. 33-34) . 32. U.S . Congress , Hearings on U.S. Policy toward Eastern Europe, p . 39 . Se e also Jonathan Dean , Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation (Lexington , Mass. : Lexingto n Books/D.C . Heath , 1987) , pp. 267-69 . 33. Independen t Commissio n o n Disarmamen t an d Securit y Issues , Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (Ne w York : Simo n an d Schuster , 1982) , pp. 182-83 . 34. Joachi m Krause , Prospects for Conventional Arms Control in Europe (Boul der, Colo. : Westvie w Press/Institut e fo r East-Wes t Securit y Studies , 1988) , p. 26 . 35. Willia m H . Luers , "Th e U.S . and Easter n Europe, " Foreign Affairs, 65, no . 5 (Summe r 1987) : p. 991. 36. Zbignie w Brzezinski , Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest (Boston: Atlanti c Monthl y Press , 1986) , pp. 105-8 , and Brzezinski , "Peace ful Chang e i n a Divided Europe, " pp . 21—22. The cas e fo r Europeanizatio n was als o argue d eloquentl y b y Davi d Calle o i n Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (Ne w York : Basi c Books , 1988). 37. New York Times, Septembe r 24 , 1986 . 38. Washington Post, Apri l 25 , 1987 ; Senato r Bil l Bradley' s pres s release , Au gust 27, 1987 . 39. Speec h a t Davos , Switzerland , Februar y 1 , 1987 , quote d i n John Borawski , "Toward Conventiona l Stabilit y i n Europe? " Washington Quarterly, 10 , no. 4 (Autum n 1987) : 28. 40. Se e Jonatha n Dean , "Wil l Negotiate d Forc e Reduction s Buil d Dow n th e NATO-Warsaw Pac t Confrontation? " Washington Quarterly 11 , no . 2 (Spring 1988) : 73 , an d Davi d S . Yost , "Beyon d MBFR : Th e Atlanti c t o Urals Gambit, " Orbis 31 , no. 1 (Spring 1987) : pp. 99-134 . 41. International Herald Tribune, Januar y 13 , 1988.

Notes 39

7

42. NAT O communique , Brussels , March 3 , 1988 . 43. NATO , Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts, Brussels , Novembe r 1988. A smalle r imbalanc e wa s reporte d b y th e Internationa l Institut e o f Strategic Studie s (The Military Balance 1988-89 [London , 1988]) , whil e the Warsa w Pac t o n Januar y 30 , 1989 , release d statistic s widel y differin g from thos e of NAT O {The Economist, Februar y 4 , 1989 , p. 45). 44. Befor e th e withdrawals , th e Sovie t Unio n ha d 562,00 0 troop s statione d i n Eastern Europe : 380,00 0 i n th e GDR , 80,00 0 i n Czechoslovakia , 62,00 0 i n Hungary, an d 40,00 0 i n Poland . Th e concurren t reorganizatio n o f Sovie t forces complicate d precis e calculatio n o f th e ne t reduction s tha t coul d b e expected b y 1991 ; see the estimates i n Douglas Clarke , "Warsa w Pac t Arm s Cuts in Europe," RFE Research, Februar y 22 , 1989 . 45. Internationa l Institut e o f Strategi c Studies , The Military Balance 1989-90 (London, 1989) . 46. Csab a Tabajd i i n Magyar Hirlap, Septembe r 27 , 1988 ; Radi o Budapest , July 26 , 1989 . 47. Associate d Press , January 20 , 1989 . 48. New York Times, Jul y 7 , 1989 . 49. New York Times, Apri l 25 , 1989 . 50. Washington Post, Ma y 8 , 1989 . 51. Reuter , July 8 , 10 , 1989 . 52. Associate d Press , October 3 , 1989 . 53. The Economist, Septembe r 16 , 1989 , p . 50 ; Globe and Mail, (Toronto) , October 21 , 1989. 54. Associate d Press , January 20 , 1990 . 55. Reuter , January 24 , 1990 . 56. Tass , January 2 1 , 1990. 57. Dougla s C . Clarke , "Wha t Futur e fo r th e Warsa w Pact? " Radi o Fre e Eu rope, Report on Eastern Europe, vol . 1 , no. 3., (January 19 , 1990) : 39 . 58. New York Times, Novembe r 12 , 1989 . 59. Vla d Sobell , "Austria , Hungary , an d th e Questio n o f Neutrality, " RFE Research, Augus t 14 , 1989 , p. 31. 60. RFE/RL Daily Report, Novembe r 9 , 1989 . 61. New York Times, Jun e 8 , 1990 . 62. Financial Times, Januar y 8 , 1990 . 63. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , Februar y 1 , 1990 . 64. New York Times, Jul y 7 , 1990 . 65. Thoma s Bailey , America Faces Russia (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press, 1950) , p . 327 , quote d i n Ala n A . Piatt , "Th e Settin g o f U.S . Foreig n Policy toward th e Federal Republi c of Germany, " i n Uwe Nerlich an d Jame s A. Thomson, eds. , The Soviet Problem in American-German Relations (Ne w York: Cran e Russak , 1985) , p. 65. 66. Jose f Joffe, "Th e Vie w fro m Bonn : Th e Taci t Alliance, " in Lincol n Gordon , Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe (Washington , D.C.: Brooking s Institution , 1987) , pp. 139-40 .

3 9 8 Notes 67. Se e Angel a Stent , From Embargo to Ostpolitik (Ne w York : Cambridg e University Press , 1981) . 68. Quote d i n Piatt, "Th e Settin g of U.S . Foreign Policy, " p. 75. 69. Se e Joffe, "Th e Vie w from Bonn, " pp. 163-64 . 70. Thes e 198 5 statistic s ar e tabulate d i n Gordon , Eroding Empire, pp . 332— 33. 71. New York Times, Jul y 18 , 1988. 72. Fo r 1989 , i t wa s estimate d tha t th e GD R woul d ear n D M 52 5 millio n i n transit taxe s fo r roa d traffi c t o Wes t Berlin , D M 45 0 millio n fro m compul sory currenc y exchang e fo r visitors , D M 20 0 millio n fo r posta l services , over D M 40 0 millio n fo r "humanitaria n services " (includin g ranso m fo r political prisoners , some 2,500 i n 198 5 alone) , and anothe r D M 2 - 3 billio n from sundr y privat e remittances , bringin g th e tota l har d currenc y transfe r close t o D M 5 billion , o r som e $2. 6 billio n (The Economist, 7 Octobe r 1989, p. 56). Se e also Joffe, "Th e View from Bonn, " p. 157 ; Michael Kaser , "The Economi c Dimension, " i n Edwin a Moreton , ed. , Germany between East and West (Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1987) , pp . 1 2 8 33; an d Lawrenc e L . Whetten , Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Fact Countries (London : Oxfor d University Press , 1971) , p. 132 . 73. Washington Post, Septembe r 14 , 1987 . 74. Der Spiegel, Decembe r 22 , 1986 , pp. 2 8 - 2 9 . 75. Reuter , January 6 , 1990 . 76. The Independent (London) , May 13 , 1989. 77. Unite d State s Information Service , September 15 , 1989. 78. The Economist, Ma y 27 , 1989 , p. 47. 79. Reuter , January 12 , 1988 . 80. Reuter , June 13 , 1988. 81. New York Times, Octobe r 29 , 1988 . 82. Angel a E . Stent , "Eas t Germa n Ques t fo r Legitimacy, " Problems of Communism 35 , no. 2 (March-Apri l 1986) : 85 . 83. Se e th e revie w articl e b y Joyc e Mari e Mushaben , " A Searc h fo r Identity : The 'Germa n Question ' i n Atlanti c Allianc e Relations, " World Politics 40 , no. 3 (Apri l 1988) : 4 0 3 - 7 . 84. Barbar a Donovan , "Refor m an d th e Existence o f th e GDR," RFE Research, August 25 , 1989 , pp. 1-2 . 85. Pravda, Octobe r 5 , 1989 ; Associated Press , October 2 1 , 1989. 86. Ji m Hoagland , "Europe' s Destiny, " Foreign Affairs 69 , no. 1 (Spring 1990) : 40. 87. Associate d Press , November 9 , 1989 . 88. New York Times, Januar y 7 , 1990 . 89. New York Times, Decembe r 12 , 1989 . 90. Quote d i n The Economist, Ma y 12 , 1990 , p. 49. 91. The Economist, Decembe r 16 , 1989 , p. 51.

Notes 3 9

9

92. New York Times, Decembe r 12 , 1989 . 93. The Economist, Januar y 27 , 1990 , p . 49 . Th e surve y foun d 6 1 percen t o f Americans i n favo r an d 1 3 percent opposed , wit h onl y 2 9 percen t express ing concer n abou t a German-dominate d Europe . Anothe r pol l foun d 7 1 percent o f American s favorin g unificatio n {Business Week, Novembe r 27 , 1989, p. 70). 94. New York Times, Novembe r 12 , 1989 ; Globe and Mail (Toronto) , No vember 14 , 1989 . 95. New York Times, Decembe r 12 , 1989 . 96. Globe and Mail, Januar y 31 , 1990; Reuter , Februar y 1 , 1990 . 97. Reuter , Februar y 1 , 2, 1990 . 98. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , Februar y 15 , 1990 . 99. Associate d Press , February 15 , 1990 . 100. New York Times, Februar y 26 , 1990 . 101. Washington Post, Februar y 25 , 1990 . 102. RFE/RL Daily Report, Apri l 23 , 1990 . 103. Toronto Star, June 4, 1989 . 104. Associate d Press , February 2 1 , 1990. 105. Financial Times, Januar y 5 , 1990 ; New York Times, Novembe r 15 , 1989 . 106. The Economist, Januar y 27 , 1990 , p. 49, and Octobe r 6 , 1990 , p. 53. 107. Time, Novembe r 6 , 1989 , p. 27. 108. The Economist, Novembe r 11 , 1989, p. 14 . 109. Quote d b y Andr e Fontain e i n he Monde, Octobe r 12 , 1989 ; New York Times, Novembe r 110 , 1989 . 110. The Economist, Januar y 27 , 1990 , p . 49 . A poll take n i n Februar y foun d 64 percen t o f Pole s oppose d t o unificatio n (The Independent (London) , February 19 , 1990) . 111. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , March 19 , 1990 . 112. Reuter , Novembe r 9 , 1989 . See Jan B . de Weydenthal, "Th e Politic s o f th e Oder-Neisse Line, " RFE Research, Decembe r 15 , 1989 . 113. Associate d Press , Januar y 3 , 1990 ; New York Times, Januar y 6 , 1990 ; Radio Fre e Europe, Report on Eastern Europe, Septembe r 14 , 1990 , p. 15. 114. Reuter , November 14 , 1989 . 115. Reuter , January 18 , 1990 ; Toronto Star, Marc h 11 , 1990. 116. Associat e Press , October 4 , 199 0 117. Se e Domini c Lawson , "Sayin g th e Unsayabl e abou t th e Germans, " The Spectator (London) , July 14 , 1990 , pp. 8-10 . 118. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , September 15 , 1989 . 119. Quote d i n Gebhar d Schweigler , "Th e Domesti c Settin g o f Wes t Germa n Foreign Policy, " i n Nerlic h an d Thomson , The Soviet Problem in American-German Relations, p . 44. 120. Fo r th e debat e o n thes e issues , se e Georg e Schopfli n an d Nanc y Wood , eds., In Search of Central Europe (London : Polit y Press , 1989) , an d th e special issu e o f Daedalus 119 , no . 1 (Winte r 1990) , especiall y th e contri -

4 0 0 Notes butions o f Timoth y Garto n Ash , "Mitteleuropa? " Ton y Judt, "Th e Redis covery o f Centra l Europe, " an d Jacques Rupnik , "Centra l Europ e o r Mit teleuropa?" 121. Dominiqu e Moisi , "Frenc h Polic y towar d Centra l an d Easter n Europe, " i n William F . Griffith, ed. , Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain (Boulder, Colo. : Westvie w Press , 1989) , pp. 364-65 . Se e als o Pierr e Has sner, "Th e Vie w fro m Paris, " i n Gordon , Eroding Empire, pp . 188—231 , and Alfre d Grosser , "Pou r un e 'Ostpolitik ' franco-allemande, " he Monde, October 22 , 1987 . 122. Quote d i n Timoth y Garto n Ash , "Tunin g th e Violins, " The Spectator, December 10 , 1988 , p. 18 . 123. Financial Times, Octobe r 16 , 1989 ; The Economist, Octobe r 14 , 1989 , p. 55. 124. Se e Zbignie w Brzezinski , The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Ne w York : Scribner's , 1989) . 125. Financial Times, Ma y 18 , 1988. 126. The Economist, Januar y 27 , 1990 , p. 49. 127. Radi o Fre e Europe, Report on Eastern Europe, Septembe r 14 , 1990 , p. 14 , and July 27 , 1990 , p. 18 . 128. Globe and Mail (Toronto) , December 11 , 1989. 129. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , June 1 , 1989 . 130. Krasnaya Zvezda, Februar y 10 , 1990 , quote d i n RFE/RL Daily Report, February 12 , 1990 ; Globe and Mail (Toronto) , June 21 , 1990. 131. Charle s Gati , The Bloc that Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition (Bloomington : Indian a Universit y Press , 1990) , p. 192 . 132. Newsweek, Septembe r 19 , 1988 , pp. 34, 37. 133. Unite d State s Informatio n Service , January 18 , 1990 . 134. Washington Post, Ma y 5 , 1990 . 135. I n Apri l 1990 , a majority o f Wes t German s favore d America n withdrawa l (Associated Press , April 12 , 1990). In June, 25 percent favored withdrawal , 28 percen t continue d stationing , an d a furthe r 3 9 percen t mixe d NAT O units (The Economist, Jun e 30 , 1990 , p. 46).

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4 1 0 Bibliography Ullmann, Walter. The United States in Prague, 1945-1948. Boulder : Eas t Euro pean Quarterly , 1978 . Valenta, Jiri. Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision. Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press , 1979 . Vucinich, Wayn e S. , ed . At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective. Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1982 . Weintal, Edward , an d Charle s Bartlett . Facing the Brink. Ne w York : Scribner's , 1967. Whetten, Lawrenc e L . Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries. London : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1971. Winiecki, Jan. The Distorted World of Soviet-type Economies. Pittsburgh : Pitts burgh Universit y Press , 1988 . . Gorbachev's Way Out? London : Centr e fo r Researc h int o Communis t Economies, 1988 . Wolfers, Arnold , ed . Alliance Policy in the Cold War. Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Press, 1959 . Woodward, Bob . Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987. Ne w York : Simon an d Schuster , 1987 . Yergin, Daniel. Shattered Peace. New York : Houghto n Mifflin , 1977 . Yost, Davi d S . "Beyond MBFR : Th e Atlanti c t o Ural s Gambit. " Orbis, Vol . 31, No.l (Sprin g 1987) . Zinner, Pau l E. , ed . National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe. Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1956 .

Index

Abrams, Elliott, 18 1 ACEN. See Assembly o f Captiv e Europea n Nations Acheson, Dean , 2 1 , 3 1, 34, 35, 38, 39, 46, 163,314,332 Adamec, Ladislaw, 21 3 Adenauer, Konrad , 35 , 54, 77, 109 , 121, 330-31 Afghanistan: Sovie t invasion (1979) , 128 , 130,136,143,258,312,316 AFL-CIO, 131 , 133, 140, 181 , 221, 249, 252, 258 , 28 4 Agh, Attila, 32 5 Albania: America n cover t operation s in , 4 3 - 4 5 ; foreig n relations , 73 , 163 , 198, 305; foreig n relation s with Sovie t Union , 104; government, 44 , 218, 219; trad e with Unite d States , 2 6 Alia, Ramiz, 21 9 Allen report, 2 3 6 - 3 7 Amory, Robert , 78 , 84, 9 5 - 9 6 Andropov, Yuri , 87 , 88, 24 0 Angleton, James J., Jr., 78 , 7 9 - 8 0 Antall, Jozsef, 205, 226, 35 9 Apro, Piroska, 27 3 Arms control , 55, 113 , 127 , 143 , 151,

314; an d huma n rights , 136 , 145-47 , 319, 320 . See also Conventiona l Force s in Europe; Disarmament; Mutua l an d balanced forc e reduction ; Nuclea r weap ons; Strategi c Arms Limitatio n talk s Arms Expor t Contro l Act , 12 8 Aspin, Les , 32 2 Assembly o f Captiv e Europea n Nation s (ACEN), 65-66, 10 6 Atlantic Charter , 9 , 11 , 12, 15 , 16, 18 , 25, 45,161 Atomic weapons. See Nuclear weapon s Austria, 19 , 23, 56, 57, 96 , 197 , 240, 35 6 Autonomy, 108 , 163 , 170. See also Sover eignty Bahr,Egon,317,342 Baker, James A. , 155 , 227, 311, 342, 345, 350 Balance of power , 96 , 112 , 116 , 232, 308, 313, 318 , 338, 350, 352, 361, 363 Balance of trade , 234, 242, 255, 256, 275, 283 Balkan Pac t (1954) , 24 6 Balkans, 10 , 11 , 19, 38, 246, 35 2 Barry, Rober t L. , 12 8

411

412 Index Basket On e (I) , 168,30 8 Basket Three (III) , 168, 169 , 173 , 178-79 , 190, 194-9 5 Battle Act (1951) , 232, 233, 23 5 Belgrade conferenc e (1977) , 178-80 , 18 7 Belgrade Declaration , 75 Bell, Griffin, 18 7 Benes, Edvard, 11 , 18,3 0 Beria, Lavrenti, 42, 6 2 Berlin (Germany) , 22, 122 , 152 , 251, 283 Berlin blockad e (1948) , 3 0 Berlin conferenc e (1954) , 56, 30 7 Berlin crisi s (1961) , 109-11 , 30 8 Berlin Wall, 110 , 111 , 209; opening of , 145,210,211,340,348 Berman, Jakub, 4 2 Bermuda conferenc e (1953) , 56 Bern conferenc e (1986) , 19 3 Bessarabia, 2 5 Bevin, Ernest, 4 4 Bibo, Istvan, 9 8 Bielkin, Fedor, 4 2 Bierut, Boleslaw, 8 2 Blumenthal, Michael , 12 7 Bogomolov, Ole g T., 14 4 Bohlen, Charles , 57, 62 , 89, 91, 98, 25 0 Bonn conferenc e (1990) , 28 8 Borders, 168 , 170 , 308, 341, 342; Czech , 11; German , 121-22 , 167 ; German-Pol ish, 15 , 20, 55, 131-32 , 341 , 344, 347 , 349; Hungarian , 14 , 2 4 - 2 5; openin g of , 197-98, 340 ; Polish, 12 . See also Berli n Wall; Territorial claim s Braden, Thomas, 4 0 Bradley, Bill, 293, 319 Brandt, Willy, 121 , 315, 331, 333, 336, 346 Brecht, Bertolt, 18 8 Brezhnev, Leonid , 113 , 115-16, 135 , 137 , 139, 143 , 166, 240, 252, 314-1 6 Brezhnev Doctrine , 104 , 115 , 119 , 123, 132, 144 , 165 , 167 , 308, 309-10; aban donment of , 151 , 205, 207, 310-1 3 Bross, John A. , 5 9 Brussels Treaty (1948) , 3 0 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 107 , 109 , 145 , 311, 318, 355 ; and detente , 114 , 116 , 125 , 129; an d huma n rights , 175 , 176—77,

178; an d Poland , 131 , 132, 257, 292; and securit y interests , 308, 351, 352 Bucy report, 23 5 Budapest Cultura l Foru m (1985) , 192-9 3 Bulganin, Nikolai, 75 , 99 Bulgaria, 8 ; economic policies, 262; for eign relations , 6 , 25, 73, 148; foreig n relations with Sovie t Union, 13 , 14, 26; foreign relation s wit h Unite d States , 10 , 107, 120 ; human right s abuse s in , 148 , 192, 197 , 198 , 211, 212; an d perestroika, 148 , 211-212; trad e with , 28 3 Burnham, James, 4 6 - 4 7 Bush, George: a s president, 151-52 , 153 , 222, 344 ; as vice president, 141, 149-5 0 Bush administration , 151 , 152—55, 242— 43, 293-96 , 311 , 342; an d securit y in terests, 322, 327, 328, 345, 347, 3 5 0 51,357,358,360,361-62 Business, 285; response t o expor t controls , 234, 236, 238-42, 2 4 9 - 5 1 , 252 , 258. See also Investments ; Technology trans fer Byrnes, James F. , 18 , 2 0 - 2 1, 2 4 Calf a, Marian , 21 4 Canada, 56, 122 , 195 , 196 , 36 2 Captive Nations Resolution , 51 , 105-6 , 117, 145,164-6 5 Carlucci, Frank, 25 3 Carter, Jimmy, 129 , 136 ; and 197 6 election, 124 , 125 , 177 ; and 198 0 election , 180 Carter administration , 235 , 309; an d hu man rights , 125-30 , 172-73 , 175-77 , 180, 187 , 253; and Poland , 130-31 , 132-34, 256-57, 25 8 Case, Clifford P. , 17 4 Catholic church , 82 , 103 , 128, 186 , 206, 259, 26 0 CBM. See Confidence-building measure s CCC. See Commodity Credi t Corporatio n CDE. See Conference o n Confidenc e an d Security-building Measure s an d Disar mament i n Europe (Stockholm , 1984 ) Ceausescu, Nicolae , 114 , 119 , 127 , 145, 177,186,207,214-16,240 Censorship, 190 , 209; lifting of , 203 , 2 0 6 -

Index 41 3 7, 2 1 0 - 1 1, 213 , 217. See also Interna tional broadcasting , jammin g o f Central Intelligenc e Agency (CIA) , 36, 61, 78, 92 , 186 ; and Czechoslovakia , 105 , 114; an d Italy , 29; and Poland , 131 , 132, 133 , 138-39, 140 , 257; role of, 73 , 74 Centrally planne d economies , 243, 255, 261-63, 264 , 267, 269, 273, 279, 28 8 CFE. See Conventional Force s in Europ e Cheney, Dick, 242 , 3 1 2 - 1 3, 322, 32 5 Cheysson, Claude , 140 , 18 8 China, 33 , 45, 281; foreign relation s wit h Soviet Union, 87 , 104 , 107 ; foreign rela tions with Unite d States , 116 , 119 , 177 , 253,283 Churchill, Winston, 9 , 10 , 13 , 15, 17 , 23, 52, 53 , 54, 5 6 - 5 7 CIA. See Central Intelligenc e Agenc y Claims: American, 18 , 106 , 120 , 148 . See also Territorial claim s Clay, Lucius, 22, 30, 40, 110 , 17 2 Clayton, Will, 2 1 Clifford, Clark , 2 3 Cline, Ray, 7 8 CMEA. See Council fo r Mutua l Economi c Assistance Cocom. See Coordinating Committe e fo r Multilateral Expor t Control s Cold war , 20 , 34, 141 , 229, 314, 33 1 Collective security , 30 , 56, 115 , 170 , 3 0 7 8, 359, 36 0 Comecon, See Council fo r Mutua l Eco nomic Assistanc e Cominform, 29 , 36, 7 7 Comintern, 8 , 163-6 4 Commerce Department , 235 , 237, 238, 240, 242, 250, 28 4 Commission o n Securit y an d Cooperatio n in Europe (Helsink i Commission) , 174— 75,177-78,180,184,219 Commodity Credi t Corporatio n (CCC) , 136, 138 , 256-57, 258 , 25 9 Communism, 19 ; American anti-Commu nist efforts , 28 , 3 1 - 3 5, 46; American at titudes toward , 7 , 14 , 17 , 19 , 23, 3 1; East European attitude s toward , 8 , 201, 204, 20 8

Communist parties , 8 , 107 , 158 , 162 ; in Eastern Europe , 19 , 2 9 - 3 0, 145 , 201, 2 0 2 - 3 , 305 , 3 1 0 - 1 1; purge s by , 4 2 - 4 3 , 71,112,213 Communist part y (Albania) , 1 4 Communist part y (Czechoslovakia) , 11, 19, 27, 212-1 4 Communist part y (Eas t Germany), 20, 2 1, 209,210-11,342 Communist part y (Greece) , 13 , 36, 4 4 Communist part y (Hungary) , 19 , 27, 71, 85, 86 , 144 , 2 0 3 - 5, 2 0 7 - 8 , 32 4 Communist part y (Poland) , 8 , 115 , 149 , 271; an d Polis h crisis , 130 , 132 , 1 3 4 35, 137-38 ; loss of contro l by , 205, 206, 311 ; in postwar government , 14 , 15, 19 ; reforms in , 135 , 208; and revo lution, 81-8 3 Communist part y (Sovie t Union), 7 7 - 7 8 , 193-94,315,321 Communist part y (Yugoslavia) , 14 , 217, 218 Conant, James B. , 60 Conference o n Confidenc e an d Security building Measure s an d Disarmamen t i n Europe (CDE , Stockholm, 1984) , 3 0 9 10,318,319 Conference o n Securit y an d Cooperatio n i n Europe (CSCE) , 116 , 122 , 125 , 166-68 , 174-75, 227 , 309, 359, 3 6 0 - 6 1, 363 . See also specifi c conferences , e.g . Vienn a conference (1986 ) Conference o n th e Human Dimension , 197-200 Confidence-building measure s (CBM) , 198 , 233,308-9,310,324,360 Congress, 49, 107 , 109 ; economic leverag e by, 239, 248, 249, 293, 296; an d expor t controls, 108 , 2 3 4 - 3 5, 236, 253-54 , 283-84; an d huma n rights , 105-106 , 117, 120 , 160 , 164 , 165 , 173-75 , 1 8 0 82, 184 , 185-86 , 1 9 0 - 9 1 ; an d libera tion policy , 6 2 - 6 3 , 105-6 ; an d securit y interests, 22, 46, 130 ; an d self-determi nation, 5 1 , 124, 160 . See also Hous e o f Representatives; Senat e Containment policy , 26, 27—29, 31—35, 41, 103 , 151, 230, 245, 3 0 3 - 4, 330 ,

414 Index Containment polic y (Continued) 358; attack s on , 4 5 - 4 9, 151 ; militarization of , 3 0 - 3 1 , 44 , 313-1 4 Conventional Force s in Europe (CFE) , 123, 320-23, 324 , 3 2 7 - 2 8, 34 5 Coordinating Committe e fo r Multilatera l Export Control s (Cocom) , 230, 233, 234, 235-37 , 238 , 239, 242, 265-66, 281,284 Council fo r Mutua l Economi c Assistanc e (CMEA), 104 , 247, 263, 352; intra CMEA trade , 272—77; limitations of , 241, 267 ; and Romania , 118 , 249, 250 ; and worl d trade , 281-8 3 Council o f Europe , 73—74, 224, 36 1 Covert funding , 29 , 65, 171-72 , 24 4 Covert operations , 40, 4 3 - 4 5, 7 2 - 7 3 , 74 , 105, 140 , 2 4 0 - 4 1. See also Espionage ; specific operations , e.g. Operatio n FO CUS CPSU. See Communist part y (Sovie t Union) Crawford, William , 10 8 Croatia, 6 , 21 8 CSCE. See Conference o n Securit y an d Co operation i n Europ e Czechoslovakia, 6 , 30, 87 ; American assis tance to, 222, 226; American cover t op erations in , 69, 105 ; economic policies , 59, 103 , 262, 264; economi c relation s with Unite d States , 18 , 250; foreig n rela tions with Sovie t Union, 11 , 24, 29, 112 , 324; foreig n relation s with Unite d States, 120 , 147-48 ; human right s abuses in, 147 , 192 , 196 , 197 ; and perestroika, 147 , 212-14; Pragu e sprin g (1968), 103 , 111-15, 213, 250; trad e with, 276, 280, 282; trade wit h Sovie t Union, 272, 30 1 Czyrek, Josef, 14 9 D'Amato, Alfonse , 19 4 Davis, John, 14 9 De Benedetti, Carlo, 29 0 Debt: Eas t European, 256-57, 277-80 , 290, 301 ; Hungarian, 265 ; Polish, 120 , 136, 150 , 2 5 5 - 5 8, 259-60 , 261 , 269, 294, 296 , 298; Romanian, 182 , 18 4

Declaration o n Liberate d Europe , 15-1 6 Declaration o n Principle s (1972) , 169 , 19 1 DeConcini, Dennis, 21 9 Defense Department , 65 , 102 , 141 ; and export controls , 236, 237, 238, 239, 242, 2 5 7 - 5 8 ; an d Polis h crisis , 139-4 0 de Gaulle, Charles, 8 , 2 1, 115, 120 , 331, 348 Delors, Jacques, 346, 348-49, 354 , 35 5 de Maiziere, Lothar, 30 0 Demonstrations: i n Bulgaria, 198 ; in Czechoslovakia, 197 , 213; in Easter n Europe, 5 9 - 6 1; i n East Germany , 210 , 340; i n Hungary, 85-86 , 204 ; in Poland, 8 1 - 8 2 , 128 ; in Romania , 198 , 199,215,216,217 Detente, 111 , 120-21, 122 , 166-67, 306 , 314-15, 317 ; under Carter , 125 , 1 2 9 30; unde r Eisenhower , 76 ; and huma n rights, 106 , 123 , 165-66, 191 ; under Johnson, 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; under Nixon , 116— 118, 124 , 251, 252, 308; under Reagan , 136, 142 . See also France , and detent e Deterrence strategy , 47, 100 , 307, 315, 318,319,320,322,362 Differentiation policy , 106 , 118-20 , 124 , 141-42, 147 , 254, 294, 3 3 2 - 3 3, 335, 337; revisio n of , 125-26 , 129-30 , 15 2 Dirksen, Everett , 8 1 Disarmament, 22 , 53, 78, 152 , 309, 314 , 316. See also Arm s contro l Dissidents, 142 , 178 , 179 , 187 , 190 , 196 , 201, 221 ; Bulgarian, 211 ; Czech, 147 , 175-76, 212 , 213; East German , 209 , 210, 337; Hungarian, 192 ; Polish, 81, 128, 129 , 188 , 206; Romanian, 185 , 215-16; Soviet , 168 , 174 , 176 , 19 4 Dixon, Si r Pierson, 9 9 Dobrynin, Anatoly , 113 , 11 4 Donovan, William J., 10 , 7 3 Douglas, Paul, 8 1 Dubcek, Alexander , 111 , 113, 2 1 2 - 1 3, 214 Dulles, Allen, 40, 78, 79, 9 4 - 9 5, 107 ; covert operations by , 10 , 42, 43, 59, 73; and Hungary , 89 , 98 Dulles, John Foster , 48, 50, 55, 5 7 - 5 8 , 62 , 78; an d Hungaria n revolution , 90 , 91, 96-97, 98 , 247; an d liberatio n policy ,

Index 41 5 47, 53 , 62, 63, 76, 77, 81, 101, 105, 163; an d peacefu l coexistence , 52; an d Polish revolution , 83 , 84; propagand a efforts, 66—67 ; and Titoism , 77 , 83 , 89, 91, 94 ; and Yugoslavia , 5 1 , 75 Dumas, Roland, 15 5 Dunai, Imre, 28 5 EAA. See Export Administratio n act s Eagleburger, Lawrenc e S. , 156 , 183 , 223, 338,350 Eastern Europe , 2 8 5 - 8 6; America n assis tance to , 17-18 , 2 8 - 2 9 , 1 4 7, 222 ; armed force s in , 25, 30, 36, 130 , 305, 316-17, 3 2 0 - 2 1 , 322 ; economic poli cies, 126 , 231; economic relation s wit h Western Europe , 118 , 251, 294, 2 9 8 99; government , 27 , 30; trade with , 73— 74, 2 3 9 - 4 1 , 2 4 2 - 4 3 , 262, 2 7 2 - 7 7 ; trade with Unite d States , 26; trade wit h Western Europe , 152-53 , 2 3 0 - 3 1 , 232-33, 234 , 248, 252, 2 8 1 - 8 3, 2 9 192 East European Democrac y Ac t (1989) , 29 6 East Germany : economi c policies, 235; economic relation s with Wes t Germany , 60, 178 , 268-69, 276-77 , 286 , 297 , 332, 334-36 ; economy , 2 1 , 55, 2 6 2 63, 267-68 , 277, 339-40; foreig n rela tions with Sovie t Union, 341 , 342; for eign relation s with Unite d States , 148 , 334; foreig n relation s wit h Wes t Ger many, 1 0 9 - 1 1 , 1 2 1 - 2 2 , 140 , 225, 331, 332, 334 , 339; government, 2 0 9 - 1 1 ; human right s abuse s in, 148 , 209, 210 , 335; political reforms , 2 1 0 - 1 1 ; recogni tion of , 109 , 110 , 111 , 118, 120 , 121, 331, 338 ; trade with , 267 , 274, 275; trade with Wes t Germany , 233 , 235; treaties with Sovie t Union, 77 ; uprisin g (1953), 59—62, 63. See also Germa n re unification EC. See European Communit y Economic assistance , 10 , 17 , 229, 231, 288, 2 9 0 - 9 8 , 3 0 1 - 2 , 33 5 Economic leverage, 333, 359 Economic power, 32 , 228, 243, 35 1 Economic warfare, 230 , 2 3 5 - 3 7, 243-4 4

Economist, The, 263 , 346 EDC. See European Defens e Communit y Treaty Eden, Anthony, 56, 58 , 6 2 Egypt, 127 . See also Sue z crisis (1956 ) Eisenhower, Dwigh t D. , 10 , 50, 5 1; and Khrushchev, 105 ; and liberatio n policy , 62, 76 ; and 195 2 election , 4 7 - 4 8, 52 , 163; an d 195 6 election , 8 0 - 8 1 , 246 ; and securit y interests , 40, 52—53 Eisenhower, Milto n S. , 17 2 Eisenhower administration , 5 1 , 105, 2 4 4 46, 314 ; and Hungaria n revolution , 89— 99, 100 , 101-2 , 164 , 247; and Polis h revolution, 83-8 5 Emergency assistance , 2 9 6 - 9 7; American , 60, 81 , 99 , 136 , 138 , 229, 247, 29 5 Emigres. See Refugee s Espionage, 22, 45, 186 , 235, 2 4 0 - 4 1, 253 . See also Cover t operations ; Intelligenc e Ethnic minorities. See Minoritie s Ethridge, Mark, 2 4 Europe: economi c recover y of , 26 , 28—29, 31; divisio n of , 13 , 15, 2 1 - 2 2, 23 , 29, 313; reintegratio n of , 117 , 151-52 , 298-99, 304 , 350, 3 5 1 - 5 5. See also Eastern Europe ; Western Europ e European Ban k fo r Reconstructio n an d Development (BERD) , 297, 298-9 9 European Commission , 154 , 295, 296, 29 9 European Community , 136 , 299, 301—2, 333, 356—57, 3 6 2 - 6 3 ; and Easter n Eu rope, 154 , 2 8 1 - 8 3, 294, 2 9 7 - 9 8, 3 5 2 53; an d Germany , 335 , 342, 348-49 , 354-55; an d huma n rights , 168 , 2 2 4 25; an d Hungary , 148 , 292, 340; an d Poland, 133 , 152-5 3 European Defens e Communit y Treat y (EDC), 35, 52, 53, 54, 56 Ewing, Gordon, 6 1 Eximbank. See Export-Import Ban k Export Administratio n act s (EAA) , 234, 235, 236 , 237, 25 3 Export Contro l Ac t (1945) , 230, 234 , 235 Export controls , 111 , 2 3 0 - 3 3, 248, 249, 252, 2 5 7 - 6 1 ; enforcemen t of , 2 3 8 - 4 2 ; loosening of , 2 4 2 - 4 3 ; problems with , 233-38

416 Index Export-Import Bank , 18 , 106 , 108 , 182 , 234, 245 , 247, 252, 25 7 Falin, Valentin, 33 8 Fascell, Dante, 174,18 1 Fenwick, Millicent , 17 4 Field, Noel, 42, 4 3 Findley, Paul, 25 0 Finland, 24 , 26, 240, 355-56 Ford, Gerald , 124-25 , 170-71 , 174 , 252, 253 Foreign Assistanc e Act , 177-78 , 248, 25 0 Forrestal, James V. , 3 2 France, 8 , 29, 53; and detente , 120-21 , 140, 331; economic relation s wit h East ern Europe , 239, 296, 301; foreign rela tions, 92 , 94, 9 6 - 9 7, 100 , 155 , 301; foreign relation s wit h Germany , 2 1 , 60, 354; foreig n relation s wit h Sovie t Union , 99, 133 , 147; foreign relation s wit h United States , 65, 115 ; and Germa n re unification, 52 , 297, 331, 344, 345, 346, 348, 350 ; human right s policies, 167 , 187, 188 , 353; military policies , 234, 305,316,317,318,319,324 Freedenberg, Paul , 23 8 Freedom o f movement , 128 , 148 , 167 , 190, 193,167 , 197-98 , 252 , 337. See also Jewish emigratio n Frontiers. See Borders Fulbright, Willia m J., 17 2 Funderburk, David , 141 , 185 Gaddis, John Lewis , 3 3 Gati, Charles , 144 , 35 9 GATT. See General Agreemen t o n Tariff s and Trad e GDR (Germa n Democrati c Republic) . See East German y Gehlen, Reinhard , 3 9 General Agreemen t o n Tariff s an d Trad e (GATT), 22, 2 8 0 - 8 1, 292 , 36 3 Geneva summi t (1955) , 5 7 - 5 8, 75 , 76, 77, 307-8 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich , 239 , 319, 333, 338, 340 ; and Germa n reunification , 346, 349 , 3 5 4 - 5 5; an d huma n rights , 183-84, 19 3 Gerasimov, Gennadi , 312 , 35 6

German minorities , 215, 276, 329-30 , 337, 34 7 German reunification , 52 , 121 , 211, 282, 297, 337-49; America n attitude s toward, 77 , 9 1; American proposal s for , 21-22, 3 1 ; fear of , 22 , 53, 117, 341, 344-45; militar y aspects , 307, 327, 328, 3 3 0 - 3 1 ; negotiation s on , 268-69, 314 ; Soviet proposals for , 35, 54—5 8 Germany, 23 , 30, 350 ; American assis tance to, 2 1; occupation zones , 20—21, 22, 31 , 109-111, 349 ; in World Wa r II , 8, 11 , 12, 329-30. See also Eas t Ger many; Wes t German y Gero, Erno, 85 , 86 Gershman, Carl , 181-8 2 Gierek, Edvard , 119 , 120 , 129 , 130 , 176 , 254, 25 5 Giscard d'Estaing , Valery , 133 , 290 Glasnost, 143 , 223 Goldberg, Arthur , 165 , 179 , 18 0 Gomulka, Wladyslaw , 8 1 - 8 3 , 84 , 106 , 112,119,247 Gorbachev, Mikhai l S. , 104 , 142-45 , 282, 348, 356 ; and arm s control , 317-19 , 320-22, 328-29 ; an d Czechoslovakia , 212, 213 ; and Easter n Europe , 153 , 272-73, 3 1 0 - 1 3 , 323; and Germa n re unification, 339, 341 , 342, 3 4 4 - 4 5 , 350; an d huma n rights , 193-94 , 1 9 5 96, 200, 203; and Hungary , 208 , 21 6 Grass, Gunter, 34 1 Gray, Harry J., 23 7 Great Britain : economi c relations , 294 ; foreign relations , 9 , 91 , 94, 96, 99; for eign relation s wit h Eas t Germany , 60 ; foreign relation s with Greece , 13 ; for eign relation s wit h Sovie t Union, 13 , 26, 56-57, 99, 100 ; foreign relation s wit h Yugoslavia, 37 ; and Germa n reunifica tion, 331 , 349, 350; human right s policies, 147 , 187 , 195 ; military policies , 319 Greece, 25, 74, 246; civil war, 13 , 28, 36, 44 Grew, Joseph C , 4 0 Griffith, Willia m E. , 10 7 Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich , 136 , 16 8 Gronouski, John A. , 10 9

Index 41 7 Grosz, Karoly, 144 , 149 , 203, 292 Gysi, Gregor, 210 , 34 2 Haig, Alexander, 141 ; and Polis h crisis , 134, 135 , 136 , 137 , 139 , 252-5 8 Hallstein Doctrine , 111 , 315, 330, 331, 332 Hammarskjold, Dag , 10 0 Harkin amendment , 17 7 Harriman, W . Averell, 12 , 13 , 16, 25, 23 2 Havel, Vaclav, 213, 214, 218, 34 7 Helms, Richard, 114 , 34 4 Helsinki Commission . See Commission o n Security an d Cooperatio n i n Europ e Helsinki Fina l Ac t (1975) , 55, 123 , 124 , 133, 142 , 148 , 151 , 168-71, 174 , 189 , 308-10, 342 . See also Conferenc e o n Security an d Cooperatio n i n Europ e Herrnstadt, Rudolf , 6 2 Hitler-Stalin pact . See Molotov-Ribbentro p Pact (1939 ) Honecker, Erich , 121 , 209-10, 317 , 3 3 5 36, 34 0 Hoover, Herbert , Jr., 9 8 Hopkins, Harry , 1 7 Horn, Gyula , 216 , 27 4 House o f Representatives , 17 , 283-84 , 322 Hoyer, Steny , 18 6 Hull, Cordell , 12 , 1 3 Human rights , 25, 151 , 169; primacy of , 160, 170 , 181 , 189-90, 199 , 200. See also Arms control , an d huma n rights ; Censorship; Freedo m o f movement ; Hel sinki Fina l Ac t (1975) ; Jackson-Vani k amendment; Marxism , an d huma n rights; Minority rights ; Security inter ests, and huma n right s Hungarian Americans , 90 , 127 , 148 , 184 , 221 Hungarian minorities , 24, 87 , 183 , 184— 85, 192 , 204, 214, 215, 216, 32 3 Hungary, 5 , 4 1, 109; American assistanc e to, 222, 225-26, 292 ; economic assis tance to , 296, 298; economic policies , 103-4, 263 , 279; economic relations , 285, 286 , 287; economic relation s wit h Soviet Union , 112 ; economic relation s

with Unite d States , 148-49 , 283-284 ; economy, 261-62 , 2 6 4 - 6 7 ; foreig n re lations, 6 , 13 , 73, 207, 306; foreig n rela tions with Romania , 14 , 2 4 - 2 5; foreig n relations with Sovie t Union, 14 , 23, 321; foreign relation s wit h Unite d States , 10 , 106, 120 , 127-28 ; foreig n relation s with Yugoslavia , 85 ; and Germa n reuni fication, 345 , 347; government, 27 , 120 ; military policies , 320, 323, 324, 3 2 5 26, 327 ; New Cours e policy, 7 1 - 7 2 , 74 , 85; politica l reforms , 2 0 3 - 5 ; revolutio n (1956), 85-89 , 9 0 - 9 9 , 102 ; trade with , 242, 265-66, 276, 281 , 282; trade wit h Soviet Union, 272 , 273; trade wit h United States , 18 , 128 , 241, 254, 283, 284 Husak, Gustav , 212 , 213, 31 7

IBRD (Internationa l Ban k fo r Reconstruc tion an d Development) . See World Ban k Ideological warfare , 163-64 , 23 0 Ideology: American , 18 , 45, 157-58 , 1 6 1 62, 176 , 180-81 , 252 ; socialist, 1 7 8 79, 192 , 291, 311, 339; Soviet, 55, 143 , 177, 309-1 0 Iliescu, Ion , 216, 21 7 IMF. See International Monetar y Fun d Industrialization, 82 , 103 , 104, 231, 239, 246, 26 1 Insurgency, 4 3 - 4 5 . See also Dissidents ; Resistance movement s Intelligence, 233; American, 32 , 4 1, 42, 73, 79 , 95, 101 , 114; British, 14 , 4 1, 95; Israeli, 78; Romanian, 127 ; Soviet, 10 , 45; Wes t German , 39 , 110 , 114 , 336 ; Yugoslav, 75 . See also Espionage ; Cen tral Intelligenc e Agency ; Secre t Intelli gence Servic e International broadcasting , 172-73 , 179 , 188, 195 , 223; jamming of , 84 , 150 , 171, 197 . See also Radi o Fre e Europe ; Radio Liberty ; Voic e of Americ a International Monetar y Fun d (IMF) , 229, 259, 260 , 267, 278-80, 289 , 293-94 , 298, 299 , 30 1 Investments, 251, 255, 2 8 4 - 8 8, 289-90 , 297

418 Index Isolationism, 6 , 16 1 Israel, 118 , 127 , 183 . See also Sue z crisi s (1956) Italy, 24, 26, 29, 74, 167 , 231, 344 Jackson, C . D., 40, 5 9 - 6 0, 6 2 Jackson-Vanik amendment , 120 , 173—74, 252, 284, 302; and Eas t Germany , 148 ; and Hungary , 128 ; and Romania , 127 , 177, 182 , 184 , 186 ; and Sovie t Union , 177, 25 3 Jakes, Milos, 147 , 212, 32 0 Japan, 239 , 241, 252, 278, 287, 29 8 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 132 , 133 , 2 0 5 - 7, 260, 269 , 320; an d Solidarity , 134-35 , 137-38, 140 , 261; and Unite d States , 149-50, 151 , 258 JCS 1067 , 2 1 Jeszenszky, Geza , 326 , 35 7 Jewish emigration , 117 , 127 , 166 , 177 , 183, 25 2 Johnson, Lyndo n B. , 109, 11 5 Johnson administration , 108—109, 111, 112-14, 115 , 171-72 , 234 , 248-5 1 Kadar, Janos, 86 , 88, 89, 112 , 120 , 204, 247 Kaifu, Toshiki , 29 8 Kampelman, Ma x M. , 187 , 19 9 Kania, Stanislaw, 130 , 132 , 13 5 Katzenbach, Nicholas , 17 2 Kemenes, Erno, 24 1 Kennan, George , 17 , 25, 27, 104 , 162 , 361; an d containmen t policy , 23, 58, 154; an d Czechoslovakia , 130 ; and Ger many, 2 1, 30, 314; a s Policy Plannin g Staff head , 2 7 - 2 8 , 36 , 39, 40; an d spheres o f influence , 13 , 15, 24 Kennedy, John F. , 107- 8 Kennedy administration , 110-11 , 233—34 , 246, 247-4 8 Keogh, James, 12 3 Kersten, Charles , 6 3 Kersten amendment , 46 , 63 , 6 4 - 6 5, 17 3 Khrushchev, Nikita , 57 , 105-6 , 165 , 314; and de-Stalinization , 7 7 - 7 8 , 103 ; and East Germany , 109-11 , 308 ; and Hun garian revolution , 8 7 - 8 9 , 90 ; an d Po land, 82 . See also Tito, and Khrushche v

Kirkland, Lane , 131 , 132, 181 , 258 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 177 , 180 , 33 6 Kissinger, Henry, 116-17 , 181 , 311, 316, 331, 357 , 360; and CSCE , 167 , 168 , 174; an d differentiatio n policy , 118 , 124; an d linkag e diplomacy , 122 , 166 , 251, 252 ; and Yugoslavia , 12 5 Klaus, Vaclav, 27 5 Kohl, Helmut, 295 , 296, 297, 336, 351, 355; an d Germa n reunification , 269 , 339, 3 4 0 - 4 1 , 343 , 344, 347, 348, 349, 350 Korean War , 33 , 37, 38, 45, 46, 48, 80, 232, 23 3 Kornai, Janos, 26 1 Kossuth, Lajos , 16 1 Kovacs, Imre, 7 1 Krenz, Egon, 210, 34 0 Kryuchkov, Vladimir, 20 7 Kubiszewski, Krzystof , 34 6 Kuklinski, Ryszard , 131 , 139 Kulcsar, Kalman , 26 5 Kulikov, Viktor G. , 135 , 13 8 Labor Servic e Organizatio n (LSO) , 63-64 , 65 Lane, Arthur Bliss , 48, 6 3 Legitimacy: o f governments , 1 , 157 , 163, 199, 202, 216-17, 340 ; of Sovie t expan sion, 6 , 9, 26, 122 , 123 , 142, 167 , 251, 309-10,313 Lend-Lease program, 10 , 17 , 229 Leninism, 159-60 , 177 , 200, 202, 211, 311 Liberation policy , 44, 4 7 - 4 9, 5 0 - 5 1 , 5960, 6 2 - 6 5 ; failur e of , 67, 70 , 80 , 94 , 101-2, 106 ; revision of , 7 6 - 7 7 Ligachev, Yegor , 313, 358 Lindsay, Frank , 37 , 3 9 Linkage diplomacy , 120 , 166 , 191 , 251, 253, 315-16 , 3 3 2 - 3 3 . See also Arm s control, an d huma n rights ; Political liberalization, an d economi c aid ; Securit y interests, and huma n right s Litvinov, Maxim, 19 , 2 5 - 2 6 Lodge, Henry Cabot , 83-84 , 90 , 91, 99, 100 Lodge Act, 43, 64 London Informatio n Foru m (1989) , 19 7

Index 41 9 Luers, William H. , 126 , 306, 31 8 Lukacs, Gyorgy, 8 6 Lukanov, Andrei, 14 8 MacArthur, Douglas , 4 6 Macovescu, Gheorghe , 11 9 Madrid conference , 183 , 187-9 0 Malenkov, Georgi , 5 1 - 5 2, 55, 71 , 88 Mandelbaum, Michael , 29 0 Manescu, Corneliu , 21 5 Mansfield, Mike , 31 5 Marshall, Georg e C. , 22, 3 9 Marshall Plan , 26 , 2 8 - 2 9, 3 1 , 229, 230 , 233 Marxism, 310 ; abandonment of , 144 , 220 , 311, 325 ; and huma n rights , 158-60 , 200-203. See also Leninism ; Stalinis m Masaryk, Jan, 2 9 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 207 , 208, 270, 325, 344 MBFR. See Mutual an d balance d forc e re duction McCargar, James, 44, 9 2 - 9 3 McCarthy, Joseph, 46 , 7 8 Meyer, Cord , 40 , 66, 79 , 89 , 9 3 MFN. See Most favore d natio n Middle East , 85 , 116 , 127 , 301. See also Suez crisis (1956 ) Mihajlovic, Dragoljub , 1 4 Mikoyan, Anastas , 86 , 8 7 Mikulic, Branko, 28 9 Military disengagement , 154-55 , 304 , 314-15,258,359 Military intervention , 105 , 155 . See also Nonintervention Military interventio n (Soviet) : in Czecho slovakia, 112 , 113-15 , 165-66, 250 , 310, 312 , 323; in East Germany , 59 ; in Hungary, 86 , 87-89 , 98 , 112 , 305; in Poland, 81 , 8 2 - 8 4; threa t o f use , 1 3 1 34 Military power : American , 20 , 23, 34, 5 3 54, 96 , 142 ; German, 6 ; Soviet , 26 , 115 , 122, 142-43 , 243, 304, 305, 319, 3 2 0 22, 359 , 361, 36 2 Miller, J. Irvin , 248-4 9 Mills, Wilbur, 24 9 Mindszenty, Jozsef, 38 , 87, 89, 12 0

Minorities, 124-25 , 182 , 192 , 199 , 216, 218, 252 , 352. See also Germa n minori ties; Hungarian minorities ; Polish Amer icans; Turkish minoritie s Minority rights , 169 , 192 , 195 , 196 , 19 9 Mittag, Gunter , 26 8 Mitterrand, Francois , 298-99, 319 , 341; and Europea n unity , 297, 354, 355; an d German reunification , 346 ; and huma n rights, 187 ; and Poland , 29 4 Mladenov, Petar , 21 1 Modrow, Hans , 268, 340, 34 3 Moiseyev, Mikhail, 35 8 Moisi, Dominique, 35 3 Molotov, Vyacheslav , 16 , 22, 56—57, 30 7 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pac t (1939) , 8 , 9 , 1 2 Mondale, Walter, 181,25 0 Monnet, Jean, 2 1 Mosbacher, Robert , 24 2 Moscow summi t (1972) , 122-23 , 166 , 315-16 Most favore d natio n (MFN) , 249; an d China, 253 ; and Czechoslovakia , 284 ; and Hungary , 120 , 128 , 284, 295; an d Poland, 106 , 140 , 149 , 247, 248, 257, 259, 280 , 284; an d Romania , 108 , 120 , 140, 147 , 182 , 184-86 , 250 , 253, 254, 283; an d Sovie t Union, 252 ; an d Yugo slavia, 24 8 Moynihan, Danie l Patrick , 25 9 Muravchik, Joshua, 17 5 Murphy, Robert , 89 , 9 6 Muskie, Edmund, 13 1 Mutual an d balance d forc e reductio n (MBFR), 123 , 133, 309, 315-17, 318 , 320, 32 1 Mutual Securit y acts , 46, 63 , 6 4 - 6 5, 78 , 81,246 Nagy, Imre , 71, 85, 86, 8 7 - 8 9, 92 , 20 4 Nalen, Craig , 28 4 National Committe e fo r a Free Europe, 4 0 National Endowmen t fo r Democrac y (NED), 140 , 181-82 , 221 , 222, 2 2 6 - 2 7 Nationalism, 1-2 , 108 , 143 , 352, 359 , 361; German , 209 , 3 3 6 - 3 8, 341 , 348; Yugoslav, 214, 218-19 . See also Self determination

420 Index National Securit y Counci l (NSC) , 35, 36, 37, 74 , 97, 105 , 125 ; Planning Board , 79, 84 , 9 0 - 9 1, 95 ; Special Coordinatio n Committee, 13 1 NATO. See North Atlanti c Treaty Organi zation NED. See National Endowmen t fo r De mocracy Nemeth, Miklos , 2 0 4 - 5, 265, 324, 34 0 Neutral an d nonaligne d countrie s (NNa) , 187, 188 , 191 , 192, 19 5 Neutrality, 308 , 356; and Austria , 57, 96 ; and Germa n reunification , 35 , 54, 307, 338, 343 , 346-47; an d Hungary , 88 , 9 5 New Cours e policy, 6 9 - 7 2 , 8 5 New York Times, 78 , 90, 145 , 260, 34 6 Nitze, Paul, 34, 4 6 Nixon, Richard , 106 , 118 , 119 , 164 , 16 6 Nixon administration , 118 , 251—52; an d human rights , 117 , 166 , 167 , 252, 253; and securit y interests , 116-17 , 122-23 , 308,316 NNa. See Neutral an d nonaligne d coun tries Noninterference, 123 , 167 ; by Sovie t Union, 112 , 116 , 144 , 153 ; by Unite d States, 90, 95-96, 112-1 3 Nonintervention, 118 , 167 , 168 , 308, 311; by Soviet Union, 86 , 113-14 , 133 ; by United States , 84, 87, 102 , 136 . See also Military interventio n North Atlanti c Treaty Organizatio n (NATO), 69, 111 , 112, 113 , 363; and arms control, 130 , 151 , 315, 316-17 , 318-22, 326 , 327, 361-62; an d Czec h invasion, 112 , 113 ; and East-Wes t trade , 239, 294 ; and France , 234, 3 0 4 - 5, an d German reunification , 122 , 342, 343, 344, 345 , 346-47, 348 , 349, 357; an d human rights , 96, 166 , 195 , 196 ; an d Poland, 133 , 136, 259; strategies of , 54 , 304, 306, 318, 319, 3 2 7 - 2 8, 359 . 361; and Wes t Germany , 31 , 35, 307, 308, 330, 33 7 Novak, Michael , 19 3 Novotny, Antonin , 11 1 NSC. See National Securit y Counci l NSC 7, 3 2 NSC 20/1 , 3 2

NSC 58 , 32, 34, 39, 6 7 NSC 68/2 , 33, 34, 3 9 NSC 74 , 4 4 NSC 143/2 , 6 4 NSC 158 , 6 7 NSC 162/2 , 58 NSC 174 , 67-69,16, 7 9 , 9 7 NSC 5412, 7 2 - 7 3 NSC 5505/1 , 7 9 NSC 5602/1, 79 NSC 5616 , 91,9 5 NSDD 54 , 14 1 NSDM212, 11 8 Nuclear war , 38 , 96, 9 9 Nuclear weapons , 22 , 319, 320; contro l of, 111 , 223, 308; and Sovie t Union, 33, 54; an d Unite d States , 20, 34, 32 2 Nunn, Sam , 31 9 Nyers, Rezso, 32 1 OCB. See Operations Coordinatin g Boar d OECD. See Organization fo r Economi c Cooperation an d Developmen t Office o f Polic y Coordinatio n (OPC) , 39, 43, 4 4 - 4 5 , 7 2 Office o f Strategi c Services (OSS) , 10-1 1 Olechowski, Tadeusz , 15 1 OPC. See Office o f Policy Coordinatio n Operation FOCUS , 71-7 2 Operation Prospero , 6 9 Operation Re d Sox/Re d Cap , 79-80 , 92 , 105 Operations Coordinatin g Boar d (OCB) , 68-69, 76 , 7 7 Operation Splinte r Factor , 4 2 Operation Sunrise , 10-1 1 Operation Valuable , 4 4 - 4 5 Operation VETO , 7 0 Organization fo r Economi c Cooperatio n and Developmen t (OECD) , 275, 276, 278, 286 , 295, 296, 298, 299-300, 354 , 363 OSS. See Office o f Strategi c Service s Ottawa conferenc e (1985) , 191-9 2 Palme, Olof, 31 7 Palmer, Mark, 148 , 185 , 287, 29 2 Paye, Jean-Claude, 30 0

Index 42 1 Peaceful coexistence , 52, 58, 75, 76, 77 , 116,117,123,312-13 Peaceful engagement , 104 , 105-9 , 111, 116,119,154-55,165 Pell, Claiborne, 17 4 Pentagon. See Defense Departmen t Percentage agreemen t (1944) , 1 3 Percy, Charles , 13 2 Perestroika, 143 , 144-45, 223, 270, 272 , 293, 297 , 336, 340, 35 8 Perle, Richard, 235 , 33 6 Poland, 5 ; American assistanc e to , 129 , 131, 136 , 138 , 152 , 153-54 , 165 , 176 , 222, 247, 2 5 6 - 5 8, 292-96 ; crisi s (1980-1981), 130-38 , 316; economi c policies, 103 , 119 , 129 , 150 , 205, 207, 269-72; economi c relations , 285, 286, 298; economi c relation s with Sovie t Union, 137 ; economic relation s wit h United States , 18 , 119-20 , 136 , 1 4 9 51; economy , 128 , 254—56; foreign rela tions with Sovie t Union, 16 , 20, 26 , 324-25; foreig n relation s with Unite d States, 15-16 , 84 , 106 , 131 , 140, 149 ; foreign relation s wit h Wes t Germany , 337, 347 ; and Germa n reunification , 344, 345 , 346; government, 6 , 27, 82 , 108-9, 128-29 ; martia l la w (1981) , 131, 132 , 135 , 136 , 137 , 138 , 140 , 188 ; political reforms , 206—8 ; revolution (1956), 81-84 ; trad e with , 294 ; trad e with Unite d States , 2 5 7 - 6 1, 280 , 283, 284; Warsaw uprisin g (1944) , 8 , 1 2 - 1 3 ; West Europea n assistanc e to , 13 6 Polansky, Sol , 14 8 Polish America n Congress , 106 , 149 , 15 0 Polish Americans , 11 , 48, 83, 84 Political liberalization , 104 , 115 , 120 , 141, 142, 145 , 2 0 1 - 2, 302 , 311, 336, 353, 355; an d economi c aid , 147 , 149 , 246, 2 6 0 - 6 1 , 27 6 Political pluralism , 151-52 , 198 , 199 , 203, 2 2 0 - 2 1 , 268 , 272, 310-1 1 Political prisoners , 89 , 106 , 148 , 179 , 213, 259, 26 0 Potsdam Conferenc e (1945) , 2 0 - 2 1, 2 4 Potsdam conferenc e (1988) , 29 2 Power, 8 , 24, 68. See also Economi c power; Militar y powe r

Pozsgay, Imre , 20 4 Pravda, 115 , 131 , 133 Propaganda (American) , 39—43, 57, 66— 67, 79 , 80 ; and Eas t Germany , 6 0 - 6 1 ; and Hungary , 93-94 , 99 , 100 ; and Po land, 131 , 132, 140 ; role of , 6 0 - 6 1 , 69 ; and Sovie t Union, 10 , 3 1. See also Radi o Free Europe; Radi o i n the American Sec tor; Radi o Liberty ; Voic e of Americ a Propaganda (Soviet) , 66, 112 , 131 , 137, 189,231,305 Proxmire-Lausche initiativ e (1962) , 165 , 248 Psychological Strateg y Board , 4 1 , 60, 6 7 Psychological warfare , 230 ; effectivenes s of, 6 6 - 6 7 , 105 , 110 ; under Eisenhower , 5 9 - 6 1 , 64 , 84 , 101-2 ; objective s of , 6 0 - 6 1 , 67 , 70, 163 ; under Truman , 3 2 34, 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 3 - 4 5 , 4 6 Public opinion, 356 ; American, 15-16 , 18 , 19, 22, 26, 3 1, 63, 296, 341-42; Eas t European, 201 , 289, 346; German, 339 , 341, 362 ; Soviet, 312 , 345; West Euro pean, 13 6 PUWP (Polis h Unite d Workers ' party). See Communist part y (Poland ) Quadripartite Agreemen t (1971) , 12 2 Radio Fre e Europe (RFE) , 40, 4 1, 66, 123 , 163, 172 , 2 2 2 - 2 3, 333; and Czechoslo vakia, 69-70 , 213 ; and de-Stalinization , 79, 80 ; funding, 125 , 171-72 , 173 ; and Hungary, 7 1 - 7 2 , 9 3 - 9 4 , 204 ; an d Po land, 7 0 - 7 1 , 81 , 83, 130, 131 , 132, 150, 20 7 Radio i n the American Secto r (RIAS) , 40, 61 Radio Liberty , 40, 66, 123 , 172 , 222, 33 3 Radkiewicz, Stanislaw , 7 1 Rajk, Laszlo , 42, 43, 85 Rakosi, Matyas, 19 , 71, 85 Rakowski, Mieczyslaw , 144 , 20 8 Ramparts (magazine) , 17 1 Rapacki, Adam, 31 4 Reagan, Ronald , 155 , 156 , 180 , 186 , 33 6 Reagan administration , 142 ; and arm s control, 309 , 318-19; an d huma n rights, 141 , 142, 145-47 , 180-82 , 186 ,

422 Index Reagan administratio n {Continued) 190-91, 194-96 , 197-98 ; an d Polis h crisis, 134 , 135-36 , 137,138-40 , 2 5 8 61; an d Romania , 182-86 ; trad e poli cies, 235-39, 242 , 257-59, 283-8 4 Refugees, 187 , 210; American recruitmen t of, 40 , 72; assistance for , 30 , 42, 65, 99 ; East German , 20 , 110 , 210, 268, 340, 342; Hungarian, 89 , 93, 94, 99, 215; military recruitmen t of , 43 , 4 4 - 4 5, 46 , 6 3 - 6 5 , 79-8 0 Reinhold, Otto , 33 9 Resistance movements , 8 , 36, 4 1, 79; American assistanc e for , 28 , 4 3 - 4 5, 4 8 Reuter, Ernst , 6 0 RFE. See Radio Fre e Europ e RIAS. See Radio i n the American Secto r Ridgway, Rozann e L. , 28 3 Rogers, William P. , 119 , 12 0 Rokossovsky, Konstantin , 82-8 3 Rollback (policy) , 5 1 - 5 2, 5 8 - 5 9 , 74 , 92, 95-96, 100 , 10 5 Romania: America n assistanc e to , 177 , 222; cou p (1989) , 2 1 5 - 1 7; economi c policies, 261, 262; economic relations , 249, 279 , 294, 298; economic relation s with Unite d States , 108 , 182-86 ; for eign policies, 104 , 109 , 149 , 250, 3 2 3 24; foreig n relations , 6 , 73 , 127, 130 , 147; foreig n relation s with China , 119 ; foreign relation s with Sovie t Union, 8 , 10, 13 , 14, 114 , 305; foreign relation s with Unite d States , 106 , 118-19 , 141 , 177, 227; foreig n relation s with Wes t Germany, 111 , 183-84, 337 ; govern ment, 170 , 2 1 4 - 1 5; huma n right s abuses in , 87 , 182-84 , 188 , 192 , 195 , 196, 197 , 198 , 204; revolution (1989) , 155; trade with, 275 , 281, 282; trad e with Unite d States , 119 , 249-50, 2 5 3 54, 28 3 Roosevelt, Frankli n D. , 6, 9, 15-16 , 3 1, 161; an d Stalin , 11 , 13, 14, 1 6 Rostow, Walt, 2 1 , 107,113, 31 3 Rush, Kenneth , 118,25 1 Rusk, Dean , 108-9 , 113 , 114 , 115 , 165, 249 Ryzhkov, Nikolai , 27 4

SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitatio n Talk s Sanctions. See Trade sanction s Schifter, Richard , 160 , 178 , 191 , 192, 19 6 Schmidt, Helmut , 140 , 333, 33 6 Scientific cooperation , 273-7 4 Scowcroft, Brent , 293-94, 295 , 32 6 Secret Intelligence Servic e (SIS) , 4 1, 43, 45 Security interests , 123 , 142, 230, 243, 302; American, 26, 27, 28, 3 1, 6 7 - 6 8, 8 4 85, 125 , 164 , 236, 259, 291; East Euro pean, 152 , 313; European, 111 , 122, 308-10, 317 , 331, 350-52, 358 , 3 6 162; German , 304 , 332, 344; an d huma n rights, 117 , 167 , 169 , 186-87 , 319 ; Soviet, 9, 11 , 2 6 - 2 7, 5 4 - 5 5 , 77 , 117,139 , 311-12, 313 ; West European , 5 3 - 5 4 , 56, 304 , 305-6, 357 . See also Collectiv e security; Military powe r Self-determination, 5 , 27, 107 , 165 , 2 1 8 19, 325, 329, 348; of Eas t Germany , 204, 314, 330, 331; and huma n rights , 160-62, 163 , 167, 185 , 220. See also Nationalism; Sovereignt y Self-sufficiency, economic , 231, 240, 281, 359 Senate, 30, 63, 293; and huma n rights , 133, 151 , 160, 168 , 172 , 17 6 Senate Foreign Relation s Committee , 5 1, 180 Serov, Ivan, 8 8 Sherer, Albert W., Jr., 179-8 0 Shevardnadze, Eduard , 209 , 240, 312 , 313,318,321,343,344,361 Shultz, George, 146 , 147 , 151 , 189, 190 , 196, 29 0 Shtemenko, Sergei, 31 0 Sikorski, Wladyslaw, 1 2 Simon, Paul , 29 6 Simons, Thomas W. , Jr., 18 5 SIS. See Secret Intelligenc e Servic e Skubiszewski, Krzysztof , 32 4 Slovakia, 6 , 214, 21 8 Smith, Walter Bedell , 2 3 Solidarity (trad e union), 125 , 137-39 , 149, 150 , 152 , 188 , 206, 208; bannin g of, 104 , 140 ; and elections , 207, 261; legal statu s of , 131 , 134-35; an d Unite d States, 132 , 182 , 221, 222, 295-96

Index 42 3 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut , 124 , 17 0 Soros, George, 148 , 22 1 Sovereignty, 9 , 118 , 167 , 218, 308, 324 ; American view s on, 117 , 118 , 142 , 163, 171; Sovie t views on, 77, 115 , 153, 163-64, 309-10 . See also Sphere s o f in fluence Soviet Union, 358-59 ; America n assis tance to, 10 , 17 , 2 2 8 - 2 9; economi c policies, 263, 281; economy, 142-43 ; fea r of German y by , 22, 117 , 3 4 4 - 4 5; for eign policies, 15 , 143-44, 312 , 338, 355; an d Germa n reunification , 35 , 54, 56, 339 , 341, 342, 349; military poli cies, 78, 115 , 143 , 233, 235, 3 0 8 - 9 , 314-15, 3 2 6 - 2 7 ; objective s of , 7 - 9 , 22 , 32, 3 1 4 - 1 5 ; revolutio n (1917) , 7, 329; secret service s of, 10 , 42; successio n struggles in , 50, 5 1, 57, 77; trad e poli cies, 126 , 281; trade with, 228 , 230, 242; trade with Easter n Europe , 229, 272-74; trad e with Unite d States , 240, 258; West Germa n assistanc e to , 302 . See also Sovie t an d Sovie t Union unde r specific subjects , e.g. , Militar y power , Soviet; Czechoslovakia , foreig n relation s with Sovie t Unio n Special Forces (American) , 43, 73 Spheres of influence , 13 , 115, 311, 361 Spheres of influenc e (Soviet) , 8-9, 22 , 3 2 24, 2 9 - 3 0, 359 ; recognition of , 11 , 1 4 15, 19 , 123, 124; American respons e to , 15, 17 , 3 2 - 3 5, 44, 6 7 - 6 9 , 108 , 144 , 146. See also Legitimacy , o f Sovie t ex pansion Stalin, Josef, 10 , 18 , 22, 31, 33, 5 1, 144, 233, 328 , 330. See also Roosevelt , Franklin D. , and Stalin ; Tito, and Stali n Stalinism, 27 , 162 , 201, 229-30, 231 ; and de-Stalinization, 55 , 75, 7 7 - 8 1, 103-4 , 164 Stassen, Harold, 73 , 232 State Department, 15 , 113 , 182, 344; an d Hungary, 92 , 9 7 - 9 8, 141 ; monitoring human right s by , 177-78 , 180-81 , 183 , 184, 185 , 190, 217, 316; an d Poland , 135-36, 139-40 , 2 5 7 - 5 8 , 295 ; Policy Planning Council , 108 , 248; Policy Plan -

ning Staff, 30—31 , 32, 109 ; and securit y interests, 9, 16-17 , 33 ; and trad e poli cies, 248, 249, 25 3 Stettinius, Edward R. , 1 4 Stevenson, Adlai , 4 8 Stevenson amendment , 25 2 Strategic Arms Limitatio n Talk s (SALT) , 113, 119 , 122 , 130 , 136 , 176 , 17 7 Suez crisis (1956) , 85, 87, 88, 89, 9 1, 9 4 95, 9 6 - 9 7 , 99-100 , 10 2 Suslov, Mikhail, 86 , 87, 13 5 Swiatlo, Joszef, 4 1, 42, 7 0 Taft, Robert , 4 7 Technology transfer , 122 , 129 , 133 , 235, 237-38, 2 4 0 - 4 3 , 285, 334-3 5 Teheran conferenc e (1943) , 11 , 12 Territorial claims , 14 , 2 4 - 2 5, 74 , 184-85 . See also Border s Thatcher, Margaret , 187 , 294, 349, 35 3 Thompson, Llewellyn , 113 , 11 9 Tito, 14 , 24, 26,128, 177 ; and Khru shchev, 75 , 78, 87, 88, 98; and Stalin , 32, 3 5 - 3 6 , 42 , 24 7 Titoism, 7 6 - 7 7 , 83 , 94, 109 , 218, 245, 248 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 7 Totu, Ion , 19 6 Trade Ac t (1974) , 120 , 173 , 183, 252 Trade sanctions , 7 3 - 7 4, 133 , 139-40 , 215, 236, 239, 301, 302; suspension of , 136, 149 . See also Expor t control s Trade unions , 130 , 139 , 189 . See also AFL-CIO, Solidarity (trad e union ) Transylvania, 14 , 24, 184-85 , 20 4 Treaty o f Rig a (1921) , 1 2 Trieste, 24, 74, 24 6 Truman, Harry , 16-17 , 24 , 25, 39, 4 4 Truman administration , 22 , 28, 38, 4 6 49, 24 4 Truman Doctrine , 16 3 Turkish minorities , 148 , 192 , 198 , 211, 212 Turkey, 28, 74, 24 6 Turner, Stansfield , 25 7 Ulbricht, Walter, 8 , 35, 60, 62, 110 , 112 , 121

424 Index United Nations , 301 , 308; and huma n rights, 160 , 162-63 , 215; and Hungary , 88, 90, 91, 9 9 - 1 0 1, 106 , 164 ; member ship, 73, 163; and Sovie t Union, 46 , 105, 115 , 130 , 133 , 320; an d Yugosla via, 3 7 - 3 8. See also Universa l Declara tion o f Huma n Right s United States : cultural relation s with East ern Europe , 106-7 , 148 , 190 ; cultura l relations with Sovie t Union, 113 ; economic assistanc e by , 17-18 , 2 7 - 2 8 , 291—96; economic interest s of , 26 , 162 ; economic leverag e by , 104 , 108 , 129 , 133, 134 , 139-40 , 154 ; economic rela tions with Easter n Europe , 107-8 , 129 ; foreign policies , 58, 104-7 , 125-26 , 142, 172 , 180-81 , 351 , 363; foreign re lations with Easter n Europe , 14—15, 38-39, 118 , 124 , 146-47 , 156 ; foreig n relations with Sovie t Union, 9—13 , 14, 15-16, 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 5 - 2 6 , 30 , 122-23 , 166; interdepartmental quarrels , 139— 40, 149 , 238, 242, 2 5 7 - 5 8; objective s of, 32 , 35, 4 0 - 4 1, 6 0 - 6 1 , 68 , 97, 151, 180; postwar policies , 2 1 - 2 5, 161 ; recognition o f Eas t German y by , 77, 118 , 120; recognition o f government s by , 6 , 20, 24, 44; response t o Czec h invasion , 113-14, 115 , 116 , 165 , 175-76 ; re sponse t o de-Stalinization , 7 8 - 8 1 ; re sponse t o Eas t Germa n uprising , 5 9 - 6 1 ; response t o Hungaria n revolution , 8 9 99; respons e t o perestroika, 145—47 , 293; respons e t o Polis h crisis , 125 , 1 3 0 31, 132-34 , 135-36 , 137 , 138-40 , 238, 258—59 ; response t o Polis h revolu tion, 8 3 - 8 5 , 90, 97; trade policies , 1 7 3 74, 230, 232, 242-44, 248 ; trade wit h Eastern Europe , 26, 2 3 2 - 3 3, 234, 240 , 250-52, 293 ; trade wit h Sovie t Union , 22, 117 , 136 , 238-39, 257-58 . See also American an d Unite d State s under spe cific subjects, e.g. , Intelligence , Ameri can; Hungary , foreig n relation s wit h United State s United State s Information Agenc y (USIA) , 80, 190 , 22 2 Universal Declaratio n o f Huma n Rights , 160, 168 , 169 , 17 1

USIA. See United State s Informatio n Agency USSR. See Soviet Unio n Valyi, Peter, 12 0 Vance, Cyrus, 128 , 17 6 Vandenberg, Arthu r H. , 2 2 Vandenberg resolution , 30 , 4 5 Vargo, Franklin J., 291-9 2 Verity, William, 29 2 Vest, George S. , 12 6 Vienna conferenc e (1986) , 146 , 193-97 , 216,260,316,321 Vietnam War , 109 , 116 , 122 , 246, 25 1 Voice of Americ a (VOA) , 72, 80, 131, 132, 163 , 224 Volunteer Freedo m Corp s (VFC) , 6 4 - 6 5 Wailes, Edward T. , 92 , 9 8 Walesa, Lech , 134 , 135 , 138, 206, 207 , 208, 261 , 270; and Unite d States , 150 , 260, 29 6 Warsaw Pact , 122 , 138 , 141, 249, 306 , 323-26, 352 , 357; and arm s control , 215, 316-17 , 319 , 321; and Germa n question, 121 , 345; human right s stanc e of, 173,188 , 1 9 1 - 9 2 , 1 9 3 , 1 9 4 , 1 9 5 , 197-99; membership , 304 , 305; military interventio n by , 87 , 112 , 119 , 133, 207, 250 , 305; military powe r of , 320 , 327; strategie s of , 114-15 , 139 , 168 ; and Unite d Nations , 13 0 Warsaw Treat y (1955) , 57, $6, 116 , 304, 307 Weinberger, Caspar , 25 8 Western Europe , 116 ; integration of , 29 , 30, 5 2 - 5 3 , 156 , 301, 303, 3 6 2 - 6 3; trade policies, 232—33 West Germany , 3 1 ; and detente , 120 , 121, 133, 140 , 331-32, 336 ; economic assis tance by , 296-97, 298 , 301, 302, 3 3 2 33, 340 , 349; economic relation s wit h Eastern Europe , 286, 287, 296-97 , 300-301, 333 ; foreign policies , 3 3 0 - 3 1 , 332; foreig n relation s wit h Easter n Eu rope, 121 , 338; foreign relation s wit h Soviet Union, 77, 114 , 133 ; human rights policies, 178 , 183 , 188, 193 , 276, 347; Ostpolitik, 111 , 121, 123, 147,

Index 42 5 234, 276, 331-34, 339 ; rearmament by , 31, 34 , 35, 52 , 54; trade with , 231 , 276. See also West German y unde r specifi c subjects, e.g . Romania , foreig n relation s with Wes t German y Wheeler, Earl , 8 4 Whitehead, John C , 146-48 , 149 , 150 , 239, 29 2 Wilcek, Mieczyslaw , 20 1 Wiley, Alexander, 6 3 Wilson, Charles , 5 8 Wilson, Woodrow, 5 , 16 1 Wisner, Frank , 39 , 44, 50, 52; and de-Stal inization, 78 , 79, 80; and Hungaria n revolution, 92 , 93; as head o f Offic e o f Policy Coordination , 7 2 World Bank , 229 , 278-79, 284 , 29 3 World Wa r I , 5-6, 12 , 161 , 329 World Wa r II , 6-7, 18-19 , 2 1 , 24, 3 2 9 30; treaties , 11 , 14, 25, 161-62 , 163 , 184-85 Wyszynski, Stefan , 8 3

Yalta Conferenc e (1945) , 8 , 10 , 14-15 , 16, 18 , 19 , 115 , 142 , 145 , 151 , 161 ; repudiation of , 47 , 48, 5 1 Yugoslavia, 289 ; American economi c assistance to , 74, 165 , 177 , 232, 2 4 5 - 4 7 ; American militar y assistanc e to , 3 6 - 3 8 , 128, 245—46; economic assistanc e to , 36; economi c relation s wit h Unite d States, 18 , 78; economy, 263 , 279; for eign relations , 25, 7 4 - 7 5, 109 ; foreig n relations wit h Sovie t Union, 13 , 32, 78; foreign relation s wit h Unite d States , 24, 98, 125 , 128 ; government, 6 , 16 , 24, 26, 217-18; an d Hungaria n revolution , 88 , 96; militar y policies , 7 4 - 7 5; respons e t o Afghanistan invasion , 130 ; trade with , 276, 280 . See also Titois m Zaisser, Wilhelm , 6 2 Zhdanov, Andrei , 2 9 Zhivkov, Todor , 198,21 1 Zimmerman, Warren , 194 , 19 6